


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The Craft Sinister

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
“The Iron Ration”

(LA DÉTRESSE ALLEMANDE)

“From Berlin to Bagdad”

“The Craft Sinister”

Harper & Brothers, New York
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CALIFORNIA

THE CRAFT SINISTER

A Diplomatico-Political History of the Great War
and its Causes — Diplomacy and International
Politics and Diplomats as Seen at Close
Range by an American Newspaperman
who served in Central Europe as War
and Political Correspondent.

By

GEORGE ABEL SCHREINER

Author of

“The Iron Ration”

(*LA DÉTRESSE ALLEMANDE*)

“From Berlin to Bagdad,” etc.



G. ALBERT GEYER
Publisher
New York City

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ABSTRACTS

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THE CRAFT SINISTER

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To my dear friends

Frieda and John A. Bullinger

**Tu regere imperio populos Romano, memento.
Hae tibi erunt artes; pasisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.**

—Virgil.

INTRODUCTION

I AGREE with the reader that it seems nonsensical to add an "Introduction" to a book, which already has a "Preface." But in this case something had to be added, and if I have taken recourse to the word "Introduction" it is for no other reason than that this word seemed as good as any other.

This manuscript has been making the rounds of publishing houses for a year now. The "Preface" was pre-dated to May 1, 1919. In reality the book was completed two months before that, and represented then the labor of about eight months, not counting three years of work in Central Europe and another year in the United States—time devoted to the study of the subject and the experience that had to be gained.

The publishers who had the manuscript were afraid to publish it. One of them had indeed accepted the book and went so far as to place it among his "Announcements" to the book trade. But something went wrong. Another publisher was torn by his emotions for the space of weeks and finally admitted that it would be "too dangerous for his firm" to publish the book. The man feared the High and Mighty in Washington, and well he might. He was of the opinion that there was involved a public duty, and that he should meet it.

"But," he said, "if I get into trouble the public won't thank me."

For the man in question I will say that I fully sympathize with him. A few might feel different about it, in case the Most Honorable Burleson denied the mails of the United States to him, but the dear public, that great mass of people which is swayed only by the passions of the day, would, in its fervor to please the Powerful, do little better than boycott his books besides.

But it seems wholly useless to go into further details of this sort. Publishing is a business, not a mission, and wise indeed the publisher who keeps this in mind. For not to keep it in mind means that he will not be a publisher for long.

I have, then, no quarrel with any publisher. In fact, I sympathize with all of them. On the other hand, I must state here what has been stated, if for no other reason, then for the one that here

and there the reader will find that I speak of things and conditions that seem a little anterior now. True enough, I might have changed the text in all such cases, but that could not have been done without interfering seriously with the general aspect of the book and the statements it contains. Recent events have somewhat modified this general aspect—as the public is pleased to believe. That change, however, is merely an apparent one. It is not real in any sense of the word. The fact of today should remain that same fact even tomorrow, and he who views in the light of a subsequent condition the event of yesterday may write an interesting book but not a true one.

I wish to state in this connection that most of the facts concerning United States diplomatic representatives mentioned in this book are now before the Congress of the United States in the form of a Report, dated October 4, 1919, which Report was necessitated by the conduct toward me of the State Department of the United States, which, for the purpose of protecting the incompetents it had on diplomatic post in Central Europe, caused my virtual internment and "black-listing" at home.

Of course, the Congress has taken no action as yet. But the State Department has. For the purpose of "shutting up" so disagreeable a person, Mr. Lansing, himself, ultimately and personally caused that a passport was issued me, without many of the usual requirements being exacted of me. The State Department felt that in August of 1919 the world was too interested in other troubles than to give attention to things that had taken place almost three years before. It also expected that I would take the passport in lieu of the damages I claimed. In fact it was mistaken. For the Congress I must say, however, that it is still too much occupied with justifying and vindicating its suicidal conduct during the War years to find time for something which would be more honest: A sweeping investigation of the State Department, its diplomatic chiefs and secretaries and its inexplicable un-American policies.

I further wish to mention that I have called upon the State Department to defend itself against my charges—to no avail. For a while that was being considered, but, unfortunately for the State Department, nothing could be found that would serve as a pretext to have me brought in contact with the War Acts of our most complacent Congress. After all it would not do to have a person incarcerated and then run the chance of having his trial on a trumped-up accusation bring out that he for weeks was the real representative of the State Department at Vienna and other points and as such

prevented the summary dismissal of two ambassadors of the United States and one diplomatic agent. No doubt, that would have been very embarrassing, especially if in connection with that it would have developed that one of these ambassadors was for months, aye, even years, little more than the agent in a Central European state of the Entente governments and conducted his great office of trust accordingly. I repeat, that all this would have been most embarrassing. To that alone I owe the freedom of movement which I have had in the last two years.

Naturally, the good men in the State Department are averse to having their acts reviewed for the purpose of showing that diplomacy is a "Craft Sinister." They regard the man in the street as the "Layman," who has no right to question the conduct of the Sacerdotalists of Cypher and Code, the High Priests of the Temple of National Avarice, the Sacrificers at the Altar of Blood and Famine. Diplomacy is a Cult. Some look upon it as a necessity. If the latter conclusion were correct we would have to assume that mankind can manage its affairs best by being deceitful. For, in the words of a man who at least in South Africa is immortal: All diplomatists are liars. The sooner the public places those of its affairs now styled "diplomatic" into the realm of decent transactions between national units, the sooner will we come to a period in which wars will be few and far between. And that, naturally, applies to United States diplomacy and diplomatists as much as to any other, more so in fact.

With the proper men in Central Europe the government of the United States could have brought the Great War to a close as early as 1916, and again in April of 1917. The citizen here and elsewhere would then have been spared many of the hardships that have come his way. Public debts would be smaller. The world, instead of continuing to tear down for another three years (and the end of that is not yet in sight) would have started to build up again. We would not then have been obliged to see everywhere the fatuous endeavor of the radical who believes that the fine theories of the Socialist philosopher are in reality applicable in a world where any two men hold three opinions, each their own, and one for their community of two.

In a few years from now mankind will have returned to that much despised socio-political and socio-economic system at which our ancestors labored so long without finding at all the road to Utopia. From that moment on the old abuses are bound to rear their heads again, and, if nothing is done to check them, our posterity will find that, after all, the Great War was as unproductive of good

lessons as the Thirty Years' War or the Convulsions of the Corsican ward politician known as Napoleon Bonaparte. There is at least one good lesson we should take to heart and that is expressed in the words: Curb diplomacy, and if at all possible abolish it.

By the way, what has become of "open diplomacy"? Has the Wilson administration practiced it in the least? Now, as before, the public learns only of the diplomatic *fait accompli*. Of the bartering done and the obligations assumed it knows nothing, and will know nothing so long as it does not insist upon being a full-fledged partner to the deals made in regard to its substance and future weal.

To this I will add what was formerly an author's note.

The might-have-beens of history are like so many eggs that have been scrambled in the making of an omelette—which human endeavor will never restore to the primary place they had in nature—the state of being hatchable. In the course of human events regret is of as little value as the cackling of the hen that sees her eggs broken on the rim of the skillet.

The purpose of this book, then, must be sought in another direction. That purpose is threefold. It is the writer's intention to bring to the notice of the public everywhere the dangers of diplomacy, as the "art of negotiation" has been practiced hitherto and recently; to point out to the public of the United States in what respects its own diplomacy was found wanting and defective, and, thirdly, to correct a good many false impressions that have been fostered during the Great War and before.

Some of the chapters of this book go into the *modus operandi* of "the craft sinister," and depict its results, while others go more deeply into the nature and methods of diplomatists. Much attention is also given the handmaiden of diplomacy—the press. What censorship was and what it strove to do is made clear—astoundingly clear, I venture to think. A persistent combat on my part with censorship, for three years in warring Europe and two in the warring United States, has put me in position to thoroughly "spotlight" its practices and motives. When left untrammelled the press does well enough, despite the assertions of the chronic uplifter; it becomes the great scourge of man with the moment it passes under control.

To draw an accurate and clear picture of diplomacy—the craft sinister—was not possible without removing much of the obscurantism in which government everywhere veils itself, so that the governed may be the more easily led to subscribe to the theory of governmental infallibility. The government which must admit that it can err, and which

must make that admission in times of stress, does not remain a government *de facto* for long thereafter. On the other hand, the public which permits its government to arrogate unto the theory of infallibility, a "divine right" in fact, will not thereafter be far from disaster. It is best in life—in all its phases and departments—to look at things as they are, not as we wish them to be.

The term *diplomacy* covers for my purpose the international activity of statesman and envoy alike, and the reader will find that all diplomatic contact in this book is hostile—of sinister mien. This is due to the fact that I deal here only with the political moves and countermoves directly related to, or responsible for, the Great War. It will be noticed that the book hardly admits that diplomacy is other than bad—vile and vicious, and the question will be asked: How can that be? No doubt, there was a certain amount of decency and fair play in the deals made between members of the same group—Triple Entente and Triple Alliance, but there was no such thing at any time between the groups themselves.

In weighing acts and conduct of governments, I have kept in mind that nothing is harder to keep in focus than international relations, a thing that has as many angles and aspects as its constituents have moods and desires. A strictly impartial attitude has been observed in that respect. Contrary to general practice during the Great War, I have accepted International Law, and applied it here, as something that was to dispense special favors to none. To be sure that would seem rather naive, in the light of what happened under the Orders in Privy Council, but after all we must have something upon which to pin our hope. I have assumed that the powerful criminal is no better than the slinking crook—the shameless cynic not more virtuous than the blustering brute.

In war the end justifies the means—that is why we have wars. In diplomacy the purpose hallows the method—that is why we have diplomacy. Let us not forget that so long as we have diplomacy we will have wars. The favorite device of all governments of the World Power type is: War is the continuation of international relations by other means. Brutal cynicism could not be carried further than it is in this hypocritical phrase of the bully obliged to describe his overt acts.

It would seem that there has been little improvement in international relations in the last three thousand years or so. No doubt, such a statement could be rated as being extremely pessimistic, and to guard against that I have incorporated into this book a very small amount of ancient data to reinforce certain assertions I make. There is, for instance, the literal text of the oldest treaty of record, concluded between Rameses II and Kheta-sar, king of the Hittites, on Tybi 21st, in the XXIst year of the reign of the Pharaoh in question

(November 28th, 1279 B. C.), and a charming account of "The Battle of Kadesh," by either a press agent of Rameses II, or some propaganda bureau of the Royal Egyptian Government of Upper and Lower Egypt, Ethiopia, Judea, Arabia and what not. I am sure that the reader will have no difficulty at all seeing the appropriateness of the presence of these rare documents, and his perspective on international contact and relations and war will be further extended and widened by the purely biological and historical, and diplomatico-technical matter placed before him. In regard to the latter I must state that within the space of a single book it was quite impossible to give more than what is absolutely essential to an understanding of things, systems, conditions and policies.

Since it is proper that men should acknowledge to whom they owe their information, I must state that in my case thanks are due to many. To give the names of all of them would be impossible for the reason that I would place in jeopardy the interests and welfare of scores—of men who spoke to me of things they were not "supposed to know." Wherever it has been possible I have mentioned my authority.

To "Historicus" I am obliged for some information on the Balkan subjects treated, and to "The Nation" and Prof. R. C. McGrane, of the University of Cincinnati, for the text of the Sixteenth Century League of Nations.

THE AUTHOR.

New York, January 25, 1920.

PREFACE

MUCH has been heard recently of open diplomacy and open covenant, openly arrived at. While the Great War was still on, the public of the United States was led to believe that at the Peace Conference all discussion would be done in the limelight of publicity. Yet such was not the case. The Paris Conference was a star chamber proceeding of the worst sort. Only its edicts have become known, despite the promises that had been made, despite the fact that the fate of neutral and foe alike was under treatment. Diplomacy of the old type was again employed. Diplomacy started in again where it had left off—for the good reason that it had never left off.

It has been said, and rightly so, that war is a continuation of international relations with other means. In the past diplomacy has used military strength as a means of persuasion in times of peace and as the instrument of coercion in days of war. A diplomacy not backed by a large and efficient military establishment is likely to be a good diplomacy. Instead of force of arms it must employ the force of morality. Good conduct, indeed, is its only argument. It must do as it would be done by. Intrigue and machination may not be indulged in, because in the end there will be no large army and navy to prevent a reckoning or obviate the liquidation of the claims that will be made by those who consider themselves injured. The diplomatist of the small nation is obliged to work without the "prestige" that is at once incentive and tool for the activity of the man representing the "World Power." The "small diplomatist" must limit his endeavor to the continuation of good relations. And, as a rule, he succeeds.

Unfortunately, the diplomatic representative of the World Power is not in the same position. For all of the things he does, be they good or bad, he has the sanction of what has been termed his country's needs. Expansion in any direction and of any sort is considered an absolute necessity by any large state, and within the frame of that its diplomatists may work and intrigue to heart's content. The assurance that ultimately a declaration of war will wipe out every mistake he may have made, every questionable practice he has engaged in, is to the diplomatist of the World Power the very invitation

to do all those things which the representative of the small state cannot afford to do, except when on the defensive.

Nothing has happened so far at Paris that could cause the student of human affairs to believe that diplomacy of the big-power sort has been abandoned. Of course, there are those who would have the public take a different view. Yet the fact is that nothing has been done so far that could cause the initiate in diplomacy and international relations to be at all optimistic. To give a thing a new name is of little consequence, and the poorest sort of anticlimax for a catastrophe that cost the world 7,254,000 of its best lives and about \$450,000,000,000 in wealth. There are some conservatives who marvel that so much has been done. The sensible human being must be astonished that so little has really been accomplished.

Mihi cura futuri!

It should not be impossible to live without so-called diplomacy some day. Those who have the welfare of mankind at heart must wish that this day will come soon. But right now this sort of diplomacy is still with us, and if left to itself it will, before long, again revert to the practices for which it has become truly and deservedly odious. Covenants arrived at may not encourage another sowing of secret treaties, but they cannot prevent the making of *ententes*, nor can they curb those who engage for purposes of their own in the fostering of misunderstanding and hatred between peoples.

When Mr. Wilson declared himself opposed to secret diplomacy he evidently had realized to what extent hidden intrigue was responsible for the riot of carnage and destruction that swept over Europe. His many utterances on this subject leave no doubt as to this. Unfortunately, he was not in a position to change overnight a condition that had prevailed for centuries, nor has he been able to apply to his own relations with foreign governments the valuable lessons history taught him. The fact that the executive with *plein pouvoir* of a strong nation of 100,000,000 was unable to shape his own diplomatic course so that it might agree with his views, as stated by himself, shows how strong and well entrenched the modern system of diplomacy is. The President of the United States, moreover, was so represented in most of the capitals of Europe, especially in Berlin, Vienna, Constantinople, Sofia and The Hague, that neither he nor the governments to whom his diplomatic representatives were accredited benefited in any degree thereby. The chiefs of the American diplomatic missions at those posts were not only untrained for their duties, but were in addition unsuited temperamentally.

With the possible exception of a single individual these *chefs de mission* were sent abroad by Mr. Wilson and his party in return for favors done. In some instances the favor consisted of substantial contributions made to the campaign fund of the Democratic Party. That these men had given their money in order that the Democratic Party might be successful at the polls is in itself nothing unusual or dishonorable. Campaign contributions are one of the socio-political evils we must put up with. Nor is there anything reprehensible in doing such donors a return favor. It cannot even be said that appointing them ambassadors and ministers was a grave error. We must bear in mind that before the outbreak of the Great War it was generally assumed that ambassadors and ministers were in reality little more than the messenger boys of state departments and foreign offices. If blame attaches to any one at all in this respect it is the general public that must bear it.

To lay into the hands of political favorites the power of peace or war is reckless procedure, to say the least. But it was done—largely because, I believe, few of us recognized that danger was associated with the practice. With our notion that diplomatists were the messenger boys of governments went the delusion that wars would be short and parlor affairs. So much had been said concerning universal peace that most of us had been lulled into a false sense of security.

The few who saw in the blatant peace apostles but the petrels of disaster, and I have the distinction of having been one of these few, were descried as militarists. With the utmost complacency the world drifted on, forgot its duties toward the neighbor, grabbed for markets and grew callous of all but the ego. The result was the costliest of wars and the debacle of a social system on which better men than ourselves had labored. Revolution instead of evolution became the watchword. It was deemed necessary to pull down everything in order that the fantastic structure of the idealist might be raised.

Whether or no mankind is to derive benefit from this excursion into Utopia remains to be seen. So long as municipal law in the well-administered state is the result, rather than the cause, of good conduct by the majority of citizens, so long will sound international relations be the effect of good conduct by the majority of states. And that majority, naturally, includes the leading elements in both categories. A rapacious caste will influence legislation for the purpose of furthering its own interests; the rapacious government and state will shape international relations, and direct their course, agreeable to its own objectives. Glib assurances will not do—nor should they longer

suffice. While the axiom, the end justifies the means, has fallen somewhat into disfavor and has been disavowed by the idealists at least, the fact is that the Great War was really a procession of such cases—a sad procession, to be sure, but a reality for all that. All the hypocritical protests that could be uttered in a thousand years will not efface the sorry fact that the Great War was between two camps, the test to what extent Might could be made Right. But while arms settled the issue it was diplomacy that made the issue.

In this connection I deem it proper to call attention to the fact that I had a great deal of experience with diplomatic circles and diplomacy in Europe. This experience in fact is my justification for treating this subject and documentation here thereof has the purpose of letting the reader see diplomacy at close range. In the interest of peace I caused the removal from his post of one diplomatist, and for a little time took over much of the affairs of an embassy, to whose chief I later brought the sad news that in the morning he would get his passports. At the man's request I asked the foreign office in question that the severance of diplomatic relations be postponed for a few days. This was done and a little later it became my duty to argue for a continuation of relations so that there might be left standing a bridge over which relations with another power might be resumed.

Diplomacy had failed woefully. In desperation and despair, high government officials had to turn to a mere scribe, a foreign correspondent, for counsel and assistance. Diplomatists had arrived at a point where they no longer trusted one another. Both sides seemed willing to stay out of the Great War, yet neither had enough confidence in the other to be frank in the least degree. So long had these men lied to one another and so many deceptions had been practiced that an outsider had to be called in to interpret the Machiavellian assurances that had been or were being given. In other words, diplomacy stood unmasked even before those who engaged in it. Greek had met Greek.

The occurrence was tragic in the extreme. It caused the writer to double his interest in diplomacy and its questionable practices, of which by that time he had seen enough already. His present effort is the result of the observations and investigations made by him before and after the incident referred to.

Those who may conclude that American diplomacy and diplomatists get a disproportionate share of attention here are reminded that I am writing for the American public, that, as American newspaper correspondent, I, naturally, occupied myself more with American diplomacy than with any other, and that, finally, the role of the United

States came to be a most exceptional one in Central Europe, the *locale* of my work. There is another reason why I should select the United States diplomatic service for purposes of illustrating what the pitfalls of diplomacy may be. It is not necessary to have the foreign affairs of a country in the hands of designing rascals to get that country into trouble. The amateur diplomatist—the yokel in foreign affairs and relations—can do that also. He can create situations by his own effort, and, what is far worse, he serves so much the better the sinister purposes of a man or group with a mission, a Woodrow Wilson, for instance.

Next to nothing is so far known in regard to United States diplomacy in Central Europe. The American public, like its Congress, knows that there was trouble *somewhere*, and Mr. Wilson has steadfastly refused to take either into his confidence. Mr. Lansing also has said little, knowing that no credit of any sort attaches to our participation in the Great War. In fact nobody hath spoken, and nobody will speak.* To me it seems that my co-citizens deserve better. I will afford them the means toward that end, and it is possible that I, blazing here a trail, may induce others to be heard from, because, I take it, and what is more, I know, that our diplomacy at other capitals was not one iota better. I have written here merely of the things I came in touch with. Were I to put down even a part of what I heard five such volumes would be needed to perpetuate the antics of men who, according to their own books, were little short of being omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent—in the eyes of the penny-a-liners who wrote these books, if not by admission of His Excellency himself.

It is to be hoped that the future historian will not give too much heed to the drivel one finds in the books of diplomatist-authors. I at least have found these books remarkably unreliable on the part played by the author. It would seem that these literary productions are on a par with the “blue books” published by governments for the edification of the public and their own amusement, as in some cases I will show. And here it may be noted that so far the British and French diplomatists on foreign post just before the outbreak of war have not been heard from. In fact, they will not be heard from,

* “. . . Yet the fact that the Senate must ratify all agreements is likely to make us believe that we really have popular control of foreign policy, when, as a matter of fact, less is known about American diplomacy before and during the war than about the exchanges leading to and accompanying the belligerency of any of the other Allies. . . . What actually did Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando say to each other in that stuffy room which housed the Council of Four? These are things that we must know before even provisional estimates can be formed of President Wilson’s policy before and during the war; and, in spite of *our machinery for popular control of diplomacy*, Americans know rather less of their own recent history than of European history. It is a nice ethical question, finally, as to whether the citizens of a democracy should not be told these matters by official publications instead of personal memoirs.”—Lindsay Rogers, *The Review*, Feb. 28, 1920.

because their government and Foreign Office would never let them. Thus it will seem that only the diplomatists of the United States, and of the countries defeated by the Allies, engage in writing memoirs that are personal and partial, but which for all that aspire to being accepted as "truth and nothing but the truth." Study of these books will lead to no other conclusion than that they are at best a record of backstairs gossip perpetuated by the mighty master of the house—a rather ludicrous situation, to be sure. Yet it is from books of this sort that the public of the United States has taken the scant knowledge—or what it mistakes for knowledge—it has of the Great War. In this regard it is not unique, of course, since the United States Senate was obliged to gather its information concerning the sessions in Paris from the Canadian, South African and Australian press. That Mr. Wilson wanted to guarantee for ever and aye the *status quo* as now existing in the Balkan was learned by our Senate not from Mr. Wilson or American newspapers but from the Rumanian and Serbian press.


Since from a labor of this sort purpose cannot be dissociated, I wish to say that I have the betterment of the methods of international relations at heart. Above all, I would contribute something toward the improvement of which the diplomatic service of the United States stands in the sorest need.


I have certain recommendations to make, but before I speak of them it becomes necessary to picture diplomacy as it was and still is, and how it brought on the Great War.

In conclusion I wish to state that no single individual is in position to know it all. I confine myself here strictly to the sphere in which I moved and to the facts with which I became familiar.

New York, May 1, 1919.

S.





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
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The Craft Sinister

WAR AND DIPLOMACY

THE causes of war advanced by the historian seem varied enough. Close and impartial scrutiny, however, discloses that the prime cause of war has been real or fancied necessity—economic pressure in some instance, political factors in others.

It is no simple operation to divide in this instance the real from the fancied. Economic pressure becomes generally a political factor; it is that in all cases when the *ultima ratio*—war—is resorted to. When it is considered that even the material needs of a state are not always a matter of actual want, but may be no more than what is usually understood by the term: Expansion—the enlargement at the expense of others, of domain, markets or political influence, the task of delimitation appears in its proper proportions. We do not deal here with a simple form of taking. Some other party must lose before the taking can occur. The claims of a population living under intolerable conditions due to overcrowding seem valid enough so long as they are viewed by themselves. They lose, however, much of their weight when contrasted to the position of the people at whose expense more room is to be found for the claimant. The territory in question may not be needed by the second party, but the fact is that the latter thinks that the space will be needed before long for its own increase in population.

Breaking away from the purely biological aspect of the case, we come to the matter of wealth. Territory not actually occupied or made use of is wealth, of course. Of this each nation would retain as much as possible. To retain it, nations in all ages have taken recourse to arms, either in a preventive manner, by being militarily prepared, or by entering upon war.

Whatever aspect of decency there attaches to military operations is found in the defense of such a right, so that, generally speaking, defensive wars are the only ones which need appeal to our imagination. It follows that where there is defense there must be aggression, and it is plain, then, that the aggressor is in the wrong.

But the aggressor is not in the wrong from his own point of view, and the instances are not few in which the historian and philosopher has sided

with him. It is, for example, the universal acceptance that the subjugation, and even the total elimination, of a people considered barbarous is permissible, to say the least. Anciently such was the general practice unblushingly adhered to by all. But there are even more recent examples of this. We have but to remind ourselves of the fate of the American Indian, the Aztecs and the Peruvians to see how little headway civilization has really made. Antiquity, indeed, does not show us a single case in which races and nations were treated so ruthlessly or were so completely effaced. There is no doubt that the Jews suffered very hard treatment at the hands of the Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Romans and others. For all that the race survived, and mankind has lost nothing thereby.

The fate of nations is, as that of individuals, a question of survival of the fittest. The fact that the Aztec and Inca civilizations disappeared is not entirely a matter of Spanish cruelty. To be sure, both of them would have survived, at least in part, had they first come in contact with as enlightened a system of colonization as the modern British. Nevertheless, the Aztec and Inca civilizations contained within themselves the elements of weakness that was to be their doom. The haughty and cruel government of the Montezumas made it possible for Hernando Cortez to find within Mexico the allies he needed to destroy the despotism of the Aztec government, and in Peru another *conquistador*, Francisco Pizarro, found a highly centralized government in a socialistically administered state, the collapse of which left the people without leadership and made the handful of Spaniards supreme.

In both instances the less fitted succumbed to the better fitted. The fate of the North American Indian is very similar. In this case the subject race was unable even to grasp what little opportunity there was given it. Instead of reconciling itself to the new state of things, the Indian preferred to pass into oblivion over the route of idleness and free government rations on a Reservation. Only the confirmed sentimentalist would shed tears on behalf of the "poor" Indian.

The Varying Nature of Fitness

Though some would have it otherwise, the fact is that the survival of the fittest is the main trait in the history of mankind. That fitness, however, has not been always of the same class and degree. In some cases it has been entirely physical, in others superiority of intellect has been the means of survival, as witness the case of the Old Greeks and the Jews. There are cases even in which the mere superiority of numbers counted, as was true especially of the migratory hordes that swept from Asia into

Europe and dispersed strong governments and well-organized peoples as if they had been so much chaff before the wind. That the Tartaric and Mongolian elements in Europe are not more prominent is due to the fact that superiority in numbers could not prevail in the end. The people through whose territories these nomad armies spread had brains in addition to brawn, and so it came that before long there was little left of the invaders. The Finns moved into uncontested districts and the Huns were assimilated by a civilization. With the adoption of the arts and practices of the Germanic peoples, among whom they settled, the race of Attila armed itself against ejection. The result has been that it has survived into our own days and is still one of the most virile peoples in Europe.

It is not within the range of the subject discussed here to give further examples of this sort. History is almost entirely made up of similar instances. The point that is to be illustrated here is of what nature the necessities leading to war may be, and what results they have generally led to. We find on the one hand that a few adventurers bent upon the accumulation of riches have destroyed great organized states, while on the other whole racial groups went out in search of the *promised* land, found it, and then either perished or prospered.

The war records of antiquity are entirely too meager and incomplete to permit the drawing of a line of demarkation between the actual and specific causes of, and the pretexts for, war. What little authentic data there has come to us consists in the main of the self-laudatory records left by rulers who had been successful on the battlefield, a condition which would easily cause the impression, as it has done, that the wars of the Ancients were nearly always personal exploits of a sportive character. A closer study of the subject, however, shows that this is a fallacy in many cases. Real and fancied necessity was even then the moving factor. Pretexts of one sort or another were already resorted to, showing that then, as now, there was a sort of world public opinion that had to be appeased when it was not actually appealed to.

In the valley of the Two Rivers, now known as Mesopotamia, the population was already dense at the very dawn of history. For the purpose of increasing the arable area the water of the Tigris and Euphrates had been led into thousands of irrigation canals, a labor which in itself is the best evidence that the Chaldeans and Sumerians were meeting the demand for more room made by the growing population in a manner which could not offend the neighbor, except, possibly, in so far that the neighbor grew alarmed at the increase in population itself or became envious of the riches of these states.

It would seem that after a while the possibilities of development in the central and northern reaches of the two rivers were exhausted, and

that the Chaldeans had to look for more room elsewhere. Bounded in the West by great deserts, similarly handicapped in the East, the Chaldeans endeavored to find room in the North and South. The Eastern Taurus, however, was inhabited by mountaineers, probably the ancestors of the Armenians, and no headway could be made in that direction.

The result was that the Chaldeans turned toward the South, and before long became not only the masters, but also the sole inhabitants of what had been the state of Sumeria. When the country was taken much of the population was put to the sword and the remainder carried into captivity.

The same people, later known as Assyrians, repeated this practice elsewhere, as did the Babylonians, their direct descendants. The Medes and Persians finally put an end to the whole state structure in Mesopotamia, but did not enjoy their empire for long. Greek and Roman came and put a period to Persia and her empire, and within a very short time, so far the life of nations goes, the new overlords of Southwest Asia themselves went into oblivion, to be succeeded by the Arabs, cousins of the Chaldeans, Assyrians and Babylonians. The same race was again in possession of the Two Rivers country. The arteries of life, however, the great irrigation canals, had dried up and little could now be done with a country into which Paradise had been laid by the Ancients.

We have in this instance what may be called an entire cycle of national life, extending well over seven thousand years, if we make allowance for the time required to bring Chaldea into the relatively high state of development it had when the curtain lifts on it.

The Causes of War in Mesopotamia

The tendency to expand in numbers, and possibly in commerce, as shown by the inhabitants of the Two Rivers country, is indeed a most sinister one. It led to the most cruel wars of conquest we have record of. Military operations were, seemingly, undertaken on slightest provocation and no regard whatever was shown for the rights of the state neighbor. The absence of such a thing as international law and its sanctioning matrix, a strong public opinion, tended to make these wars as ruthless as they could be. That such was the case is shown by the tablets and stéles of the time, on which rulers boast with great satisfaction of the cruelties they committed. From the defeated *enemy* ruler was generally taken "the light of his eyes, the speech from his mouth, and the sound from his ears," after which he might suffer "the pain of the boat," the most disgusting method of execution ever devised by the brain of man. To flay the captive alive was nothing unusual in those days; the *morale* of populations and besieged garrisons was generally shaken by impaling within view from the city walls

the hapless creature from whom fate had withheld the swifter end that came when the populace was put to the sword by the conqueror. When the city had finally been sacked and razed, the comely females, and now and then, the young men, were carried into slavery.

Ancient history is largely compiled from such records, because the chronicles of kinder import are exceedingly scarce. Small wonder then that the history of Southwest Asia is one long account of cruelty in war and deceit in international relations, of conquest today and subjugation tomorrow.

But we must guard against thinking ourselves entirely in a different class. As pointed out, the records of the better side of life in the Two Rivers country are scant. We must not forget that the blatant autobiographies of the ancient *conquistadores* are, at their very best, most fragmentary and extend over a period of almost four thousand years. To condemn a whole civilization on such evidence would be unfair. It must be borne in mind also that the rulers of those days and parts were absolute despots, amenable only to the dagger of the assassin and the tender mercies of another ruler. Apparent also is that much of the murder that was done, on ruler and people alike, was in the nature of reprisal. Cruelty was met with increased cruelty, and crime was visited with retribution in endless repetition, until it was looked upon as a perfectly legitimate incident to war.

Agriculture, industry and commerce were too well fostered by the Ancients in the Two Rivers country to permit the snap judgment that all of its rulers engaged in war for the sole purpose of drowning their ennui in bloodshed and destruction. When a city was razed and its people massacred and deported, or when a whole country was laid waste and its population put to the sword or carried into captivity, some sort of necessity was behind the undertaking. In some cases more room was needed, in others a commercial rival was to be eliminated, and when we read in the chronicles of old that this or that king left his country greater than he had found it we may be sure that he left it more prosperous and that the wars he waged had that for an objective.

Ancient Egypt is a good example of this. Though a contemporary of the states in Mesopotamia, its military history is on the whole a very gentle tale. The Pharaohs were never a cruel lot. Expansion was attempted in the direction of Ethiopia and Judea, but nothing of any account ever came of this. Small territories were occupied for a time, to be ultimately abandoned. In many respects Old Egypt was the Holland of her days, I should say, without wishing to infer that dykes and annual inundations must of necessity influence all peoples alike. The Egypt of the Pharaohs was separatistic. Her borders were rather secure on the whole. To the East and West of

the valley the desert formed natural means of defense. The shores of the Red Sea and Mediterranean were easily guarded, and the Ethiopians in the South seem to have been fairly decent neighbors, a condition to which another desert and a good line of communication for the Egyptians, the navigable Nile, must have contributed.

Old Egypt was thus able to nurse her civilization and from it must have come the realization that wars of conquest are profitable only when necessity for them exists. For reasons unknown to the historian the population of the Nile valley does not seem to have increased at a great rate. It is not improbable that the increase was regulated, either purposely or through the influence of religious practices of a sexual character, the cult of Isis.

At any rate the state in the Nile valley lasted, so far as our records show, some five thousand years, and since we must take into consideration that Egypt enters history a well-organized state, bearing the imprint of a slow, and, therefore, long development at the time of her entrance, another two thousand years may safely be added to her national life as we know it.

The Oldest Treaty of Record

It is of interest to know that the oldest treaties extant were made between Egyptian kings and rulers in Southwest Asia, Asia Minor included. Of one of them the entire text is known. Rameses II, Pharaoh, and Kheta-sar, King of the Hittites, are the high contracting parties. The treaties then in force, a defensive alliance, prohibition of change of allegiance (November 28, 1279 B. C.), and provides for the reaffirmation of other treaties then in force, a defensive alliance, prohibition of change of allegiance of the subjects of the two rulers, and extradition of fugitives from justice with the rather humane stipulation that persons extradited may not suffer cruel punishments. The document was evidently drawn up at the Egyptian court, with two Hittite ambassadors, Tarte-sebu and Rames, representing King Kheta-sar.

The treaty throws a strong light on international and diplomatic relations in those days, and, though more than 3,000 years have passed since then, it cannot be said that we have very much improved upon its text, and, what is more important, its spirit. (See Appendix.)

Egypt, indeed, was the leader of international morality in her days, and it would seem that this contributed not a little to her downfall. Surrounded by a world in which brute force and political deception was rule and practice, she neglected her military establishment and ultimately fell prey to the invader. When she finally passed off she was in the condition of the octogenarian, whose works and years were ripe alike. She had

avoided and had been spared such wars as would have resulted in the infusion of new blood into her people, and when the raider finally came she was no longer virile enough to assimilate. Instead she was completely assimilated—eradicated to such an extent that the very type of her people has disappeared.

Of the state on the Nile it must be said, however, that a minimum of wars left her a maximum of prosperity, so long as the structure lasted. And with that prosperity she coupled a degree of culture that was really extraordinary. It was the matrix of Greek philosophy and science, nor is there much ground for the belief that the sages of Hellas carried their own culture very much beyond the confines of what they had imported from the Land of Temples and Pyramids.

International relations between Egypt and Greece were the closest and at times the best, despite the fact that the Greeks did not always deal honestly with the Egyptians, did so very rarely, in fact. Greece in her heyday, however, seems to have followed the Egyptian model of foreign intercourse and relations. It is rather surprising that with the same means and with a more favorable geographical position, the Greeks did not take to a plan of expansion, empire-building, which later gave its stamp to Rome.

The wars undertaken by Old Greece were mostly efforts to procure colonies in the *bona fide* and afterward hold them. The colonies of the Greeks were established to give room for the surplus population in the home country, to further Greek commerce and procure raw material. To find sites for the new cities, for of such a nature most of the colonies were at the beginning, does not seem to have been very difficult at any time. Trouble came when these cities and the surrounding country began to flourish and excited the envy of rapacious rulers and governments. First it was the Persian, later the Roman bandits who coveted them and in most cases placed themselves in possession.

Two Early Types of Arriviste

It is very unfortunate that Greece's civilization finally fell prey to the duplicity of her statesmen, most of whom were great diplomatists and as such forever engaged in intrigue, against some neighbor now, against a Greek state or colony then. Alcibiades and Themistocles, perhaps the greatest of Greek diplomatists and statesmen, may be considered the very prototype of the modern intrigant of the diplomatic service. They were arrivistes of the worst type, suffered forever from hurt feelings and closed life as traitors to their own people. Since there were many of this type in Greece, not to mention Pausanias, Hellas was doomed. The worst enemy of the Greek was the Greek, and so it came to pass that, urged by

the demagogue and professional politician, the Hellenes exhausted themselves in internecine strife and passed under the rule of their enemies first and out of existence a little later. The very people of modern Greece are not Greeks. They are Slavs and stand in relation to the Hellenes very much as the Fellah along the Nile stands to the Egyptian.

With the departure of Egyptian and Greek came a new era in warfare and international affairs. For want of a better term I will call it: The Persian.

For a thousand years at any rate warfare had had a constructive character, that is to say, after every campaign the world seemed a little better off than it had been before. The coming of the Persian and Roman changed all that, though the last of the Roman emperors, again—alas, too late—tried hard to reap other fruits from war than mere loot. I refer to Augustus, Trajan and Hadrian.

The Persian kings were empire-mad, with the result that their wars were entirely destructive. To the Greeks the Persians were known as barbarians, and there is little doubt that this characterization was to the point. The Persians had done little enough, in civics, in their own country. They did less in the conquered territories. Loot was the principal objective of their military operations. Under their rule the irrigation systems of Mesopotamia were so neglected that the country ceased to produce enough food for the hapless remainder of the Babylonian nation. Soon there was little to steal in Mesopotamia and with that the Persians moved further westward. It was not development that interested this fine race-brother of ours, but exploitation by the swiftest method then known—the taking of some rich city and the levying of tribute thereafter. It is rather amusing that this international highwayman of Antiquity should have given his acts the purest of motives—if we are to take his word for it. The plain fact is that he appropriated right and left without even so much consideration for the inhabitants as is included in a thought for their further productivity. The Persian is truly the *conquistador* of old. When he finally subsided he left in his trail a dozen Mexicos and Perus. His rulers and military leaders were the precursors of the Spanish adventurers, with the same wild craze for gold and dominion, with neither of which they knew how to deal judiciously.

The first imperialist of record, giving the noun the sense it identifies today, was Rome. Heretofore wars had been waged for more room and now and then to get rid of a neighbor whose prosperity was either a real or fancied danger. The warring kings of Mesopotamia deported whole populations after laying waste their country, and after the lust for blood of their armies had been stilled. Colonization was not practiced by them for the reason that contiguity of domains was considered very desirable,

but was out of the question, since great trackless deserts lay between the homeland and the districts that could serve as colonies. It is possible that the Egyptians were similarly hampered, and, with the means of navigation still very primitive, the founding and maintenance of overseas colonies cannot have greatly appealed to the Egyptians since they, unlike the Greeks, had no string of islands from the home shore to colonizable lands.

The colonies of the Greeks were merely the endeavor to find room in which to plow, work, build and trade. The result of this was that most of these colonies were autonomous. For reasons unknown to us the Greeks were not fond in the main of ruling others. They probably found ruling themselves strenuous enough. Their history, in fact, leaves no doubt as to this.

Expansion in Imperial Rome

With Rome it was different. There was a time when her citizens occupied themselves entirely with their own affairs and problems. Ambitious leaders, however, soon deprived them of this commendable habit. All Italy was brought under Roman suzerainty, and, since *l'appetite vient en mangeant*, it was not long before the Roman stay-at-home began to rove all over the known world in quest of new colonies. That quest, especially under the later consuls and emperors, meant a great deal of booty in loot and slaves, and, above all, a large income for the state and its ministers in the form of tribute—a regular revenue in gold and silver, and often enslaved human beings. For the rabble the colonial policy of imperial Rome meant free wheat, stolen in Egypt and Cilicia mostly, and free wine from the shores and islands of the Mediterranean; free performances in the Circus Maximus. This could not go on forever. Rome's population grew poor mentally and so it was that Rome became the *ne plus ultra* in having ended as a republic because it was rich, and as a monarchy because it was poor—an intellectual beggar.

Back of the "splendor that was Rome" lies a disgusting picture of militarism. Rome waxed fat on her brutality and cant. Might is right, was the maxim which the senators in the Forum circumvented. Consul and proconsul cudged their brains night and day how further conquest could be made, or how the revenues could be increased to such an extent that even the taxes farmer could not steal them all. Political leaders who had fallen into disfavor with the capricious rabble of the city engaged in tirades against "barbaric" states to divert the attention of the populace from the shortcomings and crimes of the men in the toga. Wars were started, lost and won, for no other purpose than to save the reputation of the rascals in high places.

Let Carthage be destroyed!

The colonies of Rome experienced better times under the later emperors. Monarchs and monarchies have always paid much attention to what may be termed a fixed state policy, in which respect they are much superior to republican institutions. Most of the Roman emperors, even the worst of them, subscribed to the continuation of principles and methods that had been found advantageous. The colonies profited more by that than did the city itself. Roads were built and shipping was placed on the navigable rivers. The signal hills furnished a rapid means of communication, as did a sort of postal service. Little by little the taxes farmers were curbed and a part of the revenues collected was spent among those who contributed to them. In the cities great public buildings were erected and such Roman temple-citadelles as Baalbec assisted in making the population in the provinces feel that they were to some extent part of that mighty empire far away.

It is a rather odd circumstance that Republican Rome was liberal and farsighted only at home, while Monarchic Rome was liberal and progressive in the colonies. Under the republic the colonials were expected to pray to the gods of Rome, but refused to do it; in the monarchy the colonials could pray to whatever god they pleased, but preferred the Roman deities, worship of most of whom had been agreeably modified, so that a Syrian, still fond of Baal, could without injury to his conscience do his devotions in the Temple of Jupiter Ammon in Baalbec, while the Greek could do likewise in the shrine to Venus on the same fortress platform.

Emperors Augustus and Trajan were probably the greatest builders Rome had. Unfortunately, they built in the eleventh hour of Rome's existence. The mortar in their edifices was scarcely dry and the pavement on their roads had barely settled when the Germanic barbarians gave the empire in the West its quietus. The empire of the East, Byzantium, reinforced by nearly all that was left of Greece, lasted a thousand years longer, and then it, too, fell to pieces. The necessities of another race, this time a Turanian, the Osmanli, had of a sudden grown into the proportions of an empire—and an empire the needs of a small flock of nomads were to be, even though it numbered but "four hundred tents" when it squatted down before Old Dorylaeum, frontier post of the revolution-torn Byzantium.

At that time, I am speaking of the Fifteenth Century A. D., diplomacy was already a fine art in Europe. During the Dark Age it had flourished greatly, especially in Italy, France and Spain. The Neo-Idealism of those times, which ultimately took on the form of a wild scramble to free the Holy Places in Palestine from the yoke of the Saracene, was the proper hotbed for political intrigue. Italian diplomatists especially were famous,

so famous, in fact, that governments hired them as later they hired Swiss Guards. When a certain Machiavel, a century later, published his fine book on the conduct of princes and governments he was not by any means as original as has been laid to his credit by some, to his discredit by others. Those who condemn Machiavel usually overlook that he was a benign cynic who saw the world in his day as it actually was, and as in our days it usually still is.

II

DIPLOMATISTS AND THEIR CRAFT

JUST when diplomacy became the occupation, professionally, of men trained or selected for the *art of negotiation*, as known to governments, is uncertain, of course. The first professional diplomatists seem to have served the governments of Genua and Venice, though in making that statement one has to bear in mind that it is not always easy to distinguish between the professional and the occasional, as the case may be put here, seeing that amateur and dilettante are terms that can hardly be applied.

Long before the diplomatic representatives of these two trade republics negotiated commercial treaties and trade concessions in the capitals of the countries about the Mediterranean, and said wicked things of one another, ambassadors and envoys had been sent and received by most of the courts for several centuries. But the first of these resident envoys were usually favorites of the court that sent them and had little to do with diplomacy as we understand the term. To send a resident ambassador to another court meant then that one monarch wished to pay a compliment to another. That personages so delegated did now and then occupy themselves with international affairs is quite possible, but on the whole they seem to have been true to their proper mission, and that was to say little and let their presence speak for itself. To have an ambassador at another court was the equivalent then of attesting that there was friendship between the two monarchs. It meant little more, as is proved by the practice of sending special envoys whenever some bit of state business had to be attended to.

It would seem that ambassadors were not always as well received as was expected. The first European ambassadors who arrived at the court of a Turkish Sultan were presented to His Majesty in strong cages especially made for the occasion. It is a matter of record that the Prussian envoy did not relish this treatment and complained to his government. But the Turk was in those days a master in Europe. His domain extended as far north as the Carpathians, Budapest and the neighborhood of Vienna, and when the Sultan saw fit to receive ambassadors in a cage there was no help for it.

The Turk had but a little while before emerged from Asia Minor

and his notions as to dignity were still somewhat Oriental. In this case they dated back to the days of Darius and the Persian kings generally.

So far as known, the first ambassadors of record who negotiated a treaty are Tarte-sebu and Rames, mentioned in the preceding chapter. In view of the fact that the treaty made between Rameses II and Kheta-sar speaks of other treaties, it is safe to assume that other ambassadors had been similarly employed, except it be that the treaties mentioned were negotiated by the high contracting parties in question themselves. If the usual method of doing things, as prevailing in those days, figures in this case, the facts are probably that Mauthnuro had offended the Pharaoh, had thereby loosed the dogs of war on himself, and had been defeated and killed, with his brother Kheta-sar succeeding him to the throne. The new king of the Hittites acknowledged evidently whatever conditions had been imposed upon him, and, agreeable with his status of inferior, possibly vassal to Rameses II, sent his ambassador to the Egyptian court. Of interest is that the treaty, despite its fervent assurances that there shall be friendship between the two kings *forever*, did not enjoy too long a span of life, it would seem. Rameses III, who was king of Egypt from 1202 to 1170 B. C., is pictured in a tablet at Medinet Habu as receiving the hands of slain Hittites, while an inscription explains that the expedition against the "chief of the Kheta" was undertaken because he organized a coalition of all Syria against Egypt. This act, by the way, if the inscription is to be trusted, terminated, for good, a case of relations that had existed a good many years before Rameses made the treaty of record, as is shown by an allusion to treaties made between Sety I, of Egypt, and Marsar, of Kheta, and another concluded by Horemheb, of Egypt, and Sapparuru, of Kheta. (See Appendix—The Battle of Kadesh.)

The ambassadors we hear of before Tarte-sebu and Rames seem to have acted in the capacity of parliamentary. Their person seems to have been secure in all cases. The very first instance of this brought to our attention by the records of the Ancients dates back to 2960 B. C.

Diplomatic Privileges of Ancient Origin

The practice of giving safe conduct to ambassadors is an old and universal one, and was necessary if the person charged with communicating with an enemy or foreign court was to discharge his duties. Even savages have subscribed to the inviolability of the person of an ambassador, which is nothing unusual since both sides were obliged to reckon with the possibility of having to send a parliamentary. The case is one of self-interest and the surprising thing about it is that in our own days this very simple matter has expanded into a good many foolsome notions,

known collectively as the giving of diplomatic privileges. In addition to extending extra-territoriality to the seat of a diplomatic mission, be it embassy or legation, governments subscribe to, and guarantee, the inviolability of the telegraphic dispatches, in cypher or *texte claire*, and the mail of a diplomatic mission. When censorship has completely deprived the ordinary citizen of the right to use the telegraph, cable and mails, without having the censors know the full contents of the dispatch or letter, diplomatists, provided the "privileges" have not been withdrawn, as happened so often during the War, may telegraph, cable and write in letters what they please. The diplomatic courier, in charge of a mail bag, is about the only individual in mufti who in times of war can cross the borders of belligerent countries without being subjected to the closest search.

There are many minor privileges which are granted members of the diplomatic service. They may import and export whatever they please, and without paying customs dues. Misdemeanors and even crimes are made the subject of diplomatic correspondence instead of being aired in the municipal courts of a country. There is a case on record in which a diplomatist shot and killed several persons without suffering greater punishment for it than comes of being transferred to another and better post.

The life of a diplomatist on post is one long ceremonial. While the foreign offices have now generally ruled that diplomatic callers will be received in order of their arrival, strict attention is still paid to the rules of precedence at official functions to which ambassadors and ministers and their secretaries are invited. The dean of the *corps diplomatique*, as the ranking resident ambassador is usually known, is a person whose displeasure it will not pay to invite. To his equipment for the post he holds belongs a knowledge, and a thorough one, of one of the most intricate set of social rules known. Great tact is necessary besides, though the tendency, now evident in most capitals, to give precedence to ambassadors and ministers in accord with length of service at the post has much reduced the possibility of friction which existed in the days when diplomatists insisted that the relative standing of the ruler they represented was also to be considered in assigning them places at banquet tables, or in the lines that are formed at receptions and similar affairs at court. To be punctilious in the extreme is considered not only proper, but absolutely necessary by some diplomatists, especially that class which by the newcomers in the service is styled, as has ever been the case, the "old school."

There is a popular impression that ambassadors and ministers are accredited by one government to another government. Such is not the case. In addition to having greatly magnified the inviolability of the person

of an ambassador, handed to us by the Ancients, we have clung tenaciously to the habit of having ambassadors and ministers seem the personal representatives of kings and presidents. So far as this concerns the United States, I may mention that the American chief of mission is not accredited by the State Department to some foreign office, but by the president personally to the person of the foreign potentate.

Instructions to a chief of mission come as a rule from the branch of the government charged with the care of foreign affairs, the State Department in the case of the United States. The ambassador or minister on the other hand addresses all of his communications to the same branch of the government. That arrangement does not preclude, however, that the actual head of the government also address his representative, or that the latter place himself in direct communication with the head of the government in case he is invited to do so, or thinks that departure from the regular practice proper.

When the chief of a diplomatic mission is absent, or possibly prevented from attending to his duties by sickness, the diplomatist next to him, usually the so-called *conseiller*, or counselor, assumes the name of *chargé d'affaires* and as such charges himself with the affairs of the post, be it embassy or legation—that is, he attends to the duties of the chief of the mission, known as *chef de mission*. All terms and designations in the diplomatic service are French, because it is the language in which, less rigorously now than formerly, the intercourse between the foreign government and the diplomatic missions is still effected. Hence such terms as here already used and such others as these: *Note*, *note verbale*, *mémoire*, *conversation*, *pourparlers*, *laissez-passer*, *passaporte* and many others.

Diplomats Receive Scant Salaries

In addition to the *conseiller*, each diplomatic mission has a number of secretaries, known as first, second, third and so on. These men, too, despite the fact that their pay is usually a mere pittance, subscribe, among themselves even, to precedence, as will their wives at social events. Needless to say, the secretaries, not forgetting the military and naval attachés, and the commercial experts, diplomatic agents, and what not, are generally people with enough private income to make them independent of the small salary paid by the majority of governments. If they do not have such incomes they will not stay in the service long. To be a poor diplomatist is nothing short of wasting one's life entirely.

The lesser secretaries and clerks of a diplomatic post concern themselves with routine matters, such as issuing and viséing passports, getting

a compatriot out of trouble occasionally, especially after he has appealed to the government at home through his senator. I make special reference to this because normally it is next to impossible to interest an American diplomatist in the troubles of an American citizen, except upon special instruction from the State Department. The United States diplomatic and consular services are notorious for this the world over.

The popular notion that in times of peace the post of ambassador is purely decorative, and that his function is confined to delivering with due decorum the communications of the government he represents, and receiving others in a like manner, is more of a fallacy in many cases than has been thought. It takes a war to bring out at least some truths. The Great War made it only too apparent that some of the ambassadors in Europe had not been entirely messenger boys, as I propose showing here. At the same time I must state that the United States diplomatic representatives seem to have occupied themselves with little enough before the outbreak of the War.

It has been brought to light that diplomatists of the balance of power in Europe, to wit: The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, had been very busy for some years preceding the general debacle. Upon orders from their governments and upon personal initiative, these men, if not actually trying to avert the immediate coming of the disaster, did their best to postpone its advent until the moment when a declaration of war would be most propitious to their own side. Diplomatists, as a rule are not patriots of the rabid sort. For all that they are patriotic enough, though their sentiments in that respect are somewhat colored by personal and professional interests. Especially is this true of the so-called arrivistes—men who are prone to shape diplomacy to suit their own ends. An individual of that type will walk on the brink of war for months in the hope that ultimately he may settle to his own profit a situation he may have artificially caused in order to get an opportunity for the display of his talents.

To describe the operations of a diplomatist may be very simple and again it may be most difficult. It depends upon the government whom he represents and its affiliations in world politics, and, again, upon his standing at his *locale* or post. A diplomatic representative of the United States, for instance, has very little to do in normal times. In the course of a week he might call once or twice at the foreign office, just to show his face, as it were, and now and then he may actually have to handle a small case. Once or twice a year he would attend some state function at court, present the congratulations of the president on the occasion of the ruler's birthday and do as much on his own behalf on the anniversary of the premier, possibly the minister of foreign affairs, and such other

high officials as he might have come to know. His official business ended with that. The United States was not mixing in the politics of Europe, and for that reason the ambassador or minister had ample time in which to cultivate his social opportunities, if so inclined, and usually he was that inordinately.

It was rather different with the European diplomatists at the capitals of the World Powers. Most of them had a rather strenuous time of it always. When it was no affair of their own government, or of the government to which they were accredited, that concerned them, it was the real or fancied activity of a fellow diplomatist that kept them occupied. There was always the danger that this or that government might be interested in a *rapprochement* with the government of his post, and if he could not do anything to prevent its perfection he at least had to keep his government informed on what was being attempted or actually done. Generally it was not the *fait accompli* that bothered these men to any extent. It was the making of such accomplished facts that caused them to keep their wits ever sharp and their minds ever alert—that is to say, if they understood not only their business but their duty, which in the diplomatist are two separate things.

In preventing another diplomatist stealing a march on them, the ambassadors and ministers in Europe found their regular staff of attachés very useless generally. At best the *conseiller* and secretaries could act as intermediaries between the *chef de mission* and the many private informers who were willing to be of use for a consideration. Informers of that sort were not rare, of course. They might rank from an underpaid *sous-secretaire*, who in order to be a hero at some cabaret sold the secrets of his government, to the person who emptied the wastepaper baskets in the foreign office or got away with the blotters that might reveal some secret in a telltale mirror. The servants of high government officials also were sought for, and above all it was important to have somebody on intimate terms with the lady that was supposed to be bestowing her affection upon men active in foreign affairs.

Diplomacy as Seen *Ad Hominem*

But that sort of work did not stop here. It was necessary that the several members of the diplomatic corps spy upon one another. In fact, there were several embassies in London, Paris, Petrograd, Berlin and Vienna that needed much closer watching than either Downing Street, the Quai d'Orsay, Novski Prospect, the Wilhelmstrasse or the Ballhausplatz. The *modus operandi* was similar to that employed in the case of the foreign office. Lucky was always the man who managed to get into

the confidence, second hand, of course, of the *maitresse* of the ambassador who was credited with evil designs. Since ambassadors seem to have a failing for such attachment, much of Europe's politics before the War was shaped and reshaped via the boudoir. The world will marvel at this, or should do so. That the sweet lips of a diplomatic sweetheart should have contributed to the killing of 7,254,000 able-bodied men, the maiming for life of millions of others, the starvation and death of millions of infants and adults and the wasting of, roundly, \$450,000,000,000 seems incredible. Yet such is the fact. World politics reduced to cases *ad hominem* are a very queer spectacle.

Before I attempt to say more of this let me remind of the attitude of the public to almost anybody connected with the diplomatic service. To be in the diplomatic service was considered a great distinction. Without being in any way entitled to it, the average diplomatist, and that is putting it mildly, was surrounded by a nimbus that would have done honor to any saint. Without wishing at all to appear facetious I would say that diplomatists before the Great War were awe-inspiring figures to the average mortal. I hasten to make the same assurance before I say that they seemed to be the last of the gods—remnants of the *Gotterdammerung*, whom the iconoclast had overlooked. Nor can it be said that some men in the diplomatic service did not deserve some such tribute.

The ambassador who can keep his country out of war deserves prompt translation to the Elysian fields. A few men have actually done that and very many have claimed that they did it. A fine foundation, indeed, for the credulity of the masses. Those who were not familiar enough with the ins and outs of diplomacy to know this knew, at least, that the diplomatist always had it in his hands to start a war when he saw fit. Such, at least, was another popular notion concerning ambassadors. Since man is so constituted that he reveres the evil god as much as the good deity it really made not much difference which of the two versions was the base of the reverence brought the diplomatist. After all did not one's own government show such a person all the consideration that could be shown?

Many of the men in the diplomatic service knew this well enough and, being after all but human beings, they enjoyed it. Successful men of affairs especially had their fancies tickled when contemplating themselves in the circles of awe-struck friends as a diplomatist, who could deny that he was a modern Atlas but infer by his mien that he really was that and much more. It was for this reason, and for the wife's social ambitions, that many a man contributed to a political campaign fund until it hurt on the promise that, his party winning, he would be made ambassador to this or that court.

The United States government has been especially culpable in that respect, though hardly more so than some of the other governments that needed but a so-called figurehead in the European capitals. Diplomacy in Europe was thought so innocuous by most of the American governments that it became common practice down to Cape Horn to sell diplomatic posts to the highest bidder.

At one time even the secretaries were appointed in this manner. The reforms instituted by the late Mr. Roosevelt changed that, however. Diplomatic secretaries, together with their much-disliked confrères in the consular service, were expected to know something after that—a little of international law and good social deportment at any rate. Up to that time it had been nothing unusual to have United States diplomatic secretaries who employed in their speech the double negative. Not that a man of such social handicaps may not be a good man. The fact is that he is hardly an ornament to the *corps diplomatique* at a capital of a World Power. At Sofia he might do; at Vienna, for instance, never.

Governments having big stakes in the European political situation were more particular, though not always as fortunate, in the appointment of ambassadors and ministers. The safest way to keep out of trouble in a country where one's interests are small was to have as *chef de mission* a wealthy man interested in nothing but his own glory and the social advancement of his wife and daughters. The great powers of Europe were not in a position to follow this rule.

The European Professional Diplomatist

The diplomatists in the service of the World Powers were of the strictly professional type. All of them had enjoyed the preferments of good education and an efficient nursery. Station and a moderate amount of private income was theirs. For some years at least they had been trained in their craft in the foreign office. After that they had been given a small secretaryship. In the course of time they had become *conseiller*, then minister and later ambassador, provided they belonged, in the case of Germany and Austria-Hungary, to either the *Hochadel* or *Uradel*—high nobility or archaic nobility in free translation, or were of enough importance otherwise, which was none too often the case. For rapid advancement in Germany it was necessary to have studied at Bonn or Heidelberg so that one might belong to the student fraternity known as the *Borussia*, to which the male members of the Hohenzollern dynasty have belonged for many generations.

In Russia the case was much the same, though nobility *per se* was not the open sesame it was in the Central Empires. If one had enough

money one could get into the diplomatic service without much trouble. If one had enough political backing one could become an ambassador after a reasonable length of service in minor capacities. France followed more or less the same plan. Money was a great consideration also to become *diplomate de carrière*, and if one had enough senators and ex-senators to promote one's aspirations, an ambassadorship could be had. Great Britain's method does not differ much from this, though now and then a fat post is given to a deserving politician of the statesman type.

What has been said in these three instances applied more or less to every other government in Europe. Always one of the prime prerequisites was that the aspirant for diplomatic honor have sufficient private means to look upon the small salary paid him as enough to meet his *pourboires*. A little ability, a great deal of training, and much inborn *savoir faire* constituted the purely personal qualifications. Political and social backing did the rest.

The diplomatic service almost everywhere looks upon itself as a sort of cult. The caste has social rites of its own and is extremely exclusive. So long as the man in the service is below middle age he is prone to be a most exasperating snub towards inferiors, socially and officially, while towards his superiors, and they are not many, he will show a certain amount of servility without feeling it, as a rule. There is one thing which the diplomatist learns quite early in his career: To have a good opinion of himself and to feign self-assurance so long as he does not actually have this. He is very much of an *enfant gatée* of his government, and the government to which he is accredited, from each of which he takes a goodly share of the infallibility that is accorded such institutions by the complacent public. To feel that the organization to which one is so closely allied is infallible is an invitation to conceit which few men can withstand.

Governments themselves never admit that their diplomatic service is capable of making mistakes. In the chancelleries that notion is not held, of course, but toward the public that deception must be kept up. The diplomatist, therefore, finds it easy to preserve that superiority which to the uninitiated seems all too real. A government may be open to attack in the press in all other respects, but, strange to say, it is a rare occurrence to see its diplomatic service criticised from the point of view of personnel. The service is sacrosanct. It is this for the reason that it is recruited, generally, from the classes whose influence is great; that it is so poorly paid in most cases, and, finally, that it has always been treading on thin ice to inquire too deeply into any of the things that concern the holy precincts of a foreign office or state department.

The older professional diplomatists discard some of the silly notions

they held in their own novitiate. They are no longer the enthusiasts of youth. In the course of years they have learned that much in life is futile. The plaint of Koheleth that *vanitas vanitatum vanitas* so much is governed here below, comes to have a great meaning to them. At first they become cynics, and later, provided there is enough of the milk of human kindness left in them, benign pessimists. A life in which deceit and simulation is the daily portion, so far as one's own conduct is concerned, and in which the words and acts of others must be regarded with the keenest skepticism, is bound to leave the mind in that frame. Thoroughly disillusioned, these men may come to the point where honesty is a salve to them—a balm of Gilead as hard to find as the thing Diogenes looked for with a lantern in the streets of Athens.

On the Mentality of Diplomats

I have before made the statement that diplomatists are patriots of a somewhat peculiar stripe. The good diplomatist is never a ranter. He knows the enemy people and their problems too well by the time he might harangue against them, and has too fine a conception of dignity withal to contribute to the flood of abuse that is heaped upon men and women who before the declaration of war may have been thought ever so good. It is the diplomatist who realizes, more than anybody else, that war is the continuation of diplomacy with other means. He knows that war has come simply because the peace means of diplomacy failed. Whether or no he had a share in the bringing on of the disaster, he understands on how little the fate of international relations often turns. In addition to that he realizes that his diplomatic career in the future might be adversely influenced by what he could say. Certain it is that every foreign office in the world would give the closest attention to his utterances and that would be enough to make him *persona non grata*. To have spoken at all would be considered a *faux pas*. The talking diplomatist does not remain a diplomatist long; promotion at least is out of the question. What the government exacts from its diplomatic service it expects of the diplomatists of other governments.

Thus it happens that the diplomatist to whom the passports were handed does not, as a rule, reappear on the scene during the period of hostilities. My own experience is that most of these men could not be induced to talk. There is no human being that can be wholly indifferent to the facts of life. The diplomatist may defy them for years in the routine of his activity, but he cannot deny them. When war comes and the flood gates of vituperation and calumny are down the decent diplomatist (if there be such a thing) remains generally the only one who

has nothing to say. He knows what the facts in the case are, and even if he should not know all of them he understands his *métier* too well to accept that all is so very onesided. The pretexts advanced by the parties at war do not interest him personally. He may take a professional interest in them, but knows that back of them lies a cause far greater than he could regulate or direct. War is to him a detail of the laws of nature. He realizes, more than any other class and individual, that before war can be eliminated man generally must improve.

Men of that type are likely to be included in what the younger element in the diplomatic service is fond of calling: The Old School. There has always been an *old* and a *new* school in diplomacy, and the distinction has been made either by the newcomers in the service or by the arrivistes, who found the sane and conservative men *de carrière* in the way. In recent years the young and arrivist diplomatists have drawn the line between themselves and their elders where Metternichism and the "new diplomacy" were supposed to meet. The trouble with this was that this new diplomacy was as Machiavellian as the older variety. So long as into the *art of negotiation* enters a great deal of duplicity, so long will it remain the sharp game of wits it is.

There is much more comraderie in the *corps diplomatique* at a capital than is generally found among members of the same service. It is a notorious fact that relations between the embassies and legations are much more sincere and congenial than they are within the confines of the mission itself, or within the same service. The trip made by Colonel House to Europe in the winter of 1915-16 was undertaken partly for the purpose of settling the difficulties that existed between the United States diplomatic posts at London, The Hague, Berlin, Vienna and Berne. The *chefs de mission* at these points did not agree with one another on anything. There was a great deal of interference with one another's affairs. Quite early in the War, in the fall of 1914, Mr. Henry van Dyke, minister at The Hague, had undertaken, without the least authority, to examine the mails of Mr. James W. Gerard, ambassador at Berlin. In these mails Mr. van Dyke had found matter which he thought did not belong there, and, though not enjoying the powers of a censor, so far as the others knew, he had destroyed some of this matter, as on one occasion he stated to me. Naturally, the Berlin embassy did not like this. Mr. Gerard himself was not anxious to have his diplomatic mail littered with matter of that sort, but, and properly so, took the stand that his mail was as inviolate at the hands of a brother diplomatist as it was supposed to be at the hands of the government to which he was accredited.

A little later the London embassy undertook to take over the duty The Hague legation had charged itself with. The result was more

friction. The United States embassy at Vienna had trouble when Mr. Frederic C. Penfield, its chief, began to use the diplomatic mail and courier to import from London such articles of apparel as men of means will buy, and such tidbits of the table as the Vienna market offered no longer. An attempt after that to get these things via Paris caused the United States legation at Berne to worry. One thing led to another, and for a time it seemed as if the several United States diplomatic missions in Central Europe were about to break off relations with one another. The good offices of Colonel House prevented war.

Incidents of that sort are not confined to any particular service, however, though in this instance they degenerated into an affair between fishwives. As a rule, the members of the same service have great difficulty being civil to one another, except it be that they have made special pacts to promote one another. A world that thinks entirely in terms of treaties, alliances and *ententes* is all too apt to spread over its private affairs the varnish of its official conduct—its profession.

De Schelking, in his book, "Recollections of a Russian Diplomat," tells the rather interesting story how Baron von Schön, of the German diplomatic service, and ambassador in Paris at the outbreak of the War, and M. Isvolski, of the Russian diplomatic service, and ambassador in Paris also at the coming of the debacle, made a pact years before at Copenhagen to promote one another's interests. The two men were then on post at the Danish capital, not the most hopeful place in Europe. It was decided that Schön should get to Petrograd as German ambassador, while Isvolski was to be Russian ambassador at Berlin. A piece of international deviltry which they had promoted in the interest of Russia and Germany and to the detriment of Denmark in the summer of 1905 was to be the fulcrum of the scheme, the promotion of better relations between the two empires the lever.

In the end they succeeded in promoting one another, though not as per schedule. Isvolski was made minister of foreign affairs, a post he held from 1906 to 1909, while Schön ultimately was appointed ambassador at Paris, where Isvolski found him later on, and where the two together saw what had become of the great scheme they were a part of.

I quote the case as a good illustration of how the "good" relations between governments and nations may have a purely personal basis and what diplomatists can do when they set their minds to it. While this was going on, Russia was bound to France by a treaty of alliance, and there were times when this treaty might have become a scrap of paper overnight. The Russian minister of foreign affairs, Isvolski, was still the same Isvolski who made the pact with Schön, and the Russian ambassador at Paris, Isvolski, while in the course of time he might have changed, was

still a man susceptible to influences that were not particularly pro-French nor in any way too friendly to the Franco-Russian entente.

A Hypothetical Demonstration of Diplomacy

There is no situation in international affairs that is too much for two diplomatists of influence and ability who have made up their minds to change it. Indeed, one of them can do it, if he be unscrupulous enough. The means at his disposal, especially the fact that he can always falsely incriminate any government and diplomatic mission, make that perfectly simple. His government will always believe him. It will never believe another government or its representative. Even if the facts ultimately corroborate the protestant's statement, skepticism will remain. It will be said that the *entente* or alliance, or whatever it was the falsely accused wished to engineer, was not carried into being and effect because something else interfered. In diplomacy all rumors are looked upon as at least half-truths and every false move on the part of a foreign office or diplomatist constitutes a *fait accompli*. To try at a thing and fail has the same effect as to succeed. The unsuccessful negotiation of a treaty is considered a treaty plus aggression, plus the losing of standing that comes with failure.

For the purpose of illustrating this better I will set up a purely hypothetical case.

In the capital of Government *X* is the ambassador of Government *A*. *A* has for some time occupied itself with the thought of forming an alliance with *X* for the purpose of meeting a situation created by Government *Z*. That situation may be one that calls for defensive measures or it may be one that spells aggression. *A* may need more room, more markets, more raw material, an outlet to the sea, a share in a "zone of interest," or any of the things a nation may actually need or merely imagine as necessary. *Z*, however, is too strong to be attacked without assistance, and *A*, therefore, decides that *X* must be inveigled into giving it. Or it may be that the ambitions of *Z* can be curbed only in this manner.

Government *X* may have its own cares and obligations just then and careful sounding has established that for the time being, at any rate—governments never turn down definitely such overtures—it cannot entangle itself. Government *A*, however, sees in *X* the only possible, or maybe, logical ally, and instructs its ambassador to bring about the desired alliance by any means.

It is highly probable that the first diplomatist of *A* who attacks the problem is instructed to limit his efforts of a direct nature to a better understanding between the two governments and nations. With that in

view the ambassador of *X* in the capital of *A* will be taken in hand and made to feel that he is quite the best diplomatist there ever was.

An *entente cordiale* being established, *A* sends to the capital of *Z* an ambassador known to possess the special ability required by the conditions existing. At first nothing unusual happens, of course. The new ambassador of *A* goes out of his way to show that he cares more for social prominence and favors than he does for professional prestige, keeping meanwhile his eyes on the objective that is his.

After a while, and at the psychological moment, rumors about Government *Z* begin to float about the capital. They are not especially edifying to the Government *X*, and its foreign office honestly doubts them. The ambassador of *X* at the capital of *Z*, however, is instructed by means of a cypher dispatch to be on the lookout for anything that might in any manner shed some light on the report that, let us say, Government *Z* was anxious to reach a better understanding with Government *Y*, known already to be not especially friendly to Government *X*.

The ambassador of Government *X*, being in all matters concerning his duties a conscientious man, thinks the thing over and discovers that some of the happenings and rumors that have come to his attention recently are now better understood. He knows that there is as yet no alliance between *Z* and *Y*, but may remember that only last week the foreign minister of *Z* was unusually cordial to the ambassador of *Y*, going perhaps so far as to make the audience unduly long at the expense of *X*, who arrived after ambassador *Y*.

But ambassador *X*, in order to demonstrate that such a thing could not escape his notice, informs his Foreign Office that, while there is reason to believe that Government *Y* has shown some uncalled-for friendliness to the Government *Z*, there is as yet no ground for the conclusion that an alliance will be formed. No alliance has been effected so far, of course, and the ambassador will continue to watch developments with the care he has given the matter ever since the first signs of a desire for a rapprochement on the part of *Y* with Government *Z* came to his attention. He gives the assurance that as yet nothing has occurred that would have justified him to make a report.

The Foreign Office of *X* is not wholly satisfied with this report, but waits until it has heard from its ambassador in the capital of *Y*. That personage may be frank enough to say that nothing has been heard at his post of such endeavor on the part of Government *Y*, which would be natural enough since the petitioner would be obliged to make his presentations at the capital of *Z* through its ambassador.

But this diplomatist also will have grown at least a little suspicious, and, together with his confrère at the capital of *Z*, he will begin to watch

for evidence showing that a rapprochement between Governments *Z* and *Y* is *fait accompli*. When next the minister of foreign affairs of *Z* or *Y* has occasion, at a banquet, let us assume, to use the usual formula in referring to the relations between the two countries as especially good, the harm is done. Though the foreign office of *X* may know perfectly well that no secret treaty of alliance has been made, as it will know if it be worth its salt, press and public of *X* will look upon the situation as grave. A treaty of alliance against *X* is said to exist and after that Government *A* will not have to wait so very long before *X* is willing to make a "similar" treaty, this time a real one. War is the next step.

It would serve no purpose whatsoever did Government *Z* and *Y* protest just before the break that there was no such alliance between them. Such a statement would be looked upon as another violation of confidence and a further endangering of the world's peace, so far as the combined public opinion in the countries of *A* and *X* is concerned. To the Government *X* such a protest would seem a sparring for time in order that *Z* and *Y* might select a better moment for the attack, while Government *A* would forget for good and always what its own share in the matter was.

Diplomacy in such instances knows but one rule and guide:

"Qui s'excuse, s'accuse."

III

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

THE utter debacle of the mad military expedition into Russia in 1812 and the resulting rising in Prussia in the following year set the star of Napoleon Bonaparte. Among the very ashes of France's dream of liberty, which in the hands of the Corsican opportunist had become the instrument of wildcat imperialism, was formed in September, 1815, by Alexander I, of Russia; Francis I, of Austria, and Frederik William III, of Prussia, an agreement known as the Holy Alliance. Reaction thus followed Radicalism. The pendulum swung once more from one extreme to the other, as it has the habit of doing.

Ostensibly the league was formed for the purpose of preserving in Europe "peace, justice and religion," all three of which had been endangered by the French, as it was seen at the time. Great Britain did not join the pact, because, after the fall of Napoleon, she was content with letting the Continent attend to its own affairs. So long as her shores and her colonies were secure, European situations did not greatly interest her statesmen nor worry her public. The Holy Alliance was later joined by all the sovereigns on the Continent, with the exception of the Pope, who seems to have realized, as did Pope Leo X in 1519 in connection with a similar pact, that the protection of religion by a combination of monarchs and their governments was not to the best interests of the Church. The Catholics of France had to be won back, moreover, and were willing to return to the flock, now that the Reign of Reason was over—now that Reason had shown herself rather incompetent in dealing with matters highly abstract. There was nothing to be gained, therefore, by the Holy See in joining an alliance that was unnatural enough despite its quite natural composition. To the men in the Vatican, whatever their faults, must be left the recognition that they have been fine students of human nature. The limits of the feasible have ever been clear to them, and so it came that the papacy did not join the Holy Alliance, despite the fact that Austria always had been far more the daughter of the Church than was France.

This "League of Nations," like its forerunner, the League of 1518-19, did not endure for long. In 1830 it was dead. The league started with an act of violence and gross injustice. The monarchs of Russia, Austria

and Prussia divided Poland once more—in the interest of world peace, of course; actually because they coveted the territory. At the Congress of Vienna Metternich had an able opponent in the person of Talleyrand, but the fact is that the former had force with him, and force has always been the best argument at the peace table. To plead morality is well enough, but it is the number of battalions which shapes the provisions of the treaty.

In the same year the Orleanists reconverted France into a monarchy, and for a time it seemed as if liberal institutions in Europe were to be banished again. But the reaction that was setting in was due to popular disapproval of tyranny by the masses. There have always been some who would prefer government by a single despot to government by a million tyrants, as a people misled by the demagogue is only too prone to be.

But common sense was far better in the saddle than the reactionaries believed. The revolutionary wave that swept over Europe in the forties wrung concessions from many a government, induced even the Prussian king to grant to the people a somewhat hamstrung Constitution. After all, the French Revolution had made the world a little better—would have made it much better had it not gone to such terrible extremes.

The revolution in France of 1848 re-established the republic for the short spell of four years, when a pseudo-Napoleon came to the throne. It seemed that the several experiments with republicanism made in Europe up to that time did not meet the popular view, and for the next eighteen years only Switzerland, and if San Marino and Andorra count in such matters, they also, continued a form of government well suited, apparently, to their needs. The remainder of Europe fell back to the "divine-right" system of government.

For a time Emperor Alexander II, of Russia, was by far the most liberal monarch in Europe. The Prussian kings and the other German overlords regretted what rights and guarantees they had *given* their people in the "Forties." In Hungary the Magyar class, ably supported from Vienna, worked hard to return to feudalism and, in a measure, succeeded. In Italy, on the other hand, men were at work "redeeming" the country, politically only, to be sure, but not without bettering the lot of the people so freed. A period was set these socio-economic and socio-political ups and downs by the raid of Prussia and Austria upon Denmark in 1864, their quarrel over the spoils and other differences in 1866, the formation of the North German Union, and the war of a united Germany, under Prussian leadership, with France, 1870-1871.

Up to the attack by Prussia and Austria on Denmark in 1864 the political affairs of the continent of Europe had been rather chaotic, and

the landhunger of three of the leading powers having been appeased by the partition of Poland, peace for the time being was rather secure. The density of populations, moreover, was not great, and industry had not yet gone to mass production, so that there was no necessity of a wild scramble for markets. Thus it came about that for a while the smaller states were assured of their tomorrow.

But a cloud appeared on the horizon when Prussia, by means of the gradual extension of the Zollverein, was slowly making herself the head of an economic and, to some extent, political federation that needed but the touch of a Bismarck to act as an entity, as it did when war broke out between Prussia and France. French statesmen had watched with keen interest and great anxiety the gradual congealment into a formidable unit of the formerly disrupted neighbors in the East. The fact that a highly efficient Prussia was at the head of the combination, a Prussia that had wiped out the kingdom of Hanover, the Duchy of Brunswick and the old Kurhessia, and which was now supreme on the Rhine, did not in any way tend to allay the fears of the French. That being the case, a very flimsy pretext was used by the French government to bring on war with Prussia.* The enterprise ended disastrously for France. The loss of Alsace-Lorraine and five billion francs indemnity was all that could be shown by the French when the peace treaty of Versailles had been signed. On the other hand, France was once more a republic. Whether or no, from the viewpoint of national biology, that was a benefit only the future can show.

The Three Emperors' Alliance Superseded

Germany was now an empire once more. The emperor of Austria dismissed his claims to the German imperial crown and shortly afterward became a constituent of the Three Emperors' League, of which Czar Alexander III, of Russia; Emperor William I, of Germany, and Emperor Francis Joseph, of Austria-Hungary, were the members.

For a time this arrangement seemed to suffice to preserve the balance of power in Europe, for which there was now a necessity. It seemed also that the Three Emperors' League would for many years, decades, perhaps, remain the major political fact in Europe. But that was not to be. In 1884, at Skyernewice, the league was renewed for another term of three years, and when 1887 came around it was found that the league had become obsolete.

* "*Napoleon II a déclaré, sans rime ni raison, la guerre aux Russes, aux Autrichiens, aux Mexicains, aux Prussiens, et finalement il nous a fait enlever l'Alsace et la Lorraine, sans parler des milliards à payer.*"—A French School Book, "L'Instruction Civique."—Paul Bert.

Two factors contributed to this:

In 1882 there had been made between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy a treaty, which later became known as the Triple Alliance. That this alliance did not immediately supercede the Three Emperors' League is due to the fact that, though Austria-Hungary and Italy had fairly well ironed out their difficulties, Italy was still considered an *unsicherer Kantonist*—uncertain "customer"—by the statesmen in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Nor was it ever clear whether, after all, the military power of Italy considered, the Italians were not more of a charge than a help in a defensive alliance. The attitude assumed at the outbreak of the Great War by the Italian government that the terms of this treaty did not oblige her to side with Austria-Hungary on the ground that Austria-Hungary had attacked instead of being attacked, while Germany adhered to the spirit of the document, seems to justify the fears always entertained by a large number of German and Austro-Hungarian statesmen, which very recently indeed had been voiced frankly by Kiderlen Waechter, predecessor of von Jagow, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Russia continued a member of the Three Emperors' League after the making of the Triple Alliance, as has been shown. She could well afford to do that, nor was her prestige impaired by not being a member of the alliance. The agreements she made with Germany and Austria-Hungary, through the person of the czar, bound her only for three years at a time and left her hands rather free. Again, Russia derived certain benefits from being a member of the Three Emperors' League. She was almost constantly at odds with Great Britain in regard to points of unfriendly contact along the northern boundaries of India. Gradually the sphere of influence of Russia had been extended southward. A dispute over Afghanistan in 1885 led almost to war, nor had the affair in the Crimea been forgotten yet.

There were many in Russia who regarded the Three Emperors' League as a very illiogical combination. Russia was hostile to Great Britain and never went out of her way to let this be forgotten. Germany, on the other hand, had strong dynastic ties with England, and a little unpleasantness at the time of the annexation of Hanover and Brunswick overlooked, the Hohenzollerns had managed to get along very well with the British government and reigning family. The consequence of this was that all the Russian government could expect to find in Berlin, despite the Three Emperors' League, was good advice rather, to keep the peace, than an offer to go to war for the further aggrandizement, eastward, of the Russian empire. Russia's imperialists were not looking for good advice in Berlin. What they wanted was a guarantee from the German government to actively promote Russian interests in case of war between Russia

and Great Britain. This guarantee Bismarck might have given, but Emperor William II never, being in those days intensely Anglophile. This is one of the reasons why the impetuous, young monarch "dropped his pilot." It must not be overlooked, however, that the attitude taken by William II was not an entirely unreasonable one. Long before there was a "German peril" in the world was there a "Russian peril" in Germany. There were about 160,000,000 Russians of all sorts to 68,000,000 Germans, whose country had but little of natural wealth, while Russia's resources even today have been hardly tapped. Out of these conditions grew the two major of Germany's political tendencies: Orientation toward the East, or orientation toward the West. The latter tendency meant assuming a hostile attitude toward Russia, the former had for its tangible objective an alliance between Germany and Russia, which alliance would have been made had the Berlin government been ready to go to war with Great Britain in the interest of Russia, in addition to placing a premium on Pan-slavism by surrendering to Russia the Balkan states and probably Austria-Hungary. It was not easy to determine which of these was the lesser of two evils. Berlin could not afford to affront either the one or the other, and for that reason did its best to be on good terms with both, St. Petersburg and London, hoping always, it seems, that the parting of the ways would never come.

Czar Alexander III was sensible enough to see that this could not be otherwise, and his friendship continued to be enjoyed by William I after the league was a thing of memory. This friendship was even transferred to William II and lasted until the death of the czar in 1894.

Alexander was rather reactionary and had little sympathy with representative and popular institutions. Republics were his *bête noire*. For this reason he resisted consistently every endeavor to have Russia attached to France with a treaty of alliance. M. de Giers, most prominent of his foreign ministers, also disliked the idea of seeing the autocracy do teamwork with a republic, but in 1893 was obliged to enter into such an alliance.

Purpose of Franco-Russian Alliance

The alliance between Russia and France was not aimed at Germany, which was the reason why Czar Nicholas and Emperor William II managed to maintain the best of relations and even enter into agreements against others. The Franco-Russian *entente*, as the agreement is popularly known, was intended to be a curb upon Great Britain. It was frankly anti-British, as was so often demonstrated during the late Boer War, when Great Britain had hardly a friend in Europe, Emperor William

excepted, despite the impulsive telegram he sent to President Kruger on the occasion of the Jamieson Raid.

Russia had many grievances against Great Britain, or thought she had, which in international affairs is the same thing. Her animus was founded, however, not on clashes in the Far East and India, but on the determination of Great Britain to retain the Dardanelles and Bosphorus in the peculiar status they had. The Russian Black Sea fleet was prevented by the several treaties that established this status, and later by what was known as the "Concert of Europe," which in matters affecting the Near East was always under the direction of Great Britain, from entering the straits and the Mediterranean, while Russian mercantile shipping was forever at the mercy of the fetwabs of the Turkish sultans, who could close the Bosphorus and Dardanelles whenever they deemed this wise.

Such at least was the gravamen Russian statesmen advanced. As a matter of fact, this was stating but half of the case. Long before the Byzantine empire passed away, in 860 and again in 1048, of our era, Russian fleets had attempted to "force" the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Ever since then it had been the dream of the men in Moscow and St. Petersburg to make Constantinople their third capital and the Balkan one of their provinces. In addition to being a tremendous economic and political advantage, that plan, if carried out, would have united the Slavs into a single nation, and what was of greater importance even, during the supremacy of the clergy in Russia, it would have made Constantinople the seat and glory of the Greek Orthodox Church. When Great Britain refused to have Russia navigate the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to her heart's content, Russia felt how bitterly her plan of expansion southward was being opposed by the British.

The French also had reason to resent the pretensions of the British about the time the treaty was made with Russia. Quite calmly Great Britain had placed herself in control of the Suez Canal and most of Egypt, to mention but two of the points of hostile contact. The boundaries of the British and French empires in Africa furnished ample opportunity for more friction, the Fashoda Affair, for instance, and France saw that she needed an ally and a strong one. Relations between Germany and Great Britain continued to be good, and complications with one meant an invitation to the other to strike, as the French viewed it.

In addition there was the Levant and its many problems that kept Russia and France meeting on the same ground. In that sphere the two had much in common. France saw in the Balkan, though much more so in Asia Minor, good markets close to her doors. She had been able to meet Italian and Austrian competition. Germany had as yet not

entered this market very strongly, and Great Britain seemed content with getting all the railroad concessions the Turks had to give, without building any of the lines, which was not necessary since railroad concessions in hand are out of reach of the competitor and can be used for political purposes. True enough, the Turks were partial to the French and favored them in many ways. They were also ready to be good friends with the Russians. But it was British anti-Russian diplomacy in Pera that was successful at the Sublime Porte.

Turkish and British interests happened to coincide exactly in many respects. The principal question on which Turkish policy, such as it was, and British policy agreed was that the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles should retain the status given them. That status involved a slight infraction of Ottoman sovereignty, in that it made a waterway, which the Turks claimed to be territorial, the subject of international agreement. But it left the Turks in full control of it, pending good behavior, and the Turks, by that time, had learned that it was not well to be too particular in matters affecting British interests. The Ottoman government could have never held for long the straits, if not internationally guaranteed in their possession. Both, the Ottoman and the British governments had to fear that overnight the Russian Black Sea fleet, which was largely maintained for this very purpose, would swoop upon the entrance to the Bosphorus, force entry, take Constantinople, close the Dardanelles at Sid-il-Bahr and explain afterward, as is done in such cases.

To Turk and Britisher alike that would have been disastrous. The Ottoman capital would then have been elsewhere again, probably Brussa or Eskişehir in Anatolia, and with Russia in possession of the Black Sea, the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles, British control of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal would have been problematical, to say the least. That much Great Britain could not risk, and so it came that the Franco-Russian *entente* was arrived at despite the dislike of a czar, who was logical enough to see that his autocracy could not very well pair itself with a republic, and despite the liberals of France, who, naturally, stuck up their noses when it was first proposed to link *la republique* to a state as reactionary as Russia.

Russia and Germany Continue Friends

Instead of drawing asunder, as the result of the *entente*, Russia and Germany became more attached to each other for a while. In at least one respect had William II heeded the advice of his illustrious grandfather. The founder of the German empire had told his grandson on his deathbed that whatever he did he was to treat with consideration and

respect Czar Alexander. William II seems to have carried this out to the letter. Alexander was the only man before whom the impetuous young ruler of Prussia and Germany was ever conscious of a certain degree of that inferiority which youth will feel before the dignified elder. There were two other persons to whom William brought this tribute: Emperor Francis Joseph, of Austria, and Queen Victoria. While William was on the best of terms with Nicholas of Russia the restraint alluded to was absent, of course. The two men were of about the same age, and, while they advised one another, neither was able to permanently influence his fellow sovereign, a condition that was to make itself felt in the relations of the two empires.

The elimination of Prince Bismarck had left William not only a free hand in German internal affairs—to get that free hand the emperor dismissed the chancellor—but it also started Germany on a dangerous career in foreign politics. There is no doubt that William was actuated by the best of motives. He wanted his empire to grow and grow rapidly. Bismarck was committed to slower methods, it seems, for none knew better that gradual evolution is the best for a state, especially a state which had grown into an empire overnight from a conglomerate of states and principalities which none had feared in the past for the reason that their own difficulties and differences, and the fancied divergences of interest, had made them a danger more to one another than to their foreign neighbors. The death of Czar Alexander took from William a curb—the last one—which Germany could ill afford to lose. With this restraint gone, the German emperor began to enwallow his people, entirely by utterances that were indiscreet and injudicious, in a slough of international complications that led from one crisis to another.

Czar Nicholas had taken over from his father, as foreign minister, M. de Giers, a Russian statesman and diplomatist of what was then known as the Old School. De Giers was decidedly pro-German and anti-British, a great admirer of Bismarck and a stout adherent of the principle of the Three Emperors' League. He had finally entered the Franco-Russian pact, but only against Great Britain. He knew, of course, that the French hoped to kill two flies with this stone, Germany and the British Empire, but had no reason to believe, at that time, that the *entente* would in the end find the application it had. In conformity with his policy, he promoted as much as possible the marriage of Nicholas to Princess Alice of Hesse-Darmstadt, who, though the daughter of a princess-royal of Great Britain and granddaughter of Queen Victoria, was German enough to take care for a time of German interests at the court of St. Petersburg.

M. de Giers was succeeded as Russian minister of foreign affairs by Prince Lobanoff, a man whose greatest achievement has been that he

ran away with the wife of a secretary of the French embassy at Vienna. Lobanoff was a Germanophobe and an intrigant of the most vicious type. He opposed the match between Nicholas and Alice to the best of his ability, but the de Giers element in the Russian capital, and its counterpart in Germany, succeeded in their plan, all the easier since there was a great deal of natural attachment between the two.

Europe's Three Political Camps

For several years after that Europe was divided into three political camps. The Triple Alliance, which, despite its weak elements—the inefficiency of Austria-Hungary and the untrustworthiness of Italy—made the three component states sufficiently secure against attack; the Franco-Russian alliance, directed against Great Britain, so far as Russia was concerned, and against Great Britain and Germany in the case of France, and, finally, Great Britain herself, constituting then the object of an isolation policy, unintentional so far as the Triple Alliance was concerned, intentional in case of the Dual Alliance of France and Russia. The result of this was that Great Britain came to adhere more and more to the policies taught her by her own history and geographical location, of which the two-power standard of her naval program was the most important.

It had been shown that from the Triple Alliance Great Britain had nothing to fear. The governments forming it had been uniformly friendly to Great Britain in the past. England had had no serious difficulties with any of the German states. Her relations with Austria-Hungary had been the best for generations, and Italy was not a serious factor in world politics at that time.

For all that the Triple Alliance left Great Britain a little in the cold, as it were. The interests of an allied group multiply with the cube of the number of allies, and to feel that one has the power of an alliance to back up one's plans and ambitions is not calculated to further the interests, nor promote the good feeling, of a state which stands alone, and has, in addition, a pact between two strong states directed against it. The Dual Alliance was frankly hostile to Great Britain, and there is no telling what would have happened had not William II and Francis Joseph held Queen Victoria in too high an esteem to permit them to view with complacency any attempt to strike at the British when the moment was ripe—during the late Boer War, for instance, when overtures to that effect were actually made at Berlin and Vienna.

There is a great deal of evidence to prove that Berlin and Vienna did not look upon the Triple Alliance as the means of aggression in those days. Italy continued to limp in loyalty and military strength. William overlooked no opportunity to make the French feel that better

relations between Germany and France were not as impossible as the French chauvinists thought. To be sure, there was always an element of condescension in these efforts, as the French viewed it. But that may have been due to the fact that the people of France could not but look upon the Germans as conquerors, who had taken from them two provinces and five billion francs, in addition to humbling *la grande nation* on the battlefield. At any rate William was never so proud in his life as when the French government consented to place under the command of a German general, Count von Waldersee, the military contingent it contributed to the expedition against the Boxers.

It would seem that in those days Germany had the last of her good statesmen. Count Caprivi was a great success as chancellor, despite the criticism that was heaped upon him. Under him Germany had more friends than she had ever had before and has had since. Prince Hohenlohe, married to a member of one of the most influential families in Russia, the Wittgensteins, bettered relations with that country wonderfully, and even Prince von Buelow had a modest measure of success.

German diplomacy was rather successful then—which diplomacy easily is when the government represented has friends. Good or bad diplomacy is not by any means so much a question of personnel as is generally believed. Against antipathy for his government and state the best diplomatist is absolutely powerless.

A good illustration of this is had in the case of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, a man looked upon by many Germans as the best diplomatist they had had in generations. Baron Marschall has to his credit the fact that he was the only German diplomatist who managed to get along with the French and was held in high esteem by them. It was he who promoted the rapprochement between Turkey and Germany, did the groundwork for the Bagdad railroad and brought the German military mission under von der Goltz Pasha to Constantinople. Later he was sent to London, where he died—all too soon. The interesting feature of the case is that Baron Marschall was a typical "Prussian"—a man of brusque manners, but withal sincere and forceful of character. Though his successes in Constantinople had not left British influence in Turkey better off, he was well received in London and enjoyed not only the esteem but also the confidence of the British government.

The Triple Entente Puts in Appearance

The diplomacy involved in the conditions here outlined was on the whole very simple. The situation in Europe called for direct action in most cases. Intrigue could accomplish nothing which a reasonable modicum of frankness did not achieve. Between Berlin, Vienna and

Rome there were no issues that called for diplomacy, giving the word its sinister meaning, nor were these capitals interested in creating situations elsewhere. St. Petersburg had made up its mind to reap the fruits of the Franco-Russian pact, but did not rely solely upon that agreement, taking good care to have Germany as a potential ally, through the medium of the two emperors. Paris, however, had to continue cultivating Russian friendship, largely by means of loans, and London for the time being relied on the strength of the British empire and the great probability that her statesmen and diplomatists could easily find a place in either of the two camps in case of trouble. Moreover, there was Britain's mighty fleet of war, and, with the exception of the Grover Cleveland administration, the government of the United States could be considered a potential ally, the British government having seen to it that the stage was set and the lines written for the necessary blood-is-thicker-than-water comedy. Mr. Hay, as Secretary of State, and Lord Pouncefote as British ambassador at Washington were the first high contracting parties in the "gentlemen's agreement" made.

Neither the open hostility of the Russian government nor the concealed animus of the French perturbed the British. The fulsome exuberancy which characterized expression in the French press at the time the czar and czarina visited Paris left the British public calm. Though every phrase had been whittled for British consumption, the men in London also saw that some of the veiled threats between sentences were meant for Germany. For the time being, then, the Franco-Russian alliance had no definite direction, so that it would always be possible to still shape its final course. Ultimately the prime motive of the pact was overlooked and Great Britain made the arrangement serve her own purpose.

That was statesmanship of the highest order. But it is possible that it was more the general situation throughout Europe than lack of ability that prevented the leaders in government elsewhere from being statesmen instead of mere politicians.

The statesman is a politician who can foresee what an act of his will result in, not only tomorrow, but twenty years hence, while the politician is a statesman who cannot do that. The former must have not only ability, but opportunity as well. He must have space in which to move, in which to exercise his imagination and energy, and such space was not to be found on the continent of Europe at the end of the first decade of the Twentieth Century.

So far as the Central Powers were concerned the Triple Alliance, defective as it was, was the full measure of success attainable in a world where "Balance of Power" was become a fetich and the only antidote

for war. A rapprochement with the only available state, the Ottoman empire, was the only political expansion now possible. This was effected by Germany, despite the fact that Austria-Hungary, her ally, was forever ready to shear the Turk of territory. This was no mean success of German diplomacy, considering that Great Britain had in the past done more than any other power to keep the Sick Man of Europe alive. At the same time it marked the end of a cycle in national and international life.

The opportunity for further development was rather better in case of the Franco-Russian alliance. While Great Britain seemed hardly suited to belong to that combination, as her moralists never tired of pointing out, there were several reasons why in the end she would find it profitable to join it, despite the fact that its first purpose had been to put an end to British hegemony.

It is really very hard to say whether this twist in international affairs argues for the great ability of the British statesmen or the great stupidity of all others. Be that as it may the men in Berlin lacked all the means, even had they had the ability, to undo what so strange a turn in the international relations of Europe had brought about. It would be highly unfair to blame them for anything in connection with this *fait accompli*. Small, indeed, is the number of men in political history who would have been able to meet such a situation along lines of aggression, but one must wonder why the German government did not become more wary and more *diplomatic*.

IV

THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

INTERNATIONAL affairs, like the conditions affecting the lesser groups of man, overlap one another. They did this in the instance of the arrangement later known as the Triple Entente, and the subject treated in the preceding chapter, the Triple Alliance.

The Franco-Russian pact was directed primarily against Great Britain and secondarily, by France at any rate, against Germany and Great Britain. Great Britain was virtually isolated and considered herself totally so when the expansionists of Germany undertook to build a navy commensurate, at first, as was said, with the growth of the German merchant marine, agreeable later, as was announced, to the dignity of the new German empire. Such was the compound program of the German *Flottenverein*, which in Emperor William had so ardent a spokesman and promoter. That tendency was considered a danger by Great Britain, and properly so. Great Britain had never raised an objection against the armament on land which Germany maintained; with preparation on sea it was a different matter.

Thus "the German peril" came.

A strong German army could be useful to Great Britain against Russia and France, whose alliance was an argument in that direction, and no mean one. A strong German fleet, on the other hand, might be turned against Great Britain herself, and there were not wanting in Germany the indiscreet wielders of speech and pen who reminded the British public of this. The emperor, in fact, was one of the worst offenders. There were times when he could not contain his great dislike for his uncle, later King Edward VII, and there is ample proof to show that most of the vehement utterances William made were directed at that relative rather than at Great Britain. The chancellors of William II had a rather bad time of it, trying to place a curb on the imperial tongue. They were men who realized that one of these days such intemperance would have results detrimental to the nation. Unfortunately, they never succeeded for long holding their master in check, and in the end exactly that happened what they feared would happen.

There are two sides to every question, and the claim of Great Britain, that she was fully justified in maintaining a naval establishment able

to cope with a combination of the two foreign war fleets next in strength to her own, should be viewed with more sympathy than at first it would seem to deserve.

Great Britain depended as much upon her navy as Germany depended upon her army. On that point, moreover, the statesmen in Berlin and London had agreed long ago. But it is a characteristic of navies that they can be used for a variety of purposes. An army is quite a negligible factor in colonial enterprises so long as its line of communication with the home country is not protected by a strong navy. Thus, in colonial expansion overseas, a good navy is the prime prerequisite so long as interference with this policy must be taken into account. The lack of such a navy makes one's colonial enterprises dependent upon the good will of the nation that has such an arm. The best army becomes useless for expeditionary purposes away from home when its transit on the seas can be threatened, or when, transit having been accomplished, its supplies can be cut off.

A strong navy also is able to protect one's merchant shipping. An army is a nonentity in that respect, no matter how strong and efficient.

Germany had brought into being a great merchant marine, and had in the course of time, and somewhat by the grace of Great Britain, founded a colonial empire of promise, the slow development of which had its causes in the fact that the Germans were not colonizers in the sense in which the British are this. Instead of getting the natives to do their best under conditions as yet unsuited for the White Man, they had attempted to do everything themselves in the manner which has become known as "Potsdam." Too much thoroughness was expended on trifles, and the major issues were never grasped. The result of this was that the colonial possessions of Germany were a charge when they might have been a factor of at least economic strength.

These things were known to the German colonial enthusiasts merely by their effect, not by their causes. That the colonies did not pay was thought due to inherent conditions. The colonies were no good, and a *place in the sun* had to be sought elsewhere, therefore. To get that place in the sun a large navy was thought necessary, as indeed it was, taking the strictly German view of it.

Against the German naval program, Great Britain advanced a certain number of arguments, all of them good for Great Britain, naturally, yet none of them really bad for the Germans. When the Germans argued that their merchant marine needed protection, and that its growth was retarded by the lack of a strong navy, the British pointed to the fact that the Dutch and Norwegian merchant marines were greater in proportion than the German, and that in their case the absence of a strong

navy had been no handicap. To the contention that Germany needed a strong navy for the good of her colonies, the British were in the habit of replying that the Dutch colonial empire, much more valuable than the German, had continued in spite of having no such protection.

The *Kleindeutschen* element—Little-Germans—were satisfied with that presentation of the case. Not so the *Alldeutschen*—men who promoted, supported and guided the navy and colonies associations.

The latter had a telling argument on their side. What the British politicians said was all very well. It was quite possible that for the time being Great Britain would not molest the German merchant marine and would not take the German colonies, but what guarantee was there that Great Britain might not do that tomorrow?

It is the habit of the German mind to do things for keeps. The word *forever* has a real meaning to the average German. He is ever concerned with the future, without realizing that a statesman's *forever* is a mockery. Seeing that none are better students of history than these very same people one must wonder that the duration of things and conditions has never become clearer to them. Be that as it may, the fact is that the navy and colony leagues saw things only from that angle.

The Case of the Two-Power Standard

But Germany also had a caste which for its opposition to the British two-power standard did not even have that justification. It was the contention of this class that acquiescence into this British policy meant a woeful surrender of German sovereignty. Any measure by a foreign government which at all influenced a German measure of the same general category was to this element an infraction of sovereignty; consent to it was adjudged supineness and even treason. If Germany wanted to build a large navy it was entirely a German matter and the right of Germany to do so. Did not Great Britain do the same thing? If Great Britain wanted to increase her army she had a right to do that without asking.

All this was well only from the position of the case-hardened doctrinarian in statecraft. To take such a view was neither prudent nor profitable. The British navy and the German army could have kept the world at peace, as they had done for forty years, and the cases of Dutch and Norwegian shipping, and the Dutch East Indies, were certainly in favor of the contentions of the British. Even the French colonial empire was to a large extent at the mercy of the British, and despite that it had done fairly well, would have done better yet were the French as good colonizers as the British are.

Emperor William was an ardent navalist. He loved to dwell on

the possessive adjective: *Mein*—my. *Meine Flotte* was, next to *meine Armee*, the *pièce de resistance* of every speech he made. Coupled with the unfortunate tendency to see in Great Britain but his uncle, Edward VII, that failing was to bring on disaster in the end.

The impartial observer and student cannot fail to arrive at the conclusion that Germany's prestige would in nowise have suffered had she completely acquiesced in the two-power standard. Moreover, she would have benefited thereby. The claim advanced by apologists for the German government, that Great Britain was jealous of Germany's commerce and merchant marine, sounds logical enough to those who are anxious to hear it, but is not convincing. Germany herself was too good a buyer in Great Britain and her colonies, and supplemented too well British industry and trade, to have been selected by Great Britain for destruction on that account. The boycott of German goods agreed on later by the Allies was a French measure rather than a British one. There is no doubt that, had Germany taken a more sympathetic view of the facts in Great Britain's national defense scheme, there would have been a perfect rapprochement between the two and the peace of the world would have been far better secured than any other means or method can ever achieve. The addition of Great Britain to the Triple Alliance would have put an end to the mad race in naval and military preparation and a partial disarmament would have been possible even.

There were men in both capitals who realized this. Lord Haldane was one of the leaders in the British group of so-called pacifists, who pleaded with the German government to be reasonable. His words found indeed an echo in Germany, but not in the right circles. There was no such thing as representative government in Germany; quite the last thing William and his caste wanted was a responsible ministry. The invasion of England by Roman, Saxon, Dane and Norman was thought too anterior to be applicable in our day, said those in control of German public opinion—as bad a set of swashbuckling militaristic politicians and pressmen as have ever ridden a people over the brink of the abyss. If Great Britain wanted to build a score of ships to Germany's ten that was her business. The next naval program of Germany would provide for forty for the twenty and the best man was to win. Great Britain wanted to form a world hegemony and it had become the duty of Germany to prevent that.

Such childish twaddle found response in kind in London, of course. "The German peril" was on every lip. Mr. Arthur Lee, then civil lord of the admiralty, announced quite calmly one day that the German fleet could be sunk out of hand by the British. That extravagant framing of the case was not only ill-advised but it was also an insult to the Germans.

Needless to say, it furnished the German navalists with the very arguments they needed.

Lord Haldane, being a farsighted Scot, continued to labor for an understanding on this point between Great Britain and Germany. But he labored under the handicap of having as many jingoes to fight as his German collaborators had chauvinists to contend with. By 1902 the growth of the German navy began to assume alarming proportions, as the British saw it. The tension between the two countries grew with every day. Propaganda for larger fleets had in the two countries invaded every sphere of life. Banquet table, platform, pulpit, press, novel and play, and the very schools were turned to the discussion of the same thing: More armament on sea and then more of it.

A Race Between Jingo and Chauvinist

The coming into power of the Liberal Party in Great Britain in 1906 improved the situation a little. In London, as well as in Berlin, men began to take stock a little, and for a while it seemed as if some degree of reasonableness was to prevail. There is ample evidence to show that on both sides an awakening had come. But it was too late now. The furor was travelling by its own impetus. Such men as Haldane and Asquith, and even Sir Edward Grey, did their best to assure the British public that, after all, the case was not as critical as had been thought. But they did not succeed in reassuring their public, nor did the jingoes in official position and in the press allow the British public to forget what so recently had excited it. The fact is that the *German peril* had been much exaggerated, as the developments of the Great War have so amply demonstrated. The British fleet was shown still able to defend the home shores.

This, in short, was the case as it appeared before the public.

But while the flood gates of propaganda were open the several foreign offices and diplomatic services were not idle. The man in the street has ever been in ignorance of what goes on in the chancelleries, foreign offices and embassies, which need not surprise since even parliaments and congresses in this imperfect world of ours are generally confronted by the executive branch of the government with little more than the *fait accompli*.

In Paris, London and St. Petersburg diplomatists were feverishly at work making of the Franco-Russian alliance the Triple Entente. The busiest of them was King Edward VII.

For reasons that are only known in part, Edward VII was at no time much of a friend of things German, despite the fact that his father was a German; despite the fact that his mother was so typically of that

race that she was not able to entirely rid herself of her German accent. At any rate, Edward was no admirer of the country of his ancestors. Some say that he took very much to heart the grievances of his sister Victoria, who was married to Frederik, emperor of a hundred days, and father of William II. That princess-royal of Great Britain was never acclimated in the chilly, stiff and discipline-ridden atmosphere of the Berlin court, where everything moved according to the rules of the average, typical German household. She was and remained the *Auslaenderin*—the foreigner—to whom Bismarck was in the habit of referring as *die Englaenderin*. The Iron Chancellor was not exactly the personification of tact and the Crownprincess Victoria loathed the very sight of him. Edward VII is said to have been influenced by this.

But that was not all. At the Berlin court much attention has always been given to correct conduct in sex matters. Notable exceptions are recorded, of course, but generally the monarchs and princes had to behave after sowing their wild oats before marriage. Emperor William, especially, was a stickler in this respect—was a puritan, in fact. All would have been well had he, as a sensible monarch should do, confined such discipline to himself. But the great meddler that was in him did not allow that. There happened to be in the waters of Kiel, on the occasion of the annual regatta, an American yacht with a particularly handsome woman aboard. The lady had a somewhat frayed reputation, due to an acquaintance with Edward VII, as Prince of Wales, that was considered too intimate. Edward heard of the presence of his former love and promptly paid her a visit—to the great disgust of the emperor. William, of course, considering himself the guardian and head not only of all the Hohenzollerns, but their relatives by marriage as well, chided his flighty uncle. Edward told his nephew, *Willie*, that he had better mind his own business. It is said that this was the last time that the two men spoke to one another on a strictly personal matter.

Among the many mistakes made by William II was the one that he looked upon his uncle as a sort of royal good-for-nothing, as he put it in a letter on one occasion. In addition to being somewhat presumptuous for a nephew to thus adjudicate his uncle and elder, it was foolish, to say the least. Queen Victoria had not given her son much of an opportunity to occupy himself with the very limited affairs of the British crown. To what little actual business there was she gave attention herself. The ministry took care of the government from cellar to garret, left the queen the parlor and the heir-presumptive the porch, as it were. As Prince of Wales, the duties of Edward had been confined to laying cornerstones, visiting hospitals and almshouses and receiving the lesser potentates. That left him a great deal of leisure, naturally, and this

the prince spent in a manner agreeable to himself and seldom agreeable to his mother. Queen Victoria used to complain of this within the family, and so it came that *Bertie* had not as good name *entre eux* as he would have had under the cast-iron regime at the Berlin residence. Why William II should have concluded that his uncle and brother-sovereign was a puddinghead besides is not a matter of record, but a fact nevertheless.

The Anti-German Policy of Edward VII

Edward VII has been credited, or discredited, as the case may be, with the intention of making the British sovereign less of a figurehead than he had been in the past. To that have been ascribed his activities known as the "isolation" of Germany.

The isolation of Germany was taken in hand by Edward VII immediately upon the death of Queen Victoria in 1901. While the public of Paris was still laughing over the Boer War caricatures in *Le Rire* and such salacious publications as *l'Assiette au Buerre*, in which Queen Victoria especially did not fare well, and while the humanitarians of France were still demanding that, in the name of civilization and human progress, France, Russia and eventually Germany and her allies strike Great Britain without loss of time, and put an end to her hegemony, Edward was busy laying the foundations of a policy that was to crush the man in Berlin, who had been quite busy giving his grandmother good military advice how the Boers could be overcome the quickest. From sending a telegram of congratulation to President *Oom* Paul Kruger, at the time of the Jamieson Raid, to that sort of thing was quite a step, to be sure. But to versatile, volatile William that was nothing.

It really was not difficult to win the French diplomatists over. They had discovered during the Fashoda Affair that it is not easy to perturb the British lion, or to take what he has in his claws. There had also been a rather annoying incident on the Lorraine border, and, above all, the conduct of the Russian ministers of foreign affairs was not uniformly satisfactory. There were times when the Franco-Russian alliance seemed on the verge of expiring. Count Muravieff was an arriviste diplomatically, somewhat pro-German by nature and easily influenced, and his successor, Count Lamsdorff, was openly Germanophile. It was one's duty under such circumstances to look about for a sort of supplementary insurance policy. The German population was increasing at a truly remarkable speed, having about 1900 reached its best birthrate, which meant a greater army twenty years hence, and meanwhile a greater production, and so more exports and more wealth. There was nothing else to do for the prudent states-

man but to effect an understanding with a nation that was more vitally interested in such things than was Russia, apparently. Czar Nicholas meanwhile had shown toward the Franco-Russian alliance an indifference that was disconcerting. The reactionaries of his court, and the nobility of his empire, generally, had never been any too fond of this international *mésalliance*. To some extent also German influence in St. Petersburg had undermined the standing of the Franco-Russian *entente*, as it was still called, and the Germanic nobles in the Baltic provinces also threw their weight in the scale against the arrangement with France.

But there were Russians, and a good many of them were to be found in Paris, who were still ardent supporters of the alliance. Some of them had looked rather farther into the future than M. de Giers and Prince Lobanoff had done. They had not seen it merely as a curb upon the imperialism of Great Britain, but they had also kept Germany in mind. Though the Russo-Polish element could gain nothing by setting Russia upon Germany, they, nevertheless, actuated by their greater hatred of the Prussians, and to some extent by their love of France, did everything they could to keep the treaty alive. M. de Hansen, a Dane with a grudge against Bismarck in particular, and all things German in general, who was being credited with having engineered the Franco-Russian pact with Gustave Flourens, then French minister of foreign affairs, had been given a great deal of assistance by the influential Poles at Paris and St. Petersburg, among whom was a certain Ratchkowsky, connected with the Russian secret service abroad. Baron Mohrenheim, at that time Russian ambassador at Paris, had never been more than lukewarm toward the proposal, following in this the example of de Giers, his chief in St. Petersburg. The treaty seems to have come about for no other reason than that both of the contracting parties needed one another and were willing to let matters rest with the strictly neo-platonic arrangement that was made.

France, therefore, was easily won over to the *entente cordiale*, which Edward VII had in mind, when the British press began to speak of a *rapprochement*. In 1904 relations between France and Great Britain were already of so cordial a character that the *entente cordiale* could be referred to in Downing Street without the press of Europe going either into ecstasy or suffering a convulsion.

One of the first practical results of the *entente* between Great Britain and France was that the latter acknowledged the justice of claims Great Britain had made in regard to Egypt. France also receded from the position she had taken, and stoutly defended in the past, on the exclusive fisheries rights in the waters of Newfoundland, retained by her in the treaty of Utrecht. In return for these cessions France was given a free hand by Great Britain in Morocco, a transaction which left the

German interests, mostly of a special concession character, high and dry, as members of the German Reichstag claimed at the time. Prince von Buelow, then chancellor, was not inclined to make an issue of the case. and pointed out that Germany's interests in Morocco were entirely economic, and that, since Spain had been left a place in Moroccan affairs, there was no reason to suppose that German commerce would be excluded.

The Morocco affair was to keep the chancelleries and diplomatic missions in Europe occupied for a long time—seven years. On at least one occasion it came close to leading to war between Germany and France, and the allies of both, probably. At this date it seems hardly worth while to give too much attention to the event; its main outlines must be drawn, however.

Though the German chancellor had stated publicly that Germany had only economic interests in Morocco, the German government a few months later, urged by special interests with investments in the country, it is charged, demanded that the status of the sultanate be reviewed at a conference at which the representatives of all claimants should be heard. The conference took place after the French minister of foreign affairs, M. Delcassé, had resigned in protest. Even the French government was not entirely sure of its ground, despite the attitude of its foreign minister. It was really a case of Delcassé making the best of a bad bargain. Great Britain had taken possession in Egypt, and France's compensation for the concessions made on the Nile was now being questioned and placed in jeopardy. Small wonder that the minister decided to abandon his post, and was from that moment on one of Germany's arch enemies.

Diplomacy in Its Heyday

The conference of Algieras was at first inclined to place Morocco under international control. The Germans were satisfied with that proposal, and, their vanity having been appeased, they consented readily enough that France continue her work, after the sphere of influence of the Spanish had been inconsiderably augmented. So far as the German government is concerned, anyway, all the noise that was made at home was nothing more than incident to a saving of face under difficult conditions. The *Alldeutschen*—Pan-Germans—saw in the Morocco affair a good opportunity to embarrass the government, which after a short flaring up in regard to armament on the sea, had again subsided into a closer adherence to the policies due the Triple Alliance. That great conservative in Vienna, Emperor Francis Joseph, was forever opposed, so long as his mind was active enough, to innovations in Triple Alliance politics that might have war in their wake. It is regrettable that the advice of the old man was not more often heeded

by Berlin, which is easily understood since in that capital already men were thinking of Austria-Hungary as a political incubus.

Though many promises had been made and many understandings arrived at, the French did not always show German interests in Morocco that consideration which they thought their due. The result was that, after much wrangling, an agreement was entered into, in specific terms, between France and Germany, 1909, by which the commercial interests of Germany and the political position of France, in Morocco, were clearly defined. In 1911 French troops, for the purpose of settling disorder in the interior, penetrated beyond the zone given to France. This and continuous complaints of German firms that they were being discriminated against by the French caused the German government to send the gun-boat "Panther" to Agadir Bay. Again, Europe was threatened by war, and again the *entente cordiale*, of which the prime mover, Edward VII, was now dead, saved the situation. The debates in the Reichstag of these days show how completely checkmated had been Germany by Great Britain—the country which but a few years ago had nary a friend and no ally in Europe.

The French ceded some territory in the Congo regions to the Germans and another Morocco incident was closed.

In 1907 there was effected an *entente* between Great Britain and Russia. The pact was never committed to paper, so far as is known; it was sealed with what amounted to a partition of Persia. The country in question was divided into two zones of interests, or political spheres. The northern went to Russia, the southern to Great Britain, which thereby gained entry into the potentially rich valley of Mesopotamia. Here, too, hostile contact was had with German interests. The Turkish government had given, and was about to give more, railroad concessions to German capitalists, the system projected being known as the Bagdad railroad. The Deutsche Bank of Berlin was behind this enterprise. The Germans built (1890) a branch line from Ismid to Ada Basar, extended the trunk line to Eski-Shehir and Angora (1892) and then to Konia (1896). In 1902, the Deutsche Bank was given the concession to continue the main line into Mesopotamia and immediately began work, starting at several points at the same time. At first it was the intention of the company to build the line through to Koweit on the Persian Gulf, but the British government objected to this. An agreement between the Turkish and British governments (1913) limited the concession of the Deutsche Bank south of Bagdad to the line Bagdad-Basra, 585 kilometers long.

The ring about Germany and her allies was now complete. Prince Lobanoff had been the first to give this political scheme his attention. But he was not the man to carry it out, or rather before he could con-

summate his plan death carried him off. It seems that his escapade with the wife of the French diplomatic secretary had robbed him of much of the prestige he needed to carry out his design. Though he was an ardent Francophile, even government circles in Paris grew wary of this adventurer in international politics—the fate of nations. King Edward succeeded far better—beyond his own expectations, it would seem. The isolation of Germany was complete. It was considered the more complete, because everybody expected the Hapsburg monarchy to crumble from one season to another, while Italy had long ago ceased to be regarded as a staunch member of the Triple Alliance, a little matter to which M. Barrère, the French ambassador at Rome, attended well. The Triple Entente, therefore, was the major fact of the political situation in Europe.

Germans who realized that a contest with the Triple Entente was inevitable and not far off were not few in number. Most of them were Socialists, however, and to be a Socialist damned in those days whatever view was held by one. In Germany, unfortunately for the people, it was not a case of what was said, but rather one of who said it. Infallibility of the government was more than ever the favorite doctrine, and the privileges of this were extended in the most gratuitous manner to all who seemed in authority, be that in state administration, politics or society. The Socialists alone were denied this, despite the fact that they represented the common people much more than the artificial majority sent into the state legislatures by the plural vote election system of the leading state, Prussia, and its principal supporter in reactionism, Saxony. Socialists such as David, Scheidemann, Haase, Ledebour, Liebknecht, Braun and Noske were not listened to, because it was assumed that they saw the situation through the black spectacles of partisanship. Indeed a review of the case nowadays fails to indicate an avenue of escape which Germany might have taken.

A General Maneuvering for Position

It was especially the *Alldeutschen*, or Pan-Germans, who were extravagant in their claims and intemperate in their speech. The Pan-German League first came into prominence about 1890, when it distinguished itself in adverse criticism of the cession to Great Britain of minor interests in Zanzibar and in East Africa in return for the transfer to Germany of Heligoland, which up to that time had been held by the British, despite its proximity to the German ports on the North Sea. During the time of international stress which followed the Agadir incident and the realization that the Triple Entente was indeed *fait accompli* and likely to stand any test in the fire, the Pan-Germanic Party and its

publications supported any movement calculated to promote armament. The German people and even the government, as the attitude of the German chancellors of those years shows, were eager to give their enemies a minimum of affront, but the less the cautious element talked, the louder were the Pan-Germans. Today one cannot read their fulminations without being struck by the force of the adage of old:

"Whom the gods will destroy they first make mad."

The completion of the Franco-Russo-British *entente* seems to have had little effect upon the radical *Alldeutschen*. More and more they pressed for armament on sea and land. The fear of the Englishman that his tight, little isle might be invaded had subsided at least a little by 1909. The "Englishman's Home" seemed again as secure as the British navy could make it. In that year, however, it was shown that the German navy was still growing at too rapid a pace, and the news that Krupp, with that fine impartiality that distinguishes the conduct of the princes of industry, was delivering as many armor plates to Great Britain as to Germany added to the fear in Great Britain. The plates might be bad.

A really unbearable situation had been brought about. It was so unbearable that Winston Churchill, first lord of the admiralty, proposed a naval holiday, a period in which no keels for new battleships should be laid down. In Germany that proposal found no willing ears, because it was interpreted as a ruse. Great Britain had more hulls on the stocks than had Germany. Be that as it may, no concessions were made in Berlin. The fight was on, and, while as yet no powder was being burned, it was already a case of no quarter.

Lord Haldane, who had been so active in behalf of the limitation of naval armament that he earned the reputation of being a Germanophile, which was already the least desirable name one could have in Great Britain, made another trip to Germany, this time officially for the Liberal government. The German government had the utmost confidence in Haldane, and showed itself most conciliatory. But it was no longer a case of agreeing in regard to the two-power standard or anything connected therewith. It was the Triple Entente that worried Berlin. The German government was willing to reduce its own naval program greatly in case the Liberal government would agree to remain neutral in case there should be war between Germany and France. Lord Haldane was not able to make that promise, but, after communicating with his government, was ready to put Great Britain on record as willing to leave France to her fate in case she attacked Germany. In view of what happened in 1914, a scant two years later, this is of interest. The offer made by Lord Haldane was tantamount to a notice upon Germany that Great Britain would side with France in case of aggression on the part of the Germans.

The remarkable feature of this is that, according to statements made to me by men in high official position in Berlin, who were in a position to know, the German government did not fully comprehend this at that time. I have proof to show that Lord Haldane was, seemingly, not understood. Had he been understood the history of July and August, 1914, might be other than what it is.

With this incident came to a close all effort on both sides to limit the naval programs of the two countries. In Germany every Socialist leader and many of the prominent men in the government had spoken in favor of it, and in Great Britain the Liberal Party had looked upon it as a sort of plank in their platform. They had promised the electorate that the money so saved was to be used in a number of socio-economic reforms that were greatly needed. Such men as Campbell-Bannerman, Lloyd George, Lord Morley, Vivian, Trevelyan and Haldane, not to mention a score of others, had been behind the movement. Nothing whatever had come of it, and for that secret diplomacy was responsible.

To say that every Englishman and German who favored an understanding between their countries on the question of naval armament was a deceiver is to take it for granted that there are no honest men in government. If that view should actually represent a fact then we must admit that those cheerful pessimists, the anarchists, are right after all. But there is no reason to assume that all the honest men are *out* of government, though election speeches would have it so, as a rule. The fact is that, as I will show in the chapter following, some forty men had made up their mind that there should be war, a world war, if necessary, and that they succeeded all too well. What is more, these forty men were not all in one capital. They belonged to the foreign offices and *corps diplomatiques* in London, Paris, Petrograd, Berlin and Vienna. The situation in Europe had given diplomacy its heyday, and never before had the intrigant such an opportunity.

Preparedness for War Gets New Start

The mission of Haldane, having been fruitless, the German government decided upon the military law of 1913, which increased the establishment of the line to 866,000 officers and men, without affecting the reserves and older bans, however. The increase itself was about 135,000 officers and men—not great in itself, but notice to the world that military preparedness in Germany was being put on yet a larger base. The law was passed June 30. On July 19 came the reply from France in the form of a similar law, and the battle under cover was on more than before. Most Germans referred to the law as a new form of mobilization, and

such, in effect, it was to be. Criticism of the government elicited nothing more than reference to what was being done in Russia. In March, 1913, the Russian government also increased its standing army materially and provided for a general and thorough reorganization, and, meanwhile, the strategic railroads along the Polish-Prussian and Russo-Galician borders were being pushed to completion as rapidly as possible. It was known that the last of these roads would be completed in 1915. The French banks and investors had furnished the money for the building of these lines. It was difficult to claim that economic requirements were the reason for their building, and St. Petersburg, therefore, calmly asserted that the railroads were meant for defensive purposes only. Since the gun may be used for aggression as well as in defense that was begging the question, of course.

To what extent the constantly growing industries of Germany, with their resulting exports and increase in wealth, were responsible for the Great War is entirely a matter of controversy into which it will not pay to enter. That Germany was getting to be a very dangerous neighbor to France is true enough. But it does not follow that it was envy of German industriousness and efficiency, as has been claimed, which induced the French to risk a war. France herself was still richer than Germany—richer especially in so far that she had room for her population, a rather negative quality in this instance, since the rapid growth in population of the German empire constituted in itself a sort of wealth which France had to fear more than the rapidly accumulating savings of the German people. In 1908 the density per square mile in Germany was 290.4 persons, while in France it was 189, or about 100 less. The area of the two countries was 208,780 square miles for Germany and 207,509 for France; the population respectively 66,800,000 and 39,800,000. What France had to fear was that she would lose more territory to the Germans soon or late, and this, then, will be accepted by the future historian as the actual causal motive of the Great War, so far as France and Germany are concerned. The philosophical investigator will arrive at a similar conclusion, no doubt, with the exception that he will state the case in terms of national biology. That France and Great Britain, and the United States destroyed completely Germany's manufacture and commerce—in the most ruthless and impolitic fashion—is more to be looked upon, under the circumstances, as a preventive measure than a policy completely in being at the outbreak of the War. To cripple Germany in this manner was the *sine qua non* of the prophylaxis of the so-called Peace Conference at Paris.

What has been said here for France would seem to apply to Great Britain. Germany was a long way off from being the dangerous com-

petitor of the British, whom apologists in the German government have pictured. There is something in the foreign trade figures of the two countries which has been overlooked. In 1913 Great Britain imported to the amount of \$3,741,048,000, while the exports totalled \$3,089,353,000, leaving a deficit of \$561,695,000. Germany in the same year imported goods and materials to the value of \$2,773,850,000, and exported \$2,592,239,000, leaving a difference against her of \$181,611,000. In the one instance we have a population of about 46 millions importing 3,741 million dollars worth of merchandise and exporting 3,000 millions worth, while in the other we have a people numbering roundly 69 millions, or 23 millions greater in number than the British population, importing only 2,773 millions worth of commodities and exporting again 2,592 millions worth. Though the difference between import and export, in both cases, does not wholly represent home consumption, it nevertheless is a fact that the British public, 23 millions less, consumed more than the German, as our figures go, at least three times as much; much more in reality.

In the case of Russia, also, it was not a question of getting rid of an economic competitor. The density of population of Russia in Europe was in 1908 only 53.8 persons per square mile, while for the empire it was only 14.92. What this means will be best understood when it is considered that the density in Belgium was 589 persons for each square mile. Americans will realize that better in comparison with the density in Rhode Island, which is 508.5, by far the greatest in the United States. The figures for Russian exports and imports were, in 1913, respectively \$782,869,000 and \$707,627,000, with a favorable balance of \$75,242,000, a wholly negligible amount for a population of about 177 million persons. Density and foreign trade figures show both that Russia was neither in need of more room nor of more trade.

The case, then, was entirely a question of politics. That the elements of national biology had something to do with it cannot be overlooked, however. Still it would seem that if Belgium could get along with a density of 589, Germany could have for some time managed with a density of 290.4—at least, the necessity for more room was not pressing enough so as not to permit her government to select a more propitious moment for a war of conquest and annexation.

The Position of Austria-Hungary

The position of Austria-Hungary in the setting of the stage for the great tragedy is very unimportant. As second member of the Triple Alliance, her role, politically, was great enough; militarily, it was anything but that. For years she troubled nobody and managed to get along

with all her neighbors. Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria and Czar Alexander III, as well as his father, had been on the best of terms. The first two were feudal enough in their state tendency to be perfectly *en rapport* on all matters affecting the intercourse of their states. For Alexander II the Austrian emperor was progressive enough to meet his liberal views. Francis Joseph was a rare personage among monarchs. Without having to simulate in the least he was everything to all men. Hence his great success as the ruler of a dual state composed of no less than ten races, having no less than ten sets of national aspirations, and all that in an age in which liberal tendency was not as scarce or as disregarded in his realm as some would have us believe.

The Austro-Hungarian government made two great mistakes. The one was the consequence of the other. In October, 1908, it annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, since the Berlin Congress under its control, without consulting at all in any respect the wishes of the people thus brought into the dual monarchy. Many of these people were of Slav origin, and what is more important the majority of them felt attracted to what had become known as Jugo-Slavism.

The annexation of these two Turkish provinces had been contemplated in Vienna for a long time. But the moment was never propitious until Count Aehrenthal, then Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, made it that, by breaking the news privately to Isvolski under circumstances that placed the Russian minister of foreign affairs at a great disadvantage. In September of 1908 Count Berchtold, at that time Austro-Hungarian ambassador at St. Petersburg, invited Isvolski, then travelling in Austria, to spend a few days at a hunting lodge of his near Buchan in Bohemia. It was there, while the Russian minister of foreign affairs was a guest, that Count Aehrenthal initiated him into the design of his government to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. Isvolski was a man who liked to please, and the sharp Count Aehrenthal, an apt pupil of Metternich at his worst, outwitted him. For that Isvolski lost his post in the Russian cabinet and later went to Paris as ambassador, there to nurse his resentment of both, his own good nature and the sharp dealing of Counts Aehrenthal and Berchtold. It has been said that a diplomatist must never say either yes or no. Monsieur Isvolski seems to have taken that too literally. Needless to say this little trick did not in any way improve relations between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance.

The Austro-Hungarian government prepared the ground very poorly for the annexation of the two provinces, because, two years before, it had allowed the big Hungarian landowners to inveigle the country into a sort of tariff war with Serbia. As the result of this Serbian exports to the Danube country had gone down from 63,000,000 crowns in 1905

to 12,500,000 crowns in 1907, though Serbia had cut her imports from the same country for the two years only from 32,000,000 to 25,000,000 crowns, that is to say, Serbia had exported to Austria-Hungary 50,500,000 crowns less in 1907 than in 1905, but had bought only 7,000,000 crowns less.

For a while it seemed as if the Serbian farmers would have to choke in the lard, pork and prunes they had to sell. But Germany came to their assistance and bought to the tune of 32,000,000 crowns in 1907 as against 2,000,000 crowns in 1905. Belgium likewise increased her imports from Serbia from 300,000 crowns to 13,000,000 crowns in 1907. Economic war makes as strange bed fellows as the other sort. The fact that Serbia could sell to advantage was due entirely to international railroad agreements, which permitted German and Belgian freight cars to pass in transit through Austria-Hungary without duty having to be paid on their cargoes. That Serbia had no outlet upon the Adriatic Sea made this atrocious case of tariff discrimination possible. There are times when governments and governed as well must be protected against their own stupidity, and this was such a case. Had fate willed it that Serbia could get to the sea Austria-Hungary, in the first place, would have never excluded her products, and, secondly, Austria-Hungary might not today be in the position she is in. Again:

Whom the gods would destroy they first make mad.

The Profits of Tariff Discrimination

The ruthless proceeding against Serbia roused the anger of every Slav in the monarchy. It gave Jugo-Slavism and Pan-Slavism the very impetus they needed. Overnight the quasi-secret organization of the Jugo-Slavs, the somewhat notorious "Narodna Odbrana," became a tremendous factor and in the end Austria-Hungary saw more of her people and territory carried away by the tariff discrimination against Serbia than she had gained by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And all this to please a landed class, which thought that it was not getting enough out of special privileges enjoyed in vested rights and the unlimited opportunity to exploit the peasant.

Here, too, was a case in which a sovereign state thought sovereignty to be a patent for any sort of conduct toward the weaker neighbor. The worst of fallacies is independence carried to extremes. Even the most powerful of nations, the most absolute of monarchs, is not independent wholly of others. The time usually comes when transgression against natural law, even though it be one of the misunderstood factors in national biology, will be visited upon the transgressor. The Great War had many

examples of this—enough of them to last the haughty World Powers that remain for the rest of their existence. Let us hope that at least this lesson is not lost.

Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir-presumptive of Austria and Hungary, had made the mistake—and for the future ruler of several millions of Slavs it was a bad mistake—of permitting himself to become known as a Slavophobe. To what extent he was this I have no means of ascertaining, but there is hardly ever smoke where there is no fire. At one time he was credited with being anti-Magyar. Both rumors or claims were probably greatly exaggerated. At any rate he was done to death on June 28, 1914, by Jugo-Slav fanatics in the town of Sarajevo, Bosnia.

For several days it was feared that the political mine of Europe was surely sprung. The world held its breath, so to speak. It waited for the blow to fall for a week and then returned to its business, the diplomatic world to its vacations. Twenty-six days passed and then the news came that the Austro-Hungarian government had sent an ultimatum to Belgrade the like of which had not been transmitted in years. When the ultimatum was delivered the European chancelleries were virtually empty of the men who attended to the affairs of state. Ambassadors and ministers everywhere were out in the country and at the season places summering. The German emperor was on his wonted trip to the Northlands, and even Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, was not in the building on the Ballhausplatz, nor even in Vienna. It seemed as if the ultimatum had fallen from the blue sky. For a day governmental and diplomatic circles everywhere went through the motion of coming to wakefulness, real in some cases, simulated in others, and then diplomacy and all that appertains to it engaged frantically in efforts to prevent in the last minute what it had labored and intrigued for during years.

V

THE GREAT DEBACLE

WHEN Europe next occupied itself with the assassination at Sarajevo it was the hard terms of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia that attracted attention. Reasonable men everywhere felt that they might lead to war. There were many who could not see why the blood of thousands, as it was then viewed, should be spilled for the murder of an archduke and his wife, even though they were Hapsburgs and the prospective sovereign couple of a World Power.

The ultimatum expired on Saturday, July 25, at six p. m. Its worst feature really was that it demanded of the Serbian government that in its official publication it should on July 26th publish a statement prepared by the foreign office at Vienna. That measure was punitive, of course. It was hardly possible that the Serbian government could keep from its people the fact that it had been humbled into the dust, as governments look upon such things.

Why the Austro-Hungarian government gave its ultimatum just that form has puzzled many. The tenor and demands of the instrument could easily be given that interpretation which much of the world placed upon them later on in the charge that Austro-Hungary wanted to have war with Serbia at any price. The circumstance that a partial mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army had already been ordered, and the fact that considerable bodies of troops were already on the borders of Serbia, could not but serve in support of that conclusion.

Yet the actual fact is that the Austro-Hungarian government hoped to settle its differences with Belgrade without recourse to war. The mobilization which it ordered was a purely coercive measure, applied by Vienna, as I have been able to establish to at least my own satisfaction, so that the Serbian government would not be able to think lightly of the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian government. That the procedure was reckless in the extreme is true enough. Vienna and Berlin felt that they could still afford extravagances of this sort. I say Vienna and Berlin, because the German government has seen fit to assert that it knew nothing of the intentions of its ally, which is absurd, of course.*

* Since the writing of these lines this has been definitely established.

I happen to know that the German ambassador in Vienna was fully acquainted with what was going on, and it is not likely that he left his foreign office in the dark. More likely is that the text of the ultimatum was submitted to the government in Berlin through the Austro-Hungarian envoy at that capital.

Six years before Austria-Hungary had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina with the assistance of the German government. That assistance may have been limited to an assurance on the part of the German government that in case of complications arising from the annexation it would stand by the terms of the treaty of alliance. But that, naturally, was all the assistance Austria-Hungary needed. When Isvolski had been won over in the manner explained before, Austria-Hungary and Germany, moreover, could proceed without having to fear anything. So long as Russia, self-appointed guardian of all the Slavs in the world, had been disposed of, Bosnia and Herzegovina could be incorporated without much of a risk. The annexation was no affair of Great Britain nor of France so long as primarily it benefitted only the dual monarchy, with whom both governments maintained at least cordial relations despite its membership in the Triple Alliance. It would have been different had Germany made the annexation. The Triple Entente, so far as Great Britain and France were concerned, was a measure against Germany, and both the British and French governments could well afford to be on especially good terms with the Austro-Hungarian government, which, as a member of the already very shaky Triple Alliance, might yet further weaken that pact, eventually leave Germany unallied entirely. But of this more further on.

The Austro-Hungarian government entertained little respect for the Serbian government, people and royal family. The tariff discriminations already referred to could leave no doubt as to that. Primarily, however, it was the great disdain for the Karageorgevitch—Kara-Yürük—family that was felt in Vienna, that led to the rudeness displayed in the ultimatum.

The social distinctions drawn in royal circles are many, as is known. Upon them is based the elaborate system of etiquette which governs the intercourse within this caste. The fact that most of the monarchs of Europe addressed one another in the familiar "thou" form has little to do with that, though the uninitiated might easily look upon this practice as proof of the great solidarity sovereigns and their families are supposed to maintain.

A Question of Royal Respectability

The Karageorgevitches had been a stench in the nostrils of royalty for decades. They succeeded the Obrenovitches by means of assassina-

tion and were considered unfit members of the family of kings therefore, especially since the Obrenovitch family was credited with better qualities than its rival, that of Black George. The founder of the Obrenovitch dynasty had been a humble Serb peasant who had distinguished himself in leadership of armed bands against the Turks. The original Black George was a man of a different type, though he also did his best to make the lot of the Turks in Serbia anything but pleasant. George was a gypsy, hailing from Bosnia, so far as records show. The story is that he was born under a hedge *somewhere* in the Balkan peninsula. Another story has it that he saw the light of day first in a gypsy tent pitched at the base of the Theodosian Wall at Stamboul. Be that as it may, the writer one day visited the village on the slopes of Mount Vidosh, near Sofia, where George resided in a hovel, gypsy fashion, before he decided to become a liberator and a statesman. In those days he herded pigs now, and took a shot at Turks then, being one of the members of a band of the variety later known as *comitadjes*.

A folklore which is not unfriendly in the main has it that George earned himself the sobriquet *Kara*—black—for a number of crimes of a particularly shocking aspect. It is said that he shot his father, raped his sister and hung his brother. In extenuation of this conduct it may be said that such crimes were nothing unusual among the lawless elements in the peninsula, which only too often made the presence of the Turk the mere pretext for organizing into bands of robbers, as was especially the case in Serbia in those days, where a little later Karageorgevitch and Obrenovitch vied with one another in cruelty toward Turk and Serb alike.

All of this would have been well had it not been that King Peter, as late as 1890-91, worked, like any other common individual, for a photographer in Vienna, one Charles Scolik. With the notion held in the Austro-Hungarian capital that royalty is something indeed sacrosanct these things did not all harmonize. So it came that King Peter was looked upon as the veriest of royal upstarts. To make the Obrenovitches feel that they were vassals of the Austro-Hungarian crown they were given a large annual stipend in return for nothing in particular. The Karageorgevitches, on the other hand, received such an income from the Russian court.

With such men the Austro-Hungarian court, on the one hand, and the very superior aristocrats in the Ballhausplatz building, on the other, were not inclined to be any too diplomatic, as the tariff matter had already demonstrated. Goaded into exasperation by the activities of the rather notorious "Narodna Odbrana" and other Jugo-Slav patriotic organizations, of which the assassination of the archduke was but the climax, the Austro-

Hungarian government was ready to treat Serbia in the manner which has ever been followed by the powerful government in its dealings with weaker states, especially when the latter were generally supposed to be somewhat "barbarian." In short, the attitude of the dual monarchy, and most of its non-Slav constituents, was about the same as that observed by many people in the United States toward Mexico and some of the other Latin-American republics. All would have been well had it not been that Sazonoff was just then Russian minister of foreign affairs, and that the political ulcer of Europe was ready to break.

Men who know this situation only superficially have said that it was Russia's fixed policy to get to Constantinople by the Balkan route, that was responsible for the stiff-backedness which the Serbian government developed—almost overnight. To some extent that is true, but the weak and vacillating Czar Nicholas was not the man to give much attention to this phase of Russian expansion. To be sure it was his foreign minister, Sazonoff, who had engineered the vicious treaty of Bucharest, 1913, which deprived the Bulgarians of a great deal of territory to which they had every valid claim, and which took from them, in addition, a district as Bulgarian as Maine is American—the Dobrudja. Needless to say, this estranged the Bulgarian people, and created throughout Southeast Europe the impression that Russia proposed marching to the Dardanelles via the Balkan, with the favored Serbians on their right flank of advance and with the Greeks doing a similar service on the shores of the Mediterranean. That the Rumanians had been pleased at the expense of the Bulgarians, by getting the Dobrudja, was interpreted as the throwing out of a fine bit of bait. It had a very sharp and strong hook in it, however, as Senator Marghiloman explained to me. That hook was the passing of Rumania under Russian suzerainty, if not rule. But all this did not dictate the moves of Sazonoff just then. He knew well enough that the conquest of the Balkan and the remainder of Turkey of Europe was not yet something to which Great Britain would give her assent, though with the French, with whom he dealt most, that might have made no difference so long as the German situation was taken care of. For that enterprise the world in Europe was not yet ripe.

The Diplomatic Mines Are Sprung

The fact is, as I will show better later on, that Sazonoff instructed Belgrade not to pay much attention to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. With the assurance that the big brother in the North was coming to help, the Serbian government had no reason to acquiesce into the extreme and insulting demands of Austria-Hungary. As I later learned, the

Austro-Hungarian government was sure that Serbia would accept her terms. Baron von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian minister at Belgrade, was under the impression, even sure, that the ultimatum would have the desired effect. But he was ignorant of the intentions of Sazonoff and the instructions rushed to the Serbian government, and made what, under the circumstances, is a natural mistake. Had Pashitch, the premier and foreign minister of Serbia, given him a tip that all was not as it appeared on the surface, the minister might have changed his tactics, so far as he could. It is very probable, however, that neither he, nor his foreign office, would have believed the Serbian government. Most likely such an intimation would have been looked upon as a ruse. There is also the circumstance that premiers are not generally allowed to speak of such matters. Thus it came about that on July 28 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.)

For the next five days the telegraph wires of Europe continued to be very busy trying to mend matters. There were meetings of crown councils and cabinets everywhere. In the chancelleries the midnight oil was burned. Embassies and legations were the scene of wildest confusion. The press grew excited, and the public, throughout Central Europe, stood silent in awe. Foreign ministers and premiers did this and that, and arrived nowhere, and four of the monarchs of Europe, William, George, Nicholas and Francis Joseph, engaged in as futile an exchange of telegrams as could be imagined. The German emperor became the center of this. He tried, and tried honestly, to avert the catastrophe that was imminent. I realize fully that it will be considered daring to defend William II in that respect, yet a fact is a fact. As George Bernard Shaw put it recently:

"It is out of the question to present the truth concerning a war to those who must chiefly bear the burden of it. Yet that should be done, must be done, if the public is ever to fully realize its own position."

It is utterly futile to attempt the proving of anything in war by means of the vari-colored books, so-called "blue" books, which governments are in the habit of issuing after they have entered upon a martial adventure. The writer has reached that conclusion after studying, for a matter of five years almost, the British *white*, Russian *orange*, French *yellow*, German *white*, Belgian *grey*, Austro-Hungarian *red* and United States *white* papers.

The general public cannot be expected to understand, is not permitted to understand, in fact, what the purpose of these specious documents is. *The vari-colored books are issued by the governments concerned for the purpose of exonerating them before their own publics, putting the enemy in as bad a light as possible and influencing the public opinion*

of the world. That is their sole purpose, and there is no other. At the same time it is hard to understand how serious men, professors of history among them, can take such garbled accounts as throwing really a "strong" light on the guilt or innocence of this or that government. The documents I have named and their supplements contain nearly 700 major communications. Yet not a single one of them speaks of what had transpired before the situation was critical. The obligations of one state to another, as caused by understandings and alliances, understood by the public, or secret, which is more important, are not even touched upon. Nor is there among this mass of so-called evidence so much as an allusion to an instruction of a diplomatic envoy that made for war in case orders furthering peace should not bring good results. The reasonable human being has every right to think that a government would at least include, if it were honest in its so-called defense, such instructions to ambassadors and suggestions to allied governments as would be considered perfectly justified in case a bellicose power conducted itself in such a manner as to make war a strong eventuality.

But nothing of the sort is done in these "papers." Their authors point to themselves with seeming satisfaction as the government or group which *alone* tried to avert the calamity of war. The British white book makes no reference to a fact, which Lord Haldane had already presented to the German government as late as 1912, to wit: That there was a definite understanding of the *entente cordiale* that Great Britain would come to the aid of France in case there was an attack made upon her. That much, at least, Haldane had made perfectly clear to Berlin by his attitude in refusing to agree to it that in case of war between Germany and France Great Britain would remain neutral.

Sir Edward Grey and other British statesmen have since then asserted that the British government had made no promise to France of military aid of any sort and that it was the violation of the neutrality of Belgium that drove Great Britain into the war. How the world can be expected to believe that is hard to see. Haldane had admitted that under certain conditions Great Britain would go to war in the interest of France, and he admitted it in an endeavor to bring Germany to reason. His motive was the best. But apart from all that, may we not ask what was the purpose of the *entente cordiale* if it was not, at least, an agreement of a defensive-alliance character? That is the very least upon which governments have in the past been willing to give their foreign relations that aspect which an *entente* between powers creates. The government that would complacently permit itself to be known as the close friend of another government without having more than the friendship and esteem of another nation in the bargain would be very foolish, to say the least.

Such a friendship would be seriously questioned by other powers, who, misunderstanding this platonic love, would rightly cast about for an ally to meet the day when the purely altruistic union of the others would suddenly unmask itself as something entirely different. Surely, British statesmen expect too much from this gullible world when they demand that this fairy tale of theirs be accepted as presented.

The Terms of the *Entente Cordiale*

The fact of the matter was that the British government had promised France to side with her in a war against Germany under any circumstances. The mobilization ordered by the British government was a partial mobilization in name only and was meant for an attack on Germany *no matter whether the German army attacked France through Belgium and Luxembourg or through Alsace-Lorraine*, because such was the import and purpose of the *entente cordiale*. This and the fact that there was in force an *entente* between Great Britain and Russia and an alliance between Russia and France, and the further fact that Russia would not consent to a localization or limitation of the trouble on the Danube to letting it remain an issue between Austria-Hungary and Serbia made the Great War inevitable.)

It seems unreasonable to criticize for its own sake the attitude of the Russian government in regard to Austria-Hungary's unreasonable demands upon Serbia. At the same time, so far as Russia and Germany were concerned, the possibilities for peace were not yet exhausted, as has been shown by the failure of Czar Nicholas to get his orders to his minister of war, General Soukhomlinoff, carried out so that the general mobilization under way might be halted. A sane diplomacy, willing to preserve the peace of the world, would have served notice upon the Austro-Hungarian government that measures taken against Serbia would have to be accounted for and their consequence borne. As it was, the diplomacy of Europe and Great Britain was on the single track of maneuvering for war, in the case of some governments; in the case of others treaty obligations and prestige drove their nations over the precipice.

Great Britain alone could have prevented the Great War. Her special position gave her that power and conferred upon her that duty. Had Sir Edward Grey frankly informed the German government the catastrophe *might* have been averted. I say *might have been averted* for the reason that I am not so sure that the German government would not have run the risk for all that. In Germany the very thought of a big navy had, as has been the case before, created in many the impression that such a sea power was already in existence. The contemplation of the thing

that was to be, had fired the brains of many with a wild desire to see it used.

But Great Britain did nothing of the sort. Prince Lichnowski, who only recently published his very interesting but quite foolish memoirs concerning his stay in London as German ambassador, was one of those German diplomatists who thought their wishes and hopes to be reality. Edward Grey had assured him on many occasions that Great Britain was not as absolutely committed to France as was believed. The German ambassador believed that, and has since then been paid the compliment by Mr. Shaw that he was too honest a man to deal with the British premier, that, as a matter of fact, he credited Sir Edward with the qualities he himself had. I am not so sure that this is in accord with the facts. In what particular respect Sir Edward was unusually dishonest, for a politician, has not been shown. To leave Lichnowski under the impression that Great Britain had a free hand in regard to France was perfectly honest when viewed in the light of accepted diplomatic morality. Not to leave the German ambassador in these false hopes would have been an instance of altruistic conduct, not only toward Germany but to the world as well. Governments, as a rule, are expected to be altruistic only with themselves. Most of them follow that principle in statecraft.

Lichnowski actually believed that Great Britain would stay out of the war. He has since then admitted this to the extent of confessing that he thought Great Britain would come to the aid of France only in case the neutrality of Belgium was violated. There was a time, however, when he was positive that the British government would on no account go to war with Germany—*entente* or no.

Of the great simplicity of Prince Lichnowski, and his need-born optimism I have found telling corroboration in a book on official pre-war correspondence, suppressed by the publisher thereof. I refer to von Mach's "Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War." Pages 593-94:

German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, dated 1st August, 1914.

"Sir Edward Grey has just called me to the telephone and has asked me whether I thought I could declare that, in the event of France remaining neutral in a German-Russian war, we would not attack the French. I told him that I believed I could assume responsibility for this.

LICHNOWSKI."

Pages 594-95:

His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, dated 1st August, 1914.

"In answer to your telegram, which has just been received, I believe that there must be a misunderstanding with regard to a

suggestion which was made in a friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowski and Sir Edward Grey when they were discussing how an actual conflict between the German and French armies might be avoided, so long as there is still a possibility of an agreement being arrived at between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowski early tomorrow morning in order to ascertain whether there is any misunderstanding on his side.

GEORGE."

Page 595:

German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, dated 2nd August, 1914.

"The suggestions of Sir Edward Grey based on the desire of creating the possibility of lasting neutrality on the part of England were made without any previous inquiry of France and without knowledge of the mobilization, and have since been given up as quite impracticable.

LICHNOWSKI."

Since the text of the telegrams, the dates and the general aspect of the situation then prevailing are more eloquent than any explanation possibly could be, the reader is left to draw his own conclusions, though attention is directed to the apologetic tone of Lichnowski's telegram of August 2, in which he explains for Sir Edward Grey what no longer needed such treatment.

The Attitude of Prince Lichnowski

Far more eloquent is something which occurred about noon on July 30. With Lichnowski was at the time Dr. Richard von Kühlmann, subsequently minister at The Hague and ambassador at Constantinople and later state secretary for foreign affairs. Kühlmann was then the *conseiller* of the German ambassador to the court of St. James, and as such had to be consulted by Prince Lichnowski much oftener than this rich, well-trained and somewhat overbearing diplomatist found agreeable. Kühlmann had the nasty habit of looking facts in the face. He was of the "new school" of German diplomatists and decidedly Anglophile, yet not blindly so in matters of duty.

The *conseiller* had just discussed with the ambassador what Great Britain might do—would do, so far as Kühlmann's judgment went. He was about to leave when the doorman announced to Prince Lichnowski that Captain von Müller, the embassy's naval attaché, was very urgent in his desire to be received. The ambassador was not edified by this. He looked upon the attaché as a man with alarmist leaning, and felt that he would bring another series of bad tidings. After saying as much

to Kühlmann, the ambassador told the doorman to invite the captain to come in.

Evidently the naval attaché had news of importance. To some remark of Lichnowski's to that effect he laid on the table what turned out to be a report to the person of the emperor. Under pressing conditions, or when the subject was important enough, such reports were made by military and naval attachés.

The ambassador read the report, then looked up at the attaché and at Kühlmann with a pained expression on his face.

"My dear captain!" he said as he handed the paper to Kühlmann. "This report cannot be sent. I have been trying hard to keep this country and Germany at peace, and have almost succeeded. All my work will be in vain in case this report gets to His Majesty. I beg you not to send it."

Captain von Müller could not see it that way. His report said that he had just learned that the mobilization orders of the British government were of such a nature that the immediate general use of the naval and military establishments was contemplated. It was certain also, said the report, that Great Britain proposed coming to the assistance of France in any event. Whether Germany attacked France through Alsace-Lorraine, Luxembourg or Belgium would make no difference.

The German naval attaché had his authority for these statements. To him this seemed reliable enough, but Prince Lichnowski thought the assertions of the report so out of harmony with the facts, as he thought of them, that he questioned the accuracy of the information. He asked *Conseiller* Kühlmann what his opinion was and received a non-committal reply. It was plain to the attaché that Kühlmann did not want to interfere, but he, nevertheless, was inclined to side with the report.

To make a long story short, Captain von Müller was prevailed upon not to dispatch the report immediately, as he had intended, but to wait for further developments. When, finally, the ambassador consented to the forwarding of the telegram, having then been convinced that the attaché was right, it was too late. A few hours before the British government had given orders to the telegraph service that no more dispatches in code from the German and Austro-Hungarian embassies were to be accepted.

Lichnowski in this manner held up the means that might have caused the men in Berlin to yet change their course. The report itself was not authoritative, to be sure, but it would have been a warning. It might have accomplished more than a statement from the British premier, because such a statement from Sir Edward direct might have caused the Berlin government to be more touchy than ever, while the same notice from the

German naval attaché at London, a man of high standing, would have appealed more to common sense than to the susceptibilities of the pride of monarchs and ministers.

The reader may ask how I come to know the details of the case. My informants are Captain von Müller himself, Dr. Richard von Kühlmann, Baron Carl von Giskra, at that time Austro-Hungarian minister at The Hague, and a neutral diplomatist at London whose name I am not permitted to give.

Prince Lichnowski has made no mention of this incident and its features in the pamphlet of self-defense published by him in Switzerland, nor has he at all intimated to what extent the wool was pulled over his eyes by Sir Edward Grey—all of which was natural enough in the case of a man who smarted more under the treatment that was given him at home, when his mission was terminated by a fiasco, than he resented the masterly manner in which the British foreign minister convinced him that black was white.

Meanwhile, the wires of Europe were hot with frantic endeavors to avert the highly imminent war. Emperor William was wiring in all directions. He pleaded with Czar Nicholas, and his cousin, King George, but did little enough to bring Austria-Hungary to her senses.* In a large measure that was due to the fact that Emperor Francis Joseph was no longer the actual head of the Austro-Hungarian government. Nominally still the chief of that government, the old man was living now entirely in the past—a past in which monarchs made war according to personal formula. Count Berchtold had persuaded him that Serbia deserved no better than she was getting, and there was in Belgrade no brother monarch in whom old Francis Joseph would have taken an interest sufficiently great to cause him to occupy himself with the ultimatum from that angle. The old emperor, in addition, had too fine an opinion of the military strength of his German ally to worry over the possibility of war, and when the moment came that war was inevitable he calmly left affairs in the hands of the same ally. That there was some correspondence on the subject of the ultimatum to Serbia between the two emperors is most likely. It has not been published, however. Allied rulers and allied governments, necessarily, do not include their own correspondence in the "papers" they afterward publish.

That the German government stood so valiantly by Austria-Hungary in those days has puzzled a good many impartial observers. An alliance of defense leaves usually some way out for the signatory who may con-

* The recent publication of what is known as the "Kautsky" papers, dealing with this phase of relations between the Austro-Hungarian government and Emperor William and his ministers, corroborates this in a most absolute manner.

sider that the co-signatory had been the aggressor in an imprudent degree. Italy did this later on, and there is no reason to believe that the German government could not have advanced the same contention and in this manner, with all honor saved, left Austria-Hungary at the mercy of the Russians. There are limits even to loyalty, and generally these limits are prescribed by the self-interest of the other party.

It must be accepted, therefore, that the German government had much in common with the Austro-Hungarian government. But it was not in Serbia itself where these interests met. In fact, so far as Serbia was directly concerned German and Austro-Hungarian interests were opposed. When the government in Vienna sanctioned the tariff war upon Serbia it was Germany which bought from the Serbs most of what they could export, and so long as the German government supported Russia on the Balkan as against Austria-Hungary, Belgrade had staunch friends in Berlin. The support given the Austro-Hungarian government by the German government had its causal origin in the general political situation in Europe.

When Emperor William and his advisors stood for the localization of the Serbian-Austro-Hungarian difficulty they had in mind the curb that had to be placed upon Russian designs southward and southwestward. It was Pan-Slavism that bothered Berlin. The Slavs of Austria and Hungary and those in the Balkans were gravitating toward Russia. A declaration of war by the Russian government against Austria-Hungary would have caused the latter to fall to pieces if not supported by the German army, and overnight Russia would have had Germanic Europe at her mercy in that event. Just as the British had their "German peril" so had the Germans their "*russische Gefahr*"—Russian peril. To meet that peril before Russia could complete her strategic railroads close to the German and Austro-Hungarian borders and carry through the reorganization of her increased army was considered the paramount duty by the men in Berlin. If that could be accomplished diplomatically so much the better; if it had to be done on the field of battle then, as most Germans thought, the inevitable had to be faced a little ahead of time—a scant twelve months at that, as the situation was viewed.

Germany was not by any means unanimous in this matter. As stated before, there were many who looked upon Austria-Hungary as a poor sort of ally. From the military point of view the dual monarchy was accepted by some of the leading German statesmen as a charge rather than a gain. In that respect Austria-Hungary was not much better than Italy, as these men thought.

On the whole the Junker element of Prussia, then quite the strongest factor in the German imperial government, was rather Russophile. And

it was this honestly. Being reactionaries mostly, the Prussian Junkers looked upon the control of the Russian masses by a handful of autocrats at St. Petersburg with admiration. East of the Elbe they had social standards that differed from Russian social standards only in so far as they were more genuinely paternal. So far as the proletariat was concerned the Russian government was a neglectful father, while the Prussian government, equally stern and absolute, was really mindful of at least the physical wants of the governed.

It was the Junker element of Germany which had in the past examined critically the Triple Alliance and subjected it to much scrutiny. Since this group thought in terms of "Realpolitik" it was but natural that it came to oppose the Austrophiles in Germany. For many years before the War Russian and Austro-Hungarian interests had been in hostile contact in the Balkans. Russia wanted to get to the Mediterranean by way of Constantinople and the straits and thought the incorporation of the Balkan Slavs a pleasant and profitable incident to this, while Austria-Hungary wanted to prevent these very things, feeling that the loss of her own Slav population meant the doom of the state. The Slavs in the dual monarchy were the keystone of the state, holding up the German-Austrian and Hungarian half-arches. To lose that keystone was synonymous with the end of the monarchy, and might even lead to Russian suzerainty in all of Austria-Hungary. The Russian peril was much more of a reality to Central Europe than the German peril was that to Great Britain.

There were men in Germany who wished to placate that peril. In Austria and Hungary that element was wholly absent. The Junker party of Prussia was forever for a rapprochement with Russia, but made little progress owing to the fact that the Liberals of Germany did not propose having their country Russified in addition to being Prussianized. Liberal South Germany was consistently pro-Austrian for no other reason and was mainly responsible for the continuation of Austrophile politics in Berlin, rendering futile in this manner the "orientation toward the East" which the Junkers, as the better politicians, persistently advocated. Social Russia was a stench in the nostrils of the German Liberals, as it was in those of progressives everywhere. On the one hand this led to the cementing of the Triple Entente, and on the other to the reinforcement of the Triple Alliance, so far as Germany and Austria-Hungary were concerned. To the claim of the Junkers that Austrophilism would in the end prove the undoing of the German empire, the Liberals replied that closer relations with Russia would do the same thing socio-politically. Thus it came about that the German government gave its support to the Austro-Hungarian government in its program of action in Serbia.

We must now turn to Petrograd—then still St. Petersburg—to see what was taking place there. The trial of General Yanushkevitch, chief of staff of the Russian army, during the initial phases of the War, has established that he did not carry out the orders given him by Emperor Nicholas. Backed by Minister of War General Soukhomlinoff, by Grand Duke Nicholai Nicholaievitch and by Sazonoff, the chief of staff felt himself free to lie to his imperial master, the czar. Nicholas had learned from Emperor William, Count Pourtalès, the German ambassador at St. Petersburg, and the German military attaché that the Russian mobilization was not a partial one, as had been ordered, but one of so general a character that the German government considered it a menace. At first Czar Nicholas was not inclined to pay much attention to the claim of the Germans, but finally decided to ascertain whether or no, after all, there was some truth in what he had heard. He called General Yanushkevitch to the telephone and questioned him, to be told that the mobilization was indeed a partial one. It was from this angle that Czar Nicholas pursued his correspondence with Emperor William. Meanwhile the general mobilization continued, and left the German emperor in no other position than to assume that his brother monarch in St. Petersburg was lying to him. Berlin was well informed on what the Russian general staff was doing. It had many friends in Russia and the Russian army—many of them Baltic Germans, who in the past had been zealous promoters of a Russo-German *entente*. The news which these managed to get to the German diplomatic mission at St. Petersburg, and through that agency to Berlin, was a sweeping contradiction of the letter and spirit of the telegrams Czar Nicholas was sending to Emperor William.

With every thought only on war and with the militarists supreme by now, there was no longer any hope that diplomacy might effect a conciliation. The mobilization of Russia was general and was making rapid headway, and Germany saw herself obliged to follow suit. The attitude of Paris and London was as menacing as that of St. Petersburg, and there was now no time for any other move than to stand pat by Austria-Hungary.

The Conduct of a Mad Militarist

To German apologies in regard to this situation it has often been remarked that the German government could have mobilized its army, concentrated it along the Russo-German border and then awaited developments. From the peace point of view that is indeed a good argument. Two parties not willing to fight might do that; eager to fight they would not do it, of course. In their mobilization the Russians had quite a start

over the Germans. It is not good policy when war is imminent to wait until the other party has every man in the field; it would not have been good policy for the Germans to do this in this instance, since the Russian army was numerically much the superior of the German. Nor would it have been easy for the German government to explain later on that it permitted all initial advantages of war to slip into the hands of the Russians by a conciliatory attitude that might not have changed the situation at all in the end. From that angle the German government acted indeed on the defensive. Allowances must be made for a man, Emperor William in this instance, who as chief executive of a nation receives from another chief executive assurances that bear the stamp of sincerity, because they were sincere, while from his own agents he gets information that the preparations for war are proceeding on a general scale at maximum speed.

The case of General Yanushkevitch is of more than incidental interest. It has been said that he was a mad militarist and Germanophobe and that for this reason he took the making of war into his own hands, by telling the czar that a partial mobilization was going on, when he knew that a general mobilization was in progress. There is no doubt that Czar Nicholas was under that impression to the very last, though as yet it has not been explained how the news was ultimately broken to him. There is reason to believe that much would have been different had the facts in regard to mobilization in Russia, as they reached Berlin, coincided with the conciliatory and pacific spirit of Czar Nicholas' telegrams to the German emperor. Minds would have sufficiently cooled off to permit the taking of stock, and the European War might have still been avoided. That it would have been avoided seems a reckless statement under the circumstances; at any rate, reason would have been given a chance.

Though M. Sazonoff himself has been one of those who have claimed that General Yanushkevitch was solely responsible for the extent of the Russian mobilization, it would be ridiculous to assume for even a moment that such was the case. While the credulity of the world public has ever been great, there are times when those presuming upon it go a little too far. M. Sazonoff knew that the chief of staff had lied to the czar, as did General Soukhomlinoff, the minister of war, and Grand Duke Nicholai Nicholaievitch, the Russian commander in chief. Yet even these could not shoulder so tremendous a responsibility without assurances that, come what might, France and Great Britain would support every act of theirs. The men who actually had the war machine in hand, so far as contact between Russia and France and England was concerned, were: Sir George Buchanan, the British ambassador at Petrograd; M. Paléologue, the French ambassador at the same capital; Count Benckendorff,

the Russian ambassador at London, and M. Isvolski, the Russian ambassador at Paris. Needless to say, the leaders of the British and French governments were the source of their authority.

I make this statement on the strength of information which reached me in Constantinople. M. N. de Giers, the Russian ambassador at that point, maintained the friendliest relations with the Bulgarian legation, then in charge of M. Koulocheff, a man of strong Russophile tendencies, who in those days was anything but a friend of the Germans and Turks. Mons. de Giers, oddly enough, was strongly pro-German, and spoke of the international war camarilla in St. Petersburg in terms that were not exactly flattering. De Giers was rather Anglophobe and doubted that Great Britain would ever do anything to place Russia in possession of Constantinople—a rather sound conclusion with which M. Koulocheff begged to differ. The Bulgarian minister thought otherwise. He saw the future of his own country in the light of Pan-Slavism and the eradication of the Turks and Germans even after his country had become an ally of theirs. He was a Russophile of the subservient type, and for that reason always well informed on affairs in Russia.

In this connection I must state that Sir George Buchanan was the leader of this bloody combination in Petrograd, while M. Isvolski worked most of the wires abroad. Isvolski had been somewhat of a friend of the Germans at one time. Of the Austrians he was rather fond, especially of their women. But it seems that the experiences he had with Counts Aehrenthal and Berchtold, in connection with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, cured him of all Austrophilism. For this the man, reducing the case to one *ad hominem*, cannot be blamed. Yet that is hardly an endorsement of state representation that makes it possible to throw whole nations into misery because a single person may have a grudge against another. Isvolski would have served the world better to tell Counts Aehrenthal and Berchtold that he could not bind his government to any such bargain—such a one-sided one at that.

A Diplomatic *Jeu de Grimace*

On the fateful July 31 two rather interesting things occurred. The British government thought it necessary to ask the French government whether or no it would abide, in regard to the neutrality of Belgium, by the terms of the treaty it had signed. A finer piece of cant is hard to discover. Of course, the French government would respect the neutrality of Belgium! The same inquiry went to Berlin. But Sir Edward Goschen did not get so ready an answer as Sir F. Bertie received from Premier Viviani. Sir Edward presented the inquiry of his government

to Herr von Jagow, the German state secretary for foreign affairs, and received from him the reply that he could not answer without consulting first the emperor and the chancellor. Those who know what the German imperial system of government was will concede that Jagow had no authority to say either yes or no under the circumstances, all the more since under the ministerial system of Germany, at that time, he was but little more than *vortragender Rat*—reporting counselor, a straw-man in other words. Von Jagow could receive inquiries and complaints, and could, after bringing the matter to the attention of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, transmit a reply. More than that he could not do; such being the wonderful aspect of Byzantinism as practiced on the banks of the River Spree.

Sir Edward Goschen knew this, of course, and made it his business to see the chancellor himself. From Bethmann-Hollweg he received a reply to the effect that "Germany, in any event (before committing herself) would want to hear what the French government's answer was."

No doubt, that was a foolish playing with words. But Bethmann-Hollweg was really in no position to give a clearer reply. The German general staff had so long looked upon the use of Belgian territory as necessary in case of war with France that the chancellor was afraid to be specific. He was sparring for time and hoping, meanwhile, as he has since then admitted, that something would happen to save him from having to deal with this situation. He knew well enough that in case of war he would be powerless to prevent the invasion of Belgium. The radical military element would then have its way, no matter what objections he might raise. A Bismarck would indeed have told Sir Edward that Germany would respect the neutrality of Belgium. The making of such a promise might not have pleased the militarists, but Bismarck would have realized that not even the worst of that element would have dared to remove him so long as the crisis was on. There are some things which even the German emperor could not afford to do, and one of them was a change in chancellors in July and August, 1914.

But Bethmann-Hollweg was not a heroic type of man. In his official acts he was timid and shortsighted, as was to be expected from an individual of a moderately arriviste character—from a man who had risen in the government in the police department, in whom system and orderliness of the extreme class had killed all initiative.

There was another condition that beclouded the mentality of the German government at that moment, if the case may be expressed in those words. The attitude of the French government was such that Baron von Schön, the German ambassador at Paris, could make but the most pessimistic reports to his government. The result of this was that he was

instructed to immediately ascertain what the French government intended doing. On July 31, as late as 7 p. m., the German ambassador served notice upon the French premier, M. Viviani, that by 1 p. m. on the following day the German government expected a definite declaration, on the part of France, what she would do in case war should break out between Germany and Russia. Viviani did not need the time given him. His mind, or that of his government, had been made up long ago. He told Baron von Schön that France would do that which the safeguarding of her interests prescribed.

From that enigmatic reply the German government could draw no other conclusion than that France had made up her mind to go to war on the side of Russia. Indeed, no other course was open. The Franco-Russian alliance was still in force, was, in fact, the written treaty upon which the Triple Entente rested, and, according to its terms, France would have to come to the aid of her ally in case of attack.

Another reply could have been given by Viviani had he willed to do that in the interest of peace. He could have told Schön that France would live up to her treaty agreement in case Germany attacked Russia, but that she was not obliged to do that in case Russia was the aggressor. That would have been a bid for peace. The reply Viviani gave was an incentive to war—a promotion of German distrust and fear, and the direct cause of her declaration of war against Russia within a few hours.

The piece of simulation which the British and French governments had indulged in regarding the neutrality guarantees of Belgium stood now unmasked in Berlin. It was a sinister writing on the wall. On August 1 Sir Edward Grey had another occasion to discuss the neutrality of Belgium with Prince Lichnowski. It was this conversation which made the trustful German ambassador suspicious for the first time of the attitude of the British government. So far he had lived in his delusion that war could be localized.

The contents of the report which Captain von Müller had made had caused Prince Lichnowski to recognize the possibility that Great Britain might go to war on the side of Russia and France. Already the man was out of his wits, though still sure of his ground that Great Britain, despite the frictions of years, would not strike at a country that had been the traditional friend of the British. He asked Grey whether Great Britain would remain neutral in case Germany did not violate the neutrality of Belgium and received a reply from the British secretary of state for foreign affairs that was a worthy counterpart of the answer the French premier, M. Viviani, had made. Sir Edward Grey replied that he could not say whether or no Great Britain would remain neutral

in case of war between Germany, Russia and France, but that the hands of the British government were yet free, and that *the position which Great Britain might take had yet to be considered*. Public opinion, said Sir Edward, had to be taken into account, and public opinion in Great Britain was very much exercised over the possibility of Belgium's neutrality being violated. On the other hand, Sir Edward would not promise neutrality on the condition that Germany made the promise that she would respect the status of Belgium.

That again left things in the air. The reply which Grey gave Lichnowski was virtually the same Baron von Schön had gotten from M. Viviani. The text of the records made of the two meetings differs, of course, and in the official white and yellow books they seem very dissimilar. The fact is that neither of them is a stenographic report, made at the time, but merely a statement of a conversation as an ambassador, in the one case, and a foreign minister, in the other, remembered it.

A Bull in a Political China Shop

But so far nothing had really happened in Germany that could cause the British and French statesmen to believe that the men in Berlin, at least Emperor William, who was still telegraphing to and pleading with his fellow-monarchs and relatives, would not abstain from violating the neutrality of Belgium. At any rate Belgium had not yet been invaded, and so far the German government had made no demands upon the Belgian government. The first of these was made on August 2nd and was based by Germany on the report that French troops were about to enter upon Belgian territory, near Givet and Namur, for an attack upon Germany.

The writer has no means of knowing to what extent this report was true. The French government has steadfastly denied that the German claim was founded on fact, and we must bear in mind that in the excitement of those days the information of the Germans may have been unreliable; may, in fact, have been the work of some zealous agent who had more ambition than discretion. Since I have met many of that ilk who were so constituted I am inclined to believe that such was the case. The most dangerous human being I know is the government agent who wishes to make his mark.

On the other hand, the Entente governments have claimed that the substance of the "strictly confidential communication" which the German minister at Brussels, von Below, transmitted to Baron van der Elst, Belgian general secretary of the exterior, was a mere pretext for the opening of negotiations by which Germany hoped to get the consent of the Belgian government for the use of Belgian territory in the military operations that seemed now more inevitable than ever.

The facts of the case support this interpretation strongly, and the admission by Bethmann-Hollweg that his government had done wrong seems to be in itself enough to prove that Berlin was far too eager to make an issue of what may have been no more than an incident to the mobilization of the French army. The presence of large bodies of French troops near the Belgian border was in reality symptomatic of nothing, so far as Belgium was concerned. The troops might have been intended, so far as the general aspect of things then went, to protect French territory in case Germany did violate the neutrality of Belgium. France, of course, had a right to mass troops along the Belgian border, to take care of an eventuality of a critical character given prominence by specific diplomatic *conversation*. A sane government in Berlin would have paid no attention whatever to the presence of French troops near Givet and Namur, especially since troops held there would not have to be encountered along the western border of Alsace-Lorraine.

Instead of taking that very prudent attitude the German government did exactly what it should not have done. It made the neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed by Prussia first and later accepted as an obligation by the empire, the subject of debate, lost some time in doing that, sacrificed her military chances in the south and gave its enemies a very excellent weapon for propaganda warfare.

The German government has made a great deal of certain state documents found in the Belgian archives after the invasion of Belgium had become a fact. *Per se*, these records prove only that Great Britain and France were rather well informed of the plans of the German general staff and government. They prove also that Great Britain had of a sudden taken an unusual amount of interest in the status of Belgium, and that in the course of the few years immediately preceding the war, the British government had come to regard Belgium as a sort of naval and military base on the Continent. Great Britain, if we take the conventional view of things, could not be prevented from doing that, nor was it feasible to dissuade the French government from similar activity, any more than later it was possible to keep Germany from actually invading Belgium. The designs of our neighbors are something over which we have no control so long as no attempt is made to carry them into execution.

The documents found demonstrated also that members of the Belgian general staff had been in co-operation with the British and French army men, who had "organized," on paper, so far, the military exigencies in Belgium. It can hardly be said that on the part of the Belgian government this was the strictest adherence a treaty can be given. A treaty not observed in spirit is bound to be ultimately disregarded in text. This is one of the few rules that have no exception. Even the stoutest admirer of

Belgium must concede that in this respect the treaty in question was leaky, and had been made that by the Belgian government itself. To consider with two of the signatories the eventuality of infraction of the treaty by a third signatory may be diplomacy, but is not an out-and-out honest transaction.

It must be borne in mind, however, that in international relations the ideal is not to be obtained any more than in the other conditions and problems that worry mankind. From this angle the Belgian government was less culpable. The militarists and expansionists of Germany had been so intemperate in their language, had given their country so threatening an aspect that the Belgian government might indeed cast about for succor to be summoned when the day of trial came.

Against that stands what the Germans came to identify as a national and military necessity: The invasion of Belgium and the use of her territory against the French in case of war. The number of Germans who were against the invasion of Belgium was rather small, and dwindled to zero as with the progress of the war the Germans began to feel that the cards had been stacked against them. What pangs of conscience there were felt—if war leaves room for such a thing—were set aside by the feeling that with Germany attacked from every quarter any measure of self-protection was allowed. In the course of time this became a recognized doctrine, and after that discussion of the case was no longer possible. There were the incriminating documents! How and when they were found was overlooked as was the fact that finding them was a bit of belated luck—nothing more. Had Berlin been in possession of any evidence, showing that the Belgian government had entered into military *liaison* with Great Britain and France, that evidence, and not the fear of French troops massing along the Belgian border, would have been made the substance of representations by the Germans in Brussels on August 2. The finding of the papers was, therefore, proof of nothing, so far as the position of the German government was concerned.

The Government "Official" as Statesman

Even if the case had been one of evidence and proof, as outlined above, the German government had as yet no specific cause for complaint, at least no very weighty one. It could, indeed, have called upon the Belgian government for an explanation, and it would not have been easy to give a satisfactory explanation. But invasion and war could have been averted, so far as Belgium was concerned, by her promise to adhere to the treaty of 1839, by which Holland acknowledged Belgium an independent state with "eternal" neutrality, and to which Prussia, France, Great Britain,

Russia and Austria-Hungary became parties in the quality of guarantors. The German government failed to approach the case from that angle because it had no knowledge of what had been done behind its own back and that of at least one other guarantor, Austria-Hungary. Instead it made the possible intention of the French government the subject of overtures calculated to get from the Belgian government the consent for the use of Belgian territory against France, another guarantor. The government in Brussels could not give such consent. That much at least was clear to the men in Berlin. The best they expected was a lenient protest against the proposed invasion and the retirement of the Belgian government to a city further west, Antwerp, for instance.

That such conduct would have given the French the right to also enter upon Belgian territory, and that in such an event Belgium would have become a theater of war in a quarrel in which her people were not interested, was something which Berlin expected the Belgian government to overlook in return for payment. To say that this was expecting too much from a country and people is putting it mildly. Bismarck had taken a more sensible view of this situation, the right view, in fact, in 1870, when, over the head of the militarists of his day, he announced that the Treaty of 1839 was something which Prussia considered binding.

But Bismarck was the Iron Chancellor, while Bethmann-Hollweg was a mere government official. Bismarck was a statesman, Bethmann-Hollweg a politician and a very poor one at that. The former measured his acts by results they would have twenty years hence, the latter lived mentally from hand to mouth, as he had done politically.

The claim of the German government that the use of Belgian territory was a military necessity is hardly of sufficient importance to merit attention. It is on a par with the assertions of Emperor William that he could not stop his mobilization. To be sure, a mobilization is something that will, for hours at any rate, travel on its own impetus, but in our days, with telegraphic and telephonic means of communication, even the poorest of general staffs ought to be able to arrest such a preparation for war. The plea that the mobilization program contained no provisions for the arrest of a mobilization and the diverting of troops to places other than selected in the first place falls flat also. If such provisions had not been made the great efficiency of the German general staff was indeed a very one-sided affair, efficient only for war and totally inefficient for peace. By and large the absence of so prudent a feature means that in Berlin, and in all other capitals, for that matter, they thought that war there must be once the dogs had been loosed. After all, we deal here with nothing but lame excuses of a diplomatic sort. The facts were other.

The situation in Russia, where the czar made assurances of good will

that were honest enough, and where Sazonoff, Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch, General Soukhomlinoff and others were speeding a general mobilization over the head of the sovereign and supreme commander, and the replies given German ambassadors by M. Viviani and Sir Edward Grey, left the German government no alternative to preparing for war. Between the Serbs and the Austro-Hungarians war was already in progress, and the German government, therefore, could not but mobilize as rapidly and completely as possible. German troops were concentrating along the German border, from Dutch Limburg down to Switzerland, and on August 3 the French government gave Baron von Schön, the German ambassador, his passports.

The Great War was on.

Under Bismarck the Prussian government had managed to get its own troops into battle position far south of the point which the general staff of William II considered the tactical and strategic center of battle formation, if that term may be applied to what the Germans know as *Aufmarsch*. If that was possible at a time when Bavaria, Wuerttemberg and Baden were merely the allies of Bismarck and Prussia, when they were states whom France expected to remain neutral, how much more was this possible with those countries an integral part of the empire and with their own military forces directly under the control of the German general staff in Berlin. The argument made by apologists for the German imperial government that the situation was different in 1914 from what it had been in 1870 is not very convincing. To be sure, the situation was somewhat different, but it was different only in so far that it was more in favor of the German army and fortunes of war, as compared with what Moltke and Bismarck had to cope with. The French had since 1871 greatly improved their defenses *in situ* adjacent to the border, but, on the other hand, the German army had means to reduce this disadvantage correspondingly. Advantages were on the side of the Germans because in 1914 their army was being directed as an unit which in 1870 the Prussian Allied armies were not.

With such matters the German general staff did not concern itself any too much. It was out for a quick victory, through Belgium. The fortifications of the French along the Belgian border were not as formidable as those west of the Vosges hills. There was to be an *Ueberrumpfung*—defeat of the French by crushing surprise. Belgium stood in the way of that, and Belgium had to make way. Such was the major and true aspect of mentality in the government circles in Berlin now that the Triple Entente had decided to measure issues on the field of battle with the Triple Alliance. We must doubt that in London, Paris and St. Petersburg they would have done otherwise.

On the possibility that the Belgian parliament would have acted as a check on the Belgian government in case the latter had shown partiality toward the French and British we need not dwell too heavily. Parliaments the world over, the Congress of the United States included, have had little or nothing to do with the conditions that prevailed immediately anterior to the state of war. In all cases the executive branch of the government presented them with a *fait accompli* and a demand for war credits. The accomplished fact was either that a state of war existed or that relations with the foreign government were on the breaking point. The best which any body of legislators has done in such circumstances is to applaud the men on the ministerial bench and then vote money for war *ad libitum—ad nauseum*. The Solons of our day become just plain subjects and citizens on the day on which the government, impelled by necessities of its own in which the "public interest" is supposed to be crystalized, declares that a state of war exists and implies that this also extends to those legislators who might have the temerity to examine into the facts of the case—which temerity is adjudged to be treason by nations everywhere.

What the German Government Overlooked

The German government would have done its people a great service by keeping the troops massed against the Belgian border on German territory, affording thereby the Belgian government the chance to declare itself. In case French military forces really made use of Belgian territory knowledge of that would have been quickly gained by the German government. The process of obtaining an explanation from the Belgian government, as to its intention, would have been simple after that, so simple in fact that it would have been automatic. Against an invasion of Belgium by the French the Belgium government would have been obliged to protest. Failure of that protest would have left the Belgian government two courses open. One of them would have taken the form of an appeal to the signatories of the Treaty of 1839; the other would have been opposition to the violation of her status and territory by means of arms. In that case Belgium would have become a co-belligerent of Germany, as later she became that of France and Great Britain. The German troops would have rushed to her assistance, no doubt, and France, instead of Germany, would have had to bear the stigma of the "scrap of paper."

But the men in Berlin could not see that far. An emperor who, to himself at least, enjoyed somewhat the blessings of omniscience, was too shortsighted—too poor a statesman and diplomatist to see so simple a case of logical development of a situation. The Belgian government had no way out of this. Its neutrality remained either sacred to the French,

or a declaration of war against France was, *under the circumstances*, inevitable. It was violated by Germany, and Belgian participation in the Great War resulted.

I have used the modification italicized above for a purpose. I say *under the circumstances* because an appeal of Belgium to Great Britain and Russia against the violation of her neutrality and territory by France would have led to a situation of the most peculiar type. Let us imagine the Belgian government calling to its assistance Great Britain and Russia in an effort to maintain her status under the Treaty of 1839, with France as the offender, the same France with whom Great Britain and Russia were allied for the purpose of keeping Germany on good behavior. What an impossible situation that would have been! Imagine further that this situation had come into being in the first days of August, 1914. Great Britain and Russia, according to the asserverations of their statesmen, would have been obliged to also side with Germany in its war upon France.

It is entirely out of the question that this possibility had been overlooked in London, St. Petersburg and Paris. It is not to be thought of that Belgian neutrality was ever associated with so strange a proposition. It was not only to the interest of the Triple Entente that Belgium remain neutral during at least the initial stages of the war, but such conduct on her part constituted the very principle of whatever measure the Triple Entente would have to apply against Germany along the latter's western frontier. If the Berlin government thought for even a moment that the governments in London, St. Petersburg and Paris had left at all any room for such an "accident" then Germany, indeed, had the poorest government and foreign office a people was ever cursed with. It was to the interest, it was a *sine qua non*, of Triple Entente diplomacy and statecraft, that Belgium, so far as France and Great Britain were concerned, and so far as the initial stages of the Great War went, retain its neutrality untouched—blemished only by what understanding there was between the Belgian government and Paris and London.

It is remarkable, to say the least, that nobody in Berlin ever gave voice to this fact. But it is not to be assumed on that account that nobody ever thought of it. My opinion of German diplomacy is not very high, but it is hard to believe that there were men in the German government who would not have smiled, even in those days of stress, at the suggestion that the Triple Entente had left room for a contingency in which London and St. Petersburg had to protest against the violation of the neutrality of Belgium by France, and then come to the aid of France against Germany with large armies and a blockade, nevertheless. A more ludicrous situation could not be thought of; a greater predicament could not

be pictured by the cleverest writer of farce. Since it cannot be assumed, within reason, that the German government was not fully aware of this, we must needs accept, all assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, that the violation of the neutrality of Belgium was a deliberate act on the part of the German government, decided upon long beforehand by a general staff that thought in terms of maximum results in a minimum of time without thinking at all that the neighbor has rights which should be respected.*

A Piece of Diplomatic Hypocrisy

I have already referred to the fact that Sir F. Bertie, the British ambassador at Paris, on July 31 made a formal inquiry of the French premier, M. Viviani, whether or no France, in case of war, would respect the neutrality of Belgium. M. Viviani is on record as saying that France would respect that neutrality, and that France might depart from that policy only in case another violated the neutrality of Belgium and made this act a factor of insecurity to the French republic. The reply of M. Viviani was brought to the attention of the German government and the German ambassador in London, a procedure which in itself was enough to draw the attention of the government in Berlin to the subject involved and the situations I have already treated.

The inquiry made of M. Viviani being entirely gratuitous, we must look upon it as a piece of rank hypocrisy by Sir Edward Grey. British diplomacy has forced a great deal down the throat of a gullible world, but it would seem that the mentality of the general public might have been respected enough, even in London, by not expecting reasonable human beings to believe that this detail of *entente* was left to so late

* It would seem that here we have something for which those responsible for it should be placed on trial before a tribunal set up by the nations that remained neutral throughout the Great War. There are enough such neutrals to make this possible, and the small neutrals of Europe certainly have the greatest interest in the case. The trial of such persons would be both justified and prudent, because it would have a salutary effect of a preventive character. There is no doubt that the premeditation of a military undertaking of this sort has every aspect of a crime, and that it should be reviewed from that angle and its perpetrators punished. The sooner general staff men the world over are made to realize that they may be held responsible, though only, as is now the case, when their army has been defeated, compunction is likely to visit them oftener. The same applies to the civilian part of the governmental personnel which gives its sanction to such raids upon the small neighbor.

The conduct of the Allied and Associated governments in the matter of trying German officers and officials charged with "crimes" committed at the front has been a series of bluffs with a political purpose. So long as the principle of reprisal is recognized by governments so long will it be difficult to say what is and what is not a "crime." It is different when, as in the case of the invasion of Belgium, we have a clear case of criminal initiative.

If in connection with such a trial the activity of the British and French governments in regard to Belgium would be traced and weighed so much the better, and a great deal of maudlin sentiment might be disposed of by looking over the conduct of the Belgian government, especially from 1911 to the outbreak of the War.

There is no use doing any of these things in case they cannot be undertaken by a tribunal of neutrals, composed of, let us say, men from Switzerland, Holland, Scandinavia with the exception of Denmark, Spain and the neutrals in Latin America. It is to be hoped that the Allied and Associated governments will respect mankind enough not to expect it to have the least confidence in any verdict a handpicked *entente* tribunal would decide upon.

an hour as July 31, 1914, especially since the discovery of documents, showing that there had been contact between British, French and Belgian authorities on what the status of Belgium was to be in case of war against Germany. We may be excused for asking British diplomacy and historians not to stress that point.

The fact is that Belgium had become a vassal state of the British. The fact further is that in Berlin this was known. True enough, the German government was still groping in the dark in this respect, but enough had transpired to leave no doubt that Belgium, in case of a world war, would be an *unsicherer Kantonist*—uncertain quality. A few years before there had been a most violent campaign in the British press in regard to alleged Belgian atrocities in the Congo, and for a time it seemed as if the Congo would follow the Boer republics. Of a sudden, however, that campaign subsided. The exposure by Sir Edward Carson of the Putomayo atrocities, committed by Britishers, had a great deal to do with diverting the attention of the British public. The British and Belgian governments after that met on a different basis, as the documents found by the Germans demonstrate all too well. France, too, was a party to the understanding that was reached, and in the light of this, as already pointed out, the great concern by Sir Edward Grey for the safety of Belgium was a crass piece of sham.

The reply of M. Viviani was in absolute conformity with what had been decided upon several years before by the two groups of politicians in Paris and London that had managed to keep the governments of France and Great Britain in their hands for the purpose, as was well known, of attending to the case of the Triple Alliance at a propitious moment. In France the government had been largely in the hands of Clemenceau, Briand, Pichon, Barthou and Viviani during that period. In Great Britain the same set of office holders had not always followed so very closely and unswervingly in the track of *la revanche*, as Caillaux knew well enough, but in the main they had been dependable. When they were not, the men in Paris had but to remind themselves of the hopeless naval controversy that was going on between Great Britain and Germany to feel that in the end their time and opportunity would come.

British interests demanded special scrutiny of Russia. The defeat of the Russian army by the Japanese, and the destruction, virtually, of the Russian war fleet by the same people, eased that situation so that later on it was possible to meet on common ground in Persia. The rapprochement of Germany and Turkey removed Constantinople a little more in the plans of Russia's imperialists, and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina also pushed those plans farther away from realization. Bulgaria, meanwhile, was showing tellingly that she was no longer minded to be

the child of Czar Alexander *Osvoboditel*—a political appanage especially of the Romanoffs, and above all only a great war could clear the socio-political atmosphere of the Muscovite empire and retain in control those classes to which the *mujik* was still little better than a beast of burden. So far as Russia is concerned none of these aspirations were promoted by the enterprise which was inaugurated in Serbia and which centered so much about Belgium. The British and French were rather more successful—so far as developments permit us to see at present.

The period of 1907-14 was indeed the heyday of diplomacy. The isolation of Germany was completed by the Anglo-Russian *entente*. On this basis of power the diplomatists of the Triple Entente could proceed to labor for the culmination of their purposes with that degree of dignity which everywhere gave them prestige and made their cause holy long before it had reached the distinction that attaches to "cause." Every move of theirs was correct, because the potency of the political combination behind them precluded almost wholly the possibility of mistake.

The diplomatists of Germany were not in so comfortable a position. They probably had on the average as much ability as their Triple Entente confrères. What they lacked was power in reserve. Nor was all of the strength behind them real. Austria-Hungary did ultimately far better than the greatest optimists in the Triple Alliance hoped and Italy had long ago passed into the category of uncertain quantities.

Thus the Great Debacle came. It came in a manner that proved that diplomacy can be successful only when there is a superiority of power behind it, and when this superiority is actually admitted by those who may be the subjects of diplomacy. British statesmen in the position of the Germans could not have done any better. They would have been guilty of the same "bungling" had their intentions been met, as were those of the Germans, by the superior power and better strategic position of their adversaries. From being isolated, Great Britain became the isolator, and it is not exactly to her credit that she did this with a nation which at one time was really her only friend in Europe. But perfidies of that sort have ever been a favorite means of British statesmanship. For eight years Great Britain maneuvered for position, and then she struck, with Belgium, the poor little lamb, as a bait in the trap set for that most stupid of animals of prey, militaristic Germany.

Sir Edward Grey, reduced to the necessity of having to ascertain from M. Viviani in the eleventh hour whether or no France would respect the neutrality of Belgium, will go down the corridors of time as the man greater than a partnership of Machiavel and Metternich.

VI

WHAT WILL AMERICA DO?

IT IS the practice of governments to serve formal notice of neutrality when a state of war is on between other nations. The United States government has done that on the very heels of each declaration of war, issuing no less than eleven such notices up to September 1, 1914. The documents announced that in the war between the several belligerents the United States government would observe a neutral attitude. The public was enjoined to conduct itself accordingly and attention was drawn to the fact that on the statutes there were laws that provided for the punishment of those who forgot their neutrality far enough to engage in acts giving affront to a friendly power.

President Wilson was to realize very soon that he would have to give these proclamations a personal touch if they were to be observed in a proper manner. On August 19th he made an "appeal" for neutrality by the American public, from which I will quote here the most essential portions:

"The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say and do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what ministers utter in their pulpits, and men proclaim as their opinion on the streets.

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility, responsibility for no less a thing than that of the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of

hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion if not in action.

* * * * *

"I venture, therefore, my fellow countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another."

Mr. Wilson has been happier in his selection of words than he was here, but the important fact is that his appeal made a deep impression in Europe. Naturally, Mr. Wilson could not please everybody. In Paris and London they thought even then that it was the duty of the United States government to take an active interest in the fate of Belgium. They thought this all the more when a little later it became known that President Wilson had not been particularly obliging to some Belgians who called on him for the purpose of presenting their grievance against Germany.

There were many Germans and Austro-Hungarians who at first paid no particular attention to the appeal. To them it seemed a matter of course that the United States should stay out of the war. The admonition of George Washington, warning against entangling alliances, was to them the genesis of the foreign relations of the United States. Presidents Jefferson and Monroe, not to mention virtually every other American president, had heeded this advice by the Father of the Republic; few, in fact, could see how the United States could become involved in the war, *except against Great Britain*. The diplomacy of Central Europe had moved so long in the groove of "Traditional Enmity" that most of its managers could not see far beyond this sorry limitation. In the case of Germany the idea of *la revanche* so tenaciously held by the French was responsible for this sad state of affairs, and in the dual monarchy it was disdain for, and fear of, all that was Russian that circumscribed vision and kept it in narrow bounds.

There were a few farsighted men in Central Europe who did not like the aspect of things in the United States, however. That President Wilson had been obliged to make an appeal for neutrality, in addition to his neutrality proclamations, had a significance to these few. While censorship prevented much of the more uncomplimentary expressions by the American press becoming known in Central Europe, it was felt, nevertheless, that the American press and public generally was not as neutral as Presi-

dent Wilson would have liked to see them. If that was not the case, why this appeal for neutrality?

The majority of American newspapers had been frankly hostile to Germany and Austria-Hungary from the very first. The treatment given Belgium was largely responsible for this, as it well could be. Though the stupidity of the Berlin government was as yet not understood, which, by the way, might have alleviated matters somewhat, the wanton brutality that appeared on the face of the event could not but give journalism in the United States the direction it had taken. In its conduct with European nations the United States had always been most considerate and obliging; no such incident had ever occurred within ken of the average American writer and editor, and indignation ran high, therefore. It must have seemed to President Wilson that it was going too high, for otherwise there would have been no necessity for his appeal. At the same time notice must be taken of the fact that the appeal for neutrality was to some extent a notice upon the several foreign and unassimilated elements in the United States, who had promptly taken sides in the great issue and fought one another with means both fair and foul. The document shows whom President Wilson had in mind especially—press, pulpit and public meetings. Propaganda for both sides was on and daily gaining greater proportions and new forms, and the government had to do within its powers what it could. A little later Congress augmented these powers by the Joint Resolution of March 4, 1915.

There was one thing which diplomatists of the Central Powers were ever prone to overlook, as I had ample opportunity of ascertaining. They had come to look upon the United States as a nation as wholly separatistic as any state in Europe. The fact that historically, intellectually and sentimentally the majority of the people of the United States gravitated toward Great Britain far more than toward Germany was only too often ignored. At that particular time the statesmen of Germany and Austria-Hungary were impelled to see everything in the light of war. Thus it came that the relations between the United States and Great Britain were viewed from the angle of the American Revolution, the War of 1812 and Great Britain's partiality for the Confederation in the Civil War. Against these facts was contrasted the historically friendly attitude of Prussia and Germany generally.

The "Orders In Council" Become Supreme

Things were to happen soon that opened the eyes of some of these optimists. Governments at war issue, for the benefit of neutrals, lists

of contraband, and declare, if that be within their necessity and their sphere of power, the establishing of blockades. The British government was not slow in doing this. The first list of contraband issued is dated August 5, 1914. The selection of articles was, in the main, in harmony with the provisions of the Declaration of London, 1909, that is to say, as Absolute Contraband were designated those things which have specifically a military character, while under Conditional Contraband were listed materials, commodities and necessities of life which the civil population of a belligerent may need, which are no less needed by its army, however.

For the purpose of sparing the reader the trouble of looking up both the Declaration of London, 1909, and the British Order in Privy Council in question, I will here concisely give a list of these articles:

Absolute Contraband were declared: arms of all kinds, ammunition of all kinds, explosives and projectiles included; clothing and equipment of a strictly military character; harness; saddle, draft and pack animals suitable for use in warfare; camp equipment and its parts; armor plates; warships and their parts; the means of aerial navigation, and machinery and implements used in the manufacture of any of the above *materielle*.

Conditional Contraband were declared: foodstuffs; forage and grain suitable for feeding animals; clothing and shoes suitable for use in war; gold and silver in coin or bullion and paper money; vehicles of all sorts available for use in war, as well as their component parts; ships of all kinds and floating docks; railroad material of any sort, trolley-electric equipment included; fuel and lubricants; explosives not especially prepared for use in war; barbed wire and nippers for cutting the same; horseshoes; harness and saddlery; field glasses, chronometers and nautical instruments.

Little by little this list was extended. On September 21 copper, lead and magnetic iron ore, rubber and glycerine and hides were added, as were all iron ores in general demand. October 29 the whole list of Absolute Contraband was revised and extended so that it included everything used by armies in modern times. The list of Conditional Contraband remained virtually what it had been before.

These measures were still within the frame of the provisions of the Declaration of London, 1909, but a sweeping change was made on the same date in what had been the attitude in the past of the British government as a signatory of the London Declaration. By giving the text of the Order in Privy Council verbatim I can make that clear enough:

"1. During the present hostilities the provision of the Convention known as the Declaration of London shall, subject to the exclusion of the lists of contraband and non-contraband, and to the modifications hereinafter set out, be adopted and put in force

by His Majesty's Government. The modifications are as follows:

"(i) A neutral vessel, with papers indicating a neutral designation, which, notwithstanding the destination shown on the papers, proceeds to an enemy port, shall be liable to capture and condemnation if she is encountered before the end of her next voyage.

"(ii) The destination referred to in Article 33 of the said Declaration shall (in addition to the presumptions laid down in Article 34) be presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to or for an agent of the enemy state.

"(iii) Notwithstanding the provision of Article 35 of the said Declaration, conditional contraband shall be liable to capture on board a vessel bound for a neutral port if the goods are consigned "to order," or if the ship's papers do not show who is the consignee of the goods, or if they show a consignee of the goods in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy.

"(iv) In the cases covered by the preceding paragraph (iii) it shall lie upon the owners of the goods to prove that their destination was innocent.

"2. Where it is shown to the satisfaction of one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State that the enemy government is drawing supplies for its armed forces from or through a neutral country, he may direct that in respect of ships bound for a port in that country, Article 35, of the said Declaration, shall not apply. Such direction shall be notified in the London "Gazette" and shall operate until the same is withdrawn. So long as such direction is in force a vessel which is carrying conditional contraband to a port in that country shall not be immune from capture.

"3. The Order in Council of the 20th August, 1914, directing the adoption and enforcement during the present hostilities of the Convention known as the Declaration of London, subject to the additions and modifications therein specified, is hereby repealed.

"4. This Order may be cited as "The Declaration of London Order in Council, No. 2, 1914."

Article 35 of the Declaration of London is now cited here to show what the modification was:

"Conditional contraband is not liable to capture, except when found on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy, and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening port.

"The ship's papers are conclusive proof as to the voyage on which the vessel is engaged and as to the port of discharge of the goods, unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated by her papers, and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation."

Since it was Article 36 of the Declaration which ultimately played

so great a role in the blockade measures of the British government, I will give that also in this place:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35, conditional contraband, if shown to have the destination referred to in Article 33, is liable to capture in cases where the enemy has no seaboard.”

Article 33 of the Declaration provides that “conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a government department of the enemy State, unless in this latter case the circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes of the war in progress. This latter exception does not apply to a consignment coming under Article 24 (4), to wit: “Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money.”

International Law Goes Into Discard

The principal difference between Absolute Contraband and Conditional Contraband as drawn by the Declaration of London, 1909, is that the articles constituting the first are liable to capture if it is shown that they are destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or the armed forces of the enemy, and that it is immaterial whether the carriage of the goods is direct or entails a transshipment or a subsequent transport by land, while the items of Conditional Contraband were to be treated as stated in Article 35. It is very plain, therefore, firstly: That the Declaration of London, 1909, did not intend that the civil population of a State at war should be starved, along with the armed forces—quite an impossible undertaking, of course, and, secondly: That the British government, by its Order in Privy Council, of September 21, violated the said declaration by setting aside what indeed was a provision hard to meet, Article 35, and substituting therefor a decision of its own, the Order in Privy Council in question, without consulting first the other signatories of the Declaration of London. The fact of the matter is that the British government simply repealed its Order in Privy Council, of August 20, which was sweeping enough, but which still directed “the adoption and enforcement during the present hostilities of the Convention known as the Declaration of London.” To repeal that “adoption and enforcement . . . of the Convention known as the Declaration of London” was to say, in other words, that the Convention would not be lived up to by the British government, that it was considered obsolete by Great Britain, France and Russia, who were making common cause in this as in other respects.

To set aside in such a manner a convention which represented the last word on contraband and blockade by the powers, and, to some extent, world public opinion, was an act which the British government and its

allies must have given considerable thought. It must be considered here that the Declaration of London, though made by a conference that had come together at the invitation of the British government, was an agreement, in the nature of a general treaty, by the following signatory powers: United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Holland and Japan. The Convention was never formally ratified, but its authority was established by a preliminary provision which stated solemnly that the principles enunciated were those constituting the substance of International Law. Its authority, further, was recognized by the British government in "directing its adoption and enforcement during the present hostilities," by the French government by stating that "the declaration signed in London the 26 February, 1909, concerning the law of naval warfare, shall be applied during the present war," and by the Russian government by proclaiming the enforcement by its navy and marine department, together with an imperial edict, "the rules on naval warfare worked out by the London Maritime Conference of 1908-9"—the Declaration, in other words.

The German government, on September 4, acquainted the government of the United States, through the American ambassador at Berlin, that it intended applying the provisions of the Declaration of London provided "they are not disregarded by other belligerents," and the Austro-Hungarian government committed itself in much the same terms. Though not a signatory to the Declaration, the Ottoman government also declared its readiness to be guided by the agreement, doing that at a time when the British government had already substituted for the Declaration of London, 1909, the thing labelled by it "The Declaration of London Order in Council, No. 2, 1914," whatever the import of this *mêlée* of terms was to be. Surely, an Order in Privy Council had nothing to do with the Declaration of London, when the provisions of the convention were being relegated into the background by three belligerents, when two other belligerents were adopting retaliatory *paper* measures in return for this, and when three signatory neutrals, not to mention the rest of the neutral world that was not a signatory but an adherent for all that, were not to be heard from. In effect, "The Declaration of London Order in Privy Council, No. 2, 1914," was an abrogation *in toto* of International Law. It was the application of *might* in the place of what had hitherto been regarded *right*.

But this substituting of British Municipal Law for International Law was not entirely without warrant, under the circumstances. There was the question of: When does food become in effect Absolute Contraband instead of Conditional Contraband? Food was regarded Conditional Contraband by the Declaration, but there was the insuperable difficulty—in that light, at least, the thing was viewed—of telling what amount of the

food imported by a belligerent goes to the civil population and what to the army. The London Convention did not intend to starve the population of belligerents; it did intend to have the scarcity of food become a problem of the military. The reduction by starvation of besieged garrisons had long been recognized as a legitimate means of warfare, though little honor to the victor had ever come of its application. But to keep the food of a belligerent civil population from its army is not so easily accomplished. So long as the civil population has something to eat, so long will the army have more than its share of it. Such an army, moreover, is entitled to at least the food produced in its own country, to meet the argument of the moralist à *outrance*, and Germany, for instance, could not have been starved into submission, as later she was, if her army had subsisted on the food grown in the country and the civil population on the import of food which Great Britain and her allies would have permitted.

When Diplomacy Shirks Problems

On that point there can be no difference of opinion. The point that must strike the observer as odd, to say the least, is that the participants of the London Convention did not see this difficulty in the proper light or deal with it honestly, and therefore failed to come to an agreement on it. If, on the other hand, they did see the point, what was the use in the Declaration of Articles 33, 34 and 35? Were they not expedients to get away from an impossible situation—mere subterfuges that left things as they had been before? The fact is that the *conférenciers* knew only too well that to put food definitely and permanently on the list of non-contraband would be futile, so long as food or the lack of it is so great a consideration in war—the very thing, in fact for which most wars have been waged. The men who labored in the conference knew well enough that placing food on the “free goods” list would have been considered anarchical by most of the governments represented. Great Britain, for one, would have never consented to this, neither would France and Russia. The program of the delegates from the United States was not far from this happy solution of the problem of contraband and food.

Ultimately the thing known as “The Declaration of London Order in Council, No. 2, 1914,” was carried even far enough to exclude not only food in any quantity from the civil population of a belligerent government, but even the export to neutral civil populations was limited far below their actual needs, a vicious policy which found in the governments of France, Russia, Italy and the United States a little too much support as to permit the future historian to say aught in commendation.

Naturally, it was not always thus. As late as October 21, 1915, the government of the United States transmitted to the British government a sort of general protest against the violations of the Declaration of London. That document says, among other things:

"I believe it has been conclusively shown (in the text of the note) that the methods sought to be employed by Great Britain to obtain and use evidence of enemy destination of cargoes bound for neutral ports and to impose a contraband character upon such cargoes are without justification; that the blockade, upon which such methods are partly founded, is ineffective, illegal and indefensible; that the judicial procedure offered as a means of reparation for an international injury is inherently defective for the purpose, and that in many cases jurisdiction is asserted in violation of the law of nations."

The note goes on to say that "the United States, therefore, cannot submit to the curtailment of its neutral rights by these measures, which are admittedly retaliatory, and therefore illegal, in conception and in nature, and intended to punish the enemies of Great Britain for alleged illegalities on their part. The United States might not be in a position to object to them, "continues the document," if its interests and the interests of all neutrals were unaffected by them, but, being affected, it cannot with complacency suffer further subordination of its rights and interests to the plea that the exceptional geographic position of the enemies of Great Britain require or justify oppressive and illegal practices."

I beg to draw attention to the fact that Mr. Lansing objects specifically to practices which the British government had applied illegally, by reason of geographic disadvantages of the enemy, against Germany and Austria-Hungary. He states that he might not be in a "position to object to them" if the interests of the United States and all other neutrals were not affected by them. May I request the reader to keep that in mind particularly, since this proposition comes into the foreground again and again?

The Position of Neutral Holland

The neutral who was to feel the heavy hand of Great Britain first was the Netherlands. Against the Netherlands, in fact, was primarily directed the notorious "The Declaration of London Order in Council, No. 2, 1914." The territory of that people is contiguous to Germany, and in the past there had been an active exchange of commodities between the two. The Dutch government, as a neutral, had no reason to apply against Germany a sort of retaliatory export prohibition, though so far as its own needs went, it could, as it did, limit the exportation of goods to Germany. But a great deal of food was still bought in Holland by the

Germans, and that, of course, was not a promotion of the British blockade, which already aimed to starve the civil populations of the Central Powers. The Order in Privy Council referred to above was to prevent that, though the order in itself was merely the sanction of a sort of piracy that had been going on for weeks in the waters adjacent to the British coast. In September already British cruisers had brought up in the Channel and taken to the Downs ports a number of Dutch freight and passenger ships whose masters had complied with the Order in Privy Council of August 5—with the Declaration of London, therefore. Though it was plainly a case of a *neutral* vessel, from a *neutral* port to a *neutral* port, with cargo for a *neutral* consignee, in some instances the Dutch government itself, as in that of several copper shipments, the British government seized whatever part of the shipment it wanted and later bought it. The world was as yet not any too familiar with the reign of terror that was on in the North Sea and the Channel, and general public opinion had to be placated for the time being. All that was to change, however.

The Dutch government took the seizure of its copper shipments much to heart. It was grieved that the British government should have arrived at the conclusion that the metal would ultimately find its way into Germany. The fact is that the copper was needed to supply the mobilized army of Holland with ammunition. Germany's violation of the neutrality of Belgium had left the Dutch people no guarantee that their country might not also be invaded before the war was very much older. Since copper was needed to put Holland in a state of defense, and since the United States was just then the only country where that metal could be found in large quantities in the open market, Holland was obliged to take it through waters in the control of the British cruisers and promptly lost it. Moreover, the danger of invasion of the Netherlands did not come all from the East. A few days before Antwerp was taken by the Germans, October 9, and again later, the governments in London, Paris and Petrograd had considered the advisability of forcing the Scheldt, so that a large expeditionary force might be brought to the relief of the Belgian city and port. The Dutch government knew of this tentative project and quickly moved its army, which had been stationed for the greater part along the German border, to the points near the mouth of the Scheldt. That served notice on the Entente that Holland meant to defend itself against invasion no matter from what quarter it might come. To the Allied governments this was not the most pleasing of signs just then. In retaliation they limited further the imports of the Dutch.

Holland had been perfectly willing to meet the wishes of Great Britain, even at the risk of displeasing the Germans more. There was also an easy business way of meeting the wishes of the British government with-

out offering official affront to the government at Berlin. Dutch exports had so far gone to Germany and Great Britain alike, and the government, prudently, had done nothing to divert or direct this traffic. But it was possible to let the Dutch merchants know that it would be best to favor the importers of Great Britain, even if prices were not quite so good. This, then, was done. For a while the greater bulk of Dutch dairy products and the like went to England.

All would have been well had it not been that the British government put an embargo on coal and left Dutch shipping, the railroads, the factories, and home consumption generally, without that fuel. Coal had to be gotten if not every wheel in Holland was to stop turning, and Germany was willing to furnish it, provided there was an exchange in kind—food. *Nolens volens* the Dutch government had to enter into such an arrangement.

Coal was exchanged for food in precise quantities and the tyranny of the high seas grew. In desperation, the Dutch government surrendered much of its sovereignty and gave its imports from the West and exports toward the East into the control of the Overseas Trust—a corporation called into being for that purpose and standing under the close supervision of the British commerce agency at Rotterdam, presided over by a zealous convert to Britishism, one Sir Francis Oppenheimer, son of a Frankfurt Jew.

When the copper shipments were held up, the Dutch government placed itself in communication with the United States government, through its minister at Washington, Chevalier van Rappart, and through Dr. Henry van Dyke, American minister at The Hague. The former did not accomplish much, and the latter, a most radical anti-German, was unwilling to do more than was necessary.

The Attitude of an American Diplomatist

The copper cases were the newspaper sensation of the day and I had a great deal to do with them, a circumstances which brought me in contact with the Dutch government for the first time. I also ascertained then what the views of Dr. van Dyke were. He was not inclined to at all urge the case of the Dutch. Quite frankly he expressed to me the fear that the copper might go to Germany, despite the protestations of the Dutch government. I took the liberty to disagree with the United States minister and tactfully reminded him that after all it was not his business to occupy himself with the ultimate destination of the copper, so long as the Dutch government was willing to pledge itself that the metal would not go to Germany, which pledge the diplomatist had no reason to doubt. But evidently Dr. van Dyke was not familiar with the statement of another

Secretary of State, Mr. Thomas Jefferson, who, on September 7, 1793, instructed the United States minister at London, Mr. Pinckney, to inform the British government that :

“When two nations go to war, those who choose to live in peace retain their natural right to pursue their agriculture, manufactures and ordinary vocations, to carry the produce of their industry for exchange with all nations, belligerent or neutral, as usual.”

The fact is that Dr. van Dyke even then had ceased to be a neutral in regard to Germany, as later he admitted in an interview with a newspaperman. On his arrival in the port of New York, from his post at The Hague, in August, 1917, Dr. van Dyke stated to a reporter that he was glad the United States had entered the European War and put an end to its neutrality. He himself had never been much of a neutral at any time since the outbreak of the War. For a man who had been in the diplomatic service of his country that was not the best sort of an admission to make. Utterances of that quality are likely to shake the faith of foreign governments in all United States diplomatists.

What may have been news to a reporter of the *New York Times* was not news to me any more. I knew only too well that Dr. van Dyke, as the minister of a neutral government, favored the British cause in Holland, as against the cause of American and Dutch interests. He did this because he loathed the Germans—for their acts in Belgium, he used to say to his friends and social acquaintances. The private individual may be permitted to do that; the diplomatist, however, ought to keep such opinions to himself. The minions of Baron von Giskra, Austro-Hungarian minister at The Hague, and those of Herr von Müller, the German minister, had no difficulty ascertaining what Dr. van Dyke said and did. Their reports to their respective governments could not but increase the suspicion already felt in Vienna and Berlin that there was something not altogether in the clear between Washington and London, an impression then entirely due to the discrepancy between expectation and performance in regard to the British Orders in Privy Council. Many of the Dutch government officials of lesser importance were decidedly pro-German and they, too, thought that Dr. van Dyke, as diplomatic representative of a neutral power, was certainly too partial for one of the belligerents.

It was unfortunate that Mr. Soren Listoe, the United States consul-general at Rotterdam, also had earned himself the reputation of being ardently pro-British. To what extent this was based on fact I am not able to say. At any rate the Dutch government began to look upon the cases of Dr. van Dyke and Mr. Listoe as telling indications of what

United States neutrality was. The fact that the former was of Dutch descent and the latter a naturalized Dane seemed to complicate matters not a little. The United States government had in the past often sent men to diplomatic stations who were of the same blood as the people with whom they represented the government. That had been done for the purpose of making understanding so much easier. In the case of Dr. van Dyke and Holland that scheme had not worked, it seemed. Mr. Listoe began to be looked upon as a man who had no particular interests in keeping relations between the United States and Holland good.

For the purpose of keeping in touch with the developments of the day I had established good relations with a high government official. All I will say of his identity is that he was not Mr. John Loudon, then the minister of foreign affairs.

On the day in question the official was very much under the influence of the dangers that were besetting Holland. There was some talk of an Entente force landing in Holland, at or near the mouth of the Scheldt River, and the German government had again notified the Dutch government that for more coal from Germany more food would have to be exported. The Dutch were ready to pay good money for the coal of the Germans, but gold was not just then what Germany needed most, although the food shortage in the empire was as yet but the threatening aspect of the near future. On the same day had been received from the Dutch minister at Washington, M. van Rappart, a communication placing the status of Dutch shipping in no better a light than it had been in the past. There had been some exchange of views between the several neutral chancelleries of Europe as to the feasibility of establishing a sort of "League of Neutrals," with a view of combating the highhanded methods of the British blockade. Chevalier van Rappart had been asked to sound the Washington government as to its own position. But his reply, which had come in in the morning, had not been encouraging. The Dutch government was beginning to see how slim were the chances of forming a League of Neutrals under leadership of President Wilson.

The official was very pessimistic. I could not see it just that way at the time, but must say that every one of his predictions came true shortly afterward. He was inclined to criticize Mr. Wilson. To that I put the question, what he expected the United States government to do?

"There is nothing to be done except serve notice on the British government that it must observe International Law, and, above all, the Declaration of London," replied the official.

That was well enough, but who was to serve that notice? A League of Neutrals might do it, thought the minister. But no League of Neutrals, more than a name, was possible except the United States government

joined and headed it. Meanwhile President Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan seemed to be floundering about in a most erratic manner, he thought. Their moves were uncertain, and would remain that so long as there was no return on their part to the provisions of the Declaration of London—so long as they permitted themselves and the world to be run by "Order in Privy Council." It seemed to him that President Wilson was vacillating between duty and sentiment.

When I asked the official whether that implied that Mr. Wilson was considered pro-English rather than neutral I was given the answer that such, indeed, seemed to be the case. I cited the neutrality proclamation of the president in reply, but was answered with a rather cynical smile. That had been done before, said the minister. And since the pronunciamiento there had been ample time to change one's mind. The fact that Mr. Wilson had supinely accepted the edicts of the British government and had for them abandoned the Declaration of London spoke louder than words. The convention in question served no purpose if the most powerful of the neutrals, party to it, did not insist that it be accepted by Great Britain and her allies as binding without modification of any sort. The elimination of whole articles from the agreement, and the impairment thereby, of virtually every other proviso in the Declaration, was something which so powerful an institution as the United States government would not have permitted had it been truly neutral. In proof of his contention the official brought out a textbook on International Law and drew my attention to a note sent by Mr. Thomas Jefferson to the British government on September 7, 1793, at the time of the war between Great Britain and France.

As is well known, this was to be the view, in a general manner, of the German government, which as yet busied itself more with retaliatory, but absolutely futile, anti-blockade measures against the Entente governments.

To a very large degree this opinion by at least one prominent member of the Dutch government was due to the tactless conduct of Dr. van Dyke. That diplomatist had the most peculiar manner of doing things. I will give here an instance that is typical.

Views of an Irate Diplomatic Censor

Calling at the United States legation about noon, on October 8th, I found Dr. van Dyke in a fine state of agitation. Mr. Marshall Langhorne, first secretary of the post, a very quiet man with a fine sense of proportions and commendable appreciation of his duties, had told me that the minister wanted to see me on something very important. When I saw the

man pacing up and down in front of the fireplace, like a caged and impatient lion, I thought that another calamity had fallen upon mankind.

I took a seat and waited until the wrath of the diplomatist should have subsided. After a while it did, and then my attention was drawn by the minister to what seemed to be the remains of burned papers in the grate. This done the diplomatist handed me two sheets of paper with a remark to the effect that their contents were to be a warning to me. I read the letter and notice, for such they were, and then informed Dr. van Dyke that his cautioning me was superfluous—that I had not attempted, nor would attempt, to be guilty of the *crime* set forth in the papers in my hand. With that I left, somewhat put out myself.

The smaller of the sheets of paper, a carbon copy, said or says:

“It must be distinctly understood that the United States of America, a neutral country, will not allow its diplomatic service to be utilized for the transmission of hostile communications or war news. It is for this reason that I give a copy of the following letter to the press. I wish it to be a warning to all persons, of whatever nation, that the United States will resent and *punish* every attempt to make an improper use of its diplomatic service.

HENRY VAN DYKE.

The signature is in pencil—bold and flourishing.

The larger sheet of paper, also covered with a carbon impression, contains this:

American Legation,
The Hague, Netherlands,
October 8, 1914.

E. F. B., Esq. (original address erased and initials surscribed),
c/o American Embassy,
London.

Sir:

Some one has sent from Berlin to this legation in a *sealed* envelope, addressed to you as above, a number of printed documents and letters, some of them apparently from official German sources, and all of them evidently of a distinctly partisan and belligerent character.

I have opened the envelope because it is contrary to the *announced rule of this legation* (the italics are mine) to forward any sealed envelopes except on official business of the United States.

I have destroyed its contents because our neutral government does not intend its diplomatic representatives to be used as forwarders of belligerent propaganda.

If you have any idea who the persons in Germany are who have attempted to make use of this legation in this improper way you will do well to warn them not to repeat the offense. I remain, sir,

Your obedient servant,

HENRY VAN DYKE,
American Minister at The Hague.

For the purpose of showing how Dr. van Dyke viewed things I must explain that the offending reading matter had gotten into the Berlin-The Hague United States diplomatic mail pouch with the consent of the United States embassy at Berlin, and that I ascertained that neither the newspaper copy nor the printed matter was in any way incendiary. Some American newspaper correspondent in Germany was bent upon getting something past the British censors—that was all. I may say here that American newspapers and news services sent correspondents abroad not for the purpose of counting their ten fingers but to get news of the Great War and its associated aspects.

That Dr. van Dyke had the right to open sealed envelopes from Berlin was a little later seriously questioned by Mr. James W. Gerard, the United States ambassador at that point. Nor does it appear that the zealous minister at The Hague had been appointed by Mr. Bryan to be censor of the United States diplomatic mail. If Dr. van Dyke thought that the law had been violated it was plainly his duty, as an officer of the government, to preserve the records in the case, instead of feeding his fireplace with them. Last but not least, and that was the part which Dutchmen find the most delicious, Dr. van Dyke had no authority to threaten "persons, of whatever nation," with the resentment and punishment the United States might mete out, seeing that *diplomatic* mail constitutes a *privilege* and not a right. The "announced rule of this legation" was an order of the State Department made much later.

The Censor Assists Entente Diplomacy

In itself the incident is not important. I have cited it here as an index to the mental qualities of the United States minister at The Hague. It also leads up to the question of censorship and the absolute control by the British government of the means of getting news to the United States. At the time of which I speak the British censors held up all matter that did not please and often added and interpolated, and a few months later even the mails were no longer secure. Still later, both cable and mail were virtually closed to the American newspaper correspondents in the Central States.

The censorship of the British went into effect a day or two after war had been declared. For a week or so it was still possible to get

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"neutral" newspaper dispatches to the United States; after that it was entirely a matter of hazard, or one of writing from the British point of view.

At first British censorship was to be a matter of strictly military precaution. That, of course, could only be applied to outgoing newspaper dispatches, eastward bound. Dispatches intended for the United States may have needed some scrutiny, but with Great Britain in absolute control of the cables that was no reason why thousands upon thousands of newspaper dispatches should have gone into the wastepaper baskets of the British censorship, next to the French, the most absolute I have encountered. The fact is that the British government suppressed nearly all news from Central Europe for the purpose of influencing American public opinion.

It is hard, nowadays, to draw a distinct line of demarkation between matter of military import and matter that is not. I have here not the space to go into this very interesting subject, suffice the statement that almost anything can be given the name of military "information" if one sets out to do that. Political news, especially, is easily "military," particularly when it may be flavored with the condiments of propaganda. Perhaps the most noxious sort of newspaper copy read by the censor is the sort which is likely to put the claims and motives of his own government in a bad light.

Mr. Melville E. Stone, general manager of the Associated Press of America, with which service I was connected at the time, was very much interested in the early "atrocities" stories of the War. These lurid tales had it that the most shocking crimes were being committed throughout Central Europe and that Americans, together with English men and women, were being treated outrageously. In a few cases Americans had been mistaken for Englishmen and had been arrested. Appeal to the American consulates had righted that. I said as much in my dispatches, but seemed unable to still the demands of New York for more "refugee" stories. Letters from the London office of the service complained of the very strict censorship the British had established, and gradually it dawned upon me that London had made up its mind not to permit copy "favorable" to Germany to reach the United States. The word favorable meant in this instance news of a sort which would not be welcome in Great Britain.

As an example, I may cite a long dispatch of mine which dealt with the arrival in Holland of the third American "refugee" train. The dispatch contained over two thousand words. It was headed by a general statement, then came several short interviews with the more prominent Americans, among them Henry George, Jr., and finally the list of the

"refugees." The purpose of the story was no other than to still the fears of those Americans who had relatives and friends travelling in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Inquiry I had made showed that there were still about ten thousand American citizens "summering" in Central Europe. To ease the anxiety of at least that number of American families seemed very necessary to the service and myself—not to the British censors. The dispatch was suppressed by the British censors.

A good picture of the censorship conditions already prevailing will be gained from the following excerpts from the correspondence I had with several Associated Press bureaus:

September 8, 1914:

"From comparison of your mail copies with your recent messages it appears that the censor has been letting *almost all* of your matter through. I do not see that statements from Germany which mention the location of French and German troops can be objectionable, because they do not give information to the Germans but just the opposite.

R. M. COLLINS."

Mr. Collins was the chief of the London Bureau of the Associated Press. His reference to the "statements from Germany" was made in reply to a question of mine concerning an order issued by the British censorship authorities concerning military information. The wording of that order was so ambiguous that I could not understand it and asked Mr. Collins for advice.

On the 16th of the same month the British had already in force a search of the mails. From the London office I received the following:

"Let me remind you that all mail matter which you are forwarding to us is now being opened by the censor and we have no way of knowing what he takes out.

"Let me also remind you to preface every one of Conger's dispatches with the word Conger and do not preface a dispatch with "Berlin," which is like waving a red flag in the face of a bull.

FREDERICK ROY MARTIN."

British censorship had progressed considerably. The "mail copies" to which Mr. Collins referred and the "mail matter" mentioned by Mr. Martin was carbon copies of the cables I had sent. The messages were numbered and that number showed on the carbon copy, of course. In addition to the serial number the messages also carried a statement of the number of words filed, so that the London office was able to keep tally on the amount of copy suppressed by the British censors and the amount added for propaganda purposes by the same authorities.

It was the season of the "atrocities" yarn. My experience was that such tales were very much exaggerated, to say the least. But so many

of these stories were making the rounds in the press that I deemed it necessary to draw the attention of the Chief of the News Department of the Associated Press to the case. A letter from him, dated September 19th, contains the following:

"As you know, our Mr. Roger Lewis, John T. McCutcheon, Irwin Cobb, James O'Donnell Bennett and Harry Hanson, all well-known American newspaper men, went through behind the German army and were taken prisoners and sent to Aix-la-Chapelle under detention. The men followed the army from Brussels clean through on the main line of action through Belgium. Every one of them has written detailed mail stories giving the results of their observations and saying that, although they made the most careful investigation, they were unable to find a single case of wilful atrocity on the part of the German soldiery. Mind you, these stories were written by these men after they were out of the country and under no duress in any way. Therefore, I think it would be wise not to discuss atrocities, because you cannot do so from first-hand knowledge but can only give *ex parte* accounts of such incidents.

"The censorship in England is very strict and very severe. London writes us that much of your stuff is so mutilated by the censors that when it reaches them it is not intelligible.

CHARLES E. KLOEBER."

Mr. Kloeber thought it necessary to write me another letter on the same day:

"In view of the fact that your stuff is so censored by the time it reaches London and so few of your dispatches seemingly are allowed to go through, I suggest that you write a connected resumé of the week's news that you have filed, supplemented with other matter that occurs to you, and let us have it by each steamer that comes direct to America.

CHARLES E. KLOEBER."

Preparing American Public Opinion

The following excerpts from a letter written to me by Mr. Stone throws a strong light on the news situation and censorship of those days.

September 21, 1914.

"I enclose herewith clippings from the New York papers, which you might transmit to Conger, so that he can see that both by wireless and by Rotterdam, as well as via Copenhagen, we have been getting a pretty fair report. . . . The Berlin report seems to me to be rather dry and, of course, necessarily meagre. . . . Also you might give us something of the same sort in Southern Holland. The people of the United States are almost weary of the daily see-saw of the armies. They are impatient for some

definite victory, which, of course, they cannot have at the instant, and, as a substitute, picture stories of a moderate sort—not trivial stories—would be of value.

“Again, it would be well to ask Conger if he could confer with the German authorities and see if there would be any possibility of an Associated Press correspondent or two going with the German army. Advise him that the British and French have absolutely refused to allow any American correspondents with their armies and I should think, under the circumstances, the Germans might be willing to do it, and the reports from these correspondents might come out either by wireless or through you. Of course, they would have to be handled carefully in order to pass the British censorship, which surpasses anything I have ever known for stupidity.

MELVILLE E. STONE.”

In explanation of Mr. Stone’s reference to a “fair report” I may say that the report seemed even fair after the British censors had suppressed virtually two-thirds of all matter relayed by me or written by me. With the wireless the British could not interfere, and that helped greatly to make the report of the Associated Press as good as it was.

On October 5, 1914, Mr. Stone wrote me another letter on this subject. It said in part:

“The situation in London is extraordinary and has been very trying, but I am glad to say that I think I see distinct marks of improvement.

MELVILLE E. STONE.”

Meanwhile, the London Bureau of the Associated Press was better acquainted with the situation, as is shown in a letter dated September 21st:

“It is now apparent that a very large part of your work is going to waste, at least so far as the cable is concerned. For example, your telegram No. 134 was all killed, 135 was nearly all killed, 136 all killed, 138 came through in full, 139 and 140 were all killed, 142, 143, 144, 145 and 146 came through in full, 147, 148 and 152 were all killed.

FREDERICK ROY MARTIN.”

The fate of dispatches Nos. 137, 141, 149, 150 and 151 could not be ascertained, it seems, because the censors in London had also taken the carbon copies of them from the mail. The case deserves a few words of explanation. The dispatches involved were numbered 134 to 152, inclusive. That meant 19 separate messages. Of this number were passed by the British censors, 7; mutilated, 1; wholly suppressed, 11. The British mail censors, however, had found only 5 objectionable, because the carbon copies of the other 14 had been permitted to reach the London office of the service.

Mr. Martin doubted that his letter would reach me if he did not explain what the numbers meant. To the typewritten letter he added as postscript the following remark in handwriting:

“To mail censors: The figures in above are not code but numbers of dispatches. The only object of this letter is to save the Associated Press hundreds of pounds now being paid for cable dispatches that are not delivered.”

This letter advised me to reduce cabling to a minimum and make a more general use of the mails. This I did, of course. And after that the American public received comparatively little news from Central Europe, since I was then handling out of The Hague, to which point I had transferred the bureau, virtually every dispatch of the Associated Press correspondents in Central Europe, in addition to the news matter I gathered myself. I must state here further that the Berlin dispatches of the Associated Press were written for the greater part by two men who were distinctly hostile to the Germans, a fact referred to by Mr. Stone in his remark that the Berlin report was “dry.”

The New York office, however, anxious to present both sides, continued to bombard me with demands for copy by cable. Since I knew that to cable via London, as I was obliged to do, since there was no other line open, was futile, I wrote on October 3rd the following to the Chief of the News Division:

“However, the only thing to do is to carry on this most unsatisfactory sort of labor. Meanwhile, I may not have to tell you that the English censor is not concerned with suppressing military news as much as news favorable to Germany—which, of course, is the same thing in the end. I suspect strongly that some nine interviews I secured from Americans returning from various parts of Germany on August 19 never reached the London office even, though the term ‘mobilization’ was the only military word used in them. At any rate, I saw in one of the American newspapers the bare announcement that a special train from Berlin had arrived in Rotterdam with some 300 refugees aboard. After that I feared the worst, of course, and a few days later Mr. Patterson, of the *Chicago Tribune*, told me that he had good reason to believe that the English censors went as far as to interpolate their own views into copy.”

The Case of Cardinal Mercier

Before dismissing the subject of censorship, for the time being, I must give here a copy of a letter I addressed to Mr. Martin, the assistant general manager of the Associated Press, in connection with the famous Cardinal Mercier incident.* My original message, saying that Cardinal Mercier was virtually a prisoner of the Germans, went through. Mean-

* Cardinal Mercier has since then been quoted as saying that I had “saved his life,” which is not in accord with the facts since his life was at no time in jeopardy.

while, British correspondents in The Hague and Rotterdam had given their imagination full play, despite the fact that they had no other authority than what I had, to wit: "De Tijd," a Dutch Catholic newspaper. Since the *stories* then published proved one of the first great political sensations of the War, but were devoid of all fact, I will here give the letter in full.

"In view of the fact that I am leaving tomorrow (for Berlin) I thought it best to acquaint you with the steps I took in the Cardinal Mercier matter. I am induced to do this, first, because I do not think the incident closed; secondly, because I want both you and Mr. Berry (my successor at The Hague) to be thoroughly familiar with the affair. With this in view I have asked Mr. Berry to read the letter and then mail it to you.

"The various exhibits named in the letter are here enclosed.

"In my telegram No. 629 (see date on copy) the story was first told as it appeared in the Amsterdam 'Tijd' of that day—certain non-essentials omitted, of course. On the following day, in telegram No. 634, I added a few other details, also from the 'Tijd'—Dutch papers generally having paid little attention to the 'Tijd' story of the day before.

"As shown in Tel. No. 637, I received the German official dementi about 10 a. m. on the 7th, obtaining the same at the The Hague German legation, where I called for the purpose of getting some data on the matter or an explanation. At the legation the story, as told, was characterized as absurd. I sent the dementi as received here direct from Brussels.

"On the same day I received your cable No. 1, and following this sent to Mr. Conger Tel. No. 638. In reply to the latter I received from Mr. Conger Tel. No. 2, and then sent Tel. No. 639.

"At 5.36 p. m. that day I received your cable No. 3. I immediately called at the German legation with the request that I should be given the papers necessary to enable me to leave for Belgium that night, by automobile, if possible. I was told that this was out of the question, for the reason that the legation did not have the authority to issue any such papers. I made inquiry as to what other way was open, and was told that there was none. The legation regretted very much that nothing could be done in the matter, and I have good reason to believe that they really tried very hard to solve the problem.

"I returned to the hotel and wrote Tel. No. 641, which I routed via the Platzkommando at Aix-la-Chapelle, acquainting you of what I had done by means of Tel. No. 642, sending at the same time Tel. 643 to Conger. A little before that I had sent Tel. No. 4 a4b to the London office. Later in the evening I followed this up with Tel. 644.

"At about 7 p. m. on the 9th I was called up by the German legation. I was told a reply from General von Bissing had been received there. The message was read to me over the telephone. Tel. No. 647 was the result of this. Later in the evening I received from Mr. Conger Tel. No. 5, telling me that Mr.

Bouton had been dispatched to Belgium. On the following day I received from Mr. Conger Tel. No. 6, of which my Tel. No. 652 is in the main a translation.

"So far Cardinal Mercier has not replied to my telegram."

The above was written on January 11, 1915. Of the several telegrams mentioned in it only two reached the London office of the Associated Press. According to the "Tijd," Cardinal Mercier was a prisoner and had been given very severe treatment. That story I had forwarded with due credit. The German official dementi denied almost *in toto* the charges that had been made and which I had repeated with mention of my authority, the "Tijd," while the telegram from General von Bissing reiterated the substance of the dementi. The fact of the matter was that Cardinal Mercier had urged a part of the Belgian population to resist the Germans in every way possible. What he probably meant is that the Belgians were to engage in passive resistance. From the point of view of the patriot the cardinal can hardly be blamed for that.

The truth is that under the conditions prevailing in Belgium his policy was open to criticism. The country had by that time been occupied by Germans, who were meeting the slightest outbreak of *franc-tireur* activity with all the ruthlessness the militarist anywhere is capable of. The Belgian army had been unable to hold back the Germans. Cardinal Mercier was guilty of a grave error, to say the least, in calling upon his hapless people to resist the Germans, since by doing that he was placing in jeopardy lives without affecting in any manner the situation as it was. Since the Germans did not want to have more trouble on their hands, Cardinal Mercier was placed under surveillance, but not in any manner abused or mistreated, as he has since then reluctantly admitted.

My telegrams would have acquainted the world with the actual state of affairs. But that is exactly what the British censors wished to prevent. How admirably they succeeded is one of the major political facts of the War.*

Voice of Press Is Voice of People

It is rather surprising that the United States government never interested itself in the subject of British censorship. Now and then the State Department would take in hand a particularly atrocious case in which some large firm had lost money through interference with its cablegrams by the British government. It does not seem as if anybody in Washington paid the slightest attention to the one-sidedness of the news

* See "*Société Anonyme*" in Appendix.

which resulted from the suppression of nearly three-quarters of the dispatches written by American correspondents in Central Europe. Had it not been for the wireless of the Germans the American public would have heard even less of the "other" side. It heard almost next to nothing as it was.

The German censorship usually saw to it that no really "disagreeable" dispatch or mail story got through without pruning by blue pencil and scissors. The dispatch, as it reached London, was bound to appear to the British censors a rather partial account, and so it went into the limbo.

To make a long story short: What appeared good to the Germans seemed bad to the British. Between the two the American newspaperman had a hard time of it.

Since governments, statesmen and diplomatists are rather fond of the press in times of war, so long as it is amenable, and since the press has only too often demonstrated that it can make war at will, it would not be so bad an idea if this subject of censorship was attended to a little better by parliaments. Nations, moreover, owe it to themselves to keep their news channels open and the water in them unclouded.

It is all very well to be in a forgiving mood when a war is won, as I have been able to observe in this instance on the part of the American public. But there is the possibility that the martial adventures of the future may not always end so advantageously. The negligence displayed in having the news channels of the American public wide open to foreign interference, of a physical and moral character, may cost dearly some other time. If public opinion is really and truly behind all wars, as one must doubt, then public opinion, to be intelligent, must needs be formed of the balance struck between the accounts from both sides—two belligerents, when war is on. A public opinion resting upon one-sidedness is no public opinion at all. It is partisanship of the most noxious character because the sentiment thus formed has not even the advantage of being purely selfish—the only redeeming quality that may be associated with frenzy for war.

With the phase of initiatives of the Great War over, the acts of the United States depended entirely upon the American diplomatist and the American press. The answer to the question which many Central Power statesmen were to ask soon: What will America do? was given by the diplomatists and journalists of the United States. The American public may be permitted to flatter itself that it decided the question of war or peace. Ultimately it did what Mr. Wilson, the politicians, diplomatic envoys and editors thought best—mass psychology attended to that.

Fully another two years passed before the answer was given. It took that long to prepare public opinion in the United States and find

the auspicious moment for entry into the War. The phase of expansion of the Great Calamity was well over, and the phase of attrition had set in with unprecedented savagery, when Mr. Wilson finally found the long-sought opportunity to *associate* himself with the Entente group so that the Central Powers could be brought to their knees.*

* The following interesting dialogue occurred between a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and President Wilson:

SENATOR McCUMBER: "Would our convictions of the unrighteousness of the German war have brought us into this war if Germany had not committed any acts against us without this League of Nations, as we had no league of nations at that time?"

PRESIDENT WILSON: "I hope it would eventually, Senator, as things developed!"

SENATOR McCUMBER: "Do you think that if Germany had committed no act of war against our citizens that we would have got into this war?"

PRESIDENT WILSON: "I do think so!"

The above is, of course, a complete refutation of what has been advanced as the cause of war by the administration. We deal, then, with a mere pretext, and not at all with a cause. In the light of this admission by the nation's Chief Executive, we must look for the actual cause elsewhere. Since it would be unfair to *assume* that any particular thing was the cause, we must of necessity wait for an explanation. Just two things stand out at present. One of them is that even a League of Nations, and, I presume membership therein for Germany, would not have eventually kept the United States out of the war. The second is that the most rigorous regard for citizens of the United States by Germany would not have "kept us out of the War," despite the promises made before and during the election of 1916.

Indeed, such a regard for citizens of the United States by the German government would have amounted to little in the end. The later *notes diplomatiques* of the State Department were hair-trigger affairs of the most dangerous sort, especially the famous "Sussex" note. That note placed a premium on trouble.

Let us assume that a ship with Americans aboard had been sunk by a mine! Let us assume, further, that a government, face to face with defeat, had instructed one of its own submarines to torpedo such a ship! Would the Department of State, and the world, have believed the protestations of the German government that it was not one of its submarines that sank the vessel—that it was a floating mine, or that it was, possibly, the submarine torpedo of a government acting as its own *agent provocateur*?

Moreover, let us assume that just about that time one or several German submarines would not have been heard from again, as was often the case! Would the German government have been able to defend itself, since now and then the commanders of submarines did make mistakes or became too zealous entirely? Hardly! The hair-trigger situation created by the notes of the United States government made war with Germany inevitable in the end—extended submarine warfare or no. To say the very least, participation in the Great War by the United States was too inviting, too necessary, too imperative to the Entente governments to weigh at all against the cutting pangs of conscience of a submarine commander forced to torpedo a vessel flying his own flag.

January 20, 1920.

S.

VII

DIPLOMACY IN TURKEY

THE Ottoman government was the first to join in the European War on the side of the Central Powers. On October 30, 1915, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Russia severed relations with Turkey, and, within the next week, the three last of these Powers declared war upon her, being joined by Serbia on December 2nd. Before these steps were taken, the diplomatic representatives of the Entente group had done their best to persuade the Ottoman government to the view that the guarantee on the part of the Entente group, for the inviolability of Ottoman territory for the space of thirty years, would be better than risking another war.

There were many men in Stamboul who agreed with this. Turkey had not fared well in her recent military enterprises. She had lost the war against Italy. The Balkan allies had shorn her of almost the last of her provinces in the peninsula, and the revolution also had weakened the empire. There was every reason why the Ottoman government should avoid entering the great struggle that was already on. The War was already a fact, no longer an accommodating possibility to the diplomatists. What the constellation of Mars would be was very plain.

The first successes of the German army had already been nullified on the Marne, and the Austro-Hungarian forces were falling back rapidly before the onslaught of the great Russian hosts. The Battle of the Masurian Lakes was indeed the only hopeful sign on the horizon. Moreover, the British blockade had already shown itself absolute, and Great Britain had not only announced, but was already demonstrating, that she would come to the aid of the Entente with her last man and the last "silver" bullet. Already it was clear that France would put up a most valiant defense. Her army was not as decadent as speculators on her birthrate were prone to believe, and Russia had done rather better than was expected. On the other hand, nearer home, the Rumanians were already shaky in their alliance with Austria-Hungary, the Bulgarians were anything but committed to any given line of action; that Italy would ultimately join the Triple Entente no sane statesman in Central Europe doubted any longer. Saïd Halim Pasha, the Ottoman grand vizier, was sure of this, as he told me, when the Italian government refused to live

up to the spirit of the Triple Alliance treaty at the very outbreak of the War.

To this list of discouraging factors must be added that the treasury of the Ottoman government was, as ever, nearly empty; that the Ottoman army was poorly armed and managed, the defenses along the Dardanelles and at the Bosphorus in a poor state, and the fleet entirely negligible. Even the Osmanli part of the population was not united, and the Arabs, Greeks and Armenians might strike for independence any day after the Ottoman troops had been called to a front. To join the Central Powers under such handicaps and then risk being cut off from them by the people in the Balkan and by Rumania was rather more than even an Enver Pasha, Germanophile, and a Talaat Bey, a most consistent and enterprising Talaatophile politician, could risk. That in the end they did run this risk was due to their fear that the hour of the Osmanli was come, no matter what agreements they might make with the Entente group, and that in the possible victory of the Germans lay their only hope.

Constantinople has ever been the "empire." It always was and still is the metropolis *par excellence*. Of the several states of which it has been capital in its history of, roughly, 2,700 years, it was the *multum in parvo*. It was the glory and strength of the Hellenic colonies in Phrygia Minor, of the Eastern Roman empire, of Byzantium and of the Ottoman state. Founded in or about 660 B. C. by Dorians, the city had grown rapidly into prominence. Her waterways, the Hellespont, Propontis and the Ford of Io, and the seas beyond, the Pontus Euxinos and the wide Mediterranean, were responsible for that. As the means of navigation were improved, and trading by water more and more facilitated, the city on the Golden Horn gained greater importance. Soon she was the mistress of a great domain, and as such she did not often fall under the influence of such men as Themistocles and Alcibiades. Together with Cyzikus, Byzantium refused to be swayed by the quarrels of Athens and Sparta. Having power and interests of their own, these two cities had adopted policies of their own and were little inclined to listen to the ranting of the demagogues in the market places of the capitals of Greece at home.

But *Byzantion* was to fall in the hands of the Romans. In 194 A. D. Septimus Severus blockaded and besieged the city, and two years later took it. He went so far as to give the city another name. But *Antonia* did not stay long, nor did Roman rule, for that matter. Constantinian made himself master of the city in 324 and began to build up an empire in which the Greek was once more the chief political factor.

On May 11th, 330 A. D., Byzantium became *Nova Roma*, the new capital of Rome, but to the people the city was and remained Constantinople

—city of Constantin. Under Justinian, Constantinople was at the height of her glory. The city was immensely rich and had a population of about 500,000. It was also well fortified. The natural defenses of the site, water at two-thirds of the precinct, were reinforced by a stronger wall, and across the base of the triangle, on land, was erected the strongest wall then known. Europe at that time was being overrun by several barbarous races whom something or other had dislodged from their homes in Asia. Constantinople was the only nut they could not crack.

The Dardanelles in Early Diplomacy

The Hellespont—Dardanelles—had meanwhile been crossed and re-crossed by many of the famous armies of antiquity. The Heptastadion Ferry, as the narrows at the base of Cape Nagara were styled then, offered the most feasible, if not a very convenient, passage into Phrygia Minor, Asia Minor and Southwest Asia generally. Among others who passed that way was Xerxes. That this robber baron of a Persian should attempt to take Byzantion was natural. He failed, because a Spartan, Pausanias, of evil reputation but considerable military ability, came to the city's relief. For the first time the Thracian Chersonesus came to be looked upon as the backyard, figuratively, of Byzantion, and on almost the very site on which are now located the forts and redoubts of Bulair a great wall was erected, the Makron Teichos. Perikles was the builder. Some fifty years later Derkyglades either added to the strength of the defenses or rebuilt them.

The Heptastadion Ferry continued to attract military adventurers. Alexander passed over it, and so did the Roman leaders. The Makron Teichos was hard to keep up, it seems, and, while the city on the Golden Horn was not taken by every army that passed by, she, nevertheless, suffered great economic losses, and was no longer what she had been. Yet in 1001 she was still of enough importance to give sanction to the coronation of King Stephen of Hungary, whom she sent a crown that was later made into one with a similar insignia furnished by the Pope of Rome.

But it seemed that the sun of Byzantium was setting. Emperor Basilios succeeded for a while in putting a stop to the progress of the Seljuks, who were rapidly eating up the empire and began to threaten its capital. But he was on the defensive, and, being that, he had to do the best he could with the Italian concessionaires who had gradually infested his domain. Italian traders had the peninsula and city of Gallipoli, the ancient Thracian Chersonesus and Kalliupolis, in their hands and valuable concessions had been surrendered to the Genuese and Venetians, including

extra-territorial privileges or rights at the very gates of Constantinople, at Pera and Galata, of which the Tower of Galata is still the monument. The Powers of Europe later made what is known as the capitulations of this historic precedent.

A period of Neo-Idealism had meanwhile seized hold of thought in Europe. The Holy Sepulchre was to be cleansed of the Saracene, and the Crusades were undertaken for that purpose. Neo-Idealism was as unpractical then as it is now, as the Children's Crusade demonstrates.

With the brief attack of religious fervor over, the good knights turned to pillage and conquest *en route*. Constantinople, being unfortunate to lie in their path, suffered greatly from this. To the Byzantians, the Holy Places in Palestine, being so close at hand, had little attraction. Familiarity with a thing has ever been the best counsel. For holding a reasonable view in this matter, and having still in their possession much that could be looted, the people of the city, just then engaged in one of the many uprisings to which partisanship for *Blue* and *Green* led, were besieged, overpowered in 1203 and treated with a brutality that has no rival in history. For three days the good Christian knights murdered and pillaged, raped and burned, and, when finally they desisted, it was from sheer exhaustion and satiety.

Byzantium was never the same after that. Michael Palaeogus made a desperate attempt to organize his state and city for the coming of the Turk, but did not make much headway. The Crusaders had massacred and pillaged the country side as thoroughly as they had Constantinople. What that meant may be gathered by considering that the population of the capital had been reduced to about 100,000.

Meanwhile, the "400 tents" of Osmanli which had been pitched on the outskirts of Dorylaeum in 1074 had grown into a strong population by reproduction and the assimilation of others. In 1354 the Turks crossed the Hellespont at the Heptastadion Ford, overran Thrace, made Adrianople their capital, subjugated the people in the Balkans shortly afterward, and, in 1411, cast their eyes upon Constantinople. Eleven years later they were able to lay the city under tribute and in 1453 they took it, largely through the assistance of military engineers and artillerymen who were good Christians, to wit: Frenchmen. Constantin had a force that numbered but 7,500. He pleaded for help in vain. The succor that could have been brought, at least by the Christian states along the Mediterranean, was not brought, because the political situation in Europe did not permit it and the Byzantians happened to be the *bête noire*—Huns—of the period.

This is the manner in which the Turks got possession of Constantinople and her waterways.

I have not the room here to trace the further developments along the

straits, with the exception of stating that the first of the Osmanli rulers, and their able grand viziers, set about to fortify the entrance to the Dardanelles and Bosphorus in a maner which even today must excite admiration. Grand Vizier Achmed Koprülü erected the castles at Kum Kalé and Sid-il-Bahr, and armed them with the best guns of the times. Thereafter the Dardanelles were closed to all traffic which the government in Stamboul did not favor. Similar fortifications were laid out at the entrance to the Bosphorus, and Russia, into which the republic of Nishni-Novgorod had now grown, or degenerated, as the case may be, was now further removed from the substance of her dreams, the *Zarigrad* on the Golden Horn, than she had ever been before. The fleets she had sent into the Bosphorus in 860 and again in 1048 had been able to sail as far as the Sea of Marmora. Attack from that quarter was now out of the question. Russia tried to get to Constantinople via Baltic, North Sea, Channel, Atlantic, Mediterranean and Aegean. Her fleet managed to get past the Turkish batteries at the entrance to the Dardanelles, in 1770, but lacked enterprise enough to measure issues with Turkish batteries at Tchanak Kalé and Kilid-il-Bahr. At the headland of Kefes Burnu it came to and put about.

A British fleet, under Admiral Duckworth, was more successful in 1807. It reached Constantinople, but the peace treaty made two years later recognized the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus as Ottoman territorial waters. Such being the case no foreign warcraft could hereafter enter the straits without the permission of the Turkish government, which permission, by the way, depended again upon several of the other signatory Powers. For warships, then, the Dardanelles and Bosphorus were closed. For merchant vessels, of any registry, they remained open so long as the Turkish government had no valid reason to close them, which reason again was subject to what the Concert of Europe might have to say. This status of the case was created and ratified, and in some instances modified, by the Hunkiar Iskelessi Treaty of 1833, made between Russia and Turkey; the Dardanelles Treaty of 1841, the Paris Dardanelles Convention of 1856, the London Protocol of 1871 and the Berlin Convention of 1878. It was modified in 1853, at the beginning of the Crimean War, when French and British warcraft, as allies of the Turks against Russia, appeared before Constantinople, and in 1878 when several British ships arrived off the city for the purpose of defending it, if need be, against the Russians. During the late Balkan War the Ottoman government was persuaded to permit each of the Great Powers to station in the Golden Horn a small cruiser, known as *stationnaire*, for the protection of the Europeans in the city. That privilege was still given at the outbreak of the European War, nor was it specifically recalled when the Ottoman government abolished the capitulations—concessions of an

extra-territorial character given governments for the protection of the interests of their nationals, as the claims read.

As pointed out, the Byzantian government had seen fit, for very good reasons, to grant the Italians similar concessions centuries before. It did that when it was moving along swiftly on its downward curve. The case of the Turk was the same. So long as the sultans were strong, largely because they had good premiers and ministers, so long were the haughty diplomatic envoys of the European powers obliged to appear before the several Osmanli Majesties in cages. When the Turk was no longer strong and able the process was reversed. Such is the course of human events.

Entente Diplomacy When Handicapped

On August 9, 1914, a few days after the outbreak of the War, the German dreadnaught cruiser "Goeben" and the light cruiser "Breslau" sought refuge in the Dardanelles from their British and French pursuers in the Mediterranean. For two days the Ottoman government did not know what to do. To give asylum to the two warships, for longer than the time permitted by international practice, was dangerous. The diplomatists of the Triple Entente would call, as they did, at the Bab-i-Ali, Sublime Porte, and demand an explanation. Grand Vizier Saïd Halim Pasha, Enver Pasha, the minister of war, and Talaat Bey, minister of the interior and general factotum of the Ottoman government, found themselves in sore predicament. It would not do to offend the governments in London, Petrograd and Paris. On the other hand, the Berlin government could not be affronted.

For a day the problem remained unsolved, and then a solution was found by the several heads that were stuck together, to wit: The Ottoman ministers already named, Baron von Wangenheim, the German ambassador to the Sublime Porte, and the men in Berlin. The solution was that the "Goeben" and "Breslau" should be *bought* by the Ottoman government. They were bought over the protest of the British, French and Russian ambassadors and governments. The prompt conversion of the ships into "Sultan Jawus Selim," for the "Goeben," and "Midillih," for the "Breslau," did not appease the anger of London, Paris and Petrograd.

But the Ottoman government had an argument of its own. The United States government had in the preceding month transferred by an act of Congress, dated July 8th, and for a consideration of \$12,535,-276 and 98 cents, a regular bargain figure, to one Fred J. Gauntlett, the United States battleships "Idaho" and "Mississippi." The understanding

was, though Mr. Wilson could not himself appear in the transaction as the seller, to transfer these ships to the Greek government, as was done.

The two battleships were of a rather obsolete type and fitted no longer into the tactical scheme of the United States navy department. But they were superior to anything the Greeks had, and the Turks also had in their ramshackle navy nothing that came at all close in efficiency to the two craft. The Ottoman government objected to the sale, and the American ambassador at Constantinople, Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Sr., also did not view the transfer of the warships with favor. It was generally known that the Greek government bought the ships to attend at some day not far off, under the aegis of another Balkan League, to the case of the Turks for good. *Graecia irredenta* was to be redeemed. As yet the Turks held several of the Greek islands in the Aegean, and Athens made claims to certain parts along the coast of Asia Minor, notably the district and city of Smyrna and the Cilician Plain, with the towns of Mersina and Tarsus.

Graecia irredenta, so hoped the diplomatists of the Balkans, was to be redeemed together with *Bulgaria irredenta* in Thrace. The Nationalist Party of Bulgaria, headed by M. I. M. Guechoff, one of the Bulgarian premiers during the late Balkan War, was determined to make good the defeat suffered at the peace conference in Bucharest, 1913, which fastened upon a people as noxious a treaty as was ever signed. To make good that defeat was possible, however, only at the expense of the Turks. The Serbs stood in too high an esteem, if we may call it that, with the Russian government, which just then was Sazonoff from cellar to attic, to figure in the *revanche* scheme of the Bulgarian Nationalist Party. With the Turk it was different, of course. He had few friends just then, as the London and Bucharest conferences had demonstrated, and Russia had not changed her plans—was still dreaming the dream of seeing the Romanoffs, in temporal and spiritual sublimeness, enthroned in the *Zarigrad*—the emperor city—on the Golden Horn. How *eternally* great a man Sazonoff would have been in that case!

The Neo-Idealists of reactionary Russia looked upon the substitution of the Greek Cross for the Crescent on Hagia Sophia mosque as a god-sent duty. Practical men of the Sazonoff type had plans of their own—Russia's hegemony of the world south of the borders of the Russian empire. Control of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal was to follow and after that it was to be seen whether or no Great Britain could keep her empire in India with the route about the Cape of Good Hope the only one open for her mighty armada. Sazonoff and his ilk were indeed playing the lute of the Triple Entente in the Concert of Europe, but they had not forgotten that the unbelievable, an alliance between demo-

cratic France and autocratic Russia, had been brought about because of the antipathy of the Russian bear for the British lion.

M. Guechoff—I may say *en passant* that I know him very well—knew all that and more. He was, in addition, a Russophile by conviction—one of those quietly intense natures in whom gratitude and resentment are lasting sensations. He believed implicitly in the cause of the Slav, and the noble equestrian statue of Czar Alexander *Oswoboditel*, monumented almost before his house in Sofia, was to him rather more than to the men in the Sofia foreign office at that time. Alexander II, Czar Liberator, had shaken the Turk off the Bulgars. M. Guechoff cherished the hope that he would be able to drive the Turk out of Thrace. What he would do with Constantinople, *Zarigrad*, was not so clear to him. But time brings counsel.

A Balkan "Problem" in the Making

There was no *entente* yet between Greek and Bulgar, so far as I know, though a lame sort of alliance between Greece and Serbia *à la Italia*. But the fact is that the leaders of certain elements in Bulgaria and Greece had decided upon the matter. I discussed the question with several of them, and found that the more conservative and far-sighted thought that while Greece was to have again control of all the Greek islands in the Aegean, and the districts in Asia Minor I have named, Bulgaria might extend her dominion as far as the Tchatdalja line of fortifications. The line Enos-Media had formerly been the peace objective of the Bulgarians. Such a border would join to Bulgaria nearly all of the Bulgarians still under Turkish rule, and would also have the desired military advantages. A part of this territory was ceded by Turkey in August, 1915, as a gage for Bulgaria's entrance in the War on the side of the Central Powers group.

But there were also those extremists in Bulgaria who thought that all of Thrace and the Gallipoli peninsula ought to be taken from the Turks, Constantinople included. These men were trying to show the world that this would be the best way of settling the problem of the control of the waterways. With the Bulgarians in possession of the western shores of the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus, the Greeks, possibly, re-established in the western part of what had been Phrygia Minor, anciently, and with the Turk limited to Anatolia north of the Gulf of Ismid it would be easy enough to open the Dardanelles to all shipping, war or peace. With three states abutting upon these bodies of water it would be simple to make the straits neutral or international, since each of the governments involved could claim them only as far as their *Thalsohle*—central channel. To certain Russian statesmen that appealed

strongly. Half a loaf was better than none, and there was no telling when trouble among the Balkanites would lead to the "realization" of Russian "desires."

The Turks were well acquainted with this scheme, as I found, and could not but discountenance the sale of the two American battleships to the Greeks. They did that, but stopped a little short, so far as I know, of making a protest to the Department of State. The United States ambassador, Mr. Morgenthau, knew too little of the profession upon which he had embarked from a real estate office, and was too timid to understand the full meaning of the transaction, and the government in Washington does not seem to have given the matter much thought, which, in regard to politics in Europe, was living up to its traditions. In those halcyon days, moreover, the Congress of the United States still bickered over millions, being as yet unused to the reckless appropriation of billions, and the twelve million dollars for what would have been scrap iron in a few months looked very good to the watchdogs of the treasury.

To the argument of the Ottoman government that the "Goeben" and "Breslau" had been bought to offset the increase in the naval armament of Greece produced by the "Idaho" and "Mississippi" the diplomatists of the Triple Entente could make no effective rebuttal. There are some facts which even a diplomatist can not deny, although they are few in number, withal.

The *sale* of the two German ships could be attacked from another angle, however. It was not a *bona fide* transaction, claimed the British, French and Russian governments and their ambassadors. To this the Ottoman government replied that while the *transfer* would seem to suffer from this aspect, it was nevertheless *bona fide*.

Turkey had ordered two modern battleships in Great Britain. That she had not ordered them in Germany was due to the fact that her naval service just then was in the hands of the British Naval Mission to Turkey, headed by Admiral Limpus, just as her army was under the administrative control of the German Military Mission to Turkey, commanded by Field Marshall Liman von Sanders Pasha. The two missions were *commis voyageurs* in more respects than one, and bought each in their own country what the Turkish national defense scheme needed.

The Ottoman government pointed out that the German commander, Admiral Souchon, had sought refuge in the Dardanelles, before an overwhelming force of enemies, and that sending him back into the Mediterranean, to either go down in battle or suffer capture, might be construed an unfriendly act on the part of the German government. In fact the only alternative available was internment. The sale of the ships obviated internment. The Ottoman government had the right to buy the ships,

especially since the Greek government also had bought ships. Would it not be better to consider the incident closed?

But that was impossible, of course. Despite the evasion practiced by the Ottoman ministers the *sale* of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" could not be dissociated from its sinister aspects. Admiral Souchon, who had come into the Dardanelles as commander of the German Squadron in the Mediterranean, and his officers and men remained on the two ships, though already they were "Sultan Jawus Selim," and "Midillih." To make matters worse the Ottoman government dismissed the British Naval Mission, and on September 27th closed the Dardanelles and Bosphorus.

Diplomacy on the Golden Horn was moving rapidly and in a direction opposite to that desired in London, Paris and Petrograd. The immediate effect of the closing of the Dardanelles was that Russia could not import from Great Britain and France war materials she urgently needed, nor could she exchange therefor the wheat and other foodstuffs wanted in the countries of her allies. That, indeed, was the purpose of the closing.

An American Ambassador Is Heard From

Though "forcing" the Dardanelles had ever been a favorite phrase of those dissatisfied with the treaties on the status of the straits—temporarily, to be sure—the Russian, French and British governments did not immediately speak of that.

Sir Louis Mallet, the British ambassador, especially would seem to have taken the closing of the strait to heart. According to statements made by Mr. Morgenthau he appealed to the ambassador of the United States, to whom he suggested, if the report is to be believed, that the two of them call together on the Grand Vizier and enter a protest. At any rate Mr. Morgenthau selected to go alone, and according to his own admission informed the Ottoman premier somewhat as follows:

"You know this means war!"

I think it is the practice, usually, of ambassadors to first get in touch with their government before they enter climactic protests, nor do they, except on specific instruction, ever mention *war* as the only alternative for something which a government has done. If the State Department of the United States should be an exception to this rule, which I can not believe, it would be time for Congress and the American people to look into this matter. There is no assurance, it so happens, that an indiscretion of that sort is always in the interest of the state.

The closing of the Dardanelles was to the governments of the Triple Entente the signal that it was time to act. Sir Louis Mallet, M. Bompard, ambassador of the French republic, and Mons. N. M. de Giers, the

Russian ambassador, had matters in hand at Constantinople, while Sir Edward Grey, M. Viviani, and M. Sazonoff handled this great problem at home. To have the strait closed was a serious matter of itself. To have Turkey an ally of the Germans was not much worse, of course, as it then seemed. But at best something had to be done to open the strait again. It was a case of war, or of concessions to the Turks.

The offer of concessions was made. The interminable transactions resolved themselves into this: The governments of the Triple Entente would guarantee the integrity of the territory of the Ottoman empire for the space of thirty years against all comers, if the Ottoman government consented to what in the main would be a neutrality of benevolence toward the countries of the Entente.

Saïd Halim Pasha, the grand vizier, was not the only one who at first gave at least a willing ear, if not a willing mind, to the proposal. Talaat Bey also was more than interested, though not by any means very sympathetic. The grand vizier had thoroughly enjoyed, as he told me once, his course at Oxford and his intercourse with Englishmen in Great Britain and Egypt, from which latter country he hailed. But while he was fond of the everyday-things of the English he had no great opinion of "their political morality," as he put it. Egypt was already little more than a British colony, since its abandonment by the French to Great Britain as a pawn in the *entente cordiale* and consideration for a free hand in Morocco.

Being a good Mohammedan the grand vizier also resented that the world of Islam was everywhere passing under the suzerainty of Great Britain and France. Of promises made by any of the Great Powers he had the poorest opinion. That Turkey was perishing on the good promises of others, was a favorite way of putting it with him. Talaat Bey, again, saw in the Young Turk Party the only salvation of his country, and had concluded that with the acts of that party the Ottoman empire would either rise or fall. An alternative he could not see, as he admitted to me in an interview, after Turkey was in the War. A victorious Triple Entente would dismember Turkey, no matter what promises her statesmen might have made. Turkey, he knew full well, had in the past continued a state by the grace and for the benefit of the anti-Russian Balance of Power in Europe. A victory of the Triple Entente meant a defeat for the Central Powers camp, of course, which in its turn was equivalent for Turkey of being entirely at the mercy of Great Britain, France and Russia for a time. Seeing things in that light left the Young Turk cabinet no other course open but to join the Central Powers sooner or later. The wholly fictitious "session of the Crown Council at Potsdam, July 5, 1914," had nothing to do with it.

The alternative was to remain *strictly* neutral. Even that was difficult, regardless of whatever viewpoint was taken. For one thing, the Young Turks, with all their faults, were patriots. To remain strictly neutral imposed upon the Turk a sort of conduct which neither side would like.

With the War over, Turkey again would have to live by and on the clash of interest of the Powers of Europe. To Enver Pasha, especially, that was a most unpalatable fare, though Saïd Halim Pasha, Talaat Bey, and the few other men who had anything to say in the matter, were no better pleased with this prospect. There would be a continuation of capitulations and the revenues of the empire would still be in the hands of the foreign capitalists who ran the *Dette Publique* in Stamboul.

With the occidental ideas of statecraft with which these men occupied themselves that outlook did not in any way harmonize. They had promoted the Revolution, and the elimination of Sultan Abdul Hamid, for the avowed purpose of making the Ottoman empire an equal among nations. In this they had failed not only in practical respects but also in principle. But it has ever been difficult for men to be fair judges of themselves. Last but not least the Ottoman government had to take into account that an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward the Triple Entente would have serious consequences in case the Central Powers should emerge from the War with victory on their side.

Though the military aspect of the situation in Europe was just then not in favor of Germany and her ally, the men in Stamboul knew that the resources of the German empire were far greater than others were pleased to believe. They all realized that they had in their hands the means to embarrass at least, if not actually handicap greatly, one of the Entente powers, Russia, by keeping the Dardanelles closed. That had been done already—with the approbation, if this counted for anything, of every Turk, no matter whether "Old" or "Young."

Upon Russia every Turk looked as the arch enemy, and Russia, indeed, had merited that reputation. Constantinople and her waterways were still, as they had been of yore, the *multum in parvo* of the state of which the city was the capital. Without Constantinople there would be no state—without Stamboul there would be nothing. Geographic factors and mixed populations produce such anachronisms. The Greek and Armenian subjects of Sultan cared little enough for the Ottoman government. What interest they had in the empire was represented by the capital. To perpetuate this City on the Golden Horn, and its many suburbs along the same body of water and on the shores of the Marmora and Bosphorus, was to them patriotism—a disemboweled patriotism, perhaps, but still the little they could have under the circumstances.

Thus it came that even the Greeks and Armenians rejoiced a little,

for a day or so, when the Dardanelles were closed. They were less pleased as the drudgery of war started, as it did presently, when the Ottoman government objected to the presence at the entrance of the Bosphorus of Russian mine-laying ships. Negotiations came to an end, relations were severed, and on November 3rd, the Allied fleet let the Turks know that war was on. The bombardment of the Turkish batteries at Sid-il-Bahr and Kum Kalé lasted a scant fifteen minutes. Some 200 shots were exchanged, and one of them set off a powder magazine in Sid-il-Bahr, not exactly an auspicious start for the Turks.

When and Why German Diplomacy Won

A great deal has been said concerning the activity of the German ambassador at Constantinople. That Baron von Wangenheim was an able diplomatist is true enough. Indeed, from the angle of events he was the best of the German diplomatists. But the angle of events is nearly always a poor guide. Had the situation of the Turks been different, Baron von Wangenheim would have failed as completely as did most of his German confrères. I say that on the ground that I knew the baron thoroughly well.

The German ambassador was principally able in so far as he did not give the natural direction of events any violent promotion, and that, after all, distinguishes the good from the bad diplomatist. True enough, some diplomatists have flattered themselves that they made this or that ally for their country. The impartial student of human affairs has ever doubted that. What a diplomatist can do is: To engage in acts of provocation that will make enemies. Acts that would make friends lie entirely beyond his reach. The system wills it so. Before two nations, or even two governments, become so friendly to one another that one will spill blood and dissipate treasure for the other there must be a community of interests, be that racial, economic or political. It seems to me that even the most conceited diplomatist and statesman can afford to admit that much.

What Baron von Wangenheim did in Constantinople was to present the case of the Central Powers in as favorable a light as possible, in which respect his position was not dissimilar to that of the representative of a firm trying to induce another house to do business with it. Though the contrary has been maintained, I would indeed like to meet the man who could influence Talaat Bey, who justly deserves the surname: The stubborn. How little the Ottoman minister of the interior could be swayed was shown later when Baron von Wangenheim insisted that the government in Stamboul put an end to the deportations of the Armenians.

In view of what has been said it should be news that in July of 1915, Baron von Wangenheim presented to the Ottoman government, on behalf of

the Armenians, what amounted to an ultimatum. The religious societies of Germany had finally managed to present the case of the Armenians to the emperor and had prevailed upon him to interest himself in these fellow-Christians. The Foreign Office in Berlin did not like this interference in an Ottoman affair that was considered strictly an internal matter. For all that, it instructed Baron von Wangenheim to take the matter up with a little more energy. This was done. But Talaat Bey casually informed the German ambassador that the Turkish government would permit no interference with anything that had no bearing upon Turkish-German relations. Baron von Wangenheim would point to the evil repute Germany was getting as the result of the treatment given the Armenians. His plea, that the agents of the Entente used the case for propaganda calculated to further hurt a government already laboring under the handicap of the invasion of Belgium and the sinking of the Lusitania, would elicit from Talaat Bey nothing but the rather cynical remark that Germany, "if ashamed of her company with Turkey, could go her own way."

Some men in Berlin, possibly the emperor himself, found such conduct on the part of Talaat Bey a little too presumptuous. Baron von Wangenheim was instructed to demand the immediate cessation of the measures employed against the Armenians and place the possible abandonment of Turkey by Germany as the alternative. When Talaat Bey heard that he smiled, as usual, and told the German ambassador to inform the German government that in Turkey it was the Ottoman government that was supreme, and that, if it was so minded, the German government could go its own way without delay. It would be best, anyway, if the Imperial German government began to realize a little more that in Turkey it had not found a vassal but an ally—an equal.

For the German government that was a bitter pill to swallow. Nothing of this was permitted to get into the press, lest the German public become alarmed. After that Baron von Wangenheim refused to entertain similar requests, and in the interest of good relations made a trip home, though his health also needed a little more consideration than it had been given by him.

On the whole the German diplomatists in Constantinople had a very strenuous time with the Turks in Stamboul. Even the able and shrewd Dr. Richard von Kühlmann, at that time conseiller of the Germany embassy, had his hands full, despite the fact that he was dealing only with the overflow of friction. Not all of this was due to Germano-Turkish international relations. For the purpose of promoting the interests of Field Marshall von der Goltz Pasha, at that time commander of the Ottoman Second Army in Thrace, and formerly chief of the German Military Mission to Turkey, a large and influential element at the German embassy

had made up its mind to effect the recall of Field Marshall Liman von Sanders Pasha, then head of the mission and commander of the Ottoman forces on Gallipoli. It was charged that Liman Pasha had made a very poor job of defending the peninsula. So far as could be judged the complaint was unjustified. I had spent a great deal of time at the Dardanelles and on Gallipoli and knew what difficulties Liman Pasha had encountered most successfully. There can be no doubt that he did his best with the means at his disposal. For all that the intriguants at the German embassy persisted that he ought to be removed.

Since Enver, Pasha, minister of war and vice-generalissimo of the Ottoman army, was not yet through congratulating himself that the landing at Sid-il-Bahr and Ariburnu had not resulted in worse, it was rather difficult to get his attention on this subject. I am sure that Enver Pasha had a case of gooseflesh whenever he thought himself in the role of commander in chief on Gallipoli. An uglier job could not be found. Quite impatiently, therefore, he told Baron von Wangenheim one day that, while the German general staff and the German emperor could not be prevented from recalling Liman Pasha and appointing another man as chief of the German Military Mission to Turkey, he would deem it a great favor if he would be allowed to have Liman Pasha enter entirely the Ottoman military service as commander on Gallipoli. That ended it. Baron von Wangenheim had once more put his foot into it, as the saying goes, and he had done this against his better judgment. Instances of that sort were many, and all of them went to prove that so far as the post at Constantinople was concerned it would have been better had the German Foreign Office forgotten that there was such a thing.

Diplomatic Sauce for Goose and Gander

The attitude of the German government toward the Armenians was not always what I have pictured here. At first it was entirely different—essentially Prussian. On a trip I made through Asia Minor in May, 1915, I accidentally encountered a large column of deported Armenians in the Cilician Gates in the Taurus Mountains. Though I saw none of the cruelties the Turks have later been charged with, and I hold brief for neither Turk nor Armenian, and flatter myself with being somewhat of a truth-loving man, I could not but sympathize with the four thousand-odd women and children and decrepit men, who on a cold and rainy day were crossing over a mountain pass in a wilderness where even in worse weather they would have been unable to find shelter, food or comfort.

The inquiries I made at that time and later have caused me to believe that Turkish ineptness, more than intentional brutality, was responsible for

the hardships the Armenians were subjected to. On my return to Constantinople I wrote of the matter and submitted it to the censors. These good men were horror-struck at my audacity, to think that they would permit anything of the sort to go through, but were rather apologetic when they handed the articles back to me. When every other means to get the story to the United States had failed, I appealed to Baron von Wangenheim, making it clear to him that as the correspondent of a neutral press it was my duty to get this piece of news out. The ambassador agreed with me, and was willing to dispatch the copy as far as Berlin by means of the courier—Feldjäger—of his own embassy. But it was his opinion that in Berlin my dispatches and mail articles would be held up, and that nothing could be gained, then, by getting them that far.

I decided to try some other avenue, and finally found it in the service of a train conductor, who promised to mail the matter from the Bulgarian frontier railroad station. My articles were never delivered to the headquarters of the news service at Berlin, instead I was ultimately informed that I had no right to evade the Turkish censorship. The information came from the German government, and the attaché of the German embassy in Constantinople who conveyed it took pains to have me understand that the suppression of an uprising in times of war, as in times of peace, no matter what means employed, was a right which all governments reserved for themselves, and that so far no government was known that had made common cause with rebels. It was a phase of sovereignty, etc., etc., etc.

Sovereignty does cover a multitude of things, when applied propagandically. The uprising of the Armenians was one thing, it seemed, that of the Irish quite another.

Before I proceed with the general depiction of diplomacy in Turkey I must devote a little more space to the United States embassy at that point.

Ex-ambassador Morgenthau has in his book devoted considerable space to the occasions on which he was of some use to the diplomatic representatives of the governments of the Triple Entente. He has also made it clear that from the very first he was not in sympathy with the diplomatists, diplomacy and general policies, of the Central Powers, all of them being more or less noxious to his fine principles. To have been of special importance to Sir Louis Mallet, and of gratuitous service to him at the time of the closing of the Dardanelles, and again later, is one of the things he is proud of. Yet in his neutrality proclamations, and especially in his appeal to the American people to observe a true neutrality, President Wilson had emphasized the necessity for an impartiality in words as well as in conduct.

But the books of diplomatists must not be taken too seriously. The ambassador who avers that from the very inception of trouble he was

with this or with that side may be doing nothing more than presenting just one side of his attitude, with slight exaggerations, possibly. The fact in this case is, that Mr. Morgenthau was well liked by the German diplomatists in Pera, and, long after the outbreak of the War, was not averse to being known as a friend of Baron von Wangenheim. I happen to know that the German ambassador consulted the American ambassador on subjects that did not at all concern the latter. On the other hand, there was no more constant caller at the American embassy than the Marquis Pallavicini, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, and the relations between the Central Powers and United States diplomatists were rather more cordial than what Mr. Morgenthau would have us believe. All of which would be of no consequence to the general public, were it not that it seems necessary, in view of the cost of the Great Disaster, and its effect upon the world in general, to portray the diplomatic service as it is.

The United States diplomatists in Europe during the Great War were in their local spheres the least omnipotent and omniscient of any. The chiefs of the several missions were not *hommes de carrière*. They were successful men of affairs, whom campaign contributions and political party favors landed at their diplomatic posts. They possessed neither the training nor the experience to make them good diplomatic envoys in a world entirely foreign to them in political practice, ideals, and social systems.

A Diplomatist in a Quandary

When Mr. Morgenthau arrived in Constantinople, the officials in Stamboul did their best to make him feel at home and at ease. Among the men who especially cultivated the new United States ambassador was Enver Pasha, who was a welcome guest at the teas and luncheons of Mme. Morgenthau long after Turkey had entered the War. Talaat Bey, too, was on the best terms with the American ambassador, and so were a number of other officials and officers, even though, as has been averred, *they lacked the means to buy uniforms and wore, as the Turk always does, the regulation Stambuli—a frock-coat with a high collar of clerical cut*. By and large the American ambassador was rather friendly with the Turks, as the diplomatic representative of a friendly power ought to be; that he was this is proved, moreover, by a statement made to me by M. Haïm Nahoum, Grand Rabbi of Turkey, who took particular delight in pointing out that the really congenial qualities of the new American ambassador had contributed greatly toward making the Ottoman government amenable to certain requests that had been made in regard to the interests of the Jewish colonists in Palestine.

It may be presumed that there are few people who expected Jews generally to espouse the interests of Russia at the outbreak of the European

War and for many months afterward. To be frank about it, I was one of those who found such an attitude perfectly logical. Whatever the facts back of the pogroms may have been, the truth is that the Russian government had been guilty of gross negligence, to say the least, in permitting such atrocities to happen.

When relations were severed by Russia with Turkey, the care of Russian interests in the Ottoman empire was given into the hands of the Italian embassy at Constantinople. When Italy became involved in the War with Turkey, Russian interests were once more out in the street, so to speak. The government in Petrograd requested the United States to take charge of them, and the State Department, despite the fact that the American embassy in Pera was already overcrowded with the care of foreigners and their property in Turkey, asked Mr. Morgenthau to care for the Russian subjects and their interests also.

The American ambassador had a caller one fine summer's morning in 1915. The person in question had visited the embassy on routine matters, but had been asked by Mr. Antonian, private secretary of the ambassador, to step into the *sanctum sanctorum*.

The ambassador seemed very much agitated. He asked the caller to be seated, and then resumed his perambulations about the room. After a while he stopped before the visitor. There was no doubt that he was greatly perturbed.

He had been asked by *his*, the American, government, began the ambassador, to take charge of Russian interests in Turkey.

"To comply with the request is hardly possible for me," he continued. "What would my people in New York say to it—what would Jews anywhere say to it, if I took over the care of Russian interests in this country? Can you imagine what they would say? They would loathe me for doing it. How could a self-respecting Jew do anything of the kind? How could he lend himself to the protection of the subjects and their properties of a government which for centuries has ruthlessly and systematically persecuted and abused members of his race? I won't do it. I can't do it?"

The caller did not know whether or no an expression of opinion was wanted and remained silent. The ambassador resumed his peregrinations about the room, leaving the other to review pogroms, the refusal to recognize passports of the United States issued to Jewish citizens, the abrogation on that account by the U. S. Senate of the Russian commercial treaties, things that happened outside the port of Odessa, and what not.

After a while the ambassador stopped again before the caller.

"I would like to hear what you think of it," he said. "You have knocked about this world long enough to have an opinion on the subject."

The caller said that he did not wish to give advice on such a matter. It was hard to see how any Jew could take care of Russian interests. On the other hand, the ambassador would have to consider that he was not a Jew in this instance but the diplomatic representative of the United States, a government at peace with Russia, despite the abrogation of the commercial treaty in retaliation of Russia's discrimination against American citizens of Jewish race, and that governments at peace with one another could not very well refuse to be mutually of service in times such as they were.

Rather than take that view, said the American ambassador, he would resign. While he appreciated the trust placed in him, and the honor accorded, in being given a diplomatic appointment, the State Department could not expect him to do something that savored of an insult self-administered. He would resign, if the government insisted upon his taking over Russian interests in Turkey.

The caller saw the substance of a first-class news dispatch in the interview, and suggested something to that effect. To that the ambassador would not listen, however. There would be time enough in a few days. The few days never came, of course.

In view of the fact that I am not a great admirer of anonymity I will state that I am the caller.

Diplomatic Omnipotence at Close Range

Diplomatists off post are fond of having others believe that they were not far from being omnipotent while accredited. That applies particularly to those who served last in a country with whom their own government has gone to war.

I met in Constantinople two excellent gentlemen: Captain J. P. Morton, commander of the U. S. Cruiser "Scorpion," the American *stationaire* in the Golden Horn, and Captain R. H. Williams, of the U. S. Coast Artillery, attending to relief work in Turkey. The first of the officers was also naval attaché, while the latter had an uncertain status as military attaché. Both were very much interested in what was going on at the Dardanelles and on Gallipoli, and had so far been unable to get to either point; both of them felt that the affairs at the gates of Constantinople were of the utmost importance to military observers. Captain Williams was keen to judge the effect of shell fire on the Turkish emplacements along the Dardanelles, since coast defense is an important factor in the national security of the United States, and Captain Morton, also, showed the greatest interest. Here was a case in which two members of the arms which were opposing one another in attack and defense, navy and coast

artillery, were within a stone's throw of the greatest demonstration that had ever been seen, but had found their ambassador *unable* to get them there.

I had, so far as this was permissible, and within my pledges to the Ottoman minister of war, given to Captain Williams what data I could. Though I had had some artillery experience myself, my knowledge was confined to field artillery, and for the purposes of Captain Williams was not definite enough. He was working on a report to his department, and to make this complete he required better and more technical information than I could give him. Captain Morton, also, had occupied himself similarly, and on March 16th, Mr. Morgenthau had been to see himself what little damage up to then the British and French fleets had been able to inflict. In the major attack of March 18th the damage done to the Turkish "forts" and emplacements along the strait was more extensive, but not fatal. But these are things that must, for military purposes, be seen by men who are more or less expert.

Together with another American correspondent, Mr. Raymond E. Swing, Berlin correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*, I had succeeded in getting from Enver Pasha, the minister of war, a passport that amounted to *carte blanche* at any of the Turkish fronts. The two of us had witnessed the Allied operation against the Dardanelles, from A to Z, as the saying goes, and had shown by our conduct, I believe, that we were to be trusted. The result was that we could move about in Turkey very much as we pleased, provided we gave notice of our intentions.

Captains Williams and Morton had suggested several times that I use my efforts in their behalf to get them to the Dardanelles. Already it was in the American embassy a case of being mistaken for pro-Turk when one did not heap verbal abuse upon a country and government whose guest one was. Captains Morton and Williams were sure that my standing with the Ottoman government was better than that of the ambassador. Others thought so, too, but hinted that it was love for the Turks that caused this state of affairs. Especially, one G. Cornell Tarler, one of the embassy secretaries, was sure that love for the Turk and "maybe something else" was responsible for the good standing of Mr. Swing and myself with the Turks and Germans. That newspapermen are as a rule very cold-blooded in such matters—too cynical in fact to give much for the sentiments roused by war, was not clear to some of the United States diplomatists in Constantinople, who themselves had taken sides, quite frankly and openly at that, in spite of the neutrality proclamations of their superior chief.

I was willing, even anxious, to help the two captains, feeling that there were lessons in the Dardanelles coast batteries that would benefit the United States coast artillery service and the navy. The matter was

brought by me to the attention of Major Kiamil Bey, personal adjutant of Enver Pasha, and to Major Sefid Bey, in charge of the Second Division of the Harbiyeh Nasaret, the Ottoman ministry of war and general staff. Both of them promised to do what they could, but feared that this would be little enough. The Turk has the delightful quality of being frank with persons whom he has no reason to placate with empty promises.

Kiamil and Sefid Beys did what they could, and it amounted to nothing. Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorf, the Ottoman chief of staff, and Major Fischer, a German officer in the Ottoman service, who was charged with such matters, had expressed themselves against the trip of Captains Morton and Williams, because, as they put it, they did not want to establish precedents. Up to now, in fact, no other foreigners, not in the Ottoman military and naval service, had been given the privileges Mr. Swing and I enjoyed. From another source which I need not divulge I had learned, however, that Turk and German, both, were afraid to let the two American officers go to the front. In the circles that ran the military machine of Turkey, Americans in official capacity were suspected of being so much in sympathy with the cause of the Allies that they would transmit to them information they gathered.

Mr. Morgenthau, meanwhile, was also doing his best. But Enver Pasha, whom he addressed in the matter, made promises which he hoped to be able to keep some day. The prospect that anything would come of them were slim enough, and since Captains Morton and Williams thought the thing very pressing, they asked me to get in touch with the Ottoman naval staff. That organization, however, was entirely in the hands of the Germans; its chief was Admiral Souchon, who, possibly, because he was married to an American woman, was more easily approached than others. Unfortunately, the admiral was away from the city just then. The man next suitable for my purposes was Corvette-Captain Humann, commander of the German Naval Base on the Bosphorus, and naval attaché of the German embassy. He would do his best, he said. That best was a letter, dated April 18th, in which he said that he had taken the matter up with Captain von Jansen, Souchon's chief of staff, but that the prospects were not promising.*

That reply seemed final enough to me. Captains Williams and Morton were not to get to the Dardanelles.

For some weeks the matter rested, and then, at a dinner given in the quarters of one of the officers, it was decided to take it up again. I am afraid that the two officers feared that I was not promoting their cause as well as they thought I could. On the following day, the ambassador asked me into his office.

* See footnote on opposite page.

He said that the two captains had importuned him until life was a misery—as well they might since they considered their professional reputation at stake, in addition to being unable to make a thorough study of the effect of modern high-explosives upon coast artillery works. Everything possible had been done by him to get them to the scene of action. But there was no end of promises and no performance. Enver Pasha had told him time and again that the two officers would be given the opportunity they sought, but it seemed that the Germans “up on the hill”—a reference to the German embassy on the Boulevard Ayas Pasha—were against the trip. It seemed, also, that one element was putting the blame on the other, since German officers in high command had made the Turks responsible. He wanted me to remove the obstacles.

I told the ambassador that he was mistaken. Whatever influence I had was being exerted, and so far my efforts had led to nothing. It also was brought to the ambassador's attention that there was no reason to believe that I could do what he could not do. But Mr. Morgenthau was of a different mind.

Having been given *carte blanche* in this manner, I set again about to make the trip possible. This time I took the matter up with Enver Pasha himself, and also interested the German ambassador in the project. Within two weeks I had the promise of the two that the American officers would be taken to the front. Some time was lost, however, in breaking down the

* I append a part of a report made to the Congress of the United States.

“Copy of a letter (original in existence) written by Corvette-Captain Humann, commander of the Imperial German naval base at Constantinople, to the verbal request made to him that Captains R. H. Williams and J. P. Morton be allowed to visit the fronts at the Dardanelles and on Gallipoli.

“Kaiserlich Deutsche Marine
“Etappen-Kommando
“B No.

“C'pel, 18. 4. 15.

“Sehr geehrter Herr Schreiner!

“Nach einer Auskunft des Herrn von Janson scheint mir ein Gesuch des Captain Williams fuer eine Besichtigung der Dardanellen nicht aussichtsreich.

“Man befuerechtet den Durchbruch des Prinzips und besonders den Praezedenzfall der unumgaengliche Konsequenzen schafft!

“Mit ergebenstem Gruss!

“Ihr

(Signed) “HUMANN.”

“Herr von Janson wird Ihnen wegen Fahrgelegenheit nach den Dardanellen direct Nachricht geben.”

“Translation.

“Imperial German Naval Base Headquarters,

“B No.

“Constantinople, April 18th, 15.

“My dear Mr. Schreiner:

“According to information coming from Herr von Janson, there is little prospect of success for an application by Captain Williams for an inspection of the Dardanelles.

“The violation of the principle is feared, as is especially the precedent which would create inevitable consequence.

“With best greetings,

“Yours,

(Signed) “HUMANN.

“Herr von Janson will inform you directly concerning travel opportunities to the Dardanelles.

“NOTE.—The above letter was written at the very beginning of the negotiations. Other correspondence relative to the case of Captains Williams and Morton is still among my effects in Switzerland, which, owing to the habit of the French authorities, seizing the papers of travellers, I did not attempt to take out with me. GAS.”

resistance of the Turkish and German officers who in the past had opposed the trip of inspection, but Captains Morton and Williams were finally *invited* to make the trip, and had the experience of seeing the first American-made shells used on Gallipoli break about them.

I have gone into the details of this case for a special reason. It has been intimated already that the authorities in Constantinople were suspicious of the American embassy. The case, indeed, was much worse. In the cafés of Pera and Stamboul it was openly discussed that the American embassy was a sort of headquarters for the spies of the Entente governments, who, by the way, numbered hundreds. The U. S. *stationaire* "Scorpion" was linked with the exploits of the British submarines in the Sea of Marmora, and when, one fine summer's afternoon, a British submarine penetrated into the Bosphorus, and nonchalantly blew up a coal barge at a quay in Haidar-Pasha, under the very windows of the Ottoman government offices in Stamboul, the Turkish populace swore that the Americans were responsible for it, while the Greeks and Armenians, waiting for a deliverer, saw in the sinking of the coal barge a sign that the United States had made an alliance with the Triple Entente.

The Foibles of a Diplomatic Agent

Public opinion in times of war is the most unreliable thing there is. The indignation of the Turks and the wishes of the non-Turks had to be met by the Ottoman government. They were met by ordering the "Scorpion" to take station inside the Golden Horn, between the new and the old bridges. To Mr. Morgenthau's protest the Ottoman government replied that it would be safer to have the *stationaire* at her new moorings, since a British submarine might mistake her for a Turkish vessel and sink her. The circumstance that this step was accompanied by a close search for wireless apparatus at Robert College, the American School for Girls at Arnautkoi, and in some of the houses inhabited by Americans, serves as an indication that the Ottoman government was itself not entirely satisfied with the appearance of things.

In March, 1915, the staff of the American embassy received reinforcement in the person of Mr. Lewis Einstein, who had formerly been a secretary at the same post, had left it as *persona non grata*, and had since then filled a small position as *chef de mission* in Latin America. Mr. Einstein was not wanted at the American embassy in Pera. At the time of his arrival I was at the Dardanelles, but even in that shell-raked region the name of the new diplomatic agent was mentioned. It seems that the Turkish government persisted in looking upon Mr. Einstein as entirely a plain citizen and refused to extend diplomatic privileges to him. Since

more help was needed at the American embassy, owing to the increase in work occasioned by the taking-over of the interests of belligerent governments, it was not easy to understand why Mr. Einstein should be given such treatment.

Upon my return to the city I learned that the diplomatic agent was even *persona non grata* with the embassy staff. He had been relegated into a little cubby-hole of an office on the second floor of the embassy chancery and his principal occupation seemed to consist of doing nothing in particular. The ambassador himself was highly displeased with this sort of assistance, and indiscreet persons about the embassy let it be understood that Mr. Einstein had been sent to Constantinople at the request of M. Jusserand, the French ambassador at Washington. Since Mr. Einstein, before his transfer to the Turkish capital, had been stationed at London and Paris, that rumor had more color than was well.

I may say that many of my despatches from the Dardanelles were relayed through the American embassy, though I had an assistant in Constantinople with an address of his own, the Petit Club, next door to the embassy. Since Mr. Damon Theron could get the despatches at one place as easily as at the other, and since Mr. Morgenthau was keenly interested in what was going on at the front, I addressed my despatches to his embassy. In that manner he and his secretaries and attachés were kept informed almost up to the minute.

My despatches contained all the general public could be interested in. Originally they contained more than what the Turkish and German officers-censors at Dardanelles thought necessary, and from their own angle, wise. Since the newspaper correspondent writing war copy can not afford to violate confidence, should not do it, as a matter of fact, if he wishes to retain his usefulness, let alone his good name, the despatches which the embassy members had read marked the limit to which I could carry discussion. Several members of the embassy staff did not think so.

Shortly after my return from the Dardanelles front I was invited to have tea with the ambassador and his staff—a "stag affair," which took place almost every day and to which usually only the secretaries and the chief clerks were invited. On this day were present: Mr. Morgenthau, Mr. Einstein, Mr. Shamavonian, first dragoman, Mr. Antonian, the ambassador's private secretary, and one of the diplomatic secretaries.

There was no reason why for their entertainment I should not recount the general features of the great bombardment in a more intimate manner than newspaper writing permits. But I noticed that after a while I was being cross-examined, with Mr. Einstein in control of the process. What he wanted to know especially was what amount of ammunition there was left in the Turkish emplacements. In military information that is a major

subject, of course, and quite the last thing which a war correspondent should discuss. Needless to say I avoided that question. When a diplomatic agent shows too great an interest in so vital an aspect of a military situation it is usually best to be on guard.

Several efforts to bring Mr. Einstein off the subject failed. I pleaded ignorance. That also was futile. The diplomatic agent thought that as a former officer of artillery the detail of ammunition could not escape my attention. In that he was right, of course. It did so happen that I knew the exact number of shells, of the armor-piercing variety, which were left in the main batteries of Anadolu Hamidieh and in the Kilid-il-Bahr works. I also surmised that the agents of the Entente government would pay any sum for the information, and think the bargain a good one. The *blue-heads* left could not keep the Allied fleet from forcing the strait—the Dardanelles in fact were open, as the Allied commander could have easily ascertained by returning to the attack on March 19th, or for weeks thereafter. With a little more initiative than was shown, the British and French fleets would have been in Constantinople long before I could be there, as I have fully explained in my book "From Berlin to Bagdad."

There is no doubt that I had in my hands a goodly share of the fate of nations, but it was no business of mine to give the rudder of the war and fate so violent a jerk. Had the Allies known that the Turkish batteries along the Dardanelles were virtually out of ammunition of the armor-piercing kind, had they known that the further resistance of the Turks could at best be but a matter of minutes, not even hours, that Admiral von Usedom Pasha, Mertens Pasha and the Turkish officers were sure that a following-up of the bombardment of March 18th would result in crushing defeat for them and a retreat into Anatolia, much of the history of the Great War might be different. What the Allied governments did learn was that on March 19th the Ottoman government was ready to go to Eski-Shehir, but that did not seem to be enough.

Mr. Einstein must have surmised that I knew more than I was willing to admit. I am afraid that I was not enough of a simulator to deceive him. He began to press the point anew, and this time stated that as a citizen of the United States it was my duty to give the diplomatic service whatever information I had. Mr. Morgenthau was inclined to support that view, and Mr. Shamavonian also chimed in. The incident closed by my telling Mr. Einstein and the company gently but firmly that I did not take this view of the situation, and that the journalistic profession had rules of its own—one of them being not to exchange confidences with a service, the diplomatic, for instance, which normally made it its great principle not to give more information to press and public than was deemed wise or purposeful.

My actual motive in not telling Mr. Einstein what ammunition the Turks had left was my desire to treat them as they had treated me. There was no reason why the Turkish and German officers in the Ottoman service should allow me to practically live in their emplacements—a most incautious violation of every rule of military security. Still they had done that, because I was personally liked by them and had, in return for the privilege of being permitted at the fronts, placed myself under Ottoman military law, with the especial understanding that in case of trouble I would not appeal to the American embassy for help. But conduct of that sort is not so easily understood by the members of a profession that will violate every rule of good ethics when it can do that with impunity.

Though I had given Mr. Einstein to understand that on questions of vital importance to the Turks I could not be interviewed, he tried again later on to get the information he seemed to want so badly. For Captains Morton and Williams, who had at least some reason to be interested in this aspect of affairs at the Dardanelles, I must say that neither of them even hinted at the subject of ammunition.

Beyond the Bounds of Diplomatic Propriety

It was the conduct of Mr. Einstein that brought the American embassy in Pera into disrepute. Constantinople was the *locale* of an extended espionage of the Allied governments. One of their agents was a man who had come to Turkey with an American passport, issued him in London under false pretenses or with the connivance of some embassy official, when he was in reality a British subject and had already served in the British army in France. The man had in addition credentials from Mr. Bell, of the *Chicago Daily News*, a paper which was represented at that very moment by an able man I have mentioned, Mr. Swing, who did not know that representation of his paper in Constantinople had been duplicated in so imprudent a manner. I did not wish to see the young man strangulated on a tripod, on the Seraskerkapu, and let him know that the last boat for Rumania was to leave early the following morning. The secret service of the Turks had been watching him closely, and Mr. Morgenthau had confirmed what I had suspected by asking me to tell the man that a renewal of his passport had been refused by the Department of State on the ground that he was not an American citizen.

I may say that the agent first attracted the attention of the Ottoman authorities by coming to Constantinople with credentials for a paper that was well represented in Turkey. Mr. Swing was questioned in regard to the man before he had met him, and had stated that probably it was some other Chicago paper, which the agent, who was not a newspaper man, of

course, had come to represent. He had no reason to believe that the "correspondent" had been appointed by the Chicago Daily News, as his card actually said, nor did he believe it until he saw the letter from Mr. Bell. There was nothing to do after that but accept the man as *bona fide*, at least publicly. The authorities, however, were not satisfied with these features of the case, and in the end Mr. Swing himself was doubted, so much so that he had to apply for a sort of safe conduct before he could return to his regular post in Berlin.

The standing of the Americans in Constantinople was further injured by the conduct of a man known as Captain Stanley Fortesque, an American journalist. The man had been taken to the Dardanelles on one of the personally-conducted trips the war department organized for itinerant newspaper men not regularly stationed in Turkey. Such a trip consisted of a run down to the Dardanelles aboard a torpedoboat or destroyer and a view of the Turkish emplacements from the outside, to which later a short trip to the fronts at Ariburnu and Sid-il-Bahr was added. As the result of this the man in question had written for the Paris periodical *l'Illustration* an article going into the minute details of what was purported to be the condition along the Dardanelles. The article was accompanied by drawings, more or less inaccurate, but dangerous enough to the Turks to necessitate a change in some of the emplacements. Needless to say, the Turks were not pleased with that sort of conduct on the part of a man who had been a member of the United States army.

The incident had the effect that thereafter no foreign correspondents of the itinerant type were permitted to go to any of the Turkish fronts. In this connection I may say that the Turks were unusually liberal in that respect at the outbreak of the War.

To sum up this situation I wish to record that already the relations between the Turkish government and the American embassy were the poorest. They were so poor in fact that on the occasion of an audience given Mr. Swing and myself by Sultan Mohammed Rechid Khan V, the sovereign did not even think it worth while to express the usual formula according to which the relations between two countries are supposed to be the best. Though the audience was long enough to have included that little detail, the sultan did not refer to it. The callers could not remind him of it, of course, nor did Salih Pasha, the Sultan's *aide de camp*, who acted as interpreter, think of this little matter. When later we came to it, Mr. Swing and I concluded that no great harm would be done by supplying this little formality ourselves. In this connection I must state that Mr. Morgenthau had been unable to secure the audience for us, and that we made use of our private connections in Turkish and German official circles.

VIII

MACHIAVELISM À OULRANCE

THE Dardanelles-Gallipoli fiasco is still puzzling the minds of the few who care to go into subjects of that sort with reason and logic as their equipment. The peculiar aspects of the operations of the naval forces and expeditionary armies of the Allied governments were to a certain extent dealt with by the British Dardanelles Commission, which investigated the obvious phases of this piece of military Quixotism, but nothing substantial—that is, truthful—ever came of this. In the reports of this commission it has been admitted that mistakes were made, and after that nothing was heard again of Sir Ian Hamilton, who was in charge of the landing and operations on Gallipoli.

Though the military features of this adventure are somewhat stale just now, I must give enough of them to prepare the reader for the politics behind them, promising to be brief in my outline.

The first attack by the Allied fleet on the Turkish works at Kum Kalé and Sid-il-Bahr was made on November 3, 1914, the bombardment having in the main the character of a demonstration—notice to the Turks that the War was on. On December 13th an Allied submarine penetrated the Dardanelles as far as the Dardanos emplacement and there torpedoed the converted hull of the Turkish former battleship "Messudieh," moored on the shallows of Sari Siglar Bay and serving as a signal station. Two days later the Turkish gunners sank nearby the French submarine that may have done this, and on January 15th, 1915, the French submarine "Sapphire" sank in the same locality by striking a mine.

On February 20th the Allied fleet began a severe attack on the batteries of Kum Kalé and Sid-il-Bahr, which guarded the entrance, and after a seven-days bombardment, in which the Turks were sorely handicapped by the lesser range of their guns, the works in question were silenced and in part razed to the ground. For another two days the sites of the coast batteries were subjected to bombardments and then the Turkish emplacements along Erenkoi Bay were taken under fire, especially the five-piece battery on the site of the ancient city of Dardanos. Little by little the zone of the bombardment was extended, and on March 5th the works at Killid-il-Bahr were seriously hammered for the first time. On the following day the *pièce de résistance* of the defense scheme of the Outer Dardanelles,

Fort Anadolu Hamidieh, was placed under fire by the Allied fleet, and on the following day this was continued. After that a period of rest set in, due in the main to the paucity of effect favorable to the Allies.

The Turks had placed howitzers on the elevations of Gallipoli and the eastern shore of the strait and these were making themselves much more felt than the German artillery experts, who had advised that course, had themselves expected. While the shell of the howitzer is absolutely impotent against the side of an armored warcraft, it can, nevertheless, penetrate the decks of such ships, when these are unarmored. The Allied fleet had been much molested by this, and their conduct indicated that re-inforcements would be called to take care of this situation.

Caliber for caliber the guns in the Turkish emplacements were much inferior to those of the British and French battleships. They were wholly impotent in comparison to the large rifles of the "Queen Elizabeth," a member of what was then the most modern type of superdreadnaught battle-cruisers. The difference in range between gun ashore and gun afloat was even in case of the older pre-dreadnaught types employed by the Allies great enough to permit the total reduction of the coast batteries without the ships having to come within what was at all an effective range of the Turkish guns.

In the bombardment and reduction of the works at the entrance to the strait that had been the deciding factor. The Allied fleet had destroyed those batteries without suffering material losses of any kind. Within the Dardanelles, in the Bay of Erenkoi, it was different, however. Outside the Allied battleships had stayed well out of effective range of the Turkish guns. In Erenkoi Bay that was not possible, since a ring of emplacements, all of them more or less antiquated, surrounded them there. In addition there were the howitzers of the Turks. A shell piercing the deck may easily ruin the machinery of a ship, may even sink it, provided conditions are favorable.

A Militaro-Diplomatic Move Foiled

It was plain, then, to the commander of the Allied fleet, that he would have to augment his forces sufficiently to take the major part of the coast batteries along the Outer Dardanelles under fire simultaneously. He had this fleet at Tenedos and Lemnos on March 16th. Two days later he came to the attack with a force of eighteen battleships of the line and the "Queen Elizabeth."

So far the Turkish gunners and their German associates had been accustomed to dealing with from three to seven bombarding battleships. The greater array left them somewhat diffused in mind and fire practice. So many targets were offered and so few of them could be reached that

a most uncomfortable feeling crept over everybody, as I have reason to know, seeing that I weathered the opening salvoes in a Turkish emplacement, Fort Tchemenlik. Knowing that a live war correspondent is better than a dead one, I ultimately found better cover, a polite way for saying that there was an unceremonious retreat, with little glory attaching thereto.

The fire of the Allied ships was an overwhelming one. But the great range of it made most of the shells rather ineffective for lack of good aim, to which must be added that the old earthworks of the Turks withstood the impact of the huge projectiles much better than a modern concrete-armor contraption of the Antwerp type would have done. Aerial observers had established that much by about 1 p. m. and the result was that the Allied ships, milling about the bay, ventured in closer, despite the mine field that was believed to be more formidable than in reality it was.

At 2 p. m. the French battleship "Bouvet," was sunk by the Turkish and German gunners in Fort Anadolu Hamidieh, and two hours later, the Allied armada had seven disabled ships on their hands. About sundown one of these, the "Irresistible," was sliced to pieces by the guns of the Turks, and a little later, a third member of the fleet, the "Ocean" sank in Morto Bay, a little bight on the Gallipolian shore, where British cruisers intended beaching the injured vessel. The "Queen Elizabeth" had suffered heavily from the shells of the howitzers and had also withdrawn.

All of this took more ammunition than the Turks had to give to the affairs of a single day, and when night came the prospect was that a return of the British and French *en force* on the morrow would certainly "force" the Dardanelles.

There was no return engagement, however, contrary to the fulsome newspaper reports of those days. The Allied fleet failed to appear, and after sticking close to the islands of Tenedos and Lemnos for a few days, most of the ships went to other parts for repairs and refitting. The supreme commander of the armada could not know that the Turks were practically out of ammunition, and, in addition to that, he was obliged to count on the defense of the Turkish batteries along the Inner Dardanelles as well as on the efforts of the works he had bombarded during a day that cost him three battleships, several minor craft, and necessitated much repair work. Nor had he learned that the Germans, theorizing that with the defense of the Outer Strait the fate of the Inner Dardanelles would be decided, had totally changed the system of batteries, as the British Naval Mission to Turkey knew it. Admiral Limpus, the chief of that mission, was indeed with the Allied fleet, and his advice under different conditions would have been invaluable. But the Germans and Turks had discounted that in the regroupment that was undertaken within the limits set by time and equipment.

The Allied fleet resumed the bombardment of the batteries in conjunction with the landing of the first expeditionary forces on April 25th, but remembered too well the lesson it had been given on March 18th to venture in very close. Moreover, a different plan of action had been decided upon meanwhile in London.

The troops landed on Gallipoli on April 25th and for the three days following were supposed to place themselves in possession of certain elevations on the peninsula from which the Turkish coast batteries along the Outer and Inner Dardanelles could be bombarded to greater advantage, and silenced, so that the Allied fleet, in which the British units predominated, could steam to Constantinople. The two principal elevations were the Atchi-Baba, a little distance north of the points in and near Sid-il-Bahr, where British troops were landed, and the Kodjatchemen Dagh, immediately in the rear of Ariburnu, where the "Anzac" troops were set ashore.

The landing of French contingents near Kum Kalé, on the Anatolian shore, and a feint on the Thracian shore by Greek volunteers, in the Gulf of Xeros, were measures designed to deceive Field Marshall Liman von Sanders Pasha, who was in charge of the defense of the peninsula.

To some extent Liman Pasha was deceived. While he had not left entirely undefended the shore at Sid-il-Bahr, and Ariburnu, he had, nevertheless, stationed the *gross* of his scant force, and his puny reserves, in a manner agreeable to tactical and strategic practices that harmonized with what the military world in general had expected. Some of Liman's spare troops were concentrated to the west of Maïdos, but more of them were up at Bulair, about 65 miles north of Sid-il-Bahr, with no railroad to serve them. The Turkish commander had expected, of course, that Sir Ian Hamilton would make his major attack on the narrow isthmus which connects the peninsula with Thrace, and which for such contingencies had been fortified by the Turks across its entire width, about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles, with the defense face north, instead of south, as is so generally believed, even by military men. The purpose of the forts and redoubts, and their intervening infantry positions, was not to hold back an enemy in possession of the peninsula from advancing into Thrace and on the capital, but to protect the coast batteries along the Dardanelles against attack from the rear.

Liman von Sanders Pasha realized fully that the successful occupation by Allied troops of almost any point along the shores of the Gulf of Xeros might develop into a far greater problem for him, and for Turkey, than the effective landing at Sid-il-Bahr and Ariburnu. It meant at the very least a cutting-off of the peninsula by land, and the placing in jeopardy of the line of communication with Germany, the Constantinople-Sofia railroad line. True enough, an advance of the Allies on the Turkish

capital would have brought them up at the Tchataldja line of fortifications, no easy nut to crack for an expeditionary force that depended upon a long line of communication, but the effect of cutting the rail line from Berlin to Constantinople was something which both, the Turkish and the German general staffs, had to avoid. Militarily that would have been no especial loss just then, but the political effect would have been tremendous.

Before entering upon a disquisition of the political motives behind Sir Ian Hamilton's instructions, I will complete the outline of the Gallipoli operation.

With the landing accomplished, the Allies, French and British troops at Sid-il-Bahr, and the "Anzacs" at Ariburnu, engaged the Turks in a series of most murderous offensives. But the Atchi-Baba hill, and the Kodjatchemen Dagh, remained as far off as ever in August of that year. On the 6th of that month Sir Ian Hamilton began to throw his second expeditionary contingents upon the peninsula, especially at Suvla Bay, and for another few months the wearying position warfare on Gallipoli continued.

In December and in January, 1916, the Allied forces on the peninsula were withdrawn, and thereafter the Dardanelles and its environments ceased to be a theater of war. Despite the fact that the great undertaking was prevented from being a debacle, as Turk and German hoped to make it. Despite the fine management shown in the retreat from the peninsula, the loss of prestige to the arms of the Allies was great.

Such a loss had to be taken into consideration before the order for retirement was given, and had the political situation remained what it was in the winter of 1914-5 the British would have never consented to the abandonment of a plan that had cost them so many lives and so much money. The fact is that the danger of losing Constantinople and her waterways to the Russians had subsided sufficiently to permit British statesmen to regard the war with Turkey a secondary matter. Russia was for the time being too busy with her disintegrating army, and with the bad fortunes of war, to threaten seriously the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and the city between them. On the other hand, the entrance into the War of Bulgaria, on the side of the Central Powers group, had given the situation in the hinterland of Constantinople, the Balkans, a different character.

Strange Diplomatic Bed-Fellows

The decision of the Ottoman government to link its fate with that of the Central Powers had led to an awkward political situation between the members of the Triple Entente. War of some sort would have to be made upon a government which in the past had subsisted almost entirely

by the grace and upon the good will of the Powers. To leave matters with a declaration of war was highly dangerous, and might give force to the fetwah of the Sultan, calling for a Holy War, which otherwise it would and did lack. The British government, especially, had to fear the consequences of ignoring the challenge of the Turkish government. The millions of Mohammedans under British rule and control were bound to keep a very close watch on what would happen in this fight between King George of Great Britain, Emperor of India, etc., their temporal overlord, and Sultan Mohammed Rechid Khan V of Turkey, Ghazi, Caliph, etc., spiritual head of Islam.

The other side of this medal was not much prettier. The logical point of attack for British troops was not in the southern extremes of Mesopotamia, nor was Russia entirely satisfied with the case of necessity pleaded by the British in connection with the Suez Canal. What Russia wanted forthwith was the opening of the Dardanelles, so that her ships might take wheat to Great Britain and France, and materials of war to the Black Sea ports. That was sound enough, but for the British very poor policy. What Russia wanted more, though, was to set foot into Constantinople, so that she might actually have and hold what just then was nothing more than the substance of a treaty.

It would not do, just then, for British statesmen to follow their traditional policy of being the friend of the Turks, for the sole reason of keeping the Russian Black Sea fleet bottled up, and to the size which limitation of radius to a *mare clausum* imposes. To be sure at that moment a large Russian fleet would have been very desirable, as the Russian cruiser "Askold," attached later to the Dardanelles fleet, demonstrated concretely. But the British politician in office is generally a statesman for the reason that he must follow a traditional policy—drops into it as a matter of fact. The British empire today travels on the impetus and in the groove furnished by her great political leaders, and in this instance the momentum and channel were the exclusion in the future, as in the past, of the Russian from the Mediterranean.

The Russian Black Sea war fleet was small because it was limited to a relatively small sheet of water, on the shores of which live weak neighbors. It had for military purposes no access to the high seas. There was no reason why the Russian Black Sea navy should have been larger than it was—indeed, there was no valid reason why it should have been so large. But with the Dardanelles in the hands of the Russian, things would have been entirely different.

Possession of the Sea of Marmora would have given Russia the finest naval base in the world, and thereafter the Russian Baltic naval ports would have rapidly become a thing of memory. In that event, also,

Great Britain would have had for rival in the supremacy of the seas not a Germany, that was poverty-stricken, in comparison with the reserve resources of Russia, but a state to whose population control of the Dardanelles would have been the signal for a united attempt to secure hegemony of much of the earth. A Russia that had Zarigrad on the Golden Horn for its real capital, would have needed no social reforms of a violent character. In the widening of the political horizon of their country, the Russian people would have found their liberation, while the realization of a dream of a thousand years would have implanted into the Russian the thing he never had—patriotism of the imperialistic brand.

These were possibilities, nay actualities, which the British statesmen had to bear in mind. These men were indeed before the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand they might lose their Mohammedan empire, and on the other the Dardanelles, a waterway controlling, under the circumstances, the highway to that empire—the Suez Canal.

Russia's Dream a Diplomatic Desire

Let us see how the Russian government looked upon the case.

The situation being what it was, that government decided to take off for always the irksome barriers across the entrance and mouth of the Bosphorus-Dardanelles channel. Sazonoff wanted much besides. When the British government saw his program it regretted for the first time that it had entered the European War "for the sake of Belgium." In London they actually gasped for breath.

Sir Louis Mallet had been given no great welcome when he returned to his capital. Though he had done his best, some thought he should have done more, as is the lot of any "unsuccessful" diplomatist. The entrance of Turkey in the War had brought British statesmen face to face with a problem they had not counted upon a scant three months before. The Ottoman government was thought absolutely safe, and when it was shown that this was not so, the men in London were sure that a guarantee for thirty years of the integrity of the domain of the empire was all there was needed to keep the Ottoman government satisfied.

It is barely possible that the Sublime Porte would have taken a thirty years' lease on life, instead of venturing existence at a single throw, though this is not highly probable under the circumstances. The Young Turk element was sure that the rehabilitation of their country had to be preceded by a radical change in its international status. With special privileges held by influential representatives and institutions from all parts of the world, not to mention the special concessions which the capitulations were, the leaders of the Turkish government contemplated the prospect

of national suicide with less perturbation than the slow strangulation of government and state and Osmanli race to which the foreigner-controlled reign of Abdul Hamid and his immediate predecessors had condemned Turkey.

M. N. M. de Giers, the Russian ambassador, had been rather pro-German during the days that followed the assassination of the arch-duke. At any rate he had always been indifferent to the French and British diplomatists on the Golden Horn, following in this, perhaps, the inclinations of his father—the Russian minister of foreign affairs, who, together with Czar Alexander III, had opposed the alliance with France. During the negotiations on the thirty-years guarantee for Turkey, the younger de Giers had been more of an interested spectator than a participant. M. Bompard, the French ambassador, also, seemed incapable of furthering the scheme, though in his case it was rather a lack of ability that handicapped the undertaking which the British ambassador was promoting.

Be that as it may, de Giers took the stand, as he expressed it to a diplomatic acquaintance of mine, that, whatever might come of the offer made the Sublime Porte, one thing was certain: The status of the Dardanelles was bound to be a different one, after the War. It was this very statement which later caused so much anxiety to the Rumanian political group, headed by Senator Alexandru Marghiloman, and former Premier Peter Carp, of which more later on.

Whether or no the Ottoman government knew the attitude of the Russian government and its ambassador at Constantinople makes little difference now. The fact is that the negotiations were cut short by the activity of Russian mine-laying ships near the entrance to the Bosphorus. The Turkish cabinet did not trust the advances of the Entente diplomatists, and had no reason to trust the Russian envoy, who, moreover, was not anxious to be trusted. The Russian government had made up its mind to get to Constantinople and the Dardanelles this time—make or break.

The records of the Russian government show that up to the beginning of March, 1915, Sazonoff had no assurance that Great Britain and France would honor Russia's demands in and around Constantinople. It is shown in a telegram, No. 168, March 11th, 1917, sent to his government by Isvolski, the Russian ambassador at Paris, that a treaty between the Russian and French governments, concerning the claims of Russia generally, and those along the Dardanelles particularly, was not concluded until the year 1915, while from March 4th (new style), 1915, comes a memorandum handed by Sazonoff to the French and British ambassadors in which the intentions of Russia concerning the annexation planned by her government are outlined. Subject to modifications to be stated further on Russia wanted to wrench from the Ottoman empire—

“the city of Constantinople; the western shores of the Bosphorus, Marmora Sea, and the Dardanelles; Southern Frigia, to the line of Enos-Media; the shores of Asia Minor between Bosphorus, the river Samara, and a point of Ismid Gulf to be determined later on; the islands in the Sea of Marmora, and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos.”

In addition to stating that the special interests of France and Great Britain in those territories were to be respected, the memorandum refers to the fact that Constantinople was to be recognized as a free port for the transit of merchandise not of Russian origin or destination, and that merchant ships were to have free passage in the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Something more is said concerning British and French rights in Asia Minor, the preservation of sacred Mohammedan places, and the placing of Arabia under independent Mohammedan rule. For Great Britain the *quid pro quo* for all this was to be the inclusion within its sphere of influence in Persia of the territory known as the neutral zone. Not enough with that Sazonoff expresses himself in favor of separating from the Turkish Sultanate the Caliphate.

Shorn of all verbiage the conditions which Sazonoff imposed, and which Great Britain and France accepted so reluctantly, mean that Russia would have been in complete control of the principal part of the Ottoman empire—Thrace as far west as the Enos-Media line, with the remainder west of that boundary ceded to Bulgaria, the city of Constantinople, Gallipoli and the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and its islands, the Bosphorus and as much of Western Anatolia as Russia pleased.

According to the program of the Russian general staff the Russian army was to advance across Anatolia, thence into Cilicia, and occupation would in that event have completed the annexation of *all* Turkey. For its western neighbor Russia in those parts would have had the Bulgarians; for its eastern frontier on this southward expansion its own sphere of influence in Persia. In the South the Taurus range would have made a most practical military border, provided that Syria and Palestine had not been annexed; at the entrance of the Dardanelles, the islands of Tenedos and Imbros, not to mention the reefs known as the Tauschan or Rabbit islands, would have served excellently as the sites of the needed Russian Gibaltars.

That the island of Lemnos is not mentioned in the memorandum is rather surprising, but that may not mean anything, seeing that the Tauschan reefs were also overlooked. With that much gone Great Britain would have been driven out of the Aegean anyway, so the ignoring of an island or two would not have mattered. Lemnos, moreover, could have been given to the Greeks, who in this classic bit of earth would have seen the physical

link that bound them to the Greater Russian empire—the *Russia mare*, which Sazonoff had in view.

Of course, British statesmen trembled when they gave some sort of assent to this Russian program. What they had promised Russia could be snatched from the paws of the bear only by defeat, or by future political maneuvering—one of these was not to be invited, and the other lacked as yet the very room for its moves and countermoves. So we find that on March 18th—the fateful—Sazonoff informs his agent in Paris, Isvolski, that on March 8th, the French ambassador at Petrograd stated to him that the French government was taking “a most friendly attitude towards the realization of our desires * * * in connection with the straits and Constantinople,” for which he instructed Isvolski to express to Delcassé his appreciation. The telegram continues:

“In his conversations with you, Delcassé, even before, repeatedly expressed his assurances that we may depend on the sympathy of France, *and only referred to the necessity of clarifying England’s attitude, from which side he feared objections, before giving us more concrete assurances to the aforesaid effect.*”

The excerpt speaks for itself. The italics are mine.

There was a little negotiating after that, on the merest trifles, compared with the territories and interests that had been written over to the Russians. In effect the situation remained what it was. Sazonoff even succeeded in persuading his allied governments that it would be well to separate the Osmanli Sultanate from the Islam Caliphate, which was just as well as there was to be no longer any Turkey, when the Russian minister of foreign affairs was through with it. He was willing, however, to guarantee the freedom of pilgrimage to the Mohammedans that were to pass under Muscovite rule, which meant nothing, of course, considering that the Mohammedans of the Russian empire had enjoyed that privilege long before Sazonoff was born. As a shamming hair splitter the man was as exasperating it seems as an empire builder.

Where Clarification Was Needed

Such then was the status of Constantinople, her waterways, empire and government, when the necessity for military endeavor on a much larger scale arose. One would have thought that Russia would have offered a large army for this “realization” of her “desires.” That much the Turkish government feared, for these things were not unknown in Stamboul. In fact I discussed them with Saïd Halim Pasha, the grand vizier, Enver Pasha, minister of war, and Talaat Bey, of the interior, long before a serious attempt was made to carry them into effect. It was

rather odd that in this instance taciturn diplomacy shouted its plans to the populace, or at least that part of the populace which takes an interest in such matters. There were two neutral diplomatic missions in Constantinople where I had no difficulty getting quite the latest turn and fashion in diplomacy. Now and then one had to exercise a little judgment in not mixing matters, but on the whole I had no trouble keeping well informed.

There was some talk in March that the Russians intended landing a large army on the Black Sea coast of Thrace, near Media. As the result of this more Ottoman troops were withdrawn from the Caucasus and Mesopotamia than was wise, and the Ottoman Second Army, which also had been intended for use at the Gulf of Xeros was rushed northward overnight, with nothing but its cavalry contingents remaining in the Kuru Dagh for emergency purposes.

But the Russians made no move in that direction.

Instead came news that large bodies of British troops were being brought into the Mediterranean, landing in Egypt, on Cyprus, and on the island of Lemnos, the principal bay of which, Mudros, was being converted into a general military base by the British and French. It seemed that the Russians were too much occupied with the Germans and Austrians in the Carpathians to care much just then for Constantinople and its environments. The Russian general staff had its hands full engineering maneuvers that kept much of the German army out of France—the only reason why the French government and certain elements in London had acquiesced into the ambitious schemes of Sazonoff. One had to spar for time, even at the risk of having a most refractious and gluttonous ally to deal with later on.

That Sir Ian Hamilton did not land his forces on the shores of Thrace, Enos, if no other place, caused general excitement in Turkey, the Central Powers, and throughout the world. By doing that he would have cut off, as I have already stated, the Turks on Gallipoli, and severed completely their direct land route of communication between the peninsula and Thrace, no great calamity to be sure, since the Turks depended to within eighty per cent on transport by water—on the Dardanelles. But edging a little southward, as he would have been able to do, he would have gained absolute control of the entrance to the Strait from the north, where it joins the Sea of Marmora. Of course, the line of fortifications at Bulair was in the way, but that line he could have razed to the ground as completely as his supporting warfleet had razed the works at Kum Kalé and Sid-il-Bahr, seeing that the positions were open to flankal fire, and did not have the support of other emplaced batteries. The case of the forts at Bulair differed in that respect in nowise from that of the works at the southern gate of the Dardanelles.

With the isthmus of Bulair in the hands of the Allied troops, and with the entrance to the Dardanelles, opposite the town of Gallipoli, commanded by British and French artillery, the Turks would have been obliged to supply their Third Army and the Third Army corps, the men of the coast batteries, and a few other organizations, over the worst roads imaginable. The only railroad line in Anatolia east of the Dardanelles, the Ancient Phrygia Minor, runs from Panderma to Smyrna, and comes nowhere closer than 90 miles to the contested waterway. Since it is but half the distance from Karabiagh to Dardanelles, no railroad transportation of any sort would have figured in the efforts of the Turks to hold the Strait. Being familiar with the roads in that part of the world, and the requirements of an army, I may be pardoned for saying that these efforts would have been futile, in the absence of good roads and thousands of motor trucks.

Instead of bringing that state of affairs about, and giving himself an excellent start for an advance into Thrace, Sir Ian Hamilton, selected to land at Sid-il-Bahr and Ariburnu for the purposes I have already referred to—the taking of the Atchi Baba elevation and the Kodjatchemen Dag. From these points of vantage, and there were others just as good, British long-range rifles and high-angle pieces were to put a period to Turkish defense of the Dardanelles. After that the Allied fleet, composed six to one, of British and French battleships, was to steam to Constantinople, as it was hoped it would do in March of that year.

But nothing came of this. The Turks and their German leaders realized what the reaching of any prominent elevations by the Allies meant and held on like grim death—doing themselves anything but a favor in the light of the general situation which later ensued.

Nobody would have expected the British to hand over to the Russians two waterways, an inland sea of the greatest tactical importance, and a city like Constantinople. The British would have “internationalized” all of this gain, and “internationalization” in this case meant that the conditions imposed upon the Turk would have been extended in harmony with the British and French interests in Turkey, as Sazonoff said in his memorandum, without giving it at all that meaning. Russia would have been as near the “realization” of her “desires” as she had been a year before, which was not any too close.

Of course, the British statesmen, from whom Sir Ian Hamilton, according to rule and the findings of the British Dardanelles Commission, took his orders, were playing a very dangerous game, as Sir George Buchanan knew only too well. To bilk the Russians in that manner would have led immediately to peace negotiations between the Central Powers and Russia, and these, as is well known, were launched several

times so far as court circles in Petrograd, Darmstadt and Berlin could do it. That a peace on this basis was not actually concluded is due to the fact that the interests of Russia and Germany also clashed in and about the capital of Turkey. Berlin-to-Bagdad had indeed become an *idée fixe* with the German *Alldeutschen* and expansionists, and into this scheme could not fit the control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles by the Russians. The two sets of expansion policies crossed one another at right angles in Constantinople and permitted no satisfactory *modus vivendi*.

Clarification Is No Longer Needed

Good luck was to play an important role in this highly critical situation, and, as usual, it favored the British. The great drive of the Germans into Poland and Russia throughout the summer of 1915 left the Russian government no time to occupy itself with the landing of a large expeditionary force in Thrace. The Russian general staff had its hands full with problems nearer home. When it found time to breathe, it took stock of a state of affairs that left every balance in favor of the Central Powers. Its own army had been routed and badly disorganized on a retreat that left the Germans and Austro-Hungarians in possession of twenty times the territory the Russians had ever occupied in the countries of their enemies. Fortress after fortress, base after base, had fallen into the hands of the antagonist, and in the territory of the new front were not to be found the fine strategic railroad lines built by the money of French investors, and which had served so well during the first advance.

Elsewhere the outlook was just as gloomy. On the West Front things were stalmate and the War of Attrition was already on, wearing down both sides with fine impartiality. In the Balkan the spectacle was disheartening in the extreme. Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers, thereby opening the direct route from Berlin to Bagdad, and making possible, or at least less difficult, the complete crushing of Serbia, *enfant gâtée* of the Russian government. Greece had refused to come to the assistance of Serbia, despite a treaty that provided for this, and in Rumania, the Marghiloman faction was still defying the Bratianu-Jonescu-Filipescu coalition, and was doing it successfully.

The Italian army was bleeding itself white on the treacherous Carso, without getting anywhere, and on Gallipoli a sad chapter of the War was coming rapidly to a close. All summer long British and Anzac had given the Turks the fight of their history, and when fall came they were still on the ground they had first occupied. In some cases even ground had been lost. In the Caucasus and in Mesopotamia things were no better, and a little later Kut-el-Amara was retaken by the Turks.

Instead of thinking much of Zarigrad on the Golden Horn, the Russian government and people were near distraction. Both of them were paying the first instalment of the debt Sazonoff had heaped upon them in his mad foreign policy and later he gave up his office—favorite practice of ministers who have plunged their own people, and the world besides, into war and of a sudden feel the necessity of taking a rest—"getting from under" in American parlance. The good luck of the British statesmen in not having to cope with assistance from the Russians, across the Black Sea, was augmented by the rapid decline of Sazonoff, and so it came to pass that Great Britain and Russia did not have to end the War in favor of Germany in order to fight with each other over the possession of Constantinople, her territory, and her waterways.

No matter how the War with Germany would have ended for Great Britain, she would have been the defeated had Russia actually carried out her program of expansion southward. Within two decades Russia would have had in the Sea of Marmora a fleet large enough to control the Aegean and the Mediterranean Seas, and with that would have been coupled the loss of control by Great Britain of the Suez Canal. To occupy the Turks and Germans at the Dardanelles and on Gallipoli was necessary and wise, but to do anything that would actually place Great Britain in a position of having to refuse Russia that which had been promised her would have been folly; on the other hand there would have been no British statesman who would have dared to carry out the terms of the British-Franco-Russian *entente* in regard to Turkey.

Viewed in the light of national biology the *entente* in question was Great Britain's death warrant. Small wonder that Delcassé had seen fit to refer "to the necessity of clarifying England's attitude" on the question. Her statesmen, after denying to themselves that the traditional in international relations is the natural tendency of peoples, had been seized by a panic, with the result that "autocratic" Russia forced from "liberal" Great Britain a concession which the latter could not ultimately live up to, and which she, therefore, intended contesting at a more favorable moment than pressure of the German armies just then left the British politicians.

The British government had no reason to live up to the terms Sazonoff had insisted upon. Even the strong may be placed under duress occasionally, and in this instance the *force majeure* compelling Great Britain was not alone the strength of the Germany army, but the "desires" of Russia, the ally of the British—the same Russia, which for the culmination of her designs in the same direction had concluded with France, in 1893, an alliance calculated to put an end to British hegemony in Asia.

In the light of the *entente* regarding the partition, and so far as Russia was concerned, the total annexation, of the Ottoman empire, it should be

clear that the Turkish ministers took the only course that was open to them. That the Ottoman cabinet paid so little attention to the guarantees offered for the integrity of the empire need not surprise the world any longer, and with that vanishes the vapid talk by diplomatic propagandists who have insisted that Baron von Wangenheim was the evil genius of Turkey. What the intentions of Russia were has been shown, and how little these were calculated to benefit the world was demonstrated by the acts of the British, for, with all respect to the Russian people, we, who are more distinctly of the Occident, would prefer to pass under the rule of Great Britain rather than under that of a Romanoff Russia.

There is one point to which I must hark back. I have said that the British fleet was to steam to Constantinople, together with a small French attachment, and that in this manner the "realization" of Russian "desires" was to be foiled. The question is permissible: How was this to be done? The presence of a large British fleet would have settled the problem at the start. The fact that some French vessels were to be in the Allied fleet in the Black Sea was some argument against the clamour that would have come from Russia, for, as the memorandum of Sazonoff admitted:

"The French as well as the English government expressed their assent to the fulfilment of our desires in the event of a successful termination of the War and the satisfaction of a series of demands of France and England within the limits of the Ottoman empire as well as in other places."

Even the diplomatically uninitiated will realise that the terms were very elastic and the possibility of interpretation large in these two categories of eventualities. There was only one thing to be avoided and that was actual occupation of any part of Thrace by Russian troops, and that the good fortune of war prevented. Whether or no fortune was equally kind in placing the Straits of Constantinople under the control of the British at the end of the Great War remains to be seen.

Consequences of the Dardanelles Fiasco

I had been the first to express the opinion that the Allied fleet would not get through to Constantinople, and that the landed forces of Great Britain and France would not fare any better. Counting upon the renewal of the stock of ammunition in the Turkish coast batteries, and having seen what little actual damage had been done to the emplacements along the Outer Dardanelles in an action that cost the Allies three very good ships, and put six others out of commission for some time, I concluded that an attack on the strait would not be repeated so long as the War was young and every battleship a great asset.

I did not understand the full complexity of British-Russian interests at that time, to be sure, but was for all that far from inclined of accepting the advanced aspect of the case without a healthy amount of skepticism. The dispatches I had written had attracted the attention of the Ottoman and German authorities, with the result that officers who were my superiors in matters of technical knowledge wanted to hear more of my views. To my great surprise I discovered that I was almost the only person in Constantinople who held that the British and French would not renew the attack by water again, but would synchronize the next offensive with a landing of a large expeditionary force—in the Gulf of Xeros.

The case is of no special import except in so far as it shows that I was with the rest of the world mistaken in the latter assumption. Already in June, 1915, I wrote several dispatches in which I indicated that ultimately the expedition on Gallipoli would end in withdrawal by the Allies. One of these, I remember, caused a United States military publication a great deal of mirth, but the laugh was on the other side six months later. If Sir Ian Hamilton had set out to find the worst terrain for his troops he could not have done better than at Sid-il-Bahr, Ariburnu and Suvla Bay. Almost any point along the shore of the Xeros Gulf would have been infinitely better. But it seems that the statesmen at home did not allow him too much room for picking suitable landing places.

It has always been bad policy to give a military operation a political objective, apart from the ultimate aim of decently conducted wars—the re-establishment of peace as quickly as possible with a maximum of credit to oneself and a minimum of injustice to the vanquished.

Developments at the gates of Constantinople were to have their effect in the Balkan countries. An interview I had with the Bulgarian premier, Dr. Radoslavoff, in February of the same year, had caused me to look with suspicion upon the assertions of the Allied governments that ultimately every Slav race would fight in their camp. Dr. Radoslavoff was rather unfriendly to the Serbs in his remarks, and did not seem to care who knew it. At any rate, he gave me permission to use everything he said, and my dispatch was not questioned by the Bulgarian authorities, which was not likely, however, seeing that no "preventive" censorship existed at that time.

Thus warned I was forearmed against the many silly rumors that were set adrift in Constantinople by the Greek and Armenian sympathizers of the Entente.

The first report concerning Bulgaria that interested me at all seriously was one which had it that Bulgaria and Turkey were coming together in connection with some matter affecting the railroad line Swilengrad—Kuleia Burgas—Dimotika, which the Bulgarians had to use in order to

reach the port of Dedeagatch. The line in question was as far as Kuleia Burgas, a part of the Sofia-Constantinople trunkline, and from thereon a division of the branchline to the Bulgarian port named. Between Swilengrad and Dimotika it ran then on Turkish territory and this the Bulgarians had found rather vexatious.

Since the Turkish government had no reason of its own to get rid of the lines in question, the report that it intended ceding it to Bulgaria, and was willing to make some other border "rectifications" at its own expense, the remarks of Dr. Radoslavoff, to which I will come back further on, began to have a new meaning to me. In August of 1915, the negotiations were completed, and after that entrance into the war by Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers seemed certain to all who had followed developments.

Mr. Koulocheff, the Bulgarian minister in Constantinople, had taken a hand in the negotiations, of course, but was no great admirer of the sudden rapprochement of the two countries, which the agreement concerning the border rectification represented. He took the view of the Bulgarian Nationalists—men of the Guechoff type—who felt that it was the duty of Bulgaria to stand by Russia through thick and thin.

For the Turks Mr. Koulocheff had little use, and of their military capacity he was ever unconvinced. I remember having a conversation with him on the prospects on Gallipoli. The number of Turkish dead and wounded he mentioned was so great that I had to wonder how a man in his position could believe such a fable. He was also of the opinion that before very long the Allied forces would place themselves in possession of the peninsula and that the taking of Constantinople was then a matter of days. I took particular pains to set Mr. Koulocheff right on these points, and did not earn his appreciation therefor.

To Mr. Koulocheff, as to a good many other Bulgarians, it seemed at that time that their country ought to take arms on the side of the Allies. The imminent possibility of having Russia for a neighbor who would not be satisfied with an all water route to Constantinople, but who, as strong imperial states will do, would find highly desirable the direct rail connection to the shores of the Bosphorus, did not seem to bother these Bulgarians. Such has ever been the case when in diplomacy sentiment takes the place of the practical things that constitute the necessities of nations and individuals alike. Idealism of any sort is a condiment that renders even more unpalatable the sorry broth of international relations cooked by the diplomatists.

IX

BULGARIA VERSUS SERBIA

TURKEY had entered the War in self-defence; Bulgaria was to do the same presently. The governments of the two countries were face to face with a situation that could be solved in no other manner. They took refuge to the *ultima ratio*, because they were driven to it. Vital factors in national life—national existence in the case of the Turks; the Serbian danger in that of the Bulgarians—had become the forces in crises that meant going to war with either of the two camps of Europe.

It is difficult enough in times of peace to take matters out of the hands of the diplomatists, once they have made up their minds to straighten them out, according to their wishes; it is impossible to make them release their hold of a case in times of war. Both sides, then, have something to gain and after a tug of war of wits one of them has it its own way. That had happened in Constantinople. It was to take place again in Sofia. The Turks had gone to war when the harvest of 1914 was in, and the Bulgarians did the same when the crops of 1915 had been housed. In the Balkan especially men do not go to war at any other time, as a rule. Agricultural countries cannot afford to lose what is often their only substance.

When I say that the political disturbances and wars of the Balkan peoples have been almost entirely of ethnological and demographic origin, I mean, of course, that they have been this more pronouncedly than in other parts, for wars, generally, have this as causal agent, even in such cases when purely political, dynastic or religious differences led to trouble. In the lives of men everything is contained in, and comes to be the cause of, the preservation of the self and propagation. It is so with races and nations. The fact that organized society has found the means to keep its human units from being constantly at each other's throat is, in fact, the best indication that a society of nations, based on justice and enlightened self-interest, is feasible and the best insurance that may be had for a sweeping reduction of the possibilities of war.

The tendency to forget that life in the Balkans is still very elementary, and therefore closer to the biological actualities than elsewhere, has been the principal reason why the peoples in the peninsula and their problems have seemed so inexplicable. Those who believe that Serb, Bulgar,

Macedonian and Albanian would prefer to come to blows over a difference that seems perfectly adjudicable, instead of composing it in an amicable spirit, forget that the primitive facts of life are the hardest to deny. We have an example of this in two wide-awake businessmen of the city, who will give their case into the hands of their lawyers for arbitration, while the farmer will hardly ever do that. It is nothing for a farmer to spend more money in the pursual of a claim to a rod of land than the subject of litigation is worth. It is so with nations everywhere. We do not wonder at that usually, but when the difficulty is shown up in the light of primitive necessity we must needs think it extraordinary, if we happen to be removed from the plane on which the quarrel moves.

The population of the relatively very small Balkan peninsula is more diverse than that of any other area of similar extent. The Balkan in fact is inhabited by almost as many races as the remainder of Europe: Bulgar, Serb, Greek, Kutzo-Vlakh, Macedonian, Albanian, Italian, Turk and Rumanian, with many other divisions possible if one should set out to do it. For instance, the Serb may assert that the Croat is a Serb also, yet I have known many Croats who denied that, answering the claim of the Serb with the statement that to be a Southern or Jugo-Slav was in itself no proof that one was a Serb. The Slovene may do the same thing, as may the Bosniak, the Dalmatian and the Montenegrin. The Southern Wallachian, or Kutzo-Vlakh, certainly is no Serb, as some would have him. If related at all to any of the people now on the Balkan, he is the cousin of the Rumanian. On the other hand, the Bulgar has claimed, and the Macedonian has by his conduct admitted, that these two belong together. To meet that argument it has been asserted that the Bulgar was not a Slav at all, but of Turanian extraction, to which may be given the retort that the Macedonians, numbering about one and one-half millions, are at best a mixture of the race now known as Bulgars, and Albanian, Greek and Serb elements.

It is not my plan to enter here the maze of ethnology which the population of the Balkan peninsula forms. Volumes and volumes, veritable libraries, have been written on this subject, and while the propaganda of Serb and Bulgar alike may easily mislead us, the fact is that impartial observers have generally agreed upon this: That the Bulgarians of today are not the pure Turanian tribe which invaded the peninsula about 679 A. D., being instead, as is natural, the product to some extent of the people whom they found in what is now Bulgaria and Macedonia, the Old-Slovenes.

Though the Bulgars made themselves the masters of the country and formed the ruling caste for about a century they were already completely Slavified in the middle of the Ninth Century, according to Byzantine

historians, who had no reason to love them. Moreover, it is not at all certain that the Bulgarians, were still a pure Turanian tribe when they appeared on the Balkans. They had for so long lived on the river Volga in what is now Russia that they either gave their name to the river or were called after it: Volgarians, a term which modification by Byzantine writers converted into *Bulgarians*.

The Roots of "Balkan" Diplomacy

But even the Old-Slovenes were at that time no longer a pure race, if it is to be assumed that there is such a thing as racial purity. They had themselves arrived but lately, in 650 A. D., on the peninsula, driven hither by the pressure from the East—a pressure which, in the absence of definite data, has ever struck the historian as something uncanny, has, indeed, been likened by some to the instinct that guides migratory birds. At any rate the Old-Slovenes had settled in a country before them held, in the order named, by Dacians, Thracians, Kelts, Huns, Goths, Gepides and an older Slav tribe.

There is no doubt that the Old-Slovenes and the Bulgars found in a country as mountainous as the Balkan peninsula, especially in the more inaccessible districts of the wild and densely wooded ranges, descendants of all of these people. While it has been possible to eliminate from plain and valley populations entirely, it has ever been difficult to overcome and dislodge them completely in the mountains. Indeed, we have in the Balkans a very striking example of this in the Albanians, a fairly pure type of Illyrians, who at one time inhabited the western parts of the peninsula entirely. Another example of this are the Kelts, who, after having been displaced by the pressure from the East, continued their migration westward and strewed the Alps with their racial remnants, where we find them today, and finally landed as far West as conditions permitted—in extreme Western France and the British isles.

The Bulgarian of today, then, is a composite predominantly Slav, speaking the language of the Old-Slovenes, which statement may be supplemented in all prudence with the remark that the early culture and literature of the Slavs, anywhere, was of Bulgarian origin. The alphabet of the Russians, and until quite recently that of the Rumanians, is the Kyrillika, an adaption of the Greek letters to the phonetic requirements of the Slav, more especially, the Bulgarian, language. Two Bulgars, the Bishops Kyril and Method, are the inventors of this alphabet.

The Serbs and Croats, or Serbo-Croats, seem to be a race that underwent no such vicissitudes. A Slave race originally, they assimilated or displaced the people they found in the northwestern parts of the peninsula,

and were not molested by the Turanian invaders, who later gave their name to the country known as Bulgaria. Whether or no the Serbs were of immediately the same stock as the Old-Slovenes is not known, but the closest relationship existed. There is also the fact that the two tribes invaded the Balkans almost simultaneously, with the Serbs a few years in the lead, so far as final settlement is concerned. How the Croats came to be so closely linked with them is not known reliably. At any rate for centuries they lived together in such harmony as the political aspirations of the Serb element permitted, and later separated somewhat on account of religious divergence. The Serbs remained Greek-Catholic, the Croats embraced the Roman-Catholic faith, and most of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina elected to become Mohammedans. The Serbo-Croat race inhabits today, starting in the North, Slavonia, Sylvania, the greater part of Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Northern Macedonia.

I must in this connection draw attention to a map, issued by M. St. Stanoievitch, professor of Serb history at the University of Belgrade, and D. J. Derocco, a Serbian professor of geography. The map in question has been circulated broadcast for the propaganda purposes of the Serbian government, and was given to me by one of its agents for my own enlightenment in 1915. I mention this fact, together with the map, because it caused me to take a closer interest in the demographic problems on the Balkan. For the sake of peace in the future, I must hope that this perversion of the engraver's art did not influence the members of the Peace Conference at Paris.

I have defined the actual limits of Serbo-Croatia above. The best authorities agree that the districts named are inhabited by Serbs and Croats. The authors of the map in question go much further, after including, for the convenience and weight of argument, the Slovenes and their territory, into their scheme. For the sake of those whom such matters may particularly interest, I will trace here what Messrs. Stanoievitch and Derocco think Serbo-Croat-Slovene territory. After having laid its boundary on a map, the observer will all the better understand why Bulgar and Serb came to blows in 1915. The map was already out and excited the Sofia Foreign Office, the government, and the people as nothing could have done. There are some varieties of propaganda that are a direct provocation of war, and this is one such instance.

The limits of Jugo-Slavia, I will call it that, though the map leaves us to infer that the limits are those of Greater Serbia—the *Serbia mare*, run as follows:

Along the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea, without regard for Italian claims, from the mouth of the Isonzo to the mouth of the river

Drime, thence to the Proclivie Mts., Pachtrick Mts., Babachnitza Mts., Horab and Tablanitza Mts., Lake Ochrida, Galitchitsa Mts., Lake Prespa, Neretchka Mts., Nitche Mts., Hoyouf Mts., Blatetz Mts., Lake Doiran, Belasitza Mts., around the Strumnitza district, to follow the crests of the Osgovia Mts., along the old Bulgaro-Serb border, then along the Danube as far west as Moldawa; thence into Hungary and Austria, from Oravitza to Tchakovo, Nadjlak, Mako, Szegedine, Seksarde, Baroese, thence to a point immediately south of Velika-Kagnija, to St. Gothard; thence into Austria north of Marburg in the Carinthian Alps, to Klagenfurt, Villach, along the river Drava, south again into the Carinthian Alps, whence it enters Italy near the town of Pontebba, to approach the banks of the Tagliamento, and finally to continue in a slight southeasterly direction to the mouth of the Isonzo.

There seems to be no reason why a Serbian government under Pashitch, should not emulate the example of the Russian government under Sazonoff. So it would seem. Yet the fact is that such intemperance will not serve the peace of the world. In this instance it was directly responsible for the war between Serbia and Bulgaria, and a further expansion of the War of Europe.

The claims of the map in question had the backing of the Serb government. They could not but fan into flame the animosity between the two peoples, for in addition to the great boundaries drawn the map shows zones—*clairsemée*—as the two authors put it, in which the Serbo-Croat race was more or less scattered, according to admission.

The first of these zones takes in much of Albania, eastern Epirus and northern Greece, without paying the slightest attention to the presence of some 160,000 Kutzo-Vlakhs located along the actual borders of Albania, Macedonia and Greece, and this in a country very thinly populated. The third seems like an annexion of the Strumnitza district, which, as I happen to know from personal observation, is peopled exclusively by Bulgars, Macedonians, Turks and Gypsies. Zone number four includes the better half of the Banat, including the city of Temesvar, the fifth and sixth zones lie immediately north and south of the Hungarian capital, Budapest, where some Croats are to be found as immigrants, engaged in gardening mostly. The seventh zone *clairsemée* comprises most of the Hungarian comitats of Baragna and Chomodje, and the eighth and last claims, for the Slovenes, the comitats of Vaghe and Choprone and Lower Austria between "Viener Naichtate," as *Wiener Neustadt* is naively spelled and a point on the Danube halfway between Vienna itself and Marchegg.

To the authors of the map it seems to have made no difference that Greater Serbia would have annexed every Italian along the shores of the Adriatic, Albanians, Kutzo-Vlakhs, every Macedonian, Greeks, Old-

Bulgars, Rumanians, Magyars, and German Austrians, and that in doing this it would have given rise to a series of "irredentas" that would have kept Europe in turmoil for centuries. Such is geography as the hand maiden of political propaganda and diplomacy.

Sazonoff's Policy Toward Bulgaria

The Treaty of Bucharest, 1913, of which Sazonoff was the evil genius, despite his obviously Bulgarophile telegrams to his Serbophile minister at Belgrade, M. Hartwig, that he use his influence with Pashitch for the securing of better terms for Bulgaria, had left the Bulgars in a bitter mood. Among the things which the Bulgarian does not possess, in common with his Slav cousins, is the light-heartedness and sense of humor, which, coupled with a strong tendency toward day-dreaming and easy surrender to the supposedly inevitable, have made Slav government throughout Europe anything but agreeable. The treaty in question deprived the Bulgar not only of what he had fought for in the Balkan War, but it deprived him of territory of his own besides, the major part of the Dobrudja, which Sazonoff, as guardian angel of Bulgaria, gave to the Rumanians for their military excursion in the direction of Sofia.

It must not be supposed that the Bulgarians were the angels they made themselves out to be. Far from it. I have followed their line of march in Thrace on the highways from Üsünköprü to Kazan and thence to Bulair, and happen to know that a great deal of wanton destruction was practiced to the detriment and eradication of the Turk. For that at least I did not have to take the statements of the inhabitants. The ruins spoke for themselves. Since Turk and Bulgar have an architecture of their own for dwelling purposes, I had no difficulty observing that the Bulgarian army set afire only the houses of the Turks, and left those of the Bulgarians untouched. I was able, in that manner to ascertain that the population of Thrace, of Bulgar origin, was a very large one, after the Turks had been driven out by arson and pillage.

The Bulgarians also wanted just a little more than was their due. Thrace was to be theirs as far as the Enos-Media line, upon which line Sazonoff later fixed for his own boundary in "Frigia," as says his memorandum. Southward and eastward they wanted the country as far west as the right bank of the Struma river, that is Seres, Drama and Cavalla, in Old Thessaly, and Macedonia was to be joined to Old-Bulgaria. Bulgaria's claims were honored only in part by the Treaty of Bucharest, and to Rumania she had to cede a part of the Dobrudja—the best part, naturally.

The Macedonia of today is but a fraction of the Macedonia held by

Alexander of renown and his father, Phillip. Authorities agree in the main that it is that part of the Balkans which lies within the Karadagh mountain range, the frontier of Bulgaria, the river Mesta, the Aegean Sea, the Greek boundary, and the crests of the ranges of Shar, Grammus and Pindus. The district is now inhabited, to the number of roughly 1,500,000, by a mixed people of predominantly Bulgarian origin, with an admixture of Serbs, Greeks and Albanians, surrounded on all sides by a sort of racial twilight zone, in which the Bulgarian Macedonians finally disappear. The natural result of this is that it would be extremely difficult to draw a demographic line, or boundary, that would please everybody.

To the claims of the inhabitants in Southern Macedonia, the Serbs had not been able to raise great objections at the preliminary peace conference in London. These people, it seems, wanted to join Bulgaria, as I was told by one of their distinguished *comitadje* leaders, Colonel Protogeroff, who later commanded a Bulgarian division against the troops landed by the Allies at Salonika. But it was different with the Macedonians in the northern parts of the district, who also were eager to join the Bulgarian kingdom. The Serbian government contested their claim, and held that the site in question, the districts of Uskub and Tetovo, had always been a part of Old-Serbia. The district then became known in diplomatic parlance as the *zone contestée*, while the remainder of Macedonia was labelled *zone incontestée*. These two zones were to become the principal bone of contention just before Bulgaria's entry into the European War.

It being impossible to apply the yardstick or thermometer to the quality of effort and degree of success of armies that are allied in war, the Serbs had let it be known that they themselves had defeated the Turks, and driven them out of Albania, Macedonia and the country along the Aegean shore. The Greeks claimed most of the remaining credit, and so it came that Bulgaria found not the necessary support in world public opinion in order to retain what her troops had occupied, among this much more of Thrace than was in the end awarded. The diplomatic stage, moreover, had been set against Bulgaria. Yet the fact is that the Bulgarian mobilization of 1912 reached the total of over 600,000, while the casualties were about 93,000, a shockingly high percentage. The Serbian and Greek forces and losses were as one to three in this.

Without wishing to question at all the efficiency and the motives of the Serb and Greek leaders, the fact remains that the Bulgarians did a good sixty per cent of the fighting, and her Allies forty per cent together, if it be possible to reduce so controvertible a thing to definite quantities.

As will happen when so infallible an institution as a General Staff takes to figures, the quality of the Turk as soldier had been sadly under-

rated, and so it came that Bulgaria, instead of being able to conclude the war with the army she was to employ in co-operation with her Allies, had to actually treble it, while Serbia increased her contingent only from 150,000 to 201,115. That figure alone proves who fought and won the Balkan War.

The Bulgarians thought that their grievances against the Serbs ought to be presented to Czar Nicholas, as arbiter in the case of the contested zone. But Nicholas was not Alexander II, who had made the liberation of the Bulgars a fact. He was following more or less the example of his father, Alexander III, who cared little for the waif in the Balkans, and was very much put out when Eastern Rumelia was joined to Bulgaria in 1885. It seems that the czar resented very much that one of the provisions of the San Stefano Treaty should have been carried into effect without his specific permission. The father of Alexander III was one of the high-contracting parties to this agreement, and his son might have been consulted by Bulgaria, in all propriety. The fact was, however, that the foundling state in the Balkan was growing up, and that its government began to feel at home a little. The czar gave vent to his peevishness by ordering home all the Russian officers serving in the Bulgarian army, at a time when attack on Bulgaria by Serbia or Turkey, or both, was not entirely out of the question. This was the first rift in the lute of Russo-Bulgarian relations, which in the past had been those of mother and child.

Prince Alexander of Battenberg, a favorite of Alexander II, had been installed at Sofia as ruler, under a Turkish suzerainty that was barely more than a name. When the successor to the Czar Liberator gave Bulgaria to understand that in the future she could not count on Russia, the resentment of the Bulgarians even affected the reigning prince. A conspiracy among Bulgarian officers resulted in Prince Alexander's kidnapping and removal to the nearest Russian town, Reni on the Danube. Saner elements in Sofia started a counter move and a little later the prince was back, to find, however, that his position was untenable. He appointed a regency and departed.

Bulgaria's Independence Displeased Czar

There were those who felt the necessity of coming to terms with Czar Alexander, and the throne being vacant, they proposed that it should be occupied by Prince Waldemar of Denmark, brother of the Russian empress. But the prince declined, as Bulgarians have insisted, at the instigation of the Russian emperor, if the refusal of consent could be called that. The following year Prince Ferdinand of Coburg was

offered the throne and accepted. Russia, however did not recognize him until 1896, when Czar Nicholas was prevailed upon to do that, on the condition, however, that Prince Boris, the heir-presumptive, be re-baptized to the Greek Catholic Church, having up to that time been a Roman Catholic, as was his father and family.

The assassination of King Alexander of Serbia and his queen, Draga, in 1903, which put the Austrophile Obrenovitch family of Serb rulers out of the way for the benefit of the Karageorgevitch dynasty, opened a new chapter in Balkan history. King Peter of Serbia did his best to cultivate good relations with St. Petersburg and after a while got sufficiently into the good graces of Czar Nicholas to get from him an annual stipend, such a donation having in the past been accepted from the Austro-Hungarian government by Kings Alexander and Milan. Thereafter in all matters of hostile contact, and there was little friendly contact with Bulgaria at any time, the Russian government sided openly with the Serbian government. Friction ran from the appointment of bishops to opposition in Russia and Serbia to the establishment of complete independence from the Ottoman government for the Bulgarians, effected finally in 1908, as an incident to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. The vassalage to the Turks had been a very light burden, indeed, but there was no reason why the Bulgars should not throw it off. Isvolski had been tricked into acquiescence to the annexation by Austria-Hungary of the last two quasi-Ottoman provinces along the border of the Dual Monarchy, but the two promoters of this expansion coup, Counts Aehrenthal and Berchtold, had also arranged it with Ferdinand of Bulgaria, to do whatever he could to draw a red herring across their trail. Ferdinand, therefore, said himself loose, forever and always, from the Turkish Sultanate, promptly disconcerted European diplomacy generally, and later was made a "czar" himself, that being his official title as king. To the real *czar* of the Slav world, Nicholas II, that was no mean affront. Bulgaria had taken the second step in her national up-building without paying much attention to what St. Petersburg thought of it, and again a Romanoff was peeved.

So it came that Sazonoff, while supervising the making of the terms of the Bucharest Treaty of 1913, was not in any way friendly to the Bulgars. He did, indeed, send a few telegrams to the Serbian government in which the cause of Bulgaria was espoused. But it must be borne in mind that the oldest trick of diplomacy consists of that. M. Hartwig, the Russian minister at Belgrade, had his own instructions, and M. Pashitch also knew how these appeals to reason were meant. To make a long story short, the peace treaty in question left Bulgaria not only without some territory she coveted unjustifiedly, but without much to which she really

was entitled on ethnological and military grounds. To the Serbs she lost Macedonia, to the Greeks, Seres, Drama and Cavalla, and to the Turks, Adrianople and much of Thrace, while the Rumanians amputated her of the fattest part of the Dobrudja.

These claims must be given a little more attention. That the Macedonians wanted to join Bulgaria is established beyond cavil. In their case it was with the Serbs merely a question of admitting whether or no the inhabitants of Uskub and Tetovo were Macedonians. That could have been established easily enough, and none could have done it better than the Russians. After all it is no insuperable task to establish the identity of the inhabitants of two districts. But the Russians, favoring the Serbs, did not want to know whether the people of Uskub and Tetovo were Macedonians or Serbo-Croats. It was their intention that Serbia should keep all of Macedonia, if at all possible, and Sazonoff saw to it, in spite of a rather active and well-directed opposition of the Austro-Hungarians, that Serbia received all she wanted. Mention must be made here of the fact that Germany was still playing the game of Russia and opposed her ally, Austria-Hungary.

Sazonoff also wished to be on good terms with the Greeks, and for that reason his delegates opposed the annexation by Bulgaria of Seres, Drama and Cavalla, being backed in this instance by the protests of nearly the entire convention, and again by the Germans, who felt that something had to be left to the brother-in-law of Emperor William. Nor was the Bulgarian claim any too strong inherently. The Greek population east of the Struma is fairly numerous, and to merely barter people from one government to another does not make for peace. What the exact proportion of Greek to genuine Bulgar in those parts is I am not prepared to say for the reason that I do not know.

That Russia should object to the annexation of all of Thrace, as far as the Tchataldja line for fortifications, to the very gates of Constantinople, figuratively, was very natural. Had the Bulgarians been cautious enough not to include the ports of Gallipoli, on the peninsula, Rodosto and Silivria, the entire Marmoran shore of Thrace, in fact, into their terms, prospects might have been better, even though a city like Adrianople, founded by Hadrian of Rome, and elevated to the dignity of capital by the Osmanli, was to be snatched away from the Turks. Upon what ethnological basis the Bulgars rested this demand I fail to see. After all not everything in Thrace was or is Bulgarian. Long before the annexationists of Sofia were thought of, Thracian, Hellene, Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine and Turk had labored there, built the city, plowed the fields and raised children, whose descendants can not have as completely disappeared as the Bulgarians would have us believe.

But the amputation of Dobrudja was a crime. The Rumanian government, when the Balkan war was not yet weeks old, gave the Bulgarian government to understand that for the purpose of bettering communication with a Rumanian port on the Black Sea, it wished to enter into negotiations of a boundary-rectification character. When in the Balkan they speak of such a thing, war is never far off. Bulgaria paid little attention to the request, but when the falling-out between the Serbs and Bulgars was there, Rumania promptly took what she wanted and a little more, of course—on the plea, made afterwards, that in the Dobrudja there were Vlaks who had fared poorly under the Bulgarian government. There were some 600,000 other Vlaks, the Kutzos, further down in the Balkans, where the frontiers of Serbia, Greece and Albania meet, who needed such solicitude much more. But for these Rumania did not speak. Serbia, on the other hand, made no mention of the Bulgars—the *Shopes*—that had been traded to her by the transfer of Pirot and Vrania, in 1878, in exchange for Novipasar, which the Peace treaty of San Stefano had promised Serbia.

Bucharest Treaty a Mare's Nest

It is not surprising that this shabby deal, for which Sazonoff was wholly responsible, did not increase in the Bulgarian his love of Russia. The Treaty of Bucharest made a bad dent in the old superstition of the Bulgarian peasant that a bullet fired at a Russian by a Bulgarian, or *vice versa*, would never find its mark. Bulgaria really had a democratic and fully representative government—liberal thought and institutions—that even went so far as to make the national legislature, the Sobranye, a single body, with no senate to interfere with the acts of the people's delegates. Virtually every able-bodied man in the country had been in the field against the Turks, and, now that the fruits of victory were being snatched away from Bulgaria, everywhere the question was asked why this should be so. M. I. E. Guechoff, who had been the first premier during the Balkan War, as the head of a coalition government composed chiefly of the Nationalist and Progressive parties, had to retire in favor of Dr. Daneff, who at the next election was succeeded by Dr. Radoslavoff, heading the Liberal, National Liberal and Young Liberal parties. General Savoff, the able Bulgarian officer, of whom so much was heard during the Balkan War, was relegated for having attacked the Serb army on the night of July 29th, 1913, without waiting for a formal declaration of war, and the Russophile element, generally, was driven out of office.

But of adherents to Russia there was no great dearth even then. Dr. Radoslavoff, to be sure, maintained his position, often by the weirdest of political moves, but he had a hard time keeping his coalition together.

It was composed, at the outbreak of the war between the Triple Entente and the Central Powers, of the parties above named, and of such mug-wumps, political freebooters, and patronage-takers as he could attract and manage. These came from every one of the other parties in Bulgaria, to wit: Nationalists, still under M. Guechoff; Progressives, under Theodor Theodoroff; Democrats, under Alexander Malinoff; Agrarians, under Stambulowski; Radicals and Socialists. Political opinions varied from the statement of Dr. Daneff, who was in the Guechoff cabinet during the Balkan War and later premier, that:

"With Russia we Bulgarians do not practice politics," meaning that the Bulgarians were one with the Russians, to the attitude of Ivan Momtschiloff, vice-president of the Sobranje, who from the very first was the most ardent of the Germanophiles.

To keep these extremes within the bounds prescribed by the neutrality proclaimed by the Bulgarian government when war broke out was no easy task. Dr. Radoslavoff had his hands full.

Such was the situation when in February of 1915, I called upon the Bulgarian premier. I had spent some time in Bucharest, and watched political intrigue there. The efforts that were being made with money from all parts of the world that flowed in streams, were only too strong an indication that soon or late the war between the Central Powers and the Triple Entente would spread into other parts.

I found Dr. Radoslavoff well in control, not only of the government but also the relations with Rumania, and above all, Serbia. He seemed to be a man whom nothing perturbed easily, as was shown when toward the end of the interview we came to discussing the matter of Macedonia. The premier said that since the control of Macedonia by Serbia some 300,000 Macedonians had come to Bulgaria. These people were welcome, of course, he added, but the trouble was that they were a great charge upon a population numbering only about five millions and none too well off in the first place.

Dr. Radoslavoff proceeded to give me the details of this problem. It appears that the Serbian officials did everything possible to encourage emigration from Macedonia, and their program included such things as torture and murder, arson and rape, said the premier. The closing of schools and churches, the banishment of teachers and priests, and discrimination of an economic and political character were quite the least incidents in the plan of persecution which the Serb government was carrying out. Great stress was laid by the premier upon the fact that the Bulgars and Macedonians were "brothers" in everything two peoples can have in common, and that on this account the burden of Macedonian immigration would be borne, so long as possible. It could not be borne

for always, however. On that point, Dr. Radoslavoff was so final that I began to take notice.

I asked him what steps the Bulgarian government had taken in regard to the matter. Dr. Radoslavoff replied that he had instructed his diplomatic representatives abroad to bring the conduct of the Serbian government in Macedonia to the attention of the Powers. But he feared, and rightly so, that for the time being the Powers were too busy making war to do much, if anything.

How Bulgarian Officers Viewed It

The same evening I attended a ball at the Officers' Casino, given in honor of King Ferdinand and his family. Their Majesties failing to appear, and with the ball room terribly crowded, I repaired with Dr. Acene C. Kermecktchieff, the United States consular agent at Sofia, to the dining room in the basement of the clubhouse. Dr. Kermecktchieff, I wish to state was then the sole and single United States resident diplomatic and consular officer in all of Bulgaria, despite the fact that the Bulgarian government had some time before sent to Washington, in the person of Stephen Panaretoff, an "envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary," whose United States equal, Mr. Charles J. Vopicka, at Bucharest, attended to American diplomatic representation in Rumania, Serbia and Bulgaria.

Dr. Kermecktchieff was a Bulgarian citizen, of course, and lived largely by his pen, not the most profitable way of making a living in the Balkans. As a writer and speaker he had to be politically affiliated, which he did by joining the Radoslavoff group of parties and leaders. The result was that later he was dismissed from the United States consular service on the charge of pro-Germanism. The case is illuminating, since it happened in the summer of 1915, and to the citizen of another country, whose sole compensation for his service as consular agent had in that year been a matter of two dollars, as I recall it.

The American consular agent introduced me to a number of officer friends of his, and before long the party was discussing the European situation, from which I gathered that all those present were thoroughly anti-Russian and Serbophobe. They wished to see Russia beaten to her knees, and hoped that before the War was over they would have another chance at the Serbs. There was no bravado about the remarks that were made. When I inquired where I might find traces of the great Russo-philism I had heard so much of in Bucharest, one of the officers, a grizzled veteran of a colonel, replied facetiously that in the house across the street, referring to the residence of M. Guechoff, I could be accommodated.

"Sir," he continued. "We are bound to get into this war. There is on

the Balkan not enough room for Bulgar and Serb. One of us has to go under. So far as I am concerned it will be the Serb."

There was something decidedly savage in these words.

Until early in the morning I was entertained by what the Bulgarian army thought of the Treaty of Bucharest, and every other word, almost, was a vow that there would be a reckoning, and no pleasant one.

On the following day I was in one of the large rooms of the club for the purpose of seeing a life-size portrait of Alexander II, which he had donated to the club many years ago. I noticed that the officers who had entertained me at luncheon spoke of the Czar Liberator with the greatest respect and devotion. Suddenly one of them faced about to look at a picture of Czar Nicholas II, on the opposite wall.

"We will turn that thing upside down one of these days," he said tersely. "He is the man who deserted us and gave our victory over the Turks to the Serbs and the Rumanians."

A few days later I met Mr. Guechoff. My discussion with him left no room for doubt that he was ardently in favor of the Russians. He hoped that the remnants of the Narew Army would be assembled in proper time, and General Rennenkampf dismissed, in order that Russia might make good her losses in the Masurian Lakes. A tea at the house of the court physician of Ferdinand resulted in the information that Bulgaria would not remain neutral for long, if nothing was done by the Serbian government to check the conduct of its officials in Macedonia. All in all I left for Constantinople with the impression that Bulgaria, if at all entering the European War, would do it on the side of the Central Powers. I also surmised that Count Tarnow von Tarnowski, the Austro-Hungarian minister at Sofia, and Herr Michaelis, the German minister, would not have so hard a time of it when the crucial moment came.

When next I was in Sofia it was plain that Bulgaria, like Turkey, would enter the War on the side of the Central Powers, for the purpose of mending her fences against her neighbors. The agreement with the Ottoman government, concerning the border rectification along the Maritza river and north of Adrianople had been reached and the public was about to hear of it, as a notice, in the opinion of those who did not know any better, to the Entente governments that Turk and Bulgar were about to correct the miscarriage of the Treaty of Bucharest.

By that time I had become familiar enough with affairs on the Balkan to know that nothing could keep Bulgaria out of the camp of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. In the first place no government will cede territory to another, when there is still room for the fear that the other may go to war against one's ally, Austria-Hungary, in this case; in the second instance, the Bulgarian demands upon Serbia were such

that her government, with the best intentions in the world, could not accept them. What Bulgaria demanded was virtually a surrender of what the Serbian government had garnered at the end of the Balkan War. Though Serbia was about to be hard pressed by the Austro-Hungarians and Germans, her government could not meet the wishes of Sofia.

Of course, the Russophiles in the country had not been idle, it was claimed. A bomb was thrown in the Citizens' Casino of Sofia, in the park across from the royal residence. It was a most dastardly business, since the persons killed were innocent merrymakers at a ball. None of them was of political importance or influence, nor was there anybody near for whom the bomb might have been intended. Rumors about town had it that the Russophiles had thrown the bomb as a signal for an uprising against the Radoslavoff government, and the Germanophiles were charged with a conspiracy to bring about a state that would lead to the imposing of martial law upon the city, so that the government of Radoslavoff could not be embarrassed, and possibly removed, by losing a vote of confidence in the Sobranje. These stories had a certain amount of color, though no substance, to them, as I could ascertain. At any rate the crime was never sifted to the bottom.

Entente Diplomacy at Sofia Bestirs Itself

As yet the courting of Bulgaria was still going on in secret, nor was the wooing very ardent. Messrs. Guechoff and Daneff were making assurances to the Entente representatives that went far beyond their power, with Mr. Daneff doing a good business buying and exporting wheat for the French government, for which he afterwards was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for alleged irregularities. Count Tarnowski was rather busy promoting the cause of his country and her ally, and later his Foreign Office in Vienna made a great deal of his efforts, all of which was buncombe, because the man who could sway or influence Dr. Radoslavoff was not then in Sofia nor in any manner connected with the affairs of the Central Powers. The Bulgarian premier, as I established to at least my own satisfaction, was a man with a mind all his own. But ministries of foreign affairs must now and then point to one of their diplomatists with pride in order to let the populace know that the government is efficient in diplomacy.

The fact is that the case of Bulgaria was all fixed, pre-determined by the laws of national biology—the trend of events. Dr. Radoslavoff was bidding his time. That was all.

Among Englishmen who realized this were the Buxton Brothers, who probably were better informed on Balkan affairs, if I am to judge by

their publications, than any other person of influence in the British government. There used to be an element in journalism that found much pleasure in looking upon itself as Balkan "experts." The class to which I refer had a great deal to say just then. What they said was not worth the ink used in bringing it to the attention of a gullible and trusting public.

M. Guechoff, however, was taking a very intelligent interest in the general aspect of things, differing from some other statesmen in so far that he was withal not incautious. When I arrived in Sofia, he sent me an invitation to have tea with him.

I expected to find a tea *aux dames*, naturally. Instead there was another man, the Bulgarian general who had been in charge of the engineering phase of the siege of Adrianople. My host was perfectly frank about the invitation and the company. He said that he did not know very much of military affairs, but was keenly interested in the state of affairs on Gallipoli peninsula. Would I be kind enough to give the general the benefit of my information?

I had been given a *laissez-passer* by Mr. Koulocheff, the Bulgarian minister at Constantinople, who in that manner had learned that I intended going to Sofia. I suspect that he had tipped off his friend, M. Guechoff. A remark made by the former premier presently confirmed my suspicion.

The general and Mr. Guechoff were delightfully frank in their questions and their own remarks. But they would not believe what they heard. They were polite about it, of course, but on the whole exasperatingly skeptical, if that be the term. I had spent weeks and weeks with the Ottoman troops on Gallipoli, and was objective in the manner which some military training and responsibility are apt to instil into a man. Was I not mistaken about the chances of the Turks holding out on the peninsula? How was it possible that the Turkish army which had done so poorly during the Balkan War could of a sudden, almost overnight, show such grit and ability?

When a former premier speaks in that fashion of an army against whom he ordered a mobilization, it must be taken for granted that the man is sincere. I made some such remark, and then capped the climax by telling M. Guechoff and the other guest that before the coming winter was over there would be no more Allied troops at the gates of Constantinople. For a while that stunned the old soldier. When he had recovered, he renewed his cross-examination of me. The result was that we parted the best of friends late that afternoon, with the General and Mr. Guechoff absolutely where they had been before, which was their privilege, of course.

Meanwhile, I had become acquainted at the Russian legation, where much talk was being let off the stocks in regard to the rank ingratitude of the Bulgarian government. The liberation of Bulgaria by Czar Alexander

Osvoboditel was much exploited, but nothing was said concerning the attitude toward the foundling on the Balkan of Alexander III and Nicholas II. Now and then I would get in a word regarding more recent events, to get the stout assurance that Russia had never favored the Serbs at the expense of the Bulgars. At the other Entente legations they held similar views—all of them empty protests in the light of what actually occurred.

Mr. O'Beirne, British *chargé d'affaires*, and formerly *conseiller* of the British embassy at Petrograd, seemed to be the only diplomatist of his camp who was inclined to take a rational estimate of the situation. He was not hopeful from the very start of the negotiations and did his packing early. There were men in London who were of a different mind. Sir Henry G. O. Bax-Ironside, the British minister, had been asked home by them, to make room for a man who was supposed to be of greater ability and well versed with conditions in Petrograd, Mr. O'Beirne. He answered to both specifications. Being an able man he did not fool himself, as he once expressed it to me, without referring to himself, of course. His French colleague, however, was a man who seemed to think that if one talks long enough on a subject it will in the end turn out in accord with one's wishes. He mistook his "desires" for reality. Mons. M. A. de Panafieu also subscribed to the fine habit of telling his doorman that he was not in, within hearing of the caller, when there was some nasty turn in diplomacy to be explained. The Italian minister, on the other hand, lived in fear and trembling of the moment when he should get his passports. Ultimately, he was the first who was all packed up.

Dr. Radoslavoff's Diplomatic Notions

Soon the diplomatic whirligig was in full swing. The governments in London, Petrograd and Paris wanted to know where Bulgaria stood. Dr. Radoslavoff announced that he did not know that himself in view of the spoliation carried through by means of the Treaty of Bucharest. That was a disconcerting answer, for which the Entente governments were not wholly prepared. They had in this instance taken contact with a man who knew exactly what he wanted and what he had to do.

The attitude of the Bulgarian premier was in all respects the counterpart of President Paul Kruger, when he measured words with Lord Milner at Bloemfontein, in 1899, and told the representative of Great Britain that all diplomatists were what King David had said of all men. Dr. Radoslavoff was the most refreshing opposite of the schemer I have ever met, and since I met him often I attach some importance to that opinion. He was always straightforward. When he did not want to answer a

question, he said as much, and circumlocution with an ulterior motive tried his patience sorely, as I discovered several times for my own benefit.

The next move on the part of the Entente governments was to ask what Dr. Radoslavoff would take for agreeing not to molest Serbia while she was being pressed by the Austro-Hungarians and Germans, who were already on the verge to swoop down upon her, under the leadership of Field Marshal Mackensen.

The reply was Radoslavovianly frank. The Bulgarian government wanted all that which the Treaty of Bucharest had deprived her off.

Of course, that was a large contract to fill. It meant also taking from the Rumanians the Dobrudja. The Rumanians were being belabored night and day to join the Entente; how could they be asked to disgorge what Sazonoff and the remainder of Europe's concert had given them in order that Bulgaria might be humbled into the dust? That part of the demands the Entente governments would have to think over, said their diplomatists in Sofia. Would Bulgaria look upon Thrace as far as the Enos-Media line as a sort of compensation until the Dobrudja matter could be looked into with more leisure?

Dr. Radoslavoff knew that the same line was already the future Russian boundary in Thrace, and said that according with the agreement just made with the Turks, in regard to the rectification of the border, Bulgaria had no further intentions in that direction, being fully satisfied with having added to the kingdom the railroad line Swilengrad-Dimitika, all territory on the left bank of the Maritza, and the northern hill country of Thrace.

Bulgaria wanted to have the case of Seres, Drama and Cavalla re-opened. That, too, was difficult since Venizelos was working hard for the Entente. The re-opening of that sore point would have surely driven Venizelos into hiding and Greece into the arms of the Central Powers.

It came to be Serbia's turn. Dr. Radoslavoff said that the Bulgarian people, and they were as one man behind him in this matter, wanted Macedonia, and without strings attached to its transfer.

The Entente governments let it be known through their agents in Sofia that they could not think of presenting such a humiliating proposition to their ally, Serbia. Would it not be well to make at least some of the claims on Macedonia a little conditional; for instance, would the Bulgarian people not be satisfied with getting the southern parts of the district—*zone incontestée*—now, and the northern, Uskub and Tetovo, later on. Of course, the transfer could not be an absolutely final one. While Southern Macedonia would be ceded immediately, and might be taken in hand by a civil administration of the Bulgarians and Macedonians, it would be necessary to keep the district under military control by the

Allied governments, to please the Serbians and the Italians. As to Uskub and Tetovo—these two districts would be given to Bulgaria with the making of peace.

With this counter proposal Dr. Radoslavoff and his cabinet, such men as Major General Jekoff, minister of war; Pesheff, minister of public instruction; Tontcheff, minister of finance; Ghenadieff, minister of public works, and others were not satisfied.

Negotiations reached the argumentative stage. The Bulgarian government pointed out that while it was actuated entirely in its demands by an insistence upon what was a right of the Bulgarian and Macedonian peoples, it would also have to look into the future. Serbia had been promised so much by the Entente governments that Bulgaria, no matter how considerate of her neighbor in the West, could not overlook that the incorporation with Serbia of about 17,000,000 Slavs in Bosnia, Herzegovina, much of Dalmatia, Slovenia, the Banat of Hungary, and Carinthia would badly upset the balance of power on the Balkan—as it really would have done, especially since the propaganda of the Serbs in favor of Jugoslavia had totally excluded the Bulgarians as being Slavs at all. Of a sudden the Bulgarians, who in the past had been the very children of Russia, were being labelled all over as Tartars, and half-Turks, arch-Turanians and what not. To men of the Radoslavoff type, who know what that means, this was the signal that before long somebody would remember that the Huns had actually at one time inhabited Bulgaria. Some savant would make some cephalic measurements and prove it, moreover.

Question of Guarantee Leads to a Deadlock

An endless wrangling resulted. The intermediate solutions of the problem that were proposed need not occupy us here. All negotiating came in the end to this: The Entente governments would guarantee that in case of a successful ending of the European War, Bulgaria would get what she wanted of Serbia. To enter at all upon the Dobrudja question was not feasible just then, though some steps would be taken as time permitted. The matter of Seres, Drama and Cavalla was to be taken in hand later also. Everything depended, however, on whether or no Austria-Hungary could be separated in the end from the Banat, Slovenia, Carinthia, Herzegovina, Bosnia and Dalmatia.

The Bulgarian government wanted to be specifically informed what under these circumstances the values of the guarantees offered would be. That was a difficult question to answer. The Serbian government was not inclined to give up Macedonia without getting hold of the Austro-

Hungarian provinces and crownlands first, and said as much with a candor that was the only refreshing aspect of the entire proceeding, so far as the Entente was concerned.

Thus a deadlock had been reached. Meanwhile Mackensen was getting ready, and a military convention had been entered into between Bulgaria and the Central Powers. Colonel Ewald von Massow, the German military plenipotentiary at Sofia, had already taken possession, for office purposes, of a large building that was to be a hotel for the *Compagnie internationale des wagon-lits*, and the coming event generally was casting large and dark shadows ahead.

Mr. Guechoff, of the Nationalists, was moving heaven and earth to keep Bulgaria out of the war, in which effort he was not entirely unsuccessful, since his party included what capitalists there are in Bulgaria; Malinoff, leader of the Democrats, was doing his best also, and the Progressives were not lagging. The Agrarians, especially, were violently opposed to another war, as were the Radicals and Socialists, who in the Sofia cafés kept things in pandemonium.

A delegation of Agrarians, Radicals and Socialists decided to bring the matter to the attention of Czar Ferdinand one morning, about ten o'clock, just before the bubble of diplomacy burst. I had just visited M. Dobrovitch, the private secretary of the king, and met the delegation in the large foyer of the palace. There was grim determination on their faces, and the intention to be heard from. Since I knew what the purpose of the call was, I naturally made it my business to be on hand when the delegation left the palace. The faces of the men were grimmer yet, that of Stambulowski, spokesman, was not a pleasant thing to behold. He was furious and the muscles of his jaws were working in a way that showed that he had not fared so well with His Majesty.

The interview was a very unconventional affair. King Ferdinand told his callers that the government was in the hands of Dr. Radoslavoff, and that all he had been asked to do was sign the decrees of the cabinet, which was true enough, seeing that Ferdinand was mindful of the fact that he had taken the throne of a man whose stay in Bulgaria had been made impossible because he was thought too great a partizan of Russia. All nonsense to the contrary notwithstanding, Czar Ferdinand had very little to do with the decisions of the Radoslavoff government.

Stambulowski would not believe that.

"Thou, king!" he shouted as loudly as he could, and with his face red with rage, "take care that thou dost not lose thy head in this war."

For a moment King Ferdinand was at a loss what to say. Then he looked at his son, Prince Boris, and calmly replied:

"I will take care of my head, do you take care of your hide."

That ended the audience. The same night the Bulgarian cabinet prepared the call to the people for the mobilization.

The Entente governments were now reduced to playing their last card. Bulgaria was about to enter into a state of armed neutrality, and since that neutrality could be directed only against Serbia, no time could be lost in coming to a decision with Bulgaria.

On October 3, the Russian government transmitted to the Bulgarian government the following note:

"The events which are taking place in Bulgaria at this moment give evidence of a definite decision of King Ferdinand's Government to place the fate of its country in the hands of Germany.

"The presence of German and Austrian officers in the Ministry of War and on the staff of the army, the concentration of troops in the zone bordering Serbia, and the extensive financial support accepted from our enemies by the Sofia Cabinet, no longer leave any doubt as to the object of the military preparations of Bulgaria.

"The Powers of the Entente, who have at heart the realization of the aspirations of the Bulgarian people, have, on many occasions, warned M. Radoslavoff that any hostile act against Serbia would be considered as directed against themselves. The assurances given by the head of the Bulgarian cabinet in reply to these warnings are contradicted by the facts.

"The representative of Russia, which is bound to Bulgaria by the imperishable memory of her liberation from the Turkish yoke, cannot sanction by his presence preparations for fratricidal aggression against a Slav and allied people.

"The Russian minister, therefore, has received orders to leave Bulgaria with all the staffs of the Legation and Consulates if the Bulgarian Government does not within twenty-four hours break with the enemies of the Slav cause and of Russia, and does not at once proceed to send away officers belonging to the armies of States which are at war with the Powers of the Entente."

It was the tone of outraged paternalism of the note which offended the Bulgarian people most—many of those even who had up to now been staunch Russophiles. Nor were the facts in the case at all agreeable with this handiwork of Sazonoff's. That the Powers of the Entente had had "at heart the realization of the aspirations of the Bulgarian people" was hardly true. The Treaty of Bucharest, just two years old, was a monument to that fact. With almost every able-bodied Bulgarian a soldier during the Balkan War, and the inter-ally fighting between themselves and the Serbs and Greeks, with the invasion of Bulgaria by Rumanian soldiers still a memory of yesterday, and with Bulgaria deprived of the fruits of her victory, as the Bulgars saw it, and with territory taken from them

in the Dobrudja by main force, this Sazonoff note could not have the desired result.

But for some reason Dr. Radoslavoff began to spar for a little more time. Negotiations were dragged past this *contretemps*. Mackensen was not yet ready and the harvesting of crops was not complete.

One evening, as I was about to go to dinner, I met in the lobby of the Grand Hotel Bulgarie, where I was stopping, two German aviation officers, whose appearance suggested that they had just stepped out of the aeroplane. I noticed that the two men were being taken upstairs in a manner that reminded me of being hustled out of the way. Out in the street stood an automobile of the Bulgarian army, and just as I stepped out of doors the machine sped off. I noticed, however, that an orderly was folding up two Bulgarian army coats, which, as I surmised, had been worn by the German officers to ward off detection. The two men did not appear in the dining room, and later I learned that they had dined in their quarters. Next morning they were taken to the Sofia aviation field in the same machine, but without wearing the great coats. On the aviation field they leisurely got into their flyer and made off.

That afternoon I learned that the two aviators had come to Sofia from the Headquarters of Field Marshal Mackensen at Temesvar in Hungary. Two days later the German-Austro-Hungarian offensive against the Serbs was on, and on October 13th occurred, as is alleged by the Bulgarian general staff, the border incident which caused the Bulgarian government to declare that a state of war existed between Bulgaria and Serbia. I for one do not believe that the Serbs were the provocators. There are some cases in which cause and effect show a relationship that is more convincing than the asseverations of any government, big or little. What is more likely is that the Bulgars acted in the role of aggressor. What is just as likely is that the incident in question did not occur at all.

The statement given me by the Bulgarian foreign office was a little too "fishy" as the saying goes, to merit attention and for that reason I did not go to the trouble of dispatching it to my news service—which was something some people in Sofia could not forget, and which, I fear, had something to do with my attempted expulsion from the country by M. Georgieff, head of the Bulgarian political police, later on.

That a newspaper correspondent may see the right and wrong of a thing without being committed thereby to becoming partizan is something which few government officials ever concede. It was so in Sofia, of course.

This is the manner in which diplomacy failed to accomplish anything whatsoever in Sofia, the assertions of others notwithstanding. It was very foolish of the Vienna Foreign Office to advertise that Count Tarnowski

had brought about Bulgaria's entry into the European War. Such is not the case. Herr Michaelis, the German minister, moreover, would have been the last person to influence Dr. Radoslavoff. That he had something to do with the understanding that was reached in regard to the military convention is a fact, of course. But aside from that he was a good diplomatist—a diplomatist of the very best type in fact. He was that in so far that he was not a diplomatist at all. Politics and war were not his forte. He cared for neither, and was afraid of both—was, in other words, a diplomatist of the innocuous kind. He was this to such an extent that before long he was recalled in favor of Count Alfred Oberndorff, who was almost as good as Herr Michaelis.

X

SOME CASES OF DIPLOMANIA

INTO the period marked by the events described in the preceding chapter fall a number of cases of "diplomania" that require special attention, though not all of them were of prime importance. The world, literally, had become war mad. When governments were not foaming at the mouth, they usually had their hands full apologizing for the more recent *faux pas* that had been made, diplomatically or militarily. The press also suffered from a convulsion of passion. In Great Britain Lord Northcliffe was attending to the government with a will and considerable effect. The journalistic politicians of France were running, or thought they did, much of the War, and the press of Central Europe just then was jubilant that finally the direct route between Berlin and Bagdad was open. It would now be possible to rush to the Dardanelles and Gallipoli all the *materielle* that was needed—additional troops, if necessary.

Driving the Serbs from the Danube had first opened the water route to Constantinople, and shortly thereafter the rail line was also free. To the Central Powers that meant a great deal, naturally. "Mittel-Europa" was now more than a mere phrase. It was now possible to ship into Turkey what its people needed the most, and the rationed populations of Germany and Austria-Hungary hoped to get much food from Bulgaria and the Ottoman empire, realizing little, thanks to the strict censorship, that there were bread lines in the Turkish capital long before they were seen in Berlin and Vienna.

But there was a great deal of other traffic that began to move freely now. From Germany moved southward thousands of tons of ammunition, guns and army equipment of all sorts; chemicals and *materia medica*, stationery and paper, glassware and porcelain, machinery and implements and utensils. Northward went some cotton, wool, hides and leather.

Forcing the Serb from the banks of the Danube broke also the connecting link between Russia and Serbia. There had been an active traffic on the river between those two countries. The Russian base at Reni supplied the Serbs with ammunition and clothing, despite the many protests that were made to the Rumanian government by the diplomatists of the Central Empires. The Austro-Hungarian river monitors would have liked

to put an end to this. But that was impossible. The Danube was well mined in the narrows of the Pass of Kazan and the Iron Gate, and elsewhere Serbian artillery, for a while under the command of English officers, made navigation of the river most hazardous. The Russian ships did not come up far enough to be taken under fire by the Austro-Hungarian artillery stationed near the entrance to the Iron Gates, but usually stopped at Praovo to discharge their cargoes. With the forcing back of the Serbian army all this ceased.

That the Serbs would not be able to hold out against the new combination of German, Bulgar and Austro-Hungarian was realized long before this. The Austro-Hungarian army, under General Potiorek, to which I was attached for a while, had in November and December, 1914, made a very poor job of subduing the Serbs. The pressure of the Russians in Galicia and the Bukovina made Potiorek's force too small for the lightning program that was to be carried through. In addition to that the weather conditions were the worst for an army that proposed to advance as fast as infantry can march. In the Machwa district of Serbia, through which the main coup was being delivered, the country roads were quagmires, which would freeze over during the night and thaw again at sunrise. General Potiorek, in addition, was the poorest sort of a leader, and in the end he was routed ignominiously and Belgrade retaken by the Serbs.

These events had given the Serbian army a fancied value it did not have. The Serbian government, moreover, seems to have done little to dispel the illusions held in Petrograd, London and Paris. If at any time it made its representations strong enough they must have been ignored. At any rate the Serb army was not given the support it needed and so well deserved. If any of the armies engaged in the World War deserve an unusual amount of credit, the Serbian army, more than any other, is entitled to it. It fought under most adverse conditions, with a courage and determination that must excite, or should, the admiration of any man. I am speaking in this matter as an eye-witness to many of its heroic deeds.

The debacle of the plans of the Entente governments, so far as the Balkan was concerned, caused Petrograd, London and Paris to fly into rage, the reasons for which should be easily understood. At that very moment the fortune of war of the Triple Entente and Italy was at its lowest ebb, and to have Bulgaria enter the fracas on the side of the Central Powers and Turkey was a bad blow to Franco-Russo-British prestige and politics. Once more, as a first result in the political field, Premier Bratianu of Rumania decided to keep his hands and his country out of the fire, of which more further on.

That the Entente governments kept up their negotiations with Bulgaria after news of the border settlement along the Maritza had come,

is something which I have never been able to understand. To me, at least, and I would be the last to claim great political sagacity, it was *fait accompli* that Bulgaria would go with the Central Powers. I could see no other culmination of the case, which may have been due to the fact that I had access to the fountainhead of information in Bulgaria, the small house in Rackovski street, where Dr. Radoslavoff held forth. There was only one man in the Entente camp of diplomatists in Sofia to whom that also was clear. Mr. O'Beirne, the British *chargé d'affaires*, never took a hopeful view of the situation. He realized that the demands of the Bulgarian government could be met only at the expense of Serbia, an actual ally, and at those of Rumania, a prospective one. If it had depended upon him, the Dobrudja would have been returned to Bulgaria, and the districts of Seres, Drama and Cavalla would have been lost by Greece. Being on the spot he knew, much better than he could make the men in London see by means of dispatches, that the Bulgarians had made up their mind to wipe out the injustice of the Bucharest Treaty. But nothing less than that could have changed the aspect of the case on the Balkan.

Sofia Entente Diplomatists Depart

One rainy fall evening a train without lights pulled into a suburban station of the Bulgarian capital. On the platform stood as disconsolate a group of diplomatists and their secretaries, and consuls, as could be met. Others were arriving. Much baggage was still being dumped from wagons and into the baggage cars.

Mr. Kozeff, first secretary of the Sofia foreign office, was going about giving orders, when not greeting one of the departing ones. I was making observations.

Mr. O'Beirne, the British representative, was moving about in a most dignified manner. The French minister, M. de Panafieu, was very sulky and cross, taking his defeat and retreat with as little grace as he could. Signor Cucchi-Boasso, the Italian minister, was downcast. The Russian minister, M. Savinski, was home sick a-bed—really sick, as I had ascertained within the flexible limits of the diplomatically possible.

The cars being not lighted yet, the departing ministers had to wait on the platform. About the time set for the leaving of the special for Dedeagatch, where a British cruiser was waiting for the party, several other diplomatists in Sofia showed up. M. Derussi, the Rumanian minister, reeked perfume as usual. He bid his colleagues *de profession* perfunctory *au revoir*, and then sped off toward his rose-scented boudoir, the raw atmosphere being anything but agreeable to a man who had to live in surroundings made up entirely of the finest Turkish rugs and trimmings,

shaded lights and *violet de Parme*. Over snow-crowned Mount Vidosh swept an icy wind, laden with rain, and all about the station were visible the debris of the good international relations of diplomacy. Here was a case in which diplomania had wrecked itself in deadly impact with the necessities of a people. That much I learned from the face of M. Derussi, who with all his idiosyncrasies was not the worst of the lot.

The Greek minister also came to say farewell, as did Mr. Einstein, the man with whom I have acquainted the reader already.

Everything in order now, the dismissed ministers got into the cars. The threat of the Russian minister of foreign affairs, that he and his allies would recall their representatives, had come to nothing. I accompanied Mr. O'Beirne to his compartment and then suggested the making of a little statement.

The British *chargé d'affaires* smiled. There was really nothing to say, he replied. I was not so sure of that and pressed the point.

For some moments we discussed the propriety of the thing and then Mr. O'Beirne authorized me to say for him that his stay in Bulgaria had been very pleasant; he regretted the turn of events, but hoped that the *traditionally* friendly relations between Great Britain and Bulgaria would be re-established very soon.

It was my intention to get the views of the French minister. But this intention did not prosper. When I came to his compartment he was gesticulating wildly at one of his secretaries and shouting at the top of his voice. To my knock at his door he answered with a glowering grimace. Through the glass, forming the upper panel of the next door, I saw the Italian minister—woe-begone and with tears in his eyes. I sped some of the secretaries with farewells and then rushed off the train, which was already in motion.

No handkerchiefs were being waved. The group left behind was as serious and dejected as the one that was speeding off toward the Aegean, and which, in going there, would pass through the territory that was the first *quid pro quo* for Bulgaria's entry into the War.

Messrs. Guechoff, Daneff and Malinoff, and others, had done their best to the very last minute. They put a period to their efforts only, when one fine morning the populace gathered about the war proclamations on the street corners. With them came "preventive" censorship and the application of those specious laws intended to make things easy for governments at war.

The Russophiles had hoped that the miracle would happen, as others have done since then. It was said that they were ready to start a popular uprising against Czar Ferdinand and Dr. Radoslavoff. Stambulowski, indeed, had already threatened the ruler, and there is no telling what

the Agrarians and Radicals would have done. It was not that they liked Czar Nicholas and his autocratic government more than their own institutions, but they had absorbed so much Tolstoism that their bonds with Russia were the strongest, nevertheless. But the people of Bulgaria, the soldiers who had fought in the Balkan War, were with the government. They were literally a unit in their desire to get at the Serbs. Nothing was so popular as a song in which the Serbians were referred to as bandits, the singing of which was the special delight of the cadets of the Sofia military academy. As the army saw it: There was room on the peninsula only for one dominating state, and, as is natural for a people, that state was to be Bulgaria.

The Foreign Office had a different formula for that—a diplomatic one, of course. The predominancy in the Balkans of Bulgaria would once and for always put an end to the troubles and problems which in the past had threatened the peace of Europe—had been a menace to the world in fact. I suppose, they said the same in Belgrade, though there, as a journalist agent of mine reported, desires went much further.

The chauvinists in that capital hoped to make Serbia not only the dominating state on the peninsula, but they wished to make an empire even greater than that of Emperor Stephan Dushan, who ruled over all of Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, Epirus and Thessaly, and whose Woivodshes, after his death in 1355, prepared the Serb empire for conquest by the Turks, in 1389, by engaging in internecine strife and the state's division. The new Serb empire was to be greater than that. It was to include Bulgaria and at least northern Greece, Thrace as far as the Enos-Media line, and with the aid of Sazonoff all that could be wrung from the Austrians and Hungarians, and from the Rumanians. To all this the Serb chauvinists were laying claim in a matter highly agreeable to the maps and literature of Professor St. Stanoievitch. Since there was sitting at the door an army of Germans and Austro-Hungarians, under the leadership of Mackensen, a man who had distinguished himself in the rout of the Russian armies that very summer, that was the poorest sort of conduct, so far as the Bulgarians were interested, who themselves had not forgotten the glory of Bulgaria under Czar Simeon, who ruled the Balkans from the Adria to the Pontus Euxinos, the Serbs included, and to whom even Byzantium was tributary (893-927).

These were the factors that made the hatred between Serbia and Bulgaria the thing it was. How far the two peoples despised one another can best be illustrated by a little occurrence incident to the outbreak of hostilities. Mr. Kozeff, of the Sofia foreign office, had in person delivered to the British, French, Italian and Russian ministers their passports. To the Serbian minister in Sofia this courtesy was not shown, despite the

fact that the personal conduct of M. Tcholak-Antitch had been most satisfactory. When the moment for the delivery of the papers came a messenger of the foreign office was given a sealed envelope, addressed to the Serbian minister in the usual manner. The messenger also was told that the customary receipt was required.

The man mounted his bicycle and made off. M. Tcholak-Antitch must have surmised what was coming, and the envelope was opened before the receipt was given by signature in a book carried by the messenger for that purpose. At any rate the Serbian minister hesitated for a few moments and then signed. On the following day he was escorted across the border at Zaribrod by a military guard. Those were things which might have been omitted without Bulgaria losing anything thereby to the advantage of the "arch-enemy."

A Clash Between "Minister" and Consul General

After a short trip to the new front, Pirot-Nish, I returned to Sofia to occupy myself again with international political subjects, of which just then the activity of Mr. Lewis Einstein, and his difficulties with Mr. Dominic I. Murphy, the United States consul general at Sofia, were of absorbing interest.

I have already referred to the fact that during the summer of that year, Dr. Kermecktchieff, the consular agent of the United States in Sofia, had been dismissed by the State Department in Washington for activities that were considered pro-German. A little later it was deemed necessary to send to Sofia a consul general in the person of Mr. Murphy, who had been stationed at Amsterdam, London, and before that at Bordeaux. I was in Sofia when Mr. Murphy arrived—to make the acquaintance there, a few days later, of Mr. Einstein. Since the appointment of a consular general to Sofia in those days was not an epoch-making event, I paid little attention to the matter, apart from dispatching a line or two upon his arrival. The political situation in the Balkans was keeping me well occupied, and thus it came that I accepted the presence in Sofia of Messrs. Murphy and Einstein as a mere routine matter. After I had forwarded the news that finally, also, the United States government had seen fit to send to Bulgaria a minister plenipotentiary, I considered my duty done, though the "Echo de Bulgarie," semi-official daily in French of the Bulgarian government, celebrated the event in a column or so. I had no reason then to believe that diplomania could be carried as far as it was by the new United States "minister."

Mr. Einstein carried in those days a card upon which it said in neatly engraved French, that he was minister plenipotentiary. He was indeed a

minister of that sort, but a *had been*. The inscription on the card fooled not only me, but scores of others. When my dispatch was days old and either in the press or in the wastepaper basket of some British or French censor, en route, I discovered that Mr. Einstein was not the minister plenipotentiary to Bulgaria, but that Mr. Charles J. Vopicka in Bucharest still filled his triplex appointment.

Mr. Einstein, and this time he came again from London and Paris, had been detailed by the Department of State to act as "diplomatic agent" in Sofia. That was a different thing, of course. But it went still far enough to permit the establishing in the Grand Hotel Bulgarie of a regular legation with every diplomatic privilege, including that of sanctuary for other diplomatists that might get into trouble.

Since the public had greater matters to consider than the rectification of a mistake I had made in "appointing" Mr. Einstein *minister* to Bulgaria, instead of stating that he was diplomatic agent, as I would have done had Mr. Einstein disillusioned me, I let the matter rest and turned to more important things.

So far as I knew the status of Mr. Einstein was now as clear as that of Mr. Murphy, the consul general. Yet that was not the case. An American citizen of Macedonian origin had trouble with the Bulgarian government. It seems that the military authorities, needing every man able to carry a gun, had detained the Macedonian-American and forced him into the army. That was a matter calling for my attention.

Mr. Murphy was a man of very few words. Though he and his wife had a room next to mine in the same Grand Hotel Bulgarie, we were barely acquainted. Mr. Einstein had his "legation" on the floor below, and I had noticed that diplomatic agent and consul general came to pass one another without exchanging the conventional greetings. That struck me as odd, and verified a hint which Mr. Stancieff, of the Sofia Foreign Office, and in charge of the consular bureau, had given me inadvertently one day while I was interviewing him in the case of the Macedonian. Mr. Stancieff had said that it was rather hard to deal with Messrs. Einstein and Murphy for the reason that both of them seemed to have the same amount of authority, which meant, in this instance, that there was a clash of authority.

In the course of the next few days I learned that Mr. Murphy had given the Sofia Foreign Office to understand that his consul-generalship was linked with diplomatic duties, as in the absence of an accredited resident diplomatist in Sofia itself that might have been the case anyway. The arrival of Mr. Einstein in Sofia would have automatically confined the consul general to his especial duties, had it not been that the State Department had intrusted Mr. Murphy with certain seals and instructions which he could not surrender except upon specific orders.

For these orders Mr. Murphy waited and waited. But they came not.

The seals in question, I must state, were those that are used for the authentication of passports when issued or viséed.

In issuing an exequator to Consul General Murphy, the Bulgarian government had recognized the validity of the seals the United States official was using, and there was no question concerning them. But such a question arose when Mr. Einstein also began to issue passports and verify them, and used a similar seal.

The Bulgarian government felt obliged to bring this to the attention of the American Consul General, and in this manner Mr. Murphy learned that Mr. Einstein had a set of seals also. As the result of this discovery there was a scene in the "legation" on the first floor of the hotel. What the result of the set-to was I do not know, nor can it have been very satisfactory to Mr. Murphy since Mr. Einstein continued to use the seals.

While the quality of the official acts of Mr. Murphy was not questioned by the Bulgarian government, that courtesy was not extended to those of the diplomatic agent. Before long the passports issued by Mr. Einstein, or viséed by him, resulted in trouble for the holders thereof.

At the Foreign Office the United States diplomatic agent soon ceased to be *persona grata*, and Mr. Murphy came to be the only official with whom the Bulgarian government would treat. In addition to that Mr. Einstein engaged presently in an affair which brought down upon him the attention of M. Georgieff, the very efficient and equally ruthless chief of Bulgaria's "political" that is, secret, police. M. Bosniakoff, assistant to the chief, was detailed to keep the United States diplomatic agent under closest surveillance and succeeded in doing that in a most effective manner. Mr. Einstein used to meet his friends, among them a man by name of Walker, in a house where the majority of callers were supposed to be violent adherents of the Entente cause. I may mention that the *modus operandi* consisted of keeping in the cellar of the house a stenographer.

Mr. Einstein a Most Zealous Guardian

Men in the Sofia Foreign Office had charged Mr. Einstein with being not only the diplomatic agent of the several Entente governments, but their most able *agent provocateur* besides. The rumor that Mr. Einstein had been sent to Constantinople at the special request of M. Jusserand would not down, and when the man appeared in Sofia, after having meanwhile been attached to the American diplomatic missions in London and Paris, the report grew into a fact, as such *facts* go.

The British legation in Sofia had been left in charge of a man named Hirst, who, to give his official status, was permitted to remain as "custodian

of records." With Mr. Hirst the United States diplomatic agent associated a great deal in sharp contrast to Mr. Murphy, who may have thought that to the observance of neutrality belongs, on the part of a government representative, also a due regard for the susceptibility of others. Be that as it may, the conduct of Messrs. Einstein and Murphy was radically different and contradictory. Messrs. Murphy and Hirst associated officially as much as was necessary, but drew the line there, while Mr. Einstein, a great devotee of lawn tennis, was seen everyday in so public a place as a tennis court, with the British custodian of records. That was a privilege Mr. Einstein had, and one which in any other country he might have indulged in as much as he pleased. But the Bulgarians are a people who easily suspect. In this manner, then, the case against the United States diplomatic agent was made complete and final.

The Entente governments had placed some difficulties in the way of the Bulgarian ministers who were bound for home from their posts in London and Paris. For a time they were held in detention, and the Bulgarian government, in order to secure the release of these men, decided to practice reprisal by arresting and holding in detention the custodian of records in the British legation, Mr. Hirst.

Through a Russophile employe in the Sofia Foreign Office, whose lot in life I will not make harder than it is, the tip went out to another Russophile on the outside that Mr. Hirst would be arrested. Mr. Hirst was the first to hear of this, and promptly notified Mr. Einstein that he would seek sanctuary in the United States legation on the first floor of the Grand Hotel Bulgarie. Mr. Einstein was not in at the time, but the man whom Mr. Hirst had entrusted with the details of his plight found him shortly afterwards. When the diplomatic agent arrived Mr. Hirst was already in sanctuary, sitting in the drawing room of Mr. Einstein's suite. It was later charged that Mr. Einstein had been tipped off first. The known facts in the case do not seem to permit that conclusion.

Fifteen minutes later an official from the Bulgarian foreign office, a police officer and several gendarmes, appeared in the hotel to arrest Mr. Hirst. They were shown upstairs by the manager of the hotel, but stopped short when, above the door of the suite, they saw the escutcheon of the State Department of the United States.

The resulting parley between Mr. Einstein and the Bulgarian officials led to a draw. Mr. Einstein said that his "legation," though hardly a legation in the usual sense, enjoyed all diplomatic privileges, including the right to give sanctuary to the diplomatic agent of another government. The argument being based on an old custom in diplomacy, the Bulgarian government decided not to press the point just then. Before making further attempts to secure the person of the custodian of British records

an effort was to be made to ascertain from the United States government what its own attitude was.

But before that sane course had been followed to its conclusion, a long disquisition on extra-territoriality and the like, diplomatic privileges and what not, was engaged in with Mr. Einstein. The appeal of the Bulgarian Foreign Office to Mr. Murphy fell on deaf ears, nor did Mr. Einstein get in any way encouragement or support from the consul general. I have never met a man in the consular service of the United States who could be so exasperatingly impartial and neutral. Mr. Murphy had advice for neither of the contenders, and sat in his little office in the Slavianska ulica like a man whom the quarrel did not in the least concern, though, still living in the hotel, he came in contact with the *locale* of trouble every day.

Whether or no any part of a hotel can be looked upon as a legation resolved itself into one of the burning questions in diplomacy. Mr. Einstein claimed that the residence of a foreign diplomatist enjoyed extra-territoriality no matter where located, and that under no circumstances was the extra-territoriality contingent upon other elements than the acceptance by a government of the diplomatist's credentials. On that point Mr. Einstein scored heavily, and established, I think, a precedent which will tend to further make diplomacy intricate.

But more trouble was to come. Mr. Hirst had to eat, of course. For the first two days that condition had been met satisfactorily by ordering the meals from the waiter, and, since Mr. Einstein had been quick-witted enough to get bedding for his extra-territorial guest, Mr. Hirst was now quite comfortable, though somewhat the worse off for lack of exercise. The wags of Sofia were sure that in the end Mr. Einstein would rent a tennis court and extend extra-territoriality to that for the benefit of his guest.

However, a government bent upon being nasty has more than one way of doing that. The manager of the hotel was ordered to only serve one portion of breakfast, lunch and dinner in the Einstein apartment-legation. Of course, that did not force the enemy upstairs to capitulate. Mr. Einstein ordered the meals for himself, and then ate in the city.

There was another way of applying to Mr. Hirst what his government was trying hard to apply to the Central powers—starvation. The hotel was instructed that no meals of any sort were to be served in the rooms of the United States diplomatic agent. To see that this rule was observed the guard about the corridor on which the suite was located was increased.

Mr. Hirst would have starved to death had it not been that Mr. Einstein applied the very simple and perfectly obvious remedy of buying food in town and taking it into the "legation."

There are certain things to which even a diplomatist in sanctuary must attend. Unfortunately, the "legation" had no bathroom, and urged by an outraged government, the servants of the hotel began to object to carrying so much water in and out of the Einstein suite. That was a sore problem now. Already, the attempt had been made by a particularly enterprising Bulgarian police officer to seize the person of Mr. Hirst. Inadvertently the custodian of records had shown himself in the open door and two husky gendarmes had lurched forward to lay hands on the man whom the government wanted so badly. Retreat into the adjoining "other" room of the legation, on the part of Mr. Hirst, and the warning hand of Mr. Einstein, alone prevented a situation that would have led to war, slaughter and destruction. How nitroglycerineously instable and touchy international relations can become in the smallest of matters should be illustrated by this.

The chamber servant having refused to be of service any longer, Mr. Einstein was face to face with the first really serious problem. The lavatory was across the corridor, to be sure, a matter of eight feet at the most, but how to get Mr. Hirst there was most difficult—impossible, in fact, so long as the agents of the Bulgarian government stood ready in the corridor to pounce upon the much wanted custodian of records.

Mr. Einstein met the situation in the end, as any resourceful diplomatist would, by proclaiming the corridor as under extra-territoriality. To this the Bulgarian government objected violently. The argument was reinforced by Mr. Einstein with the sound logic that since he had to use the same lavatory, it was a part of the legation, and the fact that he did not use it exclusively could not alter that aspect, since his payment of rent to the hotel, for his quarters, comprised *ipso facto* the right to use the conveniences provided for the guests of the house.

Again Mr. Einstein won, though not entirely since it was agreed that he would have to accompany the man in sanctuary while crossing the corridor—a sort of safe conduct arrangement.

One would think that a government involved in a war would have felt very keenly, even if it could not appreciate, the farcical qualities of this wrangling over the person of a man who was of no importance in the scheme eternal. Far from it! The manager of the hotel was induced to serve notice upon Mr. Einstein that his rooms would be wanted, that they, in fact, would soon be occupied by a person, who was in the habit of always wanting these very same rooms on the occasion of trips to Sofia. At this display of naïveté Mr. Einstein laughed, and invited the serving of a dispossess notice.

In that state the diplomatic controversy was left when the ministers of the Bulgarian government were released and when the cause for reprisal had vanished, therefore.

One may indeed wonder why the Bulgarian government did not show *amour propre* enough to discontinue its fracas with Mr. Einstein. After all what could it matter whether or no Mr. Hirst was held in detention. To the sum and substance of the actual that contributed little. Men quite innocent of diplomacy were being butchered by the thousands each day, and here was a government willing to risk complications with the United States in order to settle to its own satisfaction something that could not be dignified even with being called a trifle in comparison with the great issues that were being stressed on the battlefields in every part of Europe.

The Pseudo-Minister Had a Free Hand

One day I expressed myself to this effect in the Sofia Foreign Office. The man to whom I spoke, he is among those mentioned already, listened attentively, and then produced from a file a telegram in *texte claire* addressed by Mr. Lansing to Mr. Einstein, in which it was left to the discretion of the latter to turn over to the Bulgarian government the man he held in sanctuary, Mr. Hirst.

"What we suspected has been proven," said the official. "Mr. Einstein is not only an agent of the Entente, but an *agent provocateur* as well. That is why we persisted in our efforts against him. We would have gone much further had we cared to run the risk of offending the people of the United States. The entire matter would have been dropped had we not known that the Department of State of the United States took the view that the case of extra-territoriality established by Mr. Einstein was far from clear and reasonable. We carried this thing to its ridiculous proportions in order to get rid of Mr. Einstein."

Though fully informed as to the details of the case, I had not dealt with it very extensively, and it seems that the few dispatches I wrote were suppressed by the British censors. It might not be well to let the American people know what was actually going on in Sofia. Knowing now that the State Department did not entirely sanction the conduct of Mr. Einstein, I wrote up the case with more details and cabled it. A little while thereafter Mr. Einstein was "transferred" from Sofia, and today is no longer in the United States diplomatic service.

But before my dispatch could take effect, Mr. Einstein had another occasion to show his mettle. A former attaché of the American legation at Bucharest, Mr. Frank A. Couché, had selected to engage in business in Rumania. He was to import certain articles, and in connection with that found it necessary to go to Salonica, then occupied by the forces of General Sarrail. When Mr. Couché arrived at Sofia, he found that the Bulgarian authorities were averse to having him get to Salonika via Dedeagatch.

Anxious to get to his destination, the former secretary of the American legation in Bucharest attempted, so the Bulgarians alleged, to bribe an inspector of passes working at the Sofia railroad station. The official in question seems to have been selected for the post for more reasons than one. Formerly the inspector had lived at Dallas, Texas, and was quite familiar with Americanisms. He later swore that he took the money from the man bound for Salonika and turned it over to the secret police. All of which seems to coincide with what happened. The traveller took a train going south, but two stations beyond Sofia was arrested, and brought to trial.

As *pièce de résistance* in the attempt by the Bulgarian government to prove culpability served a letter written by Mr. Einstein in a rather cryptic way and addressed to the man who wanted to go to Salonika.

It was not very pleasant for an American to live in Sofia and Bulgaria after that. M. Georgieff, the chief of political police, smelled a spy every time he saw an American, as I was to discover myself shortly afterward.

Not long before the culmination of the Einstein-Hirst affair, I had met another representative of the United States diplomatic service, who seemed bent upon provocation. The critical state caused by the torpedoing of the steamship "Ancona" in the Mediterranean had called me to Vienna. A telegram from the office of the Associated Press in New York, relayed to me via the Berlin bureau of the service, said a rupture of relations between the United States and those concerned with the sinking of the vessel in question was not out of the question. I am still surprised that this message succeeded in getting past the German and Austro-Hungarian censors. But it did.

To learn more of the details of the case I called one morning at the Austro-Hungarian admiralty, there being no separate ministry of marine in the governmental scheme of the monarchy. I told the chief of one of the bureaus that the situation was really a serious one, and that it would be best to clear up finally whether it was a German submarine or an Austro-Hungarian that had done the damage. The "Lusitania" case had left the people of the United States in no mood to view with equanimity even a partial repetition of the offense, and it was believed, therefore, that the Austro-Hungarian government, in order to avoid the imminent possibility of war between the United States and Germany, had shouldered blame which really should have rested upon the Germans. Attention to the case for a week or so had left me also under that impression.

When I was through stating my wishes the chief of the bureau informed me that a report from the officer in charge of the submarine that had sunk the "Ancona" had just been received. With that he took

several sheets of paper from his desk and handed them to me. I noticed that the report came from the Austro-Hungarian naval station at Pola. It was a rather detailed account of what had happened to the steamship. The language showed, if it did not prove, that it was an Austro-Hungarian submarine that had torpedoed the "Ancona."

I requested permission to use the data of the report. The officer said that he had no objection to that, but advised me to consult with Baron von Montlong, the chief of the press department of the Foreign Office, before attempting to forward my dispatch. So far as he knew, the note in reply to the representations of the United States government had not yet been finished, although in the main its tone had been decided upon in accord with a preliminary report by wire that had been made by the commander at Pola. Count Burian, the Austro-Hungarian minister of the exterior, had wished to learn more of the details before turning the note over to Mr. Penfield, the United States ambassador.

I copied such parts of the report as were important, wrote my dispatch and submitted it to the chief of the press department, who said that it would be bad taste to have my dispatch precede the actual presentation of the note to the United States ambassador. It would go as soon as this had been done.

Pre-Conceived Views of a Diplomatist

Later in the afternoon I called at the American embassy, and found that the note had not yet been delivered. Mr. Penfield was not in, and for that reason I was received by Mr. U. Grant-Smith, the *conseiller* and first secretary of the embassy.

My inquiry, naturally, led to a discussion of the "Ancona" affair, despite the fact that Mr. Penfield, without more than knowing me as yet by appearance, had told a colleague of mine, for no reason within my ken, that all the news I would ever get out of his embassy I could "put in one eye and not feel it." In view of the fact that Mr. Penfield was very much overworked and, as a result, nervous, I paid no attention to this uncalled-for remark of his, especially since on the whole he was given to violent prejudices anyway, as I had learned.

I took it for granted that Mr. U. Grant-Smith would know more about the "Ancona" affair than I did, and proceeded to question him. To my surprise the first secretary accepted as an absolute fact that it was a German submarine that had sunk the ship. He said he had every reason to believe that such was the case. The Austro-Hungarian government was ready to shoulder responsibility, because it feared that this additional item was more than the account of the German Admiralty, Tirpitz *et al.*

could stand. The least that would come of it would be a rupture of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany.

Much of this was known to me, and so I began to question Mr. Grant-Smith as to his evidence and proof that the "Ancona" had been sunk by a German submarine. Since the secretary was not present when the ship was sunk, and since the deposition of the captain, officers, crew and passengers of the ill-fated vessel had not established the guilt of the Germans, I wondered whether Mr. Grant-Smith had learned from Austrian sources that it was a German and not an Austro-Hungarian submarine that was responsible.

A question in that direction was not answered satisfactorily by the secretary. At any rate, he advised, I would do well to send a dispatch in conformity with his opinions. That I offered to do, if I could give my authority. Would Mr. Grant-Smith permit me to quote him? No, that was out of the question. He was not allowed to permit himself to be quoted. I could use the information on my own responsibility, if I cared to do that.

That I did not use the information, such as it was, was due to a number of circumstances. Item number one in the list was that I could get no such dispatch past the Austro-Hungarian censorship. Secondly, I had to cite my authority in at least some manner, according to the cast-iron rules of the service. I could have managed that by saying: "According to reliable sources," or, "it was learned authoritatively," or again, "it is understood in well-informed circles." But that would have caused the Foreign Office press department to make inquiry as to who my source was, and since I could not say that the origin of my information was Austro-Hungarian I would have let the cat out of the bag, or stood there a self-convicted *agent provocateur*.

Mr. Grant-Smith, to whom I pointed out this situation, could not see it that way, and grew rather excited, being of a very nervous disposition also. I finally taxed his patience too much by saying that for the time being it would be best to wait for the note of the Austro-Hungarian government. If that note showed this government as assuming all responsibility nothing could be done other than holding it responsible for the act. If Austria-Hungary was willing to incur the displeasure of the United States more than it had already done in the Dumba affair, then it evidently knew what it was doing.

To the remark of the secretary that this was a maneuver to draw from Germany the wrath of the civilized world, I returned something to the effect that there was no way of preventing that.

The next thing was that the secretary proved himself entirely ignorant of the prime essential facts of the case. He maintained that the

Austro-Hungarian navy had no submarines capable of operating as far out as the waters where the "Ancona" was torpedoed. I told him that at Pola there were now such boats, having been brought there in exactly the same manner as the "U" boat under Captain Hersing, which torpedoed the British battleships "Triumph" and "Majestic" in the shore waters of Gallipoli four months before—under their own power from Wilhelmshaven. I thought it probable that this late type of submarine in the Austro-Hungarian service was commanded by German officers and men, but stated that if such a complement was dressed in Austro-Hungarian uniforms, with the boat flying the flag of the dual monarchy, it would be extremely difficult to lay responsibility for the sinking of the "Ancona" at the door of the German government.

When finally I left the room Mr. Grant-Smith seemed to be under the impression that I was pro-German. The fact is that I had no reason to assert or even insinuate that the note about to be transmitted to the United States government was a fabrication, so long as I did not know and could not prove that it was this. I knew no more than what I had seen at the navy bureau, and what the note contained later, and had, therefore, to confine myself to the limits of my information. I would have given publicity to the views of Mr. Grant-Smith had he been willing to assume responsibility for them. There is no doubt that opinions of the first secretary of the American embassy in Vienna had a certain value in connection with the case. They had no value whatsoever when published under the cloak of anonymity: Firstly, because they were not in accord with the admissions made by the Austro-Hungarian government; secondly, they were not based on reliable information. The difference between our respective positions was: That I would have been held responsible by the several authorities concerned, and by the service which employed me, while Mr. Grant-Smith would not have been held responsible.

The newspaperman dealing with diplomatists must always bear in mind that in the end his diplomatic "friends" will sacrifice him when things go wrong—do sacrifice him every time with the greatest facility, since governments and foreign offices generally hold the journalist to be at best an interesting pariah who lives on the morsels that fall from the table of diplomacy. The newspaperman, generally, is *persona grata* with diplomatists only on two conditions. In the one he must be willing to be and remain the convenient tool; in the other he must be able enough to see through their schemes and hold his knowledge over them as a sword of Damocles.

There is one person whom the average diplomatist and politician temporarily in power cannot bear for any length of time—the newspaperman who feels that he has a duty toward the public and mankind. I have

been too long in journalism to longer hold the view that in newspaper work and the public press field the ideal is attainable. So long as newspapers must subsist on the revenues produced by circulation and advertisements, and so long as it will remain impracticable and dangerous to subsidize governmentally, or in any other manner, the press of a people that wishes to remain free and independent, so long must society be prepared to expect from the journalist nothing more than reconciliation, on an ethical base, of the altruistic with the material, the enlightenedly selfish with the striving for the better.

The views of some journalistic exploiters of the public, that this scheme leaves their hands untied by obligations toward the aggregate that bestows upon them the "freedom of the press," are no less detrimental to a state than the "semi-official newspaper" and news service, the favorite method of subsidy employed by governments that wish to *retain* absolute control of public opinion by *forming* public opinion. Nor is it necessary that this subsidy come from governmental sources, as such recognizable, as the Great War has shown in too many instances.

The ethics of journalism are simple. The duty of the press is easily recognized, and the *métier* of the newspaperman, especially that of the editor, is not as intricate as some of them would have the public believe. There are more charlatans in press work, and more unpunished criminals, than in any other business I know—diplomacy, politics and government alone excepted.

I make mention of these things here to draw attention to the fact that any and all of the things I have touched upon so far would have been impossible had journalistic conditions been different. To the person that has run the gauntlet of censorship and propaganda for any length of time that will be clear.

A Diplomatist of Ingrown Intellect

Needless to say, diplomania was not confined to just one camp of the belligerents. Lest I should strengthen in some classes of Germans the notion that their own service was as good and simon-pure as they were then prone to believe—and as some still believe—I must mention here the case of Prince Wolf-Metternich, successor to Freiherr von Wangenheim as German ambassador to the Ottoman court. There are other cases, of course, some almost as celebrated, but this one is of especial interest for the reason that it never came to the attention of the German people. After all, I am merely supplementing the world's knowledge of what it knows of diplomacy, and what in a few years it will have again completely forgotten.

When von Wangenheim had been carried off, prematurely, by the

climax that follows hardening of the arteries, he was succeeded by Prince Wolf-Metternich, great noble, *Borussian*, and special friend of Emperor William. It would have been much better to leave the man in Germany, but the post being vacant, and the prince wanting it, the emperor decided to do the Turks a favor. Thus it came that the most unbending and most conceited member of the German diplomatic service came to inhabit the great palace on the Boulevard Ayas Pasha in Pera.

Von Wangenheim had been an easy-going man. Though Prussian to the very core, he was a man of the world, and as such rather out of sympathy with the things that were Prussian in a bad sense. The result of this was that he got along with the Turks very well, though there were rough places which only Corvette-Captain Humann could negotiate. On such occasions von Wangenheim would happily forget that he was an "Excellenz" in His Majesty's service, and look for no more than speedy solutions and favorable results. If von Wangenheim was anything at all, he was as good an executive as could be found. In Captain Humann he had an *aide* worth his weight in gold several times over—and the captain always managed to do these things without feeling that he had become indispensable.

Prince Wolf-Metternich took great offense at several things he found at Pera. Item number one was that he detested the free and easy air of the German embassy, which von Wangenheim had left behind. The prince loathed all commoners, and especially Captain Humann. Upon the Turks he looked as half-barbarians, and their remarkably consistent democracy in intercourse was revolting to this aristocrat *par excellence*. The prince was not long in Constantinople before the Turks felt that he was treating them as a vassal government. As *Borussian* and friend of the emperor, Wolf-Metternich was divine-righter of the worst type.

I had heard of these things from Turkish friends of mine whom I used to meet in Sofia, Vienna, Budapest and Berlin, but had never taken much stock in them, because I knew how touchy the men in Stamboul could be at times.

In August, 1916, I was in Berlin, and heard to my great astonishment that Captain Humann was filling some detail in the Navy Office. I knew the captain well, having been shown many a favor by him while I was at the Dardanelles and on Gallipoli, and decided to call on him.

I was more astonished when he told me that he had little to do in the Navy Office. His room looked it. It was my impression the able naval officer was busiest chewing pencils. I made some remark to that effect, but the captain was reticent, and remained that even when I asked cautiously whether or no he was doing a turn at "Strafversetzung"—demotion detail for disciplinary purposes.

Captain Humann admitted nothing. Knowing that he was too valuable to sit in Berlin, when he was almost indispensable in the scheme of things in Constantinople, I drew my own conclusions, got in touch with friends of mine in Stamboul and learned the details.

The haughty prince-ambassador had no patience with a mere commoner, even if that commoner was the son of so distinguished a person as Humann's father, the celebrated archeologist who had excavated Pergamon and thereby enriched greatly the stock of knowledge of the world. But the prince had met opposition in his endeavor to have Captain Humann supplanted as naval attaché and commander of the German Naval Base on the Bosphorus. The men in the ministries of Stamboul, especially Enver Pasha, the Ottoman minister of war, were very fond of Captain Humann, who was born and raised in the Levant and understood the Turks, Greeks and Armenians as no other person in the German embassy did.

But Prince Wolf-Metternich was not a friend of William II for nothing. One day, then, the captain was transferred to Berlin to the pencil-chewing detail in the Imperial Naval Office. There was but one person in Pera who could tell the Turks what to do, and that was the prince, as he thought. It was that same person in his dual capacity of prince and diplomatist who intended preparing the Turks then and there for the role they were to have in the future under German suzerainty. The prince was not exactly a Pan-German. He was something far worse: A feudal lord who feasted on the very moods of His Majesty.

To the Turks these things gave offense. They had not entered the war to pass under the overlordship of the Germans. Whatever may be said of them, one thing is certain: The Turkish leaders wanted to have their country truly a sovereign state.

When Captain Humann had been removed, the princely ambassador proceeded immediately with giving the Turkish government to understand that from now on it would be different. The Turkish government would in the future take its orders from the ambassadorial palace on the Boulevard Ayas Pasha.

Diplomatists seem to be largely recruited from the class that learns slowly, if it learns at all. Had it been otherwise, Prince Wolf-Metternich could have delved into the prior effort by the Berlin government to remove Liman von Sanders Pasha in favor of von der Goltz Pasha. He would have learned that Enver Pasha had a mind of his own, and that, despite his readiness to please the Germans, he had very appropriate notions as to the fitness of things in state sovereignty.

But Prince Wolf-Metternich thought that he was by far a greater man than Baron von Wangenheim, and, this being so, he could do things which his predecessor in office could not do. Again he was mistaken.

Quite blandly the Turkish government informed him one day that it was ready to uphold its policy of non-interference in Ottoman internal affairs by the Germans, even if it had to break off relations with its ally, the German government.

Publicity Is Used as a Corrective

For once the cold ambassador fumed, but that did not help. Any other diplomatist would have been recalled then and there, but William II thought a great deal of his ambassador and did not recall him. To his Majesty the men in control in Turkey were upstarts of the worst sort, of course. Enver Pasha was to him never more than a second lieutenant, who knew little of military affairs, which was true enough, but the fact was that Enver Pasha represented just then a goodly half of the Ottoman government. Talaat Pasha, then still a *bey*, and minister of the Interior, was the other half of that government, but had started in life as a telegraph operator and owed everything to the Turkish Revolution. With such men William II could not be patient very long. They were not his equals on the divine-right plane. What His Majesty totally overlooked was that in the Ottoman empire there was no such thing as an aristocracy, and that the commoner might rise in the government as ability and opportunity permitted. All in all, William II held an opinion of the leaders in the Turkish government which was but slightly better than that held by Emperor Francis Joseph of King Peter of Serbia.

The Berlin Foreign Office had now and then essayed to bring His Majesty to a better understanding of affairs on the Bosphorus. But it had failed. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg was too much afraid of losing his job to take the stand he should have taken—which the chancellor would have taken had there been a responsible ministry in Berlin. Meanwhile, it was again the censorship that kept the sorry fracas out of the press and from the attention of the German public. The precautions that were taken for keeping the imbroglio out of the newspapers were the most elaborate—nevertheless it was a newspaper dispatch which finally brought about a change.

When I had gathered the details of the case I brought them to the attention of the Vienna government in form of a newspaper dispatch. The subject being political, the *story* had to be submitted to the press department in the Vienna Ministry of the Exterior. The men in the ministry knew well enough what had been going on in Constantinople, but they were powerless to effect a change.

My dispatch caused somewhat of a sensation. After all the secret had not been as well kept as was thought. How had I learned the details?

Naturally, that was not to be explained. I was asked not to insist that the dispatch be forwarded to Berlin, which way I would have to route it to get it to the United States. But I was obdurate—the dispatch would have to go. To insist that the dispatch went might mean the end of my usefulness in the Central Powers countries, I was told. With that I had counted so often that it no longer influenced me.

In the end the dispatch was forwarded and thus it came that a few days later Prince Wolf-Metternich was recalled. More than that, the Ottoman government insisted that Captain Humann be reinstated as naval attaché and commander of the German Naval Base on the Bosphorus, and one day the new ambassador to Turkey, Dr. Richard von Kühlmann, and Captain Humann passed through Vienna on their way to Constantinople. Neither of them knew that it was the fear of the Berlin Foreign Office of being confronted with the details of the imbroglio in a Swiss or Dutch newspaper which brought about the change.

To the best of my knowledge my dispatch never reached the United States, but a part of its substance leaked out, nevertheless. The rumor that the Turkish government was ready to sever relations with the German government, which at that time made the rounds, was caused by it.

Such is the value of conscientious newspaper work, and such the effect of censorship. The story might have been published months before, and the situation would have never become as critical as it was, had the German journalists been able to treat the subject. While the German correspondents in Constantinople, notably Mr. Paul Weitz of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, were well acquainted with the state of affairs, they could not afford to write of it. There was the censorship, of course, and the doors of the German embassy would have been closed on any correspondent who had shown himself "audacious" enough to question for a second the superior wisdom and august station of Prince Wolf-Metternich. Fortunately, I was not in that position, and for the sake of mankind undertook what others could not undertake.

When the gods of Greek mythology banished themselves from the earth they, unfortunately, left behind them the diplomatists. I have not yet encountered the ambassador who did not think himself omniscient and omnipotent. Now and then a minister may be found ready to admit that he is a plain mortal—the ambassador and diplomatic secretary will never admit that. The sooner the public insists that these men are to be held responsible for their acts, the sooner will the probability of wars be lessened. So long as ambassadors are enabled to wipe out their own record of malfeasance by fostering a state that will in the end lead to war, so long will we have instances of the sort here described.

Quite the best thing that could happen just now would be to investigate

the conduct of every diplomatist who had a hand in the Great War, and this world would be much the better off if a few of them could be made to answer for their conduct. I think that was what President Wilson had in mind when he framed the first of his famous Fourteen Points, concerning "open covenants openly arrived at." That Mr. Wilson has abandoned this very valuable tenet is no reason why the public should also throw it into discard. There will be more *diplomania* unless the public everywhere applies preventive measures.

XI

DIPLOMACY IN RUMANIA

RUMANIA enjoys the distinction of being the most backward of small nations in Europe. Of its rural population of five millions less than 20 per cent can read and write. The urban populace, numbering about 1.4 millions, has only 60 per cent of literates. Though the form of government is a constitutional monarchy with a responsible ministry, the actual participants in politics number about 2,000 individuals: The higher government officials, the great landowners, professional politicians and the leading lawyers.

The state is, of course, predominantly agricultural and the soil is held by some 6,000 large and small landowners. The peasantry is held in peonage, by a system resembling closely that of Mexico in the days of Porfirio Diaz. Except the Great War should have brought about radical changes in Rumania, the future of the peasant will be, as has been the past, a round of hard labor, life in the hovel peculiar of the country, the roughest of homespuns, and *mamaliga*, a dish of maize resembling *polenta*—the only thing really that links Rumania to Italy, her so-called mother country.

Though the Rumanians, especially the upper classes, are fond of claiming themselves Romans, the fact is that they are Romanized Dacians in the hills, and in the plains the descendants of all the peoples that have swept in and out of the Balkan peninsula, to refer to a few of them: Slavs, Goths, Huns, Gepides, Avars, Kelts and Bulgars. Through later immigration a fairly strong Turkish element came into the country.

Little is known of the history of Rumania before and immediately after its more or less complete organization by Emperor Trajan. It seems that even then Rumania was backward.

The modern state had its inception in two principalities, founded by Radu Negru, the one, and Bogdan, the other, about 1292. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the country was in the hands of the Turks, while from the end of the latter to 1829 Russia and Austria lost and retook the territory. In that year Rumania was placed under the protection of Russia, but the suzerainty of Turkey was still recognized. In 1848 the inhabitants were affected a little by the wave of liberalism which swept over Europe and rose in revolt. The consequence was that the country

was occupied by Russian troops, who, from 1854 to 1856, were displaced by Austrian forces, in which latter year the Russian protectorate was removed from the country by the Treaty of Paris. Shortly afterward the Rumanians in the two principalities, into which the country was then divided, Moldawa and Wallachia, decided upon the same prince, who, in 1861, united the country into modern Rumania. In 1864 Prince Karl of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was elected ruler.

During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 Rumania declared herself independent of Turkey, and the Congress of Berlin sowed here another apple of discord by ceding the Rumanian Bessarabia to Russia and the predominantly Bulgarian Dobrudja to Rumania as compensation. In 1881 Rumania proclaimed herself a kingdom, having a short time before that declared her church an autocephalic institution. The Rumanian language is of a general Roman character, but has retained many archaic, and incorporated a large number of Slavic, elements.

At the outbreak of the European War M. Bratianu, whose father had served Rumania valiantly against the Turks, with Alexander II, the Czar Liberator of the Balkans, was at the head of the Rumanian government as premier. Rumania had a treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary, a condition which led to the calling of a crown council in August of the first War year at which it was considered whether or no Rumania should enter the great struggle. It is asserted that Senator Alexandru Marghiloman, who had formerly served in the ministry, and who was still the leader of the Conservative Party, was for entrance into the War on the side of Austria-Hungary. In this he would seem to have had the support of Peter Carp, a former premier, and associated with him at the time in the leadership of the Conservatives. M. Filipescu, formerly minister of war; Take Jonescu, a prominent lawyer, and Michael Cantacuzene, were the leaders of those who opposed joining the Central Powers. The premier, M. Bratianu, was unable, it seems, to make up his mind. King Charles favored coming to the assistance of Austria-Hungary and Germany, with the reincorporation of Bessarabia in prospect in case the Central Powers won. The council, being unable to agree, dissolved and shortly afterward Rumania was in the throes of as wild a propaganda campaign as any country saw during the Great War.

Diplomatic Constellations at Bucharest

This campaign was at its height when I arrived at Bucharest. The country, that is, Bucharest, the capital, was divided into two factions that fought as if Rumania herself were already one of the belligerents. The Filipescu-Jonescu combination had been joined by Toma Jonescu, Con-

stantin Mille, and a large number of other prominent politicians, most of whom belonged to the Conservative Democratic Party, while the Marghiloman-Carp group had been similarly augmented with such men as Majorescu, Octavian Gogo, Nicolae Jorga, politicians, and Alexandru Tzigara-Samurcas, director of the Carol Foundation and National Art Museum; Rector Stere, of the University of Jassy, and Pater Dr. Lucacin, a prominent clerical.

The active leadership was in the hands of Take Jonescu, for the Ententeophiles, and Senator Marghiloman, for the Germanophiles. Most of the telling press work for the first group was done by Constantin Mille, owner and chief editor of the two most prominent Bucharest dailies, the *Adeverul* and *Dimineatcha*. Peter Carp attended to the propaganda in his camp in his personally conducted *Moldawa*. The remainder of the Rumanian press, with many dailies in French as constituents, was in the market from time to time, sold out and changed masters without notice at the behest of the highest bidders. The *Adeverul* and *Dimineatcha* differed from all other papers in so far that they were bound to the Russian legation by long-term agreements. M. Poklevski-Koziell, the Russian minister at Bucharest, was not the brightest mind in the diplomatic world, of course, but he knew that the press can accomplish much, even in Rumania. His military attaché, Col. Tatarinoff, on the other hand, was a born diplomatist, which was just as well, since Sir H. Barclay, the British minister, and M. Blondel, the French envoy, were hardly the men whom a government should send out on the streets on a dark night. Diplomacy was not their *forte* by any means, both of them being honest men.

It was rather better in the camp of the Central Power diplomatists. In Count Czernin the Austro-Hungarian government was well represented, and in Baron Hilmar von den Bussche-Haddenhausen the German government could place all confidence. The latter was ably supported by a very young man by name of W. von Rheinbaben, which is of no particular consequence, except in so far as it goes to show that the able diplomatist is woefully handicapped when it comes to arguing against superior strength.

To run even a partial list of all the propagandists whom I met in a single fortnight in Bucharest is quite impossible. In the hotels every room was occupied by an agent of some sort from any of the warring countries of Europe. In the more pretentious Palace Athene dwelled the chiefs of these agents, some of whom took keen delight in taking suites for the mere fun of keeping some propagandist of an enemy country out.

This, then, was the setting of the diplomatic stage in the Rumanian capital. And this the play:

There was a great deal of *Rumania irredenta*. The Congress of

Berlin, 1878, had given to Russia a district settled largely by Rumanians: Bessarabia. Austria-Hungary had never again disgorged the Rumanian population in Transylvania, and the eastern Banat, and there were those who thought that Bulgaria should lose still more of the Dobrudja. The extremists even went so far as to say that the Kutzo-Vlakhs on the southwestern outskirts of Macedonia ought to be returned to the main body of Vlakhs—the Rumanians. Last but not least, the Rumanians in the Bukowina were thought necessary to the mother country.

It depended entirely upon what camp one was in before expression could be made as to which of the *Rumania irredenta* districts should be reincorporated first. Feeling ran so high that neither side could afford to totally ignore the ambitions of the other. The Ententophile faction announced openly that Transylvania and the Banat would have to be annexed *in toto*, although there was a large ethnographic twilight zone about both districts, not to mention the large German population on the Burzen Plain, in and around Kronstadt, Hermannstadt and Klausenburg, which had been brought into that part of Transylvania, in the twelfth century, from the valley of the Moselle, the Palatinate, Wuerttemberg and, to a minor degree, from Saxony, though the latter country gave its name to these immigrants, to wit: *Sachsen*.

In the Banat ethnology was equally involved. As in Transylvania, so was the population in this instance a very mixed one. In both territories there is a strong Magyar element, and in the Banat, especially the southwestern parts of it, the "Serbo-Croat" population is decidedly numerous, a fact which was not overlooked later in the treaty made by Bratianu and the Allied governments, which provided that the Slavs in the Banat should be given two years in which to dispose of their property for a fair compensation before departing for Jugo-Slavia or other parts, if they wished to do that.

The Germanophile politicians did not allow their opponents to forget that there was a Bessarabia, which actually clamored for admission into Rumania, as was claimed. Considering what the lot of the Rumanian peasant was, I have always taken the eagerness of the Bessarabians to join Rumania, as advertised, *cum grano salis*. But this particular piece of *Rumania irredenta* was used to make the arguments of the Ententophile camp illogical. The result was that the Jonescu-Filipescu camp replied that Russia would cede Bessarabia later, a statement which is not borne out by the terms of the treaty to which reference has been made. The friends of the Entente in Rumania said little enough about further annexations in the Dobrudja. To do that would have been highly impolitic, since the Bulgarians, most resentful of having lost a part of the district by the Sazonovian Treaty of Bucharest, 1913, would have been heard from.

Only the Neo-Idealists of Rumania mentioned the Vlaxhs in that part of Bulgaria, and in Macedonia.

Nor could the Germanophile leaders overlook entirely the districts which the Ententophiles claimed. The program of the Marghiloman-Carp camp was to annex all of Bessarabia, do the best possible with Austria-Hungary in Transylvania and the Banat and leave the Dobrudja and the Klutzo-Vlaxhs alone.

Back of the "Coulisses Diplomatiques"

A week in Bucharest had left my mind rather confused on these burning questions of the day. The service with which I was connected had specifically instructed me to "study" the situation in Rumania, and the Balkans, and here I should mention that the Rumanian is mortally offended when one suggests that he is of the Balkan. Such being the case, and being of an inquisitive turn of mind by nature, I undertook an automobile tour through Rumania and her *irredentas*. That done, I was in better position to listen to what the several leaders of the two camps had to say.

My first interview was with Constantin Mille, the owner and chief editor of the *Adeverul* and *Dimineatcha*. M. Mille speaks French fluently, has lived in France now and then, and in the course of a fairly long life as *redacteur* and Deputy of "*Parliamentul*" has acquired a glibness of expression and inclination toward generality and platitude which I found a little irritating. When one newspaperman talks to another a certain adherence to the facts is expected, though the result of that is not necessarily for publication.

M. Mille did not know that I had made a tour of the "provinces," and he spoke, therefore, of Rumania as a sort of Paradise Forgotten. I listened to him for some time, and then wrung from him the admission that after all there was *some* room for social improvement in Rumania, to which he added that as a Liberal he had always labored ardently for the betterment of the life of the peasant.

I asked M. Mille whether or no it was true that in the recent peasant uprising some ten thousand insurrectos had been shot. He said that the number was probably not as great as all that, but a good many had been shot and fusilladed. In the end M. Mille admitted—I am using his own words—that the Rumanian peasant still lived "in the age of the troglodyte." That was better.

The conditions I had met in the rural districts—and Rumania is almost all rural—were exactly what the great editor described them now. The family lived in a hovel, half under the ground, and shared that hovel with

the few domestic animals it possessed. It subsisted on *mamaliga*, a pelagra promoting dish of corn throughout the year, getting meat once a week at the very best, and clothing itself in the crudest of raiment—a single garment in the majority of cases.

Not enough with that, the family was owned by the *boyar* on whose land it lived. In return for its labor the family was given the use of a few acres of land, the produce of which had to keep it. Since in good weather the peasant was obliged to labor on the crops of his owner, he raised generally very little, and rapacity was carried so far that the family had to pay for the privilege of pasturing the cow, if it had one. In all respects the Rumanian peasant lived on a par with the Mexican peon, with this difference: The climate of Mexico is better, and the peon can afford clean cotton pants, which the Rumanian peasant cannot.

In five villages I found one human being that claimed ability to read and write. When I tested the man I discovered that he had forgotten all he ever knew. I gained the impression that he was ashamed to own that he could neither read nor write and that he lied to me in behalf of self-respect, for of that the Rumanian has a great deal. Though the custom of the *lex prima noctis* was being frowned upon in Rumania now, I found that the overlord so minded, at any rate his sons, still availed themselves of it in all cases where the young woman seemed desirable.

I mentioned some of these things to M. Mille, and thereby put him on the defensive. Yes, it was all very true! The Rumanian peasant, unfortunately, was still in the "âge troglodytien," and it was hoped that the Rumanians in Transylvania and the Banat, who were "progressive," would serve as a leaven to raise the soggy mass in the mother country. It occurred to me that the Rumanians in question might become just as soggy if placed under the rule of the men in Bucharest. M. Mille thought that was out of the question.

The chief editor of the *Dimineatcha*, the afternoon edition of the *Adeverul*, M. Branisteanu, a Rumanian Jew, was inclined to agree with me rather than with his chief, M. Mille, but he did that only when he was away from the great editor, reformer and deputy.

On the same afternoon I called on Mr. Take Jonescu. He, too, took it for granted that Rumania was still *terra incognita* to me, as, indeed, to quite an extent it still was. Mr. Jonescu, whose wife, by the way, is a very clever English woman, outlined to me what I have already given as the outline of the Ententophile camp in Rumania. Transylvania and the Banat would have to be returned to Rumania, he said, and if in the course of that process a few millions of Germans, Magyars and Slavs passed under Rumanian rule that could not be helped. Those who found the government of Bucharest unbearable could emigrate. There was to be

a *Rumania mare*, a Greater Rumania, and to fashion that it would be necessary to join the Entente group of belligerents.

Mr. Jonescu, besides being a very good lawyer, with an especially evil reputation in inheritance cases, is also a journalist, being one of the contributors to many of the Entente-controlled newspapers in Rumania at that time, particularly the *Zina*, of which a M. Slavitchi was at that time the editor-in-chief.

Being familiar with journalism, and laboring under the impression—not so misapplied at any time—that the average American newspaperman is the poorest hand at quoting people correctly, Mr. Jonescu insisted that he write his own interview. I was to come back at six o'clock and get it.

Upon my return he handed me a long statement, done in excellent English, possibly by Mme. Jonescu. I read the several sheets of paper, and then had to inform Mr. Jonescu that I could not use all of the matter, since cable tolls to the United States were rather heavy. At that the good man took umbrage and said that I would have to use all of it or none. Later I used what I pleased, because our dealing had clearly enough established that Mr. Jonescu did not mind being quoted if he could be quoted in his own way—which way was too expensive.

The discussions I had with these men had led to mention of Russia, of course. Messrs. Mille and Jonescu were sure that the Russian government—this was in January, 1915—would be reasonable in connection with Rumania's interests in the Black Sea and Dardanelles. There was no doubt that Russia would be established in Constantinople before the War was very much older. The Muscovite empire needed a window upon the high seas very badly, and presently that window would be broken into the walls that surrounded Russia. Since the Russian minister, M. Poklewski-Koziell, had said as much to a Rumanian journalist who was assisting me, and since a *danseuse* who was on the most intimate terms with an attaché of the Russian legation had been more specific, the imminent possibility of an attack on the Dardanelles by the Entente was brought to my attention.

How Senator Marghiloman Saw It

Mr. Charles J. Vopicka, the United States minister at Bucharest, had meanwhile introduced me to Senator Alexandru Marghiloman. The first time we met at the Jockey Club, and while I watched the gaming that was going on, and in which the senator was a keen participant, I managed my first interview. There being others about, Mr. Marghiloman was rather reserved. But he informed me that for luncheon he kept open house

throughout the week, Sundays excepted in favor of his family, and that he would like me to drop in any day. *En passant*, I wish to mention that this is one of the Roman customs which the Rumanians have perpetuated—not a bad one for the politician and for those who may have dealing with him. I suggest it as a substitute for the bar “free lunch.”

After luncheon at the Villa Marghiloman, which still bore marks of an attack which Ententophile students and members of the rabble had made upon it, Mr. Marghiloman and I took several rounds in the *solarium* and discussed the political situation.

The senator's keynote was that Rumania would have to stay out of the European War. If she got involved at all, as her impetuous statesmen hoped she would, entry at the very last minute alone could be recommended. Speaking of the attack on the villa, which was synchronized with an attack on the royal palace on the Calea Victoriei, the senator protested that he was not pro-German, as had been charged by his political enemies, but that he was decidedly pro-Rumanian. He regretted that a time had come when to love one's own country had to be interpreted as being anti-this or pro-that. He was not so sure that the Entente would defeat the Central Powers, despite the fact that just then the Russians were making good headway in the Carpathians.

Senator Marghiloman pointed out to me that he spoke French much better than German, which I found to be the case, that usually he spent the better part of the year either in Paris or at the Riviera, having establishments at both points, and that he raced his horses in France, had a *chasse* there, and had most of his money invested in French securities. This, and the fact that his library was to within a small percentage entirely French, and the fact also that he was in no need of money from any government, being one of the wealthiest Rumanians, caused me to look upon the former minister of finance as a man who had good reasons for his attitude.

King Carlos had meanwhile died—from grief due to the conduct of the Bucharestian mob, and his queen, Elizabeth, better known as Carmen Sylva, was away from the capital, praying at the tomb of her late husband for the repose of his soul. The new king, Ferdinand, was neither this nor that, and his queen, Marie, as daughter of the Duke of Edinburgh, as granddaughter of Queen Victoria, and as daughter of the Grand Duchess Marie of Russia, was doing her best to give Bratianu, the minister president, every incentive to make up his mind in favor of the Entente.

Senator Marghiloman, therefore, occupied somewhat the position of the lone fisherman. When, in the face of these conditions, he persisted in retaining the attitude that was his, he was sure to have a special reason for this. I found this reason to be the uncertainty of things, and his fear

that it would not be well with Rumania in case the Russian government, especially Sazonoff, was able to carry into "realization" Russian "desires" in the direction of the Dardanelles.

Senator Marghiloman had a sort of slogan.

"Rumania must remain at peace with all of her neighbors," it was.

He told me that he had never voiced a desire to see Bessarabia annexed to Rumania under conditions that were bound to earn for his country the illwill of Russia. Bessarabia should belong to Rumania, he said, but what was the use of thinking of that so long as there was no assurance that Rumania could keep what she took, nor avoid being later penalized for her act, besides. That was sound logic—a fine specimen of "Realpolitik."

Though some shouters, taking too great an interest in the affairs of the Central Powers, were loud in their claims on Bessarabia, as loud as their opponents were in their clamoring for Transylvania and the Banat, it would be a grave situation for Rumania if the Russian government ever came to take such matters seriously. Nor did the senator have as good an opinion of the help Rumania could bring to either side, as others were persisting in. He said that the Rumanian army, while it could easily muster half a million men in the prime of life, was too poorly organized and equipped, too poorly led and trained, to be of much consequence anywhere. The ammunition at the disposal of the Rumanian government would last two weeks. There was not enough artillery and the mechanical department of the government arsenal, recently installed, was virtually useless because the materials for the manufacture of munitions could not be had. General Iliescu, the chief of staff, was incompetent, moreover, said the former minister of finance. All in all it would be best to stay out of the War.

But, said he, there was one aspect of the situation which ultimately might drive Rumania into the camp of the Central Powers. If Russia succeeded the Turks in control of the Dardanelles nothing would be gained by Rumania. It was his understanding that this was the plan of the Entente governments.

Then and there I learned what that plan was, as I have already intimated in one of the opening chapters. Marghiloman had his own agents in Germany and Russia, and possibly was in correspondence with persons in France, Great Britain, Italy and Austria-Hungary, as I surmised from what he told me on this and a later occasion. What the price to the Entente of Russia's unstinted military support would be was as clear to Senator Marghiloman as if he had read the text of the agreement which a little later was actually made. M. Marghiloman even then knew every provision, and what leaning toward the Central Powers he showed was

due to his knowledge. He did not then understand that, treaty or no treaty, Great Britain could not afford to have Russia supreme on the straits.

With Russia in control of the Dardanelles, Rumania would not for long remain independent economically, and after that the country would eventually become a Russian dependency in the political sense proper. The principal export of Rumania was cereals, mostly wheat and maize. In this department she was the rival of Russia, as the keen competition of the Braila, Rumania, and Odessa grain exchanges had already shown.

The assurance of the British and French governments that the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora and Dardanelles would be free to traffic not originating in, or going to, Russia, was well enough, thought the former minister of finance. But with Russia enthroned in Constantinople the aspects of such things might change. With this Greater Russia a defeated Central Europe would not take up an issue on the Dardanelles, nor would French and British statesmen, guilty of such an indiscretion as placing Russia in possession of the single avenue to and from a sea upon which other nations, besides Russia, depended, be likely to undo their bargain after a war that would cost them a great deal no matter how much they would gain from it.

If the Russian government, especially if still in the hands of a Sazonoff, did not openly defy the stipulations of her agreement, to which Rumania was no contracting party, by the way, and which at a pinch could have been interpreted as applying to British and French vessels only, it would find some good pretext to discriminate against Rumania. For instance, the channel at Nagara, the Inner Dardanelles, needed improvement. The Turks had not blasted the rock ledges out of the way because these were rather useful in the defense and control of the strait and its shipping, necessitating the stopping of merchantmen in Sari Siglar Bay if they entered the strait late in the day. The same ledges made a dash of a hostile fleet past the forts extremely hazardous. To blast these rocks out of the way would be simple enough. Russia would not need their protection so long as the entrance of the Dardanelles had been sufficiently fortified. What could be more inviting than to clear the channel and find in this improvement the moral basis for limiting the rights of foreign shipping in a waterway which occupancy of the adjoining territory by Russia would make Russian anyway. The Dardanelles would be strictly Russian territorial waters after that, and the Black Sea a *mare clausum*, or inland lake of Russia.

Thus reasoned Senator Marghiloman. It would be hard to deny that logic was on his side. The publication of the Russo-Franco-British *entente* on this subject later on shows how well the senator was informed and how

just his conclusions were, so long as the treaty was accepted at its face value.

I suggested to him that with the Dardanelles no longer absolutely free to Rumania, the produce of her fields might be exported to Central Europe over the Danube and the railroads. That could be done, was the reply, but to get a good price for her grain Rumania depended upon an unrestricted market. If the people of Central Europe knew that Rumania was obliged to sell her wheat and maize to them they might apply such discrimination as had been the lot of the Serbs at the hands of the Austrians. There was but one really good market for Rumanian grain in Central Europe and that was Germany. But to reach Germany the railroads of Hungary and her sister state Austria had to be used, and in that way Rumanian grain exports would have been subject to railroad tariff discrimination if to no other. To the mineral oil products of Rumania applied the same arguments, the senator pointed out. In short, the outlook upon the future by Rumania was not the best.

M. Marghiloman had been active in the peace conference at Bucharest, of 1913, and knew the quality of mind of Sazonoff, the Russian minister of foreign affairs. He also knew that the Russians had favored the Serbs for a purpose, and while, as a Rumanian, he had readily accepted a part of the Dobrudja, which the attitude toward Bulgaria of the Russian government had left in the hands of the Rumanian government, he was not wholly pleased now with that attitude, regretting, in fact, that the Treaty of Bucharest had taken the form it had. Of Serbia Rumania had no fear. It was Serbia's great ally, Russia, that set on edge the teeth of the former Rumanian minister of finance. Jugo-Slavism was a fact. The War might bring a Jugoslavia, and then a Unisllavia under the aegis of the Romanoffs and Sazonoffs in Petrograd. That Zarigrad on the Golden Horn might again be *Nova Roma*, from which the nations in all Europe would have to take their orders, to which they might have to pay tribute in fact.

For the very dignified combat which Senator Marghiloman continued to give the Jonsescu-Filipescu group, these views were the base. The unbridled ambition of Sazonoff and the Grand Duke Nicholai Nicholaievitch had in Senator Marghiloman and Peter Carp two able, although rather impotent, opponents.

A Neutrality of Several Parts

Minister-President Bratianu observed a sphinx-like attitude, meanwhile. In making several attempts to see him I never got further than his private secretary. From that functionary, a very important one, by

the way, I learned that strictest neutrality was the objective of the head of the government.

But that neutrality did not get far beyond the executive office, I am afraid, if it was to be found within it at all. Rumania was neutral only in so far as the fighting between two factions of "antis" could make it. At Reni the Russian government had established a base for the Serbian army, under the command of Admiral Vesselkine. From that point was shipped over the Danube whatever the Serbs needed, and since they needed almost everything an army has use for, the traffic was large.

The internationalization of the river, under the Danube Commission, gave Russian vessels the right to proceed as far as they could, in face of the Austro-Hungarian artillery above the Iron Gates, but the Rumanian government closed its eyes whenever its own territoriality and its railroads entered into the question. On the other hand, the same government was lenient with trans-Rumanian traffic between Central Europe and Turkey. At least it was not too inquisitive and much minor military equipment reached Turkey in that manner. German officers and men, of both the naval and military services, used the Rumanian railroads to go back and forth, a practice which brought into the Rumanian foreign office many a protest from the Entente governments. But with the Germans travelling in *mufti*, and with passports issued by the civil authorities, there was nothing to be done, even though the uniforms of the traveller were generally the chief item of baggage.

Such things as could be transported in sealed box cars went through Rumania without question for a time, but later all cars were examined. After that such smuggling of "contraband" as was possible in piano cases, barrels and large boxes became the practice. But little could be taken to Turkey in that way, and the articles needed most by the Germans and Turks in service on the Dardanelles, large calibered guns and their ammunition, could not be hidden even in piano cases. The Germans succeeded in getting through Rumania the more delicate parts of machinery that were needed, when, under the auspices of Captain Piper, they established an ammunition factory and a gun foundry on the Golden Horn. But even that did no serious damage to the Allies since the ammunition produced was of exceedingly poor quality, as I was able to establish myself, and so far as my knowledge goes no guns were ever made in the foundry, Captain Piper turning both plants to the manufacture, in large quantities, of hand grenades, in the use of which the Ottoman infantry grew to be expert.

I should state here, incidentally, that Bulgaria also gave her railroads to this traffic. The cars carrying the materials in question were ferried across the Danube at Giurgiu-Rustchuk and then continued into Turkey

over the Rustchuk-Sofia-Adrianople railroad line. Compared with the export of ammunition from the United States this traffic was as one to thousands. It was always small in volume, and the hue and cry raised in the Entente countries against these "shocking violations" of neutrality must strike mankind today as immensely funny, or should do that. As a matter of fact they were arrant nonsense.

But that was not their only aspect.

The Entente governments maintained in Bucharest great staffs of men and women supposedly gathering "military" information of importance. Some of them were serious people and expert in their line. But their field was cluttered with a large element that had left home and restraining family bonds, in the service of the government and for the "good" of their countries, to have a good time in the first instance, and to hold the job in the next. These intentions called for an occasional effort. After days and days had been spent on a tip, so-called, the pursuance of which had its *locale* mostly in one of the many Bucharest cabarets and *maisons de plaisir*, a report would be forthcoming, in which the Rumanian government would be charged with every sin in the calendar. There had been seen, on a certain day in one of the Bucharest freight yards, or in that of some other place, a whole train of big guns, all covered with black tarpaulins and labelled Berlin-Constantinople. It is quite possible that the author of the report imagined all that. If he did not do that himself, then some Rumanian in his service would do it for him, it being with the latter really a case of bread and butter, or *mamaliga*.

I arrived once in Bucharest when a very stiff note had been addressed to the Rumanian government by the Entente governments in regard to this *misuse* of Rumanian territory by the Germans. It was charged that ever so many trainloads of guns and ammunition had gone southward. If I recall the event properly the note was very specific and even gave the number of the freight cars on which the guns had been transported. An investigation by the Rumanian government proved that the things under the black tarpaulins, as specified in the protest, were harvesting machinery of American origin going to some point in the Rumanian Dobrudja.

The Value of the "Information Service"

Needless to say, government officials far from the scene are apt to believe their agents before they give much credence to an innocently inculpated government, especially when they wish to heap up on things that may later be useful in bringing that government into their camp. So it was in Rumania. The government could claim innocence and the best intentions in the world as much as it pleased. In London, Paris and

Petrograd that made little impression. One's own "trusted" agent would not make such a report if he did not know his facts. The case was somewhat complicated by the tendency of the Rumanians to do, in a perfectly good-natured way, little favors in exchange for a few *lei*.

It came about in this manner that Rumania got a bad name and that the governments of the Entente received "military" information of a very doubtful character.

When the British Naval Mission to Turkey left Constantinople in October, 1914, it knew every gun along the Dardanelles and had the number of shells, of both blue-head and red-head variety, armor-piercing and plain shell, down on paper. The emplacements along the straits had for months been under British control, as was the Ottoman navy, and for that reason there were for the British Admiralty no secrets of any kind in the two Ottoman naval services, that is fleet and coast artillery, except it be, and I can hardly assume this, that Admiral Limpus and his officers were so unusually fair that they refused to impart their information to the British Admiralty. Since such is not likely to have been the case, we may take it for granted that the commander of the Allied fleet, which bombarded the Dardanelles in March, 1915, had at his disposal an accurate list of guns and ammunition, together with the plans of every battery along the straits.

Two things he had to count upon. One of them was that the Germans would rearrange the batteries, abandon some of the emplacements, as they did, and then import greater guns and their ammunition from Germany. The latter, especially, must have been deemed probable by the members of the British Naval Mission to Turkey, since they knew well enough how badly outranged and outclassed the artillery in the Dardanelles works was.

Acting upon this circumstance and knowing that the railroad route between Germany and Turkey was not subject as yet to the British blockade, knowing further that the country of the *bakshish* begins with the northern borders of Rumania, the British government and admiralty had no reason to be too skeptical of the reports they were getting from their agents in Bucharest. The stories sent home by these agents, that ever so many guns, and ever so much ammunition, was being shipped through Rumania with the connivance of the minister of railroads, could not be disregarded, of course, especially since some traffic directly related to war was going on. On March 18th, moreover, the fire of the Turkish coast batteries was conducted with such prodigality, considering the shells in the casemates of the emplacements, that the Allied commander could have easily arrived at the conclusion that the Turks had shells of the armor-piercing sort a-plenty. There was also no reason why he should not have

feared that the Turks had more and better guns than when Admiral Limpus left, since the refusal of the Turks and Germans to measure issues at long range could have been interpreted as being merely a strategic move.

I have no means of knowing whether or no this was the actual reason for the failure of the Allied fleet to follow up the advantages gained on March 18th. But it is reasonable to believe that such was the case. Aerial observation had established that the Turkish emplacements were not greatly injured. Three battleships had been sunk by the guns of the Turks, five others had been badly mauled, and even the "Queen Elizabeth," terror of the Turkish coast batteries, had been forced to limp out of action. To the Allied commander no advantage that he had gained was observable, therefore. The advantage in his favor could not be established by reconnaissance in the air, since it was constituted of empty ammunition casemates, hiding their voids under sod-covered parapets.

A stay of five weeks, continuously, at Tchanak Kalé, through which the only road serviceable for military traffic runs, daily visits to two of the emplacements, Forts Anadolu Hamidieh and Tchemenlik—one passes through the latter in going to the first—and continual rounds in the works at Kilid-il-Bahr, Dardanos and Erenkoi, place me in a position to attest that no new guns or ammunition from Germany had arrived as late as August, 1915, at any of the coast batteries along the straits. The changes made consisted of a regroupment of material that was in Turkey when the British Naval Mission was still in charge, and of the importation from Germany of modern sighting apparatus

When March 18th had demonstrated that the Allied fleet meant to force the Dardanelles some guns were added to their defense system—15-cms flat-trajectory pieces and howitzers that came not through Rumania and Bulgaria as charged, but from the works in and about Adrianople and from the redoubts of the Tchataldja line. Since at that moment there was no assurance, so far as the Ottoman government was concerned, that Bulgaria might not join Russia ultimately, it ought to be relatively easy to judge what conditions along the Dardanelles were.

I may mention in this connection again that on March 19th the Ottoman government was ready to leave Constantinople for Eski-Shehir, in Anatolia, a city which was the capital of the Osmanli before they established themselves in Europe. All treasure and records had been loaded on trains in Haidar-Pasha and were ready to pull out on a moment's notice. Much of the packing had been done during the two weeks preceding the major attack on March 18th.

While the daily communiquées of the Ottoman war office breathed confidence galore, for the benefit of the Turk population and as a warning to the Armenians and Greeks, the men in Stamboul knew well enough,

as did those in charge of the Dardanelles, that it was a case of nip and tug at the gates of the Ottoman capital. The actual increase of armament along the straits before March 18th, consisted of five 15-cms rifles, in half-turrets, on the site of the ancient city of Dardanos, which, together with their ammunition of the armor-penetrating variety, had been taken from the German light cruiser "Breslau," the "*Middilih*," companion of the "Goeben." The Turks and Germans had no reason to hope that this would make any great difference in the defense of the straits.

But the Allied government had been misled into the belief that Rumania had permitted large rifles and ammunition to be carried into Turkey, and applied to that the logical conclusion that these pieces had been emplaced at the Dardanelles. With the Great War still very young then, the losses suffered on March 18th could not be repeated, and so it came that the armada of the British and French withdrew ingloriously.

On the quality of military information much depends in war. To have that information accurate is difficult even when experts occupy themselves with it. When its collection is left to crews of the sort the Entente governments had at Bucharest anything may be expected. There is no class that can be quite as dangerous as the male and female camp-followers of diplomacy. The slightest rumor they hear becomes a fact when it has been reduced to the dignity of a report in the diplomatically-privileged mail pouch of the ambassador or minister.

The information may be no more than the vaporing of a "neutral" traveller, who has been in the country of the enemy—hope-inflated Greeks and Armenians, in this instance. On the other hand, it may be a "tip" that was investigated and, according to appearances, verified, or, again, it may be no more than the imagination of an agent whose predilection for cabarets and *maisons de plaisir* left him no time to seriously occupy himself with the mission entrusted to him and who, to stay on the payroll, had to invent "military information."

I have found that the latter class is the most dangerous, for the reason that as a rule its members have the intelligence necessary to make their reports very convincing and quite safe to themselves. Their prevarication is of the most circumstantial sort, and generally defies every effort of exculpating undertaken by the incriminated authorities. The complaining government will under no circumstances admit that it has agents in the country, the government of which is drawn to account, nor will it ever divulge identities.

Perhaps I should state here that already in January, 1915, I met in Bucharest an individual of the latter class, whom a year later I again encountered there. The man came to my attention through his offer to act as my correspondent in Bucharest, when I should be away.

While such a man could be very useful, I had not the necessary authority to make the expenditure involved. Upon telling the man as much, he offered to be very reasonable in his expectations. Even that I could not accept. Several days later he invaded my room at the hotel and offered to work for nothing if I would give him credentials as Associated Press correspondent. That was a little careless on his part. I began to question him and learned that he had a "private" source of income that permitted him to be so magnanimous. I held the matter in abeyance until I had satisfied myself that the man was a rounder on Calea Victoriei, went to bed every morning at five o'clock, after spending the night in the cabarets and *maisons*, and rose in time to have his *feepe* o'clock tea as his breakfast. For that some diplomatic post in Bucharest paid him enough to eat the finest supper afterward and buy champagne for a little *chanteuse*, whom he also kept in board, lodging and raiment. I am sure that the best he would have done with my commission would be its presentation to some military attaché as further proof of his wakefulness and zeal in ferretting out the dark secrets in Bucharest and Rumania.

A Diplomatic Deal in Wheat

That Premier Bratianu had so hard a time making up his mind was due to the uncertainty of his position as head of the government. While he was the actual leader of the Conservatives, Senator Marghiloman, and Peter Carp, the former minister-president, still had a great personal following in the party. M. Bratianu was obliged to constantly reckon with a change in the government, though the death of King Carlos, the pliability of King Ferdinand and the efforts of Queen Marie had left him much better off.

When the Dowager Queen Elizabeth, "Carmen Sylva," passed away, in February, 1916, the last sentimental tie between the royal house of Rumania and the monarchs at Vienna and Berlin was severed. From that moment on the alliance between Austria-Hungary and Rumania was considered as another of the "scraps of paper" in Europe. Meanwhile, Italy had entered the War, and in this the Ententophiles found another argument why Rumania should join the Entente camp.

But the Marghiloman-Carp faction held on for dear life, and out of consideration for its two leaders, Germany did not declare war upon Rumania in January, 1916, the imminency of which was brought on by the grain deals made between the Rumanian Central Commission and the British Purchasing Bureau in Bucharest.

The Rumanian Central Commission had been established for the purpose of regulating exports in breadstuff, legumes, meats, fats and the like.

Food was by now very scarce in the countries of the Central Powers, and every effort was made to get from Rumania all that could be had. But that was not in harmony with the starvation program of the Entente governments. There was enough food in Rumania to offset to quite an extent the endeavor of the British blockade. Feedstuffs for domestic animals were also being produced *en masse*, German agents having induced the Rumanian landowners to plant as many of them as possible. By exporting her entire surplus farm production Rumania would have substantially supported the Central empires, such in fact was the intention of the Marghiloman-Carp combination, which was very influential in the rural districts.

That camp, moreover, had a strong argument on its side. Rumania had in the past imported most of the manufactured commodities it needed, and the War had not changed that. Against this import the country had heretofore exported her large surplus of agricultural produce. The War, also, had not brought any change in this field. Rumania, in order to import had to export. It would have been easy to offset the drain on her wealth, which importing without exporting constituted, by financial assistance from the Allied governments. Indeed, that was attempted quite early in the War. But the Germans had for such maneuvers methods of their own. As in the case of Holland, and that of other neutrals, Germany insisted that for everything exported kind had to be given in return. In all cases food was demanded.

The Bratianu government cast about for deliverance from the condition set by the Central Powers, but found none. The granaries and larders of Russia were then still full to overflowing, being glutted with the surplus of the 1914 and 1915 harvests, which closing of the Dardanelles and the control of the Baltic by the German fleet had left in the country. Russia, therefore, was not importing food, and while the port of Archangelsk had been used to some extent in the summer of 1915 for the exporting of food to France and Great Britain, the Russian railroads between the Rumanian border and Archangelsk were so overcrowded with military traffic as to remove Rumanian grain shipments from the list of probabilities. Then, too, Rumania had found it next to impossible to import over that route. Russia is not a country in which manufacture is carried on to an exporting extent, and to import from France and Great Britain via Norway and Sweden was very expensive—via the port on the White Sea it was most uncertain since Archangelsk had more than it could do taking care of the strictly military traffic.

Rumania, then, faced the situation of having her crops spoil on her hands—literally, since storage facilities were virtually non-existent—and then do without needed imports besides. The governments of Central

Europe became more and more exacting as the problem grew, and Rumania was finally obliged to sell to them whatever they wanted—cereals of all kinds, animal products, and mineral oils.

It seemed for a time that in this manner the efforts of the British blockade would go by the board. While ultimately that blockade was bound to be effective, its result upon the Central empires could, by means of the food in Rumania, be so retarded that the Germanic camp might achieve a victory over the Allies before the pinch was felt too much and the *morale* of the army and civil population undermined.

Rumania had on hand at this particular period about one-half of the large surplus of her crops in 1914, and the entire surplus of her 1915 harvest. For instance, there was then in the country about 340,000 carloads of wheat, ready for export. Since the European carload is ten tons, that meant, if all of this wheat was taken into the Central States, that every man, woman and child would have had about 57 pounds of wheat, making roughly 95 one-pound loaves of bread, as wheat was then milled, in addition to the breadstuffs produced at home. Starvation would have been out of the question then, especially since the Rumanian wheat crop of 1916, some 220,000 carloads, prospectively, would have further reinforced them. Already the War of Attrition was in its first phases, and famine was now more than ever looked upon as the most potent of the Allied forces, as indeed it was, for without starvation the Allied and Associated governments would have never defeated Germany.

The Rumanian premier was not in position to improve this situation in favor of the Allies, so long as the governments in London, Paris and Petrograd looked upon the situation as one solvent by the usual means of export and import. But little by little the Allies learned in that respect. The British Purchasing Bureau was established in Bucharest, and in the last days of December it made an agreement with the Rumanian ministry of agriculture, of which the Central Commission was but a sort of bureau, for the transfer to British ownership of 80,000 carloads of wheat. A general option for the next crop was also engineered.

News of the deal acted like the dropping of a bomb in the Central Countries. The last chance of warding off the spectre of famine seemed gone. Baron von den Bussche Haddenhausen, the German minister at Bucharest, had a few days before been called to Berlin. While he was away from his post the first rumors concerning the deal were heard in the Rumanian capital. Herr von Rheinbaben immediately communicated with his chief, who, after having been given plenary powers in the matter, at a conference of the German cabinet, rushed back to Bucharest, arrived there in the afternoon and an hour later put Premier Bratianu face to face with a declaration of war.

It seems that the grain deal made with the British Purchasing Bureau was looked upon as an unfriendly act in Berlin and Vienna. The facts in the case, as I had occasion to establish them in behalf of the news service I was connected with, were these: The 800,000 tons of wheat had been bought at a price a shade better than what the Germans were paying. There being no opportunity of exporting the grain just then, the Rumanian Central Commission had undertaken to store the wheat in granaries not yet established. Until the transfer of the wheat from the bins of the producers to the magazines all risk was to be assumed by the seller.

It was this feature of the contract that brought out that the Rumanians were dissatisfied with the deal. While the price paid was a little better, there was bound to be a loss to the wheat holders if the grain was not promptly taken off their hands. In addition, the contract was a little too specific and exacting to please men who had sold any sort of wheat to the Central Powers Purchasing Agency, the German and Austro-Hungarian commission having been merged some time before this. The agency bought almost anything that resembled food, and then saw to it that the losses sustained, which at times were enormous, were made good at home by an increase in the price of the articles exported to Rumania, the scheme meaning that the whole of the Rumanian population was being taxed by foreign governments in the interests of the Rumanian landowning class. The contract of the British called for first-class ware, and even its terms of payment were not the best obtainable.

It was frankly announced that the wheat would have to remain in Rumania until the termination of the War. Indeed, there was no alternative for that. As I have already pointed out, the Dardanelles was closed and the Russian railroads could not handle the traffic.

So far, indignation in Rumania was limited to classes that were rather pro-German: the large landowners and the grain dealers, most of the latter being Jews. But when the terms of the deal were later published in their entirety other elements began to denounce the Rumanian government. The trade balance between Rumania and the Central Powers had been liquidated in the past on a basis calling for payment in gold to the extent of one-third. The wheat contract with the British had a similar provision, but went a little further.

The National Bank of Rumania acted as the fiscal agent of the sellers and purchasers of wheat and issued notes of its own for the purpose of paying for the wheat, leaving the gold in the vaults of the Bank of London, which had established a credit for the National Bank of Rumania to the full extent of the sale, about eight million pounds sterling. Since the gold was not actually placed in the possession of the National Bank of

Rumania, and since the issuance of paper currency to the full amount of the purchase price was not guaranteed by anything actually within Rumania, it was charged that the deal amounted to no less than an inflation of the Rumanian currency for the benefit of a foreign government. In the end the case might be one in which the wheat had spoiled on the hands of those who were being compelled by the Rumanian government to sell to the Rumanian Central Commission, and then, according to the terms of the contract between the commission and the seller, the National Bank of Rumania would have the paper currency afloat, but no gold as yet, and the holders of the wheat might have neither wheat nor money. To such a wild-cattling financial transaction even the Ententophiles objected. But the deal had been closed before they could be heard and now it was too late.

Political Business in Plain Language

That the Rumanian Central Commission might engage in some such enterprise must have been feared by the German minister. At any rate he had, before his departure from Bucharest, for Berlin, obtained from King Ferdinand the promise that nothing would be done before giving the Central Powers agency a chance to compete with offers made by the British Purchasing Bureau. After Baron von den Bussche-Haddenhausen had interviewed Premier Bratianu, upon his hasty return from Berlin, he immediately applied for an audience with the King of Rumania, and obtained it the same evening. The scene which took place was not a very polite one. The German minister went so far as to call Ferdinand a man who could not be trusted, using expressions of the bitterest satire.

It was plain that the German minister wanted to provoke the Rumanian government into an act that would have led to war. The military position of the Central States was a good one just then. The Allied forces had been withdrawn from Gallipoli, and the expedition of Sarrail, at Salonika, was somewhat of a jest as yet. In the battle of Kustorino and the Golash Mountain, of which the world never heard anything, because my dispatches dealing with the affair never got further than the British censors, the Allied forces under General Sarrail had been manhandled by the Bulgarians under General Todoroff, in a manner that left them sick at heart, and the prospects at Salonika were just then the poorest. The Russian army had not yet recovered from its retreat in the course of the summer and fall of 1915. In the West the war of the trenches left the French and British none too hopeful, and the Italians seemed unable to get beyond the Tolmein bridgehead and the western fringe of the Carso. In Mesopotamia the British were being driven back by the Turks, and the Russians had a hard time of it in the Caucasus. The Central Powers

governments thought it wise, therefore, to bring the issue of Rumania to liquidation.

King Ferdinand pocketed the insults which the German minister had hurled at him, and Premier Bratianu did the same. Under the circumstances that was the best. Generals Iliescu and Averescu, the leaders of the Rumanian army, were not men whom even M. Bratianu, their patron, could trust very far in questions of efficiency, and so it came that the Rumanian Central Commission made up its mind to sell to the agency of the Central Powers as much as possible—most of the remaining wheat, great quantities of maize, beans, barley and oats, pork, butter, fats and mineral oils.

Had it not been for the efforts of Senator Marghiloman and Peter Carp even that would not have saved Rumania. The Central Powers governments feared that in the end Bratianu would, as the general character of the wheat deal indicated already, join the Entente camp anyway.

Mr. Marghiloman began to use gentle words with the German minister, and Mr. Carp did his best with Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian envoy. The two of them argued that it would be better to continue Rumania as a food-producing neutral than to plunge her into the War, which might lead to nothing more than the disorganization of the one country which could meet to some extent the effects of the British blockade. That much I learned from Senator Marghiloman.

What other promises he made I have no means of knowing. I should mention, *en passant*, that after this incident M. Marghiloman thought little enough of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians. I lunched with him quite often and during the long promenades made in the *solarium* he showed me that he was a thoroughly disillusioned man. It could not be otherwise, since his country was beset on all sides by nations that were friendly only so long as Rumania could please them. Russia might assume a threatening attitude at the very moment when M. Blondel and Sir H. Barclay were using the softest words in persuasion. The temper of the diplomatists of the Central Powers was enough to prove that the *ultima ratio* was desired in Berlin and Vienna, and in the Bulgarian press writers were very outspoken in regard to the Dobrudja and the Treaty of Bucharest.

Accepting that the true patriot looks in such a crisis at the future of his own country and people, even if he had exploited this people as much as Senator Marghiloman had done, instead of considering the welfare of other aggregates, I must say that the senator deserves to be classed as one of the best of them. He was no demagogue of the Sylla type, but a man who believed in government by the fit, without drawing fine distinctions in this fitness.

After a while the wrath of Berlin and Vienna subsided, and since the possibility of a war had been set back a little, for the time being, I decided to return to Vienna. I mention this on account of an incident en route, recording of which seems rather relevant.

Before I left Bucharest I was told that I could not get further than Predeal by train, since right beyond the border a bad wreck had blocked the line, with no prospect of its being cleared away in a hurry. There had been heavy snows, and when these fall the Transylvanian Carpathians are not the easiest mountains to cross. From Predeal to Kronstadt I would have to travel by sleigh. I was advised not to risk that, travel on the pass being anything but safe when there was a possibility of lavines coming down the high mountain sides.

I decided to sleigh it, because I wanted to get a look at the military preparations that were being made in the pass by the Austrians, on their side, and the Rumanians, on theirs. That there was something going on I had learned in this manner. On my trip southward three weeks before the conductor had ordered all passengers into the dining car. When this command had been complied with the trainhands and waiters pulled down every window shade and then saw to it that none was raised while the train sped through the border zone. That was a very fine way of announcing that something was going on. I surmised what it might be and was glad of the chance of sleighing through at least a part of the zones on both sides of the boundary.

Some Matters Incident to Warfare

I saw little enough until I reached the scene of the wreck, and then I learned how the Central Powers were getting rubber. It had been hoped by their enemies that a shortage in rubber would soon hamper the Germans and their allies, but that moment never came, as I ascertained from riding about the fronts in cars having very good tires.

The wrecked train consisted of about thirty freight cars, most of which had been derailed by brake-failure, on a steep grade, with the result that now they lay at the base of a high embankment a little south of Temes.

About one-half of the train had been piled up. Its freight of wheat and mineral oil was now a scramble. Russian prisoners of war were trying to save whatever they could, and I noticed that German officers and soldiers commanded them. The wheat was soaked with the contents of the oil tank-cars on top of the pile, and seemed to get little attention. Some large, black disks, two inches in thickness, and about two feet in diameter, seemed to deserve the greatest care. I wondered what the stuff

was, and then noticed that the open belly of a freightcar was filled with a mixed cargo of wheat and these disks. I smelled a rat, left the sleigh and examined one of the black wheels, to find on one side of each of them lettering in Russian and Latin, showing that the rubber, for such it was, came from the Putiloff Works in Russia. Evidently, there was some room for "civil" traffic on either the Russian railroads or in some Russian port. Rumanians no doubt had imported this rubber from Russia and then sold it to the Central Powers. I am no expert in such matters, but concluded that the shipment wrecked, but now about to be salvaged, would keep hundreds of automobiles going for many months. No doubt, there had been other shipments and there would be more.

Entering Temes and Kronstadt, further on, I found that German troops of some sort were near the Rumanian border. Inquiry elicited the information that these troops were concerned with the heavy imports of wheat and such made from Rumania. That may have been so. At least I have no right to say that it was not so, seeing that I know no better. For all that I was not able to dissociate entirely the language of Baron von den Bussche-Haddenhausen and the conciliancy of the Rumanian government from the many billeting notices I saw on the houses, and the sign above a schoolhouse in Temes which said that here were the headquarters of a certain German cavalry organization.

I must state, however, that German cavalry did occupy itself a great deal with transportation by motor truck. A few days later I had an interview with Count Tisza, the Hungarian minister-president. From his remarks I gathered that the crisis between the Central governments and Rumania had been most acute, but that now it was in subsidency, as he expressed it.

I will take the liberty to point out here that during the entire duration of the Great War I never allowed myself to be influenced by the appearance of things or the asseverations of governments and diplomatists. I had watched the coming of the crisis in South Africa, in 1896 and again in 1899, had borne arms in the defense of the Boer republics, and had since then occupied myself very much with political situations and war, doing service as newspaperman in Mexico and along the border before and during the revolutions. War had thus become to me what it actually is, a strictly biological incident in the life of nations. The pretexts of government meant absolutely nothing to me; toward statements made by politicians in office and diplomatists on and off post I reserved the skeptical attitude with which we newspaper men are now blessed, then cursed.

An estimate, along these lines, of Rumania's chances of staying out of the European War led to a conclusion that these chances were nil, despite the fact that Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian minister at

Bucharest, succeeded now to leadership in the management of Central Power interests in Rumania.

The excitement having blown over already by the beginning of March, 1916—the same year—Rumania again was looked upon in the old light. It would be best to keep her producing food, even if some of it was sold to the British Purchasing Bureau. At least one-half of the surplus of harvests could be demanded, and half a loaf was now more than ever better than none in Germany, Austria-Hungary and even Turkey, to which country Rumanian wheat flour was also exported. It had been shown by that time that occupying hostile territory made great demands on the man power of the Central governments. In Russia, Poland, Serbia, and in Belgium and France, not to mention Turkey and Bulgaria, and the long lines of communication to the several fronts, hundreds of thousands of men were needed for administrative purposes, and while few of these were longer fit for service in the trenches, the man power of the Central Powers group of belligerents was seriously lessened thereby nevertheless.

Bratianu Makes a Diplomatic Deal

Already it was plain that in the end Germany and her allies might conquer themselves to death, a feature of the "war map" which at first was not given enough attention. But among the several truths which were then breaking into the minds in Berlin and Vienna was also this one. Rumania was left in peace and the several commercial understandings reached with her were all more or less reasonable, some of them highly advantageous to her in fact. It came to be the slogan in Central Europe that Rumania was the best ally as a neutral, in which it was not forgotten that her entry in the War on either side would lead to an extension of the Russian front that might bring greater disadvantages than it could bring advantages, even if her participation was in favor of the Central Powers.

Senator Marghiloman had used that very often as an argument in reply to those who wanted action on the part of his country, but he did not always convince the enthusiasts on both sides who thought that Rumania could decide the War—quite the most amusing hypothesis that was ever set up. The value of the Rumanian army to either of the camps was a very low one. There were indeed good troops, but the greater part of the establishment was very poor in quality, and the War had shown that an army not uniform in *morale* was a dangerous thing to handle on a long front. The adage that no chain is stronger than its weakest link was being proven by the Austro-Hungarian troops every day.

It was a case of sentiment which later on drove Rumania into the War on the side of the Allies. There was to be a *Rumania mare*—Greater Rumania.

In April Premier Bratianu had finally made up his mind to a thing he should have attempted while the Russian army was still good and was pressing the Germans and Austro-Hungarian armies hard in the Carpathians. The war spirit was at low ebb in the dual monarchy at that time, late fall and winter of 1914, and Rumania's entry into the War would have produced a political effect which it could not produce after the population of the Danube countries had become used to losses and reverses, to war with Italy, and to deprivation. Gradually applied, distress and privation will harden any people finding itself in a desperate position, and so it came that, in Austria and Hungary, Rumania's decision caused only a temporary stir, though the oppositionists in the Hungarian parliament, wishing to hit at Count Tisza, made much ado over the initial successes of the Rumanian army and the occupation of much of Transylvania in August and September of 1916.

I was at that time temporarily attached to the Ninth German army, commanded by General Falkenhayn, the former chief of staff of the German army, and thus was able, as I had already done in the case of Turkey and Bulgaria, to see diplomacy translated to the battlefield. I saw the wrecked camps and wagon trains of the routed Second Army of the Rumanians, in the Vörös Torony Pass, the futile attempts to hold the passes further east, the childish attempts at fortification by Rumanian military engineers, in the Törzburger Pass, and the crushing of Rumanian resistance in the Predeal Pass, the one through which I had sleighed a few months before.

Before the onslaught of that truly terrible German war machine the Rumanian regiments were the veriest chaff, as I saw on the afternoon on which Predeal was taken. I thought of Senator Marghiloman as I sat in the fork of a stout oak, fifteen hundred yards away from the Rumanian trenches, for the attack of which the German and Hungarian infantry was deploying a few hundred feet away.

The treaty which bound Rumania to enter the War was finally signed on August 16th. Rumania was to get all of Transylvania, the Banat and Bukowina—the same Banat, by the way, which had already been promised to another ally, Serbia. But at that moment the Serb army was hardly in being and the Allied governments had to practice "Realpolitik" in the chancelleries, while the ideal in international relations, and the weal of small nations was *attended to* by the newspapers. To make ideal and practice a little more agreeable to one another, Rumania was bound to "indemnify the Serbians of the Banat, who, in abandoning their proper-

ties, wish to emigrate within two years from the conclusion of peace." This, indeed, was a new twist in self-determination, but presently there were to be more of these. It makes no difference to a diplomatist what he promises or has promised. He will always lie his way out.

In the realization of the desire for a "*Rumania mare*"—which two words I found written on nearly every public building in Transylvania and over every gate-keeper's cabin on the railroads in the district—the Rumanian army was to get the following support: General Brousiloff was to continue with increased vigor his attacks on the Centralists in the Carpathians, and Russia was to send into Rumania, and against the Bulgars, via the Dobrudja, two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, while General Sarrail was to start an offensive from Salonika. These reinforcements of the Rumanian army could not be called excessive, nor even generous, considering what that army really was.

On August 27th the Rumanian government declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and, the passes of the mountains of southern Transylvania being poorly defended, owing to the lack of man power and bad management on the part of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, then still in the hands of the congenial but rather inefficient Hoetendorff, much Hungarian territory was soon in the hands of the Rumanian army. On August 29th Bulgaria announced that a state of war existed between it and Rumania, a course that was taken also on the same day by the Ottoman government, which, in anticipation of this, had eight days before declared war upon Italy, to which the government in Rome replied with a declaration of war to Germany on August 28th. This cycle of war declarations was later closed by Germany declaring war upon Rumania on September 14th, when her Ninth Army was already in Hungary and ready to throw the Rumanian forces out of Transylvania, which was easily accomplished with a minimum of losses to the forces under General Falkenhayn. Meanwhile, Bulgarian, German and Turkish forces, under Mackensen, were driving the Rumanian army and the Russian contingents before them in the Dobrudja and across the Danube, northward. A few weeks later Bucharest had been taken and the Russo-Centralist front extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Rumania had no great friends among the Allies. Russia was anything but trusted, and the population did not have its heart in the business on hand. In a very interesting report made by General Palivanoff, on November 20, 1916, we find the following:

"From the standpoint of Russian interests, we must be guided by the following considerations in judging the present situation in Rumania. If things had developed in such a way that the military and political agreement of 1916 with Rumania had been fully

realized, then a very strong state would have arisen in the Balkans, consisting of Moldavia, Wallachia, the Dobrudja (i. e., the present Rumania), and Transylvania, the Banat and Bukovina, with a population of about 13,000,000. In the future this state could hardly have been friendly disposed towards Russia, and would scarcely have abandoned the design of realizing its national dreams in Bessarabia and the Balkans. Consequently, the collapse of Rumania's plans as a Great Power is not particularly opposed to Russia's interest. This circumstance must be exploited by us in order to strengthen for as long as possible those compulsory ties which link Russia to Rumania. Our successes on the Rumanian front are for us of extraordinary importance, as the only possibility of deciding once for all in the sense we desire the question of Constantinople and the Straits."

After all Senator Marghiloman was right and Bratianu wrong.

For the author of the above it may be said that he was as good a diplomatist of the modern type as he was a soldier. If you cannot gain by the successes of your allies, profit by their failure.

XII

DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC OPINION

RUMANIA'S somewhat spectacular appearance in the arena of the European War marked the end of the Expansion Phase of that conflict. It was likewise the inauguration of the Attrition Phase. The Russian successes on the Rumanian front of which General Palivanoff spoke were not so much feats of arms as tactical advantages over the waning man power of the Centralist camp. Though the mass attacks of General Brousiloff, commander of the Russian South Army, had been virtually stifled by now in the blood of the Russians themselves, the German general staff saw the Eastern Front extended far beyond its means. That front could be held, to be sure, and was held, but it was taxing the military means of the Central Powers and their allies by its very length. The German army, in the face of its successes in Rumania, which were the cheapest it had so far bought, was very much in the position of the pugilist whose arms are shorter than those of the antagonist. The Eastern Front was a thing without end, and the Central Power troops found that holding it was not dissimilar to beating the air with one's fists. Nothing came to the occupation of almost as much territory as Germany itself, and nothing could come of it. In a way the experience of Napoleon was being repeated, though this time the catastrophe came leisurely, because the modern means of transportation, which the Corsican did not have in 1812, held back for a longer time the inevitable.

The number of men in Berlin and Vienna who saw this was not small. I happen to know that Emperor Charles of Austria, and Count Czernin, his really able minister of foreign affairs, were among the first to stand in fear of the space that had been gained in the East. The German chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, also, was no longer convinced of the virtues of the "War Map." It was evident that all this sparring about in the air, was not bringing the end of the War nearer—and the end of the War, more than occupation and the like, seemed now the thing most to be desired. Of land there was a surfeit now, but of the food that could be produced on it, a great scarcity. To raise food requires labor and much of it, and that labor could not be had, so long as the men were in the trenches or in the ammunition works, and the women most of their time in the food lines.

Thus it came about that Emperor William II made overtures for peace. These overtures, as the world will have reason to remember for many a day, were turned down, because the Allied governments, rather than their peoples, chose to look upon them as beneath their serious notice. It was said that the offer of the German government was insincere and too indefinite. On the face of things it was that. The announcement confined itself to saying that Germany and her allies were now in a mood to be spoken to by the half-defeated enemies, and as a perfectly useless *jeu de grimace* the "War-Map" was invoked again—for the last time, so far as "foreign" relations of the Central Powers went.

But there is no reason to believe that a more tactful offer of peace would have fared better, under the circumstances. Men in the French government, especially, felt that the Central Power troops were beating about wildly in the space they had conquered, and seeing now for the first time a silver lining on the dark clouds that had hovered over France for two long years they made up their mind to see the thing along a little more. In France the stage had been reached where improvement only was possible. It could not be worse, even if now and then a regiment had to be disbanded and its men distributed to organizations with better *morale*. In Great Britain the childish bombardments by Zeppelins and aeroplane had roused public frenzy to the fusing point, and in Russia, though Sazonoff was now no more, too much had to be gained by the continuation of the War—everything to be lost by its cessation. The offer of the German emperor was spurned therefore—with a hollow laugh at that. Men in London, Paris and Petrograd knew perfectly well that the United States would be heard from before the end came.

The Fruit of Diplomacy Begins to Ripen

There were a good many forms to the pitfalls of the War Map. One of them was that the general public of Central Europe cared no longer whether or no there was such a thing. It wanted food, not territory. Food being on the wane, prices high, taxation already unbearable, and nothing but more war in sight, the public had come to look at the War Map as a mockery, which, indeed, it was. The great enthusiasm of the early war days was now a thing of the past. War was becoming a matter of routine—a never-ending succession of more levies in men and money, and more dead and crippled, with an ever-increasing mortality rate, due to malnutrition; an ever-gaining laxity in morals, and unceasing misery as a doleful accompaniment. To be sure the efficiency of the German army had only then reached its highest point, but that of the Austro-Hungarian army was already sadly on the decline, and Bulgaria and Turkey were sick of

the War, even if Macedonia, for the one, and Gallipoli and the very national capital, for the other, were now securely held, so far as appearances went.

Great things were ahead. The British government was now about to throw real armies into France, and that country herself was scouring her bans. Though Brusiloff had driven Russians into death by the tens of thousands, the vast reservoir upon which he drew seemed as inexhaustible as ever. On the Carso the Italians were making some gains now, and more men were being drafted into the armies. There was on in every enemy country a race for still greater armament than had yet been made. Eighty per cent of the White Race was arming, and of that another eighty per cent was arming against the Central Powers, with the United States turning more and more into a huge military base and universal arsenal for the forces of the Allies. Throughout Central Europe these things were seen and discussed *in camera*. Government and population, in the process of being pressed more and more into a compact mass by the pressure from without, looked at one another and then turned away. Times were hard, indeed!

But even that was not all. Germany had not a single friend anywhere, it seemed. "Belgium" and "Lusitania," which to many had remained empty nouns, began to have a great meaning. The weight of world public opinion was a crushing thing. It had been quite a favorite slogan of some classes in Germany: "We can do without friends, so long as they must respect us." Now it was seen that it was hard to get along without friends. None was in sight. There was partial support of the cause of the Central Powers in Sweden and Switzerland, and even in Holland it was still possible to find now and then a person not entirely Germanophobe. Denmark and Norway were on the list of unfriendly neutrals, and far-away Spain was clearly divided in its sympathies. Farsighted men, among them Count Tisza, had already realized that the Central Powers could not emerge victors from the War without coming to a reckoning with the United States also. On February 26th, 1916, already, the Hungarian minister-president had expressed himself to me in that sense. At the conclusion of a two-hours interview, Count Tisza, in reply to my question as to how much of his statements I could use, placed a pad of paper in my hand. Then he left his chair and walked several times up and down the spacious room that was his office.

"Please, say this for me," he said, as he stopped before me:

"For the United States to engage in the European War would be a crime against humanity."

When I had written this down, Count Tisza took the pad out of my hand.

"Yes! That is all I can say," he remarked. "It may be too much at that. At any rate that is my conviction. Before this thing is over President Wilson will have created the needed situation. But don't say that. You would not get it past our censors. You would not even get this much past our censors, for that matter. I will inform Latinovitch (his private secretary) to do what is necessary to get this through."

That was more than a year before relations between the United States and Austria-Hungary were severed by the latter.

Of the assininity displayed by the German government in regard to Belgium I have already spoken. Though other small nations had meanwhile fared as badly almost at the hands of the Entente governments, Belgium was a ghost that would not down. Presently it was to be joined and reinforced by the Lusitania affair.

It is hard to understand what the mentality of Great-Admiral von Tirpitz and his staff was when it was decided to attack the Lusitania with the means of the submarine, the torpedo. To be sure the attitude of President Wilson was as yet but poorly defined, and in Germany wholly misunderstood. What his views were on the question of submarine warfare versus cruiser warfare, on enemy and neutral merchant ships, was as yet scarcely known. As a matter of fact it was the later exchange of notes which seems to have crystalized in Mr. Wilson himself what his attitude was to be.

Allied Diplomacy Is Editor-in-Chief

Since this matter will be more fully discussed further on, I will dismiss the subject here with the statement that the sinking of the Lusitania was in many respects an act more foolish than the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Granting that, from the point of view of the Germans, the Lusitania should have been sunk, the act was, nevertheless, that of a mad-cap militarist, incapable of recognizing the political features and consequences of his conduct. No matter what the facts in the case, the political discredit that was bound to come from sinking a ship well loaded with passengers, many of whom were sure to be Americans, was too great a responsibility for any man to assume. Nor is it possible here, from the standpoint of statesmanship, to give weight to the protests made by an apologizing government that the commander of the submarine had been instructed to fire the torpedo in such a manner that it would serve as a warning rather than the knell of doom for those aboard the vessel and those owning and operating her.

It had been shown quite recently in the loss of the "Titanic" that ships of that type could sink as quickly as a plummet. To send a torpedo

into the side of such a structure was taking too great a risk at the expense of a world as yet not initiated into the state of things that was to come. News of the attack itself would have been stunning enough, and might have produced the very result desired, to be sure, yet the flying stone out of the hand of the thrower is the devil's weapon, as an old saying has it. Tirpitz *et al* might have thought of that. But it seems that they did not think of it.

The combination of *Belgium* and *Lusitania* was more than Germany and her allies could stand, especially since an outraged public opinion was thereafter to be fed entirely on what the British and French governments prescribed. So far as communication between Central Europe and the Western Hemisphere was concerned, Great Britain and France were in absolute control. Between Europe and the Americas there was not a single cable which the governments of the two countries did not control, and, as I have shown already in a preceding chapter, that control was ruthless in the extreme, especially when later the confiscation of the mails was undertaken.

Concerning public opinion vague notions are held. Those who think of it superficially seem to be under the impression that it is something of the mind of men and women itself—an indigenous product of one's mentality. But that is merely a snap judgment. The thing which in this instance is mistaken for one's own opinion is not the substance of that opinion but the faculty of being able to form such an opinion. Tool and handiwork are confounded with one another. It is forgotten that between hammer and anvil there is a substance that is being shaped, that the anvil is the sum total of the individual's experience and the hammer the state of mentality of the moment.

In times of stress and war the substance between the two is the news of the day—the reports of the event that is engrossing the public mind. It is the nature of these reports which ultimately determines the quality of public opinion. If these reports be one-sided, by reason of originating almost entirely in the same quarter, then, public opinion necessarily will be one-sided, or partial. If, on the other hand, the reports come from both sides, the public will have a better chance of forming an impartial opinion, because it will make comparisons, and in the very nature of things one set of reports will influence and modify the other. The public will then be able to form a general opinion more or less in harmony with the local situation and the elements of environment, as was observed in the case of the small neutrals of Europe, whose press had access to the news from both camps of belligerents.

Control of the cables, and later of the mails, by Great Britain and France, placed in their hands by the International Postal Conventions, and

later badly stretched to suit the needs of the Entente group, made it absolutely impossible for the American public to ever get the right focus on affairs in Europe. To prevent the people of the United States seeing conditions in their proper light was indeed the very purpose of the ruthless censorship applied in Great Britain and France, though I should name the latter country first, because it was by far the meanest offender. Thus it came about that the American public saw only one side of the European War.

It is not certain that seeing both sides would have changed things very much in the end. The affinity of the American people toward the British public has always been greater than that toward any other, certain historical facts taken into consideration. Despite an occasional outbreak of "philism" for this or that people in Europe or elsewhere, the American public has always been decidedly pro-British, which need not cause us to wonder, since the two people have much more in common than both have been willing to recognise and admit. Community of language, to some extent history and tradition and institution, the same literature and an American press that gathered four-fifths of its news in London or relayed it from there, and, lastly many close family ties in the most influential of classes in the United States, could not but bring about a situation such as existed when Great Britain had been in the War a few months and when "Belgium" and "Lusitania" were on every lip.

Though I was thousands of miles away at that time—in Europe—I was from the very first half-convinced that the United States would be heard from before the War was over, as a matter of fact, during the interview with Count Tisza just mentioned I had expressed the fear that the views of the Hungarian premier were all too well founded. When in spite of his convictions, Count Tisza still hoped for the best, and therewith coupled that it would be an injustice on the part of Mr. Wilson not to see that there was every element of justification behind the stand the Central Powers had taken on "submarine versus supramarine blockade," I mentioned casually that the German-Austrians would in all probability take the German view of a thing no matter what that view was and that the effect of racial affinity would be the same the other way. I pointed out that the very use of the same language was all that was necessary to bring this about, for the reason that use of the same speech would have made the mind of the one the more receptive for the arguments and appeals of the other. What the voice of a mother is to her children, language is to peoples using it. It wakes in both cases the dormant memories of a common past and calls both to thoughts for the future even if, as in the case of the United States population, such relationship concerns ethnologically but two-fifths of the people.

Mr. Melville E. Stone, general manager of the Associated Press of America, had, on October 5th, 1914, already found the censorship situation in London "extraordinary." The fact was that little of the copy written by four Americans in Berlin, an Englishman in Vienna, and myself and an assistant at The Hague was getting to New York. The report of the seven correspondents was very heavy, usually, running from 3,000 to 5,000 cable words every day, and reaching on several occasions the total of 8,000, especially when one of the correspondents of the service had been able to get into Holland from Belgium and was writing from there uncontrolled by the German censors.

When the American Press Was Less Partial

In those early days of the War both sides were still wanted by the American press, despite the fate of Belgium. On September 21st, 1914, Mr. Stone wrote me as follows:

"There is not quite as much color in it as I would like. (This in reference to the matter written by one of the men at Berlin.) By color I mean descriptive of the conditions in Germany: home life, farm life, etc., scenes and incidents in Berlin which might be of human interest. I do not mean too much of this and, therefore, I hesitate to make this suggestion. The Berlin report seems to be rather dry and of course necessarily meagre. You might forward these suggestions to (here follows the name of the man). * * * Again, it would be well to ask if he could confer with the German authorities and see if there would be any possibility of an Associated Press correspondent or two going with the German army. Advise him that the British and French have absolutely refused to allow any American correspondents with their armies and I should think, under the circumstances the Germans might be willing to do it and the reports from these correspondents might come out by wireless or through you. Of course they would have to be handled carefully in order to pass the British censorship which surpasses anything I have ever known for stupidity."

For the purpose of dealing with the "extraordinary situation" in London I had inaugurated, largely at first to make proper accounting for the considerable sums of money I was paying out in cable tolls, for my own, and the relayed matter from Berlin, a system of numbering dispatches and keeping two carbon copies of each. One set of these copies, together with a list of dispatches and the number of words contained in each, I would forward at the end of each fortnight to the Associated Press office at London, and the other set of copies and records to New York. The counting of the words was necessary to prove first that the toll sheet

was right, secondly, how much of the dispatch had been suppressed by the British censors, and what interpolations had been made, if any, while the numbering showed easily what dispatches had been "killed" entirely. It was in this manner learned what great sums were being spent by the service for nothing. Not enough with suppressing the dispatches, the British government did not refund the tolls on telegrams it did not deliver.

On September 3rd I received a letter from Robert M. Collins, the chief of the London Bureau of the service, in which he complained that a large number of my dispatches had been held up, the censor being in this instance kind enough to inform him that the cables in question would not be delivered.

In reply I wrote in part:

"Dispatches from German war correspondents reveal the location of French and English troops and while this in itself may be of little importance to the public such data are almost indispensable to an intelligent description of the action. I have written my stories so that they would give the least possible degree of offense to the censors—with the feeling, however, that I was successfully ham-strung. Some directions from you on this subject, and suggestions as to the betterment of copy would be highly appreciated. Naturally, I am curious to know how much of my stuff gets through. You might devote some spare moment to dropping me a line on this subject."

The censors had in this case advanced the argument that my dispatches contained military information. Since I was not at the front I had gathered that "military" information from Dutch and German newspapers and the private report of the "Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant" to which I had access before publication in that paper. If there was "military" information in my copy it could be of interest only to the British and French and in no way harmful to them, since it came from the side of the Germans. Accepting that it was possible to get news into Germany, over the Sayville wireless system—the United States being the destination of my dispatches—no stretch of the imagination would permit the British censors to claim that the "military" information I picked up in Holland, be it from the news service in question, or the newspapers, was not already at the disposal of the German general staff. My dispatches were going away from Germany and not into it, and for this reason the contention raised in London was based on something else—keeping the public of the United States in ignorance of what was going on.

But the British censors stoutly continued to defend their untenable position. Mr. Frederick Roy Martin, assistant general manager of the Associated Press, then active in London, wrote me a letter similar to that of Mr. Collins, to which on September 15th, I replied—in part:

“Already the coast districts (of the Netherlands) are in ‘staat van beleg,’ equivalent of state of siege, and while I was at Vaals the ‘gemeente’ Rotterdam—country districts of this city—was added to districts under military control.”

I meant to say by that, that it was impossible to maintain across the frontiers of Holland such an efficient “military” information service as the London censors seemed to believe. The fact was that their own army and that of the French permitted no war correspondents to be present in the zone of action, and that such highly entertaining “news from the front,” as was then being dished out to the British and American publics, through English and French channels, was the product of the imagination. With this the stories written by the American correspondents who were admitted to the German front, although only for days at a time, could not possibly agree.

It was not merely a case of reserving all possible space in the press of the United States for reading matter of British and French origin and tendency, but to also keep up the appearance of authenticity of that matter. Up to that time, it will be remembered, the German army had things its own way, a state of affairs which the battle of the Marne had indeed changed somewhat but not enough to make any material difference in the general situation, which was anything but promising to the Entente. Newspaper matter from Holland and Germany would have shown, at the very least, that there was a great discrepancy between the accounts from the two sides, and that would have led to questioning of an unwelcome sort for the British and French, since the general aspect favored the versions from the German side.

The British Censors Were a Touchy Lot

Meanwhile the British censors had complained that the reports of the Associated Press correspondents in Berlin and The Hague were one-sided. My reply to Mr. Martin on September 18th was in part as follows:

“I don’t know what can be done to make our service from here look more neutral. It would be folly to repeat to London what comes from London, Paris and Petrograd. That I am taking the best care of the Belgian side, as far as I do so by means of the local specials has been demonstrated, I believe. You will agree with me that a split service such as this, must of necessity appear one-sided—just as one-sided as others could claim of the service out of London. I am sure that Mr. Conger exercises the greatest caution—and I am doing the same.”

In explanation of the above I wish to state that the British censors had complained that the stories coming from the Continent were one-sided

in so far as they did not mention the British and French troops except as the enemies of the Germans. I suppose, the matter originating on the other side referred to the Germans and Austro-Hungarians as *friends*. As I said in my letter it would have been "folly to repeat to London what comes from London, Paris and Petrograd." The American news services could get that in London, without having to station men on the continent and investing more money in cable tolls which usually resulted in nothing practical.

It having meanwhile been shown to the management of the Associated Press that the British and French governments were bent upon nothing less than withholding from the American public the material upon which an intelligent view of the War could be based, I was instructed to write a weekly resumé of the military activities. With the first one of these, I forwarded on September 20th to Mr. Martin a letter which I will quote the essentials of :

"I hope you will find the discussion as impartial as it should be and as I have been trying hard to make it. You will notice that there is no reference to the question of whether or no this war was started by this or that party, or whether or no it is justifiable. I have dealt altogether with military aspects and facts, and while telling the truth has latterly become a punishable offense, I felt that nevertheless the information contained in my screech might be welcome."

But what the American newspapers wanted was not a weekly resumé that would be stale by the time it reached them, but what is known as "hot-off-the-wire stuff." The New York office of the Associated Press kept up importuning the London bureau, and Mr. Collins would promptly relay these "kicks" to me, knowing only too well, however, that all this was useless. On September 24th I wrote a letter to Mr. Stone, the general manager, for the purpose of letting him know what the position of the staff on the Continent was. It said partly :

"I am bringing this matter to your attention, because I forwarded to the New York office last week the copies of the dispatches censored—delivered and suppressed. It is quite possible that by looking over these copies you may be able to get a fair picture of what British censorship is.

"Though I have no means of knowing now what the dispatches dealt with, I take it for granted that most of them were 'Wolff' taken from the *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*, or possibly specials of that paper. At the time when these dispatches were filed, I used a great deal of the matter supplied that paper by an excellent staff of correspondents, sending no Reuter or Havas, of course."

The dispatches of the Reuter and Havas semi-official agencies of Great

Britain and France, respectively, came into Holland via London, of course, and were forwarded by the London bureau of the service long before I saw them in The Hague or Rotterdam. The service of the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* dealt largely with the state of things in Belgium, and was of the highest quality. It has been said that my use of it resulted in the relief work which was later done in Belgium, because through these dispatches the hardships suffered by the Belgian population were first made known.

The New York general management of the service persisted in its endeavor to get more news of the German side of the War. The full purpose of the British and French censorships being as yet not entirely understood, I wrote to Mr. Charles E. Kloeber, chief of the news division of the Associated Press, on October 3rd, a letter which I think will stand citing a second time:

"However, the only thing to do is to carry on this most unsatisfactory sort of labor. Meanwhile, I may not have to tell you that the English censor is not concerned with suppressing military news as much as news favorable to Germany—which of course is the same thing in the end. I suspect strongly that some nine interviews I secured from Americans, returning from various parts of Germany, on August 19th, never reached the London office, though the term "mobilization" was the only military word used in them. At any rate I saw in one of the American papers the bare announcement that a special train from Berlin had arrived in Rotterdam with some 300 refugees aboard. After that I feared the worst, of course, and a few days later Mr. Patterson, of the Chicago Tribune, told me that he had good reason to believe that the English censors went so far as to interpolate their own views into copy. What a person can do, with that sort of 'scrutiny' on the other end of the wire, I really don't know."

Shortly after this, I was instructed by Mr. Stone to go to Berlin in an effort to improve the service from the countries of the Central Powers. If possible, I was to go to the West front and stay there. But I found the German general staff was not interested in having foreign correspondents permanently at its press headquarters. The personally-conducted parties that were made every two weeks or so did not interest me very much, and so I decided to try my luck with the Austro-Hungarian army. In this effort I was more successful. I was admitted as a permanent member of the war press headquarters, but found that I was expected to write only of those things which were thought advantageous to the Austro-Hungarian government and Germany. After living in muddy, cholera-infected and typhus-stricken Galicia for a while, and following in the tracks of General Potiorek in Serbia for another few weeks, seeing the Russians break into Hungary and visiting no end of hospitals, I decided

that I was not worth my salt to the service, and took such steps as I deemed necessary, an outline of which will be found in the following letter to Mr. Stone, the general manager, dated December 12th:

"I found that it did not pay the Associated Press to keep a man with the Austro-Hungarian 'Kriegspressequartier,' and asked for my relief. After this had been given me, I was asked to present the case in person at general staff headquarters. This I did, but no improvement could be promised. I decided then to leave. Old battlefields may be seen every day, but, as I told the officer in charge of the correspondents, those are of greater interest to the military critic and historian than to the American public."

Contradicting an English Balkan "Expert"

Cholera, typhus, small-pox, "kooties," mud and what not considered, life at the Austro-Hungarian war press headquarters was most agreeable, but it did not lead to much copy that was worth while—everything being personally conducted and explained, which explanation the military censors were in the habit of paying too much attention to when reading our dispatches afterward.

Shortly thereafter I found myself in the Balkans. I had been instructed to study the situation there, because already the London press was sure that before long the entire peninsula would be at war with the Germans and their ally. I found that this was not so, as I have shown in previous chapters, and thereby made myself a very bad reputation in London. The views of Mr. J. D. Bouchier, the well known correspondent of the *London Times*, on the Balkan, were very interesting, no doubt, but lacked a proper realization of the actual conditions. Nevertheless, here was an American newspaper man who undertook to contradict Mr. Bouchier—without knowing at the time what Mr. Bouchier was writing. The result of this was that the British censors invited Mr. Martin, the assistant general manager of the Associated Press, to find another sphere of activity for me. Mr. Martin refused to do this on the ground that, as he put it at the time, the Associated Press was running its own business.

To send a man so marked to Constantinople was a risky undertaking, yet it was done. But Mr. Martin was wise enough to "expect mostly mail matter" from there, knowing too well that this would be the only means of getting news from that part of the world past the British censors. The mail was yet secure so long as it avoided British ports, as did some of the steamers plying between New York and Norway, and a little later Mr. Martin was able to write me:

"Your mail matter is extensively used and I think we got it all. Your cabled matter is slaughtered, naturally."

Quite unexpectedly my account of the action of the Allied fleet against the Turkish coast batteries along the Dardanelles, on March 18th had gotten past the British censors. On March 26th I received the following telegram:

“Roy Martin telegraphs congratulations excellent story eighteenth first delivered us by cable stop reached here twenty fourth stop spare no expense accelerate to damon.”

The burden of this message was that the British censors had suppressed every cable of mine which I had written from the Dardanelles—eleven in number up to that time, as my records show, totalling 9782 words, and dealing with the futile attempts to silence the Turkish batteries, delivered from March 1st to March 12th, 1915. The dispatch of March 18th, the British censors, *even*, could not suppress, because the world was bound to learn anyway of the defeat of the Allied armada, and the total loss of three battleships, besides the placing *hors de combat* of five others, and the mauling which the super-dreadnaught “Queen Elizabeth” received from the howitzers. The magnanimity of the British censors was great, therefore. It brought me a message of appreciation and the instruction to spare no expense even in face of the fact that so far I had invested several thousand dollars in cable and telegraph tolls, every cent of which was wasted.

I had by that time learned enough of British censorship to know that in order to get matter through I would have to dwell strongly on the shortcomings of the people I was with. The Turkish censors at the Dardanelles I had convinced of the necessity of this, but the censors at Constantinople, whom I could not reach from the scene of action, could not take as lenient a view. The result was that I had a great deal of trouble with them. To get around that I instructed Mr. Theron Damon, my assistant at Constantinople, to have my despatches censored at the bureau of the German Military Mission to Turkey, where my difficulties were understood. To Major Fischer I had explained that I would have to accompany each dispatch with something that was not complimentary to the Turks and the Germans in order to get it past the British censors. The major saw the point and undertook to be of help. But the scheme was no great success. There were men in Berlin who were sure that I was the worst Germanophobe there ever lived.

From the Berlin bureau of the service I received, on April 2nd, the following message:

“Oberkommando Berlin declines accept as sufficient censoring on your copy by military mission constantinople and insists on right recensor matter remained at berlin might avoid delays if you could mail direct to berry.”

Mr. Berry, I must explain was then the correspondent at The Hague. The gravamen involved telegrams as well as mail matter. "Oberkommando" was the title of general military headquarters for the province of Brandenburg at Berlin.

Meanwhile, Mr. Stone, was trying to get in touch with me from New York direct. He knew that I was at the Dardanelles, and knew further that an effort was being made by the Allied fleet to force the straits. The "story" was of the first magnitude and so far he had seen no dispatch from me on the subject. The thousand odd members of the Associated Press found it strange that the only news from the Dardanelles should come from British sources and there was much importuning, with the result that my *incommunicado* in Turkey had to be explained. The general manager thought that he might help me with some suggestions, as indeed he could have done under different conditions. He was finally able to get a wire to me through the American embassy in Constantinople. It read:

"Send matter via athens address elmer roberts thirteen place bourse paris. American embassy."

Since I had already established that the cables beyond Athens were being watched by a double-crew of French and British censors, I felt that little would come of this suggestion, but carried it into effect, nevertheless, by filing my dispatches in duplicate. But that avenue for getting news to the American public was quite as effectively closed as the one Constantinople-Constanza-Budapest-Berlin-The Hague-London.

Mr. Martin also was again in despair. Though he knew what the trouble was and what little there could be done, he wired me under date, March 14th as follows:

"Wire daily graphic story"

It is possible that he intended no more than to remind the British censors that such matter was wanted, and that as yet the press of the United States was not content with hearing the one side only.

In Press Diplomacy First Version Counts

An attempt made to get dispatches to New York under diplomatic privileges also failed, and the Turkish authorities soon put a stop to news dispatches routed via Athens, being afraid that I might inadvertently, if not intentionally, supply the Allied fleet with "military" information of value. At any rate, Mr. Damon, the man at the base in Constantinople, wired me at Tchanak Kalé that:

"Suggestions paris or athens unfavored here."

Five dispatches had meanwhile been routed that way without anything being accomplished. I finally suggested to Mr. Damon to take the matter

up with Talaat Bey, the Ottoman minister of the interior, but nothing came of this. I was at the straits and not in position to explain to everybody that my dispatches had to be impartial, and, for the edification of the censors in London and Paris, partial to the Entente cause, in order to get them through.

News of the great action at the Dardanelles had first reached the world through British channels. It occurred on March 18th, and on the 22nd my anxiously-awaited story of it had not yet been received in New York. It later developed that it took the British government four days to make up its mind whether or no this dispatch of mine should also go into the censor's wastepaper basket. Mr. Martin was going from one government office to another to get my story released for transmission to New York, its arrival having been announced. He was informed on this occasion that this was not the only dispatch of mine, which was resting securely in the care of the censor, that "there were stacks of them." But the British version, which, by the way, was a very pretty concoction, had to be given time to have its effect.

Mr. Stone brought the case to the attention of the Department of State, as the result of which I received, through the American embassy at Constantinople, the following cable:

Washington 78 45 23 4-40.

"523 twenty-second for George A. Schreiner quote no word from you since twelfth stop think you could do better if were in touch with Tenedos or other British cable points stop London and French especially come through without difficulty stop Melville E. Stone unquote. Bryan."

The advice that I cable via Tenedos shows how poorly informed even the general manager of the Associated Press was in regard to general conditions. The island in question does indeed have some sort of telegraphic connection, but it was just then the main base of the Allied fleet, attacking the Dardanelles batteries. On the other hand, the assurances of the British government that commercial and press dispatches were not being interfered with when they had no military information was fooling many—the American government included. Mr. Stone had been led to think that Constantinople and Berlin censors were to blame.

By that time the status of the telegrams, cables and mail of the United States diplomatic missions abroad had been settled, Mr. Bryan, then secretary of state, having undertaken as far back as November 25th, 1914, to get into clear water on this subject. It had been agreed that "in view of an understanding between United States and belligerent countries regarding inviolability of Department's diplomatic and consular correspondence," the following rules should be observed:

“Communications from private individuals or institutions to private individuals or institutions in the United States should not be sent in Department pouches. * * *

“The Department reserves the right to censor all mail received in the pouches.”

This done the United States government surrendered the highways and byways of international communication to the British and French government and took notice of the conditions on them only when some commercial cables had been delayed with loss to the party interested. Now and then, to be sure, press cables were mentioned in the diplomatic correspondence but nothing ever came of that.

We must turn to the American White Papers to see what was done.

After many protests made during the first two weeks of the War and application of censorship the British Foreign Office informed Ambassador W. H. Page as follows:

“As regards enquiries respecting the delivery of such messages as may have been stopped in the public interest it does not appear to be practicable to remove the prohibition on such enquiries without impairing the usefulness of the censorship.”

This meant that the British government would continue to refuse to give information as to cables which had been suppressed.

On September 26th, 1914, Mr. Lansing, the acting secretary of state, felt called upon to transmit the following to the American ambassador at London:

“The department has received a great many protests from commercial houses and boards of trade and transportation throughout the United States in regard to the suppression by British censors of cable communications to and from neutral countries. This considerably interferes with legitimate foreign commerce between the United States and neutral countries. You may present the matter to the British Foreign Office with the suggestion that the department deems it very desirable to discontinue suppressing harmless commercial cables.”

All that could be sent in reply to this by Mr. Page was a laconic:

“No change in censorship regulations.”

Mr. Lansing Thought It More Courteous

By October 5th, Mr. Page had taken the matter up with Sir Edward Grey, who, according to a cable to the secretary of state, dated 13th, confirmed merely what had already been placed on record, *i. e.*: that no information would be given in regard to suppressed cablegrams. On the following day, Mr. Lansing, thought “that notification of non-delivery

would be more courteous and just," and meanwhile much effort was being wasted on a trifle: Attempts to remove the stipulation of British censorship that signatures and addresses of cablegrams should be given in full.

Information in regard to suppressed cables would have involved a refunding of tolls in the end, and for that reason, the British government, from motives best known to itself, never swerved for an instant from the position it had taken. In spite of that the subject of returning the costs of cables in case of non-delivery had to be made the object of official correspondence. A communication from the office of the British postmaster general, dated November 2nd, 1914, says:

"I am directed by the Postmaster General to point out that Article 8 of the International Telegraph Convention reserves to each of the contracting states the right of suspending the international telegraph service for an indefinite period. Such a notice was issued by the British Government when the present emergency arose, but in order to avoid the inconvenience which would have arisen from a total stoppage of communication it was decided as an *act of grace* to accept telegrams for transmission on the understanding that they were to be accepted at the sender's risk and subject to censorship by the British authorities; that is, that they might be stopped, delayed, or otherwise dealt with by the censors, and that no claim for reimbursement could be entertained."

That was a very frank statement of the conditions, of course. Stoppage meant suppression, and delay might amount to the same. The "dealing otherwise" might mean the interpolation of matter promotive of British interests throughout the world over whatever signature the cablegram had.

The case went so far that Mr. Hoffman, President of the Swiss Confederation, came to occupy himself with it. But even that did not help.

On December 2, of the same year, Mr. Page cabled to the secretary of state as follows:

"I have just received the following statement from Sir Edward Grey:

"In connection with complaints about both press and commercial cables, I can make no progress without specific instances of difficulties. The censorship asks that the names of the addressees and senders of stopped telegrams should be given in order that inquiry may be made. The chief censor is willing to make most searching inquiry, and if it is found that any message has been stopped without sufficient *prima facie* grounds, all the necessary steps will be taken to prevent the occurrence of similar cases in future. The chief censor would indeed welcome specific instances, as they would possibly be accompanied by evidence of the innocence of messages that have appearance of being suspicious and this might give a clue to the nature of a whole class of mes-

sages. The chief censor is confident that American and Swiss telegrams are not being stopped wantonly, but only when there appears on the face of them good reasons for supposing that they may be improper messages."

It was ever hard to establish in censorship matters that anything is *prima facie*. It all depends on what is considered "military" information and what is not. As the Great War progressed information of any sort was given a military character, if the censors so pleased. As to specific instances—there were enough of them: The London Bureau of the Associated Press alone had by that time over two hundred cases of suppression, in which both the sender and addressee were known. One must wonder that the government of the United States accepted this cynical explanation of the case as complacently as it did, and that there was nobody in the Department of State farsighted and public-spirited enough to realize, in those pre-Lusitania days, that it was in the interest of the American public to know both sides, whether culpability for the war had been already decided upon or not. The people of the United States were then still sitting in the jury box as it were, and their attorney, the government in Washington, was in duty bound to present the evidence of both sides.

My experience with censorship in Turkey was rather different. Whenever a dispatch of mine was suppressed, or when a part of it had been "blue-pencilled" out of it, I would receive on the following day a letter of which the following is an example:

Direction Générale des Postes, Télégraphes et Téléphones Ottomans.
Bureau Central de Péra.
No. 76.

Péra, le 31 Mai, 1915.

"Monsieur :

"Je viens vous informer que pour votre télégramme No. 2315, daté du 28 Mai, 1915, pour Berlin, il a été perçu par erreur deux piastres vingt paras en plus. Je vous prie donc de faire retirer susdite somme de la Caisse de notre bureau avec le récépissé y relatif pour être rectifié.

"Agréez, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

Le Directeur,
du Bureau Central Télégraphique de Péra.
(Signed)

Translation—

"Sir :

"I would inform that for your telegram No. 2315, dated May 28th, 1915, for Berlin, two piasters and twenty paras were charged in excess by error. I beg you to withdraw the sum mentioned at the cash desk of our bureau, with the receipt concerned so that it may be rectified."

But then the Turk has ever been a fairly honest individual.

The same fine regard for the proprieties was exhibited by the Bulgarians and Germans, and in Austria-Hungary the cost of suppressed telegrams could be reclaimed upon application in writing. In all three of these countries the senders of suppressed telegrams were notified of whatever action the censor had taken, and for the purpose of giving the foreign newspaper correspondent the chance to appeal to a higher authority, all press dispatches had to be filed in triplicate, one of which was used by the telegraph operator, the other was kept by the censor and the third was returned to the correspondent, who was thus able to see what had given offense, if elimination had been practiced. If the sender was not satisfied with the work of the censor he could bring the case to the attention of the press department of the foreign office, if the dispatch was of a political nature—to the press department of the general staff, if it was of a military character. Correspondents in those countries were invited to make deposits in the telegraph bureau, and in some cases the tolls were charged to account. In this manner no tolls were paid on suppressed telegrams or parts of telegrams.

British Censorship Diplomacy Ubiquitous

The British and French censors were especially concerned with keeping out of the United States my dispatches from Sofia in the summer of 1915, despite the fact that they permitted their publication in their own newspapers, which had access to them through Holland and Switzerland. Mr. Stone made some more desperate attempts to get the matter through but failed again. Through Mr. Paxton Hibbon, Associated Press correspondent at Athens, Mr. Stone instructed me to try every telegraph-cable route I could reach. For a time I filed dispatches in triplicate over the following connections:

Sofia-Bucharest-Budapest-Berlin-The Hague-London-New York; Sofia-Constanza-Odessa-Petrograd-Stockholm-London-New York, and Sofia-Dedeagatch-Salonika-Athens-Marseilles-Paris-New York. Even this effort resulted in very little and since it was already the fashion to take *neutral* mail from *neutral* ships on the *high seas* and in British ports, the outlook was the poorest possible.

A few messages via Athens went through, but on September 22nd, Mr. Paxton Hibbon had occasion to write me:

“Your long and excellent dispatch about Bulgarian affairs was held here by the censors a total of 23 hours! From the time it reached me it was filed within 25 minutes—but the delay was the fault of the censor, not of the telegraph company. If events

keep on as they are going, I think of going up to Nish—in which case we may be able to make faces at one another from opposite camps.”

A carbon copy of that dispatch shows that in it I announced that Bulgaria would before long bring the issue of Macedonia to a climax, and war would be the inevitable result, “according to a reliable source of information.” The reliable source was Dr. Radoslavoff, who, for reasons of his own was very outspoken about that time. The censor referred to was not British in this instance, but a Greek, a man, as I learned later, who was well liked by the Agence Radio of Paris, a French propaganda institution, whose manager at Athens, was later invited to a duel by Mr. Hibbon.

Very shortly after this the Athens route failed us completely. It seems that Mr. Hibbon, who was French enough to fight duels, could not understand why the correspondent of an American news service was to be looked upon as an adjunct to French and British propaganda in Greece. About that time he was received about once a week by King Constantin of Greece, so often in fact that a French paper thought it proper to refer to him as “the American secretary of a pro-German Greek king,” all of which did not improve our telegraphic facilities. After a while I stopped using that route.

Mr. Martin was again in London now, and the service needed news of the highly critical situation in the Balkans. He sent a message to the Berlin office which in part read thus:

“Long articles on diplomatic relations unrarried received today your two service dispatches sixth seventh also yours of october fifth latter not forwarded because facts already published england.”

The date of the telegram is October 9th. Its burden is that my dispatches from a country on the verge of war had been delayed three, two and one days, and when finally they were delivered the facts of one had been published in England, though not in the same dress. I had similar service messages from New York, but will not weary the reader with them.

In the meantime my Berlin dispatches were being delayed in a rather mysterious manner. On October 8th I received a telegram from the Berlin office saying:

“Nothing received from you since your october first.”

It was evident that there was somebody “sitting” on the wire along the Sofia-Bucharest-Budapest-Berlin route. On the tenth Mr. Martin was heard from again:

"Approve schreiner remaining but we get almost none his matter by cable stop advisable employ wireless importanest."

Allusion to my possible departure from Bulgaria was due to the fact that I had been asked to go to Berlin, because the chief of that bureau had taken a trip to the United States. Since Bulgaria was on the very eve of war, I decided that it would be the poorest policy to leave Sofia then, but was not able to get that information to the management. I finally succeeded in getting access to a diplomatic mail pouch into which I was able to smuggle a letter to Mr. Stone. It is dated October 3rd, and contains among other information the now doubly interesting remark:

"In view of the fact that I hope to get this letter to you through the diplomatic mail. . . . I may tell you that Bulgaria will be obliged to take part in the European War before long, will have done so, I think, by the time this letter reaches you."

The delay and suppression of my dispatches over the Rumanian route had caused me to make representations first to the Bulgarian telegraph administration and censors. The records of the operators who had handled my copy showed, however, that my telegrams had been promptly transmitted. Tracing the dispatches at Budapest showed that the delay had been due to Rumanian influence, and that four of them had been there suppressed.

Since the situation in Bulgaria did not affect the Rumanian government, so far as I knew, I telegraphed several times to the Rumanian telegraph authorities, but received no reply. It was bad enough to be baffled by the censors of the countries at war. What Rumania should have to gain or lose, at that stage, by interfering with telegrams, showing on their face that they were intended for publication in the United States, was a little more than I could understand. I sent to Mr. Charles J. Vopicka, the United States minister to Rumania, Bulgaria and Serbia, at Bucharest, the following dispatch:

"Sofia october eleventh fourthirty pm request you have kindness interest yourself in fate my telegraphic messages sent from here during period october first seventh stop sent about ten none arrived berlin which point destination stop messages addressed conger associated press stop inquiries here show messages duly forwarded stop asserted here bucharest censorship possibly responsible stop kindly inform rumanian authorities my messages go only america and that it not always well lose goodwill our organization stop greetings many thanks—aux censeurs inutile supprimer cette dépêche parceque copie sera remise au ministre par voie diplomatique."

The French text of the message says merely to the censors: It will

be useless to suppress this dispatch since a copy of it will be remitted to the minister through diplomatic channels.

Censorship Diplomacy in Bulgaria

A little while later I had the experience of being notified by M. Georgieff, the efficient chief of Bulgaria's political police, or secret service, that I would have some two hours before leaving Bulgaria and its capital for good and always. War had in this instance, as elsewhere, worked a complete metamorphosis. There was now a censorship that did not have its superior anywhere. (See Appendix.) Major-General Jekoff, the chief of staff, had put together a set of press regulations that permitted only the really *good* news of Bulgaria and her war with Serbia and the Entente to go out. Moreover, the chief censor, and the general manager of the Agence Télégraphique Bulgare, and director of the Press Bureau in the Foreign Office were one and the same person, a Mr. Joseph Herbst, who a little while before had confided to me, in a fit of trustfulness, that if he had his way about it he would hang with his own hands every foreign correspondent in the country as soon as the mobilization had been ordered. Incidentally, he wished to make this little massacre complete still by hanging the military attachés at the same time. *Cospodine* and Captain Herbst, being a pleasant man withal, did not attend to my execution, possibly because I was the one lone neutral foreign correspondent with whom he had to deal. But we had our clashes, especially after I had been with a Bulgarian division in Serbia, and later in Macedonia, and had run into things that did not entirely please me.

The consequence was that one fine afternoon I was cited to appear in the presence of Mr. Georgieff, who saw in every American, about that time, another Mr. Einstein. The interview was terse. A police secretary acted as interpreter, and the political police chief thought that he was dealing with a person as amenable to threats as the poor devils whom he used to beat, until the blood ran, with the great cowhide whip, model *à la knut*, that hung behind his desk on the wall. M. Georgieff was rather surprised when I told him that he could go to a certain warm place and that I did not think of leaving Sofia that evening. I would have to be out of the city and country on the following day, he snorted. To which I remarked that I had no intention doing that even. The chief then mentioned the deepest dungeon he had at his disposal and similar tommyrot. He was pummeling the desk with both fists as I walked from the room.

In times of war the secret police is a mighty institution, of course. It is best to be on good terms with it, as I knew only too well by that

time. It is better yet to watch the secret police, which can be done by the averagely wide-awake newspaper man, especially since he knows most of the little tricks of the secret service himself, and in consequence does not have before these ferreting minions of the governments at war that awe and fear which seems to strike the meek citizen. Knowing that M. Georgieff had taken an interest in me, being familiar also with what happened to the foreign newspaper men in Sofia at the outbreak of the Balkan War, I had given certain men in the Foreign Office to understand that I did not propose being railroaded out of the country with a police escort, should the moment come when my copy might have to give offense.

The following letter will throw more light on this:

Sofia, April 14th, 1916.

Dimiter Stancieff, Esquire,
Chief Consular Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Sofia, Bulgaria.

"Dear Mr. Stancieff:

"During the past few days it has come to my ears several times that I am being looked upon as a suspect by your secret police. At first I was inclined to pay no attention to so silly a rumor. Indeed, I am not yet convinced that the authorities in question have been rightly reported on the subject. The fact, however, that today again I was informed that I am being looked upon with suspicion—this time by a person whose word I do not care to doubt—compels me to bring the matter to your attention.

"I do not for a moment question the right of the authorities concerned to keep an eye on strangers, but it seems to me that in the absence of all justification for such an absurd contention it is overstepping the bounds of propriety to label unoffending visitors to Bulgaria *volens volens* suspects. You will have no difficulty realizing, I am sure, that a reputation of that sort is injurious not only to my work and standing here, but also in the Central Empires. For these reasons I must ask you to take the necessary steps for the cessation of such slanderous gossip on the part of certain government officials. The least that could be done under the circumstances is to point out to the secret police that it serves no purpose whatsoever to treat all Americans as Entente agents, or to listen to rumors possibly spread by the Entente group of Americans in Sofia.

"You would very much oblige me by bringing this matter to the knowledge of competent authorities, for which purpose I have written this letter when I could have discussed the matter with you personally."

I did not leave Sofia as M. Georgieff intended, but instead made a trip to Macedonia, leaving meanwhile somebody in the capital to watch

the secret police, as it were. This person discovered that the chief of the secret service, in addition to being sympathetic to complaining censors, had listened to the fears and opinions of two German cavalry lieutenants, who were now in the aviation service and who from some remarks I made at a dinner table had concluded that I was at least in the service of the Entente governments.

Unfortunately, the exigencies of war cause some men and nearly all women to believe that their cause alone is good, and that the neutral must either have no opinions of his own or must be hypocrite enough to set his mental sails to every passion breeze that blows. M. Georgieff had made up his mind to expel me, and in this he had also the support of a Major Frederici, then in charge of German secret service in Bulgaria and at one time connected with the secret police of Berlin. Before both gentlemen changed their mind I had been obliged to enlist the good service of M. Kozeff, general secretary of the Sofia Foreign Office, and Dr. Radoslavoff, the minister-president. Such is the power of the political police and the military in times of war.

A little later, a member of the opposition of the government in the Sobranje made the incident the subject of an interpellation of the ministry. The man, it seems, was after the scalp of Captain Herbst, which I enabled the latter to keep on by stating facts in the case which had not become known.

I have related the above for no other reason than to show that governments at war have no room for the impartial newspaper man. It is not the truth that is wanted, but the literary compositions that make up propaganda. The interests of the neutral are not regarded at all, of course. Every line, every word in fact, is weighed against the effect it will have if brought to the attention of a people that may have no direct interests at stake but whose sympathy may in the end become an asset.

Mr. Gerard Also Promotes Public Opinion

After a short vacation in the United States I was instructed to return to my post in Vienna, from which point I was covering the Balkans—as best as I could. My territory was larger than that of all other American correspondents in the Central empires—in Germany I should say, because few of them ever ventured far afield. In Vienna I was the only American correspondent and had in the course of time succeeded in wearing down the great distrust toward all who, by virtue of origin or domicile, were likely to have leanings toward the Allies.

Since the chief of the Berlin Bureau of the Associated Press needed also a vacation, it was decided that I should stay in his place long enough for him to take a rest.

I was familiar enough with the difficulty of getting news to the United States and was not at all surprised, therefore, when I learned that the American correspondents at Berlin had petitioned the United States government to come to their rescue. Two things had to be considered by these men. In the first place they were eager to get their copy through, after running to some extent the risks of war at the front, and paying out good money for it in telegraph and cable tolls as far as London, and, secondly, they had to think of themselves. Editors and publishers in the United States had begun to feel that nothing was gained by having a correspondent at Berlin, since so little of his matter ever reached them, and since so much of it arrived in mutilated condition, after the British censors had cut it here and there so that often the dispatch was a mere jumble of words in its most important essentials. The result was that little by little correspondents were lopped off, which was exactly what the British government wanted. Their number had never been great. I believe that thirty was the maximum at any time of the War. Now they had dwindled down to hardly a dozen.

Such being the case it was decided to petition the United States government to use its kind efforts in London for the purpose of assuring to dispatches originating with *bona fide* American correspondents at Berlin unhindered transit. That much was explained to me by a member of the Associated Press staff at the German capital, Mr. Miles S. Bouton. The man also stated that the petition had been sent through the American embassy, and that Mr. James W. Gerard, the ambassador, had been consulted in connection with it. Mr. Gerard had said that he could not endorse "this effort to interfere with the censorship of the British." The correspondents had hoped that he would do this, but, knowing the man, were not surprised when he refused. They asked him, however, not to interfere with the petition otherwise, possibly by stating to the United States government that he could not endorse it.

This Mr. Gerard promised to do, but did not do. The correspondents knew Mr. Gerard too well, and decided, therefore, to watch his hands. A day or two later they learned that Mr. Gerard had forwarded the petition, but had accompanied it with a statement to the effect that he was not in sympathy with the desires of the American correspondents.

It was at this juncture that I became involved in the affair.

One of the signers of the petition was Mr. Conger, the chief of the Berlin Bureau of the Associated Press, who was on leave, and whose place I was filling. One morning, then, a committee of American correspondents called to acquaint me with what had occurred. This done they suggested that in view of the fact that Mr. Conger was one of the

petitioners I, having taken his place for the time being, should go with them to see Mr. Gerard, whom they accused of a breach of faith.

We met at the offices of the *Chicago Daily News*, where presently the other petitioners gathered. An appointment had been made with the ambassador, but he seemed surprised when a little later the entire group put in appearance, the members of which were: Ackerman, *United Press*; Bennet, *Chicago Tribune*; Brown, *New York Times*; Endress, *International News Service*; Hale, *New York American*; Schütte and Swing, *Chicago Daily News*, von Wiegand, *New York World*, and myself.

Mr. Gerard greeted us airily enough.

"Why, you look like a crowd of undertakers," he remarked, as we, following his invitation, seated ourselves about the large room. There being no response to this greeting, Mr. Gerard seated himself at his desk in the corner, and began to look from one of his callers to the other.

"Mr. Ambassador!" began Mr. Endress, "before we go into the matter which we wish to discuss with you, we would like to warn you that everything you say may be used by us for publication."

"Well, what is it" asked Mr. Gerard, a little impatiently.

For a while Mr. Endress continued to have the word. He reminded the ambassador of the promise that had been made, and asserted that this promise had not been kept. In defense of himself Mr. Gerard said that he had made no such promise, and that, aside from all that, he had the right to give his opinion of anything he transmitted to the government.

"I do not think you have that after a different understanding has been reached, Mr. Ambassador!" put in Mr. Schütte, rather tersely. "It was well understood, I believe, that if you could not endorse our request, you were to forward the petition without comment of your own."

Mr. Gerard said that there had been no such agreement. The result of this was that several men began to be heard from. My colleagues were remarkably icy about it, and the cooler they kept the more the ambassador lost his temper, though he tried hard to control it.

It came to the point where unpleasantries were passed back and forth. Mr. Swing, the only man in the group whom I knew at all well, has a biting sarcasm and it was not long before Mr. Gerard was the subject and object of it. To some remark made by Mr. Gerard one of the group said that he need not think that he was afraid of any ambassador, adding *sotto voce*, even if that ambassador was in the habit of taking up the passports of Americans who did not kowtow to him.

I gained the impression that Mr. Gerard was of the opinion that the thing had been staged in order to make him lose his temper. That was not the case, however. At the preliminary meeting held in the office of the *Chicago Daily News*, no mention of that was made, though

most of the correspondents agreed that no words were to be minced with Mr. Gerard. I can attest that they kept their word. These men had been goaded so long by the British censors and the telegrams of their editors demanding copy and complaining when there was none, after they had taken a turn in the mud of the trenches or were routed four times a day by Allied aeroplane attacks, that they seemed glad to have found somebody in authority upon whom they could pour a little of their indignation.

Since I was not one of the signers of the petition but was there as proxy I did not deem it worth while to meddle much with the affair. I had troubles of my own in Vienna, and knew the policy of the man whose place I was filling merely to the extent of having learned that he was one of the petitioners, number one, in fact, since he was looked upon as the dean of the corps. Mr. Gerard, moreover, hardly knew me, having met me once, a year before.

But presently I was to be drawn into the affair against my will. The discussion, still very heated, had turned upon the attitude of the American ambassador. That attitude was simple enough, it seemed. Indulging in a generalization that was highly unwarranted, Mr. Gerard said that it was far from being the concern of the American correspondents in Berlin what the British censors did with their dispatches, so long as the same correspondents did not demand that their matter was permitted to leave Germany without being censored. He said that he would endorse their petition on the day on which they could show him that their dispatches were no longer subject to a censorship that was extremely rigorous, partial, unfair and calculated to make every newspaper article going out of Germany a piece of propaganda. Before expecting the American government to ask for non-interference on the part of the British censors with their dispatches, the American correspondents would do better to demand the same treatment of the German government. They could get that treatment, he was sure, if as a body they insisted upon getting it.

Several efforts were made to point out to the ambassador that there was a great difference between censorship at the source of news and censorship in transit. Several remarks of mine in that direction were not well received by Mr. Gerard, who was on the verge of telling me that he did not know me, or that the business in hand was no affair of mine anyway. To save the ambassador that trouble I informed him that I was acting for Mr. Conger, and that I felt myself entitled to my opinions whether he thought so or not.

The conversation, if I may call it that, was carried on in high voices, and presently one of the group suggested that it might not be a bad idea to tone down a little. This done an attempt was made by almost

every one in turn to show that while the American correspondents in Berlin might have no rights in the premises, it was possible, nevertheless, that the press of the United States and the American public had some interests here—interests which, perhaps, were not recognized in Washington, but which were great for all that. It was the right of the American public to know both sides, the right at least of those who cared to examine the issues, as Mr. Bennet put it.

Before long the discussion was heated again. Mr. Gerard made a *faux pas*. Rather heatedly he charged that all those present were the agents of the German government, and even went as far as to suggest that they were taking money from unholy hands.

"I presume, you do not include me, since I do not work here," I remarked.

The correspondents were now on their feet. Some of them started for the door.

"I regret to say, Mr. Ambassador!" said Mr. Schütte, stopping a moment as he walked past Mr. Gerard, "that we must use this story. We expected to find you in a different frame of mind."

"Use this—what?" almost shouted Mr. Gerard. "You will do nothing of the kind. What passed here is confidential."

"Would have been, if we had not warned you," said Mr. Endress.

"You did nothing of the sort," shouted the ambassador.

"You were warned," said the chorus and filed into the hall and then into the street.

There was a sort of indignation meeting on the next corner, and it was not until then that I learned that English and French correspondents in Washington had cabled to their papers a story to the effect that the petition of the American correspondents was not likely to get favorable consideration by their government, because Ambassador Gerard had expressed himself as unable to support the move.

When the group dispersed it did this for the purpose of writing of the interview and two hours later most of the dispatches were on the wire to Holland and on the wireless from Nauen. There was also a sensation in the Foreign Office, and a little later the German government was considering the advisability of suggesting to the government of the United States that Mr. Gerard take a vacation.

Through the Wolff Bureau the affair had gotten into the Berlin afternoon papers, most of whom promised their public editorials on the subject later on.

Next morning those editorials were there. It cannot be said that the American ambassador fared too well in any of them, nor did some of them spare the American correspondents. Count Reventlow, for instance,

called upon the government to cease immediately giving the American correspondents the great privileges they seemed to enjoy, though I have never understood, being a novice in Berlin, what those privileges consisted of apart from first call on all interviews with the leading men in the government and army.

All that day the Berlin press raged with might and main, and next morning the storm grew worse. Over night there had arrived from Switzerland news dispatches taken from the French press, which had it that the Berlin correspondent of the Associated Press, in this instance my humble self, had sent a wireless to New York in which he charged the American correspondents in Berlin with being the paid agents of the German government. I had done nothing of the sort. To be sure I had stated that Mr. Gerard was of that opinion, but the men on the Eiffel Tower who were ever on the alert for the news that flitted past them had either made a mistake or some French bureau of public "information" had purposely misquoted my dispatch.

The correspondents were not minded to let the matter rest there. Another appointment was made with Mr. Gerard, and to our surprise he consented readily enough to another meeting.

"It is a fine mess you have fixed up there," was Mr. Gerard's first remark, when we had accepted his invitation to be seated. "What is to be done about it? I think you were rash—what have I ever done to you? Is that all the thanks I get for what I have done for the gang? What's the matter?"

It was explained to Mr. Gerard that in adding his own comment to the petition he had certainly not helped the cause of freedom in journalism so far as the British and French censors were concerned.

"One would think that you were here representing British instead of American interests," said one of the men. "That is what is the matter, if you want to know."*

This time the group had a dissenter in the person of Mr. Ackerman, of the United Press. He began to see things in the light of Mr. Gerard's position, and planted himself on top of a little table that stood beside the ambassador's desk.

To the reiterated question what the correspondents wanted, answer was finally made to the effect that nothing short of a retraction—a complete one—would be acceptable. It would have to be that or Mr. Gerard would soon have reason to regret that he had charged the body of correspondents in Berlin with being the agents of the German government. Meanwhile, the ambassador could exclude from the retraction all those whom he knew were in the service of the German government,

* Since then Mr. Gerard has been knighted by King George of England.

provided he was willing to institute such proceedings against them as the offense demanded.

The suggestion of Mr. Ackerman, that an understanding be reached on a different and more amicable basis, was ignored. For a few moments there was an awkward pause, and then Mr. Gerard reached for a thick pad of yellow paper and began to write.

The retraction of which Mr. Bennet still has the original, and I only the notes I made at the time, said that there seemed to have been a misunderstanding at the recent meeting between the American correspondents at Berlin and Ambassador Gerard. The latter had not wished to express himself in the sense that the German censorship was unduly rigorous and partial, that on the contrary it was rather liberal. For the American correspondents in Berlin he could say that they were men who had always lived up to the best traditions of their profession.

Mr. Gerard handed the sheets to me and I read them to the group. Several of the men did not want to accept the retraction in that form, seeing that there had been no *misunderstanding* in word and sense, but when it was pointed out that the statement could not very well be given another form, considering the dignity of the post of ambassador, an agreement was reached to publish the statement in that form.

I am sure that American correspondents at London, of the same mettle as the men in Berlin, could have done their public a great service. The American newspaper men in Berlin could have broken down the censorship of the German government overnight, at least so far as their work was concerned. That they did not do this was entirely a question of British censorship. None of the men felt that they could proceed along these lines if their dispatches and articles were to be subject to the British censorship in transmission as absolutely as they were. Two "strikes" were won by the Americans, though they were only partial, because the news service men, those of the Associated Press, for instance, did not feel that they could embark upon such an enterprise. But there was a way of getting them into line, since the German government cared more for the "specials" than for the news service writers, whose reports were extremely perfunctory and "dry" as Mr. Stone had put it.

More could be said on this subject, but since it would no longer greatly interest the public it may as well remain unsaid.

What the Wilhelmstrasse Thought of It

On the day of the retraction I was called up from the Foreign Office by a man whose name is known to every American.

I found the functionary in a rather perturbed frame of mind. He

had asked me to see him on a rather important matter that might develop into a sensational dispatch, which was to be given to the Associated Press. As yet the question had not been entirely decided. What did I think would be the effect on the American public in case Mr. Gerard was sent home?

Having known that the German government had on several occasions occupied itself with that sort of thing I was much less surprised than may have been expected. I replied that though I had only recently been in the United States, I was not in a position to say what the effect upon the American public and government of that course would be. There was no reason to take the utterances of Mr. Gerard too tragically. To some extent he had been carried away by his temper and ego, and so far as I was able to judge the situation nothing could be gained by a step that might lead to a rupture of relations between the United States and Germany, and probably war.

In the course of the interview I gathered that the personage was badly informed concerning the general state of affairs in the United States. He seemed to be under the impression that *despite* all efforts made to gain the sympathy of the American public nothing had been accomplished. I corrected that opinion to the extent of saying that failure might be due to these efforts, seeing that they were of the poorest quality and could not begin to measure themselves with those of the Allied governments, who had started with everything in their favor: The inherent racial factors; the same language, a literature and press that was almost held in common, similarity in institutions and to some extent in ideals—so far as the British propaganda in the United States was concerned; Belgium and the Lusitania, and absolute control of the world's news channels by Great Britain so far as the endeavor of the Allies generally went.

In view of these odds nothing but a withdrawal from the field of propaganda could be advised. It would be best to keep the padlock on the lips and hands of every German propagandist in the United States, and instruct Count Bernstorff to limit his own activity to reading the German official communiqués twice a day and tell callers that he had nothing to say. Any of these things would be better than having Mr. Gerard recalled. If all of them were carried through they might even keep the United States out of the War, by bringing it forcibly to the attention of the American public that it was really hearing but one side of the bloody affair. I pointed out the tactical advantages of an orderly retreat in this field, and finally left with the remark that into this scheme Mr. Gerard would fit better than any other man.

Before I left for my post in Vienna I ascertained that my suggestions had fallen on barren soil with the men "higher up." It was decided, however, not to disturb Mr. Gerard, of whose quality of service as

ambassador to Germany his book, "My Four Years in Germany," is probably the best index.

I have throughout this chapter dealt with experiences of a personal sort for the purpose of illustrating in that manner what the control of the news channels by the British government was and what effect it had. I hasten to say, however, that my American colleagues in the Central Empires, notably those at Berlin, would be able to present a mass of evidence of the same character. For two years and a half these men struggled with a censorship in transit that was ruthless in the extreme, which, in fact, was not only applied to keep the American public in the mental strait-jacket of Allied propaganda, but which, in addition, was to make this all the easier by discouraging the maintenance of American newspaper correspondents in Central Europe and the adjoining neutral states.

Great Britain and France had made up their minds that the American public was to learn only that which promoted their interests in the United States, and since the two governments sat at the cableheads they had no difficulty doing that. To the credit of American publishers it must be recorded that they bore cheerfully the great costs which brought them so little, and that, considering the public sentiment they dealt with, it could only be the appreciation of sound journalism which was their motive for procuring at so great an expense so small a volume of news.

To the credit of the American correspondents in Berlin it must be recorded that to the very last they observed that equanimity of mind which is the chief pre-requisite of the man who would write "war" copy. I know that some of these men were charged with being pro-German. I also know that in Berlin they were charged with being pro-British. But that is bound to be the lot of the individual inclined to state a case with malice toward none. The fine and impartial work of the American correspondents in Germany, during the Great War, will always be a worthy monument to the best there is in journalism.

It seems futile to moralize on the attitude of Great Britain and her allies in regard to the press rights of others. I have failed miserably in this effort if I have not made clear the danger there is for a public and state in having to subsist on the crumbs that fall from the table of the rich man who controls the news avenues of the world. That control enables him to mould the public opinion of the world into any shape he desires. Of diplomacy that control is the most noxious form, of morality it is the ethics of the robber baron of old—the mercy of the highwayman.

On this occasion, indeed, the public of the United States fared well in the course of action it came to accept ultimately. But it may not be always that so pleasant a termination of war comes from embarking

wildly upon a huge military adventure, as promoted by the control of the world's news channels by a nation not forever committed to be the friend of the United States.

It is not inconceivable that some day the American public may find itself in the position of the German public in 1917—not through any fault of its own, but because of the political ineptness of the men in the government, or through external conditions over which it has no control. In that case the people of the United States would be as anxious to present their case to the world as were the Germans. They would want to have their case understood by a public in order that the diplomacy of its government might be counteracted if that should seem necessary.

A free news channel would be the first requirement in this. How to get that should interest the several nations and their governments much more than is now the case. By bringing but one side of a case in court justice becomes a travesty? Moreover, the universal freedom of the cables and other means of electric transmission would greatly discourage the international bully.

To secure that freedom looks very difficult, I know. But it is hardly that. Nor is it necessary at all to touch the sovereignty and territory of nations in order to bring it about. The remedy is the simplest and will not in any way interfere with the rights of sovereign states. It consists of a law that will put an absolute prohibition on the publication of news, be it military or political, from a country the government of which may have applied censorship in any form, be it supervision of the news as written or interference with the tele-*electric* and postal means of communication at the point of origin or in transit.

The moral elements involved are obvious enough. Governments at war exercise their ruthlessness in censorship and associated endeavor in what is known as "public interest," which, however, may be nothing more, fundamentally examined, than the ambition of the ruling caste. The purpose of censorship is to mislead the public of the neutral world, and, if possible, to enlist sympathy and aid in quarters where none might be found without this exercise of absolutism. That means, of course, that only favorable news and comment are allowed to pass on, while the treatment of one's own faults is not permitted.

The censorship of any country at war is never confined to purely "military" matters. Feeding the mind of the world on one-sided accounts of the events on the battlefield leads to doing the same in every other department. Uniformly, it is the intention of censors to fool others, and during the Great War they succeeded as never before.

But against that sort of imposition and insult, the nations not at war have a right to defend themselves. They can best do that by letting

it be known that censorship in any form, be it at the point of origin, or in transit, will lead instanter to the exclusion of all news from the offending country. The resulting one-sidedness of information would not obtain long, for there is no nation, however powerful, that would risk being thus damned in the eyes of the public, as the case of the Central Powers during the Great War so well demonstrated, though in their case it was control of the news channels by the British and French that brought about this result, and for that reason it was not directly of their seeking.

Such a state of affairs would make statesmen and diplomatists a little more careful than they have been recently. And the example of Germany and her allies would aid them in improving themselves. It was not force of arms which finally overcame that most marvelous human institution of all time—the German army—but world public opinion, the realization by the German people and their associates that they had not a friend in this world. It was this thought that led to introspection and the breaking-up of that marvelous *morale*, which endured the agonies of the damned for four years, which was the antidote for the great losses on the battlefields and famine and general deterioration at home.

The victory of the Associated Governments over the German army and people was not a military one in any sense of the word. No dishonor can attach to the outcome of a struggle conducted against such odds as the Central Powers group of belligerents faced successfully to the very last. The credit belongs to starvation and to world public opinion as this was shaped by the British and French censorships.

To the American public that can not seem very flattering, but the facts in the case permit of no other judgment. Nor has it yet been established that the ultimate result of this censor-promoted regulation of world affairs is to be beneficial in the main. We can at best but hope that it will be this.

Under these circumstances it behooves the people of the United States to see to it that it may not have itself to face in the future a situation in which a thoroughly corrupt diplomacy may by the control of the world's news channels be clothed in the robes of a saint, with haloes for every Neo-Idealist and Megalo-Idealist who choses to wear one. True democracy has for its foundation strict adherence to the laws of nature as they manifest themselves in the relations of the one to the many—the social unit to the state. In that scheme it can not be tolerated that individuals stricken with megalomania foist off, upon the public, their notions and substitute them for what would have been public opinion—might have been public opinion were it based upon the unlimited sifting of the evidence.

That applies to the Great War, of course—in this instance. In the

next it may apply to a war in which the United States may be the object of a general attack. The world has always had its *bête noire*—black sheep. It will be a better world when it makes up its mind to see for itself whether the black sheep is really as bad as others say it is.

Sometimes correction is carried too far, a fact which is recognized by the legislator, who provides both a maximum and a minimum punishment for an offense before the law. And diplomacy is the least desirable of prosecutors, for the reason that it is the accomplice of those who would sit in judgment. When the judge—public opinion—also passes under the influence of the prosecution, the case of the accused, even if he be a hardened criminal of the Prussian militarist type, is not likely to lead to a judgment to which posterity will point with pride.

To the American public which has been flattered into believing that it entered the Great War for purely moral considerations, these things should have several meanings. In the first place the liberation of the news channels is something that should be undertaken in behalf of national security, and, secondly, the welfare of all other nations, that of the despots at the cableheads included, demands that this be done, in order that diplomacy may in the future have to recognize at least one master—strongest of them all:

World public opinion.

XIII

THE BERLIN VIEWPOINT

THE War was to be a swift and crushing affair. It was to be terrible. To that the German government, and its *sanctum sanctorum* of the general staff was absolutely committed. Mobilization was to be carried out with the greatest speed, and was to be followed immediately by impetuous attack in order that every initial advantage might fall into the hands of the German army. In pursuance of that policy, Belgium was to be used in the "Aufmarsch," or first advance to the attack, as it was used, though with unexpected military results. The Belgian forts and the army put up a resistance that discounted entirely the military advantage gained by being able to press the French army from the Northeast. Since the fortifications and the army of Belgium existed long before the outbreak of the War, it was shown that the military experts in Berlin were not as wise as they thought, though against this seeming miscalculation must be charged the possibility, which was deemed great, of the Belgian government permitting the invasion of its territory by the Germans after the making of a protest.

It was held in Berlin that the War would be short. Those who looked with anxiety at the "neck of the bottle" through which Germany would have to gain access to the high seas and foreign markets during war saw indeed a sinister power in a most advantageous position, but were told and assured, as they were to the last by Prince Lichnowski, that Great Britain would not come to the assistance of the Dual Alliance. Should that become the case, however, the war would still be short enough to make the British blockade ineffective. Indeed, there were those who hoped that the young German navy would be able to put a bad crimp into its great antagonist, the fleet of the British. As I have said before, the German government and people had given their youthful naval establishment the value of an adult, which it had as yet only on paper and in the imagination of the German chauvinists.

But there was ample evidence to shake the *idée fixe* of the German general staff. When a mere has-been soldier of my class was able to see that the wars of the future would not be necessarily shorter than those of the past, the great experts in Berlin might have done the same, had their minds been bent toward peace a little more. I hope it will not be

thought presumptuous when I reproduce here, in part, an editorial I wrote in 1912.

"The Italians hold but a small part of Tripoli and seem loath to attempt aggression at points where the Turkish army would not be hampered by considerations of base. Italy today is no nearer her objective than she was when her fleet attacked the city of Tripoli. The whole affair is a bad draw; a waiting game which in the end will be decided not on the battlefield but on the bourses of Europe.

"The pet theory of the modern military expert has thus come to grief. When the Franco-Prussian War ended the conclusion was reached that the wars which would follow this lightning campaign would be as short and even shorter. It was claimed that hostilities between modern armies would last as many days as formerly they had lasted months. There would be a tremendous impact, accompanied by a fearful loss of life and on the morrow negotiations for peace would be inaugurated. For many years nothing occurred which seriously assailed this theory. The few minor affairs in Europe, two of them involving Turkey as a belligerent, were short and decisive, and the improvements made in artillery and small arms tended to affirm the conclusions based upon them. However, the late Boer War upset calculations considerably, and so, of course, did the Russo-Japanese War. Neither of them was ended by virtue of greater efficacy of modern armament. The Boer War held on for over two years and came to a close because one of the belligerents had been exhausted by deprivation, and the Russo-Japanese campaign came to an end because both sides found it difficult to raise further loans for the pursuit of hostilities. That the Turco-Italian fracas will end as ingloriously can no longer be doubted.

"Why better artillery, magazine rifles and machine guns should not have the tendency to shorten the duration of wars is easily explained, indeed any modern book on tactics will make this clear. As the efficiency of the arm is increased the movements of the force against which it is to be directed are modified. The greater range and quicker fire of the modern magazine rifle has merely resulted in tactical changes calculated to counteract both, and since this is a game at which two can play it would be ridiculous to assert that from this quarter the shortening of wars is to be expected. . . .

"We have but to consider the percentage of casualties of the modern battlefield to convince ourselves that from a strictly military point of view nothing has transpired which would justify the belief that wars today must be shorter than they were formerly? The frightful appetite of modern armament for loans is probably the only influence it has to hasten peace. That it cannot do this even in all cases is a lesson which Turk and Italian are now being taught."

Since this is precisely the negative of what the German general staff

believed, further discussion of the fallacy which induced Emperor William to think or believe that his mobilization could not be stopped or the direction of the started armies changed, seems unnecessary.

Of course, the German government did not take into proper account the attitude of Italy as a member of the Triple Alliance. That Italy was decidedly lukewarm toward her allies was known, of course, but too much attention was yet paid to the utterance of Signor Crispi, Italian premier at the time when the Triple Alliance was made. That able statesman then said:

“Weakened in the East, with the freedom of the seas subject to detrimental circumscription, restless internally, without friends, and without sufficient armament, Italy is compelled to care for its safety.”

Diplomacy of the Palazzo Farnese

Italy did that for the next thirty years under the aegis of the Triple Alliance. But times will change, and other days will give to the best of treaties a meaning they did not have when entered into. In M. Barrère the French had an ambassador at Rome who was just the man to wear down the antipathies that were held in common by the two peoples. Italy was the only weak spot where the Triple Alliance could be attacked as an agreement between the signatories, and Barrère was the man to do it. For years and years the occupant of the Palazzo Farnese labored away, often in the face of great obstacles, very often in the fetters of indiscreet conduct on the part of men at home who did not fully know the plans of the government, Admiral Bienaimé, for instance, who on one occasion was sure that he could sink the Italian navy in exactly 40 minutes.

For a while it seemed that the old hatred of the Italian for Austria-Hungary would be superceded by something better. In Vienna they hoped that *Italia irredenta* would be forgotten, and such seemed to be the case when in 1893, a Roman mob stormed the French embassy and then marched to the Austro-Hungarian embassy and cheered the ambassador and his government wildly. Too much attention was paid to these things by men in Berlin and Vienna, who in them saw hopes realized—hopes they were pleased to identify as actuality. There were cautious men who felt that the antics of a mob must not be taken for anything, and that international affairs must move on the plane from which they spring—tradition and community of interest. A mob which today could storm the Palazzo Farnese might tomorrow storm the Palazzo Cafarelli, as it did some twenty years later while under the influence of the silver-tongued and hare-brained Pan-Latin buffoon d’Annunzio.

M. Barrère, mindful of the fact that nations are biological phenomena,

labored on patiently and was later joined by the efficient Rennel Rodd, the British ambassador at Rome. He knew that while Italians had not forgotten the occupancy of their country by the French and the tender mercies of the Zuaves, his cause had the advantage of having to answer to no *irredenta* arguments. He had no objection to seeing the Adriatic Sea a *mare clausum* in the control of the Italians. The interests of his country were on the wide Mediterranean and in the further Levant, while those of Austria-Hungary were primarily in the *Adria*. To the French it could not matter much in the end who held the Epirus; to the Austrians it meant a great deal, so long as the "corridor to Salonika" occupied the minds of men of the Count Aehrenthal type.

Thus it happened that the Italian government disagreed with the contention of Vienna and Berlin, that the War between the Triple Entente and the Central Powers was to be looked upon as a war of defense in the case of the latter. Nor can it be said that the general aspect of its inauguration substantiated that assertion. Serbia could not attack Austria-Hungary and thus make operative the terms of the Triple Alliance Treaty and did not do that, of course.

But, as the Austro-Hungarians could well claim, Serbia had the assurance of Sazonoff that Russia would come to her assistance, in case Serbian stiff-neckedness were followed by a declaration of war. And so far as Serbia was concerned the Italian government would not have lifted a little finger. Jugo-Slavism along the Adriatic was already a fact, and in Rome it was felt that this *megali eedea* would some day seriously interfere with the Italian plans along the *Adria—mare nostro*.

Indeed, for the time being it was a case of either seeing the South-slavs supreme in the Balkans, or the Austro-Hungarians. Since neither was loved too well it really made no difference how the terms of the Triple Alliance were interpreted. But Italy has a good many open cities along her very extensive coast line. To join the Central Powers in the War meant that these would be open to attack on the part of a fleet, the British and French, which would at the same time keep bottled up the German fleet in the North Sea and Baltic and the Austrian and Italian in the Adriatic. That possibility was not to be invited except *in extremis*, and that was not yet. In Berlin and Vienna that was well understood and sympathetically considered.

The French government had been obliged to throw a fairly large army against the Italian border when the War came. Italy's attitude was at least one fraught with uncertainties. Germanophile and Austrophobe held each his camp and the government had to enter upon a strict neutrality. But *something* happened shortly afterward. The advance of the Germans through Belgium and their great successes in August, 1914,

as the result of which much French territory was occupied, and the French government obliged to prefer Bordeaux to Paris as a temporary capital, necessitated the transfer of the French troops along the Italian frontier to the north, and in a little while Marshal Joffre was able to bring with their aid to a standstill the advance of the Germans, after a series of maneuvers and actions known as the Battle of the Marne. The *something* referred to are the terms of the treaty made by Italy with the Entente governments, on May 9th, 1915, fourteen days before Italy declared war upon Austria-Hungary, one year, three months and nineteen days before Italy declared war upon her other ally, Germany. I suppose nobody has taken it for granted that the terms of this treaty were arrived at over night.

Since the treaty is to be found in the appendix, I will not go into it here any further than saying that the *quid pro quo* involved the annexation of much Austro-Hungarian territory, of districts in the Balkans inhabited by Slavs, Albanians, Kutzo-Vlaks, Macedonians, Greeks and Turks, of some desirable territory in Asia Minor, to be taken from the Turks, and other districts in Africa, involving annexations of large populations not Italian along with some that really were.

The Sacred Egotism of Diplomacy

Thus Italy entered the War against Austria-Hungary and entered upon a state of armed neutrality against Germany. The frantic attempts of the German government to prevent all this was unavailing. The removal of Herr von Flotow, the German ambassador at Rome, who was charged with being inefficient, when he was merely handicapped by the situation, and the filling of his place by Prince von Buelow, the former chancellor, was so much beating of the air. Nothing could help—not even the fine social connections of the Princess Buelow, an Italian of influence, formerly Maria di Bologna, principessa di Camporeale. Against d'Annunzio at home, Sir Edward Grey in London, Messrs. Barrère and Rodd in Rome, Count Benckendorf, the Russian ambassador to the Court of St. James, the Marquis de la Toretta, Italian ambassador at Petrograd, and the Marquis Imperiali at London, Prince Buelow was as helpless as a child, even in the face of the concessions which the Austro-Hungarian government made in *Italia irredenta*.

The war came despite all this, and found the Isonzo border in the poorest state of defense so far as the Austrians were concerned. General Stoeger-Steiner, later Austro-Hungarian minister of war, managed to drive the Italians from the Sveta Maria hills at Tolmino, and established there the one position which Cadorna's forces were never able to take. The

fact that General Stoeger-Steiner had to do this with a battalion of indifferent garrison troops stationed at the nearby Laibach, and a scant company of rural gendarmes, shows to what extent the Central Powers counted on the efficacy of the methods employed by Prince and Princess von Buelow. The German special ambassador himself seems to have overlooked that he was trying to hatch the hard boiled egg of d'Annunzio's *sacre egoismo*, of which useless endeavor nothing could come, naturally.

After that the men of the Berlin Foreign Office turned their faces in other directions. Turkey was already in the War and all promises in that quarter had been made. To what extent these were committed to paper, I do not know. But the Ottoman government would not have fared badly by any means, especially if the Sultan-Caliph's fetwah for a Holy War had produced better results than it did. At any rate Turkey-in-Europe was to be continued. So was Turkey in Southwest Asia. Egypt was to be re-incorporated in the Ottoman empire. Arabia was to be made to understand that thereafter it was really a province of Constantinople. When Italy had entered the War all of Northern Africa was to be recovered, and if fortune permitted it, Morocco was to become a German sphere. The Holy War call being effective the Caliphate was to be again what it had been of Old. In the Caucasus region the boundary of the Ottoman empire was to be extended at least to the crest of the central chain. From Persia the British and Russians were to be driven, and with India rising, as was hoped, the ruler of the Osmanli, an aged and kind-hearted man, who for years had been the prisoner of his brother Abdul Hamid, might have found himself over night in the possession of an empire larger than that which Alexander the Great had in mind.

The Wilhelmstrasse made some promises also to the Bulgarians. One of them was actually carried out at the expense of the Turks—the border rectification along the Maritza. Bulgaria was to get, and for a time did hold, the entire Dobrudja. Macedonia was to be joined to her, and in Thessaly gain was to be made according to the conduct of the Greeks. So long as King Constantin did his best to keep his country out of the War these gains remained unknown quantities. Later they came to include all territory east of the Struma and west of that river as far as the Vardar. In addition the Bulgars intended to hold whatever they had occupied in Old Serbia, though actual consent had been obtained from Berlin and Vienna only for the districts of Vranja and Pirot and the Timok valley, through which latter was to run a new railroad that was to make Berlin-to-Bagdad so much more of a reality. Covetous eyes were cast by the Bulgarians also upon small parts of eastern Albania.

At one time the German government had offered Rumania all of Bessarabia and retention of the Dobrudja as far as the Bulgarian border

of 1913. Austria-Hungary was willing to cede the part of the Bukowina peopled by Rumanians. And that country, anyway, seemed to be the only one which had no great appetite for new lands and more races. The aspiration of the Macedonians and Bulgarians had made impossible now, put into the background at least, for the time being, the "corridor to Salonika" physically, over which Count Aehrenthal was so enthusiastic. To Italy had been offered the Austrian *Italia irredenta*, so far this seemed reasonable, and one of the last things Emperor Francis Joseph did was to give the Galicians autonomy, as a pledge to the Poles that he at least meant well by them.

The Pan-Germans' Dream of Empire

What territories Germany herself wanted is hard to say. Its censors saw to it that the "Kriegsziele"—war aims—were never discussed in the press, and on this point her government officials never shed the weakest ray of light. Not even her allies were taken into confidence, as was natural, perhaps, seeing that the German army was the alpha and omega of everything that had to be done before any of these "desires" could be realized, as Sazonoff might put it. For all that the world did not remain entirely ignorant on this point. Russia was to be separated from her Baltic provinces, and at the expense of Great Britain and France a large colonial empire was to be founded. To incorporate large foreign populations found little echo among the German people, who seemed to look upon the Poles and some of the Alsace-Lorrainers more as a punishment than a blessing. Still that does not mean that the *Alldeutschen* would not have insisted upon some such adventure. The appetite of some of these chauvinists was a wonderful thing to behold.

A victory of the German army would have had other results, moreover. Mittel-Europa would have become a fact. German hegemony would have extended from Riga to Calais and from there on along the borders of France, Switzerland, Italy, along the boundaries of the new Turkey in Africa, the shores of the Red Sea, up the Persian Gulf, along the eastern boundaries of Persia to the Caspian Sea, Caucasus, Black Sea, the eastern border of the Greater Rumania and Poland, and the Baltic principalities that were to be formed, as far as Riga, with Finland and Sweden, and therefore, Norway included. The Dutch East Indies would then have been territory under German protection, and if by any chance this *Germania mare*—Greater Germany—wished to have coaling stations and naval bases in the Caribbean, they could have been established with a Dutch label on them.

Such was the tentative program of the *Alldeutschen*. To them as to

others, the world and its peoples seemed items, mere details, in dreams as extravagant as Sazonoff ever had. But there were several flaws in this great program, and sensible Germans were not unmindful of them. In the first place the political constellation would change—was bound to change in very little time. Austria-Hungary, especially its Hungarian and Slav populations might not be willing to pass under the orders of the Prussian *Feldwebel*—sergeant, despite the fact that he never bites as hard as he barks. Bulgaria, too, might have felt her oats, and of the Turks no German could ever predict anything for the future. The Turk is by nature Francophile and would have done what always has been done: Deal with the man who gives the best value for the least money. Persia, Rumania and Poland might have shown minds of their own, and the Dutch and Scandinavians are not fire-proof by any means. That project would only have amounted to much had the German politicians and statesmen the qualities of the British in addition to their own, and since they did not have these, we need not lose too much sleep over the Mittel-Europa that was to be, but was not.

Mittel-Europa was, after all, but the dream of the *Alldeutschen*, despite the fact that it became in the end the nightmare of the German race. The peaceful penetration of the territories named was indeed the plan of a larger number of Germans, but that differed in nowise from the practices that had obtained in the past, with the benefits of being secure against discrimination, and the profits of great prestige added. In other words, the German manufacturer and trader wanted to enjoy the advantages which in the past had been peculiarly the boon of the British. He had for so long dealt in mass-production at small profit that the *megali eedea* of the *Alldeutschen* tickled his fancy, and for at least a partial realization of their desire he staked everything in the form of service at the front, war loans, heavy taxation, and finally the starving of his wife and child.

In the Berlin Foreign Office these things were not discussed, of course. In the main entrance to that diplomatic temple crouch two rather puny sphynxes in stone. I passed them many times and will admit that I found it difficult repressing a smile when I saw that warning to the officials and denizens to observe silence and discretion.

That, I take it, was the purpose of putting the lion-women there. It was a naive idea to me, bringing thus to the attention of the foreign callers the "Byzantinism" that reigned upstairs. On the faces of the two creatures in stone seemed to be written the statesman's and monarch's "forever."

Passing them, I could not help being forcibly reminded of the holes in the rockfaces along the right bank of the Danube in the Pass of Kazan, which once held the miles of bracket-bridge which connected the great highway of Trajan in Dacia with its western and eastern stretches.

Of the great highway nothing is left but a tablet and the holes in which the stout timbers rested. From the face of the rock the Danube has in two thousand years washed away a scant two inches, as the holes—fine nilometers of eternity—show. None was fonder of the “forever” than the Roman, and today he is no more. The education of the politician and diplomatist should include at least a trip through the somber pass and its swirling, racing waters, and at each of the holes in the rockfaces, that hold easily all that remains today of a Caesar’s *forever*, a lecture should be given them.

The little sphynxes in stone were somewhat symbolical of the mentality of the German foreign office. The minds of the men who passed them going to or coming from their work were hardly more plastic. These men were intelligent enough, to be sure, were industrious and had a keen perception of their duty, but few of them ever were able to see Germany from without. Most of them, indeed, were hardly inclined to look at their country from within. The caste system made that seem unnecessary in the case of some; it made it superfluous in that of others. If it was not the privileges of the nobility, it was the annointment of the “*akademische Bildung*”—academic training—which gave to each and every higher German government official full warrant to slip, clamlike, into the shell of his own self sufficiency and stay there. Men were valued by their conservatism only. Those who showed tendencies toward enterprise were often, if not always, thought dangerous. In the scheme *eternal* of the German empire everything was to move along in the manner beloved by the grandfather, and nowhere was worship of yesterday carried so far as in the government circles of Prussia and Germany. The statesman’s *forever* was the command there for the erection of a huge and imposing state edifice, resting on sands of time that were the more fluid the more solid they were thought.

German *Realpolitik* Against British *Idealpolitik*

German diplomacy was sadly handicapped by reason of the fact that those who shaped and applied it were not versed in matters related to public opinion.

The Germans have generally been credited with a strong penchant for philosophy, and there is no doubt that they possess this. Inclined as a people to be painstaking, analytical and thorough, it was natural that they should have been masters in philosophy. But the shoemaker wears often the most neglected of foot covering. On the same principle philosophy was neglected by the German government. It vaunted its great “*Realpolitik*”—practical politics—but practiced a system that was excessively ideal, in so far as it was much removed from the realities and actualities

of life, quite in contrast to the politics of its principal antagonist during the Great War, the British government, which professed to be committed to "Idealpolitik"—ideal politics—but applied them only practically.

The German government would first announce what it proposed doing, and give the world a chance to exercise its imagination on the terrible things that were to come, and when public opinion had been duly inflamed, it would proceed calmly with whatever the innovation was and thus add fuel to the flame. The British government would do the thing first and explain its great necessity in the "public interest" of the world afterward, and thus demonstrate easily that it was obliged to do these things—not for itself but for others. Its cruisers would seize neutral vessels on the high seas, carry them into British ports, detain them, take their cargo, seize their mail, arrest their passengers, establish zones of blockade and later on the British government would leisurely explain that according to "The Declaration of London Order in Council No. 2" or whatever the number might be, these things *were just because in the "public interest" at home and abroad they were necessary.*

Public opinion of the world remained a closed chapter to German diplomacy for the reason that there was in Germany no public opinion on which her statesmen and officials could practice, of which they would see the result, in fact. To be sure, there was an "öffentliche Meinung." But that public opinion was looked down upon as something inferior and unimportant. In a state in which one individual questioned the right to independent thought of the other, in which the class above denied that the class below had at all a right to think, in which the government thought the masses really unfit to govern themselves, and in which the masses tacitly conceded all this by paying but the scantest attention to the administration of the public domain, that could not be otherwise. The press itself promoted this, fostering all sorts of separatisms.

German public opinion became in that manner a very impotent thing. It was never heard by the government, except in protest against another advance in taxation. The question of what was being done with the money hardly ever was broached, and if it was actually put, the answer was accepted with all readiness and without further inspection. Most of the taxes went for armament on land and sea. So long as the armament resulted all was well. What the ultimate end would be, bothered none but the socialists and the few who were enterprising enough to assume that certain causes will have a certain effect.

The character of any instance of public opinion is not so easily established. Just what is public opinion is a question that may lead to many replies, especially when with it is coupled the thing known as government opinion, which is never quite the same thing. Governments being

organisms within another organism—society—and often parasitic ones at that, they have, of course, an opinion of their own. The natural influence of the leader upon those whom he leads, and his control of a great deal of information, makes the opinions of a government usually of greater value than the views of the masses. When the latter are not inclined to take an intelligent interest in their own affairs, or are prevented from doing so, government opinion becomes public opinion. But at best public opinion anywhere, even if it be of high quality, is the refined product of the process of neutralizing the opinions of the masses with those of the government and *vice versa*. The process being reciprocal in such cases, it follows that the best public opinion is obtained when this operation of the law of selection and elimination is least opposed, which was far from being the case in Germany. Even during the War “*öffentliche Meinung*” was never sufficiently respected by the men in power to be heeded. The government class thought no other but its own opinion of importance, and the result was that its international policy and diplomacy were of the same brand and, therefore, entirely unequipped to deal with public opinion abroad—in the Anglo-Saxon countries, especially. I do not mean to imply that public opinion in the British empire and the United States is the last word in that department of human affairs, but there is no doubt that with German public opinion it compared as dross to silver.

German diplomacy was woefully handicapped, therefore. Its agents disdained public opinion abroad, because they had been permitted and taught even, to disdain it at home. They found that other governments did more or less what their own did, but were unable to see that the thing immediately before them was government opinion unrefined and as yet not modified by public opinion. In this manner it was brought about that the German government looked upon the world in general through the glasses of its own failings, and the result was to be catastrophic.

German Diplomacy as Seen from Within

Germans who had been abroad understood all this well enough and were mindful of the dangers that came from it. Many of them made attempts to bring the thing to the attention of the government, but in this they failed miserably. In the first place every German who selected to live away from the Fatherland was regarded little better than a traitor, whose counsel could be of no worth, and, secondly, there was nothing superior to anything that was German, especially government. Paternalism in its unloveliest form, starting with the “*Dienstbuch*” of the servant, in which the authorities attested the quality of service given, to the itemizing of

ambassadors' expense accounts, was the main ingredient in this fine Chinese system of social regulation.

Small wonder that the German diplomatist, already hampered by the fact that Entente superiority of strength and prestige was against him, made so poor a job of it. The *chefs de mission* were often men who made use of their plenary powers, who were able to exercise initiative governed by discretion, but when they were not handicapped by the poorest quality of assistance by their attachés, they were hamstrung by their Foreign Office, in which, for instance, it was possible to have an imperial chancellor of the Bethmann-Hollweg type, a promoted police official whom the Great War took by surprise and left bewildered to such an extent that he was able to leave the British government the political advantage which the use of the words: Scrap of paper, resulted in.

It is not to the interest of a nation when its highest official selects to wear the boots of a great predecessor, Prince Bismarck, for instance. There is in the history of the Great War no more pathetic figure than that of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, given, *à la* Bismarck, to wearing a military uniform—a major's, tall and bulky and small-headed; brought up in the Prussian state service, bureaucrat, arriviste, servant of the emperor and slave of a catastrophe, head of a civil government cowed by military decrees and master of a misled people—an egotist hanging on to an office for which he was the least fitted.

The European War was not very old before the German government was engaged in controversy with the government of the United States in regard to questions of International Law arising from the blockade decrees and practices of the Entente governments, the purpose of which was to place the Central Powers under the disadvantages of siege, to wit: To make it difficult for them, if not impossible, to carry on their military operations by cutting off, so far as possible, supplies having a military value. International Law had already delimited Absolute Contraband and Conditional Contraband, so far as this was feasible in face of a variety of diverging national interests that had to be considered. In the Declaration of London, 1909, a few other faint lines of demarkation had been drawn. These, however, together with policies formerly supported by the British government itself, had been totally obliterated by the several "Declaration of London Orders in Council," upon which the fate of all shipping, enemy and neutral alike, now depended. In other words, Great Britain had substituted the Orders of her government's Privy Council, in the guise of "Declaration of London Order in Council" for what had been International Law.

Before proceeding, it may be well to remind the reader of what "International Law" is. In the first place there was no "International"

law, or, to put it in other words, International Law was not a law in the sense in which municipal law is this. The laws passed by a community in behalf of social regulation are known, in contradistinction to International Law, as Municipal Law, and the former is in all cases subject to the latter in matters concerning the sovereignty of a state, or any community having the right to make municipal laws without regard of any sort for the laws made by a superior body or government. Thus, the laws made by a colonial government, or by a vassal state, do not effect international relations except in so far as they are sanctioned and assumed by the governmental body which has charge of the international affairs of the country. Municipal law, then, has a sanctioning authority, that is to say, it has been accepted by the executive branch of a government, and usually has been called into being under the supervision of such a body, as a rule of conduct for individuals and groups, the non-observance of which will be punished. In fact the ability to apply such municipal law is regarded by most governments as *prima facie* evidence that another government, after a revolution, for instance, is recognizable as *de facto*, or the government in fact, as well as of pretension—*de jure*.

International Law a Mere Rule of Conduct

International Law differs from municipal law in so far as in the past it has been found impossible to devise a means by which it could be applied with enforcement, by penal means, as the alternative to non-compliance. Moreover, International Law, is in principle not obligatory. It is at best but a doctrine adhered to by nations large and small, which, regardless of prominence, are admitted as equals under the operation of the principle known as sovereignty.

Non-observance of the terms of International Law may indeed bring the offender to the bar of world public opinion, it may also make the offender liable to punitive measures employed by other governments, but at best the judicial adjudication of infractions of International Law may be attempted only before a body of reviewers, under an agreement of arbitration, to which the name of *court* cannot be given for the reason that the body in question lacks the peculiar and inherent powers of a court—it can not punish. The findings of the body may indeed assume a lenient punitive character, but that does not mean that they will be accepted in that light by the culprit government. In fact that government could not accept them without surrendering, temporarily at least, a most essential quality of sovereignty—the inviolability of its integrity, be this of a material or a metaphysical aspect. The whole category of often so-called questions of honor belongs into this department of sovereignty.

International Law, then, is not *law* at all. It is an agreement among civilized and independent states, almost entirely founded on precedents, to govern conduct in times of peace and of war so that it will harmonize with, what in the absence of a better term, may be styled, international morality.

When this agreement is given a more concrete form in a contract between two nations or groups of them, it is given the character of treaty. So long as a treaty is such that it does not openly violate the rights of another state or group, and International Law, therefore, its terms are generally published by the contracting governments. Treaties that are not in this manner given publicity are known as secret treaties, and their terms are generally withheld from common knowledge, because openly or impliedly they threaten another nation or a group of other nations.

International Law, in addition to being no mandate of a law-giving body, may, as is shown here, be violated in contemplation by such governments as may band together for that purpose, and, who, before that, are fairly certain that their overt act will bring upon them no consequences they need fear. The conspiracy would not be apparent until its result was there—a war of aggression, and after that even it would not be so very simple to fix the blame so long as the diplomacy of the offending governments was able to mislead the neutral public. Then, too, with a state of war prevailing, the offending government would still enjoy every advantage of International Law, and could meet all contentions of the neutrals with the plea that the “public interest” of its state did not permit just then a stricter adherence to rules of conduct promotive of the “public interest” of neutrals. So elastic a thing is International “Law.”

This is the attitude which was assumed by Great Britain in regard to its blockade of the German ports and the condition that arose therefrom to neutral ships and cargoes. Had there been a sanctioning authority for International Law, the Declaration of London, 1909, would not have been superseded by the “Declaration of London Orders in Council.” The sanctioning authority, if disposed to be just, would have informed the British government that International Law, as interpreted by the Declaration of Paris, 1856, would have to be observed. But since it is not easy to make accountable and punish a powerful and sovereign state, Great Britain went her way and disregarded consistently every protest made by the neutral governments.

The Declaration of London was based on the Declaration of Paris in regard to Maritime Law. Of the latter I will give here Articles 2, 3 and 4, which deal with this subject.

(2) “The neutral flag covers enemy’s goods with the exception of contraband of war.

(3) "Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.

(4) "Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coasts of the enemy."

We find, according to the American White Papers, that the government of the United States, in a communication to the British government, dated March 30th, 1915, replying specifically to the Order in Privy Council, of March 15th, still adhered stoutly to the terms of the Declaration of Paris. In that note the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, said:

"Moreover the rules of the Declaration of Paris of 1856—among them that free ships make free goods—will hardly at this day be disputed by the signatories of that solemn agreement."

The signatories are: Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia (the former government in Italy) and Turkey.

The Earlier View of the American Government

On October 21st, of the same year, the government of the United States was still of the same opinion, it seems. In a note to the British government, bearing that date, and "relating to restrictions upon American commerce by certain measures adopted by the British government during the present war," the Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, says:

"The Declaration of Paris in 1856, which has been universally recognized as correctly stating the rule of international law as to blockade, expressly declares that 'blockades in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.'" The effectiveness of a blockade is manifestly a question of fact. It is common knowledge that the German coasts are open to trade with the Scandinavian countries and that German naval vessels cruise both in the North Sea and in the Baltic and seize and bring into German ports neutral vessels bound for Scandinavian and Danish ports. Furthermore, from the recent placing of cotton on the British list of contraband of war, it appears that the British government have themselves been forced to the conclusion that the blockade is ineffective to prevent shipments of cotton from reaching their enemies, or else that they are doubtful as to the legality of the form of blockade which they have sought to maintain."

Further on the note says:

"I believe it has been conclusively shown that the methods sought to be employed by Great Britain to obtain and use evidence of enemy destination of cargoes bound for neutral ports and to impose a contraband character upon such cargoes are without

justification; that the blockade, upon which such methods are partly founded, is ineffective, illegal, and indefensible; that the judicial procedure offered as a means of reparation for an international injury is inherently defective for the purpose, and that in many cases jurisdiction is asserted in violation of the law of nations. The United States, therefore, can not submit to the curtailment of its neutral rights by these measures, which are admittedly retaliatory, and, therefore, illegal, in conception and nature, and intended to punish the enemies of Great Britain for alleged illegalities on their part. The United States might not be in a position to object to them if its interests and the interests of all neutrals were unaffected by them, but, being affected, it can not with complacency suffer further subordination of its rights and interests to the plea that the exceptional geographic position of the enemies of Great Britain require or justify oppressive and illegal practices."

The note from which the above citations are taken had the nature of a general protest against the infraction of International Law by Great Britain, the general character of which is made clear in a communication transmitted to the United States government by the British ambassador at Washington, on March 1st, 1915, the burden of which is that:

"The British and French governments will therefore hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of *presumed* enemy destination, ownership, or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they would otherwise be liable to condemnation."

What such "presuming" meant was clear to the government of the United States when it expressed itself in the note of October 21st, 1915. An appendix to the note gave the names of 273 vessels and the nature of their cargoes, together with the date of arrival and departure from the port of Kirkwall, incident to the change of course forced upon the commanders of the neutral ships by the British Government. The period covered was a short one: March 11th to June 17th, 1915. Before that 155 neutral vessels had been taken to British ports, of which in 40 cases the cargo had to be discharged to be held for prize court proceedings. In the case of seizures antedating the British communication of March 1st, 1915, the British government had employed a favorite method of its own: It had gone ahead and done what it thought best in the public interest. The explanation could wait.

By the end of August of that year incomplete data showed that the British government had obliged 511 neutral vessels to put into British ports against their will. Ships no longer sailed to or from their *neutral* ports, but made the British ports of Kirkwall and Falmouth, and others, ports of obligatory call, as ordered by the Orders in Privy Council. This under the penalty, that if caught on the high seas by the British cruisers,

without having their papers viséed in one of the British ports of search, they would lay themselves open to: From long detention in a British port to confiscation of ship and cargo. International Law, specifically the Declaration of Paris, 1856, had been superceded in this respect entirely by the "Declaration of London Orders in Council," to which France, Russia and later, Italy, gave their willing assent.

The World from Now On "Privy-Counselled"

I will give here one of the Orders in its entirety, so that it may do service as an illustration of the acts to which the note of the United States government, cited above, protested in such vigorous language:

ORDER IN COUNCIL

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 20th day of October, 1915.

Present, the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

Whereas by the Declaration of London Order in Council No. 2, 1914, His Majesty was pleased to declare that, during the present hostilities, the provisions of the said Declaration of London should, subject to certain exceptions and modifications therein specified, be adopted and put in force by His Majesty's Government; and

Whereas, by Article 57 of the said Declaration, it is provided that a neutral or enemy character of a vessel is determined by the flag which she is entitled to fly; and

Whereas it is no longer expedient to adopt the said Article:

Now, therefore, His Majesty, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, is pleased to order, and it is hereby ordered, that from and after this date Article 57 of the Declaration of London shall cease to be adopted and put in force.

In lieu of the said Article, British Prize Courts shall apply the rules and principles formerly observed in such Courts.

This Order may be cited as "The Declaration of London Order in Council, 1915."

And the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and each of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, the President of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, all other Judges of His Majesty's Prize Courts, and all Governors, Officers, and Authorities whom it may concern, are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respectively appertain.

J. C. LEDLIE.

But British "public interest" was to demand a more sweeping measure before long. An Order in Council, dated March 30th, 1916, orders as follows:

"The provisions of the Declaration of London Order in

Council No. 2, 1914, shall not be deemed to limit or to have limited in any way the right of His Majesty, in accordance with the law of nations, to capture goods upon the grounds that they were conditional contraband, nor to affect or to have affected the liability of conditional contraband to capture, whether the carriage of the goods to their destination be direct or entail transshipment or a subsequent transport by land.

"The provisions of Article 1 (ii) and (iii) of the said Order in Council shall apply to Absolute Contraband as well as to Conditional Contraband. . . .

"From and after the date of the Order, Article 19 of the Declaration of London shall cease to be adopted or put in force. Neither a vessel nor her cargo shall be immune from capture for breach of blockade upon the sole grounds that she is at the moment on her way to a nonblockaded port."

The heavy hand of Great Britain was now upon all trade on the high seas, to and from neutral ports, or through waters that had been declared within the zone of the British blockade. Thereafter, all Dutch, Danish, Swedish and most of the Norwegian shipping had to put into a British port of search, since meeting with an Allied cruiser without evidence that the ship had been in such a port of search for an inspection of papers, cargo, mail, passengers and crew meant going through the British Prize Courts, with condemnation and seizure in prospect. The previous protests of the government of the United States had been so much beating of the air, and the small neutrals were helpless. There was none but British and Allied freedom of the seas, and the very scant sphere that had been left to neutral shipping was a little later wiped out completely.

Under the auspices of the United States government, Great Britain went in the *public interest* so far as to deny neutrals the right to import anything from any neutral port without consent secured from the belligerents. Maritime Law of any sort was no more. The Declaration of London had been forgotten, and the government of the United States, hitherto the stoutest champion of the Declaration of Paris, complacently forgot that there ever had been such a thing.

The fact is that neutral public interests had made way for Allied national necessities and emergencies of war, and that these were met by the Entente in a manner agreeable to the strong—themselves. In harmony with that, neutral shipping was detained in United States ports for weeks and months at a time, and, ultimately, this went so far as to lead to the commandeering of every Dutch vessel in Allied and United States ports under the invoking of a measure that was thought obsolete but which was resuscitated when it was convenient. There was a precedent for this, of course. But it was a precedent made in the same camp, by the British

government, when it discarded Article 57 of the Declaration of London and substituted therefore the rules and principles of prize court procedure applied by Great Britain before that—during the Civil War, to mention one of the occasions.

On May 10th, 1916, the government of the United States did indeed voice a feeble protest against the Order in Council of March 30th. The note dealt with specific instances. It is of enough interest to have its last two paragraphs quoted:

“I observe from your note that you have been instructed by Sir Edward Grey to inform me that “the immunity from capture at present enjoyed by the American Transatlantic Company’s vessels can only be continued provided that an assurance is given by the company that the vessels will not trade with Scandinavia or Holland.”

“Under the circumstances, before giving further consideration to the matters referred to in your note I would like to be informed whether, as would appear from your note, it is the intention of the British Government to repudiate their promise respecting the treatment of these vessels, which in good faith has been relied on by this government and by the owners of these vessels.

ROBERT LANSING.”

Here I may add that at this time there were already active in the port of New York, under the very eyes of United States government officials, agents of the British government, who inspected cargoes and the passports of passengers, and were in position to refuse transport to either at will. No master of a vessel could be induced to take aboard a shipment or passenger upon which a British agent had frowned. Meanwhile the British blacklist was in operation, despite the fact that on January 25th, 1916, the United States government had expressed itself as follows:

“As it is an opinion generally held in this country, in which this government shares, that the act has been framed without a proper regard for the right of persons domiciled in the United States, whether they be American citizens or subjects of countries at war with Great Britain, to carry on trade with persons in belligerent countries, and that the exercise of this right may be subject to denial or abridgment in the course of the enforcement of the act, the Government of the United States is constrained to express to His Majesty’s Government the grave apprehensions which are entertained on this subject by this government, by the Congress, and by traders domiciled in the United States. It is, therefore, necessary . . . to contest the legality and rightfulness of imposing restrictions upon the freedom of American trade in this manner.”

The answer to all this by Germany was the employing of submarines in an ineffective blockade that was as much contrary to the terms and

spirit of the Declaration of Paris, 1856, as was the British. The measure of the Germans had for all that proper support in the principle of reprisal fully recognized by International Law.

By and large the attitude of the government of the United States had been that the British blockade was not effective, because it was not in fact complete, since German merchant vessels could with immunity trade with Norway and Sweden and secure *via* these countries supplies from the United States and other countries. German men-of-war were still able to take prizes in the North Sea. The British blockade was indeed a paper affair, which was rendered effective only, and in violation of International Law, when the British government placed under duress and coercion all neutral shipping. At first this was accomplished by the conditions under which bunker coal could be obtained in British ports, and later, the timidity of the neutrals having sufficiently encouraged Great Britain, this was done frankly by Orders in Privy Council in the manner here described. To the interests of the neutrals and to International law no attention was paid by the Entente bent upon winning the war.

Diplomacy and the Question of Food

The first reply of the German government to the British blockade rules was the announcement that it had established a zone of blockade in the waters of Great Britain, choosing the term "war zone," for the reason that with the means to be employed, the submarine, any other term could not well serve the purpose. The British announcement was dated November 4th, 1914, and took effect on the following day. The German announcement came on February 4th, 1915, and became operative on the 18th, the longer notice—14 days—being due to the fact that it was desired in Berlin to give sufficient warning to such neutral vessels as were bound for British ports with cargoes already loaded, and to warn others not to take such cargoes.

Germany had done this in reprisal of the efforts of the Entente governments to starve her population, military and civil, into submission.

In a note dated December 26th, 1914, the United States government had drawn the attention of the British government to the illegality of the treatment accorded by the latter to cargoes of contraband and conditional contraband character. Touching upon foodstuffs, the note said:

"That a consignment 'to order' of articles listed as conditional contraband and shipped to a neutral port raises a legal presumption of enemy destination appears to be directly contrary to the doctrines previously held by Great Britain and thus stated by Lord Salisbury during the South African War:

"Foodstuffs, though having a hostile destination, can be

considered as contraband of war only if they are for the enemy's forces; it is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used, it must be shown that this was in fact their destination at the time of their seizure.'"

To this note the British government replied:

"We are confronted with the growing danger that neutral countries contiguous to the enemy will become on a scale hitherto unprecedented a base of supplies for the armed forces of our enemies and for materials for manufacturing armament. The trade figures of imports show how strong this tendency is, but we have no complaint to make of the governments of those countries, which so far as we are aware have not departed from the proper rules of neutrality."

We seem to deal here with a contradiction in the same sentence. If the neutral government had not departed from the proper rules of neutrality, as they indeed had not, then where was the danger of which Sir Edward Grey speaks? That danger lay, of course, in the fact that adherence to International Law, on the part of the Entente governments, would have resulted in the importation of food for the civil population of the Central States.

Speaking of the notice of the German government, in regard to the war zone in British waters, the American government, on February 10th, 1915, expressed itself to the effect:

"The Government of the United States views those possibilities with such grave concern that it feels it to be its privilege, and indeed its duty in the circumstances, to request the Imperial German Government to consider before action is taken the critical situation in respect of the relations of this country and Germany which might arise were the German naval forces, in carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the Admiralty's proclamation, to destroy any merchant vessel of the United States or cause the death of American citizens."

On the same day a note to the British government pointed out, that:

"Assuming the foregoing reports are true, the Government of the United States, reserving for future consideration the legality and propriety of the deceptive use of the flag of a neutral power in any case for the purpose of avoiding capture, desires very respectfully to point out to His Britannic Majesty's Government the serious consequences which may result to American vessels and American citizens if this practice is continued."

The note was due to the practice, already indulged in by British merchant ships, of sailing under neutral flags, and a distinction was drawn between the "occasional use of the flag of a neutral or an enemy under the stress of immediate pursuit" and the "explicit sanction by a belligerent government for its merchant ships generally to fly the flag of a neutral

power within certain portions of the high seas which are presumed to be frequented with hostile warships."

The government of the United States was then still mindful of an example in neutrality which Thomas Jefferson had given, in a note to the British government, September 7th, 1793, in which he said in part:

"It is not enough for a nation to say we and our friends will buy your produce. We have a right to answer that it suits us better to sell to their enemies as well as their friends. Our ships do not go to France to return empty; they go to exchange the surplus of our produce which we can spare for the surplusses of other kinds which they can spare and we want; which they can furnish on better terms, and more to our mind, than Great Britain and her friends. . . .

"Were we to withhold from her (France) supplies of provisions, we should in like manner be bound to withhold them from her enemies also, and thus shut to ourselves all the ports of Europe where corn is in demand or make ourselves parties in the war. This is a dilemma which Great Britain has no right to force upon us, and for which no pretext can be found in any part of our conduct. She may, indeed, feel the desire of starving an enemy nation, but she can have no right of doing it at our loss nor of making us the instruments of it."

To reach an agreement that would be fair to all concerned the government of the United States proposed, on February 20th, the following:

"Germany and Great Britain to agree:

"That neither will plant any floating mines, whether upon the high seas or in territorial waters; that neither will plant upon the high seas anchored mines except within cannon range of harbors for defensive purposes only. . . .

"That neither will use submarines to attack merchant vessels of any nationality except to enforce the right of visit and search.

"That each will require their respective merchant vessels not to use neutral flags for the purpose of disguise or *russe de guerre*.

"Germany to agree:

"That all importations of food or foodstuffs from the United States (and from such other neutral countries as may ask) into Germany shall be consigned to agencies to be designated by the United States government; that these American agencies shall have entire charge and control without interference on the part of the German government . . . and shall distribute them solely . . . to noncombatants only; and that such food and foodstuffs will not be requisitioned by the German government for . . . the use of the armed forces of Germany.

"Great Britain to agree:

"That food and foodstuffs will not be placed on the absolute contraband list and that shipments of such commodities will not be interfered with or detained by British authorities if consigned

to agencies designated by the United States Government in Germany for the . . . distribution solely to the noncombatant population."

To this proposal the German government agreed readily enough. It accepted the conditions in regard to floating and anchored mines, and announced itself as ready to limit the use of submarines as suggested. The conditions governing the importation of food and foodstuffs were also accepted, it being reserved, however, to import also raw material needed for the noncombatant population, and forage, in accordance with the provisions concerning Conditional Contraband of the Declaration of London. In its note the German government hoped that an agreement would be reached and that a way would be found for excluding the "shipping of munitions of war from neutral countries on ships of any nationality."

The replies of the French and British government were almost similar and equally negative. Nothing came of the plan, on that account.

The British note said:

"Her (Germany's) opponents are therefore driven to frame retaliatory measures in order in their turn to prevent commodities of any kind reaching or leaving Germany. These measures will, however, be enforced by the British and French governments without risk to neutral ships or to neutral or noncombatant lives and in strict observance of the dictates of humanity."

What these eloquent words came to mean before very long has already been seen. The fact is that at the very moment they were uttered they were a hollow phrase. Such is diplomacy.

Fulcrum of a Diplomatic See-Saw

The American note of February 20th should have convinced the Berlin government that the government of the United States had done everything within reason to bring about the state of affairs which Germany desired. The proposal made by Mr. Bryan was a wholehearted one, and had Great Britain and France willed it the European War would have assumed a totally different complexion then and there. Knowing what the temper in Germany was at that time, I must remain somewhat skeptical toward the possibility that Mr. Bryan's kind offices would have led to a quick peace, as he hoped. The militarist party was still strong in the saddle.

On the other hand, it is probable that the acceptance by the Triple Entente of an agreement of the sort outlined by him would have taken much of the wind out of the sails of the chauvinists. The government was vehement in its assertions that the war was for the Germans one of defense, as indeed it was become, and by February of 1915 the first

excitement of the War, and the flush of victory, had cooled down very much. It is but reasonable to assume that a readiness on the part of the Entente governments, to restore that which they had taken away, the import in sufficient quantities of food, would have been accepted by the German public as an indication that the men in Berlin had drawn the long bow in their protestations as to the causes and nature of the conflict. On the other hand, the German militarists might have disregarded such an offer of peace entirely.

To engage now in vain speculations as to what might have been is a vain effort, of course. As the government of the United States had to point out, again and again, it could not shape its negotiations with either belligerent camps by conditions set by the other. The fact that the Berlin government—now on the defense in all matters diplomatic—was by far the worst offender in that respect shows how little these men really knew of statecraft and diplomacy. That aspect of their notes was but another expression of the fact that they could not see anything beyond their own frontiers. Such tactics could only tend to aggravate a situation, and the veriest novice in statecraft should have known that there was nothing to be gained by promising the government of the United States something which was contingent upon a certain sort of conduct on the part of the Entente. Berlin simply did not know when to say yes or no. In routine that Metternichian indulgence may have its place, but when great issues are to be decided plain transaction should take the place of "diplomacy."

Meanwhile, it was not borne in mind that the United States government had problems of its own to meet. So far as these were due to the arrogant conduct of the Entente government they *might have*, soon or late, led to exactly the situation which Germany desired, to wit: strained relations. The most foolish of tactical mistakes which the German government made was to press its own case, by acts of a precarious nature, at a time when it should have given the people of the United States every opportunity to look upon the Entente governments as the only violators of International Law, the Declaration of Paris and that of London.

The men in Berlin, being totally ignorant in the management of public opinion and very disdainful of it, were never able to see that the government of the United States was still hampered by the impression which the violation of Belgium's neutrality had made upon the British propaganda-fed American people. The leaders in Germany looked upon such acts as an attendant evil of war, and, the proof of duplicity, by the Belgian government, having now been obtained, they allowed themselves to totally forget that a grave wrong had been done, feeling, meanwhile, it seems, that the finding of the documents had totally absolved them. In that they had against them the "first" impression, always a dangerous thing, and

while the authenticity of the papers could not be doubted, they were of little avail now, especially with a people so subject to impulsiveness and snap-judgment as that of the United States.

There is no country in which explaining has ever helped so little as in the United States. The facts were these: The German army had invaded Belgium without provocation by the Belgians, so far as then known. That such provocation was proven afterward could not affect the situation very much. Indeed, one can not see why it should have done this. The Belgian government might yet have repented at the eleventh hour, and our conception of equity and fairness is against the hanging of a man for a crime he may have merely contemplated. In that direction the German government, had it known anything of public opinion in the United States at all, would have looked for no alleviation of its condition.

What Machiavel Would Have Done

To be sure many things might have been different at that moment. With a Machiavel in the chair of the German chancellor, Sir Edward Goschen would have left with the assurance that the German government knew positively that Belgium intended to cast off her neutrality herself. And the world public would have heard of it. Such a diplomatist would have said that the German government had indubitable proof that there was an anti-German understanding between Belgium and the Triple Entente. If the documents had then been found in Brussels there would have been a real case, and many expressions of surprise and disgust. If they had not been found, assuming that the case had stopped short of forgery, there would have been many who would have believed the assertion of the Machiavel anyway. As it was the German government and people were laboring under the punishment which Bethmann-Hollweg's reference to a "scrap of paper" had so justly earned. Whatever may be said of the defunct governmental machine in Berlin, one thing must remain to its credit: That it was frank enough to avow that the invasion of Belgium was a deliberate act. It will always be doubted that some other statesmen of the time would have done the same thing. There would have been a regulation sentence, in the shape of a "valid" pretext first, and then Machiavel would have gone to work to *prove* his case, which is easy enough when one has the necessary diplomatic talent.

The fervor of the militaristic *Alldeutschen* was still unbounded, when the German government acquiesced into the proposal of Mr. Bryan, at which by the way, some of the chauvinists did not mind sticking up their noses. Though the trench outlook in Flanders and France, where men were being led into death like sheep every day, was not good, the prospects in

the Carpathians not very promising; though Russia was getting second breath, and with things in Turkey very uncertain, this plague of a people was still howling vociferously. The press being also in a jingo mood, the refusal of the Entente to consider the proposal of the United States was received with much indifference. The War would be over soon!

Toward the end of April, 1915, it was already clear to many in Central Europe that Italy would before long have to be counted as an active enemy instead of an unreliable ally. Despite that, the German government and the Admiralty found the courage to send out a submarine to waylay the "Lusitania." The fact that complaints had already been made then that this Leviathan was in the habit of sailing under the United States flag while in dangerous waters, proves at least that she had been watched. The inference may be made that for a time the German submarine commanders had orders not to attack the vessel. If it could be asserted in all good faith by submarine commanders that the ship was flying the Stars and Stripes, she could have been sunk.* It is hard to see in fact how she could have escaped.

At the end of April, then, somebody decided that the "Lusitania" was to be made a horrible example. Whether it was Great-Admiral von Tirpitz who issued the order, or whether it was some other person does not matter now. At any rate it is certain that no one individual decided to shoulder all responsibility himself. On the other hand some credence may be given the claims that it was not intended to sink the vessel. Be that as it may, the attack on the ship was in itself the most foolish of political moves. So much shipping was still going in and out of British ports that the tonnage of the "Lusitania" was a veritable trifle. But even if her cargo had been the most important and largest which left an American port at that time, the act of attacking the ship was still unjustifiable from the political standpoint. Those responsible for this reprehensible undertaking must have lacked all foresight. The German government had been warned that the loss of American ships and lives would lead to unpleasant situations, and it was but reasonable to assume that this ship of all others would have a large American passenger list, and that many of these would be persons of some prominence.

It is hard to understand how any government, however determined to win a war, could have placed at so high a value its own proclamation concerning the establishment of a War Zone on paper, which had already been protested by a government traditionally committed to "free ships, free goods." It is hard to understand, moreover, how any government

* Flying the Stars and Stripes, however, was not the reason why the "Lusitania" was sunk. She was torpedoed by the Germans for the reason set forth by Lord Mersey, chairman of the Court of Enquiry into the sinking of the "Lusitania," in the words:

"The 5,000 cases of ammunition on board were fifty yards away from where the torpedo struck the ship."—(*Glasgow Evening Citizen*, July 17th, 1915.)

could have risked so much at a single throw. That government had also to consider that the means of its blockade, the submarine, had no standing whatsoever in the rules of "visit and search," this for the very simple reason that in tactical respects it was not the equal of the smallest tramp, the bow of which could cut the hull of the "U" boat in two.

One must wonder how the men in Berlin had pictured to themselves the situation in the United States. The only feasible explanation, in the absence of information on the subject is, that the German government and Admiralty took it for granted that the tone of some of the notes sent to the Entente governments by the Department of State seemed really sharper than it was.* Men who are anxious to believe a thing will believe it, despite every discouragement. In that frame of mind adverse circumstantial evidence is underrated and the favorable thing in hand examined microscopically, with the result that it is magnified a thousand times.

One of the results of the sinking of the "Lusitania" was the arming of the British merchant marine. That this would have been done anyway before very long is certain. But Great Britain might not have found it so easy to make her arguments weighty had it not been that the "Lusitania" case recommended a lenient attitude on the part of the government of the United States. The contentions on this and that side, in regard to caliber of guns, and their location aboard, are hardly worth attention. Great Britain was arming her ships for their protection, and there was no assurance worthy of the name that a gun barbetted aft could not be shifted forward once the ship was out of a neutral port. At any rate from that moment onward the situation of 'submarine versus supramarine warfare' on merchant shipping was and remained critical. On September 1st, 1915, the German government instructed Count Bernstorff to say:

"Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of noncombatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance."

A Diplomatic Splitting of Hairs

Meanwhile the sinking of the "Arabic" had demonstrated what the new international political danger, submarine against armed merchant vessel, would lead to, and the many attempts on the part of the German government to induce the government of the United States to view analytically this latest departure in sea law in war did not lead to anything. The Berlin government offered to arbitrate the "Arabic" case, but decided to "pay an indemnity for the American lives which to its deep regret have been lost on the 'Arabic.'"

* An English editor of prominence has since then explained on a lecture platform in New York City that the British government knew that the tone of the notes of the U. S. Department of State was artificial.

The case of the "William P. Frye," that of the "Hesperian" and the conduct of Dr. Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, had meanwhile aggravated the general situation in the United States. Notwithstanding this, the government of the United States sent, on October 21st, to the British government the *strongest* note it was ever to get, that in which Great Britain's substitution of her own volition for International Law was characterized as "ineffective, illegal and indefensible."

The German government continued its diplomatic fight against the arming of merchant men. The fact that it had the edicts in that regard of International Law on its side helped no longer, of course. The world had long passed out of the reign of international morality, and if the Germans could not see this it was due largely to the fact that they saw only the faults of their enemies and their enemies' sympathizers, but not their own.

Some months before that, Mr. Bryan had in a letter to William J. Stone, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, defined very aptly what the position of the United States government was. A part of the press had accused the government of having shown partiality to the Entente governments as against the Central Powers. Mr. Bryan was able to refute all of the charges that had been made, and in conclusion said:

"If any American citizens, partisans of Germany and Austria-Hungary, feel that this administration is acting in a way injurious to the cause of these countries, this feeling results from the fact that on the high seas the German and Austro-Hungarian naval power is thus far inferior to the British. It is the business of a belligerent operating on the high seas, not the duty of a neutral, to prevent contraband from reaching the enemy. Those in this country who sympathize with Germany and Austria-Hungary appear to assume that some obligation rests upon this government in the performance of its neutral duty to prevent all trade in contraband, and thus to equalize the difference due to the relative naval strength of the belligerents. No such obligation exists; it would be an unneutral act, an act of partiality on the part of this Government to adopt such a policy if the Executive had the power to do so. . . . The markets of this country are open upon equal terms to all the world, to every nation, belligerent or neutral."

Such indeed was the case. The attitude of Mr. Bryan was far from that of Mr. Jefferson, whose view on neutrality was more a moral than a technical matter, which, even in his times did not find universal approval by any means—might have found none at all had it not been that the Revolution and the participation therein of some Frenchmen had been too recent to make any other attitude popular. The political situation of

then made the United States government toward France a friendly neutral, while the state of affairs during the European War caused that same government to follow a neutrality that was legally correct, but otherwise pro-British.

There was nothing to be done but to pursue the best course, after the government of the United States had failed to take a firm stand when the British government set aside, at leisure and with design, every rule of Maritime Law as pronounced by International Law, and defined by the Declarations of Paris and London. Maritime Law was in flux, and the Orders in Privy Council placed upon its poor and flayed verbiage whatever interpretation seemed desirable, setting aside whole Articles and interpolating whatever it pleased, so that the Declaration of London was indeed become a series of "The Declaration of London Orders in Council."

To have permitted this, in face of its staunch support in the past of the "free ships make free goods" principle, is of no credit to the administration of Mr. Wilson. This sin of omission encouraged banditry on the high sea, and piracy *under* it. It also gave the affairs of the world—mankind—a turn from which it will need many a decade to recover. That the German government, composed of men who had grown up in the atmosphere of bureaucracism, interpreted this *failure* as a proof of weakness on the one hand, and an unfriendly act, on the other, should not surprise us.

The Handicaps of German Diplomacy

We may well doubt that any other set of diplomatists and officials would have seen the situation in a different light.* As a matter of fact the diplomatic conduct of the British government was no better, but it was backed by the fact that the British public had in the governing and possessing classes and in the government of the United States many staunch supporters, while the German public had in the country only some unorganized and dollar-chasing race-fellows of far less importance than they themselves could believe. The German in the United States had indeed contributed his share to the upbuilding of the country, but so had the racial relatives of the other belligerents. In a majority-run country, therefore, they could but expect the inevitable—the *ultima ratio* that is the lot of the weaker.

For the German government it may be said that it never fooled itself on the position of the Germans in the United States. But that was an odd sort of enlightenment. It did not spring from an intimate knowledge of conditions across the Atlantic, but from the disdain in which it held all those who had sought respite from the burdens of militarism at home.

* See "The Pitfalls of Diplomacy" in Appendix.

I do not wish to appear facetious when I say that this was the only subject on which the men in Berlin were well informed. How *rightly* they were informed is another matter, of course. If that wonderful espionage service of the Germans really existed, it must have been an institution in which employment was dependent upon one's negative qualifications.

In considering these things we must not overlook that in whatever German diplomacy attempted it was handicapped also from without. The prestige of Great Britain, the power of Russia, and the privileged position of France, were all matters against which the German government and its diplomatic agents found it hard to argue effectively. The Triple Entente had enlisted the sympathies of Europe, and to a large extent the world, and Germany, as leading member of a decrepit alliance, as a state that was making itself felt as competitor, the head of whose government was a man given to impetuosity and oratorical indiscretions—a nation whose chauvinists saw their ideals realizable only by the application of force—was hardly fitted to upset this scheme.

Already the control of the world's news channels gave Great Britain in times of peace the opportunity and means to disseminate of German "news" only the worst, and when it was clear to the British that there was to be no understanding on the Two Power Standard in naval armament they inaugurated a campaign of anti-German propaganda the like of which had not been seen before. The "German Peril" became a world slogan. The childish babbling of the emperor, whose forensic effusions dealt hardly ever with anything but the "shining armor and the trusty sword," the wild incantations of the *Alldeutschen* to their new Wotan in the Walhalla of Pan-Germanism, the native idiosyncracies of the German people—all these were things which the British press and its agencies peddled throughout the world. This world came to know the German as a rather stupid, beefy caricature addicted to beer and a pipe, when it did not see him in Anglo-Saxon literature as a crafty though ill-mannered, intriguing, buying forever the secrets of other governments.

Against that sort of *military preparedness* the best diplomacy is impotent. While the government of a country may remain polite enough in such campaigns, and while the populace at first may find such extravagances no more than amusing, both come to assimilate them ultimately in the manner the promoter of them intended. For a new twist of public opinion such things are the foundation. Anything that will create and foster the impression that one people is the superior of the other will find a warm reception with the masses whose vanity is appealed to. That later on this vanity, like all others, will have to be paid for, occurs to but a few.

An able government would have paid more attention to such things.

But the German government was not an able one. In that lies the answer. Its diplomatic representatives were quite satisfied when their own social standing was well launched, and since on the whole they were rather "charming fellows" that matter was quickly attended to. The German *chef de mission*, though usually an accomplished linguist, did what most other men of his class do: He read only that part of the newspaper which the clerk or secretary in charge of that department, digested into a sort of literary review every day. The opinions of diplomatic secretaries are none too highly valued by their chiefs, and thus it came about that the German diplomatic agents had each his little Chinese wall, exact replica of the great mental circumvallation in which labored the government at Berlin.

That interesting state of affairs brought on the following conditions. Before the Great War was over, Germany and her puny allies, had against them the entire civilized world, some small states, between the upper and nether grindstones, duly excepted. A picture of that is given in the table below:

	Population at Home (millions)	Area (sq. miles)	National Wealth (billions)	Popul. in Colonies (millions)	Area (sq. miles)	Number of Military Effectives
British Empire..	46.2	121,331	\$69.2	399.6	13,505,481	5,500,000
Russian Empire..	145.8	1,996,743	65.5	31.5	6,650,914	9,700,000
French Empire..	39.8	207,509	58.2	48.0	4,836,032	5,400,000
Serbia	4.7	34,000	4.5	510,000
Belgium	7.6	11,373	8.2	15.0	900,000	500,000*
Japan	53.8	147,655	42.5	20.5	110,611	5,800,000†
Italy	36.4	110,623	22.5	1.9	596,000	3,800,000
Portugal	6.2	35,490	6.5	9.6	832,267	540,000‡
Rumania	7.8	54,000	5.7	680,000
United States...	103.0	3,616,484	190.5	10.3	125,344	5,500,000§
Totals	451.3	6,345,208	473.3	536.4	27,566,649	37,930,000
German Empire..	66.9	208,780	83.2	14.1	1,027,820	7,400,000
Austria-Hungary	52.0	260,034	55.5	5,400,000
Ottoman Empire	21.8	710,224	11.3	1,740,000
Bulgaria	5.1	43,000	3.9	600,000
Totals	145.8	1,222,038	153.9	14.1	1,027,820	15,140,000

* Partial mobilization.

† Inactive.

‡ Partial participation.

§ Number mobilized at end of war.

Against such odds the German army and the forces allied with it could not prevail, of course. For all that the Great War lasted over four years, and cost 7,254,000 lives, and in direct war expenditures the great sum of \$200,000,000,000, while the indirect losses to all involved have been estimated at \$250,000,000,000, or about \$450,000,000,000 in all—a rather costly enterprise this breaking up of the world's greatest military machine. The large sum of \$29,722 had been spent in the maintenance of each Central powers group soldier, and in opposing him, to the accompaniment of the economic losses included in this sum, before The Great War was a thing of the past. In other words, it cost mankind that much to render innocuous each man in the Centralist camp.

Since the combined national wealth of the states at war was only \$627.2 billions at the outbreak of the European War, not so much was left when finally the Germans agreed to an armistice.

The display of military and economic strength and efficiency of the Germans was truly phenomenal. To almost the very last moment they were successful against forces that were their superior numerically as two to one, and which for their munitions and supplies had the world for their arsenal and base. Had it not been for the British blockade, Germany would have won the War.

The "Declaration of London Orders in Council," sophistical as they will seem to the historian, and the future writers on International Law, had, from the point of view of British public interest, their absolute justification in the fact that without them the German army could not have been beaten. To lay all Central Europe in a state of siege was the direct purpose of the Orders in Privy Council, and in this they were effective, because the neutral governments had at first not the inclination, later not the courage, and still later not the incentive to insist that, according to the genuine Declaration of London, and the agreements on Maritime Law in Paris, 1856, "free ships make free goods," which was already the notion held by Thomas Jefferson, though he expressed it in terms of neutrality as a moral conception. The London Orders in Privy Council were further the agent that brought the United States into the War.

In Diplomacy Might Is Right

There are those who have criticized adversely such statesmen as have in the past defended the proposition that *might is right*. The British government has never admitted that its policy of expansion was in any manner tainted by that. Yet one has but to inquire into the acquisition of the units of the vast British domain to see that conquest and annexation were the principal factors in its growth. As late back as 1902 the British

government snuffed out the lives of two small republics in South Africa, and did that in the most ruthless manner. The concentration camps of General Weyler, in Cuba, were hardly less the graveyard of a people's spirit than were the iniquitous institutions of the same name, which the late Lord Kitchener, with astounding cynicism, conducted on the South African veld, until 26,000 Boer women and children had been done to death, by absence of sanitation and lack of proper food.

Filth and famine have ever been a potent ally of the British, and the German government knew that. Against these means of war it felt called upon to employ its steel sharks of the deep, and had it been possible to do that without endangering the interests of the neutrals, the world might not have been so full of indignation as it was.

As between two law breakers the neutral public could well afford to remain the spectator, as Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Spain did to the very last, because they knew that the protestations made in London were not one whit better than those that came from Berlin. There is nothing like knowing one's neighbors by the washing they hang in the backyard, and in the capitals of the neutrals mentioned the British brand was as well known as the German, the sole reason why Mr. Wilson's appeal to the neutrals of Europe in the spring of 1917 found not the least response, and why American propaganda among them remained ineffective.

Spain knew Great Britain too well to do anything in her favor that was not immediately a question of export balance, and with the French government the Spaniard dealt in the experience gained in Morocco. Those who believe that the Roman Catholic Church had much to do with Spain's attitude must be counted among those who know much because they have learned so little. It was Gibraltar and the loss of a vast colonial empire which made the Spanish averse to anything promotive of Anglo-Saxon interests.

In the Wilhelmstrasse these things were not overlooked, of course. But they were given a false value. As said before, adverse circumstantial evidence was not properly weighed, and favorable testimony was magnified. When a government becomes the victim of the mania of making the wish father of the thought, and its own necessities the mother, the state is not far from debacle, as events in Germany have demonstrated.

The German government was expert enough in military matters to know that its army was by far the best of any, it was efficient enough to feel that the country's economic resources could be stretched, but it was not perspicacious enough to so shape its conduct that there would come within view of army and population the end of the War. Had it been competent in that respect it would have done what it did not do—

exercise every effort to keep the United States out of the Great War, in which case the Central Powers would have been victorious. That this was difficult must be admitted, but it still seemed possible at one time.*

Not to resume unlimited warfare on merchant ships with the submarine was for Germany to sacrifice a great military advantage. Of that there can be no doubt. On the other hand, the political factors were such that they could not be overlooked. Behind those political factors stood the power of the United States. But the Berlin skeptics who doubted that this would be turned against them, who in the unpreparedness of the United States saw a handicap great enough to prevent active participation by American forces in the Great War, had seemingly forgotten that there was ever such a thing as the Civil War. That these men had indeed some foundation for their optimism must not be denied. In the presidential campaign of 1916 "He kept us out of the War" had been the general slogan of one faction, but it was overlooked that the other faction, which did not have this cry, was able for a few hours to claim the election, so close was the result of the ballots cast for and against participation in the Great War, for such was the true import of the campaign.

But with the immediate aspect and nature of a situation no competent government will busy itself too much. It is the ultimate of a crisis that is kept in view by the statesman, for which reason he may be described as a politician who today can do that which twenty years hence he need not regret. Of such men German statecraft and diplomacy had none. Hence the steps which led to the accession in the camp of the Allies of the moral, material and military resources of the United States.

* Though testimony given by Mr. Wilson himself would seem to deny this, it may be doubted that even he could have carried so completely off its feet the Congress of the United States as to make war with Germany absolutely inevitable.—Note made on January 20, 1920.

XIV

THE VIENNA VIEWPOINT

WHILE the unreasonable terms of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia were directly responsible for the crisis that led to the European War it was not the intention of the Austro-Hungarian government to bring on the catastrophe which ensued. By and large that government had for a long time been in the habit of doing as it pleased in the Balkans, and, for a time, in what later became Rumania. That habit had been acquired in dealing with the Turks.

The emperors of Serbia had been able to maintain the rivers Danube and Sava as their border towards Austria and Hungary, the first of which was then Germany proper, but their successors were not able to do this. Already in 1640 the Roman Catholic Church in Albania passed under the protection of the Austrian emperors, and it was largely due to the efforts of the Austrian-Hungarian government that Albania, in 1913, was made an independent principality under Prince William of Wied.

Serbia had passed completely under the Turks in 1459, when the capital, then Semendria, was taken. This accomplished, the Turks invaded the remainder of Hungary, beat back the Austrian forces and laid siege to Vienna. From then on, war by the Austrians and their allies against the Turks continued to be the order of the day. In 1717, Prince Eugene, the famous, succeeded in taking Belgrade, and from 1718 to 1739 northern parts of Serbia were Austrian territory. During the first decade of the Nineteenth Century the Serbs finally gained their independence, though as yet that was to be enjoyed only under Russian and Turkish protection. In 1882 Serbia was again a kingdom and under the Obrenovitch kings the traditional relations of friendship between Austria-Hungary and Serbia were carefully fostered by both. So far did these relations go that King Milan, and his successor, Alexander I, were allowed a sort of piñ-money by the Austrians, King Peter, of the Karageorgievitch family, deciding later to take such an allowance from the Russian crown. That, however, was not entirely his own choice. The Austro-Hungarian government was under the impression that Alexander and Draga had been murdered at the instigation of the Karageorgievitches, and decided to turn its back upon them, which it did, having in this the hearty approval of the British government, which was the last to recognize King Peter.

Since I have already mentioned in a previous chapter that Austria did for a time occupy itself with the affairs of Rumania, I need not go into that subject again here. The fact is that Austria-Hungary had had a free hand in the Balkans, though now and then Russian influence was in the lead in the eastern parts of the peninsula. The Turks had been driven back, and the Austrian armies did much to get them into motion southward and eastward.

This was recognized by the Congress of Berlin, 1878, giving Austria-Hungary a protectorate over Bosnia and Herzegovina, which in 1908, resulted in complete annexation, in the manner already gone into. Count Aehrenthal, then the Austrian minister of the exterior, was a rather ambitious man, and labored besides under the misfortune of being somewhat of a Serbophobe, a circumstance which opened anew the door in the Balkans to Russian intrigue with a view of getting to Constantinople over land, the "Concert of Europe" discountenancing still advance across the Black Sea. His policies were continued by Count Berchtold, who succeeded him in office, the man who was the accomplice in the sharp deal with Isvolski. It was for this reason that Count Berchtold was the only one who objected strenuously to the further strengthening of Serbia, which Sazonoff engineered by the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest, at the expense of Bulgaria.

Diplomacy Versus National Fact

While the tariff discriminations against Serbia were intended to benefit especially the Hungarian landowners and farmers, the measure was also designed to discipline the Serbs, and above all their government. King Peter continued to remain in bad odor in Vienna and Budapest. That he was a regicide could not be charged officially, but the Austrian government proceeded from that basis in all its dealings with the Serbian government.

This, then, explains the peremptory tone of the ultimatum. The men in Vienna would not concede that they were dealing with an equal and a sovereign state.

But there was also another reason. The Serbs had hoped that, soon or late, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which before the rule of the Turk had been a part of the Serbian empire, would be joined to their country. The annexation of the two districts, with some two millions of Croats, by Austria-Hungary, in 1908, put an end to this hope. Its place was taken by the movement which today is known as Jugo-Slav.

By means of propaganda, industriously supported by the Russian government, the attempt was made to make the South-Slavs of the Dual Monarchy eager for incorporation into Serbia. That at least was the objective, though, naturally, the thing was given a different name. The fact is that religion

divided the two families of Slavs. The Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina are Roman Catholics for the greater part, and Mohammedans, while the Serbs subscribe to the Greek Orthodox faith. In a country like the Balkan that means more than it does in other parts. Intellectually these people are in the days of the Reformation, and since religion is to most of them the principal impetus to mental life, violent prejudices founded on it are the inevitable result.

It is quite a common trick for governments to impose economic burdens and handicaps upon a state or people they later wish to annex. The Austrian government, though in this case Hungarians were the principal offenders—Count Berchtold, despite his German name, being one of them—had realized that Jugo-Slavism was one of the facts of the day.

The empire had the reputation that it was on the verge of disintegration and it was feared that it could hardly stand trouble from that quarter. It was later proven that, as in the case of Mark Twain, the obituary notices were a little premature, but that could not deter the Austrian government from doing what seemed logical under the circumstances.

The total annexation of Serbia was not intended, so far as I have been able to ascertain, but a humbling into the dust of the Jugo-Slavism-promoting government in Belgrade was the program. The terms of the ultimatum were chosen with that in view. That they were not accepted was due entirely to Sazonoff. Before the Serbian government decided upon the course it was to take, the Russian minister of foreign affairs was consulted, and when he declared his readiness to stand by Serbia in any event compliance with the ultimatum was refused.

The Austrian government, as has been noted, waited a full three weeks after the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand before it made up its mind to send the ultimatum, and with the ink still wet on it, Count Berchtold decided to continue his summering. It is entirely out of the question that he did not consult the German government in the matter, and that Berlin had given him a free hand, as Bethmann-Hollweg has attested.* It is quite possible that to the German chancellor, who had been brought up in the police service of Prussia, and who had a police official's mind, withal, the terms of the ultimatum seemed perfectly proper. The case of Serbia seemed to call for punishment and full power was given given the authority concerned.

That the murder of the heir apparent and his wife was the spark that set off the mine which double-dealing diplomacy had laid in Europe, need not blind us to the fact that the Serbian government would not have fared

* This has since been proven by investigations made by the Ebert Government. The German government, especially Emperor William II, gave the advice that Austria Hungary should do what she did do.—Date of this note, January 20, 1920.

better, had some other "power" been the injured party. It is all very well to protest the terms of the ultimatum. The fact is that much less has brought on wars between nations.

Since Great Britain had been the last to recognize the status of King Peter, and since she had made the killing of an Englishman in Johannesburg, by a Boer policeman, a very important item in her bill of complaints against the government of the South African Republic, she might have been the last to prate of arrogant conduct and the like. Surely, even an Austrian archduke is the equal of an English commoner. And what difference, indeed, should it have made to Great Britain if Austria-Hungary had annexed Serbia, since she had only recently annexed the Transvaal and Orange Free State for reasons that were alike, if we go by pretext. Instead of all that, Sir Edward Grey, coming valiantly to the rescue of his friend and ally, M. Sazonoff, made a mountain of a molehill, as such things are looked upon by and between governments that have not premeditated to cut each other's throat.

But we are looking at this thing from the point of view of humanity—from the position of self-determination for small peoples, a very noble principle aired so much at that time, but again totally forgotten now. There is no reason that I can see, and I have investigated the Jugo-Slav on the spot, notably in and about Agram and Serajewo, which towns were the hotbeds of the movement in Austria-Hungary, why the Serbs, Croats proper, and Slovenes should not come together if they are so minded.

On the other hand, taking the economic side of the thing, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina were better off than they would have been under Serb rule, for, to say the least, the Serbian government has always been notorious for its corruption, ineptness and inefficiency. What Serbia was before the War she was in spite of that government, and by virtue of the good qualities of her people. In making that statement I take into account the fact that from the Balkan we can not within reason expect as yet too much. Its people were but too recently a subject race, to have thrown off the effects of that condition, and government for the greater part has not as completely dissociated itself from the methods of the Turkish *valis* and *begs* as might be expected.

The Austrian government did consider the possibilities that might arise so far as Russia was concerned. But only a little while before the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the complete emancipation of Bulgaria, had been accomplished by Austria-Hungary in the face of much German opposition without any real interference from Russian quarters. It was believed that the Russian government had its hands too full with internal unrest to care whether or no Serbia was taken to task for the alleged complicity in the murder of the archducal couple.

The revolution in Russia had never really subsided, and the Muscovite government had to keep its eye on it, as later developments have shown. In Vienna, then, it was thought that this would act as a deterrent, in spite of the fact that the building by Russia of a great mileage of strategic railroads along the borders of Galicia and in Poland was accepted throughout Central Europe as being the sure sign that trouble was coming. So far as Germany was concerned there was the additional fact that these railroads were being built with money raised in France.

In a Diplomatic *Cul-de-sac*

But this calculation was wrong. Governments have ever found a foreign war the best antidote for revolution, and Russia was to find it that. When finally it became clear that Russia would not consent to a "localization" of the difficulty between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, it was too late to do anything. Withdrawal of the ultimatum would have damaged the prestige of Austria-Hungary, and in Petrograd, the war clique—Sazonoff, Grand Duke Nicholai Nicholaievitch, Sir George Buchanan and M. Paléologue, the French ambassador—saw to it that the Czar negotiated with Emperor William on the basis of a partial mobilization, while a complete one was actually in progress. Sir Edward Grey and M. Viviani were in the meantime exchanging compliments on the status of Belgium, though that seemed, and must always seem, superfluous in view of the fact that both, Great Britain and France, were signatories to the treaty which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, and had at that time no reason to think that Germany, another guarantor, would violate that pact. The men in Berlin were not particularly good statesmen, but they were able to think, and in Vienna they thought even more rapidly, if not as deeply.

The Austro-Hungarian government loved public opinion as little as did the German, but conditions within the realm had in the course of time forced the study of the public's mind upon the men at the head of affairs. With ten races in the empire, and with political antagonism ever present in the Austrian Reichsrat and the Hungarian parliament, that could not be different. *Nolens volens* the Austrian government had to take public opinion into account. Now this, then that, racial element had to be placated—had to be shown that it was profitable to be a part of the Danube monarchy.

To meet the several *irredenta* movements a protective tariff policy had been adopted, by which, for instance, the Italian in Austria was shown that he could sell his products to greater advantage in Austria than in Italy so long as he was under the Austrian flag. Even if proximity to good

markets had not been an advantage in itself, he could always count on having in his favor the import duty which the Austrian government exacted from the Italian producer across the boundary. The Austrian Slavs were similarly favored, as against the non-Austrian Slavs, as had been shown in the tariff discriminations invoked against Serbia. The Rumanians in Hungary enjoyed like privileges, though the Magyars saw to it that they themselves were the chief beneficiaries. At any rate the Rumanian in the Danube monarchy was able to send his children to school, if he had a mind to, and later he was forced to do that, which was not the case in Rumania. In Galicia, Pole and Ruthenian also had protection from the tariff, and the Bohemian, being the most active of the Austro-Hungarophobes in the monarchy, had succeeded in building up, at the expense of his other co-nationals, a great and flourishing industry—the best in all the land.

That this policy of the Austrian government was not the outcome of an inherent liberalism must be granted, yet it certainly was the proof of a broadmindedness, which the German government did not possess. In Berlin they were still the carping hairsplitters, when in Vienna and Budapest *Grosszuegigkeit*—enterprise coupled with generosity—was already the rule.

In many respects the Austro-Hungarian government was far better than the German. That the difference between the two was interpreted in Berlin as due to a *laissez-faire* spirit need not concern us too much. The efficiency of the German government, of which so much has been heard, and which certainly came to the front during the Great War, was not so much the work of the government as a quality of the governed. In fact, much of that quality was stifled by the unreasonable caste system to which the German government seemed hopelessly committed. The men in Berlin, being for the most part governmental charlatans and political sophists, had arrogated unto themselves much that did not belong to them. They took credit for the thoroughness and thrift of the people and succeeded in giving the act an aspect that fooled all.

In Vienna that was not done. The government did have a somewhat sleepy look, to be sure. But it had that largely because nobody cared to adorn himself with the feathers of the governed. There was some *Schlamperei*—negligence—as some saw it, but when honestly examined this neglect was nothing but an abstinence by the government from mixing in affairs that were not strictly administrative.

Austria-Hungary came much closer to the ideal in government than did Germany, and most other countries for that matter. In the absolute this ideal is the non-existence of government; within the realm of the practical it is government eliminated from all spheres that can be left in the

hands of the individual. In that respect the two governments were somewhat antithetical. Just as the ideal of the social extremist is anarchy, so was the ideal of the German government, a monarchic extremist, for the total submergence of all public activities and interests into the ever rising flood of government.

Had the Austro-Hungarian government enjoyed the advantage of dealing with a single people—a united race—it would not have done any better than did the German. The case is, therefore, not one of governmental morality and virtue, but one of necessity. Austrian, German, Hungarian, Czech, Pole, Ruthenian, Rumanian, Italian, Slovak, Slovene and Croat had each and all their own inclinations, and since these had to be reconciled with one another, the Austro-Hungarian government came to be rather susceptible to public opinion. While it did modify the opinion of the several groups, individually and collectively, its own views were necessarily affected also.

Austro-Hungarian Diplomacy Less Handicapped

This, then, was the reason why Austro-Hungarian statecraft and diplomacy were in foreign questions much more competent than the German brand. World public opinion was well understood in the Vienna Ministry of the Exterior, and being well understood, it was efficiently met and never assumed toward Austria-Hungary the ferocious attitude it took in matters related to Germany. To avoid stating the case one-sidedly I must add that Austria-Hungary did not appear as prominently in the arena of war politics as did Germany, and with her, Great Britain and France, the two principal promoters of anti-German propaganda, had no particular quarrel.

While Sir Edward Grey had made a great deal of fuss about the ultimatum to Serbia, he knew only too well that he had done this for the purpose of pleasing Sazonoff and his ambassador Benckendorf. Against the Austrian government he had nothing, apart from the fact that it was an ally of Germany, and France had only too often divided spoils with the Austrians in Italy to become of a sudden a violent *hereditary* enemy.

To the British in fact, Austria-Hungary had been very useful in the past. She had been one of the means of keeping the Russians out of the Dardanelles. Having no colonies, Austria-Hungary came hardly in contact with British imperialism, and the small fleet she kept in the Adriatic did not in any manner menace British control of the Mediterranean. So close were the two governments, especially during the reign of Queen Victoria, that the Austro-Hungarian government did not mind exporting a great deal of munitions and ammunitions for use by the British army during the late

South African War, to which the government of the United States referred incidentally in reply to a note of the Vienna government protesting against the large exports of war materials to the Entente countries from the United States in August, 1915 :

“During the Boer War between Great Britain and the South African Republics the patrol of the coasts of neighboring neutral colonies (Portuguese East Africa, especially) by British naval vessels prevented arms and ammunitions reaching the Transvaal and Orange Free State. The allied Republics were in a situation almost identical in that respect with that in which Austria-Hungary and Germany find themselves at the present time. Yet, in spite of the commercial isolation of one belligerent, Germany sold to Great Britain, the other belligerent, hundreds of thousands of kilos of explosives, gunpowder, cartridges, shot and weapons; and it is known that Austria-Hungary also sold similar munitions to the same purchaser, though in smaller quantities. While, as compared with the present war, the quantities sold were small (a table of the sales is appended) the principle of neutrality involved is the same.”

To this I would add, as a combatant on the Boer side during the late South African War, that when later a party of Boer soldiers, myself included, were obliged to leave South Africa for the United States and effected our emigration via the Austrian port of Triest, the authorities there made our transit to Hamburg and New York, over Austro-Hungarian territory, conditional upon the understanding that none of us would remain within the boundaries of the Danube Monarchy. After that we were transported across the country under police escortment, lest one of the ex-soldiers of the two Boer republics should select to remain in Anglophile Austria-Hungary.

On the other hand, the United States government did not wholly state the case in its note. It was overlooked entirely that from American ports more munitions of war, ammunition, general equipment, food, forage, wheel-transportation, and saddle and pack animals were exported to South Africa, by the British government, under the auspices of the government of the United States, than from the remaining non-British world together; that the ports of New Orleans and Galveston were regularly established British military bases, and that the United States government, regardless of protests and an action in a Federal Court initiated by the governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, permitted these things and remained heedless to the fact that American muleteers were forced into the British army against their will.

On the side of Germany I would add that Emperor William II, stretched his neutrality so far, for love of his grandmother, it would seem, that he submitted to the British general staff his own ideas how the resist-

ance of the Boers could be broken. For those ideas I will say that they were useless in the guerilla warfare we were practicing.

Such are the aspects of yesterday in diplomacy. The United States Department of State answered with an argument based on its own sins, and the British government supplied the "tables of sales . . . appended" to give that argument an extra sting in those days and for our times and posterity a most peculiar flavor.

Diplomacy Reduced to Plain Business

Mr. Archbald, the American "war" correspondent, who later managed to bring on a critical international situation, and the recall of Dr. Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Washington, by letting everybody aboard his steamer know that he was the carrier of important political dispatches, a blossoming diplomatist, therefore, was brought to my attention in Vienna on one of my trips through Austria. A gentleman, whom I will not name for his own sake, and with whom I had dealing in matters referring to censorship, asked me one day, how much I could tell him about Mr. Archbald. I replied that I had met the gentleman in the hotel I was stopping at, the "Bristol." That did not seem to be enough. Did I know Mr. Archbald well? No, not so well! Could I vouch for him as reliable? To which I replied that I never vouched for any man, except he was well known to me. Mr. Archbald, no doubt, would meet the requirements at the front, and then there was the censorship to take care of his literary efforts.

But it seemed that I was talking in a direction different from that of which my questioner was thinking. Did I know Mr. Archbald as a man whose conduct was one of discretion and perspicacity? My reply was as before, to wit: I was not in the habit of passing judgment upon persons I did not intimately know. For some time I was interrogated on what Mr. Archbald's standing was in the American journalistic and social world. Since I had heard of the man for the first time in my life when I met him at the hotel, and when he calmly informed me that in a day or two he would be received by Emperor Francis Joseph, I could give no information that seemed satisfactory to the government official, who later expressed himself to the effect that I seemed to be overcautious.

A year later the man confessed to me that after all he was now able to value my attitude. Mr. Archbald had been found out, as it were, and Dr. Dumba had passed me on the stairs of the Ballhausplatz building not in a mood to be interviewed. His notions on the propriety of things had led to his dismissal by the government of the United States and his complete relegation in the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic service, as will happen in such cases.

But something far worse had happened. Though the Austro-Hungarian government had been one of the first to agree to the inviolability of the diplomatic cyphergrams and mail pouches of the United States embassies and legations, the government in Washington had thought it necessary to now deny the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic mission in the United States that very same privilege. It was argued that since Dr. Dumba had been exposed as a fomenter of acts inimicable to the American public interest, his embassy could no longer be left in the possession of a privilege which made secret communicating between the Austro-Hungarian embassy in Washington and the government in Vienna possible.

Without wishing to inject myself into this, I would go on record as saying that this was poor policy. The concessions known as "diplomatic privileges and the inviolability of diplomatic telegrams and mail" can no longer be defended. They have been the very invitation to intrigue. International machination, indeed, would be of the riskiest nature an enterprise, if it were not that in the past ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary have been able to communicate with one another and their governments by means of code messages that generally defied scrutiny if done in a good cypher, which in addition to being secret itself defied detection by being constantly changed or substituted by another.

The withdrawal of the "diplomatic privilege" in question, left the Vienna Ministry of the Exterior in the plight of being now unable to receive from its *chargé d'affaires* in Washington, Baron Zwiedenik, the tips and information it needed to shape its conduct so that it would give the minimum of offense to the government of the United States.

On the other hand, the system of communication substituted was most unsatisfactory to the Austrians. Its general form was this: The Austro-Hungarian diplomatic mission in Washington was required to submit to the United States Department of State its communications addressed to the government in Vienna in *texte clair*. The plain text of the message was then transcribed in the State Department into a code of the United States diplomatic service. After that the cyphergram would be cabled to the United States embassy at Vienna, where decodization took place, the result being transmitted to the Austrian Ministry of the Exterior in plain text.

Later this system was somewhat modified. I had several occasions to point out in my dispatches that the *modus operandi* was an expedient of an unfair and dangerous character under the circumstances. One of them was when a secretary of the United States embassy in Vienna, a Mr. S. L. C., failed to deliver promptly, as was the intention of Mr. Penfield, the ambassador, a rather important communication so transmitted, keeping

it in a coat pocket for twenty-four hours, and improving thereby greatly the chances of war.

While a universally applied innovation of that sort could only be recommended, in this instance it left a government badly handicapped in the face of a condition which to a large extent had been created by the abuse of "diplomatic privilege." in a war that had been brought about by this very means of secret diplomacy. Nothing whatever can be said in condonation of activity of the nature Dr. Dumba was linked with. Sabotage is indeed looked upon as a perfectly admissible means of war. if employed in the country of the enemy, but, together with its twin brother, propaganda, which is but sabotage of a mental character, it certainly is out of place in a neutral country, no matter how much that country may aid one of the belligerents. On strictly moral grounds the practice is justifiable, of course, but international relations can not be put on that plane, if war is to be confined to its hearth. The public interest of a neutral must be respected by the belligerents, or ought to be respected, no matter what the situation on the other side of the ledger.

As it was, the withdrawal of "diplomatic privileges" from the agents of Austria-Hungary, made havoc unavoidable. Thereafter the Vienna government found it impossible to keep itself properly informed on the attitude of the government of the United States, and the quality of American public opinion. This is to be regretted from several angles. The Austro-Hungarian government was far better able to put a correct interpretation upon this attitude and public opinion than was Berlin, and, as I have good reason to say, the cause of peace would not have suffered had the United States government confined its resentment of Dr. Dumba's activities to his dismissal, especially since it counted upon separating Austria-Hungary and Germany as allies.

In attending to the duties of war and political correspondent, I had in the course of time met every Austro-Hungarian government official of prominence. With some of them I became well acquainted, and not a few of them were friends of mine. Being inclined to look under the surface of things, and to regard government anywhere as the agency of public administration, instead of an avowedly or unavowedly heaven-sent mission, I was able to see behind the screen of obscurantism which governments like to surround themselves with, and found in the dignity-scented atmosphere of the Ballhausplatz, a sincere, albeit selfish, desire to remain at peace with the United States.

Against this, however, was placed Austro-Hungarian public interest, which was no less important to the men in Vienna than was British public interest to the gentlemen who in Buckingham Palace undid International Law at their leisure. To reconcile Austro-Hungarian public in-

terest with United States public interest, in order that peace might be preserved, was not easy, however. The Vienna government was not in a position to entirely place in a secondary class the public welfare it was caring for, and there had to be a certain amount of maneuvering for points of vantage in the attempts to reconcile the interests of the United States with those of Austria-Hungary.

Good international relations are the result of give and take, just as good relations are that within the state, social groups and family. But give and take become impossible when one of the parties is blindfolded and gagged in such a manner as the Austro-Hungarian government was this by the withdrawal of diplomatic privilege from its mission in Washington.

It was entirely out of the question for the Austro-Hungarian *chargé d'affaires* to warn his government of this or that move, the advent of which was clear to him because he not alone understood the position of his country but was, supposedly at least, familiar with the policies and idiosyncracies of his government. On the other hand, the men in the foreign ministry, could not beforehand ascertain what, in the opinion of its diplomatic agent, the effect of this note or that act might be. The situation was very similar of having the defendant in an action represented by the attorney of the plaintiff. The United States State Department did not place prescribed limits upon the communications of the Austro-Hungarian government and its diplomatists in Washington, but it did impose a condition which made the free and frank exchange of opinion between the two impossible, which under the circumstances was the only way of avoiding an extension of the European War, which had to be feared.

I have gone into this at some length, because it was this state of affairs which ultimately made me one of the advisers of the Austro-Hungarian government, and later *ipso facto* the "diplomatic" representative of the United States in Vienna.

Tisza's View of the Situation in 1916

Before I enter upon that sad chapter in diplomacy, I must outline what the actual attitude of the Austro-Hungarian government was toward the United States. I will do that by recording what the leading officials of this government thought and did.

Previously I have mentioned an interview with Count Tisza, minister-president of the Hungarian government, and within the boundaries of that state rather absolute. I must state here, since so little is known of the governmental systems of the Dual Monarchy, that Austria and Hungary were confederated states by treaty, and that each retained independent control of its own internal affairs, being susceptible to Austrian or Hun-

garian influence only, as the case might be, to the extent in which the Emperor of Austria and Apostolic King of Hungary, the same person, might through his own influence and powers modify or shape the legislation of the Austrian Reichsrat and the Hungarian parliament. The Minister of the Exterior was the minister of the imperial house, and the diplomatic service, or better, foreign representation, was therefore an adjunct of the two crowns, held in common. The military establishment, in harmony with this, was of a triple character. The forces of the line and certain reserve bans were known as "das Gemeinsame Heer," and were under the control of the Austro-Hungarian minister of war and his general staff. The older bans of reserves, known as the "Landwehr" in Austria, and the "Honved" in Hungary, were under the administration of the national defense ministries in Vienna and Budapest. The person of the emperor-king, however, was the supreme commander of the three branches of the Austro-Hungarian military establishment.

Count Tisza, then, was the actual head of government in Hungary, and as such his position in Vienna was one of great influence. So great was this, in fact, that he had succeeded in keeping Hungarians in charge of Austro-Hungarian foreign relations for some time. Count Berchtold was a Hungarian aristocrat, whom another Hungarian nobleman, Baron Burian, replaced. To placate the Slavic elements in the monarchy the post of Minister of the Imperial House and of the Exterior was later given to Count Czernin, a Czech noble.

As the result of the interview I had with Count Tisza on February 26th, 1916, I was allowed to quote the Hungarian premier to the extent:

"For the United States to engage in the European War would be a crime against humanity."

That was not all Count Tisza said in the course of a two-hour interview. Even then Count Tisza was fully convinced that the European War could not end without becoming a world war. When I reached my hotel I made such notes as I deemed necessary, as is my practice, since I never interview a person with a pad of paper and pencil in my hands, having learned long ago that this is the best way of not getting the information sought. From these notes I gather the following:

After having asked my opinion in regard to the situation in Rumania, Count Tisza left his chair and began to walk up and down in his office. For some time he said nothing.

"The outlook in Washington is not particularly encouraging to me," he said, as he passed me on his way to and fro. "Of course, there are a good many optimists who do not agree with me. Some men have the habit of translating their wishes into facts. I am not of that sort.

"It is impossible to get reliable information from the United States.

When I ask the ministry of the exterior to give me data on this or that, it says that it does not have it, and can not obtain it. Instead of reports from our *chargé* in Washington, they send me the daily digests that are made, in the press department, of the news contained in the foreign newspapers. Since all of that news has passed over British and French cables, and has then been doctored by the censors, no credence can be given it. By the way—you are familiar with cable conditions and the like, is there a way of getting news into and out of the United States, through some neutral country, perhaps, without having it interfered with by the British and French censors. What is your own experience?"

I pointed out that there was no channel of telegraphic communication from or to anywhere in this wide world which was not watched by the British and French governments. I had been able to get mail matter past them by routing it via Bergen in Norway, but was never sure of its arrival, because the British cruisers would often search these steamers.

"I thought so," was the laconic comment of the premier, who resumed his walking. After a while he stopped again before me.

Count Tisza Doubted Mr. Wilson's Integrity

"It has been asserted that there is some sort of understanding between the government of the United States and Allied governments," began Count Tisza. "I am familiar enough with government in your country to know that this can not have been done in accord with the provisions of the United States Constitution. But gentlemen's agreements can be made, and my experience permits me to say that such agreements can be carried into effect over the head of any parliament."

I found it difficult to repress a smile. Count Tisza saw it, and wondered.

"In times of war, parliaments are confronted by the government only with *faits accomplis*, Your Excellency!" I remarked.

Count Tisza's face brightened up for a second.

"Well, all journalists are cynics," he said. "I suppose, they get that way against their own wishes."

The premier resumed his perambulations. After a while I became conscious of his intention to have me make a remark in regard to the subject of agreements.

"In the United States treaties are made by and with the consent of the United States Senate, Your Excellency! But that you know, of course! I am not able to say whether or no these rumors concerning a gentlemen's agreement, by which the United States government would come to the rescue of the Allies, if necessary, are true or not. I have heard the same thing, but have no means of learning whether the rumors are founded on

fact or not. It seems to me that the rumors are not founded on a *known* fact, since the person or persons involved would be obliged to maintain the strictest secrecy. My impression is that the rumors are the result of a combination of conditions everywhere.

"Nobody in the United States has the right to make such an agreement, and since the general policy of the Wilson administration, in regard to foreign affairs, has not a few opponents in the United States Senate, it is not even probable that a gentlemen's agreement of that sort has been reached. The Senate is rather jealous of its prerogatives and if I know anything at all concerning that body, and the mood of Mr. Wilson's opponents, I may say that the slightest knowledge of such an agreement would have led to an interpellation of the government before now. I am not inclined, therefore, to believe the rumors."

"But what is there that could prevent Mr. Wilson from giving some such assurance to—the British ambassador, for instance?" asked Count Tisza.*

"Assurance there is none, Your Excellency!" I replied. "But the

* I could not do better than to reproduce here a part of the preface of Joseph Reinach's book, "Les Commentaires de Polybe," published by the Bibliotheque-Charpentier, Paris, early in 1917.

M. Reinach wrote:

"Why was it that I did not doubt America, even in the days when I wrote some rather sharp remarks concerning its slowness, or, again, when men of importance maintained that her neutrality was of greater advantage to the Entente than her intervention? I had for that two principal reasons, one of them of a particular, and the other of a general, order, which to relate will be of some interest, perhaps.

"As to the first: An enthusiastic friend of Roosevelt brought to me one day the intimate friend of President Wilson, Colonel House. I had hardly talked to him freely when I found myself overwhelmed by the intelligence and sincerity of the man; a soul at once exalted and clear. When he assured me (it was in the first months of 1915) that Wilson was convinced of the good cause of the Entente in the war, I believed it. When he assured me, moreover, that Wilson would never obey anything but his conscience, and that as a result he would intervene, before the end of the war, in favor of the Entente, I believed it.

"Colonel House, as you may surmise, did not fix a date. He strove at the same time, with much tact, not to compromise the highest magistrate of his country, and not to have misunderstood the moral quality of his friend. He told me in addition that Wilson was following his designs farsightedly, and that his will was strong and tenacious. His (Wilson's) ambition was to first convert to the ideas he thought just the grand majority of his citizens; he would not act until later. Incapable of going beyond a line of the Constitution, he would use every right he held under it.

"House spoke in the same strain a year afterwards, when he was on his second trip to Europe. In that manner he armed me against my impatience and, to be quite frank, against the failures of his friend which presently came.

"Wilson became candidate for a second time for the presidency. The gross of the Democratic forces is in the Middle West and in the Western States. The taste for peace there was akin to pacifism. The Germans there are numerous and also the German Americans; they were excited or troubled by an active propaganda. Finally, Wilson would have for a rival Roosevelt or a friend of the impetuous Teddy. . . . From then on, Wilson, descending into the electoral arena, descended himself, so to speak, and as candidate was no longer his *better self*. It was then that he defied his vehement adversaries to find a single man capable of establishing who was right and who was wrong in the great conflict and that he pronounced the words just as famous: *Too proud to fight*. But re-elected, and prevented by usage from seeking for the third time the royalty of the White House, he was freed of all foibles or necessary prudence (sic). At present he allows only his heart to speak in accord with his reason. He is sending into the world splendid and strong formulas, being the first writer of his country. Very soon he made an unanimity of that vast people of a hundred millions, carrying it to new horizons, and he has written his name under those of his most illustrious predecessors, Washington and Lincoln. . . ."

NOTE.—The fact that Monsieur Reinach is so poorly informed of political conditions in the United States brings it nowise into doubt his veracity in connection with the extraordinary statements made in the preface, only a part of which is here reproduced. By order of United States governmental agencies, the book in question was withdrawn from the market and "put aside" in the American libraries.

conditions are against the making of such an agreement. At any rate the agreement could never be cited in Congress as an obligation of the United States government to go to war for the benefit of the Allies."

"That is perfectly clear to me," said the premier. "But as I have intimated before, the United States government, as well as any other, can create a situation which will meet with the terms of a gentlemen's agreement. I may say that it is quite easy for a government to not only create such a situation, but to bring it about in such a manner that the public will be none the wiser.

"Things are happening every day just now that would form the substance of a really fine pretext. More of them will happen, and whether the United States stays out of, or enters, the war is entirely a question to be decided upon in Washington. For the purpose of meeting, as effectively as we can, the British blockade, so that it may not reduce us by starvation, we may have to do things in the future that would give Mr. Wilson every opportunity to enter the war.

"In fact, I am sure that this will take place—gentlemen's agreement or no. So long as Mr. Bryan was Secretary of State we had a chance, I think. I fear that the natural tendencies of the American people are against us, or at least are such that they may be turned against us at any moment. The people of the United States have too much in common to ever look with equanimity upon disaster to the British arms. Is not that your opinion also?"

I replied that such was my opinion.

"Very well, then," continued Count Tisza. "We have the conditions favorable to bringing the resources of the United States against us. In fact that is already being done on a scale that has now ceased to alarm me, because I am under the influence of the realization of a much greater danger—active participation by the United States in the war against us.

"The note concerning the furnishing to the Allies of such prodigal quantities of war material, which we sent to the United States government not so long ago, was framed by Count Burian at my request. I did not expect any other answer than what we received. I was interested only in what tenor the reply would have. That tenor confirmed my worst fears.

"I have learned that whole industries in the United States have been converted into munition and ammunition plants. Only yesterday I had a report on that. Huge loans are being negotiated, many of them openly, others secretly, so that the Allies may have the necessary credits in the United States. That will go on, of course.

"In the end the indebtedness of the Allied governments in the United States will be so great that a defeat of the Allies can not be contemplated

in the United States without the probability of large losses. To express myself more clearly, I will say that the day will come on which the government of the United States will engage in this war against us for the mere purpose of rescuing the investments in the war loans and war debts of the American capitalist. Do you follow me?*"

I did indeed follow the words of the premier, and said so.

"That means that we can not bring this war to a conclusion without having to measure issues with the United States.

"Well, for the time being there is nothing to do but to follow a policy of conciliation. I hope that our internal conditions will permit us to do that. Food is getting to be very scarce. If we have a good crop this year, we may be able to weather the storm, if not, the crisis will be here.

"I have spoken very frankly to you. The men in the Ministry of the Exterior could not do that. I heard from them concerning you some time ago, and I may say that they have a high opinion of your work. Since your service reaches so many people in the United States, I thought it best that I should outline to you what the basis of negotiations between the Austro-Hungarian and United States governments is to be, so far as we are concerned. Always bear in mind that we do not want a war with the United States, and that we shall do our best to get Berlin to adopt the same principle.

"I beg you to take toward that attitude of ours a sympathetic stand, and in consideration of that will be of assistance to you in case you should have trouble with our censors. Some of those men do not seem to realize that the neutral correspondent must not permit himself to show partiality and that his reports must be accurate in order to retain their value. Let me know whenever you run into that state of affairs."

Vienna Not Fond of Submarine Warfare

To this verbatim rendition of my notes on this interview, I must add that Count Tisza was rather bitter in his comment on Mr. Wilson and

*"The financial history of the six months from the end of the summer of 1916 up to the entry of the United States into the war, in April, 1917, remains to be written. Very few persons outside the half dozen officials of the British treasury, who lived in daily contact with the immense anxieties and impossible financial requirements of those days can fully realize what steadfastness and courage were needed and how entirely hopeless the task would soon have become without the assistance of the United States treasury.—John Maynard Keynes, in *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*.

It is to be presumed, of course, that a man who served in the British treasury would know what he is talking about. Mr. Keynes, moreover, is too serious a person to make the above statement without realizing what full responsibility for it means. On the other hand, by whose authority did the United States treasury, in the six months in question, assist the British treasury, and what means did it make use of, seeing that Congress voted no appropriations for the purpose? In the face of the fact that Congress did not empower anybody at that time to come to the assistance of the British treasury, it seems reasonable to assume that considerable juggling was undertaken. I say considerable juggling, because to prevent the task of the British treasury becoming *hopeless* just then took vast amounts in either gold shipments or credits. Who authorized either or both in a manner that the United States treasury became a party to the transaction? Would Congress deem it necessary to look into this?

Mr. Lansing. At any rate there was no doubt that the Hungarian premier understood the situation thoroughly and had the courage to face it with that grim determination which marked the whole of his political career. When finally we parted he authorized me to use but the one sentence, I have here repeated, and also suggested that I write as little as possible about him. To get that lone sentence through he had to issue a special order to every censor along the Austro-Hungarian route of my dispatch.

An interview with Baron Burian was of more or less the same tenor. Since the Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs knew that he was talking for publication, he was less direct in his statements, and confined himself largely to the situation in the monarchy as created by the British blockade. He made a few sarcastic references to the attitude of the United States government toward the British "The Declaration of London Orders in Council," and, being more savant than politician, he found it hard to realize why the government of the United States had supinely accepted the substitution of the British Orders in Privy Council for International Law.

Meanwhile food conditions were worse in Austria and Hungary than even in Germany. While the assassination of Count Stuerghk, the Austrian premier, had indeed removed a stumbling block in the way of efficient food regulation, the tenure of office by that man had left little enough to do it with. When finally the food problems were taken in hand, the larder was almost empty.

The death of Emperor Francis Joseph was a hard blow to the Austrians and Hungarians. Somewhat given to superstitions, the light-hearted people of the Danube Monarchies saw in this bereavement a bad omen for the future. The old ruler had been so long an institution in Austria and Hungary that most people found it hard to understand why death should have carried him off before the War was ended. The man was no longer able to give the affairs of state intelligent attention, but his very figure seemed to be a promise that the days of the Dual Monarchy would yet be many, and that better times were ahead.

In democracies such things may be hard to understand, but the fact is that in monarchies the state finds in the ruler a very patent incarnation. He is in effect and for practical purposes the visualization of an idea, and logically, or illogically, the weal of the monarchical commonwealth is brought into relation with the personal vicissitudes of the sovereign.

It was so when Francis Joseph died.

His death, however, had another consequence. The old man still lived in the age of chivalry—the times when the commander of a besieged town could treat with the commander of the besieging forces and get the latter's respectful attention—the days of pleasant memory, when soldiers still wore

uniforms gay and gaudy with color and so cut they they showed off the man. Francis Joseph had grown up in the times of the hollow square and ball ammunition and military decencies generally. Such things as a submarine disgusted him, and, though he was not exactly a sentimentalist, the thought of having people drown at sea after a torpedo attack was as loathsome to him as the starving of woman and children. Francis Joseph was not a very lovely sort of father, not what one might call an "old dear," but for all that he was a good father to his children—a good ruler to his people.

The infirmities of age had left little political sagacity in the old emperor, and American institutions were a smell in the nostrils of this aristocrat of aristocrats. Upon the United States, the irascible old man looked with cynical disdain, and it was not regard for the government in Washington that caused him to counsel, as he constantly did, never to use the submarine against merchantment so long as the lives of passengers of any nationality, enemies included, were thereby placed in jeopardy.

I had some intimate acquaintances at the court, and from these I learned that Francis Joseph was unalterably opposed to the submarine, was this in fact long before the European War. On several occasions he had sounded foreign governments on their inclinations in the matter, but he never succeeded in finding any encouragement for the total suppression of this "pest." This in spite of the fact that his own little war fleet was in position to greatly benefit by the murderous innovation. He placed the submarine in the same class as the Maxim silencer, saying that both were unfit for use by decent men and governments. Had Emperor Francis Joseph lived on, some parts of the history of the Great War would have a different aspect. There would have been no renewal of the use of the submarine against merchant shipping. From that angle a long life and tenure of trust was still too short to accomplish its best.

Diplomacy of the Barbed-Wire Brand

What Count Tisza thought in February, 1916, was known in Berlin, of course. It is quite possible that up to the "Sussex" affair that was not as well understood, as it was when the first notes on this subject arrived from Washington. The Hungarian premier had counselled caution, and the records of submarine warfare of that period show that his words were not entirely lost. Commanders of German submarines were more careful than they had been, but seem to have fallen victim, in the case of the "Sussex" to the hazards of their *métier*. The sinking of the ship on March 24th, caused the government of the United States to go into negotiations with the German government in regard more to the general principles of German submarine warfare as to specific instances. Many

notes were exchanged and as the result of this Germany declared in the note dated May 4th, 1916, her position to be as follows:

"As the German Government has repeatedly declared, it cannot dispense with the use of the submarine weapon in the conduct of warfare against enemy trade. The German government, however, has now decided to make a further concession in adopting the methods of submarine warfare to the interests of the neutrals; in reaching this decision the German government has been actuated by considerations which are above the level of the disputed question.

"The German government attaches no less importance to the sacred principles of humanity than the Government of the United States. Again, it fully takes into account that both Governments have for many years cooperated in developing international law in conformity with these principles, the ultimate object of which has been always to confine warfare on sea and on land to the armed forces of the belligerents and to safeguard, as far as possible, non-combatants against the horrors of war.

"For in answer to the appeal of the United States government on behalf of the sacred principles of humanity and international law, the German Government must repeat once more that it was not the German but the British government which, ignoring all the accepted rules of international law, has extended this terrible war to the lives and property of non-combatants, having no regard whatever for the interests and rights of the neutrals and non-combatants that through this method of warfare have been seriously injured.

"In self-defense against the illegal conduct of British warfare, while fighting a bitter struggle for her national existence, Germany had to resort to the hard but effective weapon of submarine warfare.

"The German people knows that the Government of the United States has the power to confine this war to the armed forces of the belligerent countries in the interest of humanity and the maintenance of international law. The Government of the United States would have been certain of attaining this end had it been determined to insist against Great Britain on its incontestable rights to the freedom of the seas. But, as matters stand, the German people is under the impression that the Government of the United States, while demanding that Germany, struggling for her existence, shall restrain the use of an effective weapon, and while making the compliance with these demands a condition for the maintenance of relations with Germany, confines itself to protests against the illegal methods adopted by Germany's enemies.

"Accordingly, the German Government . . . does not doubt that the Government of the United States will now demand and insist that the British Government shall forthwith observe

the rules of international law universally recognized before the war, as they are laid down in the notes presented by the Government of the United States to the British Government on December 28, 1914, and November 5, 1915. Should the steps taken by the Government of the United States not attain the object it desires, to have the laws of humanity followed by all belligerent nations, the German Government would then be facing a new situation, in which it must reserve itself complete liberty of decision."*

In the reply of Mr. Lansing, dated May 8th, no prospect was left the German Government that its suggestions, in regard to Great Britain, would be accepted. That note said with curt brevity, what Count Tisza expected it would, as he stated to me:

"The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other belligerent Government. . . . In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative."

It is safe to say that future text writers of International Law will not agree with Mr. Lansing, if he be the author of the note, that "responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative." It would be, morally, just as easy for a government to set up the principle in jurisprudence that a law broken leads to prosecution in the one case and immunity in the other. In other words a crime would not be a crime in all cases, or at least enforcement of the law in one instance would not of necessity have to lead to enforcement in another.

In the United States Senate were men who did not think in so peculiar a groove. After long consideration of the problem they arrived at the conclusion that it would be best to warn American citizens against travelling on armed vessels in the mercantile service. In a letter to Mr. Stone, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Wilson refused to do so. To the impartial observer it would seem that to listen to the advice of the Senate in this instance would have been the least the president could have done after showing himself so accommodating

* It was under this stipulation that Germany resumed the submarine warfare on a larger scale in 1917.

to the decrees of the British government known as "The Declaration of London Orders in Council."

For the sake of argument it may be conceded that the detention of all neutral ships in British ports of search, the restraints on American commerce, the violation of neutral mail, and the exercise of a ruthless censorship, were not in themselves as grave an offense as the killing of American citizens in the war zones of the seas, and that the threat to sever relations was much more justified and merited in the case of Germany than it would have been in the case of Great Britain. But those who are familiar with the attitude of the government of the United States toward native-born and naturalized citizens of the United States must at least wonder why it was that such solicitude was shown in the one case and not in the other. Under the aegis of the Department of state the several United States diplomatic missions in Europe, and the consular service, denied every obligation which the natural contract of citizenship, or the contract of naturalization, sets up for the government as against the loyalty of the subject. In other words, while citizens of the United States, usually members of crews of British armed merchant ships, could endanger, without hindrance, the relations between the United States and Germany, citizens of the United States in Europe were at the mercy of whatever government wanted to annoy them, and force them into military service, may be, as soon as some diplomatic secretary or consular official, had refused to extend a passport or issue one, in compliance with instructions from the State Department.

State Department Policy Not Consistent

It came to a point where such citizens were arrested and jailed for days at a time by the belligerent governments, without a government anxious for the preservation of the rights abroad of the citizen caring one iota. Is it possible that the lack of co-ordination in the several divisions of the State Department made it impossible for Mr. Wilson to know what happened on *terra firma*, while the incidents of the high seas received his special care?

Be that as it may, the German government, knowing only too well that in regard to protecting its citizens on land, the United States government had not yet departed from its rule "to do nothing," selected to put upon the attitude of Mr. Wilson, in regard to citizens at sea, its own interpretation.

Regardless of the highhanded manner in which this government would now and then proceed against citizens of the United States, it had as a glorious example of the State Department's indifference toward the govern-

ment's obligation incident to citizenship, the case of Mr. Frank Ghiloni, a native born American, whom the Italian government detained at Barga, Italy, January, 1915, who was later forced into the Italian military service, in the face of a year's good-natured protests, and who did not secure his release until he had been made a prisoner of war by the Austro-Hungarian army, after being wounded, February, 1916.

Mr. Lansing handled this very interesting case in the following telegram to Mr. Penfield, United States ambassador at Vienna :

"Ask release Ghiloni upon his sworn statement that he will return immediately United States, and will not leave United States during continuance of war. Say Department received positive assurances Ghiloni impressed into Italian army against his will, and upon such assurances Department endeavored obtain his release. Department assured Ghiloni will not revisit Italy during war."

The Austro-Hungarian government consented to release Ghiloni in case certain conditions were complied with. To this Mr. Lansing replied, under date May 8th, 1916:

"Mr. Penfield is informed that the first two conditions for the release of Mr. Ghiloni mentioned in his telegram of May 5th are agreed to by the Department. As to the third condition, while an absolute guarantee can not be given, the Department does not believe that Mr. Ghiloni would be seized by the entente powers. The Government of the United States does not recognize the right of the entente powers to seize Mr. Ghiloni, and it would demand his immediate release in case he was seized. Of course it is understood that Mr. Ghiloni would not enter territory of Italy, and his return to the United States by the Scandinavian route would seem advisable."

On June 19th, Mr. Ghiloni was set free by the Austro-Hungarian government, and left for home.

It seems that what the Government of the United States was not able to accomplish in Italy it effected in Austria-Hungary, despite the fact that the Italian government violated the person of the man, while the Austro-Hungarian government had the perfectly sound defense that it had not taken in the person of Mr. Ghiloni a citizen of the United States, but an Italian combatant on the field of battle. Mr. Lansing merely *believed* that Mr. Ghiloni would not be seized by the Entente Powers, and he must have hoped that his demand for *immediate* release would in this case work better than it had before. It was to be understood, of course, that Mr. Ghiloni was not to enter Italian territory, and it would be best if he returned to his home by the Scandinavian route. Such is the concern of governments for their citizens in times of war, such their consistency!

There were many such cases, and, so far as Italy is concerned, they did not always come to a happy conclusion for the subject by being found wounded on the battlefield by the Austrians. On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian government did never feel that the detention and impressment into military service of citizens of the United States, even if they were of Austro-Hungarian origin or descent, would greatly augment its armed forces.

Such matters depend upon conditions over which the plain man has no control.

The Cause of Future Political Moves

With these things known to the Austro-Hungarian government many of the notes of the government of the United States fell on ground that was ill prepared. But the many bitter pills that came from the Department of State were swallowed heroically. The object was to keep the United States out of the War if that were possible, and with that in view everything possible was done to meet the views of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lansing.

Throughout the late summer of 1916 the German and Austro-Hungarian governments let it be understood that the crop outlook was favorable. But the men whom I interviewed on this subject did not seem any too sincere in their statements. One of them, Dr. Carl Helfferich, at that time food administrator of the Prussian government, merely *hoped* that the crops, on which so much depended, would be as good as wished for. He admitted in the course of a long conversation that there would be trouble in store for the populations of Central Europe, if there was the usual bad spell of weather to make harvesting precarious. September is a most unreliable month in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Very often it will rain heavily for the space of three weeks, and it is nothing unusual to have the entire month and part of October one succession of rains and cloudy skies. This condition was aggravated by the fact that poor cultivation of soil and lack of fertilizers retarded the development and ripening of the crops in 1916.

Such were the conditions in that year. Crops everywhere fell below expectation. A trip from Berlin through northern Germany, another to the districts along the Dutch border, one through Rhenish Prussia, Hessa-Darmstadt, and the provinces of Hanover, Saxony and Brandenburg, showed me that crop conditions in Germany were worse than they had ever been since the war, applying averages. In the kingdoms of Saxony, Bavaria and Wuerttemberg conditions were a little better, but still below the worst average of peace.

It was no better in Austria and Hungary. Mr. Moritz Benedikt, owner and editor-in-chief of the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*, a man well

versed in the affairs of the monarchy, and one of the most influential peace advocates in Austria, confided to me one day that the encouraging reports which the government was spreading through the press had no other foundation than to still the fears of the public. These reports had the peculiar feature of admitting that in some localities the crops were really bad, but in all others they were said to be so much the better. Care was taken, of course, to have different sets of reports, and complete surveillance by the press and its news channels enabled the government to say that in Carinthia the crops were bad, but they were good in Bohemia, while in Bohemia the report would have it *vice versa*.

What conditions really were I learned on a trip to the Rumanian front in Transylvania, which took me through central Hungary and through the valley of the Danube. I learned that an unfavorable spring, a wet summer and fall had resulted in an almost complete failure of the wheat crop. The only thing that was doing well was the sugar beet, and in some districts maize had given fairly good returns. In Transylvania I found that the Rumanians had driven off all livestock and had burned most of the crops on the stalk. Conditions there were so bad that the population of that rich agricultural district would have to be supported from other parts of Hungary.

On my way back from the front, three weeks later, I took another route and found that in northern Hungary the situation was no better. To make sure of the impressions I had gained, I undertook some other trips in October, to Galicia, Bohemia, Moravia, Upper and Lower Austria, Steiermark, Carinthia, Istria, Croatia and Bosnia. When this had been done I felt sure that the end was not far off, if the Centralist troops could not find in Rumania enough grain and foodstuffs to offset the failure of crops at home. The governments encouraged the spreading of *news* to the effect that the grain taken in Rumania would tide the Central Powers over. I knew better. From General Falkenhayn, commander of the Ninth German army in Rumania, I had learned that whatever food there was found in Rumania would be kept for the soldiers. The civil populations would get the surplus, if there was any, which he doubted.

All publics are plagued with short memories, and so it came that few brought the stricter regulation of food consumption into relation with the sanguine reports concerning the harvest which had been circulated in the summer. Rations were reduced in Germany, and more so even in Austria and Hungary. But the measures taken had also one advantage, and that was that finally food distribution had been put on a more or less equitable basis, though illicit trading in foodstuffs was never wholly eradicated.

Already in September of that year was discussed the possibility of re-opening and extending submarine warfare. As yet the public was not

in the confidence of the two governments. Those of us who spent much of their time in the government offices knew well enough that the question was up. But the American correspondents were averse to mentioning it in print. In the first place there was the censorship, and whether a cause be just or not the average man cannot help sympathizing with a starving population, especially when he himself has to starve along with it, as I did quite often, going without bread on many occasions, because, there was either none to be had, or the product of the Austrian bakers was so poor that one did not dare eat it. When a Vienna baker fails to make bread that is at all palatable, the materials he uses must be anything but flour, which was the case, of course. To a small quantity of flour was added anything that was suitable, from dried clover hay to a meal made of frozen potatoes.

From that angle the submarine war seemed justified. As George Bernard Shaw has expressed it, drowning quickly women and children is to be preferred to starving them to death slowly. I believe that the average statesman, be he Neo-Idealist or Megali-Idealist, or just a plain reactionary, would accord that even to the rat he caught in a trap. At least such is the practice among civilized peoples.

The Ever-Wakeful British and French Censors

The withdrawal of diplomatic privileges from the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic mission in Washington had, as I have already pointed out, made it impossible for the Vienna government to ascertain from its *chargé d'affaires*, what a resumption of the submarine warfare would lead to. The Berlin government was no better off, of course, and the result was that in the Wilhelmstrasse and on the Ballhausplatz nobody knew to what extent the government of the United States would carry out its ill-concealed intention indicated in Mr. Lansing's note of May 8th, 1916. In Berlin men thought that German propaganda in the United States had somewhat modified the attitude of the American public, and possibly, that of the United States government.

The American correspondents also had been permitted to express themselves a little more frankly in regard to economic conditions in Central Europe. There is no doubt that this was done intentionally, despite the immediate consequence, which was giving comfort to the enemies of the Central Empires. American correspondents in Berlin were never so copiously quoted in the press of the Allied countries as when in the fall of 1916 they wrote of general economic conditions in Central Europe. My dispatches used to reach me again through the Swiss and Dutch papers, and there was many an occasion to wonder at the depth of depravity some

editors will sink to in times of war. It was well that the Austro-Hungarian censors were responsible for what I had telegraphed—it was well in the light of an experience I had as the result of what French and British editors did with my dispatches.

While French and British newspapers, and to some extent the Swiss publications, were no longer given free entry into Austria and Hungary, copies of all of these papers reached the governments in Vienna and Budapest, of course. They were sent in by the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic missions at Bern, The Hague and Copenhagen and were minutely examined by men expert in such matters.

Thus it came that my distorted dispatches would reach Vienna after making the rounds in the French and British daily press. While I did not sign my name to my articles and dispatches, I was nevertheless easily identified by mention of the sources of origin, especially since I was the only American correspondent in Austria-Hungary and the Balkans, though other men would drop in and out. To give the garbled version of what I had actually written additional prestige, re-publication in the British and French dailies would be accompanied by the remark that this dispatch came from the *Associated Press correspondent* at Vienna, Budapest, Trieste, Sofia or wherever I happened to be. In that manner the culprit, as some Austrians saw it, could always be easily identified.

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, especially in its press department these "dispatches" of mine were often brought to my notice. It was also suggested that I protest against such use of my service and name, but that was out of the question, of course. It would have served no purpose whatsoever to write a letter of protest to one of these journalistic liars, especially since I was dependent upon the good will of their censors to let such of my matter pass as they thought promotive of their own public interest. Like many another journalist so was I obliged to worry about getting a certain amount of copy through for bread-and-butter considerations.

Here again I was run against the condition that dispatches of mine, which the British and French censors had suppressed in transit to New York, would later appear distorted in the press of the Allied countries. There was no means of ascertaining how this was done. But it was done! Either the censorship authorities turned these news telegrams over to a central propaganda bureau of theirs, or the news came into possession of the Allied press through the Reuter and Havas affiliations of the Associated Press of America. Without actually adding anything to what I had written, the dispatch could be made to serve the purposes of the Allied governments by being given only in part. Such, indeed, was the usual method of procedure. What was bad for Austria-Hungary was

printed; what was favorable was suppressed—quite the commonest and easiest form of propaganda there is. It is all the more effective since the use of a foreign source of reliability is made possible in that manner.

Baron von Montlong, chief of the Vienna foreign office press department, understood these things, but at the headquarters of the chief military censor, then at Baden, near Vienna, they were not understood. In this manner, then, it came about that eight of my dispatches, dealing with the food and fuel situation in and near Vienna, were held up by the military censors and carefully weighed.

Before that could be done the authority of the foreign office press department had to be attacked. My dispatches of an economic or political nature were censored in the press department of the foreign office, and after that left from Post Office No. 8 without hitch. But the military censors were getting the garbled versions of them through the foreign newspapers. It was decided by the military censorship to review all of my dispatches censored in the Foreign Office, and the result of that was not very pleasant for me.

I was cited to appear before Dr. Brandl, chief of the Vienna political police. Like all his ilk, the man was grave and pompous, and was ready to carry out the instructions from the chief military censor, which were the usual—expulsion from Austro-Hungarian territory.

But this time the proviso was added that I could once more repeat my offense—writing newspaper articles detrimental to the public interest of Austria-Hungary. The very moment that was done I would be under arrest and on the train going to Buchs, in Switzerland, where I, no doubt, would be received by my friends of the Entente. Said friends, undoubtedly, would give me a hearty welcome, seeing that I was so ardent a supporter of their cause. Austro-Hungarian police officials would see that I met none of them so far as Feldkirch, the frontier station.

After the man had become a little better acquainted with me, he produced in support of the action a large folio full of clippings and manuscript telegrams of mine, which were the gravamen of the military censors. The collection was quite interesting. It included many British and French clippings, among them items from the *London Times*, *Daily Mail*, *Chronicle* and others, while the French press was represented by the *Matin*, *Journal des Débats*, *Echo de Paris*, *Figaro*, and the *Journal de Genève*. Then came eight of my detained telegrams, fished up in Postoffice No. 8, and a score of mail articles. There was also a large report on my activity. There was no doubt in the mind of the several chair-warming lieutenants, captains, majors, colonels and generals of censorship, that I was truly a dangerous man to have around. Items this and that proved conclusively that I was an ardent admirer of the British and French, despite the fact that my

record as a citizen of the South African Republic was rather against this assumption. It seemed to be a fact, however, that I was a man of the Botha and Smuts type.

I ended the interview by saying that I would take the matter up with Count Czernin, the minister of foreign affairs. When the chief of the political police heard that I had access to His Excellency, he became rather diffident.

"To be quite frank about this," he said, "I do not fully agree with the military censors, I am afraid that they have taken a snap judgment. From the matter in your own handwriting I should judge that you have been fair enough, and I know what takes place with news dispatches. They are tailored to suit one's own ends. You understand, of course, that I am merely carrying out the orders of the chief military censor."

I understood that, and on the same afternoon there was dispatched from the bureau of the private cabinet of Count Czernin a rather sharp communication to the chief military censor, the burden of which was that the military authorities, before acting in regard to foreign correspondents, no matter under what circumstances, had better consult before the Ministry of the Exterior. An apologetic letter, promising that this would be done, reached Count Czernin on the following day.

An Attempt to Believe the Incredible

Emperor Charles looked upon all military and political measures with the eyes of the promising statesman he was. To get peace as quickly as possible was his sole thought. Count Tisza supported him in this.

In Austria-Hungary there was not at that time a single man who wished to protract the tragedy that had the nation in its grip. Mr. Benedict, owner and editor of the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*, was agitating peace in his paper to the limits of the feasible, and Dr. Henry Lammasch, one of the contributors of this daily, and probably the best expert on International Law anywhere, did the same. The thing went so far that the government, though anxious for peace itself, had to suggest to the *Neue Freie Presse* and nearly every other newspaper in the monarchy, not to overdo it, lest the enemies find more comfort than was wise to give them.

The Austro-Hungarian pacifists had the greatest confidence in Mr. Wilson. Mr. Benedict went so far as to offer me a most generous rate for articles that were to point out, from the American point of view, just why Mr. Wilson would in the end see to it that Great Britain would not be able to carry out her program of starving the Central Empires into submission.

The matter was taken up at a sort of editorial conference, which young

Dr. Benedikt, son of the editor, and a well known Austrian journalist, also attended. I was told that the Austro-Hungarian public was getting very restless, that the food problem was crushing, that thousands of babies were dying for the lack of proper nourishment, and that under these circumstances I could well afford to break the rule of my service, not to write for other publications without specific permission.

My reply was that under the circumstances I would not let that rule stand in the way, so far as an unsigned article, or several such, was concerned, but that, on the other hand, I would not be able to write of Mr. Wilson in that light, because of my inability to say whether or no he was of that mind. To Mr. Benedikt that was quite a shock. For some reason or other he was under the impression that this was my opinion of Mr. Wilson also. I told him that he was mistaken. So far as I knew and could ascertain from the American papers which reached the United States embassy in Vienna, especially the Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, New York *World* and *Times*, and several others, there was not the least likelihood of Mr. Wilson ever taking that stand. I considered it entirely out of the question that the government of the United States would do anything, contrary to the wishes of the Allies, that would alleviate food conditions in Central Europe. Washington had completely and irrevocably acquiesced into the "Declaration of London Orders in Council," despite the fact that now and then the subject of International Law was still referred to in diplomatic correspondence.

To the Benedikts that came as a surprise. It was then argued that an article from me on Mr. Wilson would at least be a comfort to the people of Austria, provided it was so written that comfort could be had from it. I dismissed the subject by stating again that I was unwilling to write for a purpose.

A day or two later I had a letter from a Dr. Lippe, one of the editors of the paper, to see Mr. Benedikt again soon. The owner of the *Neue Freie Presse*, a paper often referred to as the *Times* or *Thunderer* of the Continent, had been taken sick. When I looked him up at his residence I found that my refusal to write on Mr. Wilson had worried him greatly.

"You mean to say," he began, "that you are not of the opinion that Mr. Wilson will in the end prevent the population of the Central states from being starved as a measure of war?"

"Exactly, that is what I mean," was my reply. "The offer which Mr. Bryan made was not accepted by the British and French governments, as you know, and the tone of the "Sussex" note should have left no doubt in your mind as to what the attitude of the United States government now is."

"Then it would seem that all is lost," said the old man. "The Allied

governments have but to keep up this war long enough—to win it.”

“Such is also my opinion, Mr. Benedikt!” I said. “The conditions are against you, even if the submarine war is resumed and on a larger scale.”

Mr. Benedikt was rather surprised that I mentioned this subject. Being a man of great political influence and good connections in the government, he knew what was going on, but had no reason to suspect that news of the proposed renewal of submarine warfare had reached me also.

“Then you have heard of it” he asked. “What will be the result of it?”

“At least war between the United States and Germany,” I replied.

“And we—Austria-Hungary?” came the question.

“That depends on what your government does,” I answered. “If you do join Germany, you will probably find yourself in the same position. If Austria-Hungary stands aloof she may escape a declaration of war.”

“Which would not make much difference, of course,” remarked the editor. “We are defeated, if Germany is defeated.”

“You might get better terms in the end,” I suggested.

“Not from the Russians and Italians!” put in Mr. Benedikt. “Moreover, Germany has stood by us. We must stand by her. In that case we will go down together.”

But the old man found it far from easy to accept these obvious and very imminent aspects of the case. For hours and hours, thereafter, he would try to find comfort in what he might induce me to say in the course of an argument. But, I am afraid his efforts were futile. While at times I would try to improve his spirits, I never allowed him to think that from the United States the Central Powers had anything to expect but what they had been given in the “Sussex” note. The only way of getting food for the starving civil population was in surrendering. I finally permitted myself to be persuaded into writing several articles for the *Neue Freie Presse* in which I occupied myself with the attitude of the United States congress. Of the future I never said anything, because what that future would bring I knew, not as the result of inspection and speculation, but from information that reached me directly from the Department of State.

The First of Two Major Political Moves

There was not much in prospect for the Central Powers when November of that year came. The food situation was bad. On the West Front no gains had been made, instead, large numbers of the best troops had been uselessly sacrificed by Falkenhayn at Verdun. That, indeed, was the sum total of military achievements of the German troops on the West Front when winter approached. The British government was calling new armies

into being, and with every British plant suitable for the purpose now busy making munitions and ammunition, the outlook in Flanders and France was most discouraging to the men in Vienna and Berlin. On the Julian front, the Italians had not made gains that were worth the sacrifices in men and material, but Triest, for all that, was almost within reach of Cadorna's armies. Only the strongly fortified Hermada position, near Općina, kept the Italians back. In Rumania things were as stalemate as on the remainder of the Russian front, and it was known that General Brousiloff would in the spring resume his operations with increased vigor. The Bulgarians were heartily sick of the war, and the Turks, though no longer obliged to fight the enemy at the gates of the capital, had all they could do to slow up the British advance in Mesopotamia. Meanwhile, also, the want of metals of the better sort was making itself felt in the war supply departments—substitution everywhere had been more or less a failure, or at best a costly expedient.

On the other hand, the Central troops had done well on the defensive, and the policy of the Entente governments, as again seen in Rumania, had suffered serious defeat. It was thought, in Vienna first, and in Berlin later, that the suggesting of peace might, under these conditions, have some good results.

That the peace note of Emperor William II had the peculiar tone it took was due to two circumstances.

When a man is in the market for a horse he does not say that he wants to buy a horse for, let us say, five hundred dollars, but that he wants an animal of a certain kind. That being the case in all transactions of give and take, the peace offer of William II could not very well say what Germany was going to pay for the thing it wanted.

To make the offer less haughty, might have been good policy, had there been assurance that this would not have been interpreted as a sign of weakness. The governments of the Allies were well informed what economic conditions in Germany and the countries of her allies were, but in the end they would, for all that, give the psychological character of the peace proposal much more attention than the reports of their agents.

Be that as it may, the proposal was rejected by London and Paris in a manner that left no doubt as to the temper and intentions of those governments. While Petrograd expressed itself similarly, the Central governments had a little more encouragement from that quarter. For some time efforts had been made through the Grand ducal family of Hessa-Darmstadt to establish some sort of understanding between the Hohenzollern and Romanoff houses. The mail incident to this was carried in the German and Russian diplomatic mail pouches, and the point of exchange was Copenhagen for a while, Stockholm being selected later.

Nothing definite had so far been accomplished. Though the Czarina was doing her best to interest Russian government officials in behalf of peace, the Sazonoff-Nikolaievitch element was still too strong to let these come to anything tangible. Czar Nicholas was still the man he had been when his chief of staff undertook to lie to him about the mobilization—a vacillating servant of other people's plans. As an autocrat he will certainly go down in history as the very antithesis of what an autocrat is supposed to be.

The refusal of the Allied governments to consider the peace proposal was a hard blow to Emperor Charles. Through my connections at the court I learned that he took it very much to heart. So far, he had consistently and firmly opposed the resumption of submarine warfare upon merchant men. He felt that the next step would bring the United States into the war, and while he was a little skeptical as to what that might mean militarily, he realized that the moral and material support gained by the enemies of the Central Powers in that manner would in the end bring defeat to his army and those of his associates. Men like Count Tisza, moreover, answered such arguments as: 'The United States could not hurt us more if it was an open enemy, with the remark that this might not be the case. Count Tisza would point out that military unpreparedness in the United States had no meaning under the circumstances. Great Britain had raised armies under similar conditions and had transported some of them even greater distances. If England had found a Kitchener, America might do that also.

But the advocates of submarine warfare had a good argument for this. The number of submarines built and the technical improvements made would end the War before the United States could put a large army in the field. With the exception of a few hare-brained chauvinists there was nobody in any of the Central Powers governments, so far as I have been able to ascertain, who did not admit that if the submarine failed the war was lost, even if it were possible to hold the fronts long enough to make the Entente publics a little more war-tired than they were. The entrance into the War by the United States would hearten these peoples into a further submission to the hardships of a protracted campaign of such proportions, and if the United States needed as much as three years to raise the needed armies that could make no difference. Defeat was the sure portion in the end. Against the flagging spirit of the Central populations would have to be placed the determination of the Allied governments and publics to hold out until the armies of the United States should be ready. While the one group was starving, the other would have the markets of the world to draw upon. Subjection, therefore, was inevitable.

But as will happen in such cases the very arguments against a renewal of submarine warfare brought into stronger relief the need for the measure

and the injustice of the condition against which the submarine was to be employed, as the Central public saw it. Things had reached a stage in which terms and conceptions of International Law had no longer any meaning. On all sides the argument was heard that in self-defense all means are fair. The existence of a means suited for the purpose, if not the practice, of cruiser warfare upon merchant ships, was looked upon as sufficient to legalize its acts, and in this, it must be stated, a good many text writers on International Law could be cited, though as Mr. Lansing had said in a note, they were in the minority.

On the other hand, Maritime Law had been given its character by the acts and views of governments of maritime nations, so that the public interest of such nations was far better protected than the public interest of nations living away from the sea. The traditional policy of the United States in regard to Maritime Law, that "free ships make free goods," had indeed fared badly at the hands of the British government, and even the government of the United States, but there was no inclination in Washington to look upon the transgression of one as the justification for the transgression of another, whether the application of the Orders in Privy Council was unfair to the other or not.

That the men in Berlin and Vienna were impatient of this attitude, need not surprise us, since they, necessarily, saw the thing in the light of their own public interest, not in the one of the government whose population was growing rich on the war orders of the enemies of the Central Powers group of belligerents.

For all that, Emperor Charles was hard to move when ultimately the question was approached at a meeting held for the purpose at German general headquarters, shortly after New Year in 1917. The discussions and disputes lasted three days, and to get a settlement the matter was finally left to the decision of Hindenburg, the taking of position for and against having resulted in a draw.

Field-Marshal Hindenburg was not inclined to assume responsibility for the step. When finally he had been assured that he was to act only as a judge, who was to pass on the practicability of the measure, he consented to make the decision. He had listened to argument *pro* and *con* for weeks, and was fully familiar with every technical and political detail. He was reported to me as having said:

"What the consequences of this step will be, in so far as the United States is concerned, is clear, of course. The best we can hope for in that direction is that a declaration of war will not follow. I think it will follow. We have to consider then that war with the United States is inevitable. What that means we know.

"The question then is: Will the submarine be able to carry out the

program it has been given in this scheme—in other words, has from the mind of the naval experts been removed all doubt that the submarine can do what they expect of it?

“Before I make the decision, I must ask the gentlemen of the naval commission to once more go over their papers and plans with the utmost care. If there be the slightest weakness in their conclusions I beg to have it brought to my attention. It is better that we face those things now than later.”

As results have shown there was a weakness in the conclusions of the naval experts. I have no means of knowing to what extent the ingenuity, resources, and resourcefulness of the Allied naval services and engineers were taken into consideration. Such things as depth bombs, the efficacy of convoying, and the submarine facing merchant ships fully armed, must have been considered. How the conditions thus arising were reconciled with the great risks taken I have not learned, of course, despite the fact that my informant was a member of the Austro-Hungarian group at the conference. It is possible that the ingenuity, resourcefulness and willingness of the United States “to go the limit” were not properly weighed; these, in fact, were totally unknown factors then so far as the War was concerned. My own impression is that Great Britain’s timid naval performance of the past was the only thing taken into account. Thus the grave error was made. Emperor Charles and Count Czernin accepted the decision made by Hindenburg, and a few days later, Bethmann-Hollweg made the announcement, in the Reichstag, that Germany would resume submarine warfare against merchantmen of any nationality, if found within the extended zones of war or proscription.

DIPLOMACY AT CROSS PURPOSES

SINCE diplomatists at present are not accredited by one government to another, but are looked upon as the personal representatives of the heads of governments, be they presidents of republics or monarchs, it is necessary, of course, to re-accredit the ambassador or minister in case another sovereign ascends the throne, or another president is inaugurated.

It was so, when after the death of Francis Joseph, the successor to the crowns of Austria and Hungary, Archduke Charles Francis Joseph took charge of the affairs of state. Mr. Wilson sent to Mr. Penfield, the United States ambassador at Vienna, a large *carton*, neatly engraved, with the formal accreditation of Mr. Penfield to His Majesty's person. Since I read the contents of this message of cordial greetings and heartiest good will, I could not but wonder how mighty a force etiquette becomes at times, and how hypocritical it may be, withal.

Mr. Penfield was quite proud of the occasion. He was received at the palace with all the pomp that will mark such ceremonies. There is nothing that can make the average republican and democrat so glad as to be shown honors by royalty. It is a failing of mankind that is easily explained, understood and forgiven—even under circumstances such as they were just then. My own share in the matter was that I sent a dispatch announcing the event, and for the British and French censorship I must say that they permitted the little notice to get past them without pruning.

This little formality attended to, the world resumed its round of murder, mayhem and arson—continued also to foster diplomacy.

Very soon after this there was a little surprise for me. Without wishing to infer that I can not be "scooped" by some enterprising colleague, I came this time close to overlooking something very important. As a matter of fact I saved what little reputation I have, or had, in the veriest nick of time. My friends in the Vienna Foreign Office kept me well informed, as a rule, but this time they did not think it necessary to speak of the matter under consideration.

I had submitted to Baron von Montlong, the chief of the press department, my usual budget of dispatches and mail matter, when quite casually he said:

"I really do not see the necessity of sending an ambassador to Washing-

ton if at the same time the government of the United States does not restore diplomatic privileges to our mission there."

I did my best to show that I was not startled. Ambassador to Washington—where had I been all this time?

"Yes, that would be an improvement, Herr von Montlong" I said. "But it is quite possible that diplomatic privileges will be restored."

The case was one that required caution. For one thing: At whose suggestion was the ambassador going to be sent, and who was the man? It certainly could not be Mr. Wilson who wanted to make this improvement. But it occurred to me that, since Mr. Penfield had just presented his credentials anew, and since the Austro-Hungarian government had before that unsuccessfully tried to even up a little diplomatic representation in Washington and Vienna, and was not likely to renew that effort so closely upon the heels of the re-accreditation of the American ambassador, it must be that the rapprochement came from the banks of the Potomac after all. I felt also that it would have been a graceful thing to do that, since poor Emperor-King Charles had as little to do with the European War as I had.

"So far there is no indication of that," continued the press department chief. "Of course, we hope that it will come to that. Count Tarnowski does not like going to Washington with that handicap on his hands. But he hopes that this will be removed when he gets over there. You know he is a Pole and quite able—very able in fact! We picked him—well, not altogether we ourselves, Mr. Penfield suggested him—because the Poles are said to enjoy a certain degree of popularity in the United States."

It seemed that Count Tarnow Tarnowski, whom I had met in Sofia over a year ago, was not particularly anxious to go to Washington. It had taken even a talk with the Emperor to get him interested in this mission, which he considered quite useless. Of course, when Emperor Charles requested him to do his best, there was nothing to do but go. Right now the government of the United States was trying to secure safe conduct for the new ambassador to Washington. So far the Allied governments did not seem to have paid much heed to the request of the American government. Mr. von Montlong asked me not to mention the matter just then—not until he had released it. A few days later he gave his consent to a dispatch which I wrote in his office.

An Infested Diplomatic Woodpile

Since Mr. Penfield had not gone to the trouble of telling me anything of this, I had no reason to discuss the matter with him. On the other hand, I had made up my mind, now that I was "protected," as we newspaper men put it, to see just what the American ambassador would do.

Days passed and Mr. Penfield did not say a word. Meanwhile, the American embassy had informed the Vienna Foreign Office that it was sorry to report that the British and French governments had refused to give a safe conduct for as many persons as Count Tarnowski intended to take with him. At first the suite was to be about a score, more or less. It finally dwindled down to eight.

It was this seeming reluctance on the part of the United States government, to induce the governments in London and Paris to be generous in this little matter of safe conduct, which first caused the Vienna government to suspect that all was not well in the *affaire* Tarnowski.

Count Colloredo-Mannsfeld, formerly attached to the Austro-Hungarian embassy at Paris, and husband of a former Miss Iselin, had meanwhile been made chief of the private cabinet or chancery of Count Czernin. I called on him to get some points in connection with the mission of Count Tarnowski as ambassador to Washington cleared up. The thing had a most irregular aspect, when I came to delve into it. An attaché of the American embassy had been led into telling me that it was the Austro-Hungarian government which had suggested to Mr. Penfield that since he had been received again as ambassador it would only be fair and proper if another Austro-Hungarian ambassador be received by President Wilson. I knew enough of diplomatic etiquette, and the attitude of governments, to feel that this could not be so. Quite the last thing the men in the Vienna Foreign Office would do was to become guilty of so gross a breach of good diplomatic manners as to ask Mr. Wilson to receive an Austro-Hungarian ambassador just because Emperor Charles had received the American ambassador.

Still there was a certain amount of evidence that pointed that way. I could not for a moment believe that the United States government would not take a firmer stand in the question of securing safe conduct for Count Tarnowski and his party, if it had itself suggested the re-establishment on a footing of equality of diplomatic relations with Vienna. But many things were possible just then. It was not impossible, for instance, that the government of the United States would be as congenial in this respect as it had been in many others, so far as Great Britain was concerned. It was necessary, therefore, to proceed with caution.

Count Tarnowski was staying at the Hotel Sacher. I learned that he was greatly vexed at the turn affairs had taken. For a day or two it seemed as if, after all, nothing would come of his trip. Though in a tight fix, the Austro-Hungarian government was as yet not willing to make concessions to the British government in an affair that did not concern London as much as Washington, as it seemed.

With that stage reached I thought it best to consult Mr. Penfield. It

was well to be careful in the presence of a man who could then and there lift my passport and cancel it, as the "plenipotentiaries" of the embassy did several times a week in other cases. But one or two hints brought Mr. Penfield into action. He wanted to know how I came to know so much about the appointment of Count Tarnowski, to which I replied, timidly enough, that it was my duty to keep informed on so important an affair.

When enthusiastic or excited, Mr. Penfield had the habit of stabbing the right arm-rest of his chair with one of the steel arrows that were thrown down by the gross from aeroplanes, when the War was relatively new. He would also repeat the last few words of a sentence several times. All of this he did today.

"Let me tell you, young man!" he said, "that I am sending Count Tarnowski to Washington and nobody else—nobody else. Do you think for a moment that I would sit and see a war come on without protecting myself—protecting myself—myself.

"Not much! I am sending the Count to Washington. When the moment comes—and let me tell it is not far off—I want to have somebody in Washington for whom I am going to be exchanged. I trust these people here, but you can't trust those Germans. They are likely to keep me here—keep me here.

"But not if I know anything about it. That's why the Count goes to Washington. Do you get that—get that?"

I admitted that this was clear to me, but humbly suggested that this was a very unusual motive and a dangerous one for the appointment of ambassadors—a sort of sending hostages in advance of a declaration of war.

"No, young man," continued the ambassador. "There are some things you don't know anything about. And this is one of them. I am going to have protection for myself and Mrs. Penfield when the day comes—*Der Tag*, you know.

"O, it's coming all right!"

I left with the feeling that the many headache powders Mr. Penfield was in the habit of taking had unstrung him. He had on several occasions complained to me of the violent headaches, he was subject to, and which hard work at his post had not in any manner alleviated. I also felt that the American ambassador had created a situation that was as unfair to the government in Washington as to the one in Vienna. To protect himself, as he viewed it, he had done a most imprudent thing.

Being merely a recorder of the doings in my environment I kept Mr. Penfield's admission to myself and hoped that nobody would be the wiser until Count Tarnowski had landed in New York and been received by President Wilson.

Count Tarnowski left a day or two after his departure from Rot-

terdam the good news came from Washington that the conditions under which the Austro-Hungarian *chargé d'affaires*, Baron Zwiedenick, had transmitted dispatches to his government had been somewhat modified in his favor. That left some hope—at any rate to those who did not know any better and that included Count Czernin.

At the Vienna Foreign Office they were still under the impression that the sending of an ambassador had really been suggested by the government of the United States, an impression which could have been easily removed had the Vienna Foreign Office been able to get in touch directly with its *chargé d'affaires* in Washington, without having its dispatches read and transposed into cypher in the American embassy at Vienna.

To that extent Mr. Penfield had in his hands the entire machinery of diplomatic intercourse. By that means one ambassador was enabled to get another sent to his capital as hostage if there should be need for one. The long and short of the affair was that the United States government had been led to believe that it was the Austro-Hungarian government that wanted to put diplomatic relations on a better footing, while Vienna thought the same of Washington. Since that could easily lead to more trouble in a situation already fraught with many great dangers, I could not but marvel at the power that is given into hands least qualified to use it.

But the end of that was not yet. Before I deal with it, however, I must for the sake of chronology, enter upon a different subject.

I have already mentioned that Bethmann-Hollweg, the German chancellor, announced in the German Reichstag, the resumption of submarine warfare in an extended zone. The Austrian Reichsrat being not then in session, having been adjourned since the outbreak of the War, in fact, the Austro-Hungarian government was not able to announce its adherence to the policy of her ally, Germany, in quite so convenient a manner.

Count Czernin Before a Great Problem

One morning early—January 31st—I was called up on the telephone by the press department of the foreign office. Count Czernin, the minister of the exterior, wanted to see me as soon as possible, I was told. I hurried up to the Ballhausplatz and was taken to the quarters of the minister.

For a while I sat in the large ante-chamber, locale of the meeting of the Vienna Congress, and still adorned with the pictures of some of the men who then shaped the course of Europe, under the auspices of Metternich, the famous. It was very quiet in the building, I noticed. The only sound falling upon my ears was the closing of doors in the distance. The *Diener*—door man of the apartment—sat immobile on the red-upholstered chair beside the door, as was his wont. He had for so many years been so

close to the secrets of state and their makers, and yet so far, that he seemed to have made up his mind to be as little interested in the affairs about him as they were in him.

Meanwhile, I had learned that an event of great importance was about to be announced through me. The chief of the press department had informed me, with awe in his voice, that few newspaper men, indeed none, so far as he knew, had ever written so epoch-making a story as I was about to write. I suspected what that story would be, and for a few moments shared the excitement of the man.

From the distance came the noise of the streets—rumbling wagons and clanging street cars. Behind the double doors, leading to the office of the minister of the exterior, two men were talking. Then the outer door opened, and a man emerged hastily. The *Diener* jumped up to see him out, returned presently, and went into the office of Count Czernin.

When the servant appeared again, he left the door open, stepped to one side, bowed, and then with a movement of his hand indicated that I was expected.

Count Czernin met me in the middle of the room. I noticed, as we shook hands, that there was a grave expression on his face. But the voice was calm, as he invited me to be seated at the side of his roll-top desk.

"I have taken the liberty to send for you," he said in English, after some perfunctory remarks of greeting in German, "for the purpose of having you make an announcement for the Austro-Hungarian government. It is a sad mission, which I am about to ask you to undertake. Who knows what will come of it!

"I do not wish to influence you in any manner, and I know that you can be relied upon; at the same time, as you will learn presently, I must ask you to be particularly careful as to what you write in connection with this matter. The possibilities involved are great and grave. They affect nothing less than our diplomatic relations with the government of the United States. They may bring war, and of that we have had enough, as you ought to know.

"I suggest that you do not look upon this matter as affecting any particular nation, but all mankind. You have had ample opportunity to see that we have been anxious to put an end to this war. We have had enough of it. If there was a chance of talking this thing over with our enemies we would do it tomorrow. But that chance does not exist. The War continues, because the Allied governments want it to continue.

"We have every reason to believe that the populations of the Allied group would welcome the cessation of hostilities as would our own. But that is not to be, except we are willing to consider ourselves the vanquished.

"I am not one of those who have much faith in the War Map. There

is such a thing as being victorious at the front and defeated at home. We are getting to that fast enough, and have done our best to put a stop to this useless shedding of blood. But we have been turned down. In the face of that, the War must go on until the enemy has a better reason to enter into negotiations with us.

"We have notified the neutral governments, or will do that today, and through them our enemies, that the submarine war zone has been extended and shipping to Great Britain and her allies laid under new restrictions."

Count Czernin took from his desk a copy of the diplomatic note in question and handed it to me, with the request that I read it. I read parts of the note several times to familiarize myself with its principal contents and then laid it down. The minister then handed me a statement he had drafted.

"I would like you to publish that," he said. "If you don't care for the text the way it is written, change it, but be sure to get into your own version that I say here. At any rate you will have to translate the thing. Be kind enough to let me see it before you telegraph it."

The statement of the minister seemed a little too formal and academic. I expressed myself to that effect. He was eager to have the world public know what the position of the Austro-Hungarian government was, and I thought it my duty to make the process as simple as possible, so that he who ran could read.

Count Czernin left his desk and walked toward a far corner of the room, in which stood a large table, covered with maps.

"These are the charts the note refers to," he said, taking up one of them.

I rose and walked to the table.

The map in Count Czernin's hands was done on hydrographic principles, and executed in blue, with red cross hatching showing the prescribed zones.

"This white lane has been left open for the Greeks, while the one, entering the Channel from the Atlantic is for American shipping. The white spaces about the red zones mark the waters left open for the other neutrals. We do not want to interfere with the legitimate trade of the neutrals. What we do want to accomplish is to prevent neutral ships in addition to enemy ships from reaching British and French ports. For American ships we have left this lane in the Channel. More than that we can not do. What is your opinion?"

While I was studying the chart, Count Czernin was looking for another one. The chart in my hands showed all the waters about Great Britain and France, and the entire Mediterranean. There was another, he said, which gave the several safe lanes for neutrals on a larger scale

with a better regard for accuracy in longitude and latitude. All the charts on the table before me were of the kind I had in my hands. Count Czernin walked over to the other side of the room, but returned presently, saying:

"I do not seem to have another chart of the other kind here. Well, that won't matter. You can tell from this one what the new zones are."

I looked up from the chart, and Count Czernin must have felt that I had my misgivings about the step. He looked at me rather searchingly, and repeated his inquiry:

"Well, what is your opinion of this thing?" he asked. There was a note of care and uncertainty in his voice.

"My opinion can not be of any value to Your Excellency," I said. "I may say, however, that this is a grave situation. So far as Germany is concerned there is bound to be a severance of diplomatic relations. I say that on the strength of what I know. Your Excellency is, of course, familiar with the recent address of Mr. Wilson, the burden of which is that there is to be a peace without victory. Under the circumstances that must be interpreted that there is to be a peace without victory for the Central Powers. This decision on the part of the German government, and the adhesion thereto of the Austro-Hungarian government, aims at a condition that will be contrary to the announcement of Mr. Wilson, so long as the Allied governments persist in the attitude they assumed toward the recent peace proposal. I do not think that the men in London and Paris are willing to make a peace without victory. In that lies the difficulty. A rupture of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany seems imminent to me. Austria-Hungary may fare better. But even of that I am not convinced."

I waited for an instant to give Count Czernin the word.

"And then?" he asked.

"That, Your Excellency, depends upon the action of Congress," I replied. "There is the possibility that the opponents of Mr. Wilson in the Senate and House may take more interest in this affair when relations are broken off by Mr. Wilson with Germany. That step is likely to be the *dénouement* to the situation. If Congress does not act then, it will, like all other such bodies, be ultimately faced with a *fait accompli*—a declaration of war."*

"Declaration of war?" asked the minister.

"Something of that sort, Your Excellency!" I said. "Much depends upon the frame of mind of the American public. Unfortunately, I am not able to say what that is. If the tone of the American newspapers is to be relied upon, war is now inevitable. There has been a gradual building up

* I was at that time under the impression that Congress, before giving Mr. Wilson a free hand, would undertake a sort of general review of the entire situation. That was the least I and others expected the "willful men" to insist upon.

of war sentiment in the United States. On the other hand, the press of the United States is not always truly representative of public opinion, but like all other institutions of its sort it can make public opinion."

Count Czernin walked back to his desk and seated himself.

"Well, if the worst comes to pass, we can't help it," he said. "We have to use the submarine to shorten the war. There is such a thing as being victorious at the front and defeated at home. The food situation here is most pressing. Our people are half-starved all the time. Babies perish by the thousands, because we cannot give them enough milk. If this war does not come to an end soon, the effects of the chronic food shortage will impair the health of the entire nation. We must try to prevent that. It is our duty to prevent it by all means.

"I grant that there are certain technicalities of international law involved here. But we can no longer regard them. It is all very well for some men to set themselves up as sole arbiters of international law, nor would we have any objections against this if these arbiters dealt as fairly with one side as they have dealt with the other. But they have not.

"The Central governments could not do anything right for some of their friends—the American government included, by the way—if they stood on their heads. Save me from the man who prates loudly of international law and then interprets his own acts by the public interest of one of the belligerents. Of neutral advice we have had enough. These good neutrals remind me of men who would stand idly by while some person was being done to death piecemeal and who would think that they had done their duty with an occasional: 'O, don't hurt him.'"

Count Czernin was bitterly satirical at that moment. I saw that his hands had closed, and that their knuckles were showing white from the exertion. The man was in a rage, but had himself under full control. His blue-grey eyes stared at me and his jaws were biting off the sentences.

"It is an outrage—this entire business! We have a right to exist. We don't want anything from anybody! All we want is the integrity of the monarchy. We don't want war indemnities! We don't want anything from the Italians, and want nothing from the Russians. The sensible man of today must realize that from this war nothing can be gained by anybody—no matter who wins. For the sake of Europe's future it is best that we all go home and think over this foolish undertaking.

"We have made peace offers. I have told you several times that we do not want any of our enemies' territory. We have never let it be understood that we wanted as much as a shovelful of earth that does not belong to us. At the same time, we do not want to lose territory, nor do we want to pay a war indemnity, since this war is not of our making."

"Our peace offer has been spurned. The food question, as you know,

is acute. We simply cannot raise the food we need so long as we must keep in the field millions of our farmers. That leaves but one avenue open. We must shorten the War. We believe that it will be shortened by the use of the submarine. For that reason we have decided to use that arm for the purpose."

Count Czernin paused for a moment. He shifted some papers about on his desk in an aimless manner, and then turned to me again. This time he spoke in so calm a tone that a certain amount of indifference or resignation came to the surface.

"I hope that our calculations are correct. I am no expert in that field. I also realize that a whole flood of declarations of war may follow our step. All that has been considered, however—even the possibility of the United States joining our enemies. At any rate, there was no way out.

"I feel that I must address myself especially to the American public. The American government has condemned us out of court. I would like to have an American jury hear this case. The American government has denied us the right of self-defense by taking the stand that we must not use the submarine—the only means we have—against the enemy merchant fleet and such neutral shipping as supplies Great Britain and France with food stuffs and war materials."

Again Count Czernin grew bitter. Trained diplomatist though he was, he found it hard to master the keen resentment that was surging over him.

"Mr. Wilson thinks he is right. I do not want to question in the least that there have been times when he was right in specific cases. But how can he say that we are violating International Law, or are the worst offenders, when he calmly permitted Great Britain to displace International Law and every convention based on it by the Orders in Council, so that we in self-defense, had to do that also. Self-preservation is a law of nature which even Mr. Wilson has no right to question, which he would not question for a moment if he were in our position.

"Mr. Bryan himself, and with him the government of the United States, admitted tacitly that Great Britain was breaking every tenet of Maritime Law when he suggested the regulation of the imports into Germany of conditional contraband. Would the American government have done that if it had not then been cognizant of the fact that the Orders in Privy Council contravened ruthlessly the Paris and London declarations? What has become of the sense of justice which was then in evidence in Washington?

"Of course, Mr. Wilson has not gone so far as to protect Allied merchant shipping against the German submarines. But that does not mean anything. The shipping of the neutrals is able to supply the Allies

with all the sinews of war they need, and, if need be, enough British ships could be transferred to neutrals for the duration of the War to keep the British flag from the high seas entirely and out of harm's way. That attitude can only be compared to tying our arms behind our backs, and telling us as a friend, to go ahead now and do what we can do.

"The time has come when there must be a clear understanding on that subject, and while we have been most respectful of the views of the United States government, we must now respect our own interests at least as much. The United States has become a great arsenal for the Allied armies, and a great granary for their populations. So much American money is invested in the cause of the Allies that the moment may already have passed in which actual participation in the European War will not be more costly than the financial losses that might come to the American investor from a peace without victory and without huge indemnities paid by us.

"Such is the *impasse* the situation has reached. We feel that it will make no difference whether we face this today or tomorrow. Face it we must anyway. We may regret that such is the case, and I for one regret it deeply, but what can we do?"

Such, indeed, was the aspect of the case. I viewed the situation from some of the recesses of the Department of State, and could not but conclude that Count Czernin had rather correctly calculated. What he said coincided merely with what I knew to be the fact, as this fact was known in the United States embassy at Vienna. Not being able to even intimate that the minister was wrong, I kept my own counsel.

"I think that is all I can say," said Count Czernin, after a moment's pause. "Use that as you see fit. If reconcilable to your principles, let me see what you write before you telegraph it. Meanwhile, I will instruct the press department and the censors to let your matter pass without question."

At five o'clock that afternoon my dispatches were under way, and a copy of them was in the hands of the Korrespondenz Bureau, the Austrian semi-official news agency.

Not in decades had a newspaper dispatch created such a sensation. All that night and for three days following I had telegrams from all over Austria and Hungary and Switzerland asking me to supply additional data. The dismissal of Count Bernstorff at Washington added to the deep impression which the announcements of Berlin and Vienna had made, and for days the Vienna press was in the grip of the wildest emotion. Ultimately, I collected a few clippings of my dispatches and found that they had been reproduced in twenty-one languages, ten of them used in the Dual Monarchy. It was recognized everywhere that the world stood before a new phase of the European War—the World War phase, in which

attrition, cruel to the men in the trenches, vicious to the civil populations, and regardless entirely of the rights of neutrals, was to become the only feature. Men gasped and women wept when they came to think of the future, and the cynic alone was henceforth able to view the doings of mankind with equanimity and the hope that soon or late reason would return.

Germany and Austria-Hungary had officially defined their position in these words:

"Every day in which the fearful struggle goes on brings new devastation, new misery, new deaths. Every day by which the war is shortened will preserve on both sides the lives of thousands of brave soldiers, and means a blessing for tortured humanity. The Imperial Government, before its own conscience and before history, would be unable to assume the responsibility if it left untried any one means to hasten the end of the war. Together with the President of the United States it had hoped to obtain this aim by negotiations."

A statement made by Mr. Lansing on February 12th showed that Germany still hoped that an agreement with the United States on the one hand, and with the Allied governments on the other, would be reached. The reply of the United States government to the Swiss minister at Washington, however, demanded the prompt withdrawal of the new policy of submarine warfare, before negotiations could be entered into.

In Berlin and Vienna it was felt that this would lead to nothing except a repetition of the state of affairs that followed the conditional promises made by the German government in the "Sussex" note. So long as Washington was unwilling to bring the German maritime measures, and its own attitude concerning them, in proper and just relation to the conduct of the London and Paris governments so long was there no prospect that agreements of any kind could be arrived at.

Thus, the matter was dropped and allowed to drift on. In the Central capitals it was now realized that relief could only come from the United States Congress, more especially from the group of men whom Mr. Wilson had labelled: "Willful." The limiting of debate in the Senate, however, carried through on March 8th, and the calling of Congress for a special session, on the following day, for April 16—later changed to April 2nd—took from the Berlin and Vienna governments what little hope there was left.

An American Ambassador and "Free Press"

Mr. Penfield, the American ambassador at Vienna, had meanwhile grown somewhat resentful that I had made the submarine announcement for Count Czernin. It was his attitude that the Austro-Hungarian govern-

ment could have used its own semi-official agency, the Korrespondenz Bureau, for that purpose, or utilized even its official publication, the *Wiener Zeitung*. He seemed to totally overlook, as did later the Department of State, that I was a newspaper correspondent and in nowise bound by diplomatic rules and foibles.

As employe of the Associated Press it was my duty to get first all such news as I could, in fact that was the very purpose of my employment. Knowing how Mr. Penfield felt about it, I took pains to impress that upon one of his secretaries, to which I added that such orders as he might think fit to give me would have to come from the headquarters of the Associated Press in New York, and that State Department channels were open to him for that.

This somewhat peculiar attitude on the part of the ambassador was in a large measure due to the fact that on several occasions he had caused the Austro-Hungarian government to get its censorship to take from the Vienna newspapers such criticism of the United States government as he thought unjust. That some of the articles and editorials were intemperate must be conceded, but for all that it was rather odd that the ambassador of a government committed to "free press and free speech" should become active in that manner.

On one occasion Mr. Penfield sent to the Vienna Foreign Office a note in which he demanded that all criticism of the acts of the government of the United States be discouraged, if not entirely forbidden. It seemed to me that this was carrying the functions of an ambassador a little too far—to unwarranted highhandedness—and when I was informed in the Foreign Office that the demand would be complied with, I begged to be excused from being put in the same category with the Austrian editors.

It developed in connection with this discussion that Mr. Penfield had several times suggested that the United States government was holding the Austro-Hungarian government responsible for what I was sending out. It was being felt in Washington, said Mr. Penfield, that the Vienna foreign office, by instructing its censors, could "keep tabs" on me to such an extent that I would become useless to the service I represented, in which event I would be recalled.

Just what Mr. Penfield wanted to accomplish with that I do not know, since my dispatches dealt at best only with such criticism as I was obliged to take from the Vienna and Austrian press. This matter was permitted to pass, by the British and French censors, since it could not but further strain the relations between the United States and Austria-Hungary, which was far from being my motive. My position in the matter was not unlike that of a surgeon who has to undertake an operation whether it will hurt the patient or not. If certain chauvinist newspapers in Austria selected

to criticize Mr. Wilson adversely, it was my plain duty to send that to the United States; the fact is that I would balance such intemperate expressions with the saner views of such men as Mr. Benedikt, of the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*, Dr. Henry Lammasch and others. The difficulty again was that the French and British censors would delite the conciliatory part of my dispatches and permit only the hostile expressions to reach New York.

Before long I was to have another example of this. To the announcement of the Austro-Hungarian government that it would join Germany in the renewal of submarine warfare, the government of the United States replied by drawing attention to certain assurances given by the Vienna government in the notes dealing with the cases of ships that had been sunk by Austro-Hungarian submarines. I succeeded in getting a resumé of the note's contents and several quotations, and forwarded them promptly, as any other correspondent would have done, to New York, finding nothing unusual at all in the step I had taken.

It would seem, however, that the Department of State wanted to keep the note secret, despite the many assurances of Mr. Wilson that *open diplomacy* alone could save the world from future calamities.

One day, then, Count Colloredo-Mannsfeld, chief of Count Czernin's private chancery, asked me to see him as soon as I could.

He was rather exasperated, I thought. On the desk before him lay a small stack of telegram forms, on which I saw my own handwriting.

To the question by Count Colloredo-Mannsfeld whether I had written the telegrams in question, I replied in affirmation, of course, and asked why he had withdrawn them from the telegraph office, seeing that they had been filed almost a week ago.

"Your telegrams went through all right," he said. "That is just the trouble. This time one of your dispatches did get past the censors in Great Britain and France. They have a knack of letting through what they feel will do us harm. I wish our censors were as able.

"Mr. Penfield has objected to the publication of the contents of the note. We have just received from him a very curt inquiry as to how you came to learn of the bare existence of the communication, let alone its contents. It would seem that the note was to remain secret, at least that is the inference we draw from the ambassador's letter.

"Inquiry on our part has shown that the ambassador failed to communicate to us that desire. If the Department of State wanted the note to remain secret and so instructed Mr. Penfield, the embassy here must have failed to inform us of it. We can find nothing in our bureau that instructs us to keep the contents of the note, or the note itself, from the public. It is possible, however, that the embassy relied upon the usual course,

that of giving the sender of a note the privilege to publish it first. I have learned that this was the intention of Count Czernin. But that does not explain how you came in possession of the contents of the note and these quotations, which are verbatim. I take it for granted that you were not shown the note at the embassy or with the consent of Mr. Penfield."

All of which was very true, as I stated to the Count. The chief of the private cabinet found that all very mystifying until I told him that I learned of the note and its contents in the regular manner followed by newspaper men. I had looked for a reply to the announcement of submarine warfare, and looking for it had found it.

But where had I found it? was asked. That I could not reveal, of course, I stated. At any rate the person who had shown me the note had been under the impression that no wrong was being done, since the note would be published anyway, as was the assumption in the absence of other instructions.

Count Colloredo-Mannsfeld was much worried in regard to the incident. He said that the choleric "old man" in the United States embassy would insist that the matter be cleared up, and that the Foreign Office would have to say that it knew nothing of the thing at all. I advised him to do that.

But that would bring the wrath of the ambassador upon me. That was a chance I would take, I said. But the Count thought it best that I state how I had seen the note. If I had seen it in the Foreign Office it might be well to so inform Mr. Penfield, since the thing could be explained as an unofficial trespass.

To all of which I was obliged to remain obdurate for several reasons. Whoever the person was who had shown me the note, I would have to protect him, since he had acted in good faith, as I had done myself. Neither of us had the slightest doubt that the note would be published, and public interest demanded that it be published, as it was. Whether the protest came from Washington or originated in the embassy I have no means of knowing, nor is that germane here.

Strained Personal Diplomatic Relations

The Sunday following this, a rather interesting *contretemps* took place at the residence of Mr. Penfield, the leased palatial mansion of the Rothschild family in the Alleestrasse.

Mr. Penfield was completing his toilet for church when one of his servants announced Count Colloredo-Mannsfeld.

"Send the dirty little cur away," said the ambassador. "I am getting ready to go to church. Ask him whether he hasn't enough common sense

about him not to disturb a gentleman dressing for church. Tell him to go to”

The servant interpreted this as best he could, but found Count Colloredo-Mannsfeld determined to see the august American ambassador. The servant, being an Austrian, requested the caller not to press the matter, since it would be useless. In reply to that, Count Colloredo-Mannsfeld said that he had come to ask Mr. Penfield whether he would not have the kindness to receive Count Czernin, the minister of foreign affairs, some time after lunch, the subject to be considered being a very serious one.

Again the servant went to Mr. Penfield. His statement of the case was answered with expletives even worse, and finally the servant felt called upon to tell Count Colloredo-Mannsfeld what the state of affairs was. As the caller got into his automobile, Mr. Penfield came down the stairs and was off to church.

The matter being most pressing, Count Czernin called on Mr. Penfield early on Monday morning, and was admitted into the presence of the ambassador a few minutes before I arrived. I seated myself in the small foyer of the embassy and waited until the caller, whose identity was not then known to me, should depart. The doorman, a person by name of Franz, had told me that there was somebody with the ambassador, but had not told me who it was.

For a while I engrossed myself in some American newspapers, of which there was always a liberal stack on a table, and then I became attracted by the voice of Mr. Penfield, which was ringing loudly in excitement, so loudly that the double-doors of his office could not prevent my hearing what was going on.

Not wishing to hear more of the altercation between ambassador and minister of foreign affairs, I went upstairs to see a Mr. Harriman, in connection with the case of an American woman whose passport had been refused extension by the embassy. The case had been brought to my attention, and, since I considered it meritorious, I had interested myself in behalf of the woman—an elderly lady in poor circumstances who years ago had decided to give lessons in English in Vienna. She was a native American and now anxious to return to the United States.

After a while I decided to see Mr. Penfield, and was readily admitted. As usual, he was stabbing the arm-rest of his chair with the aviator's arrow. He was greatly excited, and could hardly wait to tell me what had happened.

It was not my intention to refer to the call of Count Czernin, and I had put the usual question: Whether or no there was anything new in the relations between the United States and Austria-Hungary.

The first reply was just as stereotyped, but for reasons best known to Mr. Penfield he began to relate to me that yesterday he had been

importuned by Count Colloredo-Mannsfeld, whom he labelled an "impertinent little pup." It seemed that Mr. Penfield had not yet recovered from the shock of being interfered with while making his toilet for church. He wanted to know what my opinion of that sort of conduct was. I replied that there were times when such things were perfectly permissible, so far as I could judge, and that even in the Good Book it was stated that on the Sabbath labors of love and those called for by necessity were permitted.

"I would do a great deal for these Austrians, if they could make up their mind to quit those beastly Germans. But I know they won't do that. They know that the Germans are going to be the end of them, but they refuse to leave their ally in the lurch—fine ally—fine ally in the lurch.

"That is what this thing was about. That is why that impertinent little puppy interrupted me in my dressing yesterday. Well, I had Count Czernin at my feet just now—at my feet, I tell you. The groveling, sniveling, yellow cur! If he thinks that he can get me to do anything for him at Washington, he is mistaken. I'll see them all in — first.

"Right at my feet I had the —. I don't care what happens. Unless these people here consent to quit the Germans they can expect but one thing.

"I am fond of these Austrians. Many of them are friends of mine. But there will be nothing doing until they get out of that alliance.

"Mark my words. I'll show them. I'll show that dirty yellow dog where he comes off. I've shown him before, I have shown him now, I'll show him again—again—again.

"O, I know that you are a friend of theirs, I know all about that. But if you are a friend of theirs, a real one, you will do them a favor to advise them to chuck the Germans, and do it quickly. We'll show those — where they come off.

"Wait a few weeks and you'll see. I'll see to it that you get a berth on my special train out, and mark you I'll pay for that train with my own money. No favors to me—not to Penfield—Penfield—Penfield!"

I am not easily impressed, and so it came that the American ambassador talked for the purpose of impressing me. The only sensation I had, however, was that the man was nervously unstrung and not in that moment accountable for his conduct. Only the day before he had referred to a loyal citizen of the United States, resident of Vienna, as an "international crook."

"Mr. Ambassador," I said, "would it not be better to pour a little oil on these troubled waters? Surely such efforts deserve better than that. You know as well as I do that both, Count Czernin and Count Colloredo-Mannsfeld are gentlemen. What they may have asked you to do was at its worst their duty. Has not this affair gone far enough without dragging

the people of the United States into it? There are two sides to every issue—”

“O, that is what they all say,” broke in Mr. Penfield impatiently. “They all say that. I have secretaries in this . . . office, who say that. You are pro-German, I have known that all along—”

“I beg to differ with you, Mr. Ambassador,” I said, interrupting Mr. Penfield. “I am nothing of the sort. If you need classify me let it go with humanitarian—”

“I suppose that as Boer you are anti-British,” remarked Mr. Penfield with a sneer. “Well, there are other Boers who are not. If you had any sense you’d see things the way they do. What’s the use of grieving over a lost cause. Let me tell you, my boy, that you are on the wrong track. To be anti-British means to be pro-German. Always remember that—remember that—that.”

I asked the ambassador what his evidence was that I was hostile to the British. He could not say that he had any, he admitted, but took it for granted that just because I had been on the side of the Boer Republics during the South African War, and was not now enthusiastically sympathetic for the British, as he knew, I must needs be anti-British and pro-German.

When I left Mr. Penfield he was still gloating over the insults he had offered Count Czernin, and I was still wondering into what hands the fate of nations, not to mention the lives of thousands may be placed for the sake of a political campaign contribution. Truly, I was disgusted. Government seemed to me more than ever a thing of hazard.

What Count Czernin wanted Mr. Penfield to do may just as well remain a state secret,* nor will I dwell upon the efforts, which were even

* Reconsideration has induced me to say a little more in regard to this matter.

Through a neutral diplomatic mission in Washington, Count Czernin had finally learned how Count Tarnowski had been sent to the United States as ambassador. Still, not everything was clear. I was invited several times to shed light on the affair, but could not do that, owing to the fact that, contrary to the views of the Department of State and its stool-pigeons in Vienna, I was minding well my duties as a citizen of the United States.

Count Czernin had found it impossible to set his mind on the proper track, because it never occurred to him that Mr. Penfield could have engineered the appointment of Count Tarnowski as a means of self-protection, for which there was not the slightest need. Yet the case continued to puzzle him. To get the information he desired, which in fact he needed, to keep off a further extension of the War, he put the question to Mr. Penfield point-blank.

The United States ambassador endeavored to evade the answer that was sought, but Count Czernin, being a man of great ability, succeeded before long in enmeshing this diplomatic tyro hopelessly. This done, Count Czernin charged Mr. Penfield with his duplicity. Again Mr. Penfield tried to clear himself, but the more he tried the deeper he floundered. Finally, the Austro-Hungarian minister of the Exterior presented to the United States ambassador the critical situation he had created, and pointed out the injustice of the act. He did that in a manner which caused Mr. Penfield to step before the sofa, next to the desk, from where, with his right hand lifted, as in taking a solemn oath, the United States ambassador said:

“Mr. Minister! I swear before God Almighty that Count Tarnowski will be received by Mr. Wilson. I know that he will be received. That he has not yet been received is due to a slight misunderstanding. I swear that he will be received!”

Count Czernin did not believe even this and inferred that in a diplomatic manner. Face to face with a man who had come to learn the truth so that he might do what was still possible to save the situation, Mr. Penfield fell to the expedient of losing his temper, the result of which was what I have related in the preceding pages.

The oath made by Mr. Penfield was a perjurious one, of course, because the ambassador had by that time in his possession evidence from the Department of State, transmitted to him

then made by the State Department, to wean the Austrians and Hungarians away from their allies, the Germans, Bulgars and Turks. Suffice it to say that the activity of the Germans in the United States was the merest buffonery in comparison with the labors to bring about a division between the Austro-Hungarians and the Germans, and this also long before war was declared or considered imminent. Already in the spring of 1915, a colleague of mine, charity compels me not to give his name, had approached Baron von Montlong along those lines, suggesting that there were prospects of immunity for the Austro-Hungarian government if it broke with the Germans.

Washington Clears Deck for Action

Count Tarnowski had indeed reached Washington, but Mr. Wilson found it unwise, impolitic and unnecessary to carry out what seemed so very proper to the Austro-Hungarian government, to wit: Receive the ambassador. At the Foreign Office in Vienna they used to ask me why this should be so; the plea of ignorance was my best way of evading the question, when a word could have explained much, and, maybe, changed the situation completely. But it was not for me to say that word, even when one day one of the highest in the land insisted that for the sake of humanity I throw light upon the situation if I could.

The reception given Count Czernin had, of course, ended the usefulness of the American ambassador. Meanwhile, it had been harder than ever to get reliable information from the United States. The Austro-Hungarian *chargé d'affaires* in Washington was of a sudden entirely marooned, it seemed. Yet there was a note from the government of the United States that demanded an explanation of Austria-Hungary's conduct in regard to the renewal of submarine warfare. That note also contained the stated and implied necessity for the promptest and most definite answer. It was courteous enough in terms, but also very ambiguous, which meant more to the Austro-Hungarian government than the terms themselves.

As already stated I had learned the contents of the note accidentally, as it were. Later I was shown the entire text, and still later it was published in Austria-Hungary. At the Foreign Office they did not know what answer to make. Evasion of any sort seemed out of the question. On the other hand, adhesion to Germany's policy in submarine matters would either have to be confirmed or repudiated.

in cypher, that Count Tarnowski would *not* be received by President Wilson—in fact Mr. Lansing was even then of the opinion that it would be best to get the Austro-Hungarian government to recall Count Tarnowski, in the furthering of which the Government of the United States was to secure for Count Tarnowski safe conduct through the Allied naval lines.

It seems superfluous to say more of this. Indeed I cite the case only to show what dangers there came from withdrawing from a government the diplomatic privileges at a time when these very same privileges were enjoyed by the embassy of the United States, whose chief used them for the most astounding diplomatic malfeasance on record.—January 20th, 1920.

On several occasions I had been asked to suggest a course of action. I had declined to give an opinion on that, on the ground that it did not concern me how the note was answered. To express myself one way or another meant to assume a certain amount of responsibility, and I did not want to assume that.

For over a week the note was in the Vienna Foreign Office and no reply was in sight. Mr. Penfield made inquiry every day, and toward the last became very insistent in the manner of men who know that they have the upper hand. But what the Austro-Hungarian government wanted was anything but war with the United States, nor could it break with Germany, despite the fact that Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, brother of the Empress Zita, was in Vienna *incognito*, on special mission from the Allied camp.

Realizing finally that there might yet come a change in the situation, I consented to give advice in the matter, but this I withdrew before the note was finished, on the ground that meanwhile the political aspect had taken a different hue so far as the United States was concerned.

There arrived one day at the United States embassy a fairly long cypher cable from Mr. Lansing. One part of it was brought to my attention by Mr. Penfield, who did not seem to know what he was to do under the circumstances. The part referred to said that the Department of State deemed it well to have Mr. Penfield return to the United States immediately for the purpose of conferring with the authorities there in connection with affairs in Central Europe. The ambassador would, therefore, arrange his affairs as quickly as possible and come home without delay.

The other part of the message said that Mr. Wilson had found the presence in the United States of Count Tarnowski very inconvenient, and that the government of the United States would secure safe conduct from the Allied governments for the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, in case the Austro-Hungarian would deem it well to recall Count Tarnowski forthwith. That part, of course, was not for the public, though, of necessity it had to be submitted to Count Czernin. For a day or two everything possible was done by all concerned to find a different solution to the matters in hand, but all efforts were vain.

Count Czernin had left it to Mr. Penfield to acquaint the public with his proposed departure. It was his opinion that if the news came from the Austro-Hungarian government, as was inappropriate anyway, all sorts of interpretations would be given to it by a panicky populace. But the American ambassador also found it difficult to handle the situation. The bubble of the Tarnowski appointment had now burst. The Austro-Hungarian government swallowed the bitter pill, but could not afford to admit that it had been fooled by Mr. Penfield into the belief that it was

the United States government which had suggested the sending of an ambassador to Washington, as had been purposely intimated in the press.

The situation being a complicated one, Mr. Penfield sent for me and asked that I prepare a statement on his behalf for the Austro-Hungarian press. He had already jotted down, with a thick blue pencil, what his ideas were. I went over them and found that under the circumstances they were complete enough.

When finally the statement was ready for dissemination, it said that the United States ambassador, Mr. Penfield, would either on April 4th or 5th leave Vienna for a trip to the United States, to consult with the government in regard to the situation in Europe, to rest up a little from the exertions on his post, and attend to private affairs which had been badly neglected. He would return as soon as possible.

On the day before the submission to Count Czernin by Mr. Penfield of the cablegram from the State Department, it had been learned in Vienna official circles that the United States government had recalled its minister to Belgium, Mr. Brand Whitlock, and the American Relief Commission in Belgium. That was looked upon as a bad sign. The Austro-Hungarian government and such journalists as were in the confidence of the government felt that the end was not far off.

The Penfield announcement appeared first in the Vienna and Budapest afternoon papers. All night long I was besieged at my hotel by Vienna newspaper men and correspondents of the papers in Budapest and the provinces, who wanted to get information I could not give them. None would believe that Mr. Penfield was going on a vacation in times as critical as these were. All insisted that war with the United States was on, but that the Austro-Hungarian government was afraid to admit it. That fear of theirs I could allay. There was no war yet. An editor in Budapest called me up over the long distance telephone and offered me five thousand crowns if I would write him so much as a single sentence which really told the truth about conditions. I told him that he would not believe anyway what I could write under the circumstances, and that he would be wasting his money if he expected to get from me news to the effect that war was on or about to ensue.

For a day or two the excitement was great and then it subsided a little, to give speculation an opportunity.

I had known for some time what would happen if the government of the United States declared war upon Germany and not on Austria-Hungary, as some believed. Few knew that Mr. Wilson had long ago made up his mind not to declare war upon both countries at the same time. As a matter of fact there were in Vienna but four or five persons who knew that, and one of them was Count Czernin, the minister of the

exterior. On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian government had agreed to sever diplomatic relations with the United States on the day on which the government of the latter announced that either a state of war existed, or was about to be entered upon, with Germany. Mr. Penfield had an inkling of this, and sounded me several times, which was useless since I collected information as a newspaper man and not as diplomatist.

Events were to move rapidly very soon. On April 2nd, Mr. Wilson asked the Congress of the United States to consider that a state of war existed between the United States and Germany and take the necessary steps. As has been the practice in such cases since time immemorial the parliament of a nation was confronted with a *fait accompli* that left little opportunity for action by the opposition. The gag rule in the Senate had made it extremely difficult for the "willful" ones to prevail, and public emotion was such that the will of the executive was bound to be done.

A Diplomatist in Sore Predicament

Mr. Penfield had intended to leave Vienna and Austria-Hungary on April 4th or 5th, but he finally found that this was not to be. He could not leave Austria very well without paying a farewell call at the Court and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which could not be done in time, because Emperor Charles and Count Czernin, spent Sunday, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, going to, staying at, and coming from German great general headquarters in France, where a conference in regard to the new situation was in progress. Mr. Penfield would have to wait until Thursday, before the Emperor could be seen, nor was it feasible to leave Vienna and the country on the same day. The following day again was Good Friday, a day which Mr. Penfield could not very well pick for his departure, since in Austria-Hungary that is one of the great church days, and the American ambassador, as a good Catholic, had to bear that in mind.

Before proceeding, I will reproduce here, in its original form, the text of a news dispatch I wrote at Berne a little later, in which the last days of diplomatic relations between Washington and Vienna are described in "skeleton" news cablegram form. I will explain also that the copy of this dispatch is one of many I managed to get past the French border authorities at Pontarlier, on the Swiss border.

"associated paris

"berne april sixteenth austrohungarian government up to last minute regretted what it considered necessity severing diplomatic relations with united states stop though austrohungarian embassy in washington had been instructed demand passports in case congress declared war against germany or decided state war exist-

ing vienna foreign office hoped that break could be avoided stop remarkable is that ambassador penfields departure from vienna not in any way directly connected with steps austrohungarian government had taken for breaking relations stop last week ambassador penfield received from state department cable to effect return washington consult with president wilson regarding general european situation taking same time longneeded rest stop penfields departure also was eliminate peculiar situation existing since president wilson thought it inopportune accept tarnowskis credentials stop state departments intention was leave vienna embassy in charge counselor grew stop when ambassador penfield informed count czernin his intention leaving he was given for first time intimation that austrohungarian government intended breaking relations with washington in case united states entered war state with germany stop ambassador informed however that nothing would be done pending action by congress stop penfield first planned leaving vienna april fourth or fifth but was informed he would be received by emporor charles on april fifth emporor and count czernin having spent first three days that week at german general headquarters stop on thursday that week penfield was received by emporor but same evening news spread that penfield himself would be given passports stop news appeared authentic to ambassador who unwilling investigate asked associated correspondent ascertain if report true or not stop correspondent learned from highest vienna sources that austrohungarian government did not intend handing penfield passports despite fact that congress had declared state war existing and president wilson having signed resolution stop in effect relations been severed however so that associated correspondent became virtually intermediary between american embassy and austrohungarian government stop vienna government made all needed arrangements for ambassadors departure and to last moment treated him as diplomatist going on leave stop two representatives vienna foreign office came to station see penfield couple off handing mistress penfield in name austrohungarian government splendid floral gifts stop on saturday april seventh associated correspondent unofficially authorized presented at vienna foreign office arguments against planned rupture diplomatic relations but was informed that other engagements made any other course impossible stop what these arrangements were associated did not learn but seemingly they were of great binding force stop certain is that austrohungarian government not moved by malice following most likely necessity alleged existing which semiofficial vienna fremdenblatt on april tenth outpointed in leader as being that with diplomatic relations between washington and vienna intact and intercourse between embassy and statedepartment unchecked certain military information likely hurt germany might get to american government stop towards very last austrohungarian government was loath exert in any way control over american diplomatic communications stop chargé daffaires grew was handed passports eastersunday at two

fifteen minutes afternoon but news suppressed until following tuesday stop vienna population which had hoped see rupture avoided accepted announcement greatest calm stop no demonstrations against americans occurred stop to very last authorities treated americans with unusual consideration waiving for their benefit nearly all passport and baggage regulations stop in austro-hungarian government circles rupture not popular but outcarried only for reasons stated stop in hungarian diet government was attacked by opposition for having broken relations but statement from government quieted tiska opponents quickly stop nowhere in monarchy could antagonism toward united states be found which true also in highest military circles and various ministries stop that diplomatic relations had be severed caused in short universal regret stop associated correspondent in position to announce on highest austrohungarian authority that monarchy does not contemplate declaring war on united states being willing to leave all further developments in hand american government stop nothing placed in way grew and staffs departure for reason that vienna government felt that no guarantees regarding austrohungarian diplomatists and staff in washington would be needed stop schreiner."

The news as it is written is hardly ever complete. Technical limits in news transmission must be considered, and that means brevity. In this case I was not able to tell the whole story, because of its political character. My statement that on Thursday the news was spread that Mr. Penfield would be given his passport, and that this news "appeared authentic" must be explained, as must also the statement that the ambassador "unwilling" to "investigate" asked the Associated Press correspondent, myself, to ascertain if the report was true or not. Elucidation of several other passages in my dispatch will come in connection with this.

On Thursday morning I made the usual round of the Vienna Foreign Office. At one place I was told that a certain official wanted to see me very urgently. My hotel had been called up several times, but it had been impossible to find me there. The official who delivered this message seemed so much excited that I began to fear for the worst. To live forever with a rupture of diplomatic relations and, possibly, war, over one's head is one of the best means I know for keeping one's mind alert.

I found the official quickly enough. What was the matter? Well, the prospect was a very bad one. From reliable quarters—a neutral diplomatic mission in Washington—news had come that a state of war with Germany would be declared as existing by Congress within hours. There was nothing else to do but to prepare Mr. Penfield for the unavoidable. The American ambassador and Mrs. Penfield had done so much for the Austro-Hungarian Red Cross and the poor of Vienna (before the sinking of the *Lusitania*) that it was felt at the Foreign Office no more than proper

that Mr. Penfield should get an intimation of the impending rupture of diplomatic relations.

Would I tell Mr. Penfield that it was likely that he would get his passports that evening or the following morning, if news came by that time that the Congress of the United States had complied with the wishes of Mr. Wilson. There seemed to be no way out of it. While, with all his shortcomings, Mr. Penfield had been a very good friend of the Austro-Hungarians, it might become necessary to hand him his papers before he would have had time to leave the country still an accredited ambassador.

I went immediately to the office quarters of the embassy at No. 9 Wohleben Gasse, to find that Mr. Penfield would not be in during the day—that he was very busy making his farewell calls. Mr. Joseph C. Grew had already taken over the affairs of the post as *chargé d'affaires*. Since I had most pressing duties of my own to attend to, I left word in a quarter where it would reach Mr. Penfield, if he should drop in meanwhile.

The Aftermath of a Diplomatic Tea

I had for that afternoon accepted an invitation to tea at the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Penfield. I had accepted others before, but had always been prevented from going there. The late afternoon was the best hour to see the officials in the Foreign Office. There was no longer any need of seeing them, because I had been informed that I would not be able to use the wires any more. The telegraph system of the country was in the hands of the military, and the gentlemen of that calling do not mince matters when a crisis is near. Moreover, I had to see Mr. Penfield in connection with my "diplomatic" mission.

The tea party was well in progress when I arrived. Those around the huge round table in one of the *salons* were enjoying themselves. Mrs. Penfield presided in very happy fashion, and a member, by marriage, of the Imperial family, was just recounting how she had succeeded in getting milk for her infant son. I interrupted the interesting story by my entrance but caught the threads of it later on.

It seems that the princess had some time ago caught the happy idea of keeping somewhere in the country a good cow, the milk of which made up most of the food of her young son. There was no longer any other way of getting milk in Vienna and even this was made impossible. The authorities were now in the habit of seizing for uniform distribution all the milk that was brought into the city, and in this manner the young scion of Parma and Hapsburg had to get along on the same ration as the child of a hodcarrier in the Ottackring District. The ladies and gentlemen at the table found that shocking enough. Why, the idea!

Well, the enterprising young princess had appealed to her connection, Emperor Charles, but he had told her that there was nothing he could do. As the result of this the princess had now sent her son to where the cow was—quite a distance from Vienna, as I recall it. All that was droll enough, and everybody laughed. The princess had told that story before, I think. At any rate she told it well and with relish.

Among the others who were present were Mr. Grew, the *chargé d'affaires*; Mr. Hugh R. Wilson, a second secretary, and Mrs. Wilson; Mr. Allen W. Dulles, also a second secretary, and another attaché of the embassy.

Conversation moved entirely in the sphere of food and nutrition. Mrs. Penfield dwelt with much enthusiasm on the farm she was running for her own household needs and which during her absence would be run by Emin Pasha. Food was high, she said. She found it hard to understand how people lived at all nowadays, and I was asked to explain how it was done. When I told the company that quite recently I had not seen a piece of bread for a week, but had subsisted entirely on potatoes, a small portion of meat and canned vegetables, they found it hard to understand that.

Uncle Sam was taking good care of his diplomatists abroad. The army quartermaster's department saw to it that the diplomatists and their families were well provided with food, sending to Vienna such things as were needed to make life agreeable—anything from a can of the finest olive oil to a barrel of flour, from juiciest California preserved fruits to a side of bacon or a bag of choicest Mocca; all of them things which we plain, everyday American civilians could not get, though our work, at least mine, was as important to the public of the United States as that of any member of the embassy staff.

The conversation was rather animated when suddenly the large double door was flung open, and the tall figure of Mr. Penfield appeared in its frame. He beckoned to me in a somewhat excited manner, and then withdrew again without greeting the ladies. I begged to be excused and followed him, being in my turn followed by Messrs. Grew, Wilson and Dulles.

When I reached the foyer, a sort of spacious stair landing, Mr. Penfield was sitting on an *ottoman*, and beside him was standing an attaché of the embassy. The ambassador was very much excited.

"What is that—what is that? I'm to get my passports in the morning. Is it true—is it true?" he panted.

"Unfortunately, Mr. Ambassador!" I said. "That is to say, if Congress declares that a state of war exists between the United States and Germany. It has not done that yet."

"But it will do it—it will do it," said Mr. Penfield, trying hard to

get his nerves under control. "Well, I won't leave this country in that fashion. I have done too much for these people to deserve such treatment. I have fed them, clothed them. Mrs. Penfield had hundreds of thousands of wound dressings made for them in her shop."

There was nothing I, or any of the others, could say to that. The secretaries—at least two of whom had prayed for this day—were themselves a little ill at ease before the discomfiture of their *chef de mission*. I found it hard to understand why Mr. Penfield should tell us all this.

"Listen, now!" started the ambassador again. "I tell you, I will not leave this country a dismissed ambassador! I want you to go up to the Foreign Office and tell them that they must delay the rupture of diplomatic relations until I am out of the country, which will be Sunday noon. Go up there and tell them, before it is too late."

"I am afraid that my word won't count with them, Mr. Ambassador!" I said.

"O, yes, it will. I know it will!" broke in Mr. Penfield. "They think a great deal of you up there. Go and see them. I tell you that can't happen. Tell them to wait until I am gone. Give me my passports—my passports . . ."

Mr. Penfield buried his face in his hands and began to stare at the carpet. I was irresolute. What chances had I warding off an action of that nature.

"I am afraid, Mr. Ambassador, it will be quite useless," I said.

"No, it won't be. You can do it," insisted Mr. Penfield. "They have a very high opinion of you up there. Go and do it!"

Mr. Grew also began to urge me, as did several of the others. A little later I was closeted with some of the Foreign Office officials.

I presented the matter to the best of my ability, pointing out that it would be better to defer the rupture of diplomatic relations long enough to allow Mr. Penfield to get over the border into Switzerland. I finally left with the assurance that Mr. Penfield would be permitted to leave Vienna and Austria an accredited ambassador.

To the night train for Feldkirch, on the following Saturday, was attached a special car for Ambassador and Mrs. Penfield, who were accompanied by Mr. Dulles, nephew of Secretary of State Lansing, and a valet and maid. Count Colloredo-Mannsfeld, not especially beloved by Mr. Penfield, and another attaché of the Foreign Office, came to the station with floral gifts for Mrs. Penfield, and the official farewell for the ambassador.

I noticed that everybody present wore a black overcoat and a high silk hat, as they do at high-class funerals. And this, certainly, was one of them. The staff of the embassy had put in appearance in full force to

see off their chief, and there was in evidence a certain amount of hilarity that did not fit into the event. Count Colloredo-Mannsfeld made a few formal remarks to the ambassador, while the other man, Count Forgatch, I believe, presented the floral offerings to Mrs. Penfield.

I watched the performance from the philosophical tower I frequent on such occasions and wondered just how much further fiction and simulation could get from reality. I must record that it went the whole distance. That somewhere there were young men who would soon bleed on some battlefield and rest in a company grave as the result of diplomacy did not seem to occur to any of those departing, or those seeing the departing off.

Diplomatic Negotiations Under Difficulties

On Saturday morning Mr. Grew called me into his office. He also had an errand for me. I was to go to the Foreign Office and argue for an indefinite postponement of the proposed rupture of relations. It was the opinion of the *chargé d'affaires* that everything possible ought to be done to prevent a break. I was of that mind myself—had been for weeks before Mr. Grew arrived from Berlin, where he had been the counselor of Mr. James W. Gerard, who was now being interviewed twice a day by the journalists of France, violating thereby every rule of diplomatic etiquette.

To present that matter for Mr. Grew was not easy, I concluded. Because the *chargé d'affaires* had been in the American embassy at Berlin he was looked upon with suspicion. He was the very man, owing entirely to his former station, who should not have been sent to Vienna, if the State Department hoped to keep up diplomatic relations with Vienna, as it had undoubtedly instructed Mr. Grew, before he came to his new post.

The conversation with the *chargé d'affaires* established that he had the best of intentions. He felt that the American embassy at Vienna might later on serve as a bridge by which negotiations with the German government might be renewed, if the occasion should come. On that point I was to lay great stress. I suggested to Mr. Grew that he be a little more specific as to his authority in the premises. Was I to make the representations officially, semi-officially or unofficially? But on that point I could not get Mr. Grew to commit himself at first. I told him that unless I could fix my own status I could not very well take the matter up. When finally I saw that Mr. Grew had specific instructions. I decided to see what I could do.

I had two conferences in the Foreign Office that day. One of them led to a conference elsewhere. I argued the case as best I could, but found a great stumbling block in the fact that I was not able to say more than

that the *chargé d'affaires* was my authority. If I could point out in what the advantages of the continuation of diplomatic relations lay for Austria-Hungary, aside from the fact that the Vienna embassy of the United States might offer a convenient means for possible negotiations between Washington and Berlin, my case would have a much better standing, I was told.

But to point out such advantages was not easy, especially since a great number of negatives had to be overcome. I was frankly told that the only reason why diplomatic relations were being severed lay in the conclusion on the part of the Central Power governments that the American embassy at Vienna had been used by sympathizers of the Allies in the Dual Monarchy, Czechs, Poles, Croats and Italians, as a clearing house for military information going both ways. A former unofficial attaché of the embassy and his wife were openly charged with having been the agents of Allied governments, and worse than that was intimated.

"The difference between the Austro-Hungarian and United States governments is that we do not howl to the four winds in such matters," said an official. "We happen to know that some of the reports of the United States consuls and consular attachés have contained matter of a character detrimental to the public interests of the Monarchy. The reports were forwarded via London and Paris.

"What assurance have we that this will not be done in the future, if we do not sever diplomatic relations? The only way to prevent that would be to treat your embassy here as ours was treated in Washington, and that we will not do. We have given the government of the United States the assurance that during this War its diplomatic dispatches and mail pouches will be inviolable. We do not care to go back on our word. If that assurance is cancelled it will be cancelled in the only way hitherto provided for by international usage: A rupture of relations."

It seemed that there was no way out of this. The embassy could not remain without everything it did being subjected to Austro-Hungarian scrutiny. It would not be able either to receive or send a single dispatch or letter in cypher. Under those circumstances it would be best to have Austro-Hungarian interests in the United States presented by some neutral legation and *vice versa*.

Mr. Grew regretted very much that I had not been more successful. On the following day, Easterday in the most Catholic country in Europe, at 2:15 p. m., when Mr. Penfield was well over the border, representatives of the Foreign Office handed Mr. Grew the passports of the embassy in his private quarters in the new Hotel Bristol.

On the following Saturday evening, April 14th, the diplomatic and consular staff of the State Department left Vienna on the same train which Mr. Penfield had taken. Such was the end of diplomatic relations between

the United States of America and the oldest empire in Europe—legitimate child of the Caesars of Rome.

Diplomatists and Plain Citizens

This account can not very well be closed without some reference to the callous conduct of the United States embassy toward American citizens whom the rupture of relations left stranded in what might at any moment become an enemy country. With the exception of two secretaries, Messrs. Rutherford Bingham and Glenn Stewart, scant consideration was shown American citizens by members of the embassy staff. The few who managed to get on the embassy train, three coaches attached to the regular night train for Feldkirch, got there largely because of their prominence or my friendship. All others were left behind to shift for themselves. While I could mention a good many such cases I will make reference only to one, because it had a peculiar significance under the circumstances.

There arrived in Vienna a Mrs. Judelsohn, mother of Mr. Montefiore Judelsohn, a student interpreter at the United States embassy at Constantinople. Mrs. Judelsohn was not in the best of health and needed the care of an elderly Armenian woman, who was in her service for that purpose. The Armenian woman claimed American citizenship by marriage, I was informed. At any rate on credentials given her in Constantinople she had been able to travel as far as Vienna. Even the Argus-eyed Bulgarian frontier officials had permitted her to pass, and after that she had run the gauntlet of the three military railroad administrations of occupied Serbia.

All had gone well until the two women reached the American embassy at Vienna. Here a visé was refused the Armenian. In some manner Mrs. Judelsohn heard of me, called and spoke of her plight. Though she was the mother of a member of the service, she was unable to get her nurse through. She could not travel without the woman, and would not leave her behind if she could. I was to help her. At the American embassy I was refused.

A request at the Foreign Office and the War Department finally secured for the woman permission to leave Austria-Hungary without the visé. I came home that night and found in my room a little round package. It contained nine crackers, which the Armenian woman sent me to show her appreciation. Nine crackers were not to be valued lowly in those days.

But the best example of how a solicitous United States Department of State will protect United States citizens, I had in France. At Pontarlier, the kind border officials marched a party of American citizens, among them six women and a young girl, from one place of inspection to another for

the greater part of a day, through streets that were covered with thawing snow to the depth of six inches. At the office of the military frontier surveyor these women, two of them American Red Cross nurses from Sofia, and two others, wife and daughter of an American missionary stationed at Prague, were lined up for a cross-examination in regard to conditions in Bulgaria and Austria that was not the nicest thing to behold. When it came to be my turn, the French captain, not a bad sort, by the way, thought a prize had been captured.

—*Eh, bien, vous êtes correspondant . . . vous avez visité le front d'Isonzo récemment, il paraît,*—he said.

Well versed in his business, the man had, after looking pensively at the legend "Vient d'Autriche," written with red ink and large lettering across the visé on my passport of the French consulate general at Berne, found quickly a number of Austrian military visées done at Tolmein, Laibach, Adelsberg and Triest.

I admitted that I had been on the Julian front quite recently. As the result of that I was invited to be seated. The officer armed himself with a shorthand pad and began to scribble in stenography. This done he began to ply me with questions of a character intended to bring out what military information I might have. He wanted to know what the *morale* of the Austro-Hungarian troops was. I said that I was no psychologist. What was the number of the new big Skoda howitzers from the Hermada to the Stol Mountain? I did not know. Had I seen any of them? I had. How far were these guns behind the infantry position on an average? I had not measured the distance.

"It would seem to me that you are averse to giving me the information I desire," said the man finally.

"I am averse to that," I remarked frankly.

"But why should you be? You are now one of our allies."

"Not yet against the Austrians!" I ventured to remark.

"What difference is there—Boche and Austrian are the same!"

"Not to me, *monsieur!*"

"*Voyons!*—What is the use of splitting hairs?"

"I hope that the French general staff does not place too great a weight on military information collected in this manner. I have had a little military experience and know enough of the business to answer your questions in such a manner that the result might be injurious to your *cause*, as you put it. I can state numbers, calibers and distances. But what assurance have you that I have given you the correct data?"

A frown went over the officer's face.

"We could hold you responsible in that event," he said tersely.

"For what?"

"For giving us false information."

"That is very ingenious, *monsieur!*" I said. "Do you not think that the government of the United States might have something to say in that?"

The officer laughed.

"So far as the United States government is concerned we have a free hand. On that you need not count."

"That means that the United States government will do nothing for its citizens when under such conditions they might get into trouble in this country?"

"If you want to put it that way," remarked the officer, pleasantly. "You have said enough even now to warrant your arrest and detention."

"Why?"

"It is plainly to be seen that you are a sympathizer at least of the Austrians," was the reply.

"There is nothing to be seen, *monsieur*, except that I am a person who does not violate hospitality. I have been the guest of the several Central Powers countries for three years and feel that I must be fair to them. How would you like it if a war correspondent, who had been in your country and with your armies, went over into Germany and peddled his stock of information?"

Monsieur thought it over for a while.

"I think I understand you. I beg your pardon!"

That afternoon he came to the train to see the party off. He was especially cordial to me.

"Such matters, unfortunately, are one of the unpleasant side issues of war. I hope that you will overlook the incident. *Au revoir!*"

At the prefecture in Paris an official nearly lost his mind when I presented my passport with the legend "Vient d'Autriche" and a German name. *Jamais—jamais de la vie*—was I to get a *permit de séjour*, not even for a day. I would have to leave France that evening or land in trouble. That I had not been able to make in four or five hours arrangements for sailing did not concern French *sécurité publique*. I went to the American embassy, where a suave and gentle-spoken secretary looked at my passport a long time and then regretted that he could do nothing. The best thing to do would be to take a train for Spain and hope to get a steamer from there.

"You come from Austria, I notice," said the man with a voice as soft as the beat of an owl's wings. "That is bad! We can't do anything for you. Better take my advice and get out of Paris and France. You have a German name—that is always dangerous. And then you were not even born in the United States. You have quite an accent, I notice. Too bad!

But there is nothing we can do for you. May be that your bureau here would fix up the matter. If you should get into trouble let us know."

They were prepared for my coming at Hendaye, on the Spanish border. A large tome was produced, and in it two French frontier officials read a long time. On this occasion I did not know any French. It would be interesting to hear what they had to say, I thought. But their remarks were only professionally interesting. He is a newspaper correspondent, connected with the somewhat official Associated Press of America. The censorship has found it necessary to suppress a great deal of his matter, it would seem—there are several entries of that type. It is strange that there is not yet a report from the point of his entry into France, though it seems that he made application in Paris for permission to stay longer than is allowed travellers in transit. He looks to me a man of unfriendly *allure*—what shall we do? I am not fond of detaining journalists. Generally, they have friends somewhere. At any rate he can't get back. Has his baggage been thoroughly examined? He may have papers with him.

One of the officers left the shed in which the passengers were examined. The other continued to go over the two books—the tome in question, and a smaller book of "Journal" size. An index card also figured in the scheme. I noticed that its edges were slightly torn and badly soiled. It had been fingered over for years, it would seem.

Presently, the man returned. The baggage of the travellers had already been put on the shuttle train for Irun, across the Spanish border. But so and so had given the assurance that all baggage had been properly inspected.

With a surly look the passport was handed me, and I was glad when the train was in motion. I may mention though that I had no papers of any sort among my belongings. They were then already on the wide Atlantic as part of a diplomatist's *inviolable* baggage.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

THE fortunes of war and the laws of life have already overtaken many of the principal actors of the Great War. The story is that Czar Nicholas and his entire family have been done to death in the foulest manner—fallen prey to the monster which Sir George Buchanan and his able fellow diplomatists unchained, when, for the purpose of eradicating the possibility of an understanding between Germany and Russia, they promoted what may be called the Kerenski Revolution. The snow ball at the top of the mountain becomes an avalanche when started rolling. There was great discontent in Russia. To remove it was one of the purposes of the War so long as autocracy was in charge of the situation. To use that discontent was made the plan of those who looked upon the Russians as still a military and political asset. Bolshevism resulted.

Emperor William II is an exile, after making none too glorious an exit—not even from Germany, but from Belgium. The authority that was to find him guilty of something or other seems to have found that he was not guilty to the extent of permitting prosecution. Probably, the evidence could not be presented without inculcating others. With the emperor went his son and heir—quite an innocuous young man of but the fraction of the ability which it was necessary to credit him with so that the slander heaped upon him might seem to have a solid foundation.

With the two was swept from its high seat the German rule-by-divine-right principle, and the aristocracy and bureaucracy that were its mainstay. The bubble of German governmental efficiency held well enough, but when it was finally pricked by the Allies, with the help of the United States, it was shown to be no better than other inflations. The mask of government snatched off, the German people were shown to be an aggregate with all the faults and virtues of others—to those who were not blinded by the loathsome prejudices that lead to war.

Francis Joseph of Austria-Hungary, last of the monarchs *par excellence*, was laid away in the crypt of the Capuzine Church in Vienna, among his forbears, before the monarchy crumbled and fell. For the greater part of a century had he been emperor and king. For all that his coffin looked remarkably small under the black pall with its huge white cross, before the high altar of St. Stephen's Cathedral. In all that pomp of state and

show of royal prerogative the catafalque of the dead sovereign seemed to me the smallest thing. It was another case of :

“The king is dead, long live the king !”

A few weeks later I saw his successor crowned in the Coronation Church of Ofen. A noteworthy thing happened. Count Tisza as paladin of Hungary, and the officiating cardinal, had just placed the crown of St. Stephen on the head of the young man—state and church had together endowed him with the right to be the future King of Hungary. But the crown had not been well placed. When the king moved his head a little it would have fallen off had he not put his hands up in time and caught it. Perhaps, that was an omen. Monarchy is not dead in Europe—the cycle of man has merely reached the point where for a time it will be not as popular as it has been.

Count Tisza was assassinated at the instigation of a demagogue—a lickspittle Sylla of the Magyars. Count Stuerghk was shot dead by one of the Megali-Idealists who would make mankind happy by doing without the elimination of the unfit, who, nevertheless, have their uses. The archdukes of Austria and the haughty nobles of Hungary have been snowed under for the time being, and the rapacious gang of bankers in Vienna and Budapest is no longer selling food to the starving masses at profits that would have made a Roman tax farmer envious.

Of such men as Count Czernin one hears seldom now. Count Berchtold, dubbed the Minister of the *handsome* Exterior, when he was Minister of the Exterior, has no longer any call for advice from Charles. With the names of Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Mackensen, Falkenhayn, von Below, have disappeared those of Hötzendorff, Boreovic, von Arz, Pflanzer-Baltin. Of Nicholai-Nicholaievich and Broussiloff and all the others one hears no more. Even Cadorna and Diaz are out of the press. Henceforth it will have to rain in the Julian Alps without the world learning of this in an official communiqué.

King Ferdinand finally met the doom Stambulowski had promised him. But he lost only his official head. When a part of the Bulgarian army in Macedonia had been bought by the Allies, the Prince of Coburg decided that his estate in Hungary would be a better place than Sofia. With him fell Dr. Radoslavoff, a man, who, when I saw him last in Vienna, just before the rupture of relations, had become the very personification of care and worry, quite a shocking contrast to Halil Bey, the Ottoman minister of foreign affairs at that time, who still found occasion for optimism. Generals Jekoff and Todoroff are no longer heard from.

Sultan Mohammed Rechid Khan V, Ghazi, etc., Caliph of the Faithful, etc., was gathered to his fathers. Prince Yussuf Issedin committed suicide in his *hareem* by opening the arteries in his wrist. Prince Said

Halim Pasha, grand vizier, disappeared before the war was lost, and his place was taken by Talaat Pasha, who started in life as a telegraph operator. Enver Pasha, the young minister of war, has not even taken the world into his confidence as to his present whereabouts, and on the Bosphorus rule now men who will have to handle the future of their race with different means.

Sir Edward Grey is totally blind, and in his night eternal he will have time to inspect his own share in the great calamity. Sazonoff was a sort of hanger-on at the Paris peace *conversations*. Asquith sees his sun setting. Lord Kitchener rests somewhere at the bottom of the North Sea. It is said that he still lives in English folklore of today. Generals French, Haig and Byng are out of print. Sir Ian Hamilton is no longer faced with the situation of having to reconcile a military operation with a purely diplomatic purpose, and his able opponent Liman von Sanders Pasha is no longer obliged to endeavor holding his command while holding back the Allied troops at the same time. If Baron Wangenheim's spirit has the faculty of perceiving things mundane it must wonder at the mental spirals some men employ in blackening the memory of the dead.

Very soon the galaxy of Great War leaders will have faded into oblivion in *corpus mundi*. Their names will remain, of course, for the tragedy of the craft sinister was too great to be forgotten in a hurry. Thousands of years from now somebody will refer to the event as we do to the Peloponnesian War or the Persian invasion of Hellas, and still a little later—long hence as we see it—in a second as the Nilometer of the flood of time records it—the fall of Germany may be another fall of Troy—with Priams and Agamemnons, and possibly a Helen—with a Helen in fact, for all such things reduce themselves in the course of time to first principles, those of biology.

Products of the Diplomatic Laboratory

Meanwhile, we of today would do well to take a rational attitude toward such things. Selfishness, like every other excess in nature, comes home to roost. The good people who saw the European War in the light of exports and imports, industry, commerce and profits—large profits—are today face to face with a condition that may take from their coffers the very thing, which to keep, the War was entered upon, driven to such extremes and terminated in the manner known. The last of Bolshevism has not yet been heard, and the best we may hope is that Bolshevism will leave mankind no worse off than the War already has done.

It was greed of various sorts that brought on the Great War, the contentions of the Neo-Idealists in statecraft and the Megali-Idealists

in "Pans" and self-determination, notwithstanding. What particular form that greed took does not matter. So far as Great Britain was concerned it had the character of a national policy designed to perpetuate the empire in face of a rapidly growing nation that sought room for expansion—Germany. That the conflict in this quarter was launched by a disagreement over the Two-Power Standard, or by the hatred of one another of an Emperor and a King, nephew and uncle, or by the fear that German commerce would soon or late displace the British foreign trade, is something over which biased writers may quibble.

No doubt there will be found those who can defend Sazonoff's methods for the "realization" of Russian "desires" on the Bosphorus, despite the fact that historically the Russian had as much right to Constantinople as the Yankee. If that city was to be transferred on strictly ethical grounds—so much mentioned in connection with the case; then it was the Greeks who should have gotten it—not the Greeks of the peninsula, but the Greeks of Pera, the descendants of the people, the Byzantians, from whom the city and its territories was taken by the Osmanli, after the good Crusaders had left it in such poor shape to defend itself. If we are going to unscramble the omelette of events and succession, let us at least be logical enough to do it right. Done properly that process of correcting injustice might have renewed in Constantinople the war of the Blues and the Greens. No doubt partisans of the Angelos, Palaeologus, Macedonian, and Armenian dynasties would have been found in the old families on the Golden Horn, provided some Roman, Athenian, Spartan or Dorian pretender had not put in appearance.

In all such matters the starting point is the thing. To find that point is about as easy as reaching a conclusion where a circle starts.

It was so everywhere. There are a number of territories claimed by many at the same time.

There is the Dalmation coast and that of Istria. The Austro-Hungarians held it. The Italians want it, and the Jugo-Slavs, the inhabitants of the hinterland, do not want to surrender it. True enough there are some Italians on the coasts in question. But how did they get there? So far as modern history is concerned they settled there when Venice was the power of the Adriatic and Mediterranean. But many of the Venitians were driven off when the Serbian emperors began to feel their oats. Other Italians came to the coast as immigrants within our own period. They came there, because the fishing on their own shores was not very profitable, while on the island-studded eastern expanses of the *Adria* it was. If we admit that principle, we will not be far off from having such claims be the cause of war in other parts.

There is the Banat. Everybody wanted the Banat. It was in turn

promised by the Allied governments to the Serbs and the Rumanians; to the Rumanians last, because it was a bit of bait needed to catch an ally. The fact that this promise had been used before, and was likely to have a mortgage on it, did not seem to bother so great a statesman as Bratianu. In the Banat live together four races: Croats, Germans, Magyars, Rumanians and a few Serbs, to name them alphabetically.

To what extent did self-determination worry the Allied governments when they promised Rumania this choice morsel of Europe? To what extent, indeed, did any such deals worry their minds? Quite calmly territories were signed away, just as that had been done in the treaties of San Stefano, Paris, Berlin, Bucharest, Vienna, Versailles, Utrecht, Portsmouth, and Osnabrueck, *locale* of the closing scene of another "World War."

And as General Palivanoff expressed it in his report concerning the situation in Rumania in November, 1916, the failure on the battlefield of the would-be beneficiary of the treaty could always be construed into a gain for those who had promised to give what they had not in hand.

Self-determination must come from within, as it has come since time immemorial. When its benefits are bestowed by the edict of another, unsatisfactory conditions to all concerned came of it.

On November 19th, 1918, M. Leon Mirman, French commissioner at Metz, Alsace-Lorraine, addressed a proclamation to "the remaining Germans," which reads in part as follows:

"France accepts homage only from those who love her.

"I am sure that you will love France as soon as, morally regenerated by a long and wholesome exercise of liberty, you will have become capable of knowing it and worthy of understanding her.

"But, today, I reject in her name your hypocritical acclamations. I would respect you more if you were silent and sad, wearing with dignity the mourning of your monstrous phantasies.

"I demand, I exact of you, only one thing—respect for France and her laws. Whosoever attempts to disturb order will be punished. Those among you who conduct themselves in a proper manner will not be molested, and, should such a thing occur, they will receive protection from me against any one whomsoever, in the name of the Republic.

"None of you need be troubled at having shown publicly in the past your joy in the temporary successes, and, more recently, your sorrow at the final disaster of your country.

"But if France, in the noble pride of her victory, remains the servant of justice, she does not forget—and justice makes it a duty not to forget—the crimes of which her children were the victims.

"Those among you who approved these crimes will not be prosecuted. If you perceive today the moral aberration in which you allowed the guardians of your conscience to involve you, France abandons you with pity to your remorse; if you do not yet understand, she leaves you with disdain in your abject condition. . . .

"I have spoken.

"In the name of the Republic, in the name of France, one and indivisible."

Vae victis!

On January 13, 1919, or about two months later a protest was sent to President Wilson, of which this is a part:

"Those who up to the present time have been full citizens of Alsace-Lorraine—native residents of German origin to whom this land unquestionably owes a great deal of its fruitfulness—turn in deep distress to the leader of the free American people, pleading for protection against the oppressive rule of the French despotism under which more than 400,000 people are suffering." . . .

The petition was made by refugees from Alsace-Lorraine at Freiburg in Baden. The population of the two provinces was in 1910, 1,874,014. Alsace and Lorraine were wrenched from the old German, or Holy Roman Empire, in the Seventeenth Century, by Louis XIV, and Louis XV. In 1871 Alsace and Lorraine were re-annexed to the German Empire as a Reichsland or federal district, and for many years thereafter had a notoriously shortsighted government of the Prussian type, the governors being mostly selected for their expertness in discipline of the barracks.

Let us contrast with that the so-called Declaration of Corfu, of July 20th, 1917.

"The authorized representatives of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, recognizing that the desire of our people is to free itself from any foreign yoke and to constitute itself an independent national state, agree in declaring that this state must be founded on the following principles:

"The State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, who are also known as Southern Slavs, or Jugoslavs, will be a free and independent kingdom with indivisible territory and unity of allegiance. It will be a constitutional, democratic and parliamentary monarchy, under the Karageorgevitch dynasty. . . .

"The special Serb, Croat and Slovene flags and coats of arms may be freely hoisted and used.

"The three national denominations will be equal before the law, and may be freely used in public.

"The two alphabets, Cyrillic and Latin, will also rank equally throughout the kingdom.

"All recognized religions shall be exercised freely and publicly; and in particular the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Mus-sulman creeds, which are chiefly professed by our people, will be equal and have the same rights in regard to the state.

"The territory of the kingdom will include all territory compactly inhabited by our people, and cannot be divided without injury to the vital interests of the community. Our nation demands nothing that belongs to others, but only what is its own.

"In the interests of freedom and of the equal rights of all the Adriatic Sea shall be free and open to all.

"All citizens shall be equal and enjoy the same rights toward the state and before the law.

"Deputies to the national parliament shall be elected by universal suffrage, with equal, direct and secret ballot." . . .

The lesson to be gathered from these three excerpts is simple. The last of them has self-determination as its object, the other two deal with a case of annexation, or re-annexation. In the one case *irredenta* will be obviated, in the other it will be made a certainty.

Such are the varying ideals of statecraft, and the contradictory interpretations that may be given the war slogan: "Liberty for small peoples." France did not even think it worth while to take a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine, as at one time some of her leaders promised. In overlooking that, French statesmen of today can not have considered seriously the future. It is the "noble pride of victory" which has bred more wars that were unnecessary than anything else.

I have at the beginning of the book made some reference to leagues of nations, citing two instances which resemble in the main the present effort. The first of these is known as the League of Peace, of 1518,* and the second as the Holy Alliance. Due to the fact that King Charles of Spain and Pope Leo X were not keen supporters of the league, though they became signatories to it, the agreement, directed this time against the Turks, did not last very long. Two years after its ratification it was dead, and nothing came of the fine promises made to one another. The Holy Alliance has been gone into already. It was directed against the French and Napoleon, and expired similarly of inanition. For many years Czar Nicholas of Russia occupied himself with the same ideals, and then ended up by losing all in the Great War.

Leagues of nations are as old and common as hills in Attica. It would be denying that causes have effects, to say that they have done no good. But the good they have done has always been far from their purpose. They have not prevented wars for the very simple reason that war has always, soon or late, broken out among the members of such leagues.

* See Appendix.

The peoples of the signatories of the Treaty of 1518, began exactly one hundred years later to devastate all of Central Europe in one of the bloodiest of wars of our era, the Thirty Years' War. Prussia and Austria, signatories of the Holy Alliance, went to war fifty years later, and the same two countries in 1914 made common cause against the third of the signatories, Russia, and the object of the alliance, France, though by that time the Holy Alliance had long been forgotten and was no longer the chemical trace of a political fact.

Modern enthusiasts and Neo-Idealists claim that with this League of Nations it will be different. One would say: Let us hope so, if to say that would not involve the complete negation of all history.

As to Open Covenants and Open Diplomacy

The reader may well have passed under the impression that the old system of diplomatic relations is dangerous and that to continue it would be to invite more disasters. All of that is very true. It may seem also that improvement does not lie in the direction of continuation of the present methods of international intercourse. That also is true, only too true, as Mr. Wilson must have realized when he set up the First of his Fourteen Points:

"Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly in the public view."

The main purpose of this labor of mine was to show how difficult, nay impossible, it is to have our present system of "diplomacy . . . proceed always frankly in the public view." So long as there is a diplomacy that resembles in any respect the practice as we have had it, "private international understandings" will be made, even if, as some have suggested, there be no longer such a thing as "diplomatic privileges," that is: The granted and reciprocally accepted "right," as governments and their own agents view it, of sending secret communications to one another. The elimination of such things as telegrams in code, and inviolable mail pouches, would mean nothing at all, would, on the other hand, tend merely to once more lead the world public into a false sense of security.

The remedy, then, does not lie in that direction.

It has been maintained that diplomatic services are necessary in the expedition of inter-governmental affairs of a routine character. Such is hardly the case. In times of peace and in the absence of intrigue the ambassador and minister of the government that has no designs upon its neighbor is little more than a drone—a sort of superior messenger boy, as

has been said. The communications he has to transmit to the Foreign Office of his post could be transmitted in the regular international mail and over the wires and cables in plain text or a cypher that is not secret in the sense in which government codes are this. If that were not desirable in some cases, the consul could attend to the matter, if such a consul, or consul-general, were given no other function than that which is his at present when no diplomatic standing is given him. Nothing would be gained, of course, if consular officers were allowed to dabble in diplomacy.

This would mean, of course, that there would be no diplomatists, and that inter-governmental affairs would be limited to matters concerning entirely the maintenance of existing relations. Alliances and understandings of any sort could not be taken care of in that manner, and not to have alliances and such was recognized as best by the immortal George Washington in his farewell address when he warned the people of the United States against the making of "entangling alliances" and gave as his reason:

"Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike of another cause those by whom they are actuated to look for danger only from one side, and thus serve to veil and even to second the arts of influence of the other. Real patriots who may resist the intrigues of the favorite are liable to become suspected and even odious, while its dupes and tools usurp the applause and the confidence of the people to surrender their interests."

The best sort of international relations are those devoid of all alliances and understandings, save the one understanding which alone can preserve peace—a mutual desire to live in harmony with the national neighbor. If each people and government will do that alliances will not be necessary.

But there will always be the bully, and the ambitious governments, who will not want to join sincerely such a scheme. Unfortunately, this half-finished world of ours is not yet ready to be run on ideals, even if in the course of time we have come a little nearer to that. Nor will it be possible for ages to come to control those desires in nations which become articulate in chauvinism and jingoism, interpreting one as the element that promotes in times of deepest peace the cause of war by fostering prejudices, and the other as the agency which promotes hatred when war is imminent or is come.

These are things to which to be blind would defeat every effort to spare mankind the visitations it has recently groaned under. It is best to look at the individual and the groups he forms as biological phenomena, the defects of which can not be explained away, though amenable to abatement they be. Quite the most dangerous foe of mankind is he who looks upon mankind as being better than it is. In the life of men as in that of nations, the primitive passion is "to have and to hold."

To restrict that passion so that it will not come in hostile conflict with another instance of it has been the purpose of the legislator and moralist ever since organized society has existed, and that goes far beyond known history. But in this the law-givers have had the advantage of being also the punishers. A law that is not enforced, or can not be enforced, is not a law at all, of course. It is mere verbiage. Law in order to be enforceable must have authority behind it. Law, to be just, must have the consent of those that are subject to it, for otherwise it becomes nothing, and, indeed, never is more in such instances, but the edict of some absolutism, be this autocracy or democracy applied in extremes.

It has been shown here that International Law has none of the characteristics, though some of the qualities, of Municipal Law, the form of legislation I have just mentioned. International Law lacks a sanctioning authority—the means to punish those who break it.

Though International Law was ruled by the British Government to be a dead letter in all respects not promotive of British public interest. during the Great War, we will be obliged to make use of it again in the future. International regulation there must be, and no matter what style this may be given for the immediate future, the fact is that International Law, as it was, will again become the fact in international relations, for the very good reason that International Law is not in principle an artificial structure, but entirely a code of conduct, based upon the exigencies of inter-communion and the lessons they have taught. It is entirely of an advisory nature. International Law does not set penalties, but merely points to correct conduct. No matter what efforts may be made to improve upon that condition, nothing better than what we have now will ever be evolved, because conditions will not be other than what they are, so long as states will continue to apply the principle of sovereignty and look upon each other as equals within their own boundaries and rights.

To set up International Courts of Justice is not feasible, because such sovereign states as would be brought before them can not accept others as their peers without violating their sovereignty themselves. The entire category of cases involving national honor, of which so much was heard in the peace movement which immediately preceded the Great War, belongs to the subject of sovereignty. To enforce the decrees of such courts—in other words, to give International Law the power to punish—is out of the question, therefore. A state or government that may be punished has ceased to be sovereign, if it submits; it ceases to be independent, if it is forced to submit, and it is no longer a member of a league when, in defense of what it conceives to be its honor, it revolts against the decree pronounced and goes to war.

This, then, is the insuperable difficulty—has been the difficulty ever

since within the realm of history nations have tried to preserve the peace by similar measures and methods.

The application of penalties being out of the question, we must needs look for a remedy in another direction, and must find it in suasion.

A Better Base for International Relations

There are not many who will remember that there was such a thing as an Interparliamentary Union. The body was in session a little before the European War broke out. It has not been heard of since, because the rational in all things has had a hard time of it recently. Yet to the Interparliamentary Union we will have to look for the preservation of peace; to it we will have to turn when the moment comes in which the paper houses of the Neo-Idealists and Megalo-Idealists will fall together.

Expanding the principles of the Interparliamentary Union as it was into a system such as it should be, we would find that its general character ought to be more or less this:

(1) Complete independence of the executive branch of the government for each national delegation.

(2) Full mandatory powers for each delegation from the national parliamentary body of which it is and remains a part; the several mandatory powers to be uniform in all respects, and so conferred upon each national delegation that the several mandates would confer full mandatory powers upon the Interparliamentary Union.

(3) All governments to guarantee, by special acts of the several parliaments, if necessary, that at all times, war included, the delegates of the union would enjoy inviolability and complete immunity, whether they belonged to a belligerent state or a neutral one; full inviolability to be given also to the dispatches and mail of the delegates at all times, war included, as well as free transit to and from the seat of the Interparliamentary Union, regardless of war measures affecting other travel.

(4) Immunity from war legislation of any kind passed by the parliament to which the delegation belongs.

(5) Parliaments to be represented, on a census per capita basis, by not less than three nor more than nine delegates, with no delegations from colonial parliaments accepted in cases where the same national element or race is already represented in the Union by the parliament exercising suzerainty in any degree over the colony in question, through the executive branch of the government.

(6) The Interparliamentary Union to be a body of one chamber.

(7) No members of the national parliament to be eligible for service on the interparliamentary delegation if within ten years connected with the

executive branch of their government in any capacity, or known to be personally or through affiliation connected with great financial interests anywhere, the body of the Interparliamentary Union reserving the right to pass upon these requirements.

(8) The Interparliamentary Union to meet once every year in times of peace and to go into session immediately following a declaration of war, and to continue therein until the conclusion of the war.

(9) All participating national parliaments to agree not to ratify peace treaties before these have been reviewed by the Interparliamentary Union; no agreement between belligerents involving in any way the territory of a neutral, or his rights whatsoever, to be considered legal until it has the approval of the Parliamentary Union.

(10) Subject races and racial aggregates under suzerainty of another to have the right to submit to the Interparliamentary Union their grievances, without any obligation upon the Union to act in the premises if it should not deem that necessary.

(11) Duties of the Parliamentary Union:

(a) To reduce International Law to easily recognizable and definitely delimited propositions and terms, so that none of them could be evaded or in spirit violated by an interpretory decree of a belligerent government or governments, leaving it free, however, for belligerent governments to engage in reprisal, within the limits of International Law as then constituted, provided that no neutral interest of any kind is thereby endangered or actually injured. No distinction to be made as to the means of warfare on land and sea, provided they do not affect the welfare of non-combatants who do not venture into a zone of war on land or sea which has been established by the belligerent powers in accord with International Law.

(b) To work for the elimination of situations that might lead to war, by approaching upon this subject the national parliaments concerned, without putting forth coercion in any form.

(c) To discourage armament by approaching the national parliaments.

(d) To promote economic equity through the same channel.

(e) To assist through the same channel in the facilitation of international intercourse, and to see that no discrimination in trade is practiced by the stronger state upon the weaker.

(f) To discourage the conducting of propaganda in favor of war, through the national parliament of the delegation in whose countries that propaganda may be conducted. To encourage by legislation the maintenance abroad of proper and responsible newspaper representation, which in times of war should be so extended by the national parliament that the belligerent, establishing a censorship or interfering otherwise, in any manner, with the flow

of news communication, over telegraph, telephone, radio, cable or mail system, be refused access to the press of the country, no matter what his arguments for the departure from normal conditions might be. No belligerent to be obliged, however, to admit war correspondents or other civilians to his fronts; refusal to admit authorized persons to be followed by the proscription of publishing the official military communiqués of the government concerned.

(12) The Interparliamentary Union not to occupy itself with strictly internal affairs of any of the countries represented or not represented, be these social, economic, political or questions of conscience; no distinctions to be drawn between forms of governments, race or color, or the interests of maritime nations against those of continental nations.

(13) Delegations or delegates to the Interparliamentary Union to enjoy full immunity, but to be subject to the Municipal Laws of the country in which the Union may have its seat, within those guarantees already stated.

(14) Violations of International Law shall, after having been brought to the attention of the offending government for the purpose of securing full adherence to the rules broken, be brought to the attention of each parliament represented in the Union, with such recommendations as the Interparliamentary Union may deem fit to make.

(15) The Interparliamentary Union shall in like manner proceed in case a belligerent changes in any respect the list of Contraband and Non-Contraband the Union has set up, or departs from the rule that "free ships make free goods." Non-Contraband shall in no case be added to Contraband, and Conditional contraband shall be abolished. The furnishing of war material by neutrals to belligerents shall be limited to the normal output of existing plants, and for the supervision of that traffic a neutral commission shall be named. The export of Non-Contraband to belligerents shall also be limited to the normal volume, and shall be supervised in like manner, and war loans made by a neutral shall in no case exceed one-half of the purchase price of the merchandise named.

(16) The care of the citizens and property of one belligerent in the country of another belligerent shall be placed in the hands of a neutral commission to be named by the Interparliamentary Union, as shall be the wounded and prisoners of war, and civilian interned, taken by a belligerent government. The Interparliamentary Union is to supervise the trials of the nationals of a belligerent state in the courts, military and civil, of the enemy.

(17) Sanction of practices contrary to International Law by national parliaments, by refusing to co-operate with the Interparliamentary Union, in the endeavor to effect correction, shall by majority vote lead to the

dismissal from the Interparliamentary Union of the national delegation concerned, the national delegation of the other belligerent, or belligerents, shall not participate either in debate upon the subject or in voting.

(18) The Interparliamentary Union shall have no other punitive power than that which it can exert morally, or that upon which the national parliaments may decide in its support. Before military measures are employed against a state or government for infraction or disregard of the rules of International Law, notice of short duration is to be given. The rights under International Law of a state against whom the Interparliamentary Union shall have invoked military action shall thereby not be invalidated, nor shall the belligerent in whose favor such military action may operate enjoy any other but only the military advantages accruing from the step. No war indemnities of any sort may be collected in such a case without the consent of the Interparliamentary Union.

While the outline here given speaks for itself, it will be necessary to explain why the executive branches of governments are not in any manner represented in the scheme. The purpose of this is to remove from the Interparliamentary Union all show of force and coercion and to place all action which may become necessary in the safeguarding of the law of nations in the hands of the parliaments, and with that so much closer to the people who will have to stand the cost of such action.

The plan also has the advantage of limiting the powers of war of the chief executive, since in the majority of cases then, if not in all, it would be the parliament which would decide whether a *casus belli* had arisen or not, something which the present methods do not permit in any case. Another feature would be that the executive branch of the government would be the servant of the parliament in time of war, instead of being, as now, its master. In times of peace the executive branch of a government remains subject to any national assembly worthy of the name; to bring about a condition in which the same institution would remain amenable to the parliament also in war seems highly desirable in the light of the long siege of parrot-parliamentism the world has just had. Parliaments having to face the possibility of being denied representations in the Interparliamentary Union, seeing, moreover, the possibility of concerted military action against their country, would be loath to sanction in their government the violation of International Law, to guard which is, indeed, the only object of this scheme, though in itself it would be a deterrent to the promoters of war.

The operation of the plan outlined would be such that the sovereignty of the several states would be respected until that moment when it should have been proven that the state concerned did not respect it itself, by

breaking the first rule of the law of nations, that which declares all states wholly independent are sovereign. The scope and *modus operandi* of this plan is such that states backward internally would in affairs of an international character be elevated to the plane of the more progressive nations.

The provisions I have mentioned in regard to the press are very necessary. To exclude from the press all news from a country at war, as soon as a censorship has been established, or other methods of force employed to promote the interest of one belligerent against that of another, becomes not an unfriendly act, as in the past it would have been looked upon, but merely an act of self-preservation so necessary that one must wonder why parliaments have in the past ignored it. News restrictions as practised in times of war are the *sine qua non* of propaganda. To let out only news that is favorable to oneself, and therefore unfavorable to the other belligerent, may in itself be justified, but is subversive of neutral interests.

The neutral has as much a right to self-preservation as the belligerent, and the line of demarkation becomes even clearer when two states have gone to war. In fact, belligerent states should in all cases be put in absolute quarantine and abandoned to themselves, so long as International Law is not broken by them. To have war as terrible as possible, with the noncombatants and neutrals well protected, must be looked upon as the ideal. To the neutral it can make no difference how men kill one another, so long as they confine their efforts to combatants. It being useless to appeal to the sanity of governments at war, their insanity ought to be given the widest field.

The proposition should be fostered that in times of war the rights of the neutral are *always* greater than the rights of belligerents, as in logic they are. If one state selects to pass under the handicaps imposed by declaring war, that is an act of volition of which it must bear the consequences. If another state be unjustly placed under the same disadvantages, that is one of the incidents of national biology which we may regret but can not obviate. Moreover, the cases are rare in which two states went to war with one entirely innocent of wrongdoing. The chances of war will be greatly diminished when once it is understood that the rights of the neutral are and remain greater than those of the belligerent.

There is no moral reason that could prevent a state from placing under the ban all news coming from a country having in operation a censorship or interfering with the news channels in any manner whatsoever. *Ipso facto* such interference is an attempt to further the interests of the belligerent concerned in the country of a neutral. There being no reason why a neutral should permit this, the suppression of such news is not an unfriendly act, but one of self-preservation. Belligerent governments have

no right to make propaganda among neutral peoples, and it can make no difference whether that propaganda is direct or indirect. The publication of official military communiqués should be forbidden, when it is shown that the belligerent is averse to having war correspondents at his fronts. This for the reason that military communiqués present only one side of the case, are not in the least frank or informative, extremely partial, therefore, and, having no news value, must be put in the domain of propaganda. Since the presence of neutral war correspondents could have a salutary effect upon the forces of the belligerents, this measure ought to be enforced from that angle also, provided care was taken to send only men of character and ability on such missions, and not as was the case so often during the Great War, baseball reporters and police court scribes.

The Field of the Interparliamentary Union

The general purpose of the Interparliamentary Union would be to discourage not only the making of war, but to curb the preliminary efforts and cure anterior conditions. For that the executive branch of any government is wholly unsuited. The legislator has usually in mind the blessings of peace, while the government official, no matter how conscientious, is bound to occupy himself a great deal with the alternative of peace—war. The government official at present approaches all international problems from the standpoint that in the end military means will have to be used to settle the issue, while the parliamentarian, knowing that he cannot present a *fait accompli* to the national assembly, would do his best to bring about a settlement on the basis of mutual understanding. In other words the Interparliamentary Union, and such was its original intent, would act upon the executive branches of governments as a check.

The questions that come up between states are far better disposed of in free and open discussion by parliamentary delegates than in the secrecy of Foreign Offices and diplomatic posts. The use of force begets force, and among equals a threat is generally met by a suitable countermeasure, for otherwise they would not remain equals. The equality of states being a fiction—a very necessary hypothesis—which for millenniums man has employed, because nothing better could be found, it will always be necessary to meet it in kind. As abstracts of any sort will do, this one gives excellent results so long as it is not subjected to the test of actuality, as is the case when friendly relations exist between states and when this fiction is respected by the stronger, or at least not openly questioned.

When war comes, the sovereignty of one belligerent is denied by the conduct of the other, while the neutral must continue to recognize the sovereignty of both. But a point may be reached in which the neutral can

no longer do this, and since in such cases the error of the offending state may be based on the natural desire to defend itself with any means, even at the expense of a neutral, a precipitate attack upon the offender would hardly serve the purposes of justice and future peace.

So far as possible this contingency could be cared for in International Law, and the Interparliamentary Union, as guardian of International Law, would be in a position to review such situations, correct the condition, and if necessary apply the preventive measures outlined. There is only one force that can rein governments at war, and that is world public opinion. Only an Interparliamentary Union with the mandate and duties outlined here can make world public opinion articulate, and the press measures to which I referred would serve to make world public opinion much more unbiased than it has been in the past, especially during the Great War.

The opinion of the world public is useless so long as it is not based on knowledge of the actual facts, and is not contaminated by propaganda of the belligerents, or corrupted by the direct and indirect control of the press by its government. It becomes then a thing which is an emotion rather than an opinion, and in emotion the end justifies the means always without exceptions.

As the great Disraeli once put it, there are lies and lies and *statistics*; in times of war governments peddle, as I have shown in sufficiency, I think, lies and lies and *facts*. The entire gamut of atrocities is a tissue of falsehood with a few facts to substantiate the sorry mess of the propaganda writers. I have yet to meet the propagandist who would not admit privately that the excesses on any front were due to the fact that in such large levies of men as were made during the Great War, the criminal and potential criminal would get into the army together with the men for whom governments do not have to maintain in peace: Police forces, jails, courts, penitentiaries, gallows, reformatories and asylums for the insane.

Governments, being the very incarnation of inconsistency, at any time, will plead that point when charges are made against their forces, but will totally overlook it when making such charges against the adversary. The "Captain Fryatt" and "Edith Cavell" cases on the debit side of the Allies' ledger did not come to the notice of the public of the United States because Great Britain and France controlled the cables. Such cases as the "Baralong" affair and the execution of alleged spies by the British and French military authorities, balance, if not outbalance, the murder of Captain Fryatt and Miss Cavell. In the department of humanities, the Interparliamentary Union could become a veritable savior of mankind, and in becoming that it would delete whole chapters of propaganda—make propaganda in times of war impossible in fact, by taking from it the

means that serve to inflame a neutral public whose interest lies never in participating in a war but in keeping out of it, no matter what arguments the Neo-Idealist and Megalo-Idealist may put up.

The man who goes to war is *always* wrong.

Why Diplomacy Should Get Its Passport

I cannot well close this book without saying something more of diplomacy and those who practice it. "Open covenant, openly arrived at" is, indeed, a happy prospect. But how will such covenants remain open, so long as there is nobody that will take them into keeping and see to it that the selfsame covenant remains confined to its original objectives. When governments are permitted to define their treaties and such, all things are possible, so long as words have synonyms, and ideas are capable of being sub-divided. So long as there is diplomacy of the brand I have described with all fairness and with all accuracy, so long will "open covenants, openly arrived at" be subject to modification by diplomacy. The *art of negotiation* is the exercise of minds striving for something of an advantageous nature.

Trickery and deception are incident to all bargaining, taking the least objectionable form in the feigned indifference of the would-be buyer and the simulated unconcern of the would-be seller. It is so in diplomacy, with the result that many of the bargains made, treaties and conventions, are later regretted by one of the contracting parties. There either was no meeting of the minds, or none was sought, or, again, in the course of a few years the complexion of things may have changed so that to live up to the bargain comes to be thought an injustice. Life is a thing in flux with the individual and groups, and for that reason no treaty looks the morning after as good as it did on the day on which it was made.

The present modus of international diplomatic relations is unsuited enough when considered merely from that angle—the angle of honesty let us call it. When to these natural limitations there is added ulterior motive and designs arising from the dictates of the hour, when thereto is joined the factor of human error, and the noxious elements of personal ambition by the diplomatic arriviste, the incompetency of "occasional" diplomatists, the idiosyncrasies of ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary whose nerves have been wrecked, the foibles of the Neo-Idealist, and the grandiose plans of Megalo-Idealists, then mankind, indeed, is in a bad way. The establishment of such an institution as I have referred to above, an Interparliamentary Union, composed of men bent upon peace by the very nature of their duties, becomes the paramount obligation of

all those who see the future of man in terms of evolution rather than revolution.

The spectacle of seeing diplomatists and governments trifle with such things as Bolshevism in order that their military plans may be successful is nauseating, to say the least. Yet that was done. What the quality of government may be is best adjudged by the fact that governments at war use machine guns on their own unruly elements, while in the country of the opponent they foster that very thing by "literature" delivered from aeroplanes. In Turkey a whole race was driven to the brink of oblivion by the agents of governments who thought it a great military advantage to have the Armenians rise in rebellion at a time when the Ottoman army was engaged otherwise. That this was not to the interest of the Armenians was known in London and Paris, but it was to the "public interest" of the Entente governments.

Such are the forms diplomacy may assume. The public learns of them when it is too late, and when in the current of life it has drifted to other matters.

I have dealt very charitably with diplomatists, leaving the list of their failings and crimes incomplete, because I felt that the very purpose of this book might be defeated if I overcrowded it with evidence that man has been living in a fool's paradise, with statesmen and diplomatists as gatekeepers, and censorship and the like an insurmountable stockade.

I could picture, for instance, how one diplomatist succeeded his predecessor to the extent that even the *maitresse* was taken over. There was a diplomatist who supplied the ambassador of his government's enemy with important military information, in order that the latter might not lose the War. In another case it was proven that members of a diplomatic post fostered white slave traffic. Another diplomatist was the paramour of a red-headed Polish countess of most pleasing appearance, and, in addition to the confidences of love, exchanged those of the state. Still another made himself the laughing stock in a *maison de plaisir*. There was a minister who used to shock certain circles by preaching prohibition with a breath that reeked of alcohol, and there was another diplomatist who one day informed a citizen at his post that he would set his house afire in case he did not stop criticizing His High-Mightiness, the same ambassador. The citizen went and filed a complaint in court, and the government concerned thought it proper to inform the diplomatist that arson was a crime even in Berlin, and that it was not included regularly under the caption: Diplomatic inviolability and privileges.

There is one more episode I must place on record.

A certain diplomatist was known as a man fond of distinctions and

decorations. There was one (I refrain from giving the name of the order, lest it lead to the identification of the man) he wanted particularly. It was a so-called "*grand étoile*" of a little kingdom, and quite a pretty bauble. Hints that the order be conferred upon the diplomatist had never brought the decoration nearer.

So the man decided to get it through the next diplomatic courier bound for a certain well-known large capital. The courier did as directed. He called on the prominent jeweler, but was told that right now this decoration was not in stock, the last specimen having been sold to the Khedive of Egypt, upon whom the government of the small kingdom had conferred the order without putting real diamonds into it. Would the courier place an order? The man did not know what to do and decided to consult his *chef de mission* again before buying the thing for him.

A little later the same diplomatist called into his sanctuary one of his men servants, giving him instructions to go to a jeweler dealing in decorations and such, and buy a certain order—one of the highest class—which nobody had conferred upon him.

The servant did as directed, and very soon returned with the "great cross."

Quite satisfied with the thing, the diplomatist asked the servant to pin the decoration where usually it was worn. The two men stepped before a mirror, and within a few moments the diplomatist had the great satisfaction of being actually decorated, though by the servant, albeit.

Servant and master were on close terms, though not of the same nationality, and for the space of minutes the diplomatist thought nothing of preening himself before the mirror and the servant in joyful anticipation of what friends would say when he appeared before them with this *mark of great distinction*.

If the public is willing to rest in the hands of such men its weal in peace and war, then, I have nothing more to say, except that it does seem foolish to expect the services of a surgeon from a butcher.

The Fourteen Points and What Became of Them

I have hewn straight to the line and have gone to the core of things, influenced by neither the views nor wishes of the few remaining frenzied patriots. The result has been a fairly complete political history of the Great War—a true history for the reason that it does not confound causes with pretexts, or judge men by their own words or those of their friends.

In an event as great as this it is not always easy to remain the calm referee. In the first place the governments are against anybody remaining

calm and thus find the opportunity to smile now and then at the man who transiently in power deports himself as though he were Caesar not only of his own for all time, but of the Universe forever, or at the man who, mistaking his own brain as the seat of all *causa movens*, will later emerge from the passion-begotten and emotion-fostered bedlam of war as the weak tool in the hands of others—at best a sort of master puppet.

What has been gained by this war? Let us, for a moment, look at the thing from the angle of the Fourteen Points, a sort of vague platform upon which Mr. Wilson entered the Great Adventure. To say that none of the Fourteen Points was carried through is not correct. In fact several of the points were applied. But they would have been applied even if Mr. Wilson had not come out for them. Point VI will ultimately find such application as the Russians can give it. That Belgium ought to be restored went without saying long before Mr. Wilson in the fall of 1914 refused to receive a delegation of Belgians that was to interest him in the fate of their country. Point VII was superfluous, therefore. It would seem that the question of Alsace-Lorraine did not concern the President of the United States except as a pretext for war, and it would seem further that the people of Alsace-Lorraine do not look upon the occupation of their country by France as an unmixed blessing—at least the Germanic element in the country is not satisfied with the conduct of the French. They now want autonomy. That much for Point VIII.

Concerning Point IX it must be said that there is now more *irredenta* in Italy than there was ever in Austria-Hungary. Hundreds of thousands of Germans and Slavs have been handed over to the Italians, and these people will in the future do what the Italians in the former Danube Monarchy have done in the past—work for their liberation. Point X was another paragraph Mr. Wilson could have left out of his list of pretexts, and Point XI is excellent reading and nothing more. If Mr. Wilson thinks that a platitude such as this would settle anything in the Balkans, he knows of the Balkans just as much as would any spectator to "The Chocolate Soldier." It is evident that Mr. Wilson is not qualified to speak of the Ottoman empire—that he was not qualified is shown by the fact that the British have taken this matter out of his hands, and so Point XII vanishes. What good Point XIII has done the Poles is hard to see, since their independence was decided upon long before Mr. Wilson was heard on the subject. As to Point XIV—it would seem that even the Senate of the United States does not want "*a general association of nations . . . under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.*"

Points VI to XIV were either buncombe or when not that, the mere

reverberation of some Entente policy. The true Wilsonian points are Points I to V. We know what has become of *open covenants of peace, openly arrived at*; we know all about *absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas*; we know about *the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace*; we know further how *adequate guarantees* (were) *given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety*; and finally we know very well there was *a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims*—to Great Britain. To that country, having already too many colonies, were given the German colonies, the colonies of a people that needed room more than any other. But, then, do not let us forget that this war came to be in the end a measure for the artificial and forced limitation of German growth in everything, population included.

So much for the Fourteen Points. They fared at the hands of the British and French as did the Alexandrian library at the hands of the Saracenes. The invaders burned that most wonderful collection of wisdom on the principle that whatever there was good in it was already in the Koran, and whatever there was in it that was not in the Koran ought to be destroyed anyway.

Of course, the Fourteen Points had their uses, and having them they were tolerated, and even used, by the Allies for a time. It was upon the Fourteen Points and its promises that the German people finally turned against its government, and went to Mr. Wilson like a new Messiah. Mr. Wilson had said that he had no grudge against the German people. He was against the Kaiser. Mr. Wilson had let it be understood that he would allow none to be hard on the German people. But the Kaiser would have to go. The Kaiser went in a manner that will do him no credit with the historian. And when the Kaiser was gone, Germany collapsed in the manner of the Inca State. The parallel is striking. Two manarchic absolutisms resting upon state socialism come to end by the single blow of ruthless adventurers—two *conquistadores*, the one using the sword and deception, as was opportune among a people like the Peruvians, the other using deception and the sword, as conditions in Germany required. In all faith, only a person of the lowest scrupulosity would have promised so much and given as little as did the author of the Fourteen Points.

The Hohenzollern made his exit as ingloriously as the last of the Incas—in fact the Son of the Sun did much better. And after that the German people was to discover that the promises of the Fourteen Points were chaff and not the grain they had looked for, especially after a gang of political opportunists of the Erzberger and Bauer types had shown its readiness to sign anything that was put before them.

The Peace negotiations being entirely under the influence of the British and French, results could not be other than they are. The British added to their holdings every German colony of importance, made sure of their grip upon Egypt, gained control of most of Southwest Asia and sat themselves more securely than ever on the shores of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. Quite incidentally, of course, their peculiar brand of Maritime Law was humbly acknowledged to be the proper one by the Paris Peace Conference. Today, more than ever before, Britannia rules the waves—her rule on land and sea, in fact, is absolute.

Of course, the French gained something also. Alsace-Lorraine, for example, and the prospect of a large indemnity, with all sorts of domestic animals and implements, and such, thrown in. At no Peace Conference was business instinct so displayed and exercised. And there was occasion for this. The French felt that this might be their last opportunity to impose upon the Germans their will.

It is as hard to say what will be tomorrow in the life of nations as it is to predict anything for the individual, especially if both are not in the best of health. And France is not in the best of health. Though the Great War has shown that her men are still able to fight as valiantly as of yore, the fact is that they and their women have lost interest in propagation. It is *à la mode* in France to have one or two children so that it or they may not have the hard struggle the parents had. The sensible human being can not but sympathize with such a policy, and in ages to come that policy will be generally adopted. But right now it is a case of France with her declining birth rate, and Germany with a most prolific population, trying to get along with one another.

Such being the case, M. Clemenceau and his associates tried to give France a sort of life insurance by hamstringing the Germans for decades. It remains to be seen whether so artificial a means can influence for long so natural a force. In 1870 there was between the two peoples a numerical difference of only three millions. Since then the 39 million Germans have increased to about 69 millions in Germany, while the French number not quite 40 millions. In addition to that about 12 million Germans emigrated, so that with their offspring the Germans since 1870 have increased to about 90 millions, while the French within the same period grew in number to about 45 millions, emigration to the French colonies and elsewhere included. It is hard to see how a population like the French, given to love of comfort and great providence can in the end exist beside a nation like the German, ready to get along with what it has, but not averse to taking what it needs. Of course, it can be done. But needless to say, if it is done, the chauvinist and jingo will not be responsible for a change in that policy which for centuries has led to wars between the two peoples. It would

be well for some to remember that a swash-buckling Frenchman is no more lovely a spectacle than a sabre-rattling Prussian, and that much which is said concerning *la gr-r-r-rande nation* is *gasconnade* pure and simple. It should be borne in mind by all concerned that the next time it may be different, and that it is best not to have a next time.


The Great War has shown in every quarter how absolute a master government may become. Parliaments everywhere became phonographic records of the Master's voice sort; every executive an autocrat. And it will take some time before the effect of this is totally eliminated.

L'appétit vient en mangeant.

It is time that the several publics leading the human procession returned to a more decent conception of government—the principle that government does not exist for the sake of those who form it—the politician unable or unwilling to make a living in some other way. Government has in all of the warring countries doubled and trebled, and the sooner a general lopping off of these parasites sets in the better it will be. The public everywhere should come to realize that government in a free community can never be more than the means of administering those affairs of the body politic which it cannot manage itself.

The ideal state is the one in which no government is needed. Let us get as close to the ideal state as possible by putting our affairs in such shape, and conducting ourselves so well, that we can get along with the very minimum in government. Unfortunate indeed is the people whose public administration intrudes as much into private life as government has done everywhere in the last five years—even in these supposedly free United States. Government by inspection and coercion has been the rule everywhere, while the blatant heads thereof announced that they intended making this world safe for democracy. A return to common sense on the part of everybody is the only thing that will save mankind from becoming as erratic as some of its leaders have become. It were well for all to remember that civilization is a matter of restraint and not an orgy in holding much and wanting more.

THE END.



APPENDIX

A

Treaty of Alliance of 1279 B. C.

I APPEND here the text of the oldest treaty extant *in toto* to afford such comparisons as the reader may wish to make.

The date of the treaty is Tybi, 21, xxi, in the reign of Rameses II, Pharaoh of Egypt, or November 28th, 1279 B. C. Rameses II is one of the high-contracting parties, and Kheta-sar, king of the Hittites, represented by ambassadors Tarte-sebu and Rames, is the other. The "anu" or treaty was engraved upon tablets of silver and in this manner exchange of the copies was effected.

"In the city of Pa-Ramessu-mery-Amen, Tybi 21, xxi.

"The ordinance made by the great chief of Kheta, Kheta-sar the mighty; the son of Marsar, the great chief of the Kheta, the mighty; the son of Saparuru, the great chief of the Kheta, the mighty; on a declaration tablet of silver, to Ra-usermaat, the great prince of Egypt, the mighty; the son of Ra-men-maat, the great prince of Egypt, the mighty; the son of the son of Ra-men-peh, the great prince of Egypt, the mighty.

"The good ordinances of peace and of the brotherhood, giving peace . . . (are to last) eternally, even from the beginning to the end eternally, even the agreement of the great prince of Egypt with the great prince of Kheta; may God grant that there shall never come enmity between them, according to the ordinances.

"Now, in times past Mauthnuro, my brother, fought with (Rameses II) great prince of Egypt. But now and hereafter, beginning from this day, behold Kheta-sar, the great chief of the Kheta, ordains to affirm the decree made by Ra and made by Sutekh, of the land of Egypt, and the land of Kheta [the supreme deities] to prevent the coming of enmities forever.

"Kheta-sar agrees with Ramessu that there shall be good peace and brotherhood between them forever. He shall fraternize with me and be at peace, and I shall fraternize with him and be at peace, forever.

"After the time of Mauthnuro, after he was killed, Kheta-sar sat himself, as the great prince of the Kheta, on the throne of his father. Behold after it there is peace and brotherhood, better than the peace and the brotherhood that was before in the land.

"The chief of the Kheta will be with Ramessu in good peace and in good fellowship. The children of the children of the chief shall fraternize peacefully with the sons of the sons of Ramessu.

"By our brotherhood and agreement . . . (the land of Egypt shall be) with the land of Kheta in peace and brotherhood altogether forever. Never shall enmity come to separate them, forever.

"Never shall the chief of the Kheta make an invasion of the land of Egypt, forever, to carry off anything from it.

"Never shall Ramessu make an invasion of the land of the Kheta to carry off anything from it, forever.

"Now the equitable treaty which remained from the time of Saparuru, likewise the equitable treaty which remained from the time of Mauthnuro . . . (Massar?) my father, I will fulfill it. Behold Ramessu will fulfill . . . (it, and we agree) with one another together, beginning in this day, we will fulfill it, performing it in an equitable manner.

"Now, if an enemy shall come to the land of Ramessu, let him send a message to the chief of the Kheta to say: 'Come to me with forces against him,' and the chief of the Kheta shall come to smite his enemies. But if the chief has never a heart to march, he shall send his soldiers and his chariots to smite the enemy or Ramessu will be angry. Or if the servants of the gates (the frontier

tribes) shall make a raid on him, and he shall go to smite them, the chief of the Kheta shall act with the prince of Egypt."

Here follows a reciprocal clause obliging the prince of Egypt to do the same if the chief of the Kheta sends a call for help.

"If there be one from the city, if there be one from the pastures, if there be one from the . . . (desert?) of the land of Ramessu, and they shall come to the chief of the Kheta, never shall the chief receive them, but shall give them back to Ramessu; if there be one of the people, or if there be two of the people who, unknown, shall come to the land of the Kheta to do service for another, never shall they be allowed to stay in the land of the Kheta, but shall be returned to Ramessu, or if there be one great man coming to the land of the Kheta, he shall be returned to Ramessu."

This earliest known instance of preventing transfer of allegiance is reciprocal in the same terms.

"These words which are upon the declaration tablet of silver of the land of the Kheta and of the land of Egypt, whoever shall not keep them may the thousand gods of the Kheta, along with the thousand gods of Egypt, bring to ruin his house, his lands, and his servants. But whoever shall keep these words, may the thousand gods of the Kheta, along with the thousand gods of the land of Egypt, give health to him, give life to him, with his house, with his lands and with his servants.

"If there shall flee one of the people of the land of Egypt, if there be two, if there be three, and come to the chief of the Kheta, he shall take them and send them back to Ramessu. And any of the people who are taken and sent back to Ramessu, let it not be that his criminal action is raised against him, in giving to destruction his house, his wives, or his children, on in slaying him, or in removing his eyes, or his ears, or his mouth [tongue] or his feet, and he shall not have any criminal action raised against him."

This agreement of extradition, for the times unusually high-minded, is reciprocally stated also, in minute similarity of terms.

"That which is on this tablet of silver, on the front side, is the engraved image of Sutekh, embracing the great chief of the Kheta, around it are the words, saying: 'The seal of Sutekh, the prince of heaven, the seal of ordinance by Kheta-sar, the great chief of the Kheta, the mighty; the son of Marsar, the great chief of the Kheta, the mighty.'

"That which is within the surrounding engraving is the seal of Sutekh, the prince of heaven.

"That which on this side is engraved, is the image of the god of the Kheta, embracing the figure of the great queen of the Kheta; around it are the words, saying: 'The seal of the sun of the city of Aranna, the lord of the land, the seal of Puukhipa, the great queen of the land of the Kheta, the daughter of the land of Quiza . . . (Nadanna, queen of) Aranna, the mistress of the land, the servant of the goddess.'

"That which is within the surrounding engraving is the seal of the sun of Aranna, the lord of all the land."

The texts of the older treaties referred to are unknown. The agreements, however, seem to have been made between Marsar of Kheta and Sety I of Egypt, and Saparuru of Kheta and Horemheb of Egypt. To make this treaty all the more binding, Kheta-sar seems to have given in marriage to Rameses II a daughter, named Neferu-ra, according to a stèle found at Abu-Simbel. The lady was the favorite wife of Rameses and appears with him on all his monuments.

The many "forevers" of the treaty became no forever, of course. An inscription at Medinet Habu, shows Rameses III (1202-1170) receiving the hands of slain Hittites, and the text claims that the chief of the Kheta had formed a coalition of the people of Northern Syria against the Egyptians. In the course of time the international policies of Kheta and Egypt had undergone changes, and so it came that the terms of the Treaty of Pa-Ramessu-mery-Amen, November 28th, 1279 B. C. had lost their value and binding force.

Centuries later the wrath of the thousand gods of the Kheta and the thousand gods of the Egyptians did indeed descend upon both peoples, but it would not seem reasonable to assume that the invocation of the "anu" had anything to do with that, or that the Persians had been selected as the means of punishment by the princes of heaven.

B

The Battle of Kadesh

(After M. Champollion's Translation of the Original Hieroglyphic Text.)

BY way of introducing this very interesting but hardly known document from Old Egypt, I wish to say that I have been unable to establish beyond all cavil whether the Battle of Kadesh preceded the peace treaty just given and discussed, or terminated it, in which event we must take it for granted that Rameses II did not have enough time, before his death, to change the inscriptions and reliefs that dealt with things related to the land and the princes of the Kheta. One thing alone is certain, the Rameses of the Peace Treaty is the Rameses of the account of the Battle of Kadesh, and when I take pains to refer to it, I do so with regret, since in treating "The Battle of Kadesh" I will have to seem disrespectful to one of the great figures in the story of mankind, for such Rameses II undoubtedly is. But I would warn the reader not to forget that of yore, as today, even the honest and righteous among the great were often obliged to take recourse to trickery and charlatanisms in order to secure their positions for the very benefit of those against whose will and for whose good the position had to be held. The phrase is a little involved, to be sure, but nothing will be lost by thinking it over.

The old papyrus reads as follows:

The ninth day of the third month of the season *shemu** in the fifth year of the reign of Horus-Ra, THE MIGHTY BULL, BELOVED OF MAAT, the king of the North and South, USER-MAAT-RA-SETEP-EN-RA, the son of the Sun, RAMESES BELOVED OF AMEN, the giver of life forever.

Behold now, his Majesty was in the country of Tchah on his second expedition of victory. A good look-out [was kept]** in life, strength and health, in the camp of his Majesty on the southern side of the city of Kadesh. His Majesty rose up like Ra and put on the ornaments of the god Menthu, and the lord continued on his journey and arrived at the southern border of the city of Shabtun. And two members of the Shasu people came and spoke to his Majesty, saying:

"Our brethren, who are among the chiefs of the tribes who are in league with the abominable prince of the Kheta, have made us come to his Majesty to say: 'We are [ready] to render service to Pharaoh (life, health and strength!) and they have broken with the abominable prince of the Kheta. Now the abominable prince of the Kheta is encamped in the land of Aleppo, to the north of the country of Tunep, and he is afraid to advance, because of Pharaoh (life, health and strength!).'"

In this wise did the Shasu speak, but they spoke to his Majesty lying words, for the abominable prince of the Kheta had made them come to spy out the place where his Majesty was, so that he might not be able to arrange his forces in a proper way to do battle with the abominable prince of the Kheta.†

And behold, the abominable chief of the Kheta had come together with

* Which is summer.

** Matter in brackets shows where original text imperfect or damaged, necessitating an interpolation to connect or complete contents. Matter in parentheses was so treated in original text.

† A very fine piece of *after-the-fact* writing, but a little too obvious since the spying out of the place could not in any manner interfere with the arranging of troops by the Pharaoh. Still, in our own days, the propagandists of governments have expected no less of the gullible public.

the chiefs of every district, and with the footmen, and with the cavalry whom he had brought with him in mighty numbers, and they stood ready to fight, drawn up in ambush behind the **abominable** city of Kadesh, his Majesty having no knowledge whatsoever of these plans.*

So his Majesty marched on and arrived at the north-east side of the **abominable** city of Kadesh, and then he and his troops encamped. Now his Majesty was sitting on his **smu** metal throne when two of the spies who were in the service of his Majesty brought in two spies of the **abominable** chief of the Kheta, and when they had been led into his presence his Majesty said to them:

"Who and what are ye?"

And they replied:

"We belong to the **abominable** prince of the Kheta, who made us come to see where his Majesty was!"

His Majesty said to them:

"Where is the **abominable** chief of the Kheta? Verily, I have heard that he is in the country of Aleppo!"

They replied:

"Behold, the **abominable** chief of the Kheta standeth [ready] and multitudes [of the peoples] of the district are with him; he has brought them with him in vast numbers from all the provinces of the country of the Kheta, and from the country of Mesopotamia, and from the whole country of Qetti. They are provided with footmen and with cavalry fully equipped, and they are like the sand of the sea shore for multitude;** and behold, they are drawn up in fighting order but are concealed behind the **abominable** city of Kadesh."

Then his Majesty caused his chief officers to be called into his presence that he might make them know every matter which the two spies of the **abominable** prince of the Kheta who had been before him had spoken. And his Majesty spake unto them, saying:

"Enquire into the actions of the officers of the peoples and of the chiefs of the districts where Pharaoh (life, health and strength!) is [encamped]." †

They did so and reported to Pharaoh, (life, health and strength!) that the **abominable** chief of the Kheta was in the land of Aleppo, whither he had to flee before his Majesty as soon as he had heard the report of him, and that, indeed, [the officers and chiefs] should have reported these things correctly to his Majesty, [and his Majesty replied:]

"See now what I have made you to know at this time through the two spies of the country of the Kheta, namely that the **abominable** chief of the Kheta hath come together with [the peoples of] a multitude of countries, and with men and with horses, like the sand for multitude, and that they are standing behind the **abominable** city of Kadesh; is it possible that the officers of the districts and the princes of the country wherein Pharaoh (life, health and strength!) now is—under whose direction the district is—did not know this?" ‡

Now when these things had been said to them, the officers who were in the presence of his Majesty admitted that the officers of the country and the princes of Pharaoh (life, health and strength!) had committed a gross breach

* Rather naive, to be sure! Though Rameses II is the invader it is *abominable* on the part of the prince of Kheta to take the necessary military measures without taking the Pharaoh into his confidence. And still, quite recently we have seen the same views expressed, with the difference that we did not stop with the use of the word *abominable*, but went much further, which may be due to the fact that in our days writing and printing is so much easier, and the violation of all rules of decency so much facilitated thereby.

** The words are laid in the mouth of the two spies by either a propagandist of the Royal Egyptian Government, or by the press agent of His Majesty, Rameses II.

† Reminds somewhat of the proposed trial of former Emperor William II and many of his officers and subjects.

‡ Rameses II must have been a very patient man, if he clothed his opinion in such temperate words. It would seem that we deal instead with a convenient method of reminding the reader that his Majesty had a poor general staff and was opposed by an army as multitudinous as the sands of the sea shore. Accomplishing so much with so little would leave to Rameses II so much more glory. It's an old ruse!

of duty in not reporting to them the various places to which the **abominable** chief of the Kheta had marched.*

And it came to pass that when they had spoken, his Majesty issued an order for the officers who were in charge of the troops that were marching to the south of Shabtun to bring their troops as rapidly as possible to the place where his Majesty was. Now whilst his sacred Majesty was sitting and talking with his officers, the **abominable** prince of the Kheta came together with his footmen and cavalry, and the multitudes of peoples who were with him, and they crossed over the canal at the south of Kadesh and came upon the soldiers of his Majesty who were marching along in ignorance of what was happening. †

Then the footmen and cavalry of his Majesty lost their courage and rushed on headlong to where his Majesty was, and the troops of the **abominable** prince of the Kheta surrounded the servants who were around his Majesty. When his Majesty saw them he raged at them like his father Menthu, the lord of Thebes, and, putting on his armor and seizing a spear, like the god Baru in his moment, he mounted his horse and dashed forward alone among the troops of the **abominable** prince of the Kheta and among the multitudes which he had with him.** His Majesty, like the most mighty god Sutekh, made slaughter among them, and he cut them down dead into the waters of the Orontes. ††

[He saith:]

"I conquered all countries. I was quite alone, my footmen and cavalry had forsaken me, and no man among them dared to come back [to save] my life. But Ra loved me, and my father Tmu had a favor for me, and everything which my Majesty hath said I performed in very truth before my footmen and my cavalry." †

* We may easily agree with this. The intelligence service of Rameses II was not the best, evidently. But it would seem that the writer dwells too purposely on this, in order to prepare us for the great heroics that are to come.

† It is hardly true that these troops were in ignorance of what was happening, even if they are not the force which Rameses II had ordered to come to his headquarters. It is well-known that the Egyptian military system of that period was a very good one, and the great value of flankers, vanguard and rearguard was even then very generally understood. We deal here entirely with a very tendentious account of something which may or which may not have taken place.

** The royal press agents of Old all had the fine habit of having their masters *sit* at leisure, with their wives and concubines, when not with their general staff members, as the hostile army swoops down upon the camp. Naturally, the king, thus taken advantage of, had to lose more time putting on his armor—which, by the way, was usually a matter of at least two minutes.

†† A very *fishy* account, begging the pardon of the reader for this use of slang. His Majesty *alone* does all these things. No doubt, the Hittite troops allowed him to cut them down without lifting even a little finger in self-defense.

† An account of what actually took place is not to be had, of course. Be that as it may, his Majesty did draw the long bow—and usually he is pictured that way, standing in his chariot and pointing the arrow over the heads of his prancing horses. I am sure, the shades of Rameses II, together with the *Kha* of his soul, will forgive me, if I say that this may be literature, but is not history. But it was ever thus. One does not have to be omniscient to feel that usually there is too much literature in what purports to be history, especially such history as was peddled by George Creel, the Pelmanite, formerly in charge of the United States Bureau of "Information." And who, RAMESSES BELOVED OF AMEN, doubted all this so that thou hadst to call upon thine footmen and cavalry to vouch for thee? Was it thine own guilty *Kha*? At that we sympathize with thee, as we should, seeing that we have come to pass judgment upon the words of a mighty king, son of the Sun, in an age in which the *office* is one thing and the *man* another. Incidentally, some credit had to be given the Gods.

C

"League of Peace" of 1518-19 A. D.

FOR the purpose of combating the Turk it was decided in 1518, at the conclusion of the Franco-British wars of the period, to form what we in our days would style a "League of Nations." The contracting parties were the Pope, the Emperor Elect of the Holy Roman Empire (Germany and Austria), the King of France, the King of Spain and the King of England. Before the treaty was ratified, Pope Leo X, and King Charles of Spain, were grown lukewarm toward it, the former because he was "deeply mortified that the office of mediator and peace maker had thus passed from the Holy See to the chancellor of England," Lord Thomas Wolsey.

Of the treaty, which was a dead letter within two years, only the relevant parts are here given:

"2. As far as the defense of the Christian Church and the Pope, or of the states and possessions of any one of the contracting princes is concerned, all the members of the league are to be "friends of the friends and foes of the foes" of any one of them.

"If any one of the contracting parties or of those who are included in this treaty attacks, invades or does any other injury to the states, dominions, towns, castles, etc. of any other member of this league, or any prince who is included in this treaty, the injured party is at liberty to require by letters patent the aid of all the other contracting parties. Those who are thus requested are bound, together with the injured party, to send letters and ambassadors to the aggressor or aggressors, asking him or them to desist from further hostilities, and to make full reparation.

"If the aggressor or aggressors continue, or continue his or their hostilities in spite of this exhortation to maintain peace, or if he or they refuses or refuse to make full reparation, all the other confederates are bound to declare war with the aggressor or the aggressors within one month after being summoned to do so. Within two months after the declaration of war, they are to begin actual hostilities by attacking or invading the dominions of the aggressor or aggressors with an army strong enough to conquer the enemy. Every one of the contracting parties is bound to pay his own expenses."

It seems proper to draw attention here to the fact that the "one month" and "two months" terms were necessitated by the absence in those days of rapid communication and transportation.

The treaty continues:

"12. All former treaties remain in full force, except in so far as they are in contradiction to this treaty.

"13. All Christian princes are at liberty to declare, within the space of eight months, their intention to become members of this league, in which case the principal contracting parties are bound to accept them and to defend them, at the expense, however, of the party asking to be assisted.

"14. The Kings of France and of England, who are the originators of this league, bind themselves toward one another that, if either of them be invaded or attacked by any Prince or Power, the other will lead in person the army which is to assist the attacked prince. Even if none of the other Christian princes should become members of the league, it is to remain in full force so far as England and France are concerned."

Article one of the treaty is the preamble, declaring that the league, which is referred to as "holy," is to combat the "tyrant of the Turk," and that the immediate aim of the treaty is the establishment of a general peace in the Christian world, and that good will is to be maintained among the members of the league. The other articles of the treaty apportion the military and naval obligations of the several contracting parties, deal with the conduct to be observed in case of rebellion by subjects against their governments, fix the status of troops marching through the territory of a confederate, and are generally uninteresting.

D

The Entento-Italian Agreement of 1915

AS an instance of what "secret treaties" of the annexation type are, I will reproduce here the agreement made between the British, French and Russian governments, on the one hand, and the Italian government, on the other.

"The Italian ambassador, Marquis Imperiali, under instructions of his government, has the honor to deliver to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sr. E. Grey, the French ambassador and the Russian ambassador, Count Benckendorf, the following memorandum:

2. On her side Italy obligates herself, with all the forces at her command, to enter into the campaign in combination with France, Russia and Great Britain, against all of the governments at war with them.
4. Under the imminent treaty of peace Italy must receive: The District of Trentino; the entire Southern Tyrol to her natural geographic boundary, the River Brenner; the city and suburbs of Trieste, Goritzia, and Gradisca, all of Istria to Quarnero, including Volosca, and the Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussino, and also the smaller islands of Plavnik, Unia, Canidole, Palazuolo, San Pietro dei Nemi, Azinelli, Grutzo, together with the neighboring islands.
5. In the same manner Italy is to receive the province of Dalmatia in its present form, with the inclusion within its limits on the north of Lissariki and Trebino, and on the south of all lands to a line drawn at Cape Planca to the east along the water-shed in such a manner that in the Italian domains shall be included all the valleys along the rivers flowing into Sebiniko, such as Chicolo, Kerka, and Butisnitza, with all their tributaries. In the same way Italy is to receive all the islands located to the north and west of the shores of Dalmatia, beginning with the islands Premua, Selva, Ulbo, Skerd, Maon, Pago, and Punta-dura, and further to the north, and to Meled on the south, with inclusion therein of the islands of St. Andrew, Buzzi, Lissa, Lessino, Tercola, Curzola, Kaisa, and Lagosta, with all the islands and bluffs belonging to them, but without the islands of Zirona, Bua, Satti and Brazza.
6. Italy shall receive in full right Vallona, the islands of Sasseno, and a territory sufficiently extensive to safeguard them in a military way, approximately between the river Voyuss on the north and the east, and to the boundaries of the Schimar district to the south.
7. On receiving Trentino and Istria in accordance with Article 4, of Dalmatia and the Adriatic Islands in accordance with Article 5, and the Bay of Vallona, Italy is obligated in the event of the formation of Albania of a small autonomous neutralized state, not to oppose the possible desire of France, Great Britain and Russia to redistribute among Montenegro, Serbia and Greece of the northern and southern districts of Albania. The southern shore of Albania from the boundary of the Italian district of Vallona to the Cape of Stilos is subject to neutralization. Italy shall have the right to conduct the foreign relations of Albania. In any event Italy obligates herself to leave certain territory sufficiently extensive for Albania, in order that the boundaries of the latter are contiguous from Lake Ochrida, to the boundaries of Greece and Serbia.
8. Italy is to receive in full right all the islands now occupied by her at Dodekez.
9. France, Great Britain and Russia in principle recognize the interests of Italy, in preserving the political balance in the Mediterranean Sea, and her

- right to receive on the division of Turkey an equal share with them in the basin of the Mediterranean, and more specifically in that part of it contiguous to the province of Adalia, where Italy has already obtained special rights and has developed certain interests vouchsafed to her by the Italo-British agreement. The zone subject to transfer to the sovereignty of Italy will be more specifically defined in due time and in correspondence with the vital interests of France and Great Britain. Likewise, the interests of Italy must be taken into consideration, even in the event that the territorial inviolability of Asiatic Turkey shall be sustained by the Powers for a further period of time, and if only redistribution of spheres of influence is to take place. Should France, Great Britain and Russia, in the course of the present war occupy certain districts of Asiatic Turkey, the entire district adjacent to Adalia and herewith more specifically defined, shall remain with Italy, which reserves for itself the right to occupy the same.
10. In Lybia all the rights and privileges which prior to this date have been acquired by the Sultan on the basis of the Treaty of Lazansk are recognized as belonging to Italy.
 11. Italy shall receive such share of the military contribution as shall correspond to the measure of sacrifice and effort made by her.
 12. Italy joins in a declaration made by France, England and Russia as to leaving Arabia and sacred Mohammedan places in control of an independent Mohammedan Power.
 13. In the event of expansion of French and English colonial domains in Africa at the expense of Germany, France and Great Britain recognize in principle the Italian right to demand for herself certain compensations in the sense of expansions of her lands in Erithria, Somaliland, in Lybia, and colonial districts lying on the boundary, with the colonies of France and England.
 14. England obligates herself to assist Italy immediately to negotiate on the London market, on advantageous terms, a loan in a sum of 50,000,000 pounds sterling.
 15. France, England and Russia obligate themselves to support Italy in her desire for non-admittance of the Holy See to any kind of diplomatic steps for the purpose of the conclusion of peace or the regulation of questions arising from the present war.
 16. This treaty must be kept secret. As to Italy joining in the declaration of September 5, 1914, only said declaration shall be made public immediately after the declaration of the war by or against Italy. (sic).

Taking into consideration the present memorandum, the representatives of France, Great Britain, and Russia, having been duly empowered for this purpose, agreed with the representative of Italy, who in his turn was duly empowered by his government, in the premises as follows:

France, Great Britain, and Russia expressed their complete agreement with the present memorandum presented to them by the Italian government. With regard to Articles I, II, and III of this memorandum relating to the co-operation of the military and naval operations of all four Powers, Italy declares that she will enter actively at the very earliest opportunity, and at all events not later than one month after the signing of the present document by the contracting parties. The undersigned have set their hands and seals at London in four copies the 27th day of April, 1915.

SIR EDWARD GREY,
CAMBON,
MARQUIS IMPERIALI,
COUNT BENCKENDORF.

As an example of what international morality should not be, the above memorandum-treaty deserves its own niche in the chamber of horrors of the Great War.

E

Censorship Regulations of Bulgaria, 1915

THE publication here of the "Regulations regarding the Military Censorship and the Manner of Its Application" of the Bulgarian government is not to leave it inferred that I have selected this document on account of its severe strictures. I publish the document because no other quite as frank and straightforward in its terms has come into my hands. Governments do not generally allow such manifests to fall into the hands of the public, issuing them "confidentially" for the guidance of their censorship officials. When such regulations are laid before editors they are generally not in a position to publish them. The censorship regulations of the Entente and Central governments were in all particulars the same, and the proscriptions pronounced by Postmaster Burleson, under penalty that offending newspapers would be excluded from the mails, had the same purpose in mind. These, then, are the reasons why I append here the censorship rules of the Bulgarian government, a copy of which I secured at the time for this purpose:

1. In times of war, or in case of danger therefrom, a military censorship is to be established. Subject to this are:
 - (a) All printed editions of newspapers, periodicals, separate compositions, notices, maps, pictures, manuscripts, and lithographic productions, illustrated cards, moving picture films, photographic productions of all kinds.
 - (b) All private telegraphic and letter correspondence.
2. The introduction of the Military Censorship, as well as its removal, is announced by Royal Edict, in accordance with the order of the Ministerial Council. During the term of the Military Censorship, all writers, editors, printers, sellers and distributors of newspapers, periodicals, separate compositions, notices, maps, pictures and all sort of printed matter must adhere to the following rules:
 - (a) Such reports only shall be sent out on the military operations as are issued officially by the chief of staff.
 - (b) It is not permitted to distort the reports officially given out by the general headquarters or to write articles and pamphlets whereby a negative influence can be exerted upon the spirit of the army and the nation.
 - (c) It is not permitted to publish reports relating to the mobilization movements or transportation of troops on the railways, or to write and publish information regarding the organization, armament, clothing, numerical strength, rationing, sanitation of the troops and different appointments in the army.
 - (d) It is not permitted to report the arrival of military materials, or to announce the orders given and purchases effected in foreign countries.
 - (e) It is not permitted to give information regarding the numerical strength or the composition of the army, its sub-divisions and detachments.
 - (f) It is forbidden to publish information regarding the number of killed and wounded, as well as the names of the killed and wounded, if there is no official permission therefor.
 - (g) It is not permitted to criticize the operations of the commanders or the troops, as well as everything whereby the prestige of the commanders and the army is affected.
 - (h) No articles and pamphlets are permitted which demand the stopping of the war or indulge in commentaries upon the benefits and injuries therefrom.
 - (i) It is not permitted to print pictures of any kind of portraits or draw-

ings, having for their purpose the caricaturing of the troops and their commanders.

- (j) It is not permitted to report anything upon defeats and retreats of our troops, the loss of positions, fortifications, colors, guns, etc., if such information is not issued officially.
 - (k) It is not permitted to report any catastrophe in the rear of the army or in the interior of the state, as, for instance, railroad accidents, great fires, the explosion of military arsenals, etc.
 - (l) It is not permitted to report the appearance in the army of epidemic diseases, or if they occur in the country.
 - (m) It is not permitted to report imminent, planned, or effected revolts and disorders, whether in the rear of the army or in the interior of the country.
 - (n) It is not permitted to print appeals and invitations for meetings, which are opposed to the authorities or the army, or which may demand the cessation of the war.
 - (o) It is not permitted to bring in from abroad and to distribute newspapers, pictures, and other printed or lithographed productions, which are likely to exert a negative influence upon the spirit of the army and the nation, or insult the authorities.
4. Those found guilty of violating the above regulations will be punished in accordance with the Law of Treason and Spying, while such matter as was used in the commission of the offense will be confiscated and destroyed.
 5. The activity in respect to the application of the Rules regarding Military Censorship is concentrated in the Censorship Section of the Staff of the Army of Operations.
 6. The appointment of the Censorship Section in times of war is:
 - (a) To trace everything which is being written in the Bulgarian and foreign press upon the organization of the Bulgarian army as well as upon that of the enemy and upon their respective operations.
 - (b) To subject to the censorship all telegrams and other communications of the war correspondents and military attachés who may be admitted to the theater of war, or be sojourning within the country.
 - (c) To trace the conduct of the war correspondents and military attachés and to take the necessary steps for the elimination of illegal and disloyal relationship of the same in regard to the transmission of their correspondence from the theater of war to foreign countries.
 - (d) To take all needed measures for the control of letters and other communications, which soldiers, officers, and military officials at the front may address to foreign countries.
 - (e) To take the necessary measures for tracing all private correspondence in the theater of war destined for a foreign country.
 7. The Censorship Division in times of mobilization is divided into two sections: The first section follows the staff of the Army of Operations; the second section remains in Sofia.
 8. On the First Section devolve the following functions:
 - (a) Accompanying the military correspondents to the theater of operations.
 - (b) Subjecting to censorship all telegrams and letters from the theater of war to foreign countries or for the interior of Bulgaria.
 - (c) To conduct censorship in the theater of war itself.
 - (d) The general management of censorship within the country and occupied territories.
 9. On the Second Section devolve the following duties:
 - (a) Accompanying all correspondents who have remained in the capital and Bulgaria.

- (b) Censoring all telegrams and letters sent from the non-war zones of the country to foreign countries.
 - (c) Censoring all printed and lithographic productions, newspapers, periodicals, etc., which may appear within the country.
 - (d) The functions imposed by the Censorship Section at the General Headquarters of the army.
10. To secure closer control over the telegrams sent abroad, as well as over letter mail, censorship committees are organized within the kingdom in the larger centers and at points where these originate or pass in transit. The committees are charged with the survey of the press and all printed matter agreeable to the foregoing regulations.
 11. In order to effect efficient censoring all printed productions must be presented by the editorial departments in proof form, in duplicate, of which one copy after passing the censors will be confirmed by the seal of the censor and returned to the submitter, while the other, correspondingly corrected, if necessary, and attested by the same seal shall remain in the Censorship Section. The same applies to all lithographic productions.
 12. Telegrams submitted from the theater of war, by war correspondents or others, and intended for foreign countries, or the interior, are subject to censoring in either sections of the Censorship division. Such telegrams must be signed by the corresponding chief of the Censorship Division and must bear the seal of the General Staff. No telegraph or postal station within the kingdom, in occupied territories or in the theater of war may accept and transmit communications not showing this signature and seal.
 13. (Deals with the censoring of the letters and telegrams of officers, soldiers and persons connected with the military service.)
 14. (Deals with the letters and telegrams of the population.)
 15. Correspondence destined for foreign countries or the theater of operations should consist of postal cards and letters in open envelopes. Letters in sealed envelopes will not be examined and will be destroyed. Telegrams for foreign countries may be sent only by persons who have secured a special permit therefor. Correspondence with persons in enemy countries is prohibited.
 16. (Deals with the censoring of letters, telegrams and newspapers from foreign countries addressed to officers in the Bulgarian army, as does paragraph 17 which says by whom the mail of soldiers is to be examined.)
 18. (Designates the officials in charge of censoring civilian mails and telegrams within the country.)
 19. The telegraph or postal official who has accepted or delivered a telegram or letter not duly examined, signed and attested by seal is liable to condemnation for Treason and Espionage, Chapter II and Article 163 of Chapter VI of the Penal Laws. An officer or functionary, who, owing to negligence, permits a letter, telegram or printed production to pass without sufficient censoring is subject to severe punishment; if such negligence have injurious consequences for the army or the military operations, the guilty person is liable to criminal prosecution.

The Minister of War,
Major-General Jekoff.

F

Société Anonyme et S. E. le Cardinal Mercier

The Joint Case of an Ecclesiastical and a Journalistic Diplomatist
(Part of an address delivered by the author at the Hotel Astor, New York City,
on March 8th, 1920.)

I SUPPOSE some of you can recall that the life of Cardinal Mercier, primate of Belgium, was saved in a very peculiar manner. The story first made the rounds of the world's press in January and February of 1915, was revived now and then as the war went on, was heard from a thousand pulpits and platforms, in millions of newspaper editions and when the four-minute men in this country and elsewhere wanted to lash the Roman Catholics into high fury, the sad, sad tale concerning Cardinal Mercier was retailed.

"Well, in all the versions you may have heard of it, there was an unknown hero. Who had saved the cardinal's life? Who had warned the Germans not to shoot him out of hand? Who had later secured his release from prison? Who had made it possible for the prince of the church to go out once a day? Who had done these and other things? Why, the same person who had first given the world a picture of the terrible suffering of the civilian population in Belgium? Did it not seem strange to you that the name of the person was never known?

"However, on September 3rd, of last year, the world was finally taken into the confidence of those who knew who this mysterious hero—this lady bountiful and lifesaver was, to wit: The Associated Press of America.

"I will read to you a dispatch which the Associated Press caused to be disseminated on September 3rd of last year.

"Paris, Sept. 2.—Cardinal Mercier, Primate of Belgium, left Paris this morning for Brest, whence he will sail for the United States.

"Cardinal Mercier told the Associated Press that he was visiting America because, having been in contact with the great work of the Americans for relief of the Belgians during the great war, he wanted to thank them on their own soil, and because he was glad to accept invitations from virtually all the universities of America.

"The cardinal added that the name of the Associated Press recalled to him one of the dramatic incidents of his experiences during the war. The Germans had threatened to arrest him and policemen were even at the door ready to take him into custody when the German commander intercepted a dispatch from the Associated Press to the cardinal, asking him if the Germans were arresting him on account of his public utterances.

"That telegram," said Cardinal Mercier, "made the commander hesitate long enough for Berlin to reflect and think better of it."

"It seems that the New York office of the Associated Press was not yet satisfied with the heroic color of this dispatch, and so it added the following:

"Following the ruthless invasion of Belgium by the Germans, Cardinal Mercier at the close of the year of 1914 issued his famous Christmas pastoral, in which he said Belgium was bound in honor to defend her independence. She had kept her word, he said. Germany had broken her oath. Great Britain had been faithful to hers. Toward the invaders the Belgians owed no obedience.

"On the appearance of this pastoral the German military authorities took great offense and practically placed the Cardinal in durance at his palace at Malines. An effort was made to obtain a statement from him for the Associated Press and the message was transmitted to an Associated Press correspondent in Belgium. In response the following message was received:

““January 10, 1915.

““Von Bissing wires has delivered to Cardinal Mercier Associated Press request for statement. Am pressing for reply.”

“No further response was received.’

“So much for the heroic concoction that appeared in the papers of September 3rd and 4th, of last year. Just think of it: Here is the Associated Press, a corporation chartered under the laws of the State of New York, along co-operative lines, for the purpose of gathering and distributing news, engaging as a sort of side line in saving cardinals and other chance persons from dire fates. But so far you know but half the story.

“You know that the Associated Press as a corporation has saved the cardinal from a horrible fate. How did it come about?

“There appeared in the TYD, a Dutch Catholic clerical paper that was extremely anti-German from the very start of the war, a long and circumstantial story, on January 5th, that Cardinal Mercier, the primate of Belgium, was in sore trouble because he had caused to be published, and had otherwise disseminated, a Christmas pastoral to this flock. The innuendoes were many, and since the Associated Press had to be protected the The Hague correspondent of the service wired what seemed to be the essentials of the story, with due credit and caution. That story was the first intimation the United States public had that something was happening in Malines.

“The story of the Associated Press was hardly off the press in the United States when every London and Paris journalist cut-throat was at it painting the heavens red with the blood of the primate of Belgium. It seems that the Associated Press correspondent at The Hague would not grow excited enough for the men in New York, and so it came that the general manager of the Associated Press instructed him by cable just what he would have to do in order to develop this story. The correspondent knew by then that the cardinal was in no danger whatever and had wired a story to that effect, which the British censors suppressed. To put an end to the demand for more *copy* on the subject he forwarded to Cardinal Mercier, through General Von Bissing, and the military headquarters, the Platzkommando, at Aix-la-Chapelle, a dispatch which makes its appearance among the cardinal's official correspondence, recently published here and abroad, as follows:

“Office of the Kreischef of Malines, January 9th, 1915.

“The Cardinal Archbishop of Malines.

“By order of the Governor General I have the honor to forward to your Eminence the following telegram which was received by the Governor General with the request to communicate it to you.

““To his Eminence Cardinal Mercier:

““It has been rumored that your Eminence has been arrested, together with certain other persons who have co-operated in the dissemination of the pastoral letter. This report has produced a deep impression throughout America. For this reason I have been charged by the managers of the Associated Press to get into personal communication with your Eminence and to receive from you details of the alleged bad treatment to which you have been subjected. If your Eminence be agreeable, I beg you to inform me at the American Legation at The Hague what can be published of your present position.

““With kindest regards,

(Signed) ‘“GEORGE A. SCHREINER.

““Correspondent of the Associated Press.”

“In case your Eminence deems it expedient to reply to this telegram, I place myself at your disposal to transmit your reply.

“The Kreischef’

(Signed) ‘G. VON WENGENSKY,

“Colonel.’

“The corrections which I will make at this point, on behalf of truth, are the following:

“Cardinal Mercier was not in detention and policemen were not waiting to take him into custody, as the Associated Press would have it, in order to seem greater than it actually is. In fact the only thing that had been done to the cardinal was

that he had been refused permission to go to Antwerp to preach to a congregation there. That was the sum total of the *durance* in which the Associated Press, for purposes of its own, as late as September 3rd, last, places the cardinal.

"And there was nothing dramatic about the entire incident. Nor did the Governor of Belgium intercept my dispatch, as is stated in the recent tale from Paris. Nothing of the sort is true. I addressed my telegram for the cardinal to General von Bissing direct, and did that through the military authorities of the Germans at Aix-la-Chapelle, to make sure that the telegram got to the addressee. So it came about that the Governor General of Belgium, General von Bissing, according to the admission contained in Cardinal Mercier's official correspondence, charged the Kreischef of Malines to transmit through his office to Cardinal Mercier my telegram.

"Somebody was careless with the truth in this instance. I take it for granted that the cardinal-archbishop of Malines, the primate of all Belgium, would not do that and still the Associated Press report implies that he did do such a thing. Who is right here, and who wrong? On the other hand, the Associated Press claims for itself so high a degree for accuracy that, taking this claim for what it seems worth, it is hard to believe that the Associated Press made a mistake. In fact, I know that the Associated Press is infallible.

"The Cardinal further is quoted as saying:

"That telegram made the commander hesitate long enough for Berlin to reflect and think better of it."

"To which I will take the liberty of saying: Piffle! The prince of the church knows as well as I do that the German official dementi, relayed by me on January 7th, at ten o'clock in the morning, to be exact, contained every word needed to describe the situation in Malines, and that was two days before I got in touch with the cardinal in the manner described. Again I hope, that it was not the cardinal-archbishop who trifled with the truth. That His Eminence was among the foremost of ecclesiastical diplomatists I know, but I would hate to think that he would be so crude in his methods as here indicated.

"Now then, let us see what the cardinal himself said in his dispatch that was to reply to mine, a dispatch which never reached me, but which I find in the cardinal's collection of official documents:

"Cardinal Mercier presents to the Count Wengerski the expression of his high esteem and begs him to be good enough to forward the enclosed answer to the correspondent of the Associated Press of America.

"George Schreiner,

"Correspondent of the Associated Press of America,

"American Legation, The Hague.

"In reply to your telegram I regret to have to declare that a number of priests have had to submit to the violations of their homes, threats of fines and imprisonment and arrest. The printer of the pastoral letter was condemned to a fine of 500 marks. Myself received January 2nd, six o'clock morning, three officers who brought me an order to remain at the disposal of Governor General; Sunday, January 3rd, received by telegram Governor General's prohibition to go to Antwerp to preside at religious ceremony.

"Shall be obliged to you for acknowledging receipt of my wire.

(Signed) "CARDINAL MERCIER,
"Archbishop of Malines."

"Cardinal Mercier tells us that the Governor-General of Belgium refused to have this telegram reach me, and that he, the cardinal, then sent me the following:

"George A. Schreiner, etc.

"I quite understand the sympathy you wish to manifest toward me and I thank you for it; but I prefer for the present not to dwell on the vexatious proceedings to which you refer and to continue to confine myself to my duties as a bishop.

"I repeat, however, that I have withdrawn and shall withdraw nothing of my pastoral letter.

(Signed) "CARDINAL MERCIER,
"Archbishop of Malines."

"May I not draw attention to the highly diplomatic character of this second dispatch of the cardinal's. My telegram to him had portrayed no sympathy in the least degree, since I had carefully confined myself to the matter-of-fact aspect of the thing. In fact, I had no reason at all to feel any special brand or degree of sympathy for His Eminence, knowing very well that the cock-and-bull stories concerning his sad fate were untrue. Again, we newspapermen are not generally given to maudlinness of any sort, and I am sure that not one of the journalists who wept over His Eminence at so much per line or column cared a rap whether or no his freedom had in any way been curtailed by von Bissing. When war is rampant it is best not to be too particular in your expectations.

"But to come back to the Associated Press for a brief moment. This corporation says that it saved the cardinal from all sorts of dire things, and for the purpose of getting what credit there can be in this for a chartered company it fails to mention the name of its correspondent, which correspondent later, that is now, disclaims all credit as a lifesaver, and announces that there was no occasion whatsoever for heroics, the whole business being just a plain incident to war and news-gathering, and nothing more.

"I would go on record to the effect that His Eminence owes me no thanks whatsoever, and, owing me no thanks, owes none to the Associated Press. The fact is that the entire business is an accident—an accident based on the frightfully exaggerated reports published in the Amsterdam TYD, which I peddled, entirely because I did not want another correspondent to scoop me, as the saying goes, though knowing full well at the time, that the thing could not be what it was said to be, an opinion shared with me by most of the responsible journalists in Holland who ignored the story. If there is going to be a general issuing of decorations on account of the Cardinal Mercier story, by all means let such medals go to the editor of the TYD, one of the bravest mental contortionists of the Great War, which is saying a great deal, considering the Ochses, Pulitzers, Noyeses and Stones."

G

"The Pitfalls of Diplomacy"

(Excerpts from an Address made by the Author at the Hotel Astor, New York, March 8th, 1920.)

I MEET a good many people who regret that things are not different as the result of this war. Everybody, it seems, thought there would be a new era when the gentlemen of the Paris Conference were through idealising and democratising. There was to be this and that. This world was to be such a happy place to live in—really. Well, look at it. If ever a crowd of politicians made a poor job of a thing this is it. So far as I can see, we have nothing today but debts; to the sum total of things upon which the happiness of mankind depends we have added nothing, on the contrary we have wasted our substance in the most prodigal manner.

"Nothing at all is to be gained by looking upon the results of war from the angle of regret. It is futile to do that. The end of all wars is similar to but one thing—that which the French call: *une omelette*. I might have said: Scrambled eggs. But French has been so very popular recently, *vous savez*, though most of you do not know it. Look at our beautiful perfume-ad English, for instance. I do love the idiot who has to mix two or more languages to make himself understood. But that is no reason why *Sauerkraut* should not continue to be known as Liberty Cabbage. Why not? The conception of liberty of some people is indeed that of a cabbage, with the difference that the cabbage does much better, so long as it stands out on the field in the sun and rain and wind and does so splendidly as a good cabbage will do with the least encouragement.

"I said: *une omelette* also, because French is the language of the peculiar business I am to speak of tonight. Now why is French the diplomatic language? The fact is that diplomatists could never trust one another. A document drawn up in one language today and translated into another tomorrow by a diplomatist always does have a different meaning than what it had to one of the parties signatory to it. No doubt, there had been a meeting of minds when the thing decided upon was placed on record, but since then conditions have changed and to meet that change the terms of the document, be it a treaty or anything else, are interpreted to suit one's own interest. To end that practice it was decided to draw up such papers in French.

"Well, even with that precaution it is not always possible to get a fair deal. In diplomacy, ladies and gentlemen, it is not the original intent and purpose that counts, but the thing you want, or want to do, at your convenience or when the question comes up. Let me remind you that in diplomacy there is no such thing as honesty. In diplomacy you can find no such thing as truth. On the other hand, diplomacy hardly ever lies entirely. I mean that the diplomatic lie is usually five per cent truth. The diplomatic truth, on the other hand, is generally ninety-five per cent lies. Diplomacy is invertebrate and polite. It is a Latin art, and Machiavel is one of its fathers, though that could be taken as being a slander upon Machiavel when we look at the Wilsonian brand.

"I passed the official ash-can of the Paris Peace Conference the other day, and found in it the version of a very old creed. I think it was King Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon—he who made a lawnmower of his august person—who first proclaimed the principle of the Fourteen Points and then failed to live up to it. But I am sure that even he is merely the first on record in that respect. These things have all been done before, ladies and gentlemen, though in a country like ours, in which they discover the obvious every day, that may not seem apparent. There is really nothing new under the sun, and, as Koheleth expressed it: Neither is there anything true under the sun.

"I was struck by the message contained in the first of the Fourteen Points: Open covenants, openly arrived at. How wonderful! How very touching! Open covenants! What a beautiful sound that word has. It is so Cromwellian, don't you

know! Just think of it—open covenants. How sublime, supreme, superlative, superb. How similar to the French pomade advertisements!

“What I have to say here tonight has a great deal to do with the first of the Fourteen Points. There were to be open covenants, openly arrived at. Well, if there is one thing this world really needs, it is open diplomacy—if that is what Mr. Wilson meant. Had there been open diplomacy, or better yet, no diplomacy at all, the Great War would have been avoided, and mankind spared one of the worst trials it ever went through. I am sure that Mr. Wilson felt that. . . . I at least prefer to look upon that aspect of the Great War from that angle, for not to do that obliges us to think of the famous Fourteen Points as the most colossal, most monumental, most Machiavellian frauds of all history.

“But there is nothing to be regretted when war is over. The eggs have been broken and the milk has been spilled. The plaint that this or that injustice was done is like the cackling of the hen that sees her eggs broken on the rim of the skillet by a cook who is not interested at all in the primary purpose of the egg in nature, but wants just an omelet. When you want an omelet you must break eggs. In Paris they broke their promises together with the eggs, which is nothing unusual since Paris is the home of the proverb: To make colonies one must break heads.

“There was held out to us the hope that self-determination was to wipe out all of the irredentas in Europe. That alone would have been worth the price paid for the great adventure. The author of the Fourteen Points was very emphatic on that particular point. Well, what happened? The Big Four applied instead the fine principle of imperialistic Rome: *Divide et impera*, which now reads: Enslave by division.

“Of course, there were to be no more subject peoples. They all were to be free. Well, in some parts that was carried out—at the expense of enemy states: But we are still looking for self-determination for the several groups of mankind, large and small, high and low, that make up the British and French empires. I am not going to give you a list of them here. It is hardly necessary. Nor do I advise self-determination as a cure-all, as does the diplomatist with an axe to grind. Contrary to what has been said, the Balance of Power is the only feasible means of sane international relations, and into that scheme the small state does not fit very well. The World Power unchecked by opposition has a most ungodly appetite. Its government and people will gobble up one small state after another. To prevent that small peoples are obliged to combine into large states. It is unfortunate that they cannot do that without acquiring afterwards themselves all the vices of the mammoth against whom they combined. But that is one of the things that show how far off the millennium really is. . . .

“But right now we are looking at these things in the light of the most recent pronunciamientos. There was to be happiness ever afterwards. The peoples of this earth were to dwell under their own figtrees. I can still see the Pharisees standing about with eyes upcast to heaven while giving mankind these assurances. It is to laugh—pardon me: *C'est a rire!*

“The easiest way of running the affairs of this world and getting the cream of its labor is to keep mankind divided in small groups and then set these groups at one another's throats. While the small fellows are so engaged, you, quite naturally, step in and help yourself. . . .

“But these are things which this world does not care to look at. I have had, recently, many an occasion to remind people of the killing off, by the late lamented Lord Kitchener, the butcher of Omdurman and Khartoum, in his concentration camps of over 26,000 Boer women and children. That was about the eleventh part of the Boer population of the South African Republic and Orange Free State. When I mention that little matter I usually get nothing more than a bland smile, back of which I can read the exclamation: What a liar that man is! Mankind has ever found it hard to believe the thing which is not in accord with its hopes and desires. In fact, most people will believe only which serves some purpose of theirs, and with that class all things beyond this very limited sphere are simply denied. One of the greatest adherents of the ostrich philosophy is the American public.

"We hear now and then of the thing called justice. And there are not a few who hoped that justice would come of this war. Such simplemindedness is pathetic and a waste of other people's time. When a government goes to war it does so for the purpose of getting something by main force which by another method it could not get. The other government then goes to war to prevent the robbery, for such the high motive shows itself to be, when the fine verbal draperies are pulled aside. There may have been a war that was started to get justice, but I have no knowledge of it, and when I say *started* I do not mean the firing of the first shot or the sending of the ultimatum, but the long list of diplomatic malfesances that go before and smile at us later as the alleged causes of the war, when in reality they are nothing but its pretexts.

"The aggressor in a war has never laid bare his actual motives. What he places before the neutral public, and his own people, is never more than the pretext. Some lofty principle in his reasons, we are told, and generally that lofty principle is one which will benefit *all* mankind—will save civilization, progress and what not. So we are told, and so most of us believe. . . .

"But of such contradictions is made up history, and of such inconsistencies is later pieced together the judgment of mankind. As we all know, there are two sides to every quarrel. The greater the quarrel, the greater the difference of opinion as to who was right and who was wrong. Though I was three years in Europe, at the fronts and in the capitals, I am not yet prepared to say just who was entirely right and who was entirely wrong, and I am sure that I will never encompass the whole of the evidence sufficiently well to allow me to arrive at a final conclusion. All I can say now is that none of them was an angel. To inquire into the culpability of those held responsible for a war is like taking a sail upon the ocean: There is one more billow, and after bobbing up and down a great deal you find, taking your bearings by the sun, that after all you have not gotten very far—not as far as you thought. That seems to have been the experience of Mr. Wilson, when in his political campaign in 1916 he averred loudly and often that he had not yet decided who was responsible for the European War.

"A great deal was being said, just before the Great War broke out, of universal peace, disarmament, the force of International Law, arbitration treaties and what not. How much is there left of these things today? Precious little! Of International Law is left the few paragraphs which the British government incorporated, for purposes of its own, in its Declaration of London Orders in Privy Council, No. 2, or whatever the number of the most famous of these was. The remainder of International Law was dumped overboard, but is now being salvaged to once once more lull mankind into a false security.

"Just what is International Law? . . .

"When you come to examine it you will find it of as much substance as the soap bubble, of as much weight as the British government may deign to give it. Today, at any rate, there is no such thing as the *jus gentium*. There is today only a *jus Britannica*, and a fool is he who thinks otherwise.

"We must bear in mind that only the envoy extraordinary and ambassador plenipotentiary of the World Power can do his best in the art of negotiations, to give you the dictionary definition of diplomacy. He can do his best for the reason that whatever mistake he may make, and no matter how and when, and by whom, he is found out, he can finally cause his dear government to call out the army, and the navy, and the pulpit, the press, the literary cutthroat, the harlotting pedagogue and all the other flunkies of authority.

"There is no such thing as an able or an unable diplomatist, as the general public views it. By that I mean that ability along the lines of honesty has nothing to do with diplomacy. Able is that diplomatist whose armed forces can in the end prove him right; unable is that diplomatist whose armies and navy go down in defeat. In the one case all intrigue and conspiracy against the peace of the world is wiped out—and all mistakes along with it—and in the other the *perfectly legitimate methods of the diplomatist* are paraded before the war-frenzied public. Before an ambassador can be successful he must have behind him great prestige—prestige not of fine attributes, but of the brutal force of arms, and if

not of the brutal force of arms, then of the cruel will of international capitalism. Such an ambassador is bound to be successful. He could not fail, because the weaker stand in awe of him. The diplomatist who does not have these means in his hands, who does not wield these dire forces, will always be a failure, because in diplomacy it is not sterling worth that counts, nor is mental superiority so great an asset: The factor that determines all in the end is force—the size of the armies, the number of guns, the efficacy of blockade, the size of the fleet, and all the other things they use in war—not to mention the capacity for prevarication of that grand, old moulder of public opinion—the press.

"Nevertheless, the poor, deluded public everywhere prefers to stand in awe of the diplomatist, realizing little how very ordinary this envoy extraordinary may be, how weak in mind, will and morals this ambassador plenipotentiary was fashioned. Contrary to the opinions of their admiring friends and the general public, diplomatists are nothing more than *human* beings, and not always very good ones either. While the granting of all sorts of silly privileges to diplomatists has in the minds of many elevated the ilk into a class related to the gods, these men, and their women also, are still subjects to all the laws of nature, as presently I will show you.

"Bookwriting ambassadors are omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent. I say bookwriting ambassadors are that, because when interviewed they are protected against their own assinity by the interviewing and snivelling scribe who weighs every word the great man utters. But in writing a book the ambassador can give his fancy free rein and woe betide the poor devil that happens across the track of his pen. According to ambassadorial war books, the government of the U. S. had in Europe by far the best diplomatists, especially ambassadors. There is no doubt about that. One of them has been knighted and is now Sir James of the Black Wallet. *Sir James* is one of the most heroic figures of the Great War, and if I make bold to mention him here at all, it is with the wish that his shadow may never grow less. I honestly believe that some of the things he did, and his books are not the least of these, will ultimately do much to improve the diplomacie service of the United States. At any rate, improved will be that service to the extent of Sir James having made it impossible to again serve himself his country.

"The main purpose of censorship then is to influence world public opinion. To what extent it is necessary to control that opinion was shown again a few weeks ago when Great Britain decided that it would not be well to let the American public get news from Germany and Central Europe over the wireless. The British government quite calmly informed the world that until further notice all news dispatches would have to be sent by cable—that meant they would have to get in and out of the British cable offices. Did you hear an objection on the part of the administration in Washington? You did not. Now as then whatever the British government does is okeh. London has but to think in order to get action on the part of a government that is said to be autonomous and independent. It is a fine state of affairs, to be sure.

"Now, I am one of those who object to an alliance between this country and Great Britain, but, conditions being what they were, it would have been the part of honorable men to admit that there was an understanding between Great Britain and the United States. That applies still today. To either admit that there is such an alliance—a gentlemen's understanding of long standing, as it were, or to out-and-out make such an alliance, would be a good thing for this world. It would be an honorable thing, because then the remainder of this world could shape its acts accordingly. Do you think that the German government would have been able to make some of its mistakes if it had been known in 1915 or 1916, or whenever it was, that Mr. Wilson had agreed with his friends in the old country that the Entente should never lose this war no matter who was right and who was wrong? Do you think that the Central European publics, sheeplike and complacent as they were, would have allowed their governments to bring them so close to the brink of extermination? I can say that the people would have seen to it that peace would have been made in time—soon enough to leave at least a little of the substance

needed in daily life. The fact is that Mr. Wilson duped these people, as later he duped them in his Fourteen Points. While this gay deceiver made it appear that he was acting from the position of an American, he was creating a situation which in the end would *not* keep us out of the war. And all of this at a time when he was running for re-election on the slogan: He kept us out of the war.

"By all means let us have an alliance with Great Britain, if we intend doing in the future what we have done in the past. Let us be honest about this thing, so that men everywhere will know exactly what they are to expect of us. That is quite the least we can do. It is the very minimum required of him who wants to seem a decent member in the family of nations.

"Of course, it might even be necessary to force Great Britain into an alliance with us. I hope you do not think that we have no alliance today because the men in Washington did not want such an alliance. I have a better opinion of your intelligence. That there is today no written alliance between London and Washington is due entirely to the fact that John Bull finds its more convenient not to have such an alliance. There is no doubt that the deepest pitfall of international machination in recent years was the gentlemen's agreement Wilson had with his cousins, once removed, in London. When the Thunderer referred to Wilson as the best Englishman living, Lord Northcliffe knew exactly what he was saying.

"Don't think that in Europe there were no men at all who did not understand this. There was Count Tisza, for instance. Many a time have I discussed with him the question whether or no Wilson would go to war on the side of the Entente. . . . It is very unfortunate for the whole world that in Berlin they were stupid enough to believe Mr. Wilson and his ambassadors, Sir James and Colonel House. Had they taken the advice of Count Tisza the war would have ended sooner, I think, and this world would have been better off by far. I will say that the greatest of all the blunders made by the men in Berlin is that they for a moment thought that they could win the war without having to measure issues on the field of battle with the United States. But they had learned little even from that. When Mr. Wilson came out with his Fourteen Points Central Europe fell to its knees before him as it might before another Messiah. He was looked upon as the third in a splendid constellation: Washington, Lincoln and Wilson. Well, we know what became of all that. It all ended up in the rare scree known as the League of Nations covenant—a sort of butcher's scrap barrel into which the Big Four dumped all of their hatred, avarice and foibles, not forgetting a few troubles of their own, as shown by the ridiculous phrases concerning labor problems.

"By all means let us come in the open with an alliance with Great Britain if in the future, as in the past, we are to trot in the dust of her chariot. Our fellow-men everywhere will then be able to conduct themselves accordingly. For instance, they will never go to war, hoping that we might or would remain neutral, as the surface of things would indicate. We will lose nothing by dropping our mask, and we will gain a great deal by serving notice upon the world that with such an alliance we cease to be a snare to the unsuspecting, a pitfall to the honest. Such an open alliance would remove from the present-day diplomacy one of its most unlovely aspects."

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
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