

103

THE CRISIS IN RWANDA

Y 4. F 76/1:R 94

The Crisis in Ruanda, 103-2 Hearing...

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

MAY 4, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



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THE CRISIS IN RWANDA

WEDNESDAY, MAY 4, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:15 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Harry L. Johnston (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. JOHNSTON. If I could call the meeting to order.

Unfortunately, we started the day off with a Journal vote, so I apologize for being a little late. Hopefully, we can have maybe an hour or an hour and a half without interruption here. I will start with my prepared statement.

Hundreds of thousands of helpless civilians have been killed over the past 4 weeks in Rwanda by an extremist Hutu-led militia and by factions of the Rwandan Armed Forces. The Coalition for the Defense of the Republic, CDR, and the militias connected to the former President's MRNDD party, are largely responsible for the continuing genocide in this country.

I strongly condemn the slaughter of innocent civilians and call for the establishment of a special task force under the auspices of the United Nations Human Rights Commission to investigate human rights abuses in Rwanda.

In a recent article, Roger Winter of the U.S. Committee for Refugees argued that it would be an unforgivable mistake to pass off the latest orgy of violence in Rwanda as simply another case of African tribal bloodletting that foreigners can never understand and are powerless to prevent. Though the killings may have some tribal motivation, the crisis in Rwanda is largely political.

The current slaughter of civilians was carefully planned and deliberately triggered by extremist elements. If this tragedy were strictly tribal as characterized by some observers, why then were so many Hutu-opposition figures and human rights activists murdered by Hutu extremists?

The vote at the United Nations Security Council to reduce the number of U.N. peacekeepers from 2,500 to 270 demonstrates the urgent needs for Africans to find an African solution to their problems.

I strongly urge the Organization of African Unity, the OAU, to explore ways to intervene in conflict resolutions, such as this, to protect defenseless civilians from marauding criminals.

It is unforgivable and shameful to watch a whole generation of Rwandese slaughtered in cold blood. It is time to act.

The United States and other Western nations should also do their share to assist the people of Rwanda. I am encouraged by the level of attention given to the crisis in Rwanda by the Clinton administration.

In addition, I recommend the following measures for consideration: Number one, the United States should make clear to those involved in the killing of innocent civilians that they will be held accountable; two, the United States should inform the parties involved in the conflict that any government which assumes control by forceful means will not be recognized; three, the United States should deny visas to members of the MRNDD, the CDR and military commanders responsible for the killings of innocent civilians. We should urge the French to do the same.

Finally, we should consider airdrops of humanitarian assistance to civilians displaced inside Rwanda and to refugees in remote areas. We should provide financial and technical assistance to African intervention forces that could help restore law and order, Mr. Ambassador, the same as you did in Liberia.

This afternoon, we will first hear from the Honorable George Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and later from Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch. We will also hear from Monique Mujawamarija, who recently escaped from Kigali after a terrifying ordeal.

I would like to express my appreciation to the witnesses for accepting our invitation to testify before the subcommittee on such short notice.

Congressman Hastings, for an opening statement?

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize, I was rushing getting here.

Mr. Chairman, this issue is of substantial interest to me. I am more than delighted that you have organized this hearing today on this issue of such critical importance to the people of Rwanda and an issue that deserves, I am sure, our immediate attention.

Mr. Chairman, first, I would like to express my condolences to the families of the late President of Rwanda and the late President of Burundi. Both of these people died on April 6, 1994, as all of us know.

And I would also like to present my condolences to the families for the loss of the thousands, literally hundreds of thousands of defenseless, unarmed civilians in the country of Rwanda.

Both Rwanda—and I recognize we are not necessarily here about Burundi—but they made major advances toward reconciliation and democracy in the early 1990's, rendering their difficulties in recent months particularly tragic. A peace accord was finally signed in August of 1993 that put the country on the road toward democratic reforms. Thus, it is important to understand that these killings are a massive effort to sabotage this historic peace agreement signed last year.

It is also important to understand that this slaughter in Rwanda was planned and triggered by a privileged clique of extremist political and military leaders there who most certainly are determined to block political reforms that would loosen their grip on power.

Today, as the world continues to watch with horror and despair of the brutal outbreak of ethnic violence in Rwanda, I call upon the

United States to support an upgraded United Nations presence to prevent continued mass slaughter or, as many call it, "genocide." We must denounce those members of the Rwandan military who are directly responsible for this mass slaughter, and we must do everything in our power to end this continuing massacre of defenseless civilians in Rwanda.

Mr. Chairman, I will submit the rest of my statement, with your permission, without objection.

I would like to thank Secretary Moose as always for his continued input and preparedness to come forward before this subcommittee. And I would hope that the immediacy of all of our concerns is going to be expressed not only to this administration but to the United Nations and to the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you, judge.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hastings appears in the appendix.]

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MOOSE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY PRUDENCE BUSHNELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Mr. JOHNSTON. Ambassador, you are on.

Again, I appreciate your coming on such short notice.

Mr. MOOSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate very much the opportunity that your calling this hearing has given us to address the urgent and tragic situation in Rwanda.

I am also pleased to be joined today by my colleague Deputy Assistant Secretary Prudence Bushnell who has been actively engaged in our response to this crisis from the very beginning.

Mr. Chairman, on April 6, the plane that was carrying the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana crashed outside Kigali, under mysterious circumstances, killing both President Habyarimana and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi.

This tragic event sparked massive violence on two levels: First, elements of the Hutu-dominated Rwandan military, hard-line party militias and Hutu extremist gangs began killing Hutu opposition politicians and Tutsi opposition leaders and civilians. These included Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. The killings began in Kigali, but they very quickly spread throughout the country.

Second, fighting quickly broke out between Rwandan Government forces and the Tutsi-dominated rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front, effectively resuming the civil war that began in October 1990, a war that was to have been ended on August 4, 1993, with the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord.

Both the fighting and the violence continue. The RPF has pushed the government forces to the south and west and controls much of the capital of Kigali. The violence has left at least 100,000 dead, and displaced hundreds of thousands of other Rwandans. Over 300,000 Rwandans have fled to neighboring countries, most to Tanzania.

On May 3, the Rwandan Government and the RPF sent delegations to attend talks in Arusha, Tanzania. Direct negotiations, however, between the two sides have not yet begun.

The U.S. response to the crisis: Mr. Chairman, since the crisis began, the United States has pursued an active strategy with five main goals: First, to stop the killings; to achieve a durable cease-fire; to return the parties to the negotiating table; to contain the conflict; and to address the humanitarian relief needs.

We have taken numerous steps and actions designed to achieve those goals. First, we have put diplomatic pressure on the parties themselves. I and other U.S. officials have spoken directly to members of the Rwandan Government, to the Rwandan military, and to the RPF in Washington, via diplomatic channels in other locations, and directly by telephone to Rwanda.

Our message has been clear and simple and direct: We want an immediate end to the killings, a cease-fire in place, the resumption of peace talks and the complete cooperation of the parties with relief efforts. We have reinforced these private contacts with high-level public appeals and statements by the President and by other senior officials of the State Department.

Second, we have worked to mobilize the international community. We encouraged the efforts by the Tanzanian Government as facilitator of the Arusha process to reconvene the peace talks, and we are supporting those efforts.

As in the past, the United States will be represented at any substantive talks. We have encouraged the Organization of African Unity and other regional states, and our European allies to join us in urging the Rwandans to agree to a cease-fire and to a resumption of talks.

Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, John Shattuck, and our Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, have been sent to the region to continue these efforts. They are being accompanied by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Refugee Programs, Brunson McKinley. Our diplomatic contacts confirm that all major players agree with and support our goals and strategy.

Third, we have been pursuing an active policy in the United Nations Security Council. We pushed for approval of a strong Security Council Presidential statement, issued April 30, which demands that the interim Government of Rwanda and the RPF take effective measures to prevent attacks on civilians. The statement condemns the breaches of international humanitarian law that have occurred and calls on all states to cease shipments of arms to Rwanda.

Fourth, we have undertaken contingency plans to provide humanitarian relief and have identified several millions of dollars from various sources that we intend to tap for that crisis. The U.S. Government has already contributed approximately \$28 million in food, relief items, and earmarked funds to organizations assisting Burundi refugees and persons displaced following last October's coup attempt and subsequent widespread violence in Burundi.

In response to the Rwanda crisis, the administration just approved \$15 million in additional funding for new relief efforts in that area, and in addition to that some \$13 million in food commodities has also been set aside for that purpose.

Fifth, we are continuing to monitor the situation in Burundi very closely. We have sent high-level visitors to the country to show our support for Burundi's fragile and nascent democracy and are continuing humanitarian relief efforts.

We have also provided support to the 47-member monitoring force that the OAU is in the process of deploying to Burundi.

The efforts outlined above are a continuation of the longstanding U.S. support for the Rwandan peace process. We were active observers throughout the year-long Arusha peace talks and provided \$1 million in assistance to support the talks and to help the OAU field cease-fire monitors.

The United States supported deployment of U.N. peacekeepers once a peace accord was reached.

In the end, only the Rwandans can bring peace to their country and no outside effort can succeed without a commitment to peace by the combatants themselves. The influence of the international community on internal conflicts of this type is limited, but we are determined to use what influence we have in an effort to achieve our goals.

If I might turn to some of our future policy options. At the same time that we are pursuing the policies outlined above, we are examining further measures to ratchet up pressures. First among these is a formal U.N. arms embargo against Rwanda which we intend to pursue this week.

We also encourage increased involvement by the U.N. Human Rights Commissioner, who could launch an investigation into human rights abuses and perhaps become involved in mediation efforts. In addition, we are exploring the possibility of having the U.N. or the OAU establish protected areas for refugees and displaced persons around the borders. If that is done, the United States stands ready to support that effort both in terms of financial and logistical support.

If I might conclude, Mr. Chairman, by touching on your question with regard to the assessment of the U.N. mission. From the very start, the U.N. assistance mission in Rwanda, UNAMIR, was a peacekeeping, not a peace-making operation. It was deployed only after a cease-fire was in place and both sides had signed a peace accord. The force had the limited mandate of monitoring and facilitating implementation of the accord, as the parties had requested.

Circumstances have changed drastically since the April 6 plane crash. Heavy fighting and widespread violence have resumed, UNAMIR troops were attacked and at least 10 U.N. peacekeepers were killed, and there was serious doubt in the early stages whether the lightly armed UNAMIR troops had the capability to defend even themselves in such circumstances.

As a result, the United States supported the withdrawal of the bulk of the force for its own safety, provided satisfactory arrangements were made to ensure the safety of Rwandans who were then under direct UNAMIR protection.

It now appears that a portion of the UNAMIR force has been able to remain safely in Rwanda. Under such circumstances, we strongly support the Security Council decision to maintain a small force to help broker a new cease-fire, facilitate humanitarian relief

efforts, and help ensure the safety of those Rwandans already under UNAMIR's direct protection.

That, Mr. Chairman, ends my prepared remarks. Ms. Bushnell and I are prepared to address your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moose appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Ms. Bushnell was very accommodating in giving us a briefing of the first 72 hours in Kigali, which were very dramatic. And as I recall, every American was able to get through the caravanning south to Burundi.

Let me ask you just kind of basic questions, and then I will get into some specifics later. Apparently, both factions here feel that the United States is kind of an honest broker, you can pick up the phone and call both factions here.

When you call the military—and you say on page 1 here that you have spoken directly to the Rwandan Government officials, the Rwandan military, and the RPF—what is their reply?

Do they give any explanation, as Judge Hastings said, for the genocide that is going on there? Do they give any reply that they are going to try to control the slaughter throughout the country?

Mr. MOOSE. If I might refer that question to Ms. Bushnell since she has indeed been the interlocutor in many of those telephone conversations.

Ms. BUSHNELL. Mr. Chairman, the response I get and the person to whom I have been speaking is the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan military, General Bizimungu.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Is he in Kigali?

Ms. BUSHNELL. He is in Kigali.

What he has told me, and the last time I spoke to him was early Sunday morning, is in his version of the truth, the plane went down, the RPF moved from their position in the North which created a spontaneous outbreak of civilian violence against civilians. In response to my question: Why aren't you containing the civilians? The answer is: We cannot contain them and fight a civil war which the RPF has forced us into.

The response to my question: What about those areas in which there is no civil war going on, for example, in places in southern Rwanda like Butare?

The answer is that the government is doing all that it can to pacify the population, that the President had gone out, and so forth.

Mr. JOHNSTON. There is no civil war going on in an orphanage when they go in there and slaughter 21 children?

Ms. BUSHNELL. You are absolutely right.

Mr. JOHNSTON. But they have no explanation for that?

Ms. BUSHNELL. His explanation is that this is spontaneous civilian outbreak as a result of incitement from the RPF.

I will say, Mr. Chairman, quite frankly, I have had, I think, three conversations with him. My last one, as I say, was on Sunday, and I found him to be even more hard-line in that on Sunday he began talking about massacres being committed by the RPF. I was saying: What about these bodies floating down the river; let me tell you some of the newspaper headlines we are reading in the United States. And he said: No, it is the RPF who are killing.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me stop you right there.

Does your intelligence report to you that the RPF have broken their discipline and are starting to murder Hutus?

Ms. BUSHNELL. The reports that we have gotten is that the RPF has conducted some executions. We have not gotten reports of massacres.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Some executions. In large part, though, it is Hutus killing Tutsis and Hutus killing Hutus; isn't it?

Ms. BUSHNELL. Those are the reports that we are getting, yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Ambassador, number two here, we have encouraged the OAU and other regional states and other European allies to join us in urging the Rwandans.

Well, let me skip to the next one. You sent two envoys here, Shattuck and Rawson. Have you had any communication with them since they have arrived?

Mr. MOOSE. They have not yet arrived. They should be arriving about now in Addis Ababa, they are scheduled to meet early tomorrow morning with the OAU Secretary General, Mr. Salim Salim who was in Arusha today, so they will have his views on the status of those talks and his views on what further actions might be taken to deal with the situation.

They will go on from Addis to Arusha tomorrow. They hope to meet there not only with the Tanzanian Prime Minister who is leading the mediation, but also with the representatives of both the RPF and the interim Rwandan Government to urge the same message that we have been pursuing all along.

They will then go on the following day to Bujumbura, in part, as I suggested, to encourage the government in its continuing efforts to maintain calm in Burundi and also to determine what could be done along the border area between Rwanda and Burundi to provide greater safety and security to the refugees that have been displaced along there.

Mr. JOHNSTON. How does one get from Arusha to Kigali?

Mr. MOOSE. They are on a government-furnished military plane that has been provided in Stuttgart.

Mr. JOHNSTON. And the airport there is safe to land?

Mr. MOOSE. In Arusha? No, I am sorry, they are not going to Kigali, they are going to Bujumbura.

Mr. JOHNSTON. They are just flying over Rwanda altogether?

Mr. MOOSE. They were flying over Rwanda, but we have not ruled out the possibility of someone spinning off from that delegation and going into Kigali. Let me add that there is a team of relief officials that was in Rwanda in Kigali last week. Another team is being dispatched later this week to pursue those discussions of what can be done to reinforce the existing relief efforts that are still going on, mostly conducted by the ICRC in Kigali.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Paragraph 3, talking about embargo of shipments of arms to Rwanda. Are there any leaks coming in from Uganda specifically?

Mr. MOOSE. We have no direct evidence of leaks. But I suspect, Mr. Chairman, that there are leaks from all sides here. One of the things we would like to urge on all of the neighboring states is a concerted effort to prevent more arms from flowing into the country and thereby fueling the conflict and the violence taking place.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Judge Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Ambassador, specifically, what has the United States done since the Rwandan crisis developed in or erupted in early April?

Mr. MOOSE. Congressman Hastings, I think you understand that the first and immediate responsibility that we felt was for the safety and security of Americans, including our personnel at the embassy, and the immediate three days, 27 hours after that crisis was devoted to ensuring their safety and their withdrawal. Beyond that, we almost immediately were in touch with neighboring states who had indeed been concerned about the instability in both Rwanda and Burundi for some time.

We had urged the Government of Tanzania, which was a very active chair of the previous Arusha talks to try to engage in a discussion with the parties with a view to bringing about an immediate cease-fire. Similar contacts that we had with the Secretary General of the OAU, Salim Salim, also has been very active in this.

We have through our public diplomacy, our statements, our radio broadcasts, our announcements, our declarations, urged on both sides an immediate end to the violence and immediate efforts to re-establish a kind of cease-fire. Beyond that, we have been in direct contact with the U.N. Human Rights Commissioner, Ambassador Ayala Lasso. He is sending a team to the area this week.

They will go initially to Burundi, but they have in their mandate the possibility of continuing to Kigali and to explore the intention announced by both sides, at least the expressed intention, to allow for some outside human rights monitors to come in and verify the situation.

We are a little skeptical about whether that commitment will be honored in the event that we have encouraged Ambassador Ayala Lasso to pursue that.

Then finally, as I mentioned, we are pursuing efforts in the Security Council. One of the initiatives that we have suggested is the possibility of an OAU-U.N. collaboration in trying to develop a force to be put along the borders, indeed perhaps inside the borders of Rwanda to afford some kind of protection to the refugees that we know have been trapped there.

Mr. HASTINGS. Can you give me the most conservative estimate that we are using for the number of persons that have been killed since the eruption of violence? We see all sorts of news reports, but what does our intelligence, to the extent that you can share it, tell us, and I ask for the most conservative numbers.

Mr. MOOSE. I think, Congressman Hastings, that the most conservative figure is the one I have used in my own testimony. But let me add very quickly, we have no real basis for determining what has been happening in the southern part of Rwanda, particularly in the Southwest.

Virtually all of the relief workers that have been working there have been withdrawn. ICRC at one point sought valiantly to maintain a presence in parts of southwestern Rwanda.

They were obliged because of the threat to their own workers, as we saw yesterday, to withdraw that presence to Kigali. They still maintain a presence in Kigali. We know that they are seeking actively to redeploy that presence. But the fact that there is no inter-

national presence in that area makes it impossible for us to have any verification as to what the real dimensions of the tragedy are.

Mr. HASTINGS. As a segue to that, if you will permit me to interrupt you just in the interests of time, what is the involvement, at this point, if any, of France and Egypt, and what is Belgium's policy and/or attitude toward the current crisis in Rwanda? And what, if anything, are we doing to coordinate those efforts to make sure that, you know, we are doing all on the same page?

Mr. MOOSE. We have had extensive contacts throughout with both the French and Belgian Governments. In fact, I met yesterday afternoon with the Belgian ambassador, the French Minister, Counsellor—the number two at the French mission—again to compare notes, both in terms of our assessment of the condition on the ground and both in terms of the action we have been taking.

There is a great consistency in the policies we have been pursuing, particularly the message directly and indirectly to the parties concerned on the need to end the violence and enter into a cease-fire, and support, as manifested in the U.N. Security Council, the declaration that was issued last Friday and Saturday and for the continuing discussion in the Council of a possible OAU-U.N. combined intervention, with the prime purpose in the first instance of affording some additional protection to the displaced refugees.

Mr. HASTINGS. Do they still hold influence in the area, Belgium, for example?

Mr. MOOSE. I think they would acknowledge that both of them carry a certain amount of baggage in Rwanda and that baggage does not make them terribly well-placed or well-positioned to exercise or exert influence in the current situation.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you.

I will ask in the next round, with your permission, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Engel, did you have an opening statement?

Mr. ENGEL. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. And then continue with questions.

Mr. ENGEL. I would like to enter my whole opening statement into the record.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Without objection.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. But I want to take some points out of it.

I am first of all delighted to see you again, Mr. Moose.

I want to commend the chairman for holding this very important and timely hearing, and I want to say that I firmly believe that rapid international action is absolutely necessary to press the warring parties to settle their dispute and to alleviate the dark conditions faced by the refugees, both in and out of Rwanda. When you consider that between 100,000–200,000 people have died in less than 1 month, it is clear that this is a crisis of tragic proportions. We really obviously need to do something immediately.

Last month, I wrote a letter, along with Chairman Johnston and the rest of our entire Africa Subcommittee, to the President urging that he make resolution of the conflict in Rwanda a priority until it is settled peacefully. I want to say that the decision to send a high-level delegation to Rwanda, as the chairman mentioned, is certainly a critical step in the right direction. But I want to reit-

erate several of the points we made in our letter: We believe that the United States should make clear to those who commit atrocities that they will be held accountable. Furthermore, the United States should inform the parties that the United States will not recognize any government which takes power by force and that continued U.N. engagement in Rwanda is crucial to peaceful settlement of the conflict.

[The material referred to appears in the appendix.]

I was disturbed that the Security Council ordered the removal of most U.N. peacekeeping forces. Obviously, it was for their safety, but my fear is that it sends the wrong message to the warring parties that we are disengaging rather than engaging. I am afraid it perhaps sends the message that the parties can continue their wanton killing and that the world community isn't prepared to take a firm step.

We look at the tragedy in Bosnia, and I have for a year and a half been trying to call attention to that tragedy, and we find 200,000 Bosnians have been killed during that conflict, over a year and a half. Sadly, in Rwanda we have nearly the same amount killed in just a month. A life is a life, and I think that the world community needs to engage.

I believe that we have to support U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's call for a multinational force to end the massacres and restore order in the country. I believe firmly that while the United States should not contribute ground troops to this unit, we should provide logistical and planning support. I also want to praise the President for providing aid to the refugees.

I am glad we were able to evacuate the Americans, but I think that we need to show that we are very, very, very much engaged, and I am wondering if you could comment on what I have said. Then I have a couple of specific questions.

Mr. MOOSE. Thank you, Congressman Engel.

I think that on many of the—virtually all of the points you mentioned, we are in full agreement. Certainly we have stressed in our conversations and directly the notion of accountability.

And I want to be careful here because what we have said is that those people who occupy positions, whether in the Rwandan Government or the Rwandan Army or the RPF who are in a position to exercise influence over people under their command and others, should be using that influence to contain, to control, to end, to stop the violence. I think the implication of that is clear.

Second, as the statement that was issued last Friday by the Security Council indicated, the international community will monitor closely and take appropriate action with respect to the violation of international humanitarian law. I think that sends a very clear signal as well. This is reinforced by the dispatch of our Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and by the actions that are being taken as we speak by the U.N. Human Rights Commissioner.

I think all of those things are important in reinforcing the signal that those who are responsible for this violence should not expect that their actions will be unnoticed or unpunished. Certainly, we would agree fully that no government that emerges out of this, who

takes power by violence should be recognized. And I think that has been made clear.

We have also made it clear that we do not regard as legitimate the so-called interim government. It does not have any legal legitimacy or status or standing. Beyond that, I think certainly we in our discussions in New York have encouraged the Secretary General's thinking and proposals with regard to the formation of a possible international force drawn largely from troops from the OAU, OAU-member states, but we understand fully that for that to work, it will require significant support from outsiders.

In urging that course of action, we have made clear, I think, our intention to provide our fair share of support, logistical, financial, and other to such an operation, should it be mounted.

Mr. ENGEL. I am glad to hear that, because I think it is crucial and I think the American public would support it. Obviously, there would not now be support for American ground troops, but I think there is support for humanitarian aid, for logistical aid, just aid to stop the violence and the killing. I think that the world does look to us as the last remaining superpower and as the leader in democracy, for guidance in this regard. And I think we need to provide it very, very intensely.

The situation essentially now, as I understand it, the Hutus are the ones that are fleeing the RPF now; is that essentially still happening?

Mr. MOOSE. That certainly was the case, and what appears to have spurred the exodus into Tanzania over the weekend. The RPF has managed to push further south, in this case, to the southeast toward the Tanzanian border.

I think understandably a lot of people fearing possible retribution have fled in the face of that advance. That was why we saw the influx of nearly 300,000 into Tanzania over the weekend.

In the mean time, of course, there are continuing reports of killings, massacres taking place behind the Rwandan Government troop lines to the southwest of Rwanda, so we have two kinds of mayhem: We have the conflict between the two military establishments, but in addition to that, we have the violence being carried out against civilians behind the military lines, and in that case much of that is being attributed to—and again, I would point out, we have no direct verification—most of that is attributed to armed militias of Hutu extremist in southern Rwanda.

Mr. ENGEL. Of Hutu extremists?

Mr. MOOSE. Right.

Mr. ENGEL. Do we have any reports on the level of the massacres? Are they continuing at the same horrific level that we have seen it the last couple of weeks?

Mr. MOOSE. Here we have had to rely largely on the reports from international relief organizations, ICRC in particular, others that have had a presence on the ground. Even those organizations in recent days have had to withdraw or limit their presence because of the direct threat to their own personnel. So again, much of what we are hearing and saying and repeating is largely conjecture and extrapolation from evidence that people have seen.

The figure that I used in my testimony, I think we would all agree, is a conservative figure, 100,000. We have all seen figures

that go up as high as 500,000. There is no way to verify those figures at this point.

Mr. ENGEL. Am I correct in saying that the Security Council motivation to order removal of the U.N. peacekeeping troops was done for their safety?

Mr. MOOSE. That is entirely correct. At the time I recall that we had the situation in which UNAMIR troops themselves had become the object of attack, I would say the slaughter, the brutal assassinations of the 10 Belgian troops was an indication. In addition to that, there was firing at the UNAMIR positions in Kigali and at the airport, and under those circumstances the UNAMIR commander himself said early on that he did not think his position was tenable.

In addition to which many of the troop-contributing countries to UNAMIR indicated that they could not justify keeping their troops in those circumstances. Since that time, there has been a change in the situation such that the UNAMIR commander has said that he believes he can and should continue to have a presence there to do a number of things, not least among them is to try to continue to provide protection to the civilians who were under UNAMIR's direct protection.

Mr. ENGEL. Now we are told that the RPF opposes any kind of intervention force. Is that true?

And if it is, what difficulties in your opinion does that pose?

Mr. MOOSE. The RPF has said that, yes, they would oppose at this point any outside U.N. or OAU force. The reason for that is that, number one, they believe that simply the declaration of a cease-fire and the establishment of a kind of truce line would do nothing to protect the civilians who are trapped behind those lines and therefore they are wary and concerned that that would only give license to the continued slaughter of people behind the lines.

Second, they argue that the introduction of an outside force at this time would simply, would do nothing—would only protect those whom they believe have been responsible for the massacres and the killings.

Mr. JOHNSTON. We will come around again.

Mr. ENGEL. OK.

Can I just ask one final question?

What have we done? Have we extended any kind of temporary protective status to Rwandans in the United States?

Mr. MOOSE. In the sense of physical protection or asylum?

Mr. ENGEL. Actually both.

Mr. MOOSE. We are seeking temporary protective status. We certainly have responded to specific requests from Rwandan officials with regard to protection of individuals. And beyond that, I understand that there is in process an asylum finding for those who fear, rightly fear return to Rwanda.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me point out that the letter that Congressman Engel authored was 2 weeks ago delivered to the President, so his foresight in what was going to happen did happen, unfortunately.

Mr. Burton, the ranking member.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a statement I would like to submit for the record. I won't take the committee's time to read it.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BURTON. As I understand it, there were 600 Bangladeshi U.N. troops that left Kigali and went to Nairobi. And I think some of the human rights groups are concerned about the children in orphanages and other civilian areas that are unprotected right now.

Is there a possibility or a likelihood that these 600 troops could be redeployed to protect those orphanages and civilian targets there or would they be in dire jeopardy if they were to be sent back into that environment and would they be able to do any good?

Mr. MOOSE. All of those are questions which, frankly, we don't have good answers to right now. Certainly, in light of the fact that the current UNAMIR force has been able to stay and continues to operate, although not without threat, as we saw just yesterday—yesterday we saw a situation in which UNAMIR troops went to the Milles Collines Hotel to try to evacuate some 300 people from that hotel and in the process were turned back by a contingent of Rwandan Army troops.

These people are in danger and in harm's way, but there is discussion now about reinforcing—in New York at the U.N.—about reinforcing that presence to the extent that it could assist in establishing some greater security for people in Kigali.

The Bangladeshi troops along with contingents from other countries, recall that these were very lightly armed troops, when they came under attack they felt that they were in an untenable position, and so it was in part in response to the request of the troop-contributing countries themselves that the Security Council acted to authorize the drawdown of the UNAMIR contingent.

The Bangladeshi troops, I understand, do remain in Nairobi. We do understand that if the circumstances are propitious, there is a possibility that they could be returned to Kigali, but that is a discussion which is going on, as we speak, in New York.

Mr. BURTON. As I understand it, the rebels have, what, 20,000 troops more or less; and of course the government has at least that many. It seems that if you introduce any kind of troops in there to do something, you are going to have to have a pretty good number. Otherwise, they might just be cannon fodder before it is over with.

Mr. MOOSE. This is indeed the concern. In the absence of an agreement or an acquiescence on the part of the parties to the insertion of any troops—and we have just talked about the latest declarations by the RPF, their attitude toward such an outside presence—I think it is understandable that many other countries would very much hesitate to put their troops into a situation like that.

Mr. BURTON. As I understand it, the Hutus have relations with the French, the Belgians, and the Tanzanians, are those countries—I presume that they are doing everything they can to work with the President to try to bring about some reconciliation over there, and at the same time, I guess, Uganda has tremendous influence over the Tutsis.

Are negotiations taking place right now try to get the warring parties at least to sit down, and is it possible to get them to sit down? Has it gone so far to reach the point where negotiations are impossible right now?

Mr. MOOSE. Certainly in our contacts with all of the neighboring states, and indeed with others, French, Belgians and others, we have found a substantial agreement, consensus on what needs to be done, and that consensus revolves around the need to impress upon both sides, the urgency in bringing the violence to an end and in agreeing to a cessation of fighting.

The prospects—in addition to that, there is an agreement that we should be doing all we can to urge the sides to resume the negotiation. It was for that purpose that the President of Tanzania agreed to return to the Arusha talks. That started last night. We understand those discussions are continuing today.

There are not yet direct negotiations between the representatives of the RPF and those of the so-called “interim government” of Rwanda. The Tanzanians are, in other words, engaged in a kind of subtle diplomacy between those two representatives.

It remains to be seen whether or not a meaningful discussion can take place. I think, though, the fact that both sides felt compelled to send delegations to Arusha is at least some sign that there might indeed be a possibility of some negotiation.

Mr. BURTON. It is all in a state of flux right now, is the bottom line?

What about Burundi, what is the chance that this is going to spill over and end up with a similar holocaust taking place there?

Mr. MOOSE. Obviously, one of our greatest concerns and one of the highest motivations about trying to do something to calm the situation in Rwanda is to avoid that carnage and that tension spilling across the border into Burundi where one has the identical kind of a mix of populations, and a history of similar kinds of tension.

We have been greatly encouraged by the efforts that the Government in Burundi has undertaken to date to try to contain both the emotion and the passion and the violence in Burundi. They have worked very hard to establish an effective working relationship with the military in Burundi. That cooperation seems to be working.

We certainly are doing—we and others—are doing all we can to give greater confidence to that process and to support it. It is one of the reasons, again, that John Shattuck will be going to Bujumbura.

We are hopeful, but by the same token, I think it is fair to say that unless the violence on the other side of the frontier can somehow be brought under control and contained, there is that risk that the situation could spill across there.

Mr. BURTON. I wonder if—I know our State Department is doing everything they can and our U.N. Ambassador is doing everything they can to try to come up with a solution to the problem.

Would it be helpful if this subcommittee and maybe the like committee in the Senate wrote communiques to the leaders of the warring factions over there? I don't know whether that would have any impact or not, but I am sure we would be very happy on a biparti-

san basis to do whatever was helpful to the State Department and the U.N. delegation to bring this to a conclusion.

Mr. MOOSE. I certainly can't see it doing any harm. It would reinforce the efforts that we and others have been making in that same direction to try to bring home to the leaders on both sides, the urgency of bringing the violence under control.

Mr. BURTON. I would suggest to our Chairman that maybe we ought to have a delegation letter to the leaders of the various factions to try to bring that to a conclusion, if it would help.

The last thing I would like to ask is regarding the refugees, I mean, they are pouring across the border by hundreds of thousands. Are there adequate facilities and supplies and are we getting those there rapidly enough to make sure that there is not some kind of epidemic or people dying from other causes because of lack of facilities?

Mr. MOOSE. Our people from OFDA, the Foreign Disaster Assistance Office and our Bureau of Refugee Programs have been working flat out with other relief agencies to try to ensure that there is an adequate response, particularly to the latest surge of refugees into Tanzania over the weekend. We have a team that will be leaving today or tomorrow to head out to the region of Ngara.

Brunson McKinley who is accompanying John Shattuck on this trip will also be going to Ngara. In a sense, the circumstances of the people who came across the border over the weekend are reasonably good in that they were fleeing ahead of violence, they were not caught up in the violence. Many of them have come, villages intact, with belongings and goods, and so the immediate problem of their care and feeding is manageable.

The World Food Program assures us that they have currently a supply that will last the first 7 days. Obviously, the challenge now is to make sure that adequate supplies are there for beyond that period.

I think the most difficult problem people are facing, according to what the reports we are seeing, is the problem of water. Water, in that they are being—there is rains, but there is also the contamination of the river because of the bodies which are floating down. And so that is the challenge I think that they are most concerned about over the next few days.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Burton, this is the largest number of refugees in the world right now.

Mr. Ambassador, there are some newspaper reports that the pro-Hutu contingency has a radio station in Kigali that is really spewing out a lot of propaganda to kill the Tutsis on sight. Is that correct?

Mr. MOOSE. This certainly was true up to about a week ago.

One of the things we were looking at very seriously over the weekend was whether we could and should deploy assets of our own to try to shut down or block out the transmissions of that radio station. The latest information that we have from our intelligence people is that over the last week, those broadcasts, those virulent broadcasts have ceased.

It should be pointed out the RPF made a determined effort to shut down that radio station and bombarded it. There is a possibil-

ity there may still be mobile radio stations. If so, we have not had a definitive evidence of that, but the current situation is that those most virulent and inciting broadcasts have ceased over the last week. In the meantime, other, a variety of different channels are being used to get other messages into Rwanda.

For example, the President's statement on Saturday was re-broadcast over the RPF radio station in Kigali and was widely heard and received in Rwanda. And we have made use of every other vehicle we could think of—VOA, BBC, RFI—to convey similar kinds of messages.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Is the administration considering trying to set up safe havens in Rwanda?

Mr. MOOSE. That is the suggestion that we have put to our colleagues at the U.N. to consider whether it is possible to establish safe havens or safe zones along the borders, that is on both sides of the border, Rwanda as well as Burundi, for the refugees and displaced people that we know are there. There are a lot of questions that will have to be answered in doing that.

Our hope is that this would be done in a permissive way, that there would be an understanding or an agreement on the part of both parties to allow this to happen. Our conversations, as Ms. Bushnell indicated earlier, do not rule that out, but neither do we have clear evidence that that would be accepted.

Mr. JOHNSTON. In talking to Mr. Khan yesterday, of the United Nations, he said that there really aren't any troops available in Africa that even can be rented, I hate to use that term, but mercenaries that will go in there. They just don't want to go in there.

Mr. MOOSE. He certainly would be in a position to know, because his job is that of trying to identify troop contributors for the various operations that we have around the world. I think even in Africa the troops have been deployed in a number of situations from Somalia to Mozambique, to currently in Liberia as well. Tanzanians, of course, have troops now in Liberia. It would not be an easy thing for them to do, and even if they were to be able to do it, I think we all understand that they would need logistical and financial support and to make it happen.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Judge, let me shift to the ranking member of the full committee.

Mr. Gilman, we appreciate your coming in today.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Johnston, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moose, some observers accuse the RPF of preventing refugees from crossing the border into Tanzania. Is there any truth to that?

Mr. MOOSE. It is a situation which, frankly, candidly it is difficult for us to understand exactly what has happened. We know that during the brief period before the RPF moved south to the border, there was a flood of refugees. The RPF continues to claim that it is not physically blocking the routes. At the same time, there continues to be a trickle of refugees across that frontier.

We know that people were fearful of retribution. We have reports, that the RPF has carried out selective killings of people they believe have been involved in the violence, but it is hard to get a firm determination as to whether or not there is a deliberate effort to block that border and keep people from coming across.

Mr. GILMAN. How many people from Rwanda fled to other neighboring countries?

Mr. MOOSE. Most of them, we saw over the weekend the surge of roughly 250,000 that came across the border into Tanzania. That added to an existing population there, refugee population of about 50,000. Those on other countries are relatively small numbers at the moment, the order of maybe 20,000 to 30,000 in Burundi, maybe 5,000 or 6,000 have crossed into Zaire.

Mr. GILMAN. Is there any organization that is helping to feed these people and house them?

Mr. MOOSE. Oh, indeed, UNHCR has been active both in Tanzania, in Burundi and in Zaire. ICRC has been extremely active, other private organizations like Medicins San Frontierre have been active as well.

Mr. GILMAN. How many have been internally displaced, would you estimate?

Mr. MOOSE. That is a figure that is extremely hard to get at because there are few if any people on the ground inside southern Rwanda to make that estimation, but one would estimate maybe on the order of 200,000 to 250,000 in southern Rwanda. In northern Rwanda as well, people have been displaced, and there at least international relief agencies do have access to them.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, are we considering any assistance package to the displaced people?

Mr. MOOSE. Indeed, the White House announced a new tranche of funding—\$15 million to the made available to finance the operations of ICRC, World Food Program and others.

In addition, commodities valued at some \$13 million are being made available, and another grant of \$1 million is being made available this week to ICRC for its activities in Rwanda.

Mr. GILMAN. ICRC will be in charge of distribution?

Mr. MOOSE. ICRC would be in charge of distribution.

Mr. GILMAN. Do we have any idea of how large a mission that would be?

Mr. MOOSE. I don't have the details. ICRC's presence in Kigali has fluctuated according to the security situation there. At one point, they had on the order of 40 to 50 ICRC employees. They had to reduce that number because of the direct threat to their employees. They still maintain a presence, but I don't know exactly how many at the present in Kigali itself.

Mr. GILMAN. Now the chairman mentioned some question about whether there are any troops available for peacekeeping. Do we have any idea of any?

Mr. MOOSE. I think the chairman was referring to the testimony provided or the briefing provided by Under Secretary General Gharekhan yesterday in which he indicated the U.N. was encountering difficulties in identifying African countries which were willing and able to contribute troops. That is a discussion which, of course, is ongoing in New York as well.

Mr. GILMAN. We have heard some reports about Egyptian and French involvement in the Rwandan war. Can you tell us if there is any information with regard to that?

Mr. MOOSE. The only thing I can say with regard, we have been in very close touch with French and Belgians and others through-

out this. I am persuaded that their view of what is needed in the current circumstances is consistent with our own.

The Egyptians, as the President of the OAU, have been actively involved, and we know that they have been in direct contact with the Secretary General of the United Nations to talk about what kind of collaboration might exist between the OAU and the U.N. in terms of responding to the crisis.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, how accurate are the reports that French weapons were manufactured in Egypt for shipment to the Rwandan Armed Forces?

Mr. MOOSE. I have seen that report, Congressman Gilman. I, frankly, at this point, have no way to verify it.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Judge Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief.

Mr. Moose, you have been a wealth of information for us, not only on this issue, but specifically today on this one, and I appreciate it so very much. My high level of frustration and my emotions regarding just the death of people and the immensity of it allows that I don't know who to direct questions or comments to.

It is just, in my view, unforgivable of humanity to allow a continuation of this kind of people slaughter, not only in Africa but around the world, and especially in Africa, and more specifically in Rwanda now, and Burundi, and as we speak, other areas of Africa in conflagration.

One of the reasons, and as you know from previous questions that I put to you, that I favor the use of forces in the locale in Africa. I came away from my trip with the chairman to Africa, with a clear view of Somalia, that I think we could have followed before any of your other involvement of this administration, and we didn't to our peril.

Central Africa provides, in some respects, the same opportunity. One of the reasons that I believe that there is a problem in developing forces that would be willing, say, for example, in Rwanda to go there, is that we haven't paid, not the United States, but the United Nations hasn't paid some of the other ones that went to some of the other places.

It is more than ironic, in my view, that 2 years ago when I was not here, Nigeria, as an example, was being hailed for its efforts in Liberia and in sending in troops to assist, et cetera, but those Nigerian troops, no matter the government, no matter the election, many of them haven't been paid. And unless we are willing—and that is my call—unless we are willing, United States and other donors to put the necessary resources in the development of military assets or to assist in appropriate peacekeeping and peace-making operations, then the real truth is there isn't anything we can do, and we need to fess up to it unless we are going to do that.

And I offer it only as a statement. I don't need a response. And I don't offer it as a question.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I don't—all I can say is I just can't fathom what is going on over there. The carnage is so great, it just mystifies me, I guess.

Mr. JOHNSTON. What were you saying, that the number equals half the population of Indianapolis?

Mr. BURTON. It is at least a third of Indianapolis, and when you think of that mass of humanity being killed in that short a period of time and the world sits back and wrings its hands and doesn't know what to do about it, it is kind of frustrating.

We get elected and we think we are going to come over here and make some great strides in trying to change the way mankind deals with one another and then we see this going on, and in just a matter of a few short weeks, the sense of frustration that I feel, I know everybody on this subcommittee feels right now, is probably greater than at any time in the last year or so.

I just wish there was something we could do. A lot of things come to mind, you know, air strikes and that sort of thing, but that is not going to solve the problem with 20,000, 30,000 troops on each side. So all I can say is you have a real challenge, Mr. Secretary, and I appreciate all the hard work you and the administration are trying to do, along with the U.N., to try to resolve it.

I wish you the best. If I or the committee can be of any help, I know we want to do everything we can to be of help.

Mr. MOOSE. I thank you.

I do think that it is hard to measure the impact, obviously, of the things that we are doing. I do think, however, it is important as one might say, to be a witness in the sense of making it clear to the people on the ground that their actions are not going unnoticed, and that those actions will risk punishment. And I think part of the effort here is to continue to focus the attention on what is going on in that situation, and that is one thing that we can all do.

And I again thank the chairman for convening this hearing today for that purpose.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Moose, thank you again for coming on such short notice.

As I continue to point out with the exception of Bosnia, and a lesser exception Haiti, every conflict in the world is under your jurisdiction, and I join with Congressman Burton, I wish you well and thank you very much.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thanks, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. JOHNSTON. We will impanel the second panel in 2 minutes, so if they will come forward.

The two members of our second panel are Alison Des Forges, a Ph.D., who is with the History Department of the State University of New York in Buffalo and also with Africa Watch. The other member of the panel is Monique Mujawamarija.

And if you don't mind, can I call you Monique?

Monique is a human rights activist and was in Rwanda on April 6 and may tell us about her escape.

Doctor, you are on. We sincerely appreciate your coming here today.

STATEMENT OF ALISON L. DES FORGES, Ph.D., HISTORY DEPARTMENT, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AND BUFFALO AND AFRICA WATCH

Ms. DES FORGES. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you very much for holding this hearing.

Those of us who care deeply about Rwanda feel that it is in venues such as this that we need to make our case. We appreciate very much the scheduling of this hearing and we appreciate very much the letter which you have written concerning this issue previously, and the activity of your staff and their accessibility to us.

I am by training a historian. I have had 20 years of field experience working in Rwanda and Burundi. I have prepared a statement which gives you some historical background. And while I would love to talk about history, obviously, we have more pressing concerns here today. So I will speak.

Mr. JOHNSTON. We will enter your statement in full.

Ms. DES FORGES. Thank you.

I will speak here instead as a member of the board of Human Rights Watch, the Africa Division, of which I was a founding member, and as the Chair of the International Commission on Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda, work which I have done since last year which involved investigation of human rights abuses in Rwanda.

I would like to deal with a number of separate issues here, mostly in response to the testimony we have already heard, because I think that is the best use of our time.

First of all, all of us are very much touched by the sympathy and the depth of concern which we have felt here at this panel this afternoon, and which we have also felt on the part of many members of the administration including people at the State Department, Ms. Bushnell, and many of her staff and Assistant Secretary Moose, and also on the part of members of the National Security Council where we have had discussions.

Many people care, but nothing happens. Why is that?

Let's try to talk about that a little bit. It is important to remark also that the very fact of holding this hearing is of enormous importance. We have in this room right now the Ambassador of Rwanda to the United States who is easily in contact with the very people whose behavior we have been discussing.

It is of very great importance that he realizes the kind of concern which you are demonstrating here, and for that reason alone, holding this hearing has been worthwhile. A term which we use at Human Rights Watch, which has been used by the Pope, which has been used by the International Red Cross is "genocide." Genocide, according to the definition and the International Convention Against Genocide involves: The killing, the intended killing of a group either in part or in whole, a systematic attempt to wipe out a people.

That is clearly what is happening here. For example, the killing of those orphans in the orphanage. Twenty-one children selected simply because they were Tutsi, for no other reason, no other crime, and their killing.

This clearly indicates to us the nature of this attempt, systematic attempt. As you have all realized and noted in your prepared statements, this has been a carefully organized attempt to wipe out

Tutsi who have for three years been targeted as scapegoats and as allies of the RPF—accomplices is the word that was used by the extremists, people who had no connection with the RPF, who are simply targeted in an effort to create an “us versus them” kind of mentality, to allow the extremists to rebuild a kind of Pan-Hutu solidarity at a time when the popularity of the President was slipping.

The responsibility of the so-called “interim government,” self-proclaimed government, whatever you want to call it, is very clear in a number of cases. And let me choose just one as an example, because it is one that touches my dear friend Monique who is here with us today.

We have talked about and you have talked about here the difference between the armed conflict between two armies and the slaughter of civilians. This is very important to recognize. The number of casualties from the fighting between armies is very limited—and, Mr. Burton, particularly in connection with your remarks about the kind of jeopardy U.N. troops would be in—we want to keep this in mind, that the fighting between the armies which is going on is only a very small part of the killing.

I don't know how many soldiers have been killed. It is a relatively small number. I guess in the past month I have become hard-hearted enough to say that I don't really care how many soldiers are killed. What I care are about the women and the children and the elderly who are being killed in churches and in hospitals and wherever they have tried to take refuge. These are the people that I think we have to show our concern for.

In the killing of these civilians, we are dealing with genocide. This is a word which we in the unofficial sector can put on the table. We recognize the difficulty for our Government or any other government in using it. And it wasn't solely the United States that balked at this during 8 hours of discussions last Friday in the Security Council. There were a number of other countries that balked at the use of the “G” word; right?

The reason for this reluctance to use the word “genocide” outright is that it carries a legal obligation for us to intervene. We have signed a treaty obligating ourselves to intervene to suppress and prevent genocide. That is why people don't put that word on the table.

Does that then remove us from—absolve us from a moral obligation to deal with it?

The U.N. resolution—excuse me, not a resolution, but the declaration of the Security Council, which came out last Friday night, uses everything except the word. It dances around it in every possible way so that we will not be held accountable.

Now, we have talked a lot about accountability here. We have talked about the accountability of the people carrying out the slaughter of innocent civilians. What is our accountability?

What is our accountability if we refuse to accept the consequences of calling something by its name? If this is genocide, why are we not calling it “genocide?” Why are we not acting to suppress and prevent it? What is our accountability in the face of the world and in the face of our children and our grandchildren?

We have all had the experience of wondering how could it have possibly been at the time of the holocaust that the world did nothing, that people didn't talk about it?

What do we say to our children and our grandchildren when they say there were hundreds of thousands of people wiped out in 1 month in Rwanda, and we didn't call it by its name.

OK. I am a pragmatist at this point. If it is a choice between saving the word or saving lives, I am for saving lives. Let's not deal with the word if the word is troublesome. But let us remember the moral obligation that is incumbent upon us because of what is happening, and it is genocide.

Mr. Moose has talked about the Presidential statement which was issued this last weekend. Certainly that was an important statement, and we welcome it. We are dealing with a situation where Rwanda is highly dependent upon international assistance. We know that, and the Rwandans know that. Everyone who is a major player here knows that no regime established in that country is going to be able to make it without significant international assistance.

We asked 10 days ago, we asked the State Department of our Government to get together with all other donor and potential donor nations to make a unanimous public statement following exactly the lines that the President issued last weekend. There is a precedent for this. There have been on any number of occasions joint action among the donor nations and involving also the World Bank.

For example, last August when it was getting very difficult to get the Arusha Accords signed, there was a deadline of August 9 that said no more foreign aid unless this accord is signed. The accord was signed. The effect of a joint declaration would be enormous.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Excuse me. More so than a United Nations declaration?

Ms. DES FORGES. Yes, because United Nations doesn't give aid. We are talking about dollars. Why is it not possible for our President to pick up the telephone and to call the Presidents of other donor nations and to say: Gentlemen, this is something we can clearly agree upon, from whatever point of view we are addressing this. Let us issue a joint statement, as we have done in the past for far less significant issues touching Rwanda. Let us make clear that this genocide is not tolerated, that this will not be acceptable.

Here it is more than 29 days, more than a month that people have been slaughtered. Why have we not had this form of international declaration?

It costs nothing, no troops are in jeopardy, no lives are at stake. But the symbolic value of it is enormous in a society that values symbols very highly. Now, presumably the people who are most involved in this kind of slaughter of civilians may not be touched, but to return to Mr. Johnston's point, that this is an African conflict that deserves—that must have an African solution, even more, it is a Rwandan conflict that must have a Rwandan solution, I think we can all agree on that.

How do we achieve such a solution? One way is to encourage moderates within the country. We have got to believe that the vast

majority of Rwandans of whatever political conviction are as much repulsed by this kind of killing as we ourselves are.

We are all fundamentally human beings from whatever kind of cultural background we come. It has got to be as repugnant to them as it is to us.

Why does the majority, then, of more moderate people, why do they tolerate or permit this to continue?

Well, I speak here based on information from a variety of Rwandan contacts which I have tried to maintain very actively over the past month, although it has been difficult because the Rwandan authorities cut the phone connections for a period of time. This made it very difficult for us, and clearly this was their intention to make it difficult for us to assemble information.

All information that I have been able to gather suggests, indeed demonstrates quite conclusively, that there are moderates, but they are isolated, they are intimidated, they are separated one from the other. What can we do to encourage these people to get together and to take the situation back in hand, to take it away from the extremists who are basically a small group?

One thing we can do is to make clear to them that there is no benefit to them personally and no benefit to their country in continuing this kind of massacre. When they get up in the morning and they decide "how far am I going to go today," we need to make sure they understand that continuing to collaborate is going to personally bring them nothing.

They need to know that no regime established this way is going to be able to continue and to make it, and therefore that putting themselves together with these people is going to mean an end to their personal careers.

OK, we are dealing with opportunism here, but let's admit it, everyone acts from a mixture of idealistic and opportunistic motives. If they know that this will bring them nothing, surely it will help them to disassociate from this kind of activity. That is why we advocate so urgently some form of joint international action, because only in that kind of context is it clear to them there is no possibility that this regime can succeed.

That is why we need to bring France on board. And while I think Mr. Moose is excessively gentle in his treatment of the French, I do have to say that in the interest, perhaps, of getting a joint statement, maybe diplomacy is a little bit better than frank talk. Along with this clear indication at the government level that such a regime is not going to make it, we need to have at the level of the individuals, exactly the kind of statements which we have been calling for here, making them clearly accountable for what is happening.

They need to know that their names are in the international arena. Sure, we can't put their names out there and say Colonel Nkundiyé is a murderer. There are libel suits, after all; right?

But what we can do is say Colonel Nkundiyé occupies a key position in the Rwandan military command. Colonel Bizimungu is the Commander in Chief of the Rwandan Armed Forces, Colonel Mpiranya is the Commander in Chief of the Presidential Guard, we can say these names and we can say you people are responsible.

We can say the name of Mrs. Habyarimana, and say Mrs. Habyarimana, you are a person of enormous stature in your society. These military people will listen to you. We appeal to you in the name of humanity—

Mr. JOHNSTON. That is the widow?

Ms. DES FORGES. That is the widow—to call upon these army officers and these civilians to demand that they stop this. We need to put those names out there. In the same way that this can operate at the governmental level, indicating that there is a united international front, it can operate in the same way at the level of individuals. This can say to those people who are making up their minds, those wavering moderates: Hey, guys, your names are going to be up there, too, unless we get some change in your behavior.

So that is why we are pressing very hard for this kind of strategy within the country to help those people come together and take the risks necessary to confront the extremists.

The radio. The radio.

Mr. JOHNSTON. You were shaking your head quite vociferously.

Ms. DES FORGES. I know, I find it hard to control my emotions, you will have to excuse me.

The radio has been knocked out three times, but it has started operating again three times. As of this morning, it was operating. As of yesterday, it was operating. This radio continues to call for killing of the Tutsi. It has set a deadline, gentlemen, it has set a deadline.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Day after tomorrow; isn't it?

Ms. DES FORGES. The original deadline was the sixth. Now, I believe it may be the 10th.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What do you mean "deadline?" To kill them all?

Ms. DES FORGES. Yes, netoyage, it is called.

Mr. BURTON. The Ambassador is here, and his government is doing that?

Ms. DES FORGES. His government is doing that.

Actually, no, I misspeak. No, it is a private radio station. We are talking here about the privatization of violence.

What has happened is that the initial efforts of this group of extremists which were sent through official channels began to switch to private channels as a result of the work of Monique and the human rights movement within Rwanda, and the result of criticism of international associations. This is a country which is highly sensitive to international opinion. When it became clear that we were criticizing this government because its officials were calling for the massacre of Tutsi and because people in positions of authority were implicated in these massacres, what happened?

President Habyarimana created the militia. The militia bands, groups mostly of unemployed young people, attached to his political party and then to the closely allied CDR political party. This allowed them to displace responsibility from officials on to the militia structure so they could say: Hey, guys, we are not doing this, this is popular anger, this is popular wrath. We cannot control it; right?

In the same way Radio Rwanda, the national Rwandan radio, played a key role in the massacre of Tutsi in Bugesera in March 1992. We pinpointed that. We talked about that, we drew attention

to the role played by its director, and we can put his name in the record, too, Ferdinand Nahimana, a very distinguished historian, a colleague of mine.

When someone asks me had I lost a lot of friends, just as a parentheses, I can say I have lost many friends through death, I have lost other friends through enormous disillusionment, people who are still alive but who are dead to me.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just clarify one thing. I think this is very, very important. You are saying that the radio station that is now roving around the countryside is at least with a tacit support of the government, asking for the annihilation of the Tutsis?

Ms. DES FORGES. I am saying that.

Mr. BURTON. So it is not directly the government, they have now tried to distance themselves, but they are tacitly supporting it?

Is it your belief that the government could shut that radio station down in a minute if they wanted to?

Ms. DES FORGES. Without any doubt.

Mr. BURTON. So they could shut it down?

Ms. DES FORGES. Without any doubt.

Mr. BURTON. I think that is criminal. I think that is criminal.

Ms. DES FORGES. It is criminal.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Doctor, you might want to wind up so we could have an opportunity to ask you some questions.

Ms. DES FORGES. Excuse me, Monique is commenting here, that the owner of this radio station is the son-in-law of President and Mrs. Habyarimana, he is one of the owners of this radio station, that is how closely connected this is.

Now, after the Bugesera massacre, when we highlighted the role played by the national radio, what happened?

Privatization again, gentlemen. They moved it on to this privately owned radio station so that the national radio does not play the same role any longer, but instead Radio des Milles Collines is broadcasting these calls and they are the most lurid incitements to violence you can imagine: "The grave is half full, who can help us fill it up by morning?"

This radio continues to broadcast. There is the incident that Mr. Moose referred to yesterday when finally the U.N. went to try to rescue the people at Hotel Milles Collines and was stopped by a crowd of civilians and military people there. The orders to them to stop this convoy and to refuse to let these people pass was given by this radio.

It transmits its message intermittently. It no longer broadcasts on a fixed schedule. Its beam is no longer anywhere near as powerful as it was, but it is doing its job in Kigali. And it is saying that it is time to finish the job. OK? Let me deal with the OAU.

Mr. JOHNSTON. If you could do it quickly.

Ms. DES FORGES. I am sorry.

The U.N. troops—but these are all very, very important points.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I understand, and I think a lot of this we could elicit through questions and answers.

Ms. DES FORGES. The U.N. troops.

Mr. Burton spoke of "dire jeopardy," was one phrase, and of "cannon fodder" as another phrase. What we are advocating is a return of U.N. troops to Rwanda.

We are not suggesting that they go between opposing armies. We are suggesting that they go against these militia units who are civilians who have had most of them a maximum of three weeks military training and most of whom are now armed with machetes and spears.

Our supposition is that a regular army force with a certain amount of central direction and strategic know how would be able to deal with this kind of threat without letting its soldiers become cannon fodder.

There are no cannons. There are machetes and spears; right?

Mr. Moose has suggested that it was at the specific request of General Dallaire that the peacekeeping force was cut back because Dallaire felt his troops were in jeopardy. That is not my understanding. My understanding is that General Dallaire was anxious to have that peacekeeping force remain at strength. U.N. troops have not been directly targeted.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Who made that decision then to pull them?

Ms. DES FORGES. Excuse me?

Mr. JOHNSTON. Who made the decision to pull the troops?

Ms. DES FORGES. U.N. Security Council.

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK.

Ms. DES FORGES. With U.S. leadership. We played a leading role in the withdrawal of those troops; that is clear.

In terms of casualties, there have been 10 U.N. soldiers killed. They were killed the first day. They were killed because they were protecting the prime minister who was the "A, No. 1" target.

They were also killed because they were Belgian. That was not accidental. Since that time, we have had 4 weeks of extraordinary violence. There has not been a single U.N. soldier killed. There have been, I believe, seven or eight wounded.

Now, gentlemen, how do we balance the potential risk, a possible risk to some professional soldiers, the possibility that some handful of professional soldiers may be injured or killed, against the absolute certainty that any failure to act is going to result in the absolute death, no doubt about it, certain death of thousands of civilians?

How can we possibly balance that equation and say we cannot send those troops back because they are at risk?

There is no way we can make that decision. The United States must play a leading role in reversing its stance in the Security Council and persuading people now to take the opposite tack and to start sending troops back in.

It can begin now with those 600 who are in Nairobi. They can be there an hour and a half from now, on the spot, making a difference in protecting orphanages and hospitals and churches, right away.

They can enter through the southern part of the country and not enter the battle zone at all. They can go into the Rwandan Government-controlled area where they are not going to be at risk of battle, but where they are going to deal with these armed militia that are in the process of killing people.

I will stop. Let you have some questions.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Well, first, we want to hear from Monique.

Ms. DES FORGES. May I introduce Monique. I will translate for her.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Give us a little biography, if you could.

Ms. DES FORGES. Monique is an outstanding human rights activist from Rwanda, the mother of three children, whose lives are still at risk in the province of Butare. The Executive Director of the Human Rights League of the Great Lakes, referring to the Great Lakes of Africa, not the United States.

Monique has been outstanding in bringing together Hutu and Tutsi people in creating a very effective human rights organization within Rwanda, and then after that building a coalition that included other human rights organizations throughout the whole country. And then finally creating a coalition that included human rights groups from Rwanda Burundi and Zaire.

She is a person of extraordinary dynamism, warmth and commitment, as you will soon see. And has put her own life at risk any number of times to defend other people.

She has been threatened numerous times, once before my eyes, with death by Captain Pascal Simbikangwa who was a close associate of President Habyarimana.

She has suffered any number of phone calls to her house, threats over the famous radio station, broadcasting saying: Here is a woman who is a traitor to her country, she deserves to die.

She bears on her face the scars of a so-called automobile accident. She was clearly targeted with death at the time when this violence began in the systematic effort to wipe out the political opposition and human rights leaders.

I am sure Monique would attribute her escape to "the grace of God," as she has said many times, to the positive thoughts and concern of many people throughout the world.

She was probably the only person in the Rwandan crisis who had a vigil going for her at a church in Venezuela, Buddhist prayers going for her in Southeast Asia, my mother-in-law in Arizona, she had prayers all over which helped her to escape. And since she has been able to do that, she has been a very effective spokesperson for her country in Europe and Canada and in the United States.

Monique has some hesitations about her English, although we tell her she is actually learning a lot, so I will translate for her.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I recognize that I am in some respects a bit out of order, but in light of the revelations that were made by the professor, it causes me a bit of concern, and I recognize the lady's great interest and concern and willingness to testify before this subcommittee, but I also don't think we ought to be because of our great way of going about public affairs, cause another person private concerns.

My point is that perhaps it could be that the committee members who are interested, could meet with her privately and talk with her, rather than have her put something on the record in the presence of persons who may very well take umbrage. And I mean no offense to those persons. I don't know anything about the situation.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I would imagine her history is such that this is just a cup of tea for her this afternoon.

Mr. HASTINGS. Oh, all right. I understand.

Mr. JOHNSTON. But, no, you brought up a very valid point, and I think if you could ask her.

Ms. DES FORGES. I hear her answer already. She is saying—over here since my colleague had translated for her, she says she has nothing more to risk than what she has already risked.

Mr. HASTINGS. Fine.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I appreciate you bringing it up.

STATEMENT OF MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA, RWANDAN ESCAPEE AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE OF THE GREAT LAKES

Mr. JOHNSTON. Please proceed.

Ms. MUJAWAMARIYA. [As translated.] I would like to begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues for the interest that you are showing in Rwanda.

Let me say that since I have been here in the United States, I find myself going between hot and cold, encouraged and supported by the warmth of interest that I feel on one side, and yet on the other side, chilled by the lack of action.

I have experienced so much goodwill and sympathy at so many levels, even up to the White House where the President has issued the declaration that you know about, but yet people continue to die, children continue to die, and this causes me to wonder even how many people have died just in the time that we have been sitting here wondering what to do about it.

You have expressed your frustration, you can certainly understand how much greater it is for me. When I was in Rwanda, we had the visit of Ms. Bushnell of the State Department who gave us a very fine speech about all of us being residents of a single village and that this village is called the world, the planet world, but yet this is obviously a village that has no chief because if there were a chief we wouldn't have children being killed, being shot to death by soldiers in Rwanda.

In October at the time of the assassination of President Ndadaye, I was very much concerned at the lack of international concern, very much troubled by the lack of international concern. I have been active in Burundi in my capacity as Executive Director of this Joint Human Rights League.

What happened in Burundi is now happening in Rwanda and it is certainly going to be happening in Zaire. Are you not afraid that some day it is going to be happening here?

Mr. JOHNSTON. We will have to go into recess in about 10 minutes, but we will be back.

Mr. BURTON. Before we leave, I would like to make a brief comment.

I won't be able to come back, and so at the conclusion of your remarks, if it would be possible, if I could have just about a minute, that is all I need.

Mr. JOHNSTON. If she is like Dr. Des Forges, she will not complete her remarks.

Mr. BURTON. Can I make just one real brief comment, Mr. Chairman, I hate to interrupt the proceedings?

Mr. JOHNSTON. Sure, go ahead.

Mr. BURTON. I met with the Ambassador from Rwanda before, very briefly before we came, and I have had an open mind on the subject. And I would like to think I still have an open mind.

However, if there is a grain of truth, Mr. Ambassador, if there is just a grain of truth in what I have heard here today, I am just appalled that the Government of Rwanda and the Hutus are letting this genocide, and I will call it what it is, take place.

I understand that the lady who is speaking right now is a Hutu, and so she has no axe to grind, if you will, because of her tribal affiliation or her background. And all I can think of when I listen to this is Idi Amin.

Idi Amin is a name in the world that is hated by anyone who believes in human rights, everybody. And I submit to you, Mr. Ambassador, that your government, if this continues, will go down in the annals of history right alongside Idi Amin. And I will also say to you that I think you will find that this government here is not going to be that tolerant for very long.

We have a bipartisan group here, Democrats and Republicans who will be telling our President that every step possible should be taken to put pressure on that government to stop this genocide. And that will include, I am confident, cutting off of aid, international trade, embargoes, everything else.

It happened with South Africa, and it took some time, but it worked. And I guarantee you that there will be bipartisan support for that kind of endeavor if that stuff doesn't stop.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you, Mr. Burton.

I guess we will break. But before we do, for fear that the Ambassador will not come back, I would just like to make an observation, too.

When the President of Burundi, a Hutu, was assassinated by the Tutsi Army there, I immediately met with the Ambassador from Burundi to the United States. It was a very touching moment, because I had met with the President of Burundi several weeks before, and really felt, you know, that it was a turnaround of this country.

I mourned his death, seriously. I went to the embassy to sign the book there. I wrote a letter to the government. So what we are saying has nothing to do with ethnicity here today.

We are talking about the humanity of man. And so that is the same message I will communicate to the Ambassador that this has got to stop.

We will be in recess for about 15 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. We will continue with Monique's testimony.

Ms. MUJAWAMARIYA. [As translated.] Ever since the drama in Burundi, I have had to wonder what this new world amounts to under American leadership and what does this all mean, the question about universality of human rights, when even the United States goes to the aid of Kuwait, why is it doing nothing for the children of Rwanda?

In this world there are people who have chosen to be soldiers; their job is to defend civilians. Are there really no soldiers anywhere who will come to the defense of these civilians? And what

about the U.N. force, the UNAMIR that had to withdraw to protect itself? Is it its job to protect itself or to protect the civilians?

I am in the uncomfortable position of having to ask a lot of questions to which there are no answers.

Is it because I come from a small country, a country that has no natural resources, a country that is inhabited by black people; is that why we have no action here? Why, despite all the sympathy and warmth I feel around me, is nothing being done?

I think it is time for us to put the question once again before the United Nations, what is the value of human life? Are we human beings like all others? If that is the case, then why is there no defense for us; and if it is said we are not human beings like all others, then let us die in silence.

Sometimes I wonder—when I came here to the West, I thought I was saved; and sometimes I wonder what it was for, what the purposes of all of this is—wouldn't it have been better if I had stayed at home and died and not had this kind of suffering?

Obviously, you are uncomfortable, too, at what is happening; but I have to ask you, what good does this do, at what door should we be knocking? To whom do we go for responsibility?

There are three points here: one, for example, the radio.

It is possible to stop this radio from broadcasting. It will cost money. But then we have to ask, how much are you willing to pay to save, say, 500 lives, those 500 lives in Kigali put at risk by the broadcast of this radio.

In speaking of the future of Rwanda, there are people from the democratic opposition who have been able to be saved, people—some of them in Rwanda, some of them outside the country—who exist to form the nucleus of a new legitimate government. These people, most of whom are scattered, are not in contact with each other; most of them have absolutely no means of support. And there is the case here of the Prime Minister Designate who had to appeal to us to get the money to buy a plane ticket to get from Nairobi to Europe so he could meet with colleagues. He was unable to find any support anywhere so he turned to human rights friends, saying, could you help me pay for this plane ticket?

He couldn't make phone calls out of this miserable little hotel he was hiding in in Nairobi because he didn't have the money to put on deposit to make phone calls even in Nairobi. How can someone in those conditions begin to think about reestablishing a legal government?

Obviously, they have to be located, they have to be brought together, they have to have some support so they can start to think about the future of the country.

Central Africa is living through a time of terrible drama now where human rights are being trampled under foot. The human rights of this new world are no longer honored, they don't exist, they are being destroyed by these dictators who have been fattened by the outside world.

I will stop here because everything I have to say, you already know.

Stop the massacres. Go to the rescue of the children. You know those things. People say them every day, but where is the action? That is what we need to know.

Mr. JOHNSTON. We have an expression, Monique, in the United States, a Baptist expression, that sometimes you are preaching to the choir.

Ms. DES FORGES. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Both Mr. Payne and I agree almost 100 percent with everything you say. I am a little defensive though about the United States, inasmuch as we pay one-third of the operating cost of the United Nations, 25 percent of the peacekeeping costs to the United Nations.

We are a world power—we are the world power, but not the only power in the world; and to put sole responsibility of monitoring and protecting every country in Africa, when we were not a colonial power, I think is unfair.

Both Mr. Payne and I voted against Desert Storm because, as you point out obliquely, the only reason we went there is because of the oil involved. You asked the question why we do not invade Rwanda; is it because you are black and there are no resources there?

My answer is yes to both questions.

A great degree of our foreign policy now, I think, is based on race and I do not deny that. I apologize for it.

So much has run our foreign policy because of Somalia. If you could have heard the debate on getting out of Somalia, either immediately January 1 or March 31, you would have thought we had become an isolationist country; and I, on the floor of the House, stated that I thought I was in a time warp dealing with the League of Nations and Henry Cabot Lodge.

To you, Doctor, you stated—again, I agree with you 100 percent—that we ought to weigh a handful of professional soldiers vis-a-vis the number of soldiers that we save—not number of soldiers, human beings that we save.

We lost 30 men in Somalia, professional soldiers, first volunteering to get in the army, and second, volunteering to get in the Rangers, which was a combat operation.

We lost 30 in a period of 14 months. We lost almost that many in Grenada in 5 days and in Panama in 12 days.

How many people did we save there?

But once CNN picked up that soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, it totally changed our foreign policy, probably for the next 2 years.

Ms. DES FORGES. Yes, sir, yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Other than having troops in Macedonia or North Dakota or something like that, you will not see us commit American troops anywhere, particularly to the African continent. It is just a political fact of life; we might as well accept that.

Monique says, how much are we willing to pay to close the radio station? I point out that we spent \$1.5 billion in Somalia and saved 400,000 Somalians from starving to death.

We are now marshaling all of the resources to put troops into Liberia; the United Nations is looking to us to totally underwrite the Angola operation, which is going to cost several million dollars, inasmuch as you are talking about between 5,000 and 10,000 troops that it will be necessary to put in Angola.

We are not going to put in any American troops, but we are going to underwrite the operation.

We are underwriting the operation in Mozambique today where there are 6,000 troops there. So when it comes to money, we are willing to sign the check even though we are \$4.5 trillion in debt.

Conversely, we are now probably the 18th country in per capita giving for peacekeeping. The Scandinavians, as you know, eat us alive when it comes to that. The Japanese are way ahead of us. The French, that is very embarrassing; they are way ahead of us.

So the question that you have on a handful of professional soldiers, would you include in that mix American soldiers?

Ms. DES FORGES. Mr. Johnston, I certainly must bow to your superior sense of the realities of American political life. My limited observations of American political life would lead me to agree completely with your analysis. So I wouldn't have expected anyone to recommend the sending of American forces.

As I understand it, a number of African leaders are beginning to mobilize and take a fairly strong position on this issue. We have a declaration that was signed by Mr. Mandela, for example, then by Bishop Tutu, Salim Salim, Secretary of the OAU. We know Salim Salim has played a very active role in diplomacy here and is willing to put himself out to try to organize an African organization.

We know President Museveni of Uganda said some time ago that he would make it a matter of personal honor to be sure that African troops were available.

Mr. JOHNSTON. You have got to admit Museveni is out of the picture.

Ms. DES FORGES. I am not speaking of his own troops, but he would find other African countries further removed from the conflict, shall we say, who would be able to supply troops.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me interrupt you there. Name a country willing to send somebody there today in Africa.

Ms. DES FORGES. There are Tunisians there, and there is a real possibility they would be willing to increase their contingent.

Mr. JOHNSTON. From peacekeeping to peacemaking?

Ms. DES FORGES. That is the question, do you need to do that? Do you need to make that distinction? Is it not possible simply to regard it as an extension of the humanitarian mission, the assistance to—

Mr. JOHNSTON. The Belgians pulled out because they did not have authority to shoot back.

Ms. DES FORGES. Right. You clearly have to have the authority to shoot back.

Mr. JOHNSTON. And you have to expand the term "humanitarian."

Ms. DES FORGES. You would have to interpret that in the broadest possible terms. Lawyers know how to do these things, right? The Senegalese and Tanzanians have also indicated some willingness to provide troops. I know that General Dallaire has approached the Canadian Government. There are avenues open there.

I think all of us feel to a certain extent paralyzed. It is so horrible. It is so horrible that people seem to have lost their capacity for any form of imaginative thinking. But surely if the United

States began to play a more active role—and we have heard from representatives of the administration that they have been playing an active role, and indeed they have, but in the wrong direction as far as the U.N. is concerned. But if they were to play an active role in the opposite direction and start to go around and urge, encourage, and provide some leadership, it seems to me we would be able to put together those African troops.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I met with the Canadian ambassador to the United States, and they are pulling out of Cyprus at the end of this year and they have 4,000 in Bosnia. They are stretched.

Ms. DES FORGES. They are pretty stretched, yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I certainly appreciate the testimony that you and Ms. Monique gave here today.

Unfortunately, I missed our Ambassador Moose's testimony but I, too, feel outraged that nothing has happened around the world as relates to the problem there in Rwanda. It appears to me that the Secretary-General of the United Nations would—is interested and would like to see something happen, but of course there can be no movement until the Security Council acts.

And I think it is unfortunate that Belgium has not taken more of an aggressive role in attempting to highlight the situation there and to attempt to rally support in the West around the situation.

I agree with the chairman, Chairman Johnston, that the United States cannot be held accountable for the inaction in Rwanda. I think that the—

Mr. JOHNSTON. Totally accountable. Solely accountable.

Mr. PAYNE. Right. I think that pointing the finger at anyone is not answering the question; but if anyone, I think that Western Europeans, Belgium, the colonial powers should have come up with some initiatives, come up with more immediate action. As a matter of fact, with the Belgian troops there at the time of the downing of the plane, it seems to me that if they were there in a peacekeeping role, with equipment and personnel and intelligence, it seems kind of inconceivable to me that a plane with two Presidents on it could be shot down if everyone was doing their job.

That certainly is a mystery as to who would want to down a plane with two Presidents and who the culprits are there. There are, of course, many—several fingers being pointed at different groups, but the bottom line is that the tragedy simply really sparked, as you know, the whole situation.

It seems to me that the—that with anticipating the Arusha Accords, almost about to be implemented, that common sense would tell you that those people who want to detract from a settlement will just sort of escalate the violence. We saw that in South Africa for months—as the elections came closer, the violence was escalated.

We see it in Israel; as the talks become more palatable and as agreements become more in accord, then we find that the extreme groups are trying to stop the talks and to create havoc so that these accords will not happen.

So it is unfortunate that the same kind of anticipation of the implementation of the Arusha Accords, the Rwanda Patriotic Front being allowed to have troops right in the city, that they were mov-

ing toward at least an accommodation; and that the extremist groups, whoever they are, would then act out.

The other sad part is the situation in existence there had been allowed to go on for decades and decades and decades, where colonial powers felt it to their advantage to keep ethnic groups at each others' throats so that they could more easily control and rule. The Germans before the end of World War I and the Belgians, following that, continued to allow minorities to exploit the majority and having deep-seated anger for decades and decades and decades to the point, when the tables had turned, then centuries or decades of deprivation and anger comes out in situations like this.

You know, the International Red Cross was working in Rwanda very, very strongly; and we met in Geneva with them about a year ago and heard about the great work that they were doing, trying to bring this situation to bear. It is sad that practically everyone else looked the other way. No one really had a strong concern about the problem of Burundi and Rwanda; they were just two little places tucked away in the middle of Africa and that was that.

It appeared to me that the U.N., that the OAU, that NATO countries, that all of the countries, rather than working toward some sort of conflict resolution—I am talking about for the last 20 and 30 years to work with the leadership ever since even before independence—that no one really worked hard at trying to bring these two groups together because they are—they have more in common than they have in differences.

They share everything, and if one group does well, the other group does well. Rather than see each other as enemies, they really should be seeing each other as friends and brothers and comrades to be working toward a positive solution.

So I guess this is certainly once again an example of where everybody looked the other way. Nobody really paid much attention. But the carnage cannot go on. There has to be something that must happen even if it is a temporary protective status, as we saw in Iraq with the Kurds. That would be an immediate answer where you don't have to confront troops, where you simply draw a line and let people be on one side, attempt to have corridors where the troops could allow people to have safe passage.

I think that might be one of the solutions which would not create a situation that would be hostile enough for lives to be lost from the United Nations, but simply a corridor and a safe-haven temporarily so that Tanzania will simply not be overrun. They cannot handle the crowds and there must be some infrastructure developed and built where the refugees currently are.

So I just hope that after this hearing and we gather the testimony that we can meet with our State Department and ask them to really push with the two envoys that have been sent over to the region to work along with other Western states to see if we can move toward getting troops.

I believe also Egypt has a strong interest in Rwanda and President Mubarak could possibly make, from what I understand, troops from Egypt available to help in a peacekeeping situation.

So there are definitely remedies. There are definitely ways that we can move in the direction.

But I, too, want to associate myself with the remarks of the Chairman and Representative Burton as relates to the official government. If the official government is allowing this kind of agitation to continue with the radio stations and with them looking the other way, then I think that this is really a crime.

I would certainly hope that the government would take some affirmative action and attempt to assist in the cessation of the carnage rather than looking the other way and tacitly approving of what is going on.

I don't have any questions, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to make those few remarks.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I think Monique wanted a rebuttal first.

Ms. MUJAWAMARIYA. [As translated.] I have followed closely the role that Belgium has played in its relationship with President Habyarimana and especially the role it has played recently in the defense of human rights in Rwanda.

Habyarimana in a most scandalous way divided the foreign Ambassadors into two groups, and those who were not willing to close their eyes to human rights violations, he refused to have anything to do with them.

It was because of this that the Belgians had no further influence with Habyarimana and his government, because they had taken a strong stand in favor of human rights. And I can say that on the very day that I was evacuated, the Belgian ambassador received telephone threats against his life because of the position that he had taken.

Belgium had in the last few months sent a number of ministers to Rwanda—Minister Martin, Minister Claas and the Minister of Defense—and all these people were unable to get any satisfaction from Habyarimana. He lied to them and sent them away without any result because his intention was never to put into effect the Arusha Accords.

It goes back to 1990 at the start of the war with the Rwandan Patriotic Front when Belgium, after having initially sent troops to repatriate some citizens, had withdrawn from Rwanda and no longer supported Habyarimana against the Patriotic Front; and this was interpreted by Habyarimana as a form of desertion, as a result of which he became more closely allied with the French, who put in their troops and stayed and stayed and stayed.

The relations between France and Belgium disintegrated to a certain extent, even to such point that France refused to help evacuate Belgian citizens at the start of the evacuation time. Because of this lack of collaboration between Belgium and France, this meant that Belgium had no way, even indirectly, to influence the Habyarimana regime.

In terms of relationships between the plane crash and the massacres which followed, it was clear that the crash itself was only a pretext, a trigger to set off a plan which had been in preparation for a very long time in terms of the army and the militia—for example, the careful establishment of which neighborhoods to attack, the lists of people who were to be killed first, all of this had been well organized in advance; and the crash simply was the pretext for making this all happen.

I very much appreciate and want to thank you for your expression of concern about the need to establish an adequate mechanism for resolving conflicts. This certainly needs to be a top priority in this new world that we talk about and even if it cannot benefit the people of Rwanda perhaps it will be able to save some others in the future.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I might just say that trying to listen to speculation as to who may have been the responsible ones, one of the prognostications was that perhaps remnants of the army were fearful that the President was going to make some broad moves with the Arusha Accords; but listening to you, you indicated that you doubt seriously whether there was or would be a true push on the part of the President, so therefore, that kind of speculation—I am not asking you for an answer because no one knows—but that would sort of eliminate the speculation that persons in the military, afraid that justice might be dispensed and have all people once again back in the government and the military and so forth, then that was, in your opinion, not a real possibility?

Ms. MUJAWAMARIYA. [As translated.] In fact, I believe that it is not impossible that the plane crash was linked to this fear of the Arusha Accords being implemented.

Three days before the crash happened, I was threatened in the most outrageous and open fashion by a woman, the wife of a man who for 18 years was highly placed in the military intelligence in Rwanda. This woman called me and threatened me with a gruesome death, saying that I would be tied to a post outside my house and eaten by dogs and birds.

She said also that the RPF would be pushed back to Uganda and that this would then allow these kinds of attacks against us who had opposed Habyarimana—while most of us were thinking the opposite, that the RPF would come into the country as a result of the Arusha Accords.

The fact that these threats could be made against me—at this point, it seems to me that those two things were linked.

Mr. JOHNSTON. We have to close down in about 5 minutes, and, Doctor, I am going to give you the last word. That is very dangerous, I realize, but we have to vote and terminate the meeting.

Before I do, let me ask a favor of you. If you could give the names of the military leaders that you cited before, to Ted, we may also include that in a letter.

Ms. DES FORGES. Thank you, Mr. Johnston. Attached to my testimony is a statement issued by Mr. Anthony Lake after he had had met with Monique a week ago Friday, and these names appear in that statement. It was actually a very important step for the White House to have taken, to name those names.

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK, thank you.

[The information appears in the appendix.]

Ms. DES FORGES. In conclusion, I would like to stress the importance of central control for this kind of violence. It is essential to look beyond the kind of cliché that this so-called government is trying to foist on us, the cliché that "Africans are bound to be violent, and we all know they kill each other."

Let me mention in the Province of Butare in southern Rwanda, far removed from the battle zone, peace existed up until very re-

cently. The governor was an American-educated Ph.D. and engineer from the University of Missouri. He was the only Tutsi governor in the country. He was a member of the opposition liberal party.

As long as he was in control of that province, there were no massacres.

He was removed on April 20 by the so-called government and replaced by a hard-line military figure. The massacres began almost immediately.

It is in this province that Monique's children are now.

And in a similar, absolutely up-to-the-minute kind of illustration of the sort of government control of these massacres that we are seeing: there was just a dispatch that came from the International Red Cross, indicating that 350 children were evacuated from north-western Rwanda across the border to Zaire; and they were able to get free in very difficult circumstances because of the intervention of the Minister of Social Affairs in the Rwandan Government.

So you are not telling me that these people cannot control this situation. If they wanted to, they could stop this violence.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me go back to my opening statement and your contraction of it; and that was, in the final analysis, Africans have to resolve African problems.

You said, and I want you to translate this to Monique, in the final analysis the Rwandans have to resolve a Rwandan affair.

Thank you very much.

I appreciate your coming.

[Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HON. HARRY JOHNSTON, CHAIRMAN THE CRISIS IN RWANDA MAY 4, 1994

Hundreds of thousands of helpless civilians have been killed over the past four weeks in Rwanda by an extremist Hutu-led militia and by factions of the Rwandan armed forces. The Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) and militias connected to the former president's MRND party are largely responsible for the continuing genocide in Rwanda. I strongly condemn the slaughter of innocent civilians and call for the establishment of a special task force under the auspices of the UN Human Rights Commissioner to investigate human rights abuses in Rwanda.

In a recent article, Roger Winter of the U.S. Committee for Refugees argued that "It would be an

unforgivable mistake to pass off the latest orgy of violence in Rwanda as simply another case of African tribal bloodletting that foreigners can never understand and are powerless to prevent." Though the killings may have some tribal motivation, the crisis in Rwanda is largely political.

The current slaughter of civilians was carefully planned and deliberately triggered by extremist elements. If this tragedy were strictly tribal, as characterized by some observers, why then were so many Hutu opposition figures and human rights activists brutally murdered by Hutu extremists?

The vote at the United Nations Security Council to reduce the number of UN peacekeepers from 2500 to 270 demonstrates the urgent need for Africans to find

an African solution to their problems. I strongly urge the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to explore ways to intervene in conflict situations such as this to protect defenseless civilians from marauding criminals. It is unforgivable and shameful to watch a whole generation of Rwandese slaughtered in cold blood. It is time to act.

The United States and other Western nations should also do their share to assist the people of Rwanda. I am encouraged by the level of attention given to the crisis in Rwanda by the Clinton Administration. In addition, I recommend the following measures for consideration:

--The United States should make clear to those involved in the killing of innocent civilians that

they will be held accountable.

--The U.S. should inform the parties involved in the conflict that any government which assumes control by forceful means will not be recognized.

--The United States should deny visas to members of the MRND, CDR, and military commanders responsible for the killing of innocent civilians. We should urge the French to do the same.

--We should consider air drops of humanitarian assistance to civilians displaced inside Rwanda and to refugees in remote areas.

--We should provide financial and technical assistance to an African intervention force that

could help restore law and order.

This afternoon we will first hear from the Honorable George Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and later from Alison Des Forge of Human Rights Watch. We will also hear from Monique Mujawamarija (MOOJA-WAAMA-REEJA) who recently escaped from Kigali after a terrifying ordeal. I would like to express my appreciation to our witnesses for accepting our invitation to testify before the Subcommittee on such short notice.

STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN ALCEE L. HASTINGS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
THE CRISIS IN RWANDA

THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN FOR ORGANIZING THIS HEARING TODAY ON AN ISSUE THAT IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA AND AN ISSUE THAT DESERVES OUR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.

MR. CHAIRMAN, FIRST, I WILL LIKE TO EXPRESS MY CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THE LATE PRESIDENT OF RWANDA, JUVENAL HABYARIMANA AND THE LATE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI, CYPRIEN NTARYAMIRA WHO DIED IN A SUSPICIOUS PLANE CRASH ON APRIL 6, 1994. ALSO, I WILL LIKE TO PRESENT MY CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES FOR THE LOSS OF THE THOUSANDS OF DEFENSELESS, UNARMED CIVILIANS IN THAT COUNTRY.

BOTH RWANDA AND BURUNDI MADE MAJOR ADVANCES TOWARD RECONCILIATION AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EARLY 1990'S, RENDERING THEIR DIFFICULTIES IN RECENT MONTHS PARTICULARLY TRAGIC. A PEACE ACCORD WAS FINALLY SIGNED IN AUGUST 1993, THAT PUT THE COUNTRY ON THE ROAD TOWARD DEMOCRATIC REFORMS. THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THESE KILLINGS ARE A MASSIVE EFFORT TO SABOTAGE THIS HISTORIC PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED LAST YEAR. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THIS SLAUGHTER IN RWANDA WAS PLANNED AND TRIGGERED BY A PRIVILEGED CLIQUE OF EXTREMIST POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS THERE WHO ARE MOST CERTAINLY DETERMINED TO BLOCK POLITICAL REFORMS THAT WOULD LOOSEN THEIR GRIP ON POWER.

TODAY, AS THE WORLD CONTINUE TO WATCH WITH HORROR AND DESPAIR OF THE BRUTAL OUTBREAK OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN RWANDA, I CALL UPON THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPORT AN UPGRADED UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE TO PREVENT CONTINUED MASS SLAUGHTER OR AS MANY CALL IT GENOCIDE. WE MUST DENOUNCE THOSE MEMBERS OF THE RWANDAN MILITARY WHO ARE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS MASS SLAUGHTER AND WE MUST DO EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO END THIS CONTINUING MASSACRE OF DEFENSELESS CIVILIANS IN RWANDA.

MR. CHAIRMAN, WITH TENS OF THOUSANDS DEAD IN BOTH RWANDA AND BURUNDI, AND ETHNIC PASSIONS INFLAMED, THE IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS FOR BOTH COUNTRIES ARE VERY POOR. BOTH COUNTRIES ARE THREATENED BY DROUGHT, AND WITH INTERNAL UPHEAVAL, I BELIEVE THAT FOOD PRODUCTION WILL DROP. WE MUST PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF, HOWEVER THE UNSTABLE POLITICAL CONDITIONS MAY MAKE IT RATHER DIFFICULT.

IN ANY EVENT, OUR MAJOR FOCUS IS TO END THIS VIOLENCE IMMEDIATELY. WE MUST USE ALL OUR POWER TO HALT THE MASSIVE KILLING OF CIVILIANS IN BOTH RWANDA AND BURUNDI.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM OUR DISTINGUISHED WITNESSES TO DAY. THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN

TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
 GEORGE E. MOOSE
 BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
 ON
 THE CRISIS IN RWANDA

MAY 4, 1994

Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa:

On April 6, the private plane of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana crashed outside Kigali under suspicious circumstances, killing President Habyarimana and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi. This tragic event sparked massive violence on two levels. First, elements of the Hutu-dominated Rwandan military, hardline party militias, and Hutu extremist gangs began killing Hutu opposition politicians (including Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana) and Tutsi opposition leaders and civilians. The killings began in Kigali, but eventually spread throughout the country. Second, fighting quickly broke out between Rwandan government forces and the Tutsi-dominated rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), effectively resuming the civil war that began in October 1990 and was to have ended on August 4, 1993, with the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord.

Both the fighting and the violence continue. The RPF has pushed government forces to the south and west and controls much of the capital of Kigali. The violence has left at least 100,000 dead and displaced hundreds of thousands of Rwandans. Over 300,000 Rwandans have fled to neighboring countries, most to Tanzania. On May 3, the Rwandan government and the RPF sent delegations to attend talks in Arusha, Tanzania, but direct negotiations between the two sides have not yet begun.

The U.S. Response to the Crisis

Since the crisis began, the U.S. has pursued an active strategy with five main goals:

- Stop the killings.
- Achieve a durable cease-fire.
- Return the parties to the negotiating table.
- Contain the conflict.
- Address humanitarian relief needs.

We have taken several actions designed to achieve these goals.

First, we have put diplomatic pressure on the parties themselves. I and other U.S. officials have spoken directly to Rwandan government officials, the Rwandan military, and the RPF, in Washington, via diplomatic channels in other locations, and by telephone to Rwanda. Our message has been simple and

direct: we want an immediate end to the killings, a cease-fire in place, the resumption of peace talks, and complete cooperation with relief efforts. We have reinforced these private contacts with high-level public appeals and statements by the President and the State Department.

Second, we have worked to mobilize the international community. We encouraged the efforts of the Tanzanian Government, as Facilitator of the Arusha process, to reconvene peace talks and are supporting those efforts. As in the past, the United States will be represented at any substantive talks. We have encouraged the Organization of African Unity, other regional states, and our European allies to join us in urging the Rwandans to agree to a cease-fire and resume talks. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs John Shattuck and our Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, have been sent to the region to continue these efforts. They are being accompanied by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Refugee Programs Brunson MCKinley. Our diplomatic contacts confirm that all major players agree with and support our goals and strategy.

Third, we have been pursuing an active policy in the UN Security Council. We pushed for approval of a strong Security Council presidential statement, issued April 30, which demands that the interim government of Rwanda and the RPF take effective measures to prevent attacks on civilians. The statement condemns the breaches of international humanitarian law that have occurred and calls on all states to cease shipments of arms to Rwanda.

Fourth, we have undertaken contingency planning to provide humanitarian relief and have identified several million dollars from various sources that we intend to tap for the crisis. The U.S. government has already contributed approximately \$28 million in food, relief items, and earmarked funds to organizations assisting Burundi refugees and persons displaced following last October's coup attempt and subsequent widespread violence. In response to the Rwanda crisis, the Administration just approved \$15 million in additional funding for new relief efforts in the area.

Fifth, we are continuing to monitor the situation in Burundi very closely. We have sent high-level visitors to the country to show our support for Burundi's fragile nascent democracy and are continuing humanitarian relief efforts. We have also provided support to the 47-member monitoring force that the OAU is in the process of deploying in Burundi.

The efforts outlined above are a continuation of the longstanding U.S. support for the Rwandan peace process. We were active observers throughout the year-long Arusha peace talks and provided \$1 million in assistance to support the

talks and help the OAU field cease-fire monitors. The United States supported deployment of UN peacekeepers once a peace accord was reached.

In the end, only the Rwandans can bring peace to their country, and no outside effort can succeed without a commitment to peace by the combatants themselves. The influence of the international community in an internal conflict of this type is limited, but we will use what influence we have in an effort to achieve our goals.

Future Policy Options

At the same time that we are pursuing the policies outlined above, we are examining further measures to ratchet up the pressure. First among these is a formal UN arms embargo against Rwanda, which we intend to pursue this week. We also encourage increased involvement by the UN Human Rights Commissioner, who could launch an investigation into human rights abuses and perhaps become involved in mediation efforts. In addition, we are exploring the possibility, if necessary, of having the UN or OAU establish protected areas for refugees and displaced persons around border areas.

Assessment of the UN Mission

From the start, the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was a peacekeeping, not a peace-making, operation. It was deployed only after a cease-fire was in place and both sides had signed a peace accord. The force had the limited mandate of monitoring and facilitating implementation of the accord, as the parties had requested.

Circumstances have changed drastically since the April 6 plane crash. Heavy fighting and widespread violence have resumed, UNAMIR troops were attacked and at least 10 UN peacekeepers were killed, and there was serious doubt in the early stages whether the lightly armed UNAMIR troops had the capability to defend themselves in such circumstances. As a result, the U.S. supported withdrawal of the bulk of the force for its safety, provided satisfactory arrangements were made to ensure the safety of Rwandans under direct UNAMIR protection.

It appears now that a portion of the force has been able to remain safely in Rwanda. Under such circumstances we strongly support the Security Council decision to maintain a small force to help broker a new cease-fire, facilitate humanitarian relief efforts, and help ensure the safety of those Rwandans already under UNAMIR's direct protection.

OPENING STATEMENT OF REP. ENGEL
FOR AFRICA SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
ON THE CRISIS IN RWANDA
MAY 4, 1994

Mr. ENGEL: Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing and your efforts to promote a resolution of the tragic conflict in Rwanda. The conflict we are now witnessing in Rwanda has reached the most tragic proportions.

Less than one month and between 100,000 - 200,000 lives later, the United States and the world are debating how to respond to the calamity that has overtaken the central African country. I am glad that Secretary Moose is with us today so that we can learn what steps the United States is taking unilaterally and multilaterally to end the killing.

I firmly believe that rapid international action is absolutely necessary to press the warring parties to settle their dispute and to alleviate the dire conditions faced by the refugees -- in and out of Rwanda.

I, along with Chairman Johnston and the rest of the Africa Subcommittee, wrote to the President urging that he make resolution of the conflict in Rwanda a priority until it is settled peacefully. The recent decision to send a high level delegation to Rwanda led by Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck represents a critical step in this direction. I would like to reiterate several of the points we made in our letter:

- * The U.S. should make clear to those who commit atrocities that they will be held accountable;
- * The U.S. should inform the parties that the U.S. will not recognize a government which takes power by force; and
- * Continued U.N. engagement in Rwanda is crucial to peaceful settlement of the conflict.

I believe, however, that with the intensity and brutality of the killings, more than diplomacy is needed to ensure a resolution of the conflict. We must support U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's call for a multinational force to end the massacres and restore order to the country. While the U.S. should not contribute ground troops to this unit, we can provide logistical and planning support.

Also, I praise the President's decision to provide \$28 million in aid to the refugees. I look forward to Secretary Moose's comments as to whether this money will suffice, or whether additional assistance will be needed.

I am pleased that the U.S. Embassy in Kigali and the State Department's Africa Bureau were able to successfully evacuate Americans from Rwanda. I fear, however, that the departure of foreigners could signal the withdrawal of the international community just when our help is most required.

America must resist the urge to avert its eyes from this horrible crisis. I along with other members of Congress have mourned the killings of Bosnians and have called for American action. In Rwanda that death toll has reached thousands per day.

For the U.S. to retain its moral leadership of the world community, it is important to demonstrate that Rwandans are just as worthy of our attention as people affected by conflicts in other parts of the world. That means resolution of the crisis in Rwanda must be a priority for the United States.

THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

MAY 4, 1994

**THANK YOU VERY MUCH MR. CHAIRMAN. I
COMMEND YOU FOR CALLING THIS HEARING ON
SUCH SHORT NOTICE TO DEAL WITH THIS TRAGIC
EMERGENCY IN RWANDA. I WILL BE BRIEF
BECAUSE, TRUTH BE TOLD, WORDS ARE SIMPLY
INADEQUATE TO DESCRIBE THE HORROR AND
REVULSION WE ALL FEEL OVER THIS SITUATION.**

MR. CHAIRMAN, AFRICA CERTAINLY HAS MORE THAN ITS SHARE OF MISERY AND SUFFERING. BUT THE CARNAGE OVER THE PAST MONTH IN RWANDA SURPASSES ANYTHING ELSE WE HAVE SEEN IN RECENT MEMORY. I VENTURE TO SAY, ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO QUANTIFY ATROCITIES, THAT RWANDA OVER THE PAST MONTH, DWARFS SOMALIA, LIBERIA, AND EVEN SUDAN.

VIVIAN DERRYCK OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN INSTITUTE CORRECTLY CALLS IT "THE TOTAL COLLAPSE OF THE STATE IN TWO WEEKS IN THE SWIFTEST MANMADE CARNAGE IN THIS CENTURY".

WHAT IS PERHAPS THE MOST DISTURBING ASPECT OF THE RWANDAN TRAGEDY IS THE REALIZATION THAT WE HAVEN'T YET SEEN THE END OF IT, OR

EVEN THE WORST OF IT, HARD AS THAT MAY BE TO BELIEVE.

IF THERE WAS EVER A TIME TO PUT ASIDE OUR DIFFERENCES AND PUT OUR HEADS TOGETHER TO MEET THE CHALLENGE OF AN OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE, NOW IS THAT TIME.

TRUE, OUR OPTIONS MAY BE LIMITED, FRUSTRATING AS IT MAY BE TO ACCEPT. BUT WITHIN THOSE LIMITS, WE HAVE GOT TO DO OUR UTMOST TO SAVE THE REFUGEES AND THOSE STILL IN RWANDA WHO ARE IN MORTAL DANGER.

IN THIS CONTEXT, I CERTAINLY APPLAUD THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS IN RECENT DAYS TO

PROMOTE DIPLOMATIC AND HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS, AND TO ENCOURAGE AN EFFECTIVE AFRICAN RESPONSE TO THIS DISASTER.

BEFORE I CONCLUDE, MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ONE OBSERVATION. RWANDA WAS NOT A COUNTRY THAT WAS CAUGHT UP IN THE MAELSTROM OF THE COLD WAR. UP UNTIL ONE MONTH AGO, IT APPEARED THAT THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE ETHNIC FACTIONS THERE WERE WELL ON THE ROAD TO BEING RESOLVED PEACEFULLY. ONE PLANE CRASH SET OFF THIS TRAUMATIC ORGY OF BLOOD AND TEARS.

ALL OF US WHO ARE CONCERNED ABOUT AFRICA NEED TO ASK "WHY?", AND NEED TO FIGURE OUT IF SOME OTHER COUNTRY IN AFRICA MIGHT BE NEXT.

THANK YOU.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/**AFRICA**

Formerly Africa Watch

Human Rights in Rwanda
Statement of Alison Des Forges
Human Rights Watch/Africa
Before the House Foreign Affairs Subc. on Africa
Wednesday, May 4, 1994

Thank you for holding this important hearing, Chairman Johnston, and for inviting me to testify. My name is Alison Des Forges, and I am a historian at the State University of New York at Buffalo. I am a founding board member of Human Rights Watch/Africa (formerly known as Africa Watch) on whose behalf I appear today.

At the outset, I would like to express my appreciation for your interest in Rwanda and your rapid response to the crisis that developed on April 6. We also appreciate the interest of your staff and their accessibility to Human Rights Watch and our Rwandan friends during this difficult time.

At today's hearing I will provide background to the present crisis, and offer suggestions for U.S. and United Nations policy to address it.

The Current Crisis: The slaughter of Tutsi in Rwanda is genocide, a planned campaign to eliminate this minority people who make up about 15% of the

population of this small central African nation. But the massacres go beyond genocide to target those of the Hutu majority who show a willingness to work with Tutsi in building a more democratic nation. This is political violence, organized and executed by the Hutu extremists who refuse to share the power that has enriched them for the last twenty years. It takes place in a context of extreme poverty where control of the state is the sole route to wealth and prestige.

Hutu and Tutsi are part of a single nation with a history of 400 years of collaboration. They lived in no peaceful paradise, but made war to expand their territory and wealth just as did the people of other nations. They made war sometimes against the Hutu, sometimes against Tutsi, sometimes against mixtures of the two groups, but they made war as a state that comprised both Hutu and Tutsi.

The Tutsi ruled as an aristocracy during the time of European control. As independence from Belgium approached in the late 1950's, the Hutu majority launched a revolution that overthrew the monarchy, killed about 20,000 Tutsi, and drove another several hundred thousand Tutsi into exile in surrounding countries. But even this bloody revolution did not destroy Rwanda as a nation: after, as before, Hutu and Tutsi continued to be united by language, culture, and pride in their shared history. They live now, as then, interspersed throughout the country and they sometimes intermarry.

Most outside observers fail to realize that Rwanda is a

nation. They describe the Hutu and Tutsi as tribes and assume that the conflict between them dates from the dawn of time and will continue to the end of time. Hence, there is no point in seeking to resolve it. This analysis is just plain wrong, and leads to erroneous policy decisions.

President Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, took power in a military coup in 1973. Initially popular throughout the country, he gradually lost support over the years as he became increasingly focused on satisfying his own needs, those of his family, and those of his home region. Corruption and nepotism were complicated by a general economic decline, largely due to the sudden drop in world market prices for coffee, the major Rwandan export. The growing popular dissatisfaction for economic reasons coincided with a flourishing desire for democratization. Hard pressed by demands for change within the country and by pressure for reform from international donors, Habyarimana reluctantly began opening up his single-party regime in 1990.

At just this time, Tutsi refugees who had been seeking ways to return home organized themselves into the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and invaded Rwanda in October 1990 with moral and some material support from the neighboring nation of Uganda. The invasion offered Habyarimana the ideal opportunity to rebuild his slipping power base and he immediately began a concerted effort to generate pan-Hutu solidarity by labeling all Tutsi as "accomplices" of the RPF. Over the next three and a half years, he and his supporters would systematically make the peaceful

Tutsi who lived within the country the scapegoats for anger and resentment against the invaders. This effort also sought to discredit all Hutu who opposed Habyarimana by labeling them as supporters of the Tutsi.

Within days of the invasion, Habyarimana had thrown approximately 10,000 Tutsi and Hutu opposition figures into jail. Some would languish there, in deplorable conditions, subject to torture and privation, for as long as six months, with no charges ever being made against them. A number of others died in jail. Two weeks after the invasion, Habyarimana's officials organized the first of four massacres of Tutsi and opposition Hutu that would claim a total of 2,000 victims over the next three years. Over time, he refined his tactics in response to criticism by an increasingly vigorous human rights movement at home and to condemnation by international human rights associations like Human Rights Watch. In January 1992, he moved to "privatize" the violence by creating militia attached to his political party, the MRND. These militia led the massacres of January 1993.

These initiatives to generate and profit from an "us versus them" mentality brought only partial success to the regime, and political opposition continued to grow. Once Habyarimana permitted the establishment of opposition parties, several were created. The most important of these parties was exclusively Hutu, but the two that ranked just behind it included both Hutu and Tutsi. In April 1992 Habyarimana yielded to pressure and formed a coalition government that included equal numbers of his

own supporters and representatives of the opposition party.

This coalition government made peace with the RPF through the Arusha Accords, signed August 4, 1993, which provided for a tripartite transitional government with power shared among Habyarimana's group, the internal opposition, and the RPF. This transitional government was to take power on September 10 and rule for 22 months, after which time elections would be held. The initial target date was not met because the U.N. peace-keeping force that was part of the accords could not be in place by that time. But a further series of deadlines were also missed as skillful maneuvering by Habyarimana and squabbling among his opponents combined to stretch out an ever-tenser period of instability. The final deadline to be missed was April 5, and the plane crash that killed Habyarimana happened on April 6.

The death of Habyarimana was the pretext for launching the systematic slaughter of Tutsi and members of the opposition. The campaign of hate-filled propaganda against them had built in intensity in the preceding months, especially since the establishment of a private radio station affiliated with the CDR, a party closely allied with Habyarimana. This station incited people to violence against the targeted groups and against named individuals like the outstanding human rights activist Monique Mujawamariya, who was labelled "a bad patriot who deserved to die." Beginning more than a year ago, the government started handing out guns to members of party militia loyal to Habyarimana. So alarming was the wholesale distribution of guns

to the civilian population that the Bishop of the Catholic diocese of Nyundo protested against it last December, asking why firearms were being given to his parishioners.

During the last year, the army handed out guns to thousands of these young militiamen. In late March of this year, Human Rights Watch was warned by Monique Mujawamariya, who was still in Rwanda at the time, that "[f]or the last two weeks, all of Kigali has lived under the threat of an instantaneous, carefully prepared operation to eliminate all those who give trouble to President Habyarimana. Army officers who support him have trained 1,700 young people of his party militia. They have guns and grenades ... All those targeted by the carnage which is to come hope to escape it..."

Ms. Mujawamariya's prophecy came true in the moments following the downing of President Habyarimana's plane. Within an hour of the announcement of his death, the elite Presidential Guard had set up roadblocks and was summarily liquidating key members of the moderate opposition, including Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and a number of other government ministers. Ms. Mujawamariya herself barely escaped the violence before she escaped from Rwanda on April 12. She personally witnessed members of the Presidential Guard enter her neighborhood and kill 200 people in the space of 3 hours. We are grieved to report the murder by the army or militia of a number of human rights activists with whom we have worked closely, including Charles Shamukiga, Fidele Kenyabugoyi, Ignace Rwhatara, Gahizi Patrick,

Father Chrysologue Mahame, S.J., and Abbe Augustin Ntagara.

Human Rights Watch has been able to monitor the carefully orchestrated nature of the army's campaign of atrocities because of the reports we have received from friends within Rwanda and Burundi. Clear evidence of the direct responsibility of the Rwandan authorities may be seen in Butare Province in southern Rwanda. Despite the massacres committed in Kigali following the assassination of the president, Butare Province remained calm for two weeks. The person responsible for maintaining order and discouraging communal violence was the governor of Butare, Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana, a member of the political opposition and the only Tutsi governor in Rwanda. (He had received a PhD in engineering from the University of Missouri.)

But on April 20, the Rwandan army replaced Governor Habyalimana with a hard-line military figure, and mass murder of Tutsis and opposition political figures began that day. Governor Habyalimana and his wife, Josephine, a human rights activist, were later killed. Since then, the political party militia, accompanied by the army, have carried out massacres that continue day and night. Priests who escaped to neighboring Burundi reported to Human Rights Watch that the militia and army attacked a group of 6,000 Tutsi who had taken refuge at the church of Cyahinda, slaughtering all but 200 of them. Clergy from the diocese of Cyangugu report 4,000 murdered in the parish of Shangi, 2,000 at Mibirizi, and 800 at Nkanka. In Gikongoro, between Butare and Cyangugu, about 4,000 were killed at the

church of Kibeho.

Once the extremists launched the violence, it was soon clear that the U.N. forces would do nothing to intervene militarily to halt the killing. A RPF battalion quartered in the capital under the terms of the peace accords was nominally under the protection of U.N. troops. Seeing U.N. inaction in the face of the massacres, the RPF battalion felt itself threatened. It attacked the Rwandan army forces, bringing about a resumption of the war between the two military forces. Other RPF troops who had been restrained within a demilitarized zone to the north then began moving out to attack Kigali and elsewhere.

The battle between the two armies continues, but must be distinguished from the massacre of civilians. The war as such has produced its casualties, but the vast numbers of people killed -- the 100,000 or more -- are not soldiers. They are women, children, the elderly, lacking in arms and in organization. They make no resistance to the bands of trained and armed killers. They do not die in fighting but in slaughter.

The Role of the International Community: Human Rights Watch, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Vatican have all used the term "genocide" in describing the killings in Rwanda. We do not use that term lightly. Mass slaughter alone does not necessarily constitute genocide. But the targeted nature of the slaughter, the systematic campaign by the military and the militias to exterminate Rwanda's Tutsi minority, and the extremely large numbers of victims are clear

evidence that the authorities are indeed committed to "destroy, in whole or in part" the Tutsis through "killing members of the group."¹ In this regard, it is important to note that the Habyarimana government required all citizens to carry identity cards that indicated whether they were Hutu or Tutsi. Over the past three weeks, we have received numerous reports of army troops or militia stopping people at roadblocks, scrutinizing their identity cards, then permitting Hutu to pass and killing all Tutsi.

At the time of this writing the army and militias are continuing with their genocidal campaign. On April 29, Radio des Milles Collines, available nationwide in Rwanda, declared May 6 as the target date for finishing the "clean-up" of the Tutsi minority and members of the political opposition. The deadline for these massacres is linked to Habyarimana's funeral, set for that date.

Since Rwandan political and military figures deliberately launched these massacres and many others, they must be called upon to stop them. Among those who have the power to halt the slaughter are Colonel Bagosora, the military officer in charge during the first days of the massacre, Col. Augustin Bizimungu, Commander in Chief of the Rwandan Armed Forces, Captain Pascal Simbikangwa, who apparently directs the militia, Col. Nkundiye, who trained the militia, and Col. Mpiranya, head of the army's

¹The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

presidential guard.

The International Response: The Convention requires states parties to it to prevent and punish this horrific crime. The international response thus far, however, has been extremely disappointing.

As you know, on April 21 the United Nations Security Council voted to reduce the presence of U.N. forces in Rwanda to a skeleton force of 270. Though there are actually a larger number of U.N. troops still within the country, it is far too small to prevent the continuing campaign of violence, which some humanitarian organizations estimate to have claimed more than 100,000 victims in less than a month.

Meanwhile, in the midst of one of the most appalling scenes of carnage on the African continent, civilian representatives of the military forces responsible for it are engaging in an effort to achieve international respectability. On April 25 and 26, French officials, to their shame, met with the self-proclaimed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the rump Rwandan Government, Mr. Jerome Bicamumpaka, and the president of the CDR political party, Mr. Jean Bosco Barayagwiza. (The CDR is the hard-line political party affiliated with Habyarimana's MRND political party.) The CDR and the MRND have created the militias which have been armed and trained by the army, and which are carrying out the killings. As such, party officials are themselves directly accountable for the conduct of the militias which operate in their names. Other representatives of the rump government have been received in

Egypt and in Germany. They are hoping to be received elsewhere, including at the United Nations.

The Clinton Administration, we are glad to report, has made it plain that these individuals are not welcome in the United States. Moreover, on April 22, National Security Advisor Tony Lake issued an excellent statement in which he called upon Rwandan military officials by name to do everything in their power to stop the violence. (A copy of that statement is attached.)

Yet there is much more that the United States and our allies can and must do stop the killing in Rwanda. We all know, and all the major Rwandan players know, that no government of Rwanda can survive without international assistance. We need to make it clear that any regime built on the bodies of a hundred thousand civilians is never going to receive such aid. While this pronouncement may not influence the worst of the hard-core extremists, it may be enough to persuade wavering moderates to disassociate themselves from this bloody group of killers. We know such moderate elements exist among the Rwandan military, but they are disorganized, isolated, intimidated. If those on the fence are certain that these criminals will never succeed in establishing a successful government, they will have less incentive to continue collaborating with or tolerating abuses. They will begin to seek ways to take power back from the criminals. Such a strategy requires coordination with other donor or potential donor nations, but the precedent for such

joint action is well-established in the Rwandan case. Donor nations have joined several times in the past with the World Bank to issue ultimatums to the Habyarimana regime. This kind of declaration costs nothing but could be highly effective in influencing the behavior of moderates within the country, particularly if it is accompanied by a vigorous initiative to increase the role of UNAMIR forces on the ground.

Human Rights Watch calls upon our government to lead efforts in the Security Council to provide for an increased U.N. presence in Rwanda. We believe that the United Nations should interpret Clause 8(b) of the UNAMIR mandate "to assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible" in the broadest possible sense to permit a significant expansion of UNAMIR activities to protect and assure the welfare of the civilian population.

Such protection of humanitarian relief operations could result in UNAMIR creation of and protection for "safe havens," such as hospitals, stadiums, and other facilities both within the area contested between the RPF and the Rwandan army and in areas (such as the south) where there has been no combat but where civilians are threatened by attack from militia and the armed forces. Such interpretation could also cover the creation of "safe corridors" for the passage of refugees and relief supplies.

Adequate execution of this mandate would require more soldiers than the 400 U.N. forces now in Rwanda. Another 600 are currently in Nairobi, having been evacuated from Rwanda but have

not yet been sent home. They could be redeployed immediately within Rwanda, perhaps beginning in the south. Further troops would be provided as needed, depending upon the recommendation of UNAMIR commander General Dallaire. These troops must be supplied with necessary material and means of support, and should be deployed as soon as possible.

Furthermore, clause 8(c) states that UNAMIR "monitor and report on developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR." This provision should be interpreted to permit the sending of U.N. human rights monitors to reassure populations now frightened by propaganda campaigns and/or by the violence they have witnessed. These monitors could also begin collecting necessary information for future prosecution of those guilty of human rights violations.

Much of the debate on possible solutions to the Rwandan crisis is influenced by the bitter experience of Somalia. But Rwanda is not Somalia and many of the lessons of that experience do not apply here. Rwanda is a highly centralized nation, not a disintegrated state which includes a number of competing factions, as Somalia is. We are not proposing an intervention force between rival armed factions, but a rescue operation to protect civilians from a band of murderers. These militia have received minimal military training and are lightly armed. Many are now using machetes or clubs instead of guns, either because they found they could no operate the guns or because they no

longer have ammunition. It is unlikely that they would long resist a regular army.

It is of greatest importance to see the catastrophe in Rwanda in the larger context of the region. Burundi, which has the same demographic profile as Rwanda, is precariously balanced on the precipice of renewed violence between Hutu and Tutsi there. The continued fighting in Rwanda inflames tensions in Burundi and heightens fears both among the Hutu who watch with dread the advance of the Tutsi-dominated RPF and among Tutsi who are panicked by the killing of more than 100,000 other Tutsi in the adjacent country. In addition, the situation in Zaire is highly unstable. Should the violence in Rwanda continue without some effective form of international reaction, not only will we witness the further genocide of Rwandan Tutsi and the slaughter of members of the Hutu opposition, we will face an impending disaster of unimaginable proportions in the entire region.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

April 22, 1994

Statement by the Press Secretary

The President's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, met today with Rwandan human rights monitor Monique Mujawamarija at the White House. Mr. Lake expressed his deep satisfaction that Ms. Mujawamarija had escaped harm and expressed deep concern over the violence that continues to rage in Rwanda following the tragic deaths of Rwandan President Habyarimana and Burundian President Ntaryamira two weeks ago. He said that the horrors of civil war and mass killings of civilians since then have shocked and appalled the world community. All responsible officials and military officers must bring offending troops and units under control immediately.

We call on the Rwandan army and the Rwandan Patriotic Front to agree on an immediate ceasefire and return to negotiations called for and facilitated by the Government of Tanzania. We applaud the efforts of regional leaders who are actively engaged in the search for peace and call on the people of the region to support their quest. The United States is prepared to participate, as in the past, in renewed negotiation in the context of the Arusha Agreement of August 4, 1993. The principles of a negotiated agreement and power-sharing in that agreement remain valid bases for a return to peace in Rwanda.

We call on the leadership of the Rwandan armed forces, including Army Commander-in-Chief Col. Augustin Bizimungu, Col. Nkundiye, Capt. Pascal Simbikangwa and Col. Bagosora, to do everything in their power to end the violence immediately.

In line with the U.N. Security Council resolution yesterday, we believe that the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) has an important continued role to perform in Rwanda in attempting to secure a ceasefire between the parties, assisting humanitarian relief operations and protecting Rwandans under their care. We share the belief that the reduction of UNAMIR personnel, in recognition of the need to ensure their safety and security, must not put at risk the lives of Rwandans under UN protection.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 25, 1994

Dear Eliot:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing support for an active United States role in helping to resolve the crisis in Rwanda.

I share your commitment to bringing an end to the senseless violence that has plagued Rwanda in the weeks since the tragic deaths of the Rwandan and Burundian Presidents. Since that time, our government has been working in support of the efforts of regional leaders and the United Nations to arrange a cease-fire and renew negotiations in the context of the Arusha Agreement of August 1993.

Specifically, we took the initiative to request that President Mwinyi of Tanzania resume the Arusha peace process, urged President Museveni of Uganda to call on the RPF to cease-fire and carried this plea directly to the RPF in Kampala and Washington. We sent an experienced observer to Arusha for the talks which were to have begun April 23, and we will be represented when and if they get underway this week. We have also been in regular contact with the Governments of France and Belgium who share our concern about Rwanda. We also plan to enhance our assistance to humanitarian relief efforts to Rwanda and Burundi.

On April 22, following a meeting between my National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, and Rwandan human rights monitor Monique Mujawamarija, the White House issued a strong public statement calling for the Rwandan army and the Rwandan Patriotic Front to do everything in their power to end the violence immediately. This followed an earlier statement by me calling for a cease-fire and the cessation of the killings.

As that statement notes, I share your belief that the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) still has an important role to play in brokering a cease-fire, assisting humanitarian relief operations and ensuring the safety of Rwandans under their protection.

I also appreciate your kind comments on the superb performance of the personnel at our embassy in Kigali and their counterparts here in Washington to organize and carry out the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Rwanda. Their tireless efforts ensured the safety of more than 250 Americans.

Thank you again for sharing your thoughts and for your support of this important effort. It is my hope that peace can be restored to Rwanda soon and that Rwanda can return to the path toward national reconciliation and democracy.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Eliot L. Engel
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515



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Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

April 20, 1994

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RICHARD J. GARDIN
 Republican Chief of Staff

The Honorable William J. Clinton
 The President
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to express our strong support for an active United States role in helping to resolve the crisis in Rwanda. Given the fact that approximately 20,000 people have died thus far in the tragic conflict, it is important that the United States endeavor to end the bloodshed and to bring the parties to the negotiating table.

We praise American officials at the U.S. embassy in Kigali and at the Africa Bureau in Washington for their superb performance in the evacuation of American citizens safely from Rwanda. Nevertheless, America must not now disengage from the conflict. The United States is seen by the parties to the dispute as an honest broker. We, therefore, have a critical role to play as an intermediary if the Rwandan conflict is to be resolved.

Only last August, the interim Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) signed the so-called Arusha Peace Accord ending three years of war. Since this agreement was reached, however, continuing disputes between the parties have prevented the implementation of the agreement. The killings of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was simply a match which sparked the simmering feud into the present conflagration.

The United Nations and its peacekeeping force in Rwanda, deployed to assist in the execution of the Arusha accord, have done their best to promote a settlement. We are encouraged by the recent United Nations Security Council's decision to keep United Nations peacekeepers in Rwanda. Continued U.N. engagement in Rwanda is crucial to peaceful settlement of the Rwandan conflict.


The United States, in cooperation with the United Nations, can play an important role in conflict resolution in Rwanda. In

addition, our country can take important measures unilaterally to assist in the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda, in particular, and the region, in general. First, the United States must make clear to those involved in the killing of innocent civilians that they will be held accountable.


Second, we urge you to inform the parties to the conflict that the U.S. will not recognize any government which assumes control by forceful means.

Mr. President, the lives of thousands of innocent civilians are at stake, and it is important to demonstrate that these individuals are just as worthy of our attention as people affected by conflicts in other parts of the world. We thank you for your prompt statement on the crisis and encourage you to make resolution of this conflict a priority until it is settled peacefully.

Sincerely,



Eliot L. Engel
Member
Subcommittee on Africa



Harry Johnston
Chairman
Subcommittee on Africa



Dan Burton
Ranking Republican Member
U.S. Congress



Donald Payne
Member
Subcommittee on Africa



Lincoln Diaz-Balart
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
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