


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May 10/1862



THE



AND THE

BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

(A LETTER TO AN ENGLISH FRIEND.)

BY

J. G. BARNARD,

MAJOR OF ENGINEERS, U. S. A., BRIGADIER GENERAL AND CHIEF ENGINEER ARMY OF
THE POTOMAC.

WITH FIVE MAPS.

NEW YORK:
D. VAN NOSTRAND, 192 BROADWAY.
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ERRATA.

- PAGE 8. 9th line, for "even" read "were."
- " 10. Last line of text, for "presumptuous" read "presumptuously" omitting the comma.
- " 12. Third paragraph, beginning "It would require space" refers to the paragraph on page 10.
- " 12. 15th line, for "prtriotism" read "patriotism."
- " 15. 7th line, for "legislature" read "legislature."
- " 17. 20th line, for "his" read "the."
- " 26. 19th line, for "Mason" read "Mann."
- " 30. 11th line, omit comma after "them."
- " 34. 5th line from bottom, for "what will the 'new' be" read "what will not the 'new' be."
- " 49. 6th line, for "depended" read "depends."
- " 112. 9th line, for "column" read "columns."
- " 113. 13th line, for "at" read "let."
- " " 20th line, for "cause" read "arms."
- " " 23d line, for "the cause" read "the rebel cause."
- " 115. 2d line of note, for "and" read "of whom."
- " 119. 3d line, for "engaged" read "*engaged*."
- " 120. 21st line, insert "by" after "shouted."
- " 127. 2d line, for "81,947" read "72,947."
- " 128. 1st line, for "Planchendit" read "Planchenoit."
- " 129. 18th line, for "Caviana" read "Cavriana."

It is due to GENERAL BARNARD, to state that this work was received from him in a very crude and unfinished state, just as he was leaving Washington for Yorktown, and that the numerous errors in the book, which will be corrected in the future editions, were not his fault entirely, but were due to the haste with which the book was printed and the impossibility of submitting the proofs to him for revision.

THE PUBLISHER.

PREFACE.

THE ensuing pages were commenced in February, as a "letter to an English friend." It was soon perceived that they could not retain their original character.

Nevertheless the epistolary style was maintained to the end, but extensive interpolations have been made, in which the idea of an epistle was left out of view.

So much for the incongruity of style; now for the motive:

A main one was to vindicate the battle of Bull Run from the obloquy that had fallen upon it, and to establish a claim for it in the category of well planned and well fought battles.

Another motive, and a strong one, was found in our political relations with England. It was a period when English interference was apprehended.

Although just representations of the character of "Secession" were not wanting abroad, it struck me that a picture from another point of view, might be useful. The friend for whom it was prepared had the public ear, and it was through him I would reach it.

I claim, in all circumstances which, unconsciously

to ourselves, mould our opinions, to be as free from all causes of sectional bias as an American can be.

Born in a Northern state, I left it in childhood (almost), to enter into the service of my country. In that state, where I have not spent as much as a whole month in the aggregate, since the age of eighteen, I have not, for years, had blood relatives, unless, perhaps, *very* distant ones.

Early ordered to the South, I there passed the first fifteen years of my youth and early manhood. My domestic ties have been formed there, and, up to the period of "Secession," though stationed in a Northern city (itself the stronghold of Northern "sympathy" for the "South"), my associations and ties were mainly with the South.

Standing aloof from either of the parties which have recently divided the nation, an officer of the army, serving his "country," and not a section of that country, I claim that my views of the character of secession, and the early conviction (formed some time before the Fort Sumter affair), that it would have to be "put down" by force of arms, and the seceding states treated as "rebel," are those of my reason, and not of passion or prejudice.

My account of the battle of Bull Run will hardly be satisfactory to those who would comprehend the affair at a glance. The brief narrative of General McDowell, in his official report, was (unaccompanied by the reports of his subordinates) too *general*. The reports of the subordinate officers are too *circumstantial*. I must plead want of time to condense them, and the belief that, after all, the truest picture of the battle would be found in

grouping together the important parts of the different reports.

The occurrences and combats (not unimportant) which took place at Blackburn's Ford and the Stone Bridge, I have been obliged to pass over nearly in silence, as they were quite distinct from the main battle. The official reports treat of these, and to them I must ask attention.

I append to these pages copies of the plans of the field which accompanied General McDowell's official report; a plan recently made, under my directions, by Lieutenant H. L. Abbott, Topographical Engineer, who served with General Tyler in the battle (this gives the topography with much accuracy, that prepared for General McDowell having been, necessarily, in some degree conjectural)—a plan prepared for the "Rebellion Record" by General W. F. Barry, Chief of Artillery, under General McDowell (now Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac), and a curious map published in Richmond soon after the battle.

It should be noted that the ford that *we* called "Blackburn's," and thence designate the combat of the 18th of July, is really "Mitchell's Ford." Blackburn's Ford is a mile lower down.

THE
C. S. A.,
AND THE
BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

WASHINGTON, *Feb.* 20, 1862.

* * * * *

WHEN I saw you in Europe, I little imagined that the lapse of a few short months would exhibit my country rent by civil war, and the wicked and impracticable attempt to divide it into two separate governments.

I am in error, it was not to *divide* it; this was not the plan. It was to reduce the Northern or free states to *more thorough* subjection to the slaveholding interest; it was to make, expressly, and by admission, the slaveholding policy the ruling policy of the country. It was to open all the territories of the United States to slavery: to make even the free states recognize (if not receive) it within their own borders. You may not find such

intentions expressed in printed documents, nor admitted now, but I think I could furnish you with sufficient evidence of the truth of the above assertions.

When I returned from Europe I found my country in the same career of prosperity, apparently as little apprehensive for the future, as when I left it. It is true that political feelings ran higher, threats of "secession" even louder, but we had heard such threats before; we had escaped many great dangers threatening our national existence, and we believed in our destiny. The Northern people expected nothing so serious to occur, on Mr. Lincoln's election, as to be irremediable; and I sincerely believe that not one in a hundred throughout the South harbored graver forebodings.

Much has been said of the apathy of the government and of the North. It was an apathy originating in a long-experienced security—in an unwillingness to comprehend that any considerable number of people of the United States were really prepared to destroy this nationality, to blot out the memory of our past history, to erase the records of our joint and common glory.

But there was a greater justification of such apathy. Our government is *expressly* founded upon the consent of the people. By such consent alone

can it be changed, and no one believing that the doctrine of "secession" (inadmissible by *any* government, whether founded upon consent or not) was supported by a popular majority in any state.

They were right: no one was prepared for *treason*; and treason, flagrant treason, hatching its plots in darkness, has been the real agent which, skilfully availing itself of all the disaffection and jealousies of the South against the North, of the diversities of feeling engendered by the differing systems of slavery and free labor, hurried state after state into the mad wake of South Carolina (the only state that had fools and madmen* enough in it to lead the way in this path of stupendous folly), set up with reckless haste the mad pretension to a separate government, and plunged the nation into a civil war.

Do you think that *this* was anticipated? Not

* "Fools and madmen." These are harsh words; but is there not a time when we should call things by their right names?

The subjoined paragraph, which fell under my eye just after writing the above, is but a specimen of the folly, the madness to be found *everywhere* in the documents, speeches, colloquial language, and actions of these men.

"Whom the gods would destroy they first make mad."

A few years ago a representative of the state of South Carolina (Mr. Keitt, we believe), in anguring the probable dismemberment of the Union, and in unduly magnifying the prowess and resources of the Southern States, spoke as follows:

"They will rend this Union into fragments, and plunge the world in ruin.

in the slightest degree. Those who framed and signed the Montgomery constitution, those who were the real guiding spirits of the acts which led to it, believed that, as usual, the North *would succumb*. That the secession of the South would cause "grass to grow in the streets of New York," turn the "operatives," the "poor laborers," the "mud sills" of the North into an ungovernable mob, which would demand the heads of all the "abolitionists," was a common idea which I could easily prove by quotations from published speeches of the ablest Southern men. What poverty and anarchy failed to do, Northern pusillanimity would complete, "and a new, glorious confederacy" would be formed, world-embracing (the American continents at least), slave-holding, slave-trading, and (singular conjunction of words) *free-trading*.

If the North *did not* succumb at once, but attempted to execute the revenue laws at Southern ports, England and France would *at once* exhibit their naval power, and give free exit to "King Cotton." Should the government, still more presumptuous, undertake to assert its authority over

It is in their power to do both, for the world cannot get on without them; and if ruthless fanaticism and brute force combine, under whatever names, and with whatever authority, to ride them down, they will carry with them the pillars of the temple of civilization, and force a common fate on all mankind."

the rebellious states by marching its armies upon their territory, England and France would at once appear, by their fleets, off New York and Boston, and warn the government to desist. The patriotism of traitors ! the logic of fools !*

* "Demonstrations already made so patent to the mind of the statesman, viewing them either in their political and commercial or in their national and international aspects, will be keenly perceived and vigilantly observed as their resultants are disclosed. And so important—almost vitally so—will they be to the interests of the observers, that the men of the West and the East will pause in their threatened hostility to the revolution; *whilst England and France would send powerful fleets to insure its peaceful maintenance.* The first demonstration of blockade of the Southern ports would be swept away by the English fleets of observation hovering on the Southern coasts to protect English commerce, and especially the free flow of cotton to English and French factories. A stoppage of the raw material from the Cotton States of the South, either by failure of crops or civil war, and its consequences, would produce the most disastrous political results, if not a revolution, in England. This is the language of English statesmen, manufacturers, and merchants, in Parliament and in Cotton Associations debate, and it discloses the truth. Nor must the Cotton States be invaded by land, for it would interrupt the cultivation of the great staple. The great cotton zone of the world must never cease to be cultivated; the plough, and the hoe, and the cotton gin must never cease to move; but war and invasion would tend to that result, or at least create dangerous obstruction to cultivation. Invaders, then, would have to be restrained by force. From whence would that force be derived? From what has already been briefly considered, the answer is easily framed. The force would be derived from the West, whose interests lie in the free ports and free markets of the South. The force would be derived from England and France, whose interests are deeply concerned in maintaining an uninterrupted supply of cotton; in the free trade of the Southern and Western countries, and in the carrying trade of their great products; and the force would be derived from Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina—the frontier slave states, through which Northern troops would not be permitted to pass, and if they were, England would check that movement by blockading New York, Boston," &c.—*Extract from a Letter of W. H. Chase, to the New York Express, October, 1860.*

“The secession of the Southern States,” says W. H. Chase, in letters promulgating the above ideas, to the *New York Express*, October, 1860, “will be dignified, deliberate, and determined.” How “dignified” and how “deliberate” the process proved; how an abused people were irritated to madness by misrepresentations, and plunged into rebellion by arts and artifices which the word “treason” alone can characterize, with a studied precipitation which rendered men’s minds unfit for all “deliberation,” while it denied all opportunity for its exercise, I shall show.

The “determination” is yet to be proved; but the lack of all ideas which men usually consider to belong to self-respect, self-reliance, and patriotism, shown in the expectation of foreign interference in a domestic quarrel, and the frivolity with which the grave question of subverting an established government and destroying a nationality was treated in this and all similar productions of the time, may well throw doubt upon the “determination” which with such puerility estimated consequences.

It would require space that I cannot give to present the *proofs* of the above. Published speeches, and letters, and my own private correspondence, confirm it. Such ideas were, for the few months between Mr. Lincoln’s nomination and election, in-

dustriously disseminated in the South. His election had been purposely rendered *sure* by the artfully-planned split which divided the Democratic party (possessing largely the majority of votes) between two candidates.

In the little and contemptible oligarchy of South Carolina (contemptible as *all* little oligarchies are) was found a large enough proportion of demented men to "set this ball in motion."

On this crazy set the conspirators relied. The majority of the Southern people were far from being prepared for the part they were to act. Patriotism, love of country, allegiance to that common head under which alone a respectable body-politic could exist, were yet living feelings.

Louisiana was scarcely more prepared for secession than Illinois. Georgia resisted to the last; and was finally badgered into the act of secession, with little conception of the consequences it involved; while in northern Alabama the national flag was kept flying for weeks after the ordinance of secession had been passed by the representatives of less than one-third of the population of that state. In Tennessee and North Carolina the ordinance was equally forced upon unwilling populations. The history of secession in Tennessee is thus given in a New York journal:

“She hesitated long before she identified herself with the rebellion, and at last was really forced to espouse the cause. When the rebel flag had been unfurled in South Carolina, the agitation spread over the Southern States, and Governor Harris seems to have caught the contagion at an early day. He called an extra session of the legislature, to meet in Nashville on the 7th of January, 1861, and recommended the passage of an ordinance calling a convention of the people to consider the propriety of voting the state out of the Union. The legislature only partially followed his advice, and ordered that while voting for delegates to the convention, the people should also decide the question whether a convention should be held or not. The vote was taken on the 9th of February, three days after the first meeting of the Southern Provisional Congress. The result was as follows:

	For Convention.	Against Convention.
East Tennessee,	7,500	32,547
Middle Tennessee, . . .	26,539	27,895
West Tennessee,	20,117	6,918
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total,	54,156	67,360
Majority against convention		13,204

“The delegates chosen by this election were un-

conditional Union men; and if the ordinance calling a convention had been adopted by the people, these delegates would have met on the 25th of February. Governor Harris, thus baffled, determined to carry the state out of the Union whether the people desired it or not, and accordingly summoned the legislature to meet on the 25th of April. The work of dragooning its members was proceeded with just as it was in the Richmond convention, till, on the 6th of May, a majority was obtained sufficient to pass what was called 'a declaration of independence,' which, in effect, was an act of secession; and it was ordered that it should go to the people for their decision. In three days the legislature again adjourned, and on the 8th of June the vote was taken on the 'declaration of independence,' and it was adopted through the influence of the politicians and stump orators who overran the state from all parts of the South. On the 17th of June the legislature assembled for the third time, and consummated the secession of the state."

But the policy of the conspiring traitors was, *not* to deliberate, not to co-operate, not to present to the government or to their sister states, calm and rational representations of grievances* (they had

* Grievances! How real they were, how much they were *felt*, let the

no real ones, and they knew that such a course would fail completely), but to spur on to hasty action, conventions elected under the influence of gross misrepresentations as to the intentions of the Republican party, carried away by their excited passions, and repudiating *all* appeal to the people.*

present Vice-President of the Southern Confederacy answer. I quote from his famous Milledgeville speech:

"I look upon this country, with our institutions, as the Eden of the world, the Paradise of the Universe. It may be out of it we may become greater and more prosperous, but I am candid and sincere in telling you, that I fear, if we rashly evince passion, and without sufficient cause shall take that step, that instead of becoming greater, and more peaceful, prosperous, and happy, instead of becoming gods we will become demons, and at no distant day commence cutting one another's throats."

* "But by the law of nations we are equally bound, before proceeding to violent measures, to set forth our grievances before the offending government, to give them an opportunity to redress the wrong. Has our state yet done this? I think not."—*A. H. Stephens' Milledgeville Speech.*

Neither "our state" nor any other state, nor the disaffected states combined, did it.

The following precious document was "picked up" on the recent occupation of Fernandina, searing out the traitor Yulee and his "confreere" Finegan in too much haste to destroy the evidences of their treason:

WASHINGTON, *January 7, 1861.*

"MY DEAR SIR:—On the other side is a copy of resolutions adopted at a consultation of the Senators from the seceding States, in which Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi, and Florida were present.

"The idea of the meeting was that the states should go out at once, and provide for the early organization of a Confederate Government, not later than 15th February. This time is allowed to enable Louisiana and Texas to participate. It seemed to be opinion [sic] that if we left here, force, loan, and volunteer bills might be passed, which would put Mr. Lincoln in immediate condition for hostilities, whereas if [sic] by remaining in our places until the 1th of March, *it is thought we can keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied, and disable the Republicans from effecting any legislation which will strengthen the hands of the incoming administration.*

That there might be no failure, the several states were hurried into acts of rebellion simultaneously with, or even *before*, the acts of secession by their conventions.

"The resolutions will be sent by the delegation to the President of the Convention. I have not been able to find Mr. Mallory this morning. Hawkins (the member from Florida) is in Connecticut. I have therefore thought it best to send you this copy of the resolutions.

"In haste yours truly,

"D. L. YULEE.

"JOSEPH FINEGAN, Esq., ('Sovereignty Conference'), Tallahassee, Fla."

The following were the resolutions referred to:

"*Resolved* 1.—That in our opinion each of the Southern States should, as soon as may be, secede from the Union.

"*Resolved* 2.—That provision should be made for a Convention to organize a Confederacy of the seceding states, the Convention to meet not later than the 15th of February, at the city of Montgomery, in the State of Alabama.

"*Resolved*.—That in view of the hostile legislation that is threatened against the seceding States, and which may be consummated [sic in original, for it seems his secession mania extended even into orthography] before the 4th of March, we ask instructions whether the delegations are to remain in Congress until that date for the purpose of defeating such legislation.

"*Resolved*, That a committee be and are hereby appointed, consisting of Messrs. Davis, Slidell, and Mallory, to carry out the objects of this meeting."

Below are the comments of the *New York Times* on the above letter and resolutions:

"It will thus be seen that this remarkable letter, which breathes throughout the spirit of the conspirator, in reality lets us into one of the most important of the numerous conclaves which the plotters of treason then held in the Capitol. It was then, as it appears, that they determined to strike the blow, and precipitate their states into secession. But at the same time they resolved it would be imprudent for them then openly to withdraw, as in that case Congress might pass 'force, loan, and volunteer bills, which would put Mr. Lincoln in immediate condition for hostilities.'

* * * * *

"And here is another plot of the traitors brought to light. These very men, on withdrawing from the Senate, urged that they were doing so in

Thus, forts and arsenals, and public property of all kinds, were seized *before* the states had actually seceded, the people thereby committed to a state of *quasi* hostility, and their pride aroused to maintain their attitude of defiance.*

obedience to the command of their respective states. As Davis put it, in his parting speech, 'The ordinance of secession having passed the Convention of his State, he felt obliged to obey the summons, and retire from all official connection with the Federal Government.' This letter of Yulee's clearly reveals that they had themselves pushed their State Conventions to the adoption of the very measure which they had the hardihood to put forward as an imperious 'summons' which they could not disobey! 'Tis thus that treason did its work."

* One of the most effective means of mischief, without which perhaps the monstrous results we deplore could never have been obtained, lay in a secret society known by the name of the Knights of the Golden Circle. This was an association which had numerous lodges in every one of the rebel states. In the states of Missouri and Kentucky its establishment was apparently of not much earlier date than the mission of the *Commissioners* dispatched from the cotton to the border slave states, to solicit the latter to commit treason. All experience has shown how complete is the success, *for a season*, of a party which rests on such a secret organization. In 1854, a secret order known as the Know Nothings, and subsequently shown to be a very small minority of every state in the Union, seemed for months to be likely to possess themselves of all power, both in the state and national governments.

It is easy to understand how extraordinarily the force of such an order would be increased when all respect for law, order and the structure of society was discarded by the members. Secret political societies are frightful anomalies in a constitutional government. They are bad enough when they are the instinctive attempts of an oppressed people to throw off the yoke of tyranny which cannot be openly encountered and overthrown. When they are the nurseries in which are matured the pretences for seeking to cast off a government which had been only felt in its blessings, it is impossible to find language strong enough for their condemnation. Secret political societies have this additional title to the hatred of the citizens of the United States, viz.: that such a society was among the foremost and most effectual weapons of treason in 1861. The humiliating truth is undeniable, that a degree of

In the cotton states alone (states inflated with the arrogant notion that their slave-made idol was indeed a king, if of ignoble birth, yet born to universal rule), were such proceedings practicable. The border (slave) states were treated with undisguised contempt—a contempt justified by the part those states have played. In these states “honest and pious men” were—as has been aptly suggested by high authority—“in the pitiable weakness of human judgment, hoodwinked by natural affections, social relations, and surrounding influences,” servile admirers and servile imitators of every thing “Southern.” Virginia—proud Virginia! the mother of Washington, of Madison, of Jefferson, and of a host of others whose names are great in the annals of the republic—was now confessedly “hitched on” to the cotton states so far as the feelings of her oligarchy were concerned, and by her interests, through a kind of commerce which would be elsewhere known by the term “slave-trade.”

But there was, behind, the great body of the people, who were not so easily cajoled or driven into what they could not help recognizing as a fatal step, whose interests were not identified with slavery, whose feelings were not warped by the perverse in-

anxiety and terror was excited by this secret society, which, in many places, paralyzed the greatly superior numbers of unorganized Unionists.

fluence the "institution" exerted so powerfully elsewhere. A convention was elected in Virginia, a large majority of which was composed of members who pledged themselves as Unionists, and on the faith of this pledge received a popular majority of more than eighty thousand votes. Unfortunately, in this body were to be found some who had resolved from the first, with a perfidy not easily matched, to falsify these pledges. Of course they did not attempt to do this without the aid of casuistry. The superstition of our ancestors imagined that witches commenced their orgies by reading a portion of the Scriptures backward. These men prefaced their treason by *reading backward* that part of the Constitution of the United States which declares that instrument and the laws made in pursuance thereof, to be "the supreme law of the land"—and set up in place of this supremacy the misshapen idol of State Sovereignty, and paramount allegiance to one's state. This assembly—not of witches, but of "wise men"—which, as the result proved, at last fairly embarked on the voyage of secession "in a bowl," not over strong, beat its brains, and beat the air, and split hairs for I know not how long, in this "backward reading" method of interpreting the work of a Washington and a Madison, when the sound of rebel cannon, directed at a handful of half-starved soldiers

shut up in Fort Sumter (vainly attempting to hold the charge committed to them by their country, while they *did* uphold its honor and its glory), suggested the conclusion, extraordinary indeed, but strictly logical, when the spirit and methods of investigation are considered, that the government was *coercing* the South.

A fortress of the United States had for months been engirdled by hostile batteries, finally cannonaded and reduced—no demonstration of any kind having been made by the government, other than vain attempts to throw in reinforcements and provisions—and the so-called “secretary of war” of the so-called “Confederate States” had publicly announced, in a congratulatory address, that the flag of treason, just planted on Sumter, would soon wave over the dome of the Capitol at Washington, and over Faneuil Hall at Boston. That the call of the President for 75,000 three months’ volunteers to defend the capital and the soil of the Union from the further march of treason, was an act of “coercion,” was the discovery of these Solons, now getting fairly embarked in the “bowl” of secession, on the not very quiet sea of rebellion.*

* It is a notorious fact that the attack on Fort Sumter was a desperate expedient, prompted by the leading Virginia conspirators (several of whom,

Madness and evil passions ruled the moment. The friends of the Union in the convention were forced to succumb and even fly from the rage of a Richmond populace, and the act of "secession" was passed. Notwithstanding that, *by its very terms*, this act became valid only on being ratified a month later by the vote of the people, its reckless contrivers lost not a moment in committing the state to the rebel cause by plunging it instantly into flagrant rebellion. The great public establishments, naval and military, at Norfolk and Harper's Ferry, were seized, and the convention assumed to enter into what was in fact an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Montgomery usurpation, which bound the state, hand and foot, to the rebel cause, and speedily covered its soil with rebel troops, rendering the subsequent act of "ratification" by the people, at the polls, a mere mockery.*

such as Roger A. Pryor and the "venerable" Edmund Ruffin, were present, and the latter of whom fired the first gun from one of the batteries), conscious that Virginia could not be either cajoled or forced into secession until the pretence of "coercion" could be brought against the Federal government. It proved to be a two-edged sword, however, for it aroused the North to a sense of the treasonable character of the secession movement.

* A letter upon the Virginia election was written by Senator Mason, of that state, in which he says that the "ordinance of secession" (not yet voted upon by the people of Virginia) "annulled the constitution and laws of the United States within that state, and absolved the citizens of Virginia from all obligation and obedience to them;" and that if it be now rejected by the people, Virginia must "change sides," and "turn her arms against her

The governor of Maryland, uninfected, it seems, by the miasma which, arising from the depths of slaverydom, had inflamed men's blood and bewildered and dwarfed their reason, had frustrated the designs of the conspirators and sympathizers with treason of that state; but the latter could show their venom, if not their power.

The disgraceful attack by a mob, in the streets of Baltimore, upon United States troops passing through that city to the defence of Washington; the destruction of the railroad bridges, with the co-operation or *quasi* co-operation of the mayor and leading secessionists; the repeated efforts of a secession legislature to throw the control of the state into secession hands, and, unauthorized, against the known will of a majority of voters of the state, to pass a sham "ordinance of secession," are specimens of the disease exhibited in that state.

Identified with the "Cotton States" in scarcely any particular, except slavery; with the broad Potomac lying between her and her "sister slave states"—bearing on its banks the capital of the Union (rendering it absolutely impossible, if there is a division between North and South, that that division should

Southern sisters." Moreover, that ordinance brought into Virginia several thousand soldiers of the Confederate army, and thus the faith of Virginia is pledged to it; for if it be rejected, their soldiers will merely have been entrapped.—Doc. 170.

not unite her to the North); with the larger proportion of her agricultural population engaged in the cultivation of cereals by free labor, the advocacy of secession there was simply ridiculous. We sympathize with the hydrophobian maniac, though his appearance may be loathsome and his approach dangerous; but what sympathy could we find (if we could conceive such a thing) for the man who should fall into the canine madness through admiration for, and with the desire to imitate, the contortions of another maniac!

Such is an imperfect picture of "secession." You have doubtless seen it painted in much more lovely forms, with much more glowing colors. I may be considered unjust; but the men who so lightly turn their arms against that government with which their national existence is identified—who throw off in a moment all associations, all patriotism, all that men most cherish who cherish any thing that is good—who, in their enmity to the one and their partiality to the other, are blind equally to truth and to treason—must not expect any sympathy nor much charity from me.

Nor can the charity which we extend to men who act *merely* under errors of judgment, be fairly demanded for those who have so outraged the rights of others. Enough has been told of "secession" in

Virginia, Tennessee, Alabama, &c., to show that it was not a movement initiated or desired by the *people* of those states. The great body of the people *everywhere* were in quiet enjoyment of undisturbed rights, and they have been deluded and goaded into the crime and misery of civil war by "ambitious" and reckless "men," "that *they* might reign and ride on its whirlwind and direct the storm."*

Disaffection, prompted by the pride of wealth and the lust of power, originated with the great slave-holding classes, and with the politicians who courted them. It is these alone whose voice has been heard, and who conceived the rebellion. It has been a war of the *rich against the poor*; and I charge every Northern and Border-state sympathizer with the cause of the "abused South," with overlooking and disregarding those who alone have *real* claim to sympathy, the suffering and deluded poorer classes of the Southern people.

The Southern states, so far from having any justification for the mad and violent course they have taken, have not had one real grievance, one practical act of "Northern aggression" of which to complain. It is true that the *tariff* has been much

* See General Jackson's letter, page 31.

dwelt upon as a grievance, particularly *since* the rebellion has been inaugurated. Let Mr. Stephens tell us how justly :

“The tariff no longer distracts the public councils. Reason has triumphed. The present tariff was voted for by Massachusetts and South Carolina. The lion and the lamb lay down together. Every man in the Senate and House from Massachusetts and South Carolina, I think, voted for it, as did my honorable friend himself. And if it be true, to use the figure of speech of my honorable friend (Mr. Toombs), that every man in the North that works in iron and brass and wood has his muscle strengthened by the protection of the government, that stimulant was given by his vote, and I believe by that of every other Southern man. So we ought not to complain of that.”—*Milledgeville Speech*.

And as to *slavery*, surely the three Confederate “commissioners,” Yancey, Mason, and Rost, ought to be considered competent authority on that point. Hear them—I quote from their letter to Earl Russell:

“It was from no fear that the slaves would be liberated that secession took place. The very party in power has proposed to guarantee slavery forever in the States, if the South would but remain in the Union. Mr. Lincoln’s Message proposes no freedom

to the slave, but announces subjection of his owner to the will of the Union; in other words, to the will of the North. Even after the battle of Bull Run, both branches of the Congress at Washington passed resolutions, that the war is only waged in order to uphold that (pro-slavery) constitution,* and to enforce the laws (many of them pro-slavery); and out of 172 votes in the lower House, they re-

* We know well who is called "the father of lies," and, if paternity is to be recognized by the offspring, there will be no difficulty in tracing that of Southern "secession." As it owes its origin to falsehood and misrepresentation, it would seem as if the very spirit of the "father" infected every act and word of its agents. We know not which most to admire and wonder at—the paltry subterfuge which would swell the list of vessels eluding the blockade (and thus only make it respectable) by the cases of those vessels which left Southern ports before the blockade was notified at them, or *between the notification and the expiration of the fifteen days allowed for exit*, or the stupid confidence in deceit which expected the English ministry and English people to overlook *these little items*. The misrepresentation of the resolution of Congress is of another character. Here it is:

"*Resolved*, That this war was not waged on their part with any spirit of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of these states, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several states unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."

The constitution is not "pro-slavery," nor are the laws made under it "pro-slavery." It leaves slavery where it found it, simply because the wise men who framed it were conscious that they could, much as they were opposed to the continuance of slavery, do no better; but the Congress which almost unanimously passed this resolution was equally unanimous in its determination, exercising powers given by that constitution that *slavery should extend no farther*. And *here* is just where the shoe pinches; and not in the "high price" of Yankee shoe-leather.

ceived all but two, and in the Senate all but one vote.”

And Earl Russell, in his letter to Lord Lyons of May 11, 1861, thus states the purport of their conversations with him :

“One of these gentlemen, speaking for the others, dilated on the causes which had induced the Southern states to secede from the Northern. *The principal of these causes, he said, was not slavery, but the very high price which, for the sake of protecting the Northern manufacturers, the South were obliged to pay for the manufactured goods which they required.*”

Whatever Southern “commissioners” in search of English interference to sustain them in rebellion, may say, and however complicated by evil passions and visionary schemes its true motives may be, *abolitionism* is the *real* charge against the North.

If by this term is meant aversion to slavery and the desire to see it extinguished, it implies a sentiment common, at this period of the world’s history, to almost all Christendom, outside the fifteen slaveholding states. If it is meant that Northern abolitionism would forcibly, or by any other than moral influences, interfere with slavery *in the states* where it exists, I affirm that there was not and that there never could have been, any considerable number of

Northern men who would or could so do. The Union which the secessionists would destroy was the best protection they could ever have against that danger.

But it was just those moral influences which were unendurable. Slavery, as it had come to be in the South, could not endure the free circulation of the thoughts, the breathing of the aspirations with which Christianity has inspired and animated the civilized world. As "a slave cannot breathe in England," freedom of thought as to human rights, aspiration for human progress, could not "live" in *nor around* the region where the "institution" had established its gloomy sway. Slavery may or may not be consistent with the Divine will ; but slavery, as it now exists in the Southern states, disregards moral laws, human relations, and human rights.

For the *existence* of slavery within her border the South is not responsible. The inhabitants of England, and of what are now the Northern states, were equally concerned in the slave-trade and in the establishment of slavery ; or rather, it is alleged that the English government protected the introduction of slaves into Virginia, and perhaps other colonies, against the wishes and remonstrances of the colonists.

But the responsibility of the present slave states

differs from that of all other people of the present generation in this, that *to them* (to use the language of Dr. Palmer, of New Orleans, in his famous secession sermon, though in a quite different sense) has Providence *finally committed the institution*. Have they been faithful to their trust?

Rather have they not—in totally overlooking the human rights and the moral and physical well-being of the slave; rejecting all arguments which the quickening sense to human rights of the civilized world around them, has advanced for the amelioration of his condition, as well as all aspirations for his restoration to the rights and duties of a responsible moral agent; and looking upon and treating him solely as a “hewer of wood and drawer of water,” to minister to their wealth and their luxury—suffered the institution to become a *crime*, the intoxication of which has influenced and maddened them to the greater crimes of treason and rebellion?

The truth is, South Carolina has dreamed and raved of a Southern slaveocracy for more than thirty years; but so frantic were her ravings that few could believe that she could find any to sympathize with her folly. In 1832-'3 she attempted secession on the score of the grievance of the tariff. The firm hand and iron rule of General Jackson

quelled the treason then. The foresight of this great man was most remarkably illustrated by a letter he wrote to a friend soon after the submission of South Carolina in 1833. The letter is so short and so striking as to allow quotation here in full. The *original* was produced and read in the Senate of the United States, before the taking of Fort Sumter.

“WASHINGTON, *May* 1, 1833.

“MY DEAR SIR: * * * * * I have had a laborious task here; but nullification is dead, and its actors and courtiers will only be remembered by the people to be execrated for their wicked designs to sever and destroy the only good government on the globe, and that prosperity and happiness we enjoy over every portion of the world. Haman’s gallows ought to be the fate of all such ambitious men, who would involve their country in civil war and all the evils in its train, that they might reign, and ride on its whirlwind and direct the storm. The free people of the United States have spoken, and consigned these wicked demagogues to their proper doom. Take care of your nullifiers; you have them among you; let them meet with the indignant frowns of every man who loves his country. The tariff, it is now known, was

a mere pretext. The next pretext will be the negro or slavery question.

“ANDREW JACKSON.

“REV. ANDREW J. CRAWFORD.”

The whole history of the government of the United States has exhibited subservience, rather than resistance to the institution of slavery. In the earlier periods of our history, our statesmen, North and South, were in unison in the opinion that slavery was an evil. Seeing no means of immediate removal, and believing that it would eventually expire from natural causes, they left it to the sole control of the respective states. Says Mr. Stephens (Vice-President C. S. A.):

“The prevailing ideas entertained by him (Jefferson) and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old constitution, were, that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. It was an evil they knew not well how to deal with; but the general opinion of the men of that day was, that somehow or other, in the order of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away.”

The collision between North and South arises *not* from Northern aggression, but from the entirely new

opinions which have obtained in the South as to the institution, and from the entirely new policy it demands. The culture of the cotton-plant, and the great increase in the number of slaves, have made slavery the great material interest, and interest has moulded the opinions of the South. No longer an "evil," tolerated because irremediable, an evil to the society which maintains it, a positive wrong to the bondsman when it voluntarily *makes him* a bondsman, it is now set up as an abstract good, the true foundation of free government.

"This stone which was rejected by the first builders (says Mr. Stephens, with blasphemy worthy of the cause, in what is properly called his "corner-stone speech"), is become the chief stone of the corner in our new edifice," and he truly claims that the new Confederacy is the first to promulgate to the world the doctrine worthy of the "wise men" of the "bowl" or of the victims of mental aberration, that the foundation of free government—in other words, of Liberty—is Slavery!!*

*In another part of the same speech, Mr. Stephens says:

"Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and moral condition. (Applause.) This, our new government, is the first in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth."

Let Solons, and Numa, and Alfreds, and Washingtons, henceforth hide their

This great "good," this ruling interest, must be everywhere acknowledged and protected. The rapid increase of the free states in population and wealth, threatened the predominance of Northern or free state sentiment in the counsels of the nation. To obviate this, increasing efforts have been made for the last twenty years, to "extend the area" of slavery. The annexation of Texas, the war with Mexico, the proposed acquisition of Cuba, of Spanish American territory, *everywhere*, were simply measures of Southern and pro-slavery policy.

The Congresses of our earlier days—comprising many who assisted in framing the constitution, the early Presidents (Washington, Madison, &c.), who were the leading instruments in its framing—sanctioned by their action, the power of the national legislation to exclude slavery from the territories of the United States; but our new-light pro-slavery politicians discover that this power is unconstitutional, and demand that *slavery* shall be recognized and protected in *all* the territories of the United

heads: in our "Keitts," and "Yanceys," and "Stephenses," we have Solomons without number, and "great physical, moral, and philosophical truths," will doubtless have a rapid development under the "new government."

Bright epoch in the "history of the world!" Even the "old" government was the "Eden of the world" (see page 16). What will the "new" be? Let the smoking ruins of many a happy home—the wasted fields of Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, North and South Carolina, and Georgia—and the blood shed through the delusions of such fools and fanatics, answer!

States. In the South, that is, the cotton states, the slave-trade, long put under the ban of nations, and execrated by every philanthropist elsewhere, was fast growing into favor, and the proposition to renew it was openly discussed. The early championship and unblushing advocacy of this measure by "Commissioner" Yancey, were never concealed until deference to English sentiment rendered concealment advisable.*

Against this "aggression" upon the original principles of our government, this turning the whole fabric into a monstrous temple to slavery, this perversion of all its powers and influences for the protection and extension of the "institution," the free states at last found it necessary to arouse themselves.

Too much addicted to their industrial and commercial pursuits, too loving of quiet, too much, perhaps, absorbed in the acquisition of present gains, they had permitted the active pro-slavery influences to control the government.

*Mr. Yancey, in a recent letter to the *London Times*, asserts that there are not two public men in the South who advocate the reopening of the slave-trade. Quite likely not, *now*. He leaves it to be inferred that there *may* be one. In a brief visit to the South in the spring of 1858, I must have met that one.

A man prominent enough in the early acts of secession, and notorious enough to be styled a public man, was an enthusiastic advocate. Others, not public men, spoke not unfavorably of it, and public opinion was fast developing itself in favor of a reopening of the slave-trade.

The Van Burens, the Polks, the Tylers, the Pierces, the Buchanans, who administered the government, since the days of Jackson, were either Southern pro-slavery men, or aptly characterized as "Northern men with Southern principles." The Republican party had its origin simply in this necessity of preserving the government from the growing infamy of being converted into an instrument for the perpetual maintenance and universal extension of slavery.

This is the "Northern aggression," and in this antagonism consists the "incompatibility" of the two sections living together under one government; an idea false in itself, and never advanced, even by Southerners, until it was necessary to find *something* to say in justification of their unjustifiable proceedings.

"We can't live with them," was the puerile cry of men inflated with successful bullying, and accustomed, in their own small spheres, to nothing that was not servile. Border-state imitators at once caught up and echoed the cry.

Whether "we," *i. e.*, the Union-loving, law-abiding, and peaceful citizens of the United States, could "live" longer with men so infatuated, so self-ignorant, and, as a consequence, so ignorant of every thing outside of them, as the specimens I give of

sayings and doings of secession leaders prove them to be, until the lesson had been taught—not by soft words, but by hard blows—“how to live” on equal terms with the rest of the world, is a question which I, for one, decided more than a year ago, in the negative.

“It is estimated,” says a Richmond paper, “that one Southern soldier is equal to three Western men, and to five New Englanders—indeed we have heard many in our ranks offer to contend single-handed with *twenty Yankees*,” and the redoubtable General McCulloch, a “representative (Southern) man,” announced to his army that “we” are their “natural masters.”

Hard blows are proving themselves apt teachers.

McCulloch (defeated by inferior numbers at the recent battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas) has laid down his life *and his rod*; and General Beauregard has evidently made progress: “Our losses,” he says, in a recent address to his army, “are now about equal to those of the enemy:” a statement that can only be verified by the supposition that he has learned to count one “Yankee” equal to five Southern men.

No such “incompatibility” was ever found in the social or other relations of the people of the two sections, and it was only after the Southern people

had been badgered into fury and deceived by the most unblushing lies, as to the objects and intentions of the Republican party, that this foolish notion was made a peg to hang a sorry apology upon.

Far be it from me to dispute the right (with proper limitations) of political communities to choose their own form of government, or to appeal to the "*ultima ratio*," revolution, when oppressed by intolerable wrongs; but that a state of this Union may "secede" at pleasure, is as absurd as that Cornwall or Devonshire might secede from British rule by a popular vote; while the abstract right of self-government, or of choosing the particular nationality to which a community shall belong, is subject to conditions so far beyond man's control as to restrict very much the realization of such a right.

If I have given the history of "secession" correctly, the name of the government of the United States would have deserved to be blotted out from the roll of nations; the people of the United States would have deserved to be repudiated as the offspring of that great and glorious country from which we derive our institutions and our cherished notions of human rights, if that government and that people had not risen against the treason which aimed to sap those institutions and those principles, and girded themselves to the work of putting down

the rebellion, conscious that, *whatever might be the final result*, they owed this one plain duty to themselves, to the world, and to God.

A few words as to the military phases of this rebellion. I have already said that the people of the United States were unsuspecting of, and unprepared for, *treason*; and it is to this unsuspected treason, at work in the very highest places of the government, that is due the unmolested and successful growth of the rebellion. The infamous John B. Floyd—a man whom I had occasion, in the first month of his career as secretary of war, from his action in matters with which I was officially connected, to recognize as a scoundrel, controlled—under an imbecile President, himself the tool and dupe of the conspirators—the whole military resources of the nation. Our regular army and navy establishments are small, but a few regiments and a few ships, directed by an energetic and honest executive, would, properly disposed at Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans, have killed the cockatrice in the egg.

Floyd, of course, instead of using the army in this way, took care that it should not be available to his successor. It was scattered on our distant frontiers, and the capture of a large portion in Texas was managed through the agency of its com-

manding officer, a worthy accomplice and compeer in infamy of such a chief.

The northern arsenals were stripped of their arms by Floyd, to be deposited where they would be available to the conspirators.

The secretary of the navy, Toucey, if not as open a traitor as Floyd, was quite as false-hearted. In subservience to the traitors, he scattered the navy to the four quarters of the earth, and he is only to be preferred to Floyd in this, that he did not make so complete a sacrifice of all decency in his *private* character as did his yoke-fellow in the War Department.

Such was the situation when the "ball opened" by the bombardment of Sumter.

It was the crowning act, the "*coup de maître*" of the conspirators, to "fire the southern heart," and to give the death shock to northern pusillanimity.

If even at this moment if General Scott had had control of ten thousand regular troops and two or three ships of war, he could and would speedily have put down the rebellion. He had neither. Not the amount of half a regiment of our regular army could be brought to the defence of Washington city.

Seventy-five thousand three months volunteers (that time being the limit of the President's au-

thority to call out the militia for the "suppression of insurrection") were assembled, during the months of May and June, in Washington and elsewhere. As it was evident, however, that this was no three months affair, immediate measures were taken by the President, in anticipation of legislative enactments, to increase the regular army, and to organize a large volunteer force for three years or the war.

Of course the rebels, now fully committed to war, were as active as the government, with the great advantage that they had actually *been preparing* for three months, in a greater or less degree. The enormous proportions the rebellion had assumed before any head could be made against it, will excite less surprise when this last fact, together with the disorganized state of our army and navy, is considered.

The beginning of July found us, not only secure in Washington, but occupying the Virginia shore of the Potomac. Baltimore and the railroad communication with the North were firmly held; secession in Maryland was *suppressed*; and a considerable army under Patterson was entering the Virginia valley by Harper's Ferry, while the brilliant success of McClellan in Western Virginia gave an *éclat* of positive victory to our arms.

It was a favorite notion with a large class of

Northern politicians (and the people too) that nothing but an imposing display of force was necessary to crush the rebellion.

Such was the opinion mainly of those whose voice was most heard in public, or through the journals, and of many who had great influence with the administration. To such, the inactivity of an army of 40,000 men about Washington was incomprehensible. It was vain to say that 40,000 men, just called from the fields and workshops of the country to don the garb of soldiers, commanded by persons as little experienced as themselves, and who, of course, had no hold on the confidence of the men, were far from being an army; that, even if far more reliable than they really were, means of transportation and many important auxiliaries were sadly deficient. The cry of "On to Richmond" was raised, and even General Scott yielded at last to the general wish.

Simultaneously with our occupation of the Virginia shore of the Potomac, the Confederates had established themselves at "Manassas Junction," a point on the railroad twenty-five miles west from Alexandria, and the junction of the great southern railroad route (connecting Washington with Richmond and the South) and the Manassas Gap Railroad, leading to the valley of the Shenandoah, where another Confederate force under Johnston

confronted Patterson, who had recently crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry.

The occupation of Manassas was recommended to the Confederates by the fact that it controlled the railroad routes, and was itself a strong position. An elevated plateau, in the crotch formed by the Occoquan and its principal tributary from the north, Bull Run, of which the beds are canal-like cuts in horizontal strata of red sandstone, it was of difficult approach to an attacking army, while the general character of the country, broken, wooded, with few roads fit for the movements of an army, was favorable to the defence.

Leading almost directly west from Alexandria, diverging slightly to the north from the railroad, a macadamized turnpike road led to Centreville, twenty-two miles distant.

From Centreville, a little west of south and six or seven miles distant, lay Manassas Junction. About midway between these two points flowed the rivulet of Bull Run (the real defensive line of the enemy) in a general direction from north-west to south-east.

A road led from Centreville almost directly to the "Junction," crossing Bull Run three miles from Centreville at "Blackburn's Ford" (sometimes called by the Confederates "Mitchell's Ford"). The turn-

pike before mentioned continued its westerly course toward Warrenton, in a nearly straight line beyond Centreville, crossing Bull Run at the "Stone Bridge," four miles distant. Somewhat eastwardly of south, a country road from Centreville crossed Bull Run and the railroad at "Union Mills."

The Confederate force was distributed along Bull Run from Union Mills to the Stone Bridge (nearly eight miles), with reserves and a fortified position at or near the Junction.

The line was a strong one, for the stream, though containing little water at that season, was, owing to the character of its bed and to the abrupt and wooded slopes of its right bank, a formidable obstacle.

The army of General McDowell, which marched to the attack of this position, numbered about 30,000 men. Save perhaps 700 or 800 regular troops (fragments of regiments) of the old army, it was composed wholly of raw volunteers, none of whom had been in a soldier's garb more than two or three months, and at least half of whom were enlisted only for a term of three months, then just about expiring. General McDowell, in his official report, says:

"A large and the best part of my forces were three months volunteers, whose term of service was about

to expire, but who were sent forward as having long enough to serve for the purpose of the expedition."

* * * * *

"In the next few days I should have lost about ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered and disciplined troops in the army" (by expiration of their time): and, speaking of the organization of his army, "many of the regiments did not come across (the Potomac) till eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my ever seeing them, and without having been together in a brigade."

Such an army as this was certainly not the best suited for an offensive campaign. Troops *utterly* raw and new levies, officers and men; brigades and divisions, the component parts of which had never been brought in contact before, commanded by officers who, though generally of ability, were for the first time exercising these extensive commands, and who had hardly seen the troops they commanded.

The correspondent of the London *Times* (with singular want of magnanimity, he hurried off to Europe an account of a battle that he did not see, an account confined to the discreditable portion of the affair in which he got himself entangled, viz.:

the panic and confused crush of the baggage wagons and earlier retreating columns) has held up to notice the want of patriotism and courage displayed by the Pennsylvania regiment whose period of service expired on the eve of the battle, and which (as General McDowell expresses it) "moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon."

I would remark that men unexpectedly called from the farm and workshop for *three months'* service, and for no more definite purpose than to occupy the capital and uphold the government until some more permanent and efficient organization could be made, were not the men best calculated to enter upon an offensive campaign, with their term of service just expiring. The fact *was* discreditable, but it can be explained without impugning the courage or patriotism of our people, or the *heartiness* with which they approve the course of the government in suppressing the rebellion.

Such was the army which marched from the banks of the Potomac on the afternoon of July 16th. It moved in four columns; one by the turnpike, one by the lateral country roads on the right, one on the left of the railroad, and another between the turnpike and railroad, following what is known as the "Braddock" road, from its having been made by that general on his memorable march to Fort

Duquesne, in 1754, which terminated in his disastrous defeat and death.

We had expected to encounter the enemy at Fairfax Court-House, seven miles this side of Centreville (where we knew that he had thrown up intrenchments), and our three right columns were directed to co-operate on that point. We entered that place about noon of the 17th, finding the intrenchments abandoned and every sign of a hasty retreat.

It had been General McDowell's intention, after reaching this point, to make a sudden movement to the left, crossing the Occoquan just below the junction of that stream with Bull Run, aiming at the enemy's railroad communications. His reconnoissances in that direction, led him to consider the country impracticable for the operations of his army.

On the morning of the 18th the different columns commenced their movement from Fairfax to Centreville. While General McDowell made a personal reconnoissance of the country to the left of the railroad, making the forward movement on Centreville as a mere demonstration, I, as senior engineer of his staff, thought it a favorable occasion to examine the enemy's positions in our front. I found myself anticipated, however, by General Tyler, who, though ordered to proceed with his division no farther than Centreville, pushed on a brigade toward Black-

burn's Ford. I hastened to join him. The road, which follows a level ridge between two tributaries of Bull Run, soon brought us to a point from which it descends to the ford and from which the enemy's force could be discerned. The position was a strong one naturally, and it appeared to be occupied in force, though from the thickly wooded character of the opposite bank, we could not particularize the enemy's dispositions.

Troops, too, were in motion on the plateau of Manassas, beyond, moving up to reinforce the enemy's lines. Though no attack was intended by the commanding general on this point, there could be no harm, particularly as we had two 20-pounder rifled guns, in opening an artillery fire by which perhaps the positions of his batteries might be ascertained. This was done. After having amused ourselves for a while by observing the hasty scattering of parties upon whom our unexpected visitors had intruded themselves, we had the tables turned upon us by a sudden and rapid discharge from a battery near the ford, invisible except by the smoke of its guns. However, our 20-pounders, assisted by a battery of rifled 6-pounders, proved too much for it, and we soon succeeded in silencing its fire.

This ought to have been the end of the affair, but General Tyler, though warned that no serious en-

gement was intended at this point, persisting in the belief that the enemy would run whenever menaced by serious attack, had determined, I believe, to march to Manassas that day. Had he made a vigorous charge and crossed the stream at once, it is quite possible, so much depended upon *moral effect*, in operating with raw troops, that he might have succeeded. But he only filed his brigade down to the stream, drew it up parallel to the other shore, and opened an unmeaning fusilade, the results of which were all in favor of the enemy and before which, overawed rather by the tremendous volley directed at them than suffering heavy loss, one of the regiments broke in confusion and the whole force retired. This foolish affair (called by the Confederates the battle of Bull Run, they applying the term Manassas to the ensuing battle of the 21st which we style the battle of Bull Run) had a marked effect upon the *morale* of our raw forces.

The next day was spent in reconnoitring and in determining how and where we should attack. The "Stone Bridge" already mentioned as forming the left of the enemy's defensive position, was a single arched structure over the narrow stream. The passage was found to be guarded by batteries, and the road and adjacent ground beyond obstructed by formidable abattis. Several roads were ascertained

to lead to fords between Blackburn's and the Stone Bridge, but they were mere by-paths, and the opposite banks of the stream generally steep and tangled and probably obstructed.

It was also found that a couple of miles above the Stone Bridge there was a good ford at "Sudley Spring," which was but slightly guarded, and that above that point the stream was, almost everywhere, easily passable. No continuous road communicated from the turnpike with the "Sudley" ford, but our reconnoissances showed that the intervening country was almost everywhere practicable to all arms.*

On these data was based the plan of attack. It was as follows :

One division, under Colonel Miles, to remain in reserve at Centreville, and to make, with one of its brigades, a false attack on Blackburn's Ford ; another division (Tyler's) to move by the turnpike up to the Stone Bridge and threaten that point, and, at

* The disposition of the troops under General Beauregard, on the day preceding the battle (the 20th) are thus described by General Johnston :

" His troops were divided into eight brigades, occupying the defensive line of Bull Run. Brigadier-General Ewell's was posted at the Union Mills Ford ; Brigadier-General D. R. Jones's, at McLean's Ford ; Brigadier-General Longstreet's, at Blackburn's Ford ; Brigadier-General Bonham's, at Mitchell's Ford ; Colonel Coker's, at Ball's Ford, some three miles above, and Colonel Evans's, with a regiment and a battalion, formed the extreme left at the Stone Bridge. The brigades of General Holmes and Colonel Early were in reserve, in the rear of the right."

the proper time, to carry it and unite with the principal column, which, consisting of the two divisions (of Hunter and Heintzelman) of about 12,000 men, was to diverge from the turnpike, and, by a flank movement, reach the Sudley Ford, and descending the right bank of the stream, take the defences of the "Stone Bridge" in the rear. The united force would then give battle, strike at the enemy's railroad communication, or act otherwise, as circumstances might dictate.

This plan was carried out in its main features, but it failed in one important particular. It was calculated that the marching column should diverge from the turnpike by early daylight (the route being so wooded that a night march was deemed imprudent) and reach Sudley Ford by six or seven A. M. The Stone Bridge division did not clear the road over which both, for a certain distance, had to pass, so that the column could take up its march until near six o'clock. The route through fields and woods to Sudley proved to be far longer and more difficult than was believed. The column did not reach the Sudley Ford till near half-past nine, three or four hours "behind time." When we reached the ford the heads of the enemy's columns were visible on the march to meet us.

"The ground between the stream and the road

leading from Sudley south was, for about a mile, thickly wooded; on the right, for the same distance, divided between fields and woods. A mile from the ford the country, on both sides of the road, is open, and for a mile further large rolling fields extend to the turnpike, which, after crossing Bull Run at the 'Stone Bridge,' passes what became the field of battle, through the valley of a small tributary of the Run.

"Shortly after the leading regiment of the first brigade reached this open space, and whilst others and the second brigade were crossing to the front and right, the enemy opened his fire, beginning with artillery, and following it up with infantry. The leading brigade (Burnside's) had to sustain this shock for a short time without support, and did it well. The battalion of regular infantry was sent to sustain it, and shortly afterward the other corps of Porter's brigade, and a regiment detached from Heintzelman's division to the left, forced the enemy back far enough to allow Sherman's and Keyes' brigades, of Tyler's division, to cross from their position on the Warrenton road. These drove the right of the enemy, understood to have been commanded by Beauregard, from the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and down to the road, and across it up the slopes on the other side.

“ Whilst this was going on, Heintzelman’s division was moving down the field to the stream and up the road beyond.

“ Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of the road down which our troops had marched from Sudley Spring, is a hill with a farm-house on it.* Behind this hill the enemy had, early in the day, some of his most annoying batteries planted. Across the road from this hill was another hill, or rather elevated ridge, or table of land. The hottest part of the contest was for the possession of the hill with a house on it. The force engaged here was Heintzelman’s division, Wilcox’s and Howard’s brigades on the right, supported by part of Porter’s brigade and the cavalry under Palmer, and Franklin’s brigade of Heintzelman’s division, Sherman’s brigade of Tyler’s division in the centre and up the road, whilst Keyes’ brigade of Tyler’s division was on the left, attacking the batteries near the Stone Bridge. The Rhode Island battery, of Burnside’s brigade, also participated in this attack by its fire from the north of the turnpike. The enemy was understood to have been commanded by J. E. Johnston.

“ Rickett’s battery, which did such effective service, and played so brilliant a part in this contest,

*The house is marked on the maps, “Mrs. Henry’s.”

was, together with Griffin's battery, on the side of the hill, and became the object of the special attention of the enemy, who succeeded—our officers mistaking one of his regiments for one of our own, and allowing it to approach without firing upon it—in disabling the battery, and then attempted to take it. Three times was he repulsed by different corps in succession, and driven back, and the guns taken by hand, the horses being killed, and pulled away. The third time it was supposed by us all that the repulse was final, for he was driven entirely from the hill, and so far beyond it as not to be in sight, and all were certain the day was ours. He had before this been driven nearly a mile and a half, and was beyond the Warrenton road, which was entirely in our possession, from the Stone Bridge westward, and our engineers were just completing the removal of the abattis across the road, to allow our reinforcement (Schenck's brigade and Ayers' battery) to join us. The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken.

“But we had been fighting since half-past ten o'clock in the morning, and it was after three o'clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since two o'clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to such things seemed a long march, before coming into action, though the longest

distance gone over was not more than nine and a half miles; and though they had three days' provisions served out to them the day before, many no doubt either did not eat them, or threw them away on the march or during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had done much severe fighting. Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it, had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the ranks.

“It was at this time that the enemy's reinforcements came to his aid from the railroad train, understood to have just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's army. They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and toward the rear of our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hill-side. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house on it, and there maintained itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike, on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating troops,

and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic.

“Finding that this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day’s work in gaining almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on the field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form in line, and offer the appearance, at least, of organization. They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected by my order, by Colonel Porter’s force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost.”

The foregoing quotation is from General McDowell’s official report. Further on, after explaining the delays in the organization of his army, and the impossibility of getting it forward and into action earlier than he did, he says:

“We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the fifth division (Miles’s and Richardson’s brigades) on the left, at Blackburn’s Ford to Centreville, and Schenck’s brigade, of Tyler’s division, on the left of the road, near the Stone Bridge, not

participating in the main action. The numbers opposed to us have been variously estimated. I may safely say, and avoid even the appearance of exaggeration, that the enemy brought up all he could which were not kept engaged elsewhere. He had notice of our coming on the 17th, and had from that time until the 21st to bring up whatever he had. It is known that in estimating the force to go against Manassas, I engaged not to have to do with the enemy's forces under Johnston, then kept in check in the valley by Major General Patterson, or those kept engaged by Major General Butler; and I know every effort was made by the General-in-Chief that this should be done, and that even if Johnston joined Beauregard, it would not be because he could be followed by General Patterson, but from causes not necessary for me to refer to if I knew them all. This was not done, and the enemy was free to assemble from every direction in numbers only limited by the amount of his railroad rolling stock, and his supply of provisions. To the forces, therefore, we drove in from Fairfax Court-House, Fairfax Station, Germantown, and Centreville, and those under Beauregard at Manassas, must be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and those brought up by Davis from Richmond and other places at the South, to which is to be added

the levy *en masse* ordered by the Richmond authorities, which was ordered to assemble at Manassas. What all this amounted to I cannot say, certainly much more than we attacked them with."

To the above extracts from General McDowell's report I add a few others, giving more details, from those of his subordinates.

General A. Porter, who succeeded to the command of Hunter's division, and whose brigade was second on the field (Burnside's being the first), says:

"Owing to frequent delays in the march of troops in front, the brigade did not reach Centreville until 4.30 A. M., and it was an hour after sunrise when the head of it was turned to the right to commence the flank movement

"The slow and intermittent movements of the second brigade (Burnside's) were then followed through the woods for four hours, which brought the head of our division to Bull Run and Sudley's Mills, where a halt of half an hour took place, to rest and refresh the men and horses. From the heights on this side of the run a vast column of the enemy could be plainly descried, at the distance of a mile or more on our left, moving rapidly toward our line of march in front. Some disposition of skirmishers was then directed to be made at the

head of the column by the division-commander, in which Colonel Slocum, of the 2d Rhode Island regiment, was observed to bear an active part. The column moved forward, however, before they were completed, and in about thirty minutes emerged from the timber, where the rattle of the musketry and occasional crash of round shot, through the leaves and branches of the trees in our vicinity, betokened the opening of battle.

“The head of the brigade was immediately turned slightly to the right, in order to gain time and room for deployment on the right of the second brigade. Griffin’s battery found its way through the timber to the fields beyond, followed promptly by the marines, while the 27th took direction more to the left, and the 14th followed upon the trail of the battery—all moving up at a double-quick step.

“The enemy appeared drawn up in a long line, extending along the Warrenton turnpike, from a house and haystack upon our extreme right to a house beyond the left of the division. Behind that house there was a heavy masked battery, which, with three others along his line on the heights beyond, covered the ground upon which we were advancing with all sorts of projectiles. A grove in front of his right wing afforded it shelter and pro-

tection, while the shrubbery along the road in the fences screened somewhat his left wing.

“Griffin advanced to within one thousand yards, and opened a deadly and unmerring fire upon his batteries, which were soon silenced or driven away.

“Our right was rapidly developed by the marines, 27th, 14th, and 8th, with the cavalry in rear of the right; the enemy retreating in more precipitation than order as our line advanced. The second brigade (Burnside’s) was at this time attacking the enemy’s right with perhaps too hasty vigor.

“The enemy clung to the protecting wood with great tenacity, and the Rhode Island battery became so much endangered as to impel the commander of the second brigade to call for the assistance of the battalion of regulars. At this time I received the information through Captain W. D. Whipple, A. A. G., that Colonel Hunter was seriously wounded, and had directed him to report to me as commander of the division; and in reply to the urgent request of Colonel Burnside, I detached the battalion of regulars to his assistance.

“The rebels soon came flying from the woods toward the right, and the 27th completed their rout by charging directly upon their centre in the face of a scorching fire, while the 14th and 8th moved down the turnpike to cut off the

retiring foe, and to support the 27th, which had lost its gallant colonel, but was standing the brunt of the action, with its ranks thinning in the dreadful fire. Now the resistance of the enemy's left was so obstinate that the beaten right retired in safety.

“The head of Heintzelman's column at this moment appeared upon the field, and the 11th and 5th Massachusetts regiments moved forward to the support of our centre, while staff officers could be seen galloping rapidly in every direction, endeavoring to rally the broken 8th; but this laudable purpose was only partially attained, owing to the inefficiency of some of its field officers.

“The 14th, though it had broken, was soon rallied in rear of Griffin's battery, which took up a position further to the front and right, from which his fire was delivered with such precision and rapidity as to compel the batteries of the enemy to retire in consternation far behind the brow of the hill in front.

“At this time my brigade occupied a line considerably in advance of that first occupied by the left wing of the enemy. The battery was pouring its withering fire into the batteries and columns of the enemy wherever they exposed themselves. The cavalry were engaged in feeling the left flank of the

enemy's position, in doing which some important captures were made, one by Sergeant Socks, of the 2d dragoons, of a General George Stewart, of Baltimore. Our cavalry also emptied the saddles of a number of the mounted rebels.

“General Tyler's division was engaged with the enemy's right. The 27th was resting on the edge of the woods in the centre, covered by a hill upon which lay the 11th and 5th Massachusetts, occasionally delivering a scattering fire. The 14th was moving to the right flank, the 8th had lost its organization, the marines were moving up in fine style in rear of the 14th, and Captain Arnold was occupying a height in the middle ground with his battery. At this juncture there was a temporary lull in the firing from the rebels, who appeared only occasionally on the heights in irregular formations, but to serve as marks for Griffin's guns. The prestige of success had thus far attended the efforts of our inexperienced but gallant troops. The lines of the enemy had been forcibly shifted, nearly a mile to their left and rear. The flags of eight regiments, though borne somewhat wearily, now pointed toward the hill from which disordered masses of rebels had been seen hastily retiring. Griffin's and Rickett's batteries were ordered by the Commanding General to the top of the hill on the right, support-

ing with the 'Fire Zouaves' and marines, while the 14th entered the skirt of wood on their right to protect that flank, and a column, composed of the 27th New York, 11th and 5th Massachusetts, 2d Minnesota, and 69th New York, moved up toward the left batteries; but so soon as they were in position, and before the flanking supports had reached theirs, a murderous fire of musketry and rifles opened at pistol range, cut down every cannonier and a large number of horses. The fire came from some infantry of the enemy, which had been mistaken for our own forces; an officer in the field having stated that it was a regiment sent by Colonel Heintzelman to support the batteries.

"The evanescent courage of the 'Zouaves' prompted them to fire perhaps a hundred shots, when they broke and fled, leaving the batteries open to the charge of the enemy's cavalry, which took place immediately. The marines, also, in spite of the exertions of their gallant officers, gave way to disorder. The 14th on the right, and the column on the left, hesitatingly retired, with the exception of the 69th and 38th New York, which nobly stood and returned the fire of the enemy for fifteen minutes.

"Soon the slopes behind us were swarming with our retreating and disorganized forces, while rider-

less horses and artillery teams ran furiously through the flying crowd.

“All further efforts were futile. The words, gestures, and threats of our officers were thrown away upon men who had lost all presence of mind, and only longed for absence of body. Some of our noblest and best officers lost their lives in trying to rally them. Upon our *first position* the 27th was the first to rally, under the command of Major Bartlett, and around it the other regiments engaged soon collected their scattered fragments. The battalion of regulars, in the mean time, moved steadily across the field from the left to the right, and took up a position, where it held the entire forces of the rebels in check, until our forces were somewhat rallied.

“The Commanding-General then ordered a retreat upon Centreville, at the same time directing me to cover it with the battalion of regulars, the cavalry, and a section of artillery. The rear guard thus organized, followed our panic-stricken troops to Centreville, resisting the attacks of the rebel cavalry and artillery, and saving them from the inevitable destruction which awaited them had not this body been interposed.”

General Heintzelman commanded the second of the two divisions which constituted the turning column. He reports:

“At Centreville we found the road filled with troops, and were detained three hours to allow the divisions of General Tyler and Colonel Hunter to pass. I followed with my division immediately in the rear of the latter. Between two and three miles beyond Centreville we left the Warrenton turnpike, turning into a country road on the right. Captain Wright accompanied the head of Colonel Hunter's column, with directions to stop at a road which turned in to the left to a ford across Bull Run, about half way between the point where we turned off from the turnpike and Sudley Spring, at which latter point Colonel Hunter's division was to cross. No such road was found to exist, and about 11 A. M. we found ourselves at Sudley Spring, about ten miles from Centreville, with one brigade of Colonel Hunter's division still on our side of the run. Before reaching this point the battle had commenced. We could see the smoke rising on our left from two points, a mile or more apart. Two clouds of dust were seen, showing the advance of troops from the direction of Manassas. At Sudley Spring, whilst waiting the passage of the troops of the division in our front, I ordered forward the first brigade to fill their canteens. Before this was accomplished, the leading regiments of Colonel Hunter's division became engaged. Gen-

eral McDowell, who, accompanied by his staff, had passed us a short time before, sent back Captain Wright, of the engineers, and Major McDowell, one of his aids, with orders to send forward two regiments to prevent the enemy from outflanking them. Captain Wright led forward the Minnesota regiment to the left of the road, which crossed the run at this point. Major McDowell led the 11th Massachusetts up the road. I accompanied this regiment, leaving orders for the remainder of the division to follow, with the exception of Arnold's battery, which, supported by the 1st Michigan, was posted a little below the crossing of the run as a reserve. At a little more than a mile from the ford, we came upon the battle-field. Rickett's battery was posted on a hill to the right of Hunter's division, and to the right of the road. After firing some twenty minutes at a battery of the enemy, placed just beyond the crest of a hill, on their extreme left, the distance being considered too great, it was moved forward to within about 1,000 feet of the enemy's battery. Here the battery was exposed to a heavy fire of musketry, which soon disabled it. Franklin's brigade was posted on the right of a wood, near the centre of our line, and on ground rising toward the enemy's position. In the mean time, I sent orders for the Zouaves to move forward

to support Rickett's battery on the right. As soon as they came up I led them forward against an Alabama regiment, partly concealed in a clump of small pines in an old field.

“At the first fire they broke, and the greatest portion of them fled to the rear, keeping up a desultory firing over the heads of their comrades in front; at the same moment they were charged by a company of secession cavalry on their rear, who came by a road through two strips of woods on our extreme right. The fire of the Zouaves killed four and wounded one, dispersing them. The discomfiture of this cavalry was completed by a fire from Captain Colburn's company of United States cavalry, which killed and wounded several men. Colonel Farnham, with some of his officers and men, behaved gallantly, but the regiment of Zouaves, as a regiment, did not appear again on the field. Many of the men joined other regiments, and did good service as skirmishers. I then led up the Minnesota regiment, which was also repulsed, but retired in tolerably good order. It did good service in the woods on our right flank, and was among the last to retire, moving off the field with the 3d United States infantry. Next was led forward the 1st Michigan, which was also repulsed, and retired in considerable confusion. They were rallied, and

helped to hold the woods on our right. The Brooklyn 14th then appeared on the ground, coming forward in gallant style. I led them forward to the left, where the Alabama regiment had been posted in the early part of the action, but had now disappeared, but soon came in sight of the line of the enemy drawn up beyond the clump of trees. Soon after the firing commenced, the regiment broke and ran. I considered it useless to attempt to rally them. The want of discipline in these regiments was so great that the most of the men would run from fifty to several hundred yards to the rear, and continue to fire—fortunately for the braver ones—very high in the air, and compelling those in front to retreat.

“During this time Rickett’s battery had been captured and retaken three times by us, but was finally lost, most of the horses having been killed—Captain Ricketts being wounded, and First Lieutenant D. Ramsay killed. Lieutenant Kirby behaved very gallantly, and succeeded in carrying off one caisson. Before this time, heavy reinforcements of the enemy were distinctly seen approaching by two roads, extending and outflanking us on the right. General Howard’s brigade came on the field at this time, having been detained by the General as a reserve, at the point where we left the turn-

pike. It took post on a hill on our right and rear, and for some time gallantly held the enemy in check. I had one company of cavalry attached to my division, which was joined, during the engagement, by the cavalry of Colonel Hunter's division. Major Palmer, who commanded them, was anxious to engage the enemy. The ground being unfavorable, I ordered them back out of range of fire. Finding it impossible to rally any of our regiments, we commenced our retreat at about half-past 4 P. M."

It will be recollected that the division of General Tyler was placed at the "Stone Bridge," to menace that point, and, at the proper moment, to carry it and unite with the turning column.

Two brigades (Sherman's and Keyes') of that division actually passed. Colonel Sherman joined himself to the division of Hunter and Heintzelman, and was engaged in the hottest part of the action. He says:

"We left our camp near Centreville, pursuant to orders, at half-past 2 A. M., taking place in your column next to the brigade of General Schenck, and proceeded as far as the halt before the enemy's position, near the stone bridge at Bull Run. Here the brigade was deployed in line along the skirt of timber, and remained quietly in position till after 10 A. M. The enemy remained very quiet, but about

that time we saw a regiment leave its cover in our front, and proceed in double quick time on the road toward Sudley Spring, by which we knew the column of Colonels Hunter and Heintzelman was approaching. About the same time we observed in motion a large force of the enemy below the Stone bridge. I directed Captain Ayres to take position with his battery near our right, and opened fire on this mass, but you had previously detached the two guns belonging to this battery; and, finding the smooth-bore guns did not reach the enemy's position, we ceased firing, and I sent a request that you should send to me the 30-pounder rifled gun attached to Captain Carlisle's battery. At the same time I shifted the New York 69th to the extreme right of the brigade. There we remained till we heard the musketry fire across Bull Run, showing that the head of Colonel Hunter's column was engaged. This firing was brisk, and showed that Hunter was driving before him the enemy, till about noon, when it became certain that the enemy had come to a stand, and that our force on the other side of Bull Run was all engaged, artillery and infantry.

“Here you sent me the order to cross over with the whole brigade, to the assistance of Colonel Hunter. Early in the day, when reconnoitring the ground, I had seen a horseman descend from a

bluff to a point, cross the stream, and show himself in the open field. And, inferring we should cross over at the same point, I sent forward a company as skirmishers, and followed with the whole brigade, the New York 69th leading. We found no difficulty in crossing over, and met no opposition in ascending the steep bluff opposite with our infantry, but it was impassable to the artillery.

* * * * * *

“Displaying our colors conspicuously at the head of our column, we succeeded in attracting the attention of our friends, and soon formed the brigade in the rear of Colonel Porter’s. Here I learned that Colonel Hunter was disabled by a severe wound, and that General McDowell was on the field. I sought him out and received his orders to join in the pursuit of the enemy, who were falling back to the left of the road by which the army had approached from Sudley Springs. Placing Colonel Quimby’s regiment of rifles in front, in column by division, I directed the other regiments to follow in line of battle, in the order of the Wisconsin 2d, New York 79th, and New York 69th.

“Quimby’s regiment advanced steadily down the hill and up the ridge, from which he opened fire upon the enemy, who had made another stand on ground very favorable to him, and the regiment

continued advancing as the enemy gave way till the head of the column reached the point near which Rickett's battery was so severely cut up. The other regiments descended the hill in line of battle, under a severe cannonading, and the ground affording comparative shelter against the enemy's artillery, they changed directions by the right flank and followed the road before mentioned. At the point where this road crossed the ridge to our left, the ground was swept by a most severe fire by artillery, rifle, and musketry, and we saw in succession several regiments driven from it, among them the Zouaves and battalion of marines. Before reaching the crest of the hill, the roadway was worn deep enough to afford shelter, and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible; but when the Wisconsin 2d was abreast of the enemy, by order of Major Wadsworth of General McDowell's staff, I ordered it to leave the roadway by the left flank and to attack the enemy. This regiment ascended to the brow of the hill steadily, received the severe fire of the enemy, returned it with spirit, and advanced delivering its fire. This regiment is uniformed in gray cloth, almost identical with that of the great bulk of the secession army, and when the regiment fled in confusion and retreated toward the road there was a universal cry that they were being

fired upon by our own men. The regiment rallied again, passed the brow of the hill a second time, and was again repulsed in disorder. By this time the New York 79th had closed up, and in like manner it was ordered to cross the brow of the hill and drive the enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a good view of the ground. In it there was one battery of artillery, which poured an incessant fire upon our advancing column, and the ground was irregular, with small clusters of pines, affording shelter, of which the enemy took good advantage. The fire of rifles and musketry was very severe. The 79th, headed by its colonel (Cameron), charged across the hill, and for a short time the contest was severe. They rallied several times under fire, but finally broke and gained the cover of the hill. This left the field open to the New York 69th, Colonel Corcoran, who, in his turn, led his regiment over the crest, and had in full open view the ground so severely contested. The firing was very severe, and the roar of cannon, musketry, and rifles, incessant. It was manifest the enemy was here in great force, far superior to us at that point. The 69th held the ground for some time, but finally fell back in disorder.

“At this time Quimby’s regiment occupied another ridge to our left, overlooking the same field

of action, and similarly engaged. Here (about half-past 3 P. M.) began the scene of disorder and confusion that characterized the remainder of the day. Up to that time all had kept their places, and seemed perfectly cool and used to the shell and shot that fell comparatively harmless all around us; but the short exposure to an intense fire of small arms, at close range, had killed many, wounded more, and had produced disorder in all the battalions that had attempted to destroy it. Men fell away talking and in great confusion. Colonel Cameron had been mortally wounded, carried to an ambulance, and reported dying. Many other officers were reported dead or missing, and many of the wounded were making their way, with more or less assistance, to the buildings used as hospitals. On the ridge to the west we succeeded in partially re-forming the regiments, but it was manifest they would not stand, and I directed Colonel Corcoran to move along the ridge to the rear, near the position where we had first formed the brigade. General McDowell was there in person, and used all possible efforts to reassure the men. By the active exertions of Colonel Corcoran we formed an irregular square against the cavalry, which was then seen to issue from the position from which we had been driven, and we began our retreat toward that ford

of Bull Run by which we had approached the field of battle. There was no positive order to retreat, although for an hour it had been going on by the operations of the men themselves. The ranks were thin and irregular, and we found a stream of people strung from the hospital across Bull Run and far toward Centreville."

Colonel Keyes, who commanded (under General Tyler) the second brigade of Tyler's division which crossed Bull Run after Sherman, operated on our left. After carrying the Robinson House and hill, his operations became isolated and, at the close of the battle, his position (marked on map No. 3, "Tyler") was on the left and rear of the enemy.

At this moment, the abattis near the "Stone Bridge" had been cleared away by Captain Alexander, of the engineers, and Schenck's brigade (the third of Tyler's division) was about to pass over and join Keyes.

General Tyler, of whose division Keyes' brigade was a part, reports:

"I arrived in front of the Warrenton turnpike bridge, with Schenck's and Sherman's brigades, and Ayres' and Carlisle's batteries, about 6 A. M. Keyes' brigade having been halted by your order to watch the road coming up from Manassas, and about two miles from the run. After examining

the position, and posting Sherman's and Schenck's brigades and artillery, I fired the first gun at half past 6 A. M., as agreed upon, to show that we were in position. As my orders were to threaten the passage of the bridge, I caused Schenck's brigade to be formed into line, its left resting in the direction of the bridge, and the battery which the enemy had established to sweep the bridge and its approach, so as to threaten both. Sherman's brigade was posted to the right of the Warrenton turnpike, so as to be in position to sustain Schenck, or to move across Bull Run in the direction of Hunter's column.

"The 30-pounder gun attached to the Carlisle battery was posted on the Warrenton turnpike, with Ayres' battery considerably in its rear. Carlisle's battery was posted on the left of Sherman's brigade. In this position we awaited the appearance of Hunter's and Heintzelman's columns as ordered, until such time as the approach to the bridge should be carried, and the bridge rebuilt by Captain Alexander, of the engineers, who had on the spot the necessary structure for that purpose.

Soon after getting into position we discovered that the enemy had a heavy battery, with infantry in support, commanding both the road and bridge approaches, on which both Ayers and Carlisle at different times tried the effect of their guns without

success; and a careful examination of the banks of Bull Run satisfying me that they were impracticable for the purpose of artillery, these batteries had to remain comparatively useless until such time as Hunter's column might clear the approach by a movement on the opposite bank. During this period of waiting, the 30-pounder was occasionally used with considerable effect against bodies of infantry and cavalry, which could be seen from time to time moving in the direction of Hunter's column, and out of the range of ordinary guns. Using a high tree as an observatory, we could constantly see the operations of Hunter's and Heintzelman's column from the time they crossed Bull Run, and through one of my staff, Lieutenant O'Rourke, of the engineers, I was promptly notified as to any change in the progress of their columns up to the time when it appeared that the heads of both were arrested, and the enemy seemed to be moving heavy reinforcements to support their troops. At this time I ordered Colonel Sherman, with his brigade, to cross Bull Run,* and to support the two columns already in action. Colonel Sherman, as appears by his reports, crossed the run without opposition, and after encountering a party of the enemy flying before Hunter's forces, found General McDowell, and received his orders to join in the pursuit. The sub-

sequent operations of this brigade and its able commander having been under your own eye and directions, I shall not follow its movements any further, but refer you to Colonel Sherman's report, which you will find herewith.

“So soon as it was discovered that Hunter's division had been arrested, I ordered up Keyes' brigade, which arrived just as the left of Sherman's was crossing the run, and having satisfied myself that the enemy had not the force nor the purpose to cross Bull Run, I ordered Keyes' brigade to follow Sherman, accompanying the move in person, as I saw it must necessarily place me on the left of our line, and in the best possible position, when we should have driven the enemy off, to join Schenck's brigade and the two batteries left on the opposite side. I ordered Colonel Keyes to incline the head of his column a little to the right of the line of march taken by Sherman's brigade, to avoid the fire of a battery which the enemy had opened. This movement sheltered the men to a considerable degree, and resulted in closing on the rear of Sherman's brigade; and, on reaching the high ground, I ordered Colonel Keyes to form into line on the left of Sherman's brigade, which was done with great steadiness and regularity. After waiting a few moments the line was ordered to advance, and

came into conflict on its right with the enemy's cavalry and infantry, which, after some severe struggles, it drove back, until the further march of the brigade was arrested by a severe fire of artillery and infantry, sheltered by some buildings standing on the heights above the road leading to Bull Run.* The charge was here ordered, and the 2d Maine and 3d Connecticut regiments, which were opposed to this part of the enemy's line, pressed forward to the top of the hill until they reached the buildings which were held by the enemy, drove them out, and for a moment had them in possession. At this point, finding the brigade under the fire of a strong force behind breastworks, the order was given to march by the left flank across an open field until the whole line was sheltered by the right bank of Bull Run, along which the march was conducted, with a view to turn the battery which the enemy had placed on the hill below the point at which the Warrenton turnpike crosses Bull Run. The march was conducted for a considerable distance below the stone bridge, causing the enemy to retire, and giving Captain Alexander an opportunity to pass the bridge, cut out the abattis which had been placed there, and prepare the way for Schenck's

* These buildings are marked on Lieutenant Abbott's map, "Robinson House."

brigade and the two batteries to pass over. Before the contemplated movement could be made on the enemy's battery, it was removed and placed in a position to threaten our line; but before the correct range could be obtained, Colonel Keyes carried his brigade, by a flank movement, around the base of the hill, and was on the point of ascending it in time to get at the battery, when I discovered that our troops were on the retreat, and that, unless a rapid movement to the rear was made, we should be cut off, and through my aid, Lieutenant Upton, Colonel Keyes was ordered to file to the right and join the retreating column. The order was executed without the least confusion, and the brigade joined the retreating column in good order. When this junction was made I left Keyes' brigade and rode forward to ascertain the condition of Schenck's brigade and the artillery left this side of Bull Run, and on arriving there found Ayres' battery and Lieutenant Haines' 30-pounder waiting orders. I immediately ordered Lieutenant Haines to limber up and move forward as soon as possible. This was promptly done, and the piece moved on toward Centreville. I then went into the wood where the ammunition wagon of this piece had been placed, out of the reach of the fire, and found that the driver had deserted and taken away part of the horses,

which made it impossible to move it. I then returned to Ayres' battery, which I found limbered up, and ordered it to move forward and cover the retreat, which was promptly done by its gallant officers, and when the cavalry charge was made, shortly afterward, they repulsed it promptly and effectually. I then collected a guard, mainly from the 2d Maine regiment, and put it under the command of Colonel Jameson, with orders to sustain Captain Ayres during the retreat, which was done gallantly and successfully, until the battery reached Centreville. Before ordering Colonel Jameson to cover Ayres' battery, I passed to the rear to find General Schenck's brigade, intending, as it was fresh, to have it cover the retreat. I did not find it in the position in which I had left it, and supposed it had moved forward and joined the retreating column. I did not see General Schenck again until near Cub Run, where he appeared active in rallying his own or some other regiments. General Schenck reports that the two Ohio regiments left Bull Run after the cavalry charge, and arrived at Centreville in good order."

The following report of the rebel General J. E. Johnston, gives the enemy's account of the battle. (General Beauregard's disposition of his troops on the 20th, is already given in the note to p. 48.)

“I assumed command at Harper’s Ferry on the 23d of May. The force at that point then consisted of nine regiments and two battalions of infantry, four companies of artillery with sixteen pieces without caissons, harness, or horses, and about three hundred cavalry. They were of course undisciplined, several regiments without accoutrements, and with an entirely inadequate supply of ammunition.

“I lost no time in making a complete reconnoissance of the place and its environs, in which the chief engineer, Major (now Brigadier-General) Whiting, ably assisted. The results confirmed my preconceived ideas.

“The position is untenable by any force not strong enough to take the field against an invading army, and to hold both sides of the Potomac. It is a triangle, two sides being formed by the Potomac and the Shenandoah, and the third by Furnace Ridge. The plateau thus enclosed, and the end of Furnace Ridge itself, the only defensible position, which, however, required for its adequate occupation double our numbers, was exposed to enfilade and reverse fires of artillery from heights on the Maryland side of the river. Within that line the ground was more favorable to an attacking, than to a defending force. The Potomac can be easily crossed at many

points above and below, so that it is easily turned. It is twenty miles from the great route into the valley of Virginia from Pennsylvania and Maryland, by which General Patterson's approach was expected. Its garrison was thus out of position to defend that valley, or to prevent General McClellan's junction with General Patterson. These were the obvious and important objects to be kept in view. Besides being in position for them, it was necessary to be able, on emergency, to join General Beauregard.

"The occupation of Harper's Ferry by our army, perfectly suited the enemy's views. We were bound to a fixed point. His movements were unrestricted. These views were submitted to the military authorities. The continued occupation of the place was, however, deemed by them indispensable. I determined to hold it until the great objects of the government required its abandonment.

"The practicable roads from the west and northwest, as well as from Manassas, meet the route from Pennsylvania and Maryland, at Winchester. That point was, therefore, in my opinion, our best position.

"The distinguished commander of the army of the Potomac was convinced, like myself, of our dependence upon each other, and promised to co-operate with me in case of need. To guard against sur-

prise, and to impose upon the enemy, Major Whiting was directed to mount a few heavy guns upon Furnace Ridge, and otherwise strengthen the position.

“I was employed, until the 13th of June in continuing what had been begun by my predecessor, Colonel (now Major-General) Jackson, the organization, instruction, and equipment of the troops, and providing means of transportation and artillery horses. The river was observed from the Point of Rocks to the western part of the county of Berkeley—the most distant portions by the indefatigable Stuart with his cavalry. General Patterson’s troops were within a few hours of Williamsport, and General McClellan’s in Western Virginia, were supposed to be approaching to effect a junction with Patterson, whose force was reported, by well-informed persons, to be 18,000 men.

“On the morning of the 13th of June, information was received from Winchester that Romney was occupied by two thousand Federal troops, supposed to be the vanguard of the army.

“Colonel A. P. Hill, with his own (13th) and Colonel Gibbon’s (10th) Virginia regiments were dispatched by railway to Winchester. He was directed to move thence toward Romney to take the best position and best measures to check the advance of

the enemy. He was to add to his command the 3d Tennessee regiment which had just arrived at Winchester.

“During that day and the next the heavy baggage and remaining public property were sent to Winchester by the railway, and the bridges on the Potomac destroyed. On the morning of the 15th, the army left Harper’s Ferry for Winchester (the force had been increased by these regiments since the 1st of June) and bivouacked four miles beyond Charleston. On the morning of the 16th, intelligence was received that General Patterson’s army had crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, also that the United States force at Romney had fallen back. A courier from Richmond brought a dispatch authorizing me to evacuate Harper’s Ferry at my discretion.

“The army was ordered to gain the Martinsburg turnpike by a flank movement to Bunker’s Hill in order to place itself between Winchester and the expected advance of Patterson. On hearing of this, the enemy re-crossed the river precipitately. Resuming my first direction and plan, I proceeded to Winchester. There the army was in position to oppose either McClellan from the west, or Patterson from the northeast, and to form a junction with General Beauregard when necessary.

“Lieutenant-Colonel George Stewart, with his

Maryland battalion, was sent to Harper's Ferry to bring off some public property said to have been left. As McClellan was moving southwestward from Grafton, Colonel Hill's command was withdrawn from Romney. The defence of that region of the country was entrusted to Colonel McDonald's regiment of cavalry. Intelligence from Maryland indicating another movement by Patterson, Colonel Jackson, with his brigade, was sent to the neighborhood of Martinsburg to support Colonel Stuart. The latter officer had been placed in observation on the line of the Potomac with his cavalry. His increasing vigilance and activity were relied on to repress small incursions of the enemy, to give intelligence of invasion by them, and to watch, harass, and circumscribe their every movement. Colonel Jackson was instructed to destroy such of the rolling stock of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as could not be brought off, and to have so much of it as could be made available to our service, brought to Winchester.

“Major Whiting was ordered to plan defensive works, and to have some heavy guns on navy carriages mounted. About twenty-five hundred militia, under Brigadier-General Carson, were called out from Frederick and the neighboring counties to man them.

“On the 2d of July, General Patterson again crossed the Potomac. Colonel Jackson, pursuant to instructions, fell back before him. In retiring, he gave him a severe lesson in the affair at Falling Waters. With a battalion of the 5th Virginia regiment (Harper’s) and Pendleton’s battery of field artillery, he engaged the enemy’s advance. Skillfully taking a position where the smallness of his force was concealed, he engaged them for a considerable time, inflicted a heavy loss, and retired when about to be outflanked, scarcely losing a man, but bringing off forty-five prisoners.

“Upon this intelligence, the army, strengthened by the arrival of General Bee and Colonel Elzey, and the 9th Georgia regiment, was ordered forward to the support of Jackson. It met him at Darksville, six miles from Martinsburg, where it took up a position for action, as General Patterson, it was supposed, was closely following Colonel Jackson. We waited for him in this position four days, hoping to be attacked by an adversary at least double our number, but unwilling to attack him in a town so defensible as Martinsburg, with its solid buildings and enclosures of masonry. Convinced at length that he would not approach us, I returned to Winchester, much to the disappointment of our troops, who were eager for battle with the invaders. Colonel

Stuart, with his cavalry, as usual, remained near the enemy.

“Before the 15th of July the enemy’s force, according to the best intelligence to be obtained, amounted to about thirty-two thousand. Ours had been increased by eight Southern regiments. On the 15th of July, Colonel Stuart reported the advance of General Patterson from Martinsburg. He halted, however, at Bunker’s Hill, nine miles from Winchester, where he remained on the 16th. On the 17th he moved to his left to Smithfield. This created the impression that he intended to attack us on the south, or was merely holding us in check, while General Beauregard should be attacked at Manassas by General Scott.

“About 1 o’clock on the morning of July 18th, I received from the government a telegraph dispatch, informing me that the Northern army was advancing upon Manassas, then held by General Beauregard, and directing me, if practicable, to go to that officer’s assistance, sending my sick to Culpepper Court-House.

“In the exercise of the discretion conferred by the terms of the order, I at once determined to march to join General Beauregard. The best service which the Army of the Shenandoah could render was to prevent the defeat of that of the Potomac. To be

able to do this, it was necessary, in the first instance, to defeat General Patterson or to elude him. The latter course was the most speedy and certain, and was therefore adopted. Our sick, nearly seventeen hundred in number, were provided for in Winchester. For the defence of that place the militia of Generals Carson and Meem seemed ample; for I thought it certain that General Patterson would follow my movement as soon as he discerned it. Evading him by the disposition made of the advance guard under Colonel Stuart, the army moved through Ashby's Gap to Piedmont, a station of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Hence the infantry were to be transported by the railway, while the cavalry and artillery were ordered to continue their march. I reached Manassas about noon on the 20th, preceded by the 7th and 8th Georgia regiments, and by Jackson's brigade, consisting of the 2d, 4th, 5th, 27th, and 33d Virginia regiments. I was accompanied by General Bee, with the 4th Alabama, the 2d and two companies of the 11th Mississippi. The president of the railroad company had assured me that the remaining troops should arrive during the day.

“I found General Beauregard's position too extensive, and the ground too densely wooded and intricate to be learned in the brief time at my disposal,

and therefore determined to rely on his knowledge of it and of the enemy's positions. This I did readily, from full confidence in his capacity.

“His troops were divided into eight brigades, occupying the defensive line of Bull Run. Brigadier-General Ewell's was posted at the Union Mills Ford; Brigadier-General D. R. Jones' at McLean's Ford; Brigadier-General Longstreet's at Blackburn's Ford; Brigadier-General Bonham's at Mitchell's Ford; Colonel Cocke's at Ball's Ford, some three miles above, and Colonel Evans, with a regiment and a battalion, formed the extreme left at the Stone Bridge. The brigades of Brigadier-General Holmes and Colonel Early were in reserve, in rear of the right. I regarded the arrival of the remainder of the army of the Shenandoah, during the night, as certain, and Patterson's with the Grand Army, on the 22d, as probable. During the evening it was determined, instead of remaining in the defensive positions then occupied, to assume the offensive, and attack the enemy before such a junction.

“General Beauregard proposed a plan of battle, which I approved without hesitation. He drew up the necessary order during the night, which was approved formally by me at half-past 4 o'clock on the morning of the 21st. The early movements of the

enemy on that morning, and the non-arrival of the expected troops, prevented its execution. General Beauregard afterward proposed a modification of the abandoned plan—to attack with our right, while the left stood on the defensive. This, too, became impracticable, and a battle ensued, different in place and circumstance from any previous plan on our side.

“Soon after sunrise, on the morning of the 21st, a light cannonade was opened on Colonel Evans’ position; a similar demonstration was made against the centre soon after, and strong forces were observed in front of it and of the right. About 8 o’clock General Beauregard and I placed ourselves on a commanding hill in the rear of General Bonham’s left; near 9 o’clock the signal officer, Captain Alexander, reported that a large body of troops was crossing the valley of Bull Run, some two miles above the bridge. General Bee, who had been placed near Colonel Cocke’s position, Colonel Hampton, with his legion, and Colonel Jackson, from a point near Bonham’s left, were ordered to hasten to the left flank.

“The signal officer soon called our attention to a heavy cloud of dust to the northwest, and about ten miles off, such as the march of an army would raise. This excited apprehensions of General Patterson’s approach.

“The enemy, under cover of a strong demonstration on our right, made a long detour through the woods on his right, crossed Bull Run two miles above our left, and threw himself upon the flank and rear of our position. This movement was fortunately discovered in time for us to check its progress, and ultimately to form a new line of battle nearly at right angles with the defensive line of Bull Run.

“On discovering that the enemy had crossed the stream above him, Colonel Evans moved to his left with eleven companies and two field-pieces, to oppose his advance, and disposed his little force under cover of the woods near the intersection of the Warrenton turnpike and the Sudley Road. Here he was attacked by the enemy in immensely superior numbers, against which he maintained himself with skill and unshrinking courage. General Bee, moving toward the enemy, guided by the firing, had, with a soldier’s eye, selected the position near the Henry House, and formed his troops upon it. They were the 7th and 8th Georgia, 4th Alabama, 2d Mississippi, and two companies of the 11th Mississippi regiment, with Imboden’s battery. Being compelled, however, to sustain Colonel Evans, he crossed the valley and formed on the right and somewhat in advance of his position. Here the joint force, little exceeding five regiments, with six field pieces,

held the ground against about fifteen thousand United States troops, for an hour, until, finding themselves outflanked by the continually arriving troops of the enemy, they fell back to General Bee's first position, upon the line of which Jackson, just arriving, formed his brigade and Standard's battery. Colonel Hampton, who had by this time advanced with his legion as far as the turnpike, rendered efficient service in maintaining the orderly character of the retreat from that point, and here fell the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, his second in command.

“In the mean time, I awaited, with General Beauregard, near the centre, the full development of the enemy's designs. About 11 o'clock the violence of the firing on the left indicated a battle, and the march of a large body from the enemy's centre toward the conflict was shown by clouds of dust. I was thus convinced that his great effort was to be made with his right. I stated that conviction to General Beauregard, and the absolute necessity of immediately strengthening our left as much as possible. Orders were accordingly at once sent to General Holmes and Colonel Early to move with all speed to the sound of the firing, and to General Bonham to send up two of his regiments and a battery. General Beauregard and I then hurried at a

rapid gallop to the scene of action, about four miles off. On the way I directed my chief of artillery, Colonel Pendleton, to follow with his own and Al-burtis' batteries. We came not a moment too soon. The long contest against five-fold odds and heavy losses, especially of field officers, had greatly discouraged the troops of General Bee and Colonel Evans. Our presence with them under fire, and some example, had the happiest effect on the spirit of the troops. Order was soon restored and the battle re-established, to which the firmness of Jackson's brigade greatly contributed. Then, in a brief and rapid conference, General Beauregard was assigned to the command of the left, which, as the younger officer, he claimed, while I returned to that of the whole field. The aspect of affairs was critical; but I had full confidence in the skill and indomitable courage of General Beauregard, the high soldierly qualities of Generals Bee and Jackson and Colonel Evans, and the devoted patriotism of their troops. Orders were first despatched to hasten the march of General Holmes', Colonel Early's, and General Bonham's regiments. General Ewell was also directed to follow with all speed. Many of the broken troops, fragments of companies, and individual stragglers, were re-formed and brought into

action, with the aid of my staff and a portion of General Beauregard's.

“Colonel (Governor) Smith, with his battalion, and Colonel Hampton, with his regiment, were ordered up to reinforce the right. I have since learned that General Beauregard had previously ordered them into the battle. They belonged to his corps. Colonel Smith's cheerful courage had a fine influence, not only on the spirit of his own men, but upon the stragglers from the troops engaged. The largest body of these, equal to about four companies, having no competent field officer, I placed them under command of one of my staff, Colonel F. J. Thomas, who fell while gallantly leading it against the enemy. These reinforcements were all sent to the right to re-establish more perfectly that part of our line. Having attended to these pressing duties at the immediate scene of conflict, my eye was next directed to Colonel Cocks's brigade, the nearest at hand. Hastening to his position, I desired him to lead his troops into action. He informed me, however, that a large body of the enemy's troops, beyond the stream and below the bridge, threatened us from that quarter. He was, therefore, left in his position.

“My headquarters were now established near the Lewis house. From this commanding elevation my view embraced the position of the enemy beyond

the stream and the approaches to the Stone Bridge, a point of especial importance. I could also see the advances of our troops far down the valley, in the direction of Manassas, and observe the progress of the action and the manœuvres of the enemy.

“ We had now sixteen guns and two hundred and sixty cavalry, and a little above nine regiments of the army of the Shenandoah, and six guns and less than the strength of three regiments of that of the Potomac, engaged with about thirty-five thousand United States troops, amongst whom were full three thousand men of the old regular army. Yet this admirable artillery and brave infantry and cavalry lost no foot of ground. For nearly three hours they maintained their position, repelling five successive assaults by the heavy masses of the enemy, whose numbers enabled him continually to bring up fresh troops as their preceding columns were driven back.

“ Colonel Stuart contributed to one of these repulses by a well-timed and vigorous charge on the enemy's right flank with two companies of his cavalry. The efficiency of our infantry and cavalry might have been expected from a patriotic people, accustomed, like ours, to the management of arms and horses, but that of the artillery was little less than wonderful. They were opposed to batteries far superior in the number, range, and equipment of

their guns, with educated officers and thoroughly instructed soldiers. We had but one educated artillerist (Colonel Pendleton), that model of a Christian soldier, yet they exhibited as much superiority to the enemy in skill as in courage. Their fire was superior both in rapidity and precision.

“About two o’clock, an officer of General Beauregard’s adjutant general’s office galloped from Manassas to report to me that a United States army had reached the line of Manassas Gap Railroad, was marching toward us, and then but three or four miles from our left flank.”

[This “army” turned out to be a part of General Johnston’s own army of “the Shenandoah,” the opportune arrival of which decided the day against us.]

“The expected reinforcements appeared soon after. Colonel Coeke was then desired to lead his brigade into action to support the right of the troops engaged, which he did with alacrity and effect. Within a half hour the two regiments of General Bonham’s brigade (Cash’s and Kershaw’s) came up, and were directed against the enemy’s right, which he seemed to be strengthening. Fisher’s North Carolina regiment was soon after sent in the same direction. About 3 o’clock, while the enemy seemed to be striving to outflank and drive

back our left, and thus separate us from Manassas, General E. K. Smith arrived with three regiments of Elzey's brigade. He was instructed to attack the right flank of the enemy now exposed to us. Before the movement was completed he fell severely wounded. Colonel Elzey, at once taking command, executed it with great promptitude and vigor. General Beauregard rapidly seized the opportunity thus afforded him, and threw forward his whole line. The enemy was driven back from the long-contested hill, and victory was no longer doubtful. He made yet another attempt to retrieve the day. He again extended his right with a still wider sweep to turn our left. Just as he re-formed to renew the battle, Colonel Early's three regiments came upon the field. The enemy's new formation exposed his right flank more even than the previous one. Colonel Early was, therefore, ordered to throw himself directly upon it; supported by Col. Stuart's cavalry and Beckham's battery, he executed this attack bravely and well, while a simultaneous charge was made by General Beauregard in front.

"The enemy was broken by this combined attack. He lost all the artillery which he had advanced to the scene of the conflict. He had no more fresh troops to rally on, and a general route ensued.

"Instructions were instantly sent to General Bon-

ham to march by the quickest route to the turnpike, to intercept the fugitives; and to General Longstreet to follow as closely as possible upon the right. Their progress was checked by the enemy's reserve, and by night at Centreville.

"Schenck's brigade made a slight demonstration toward Lewis's Ford, which was quickly checked by Holmes's brigade, which had just arrived from the right. His artillery, under Captain Walker, was used with great skill.

"Colonel Stuart pressed the pursuit of the enemy's principal line of retreat, the Sudley Road. Four companies of cavalry, under Colonel Bradford and Lieutenant Colonel Munford, which I had held in reserve, were ordered to cross the stream at Ball's Ford, to reach the turnpike, the line of retreat of the enemy's left. Our cavalry found the roads encumbered with dead and wounded (many of whom seemed to have been thrown from wagons), arms, accoutrements, and clothing.

"A report came to me from the right that a strong body of United States troops was advancing upon Manassas. General Holmes, who had just reached the field, and General Ewell on his way to it, were ordered to meet the expected attack. They found no foe, however.

"Our victory was as complete as one gained by

infantry and artillery can be. An adequate force of cavalry would have made it decisive.

“It is due, under Almighty God, to the skill and resolution of General Beauregard, the admirable conduct of Generals Bee, E. K. Smith and Jackson and of Colonels (commanding brigades) Evans, Cocke, Early, and Elzey, and the unyielding firmness of our patriotic volunteers. The admirable character of our troops is incontestably proved by the result of this battle; especially when it is remembered that little more than six thousand men of the army of the Shenandoah, with sixteen guns, and less than two thousand of that of the Potomac, with six guns, for full five hours successfully resisted thirty-five thousand United States troops, with a powerful artillery, and a superior force of regular cavalry. Our forces engaged, gradually increasing during the contest, amounted to but — men at the close of the battle. The brunt of this hard fought engagement fell upon the troops who held their ground so long with such heroic resolution. The unfading honor which they won was dearly bought with the blood of our best and bravest. Their loss was far heavier, in proportion, than those coming later into action.

“Every regiment and battery engaged, performed its part well. The commanders of brigades have

been already mentioned. I refer you to General Beauregard's report for the names of the officers of the Army of the Potomac who distinguished themselves most. I cannot enumerate all of the Army of the Shenandoah who deserve distinction, and will confine myself to those of high rank. Colonels Bartow and Fisher (killed), Jones (mortally wounded), Harper, J. F. Preston, Cummings, Faulkner, Gartrell, and Vaughan; J. E. B. Stuart of the cavalry, and Pendleton, of the artillery, Lieutenant-Colonels Echols, Lightfoot, Lackland, G. H. Stewart, and Gardner. The last named gallant officer was severely wounded.

"The loss of the Army of the Potomac was 108 killed, 510 wounded, 12 missing. That of the Army of the Shenandoah was 270 killed, 979 wounded, 18 missing.

Total killed,	378
Total wounded,	1489
Total missing,	30

"That of the enemy could not be ascertained. It must have been between four and five thousand. Twenty-eight pieces of artillery, about five thousand muskets, and nearly five hundred thousand cartridges, a garrison flag and ten colors were captured on the field or in the pursuit. Besides these, we

captured sixty-four artillery horses, with their harness, twenty-six wagons, and much camp equipage, clothing, and other property abandoned in their flight.

“The officers of my staff deserve high commendation for their efficient and gallant services during the day and the campaign, and I beg leave to call the attention of the government to their merits. Major W. H. C. Whiting, Chief Engineer, was invaluable to me for his signal ability in his profession, and for his indefatigable activity before and in the battle. Major McClean, Chief Quartermaster, and Major Kearsley, Chief Commissary, conducted their respective departments with skill and energy. Major Rhett, A. A. General, who joined me only the day before, was of great service. I left him at Manassas, and to his experience and energy I intrusted the care of ordering my troops to the field of battle as they should arrive, and forwarding ammunition for the artillery during the action. Captains C. M. Fauntleroy, C. S. Navy, T. L. Preston, A. A. General, and Lieutenant J. B. Washington, A. D. C., conveyed my orders bravely and well on their first field, as did several gallant gentlemen who volunteered their services—Colonel Cole, of Florida; Major Deas, of Alabama; Colonel Duncan, of Kentucky; Lieutenant Beverly Randolph, C. S. N., aided Colonel

F. J. Thomas in the command of the body of troops he led into action, and fought with gallantry. With these was my gallant friend, Captain Barlow Mason, who was mortally wounded. I have already mentioned the brave death of ordnance officer Colonel J. F. Thomas. I was much indebted, also, to Colonels J. J. Preston, Manning, Miles, and Chisholm, and Captain Stevens, of the engineer corps, members of General Beauregard's staff, who kindly proffered their services, and rendered efficient and valuable aid at different times during the day. Colonel G. W. Lay, of General Bonham's staff, delivered my instructions to the troops sent in pursuit and to intercept the enemy, with much intelligence and courage.

“It will be remarked that the three Brigadier-Generals of the Army of the Shenandoah were all wounded. I have already mentioned the wound of General Smith. General Jackson, though painfully wounded early in the day, commanded his brigade to the close of the action. General Bee, after great exposure at the commencement of the engagement, was mortally wounded just as our reinforcements were coming up.

“The apparent firmness of the United States troops at Centreville, who had not been engaged, which checked our pursuit, the strong forces occupying the works near Georgetown, Arlington and

Alexandria, the certainty, too, that General Patterson, if needed, would reach Washington with his army of thirty thousand men, sooner than we could, and the condition and inadequate means of the army, in ammunition, provisions, and transportation, prevented any serious thoughts of advancing against the capital. It is certain that the fresh troops within the works were, in number, quite sufficient for their defence; if not, General Patterson's army would certainly reinforce them soon enough.

“This report will be presented to you by my aide-camp, Lieutenant J. B. Washington, by whom, and by General Beauregard's aid, Lieutenant Ferguson, the captured colors are transmitted to the War Department.”

A comparison of the foregoing statements will prove, I think, that General McDowell's plan of battle was well designed, and that, nearly successful as it was, it would have fully succeeded had it not been for the loss of precious time, from causes I have before indicated.

It was not till 11 o'clock that the rebel generals became fully conscious of the true character of the attack. Their troops were distributed over a line eight miles in length, and, unexpectedly attacked on their extreme left flank, while their centre and left were fixed by our demonstrations, they had to im-

provide a new line, and their reserves and reinforcements did not get up (in sufficient force at least) until the fate of the day was almost decided against them. Nor could these reserves and reinforcements have sufficed had not an additional arrival from the Shenandoah (concerning which General McDowell had stipulated that they should be kept occupied elsewhere) of three or four thousand men, turned the day against us. Nor should it, even then, have deprived us of a victory we had really gained, if our raw and wearied troops could have been induced to hold their position a few minutes longer. At the moment of the rout of the centre, the brigade of Colonel Keyes (Tyler's Division) had gained the right and rear of the enemy's position; the way was open for the brigade of Schenck to pass the Stone Bridge and to join Keyes, while the brigade of Howard, of Heintzelman's division—kept for some time in reserve at the point where the main column turned off from the Warrenton turnpike—had just arrived on the ground and was ready to support our exhausted centre and right. Thus the combinations of the battle—notwithstanding that all those accidents (incidental to all such combinations) which man cannot control, had gone against us, had been, tactically speaking, successful. Nor is it at all clear that at any moment of the battle, there was any

considerable numerical preponderance in our favor.

Eight brigades are mentioned by General Johnston as being in position on the 20th, under General Beauregard, while Beauregard himself enumerates twelve brigades in his order of battle of the 20th (among which are the troops already arrived of General Johnston's army), besides 42 field-pieces, and cavalry; an enumeration accounting for *at least* 27,000 men Beauregard is said to have commanded on the 20th.*

General E. K. Smith's brigade arrived at 3 o'clock on the 21st, in time to decide the fate of the day against us. Here then are *at least* 30,000 men.

McDowell's army at Centreville numbered within a fraction of 30,000, with 55 pieces of artillery. Of this number nine or ten thousand were, under Colonel Miles, at Blackburn's Ford and Centreville. A Pennsylvania regiment and a New York artillery company were discharged the evening of the 20th, which, with the sick, reduced the effectives to about 28,000.

Schenck's brigade of Tyler's division remained at the Stone Bridge and 18,000 men (*viz.*, the main

* General Beauregard acknowledges that he commanded on the day of the battle 27,000 men, which includes 6,200 of Johnston's army, and 1,700 sent up by General Holmes from Fredericksburg.

attacking column under Hunter and Heintzelman, and the brigades of Keyes and Sherman of Tyler's division) passed Bull Run and engaged in the battle, with 24 pieces of artillery. This force of 18,000 men was never at any one time entirely engaged. General Burnside's brigade was withdrawn from the field after sustaining the first shock of the enemy and being for an hour or two warmly engaged. The brigade of Howard, left in reserve, did not arrive in time to take much part in the battle. Sherman and Keyes did not come into action until after the enemy had been driven from his first position.

General Johnston admits, that at the final stand-point, to which his troops had been driven, and before the reserves and reinforcements under Bonham and Early came up, and before Smith arrived from the Shenandoah, he had twelve regiments and sixteen guns engaged. At this same period and point of the battle, we had the four brigades of Franklin, Wilcox, Porter, and Sherman, with two batteries (Rickett's and Griffin's); while the brigade of Keyes was engaged far to our left.

The Confederate force was afterward increased by the reserves, &c., just mentioned, while the brigade of Howard was our only accession, and this arrived too late to take much part in the struggle.

The "thirty-five thousand United States troops among whom were *full three thousand men of the old regular army,*" existed only in General Johnston's imagination. About thirteen thousand men is all there *could have* been in action on our side at that moment, for two of the seven brigades that passed Bull Run were not so.

Nor can "immensely superior numbers" be established on our part at the earlier period. Some time before the action commenced, we saw the heavy clouds of dust not far off indicating the march of troops to meet our flanking movement, while Evans' brigade was posted near where the battle commenced. He threw himself with eleven companies and two field-pieces across our line of march, occupying the isolated clump of woods in front of our centre, and the ground and woods between us and the stream, and was almost immediately supported by the brigade of Bee, and Imboden's battery. This was the force first engaged by Burnside's brigade.

The "fifteen thousand men" on our part engaged at this point, are therefore pure fictions (like the "thirty-five thousand" of General Johnston's imagination). General Burnside mentions, that his brigade of but four regiments was contending with six regiments of the enemy, and, wholly without support, bearing the brunt of the contest, until relieved

by Major Sykes of the 3d infantry, United States army, who formed his battalion most admirably in front of the enemy, and pouring in a destructive fire upon his lines, assisted in staggering him. The entire force of the column (Howard's division remaining behind) was about 10,000 men. These were in a *single column* strung along over several miles of road. When Porter's brigade arrived to the assistance of Burnside, "the enemy appeared drawn up in a long line from a house and haystack, upon our extreme right, to a house beyond the left of the division,"* a distance of nearly 2,000 yards. The united forces of Porter and Burnside, were not much over 5,000 men, and Heintzelman's division did not make its appearance until the "hour" which General Johnston mentions had more than elapsed. Sherman arrived, and connected with Burnside, just as the enemy was being driven from his first position.

Strategically speaking, then, our movement failed through the loss of time already mentioned, so far as it consisted in bringing, at any time, superior numbers upon the decisive point: on the contrary, the enemy from his more central position was enabled always to maintain superiority of numbers, and by this means finally deprived us of the victory. It was a

* See General Porter's report, p. 58.

success in turning the enemy's strong defensive line, disconcerting all his arrangements, and, through the moral influences of this, and of our being the attacking party, very nearly gaining a decisive victory.

We did not ignore the contingency of having to encounter superior numbers. We had heard the whistle of the locomotive, and the rattling of cars, during the two nights preceding the battle, and we *inferred* the arrival of Johnston's army. Had the plan of attack been fully *executed* as *designed*, we should unquestionably have beaten the enemy's left wing before he had time to reinforce it.

I trust that in what precedes, I have shown that the battle of Bull Run has a claim to be considered something more than a "rout" and a "panic;" that it was really what Jefferson Davis styles it in his dispatch to the Confederate Congress, "a hard-fought field." All the Southern accounts concur in this designation; and they concur too in their representations of the gloomy aspect of their affairs, from the very commencement of the battle till the last moments.

"When I entered on the field at 2 o'clock," says the correspondent of the Charleston *Mercury*, "the fortunes of the day were dark. The remnants of the regiments, so badly injured or wounded and worn, as they staggered out, gave gloomy pictures

of the scene, and as up to this time, after four hours of almost unprecedented valor and exertion, no point had been gained, the event was doubtful;" and in another place he says of this period: "hope seemed almost gone." And it may be added, that their victory seemed to them so unexpected and unaccountable, that they were quite incapable of following up, or even understanding the first retreat of our line; nor did they dare to make any serious effort to reap the advantage they might have reaped from their victory.

Fighting us as they did from the beginning to the close of the battle with superior numbers, it is evident, that if it was a "hard-fought field" to them, it was *a fortiori*, a hard-fought field to us. Let not then the unfortunate issue, and the discreditable incidents of the rout and retreat, and the descriptions of a writer who saw nothing of the battle, and to whom a government defeat was a *bonne bouche* to be dished up "hot" for his patrons, and for his secession friends (copies of Mr. Russell's letter were said to have been dispatched simultaneously to London and to Charleston), longer prevent justice being done to a faithful, zealous, and patriotic army!

As to the rout and panic, European military history furnishes examples enough, even with regular

and disciplined troops, to render apology unnecessary. Disorganized columns retreating along narrow country roads, jammed with baggage wagons and artillery, are mere helpless masses of human beings, and, when attacked or threatened by cavalry or artillery, a panic is inevitable.

How badly the enemy fared that day himself, may be judged from the fact, that upon these helpless disorganized column no real attack was made; that, except wounded and stragglers, no prisoners were taken, and the only artillery captured, save the unhorsed artillery left on the battle-field (ten pieces in all), was that necessarily left behind by the breaking down of a bridge on our line of retreat.

So much for "Bull Run;" it set the "C. S. A." for a brief period on its legs, and gave its leaders the opportunity to show that they did not possess the only qualities that could have enabled them to carry through their desperate undertaking, keenness to see and *seize* the golden moment, boldness and recklessness to profit by it. If they had *immediately* advanced on Washington, and *immediately* crossed the Potomac and seized Baltimore (and they could command any number of troops flushed with success, while all our three months men were leaving us, and we had to organize a new army), they would have placed the government in a situation from

which it could with difficulty have extricated itself.

As it proved, they lost every advantage which might have enured to them from this victory, and gave us all its benefits.

It taught our rulers and legislators and people, that hastily collected bodies of men are by no means armies, and that without organization and discipline and science in our armies, the material strength of the nation would be but weakness, and our immense resources but a rich prey for our enemies.

How the seven months which have elapsed since that gloomy period have been turned to account, at Hatteras, Port Royal, Mill Spring, Fort Henry, Roanoke, Fort Donelson, Newbern, Winchester, and the now resistless march of our armies into the very citadel of the enemy's strength, answer!

When I commenced this letter, eight days ago, there was no *external* indication of the progress of our cause more considerable than the capture of an inconsiderable work (Fort Henry), and the recent defeat of the rebel army under Zollicoffer. The language of depreciation for the cause and for the men who sustain it would seem unjustifiable. The letter is yet unfinished, and its language is justified by the corroborating language of *events*. In the two victories of Roanoke and Fort Donelson, and the

capture of nearly 20,000 prisoners, the vain boast of Southern invincibility and of reckless courage which was to die rather than surrender, is belied, while in the operations which led to them, the empty pretence that all the generalship and all the military talent of the country is in the rebel armies* is swept

*The *North British Review*, in an article which exhibits the comprehensiveness of opinion, dogmatism of judgment, and unscrutinized substitution of one-sided statements for facts, common to those who profess to understand their neighbors' affairs better than they themselves, and whose wishes are father to the thoughts they utter, asserts the superiority of the Confederate armies over those of the government, and gravely states that "the greater part of the educated officers of the army of the United States went over to the South."

There is more in this falsehood (for is not a calumnious statement uttered without *knowledge* of its truthfulness, and without the scrutiny necessary to verify it, essentially a falsehood?) than is contained in its words; for it exhibits (as does all the rest of the article in question) a complete ignorance of the true character of the great issue now pending in the United States.

That the "greater part of the educated officers" of the United States army should have proved false to their flag and gone over to the cause of secession, would imply that that cause had in it (as the writer would fain have believed) that which could justify a body of loyal and highly-educated men, sworn defenders of the flag of their country, to espouse a cause which made flagrant war upon it.

The *facts* are these: of nine hundred and fifty-one officers of the army, two hundred and sixty-two have proved disloyal. They (the disloyal) were, with a few exceptions, born in the seceding states, and it was not until their states had seceded and placed themselves in hostile array that such yielded (and most of them sorrowfully) to the supposed necessity of casting their lot with the section which gave them birth. Several of those who felt themselves called upon to relinquish their commissions in the army have declined to enter the Confederate service, and array themselves against their flag. Many more are known to have resigned with a similar resolution, but returning to their native states, they have found themselves compelled to serve—compelled by influences which none but a martyr resists.

The number of commissioned officers of the regular army borne on the

away, and the whole fabric of the Southern Confederacy is fast proving itself to the world to be (what sensible men here knew long ago) a sham, which could not have long endured its own weight had not the strong pressure of rightful power been brought to bear upon it.

A month or two more, and we trust that every seaport, every principal town, every railroad, and every river of the revolted states will be in the hands of the legitimate government, and the rebellion will be a thing still to be held by the throat, perhaps, but *forever* throttled.

Nor will subjugation be necessary. A people so cruelly betrayed, so grossly deceived by those in whom they trusted, as has been this people, will not forever be thus hoodwinked. They will spurn the traitors who have seduced them, and return to their allegiance to a government under which they have

Register for January, 1862, was 2,009. Of these 303 were born in the slave states (District of Columbia included), and 130 were graduates of the Military Academy. Eighty-nine were born in *seceded states*, of whom forty-five were graduates of the Military Academy. More than half of these latter graduates were from Virginia, but all the seceded states, except Mississippi, were represented. The number of officers of the army born in the free states who *went over* to the rebel cause is small, and can be counted on the fingers.

As to the alleged superiority of the Confederate army, it is wasting time to confute the calumnies of a writer whose sources of inspiration are palpable, and whose knowledge of facts is as accurate as his judgment is profound.

The proportion of naval officers who proved disloyal is about the same as that of the army.

reaped every blessing a government can bestow and felt no oppressor's hands.

Slavery will be left to the control of the states in which it exists, with a perpetual ban upon its further extension; or it will be dealt with, by mutual consent, by the states and government. As a *political power* it is forever dead.

Those who have believed that this territory of the United States could be divided between two independent nations by any such line as the Confederates would make you believe they would establish, have little studied its geography or the true relations of the people of these two divisions. I will not say that a division of governments and territories is impossible, but I will say that I believe there would be no end to the contests which would ensue, until one or the other is subjugated, and, until this result is obtained, that commerce which has been to England and France (as indeed to all Europe) one of the mainsprings of industrial activity, one of the principal sources of their wealth and prosperity, will continue, as it is now, paralyzed. Such a division will not take place. Let us hope that, though the *real intent* of this rebellion was virtually to subjugate the North, no subjugation of either section to the power of the other will be necessary, but that a union will be re-established

which shall fully guarantee the rights of all sections. Notwithstanding the ravings of desperate traitors, and the real enmities which their artifices and falsehoods have excited, there are yet enough undeceived—enough susceptible of being convinced of the delusions they have been under, and of the gross frauds practised upon them to justify such a hope.

APPENDIX.

ROUITS AND PANICS.

WHEN the “glowing” descriptions of the *London Times*’ correspondent of so much of the battle of Bull Run as he was engaged in (viz., the panic and flight of teamsters and straggling troops who were entirely out of the battle’s range, and who appear to have been led off by the correspondent himself) reached Europe, a shout of derision arose, as if such things as panics and routs and flight from the battle-field were—instead of being occurrences met with on almost every page of military history—wholly unknown in Europe.

Before attempting to show that the retreat from Bull Run is—if not wholly creditable in all its parts—not at all extraordinary, I will remark that the statements of Mr. Russell have been so far called in question by creditable writers who saw *him* before and during his retreat and saw also all that *he saw*, as to make it quite likely that an excited fancy might have had something to do with his description, or that, like one of his countrymen whose steed carried him over the ground so fast that he fancied the mile-posts to be the headstones of a graveyard, he, for like cause, conceived the entire road, from Centreville to the Long Bridge to be but one scene of panic and precipitate flight.

A writer in the *Knickerbocker Magazine*, who, from the heights of Centreville, witnessed the first appearance of retreat, describes it thus :

“ At this moment, looking up the ascent ahead of us, toward

the battle, we saw army wagons, private vehicles, and some six or eight soldiers on horseback, rushing down the hill in front of us in exciting confusion, and a thick cloud of dust. The equestrian soldiers, it could be seen at a glance, were only impromptu horsemen, and their steeds were all unused to this melting mode, most of them being barebacked. The riders appeared to be in haste, for some reason best known to themselves. Among them, and rather leading the van, was a solitary horseman of different aspect; figure somewhat stout, face round and broad, gentlemanly in aspect, but somewhat flushed and impatient, not to say anxious, in expression. Under a broad-brimmed hat, a silk handkerchief screened his neck like a Havelock. He rode a fine horse, still in good condition, and his motto seemed to be 'onward' whether in personal alarm or not, it would be impertinent to say. His identity was apparent at a glance."

He then describes, in his own way, the scene with the reserve regiment (that when Mr. Russell makes himself to say to the colonel, "I am not, I assure you, running away; I have done my best to stop this disgraceful rout, etc.,") which ended, according to a narrator, with "Pass this man up;" shouted the colonel, somewhat bluntly and impatient of delay; and on galloped the representative of the Thunderer toward Washington.

He further states: "*In less than twenty minutes the road was cleared and regulated; the army wagons halted, still in line on one side of the road; the civilians were permitted to drive on as fast as they pleased toward Washington; the regiment deployed into a field on the opposite hill, and formed in line of battle commanding the road; a detachment was sent on to 'clear the track' toward Centreville; and presently the regiment itself marched up the road in the direction of the field of conflict.* * * * * * Briefly and distinctly, no worse view of the matter was indicated by any thing we saw or heard while *waiting* two hours *in that very spot in the*

road where the panic was first stopped" (and two hours after Mr. Russell had galloped on to write the *worst* account of the disorder).

Mr. Hamlin, in the *Providence Journal*, describes Mr. Russell's *advance and retreat*, in this wise:

"He entered Centreville after the writer of this, and left before him. At the period of the hardest fighting, he was eating his lunch with a brother 'John Bull,' near General Miles' head-quarters.

"When the officer arrived at Centreville, announcing the apparent success (of the Federal forces, of which he gives a correct description), it was 4 o'clock. The retreat commenced in Centreville at half-past 4. During this half-hour he went about one mile down the Warrenton road, and there met the teams returning with some straggling soldiers and one reserve regiment, which were not in the fight. He did not wait to see the main portion of the army, which did not reach Centreville until about two hours after his *flight*." (The field of battle was fully six miles beyond Centreville.)

There is enough testimony that *there was* panic and disorderly flight in certain localities, but I can say that, leaving the field with the commanding general, being at Centreville with him while he was forming the reserves, stopping at Fairfax Court-House and remaining there till the greater part of the retreating column had passed, and being among the last to arrive on the Potomac, I saw everywhere confusion and disorganization, but the panic was but brief in time and limited as to locality.

Colonel Keyes, an officer of the regular army, who has seen some severe service, says, in his official report:

"Before crossing Bull Run and until my brigade mingled with the retreating mass, it maintained perfect freedom from panic, and at the moment I received the order to retreat, and for some time afterward, it was in as good order as in the

morning on the roads. Half an hour earlier I supposed the victory ours.

“The gallantry with which the 2d Maine regiment, and the 3d regiment of Connecticut Volunteers, charged up the hill upon the enemy’s artillery and infantry, was never in my opinion surpassed.”

In the report of the rebel General Johnston his reasons are given for not following up the victory at Manassas, among which appears first in order: “The apparent firmness of the United States troops at Centreville who had not been engaged, *which checked our pursuit.*”

Now let me give a few instances of European “panics,” and first, take the troops most comparable to our Bull Run troops, viz., the “Volunteers” of France, the troops who marched to the frontier when France, in 1792, declared war against Prussia and Russia.

“The war opened,” says Colonel Favé, “by a panic and a rout.” Though the troops were raw, and, owing to the emigration of a large part of the officers, commanded mostly by men as new to their duties as themselves, they were not *as organizations* new, like our own volunteers. The regiments were really regular regiments of the French army.

With such troops, on the 27th April, 1792, General Biron advanced to Mons. Disappointed in the hope that the inhabitants would surrender the town, he determined to retreat, and returned to Boursu. At 10 in the evening, when all was tranquil, a causeless alarm threw the whole army into disorder. Cries of “treason” were heard, and the general found it necessary to order a retreat. The Austrians perceiving this, advanced in pursuit and the retreat became a frightful rout. Five pieces of artillery and many prisoners fell into the enemy’s hands.

In September, 1793, the Austrians, occupying a strong position in the Vosges, were attacked by General St. Cyr. The enemy, first demoralized in some measure by the opening of a

4-pounder upon them from a rocky summit which was supposed inaccessible to artillery, commenced a retreat, which wound up thus:

“The General Viomesnil tried, with part of the division Mirabeau, to oppose some resistance, but his troops were overthrown. The moment afterward it was no longer a retreat, but *a complete rout*, a flight as fast as legs could carry (‘à toutes jambes’), which lasted all the rest of the day and a part of the following night.”

The troops who made such “time” in this case, were Austrian *regulars*.

Thiers, in his history of the Consulate and Empire, referring to events preceding the combat at Saalfeld, in 1806, says: “Several fugitives belonging to the Prussian corps, which had been beaten at Saalfeld, were hurrying toward Jéna, and discharging their pieces without any special object, were supposed to be skirmishers in advance of the French army. A fearful panic at once seized upon and spread among the troops who were moving toward Jéna, and among the numerous teamsters. All commenced a rapid and disorderly flight, crowding furiously along the bridges over the Saale, and into the streets of Jéna. In a few minutes a frightful confusion prevailed.”

Jomini, writing on the subject of the Art of War, thinks proper to remark as follows: “Officers and troops must be warned against those *sudden panics which often seize the largest armies* when they are not well controlled by discipline, and when they do not perceive that in order is the surest hope of victory. The French, whose military virtues when well led have never been questioned, have often performed some quick movements of this kind which were highly ridiculous.”

We may refer to the unbecoming panic which pervaded the infantry of Marshal Villars, after having gained the battle of Friedlingen, in 1704. Major-General Hon. Sir Edward Cust, in de-

scribing this battle, says: "The Prince of Baden having lost 2,000 men, abandoned the field, and retired toward Stauffen; but in the moment of victory the French were unaccountably seized with a panic, so that if the imperial troops had stood firm a moment or two longer, the victory would have turned to a defeat." Voltaire says of this transaction: "The greatest difficulty the General had, was to rally the conquerors."

A still more extraordinary case was the flight of the 97th demi-brigade, 1,500 strong, at the siege of Genoa, before a platoon of cavalry.

In 1797, Moreau, wishing to pass the Rhine near Diersheim, threw a bridge and commenced passing his army. The construction of the bridge having occupied more time than was anticipated, the Austrians found time to concentrate and overpower the first troops which passed. These crowded in the villages near the head of the bridge, and suffering from the Austrian artillery, fled toward the Rhine, and threw themselves upon the bridge.

General Lecourbe was passing with his brigade, and finding it impossible to stop the flying men otherwise, he ordered his grenadiers to charge upon them and *throw them into the river*.

Alison, in describing the battle of Wagram, says: "The Emperor (Napoleon), worn out with fatigue, had lain down to rest, surrounded by his guards, in the plain between Süssenbrunn and Aderklaa, when cries of alarm were heard from the rear. The drums immediately beat at all points; the infantry hastily formed in squares, the artillerymen stood to their guns, the cavalry saddled their horses. Napoleon himself mounted his horse, and asked what was the cause of the alarm. He set about the preparations for a nocturnal combat, and the aspect of affairs in the rear of the army was such as to call forth all his solicitude. The artillery, baggage wagons, stragglers, and camp-followers, who crowded the rear, were flying in disorder to the Danube; the plain was covered with fugi-

tives, the entrances of the bridges blocked up with carriages, and many, who even had the river between them and the supposed danger, continued their flight, and never drew bridle till they were within the ramparts of Vienna. The alarm spread like wildfire from rank to rank; the guard even was shaken; the victors for a moment doubted of the fate of the day. The ranks presented the appearance of a general rout; and yet the whole was occasioned by a single squadron of the Archduke John's cavalry, which had been far advanced toward Wagram, and, seeking to regain, as he retired, the road to Presburg, had cut down some French marauders in one of the villages on the east of the field."

In 1811, Marshal Soult was defeated at Albuhera (Spain), by the English Marshal Beresford. The battle commenced by an attack on the English right, which drove it back in disorder, and the victory seemed to be decided. The French General, Godinot, failing, however, to support the engaged left, gave time to Beresford to reform his right, and the French advance is checked by a vigorous fire, which, in close column, it cannot return.

"To remedy the disorder, General Gérard endeavors to deploy his masses, but the manœuvre cannot be executed under so hot a fire. The regiments became disordered, and the 5th corps soon presents nothing but a confused mass of fugitives, of whom the greater part *throw away their arms*, and only rally beyond the Albuhera, far from the field of battle."

The "fugitives," above, are not three-months volunteers, but veteran soldiers of Napoleon, fighting under his ablest marshal.

It is further said, "The enemy, no longer opposed, advanced with rapidity; all had been lost, if, at this moment, the artillery had shared the *general terror*." Alas! that we should learn that not only raw volunteers and teamsters fall into a panic, but that a whole army of Napoleon's veterans should be afflicted with a "terror."

But here is another instance in which not only a marshal of Napoleon, but a king—a very brother of the imperial conquerer himself—are in the field, and it reads wonderfully like Bull Run. The French army, under King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, was defeated by Wellington, at Vittoria. A retreat by the only route remaining open, was ordered.

“When, about 4 o’clock, the order was sent to the director of this ‘park’ (*i. e.* the great reserve artillery park) to commence his movement upon Pampeluna, a caisson was upset, so as to block the road. In vain the attempt is made to pass the carriages of the king, and the court, and those containing the Spanish refugees, and the treasure. The confusion is at a climax—no vehicle can move an inch. At this moment two squadrons of English hussars show themselves, and a few shells burst in the midst of the column. Overthrown by the fugitives who eagerly leave their carriages, the soldiers of the escort quit their ranks; those of the artillery train cut the traces of their horses, in order to fly more speedily. Some, with the hope of saving their pieces, throw themselves upon the sides of the road, and fall into the contiguous ditches. The Spanish refugees run in all directions, uttering cries of despair. A thick dust which envelops the army, prevents the nearest objects from being distinguished. King Joseph is separated from his ‘suite,’ and the horse of Marshal Jourdan falls. If the army had been vigorously pursued, it is probable it could not have been rallied. It abandoned 120 pieces of cannon, 400 caissons, and 1,500 baggage wagons, among which were the equipages of King Joseph.”

The foregoing instances are mainly taken from the “*Tactique des Trois Armes*” of Colonel Favé (at present an aid-de-camp of the Emperor Napoleon III.), and one of the few military books I have at hand to refer to.

There is yet a grander gloomier instance of rout, disaster, panic, and flight, and the emperor himself figures in the scene, to disappear forever. It is “fatal” Waterloo.

“Napoleon’s army at Waterloo, consisted of 48,950 infantry, 16,765 cavalry, 7,232 artillerymen, being a total of 81,947 men and 246 guns. They were the *élite* of the national forces of France; and of all the numerous gallant armies which that martial land has poured forth, never was there one braver, or better disciplined, or better led, than the host that took up its position at Waterloo on the morning of the 18th of June, 1815.”—*Creasy*.

“THE ROUT.—Cries of ‘*All is lost, the guard is driven back,*’ were heard on every side. The soldiers pretend even that on many points ill-disposed persons cried out *sauve qui peut*. However this may be, a complete panic at once spread itself throughout the whole field of battle, and they threw themselves, in the greatest disorder, on the line of communication; soldiers, cannoniers, caissons, all pressed to this point; the old guard, which was in reserve, was infected, and was itself hurried along.

“In an instant the whole army was nothing but a mass of confusion; all the soldiers, of all arms, were mixed pell-mell, and it was utterly impossible to rally a single corps. The enemy perceived this astonishing confusion, immediately attacked with their cavalry, and increased the disorder, and such was the confusion during the night coming on, that it was impossible to rally the troops, and point out to them their error. Thus a battle terminated, a day of false manœuvres rectified, the greatest success insured for the next day—all was lost by a moment of panic terror. Even the squadrons of *service*, drawn up by the side of the emperor, were overthrown and disorganized by these tumultuous waves, and there was then nothing else to be done but to follow the torrent. It was impossible to wait for the troops on our right; every one knows what the bravest army in the world is when thus mixed and thrown into confusion, and when its organization no longer exists.”—*French official account*.

“The enemy preserved means to retreat till the village of

Planchendit, which he had on his rear, and which was defended by the guard, was, after several bloody attacks, carried by storm. From that time the retreat became a rout, which soon spread through the whole French army, and in its dreadful confusion, hurrying away every thing that attempted to stop it, soon assumed the appearance of the flight of an army of barbarians. It was half-past 9. The field-marshal assembled all the superior officers, and gave orders to send the last horse and the last man in pursuit of the enemy. The van of the army accelerated its march. The French army being pursued without intermission, was absolutely disorganized. The causeway presented the appearance of an immense shipwreck; it was covered with an innumerable quantity of cannon, caissons, carriages, baggage, arms, and wrecks of every kind. * * It was moonlight, which greatly favored the pursuit, for the whole march was but a continued chase, either in the corn-fields or the houses.

“At 3 o’clock Napoleon had dispatched from the field of battle a courier to Paris, with the news that victory was no longer doubtful; a few hours after he had no longer any army left.”—*Prussian Official Bulletin*.

“The battle was lost by France past all recovery. * * And of the magnificent host which had that morning cheered their emperor in confident expectation of victory, very few were ever assembled again in arms. Their loss, both in the field and in the pursuit, was immense; and the greater number of those who escaped, dispersed as soon as they crossed the frontier.”—*Creaty*.

The following description of the panic which occurred the day after the battle of Solferino, is given by the Hon. H. J. Raymond, editor of the *New York Times*:

“Leaving the carriage on the road, to meet me further on, I turned into the field, intending to cross it: but I had not gone more than twenty rods when a tremendous outcry, such as only an excited Italian can raise, from my driver attracted my

attention and called me back. I found everybody in commotion. The Chasseurs d'Afrique had left the road and were drawn up in the adjacent field—everybody seemed preparing for a movement of some kind. Carriages were hastily drawn out of the road, and presently a train of artillery wagons, fifteen or twenty in number, came rushing up from the direction of Volta—the horses being lashed by their riders into a full gallop, and the officers in command dashing ahead at full speed, to clear the way. As soon as I could emerge from the dense cloud of dust in which their sweeping rush had enveloped us, I inquired of a chasseur who stood near me the meaning of the movement. He said he presumed the Austrians had made a stand ahead and were about to renew the fight, and that these artillery wagons had been dispatched back in all haste for fresh supplies of ammunition. The explanation seemed satisfactory enough, and as the Austrians were believed to be at least eight or ten miles away, and as the heights of Solferino and Caviana, in plain sight, were crowded with French troops, no special reason was apparent for any alarm. I started therefore again across the field, but my driver insisted upon instantly returning to Montechiaro, as he was perfectly convinced the Austrians were at hand. Finding that I could not control him in the least, and that my only choice was to go with him or be left afoot under a burning sun, some six miles from Castiglione, I made the best of a bad case, and went back as far as that place and there discharged him. I had engaged him only for the ride to Solferino, as our regular vehicle had been taken by 'Malakoff' to go to Brescia, to post our letters of the previous night.

“Thinking nothing of the affair of the artillerymen, or of the Austrians, we stopped at the first inn we saw, and finding that we could get absolutely nothing to eat, and but a very little wine to drink, we made the best meal we could under such unpropitious circumstances, and then sauntered through the town in search of another vehicle. But we found it utterly

impossible to obtain one—as every thing in the least degree available had been taken for the service of the wounded. It was too hot to walk, so we sat down upon the piazza of a *café* on the principal street, to lay some plan as to our future movements. A Piedmontese captain sat upon a chair near us, pouring cold water upon his wounded leg, and comfortably smoking a cigar. Wounded soldiers were sitting upon the sidewalks. Zouaves, with their arms in slings, or limping with canes, were lounging about; the shops were open—officers were riding along, walking their horses in the hot sun, and the traffickers and other towns-people were about their usual business. Having had very little rest the night before, and being greatly oppressed by the heat, I soon fell asleep, as did also my friend Forsyth, of Troy, who sat beside me.

“We were speedily aroused by an evident and unusual commotion—and, looking up, we saw men running down the street with uncommon agility. Their numbers and their speed increased. Zouaves and other soldiers were running as fast as the rest. I stepped into the street and asked three or four soldiers in succession what was the matter; each gave me the same reply—*Je ne sais pas*—but never stopped his running in the least. Presently one shouted as loudly as his spent breath would permit, *‘Ils tuent les blessés’* (they are killing the wounded). And when I asked him, ‘Who?’ he replied *‘Les Autrichiens.’* This was certainly rather startling information, and as it was backed up by a general flight of the whole *mobile* population, we began to think it was time for us to be moving also. We accordingly started off at a round pace—but were compelled to stop now and then, and draw up close to the wall to prevent being run over by the advancing crowd. French mounted officers came tearing down the street, spurring their horses into a dead run over the pavement. Shutters were closed—doors bolted—and Sardinian flags pulled in with a good deal more alacrity than they had been hung out the day before. Everybody who had a cart and horse mounted it and

started. I saw a Zouave who had been limping through the street not a moment before, seize a horse which stood at the entrance of a stable yard, without saddle, bridle, or even halter, leap on his back, and holding by the mane, kick and halloo him into a keen gallop down the street. Everybody was running for dear life. We went with the crowd until we cleared the town and reached the high road to Lonato. A French officer whom I recognized as one I had seen in command of the guard of the wounded, came dashing along *en grand galop*. I called out to him as he rushed by, '*Are the Austrians there?*' '*On dit*, was his only reply. Following close to his heels came one of the large wagons belonging to the imperial *suite*, and in it a young man to whom I had seen the surgeons of the imperial household especially deferential the day before. Next came an open chaise, with two civilians, one of whom was lashing the horse, and the other fighting off the soldiers who were trying their best to climb up behind. By this time we had stopped running and fallen into a leisurely walk; the men in the chaise were touchingly sympathetic, and consolingly shouted to us that we were certainly lost, as the Austrian dragoons were slashing their way right and left, directly in our rear. This decided us to quit running altogether, as it was quite hopeless to run away from pursuing cavalry. This relaxation of our pace and the recovery of our wind induced a cooler view of the whole affair; and we were already beginning to see its farcical character when our cowardly coachman came puffing and blowing behind us, his face swelling with fear and red with heat. He raised his eyes and clasped his hands in pity as he passed us, and soon turned off from the road and buried his stalwart form in a field of wheat. This quite reconciled us to the desperate state of things, and laughing at his sorrows we quite forgot our own. Reasoning the ease, moreover, as we walked along, we thought it just possible that a corps of Austrian horse might have dashed in from Peschiera to rescue the prisoners, of whom there were 6,000 in

Castiglione; but any thing beyond this seemed quite impossible. The whole body of fugitives upon our road was out of sight, but a long cloud of dust on the road to Montechiaro showed that in that direction the panic was unabated. As we had agreed to meet 'Malakoff' on his return from Brescia at Montechiaro, we struck into the cross-roads leading through the farms and country districts, and after a couple of hours' brisk walking reached that place. We found it in the very height of the fever, and it was with a good deal of difficulty that we prevailed upon the landlord of the inn to open his doors and give us possession of the rooms we had previously engaged.

"This was certainly the most remarkable instance of a pure *panic* I ever saw, and the most striking feature of it was the rapidity with which it increased in force and volume as it rolled along. We heard afterward that it produced the most serious results when it overtook the trains of wounded on the road to Brescia. They were tumbled headlong from the carts into the roadside, and many of them were run over by the artillery wagons, as they were utterly concealed from sight by the dense cloud of dust which hung over the road. Of its results our regular correspondent, who was on the spot, will give a detailed account. I have since tried very hard to find out how it originated, but with only indifferent success. At first we were told that a squadron of Piedmontese cavalry, who were promenading the country in the direction of Castiglione had been mistaken for Austrians. But an officer in the camp of General Canrobert, which we visited the next day—upon the farthest extreme of the battle-field—told us that it came from *five* Austrian soldiers, who had concealed themselves in the bushes after the fight and now came in to surrender. They were said to have stated that the Austrian army were rapidly coming up in full force and would soon be in possession of Castiglione. In that camp no alarm

seems to have been created, but when the rumor reached the ammunition train, a mile or so in the rear, it sent them scampering off in the manner I have rehearsed. They ran their horses all the way to Brescia—some seventeen miles—and reached there at about three o'clock. Why they did not communicate the alarm to the corps of Chasseurs d'Afrique, through which they passed, or why their officers did not pause for further inquiry, are among the mysteries of a *stampede*. On reaching Brescia, they soon found out that their alarm was groundless; but as they were separated from their camp they were entirely without provisions of any kind, and reached Castiglione on Sunday at about noon, both horses and men completely exhausted. Several of the former, indeed, had fallen in the traces and been left behind on the road. As we came out of the inn where we had been lurching, we saw three artillerymen sitting upon the sidewalk, their horses standing near, and all completely worn out. They told us of the flight, and said they had eaten nothing whatever since they left their camp on the morning of the previous day, and that neither they nor their horses could go a step further. They had no money, nobody had offered them any thing to eat, and it is not a French soldier's habit ever to ask a favor from any one. We gave them money enough to procure some food, and they soon after started on to join their corps.

“I do not suppose the French papers will say much about this affair, and I have therefore been more particular in mentioning it. Soldiers, certainly, are only men, and when not under the immediate control of their officers, are doubtless subject to all the ordinary weakness of humanity. But it is not creditable to the officers of the French army that they should have permitted so idle a fright to produce such serious results—especially that they themselves should have shared in the panic and led the flight. An immense amount of very serious injury was done, and many of the wounded soldiers lost their lives by it. I observe that the authorities of the

town of Brescia have published a notice calling on all those who lost valuable articles in consequence of the alarm, to apply for their restoration.”

At the battle on the Monongahela (1755), Washington, in his letter to Lieutenant-Governor Dinwiddie, says of General Braddock’s regular troops :

“They were struck with such an inconceivable panic that nothing but confusion and disobedience of orders prevailed among them. * * * * *

In short, the dastardly behavior of the regular troops (so-called), exposed those who were inclined to do their duty, to almost certain death ; and at length, in spite of every effort to the contrary, they broke and ran as sheep before hounds, leaving the artillery, ammunition, provisions, baggage, and in short, every thing a prey to the enemy ; and when we endeavored to rally them, in hopes of regaining the ground, and what we had left upon it, it was with as little success as if we had attempted to have stopped the wild bears of the mountains, or the rivulets with our feet ; for they would break in spite of every effort to prevent it.”

In another letter he says : “We have been beaten—shamefully beaten—shamefully beaten by a handful of men who only intended to disturb our march ! Victory was their smallest expectation ! But see the wondrous works of Providence, the uncertainty of human things !

“We, but a few moments before, believed our numbers almost equal to the force of Canada ; they only expected to annoy us. Yet, contrary to all expectation, and human probability, and even the common course of things, we were totally defeated, and have sustained the loss of every thing.”

Let those who entered into the battle of Bull Run with fair “human probability” of success, comfort themselves with the recollection that the first experience of Washington was the bitter disappointment of such reasonable hopes.

The civil wars of England abound in panics and flights—as at Marston Moor, where the Scots, charged by the King's horse, were so totally routed and defeated “that they fled all ways for many miles together, and were knocked on the head and taken prisoners by the country people; and Lesly, their general, fled ten miles.”

And at Naseby, “the king's reserve horse, which were his own guards, with himself at the head of them,” were seized “on a sudden” with such a panic, “that they all ran near a quarter of a mile without stopping.”

At Worcester, Charles II. had scarce time to mount his horse, after the alarm that “both armies were engaged,” before “he met the whole body of his horse, running in so great fear that he could not stop them, though he used all the means he could, and called to many officers by their names; and hardly preserved himself, by letting them pass by, from being overthrown and overrun by them.” Even the sacred person of royalty itself, must “clear the track,” or be “overthrown and overrun” by panic-stricken fugitives, not to be stayed, and the men who would have “crooked the pregnant hinges of the knee,” or deemed no sacrifice too great for a single word, or even a look, or smile, or nod, from majesty—panic-stricken—could not be inspired with the faintest sense of manliness or duty, by its most earnest appeals to them, even “by their names.”

The reader of the foregoing narratives, will find that the battle of Bull Run is not by any means a solitary instance of disorder and panic, but that unexpected resemblances present themselves with occurrences famous in history, and not generally considered discreditably. As at Albuhera and Waterloo, there was a “hard-fought field,” and an anticipated victory. At “three o'clock” (and on a Sunday too), the tidings of a victory were dispatched to Paris and to Washington. The sequel is all in favor of Bull Run. “A few hours later Napoleon had no longer an army left,” whereas, at Bull Run, the

victorious general reports that the “apparent firmness of the United States troops at Centreville, checked his pursuit.”

At Albuhera, it was the artillery which, not infected with “the general terror;” saved all from being (as at Waterloo), “lost.”


THE END.

THE NEW
PUBLIC LIFE

SECTION, LEAF
NUMBER, FOUR

their left flank, left was further constantly reinforced throughout the day, and particularly

Account heavy reserves (say 25,000) at Manassas and on the road to Richmond.



BATTLE FIELD AT BULL RUN

PLAN
of the

JULY 21 - 1861

to accompany the Report of
BRIEF GEN. IRVIN M. DOWELL COMMANDING

prepared by

CAPT. A. W. WHELPLE TOP. ENG. '61

1. LIEUT. H. L. ABBOTT TOP. ENG. '61
2. CAPT. H. B. SPINNAM TOP. ENG. '61

Drawn by
J. W. MURPHY

Scale

U. S. War Office

Notes

1000

their left flank was further constantly reinforced throughout the day,
and particularly
Accompanied heavy reserves (say 25,000) at Manassas and on the road
to Richmond.



BATTLE FIELD AT BULL RUN

1862

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DRUG STORE, BURNING MILL, BULL RUN, VA.

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Map




5, 5.

The crossing of Bull Run at Sudley Springs, and threatened their left flank, left was further constantly reinforced throughout the day, and particularly

Accompanied heavy reserves (say 25,000) at Manassas and on the road to Richmond.

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


HEIGHTS
 0 10
 BATTLE FIELD OF JULY 21, 1861
 Length of Miles
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 HUNDREDS OF FEET

Scale 1:12500

Note
 ■ Number of pieces of Artillery
 □ Number of estimated pieces of Artillery

Original position of Tyler's division on Bull Run
 Stone bridge from whence the brigades of Sherman
 & Reno passed Bull Run & joined the main column
 of the Army



EXIBARRY, U. S. A., Chief of Artillery.

- 1.—
- 2.—
- 3.—tack at Stone Bridge.
- 4.—VISION, five brigades, four batteries, and the cavalry.)
- 5, 5.

The crhe crossing of Bull Run at Sudley Springs, and threatened their left flank. Left was further constantly reinforced throughout the day, and particular


Accoht heavy reserves (say 25,000) at Manassas and on the road to Richmond.

MAP

TO ILLUSTRATE THE

Battle of Bull Run, Stone Bridge of Manassas Plains.

ENLARGED FOR THE RECORD



EXPLANATIONS AND REFERENCES. Prepared for the "RECORD" by Brig-Gen. W. F. BARRY, U. S. A., Chief of Artillery.

- 1.—MILES' DIVISION (Haves' and Bleeker's Brigades, Tibbalt's and Green's Batteries) in Reserve at Centerville.
 - 2.—RICHMOND'S BRIGADE in observation and faint at Blackburn's Ford.
 - 3.—MYLER'S DIVISION (Hensck's, Keys', and Sherman's Brigades, Carlisle's, Catfish's, and Ayres' Batteries) in observation and gained attack at Stone Bridge.
 - 4.—The dotted line leading to 4, and crossing Bull Run at 4, (Snulley Springs), is the detour made by the main body (HUNTER'S DIVISION, five brigades, four batteries, and the cavalry.)
 - 5, 5.—Position of First of the U. S. Field Batteries, and ground where the battle commenced.
- The enemy's first position was as sketched in the map, in front of Blackburn's Ford and Stone Bridge. As we deduced from the crossing of Bull Run at Snulley Springs, and threatened their left flank, they moved large bodies of troops on the prolongation of their line of battle, and toward their left, so as to face us. Their left was further constantly reinforced throughout the day, and particularly about 4 o'clock P. M. by arrivals of fresh troops from Winchester.
- Accounts from Richmond and other Southern newspapers confirm the belief that the enemy had, at 3 o'clock on the field, with heavy reserves say 25,000 at Manassas and on the road to Richmond.

MAP
OF
BATTLES
ON
BULL RUN,
NEAR
MANASSAS,
On the Line of Fairfax and Prince William Counties,
In VIRGINIA,

FOUGHT BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES
AND OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

General's BEAUREGARD and JOHNSTON commanding the Confederate
AND

General McDOWELL the United States Forces,

On the 21st of July, 1861, from 7 A. M. to 9 P. M.

MADE FROM OBSERVATION

By SOLOMON BAMBERGER,

Published by WEST & JOHNSTON, No. 145 Main Street,

RICHMOND, Va.

Two companies
during the day
wards Geo

The enemy made
about 4 o'clock P.
about our battery
columns, and then
Degan.

DUMFRIES

SCALE 1 MILE

PENSION BRIDGE

COURT HOUSE

Miles' reserve
made a stand
here evening of
21st, but broke as
the Confed't Ap-
proached and
pushed on to Al-
exandria.

VERY HIGH HILLS
SPRING

of enemy on turn-
east of Centreville.
ie they left camp at
July, turned out at
le's at 7, crossed Sud-
eat dinner in woods
ight 12 M., July 21.

High point
overlooking
the battle field
July 21, 1861.

CENTREVILLE

U.S. RESERVED FORCES.

ER CROSSING SULLEYS FORD DID NOT TURN

ENTRANCE GATE.
A 1/2 mile from summit ft. wide as
abacus and intercolumniation in front and
named also under flag of truce, July 15.

The left wing of the army retreated from
this position in the afternoon of July 21, 1861,
with the retreat towards Alexandria.

MANASSAS GAP
R. R.

MANASSAS


PHOTOGRAPHED ON WOOD FROM THE ORIGINAL DRAWING
& ENGRAVED BY WATERS & SON, N. Y.

MAP
OF
BATTLES
IN
BULL RUN,
STATE

MANASSAS,
On the Line of Fairfax and Prince William Counties,
in VIRGINIA.

GENERAL BURNETT'S TROOP WAS IN THE "CONSERVED" STATUS
UNTIL THE "UNION" STAGE OF THE WAR.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AND JOINTS COMMAND DURING THE CAMPAIGN.
AND
GENERAL BURNETT'S TROOP WAS IN THE "CONSERVED" STATUS
UNTIL THE "UNION" STAGE OF THE WAR.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AND JOINTS COMMAND DURING THE CAMPAIGN.

BY SOLOMON BAMBERGER,
FOLLOWING BY HENRY A. JOHNSON, A. S. DE BOSTON STREET
RICHMOND, VA.



PHOTOGRAPHS BY WAY FROM THE ORIGINAL DRAWING
& ENGRAVED BY WATERS, 3 CON. N. K.

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