‘ i janine cat ee a ciate ieee Si] ie te edehtsarh a i) i if Sail Werte ets “i pie alee, at eet st GOH rt {7 cient pt iG, AOte Wy Coruell University Library Sthara, New York FROM THE °< BENNO LOEWY LIBRARY COLLECTED BY BENNO LOEWY 1854-1919 BEQUEATHED TO CORNELL UNIVERSITY The writings of John Burroughs. Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924022149938 THE WRITINGS OF JOHN BURROUGHS MRiberside ECvition HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN 6 CO. eo LITERARY VALUES AND OTHER PAPERS BY JOHN BURROUGHS BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY Che Riverside Press, Cambridge 1902 ue be COPYRIGHT 1902 BY JOHN BURROUGHS ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Published December, 1902 4 XIII. CONTENTS . LirerarRy VALUES . ANALOGY — TRUE AND FALSE . STYLE AND THE Man . CRITICISM AND THE MAN . Recent PHAsEs or LITERARY CRITICISM . “THOU SHALT NOT PREACH ”’ . DEMOCRACY AND LITERATURE . . Poetry AnD ELoQuENcE . GILBERT WHITE AGAIN . Lucrp LITERATURE . Mere LITERATURE”? . ANOTHER WoRD ON EMERSON THOREAU’s WILDNESS XIV. Nature in LITERATURE XV. XVI. XVII. XVIII. SUGGESTIVENESS . On THE RE-READING oF Books THE SPELL OF THE Past ‘ x Tue SecrET oF Happiness The frontispiece is from a photograph of Mr. Burroughs sitting in the doorway of Slabsides, taken by Clifton Johnson in 1901. The vignette of Slabsides is from a photograph by Clifton Johnson in 1900. LITERARY VALUES I LITERARY VALUES I eas day inevitably comes to every writer when he must take his place amid the silent throngs of the past, when no new work from his pen can call attention to him afresh, when the partiality of his friends no longer counts, when his friends and ad- mirers are themselves gathered to the same silent throng, and the spirit of the day in which he wrote has given place to the spirit of another and a differ- ent day. How, oh, how will it fare with him then ? How is it going to fare with Lowell and Longfellow and Whittier and Emerson and all the rest of them ? How has it fared with so many names in the past, that were, in their own day, on all men’s tongues ? Of the names just mentioned, Whittier and Emerson shared more in a particular movement of thought and morals of the times in which they lived than did the other two, and to that extent are they in danger of dropping out and losing their vogue. Both had a significance to their own day and genera- 2 LITERARY VALUES tion that they can hardly have to any other. The new times will have new soul maladies and need other soul doctors. The fashions of this world pass away — fashions in thought, in style, in humor, in morals, as well as in anything else. As men strip for a race, so must an author strip for this race with time. All that is purely local and accidental in him will only impede him ; all that is put on or assumed will impede him — his affecta- tions, his insincerities, his imitations; only what is vital and real in him, and is subdued to the pro- per harmony and proportion, will count. A mal- formed giant will not in this race keep pace with the lesser but better-built stripling. How many more learned and ponderous tomes has Gilbert White’s lit- tle book left behind! Mere novelty, how short-lived is that! Every age will have its own novelties. Every age will have its own hobbies and hobby- ists, its own clowns, its own follies and fashions and infatuations. What every age will not have in the same measure is sanity, proportion, health, pen- etration, simplicity. The strained and overwrought, the fantastic and far-fetched, are sure to drop out. Every pronounced style, like Carlyle’s, is sure to suffer. The obscurities and affectations of some re- cent English poets and novelists are certain to drag them down. Browning, with his sudden leaps and stops, and all that Italian rubbish, is fearfully han- dicapped. Things do not endure in this world without a certain singleness and continence. Trees do not LITERARY VALUES 3 grow and stand upright without a certain balance and proportion. A man does not live out half his days without a certain simplicity of life. Excesses, irregularities, violences, kill him. It is the same with books—they, too, are under the same law; they hold the gift of life on the same terms. Only an honest book can live; only absolute sincerity can stand the test of time. Any selfish or second- ary motive vitiates a work of art, as it vitiates a religious life. Indeed, I doubt if we fully appreci- ate the literary value of the staple, fundamental hu- man virtues and qualities — probity, directness, sim- plicity, sincerity, love. There is just as much room and need for the exercise of these qualities in the making of a book as in the building of a house, or in a business career. How conspicuous they are in all the enduring books——in Bunyan, in Walton, in Defoe, in the Bible! It is they that keep alive such a book as “Two Years before the Mast,” which Stevenson pronounced the best sea-story in the lan- guage, as it undoubtedly is. None of Stevenson’s books have quite this probity and singleness of pur- pose, or show this effacement of the writer by the man. It might be said that our interest in such books is not literary at all, but purely human, like our interest in “ Robinson Crusoe,” or in life and things themselves. The experience itself of a sailor’s life, however, would be to most of us very prosy and distasteful. Hence there is something in the record, something in the man behind the record, that col- ors his pages, and that is the source of our interest. 4 LITERARY VALUES This personal element, this flavor of character, is the salt of literature. Without it, the page is savorless. II It is curious what an uncertain and seemingly capricious thing literary value is. How often it re- fuses to appear when diligently sought for, labored for, prayed for; and then comes without call to some simple soul that never gave it a thought. Learning cannot compass it, rhetoric cannot compass it, study cannot compass it. Mere wealth of lan- guage is entirely inadequate. It is like religion: often those who have it most have it least, and those who have it least have it most. In the works of the great composers — Gibbon, De Quincey, Macau- lay —it is a conscious, deliberate product. Then, in other works, the very absence of the literary mo- tive and interest gives an esthetic pleasure. One is surprised to read the remark of the “ Sat- urday Review” on the published letters of Whit- man, — letters that have no extrinsic literary value whatever, not one word of style, —namely, that few books are so well calculated to “purge the soul of nonsense ;’’ and the remark of the fastidious Henry James on the same subject, that, with all their enormities of the common, the letters are pos- itively delightful. Here, again, the source of our interest is undoubtedly in the personal revelation, — the type of man we see through the letters, and not in any wit or wisdom lodged in the letters themselves. One reader seeks religious or moral values alone LITERARY VALUES 5 in the works he reads; another seeks scientific or philosophical values; another, artistic and literary values; others, again, purely human values. No one, I think, would read Scott or Dickens for purely artistic values, while, on the other hand, it seems to me that one would go to Mr. James or to Mr. Howells for little else. One might read Froude with pleasure who had little confidence in him as an historian, but one could hardly read Freeman and discount him in the same way; one might have great delight in Ruskin, who repudiated much of his teaching. I suppose one comes to like plain literature as he comes to like plain clothes, plain manners, simple living. What grows with us is the taste for the genuine, the real. The less a writer’s style takes thought of itself, the better we like it. The less his dress, his equipage, his house, concern them- selves about appearances, the more we are pleased with them. Let the purpose be entirely serious, and let the seriousness be pushed till it suggests the heroic; that is what we crave as we grow older and tire of the vanities and shams of the world. To have literary value is not necessarily to sug- gest books or literature; it is to possess a certain genuineness and seriousness that is like the validity of real things. See how much better literature Lin- coln’s speech at Gettysburg is than the more elabo- rate and scholarly address of Everett on the same occasion. General Grant’s “ Memoirs’? have a higher literary value than those of any other gen- 6 LITERARY VALUES eral in our Civil War, mainly because of the greater simplicity, seriousness, and directness of the person- ality they reveal. There is no more vanity and make-believe in the book than there was in the man. Any touch of the elemental, of the veracity and sin- gleness of the natural forces, gives value to a man’s utterances, and Lincoln and Grant were undoubtedly the two most elemental men brought out by the war. ‘The literary value of the Bible, doubtless, arises largely from its elemental character. The utterances of simple, unlettered men — farmers, sail- ors, soldiers — often have great force and impres- siveness from the same cause; there are in them the virtue and seriousness of real things. One great danger of schools, colleges, libraries, is that they tend to kill or to overlay this elemental quality in aman—to make the poet speak from his culture instead of from his heart. “To speak in literature with the perfect rectitude and insouciance of the movement of animals and the unimpeachableness of the sentiment of trees in the woods and grass by the roadside, is the flawless triumph of art;” and who so likely to do this as the simple, unbookish man? Hence Sainte-Beuve says the peasant always has style. In fiction the literary value resides in several dif- ferent things, as the characterization, the action, the plot, and the style; sometimes more in one, some- times more in another. In Scott, for instance, it is found in the characters and the action; the style is commonplace. In George Eliot, the action, the dra- LITERARY VALUES 7 matic power, is the weakest factor. In Mr. How- ells we care very little for the people, but the art, the style, is a perpetual delight. In Hawthorne our pleasure, again, is more evenly distributed. In Poe the plot and the style interest us. In Dickens it is the character and the action. The novelist has many strings to his bow, and he can get along very well without style, but what can the poet, the his- torian, the essayist, the critic, do without style — that is, without that vital, intimate, personal rela- tion between the man and his language which seems to be the secret of style? The true poet makes the words his own; he fills them with his own quality, though they be the common property of all. This is why language, in the hands of the born writer, is not the mere garment of thought, not even a perfectly adjusted and transparent garment, as a French writer puts it. It is a garment only as the body is the garment of the soul. This is why a writer with a style loses so much in a translation, while with the ordinary eomposer translation is lit- tle more than a change of garments. I should say that the literary value of the modern French writers and critics resides more in their style than in anything else, while with the German it re- sides least in the style; in the English it resides in both thought and style. The French fall below the English in lyric poetry, because, while the French- man has more vanity, he has less egoism, and hence less power to make the universe speak through him. The solitude of the lyric is too much for his in- 8 LITERARY VALUES tensely social nature, while he excels in the light dramatic forms for this very reason. He has more power of intellectual metamorphosis. Apart from style and the other qualities I have mentioned, is another gift, the gift of narration — the story-teller’s gift, which novelists have in varying degrees. Probably few of them have this talent in so large a measure as Wilkie Collins had it, yet this power does not of itself seem sufficient to save his work from oblivion. Still apart from these quali- ties, and of high literary worth, and apart from the attractiveness of the subject matter, is the power to interest, Can you interest me in what you have to say, by your manner of saying it? This is one of the most intimate and personal gifts of all. No matter what the subject, some writers, like some speakers, catch our attention at once, and hold it to the end. They appear to be telling us some import- ant bit of news which they are in a hurry to be de- livered of. No time or words are wasted. There is something special and imminent in the look and tone. The sentences are definitely aimed. The man knows what he wants to say and is himself interested in it. His mind is not somnolent or stagnant; the style is specific and direct — no be- numbing effects of vague and featureless generaliza- tions. The thoughts move, they make a current, and the reader quickly yields himself to it. How soon we tire of the mumbling, soliloquizing style, where the writer seems talking to himself. He must talk to his reader and must catch his eye. LITERARY VALUES 9 Then those dead-level sentences that seem to re- turn forever into themselves, that have no direction or fall, that do not point and hurry to some definite conclusion, —- we soon yawn over these too. What rare power the late Henry George had to invest his subject with interest! What a current in his book “Progress and Poverty ” !— While it seems to me that in his “Social Evolution” Benjamin Kidd suffers from the want of this talent; I do not get the full force of his periods at the first reading. III Literature abounds in attempts to define literature. One of the most strenuous and thorough-going defi- nitions I have seen has lately been published by one of our college professors — it is a most determined attempt to corral the whole subject. ‘‘ Nothing be- longs to real literature,” says the professor, “ unless it consists of written words that constitute a carrying statement which makes sense, arranged rhythmically, euphoniously, and harmoniously, and so chosen as to connote an adequate number of ideas and things, the suggestion of which will call up in the reader sus- tained emotions which do not produce undue ten- sion, and in which the element of pleasure predomi- nates, on the whole, over that of pain. Practically,’ the writer goes on to say, “every word of this de- scription should be kept in our minds, so that we may consciously apply it as a test to any piece of writing about the literary character of which we are in doubt.” o 10 LITERARY VALUES Fancy a reader, in his quest for the real article, going about with this drag-net of a paragraph in his mind. ‘Will the definition or description bear turning around upon itself? Is it a good sample of literary art? The exactness and literalness of science are seldom permissible in literature. That a definition of anything may have literary value it must possess a certain indirect and imaginative character, as when Carlyle defined poetry as the heroic of speech. Con- trast with the above John Morley’s definition of lit- erature: ‘All the books—and they are not so many — where moral truth and human passion are touched with a certain largeness, sanity, and attrac- tion of form.” This is much better literature, be- cause the language is much more flexible and imagi- native. It imparts more warmth to the mind; it is more suggestive, while as a literary touchstone it is just as available. Good literature may be a much simpler thing than our teachers would lead us to believe. The prattle of a child may have rare literary value. The little Parisian girl who, when asked by a lady the price of the trinkets she offered for sale, replied, “ Judge for yourself, madam; I have tasted no food since yesterday,” expressed herself with consum- mate art. If she had said simply, “‘ Whatever your ladyship pleases to give,’ her reply would have been graceful, but commonplace. By the personal turn which she gave it, she added almost a lyrical touch. When Thackeray changed the title of one of his novels from “Scenes from Town Life,” or LITERARY VALUES 11 some such title, to ‘“ Vanity Fair,” he achieved a stroke of art, It is said that a now famous line of Keats was first written thus: “A thing of beauty is a continual joy.” How the effect of the line was heightened by the change of one word, and itself became “a joy for- ever.” Poe, too, altered two lines of his with like magical effect, when for “To the beauty of fair Greece, And the grandeur of old Rome,” he wrote: “To the glory that was Greece, And the grandeur that was Rome.” The phrase “ well of pure English” conveys the same idea as “ well of English undefiled,” but how much greater the artistic value of the latter than of the former! Thus the literary value of a sentence may turn upon a single word. The everyday speech of the people is often full of the stuff of which literature is made. No poet could invent better epithets and phrases than abound in the common vernacular. The sayings and pro- verbs of a people are also, for the most part, of the pure gold of literature. One trouble with all definitions of literature is that they proceed upon the theory that literature is a definite something that may be determined by de- finite tests like gold or silver, whereas it is more like life or nature itself. It is not so much some- thing as the visible manifestation of something; it 12 LITERARY VALUES assumes infinite forms, and is of infinite degrees of potency. ‘There is great literature, and there is fee- ble and commonplace literature : a romance by Haw- thorne and a novel by Haggard; a poem by Tenny- son and a poem by Tupper; an essay by Emerson and an essay by John Foster —all literature, all touching the emotions and the imagination with varying degrees of power, and yet separated by a gulf. There are no degrees of excellence in gold or silver, but there are all degrees of excellence in lit- erature. How hard it is to tell what makes a true poem, a lasting poem! When one asks himself what it is, how many things arise, how hard to nar- row the list down to a few things! Is it beauty ? Then what is beauty? One meets with beautiful poems every day that he never thinks of or recurs to again. It is certain that without one thing there is no real poetry — genuine passion. The fire came down out of heaven and consumed Elijah’s offering because Elijah was sincere. Plan and build your poem never so deftly, mankind will not permanently care for it unless it has genuine feeling. It must be impassioned, The genus Literature includes many species, as novels, poems, essays, histories, etc., but our busi- ness with them all is about the same — they are books that we read for their own sake. We read the papers for the news, we read a work of science for the facts and the conclusions, but a work of lit- erature is an end in and of itself. We read it for the pleasure and the stimulus it affords us, apart from LITERARY VALUES 13 any other consideration. It exhibits such a play of mind and emotion upon the facts of life and na- ture as results in our own mental and spiritual en- tichment and edification. Another thing is true of the best literature: we cannot separate our pleasure and profit in the sub- ject-matter from our pleasure and profit in the per- sonality of the writer. We do not know whether it is Hawthorne himself that we most delight in, or his style and the characters and the action of his romance. One thing is quite certain: where there is no distinct personal flavor to the page, no stamp ofa new individual force, we soon tire of it. The savor of every true literary production comes from the man himself. Hence, without attempting a formal definition of literature, one may say that the literary quality seems to arise from a certain vital relation of the writer with subject-matter. It is his subject ; it blends with the very texture of his mind; his rela- tion to it is primary and personal, not secondary and mechanical. The secret is not in any prescribed arrangement of the words—it is in the quality of mind or spirit that warms the words and shines through them. A good book, says Milton, is the precious life-blood of a master spirit. Unless there is blood in it, unless the vital currents of a rare spirit flow through it and vivify it, it has not the gift of life. In all good literature we have a sense of touching something alive and real. The writer uses words not as tools or appliances; they are more like his 14 LITERARY VALUES hand or his eye or his ear— the living, palpable body of his thought, the incarnation of his spirit. The true writer always establishes intimate and personal relations with his reader. He comes forth, he is not concealed; he is immanent in his words, we feel him, our spirits touch his spirit. Style in letters is a quality of mind — a certain flavor imparted to words by the personality back of them. Pass language through one mind and it is tasteless and colorless; pass it through another, and it acquires an entirely new value and signifi- cance and gives us a unique pleasure. In the one case the sentences are artificial; in the other they bud and sprout out of the man himself as naturally as the plants and trees out of the soil. There is nothing else in the world so sensitive and chameleon-like as language; it takes on at once the hue and quality of the mind that uses it. See how neutral and impersonal, or old and worn and faded the words look in the pages of some writers, then see how drastic or new and individual they become when a mind of another type marshals them into sentences. What vigor and life in them! they seem to have been newly coined since we last met them. It is the test of a writer’s real worth — does the language tarnish, as it were, in his hand, or is it brightened and freshened in his use ? A book may contain valuable truths and sound sentiments of universal appeal, but if the literary coinage is feeble, if the page is not strongly individu- alized, freshly and clearly stamped by the purpose LITERARY VALUES 15 of the writer, it cannot take rank as good litera- ture. To become literature, truth must be perpet- ually reborn, reincarnated, and begin life anew. A successful utterance always has value, always has truth, though in its purely intellectual aspects it may not correspond with the truth as we see it. I cannot accept all of Ruskin’s views upon our civili- zation or all of Tolstoi’s upon art, yet I see that they speak the truth as it defines itself to their minds and feelings. A counter-statement may be equally true. The struggle for existence goes on in the ideal world as well as in the real. The strong- est mind, the fittest statement, survives for the time being. That a system of philosophy or religion perishes or is laid aside is not because it is not or was not true, but because it is not true to the new minds and under the new conditions. It no longer expresses what the world thinks and feels. It is outgrown. Was not Calvinism true to our fathers ? It is no longer true to us because we were born at a later day in the world. With regard to truths of science, we may say, once a truth always a truth, because the world of fact and of things is always under the same law, but the truth of sentiments and emotions changes with changing minds and hearts. The tree of life, unlike all other trees, bears differ- ent fruit to each generation. What our fathers found nourishing and satisfying in religion, in art, in philosophy, we find tasteless and stale. Every gospel has its day. The moral and intellectual hori- zon of the race is perpetually changing. 16 LITERARY VALUES Iv In our modern democratic communities the moral sense is no doubt higher than it was in the earlier ages, while the artistic or esthetic sense is lower. In the Athenian the artistic sense was far above the moral; in the Puritan the reverse was the case. The Latin races seem to have a greater genius for art than the Teutonic, while the latter excel in vir- tue. In this country, good taste exists in streaks and spots, or sporadically here and there. There does not seem to be enough to go around, or the supply is intermittent. One writer has it and an- other has it not, or one has it to-day and not to-mor- row; one moment he writes with grace and simpli- city, the next he falls into crudenesses or affectations. There is not enough leaven to leaven the whole lump. Some of our most eminent literary men, such as Lowell and Dr. Holmes, are guilty of occasional lapses from good taste, and probably in the work of none of them do we see the thorough ripening and mellowing of taste that mark the productions of the older and more centralized European communi- ties. One of our college presidents, writing upon a serious ethical subject, allows himself such rhetoric as this: “ Experiment and inference are the hook and line by which Science fishes the dry formulas out of the fiuid fact. Art, on the other hand, undertakes to stock the stream with choice specimens of her own breeding and selection.” We can hardly say of such metaphors what Sainte-Beuve said of Montaigne’s, namely, that they are of the kind that are never “ de- LITERARY VALUES 17 tached from the thought,” but that they “ seize it in its very centre, in its interior, and join and bind it.” v The keener appreciation in Europe of literature as a fine art is no doubt the main reason why Poe is looked upon over there as our most noteworthy poet. Poe certainly had a more consummate art than any other American singer, and his productions are more completely the outcome of that art. They are literary feats. “The Raven” was as deliber- ately planned and wrought out as is any piece of mechanism. Its inspiration is verbal and technical. “The truest poetry is most feigning,” says Touch- stone, and this is mainly the conception of poetry that prevails in European literary circles. Poe’s poetry is artistic feigning, like good acting. It is to that extent disinterested. He does not speak for himself, but for the artistic spirit. He has never been popular in this country, for the reason that art, as such, is far less appreciated here than abroad. The stress of life here is upon the moral and intellectual elements much more than upon the esthetic. We demand a message of the poet, or that he shall teach us how to live. Poe had no message but that of art; he made no contribution to our stock of moral ideas; he made no appeal to the conscience or manhood of the race; he did not touch the great common workaday mind of our peo. ple. He is more akin to the Latin than to the Anglo- 18 LITERARY VALUES Saxon. Hence his deepest impression seems to have been made upon the French mind. In all our New England poets the voice of humanity, of patriot- ism, of religious ideas, of strenuous moral purpose, speaks. Art is subordinated to various human pas- sions and emotions. In Poe alone are these emo- tions subordinated to art. In Poe alone is the effort mainly a verbal and technical one. In him alone is the man lost in the artist. To evoke music from language is his constant aim. No other Ameri- can poet approaches him in this kind of verbal mastery, in this unfettered creative technical power. In ease, in splendor, in audacity, he is like a bird. One may understand and admire him and not be touched by him. To be moved to anything but admiration is foreign to pure art. Would one make meat and drink of it? Our reading is selfish, we seek our own, we are drawn to the book that is going our way. Can we appreciate beyond our own personal tastes and needs? Can we see the excellence of the impersonal and the disinterested ? We want to be touched in some special and intimate way ; but art touches us in a general and impersonal way. No one could take to himself Shakespeare, or Milton’s “ Lycidas,” or Keats’s odes as directed especially to his own personal wants and aspirations, We for- get ourselves in reading these things, and share for the time the sentiment of pure art, which lives in the universal. How crude the art of Whittier com- pared with that of Poe, and yet Whittier has touched and moved his countrymen, and Poe has not. There LITERARY VALUES 19 is much more of the substance of character, of pa- triotism, of strenuous New England life, in the one than in the other. “Snow-Bound” is a metrical transcript from experience; not a creation of the imagination, but a touched-up copy from the mem- ory. We cannot say this of “The Bells” or “The Raven,” or of the work of Milton or Keats or Ten- nyson. Whittier sings what he feels; it all has a root in his own experience. The great poet feigns the emotion and makes it real to us. We complain of much current verse that it has no feeling. The trouble is not that the poets feign, but that the feigning is feeble; it begets no emo- tion in us. It simulates, but does not stimulate. It is not Wordsworth’s art that makes him great; it is his profound poetic emotion when in the pre- sence of simple, common things. Tennyson’s art, or Swinburne’s art, is much finer, but the poetic emo- tion back of it is less profound and elemental. Emerson’s art is crude, but the stress of his poetic emotion is great; the song is burdened with pro- found meanings to our moral and spiritual nature. Poe has no such burden; there is not one crumb of the bread of life in him, but there is plenty of the elixir of the imagination. This passion for art, so characteristic of the Old World, is seen in its full force in such a writer as Flaubert. Flaubert was a devotee of the doctrine of art for art’s sake, He cared nothing for mere authors, but only for “ writers ; ”’ the work must be the conscious and deliberate product of the author’s 20 LITERARY VALUES literary and inventive powers, and in no way in- volve his character, temperament, or personality. The more it was written, the more it savored of de- liberate plan and purpose, — in other words, the less it was the product of fate, race, or of anything local, individual, inevitable, — the more it pleased him. Art, and not nature, was his aspiration. And this view has more currency in Europe than in this country. In some extreme cases it becomes what one may fairly call the art disease. Baudelaire, for instance, as quoted by Tolstoi, expressed a prefer- ence for a painted woman’s face over one showing its natural color, “and for metal trees and a theatri- cal imitation of water, rather than real trees and real water.”’ Thus does an overweening passion for art degenerate into a love for the artificial for its own sake. In the cultivation of letters there seems always to be a danger that we shall come to value things, not for their own sake, but for the literary effects that may be wrought out of them. The great artist, I take it, is primarily in love with life and things, and not with art. On these terms alone is his work fresh and stimulating and filled with good arterial blood. VI Teaching literature is like teaching religion. You can give only the dry bones of the matter in either case. But the dry bones of theology are not religion, and the dry bones of rhetoric are not liter- ature. The flesh-and-blood reality is alone of value, LITERARY VALUES 21 and this cannot be taught, it must be felt and ex- perienced. The class in literature studies an author’s sen- tence - structure and paragraphing, and doubtless could tell the author more about it than he knows himself. The probabilities are that he never thought a moment about his sentence-structure or his paragraphing. He has thought only of his sub- ject-matter and how to express himself clearly and forcibly ; the structure of his sentences takes care of itself. From every art certain rules and princi- ples may be deduced, but the intelligent apprehen- sion of those rules and principles no more leads to mastery in that art, or even helps to mastery in it, than a knowledge of the anatomy and the vital processes of the stomach helps a man to digest his dinner, or than the knowledge of the gunsmith helps make a good marksman. In other words the science of any art is of little use to him who would practice that art. To be a fiddler you must fiddle and see others fiddle; to be a painter you must paint and study the painting of others; to be a writer you must write and familiarize yourself with the works of the best authors. Studying an author from the outside by bringing the light of rhetoric to bear upon him is of little profit. We must get in- side of him, and we can only get inside of him through sympathy and appreciation. There is only one way to teach literature, only one vital way, and that is by reading it. The laboratory way may give one the dry bones of the subject, but not the 22 LITERARY VALUES living thing itself. If the teacher, by his own liv- ing voice and an occasional word of comment, can bring out the soul of a work, he may help the stu- dent’s appreciation of it; he may, in a measure, im- part to him his own larger and more intelligent appreciation of it. And that is a true service. Young men and young women actually go to col- lege to take a course in Shakespeare or Chaucer or Dante or the Arthurian legends. The course be- comes a mere knowledge course, as Professor Corson suggests. My own first acquaintance with Milton was through an exercise in grammar. We parsed “ Par- adise Lost.’? Much of the current college study of Shakespeare is little better than parsing him. The minds of the pupils are focused upon every word and line of the text, as the microscope is focused upon a fly’s foot in the laboratory. The class prob- ably dissects a frog or a star-fish one day, and a great poet the next, and it does both in about the same spirit. It falls upon one of these great plays like hens upon a bone in winter: no meaning of word or phrase escapes it, every line is literally picked to pieces ; but of the poet himself, of that which makes him what he is, his tremendous dramatic power, how much do the students get? Very little, I fear. They have had an intellectual exercise and not an emotional experience. They have added to their knowledge, but have not taken a step in culture. To dig into the roots and origins of the great poets is like digging into the roots of an oak or a maple, the better to increase your appreciation of the beauty LITERARY VALUES 23 of the tree. There stands the tree in all its sum- mer glory ; will you really know it any better after you have laid bare every root and rootlet ? There stand Chaucer, Shakespeare, Dante, Homer. Read them, give yourself to them, and master them if you are man enough. The poets are not to be ana- lyzed, they are to be enjoyed; they are not to be studied, but to be loved; they are not for knowledge, but for culture — to enhance our appreciation of life and our mastery over its elements. All the mere facts about a poet’s work are as chaff compared with the appreciation of one fine line or fine sentence. Why study a great poet at all after the manner of the dissecting-room ? Why not rather seek to make the acquaintance of his living soul and to feel its power ? The mere study of words, too, — of their origin and history, or of the relation of your own language to some other, — how little that avails! As little asa knowledge of the making and tempering of a sword would help a man to be a good swordsman. What avails in literature is a quick and delicate sense of the life and individuality of words — “a sense practiced as a blind man’s touch,” or as a musician’s ear, so that the magic of the true style is at once felt and appreciated ; this, and an equally quick and delicate sense of the life and individuality of things. “Is there any taste in the white of an egg ?”? No more is there in much merely correct writing. There is the use of language as the vehicle of knowledge, and there is the use of it as an in- strument of the imagination. In Wordsworth’s line, 24 LITERARY VALUES “ The last to parley with the setting sun,” in Whitman’s sentence, “Oh, waves, I have fingered every shore with you,” in Emerson’s description of an Indian-summer day, “the day, immeasurably long, sleeps over the broad hills and warm, wide fields’? — in these and such as these we see the imaginative use of words. Most of the Dantean and Homeric and Shake- spearean scholarship is the mere dust of time that has accumulated upon these names. In the course of years it will accumulate upon Tennyson, and then we shall have Tennysonian scholars and learned dissertations upon some insignificant detail of his work. Think of the Shakespeareana with which liter- ature is burdened! It is mostly mere shop litter and dust. In certain moods I think one may be pardoned for feeling that Shakespeare is fast becom- ing a curse to the human race. Of mere talk about him, it seems, there is to be no end. He has been the host of more literary parasites probably than any other name in history. He is edited and re- edited as if a cubit could be added to his stature by marginal notes and comments. On the contrary, the result is, for the most part, like a mere growth of underbrush that obscures the forest trees. The reader’s attention is being constantly diverted from the main matter —he is being whipped in the face by insignificant twigs. Criticism may prune away what obscures a great author, but what shall we say when it obstructs the view of him by a multi- tude of unimportant questions ? LITERARY VALUES 25 The main aim of the teacher of literature should be to train and quicken the student’s taste — his sense of the fitness and proportion of things — till he can detect the true from the false, or the excellent from the common. There is but one way to learn to detect the genuine from the counterfeit in any department of life, and that ts by experience. Fa- miliarize the student with the works of the real masters of literature and you have safeguarded him against the pretenders. After he has become ac- quainted with the look and the ring of the pure gold he is less likely to be imposed upon by the counterfeit. The end here indicated cannot be reached by analy- sis, or by a course in rhetoric and sentence struc- ture, or by a microscopical examination of the writer’s vocabulary, but by direct sympathetic intercourse with the best literature, through the living voice, or through your own silent perusal of it. The great Dantean and Shakespearean scholar is usually the outcome of a mental habit that would make Dante and Shakespeare impossible. So eminent a critic as Frederic Harrison is reported as praising this sentence from the new British author Maurice Hewlett: “In the milk of October dawns her calm brows had been dipped.” The instructor in literature should be able to show his class why this is not good literature. The suggestion of brows dipped in milk is nota pleasant one. One cannot conceive of any brow the beauty of which would be enhanced by it, even by the milk of October dawns, if there were anything in October dawns that in the 26 LITERARY VALUES remotest way suggested milk. Mr. Hewlett is so in love with a crisp style that he describes his heroine as lying white and twisting on a couch, crisping and uncrisping her little hands. Such things come from straining after novelty. They proceed from an unripe taste. Men of real genius and power are at times guilty of such lapses, or go astray in quest of novel images. Walter Bagehot sometimes did. Writing of Sydney Smith, his rhetoric shows its teeth in this fashion: ‘ Writ- ers, like teeth, are divided into incisors and grinders ; Sydney Smith was a molar. He did not run a long sharp argument into the interior of a question; he did not, in the common phrase, go deeply into it; but he kept it steadily under the contact of a strong, capable, jawlike understanding, pressing its surface, effacing its intricacies, grinding it down.” Such a comparison has the merit of being vivid; it also has the demerit of an unworthy alliance, —it marries the noble and the ignoble. You cannot lift mastication up to the level of intellectual processes, and to seriously compare the two is to degrade the latter. Sydney Smith him- self could not have been guilty of such bad taste. Let me finish this chapter with a bit of prose from Ben Jonson. “Some words are to be culled out for ornament and color, as we gather flowers to strow houses or make garlands; but they are better when they grow to our style; as in a meadow where, though the mere grass and greenness delight, yet the variety of flowers doth heighten and beautify.” II ANALOGY — TRUE AND FALSE L HAVE never seen any thorough examination of the grounds of analogy. The works on logic make but slight reference to them, yet the argument from analogy is one of the most frequent forms of argument, and one of the most convincing. It is so much easier to captivate the fancy with a pretty or striking figure than to move the judgment with sound reasons,—so much easier to be rhetorical than to be logical. We say that seeing is believing; the rhetorician makes us see the thing; his picture appeals to the mind’s visual sense, hence his power over us, though his analogies are more apt to be false than true. We love to see these agreements between thoughts and things, or between the subjective and the ob- jective worlds, and a favorite thought with profound minds in all ages has been the identity or oneness which runs through creation. “A vast similitude interlocks all,” says Whit- man, “spans all the objects of the universe and com- pactly holds and encloses them.” Everywhere in Nature Emerson said he saw the figure of a disguised man. The method of the uni- 28 LITERARY VALUES verse is intelligible to us because it is akin to our own minds. Our minds are rather akin to it and are derived from it. Emerson made much of this thought. The truth here indicated is undoubtedly the basis of all true analogy — this unity, this one- ness of creation; but the analogies that ‘are con- stant and pervade Nature ” are probably not so nu- merous as Emerson seemed to fancy. Thus one can hardly agree with him that there is “ intent ” of ana- logy between man’s life and the seasons, because the seasons are not a universal fact of the globe, and man’s life is. The four seasons are well defined in New England, but not in Ecuador. The agreement of appearances is one thing, the identity of law and essence is another, and the agree- ment of man’s life with the seasons must be consid- ered accidental rather than intentional. Language is full of symbols. We make the world without a symbol of the world within. We describe thoughts, and emotions, in the terms of an objective experience. Things furnish the moulds in which our ideas are cast. Size, proportion, mass, vista, vastness, height, depth, darkness, light, coarse, fine, centre, surface, order, chaos, and a thousand other terms, we apply alike to the world without and to the world within. We know a higher temper- ance than concerns the body, a finer digestion and assimilation than go on in it. Our daily conversation is full of pictures and par- ables, or the emblematic use of things. From life looked at as a voyage, we get the symbolic use of ANALOGY — TRUE AND FALSE 29 anchor, compass, pole-star, helm, haven; from life considered as a battle, we read deep meanings in shield, armor, fencing, captain, citadel, panic, onset. Life regarded under the figure of husbandry gives us the expressive symbols of seedtime and harvest, planting and watering, tares and brambles, pruning and training, the chaff and the wheat. We talk in parables when we little suspect it. What various applications we make of such words as dregs, gutter, eclipse, satellite, hunger, thirst, kindle, brazen, echo, and hundreds of others. We speak of the reins of government, the sinews of war, the seeds of rebel- lion, the morning of youth, the evening of age, a flood of emotion, the torch of truth, burning with resentment, the veil of secrecy, the foundations of character, a ripple of laughter, incrusted dogmas, corrosive criticism. We say his spirits drooped, his mind soared, his heart softened, his brow darkened, his reputation was stabbed, he clinched his argu- ment. We say his course was beset with pitfalls, his efforts were crowned with success, his eloquence was a torrent that carried all before it, and so on. Burke calls attention to the metaphors that are taken from the sense of taste, as a sour temper, bit- ter curses, bitter fate; and, on the other hand, a sweet person, a sweet experience, and the like. Other epithets are derived from the sense of touch, as a soft answer, a polished character, a cold recep- tion, a sharp retort, a hard problem; or from the sense of sight, as brilliant, dazzling, color, light, shade; others from our sense of hearing, as discord- 30 LITERARY VALUES ant, echoing, reverberating, booming, grumbling. All trades, pursuits, occupations, furnish types or symbols for the mind. The word “ whitewash” has become a very useful one, especially to political parties. Thoreau said he would not be as one who drives a nail into mere lath and plaster. Even the railroad has contributed useful terms, as side-tracked, down brakes, the red flag, way station, etc. Great men are like through trains that connect far-distant points; others are merely locals. From the builder we get the effective phrase and idea of scaffolding. So much in the world is mere scaffolding, so much in society is mere varnish and veneer. Life is said to have its “‘seamy side.” The lever and the ful- crum have their supersensuous uses. The chemist with his solvents, precipitants, crystallizations, attrac- tions, and repulsions, and the natural philosopher with his statics and dynamics and his correlation of forces, have enlarged our powers of expression. The strata of the geologist furnish useful symbols. What a significant symbol is afforded by the wave! There is much in life, in history, and in all nature that is typified by it. We have cold waves and hot waves, and in the spring and fall migrations of the birds we have “bird waves.” Earthquake shocks go in waves and circles; how often our views and concep- tions of things are expressed by the circle! Itisa symbol of most profound meaning. It helps us to understand how the universe is finally inexplicable ; that there is neither beginning nor end, and that it retreats forever into itself. ANALOGY — TRUE AND FALSE 31 ‘We speak of currents of thought, of opinion, of influence, and of tides in the affairs of men. We can conceive of these things under no better figure. Fire and all that pertains to it give us symbols, as heat, light, flame, sparks, smoke. The words juicy, unctuous, fluid, have obvious appropriateness when applied to the mind and its products. Running water gives us the delightful epithets limpid and lucid. Youth is plastic, ductile, impressible — neither the mind nor the body has yet hardened. The analogy is vital. A habit gets deeper and deeper hold of us; we fall into a rut — these figures convey the exact truth. When used as a symbol how expressive is the dawn, the twilight, the sunset! The likeness is not accidental but fundamental. The calm that comes after the storm in human life as in nature — how true the analogy. To give vent to things, how significant. To give vent to angry feelings in words, how like giving vent to smothered fire; or to any suppressed and confined force: the words come faster and hotter, the passion of anger mounts and there is a “ blow out” indeed. Deny yourself the first word, and the conflagration is avoided. A passion can be smothered as liter- ally as a fire. The use of metaphor, comparison, analogy is two- fold—to enliven and to convince; to illustrate and enforce an accepted truth, and to press home and clinch one in dispute. An apt figure will put a new face upon an old and much worn truism, 32 LITERARY VALUES and a vital analogy may reach and move the reason. Thus when Renan, referring to the decay of the old religious beliefs, says that people are no poorer for being robbed of false bank notes and bogus shares, his comparison has a logical validity, —as has also Herbert Spencer’s figure when he says, “ The illusion that great men and great events came oftener in early times than now is partly due to historical perspec- tive. As in a range of equidistant columns the far- thest off look the closest, so the conspicuous objects of the past seem more thickly clustered the more remote they are.” We seem to see the identity of law in both these cases. We are treated to a pic- torial argument. We are using analogy in a legitimate and forceful way when we speak of our fund or capital of bodily health and strength, and of squandering or impairing it, or of investing it poorly. The accidental analogies or likenesses are limit- less and are the great stock in trade of most writers and speakers. They tickle the fancy and enliven the page or the discourse. But essential analogies, or those that spring from unity of law, are more rare. These have the force of logic; they shed a steady light. St. Paul’s famous comparison of the body dead and buried with the seed in the soil, which, he says, dies before it can grow, is used with logical intent. But will it bear examination? Is the germinating seed dead in any sense that the body is dead ? It is no more dead than the egg buried beneath the mo- ANALOGY — TRUE AND FALSE 33 ther hen is dead. When the egg really dies we know the result, as we know the result when the corn rots in the ground. It is not dissolution that the seed experiences, but evolution. The illustra- tion of the eloquent apostle may captivate the fancy, but as argument designed to convince the under- standing it has no force. There might be force in the argument for immor- tality drawn from the metamorphosis of the grub into the butterfly, if the chrysalis really were a shroud and held a dead body. But it is not, any more than an egg is; it is quick, and capable of movement. The analogy between it and the dead body will not hold. A much more sound analogy, based upon the chrysalis, is that which takes it as the type of a mind or soul undeveloped, — slumber- ing, gestating, — and the winged creature as the de- veloped, emancipated mind, Analogy means an agreement of relations or an equality of ratios. When we speak of the body as a tenement and the soul as the tenant, we mean or aver that the re- lation of the soul to the body is the same as that of the man to the house he occupies. In either case the occupant can move out or in, and is entirely dis- tinct from the structure that shelters him. But if we know anything about the relations of the mind and the body, we know that they are not like this; we know that they are not truthfully expressed in this comparison. Bishop Butler’s “analogy from nature,’ upon 34 LITERARY VALUES which he built his famous work, will not any better bear close examination. What analogy is there be- tween death and sleep or a swoon? what agreement of ratios ? The resemblance is entirely superficial. Or how can we predict another sphere of existence for man because another sphere awaits the unborn infant ? But another sphere does not await the un- born infant; only new and different relations to the same physical sphere. An embryo implies a future ; but what is there embryonic about the mature man ? This breakdown of Butler’s argument in regard to a future life was pointed out by Matthew Arnold; the very point in dispute, namely, a future life, is assumed. If there is a future life, if there is another world, it doubtless bears some analogy to this. In like manner, if there are fairies and nymphs and demigods, it is not improbable to suppose that they bear some resemblance to human beings, but shall we assume their actual existence upon such a proba- bility ? That the unborn child starting as a bit of proto- plasmic jelly should become a man, a Napoleon, or a Shakespeare, may be quite as startling a fact as the assumption of a future existence; yet the former is a matter of experience, which lends no color to the truth of the latter. It is not a matter of reason that babes become men, but a matter of observation and experience. Indeed, in Butler’s famous argu- ment, the analogy of nature is everywhere forced and falsified. In every case he puts the words into her mouth that he would have her speak. His faith ANALOGY — TRUE AND FALSE 35 supplies him with the belief in a future life, and in a moral governor of the universe, and then he seeks to confirm or to demonstrate the truth of this faith by an appeal to the analogy of nature. Out of this whirling, seething, bubbling universe of warring and clashing forces man has emerged. How impossible it all seems to reason! Experience alone tells us that it is true. Upon the past history of the earth and of the race of man we may pre- dict astonishing changes and transformations for the future of both, because the continuity of cause and effect is not broken; but the perpetuity of the ““me” and the “you” is not implied. All that is implied is the perpetuity of the sum of physical forces. But as to the future of the individual, standing upon the past or upon the present, what are we safe in affirm- ing? Only this—that as we had a beginning we shall have an ending; that as yesterday we were not, so to-morrow we shall not be. A man is like the electric spark that glows and crackles for an in- stant between two dark, silent, inscrutable eternities. The fluid is not lost, but that tiny bolt has come and gone. Darkness and silence before; darkness and silence after. I do not say this is the summing up of the whole question of immortality. I only mean to say that this is where the argument from analogy lands us. We can argue from the known to the unknown in a restricted way. We do this in life and in science continually. We do not know that the fixed stars have worlds revolving about them ; yet the presump- 36 LITERARY VALUES tion, based upon our own solar system, is that they have. But could we infer other suns, from the ex- istence of our own, were no others visible? Could we predict the future of the earth did we not know its past, or read aright its past did we not know its present state? From an are we can complete a cir- cle. We can read the big in the little. The mo- tion of a top throws light upon the motion of the earth. An ingenious mind finds types everywhere, but real analogies are not so common. The likeness of one thing with another may be valid and real, but the likeness of a thought with a thing is often merely fanciful. We very frequently unconsciously counterfeit external objects and laws in the region of mind and morals. Out of a physi- cal fact or condition we fabricate a mental or spirit- ual condition or experience to correspond. Thus a current journal takes the fact that the sun obscures but does not put out the light of the moon and the stars, and from it draws the inference that the light of science may dim but cannot blot out the objects of faith. It counterfeits this fact and seeks to give it equal force and value in the spiritual realm. The objects of faith may be as real and as unquenchable as the stars, but this is the very point in dispute, and the analogy used assumes the thing to be proved. If the objects of faith are real, then the light of science will not put them out any more than the sun puts out the stars; but the fact that the stars are there, notwithstanding the sunlight, proves nothing with regard to the reality of the objects of faith. The ANALOGY — TRUE AND FALSE 37 only real analogy that exists in the case is between the darkness and the daylight of the world within and the darkness and the daylight of the world without. Science, or knowledge, is light; ignorance is darkness; there are no other symbols thatso fully and exactly express these things. The mind sees, science lets in the light, and the darkness flees. If there is anything in our inward life and expe- rience that corresponds or is analogous to the night with its stars, it is to be found in that withdrawal from the noise and bustle of the world into the atmosphere of secluded contemplation. If there are any stars in your firmament, you will find them then. But, after all, how far the stars of religion and philosophy are subjective, or of our own crea- tion, is always a question. I recently met with the same fallacy in a leading article in one of the magazines. ‘“‘ The fact revealed by the spectroscope,” says the writer, “that the physical elements of the earth exist also in the stars, supports the faith that a moral nature like our own inhabits the universe.” A tremendous leap — a leap from the physical to the moral. We know that these earth elements are found in the stars by actual observation and experience. We see them as truly as we see the stars themselves; but a moral nature like our own — this is assumed and is not supported at all by analogy. The only legitimate inference from the analogy is, that as our sun has planets and that these planets, or one of them at least, is the abode of life, so these other suns in 38 LITERARY VALUES composition like our own, and governed by laws like our own, have planets revolving around them which are or may be the abode of beings like ourselves. If this “ moral nature like our own”’ pervades our system, then the inference is just that it also per- vades the other systems. But to argue from physi- cal elements to moral causes is to throw upon ana- logy more than it will bear. Analogy is a kind of rule of three: we must have three terms to find the fourth. We argue from the past to the present and from the present to the future. Things that begin must end. If man’s life has been continuous in the past, then we may infer that it will be continuous in the future. Our earth has a moon ; it is reasonable, there- fore, to suppose that some of the other planets have moons. It is reasonable to suppose that there are other planets and suns and systems, myriads of them. It may be reasonable to think with Sir Robert Ball that the extinct or dark and burnt-out bodies in the sky exceed in numbers the luminous ones, as the non-luminous bodies exceed the luminous ones upon the earth. No man has seen live steam; when it can be seen it is dead; yet we know that it exists. We may complete a circle from a small segment of it. If we have two sides of a triangle, we may add the third. To find the value of an unknown quantity, we must have a complete equation and as many equations as we have unknown quantities. We can argue from this life to the future life only after proof that there is a future life. ANALOGY — TRUE AND FALSE 39 Professor Drummond was able to show the con- tinuity of natural law in the spiritual world by as- suming that a spiritual world which was the counter- part of the physical world actually existed. That Calvinism in its main tenets tallies, or seems to tally, with science is no more proof of the literal truth of those tenets than the ascribing of human form and features to the man in the moon is proof of the existence of such a man. Our minds, our spirits, are no doubt in a way under the same law as are our bodies, because they are the outcome of our bodies and our bodies are the outcome of material nature ; but to base upon that fact the existence of a corresponding world and life after death is to leap beyond the bounds of all possible analogy. Many of the dogmas of theology have a grain of natural truth in them. This does not prove their truth, as applicable to some hypothetical other world, but as applied to this world. The kingdom of heaven, as the founder of Christianity taught, is not yonder and of to-morrow, but is now and here. Tolstoi, I think, is guilty of false analogy when, in attempting to get rid of the idea of pleasure as the aim and purpose of art, he makes the compari- son with food, and says that pleasure is no more the end in eating than it is in painting, or poetry, or music. The analogy is false because the necessities of our bodies are not to be compared with the luxu- ries, so to speak, of our minds. We cannot live without food, but we can and do live without art. And yet, do we not eat because the food tastes good ? 40 LITERARY VALUES Is not the satisfaction of appetite the prime motive in eating ? If dining gave us no pleasure, we should probably soon learn to swallow our food in a highly concentrated form, in capsules, and thus make short work of it. Nature, of course, conceals her own pur- pose in the pleasure we take in our food, just as she does in the pleasure of the sexes; but of this pur- pose we take little thought, except in the latter case how to defeat it. We do not have conscious plea- sure in breathing ; hence our breathing is involuntary. We do have conscious pleasure in food; hence our elaborate and ingenious cookery — often to the detri- ment of our bodies. Take away the pleasures of life, the innocent natural pleasure, take away the plea- sures of art, and few of us would care for either. Man is a microcosm, an epitome of the universe, and its laws and processes are repeated dimly or plainly in him. Then there are, of course, real ana- logies and homologies between different parts of na- ture, as between fluids and gases, and fluids and solids, between the organic and the inorganic, be- tween the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms. When we strike the great vital currents or laws, — the law of growth, of decay, of health and disease, of reproduction, of evolution, — we strike the re- gion of true analogy. These laws must be continu- ous throughout nature. All phases of development must be analogous. The mind grows with the body and is under the same law. Exercise is the same to both. Each has its appetites. Each has its tonics and stimulants. All beginnings are the same; that ANALOGY — TRUE AND FALSE 41 is, from a germ. Language must have begun in the most rudimentary sounds. Art, we know, be- gan in the most rude and simple marks and signs; science in the crudest, simplest facts; religion in childish superstition ; and so on through the whole scope of human development. Development is al- ways from the simple to the complex. There is, no doubt, a deep-seated analogy between the growth of the individual and the growth of the state or nation ; between revolutions in history, and storms and convulsions in nature. We speak of the root of the matter; everything really has its root, its obscure beginning, its hidden underground processes. There are types and suggestions everywhere — fresh fuel checks the fire; the soft stone cuts the steel the fastest; the first big drops of the shower raise the dust. The analogy between the development of animal life upon the earth and the growth of organized communities seems complete. In the lower forms of life, there is no specialization, or division of func- tions. The ameba can move, feel, digest, reproduce in every part of its structure; it is not differen- tiated or specialized; so in the rudest tribes, there is little division of labor. As animal life develops, each part of the body has a function of its own; and as communities develop, extreme specialization takes place. Organic life goes from the simple to the complex, as does progress in human affairs. This is the law of all growth. 42 LITERARY VALUES When Schopenhauer says “riches are like sea water; the more you drink the thirstier you be- come,” the mind is instantly pleased by the force and aptness of the comparison, and for the moment we look upon riches as something to be avoided. But is the analogy entirely true? Sea water is to be avoided altogether, even a single mouthful of it; but even Schopenhauer defends riches and the pur- suit of riches. “ People are often reproached for wishing for money above all things, and for loving it more than anything else; but it is natural and even inevitable for people to love that which, like an unwearied Proteus, is always ready to turn it- self into whatever object their wandering wishes or manifold desires may for the moment fix upon.” Here the comparison will bear a closer scrutiny. Wealth is indeed a Proteus that will take any form your fancy may choose. “ Other things are only relatively good,’ the great pessimist further says; “money alone is absolutely good, because it is not only a concrete satisfaction of one need in particu- lar; it is an abstract satisfaction of all.’ What, then, becomes of its analogy to sea water, which so mocks and inflames our thirst ? Even the re- semblance in the one particular that Schopenhauer had in mind is not true. To the great majority of people wealth brings a degree of satisfaction; they give over its pursuit and seek the enjoyment of it, When a man enters into the race for wealth, he is unflagging in seeking it as long as his cup of life is full; but when the limits of his powers are reached, ANALOGY — TRUE AND FALSE 43 he begins to lose interest, and the appetite for gold, as for other things, declines. When the same philosopher says that to measure a man’s happiness only by what he gets, and not also by what he expects to get, is as futile as to try to express a fraction which shall have a numera- tor but no denominator, he uses a figure that con- veys the truth much more fully. It may be open to the objection of being too technical, but it ex- presses a real relation for all that. When you in- crease your expectations, you increase your denom- inator ; and as most men expect or want more than they have, human happiness is nearly always a frac- tion — rarely is it a whole number. With many it is a very small fraction indeed. Blessed is he who expects little. The man who expects ten and gets but five is more to be envied than he who expects a thousand and gets but fifty. He is nearer the sum of his wishes. Hence the truth of the old saying that it is our wants that make us poor. When a piece of good fortune that he did not expect comes to a man, his happiness or satisfaction is no longer a fraction ; it is-more than a unit. Quintilian says that the early blossom of talent is rarely followed by the fruit of great achievement, but the early works of a man or a youth are just as much fruit as his later ones. ‘There is really no analogy between the early works of an author and the blossoms of a tree. The dreams, the visions, the aspirations of youth are more like blossoms. Probably no great man has been without them; but 44 LITERARY VALUES how they wither and fall, and how much more sober the aspect which life puts on before any solid achievements can be pointed to! There is usually something more fresh and pristine about the earlier works of a man—more buoyancy, more unction, more of the “ fluid and attaching character ;”’ but the ripest wisdom always goes with age. There are, no doubt, many strict and striking ana- logies between the mind and the body, their growth and decay, their health and disease, their assimila- tive, digestive, and reproductive processes. The mind is only a finer body. It is hardly a figure of speech to speak of wounded feelings, of a wounded spirit. How acute at first, and how surely healing with time. But the scar remains. Then there are real analogies, real parallels, be- tween the mind and outward nature, in the laws of growth and decay, nutrition and reproduction. “The mind of Otho,” says Tacitus, “ was not, like his body, soft and effeminate.” There are minds that are best described by the word masculine, and others by the word feminine. There are dull, sluggish minds, just as there are heavy, sluggish bodies, and the two usually go together. There are dry, lean minds, and there are minds full of unction and juice. We even use the phrase “ men- tal dyspepsia,” but the analogy here implied is prob- ably purely fanciful, though mental dissipation and mental intemperance are no idle words. Some per- sons acquire the same craze for highly exciting and stimulating mental food that others have for strong ANALOGY — TRUE AND FALSE 45 drink, or for pepper and other condiments. They lose their taste for simple, natural, healthful things, — for good sound literature, — and crave sensational novels and the Sunday newspapers. Doubtless a large part of the reading of the American people to- day is sheer mental dissipation, and is directed by an abnormal craving for mental excitement. There is degeneration in the physical world, and there is degeneration, strictly so called, in the intellectual world. There are proportion, relation, cause and effect, health and disease, in one as in the other. Logic is but the natural relation of parts as we see them in the organic world. In fact, logic is but health and proportion. The mind cannot fly any more than the body can; it progresses from one fact or consideration to another, step by step, though often, or perhaps generally, we are not conscious of the steps. A large view of truth may be suddenly revealed to the mind, as of a landscape from a hill-top; but the mind did not fly to the vantage ground; it reached it by a slow and maybe obscure process. The world is simpler than we think. The modes and processes of things widely dissimilar are more likely to be identical than we suspect. There are homologies where we see apparent contradiction. There is but one protoplasm for animal and vege- table. A little more or less heat makes the gaseous, makes the liquid, makes the solid. Lava crystal- lizes or freezes at a high temperature ; water, at alow one; mercury, at a still lower. Charcoal and the 46 LITERARY VALUES diamond are one; the same law of gravitation which makes the cloud float makes the rain fall. The law that spheres a tear spheres a globe. These facts warrant us in looking for real homologies, vital cor- respondences, in nature. Only such correspondences give logical and scientific value to analogy. If the likeness means identity of law, or is the same prin- ciple in another disguise, then it is an instrument of truth. We might expect to find many analogies between air and water, the atmosphere being but a finer ocean; also between ice and water, and be- tween ice and the stratified rocks. If water flows, then will ice flow ; if ice bends, then will the rocky strata bend. If cross fertilization is good in the vegetable world, we should expect to find it good in the animal world. There is thought to be a strict analogy between the succession of plants in different months of the year and the prevalence of different diseases at dif- ferent seasons. The germ theory of disease gives force to the comparison. The different species of germs no doubt find some periods of the year more favorable to their development than others. If on this planet men walk about while trees are rooted to the ground, we may reasonably expect that the same is true — provided that on them there are men and trees — ofall other planets. If the law of variation, and the survival of the fittest, are the laws of one species, then they will prove to be the laws of all. The bud is a kind of seed; the fruit is a kind of leaf. High culture has the same effect upon man ANALOGY — TRUE AND FALSE 47 and animals that it has upon plants, —it lessens the powers of reproduction. The lowest organisms multiply by myriads; the higher barely keep from retrograding. A wild apple is full of seeds; ina choice pippin the seeds are largely abortive. Indeed, all weeds and parasites seem bent on filling the world with their progeny, while the higher forms fall off and tend to extinction. Such agreements and corre- spondences point to identity of law. The analogy is vital. In the animal economy there are analogies with outward nature. Thus respiration is a kind of com- bustion. Life itself is a kind of fire which goes out when it has no fuel to feed upon. The foliage of a tree has functions like those of the lungs of an ani- mal. Darwin has noted the sleep of plants and their diurnal motions. Dr. Holmes had a bold fancy that trees are animals, with their tails in the air and their heads in the ground ; but there is nothing in the trunk and branches of a tree analogous to a tail, though there is a sort of rudimentary intelligence in the root, as Darwin has shown. We use the tree as a symbol of the branching of a family; hence the family tree. But the analogy is not a true one. The branches of a family multiply and diverge when traced backward the same as forward. You had two parents, they had four, these four had eight, and so on. Ifthe human race sprang from one pair, then are its branchings more a kind of network, an end- less multiplication of meshes. All the past appears to centre in you, and all the future to spring from 48 LITERARY VALUES you. We get the family tree only by cutting out a fragment of this network. There is little doubt that certain natural laws pervade alike both mind and matter. The law of evolution is universally operative, and is the key to development in the moral and intellectual world no less than in the physical. We are probably, in all our thoughts and purposes, much more under the dominion of universal natural laws than we suspect. The will reaches but a little way. I have no doubt that the race of man bears a definite relation to the life of the globe, — that is, to its age, its store of vitality ; that it will culminate as the vital power of the earth culminates, and decline as it declines. Like man, the earth has had its youth, —its nebu- lous, fiery, molten youth; then its turbulent, luxuri- ant, copious, riotous middle period; then its placid, temperate, ripe later age, when the higher forms emerge upon the scene. The analogy is deep and radical. The vital energy of the globe was once much more rampant and overflowing than it is now; the time will come when the pulse of the planet will be much feebler than it is now. Youth and age, growth and decay, are universal conditions. The heavens themselves shall wax old as doth a garment, Life and death are universal conditions, and to fancy a place where death is not is to fancy one’s self entirely outside of this universe and of all possible universes. Men in communities and assemblages are under laws that do not reach or affect the single individ- ANALOGY — TRUE AND FALSE 49 ual, just as vast bodies of water respond to attrac- tions and planetary perturbations that do not affect the lesser bodies. Men kindle one another as do fire- brands, and beget a collective heat and an enthusi- asm that tyrannize over the individual purposes and wills. We say things are in the air, that a spirit is abroad ; that is, that influences are at work above the wills and below the consciousness of the people. There are changes or movements in the world and in the communities that seem strictly analogous to drifting ; it is as when a ship is carried out of its course by unsuspected currents, or as when arctic. explorers, with their faces set northward, are uncon- sciously carried in the opposite direction by the ice floe beneath them. The spirit of the age, or the time-spirit, is always at work, and takes us with it, whether we know it or not. For instance, the whole religious world is now drifting away from the old theology, and drifting faster than we suspect. Certain zealots have their faces very strongly set against it, but, like Commodore Parry on the ice floe, they are going south faster than their efforts are carrying them north. Indeed, the whole sentiment of the race is moving into a more genial and tem- perate theological climate, away from purgatorial fires rather than toward them. The political sentiment of a country also drifts. That of our own may be said to have been drifting for some time now in the direction of freer commer- cial intercourse with other nations. A man’s life may stagnate as literally as water may 50 LITERARY VALUES stagnate, and just as motion and direction are the remedy for one, so purpose and activity are the rem- edy for the other. Movement is the condition of life, anyway. Set the currents going in the air, in the water, in the body, in the mind, in the commu- nity, and a healthier condition will follow. Change, diversity, activity, are the prime conditions of life and health everywhere. Persons with doubts and perplexities about life go to work to ameliorate some of its conditions, and their doubts and perplexities vanish — not because their problems are solved, as they think they are, but because their energies have found an outlet, the currents have been set going, Persons of strong will have few doubts and uncer- tainties. They do not solve the problems, but they break the spell of their enchantment. Nothing re- lieves and ventilates the mind like a resolution. A true work of art is analogous to a living organ- ism. ‘The essential condition of art creations,” says Renan, ‘‘is to form a living system every por- tion of which answers and demands every other. .. . The intimate laws of life, of the development of organic products, and of the toning down of shades must be considered at every step.”” Works such as certain of Victor Hugo’s, which have no organic unity and proportion, are, according to this dictum, monstrosities. When Matthew Arnold insisted upon it that in all vital prose there is a process of evolution, he enunciated the same principle as did Renan. We all know well that which is organic in books as dis- ANALOGY — TRUE AND FALSE 51 tinguished from the inorganic, the vital as distin- guished from the mechanical. Read the learned address of the president of some local scientific or literary society, and then turn to one of Professor Huxley’s trenchant papers. The difference is just that between weapons in an armory and weapons in the hands of trained soldiers. Huxley’s will and purpose, or his personality, pervade and vitalize his material and make it his own, while the learned president sustains only an accidental and mechanical relation to what he has to say. Happy is the writer who can lop off or cut out from his page everything to which he sustains only a secondary and mechani- eal relation. The summing up of the matter would then seem to be, that there is an analogy of rhetoric and an analogy of science; a likeness that is momentary and accidental, giving rise to metaphor and parable ; and a correspondence that is fundamental, arising from the universality of law. TIT STYLE AND THE MAN I ree difference between a precious stone and a common stone is not an essential difference — not a difference of substance, but of arrangement of the particles — the crystallization. In substance char- coal and the diamond are one, but in form and effect how widely they differ. The pearl contains nothing that is not found in the coarsest oyster shell. Two men have the same thoughts ; they use about the same words in expressing them; yet with one the product is real literature, with the other it is a platitude. The difference is all in the presentation ; a finer and more compendious process has gone on in the one case than in the other. The elements are bet- ter fused and welded together; they are in some way heightened and intensified. Is not here a clue to what we mean by style? Style transforms com- mon quartz into an Egyptian pebble. We are apt to think of style as something external, that can be put on, something in and of itself. But it is not; it is in the inmost texture of the substance. Choice words, faultless rhetoric, polished periods, are only STYLE AND THE MAN 53 the accidents of style. Indeed, perfect workman- ship is one thing; style, as the great writers have it, is quite another. It may, and often does, go with faulty workmanship. It is the use of words in a fresh and vital way, so as to give us a vivid sense of a new spiritual force and personality. In the best work the style is found and hidden in the matter. If a writer does not bring a new thought, he must at least bring a new quality, — he must give a fresh, new flavor to the old thoughts. Style or quality will keep a man’s work alive whose thought is es- sentially commonplace, as is the case with Addison ; and Arnold justly observes of the poet Gray that his gift of style doubles his force and “raises him to a rank beyond what his natural richness and power seem to warrant.” There is the correct, conventional, respectable and scholarly use of language of the mass of writers, and there is the fresh, stimulating, quickening use of it of the man of genius. How apt and racy and telling is often the language of unlettered persons ; the born writer carries this same gift into a higher sphere. There is a passage in one of Emerson’s early letters, written when he was but twenty-four, and given by Mr. Cabot in his Memoir, which shows how clearly at that age Emerson discerned the secret of good writing and good preaching. “T preach half of every Sunday. When I at- tended church on the other half of a Sunday, and the image in the pulpit was all of clay, and not of 54 LITERARY VALUES tunable metal, I said to myself that if men would avoid that general language and general manner in which they strive to hide all that is peculiar, and would say only what is uppermost in their own minds, after their own individual manner, every man would be interesting. . . . But whatever pro- perties a man of narrow intellect feels to be peculiar he studiously hides; he is ashamed or afraid of him- self, and all his communications to men are unskill- ful plagiarisms from the common stock of thought and knowledge, and he is of course flat and tire- some.” The great mass of the writing and sermonizing of any age is of the kind here indicated; it is the re- sult of the machinery of culture and of books and the schools put into successful operation. But now and then a man appears whose writing is vital; his page may be homely, but it is alive; it is full of personal magnetism. The writer does not merely give us what he thinks or knows; he gives us him- self. There is nothing secondary or artificial be- tween himself and his reader. It is books of this kind that mankind does not willingly let die. Some minds are like an open fire, — how direct and instant our communication with them; how they interest us; there are no screens or disguises; we see and feel the vital play of their thought; we are face to face with their spirits. Indeed all good literature, whether poetry or prose, is the open fire; there is directness, reality, charm; we get something at first- hand that warms and stimulates. STYLE AND THE MAN 55 In literature proper our interest, I think, is always in the writer himself, — his quality, his personality, his point of view. We may fancy that we care only for the subject matter; but the born writer makes any subject interesting to us by his treatment of it or by the personal element he infuses into it. When our concern is primarily with the subject matter, with the fact or the argument, or with the information conveyed, then we are not dealing with literature in the strict sense. It is not so much what the writer tells us that makes literature, as the way he tells it; or rather, it is the degree in which he imparts to it some rare personal quality or charm that is the gift of his own spirit, something which cannot be de- tached from the work itself, and which is as inherent as the sheen of a bird’s plumage, as the texture of a flower’s petal. There is this analogy in nature. The hive bee does not get honey from the flowers ; honey is a product of the bee. What she gets from the flowers is mainly sweet water or nectar; this she puts through a process of her own, and to it adds a minute drop of her own secretion, formic acid. It is her special personal contribution that converts the nectar into honey. In the work of the literary artist, common facts and experiences are changed and heightened in the same way. Sainte-Beuve, speaking of certain parts of Rousseau’s “Confessions,” says, “Such pages were, in French literature, the discovery of a new world, a world of sunshine and of freshness, which men had near them without having perceived it.” They had 56 LITERARY VALUES not perceived it because they had not had -Rousseau’s mind to mirror it for them. The sunshine and the freshness were a gift of his spirit. The new world was the old world in a new light. What charmed them was a quality personal to Rousseau. Nature they had always had, but not the Rousseau sensibil- ity to nature. The same may be said of more re- cent writers upon outdoor themes. Readers fancy that in the works of Thoreau or of Jefferies some new charm or quality of nature is disclosed, that some- thing hidden in field or wood is brought to light. They do not see that what they are in love with is the mind or spirit of the writer himself. Thoreau does not interpret nature, but nature interprets him. The new thing disclosed in bird and flower is simply a new sensibility to these objects in the beholder. In morals and ethics the same thing is true. Let an essayist like Dr. Johnson or Arthur Helps state a principle or an idea and it has a certain value; let an essayist like Ruskin or Emerson or Carlyle state the same principle and it has an entirely different value, makes an entirely different impression, — the qualities of mind and character of these writers are so different. The reader’s relation with them is much more intimate and personal, It is quality of mind which makes the writings of Burke rank above those of Gladstone, Ruskin’s criticism above that of Hamerton, Froude’s histories above Freeman’s, Renan’s “Life of Jesus’ above that of Strauss; which makes the pages of Goethe, Coleridge, Lamb, literature in a sense that the works STYLE AND THE MAN 57 of many able minds are not. These men impart something personal and distinctive to the language they use. They make the words their own. The literary quality is not something put on. It is not. of the hand, it is of the mind; it isnot of the mind, but of the soul; it is of whatever is most vital and characteristic in the writer. It is confined to no particular manner and to no particular matter. It may be the gift of writers of widely different man- ners — of Carlyle as well as of Arnold; and in men of similar manners, one may have it and the other may not. It is as subtle as the tone of the voice or the glance of the eye. Quality is the one thing in life that cannot be analyzed, and it is the one thing in art that cannot be imitated. A man’s man- ner may be copied, but his style, his charm, his real value, can only be parodied. In the conscious or unconscious imitations of the major poets by the minor, we get only a suggestion of the manner of the former ; their essential quality cannot be repro- duced. English literature is full of imitations of the Greek poets, but that which the Greek poets did not and could not borrow they cannot lend; their qual- ity stays with them. The charm of spoken dis- course is largely in the personal quality of the speaker — something intangible to print. When we see the thing in print, we wonder how it could so have charmed or moved us. To convey this charm, this aroma of the man, to the written dis- course is the triumph of style. A recent French 58 LITERARY VALUES critic says of Madame de Staél that she had no style; she wrote just as she thought, but without being able to impart to her writing the living quality of her speech. It is not importance of subject matter that makes a work great, but importance of the subjec- tivity of the writer, —a great mind, a great soul, a great personality. A work that bears the imprint of these, that is charged with the life and power of these, which it gives forth again under pressure, is alone entitled to high rank. All pure literature is the revelation of a man. In a work of true literary art the subject matter has been so interpenetrated and vitalized by the spirit or personality of the writer, has become so thor- oughly identified with it, that the two are one and inseparable, and the style is the man. Works in which this blending and identification, through emo- tion or imagination, of the author with his subject has not taken place, or has taken place imperfectly, do not belong to pure literature. They may serve a useful purpose; but all wsefud purposes, in the strict sense, are foreign to those of art, which means for- eign to the spirit that would live in the whole, that would live in the years and not in the days, in time and not in the hour. The true literary artist gives you of the substance of his mind; not merely his thought or his philosophy, but something more inti- mate and personal than that. It is not a tangible object passed from his hand to yours; it is much more like a transfusion of blood from his veins to yours. Montaigne gives us Montaigne, — the most STYLE AND THE MAN 59 delightfully garrulous man in literature. ‘These are fancies of my own,” he says, ‘“ by which I do not pretend to discover things, but to lay open my- self.” ‘Cut these sentences,’ says Emerson, “and they bleed.” Matthew Arnold denied that Emer- son was a great writer; but we cannot account for the charm and influence of his works, it seems to me, on any other theory than that he has at least this mark of the great writer: he gives his reader of his own substance, he saturates his page with the high and tare quality of his own spirit. Everything he pub- lished has a distinct literary value, as distinguished from its moral or religious value. The same may be said of Arnold himself: else we should not care much for him. It isa particular and interesting type of man that speaks and breathes in every sentence; his style is vital in his matter, and is no more sepa- table from it than the style of silver or of gold is separable from those metals, In such a writer as Lecky on the other hand, or as Mill or Spencer, one does not get this same sub- tle individual flavor; the work is more external, more the product of certain special faculties, as the reason, the memory, the understanding ; and the per- sonality of the author is not so intimately involved. But in the writer with the creative touch, whether he be poet, novelist, historian, critic, essayist, the chief factor in the product is always his own person- ality. Style, then, in the sense in which I am here us- ing the term, implies that vital, intimate, personal 60 LITERARY VALUES relation of the man to his language by which he makes the words his own, fills them with his own quality, and gives the reader that lively sense of be- ing in direct communication with a living, breathing, mental and spiritual force. The writer who appears to wield his language as an instrument or a tool, some- thing exterior to himself, who makes you conscious of his vocabulary, or whose words are the garments and not the tissue of his thought, has not style in this sense. Style,” says Schopenhauer, “is the physiognomy of the mind, and a safer index to char- acter than the face.”? This definition is as good as any, and better than most, because it implies that identification of words with thoughts, of the man with his subject, which is the secret of a living style. Hence the man who imitates another wears a mask, as does the man who writes in a language to which he was not born. II It has been said that novel-writing is a much finer art in our day than it was in the time of Scott, or of Dickens and Thackeray, — finer, I think, be- cause it is in the hands of finer-strung, more dain- tily equipped men; but would one dare to say it is a greater art? One may admit all that is charged about Scott’s want of style, his diffuseness and cum- brousness, and his tedious descriptions, and still justly claim for him the highest literary honors. He was a great nature, as Goethe said, and we come into vital contact with that great nature in his romances. STYLE AND THE MAN 61 He was not deficient in the larger art that knows how to make a bygone age live again to the imagina- tion. He himself seems to have deprecated his “ big bow-wow ” style in comparison with the exquisite touches of Jane Austen. But no fineness of work- manship, no deftness of handling, can make up for the want of a large, rich, copious human endowment. I think we need to remember this when we compare unfavorably such men as Dickens and Thackeray with the cleverer artists of our own day. Scott makes up to us for his deficiencies in the matter of style by the surpassing human interest of his characters and incidents, their relations to the major currents of human life. His scenes fill the stage of history, his personages seem adequate to great events, and the whole story has a certain historic grandeur and impressiveness. There is no mistaking a great force, a great body, in literature any more than there is in the physical world; in Scott we have come upon a great river, a great lake, a great mountain, and we are more impressed by it than by the lesser bodies, though they have many more graces and pretti- nesses. Frederic Harrison, in a recent address on style, is cautious in recommending the young writer to take thought of his style. Let him rather take thought of what he has to say; in turning his ideal values into the coin of current speech he will have an ex- ercise in style. If he has no ideal values, then is literature barred to him. Let him cultivate his sen- sibilities; make himself, if possible, more quickly 62 LITERARY VALUES responsive to life and nature about him; let him try to see more clearly and feel more keenly, and con- nect his vocabulary with his most radical and spon- taneous self. Style can never come from the outside, — from consciously seeking it by imitating the man- ner of favorite authors. It comes, if at all, like the bloom upon fruit, or the glow of health upon the cheek, from an inner essential harmony and felicity. In a well known passage Macaulay tells what happened to Miss Burney when she began to think about her style, and fell to imitating Dr. Johnson ; how she lost the “charming vivacity’”” and “ per- fectly natural unconsciousness of manner” of her youthful writings, and became modish and affected. She threw away her own style, which was a “ toler- ably good one,” and which might “have been im- proved into a very good one,” and adopted “a style in which she could attain excellence only by achiev- ing an almost miraculous victory over nature and over habit. She could cease to be Fanny Burney; it was not so easy to become Samuel Johnson.” It is giving too much thought to style in the more external and verbal aspects of it, which I am here considering, that leads to the confounding of style with diction, and that gives rise to the “ stylist.” The stylist shows you what can be done with mere words. He is the foliage plant of the literary flower garden, An English college professor has recently exploited him in a highly wrought essay on Style. Says our professor, ‘‘ The business of letters is two- fold, to find words for meaning and to find meaning STYLE AND THE MAN 63 for words.” It strikes me that the last half of this proposition is not true of the serious writer, of the man who has something to say, but is true only of what is called the stylist, the man who has been so often described as one having nothing to say, which he says extremely well. The stylist’s main effort is a verbal one, to find meaning for words; he does not wrestle with ideas, but with terms and phrases ; his thoughts are word-begotten and are often as un- substantial as spectres and shadows. The stylist cultivates words as the florist culti- vates flowers, and a new adjective or a new colloca- tion of terms is to him what a new chrysanthemum or a new pansy is to his brother of the forcing house. He is more an European product than an American. London and Paris abound in men who cultivate the art of expression for its own sake, who study how to combine words so as to tickle the verbal sense without much reference to the value of the idea expressed. Club and university life, exces- sive library culture —a sort of indoor or hothouse literary atmosphere — foster this sort of thing. French literature can probably show more stylists than English, but the later school of British writers are not far behind in the matter of studied expres- sion. Professor Raleigh, from whose work on style I quoted above, often writes forcibly and sugges- tively ; but one cannot help but feel, on finishing his little volume, that it is more the work of a stylist than of a thinker. This is the opening sentence: “Style, the Latin name for an iron pen, has come 64 LITERARY VALUES to designate the art that handles, with ever fresh vitality and wary alacrity, the fluid elements of speech.” Does not one faintly scent the stylist at the start ? Later on he says: “In proportion as a phrase is memorable, the words that compose it be- come mutually adhesive, losing for a time something of their individual scope, — bringing with them, if they be torn away too quickly, some cumbrous frag- ments of their recent association.”” Does not the stylist stand fully confessed here? ‘That he may avoid these “cumbrous fragments” that will stick to words when you suddenly pull them up by the roots, “a sensitive writer is often put to his shifts, and extorts, if he be fortunate, a triumph from the accident of his encumbrance.” The lust of expres- sion, the conjuring with mere words, is evident. “‘ He is a poor stylist,” says our professor, “ who can- not beg half a dozen questions in a single epithet, or state the conclusion he would fain avoid in terms that startle the senses into clamorous revolt.” What it is in one that starts into ‘“clamorous re- volt”? at such verbal gymnastics as are shown in the following sentences I shall not try to define, but it seems to me it is something real and legitimate. “A slight technical implication, a faint tinge of archaism in the common turn of speech that you em- ploy, and in a moment you have shaken off the mob that scours the rutted highway, and are addressing a select audience of ticket holders with closed doors. A single natural phrase of peasant speech, a direct physical sense given to a word that genteel parlance STYLE AND THE MAN 65 authorizes readily enough in its metaphorical sense, and at a touch you have blown the roof off the drawing-room of the villa and have set its ob- scure inhabitants wriggling in the unaccustomed sun- shine.” Amiel says of Renan that science was his material rather than his object; his object was style. Yet Renan was not a stylist in the sense in which I am using the word. His main effort was never a ver- bal one, never an effort to find meaning for words; he was intent upon his subject; his style was vital in his thought, and never took on airs on its own account. You cannot in him separate the artist from the thinker, nor give either the precedence. All writers with whom literature is an art aim at style in the sense that they aim to present their subject in the most effective form, — with clearness, freshness, force. They become stylists when their thoughts wait upon their words, or when their thoughts are word-begotten. Such writers as Gibbon, De Quin- cey, Macaulay, have studied and elaborate styles, but in each the matter is paramount and the mind finds something solid to rest upon. “The chief of the incommodities imposed upon the writer,” says Professor Raleigh, is “the neces- sity at all times and at all costs to mean something,”’ or to find meaning for words. This no doubt is a hard task. The trouble begins when one has the words first, To invoke ideas with words is a much more difficult experience than the reverse process. But probably all true writers have something to say 66 LITERARY VALUES before they have the desire to say it, and in propor- tion as the thought is vital and real is its expression easy. When I meet the stylist, with his straining for ver- bal effects, I love to recall this passage from Whitman. “The great poet,” he says, “swears to his art, I will not be meddlesome. I will not have in my writing any elegance or effect or originality to hang in the way between me and the rest, like curtains. Iwill have nothing hang in the way, not the richest curtains. What I tell I tell for precisely what it is. Let who may, exalt or startle or fascinate or soothe; I will have purpose, as health or heat or snow has, and be as regardless of observation. What I experience or portray shall go from my composition without a shred of my composition. You shall stand by my side and look in the mirror with me.” This is the same as saying that the great success in writing is to get language out of the way and to put your mind directly to the reader’s, so that there be no veil of words between you. If the reader is preoccupied with your words, if they court his at- tention or cloud his vision, to that extent is the communication imperfect. In some of Swinburne’s poems there is often such a din and echo of rhyme and alliteration that it is almost impossible to hear what the man is really saying. To darken counsel with words is a common oc- currence. Words are like lenses, —they must be arranged in just such a way, or they hinder rather than help the vision. When the adjustment is as it STYLE AND THE MAN 67 should be, the lens itself is invisible ; and language in the hands of the master is as transparent. Some of the more recent British poets affect the archaic, the quaint, the eccentric, in language, so that one’s at- tention is almost entirely occupied with their words. Reading them is like trying to look through a pair of spectacles too old or too young for you, or with lenses of different focus. But has not style a value in and of itself? As in the case of light, its value is in the revelation it makes. Its value is to conceal itself, to lose itself in the matter. If humility, or self-denial, or any of the virtues becomes conscious of itself and claims credit for its own sake, does it not that moment fall from grace ? What incomparable style in the passage I have quoted from Whitman when we come to think of it, but how it effaces itself and is of no account for the sake of the idea it serves! The more a writ- er’s style humbles itself, the more it is exalted. There is nothing true in religion that is not equally true inart. Give yourself entirely. All selfish and secondary ends are of the devil. Our Calvinistic grandfathers, who fancied themselves willing to be damned for the glory of God, illustrate the devotion of the true artist to his ideal. ‘ Consider the lilies of the field, . . . they toil not, neither do they spin.” The style of the born poet or artist takes as little thought of itself, and is the spontaneous expression of the same indwelling grace and neces- sity. 68 LITERARY VALUES III I once overheard a lady say to a popular author, ‘¢ What I most admire about your books is their fine style.” ‘But I never think about my style” was his reply. ‘I know you don’t,” said his admirer, “and that is why I like it so much.” But we may regard him as thinking about his style, when he fancied himself thinking only about his matter. In his case the style and the matter were one. When he was consciously occupied only with the substance and texture of his thought, he was oc- cupied with his style. Every effort to make the idea flow clear and pure, to give it freshness and fillip, or to seize and embody in words a mental or emotional impression in all its integrity, without blur or confusion, is an effort in style. It is like taking the alloys and impurities out of a metal ; the style or beauty of it is improved. The mak- ing of iron into steel is a process of purification. When Froude was questioned about his style, he confessed that he had never given any thought to the subject; his aim had been to say what he had to say in the most direct and simple way possible. He was conscious only of trying to see clearly and to speak truly. I suppose this is the case with all first-class minds, in our day at least: the main en- deavor is directed toward the matter, and not toward the manner; or rather, it is to make the one identi- cal with the other. In no page of Froude’s, nor in any writer of equal range and seriousness, are we STYLE AND THE MAN 69 conscious of the style as something apart and that claims our admiration on its own account, as we are in the case of Walter Pater, forexample. Such men as Pater are enamored of style itself, and cultivate it for its own sake. They conceive of it as an inde- pendent grace and charm that may be imparted to any subject by dint of an effort directed to verbal arrangement and sequence alone. Iv There is a good deal of wisdom in Voltaire’s say- ing that “all styles are good that are not tiresome.” Voltaire’s own style certainly had the merit of not tiring. Even in the English translation I never cease to marvel at its grace and buoyancy. In keep- ing with this dictum is the remark I heard concern- ing a certain living writer, namely, that he had the best style in literature to-day because one could read fifty pages of his and not know that one was reading at all; it was pure expression — offered no resistance. This offering no resistance, this ease and limpidity —a getting rid of all friction in the written page — herein certainly lies the secret of much that is winsome in literature. How little friction the mind encounters in Addison, in Lamb, or in the best of our own prose writers; and how much in Meredith, and the later writings of Henry James! Is not friction to be got rid of as far as possible in all departments of life? One does not want his shoes to pinch, nor his coat to bind, neither does he want to waste any strength on involved sentences, 70 LITERARY VALUES or on cryptic language. Did you ever try to row a boat in water in which lay a sodden fleece of newly fallen snow? I find the reading of certain books like that. Some of Browning’s poems im- pede my mind in that way. Force of impact—that is another matter; that warms and quickens the mind. Browning’s “ How they brought the Good News from Ghent ” makes the mind hot by its rush and power. ‘There is no mere mechanical friction of elliptical sentences and obscure allusions here. Yes, the style that does not tire us is better than the style that does. Thus Arnold’s style is better than Walter Pater’s, because it is easier to follow ; itis not so conscious of itself; it is not so obviously studied. Pater studied words; Arnold studied ideas. Pater sacrificed the more familiar democratic traits of language — ease, simplicity, flexibility, transparency —to his passion for the more choice aristocratic features, — the perfumed, the academic, the highly wrought. Again, I find Arnold’s style less fatiguing than Lowell’s, because it has more current, more continuity of thought, and is freer from concetti and mere surface sparkle. I find Swinburne’s prose more tiresome than that of any contemporary Brit- ish critic, because of its inflated polysyllabie charac- ter, and his poetry more cloying than that of any other poet, because of its almost abnormal lilt and facility ; it has a pathological fluidity; it seems as though, when he begins to write verse, his whole mental structure is in danger of melting down and STYLE AND THE MAN 71 running away in mere words. His heat is that of fever; his inspiration borders on delirium. We never tire of Addison by reason of his style, or of Swift or of Lamb or of our own Irving or Hawthorne or Warner. It is probably as rare to find a French writer whose style tires the reader as it is to find a German whose style does not. As M. Bru- netiére well says, French literature is a social litera- ture, German is philosophic, and English individual- istic. It is the business of the first to be agreeable, of the second to be profound, of the third to be origi- nal. Who does not tire of Strauss sooner than of Renan, of Macaulay sooner than of Sainte-Beuve ? A writer with a pronounced, individualistic style —one full of mere mechanical difficulties, like Browning’s or Carlyle’s —runs great risk of weary- ing the reader and of being left behind. So far as his style degenerates into mannerism, so far is he handicapped in the race. Smoothness is not beauty, neither is roughness power; yet without a certain harmony and continuity there is neither beauty nor power. Herbert Spencer, in his essay on the Philosophy of Style, would have a writer avoid this danger of wearying his reader, by writing alter- nately in different styles. “To have a specific style,” he says, “‘is to be poor in speech.” “The perfect writer will express himself as Junius, when in the Junius frame of mind; when he feels as Lamb felt, will use a like familiar speech; and will fall into the ruggedness of Carlyle when in a Carlylean mood.” A man who should try to follow this 72 LITERARY VALUES advice would be pretty sure to be Jack-of-all-styles and master of none. What a piece of patchwork his composition would be! A “specific style” is not to be avoided; it is to be cultivated and prac- ticed till every false note, every trace of crudeness and insincerity, is purged out of it. The secret of good prose is a subtle quality or flavor, hard to define, like that of a good apple or a good melon, and it is as intimately bound up in the very substance and texture in the one case as in the other, and, we may add, is of as many varie- ties. We are sure always to get good prose from Mr, Howells and Colonel Higginson, but we are not always so sure of getting it from certain of our younger novelists. Here is a sample of bad prose from a popular novel by a Southern writer: — “The whole woods emerged from the divine bath of nature with the coolness, the freshness, the im- mortal purity of Diana united to the roseate glow and mortal tenderness of Venus, and haunted by two spirits: the chaste, unfading youth of Endymion and the dust-born warmth and eagerness of Dionysus.” Yet the man who could permit himself the use of such inflated language as that, was capable of turn- ing off such a passage as this : — “ Some women, in marrying, demand all and give all: with good men they are happy; with base men they are the broken-hearted. Some demand every- thing and give little: with weak men they are ty- rants; with strong men they are the divorced. Some STYLE AND THE MAN 73 demand little and give all: with congenial souls they are already in heaven; with uncongenial they are soon in their graves. Some give little and demand little: they are the heartless, and they bring neither the joy of life nor the peace of death.” That is sound prose; it is like a passage from a great classic. ‘When we advise the young writer to go honestly to work to say in the simplest manner what he really thinks and feels, one does not mean that by this course he is likely to write like the great prose mas- ters, but that by this means alone can his work have the basic qualities of good literature, — directness, veracity, vitality, the beauty and reality of natural things. Genuineness first, grace and eloquence after- wards. “The ugliest living face,” says Schopenhauer, “ is better than a mask.” It is real, itis alive. So the simple, direct speech of a man in earnest is so much better than the perfunctory eloquence one is so often compelled to hear or to read. Reality, reality — nothing can make up for a want of reality. Sainte-Beuve said, as I have already quoted, that the peasant always has style; the French peasant probably more often than any other. This is cer- tainly so if we take such a character as Joan of Arc as a typical peasant. What adroitness, and at times, classic beauty in her answer to her judges! When they sought to entrap her with the question, “Do you know if you are in the grace of God?” she re- plied, “If Iam not, may God place me there ; if I am, 74 LITERARY VALUES may God so keep me.” Under pressure, the peasant mind, and indeed all other minds, are, at times, ca- pable of these things. But usually the charm of rustic speech is in its plainness and simplicity, like that of other rural things, a bridge, a woodshed, a well-sweep, a log house, — no thought of style, thought of service only. But the beauty of what may be called the architectural style of the great prose masters, — Gibbon, Burke, Browne, Hooker, De Quincey, — like the beauty of a Greek temple or a Gothic cathedral, is quite another matter. What both have in common is the beauty of sincerity and reality. The vernacular style of writers of the seventeenth century, like Walton, Fuller, Baxter, Jonson, is more in keeping with the taste of to-day than the rhetori- cal and highly wrought style of certain of the eigh- teenth and early nineteenth century writers. Hence, when we ascribe style to simple, homely things, or to speech, we mean something quite dif- ferent from style when applied to the great composi- tions either in literature, music, or architecture. Milton could plan and build the lofty rhyme and attain beauty ; Wordsworth attains beauty by his sin- cerity and simplicity, and his fervent love of rural things. He has not style in the Miltonic sense. One has classic beauty, the other, natural or naive beauty. The monumental works of the ancients were planned and wrought like their architecture, and have a beauty that rivals nature. Shakespeare rarely attains anything like classic beauty, and has STYLE AND THE MAN vii) any poem since Keats’s “Ode to a Nightingale” struck the note firmly and surely ? v I have often asked myself why it is that the in- terviewer will sometimes get so much more wisdom out of a man, and so many more fresh and enter- taining statements — in short, so much better liter- ature — than the man can get out of himself. Is it because one’s best and ripest thoughts rise to the surface, like the cream on the milk, and does the interviewer simply skim them off? Maybe, in writ- ing, we often dip too deep, make too great an effort. Interviews are nearly always interesting, — much more so than a formal studied statement by the in- terviewed himself. Many a piece of sound, excellent literature has been got out of a man who had no skill at all with the pen. His spoken word is vital and real; but in a conscious literary effort the fire is quenched at once. Hence the charm of letters, of diaries, of the simple narrations and recitals of pioneers, farmers, workers, or persons who have no conscious literary equipment. Who would not rather read a bit of real experience of a soldier in battle, such as a clever interviewer could draw out of him, than to read his general’s studied account of the same engagement? ‘To elaborate is of no avail,” says Whitman. ‘ Learned and unlearned feel that it is so.” Only the great artist can rival or surpass the sense of reality we often find in common speech, Set a man to writing out his views or his experience and 76 LITERARY VALUES the danger is that he will be too formal; he will get himself up for the occasion; there will be no ease or indifference in his manner; he will go to delving in his mind, and we shall miss the simple, direct self-expression that we are after. In Dr. Johnson’s talk, as reported by Boswell, we touch the real man; in the “ Rambler” you touch only his clothes or periwig. His more formal writing seems the product of some kind of artificial put-on faculty, like the Sunday sermons one hears or the newspaper editorials one reads. The sermon is in what may be called the surpliced style, the Ram- bler in the periwigged style. Emerson said of Al- cott that his conversation was wonderful, but that when he sat down to write his inspiration left him. Most men are wiser in company than in the study. What is interesting in a man is what he himself has felt or seen or experienced. If you can tell us that, we shall listen eagerly. The uncultured man does not know this, but seeks the far-off or the deep down. Our thoughts, our opinions, are like apples on the tree: they must take time to ripen ; and when they are ripe, how easily they fall! A mere nudge brings them down. How easily the old man talks; how full he is of wisdom! Time was when his tongue was tied; he could not express himself; his thoughts were half formed and unripe; they clung tightly to the bough. Set him to writing, and with great labor he produced some crude, half-formed no- tions of his own, mixed with the riper opinions of STYLE AND THE MAN W7 the authors he had read. But now his fruit has ma- tured and it has mellowed; it has color and flavor; and his conversation abounds in wisdom. VI The standard of style of the last century was more aristocratic than is the standard of to-day. The im- portant words with Hume, Blair, Johnson, Boling- broke, as applied to style, were elegance, harmony, ornament ; and the chief of these was elegance: the composition must make the impression of elegance, as to-day we demand the impression of the vital and the real. Even the homely is more suited to the genius of democracy than is the elegant. Perhaps the word is distasteful to modern ears from its conven- tional associations or its appropriation by milliners and dressmakers. One would not care to write in- elegantly, but would rather his page did not suggest the word at all, as he would have his home or his dress suggest the quieter, humbler, more serviceable virtues. In the old story of Bruce’s saying, the style may be said to be homely. “I doubt I have killed the comyn.” ‘Ye doubt?” replies Kirkpatrick ; ‘“T mak siccar.” Hume puts this into elegant lan- guage in this wise: “Sir Thomas Kirkpatrick, one of Bruce’s friends, asking him soon after if the traitor was slain, ‘I believe so,’ replied Bruce. ‘And is that a matter,’ cried Kirkpatrick, ‘to be left to con- jecture ? Iwill secure him.’” This is polite prose, dressed-up prose, but its charm for us is gone. 78 LITERARY VALUES VII There are as many styles as there are moods and tempers in men. Words may be used so as to give us a sense of vigor, a sense of freshness, a sense of the choice and scholarly, or of the dainty and exclu- sive, or of the polished and elaborate, or of heat or cold, or of any other quality known to life. Every work of genius has its own physiognomy — sad, cheerful, frowning, yearning, determined, meditative. This book has the face of a saint; that of a scholar oraseer. Here is the feminine, there the mascu- line face. One has the clerical face, one the judi- cial, Each appeals to us according to our tempera- ments and mental predilections. Who shall say which style is the best ? What can be better than the style of Huxley for his purpose, — sentences level and straight like a hurled lance; or than Emerson’s for his purpose, — electric sparks, the sudden, unex- pected epithet or tense, audacious phrase, that gives the mind a wholesome:shock ; or than Gibbon’s for his purpose, — a style like solid masonry, every sen- tence cut four square, and his work, as Carlyle said to Emerson, a splendid bridge, connecting the an- cient world with the modern ; or than De Quincey’s for his purpose, —a discursive, roundabout style, herding his thoughts as a collie dog herds sheep; or than Arnold’s for his academic spirit, — a style like cut glass; or than Whitman’s for his continental spirit, — the processional, panoramic style that gives the sense of mass and multitude ? Certain things we STYLE AND THE MAN 79 may demand of every man’s style, — that it shall do its work, that it shall touch the quick. To be color- less like Arnold is good, and to have color like Rus- kin is good; to be lofty and austere like the old Latin and Greek authors is good, and to be playful and discursive like Dr. Holmes is good; to be con- densed and epigrammatic like Bacon pleases, and to be flowing and copious like Macaulay pleases. Within certain limits the manner that is native to the man, the style that is a part of himself, is what wears best. What we do not want in any style is hard- ness, glitter, tumidity, superfetation, unreality. In treating of nature or outdoor themes, let the style have limpidness, sweetness, freshness ; in cri- ticism let it have dignity, lucidity, penetration ; in history let it have mass, sweep, comprehension; in all things let it have vitality, sincerity, and genuine- ness, IV CRITICISM AND THE MAN I 4* looks as though we were never to get to the end of the discussion about criticism — its scope, aims, functions, any more than we are likely to get to the end of the discussion of any real question in philosophy, ethics, or religion. Is the aim of literary criticism judgment, or in- terpretation, or analysis, or description ? May it not have all these aims? For myself, I am disposed to answer in the affirmative. I doubt if there will ever be a critical method which all may apply. Every man will have his own method, as truly as he has his own manners. The French critic Schérer inclines to “‘ the method which sets to work to comprehend rather than to class, to explain rather than to judge,” or which asks as the first step to possess itself of the author’s point of view. This is substantially Pope’s dictum that a work is to be read in the spirit in which it was writ- ten, and it accords with Heine’s saying that the critic is to ask, ‘‘ What does the artist intend?” Thisisa part of, but does it sum up, the critical function ? A man’s writing upon the works of another takes CRITICISM AND THE MAN 81 the form of description and analysis — like the re- port of a naturalist upon a new species, which Mr. Howells thinks is the main function of criticism ; or it may aim chiefly at interpretation, which a recent essayist emphasizes as the latest and highest phase of criticism; or it may aim at a judicial estimate, an authoritative verdict from the rules and standards, which is the more classic and academic phase of crit- icism. Each phase is legitimate and leads to valuable re- sults. Of any considerable artistic work we want a de- scription and an analysis, we want an interpretation and an exposition, and we want an appraisement ac- cording to the standard of the best that has been thought and done in the world, — not a comparison with the externals of the accepted models, but with the originality, the spontaneity, the sanity, the in- ner necessity and consistency of them — the truth to nature and to the laws of the human mind. Is it liberating, vitalizing, cheering? Is it ethically sound ? Does it favor large and manly ideals? Does it go along with evolution and progress ? What, for instance, will criticism do with the work of such a man as Whitman, or Ibsen, or Tol- stoi? It will describe it and analyze it, and name it as lyric, epic, dramatic, etc. ; it will interpret it, or draw out and expound the ideas that lie back of it and out of which it sprang; it will seek to under- stand it and to get at the writer’s point of view; then it will judge it, try it by its own standards, and 82 LITERARY VALUES seek to estimate the value of these standards as they stand related to the best aims and achievements of the human mind. We demand of these men what we demand of Browning, Tennyson, Hugo, and every other poet and writer of high claims, — genuineness, sincerity, power, inspiration, and that they awaken in us fresh and vivid currents of ideas andemotions. We shall not quarrel with their methods, or materials, or their form, or formlessness, but they must go to the quick. All our pleasure and profit in great art — painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry — is at last one, a new experience of the beauty and significance of nature and life. We aremade to feel these emotions afresh and as if for the first time. Here are the old eternal elements, — life, nature, the soul, man and woman, all in danger of becoming dull, commonplace, uninteresting to us. But the man with the creative touch gives us a new and lively sense of them, by presenting them to us in new com- binations and under new lights. The only new thing added is himself, —the quality or flavor of his own genius. A complete criticism will not limit itself to de- scription or to interpretation; it will seek to esti- mate, to bring out the relative or absolute value of the thing. Mr. Howells in his trenchant little vol- ume on “ Criticism and Fiction,” says the critic has no more business to trample on a poem, a novel, or an essay that does not please him, than the botanist has to grind a plant under his heel because he does CRITICISM AND THE MAN 83 not find it pretty. His business “is to classify and analyze the fruits of the human mind as the natural- ist classifies the objects of his study, rather than to praise or blame them.” To classify and analyze the fruits of the human mind is certainly one of the functions of criticism, and only one. The analogy Mr. Howells employs is mis- leading. We do not sitin judgment on natural spe- cimens and products except as they stand related to human wants and utilities. We compare climates, seasons, soils, landscapes, with reference to racial and individual needs and well-being. If you bring me trees from the woods or stone from the quarry to build my house with, I am bound to sit in judgment upon them. And when my house is built, my neigh- bors will sit in judgment upon it. Of all artificial things, of all man’s works, we are bound to ask, Are they well done ? are they what they should be? are they the best of their kind? Shall we not ask these questions of the poem also, of the novel, the essay, the history ? Art has relations to life, and the critic is bound to consider what these relations are in any given work, — how true, how important ; he is examining a human product, not a natural specimen, and is as competent to reject as to accept; he must compare, weigh, ap- praise, to the best of his ability. The specimens of natural history are perfect after their kind; the main question with them is, to which kind or species does a given specimen belong ? But the poem or the history or the novel is not always 84 LITERARY VALUES perfect after its kind. Their kind is usually obvi- ous at a glance, but their merits or demerits, their relation to the best that has been thought and done in the world, are not so obvious. Hence we praise or blame according as they come up to or fall short of their own ideal. The critic is not so much a bot- anist naming a new flower, as he is a brother gar- dener criticising your horticulture, or a brother law- yer criticising your brief. We are all critics in this sense one way or another every day of our lives ; we try to get at the real value of whatever is offered us, whether it be lands, houses, goods, friends, stocks, bonds, news, pictures, or books ; we criticise the men we deal with and employ in order to find out whom to trust ; we must have our wits about us when we go to market or go shopping. he critical habit — sifting, testing, comparing, to get at the true value of things — goes with us through life, or else we come often to grief. The finer the product, or the higher the purpose it serves, the more careful is our inves- tigation. When we come to literature and art our worldly practical wisdom does not carry very far. It is not now a question of fact or of material values, but of ideal and esthetic values; it is a question of truth to nature and to life, and of the largest, most vital truth. The mass of readers have little power of divining the good from the bad, the true from the false, in this field. Not the first best, but the sec- ond or third best will draw the multitude. The literary value of a work is more intangible CRITICISM AND THE MAN 85 and elusive, harder to define and bring out, than its scientific or moral or other values. It resides in a certain vitality and genuineness of expression; we have a sense of having come face to face with some- thing real and alive in the man, and not, as is so often the case, with something assumed or put on. There is always an original inherent quality and flavor, as in natural products, The language is not the mere garment of the thought, it is the very texture and substance. In all true literature something more than mind and erudition speak,—a man speaks; a vital personality is imminent, —a Charles Lamb, a Wordsworth, a Carlyle, a Huxley, an Emerson, a Thoreau, a Lowell, — all distinct types of intelli- gence speaking through character. Self-expression within certain limits is as impor- tant in criticism as in any other form of literature. The French critic Ferdinand Brunetiére says that the truly personal way of seeing and feeling, which is a merit of the poet and the novelist, is a fault in the critic, because the critical function is mainly a judi- cial one. In every man there is the common humanity, a measure of the pure reason which he shares with all ; then there are the race traits, the family traits, the bias of his times, the bent given by his training and surroundings, and his own special stamp and make- up, — what we call his idiosyncrasy. All these things will play a part in his view of any matter. His success as a critic is when his humanity, his pure intelligence, furnishes the light which is only colored 86 LITERARY VALUES or refracted by its passage through these elements. But colored and refracted it will be, and it is this coloring and refraction or stamp of the personal equa- tion that gives value and charm to the man’s work as literature. Reduce criticism to a science, or elimi- nate the element of impressionism, and the result is no longer literature. The reason may be convinced, but the emotions are untouched. The one thing that distinguishes all modern lit- eratures from the works of the ancient or classic period is their more permanent subjectivity, and the piercing lyrical note in them. Self-expression has been the aim of the modern artist in a much fuller sense than it was with the artists of the pagan world. Our religion is a per- sonal and subjective religion, — the kingdom of heaven is within. Christianity turned the thoughts of men upon themselves. Self-examination, self-crit- icism began. Man became conscious of himself, of his sins, and of his shortcomings, and learned to be more interested in the elements of his own character. There is probably no greater delusion than that under which the critic labors when he thinks he is trying the new work by the standard of the best that has been thought and achieved in the world. He is trying it by his own conception of that standard; so much of it as is vital in his own mind he can apply, and no more. His own individual taste and judgment are, after all, his tests. The standard of the best is not some rule of thumb or of yardstick that every one can apply; only the best can apply the best. CRITICISM AND THE MAN 87 Impressionism, therefore, is at the bottom of all criticism, in whatever field. The impression which the work makes upon your intelligence, your taste, your judgment, is all that you can finally give. Criticism in France, where the art has been more assiduously cultivated than in any other country, seems divided between judicial critics like Brune- tigre and impressionist critics like Lemaitre. The latter states in terms of his own likes and dislikes what the other aims to state in terms of the imper- sonal reason. But their conclusions are likely to differ only as their temperaments and innate affini- ties differ. Brunetiére has the more dogmatic mind and the more violent antipathies. He could call Sainte-Beuve a rat, —a verdict that savors more of political and religious intolerance than of the impar- tial reason. Are we not coming more and more to demand that in all literary and artistic productions, the pro- ducer be present in his work, not merely as mind, as pure intelligence, but also as a distinct personal- ity, giving a flavor of his own to the principles he utters ? Every vital creative work is the revelation of a man as well as of a mind, and this is true in criticism no less than in other forms of literature. Suppose Brunetiére’s criticism lacked that which makes it Brunetiére’s, or Arnold’s lacked that which makes it Arnold’s, should we long care for it? Elim- inate from the works of these men all that is indi- vidual, all that in each makes the impression of a new literary force, the accent of personality, and 88 LITERARY VALUES you take from the salt its savor. Dare we say that the most precious thing in literature is the indi- vidual and the specific? Is nota platitude a plat- itude because it lacks just these things? The vague and the general may be had in any quantity, at any time. The distinct and the characteristic are always rare. How many featureless novels, featureless poems, featureless discourses, how much savorless criticism of one kind and another, every community produces! Now and then we catch a distinct personal note, a new, penetrating voice, and this we remember and follow in criticism as readily as in poetry or fiction. Have we not here the se- cret of the greater interest we take in signed criti- cism over unsigned ? The pure, disinterested, impersonal reason is a fine thing to contemplate. Who would flout it or deny it? One might as well throw stones at the sun. But as the pure white light of the sun is broken up into a thousand hues and shades as it comes back to us from the living world, so the light of reason comes to us from literature in a thou- sand blended tints and colors, or as modified by the varying moods and temperaments of the individual writers. Whether or not we want or have a right to expect this pure white light in criticism, what we get is the light as it is reduced or colored by the critic’s personality, ——the media of his time, his race, his personal equation. It must render ac- curately the objects, form and feature; but the hue, the atmosphere, the sentiment of it all, the highest CRITICISM AND THE MAN 89 value of it all, will be the contribution of the critic’s most private and radical self. Every eminent writer has his way of looking at things, gives his own coloring to general truths, and it is this that endears him to us. Is the word he speaks Ais word, —is it inevitable, the verdict of his character, the outcome of that which is most vital and characteristic in him? Or is it something he has learned, or the result of fashion, convention, imitation ? See how the old elements of the air, soil, water, forever recombine under the touch of that mysteri- ous something we call life, and produce new herb- age, new flowers, new fruit, new men, new women, — forever and yet never the same. So do the forces of man’s spirit recombine with the old facts and truisms, and produce new art and new literature. II Is it not equally true that the value of criticism as a guide to the judgment or the taste, teaching us what to admire and what to condemn, is less than its value as an intellectual pleasure and stimulus, its power to awaken ideas? Judgment is good, but inspiration is better. How rarely we make the judgments of the greatest critics our own! We are pleased when they confirm our own, but is not our main interest and profit in what the critic gives us out of himself? We do not, for instance, care very much for Carlyle’s literary judgments, but for Carlyle’s quality of mind, his flashes of 90 LITERARY VALUES poetic insight, his burden of conscience, his power of portraiture, his heroic moral fibre, we care a great deal. Arnold thought Carlyle’s criticism less sound than Johnson’s, — more tainted with engowement, with passion and appetite, as it probably is; but how much more incentive, how much more quicken- ing power, how much more of the stuff of which life is made, do we get from Carlyle than from Johnson or from Arnold himself ! That the criticism is sound is not enough, — it must also warm and stimulate the mind; and if it do this we shall not trouble ourselves very much about its conclusions. Even M. Brunetiére says that there are masterpieces in the history of literature and art whose authors were downright fools, as there are, on the other hand, mediocre works from the hands of men of vast intelligence. Very many readers, I fancy, will not rest in the main conclusions at which Tolstoi arrives in his recent discussion of the ques- tion *‘ What is art ?” but who can fail to feel that here is a large, sincere, helpful soul, whose concep- tion of life and of artis of great value? If we were to estimate Ruskin by the soundness of his judg- ments alone, we should miss the most important part of him. It is as a prophet of life as well as a critic of art that we value him. Would he be a better critic were he less a prophet ? Or take a more purely critical mind, such as Mat- thew Arnold’s. Do we care very much even for his literary judgments? Do we not care much more for his qualities as a writer, — his lucidity, his central- CRITICISM AND THE MAN 91 ity, his style, his continuity of thought, his turns of expression, his particular interpretation of literature and life? His opinions may be sound, but this is not the secret of his power; it resides in something more intimate and personal to himself. The late Principal Shairp was probably as sound a critic as was Arnold, but his work is of much less interest, because it does not contain the same vital expression of a new and distinct type of mind. Arnold was a better critic of literature than of life and history. There were other values than literary ones that were not so clearly within his range. In 1870 he thought the Germans would stand a poor chance in the war with France. How could the German Gemeinheit, or commonness, stand up before the French esprit ? In our civil war, he expected the South to win. Did not the South have distinction? But distinc- tion counts for more in style than in war. Arnold’s criticism has the great merit of being a clear and for- cible expression of a fine-bred, high-toned, particu- lar type of man, and that type a pure and noble one. There was no bungling, no crudeness, no strain- ing, no confusion, no snap judgment, and apparently no bias. He was as steady asaclock. His ideas were continuous and homogeneous; they run like living currents all through his works, and give them unity and definitiveness. He is not to be effaced or overthrown ; he is only to be matched and appraised. His word is not final, but it is fit and challenges your common sense. His contribution flows into the current of English criticism like a clear stream 92 LITERARY VALUES into a turbid one; it is not deep, but pellucid, —a tributary that improves the quality of the whole. It gives us that refreshment and satisfaction that we always get from the words of a man who speaks in his own right and from ample grounds of personal conviction. Positive judgments in literature or in art, or in any matters of taste, are dangerous things. The crying want always is for new, fresh power to break up the old verdicts and opinions, and set all afloat again. ‘We must learn under the master how to destroy him.” The great critic gives us courage to reverse his judgments. Dr. Johnson said that Dry- den was the writer who first taught us to determine the merit of composition upon principle ; but criti- cism has been just as much at variance with itself since Dryden’s time as it was before. It is an art, and not a science, — one of the forms of literary art, wherein, as in all other forms of art, the man, and not the principle, is the chief factor. III When one thinks of it, how diverse and contra- dictory have been the judgments of even the best critics! Behold how Macaulay’s verdicts differ from Carlyle’s, Carlyle’s from Arnold’s, Arnold’s from Frederic Harrison’s or Morley’s or Stephen’s or Swinburne’s; how Taine and Sainte-Beuve diverge upon Balzac; how Renan and Arnold diverge upon Hugo; how Lowell and Emerson diverge upon Whit- man; and how wide apart are contemporary critics CRITICISM AND THE MAN 93 about the merits of Browning, Ibsen, Tolstoi. Lan- dor could not tolerate Dante, and even the great Goethe told Eckermann that Dante was one of the authors he was forbidden to read. In Byron’s judg- ment, Griffiths and Rogers were greater poets than Wordsworth and Coleridge. The German Professor Grimm sees in Goethe “the greatest poet of all times and all people,” which makes Matthew Arnold smile. Chateaubriand considered Racine as much superior to Shakespeare as the Apollo Belvidere is superior to an uncouth Egyptian statue. Every na- tion, says a French critic, has its chords of sensi- bility that are utterly incomprehensible to another. “Many and diverse,” says Arnold, “must be the judgments passed upon every great poet, upon every considerable writer.” And it seems that the greater the writer or poet, the more diverse and contradic- tory will be the judgments upon him. The small men are easily disposed of, —there is no dispute about them; but the great ones baffle and try us. It is around their names, as Sainte-Beuve some- where remarks, that there goes on a perpetual critical tournament. It would seem that the nearer we are, in point of time, to an event, a man, a book, a work of art, the less likely we are to estimate them rightly, especially if they are out of the usual and involve great ques- tions and points, Such a poet as Dante or Victor Hugo or Whitman, or such a character as Napoleon or Cromwell or John Brown, or such an artist as Angelo or Turner or Millet, will require time to 94 LITERARY VALUES settle his claim. In literature, the men of the high- est order, to be understood, must undoubtedly, in a measure, wait for the growth of the taste of them- selves, or until their own ideals have become at home in men’s minds. With every great innovation, in whatever field, every year that passes finds our minds better adjusted to it and more keenly alive to its merits. Contemporary criticism is bound to be contradictory. Men take opposite views of current questions; they are too near them to see all their bearings. How different the aspect the slavery ques- tion wears at this distance, and the civil war that grew out of it, from the face they wore a generation or two ago! It is only the few great minds that see to-day what the masses will see to-morrow. They occupy a vantage ground of character and principle that is like an eminence ina landscape, commanding a wide view. Sainte-Beuve certainly did injustice to Balzac, and Schérer to Béranger. Theirs were con- temporary judgments, and personal antipathy played a large part in them. Sainte-Beuve says that when two good intellects pass totally different judgments on the same author, it is because they are not fixing their thoughts, for the moment, on the same object; they have not the whole of him before their eyes ; their view does not take him in entirely. That is just it: we each look for different values; we are more keenly alive to some merits than to others; what one critic misses another sees. We are more or less like chemical elements, that unite eagerly with some of their fellows, and not with others. CRITICISM AND THE MAN 95 The elective affinities are at work everywhere, — where is the critical genius that is a universal solvent ? Probably Sainte-Beuve himself comes as near it as anybody who has lived. IV It is not truth alone that makes literature; it is truth plus a man. KReaders fancy they are inter- ested in the birds and flowers they find in the pages of the poets ; but no, it is the poets themselves that they are interested in. There are the same birds and flow- ers in the fields and woods, — do they care for them ? In many of the authors of whom Sainte-Beuve writes I have no interest, but I am always interested in Sainte-Beuve’s view of them, in the play of his in- telligence and imagination over and around them. After reading his discussion of Cowper, or Fénelon, or Massillon, or Pascal, it is not the flavor of these writers that remains in my mind, but the flavor of the critic himself. I am under his spell, and not that of his subject. Is not this equally true of the criticism of Goethe, or Carlyle, or Macaulay, or Lamb, or Hazlitt, or Coleridge, or any other? The pages of these writers are no more a transparent medium, through which we see the subject as in itself it is, than are those of any other creative artist. Science shows us, or aims to show us, the thing as it is; but art shows it to us tinged by the prismatic rays of the human spirit. Criticism that warms and interests is perpetual creation, as Sainte- Beuve suggested. It is a constant combination of 96 LITERARY VALUES the subject with the thought of the critic. When Mr. James writes upon Sainte-Beuve we are under his spell; it is Mr. James that absorbs and delights us now. We get the truth about his subject, of course, but it is always in combination with the truth about Mr, James. The same is true when Macaulay writes about Milton, and Carlyle about Burns or Johnson, and Emerson about Montaigne or Plato, and Lowell about Thoreau or Wordsworth, — the critic reveals himself in and through his subject. We do not demand that Arnold get the real Ar- nold out of the way and merge himself into general humanity (this he cannot do in any case), but only that he put aside the conscious exterior Arnold, so to speak, — Arnold the supercilious, the contemptu- ous, the hater of dissent, the teaser of the Philistine. The critic must escape from the local and accidental. We would have Macaulay cease to be a Whig, Johnson cease to be a Tory, Schérer forget his theo- logical training, and Brunetiere escape from his Catholic bias. v No matter how much truth the critic tells us, if his work does not itself rise to the dignity of good literature, if he does not use language in a vital and imaginative way, we shall not care for him. Liter- ary and artistic truth is not something that can be seized and repeated indifferently by this man and by that, like the truths of science: it must be repro- duced or recreated by the critic ; it must be as vital CRITICISM AND THE MAN 97 in his page as in that of his author. The truths of science are static; the truths of art are dynamic. If a mediocre mind writes about Shakespeare, the result is mediocre, no matter how much bare truth he tells us. What, then, do we mean by a great critic? We mean a great mind that finds complete self-expres- sion in and through the works of other men. Ar- nold found more complete self-expression through literary criticism than through any other channel: hence he is greatest here; his theological and reli- gious criticism shows him to lessadvantage. Sainte- Beuve tried poetry and fiction, but did not find a complete outlet for his talent till he tried criti- cism. Not a profound or original mind, but a won- derfully flexible, tolerant, sympathetic, engaging one; a climbing plant, one might say, that needed some support to display itself to the best advantage. We say of the French mind generally that it is more truly a critical mind than the English; it finds in criticism a better field for the display of its special gifts — taste, clearness, brevity, flexibility, judgment —than does the more original and profoundly emo- tional English. French criticism is rarely profound, but it is always light, apt, graceful, delicate, lucid, felicitous, — clear sense and good taste marvelously blended. Criticism in its scientific aspects or as a purely intellectual effort —a search for the exact truth, a sifting of evidence, weighing and comparing data, dis- entangling testimony, separating the false from the 98 LITERARY VALUES true, as with the lawyer, the doctor, the man of science, the critic of old texts and documents — is one thing. Criticism of literature and art, in- volving questions of taste, style, poetic and artistic values, is quite another, and demands quite other powers. In the former case it is mainly judicial, dispassionate, impersonal; in the latter case the sympathies and special predilections are more in- volved. We seek more or less to interpret the im- aginative writer, to draw out and emphasize his special quality and stimulus, to fuse him and restate him in other terms; and in doing this we give our- selves more freely. We cannot fully interpret what we do not love, and love has eyes the judgment knows not of. What a man was born to say, what he speaks out of his most radical selfhood, — that the same fate and power in you can alone fully estimate and interpret. vi One’s search after the truth in subjective matters is more or less a search after one’s self, after what is agreeable to one’s constitutional bias or innate partialities. We do not see the thing as it is in itself so much as we see it as it stands related to our individual fragment of existence. The lesson we are slowest to learn and to act upon is the rela- tivity of truth in all these matters, or that it is what we make it. It is a product of the mind, as the apple is of the tree. We get one kind of truth from Renan, another from Taine, still another from CRITICISM AND THE MAN 99 Ruskin or Carlyle or Arnold. The quality differs according as the minds or spirits differ whence the truth proceeds. Do we expect all the apples in the orchard to be alike ? In general qualities, but not in particular flavors; and in literature it is the particular flavor that is most precious. It is the quality imparted to the truth by the conceiving mind that we prize. It is a long while before we rise to the perception that opposites are true, that contrary types equally serve. ‘One supreme does not contradict another supreme,”’ says Whitman, ‘any more than one eye- sight contravenes another eyesight, or one hearing contravenes another hearing.” Great men have been radical and great men have been conservative ; great men have been orthodox and they have been heterodox; they have been forces of expansion and they have been forces of contraction. In literature, it is good to be a realist, and it is good to be a romanticist ; it is good to bea Dumas, and it is good to be a Zola; it is good to be a Carlyle, and it is good to be a Mazzini, — always provided that one is so from the inside and not from without, from origi- nal conviction and not from hearsay or conformity. A man makes his way in the world amid opposing forces; he becomes something only by overcoming something ; there is always a struggle for survival, and always merit in that which survives. Let each be perfect after its kind. We do not object to the Gothic type of mind because it is not the classic, nor to the Englishman because he is not the French- 100 LITERARY VALUES man. We look for the measure of nature or natural force and authority in these types. Nature is of all types; she is of to-day as well as of yesterday; she is of this century as well as of the first; she was with Burns as well as with Pindar. Because the Greek was natural, shall we say therefore nature is Greek ? She is Asiatic, Icelandic, Saxon, Celtic, American, as well. She is all things to all men; and without her nothing is that is. VII Truth is both subjective and objective. The for- mer is what is agreeable to one’s constitution and point of view, or mental and spiritual make-up. Objective truth is verifiable truth, or what agrees with outward facts and conditions. Criticism deals with both aspects. It is objective when it is directed upon objective or verifiable facts ; it is subjective when it is directed upon subjective facts. It is an objective fact, for instance, that such a man as Shakespeare lived in such a country in such a time, that he wrote various plays of such and such a character, and that these plays were founded upon other plays or legends or histories. But the poetic truth, the poetic beauty of these plays, their covert meanings, the philosophy that lies back of them, are not in the same sense objective facts. In these respects no two persons read them just alike. Hamlet has been interpreted in many ways. Which Hamlet is the true one, Goethe’s, or Coleridge’s, or Hazlitt’s, or Kean’s, or Booth’s? ach is true, so CRITICISM AND THE MAN 101 far as it expresses a real and vital conception begot- ten by the poet upon the critic’s or the actor’s mind. The beauty of a poem or any work of art is not an objective something patent to all; it is an experience of the mind which we each have in different degrees. In fact, the field of our esthetic perceptions and enjoyments is no more fixed and definite than is the field of our religious percep- tions and enjoyments, and we diverge from one an- other in the one case as much asin the other. This divergence is of course, in both cases, mainly super- ficial; it is in form and not in essence. Religions perish, but religion remains. Styles of art pass, but art abides. Go deep enough and we all agree, because human nature is fundamentally the same everywhere, All that I mean to say is that the out- ward expressions of art differ in different ages and among different races as much as do the outward expressions of religion. In all these matters the sub- jective element plays an important part. Is Brown- ing a greater poet than Tennyson? Is Thackeray a greater novelist than Dickens? Has Newman a- better style than Arnold? Is Poe our greatest poet, as many British critics think ? These and all sim- ilar questions involve the personal equation of the critic, and his answer to them will be given more by his unconscious than by his conscious self. The appeal is not so much to his rational faculties as to his secret affinities or his esthetic perceptions. You can move a man’s reason, but you cannot by any similar process change his taste or his faith. If we 102 LITERARY VALUES are not by nature committed to certain views, we are committed to a certain habit of mind, to a cer- tain moral and spiritual attitude, which makes these views almost inevitable to us. “It is not given to all minds,” says Sainte-Beuve, “to feel and to relish equally the peculiar beauties and excellences of Mas- sillon,” or, it may be added, of any other author, especially if he be of marked individuality. We do not and cannot all have the same measure of appreciation of Emerson, or Wordsworth, or Rus- kin, or Whitman, or Browning. To enjoy these men “sincerely and without weariness is a quality and almost a peculiarity of certain minds, which may serve to define them.” Sainte-Beuve himself was chiefly interested in an author’s character, — “in what was most individual in his personality.” He had no arbitrary rules, touchstones, or systems, but pressed each new work gently, almost caressingly, till it gave up its characteristic quality and flavor. But the objective consideration of the merits of a man’s work does not and cannot preclude or measure the subjective attraction or repulsion or indifference which we do or do not feel toward that work. Something deeper and more potent than reason is at work here. Back of the most impartial literary judgment lies the fact that the critic is a person; that he is of a certain race, family, temperament, environment; that he is naturally cold or sympa- thetic, liberal or reactionary, tolerant or intolerant, and therefore has his individual likes and dislikes ; that certain types attract him more than others; CRITICISM AND THE MAN 103 that, of two poets of equal power, the voice of one moves him more than that of the other. Something as subtle and vital and hard to analyze as the flavor of a fruit, and analogous to it, makes him prefer this poet to that. One may see clearly the superi- ority of Milton over Wordsworth, and yet cleave to the latter. How beautiful is “‘ Lycidas,” yet it left Dr. Johnson cold and critical. There is much more of a cry —a real cry of the heart —in Arnold’s “ Thyrsis.”” One feels that the passion is real in one, and assumed in the other. Is “ Lycidas”’ therefore less a creative work? The affirmative side of the question is not without support. Johnson under- valued some of Gray’s best work; the touch of sym- pathy was lacking. This touch of sympathy does not wait upon the critical judgment, but often underruns and outruns it. It is said that Miss Martineau found “Tom Jones” dull reading, that Charlotte Bronté cared not for Jane Austen, and that Thack- eray placed Cooper above Scott, —all, no doubt, from a lack of the quickening touch of sympathy, As arule, we have more sympathy with the au- thors of our own country than with those of another. Few Englishmen can do justice to Victor Hugo, and even to some Frenchmen he is a “ gigantic blusterer.”’ It is equally hard for a Frenchman to appreciate Carlyle, and how absurd seems Voltaire’s verdict upon Shakespeare, — ‘‘a drunken savage’! The French mind is preéminently a critical mind, yet in France there are and have been as many schools of criticism as of poetry or philosophy or romance. 104 LITERARY VALUES Different types of mind, individual idiosyncrasy, op- posing theories and methods, stand out just as clearly in this branch as in any other branch of mental ac- tivity. From Madame de Staél down through Ba- rante, Villemain, Nisard, Sainte-Beuve, to Brunetiére and the critics of our own day, criticism has been in- dividualistic, and has reflected as many types of mind and points of view as there have been critics. Where shall we look for the final criticism? First it is classicism that rules, then it is romanticism, then naturalism, and next, we are told, it is to be idealism. Whichever it is, it is true enough when uttered by vital and earnest minds, and serves its purpose. There are many excellences, but where is the supreme excellence ? The naturalism of Sainte-Beuve is ex- cellent, the positivism of Nisard is excellent, the classicism of Brunetiére is excellent, and the deter- minism of Taine yields interesting results; but all are relative, all are experimental, all are subject to revision. It is given to no man to have a mono- poly of truth. It is given to no poet to have a mo- nopoly of beauty. There is one beauty of Milton, another of Wordsworth, another of Burns, another of Tennyson. To seize upon and draw out the char- acteristic beauty of each, and give his reader a lively sense of it, is the business of the critic, VIII Our reading is a search for the excellent, for the vital and characteristic, which may assume as many and diverse forms in art and literature as it does CRITICISM AND THE MAN 105 in life and nature. The savant, the scientist, the moralist, the philosopher, may have pleasure in a work that gives little or no pleasure to the literary artist. Criticism may be looked upon as a search for these various values or various phases of truth, which the critic expresses in terms of his own taste, knowledge, insight, etc., for scientific values, philo- sophical values, literary and poetic values, or moral and religious values, acccording to the subject upon which the critical mind is directed. No two men look for exactly the same values, nor have the same measure of appreciation of them. Emerson and Lowell, for instance, make quite different demands and form different estimates of the poets they read. Lowell lays the emphasis upon the conventional literary values, Emerson more upon spiritual and religious values. An Englishman will find values in the poets of his own country that a Frenchman does not find, and a Frenchman, values in his poets that an Englishman does not find. See how Schérer and Taine handled Milton. Milton’s great epic has poetic and literary value, often of a high order, but as philosophy or religion it is grotesque. Ix Yet let me not seem to underrate the value of what is called judicial criticism. Criticism as an act of judgment, as a disinterested endeavor to see the thing as it is in itself and as it stands related to other things, is justly jealous of our personal tastes and preferences. These tastes and preferences may blind 106 LITERARY VALUES us to the truth. Can we admire above them, or even against them? To cherish no writers but those of our own stripe or mental complexion is the way of the half cultured. Can we rise to a disin- terested view? The danger of individualism in letters is caprice, bias, partial views; the danger of intellectualism is the cold, the colorless, the formal. The ideal critic will blend the two; he will be disinterested and yet sympathetic, individual and yet escape caprice and bias, warm with interest and yet cool with judgment; surrendering himself to his subject and yet not losing himself in it, upholding tradition and yet welcoming new talent, giving the personal equation free play without blurring the light of the impersonal intelligence. From the point of view of intellectualism, criticism seeks to elimi- nate the personal equation, that which is private and peculiar to us as individuals, and to base criticism upon something like universal principles. What we crave, what our minds literally feed upon, may blind us to the truly excellent. Our wants are personal ; what we should aim at is an excellence that is imper- sonal. When we rise to the sphere of the disinter- ested, we lose sight of our individual tastes and pre- dilections. The question then is, not what we want, not what we have a taste for, but what we are ca- pable of appreciating. Can we appreciate the best ? Can we share the universal mind to the extent of delighting in the best that has been known and thought in the world ? Emerson said he was always glad to meet people who saw the superiority of Shake- CRITICISM AND THE MAN 107 speare to all other poets. If we prefer Pope to Shake- speare, as we are apt to ata certain age, we may know by that that there is an excellence beyond our reach. It is certain that the mass of readers will not appre- ciate the best literature, but only the second or third best. A man’s esthetic perceptions may be broadened and educated as well as his intellectual. An unread man feels little interest beyond his own neighbor- hood, — the personal doings of the men and women he sees and knows. Educate him a little, give him his county paper, and the sphere of his interests is wid- ened ; a little more, and he takes an interest in his State; more still, and he broadens out to his whole country ; still more, and the whole world is within his sympathy and ken. So in the esthetic sphere; he gets beyond his personal tastes and wants into the great world currents of literature and art. He can appreciate works written in other ages and lands, and that are quite foreign to his own temperament and outlook. This is to be disinterested. To emanci- pate the taste is as much as to emancipate the intel- lect; to rise above one’s personal affinities is as much as to rise above one’s personal prejudices and supersti- tions. The boy of a certain stamp has an affinity for the dime novel; if we can lift him to an apprecia- tion of Scott, or Thackeray, or Hawthorne, how have we emancipated his taste! So that Brunetiére was right in saying that, in art and literature, the begin- ning of wisdom is to distrust what we like. Distrust, not repudiate. ‘Let us examine first and see upon what grounds we like it, —see if we ought to like 108 LITERARY VALUES it; see if it is akin to that which is of permanent value in the world’s best thought. A French critic tells a story of a man who sat cool and unmoved under a sermon that made the people about him shed torrents of tears, and who excused himself by saying, ‘I do not belong to this parish.” One’s tastes must be broader than one’s parish. I suppose any of our religious brethren would feel a little shy of weeping in the church of a religious denomination not his own. Our religion is no more emancipated than are our tastes. Lowell says there are born Popists and born Wordsworthians; but the more these types can get out of their limitations and ap- preciate one another, the more they are emancipated. Vv RECENT PHASES OF LITERARY CRITICISM I HE criticism of criticism is one of the marked literary characteristics of the last ten or fifteen years, both in this country and in Europe. It is seen in France in Brunetiére’s essays and in Hen- nequin’s “Scientific Criticism ;” in England in the recent work of Wm. B. Wordsfold on the “ Princi- ples of Criticism ” and in Mr. John M. Robertson’s two volumes of ‘‘ Essays toward a Critical Method ;” in this country in Mr. Howells’s “Criticism and Fiction,” in Prof. Johnson’s “Elements of Criti- cism ”’ and in the still more recent work of Professor Sears on ‘“ Methods and Principles of Criticism,” besides the numerous discussions of the subject in the magazines and literary journals. A Western college professor lately discussed some phases of the subject under the head of “ Demo- cratic Criticism ;”? whereupon other college profes- sors raised the voice of protest, one of them asking ironically, Why not have a democratic botany and zodlogy and geology and astronomy ? I think it may be said in reply that, so far as democracy is based upon natural law and means free inquiry, a fair 110 LITERARY VALUES field and no favor, we have these things already. All science is democratic, in the sense that it is no respecter of persons, has no partialities, stops at no arbitrary boundaries, and places all things on an equal footing before natural law. Surely the spirit of science makes directly for democracy. When science shows us that the universe is all made of one stuff, that the celestial laws, as Whitman said, do not need to be worked over and rectified, that inherent power and worth alone finally tell, and that there is not one rule for the heavens above and another for the earth below, it is making smooth the way for democratic ideas and ideals. Still, pure science is outside the domain of litera- ture, and does not reflect a people’s life and character as literature does. It does not hold the mirror of man’s imagination up to nature, but resolves nature in the alembic of his understanding. It is not an exponent of personality, as art is, but an index of the development and progress of the impersonal reason. But when we enter the region of the senti- ments and the emotions —the subjective world of criticism, literature, art — the case is different. Here we find reflected social and arbitrary distinctions ; here we find mirrored the spirit and temper of men as they are acted upon and modified by the social organism and the ideals of different times and races. A democratic community will have standards of excellence in art and criticism differing from those of an aristocratic community, and will be drawn by different qualities. It seems to me that Dr. Triggs RECENT PHASES OF LITERARY CRITICISM 111 was quite right in saying that a criticism that esti- mates literary products according to absolute stand- ards, that clings to the past, that cultivates the academic spirit, that is exclusive and unsympathetic, may justly be called aristocratic; and that a crit- icism that follows more the comparative method, that adheres to principles instead of to standards, and lays the stress upon the vital and the character- istic in a man’s work, rather than upon its form and extrinsic beauty, is essentially democratic. No doubt the ideal of the monumental works of antiquity is essentially anti-democratic. It was fostered by an exclusive culture. It goes with the idea of the divine right of kings, of a privileged class, and is at war with the spirit of our times. The Catholic tradition in religion and the classical tradition in literature are as foreign to the spirit of democracy as is the monarchical tradition in poli- tics. They are all branches from the same root. The classical tradition begat Milton, but it did not beget Shakespeare, the most marvelous genius of the modern world. To the classic tradition, as it spoke through Voltaire, Shakespeare was a barbarian. In- deed, Shakespeare’s art was essentially democratic, how much soever it may have occupied itself with royal and aristocratic personages. It is as free as an uncaged bird, and pays no tribute to classic models, Its aim is inward movement, fusion, and vitality, rather than outward harmony and proportion. A Greek play is like a Greek temple, — chaste, severe, symmetrical, beautiful. A play of Shakespeare is, as 112 LITERARY VALUES Dr. Johnson long ago suggested, more like a wood or a piece of free nature. II Democratic and aristocratic may not be the best terms to apply to the two opposing types of critics, —men like Matthew Arnold or the French critic Ferdinand Brunetiére, on the one hand, both the spokesmen of authority in letters; and men like Sainte-Beuve and Anatole France, and the younger generation of English and American critics on the other, men who are more tolerant of individual differences and more inclined to seek the reason of each work within itself. Yet these terms indicate fairly well two profoundly different types. Brunetiére is a militant and dogmatic critic, as we saw by his severe denunciation of Zola while lectur- ing in this country a few years since. One of his eulogists speaks of him as the “ autocrat of trium- phant convictions.” Of democratic blood in his veins there is very little. He reflects the old ortho- dox and aristocratic spirit in his dictum that nature is not to be trusted; that both in taste and in morals what comes natural to us and gives us pleasure is, for that very reason, to be avoided. Nature is depraved. In morals, would we attain to virtue, we must go counter to her; and in art and literature, would we attain to wisdom, we must distrust what we like. This suspicion of nature was the keynote of the old theology, which found its authority in a mirac- ulous revelation, and it is the keynote of the old RECENT PHASES OF LITERARY CRITICISM 113 Aristotelian criticism, which found its authority in a body of rules deduced from the masters. The new theology looks for a scientific basis for its morals, or seeks for the sanction of nature herself ; and demo- cratic criticism aims to stand upon the same basis, and cleaves to principles and not to standards, not by yielding to the caprices of uninformed taste, but by seeking the law and test of every work within itself. We no longer judge of the worth of a man by his creed, but by what he is in and of himself; by his natural virtues and aptitudes; and we no longer con- demn a work of art because it breaks with the old traditions. Arnold was of similar temper with Brunetiére. His elements of style are “ dignity and distinction,” a part of the classic tradition, a survival from the feudal and aristocratic world, from a literature of courts and courtiers, as distinguished from a litera- ture of the people, a democratic literature. Distinc- tion of utterance, distinction of manners, distinction of dress and equipage — they are all of a piece, and adhere in the aristocratic and monarchical ideal. The special antipathy of this ideal is the common; all commonness is vulgar. When Arnold came to this country and became interested in the lives of Grant and Lincoln, he found them both wanting in distinction, — there was no savor of the aristocratic in their words or manners, And the criticism is true. From all accounts, Grant presented a far less distinguished appearance at Appomattox than did Lee ; and Lincoln was easily outshone in aristocratic 114 LITERARY VALUES graces by some members of his cabinet. Indeed, the predominant quality of the two men was their immense commonness. Washington and Jefferson came much nearer the aristocratic ideal. Lincoln and Grant both had greatness of the first order, but their type was democratic and not aristocratic. The aristocratic ideal of excellence embraces other quali- ties; there is more pride, more exclusiveness in it; it holds more by traditions and special privileges. Lincoln had less distinction than Sumner or Chase, Grant less than Sherman or Lee, but each had an excellence the others had not. The choice, the re- fined, the cultured, belong to one class of excel- lencies: the qualities of Lincoln and Grant belong to another and more fundamental kind. Arnold himself had distinction, he had urbanity, lucid- ity, proportion, and many other classic virtues, — but he had not breadth, sympathy, heartiness, com- monness. The quality of distinction, an air of something choice, high-bred, superfine, will doubt- less count for less and less in a country like ours. In literature and in character we are looking for other values, for the true, the vital, the characteris- tic. There is nothing in life or character more win- some than commonness wedded to great excellence ; the ordinary crowned with the extraordinary, as in Lincoln the man, Socrates the philosopher, Burns or Wordsworth the poet. Distinction wins admi- ration, commonness wins love. The note of equal- ity, the democratic note, is much more pronounced in Browning than in Tennyson, in Shelley than in RECENT PHASES OF LITERARY CRITICISM 115 Arnold, in Wordsworth than in Milton, and it is more pronounced in American poets than in English. In times and for a people like ours, the suggestion of something hearty and heroic in letters is more needed than the suggestion of something fine and exquisite. Distinction is not to be confounded with dignity or elevation, which flourishes more or less in all great peoples. A common laboring man may show great dignity, but never distinction. Dignity often shone in the speeches of the old Indian chiefs, but not distinction, as the term is here used. The more points at which a man touches his fel- low man, the more democratic he is. The breadth of his relation to the rest of the world, that is the test. Sainte-Beuve was more truly a democratic critic than is Brunetiere. The democratic pro- ducer in literature will differ from the aristocratic less in his standards of excellence than in the at- mosphere of human equality and commonness which he effuses. We are too apt to associate the common with the vulgar. There is the commonness of a Lincoln or a Grant, and there is the commonness of the lower strata of society. There is the common- ness of earth, air, and water, and there is the com- monness of dust and mud; the commonness of the basic and the universal, and the commonness of the cheap and tawdry. Grant’s calmness, self-control, tenacity of purpose, modesty, comprehensiveness of mind, were uncommon in degree, not in kind. He was the common soldier with extraordinary powers added, but the common soldier was always visible. 116 LITERARY VALUES So with Lincoln, — his greatness was inclusive, not exclusive. III So far as good taste means “ good form,” and so far as good form is established by social and conven- tional usages of the fashionable world, the poet of democracy has little to do with it. But so far as it is based upon the inherent fitness of things and the health and development of the best there is in a man, so far is he bound to enlist himself in its service. In a world where everybody is educated and reads books, much poor literature will circulate ; but will not the good, the best, circulate also ? Will there not be the few good judges, the saving rem- nant? Is there not as much good taste and right reason now in England or France as during more rigidly monarchical times ? The ideal democracy is not the triumph of bar- barism or the riot of vulgarity, but it is the triumph of right reason and natural equality and inequality. Some things are better than others, better from the point of view of the whole of life. These better things we must cling to and make much of in a demo- cracy, as in an aristocracy. We must aspire to the best that is known and thought in the world. This best a privileged class seeks to appropriate to itself; a democracy seeks to share it with all. All are not capable of receiving it, but all may try. They will be better able to-morrow if they have the chance to-day. We must not ignore the vulgarity, the bad taste incident to democratic conditions. If we do, RECENT PHASES OF LITERARY CRITICISM 117 we never get rid of them, Political equality brings to the foreground many unhandsome human traits, the loud, the mediocre, the insolent, etc. All the more must we fix attention upon the true, the noble, the heroic, the disinterested. The rule of temper- ance, of good taste, of right reason, antedates any and every social condition. ‘Democracy cannot ab- rogate fundamental principles. The essential condi- tions of life are not changed, but arbitrary, accidental conditions are modified. One still needs food and raiment and shelter and transportation; he is still subject to the old hindrances and discouragements within himself. We must give the terms good taste, right reason a broader scope; that is all. The principles of good taste when applied to art are not fixed and absolute, like those of mathematics or the exact sciences. They are vital and elastic. They imply a certain fitness and consistency. Shakespeare shocked the classic taste of the French critics. He violated the unities and mixed prose and poetry. But what was good taste in Shakespeare — that is, in keeping with his spirit and aim — might be bad taste in Racine. What is permissible to an elemental poet like Whit- man would jar in a refined poet like Longfellow. But bad taste in Whitman, that is, things not in keeping with the ideal he has before him, jar the same as in any other poet. He has many lines and passages and whole poems that set the teeth of many readers on edge, that are yet in perfect keeping with his plan and spirit. They go with the poet of the 118 LITERARY VALUES Cosmos, but not with the poet of the drawing-room or library. My taste is not shocked, but my cour- age is challenged. In Whitman’s case the appeal is not so directly and exclusively to our esthetic perceptions as it is in most other poets; he is elemental where they are cultured and artificial; at the same time he can no more escape esthetic principles than they can. Because a flower, a gem, a well-kept lawn, etc., are beautiful, we are not compelled to deny beauty to rocks, trees, and mountains. If Whitman does not, in his total effects, attain to something like this kind of beauty, he is not a poet. IV I have said that Sainte-Beuve was more truly a democratic critic than is M. Brunetiére. He is more tolerant of individualism in letters. He called him- self a naturalist of minds. His main interest in each work was in what was most individual and characteristic in it. He was inclusive rather than exclusive, less given to positive judgments, but more to sympathetic interpretation. He united the method of Darwin to the sensibility of the artist. Critics like Arnold and Brunetiére uphold the classic and academic traditions. They are aristocratic because they are the spokesmen of an exclusive culture. They derive from Catholicism more than from Pro- testantism; they uphold authority rather than en- courage individuality in life and letters. In criti- cism they aim at that intellectual disinterestedness RECENT PHASES OF LITERARY CRITICISM 119 which is indeed admirable, and which has given the world such noble results, but which seems unsuited to the genius of our time. Ours is a democratic century, a Protestant century. Individualism has been the dominant note in literature. The men of power, for the most part, have not been the disin- terested, but the interested men, the men of convic- tion and of more or less partial views, who have not so much aimed to see the thing as it is in itself as they have aimed to make others see it as they saw it. In other words, they have been preachers, doctrinaires, men bent upon the dissemination of particular ideas. One has only to run over the list of the foremost names in literature for the past seventy-five years, There is Tolstoi, in Russia, clearly one of the great world writers, but a doctrinaire through and through. There are Renan, Victor Hugo, Taine, Thiers, Guizot, in France; Wordsworth, Coleridge, Carlyle, Ruskin, Newman, Huxley, George Eliot, Mrs. Ward, in English literature, and in American literature Emerson, Whitman, and Thoreau. All these writers had aims ulterior to those of pure literature. They were not disinterested observers and recorders. They obtruded their personal opinions and convic- tions. They are the writers with a message. Their thoughts spring from some special bent or experience, and address themselves to some special mood or want. They wrote the books that help us, that often come to us as revelations; works of art, it may be, but of art in subjection to moral conviction, and they 120 LITERARY VALUES are directed to other than purely esthetic ends. They gave expression to their individual tastes and predilections; they were more or less tethered to their own egos; they may be called the personal authors, as their predecessors may be called the im- personal. They are not of the pure breed of men of letters, but represent crosses of various kinds, as the cross of the artist with the thinker, the savant, the theologian, the man of science, the reformer, the preacher. These personal authors belong to the modern world rather than to the ancient; to a time of individualism rather than to a time of institution- alism; to an industrial and democratic age, rather than to an imperial and military age. Modern life is undoubtedly becoming more and more impersonal in the sense that it favors less and less the growth and preservation of great personali- ties, yet its utilitarian spirit, its tendency to speciali- zation, its right of private judgment, and its religious doubts and unrest, find their outcome in individ- ualism in literature. The disinterested critics and recorders are still among us, but power has departed from them. The age is too serious, the questions are too pressing. ‘The man of genius is no longer at ease in Zion. If he rises at all above the masses, he must share the burden of thought and conscience of his times. This burden may hinder the free artis- tic play of his powers, as it probably has in most of the writers I have mentioned, yet it will greatly deepen the impression his words will make. The saying “Art for art’s sake’? cannot be impeached, RECENT PHASES OF LITERARY CRITICISM 121 even by Tolstoi. When rightly understood, it is true. Art would live in the whole, and not in the part called morals or religion, or even beauty. But its exponents in our day have been, with few excep- tions, of a feeble type, men of words and fancies like Swinburne or Poe. In Tennyson we have as pure a specimen of artistic genius as in Shakespeare, but a far less potent one. His power comes when he thrills and vibrates with some special thought or ery of his time. With the great swarms of our minor poets the complaint is, not that the type is not pure, but that the inspiration is feeble. They have more ‘art than nature. It is the same with the novelists. Since Hawthorne and Thackeray the pure artistic gift has no longer been the endowment of great or profound personalities. George Eliot, Mrs. Ward, Tolstoi, all interested writers, all with aims foreign to pure art, are the names of power in our half of the century. Henry James is a much finer artist, but he has nothing like their hold upon the great common elements of human life. The disinterested writer gives us a higher, more unselfish pleasure than the type I am considering; we are compelled to rise more completely out of ourselves to meet him. Iam only insisting that in our day he has little penetration, and that the men of power have been of the other class. I have placed Taine among the interested critics ; he was interested in putting through certain ideas; he had a thesis to uphold; he will not value all truths equally, he will take what suits him. Like 122 LITERARY VALUES all men with preconceived ideas, his mind was more like a searchlight than like a lamp. This makes him stimulating asa critic, but not always satisfying. The same is true of our own Emerson, probably our most stimulating and fertilizing mind thus far. Lowell, as a man of letters, is of a much purer strain ; he is in the direct line of succession of the great literary names, yet the value of his contribution undoubtedly falls far short of that of Emerson. As a poet, Emerson was a poor singer with wonderfully penetrating tones, almost unequaled in this respect. The same may be said of him as a critic; he was a poor critic with a wonderfully penetrating glance. He had the hawk’s eye for the game he was looking for; he could see it amid any tangle of woods or thicket of the commonplace, His special limitation is that he was looking for a particular kind of prey. His sympathies were narrow but intense. The elec- tive affinities were very active in his criticism. He loved Emersonian poetry, he loved the Emersonian paradoxes, he valued the wild eolian tones; he de- lighted in the word that gave the prick and sting of the electric spark; abruptness, surprise, the sudden, intense, forked sentence — these took him, these he dealtin. His survey of any man or matter is never a complete one, never a disinterested one, never done in the scientific spirit. He writes about representa- tive men, and exploits Plato, Goethe, Montaigne, etc., in relation to his thought. He is always on quests for particular ideas, in search for Emersonian values. He will not do justice to such poets as Poe and RECENT PHASES OF LITERARY CRITICISM 123 Shelley, but he will do more than justice to Donne and Herbert; he finds in them what he sets out to find; it is a partial view, but it is penetrating and valuable; it is not criticism, and does not set out to be; it is a suggestive study of kindred souls. Emerson’s work is kindling and inspiring; it un- settles rather than settles; it is not a lamp to guide your feet, it is a star to give you your bearings. Carlyle and Ruskin fall into the same category. They sin against the classic virtues of repose, pro- portion, serenity, but this makes their penetrating power all the greater. Carlyle cannot rank with the great impartial historians, yet as a painter of histori- cal characters and scenes the vividness and reality of his pictures are almost unequaled. Carlyle lacked the disinterestedness of the true artist. He had great power of description and characterization, but he could not as an historian stand apart from his subject as the great Greek and Roman historians do. He is a portion of all that he sees and describes, He is bent upon persuasion quite as much as upon portrayal. He could not succeed as a novelist or a poet, because of his vehement, intolerant nature. He succeeds as an historian only in portraying men in whom he sees the lineaments of his own character, as in Cromwell. He did not or could not live in the whole, as did his master, Goethe. His mind was a steep incline. His opinions were like mountain torrents. Arnold, in one of his letters, complained that in his criticism of Goethe there was too much of engouement, — too much, I suppose, of the fond- 124 LITERARY VALUES ness of the gourmand fora particular dish, or of the toper for his favorite tipple. His enthusiasm was intemperate, and therefore unsound. Doubtless some such objection as this may be urged against most of Carlyle’s criticisms. He was ruled by his character more than by his intellect; his feeling guided his vision. If he is not always a light to the reason, he is certainly an electric excitant to the imagination and the moral sense. In his essays, pamphlets, histories, we hardly get judicial estimates of things; rather do we get overestimates or un- der estimates. Yet always is there something that kindles and brings the blood to the surface. Car- lyle will beget a stronger race than Arnold, but it will not be so cool and clear-headed. Emerson will fertilize more minds with new thought than Lowell, but there will be many more cranks and fanatics and hobbyists among them. Professor Dowden says Landor falls below Shelley and Wordsworth because he had no divine message or oracle to deliver to the men of his generation, — no authentic word of the Lord to utter. Landor had great thoughts, but they were not of first-rate impor- tance with reference to his times. He was more thoroughly imbued with the classic spirit than either Shelley or Wordsworth, and the classic spirit is at ease in Zion. The modern world differs from the ancient in its moral stress and fervor. This moral stress and fervor both Shelley and Wordsworth shared, but Landor did not. Where would the world be in thought, in works, in civilization, had RECENT PHASES OF LITERARY CRITICISM 125 there been no one-sided, overloaded, fanatical men, —wmen of partial views, of half-truths, of one idea ? Where would Christianity have been, under the play of disinterested intellect, without disciples, without devotees, without saints and martyrs, without its Paul and its Luther, without prejudice, without superstition, without inflexibility ? We might fitly contrast these two types of mind under the heads of Protestant and Catholic, the one personal, the other impersonal. With the Protest- ant type goes individualism, which, as I have said, is so marked a feature of the modern world. With the Catholic type goes institutionalism, which was so marked a feature of the ancient world. With the former goes the right of private judgment, inno- vation, progress, new forms of art; with the latter goes authority, obedience, the power of the past. The Protestant type is more capricious and willful ; it is restless, venturesome, impatient of rules and precedents; the older type is more serene, composed, conservative, orderly. In criticism it is more objec- tive ; it upholds the standards, it lays down the law; it cherishes the academic spirit. The French mind is the more Catholic; the English the more Protest- ant. In literature the Protestant type is the more subjective and creative; it makes new discoveries, it founds new orders. Catholicism is exterior, formal, imposing; it takes little account of personal needs and peculiarities, while Protestantism is almost en- tirely concerned with the private, interior world. Individualism in religion begat Protestantism, and 126 LITERARY VALUES upon Protestantism it begat the numerous progeny of the sects, the thousand and one isms that now divide the religious world. To this spirit religion is something personal and private to every man, and in no sense a matter of forms and rituals. In fact, in- dividualism fairly confronts institutionalism. This spirit carried into the region of esthetics or liter- ature gives rise to like results, — to a freer play of personal taste and preferences, to more intense indi- vidual utterances, to new and unique types of artistic genius, and to new lines of activity in the esthetic field. Another name for it is the democratic spirit. Its special dangers are the crude, the odd, the capricious, just as the danger of institutionalism is the coldly formal, the lifeless, the traditional. In English lit- erature the former begat Shakespeare, as it did Tup- per; the latter begat Milton, as it did Young and Pollock. With institutionalism goes the divine right of kings, the sacredness of priests, the authority of forms and ceremonies, and the slavery of the masses; with individualism goes the divinity of man, the sacredness of life, the right of private judgment, the decay of traditions and forms, and the birth of the modern spirit. With one goes stateliness, impressiveness, distinction, as well as the empty, the moribund, the despotic; with the other goes force, strenuousness, originality, as well as the loud, the amorphous, the fanatical. RECENT PHASES OF LITERARY CRITICISM 127 Vv Goethe said that a loving interest in the per- son and the works of an author, amounting to a certain one-sided enthusiasm, alone led to reality in criticism ; all else was vanity. No doubt more will come of the contact of two minds under these cir- cumstances than from what is called the judicial attitude; there will be more complete fusion and interpenetration ; without a certain warmth and pas- sion there is no fruitfulness, even in criticism. In the field of art and literature, to be disinterested does not mean to be cold and judicial; it means to be free from bias, free from theories and systems, with mind open to receive a clear impression of the work’s characteristic merits and qualities, It is tradition that always stands in the way of the new man. In politics, it is the political tradi- tion; in religion, the religious tradition; and in literature, the literary tradition. Professional criti- cism is the guardian of the literary tradition, and this is why any man who essays a new departure in literary art has reason to fear criticism or despise it, as the case may be. It is when we take up any new work in the judi- cial spirit, bent upon judging and classifying, rather than upon enjoying and understanding, the conscious analytical intellect on duty and the sympathies and the intuitions under lock and key, that there is danger that judicial blindness will fall upon us, When we approach nature in the spirit of technical 128 LITERARY VALUES science, our minds already preoccupied with certain conclusions and systems, do we get as much of the joy and stimulus which she holds for us as do the children on the way to school of a spring morning with their hands full of wild flowers, or as does the gleesome saunterer over hills in summer with only love and appreciation uppermost in his mind ? Professional criticism often becomes mere pedago- gical narrowness and hardness; it gets crushed over with rules and precedents, pinched and sterilized by routine and convention, so that a new work makes no impression upon it. The literary tradition, like the religious tradition, ceases to be vital and forma- tive. Is it not true that all first-class works have to be approached with a certain humility and free giving of one’s self? In a sense, “except ye become as little children’ ye cannot enter the kingdom of the great books. I suppose that to get at the true inwardness of any imaginative work, we must read it as far as pos- sible in its own spirit, and that if it does not engraft and increase its own spirit upon us, then it is feeble and may easily be brushed aside. Criticism which has for its object the discovery of new talent and, in Sainte-Beuve’s words, to “ appor- tion to each kind of greatness its due influence and superiority,” is one thing; and criticism the object of which is to uphold and enforce the literary tradi- tion, is quite another. Consciously or unconsciously, when the trained reader opens a new book he is under RECENT PHASES OF LITERARY CRITICISM 129 the influence of one or the other of these notions, — either he submits himself to it disinterestedly, intent only upon seizing and appreciating its characteristic quality, or he comes prepossessed with certain rules and standards upon which his taste has been formed. In other words, he comes to the new work simply as a man, a human being seeking edification, or he comes clothed in some professional authority, seek- ing judgment. Our best reading is a search for the excellent; but what is the excellent ? Is there any final stand- ard of excellence in literature? Each may be ex- cellent after its kind, but kinds differ. There is one excellence of Milton and Arnold and the classic school, and another excellence of Shakespeare and Pope and Burns and Wordsworth and Whitman, or of the romantic and democratic school. The critic is to hold a work up to its own ideal or standard. Of the perfect works, or the works that aim at per- fection, at absolute symmetry and proportion, ap- pealing to us through the cunning of their form, scheme, structure, details, ornamentation, we make a different demand from the one we make of a prim- itive, unique, individual utterance or expression of personality like “Leaves of Grass,” in which the end is not form, but life; not perfection, but suggestion ; not intellect, but character ; not beauty, but power; not carving, or sculpture, or architecture, but the building of a man. It is no doubt a great loss to be compelled to read any work of literary art in a conscious critical mood, 130 LITERARY VALUES because the purely intellectual interest in such a work which criticism demands, is far less satisfying than our esthetic interest. The mood in which we enjoy a poem is analogous to that in which it was conceived. We have here the reason why the pro- fessional reviewer is so apt to miss the characteristic quality of the new book, and why the readers of great publishing houses make so many mistakes. They call into play a conscious mental force that is inimical to the emotional mood in which the work had its rise; what was love in the poet becomes a pale intellectual reflection in the critic. Love must come first, or there can be no true criticism; the intellectual process must follow and be begotten by an emotional process. Indeed, criti- cism is an afterthought; it is such an account as we can give of the experience we have had in private communion with the subject of it. The conscious analytical intellect takes up one by one, and exam- ines the impression made upon our subconsciousness by the new poem or novel. Where nothing has been sown, nothing can be reaped. The work that has yielded us no enjoyment will yield us no positive results in criticism. Dr. Louis Waldstein, in his suggestive work on “ The Subconscious Self,’ discovers that the critical or intellectual mood is foreign to art; that it destroys or decreases the spontaneity necessary to creation. This is why the critical and the creative faculty so rarely go together, or why one seems to work against the other. Probably in all normal, well-balanced RECENT PHASES OF LITERARY CRITICISM 181 minds the appreciation of a work of the imagination is a matter of feeling and intuition long before it is a matter of intellectual cognizance. Not all minds can give a reason for the faith that is in them, and it is not important that they should; the main mat- ter is the faith. Livery great work of art will be found upon examination to have an ample ground of critical principles to rest upon, though in the artist’s own mind not one of these principles may have been consciously defined. Indeed, the artist who works from any theory is foredoomed to at least partial failure. And art that lends itself to any propaganda, or to any idea “ out- side its essential form, falls short of being a pure art creation.” The critical spirit, when it has hardened into fixed standards, is always a bar to the enjoyment or under- standing of a poet. One then has a poetical creed, as he has a political or religious creed, and this creed is likely to stand between him and the appreciation of a new poetic type. Macaulay thought Leigh Hunt was barred from appreciating his “Lays of Ancient Rome” by his poetical creed, which may have been the case. Jeffrey was no doubt barred from appre- ciating Wordsworth by his poetical creed. It was Byron’s poetical creed that led him to rank Pope so highly. A critic who holds to one of the conflicting creeds about fiction, either that it should be realistic or romantic, will not do justice to the other type. If Tolstoi is his ideal, he will set little value on Scott; or if he exalts Hawthorne, he will depreciate 132 LITERARY VALUES Howells. What the disinterested observer demands is the best possible work of each after its kind. Or, if he is to compare and appraise the two kinds, then I think that without doubt his conclusion will be that the realistic novel is the later, maturer growth, more in keeping with the modern demand for real- ity in all fields, and that the romantic belongs more to the world of childish things, which we are fast leaving behind us. Our particular predilections in literature must, no doubt, be carefully watched. There is danger in personal absorption in an author, — danger to our intellectual freedom. One would not feel for a poet the absorbing and exclusive love that the lover feels for his mistress, because one would rather have the whole of literature for his domain. One would rather admire Rabelais with Sainte-Beuve, as a Ho- meric buffoon, than be a real “ Pantagruelist devo- tee,” who finds a flavor even in “the dregs of Mas- ter Frangois’s cask” that he prefers to all others. No doubt some of us, goaded on by the opposite vice in readers and critics, have been guilty of an intemperate enthusiasm toward Whitman and Brown- ing. To make a cult of either of these authors, or of any other, is to shut one’s self up in a part when the whole is open to him. The opposite vice, that of violent personal antipathy, is equally to be avoided in criticism. Probably Sainte-Beuve was guilty of this vice in his attitude toward Balzac; Schérer in his criticism of Béranger, and Landor in his dislike of Dante. One might also cite Emerson’s distaste RECENT PHASES OF LITERARY CRITICISM 133 for Poe and Shelley, and Arnold’s antipathy to Vic- tor Hugo’s poetry. Likes and dislikes in literature that are temperamental, that are like the attraction or repulsion of bodies in different electrical condi- tions, are hard to be avoided, but the trained reader may hope to overcome them. ‘Taste is personal, but the intellect is, or should be, impersonal, and to be able to guide the former by the light of the latter is the signal triumph of criticism. VI “THOU SHALT NOT PREACH” After Reading Tolstoi on “ What is Art?” HERE is one respect in which pure art and pure science agree: both are disinterested, and seek the truth, each of its kind, for its own sake; neither has any axe to grind. Both would live in the whole, — one through reason and investigation, the other through imagination and contemplation. Science seeks to understand the universe, art to enjoy it. A man of pure science like Darwin is as disinterested as a great artist like Shakespeare. He has no prac- tical or secondary ends ; the truth alone is his quest. He is tracing the footsteps of creative energy through organic nature. He is like a detective working up a case. His theory about it is only provisional, for the moment. Every fact is welcome to him, and the more it seems to tell against his theory of the case, the more eagerly he weighs it and studies it. Indeed, the man of science follows an ideal as truly as does the poet, and will pass by fortune, honors, and all worldly success, to cleave to it. Tolstoi thinks that science for science’ sake is as bad as art for art’s sake; but is not knowledge a reward in it- self, and is there any higher good than that mastery THOU SHALT NOT PREACH 135 of the intellect over the problems of the universe which science gives? By bending science to partic- ular and secondary ends we lay the basis of our ma- terial civilization, but it is still true that the final end of science is, not our material benefit, but our mental enlightenment; nor is the highest end of art the good which the preacher and the moralist seek to give us. A poem of Milton’s or Tennyson’s carries its own proof, its own justification. When we demand a mes- sage of the poet, or of any artist, outside of himself, outside of the truth which he unconsciously con- veys through his own personality and point of view, we degrade his art, or destroy that disinterestedness which is its crown. Art exists for ideal ends; it looks askance at devotees, at doctrinaires, at all men engaged in the dissemination of particular ideas, I am not now thinking of art as mere craft, but as the province of man’s freest, most spontaneous, most joyous, most complete soul activity, —the kind of activity that has no other end, seeks no other reward, than it finds in or of itself, the joy of being and be- holding, the free play of creative energy. Art does not rebuke vice, it depicts it; it does not urge re- form, it shows us the reformers. Its work is play, its lesson is an allegory. The preacher works by selection and exclusion, the artist by inclusion and contrast. When the resources of literary art are enlisted in any propaganda, in the dissemination of particular ideas or doctrines, or when the end is moral or sci- entific or political or philosophical, and not esthetic, 1386 LITERARY VALUES the result is a mixed product, a cross between litera- ture and something else, which may be very vigorous and serviceable, but which cannot give the kind of satisfaction that is imparted by a pure artistic crea- tion. A great poem or work of art does not speak to any special and passing condition, mental or spir- itual; its ministrations are neither those of meat nor those of medicine ; it does not subserve any private or secondary ends, even the saving of our souls, The books that seem written for us are quite certain to lose in interest to the next generation.