STRATEGY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

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

LECTURES ON THE STRATEGY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

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LONDON

HUGH REES, LTD.

119, PALL MALL, S.W.

1909

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I

EVERY campaign possesses special features distinguishing it from others, and perhaps even rendering comparison with them difficult. These differences are conditioned by topography, fertility, and climate, by national characteristics, by relative strength and efficiency, by resources, and by the character of the rival leaders.

Some acquaintance with these factors is therefore required before a just appreciation can be made of the significance of the strategical operations during the recent struggle in Manchuria.

The first item dealt with will be the geography of the seat of the war.

The soldier regards geography from a somewhat different standpoint to that adopted by the civilian.

To the latter the term geography means information as to the physical features of a country, as to its resources, climate, railways, rivers, harbours, cities, inhabitants, exports, imports, policy, etc., which will be valuable in a commercial, political, or even social sense. But the soldier looks on all countries as possible theatres of war, and though he may, and does, seek for information similar to that required by the civilian, he enquires how the various physical, meteorological, commercial, human, and political factors will affect the progress of a campaign carried out in the country the geography of which he is studying.

One of the first, if not the very first consideration, when

regarding geography from a military point of view, is therefore the communications of a potential theatre of war.

Speaking generally, the direction taken by roads is determined by the trend of the mountain ranges, which, to a certain extent, condition the flow of the water rained on to their sides, the river mouths, as a rule, also affording the best havens.

Roads usually follow the line of the least resistance—that is, the water channels—but lateral communications between river valleys cross the intervening ranges of mountains or hills at their lowest points.

Hence, to discover the general direction of roads, it is first of all necessary to obtain a clear idea of the coast-line, mountains, and rivers of an area.

Coast. The coast-line of Manchuria and Korea from Shan-hai-kuan, eastwards, extends for 2300 miles, of which 1700 belong to Korea. [See Map 1.] Though in this long stretch there are many indentations, there are but few good harbours, except in the south of Korea. Elsewhere the coast is of a shelving character, with flat mud shore sloping gradually for miles out to sea, and hardly covered with water even at high tide.

On the shores of the Pe-chi-li gulf, the difference between high and low tide is sometimes as much as twenty-five feet, but along the southern and eastern coast of Korea it does not amount to more than eight feet, and at Port Arthur and Dalny is ten or twelve feet. Commencing from the west, the first port of interest is Ying-kow, on the Liao river. Vessels drawing about seventeen feet can cross the bar at the mouth of the Liao, and can lie in the stream, which is five hundred yards or more wide, though the fair-way is much less. Ying-kow possesses wharves, lighters, etc., capable of dealing with a fair trade, but is ice-bound during five months in each year.

Following the coast-line of the Liao-tung peninsula, lying between Ying-kow and the Yalu, the next important arm of the sea is found in Fu-chou bay, where shelter may be

obtained by vessels of moderate size, but at some distance from the shore.

A more favourable anchorage is Hu-lu-shun bay, seventeen miles southwards, but this place is without facilities for landing.

To the south of Hu-lu-shun lies Society bay, with the Port Adams inlet, the latter being eighteen miles long and open to vessels of the average tramp steamer size. The shore of the inlet is, however, shelving, and there are few, if any, landing facilities.

Chin-chou bay gives little or no shelter. Louisa and Pigeon bays afford protection to small steamers, from all but westerly winds. Port Arthur is ice-free, land-locked, and of considerable extent, but has little deep water. The entrance is about five hundred to six hundred yards wide, but the fair-way available for large vessels is not much more than one hundred yards. The deep water lies in continuation of the harbour mouth. There are docks, with accommodation for cruisers and smaller craft, and fairly good workshops. The harbour bottom is of stiff clay, with rock outcrop, which makes dredging difficult. The town and harbour were protected by a complete system of works. Thirty miles north of Port Arthur is Ta-lien-wan bay, six miles long and six miles wide. To the south of this bay lies Dalny, an ice-free port, with docks, and harbour available for ships drawing thirty feet of water. Next come Yen-ta-kou, Kow-shi, and Pe-tsi-wo, also ice-free, but giving shelter only from west and south-west, and with shoal foreshore for several miles. Ta-ku-shan resembles Pe-tsi-wo, but is ice-bound for several months in the year. The mouth of the Yalu is navigable by small steam vessels, but further south the Che-chen river affords a good anchorage, though Chin-am-pho, twenty miles up the estuary of the Tai-tong river, is a better port. The river at Chin-am-pho is a mile wide, and is said to be deep, but the foreshore shelves for half a mile, and the harbour is, in winter, ice-bound.

Chem-ul-po, on the Han river, is the port of Seoul. It

is accessible to all ships throughout the year, though the anchorage is a mile from shore. In January and February the harbour is partially frozen, making discharge of cargo difficult.

Fu-san, to the south of Korea, is a fair harbour protected by an island. Gen-san, on the east of Korea, is a good port, usually ice-free in winter, but shut off from the rest of the country by steep mountains.

Vladivostock, in the Amur river province, possesses docks, and a harbour with two entrances. It is fortified, but is ice-bound for five months in each year.

Mountains. The mountains of Manchuria are, in character, a series of wooded hills, whose lower slopes, when not covered with plantations of scrub oak or hazel, are cultivated in rough terraces, whilst the higher portions often consist of bare masses of rock, affording positions accessible in only one or two places.

The hillsides, where not cleared for cultivation, are of soft soil, freely sprinkled and in some places almost covered with slabs of rock, and between the stones grow a profusion of creepers and wild flowers.

The mountain area lies east and south of a line drawn roughly from Hsiung-yao-cheng to Fu-shun.

The hills, which are volcanic in origin, trend in a general north-easterly and south-westerly direction, and consist of a number of ranges roughly parallel to one another. These are separated by fairly level valleys, from one or two miles to four hundred yards wide, each boasting a stream, which rambles over a stony and shallow, though relatively wide bed.

The principal range of hills is the Feng-shui-ling, with their southern continuation the Shui-nie-shan. The former rear themselves to a total of about 5000 feet above sea level, or 2000–3000 feet above their valleys; the latter are not more than 2000–3000 feet above the sea.

In these hills rise the Tai-tzu-Ho[1] and its tributaries, which

[1] "Ho" is the Chinese word for river, and "Ling" for pass.

flow westwards, the Ai Ho and its tributaries flowing south to join the Yalu; also the Tai-an Ho running southwards to Ta-ku-shan, and the Fu-chou river in the Liao-tung peninsula.

West of the mountain area lies a great plain, extending for one hundred and fifty miles, or more, westwards to the Mongolian hills. This plain, consisting of rich alluvial soil brought down by the great rivers Liao, Hun, and Tai-tzu, is thickly peopled, and highly cultivated, though liable to become swampy in wet weather.

The division between plain and mountain is, in most localities, distinctly marked, still, in the area between Kai-chou and Liao-Yang, at distances of about twenty or thirty miles, long, somewhat serrated ridges run westwards on to the level ground, but usually end rather abruptly near the line followed by the railway.

In the district between Liao-Yang and Mukden, the dividing line between plain and hill is still less clear, a series of isolated hills, or groups of little hills, extending for ten or fifteen miles west of the upland area, but as in the more southerly district, ceasing at or near the line of railway.

Rivers.

The principal rivers watering the mountain and plain are the Liao, the Hun and Tai-tzu. The Liao, rising in the Mongolian hills, flows at first in a north-easterly direction for three hundred miles. Then, bending south-east, it continues in this course, until, after passing the Manchurian boundary, it is turned southwards by a spur of the central Manchurian hills, and travels for three hundred miles, across the plain to which it gives its name, into the gulf of Pe-chi-li near Ying-kow. On its left bank the Liao, twenty or thirty miles above Ying-kow, receives the Hun and Tai-tzu rivers, which meet a few miles above this point. The general characteristic of all these rivers is that they run on, rather than below the plain, in broad, relatively shallow beds, and between banks raised by the silt they bring down. In the rainy season they are therefore liable to overflow,

and some ten years ago, eight days' continuous rain flooded the whole Liao plain for nearly three weeks.

Steamers drawing seventeen feet of water can, as has been noted, navigate the Liao to Ying-kow, thirteen miles from its mouth. Large junks can sail up the river for some fifty miles, small junks ascend to Hsin-ming-ting.

The Hun and Tai-tzu are navigable well above Mukden and Liao-Yang, and considerable timber trade, by means of rafts of logs cut in the higher reaches, is done on both rivers.

The Hun, south of Mukden, is three hundred to four hundred yards wide, and the Liao is of similar width at Liao-Yang. In flood both rivers apparently rise five or six feet, and are not easy to navigate owing to the rapidity of the current. They are covered with ice, from November to March, sufficiently thick to support guns.

The Yalu rises about midway across the northern boundary of Korea, and after flowing south-west for three hundred miles, empties its waters into the sea. In the upper reaches a wild region of mountain and forest is traversed, but some sixty miles from the mouth the southern bank is cultivated, though on the northern it is still enclosed by rocky hills and bluffs. The river is navigable, by junks, for about fifty miles, and small steamers can cross the bar at its mouth. At An-tung, it is over three-quarters of a mile wide.

The remaining mountain streams possess characteristics similar to the Fu-chou river. This winds along in a sandy valley, from half a mile to two or three miles wide, and flows in a stony bed, not more than two feet below the valley level, its depth, in spring, rarely exceeding two feet.

In the plain some of the tributaries of the Hun and Tai-tzu are six or eight feet below the level of the fields, but their banks are more often grass, or willow grown, than precipitous, and the depth of water is not, in spring, more than one or two feet.

Roads and Climate.

The Chinese cart, drawn by three or four mules, is the transport of Manchuria, hence almost every valley boasts a cart track, and the passes traversable by wheel transport, possess, if not good, at least practicable, though steep, roads.

No road in Manchuria is metalled, and the great Imperial and Mandarin roads differ from the others, only in that they are two or three times as wide, and, if possible, more rutty.

In many places the roads and tracks have sunk below the level of the surrounding country. This is partly due to wear, but mainly to the fact that the Chinese farmer is accustomed, annually, to remove, and use as field manure, the road surface.

So heavy do the roads become after rain, that carts habitually sink up to their axles in mud, and on these occasions the carter often seeks firmer soil by a small detour into the neighbouring ploughed fields. To prevent this, the farmer digs, at right angles to and close to the edge of the road, a series of little trenches, about eighteen inches deep and wide, and six or eight feet long.

In Manchuria, rain usually falls in July, August, and September, coming, as do the Monsoon rains in India, in bursts of from three to eight days, separated by bright intervals. During, and immediately after rain, cart traffic practically ceases, but as the soil is friable and dries quickly, the roads can be used again after two or three days' sunshine.

In October the roads freeze, and remain hard, but rough and full of ruts, until March, when the scanty snow that has covered them during winter, thaws by day. In April, the thaw regularly sets in, but the relatively hot sun soon dries the roads, and keeps them so, until the break of the Monsoon rains.

The climate is temperate to hot in summer, but is, at times, very cold in winter. The snowfall is light, but when, as happens two or three times a week, a northerly wind blows, the thermometer, by day, falls to and below zero, whilst the nights are always bitter.

The principal, that is, the most used roads, are the Imperial road from Pekin to the Yalu, and thence to Seoul. This road, which is some thirty to forty feet wide, runs, in Manchuria, from Hsin-ming-ting to Mukden, a distance of 140 miles, thence to Liao-Yang, forty miles. From this place it plunges south-eastwards into the mountains, and after crossing the Mo-tien-ling pass, about 3500 feet above the sea, and the Feng-shui-ling mountains at Len-shan-kuan, runs, by Feng-huang-cheng, to An-tung, 180 miles from Liao-Yang. In Korea, it passes by Ping-Yang to Seoul, 140 miles from An-tung.

The coast road from the Yalu to Port Arthur, via Ta-ku-shan, 230 miles. The road from Port Arthur to Kirin, via Kai-chou, Hai-cheng 230 miles, and Mukden 310 miles from Port Arthur.

Railways. The most important railways were, an extension of the Trans-Siberian line, known as the Chinese Eastern railway, running from near Chita to Vladivostock, for 200 miles in Russian, and for 950 miles in Chinese territory.

At Sungari, not far from Harbin, and 600 miles from the Siberian border, the Port Arthur branch leaves the main line, reaching Dalny in 600 miles, and Port Arthur in 615 miles. The line was single, and of five-foot gauge, the rails being single-headed, with flat base, and weighing 62 lb. the yard; the ballast and sleepers were of but moderate quality. The sidings and crossing places were about ten miles apart, and the fuel burnt was wood, except in Southern Manchuria, where coal was used. Of bridges there were, on the main line, about a dozen over 200 yards length, of which the longest was that at Sungari, which measured about 800 yards. On the Port Arthur branch were thirty of about 80 yards length, whilst those at Liao-Yang and Mukden were more than 600 yards long, and that at Kai-chou was of some 300 yards span. Apparently the maximum carrying capacity developed was about twelve pairs of trains per day.

The Imperial Chinese railway from Pekin to Ying-kow,

with a branch to Hsin-ming-ting, might possibly have been used by the Japanese to move troops against the Russian right. This was a single line, of British standard gauge.

Telegraphs and Cables.

There were telegraph lines along the railways, and cables connected Fu-san with Japan, and Port Arthur with Chifu.

Resources.

The Liao valley is a great grain-producing area, beans and millet being principally raised. The millet, which grows to a height of ten feet, provides the Chinaman with most of the necessaries of life. The grain is used as food for man and beast, and for distillation of spirits, whilst the stalks are chopped up as fodder, or are employed to thatch houses, fence gardens, or even as firewood. Few domestic animals are bred, except pigs, but Mongolia produces quantities of sheep, cattle, and small horses, which are readily obtained from Hsin-ming-ting.

The hilly country produces timber, and coarse silk from silk worms, which feed on the underwood.

Coal of fair quality exists near many of the big towns, the principal centres being Fu-shun, Yen-tai, Pen-si-hu.

Towns and Villages.

The Chinese towns are all of one pattern, square built, and surrounded by a crenulated wall twenty to thirty feet high, and at top eight to ten feet wide. These walls are pierced by numerous pagoda-roofed gates. Within are unmetalled streets, of one story, tile-roofed, shanties and shops, and in the case of the larger towns, suburbs of mud houses have grown up outside the city walls.

In the plain, the villages consist of groups of thatched houses, with walls of mud, or of sun-dried bricks plastered with mud, each standing in a garden surrounded by a more or less thick and well-built wall, or by a fence of plaited millet stalks. In the hills, houses and walls are of roughly shaped stones, sometimes cemented, and the roofs are of thatch, slate, or tile.

II

Events leading up to the war.

THE war between Russia and Japan is traceable, as are most modern wars, at any rate, to intense conflict of interest between the two powers. For centuries, and at intervals of about a hundred years, the Japanese had made incursions into Korea and Manchuria, and had, after successes more or less important, and occupation more or less prolonged, been driven back to their islands by the Chinese. Korea and Manchuria were therefore the historical lines of Japanese expansion.

Some fifty years ago, the Russians first appeared in the Far East, when they wrested the Amur province and Vladivostock from China. At this time Japan was governed under a feudal system, when the land, though nominally ruled by the emperor, was really under the power of the nobles, or Daimios, and their armed Samurai retainers. But, in 1868, the nation, after a severe struggle, overthrew the Daimios. At about the same time the Russians occupied Saghalien, an event which, combined with the seizure of the Amur province, caused Japan to fear for her safety.

The Japanese, noting that the European strength lay in armament and organisation, now decided to avoid the fate of the Amur province and Saghalien, by organising the country, Government, army and navy, on European principles. Japanese were therefore sent to Europe to assimilate Western ideas, and European teachers were freely imported into Japan.

1890. The combined result of this policy, and of these events, was such an increase in the material prosperity and popula-

tion, that Japan felt, about 1890, the need for expansion. At the same time it was feared that Korea, Japan's historical outlet on the mainland, inhabited by a physically fine, but in spirit decadent race, and ruled under the nerveless suzerainty of China, might fall into the hands of Russia. Japan therefore decided either to occupy Korea, or to render herself paramount in the peninsula.

With this object a quarrel was picked with China in 1894, 1894.
the Chinese fleet was defeated off the Yalu, the passage of the river was forced, Port Arthur and Wai-hai-wai were taken.

China thereupon concluded a peace on April 30th, 1895, 1895.
under which Korea was declared independent, the Kuantung peninsula, that is, the area between Chin-chou and Port Arthur, was leased to Japan, and a large indemnity promised.

Russia, Germany, and Austria, now brought diplomatic pressure to bear on Japan, causing her, much to the disgust of the nation, to relinquish her conquests. About 1891, Russia had begun the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway, with the object of at once linking up her East Asian possessions more closely with her European territory, and, if circumstances were favourable, of wresting a further piece of country from China's feeble grasp. By 1895 the railway had nearly reached Lake Baikal.

The Russian press, and Foreign Office, at that time fostered in the national mind, the idea that Russia must possess an ice-free port on the open sea, and this conception seems to have been used by a group of leading men in Russia to induce the Government to take up the project of obtaining such a harbour in Southern Manchuria. Japan, meanwhile, seeing in Russia's various manœuvres, a direct threat to Japanese independence, began, in 1895, deliberately to prepare herself, both morally, physically, and politically, for a life and death struggle with her powerful competitor. She therefore set about educating the nation to the idea of war with Russia, and at the same time further

improved her armed forces, and looked round for allies.

1896. In 1896, Russia made another move in the game, when she obtained permission, from China, to run the Chinese Eastern railway direct from Chita to Vladivostock, instead of along the left bank of the Amur. In 1898, she went further, leasing Port Arthur from China, together with the southern portion of the Liao-tung peninsula. At the same time she began to construct, from near Harbin, a branch railway which, by 1900, had reached Port Arthur, though the line was but roughly laid, and was unballasted.

1900. In 1900, the late Dowager Empress of China, much impressed by the South African disasters of England, the power at that time most feared in Pekin, determined to try and rid China of foreigners, and with this object fomented the so-called Boxer rising.

Russia at once seized the opportunity to occupy Manchuria to protect her railway, but later, in response to diplomatic representations, promised the powers to evacuate the Mukden province in October 1902, Kirin in the spring of 1903, and Tsi-tsi-har, north-west of Kirin, in the autumn of the same year.

Whilst these events were taking place, and the Japanese were organising their forces, the statesmen of Japan had, in

1902. 1902, concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Great Britain, under which it was agreed that if either nation were attacked by two powers, the other should come to the aid of her ally.

Japan also entered into friendly relations with the United States, thus practically securing herself against the intervention of other nations in the forthcoming struggle with Russia.

In October 1902, Russia evacuated part of south-west Manchuria, but failed to carry out her promise in respect to the remainder of the province.

1903. At the beginning of 1903, general Kuropatkin, the Russian War Minister, made a tour of inspection in the Far East, and as a result, a viceroyalty was created, which would

bring the various provinces, commands, and garrisons, under the central authority of admiral Alexiev, who was nominated viceroy.

Japan, angry at Russia's breach of faith regarding the evacuation of Manchuria, and alarmed by the creation of a viceroyalty, which, it was feared, was but the prelude to an increase in Russian activity in the Far East; began, in July 1903, to negotiate for the redemption of the pledge to quit Manchuria. These negotiations ended in war, in February 1904.

Though Japan was not, perhaps, quite ready for war in 1903, her preparations were so far advanced as to render possible the inception of the campaign, whenever diplomacy decided that the favourable moment had arrived. Russia, on the other hand, was by no means so well prepared. The Trans-Siberian, and Chinese Eastern railways, except the section round Lake Baikal, had indeed been roughly completed, the fortifications of Port Arthur had been strengthened, and the port of Dalny created.

But the railways were not yet capable of heavy traffic, and the forces in the Far East were numerically weak. The bulk of the latter had not even been organised into corps, there was but little cavalry or technical troops, guns were not plentiful, nor for the most part of the newest models, and lastly, the troops were scattered throughout the territory in small garrisons.

Whether, from a military point of view, Japan should have declared war earlier, before, for instance, the railway to Port Arthur was completed, is for consideration.

If the moment was unpropitious in 1900, she might, in 1902, after the conclusion of the alliance with England, have argued that Russia's preparations were likely to be proportionally less complete than her own, and pressure could have been put on Russia, in October 1902, to carry out the promised evacuation of Mukden.

Possibly, however, the political atmosphere was less favourable in 1902 than was the case a year later.

Again, it would seem that Japan would have been better advised to have declared war after the Manchurian and Korean ports were ice-free, than at the time she selected. True, such policy would have added to the Port Arthur squadron four large cruisers from Vladivostock; but Russia would not have been allowed two months in which to collect troops before the first blow was struck on land, and Japan might, in these circumstances, have overrun Southern Manchuria, and captured Port Arthur, before Russian regiments had begun to arrive in any numbers.

It was, however, probably Russia's threat to increase her Far Eastern squadron, which caused Japan to precipitate matters, and make war in winter.

Possessed of almost boundless resources in men, and with a navy twice as large as that of Japan, it would, at first sight, appear that Russia must have inevitably crushed her opponent.

But complete accord between policy, and organisation for war, is as necessary to success as are great resources, otherwise defeat may be experienced before the resources can be developed, and Russia was unprepared for the conflict even in 1903–4.

Encouraged by the success of a policy of bluff against other nations, Russia had apparently come to regard such procedure as infallible, but its inherent weakness became soon apparent when attempted against a rival ready to fight for her rights.

Russia was, in a military sense, weak in the Far East. Her navy was, on paper, equal to that of the Japanese, but paper equality is not sufficient to command success in war, and the ships which might have turned the balance were many months' sail distant in Europe, whence it was, perhaps, impolitic to move them.

Similarly, the Russian land forces in Manchuria were separated from the main army by a gap of some six thousand miles, bridged only by a single line of railway, ill laid, and, moreover, incomplete in the stretch round Lake Baikal.

Organisation.

In 1904, Russia possessed, according to the British official account of the war, in round numbers, a total of some 4,500,000 trained soldiers, of whom 3,500,000 belonged to the active army and reserve, 345,000 were Cossacks, and 685,000 National Guard.

The period of military service was from the 21st–43rd year, of which eighteen years were spent in the active army and reserve, and the remainder in the National Guard.

The colour service was for four or five years, and three years were passed in the reserve, during which period two trainings of six months were carried out.

The Cossacks, Finns, and the Christians of the Caucasus, served under special regulations, whilst Mahomedans were obliged to pay a sum of money in lieu of military service, but might volunteer to serve if they so desired.

The field troops comprised the units of the active army brought up to war strength by reserves, and certain so-called reserve units, the cadres of which were maintained in peace, and filled up with reservists on mobilisation.

In war time, depôt units were also formed, of reservists and soldiers not fit or not required on mobilisation.

For garrison duty there were special fortress and local troops.

The National Guard was primarily designated for home defence, but was liable to furnish drafts for the field troops.

At the commencement of the war, there were, in Europe and the Caucasus, twenty-five active army and reserve corps, in Russian Turkestan two corps, in Eastern Siberia two corps, and in the remainder of the empire a number of unallotted units.

(For composition of the army corps, see Appendix I.)

The Russian army was not really well trained and fit to take the field. Even officers who had passed the staff college rarely studied their profession after the completion of their course, and the regimental officers were ignorant of the theory of war.

The practical training also left much to be desired. The

men were little practised in shooting, but were taught to rely on mass attacks, and the bayonet, to gain victory. Outpost and reconnaissance duties were neglected, and individual initiative discouraged.

All ranks were, moreover, steeped in the plausible fallacy of the advantages inherent in the occupation of defensive positions, and attached undue importance to the value of ground, and to a defensive attitude; yet, in actual practice, folds and features of ground were rarely utilised to the best advantage.

Generals immersed themselves in details, and interfered unduly in the instruction of troops and companies, to the detriment of the training, and to the limitation of their own power to handle large forces, grasp important situations, or deal with great issues. But serious as were the above faults, they might have been partially overcome during the campaign, had all ranks been inspired with the sentiment of patriotism and unselfish devotion to duty.

This was far from being the case. Even the officers openly expressed their indifference to the war, and the rank and file, though they fought well, and endured hardship with praiseworthy patience, went to the front unwillingly.

Very different was the attitude of the Japanese army.

Here every man was convinced that his utmost efforts were demanded to save the country from destruction, and the wonderful constancy of the Japanese soldiers was a more important factor in the national success, than was even the bold generalship of the higher leaders.

In Japan, every male between the ages of seventeen and forty was, in 1904, liable to serve in either army or navy, but military service did not, as a rule, according to the British official account, begin until the twentieth year.

The army was organised as follows (see also Appendix II):—

Active army, service three years—180,000 men.

On working furlough for four years and four months—200,000 men.

Reserve army (or Kobi), in which men served for five years, with an organisation separate from that of the active army—200,000.

Conscript reserve, of men who had escaped service with the colours; obligation for seven years and four months, or for one year and four months—300,000.

National reserve, of all men who had passed the classes mentioned above, and were less than forty years old—400,000, of whom about half had received training.

Of Japan's naval resources it is sufficient to note that her merchant navy had a tonnage of 650,000 and possessed between 200 and 300 steamers.

The Japanese army was trained in the German fashion, and though to several armies in Europe, Japanese officers were, and still are attached for instruction, it was to the German army that the majority were sent. The German model was therefore generally copied in both strategy and tactics, though it is perhaps doubtful whether the Japanese peace training was as thorough as is sometimes claimed.

The Japanese adopted the enveloping form of offensive war, but attacked, with vigour, at all points.

Their infantry, at the beginning of the campaign, advanced to the attack in relatively dense lines of skirmishers, whose movements were covered by both rifle and artillery fire. The infantry pressed on, in the usual manner, as close as possible to the enemy's line, and then delivered a series of assaults, prepared by rapid but somewhat wild rifle fire, and covered by storms of shrapnel, delivered from rather long range.

It does not seem that the subordinate generals and regimental leaders directed their men with any particular intelligence, or that the latter fought much with their heads. The commanders were, as a rule, rather prodigal of their men's lives, and the soldiers, responding gallantly to their officers' orders, often, by their doggedness, repaired mistakes of tactics and leadership.

The cavalry was not well organised. Regiments were, for

the most part, with divisions, instead of being brigaded, and their employment was on a par with their organisation.

Striking a balance between the forces actually or potentially available on both sides, and having due regard to their military value, it may be concluded that the Japanese possessed over the Russians certain advantages of patriotism and training.

Command of the sea.

Though Russia had sufficient naval and military resources to ensure the defeat of her rival, the distribution of her fleet and army, necessitated by her European responsibilities, and the absence of well-developed land communications between her European territories and the theatre of war, rendered it improbable that she would be able to transport to, and maintain in the Far East, an army large enough to overcome the Japanese, unless command of the sea could be obtained; for to have duplicated the railway would have been the work of years. Besides, Japan, even if overwhelmed on land, could, so long as she retained command of the sea, have securely retired to some Torres Vedras, and there awaited a favourable opportunity to again take the offensive. And even if Russia succeeded in driving the Japanese from the mainland, her conquest would have been of little value until she obtained the power to utilise the ports won in land battles.

Command of the sea, then, was vital to Russia.

Japan is an island empire, and though fairly self-contained, was, in some degree, dependent on retention of the command of the sea, the loss of which would, at any rate, have put an end to her dreams of expansion. Moreover, loss of command of the sea would have exposed her to the danger of invasion.

Without naval supremacy, Japan's armies could not have reached the continent of Asia, and once there, even supposing they drove the Russians to Lake Baikal, before attaining naval superiority, their eventual ruin would have been all the greater, if the link binding the land forces with their island home was severed; for no large army could have been

maintained in Manchuria with command of the sea irrevocably lost.

Apparently, then, naval supremacy, that is, the destruction of the hostile fleet, was, for both sides, the decisive factor, and each should have strained every nerve to attain this end, relegating other necessary operations to strictly subordinate positions.

Had Russia been able to concentrate her whole fleet in Far Eastern waters, Japan's position would have been well-nigh hopeless, but Russia had, as has been stated, been obliged to divide her navy into two portions, and at the decisive point possessed no numerical superiority over her opponent.

Hence Japan might hope to apply the principle of interior lines, to defeat the Russians in detail, to ruin the Eastern detachment before it could be joined by its Western consorts.

If the Russian Eastern detachment chose to meet the Japanese fleet in fair fight, so much the better for Japan. But if the Russians should elect to await, in their harbours, the arrival of their European navy, then it would be Japan's duty to capture those harbours, either sinking the ships at their berths, or obliging them to bolt out and give battle.

Of the two military harbours, in the Far East, held by Russia, Port Arthur and Vladivostock, the former was most valuable, being ice-free throughout the year. But whatever the relative merits of the two places, Port Arthur was of greatest importance to the Japanese, being the base of the larger portion of the Russian fleet (four large cruisers only were in Vladivostock) and after the naval surprise of February 8th its asylum.

Japanese objectives.

It would seem, then, that Japan's primary objective being the Russian fleet based on Port Arthur, plans should have been made to secure the early capture of the fortress, since it was possible that the squadron would not quit the shelter of the harbour.

But it was important to occupy Korea, whence the siege of

Port Arthur could, in some degree, be covered, for no Russian force moving into the Liao-tung peninsula could afford to neglect a Japanese army placed on or near the Yalu. The possession of Korea would also be a strong diplomatic card, and until Dalny was taken, no satisfactory harbours for landing troops, existed, except in Korea.

If beaten in Manchuria, or at Port Arthur, Japan, with command of the sea, could perhaps maintain herself sufficiently long in the mountains of Korea to render Russia weary of the struggle.

Even without command of the sea, if the naval actions were indecisive, Japan, by using the islands in the Tsushima strait, might maintain a force in Korea, and might even, though this would be unlikely, prosecute the siege of Port Arthur from this base.

It is therefore thought, that, as was done, Korea should, in the first instance, have been occupied by the Japanese.

The capture of a fortress can be attained either by main force, or by starvation, the method employed being contingent on the necessity for the early reduction of the place.

No fortress can survive, for long, the defeat of the field forces of the nation, hence, if the field armies are destroyed, the capitulation of the national fortresses is only a matter of time.

Thus there were open to Japan two methods for the reduction of the Far Eastern naval bases of the Russian fleet. They could either be besieged, assaulted, and so captured, every effort being directed to the achievement of this result, and only sufficient troops diverted against the Russian armies, to prevent their interfering with the besiegers; or one or both fortresses could be blockaded, whilst every man not required for this purpose marched against the Russian army.

Of these alternatives it is believed that the former would have been the correct course, more especially in view of the possibility of the despatch of Russian naval reinforcements from Europe.

But whichever policy Japan elected to pursue, her utmost

endeavours should have been directed to the achievement of the main purpose, whether it was the early destruction of the Russian naval bases, or the rapid ruin of the Russian field armies, before either armies, or fleet, could be reinforced from Europe.

There should have been no halting between two opinions, such policy tends to failure, and at the decisive point it is impossible to be too strong.

Japan, however, chose to pursue a double objective, undertaking both the siege of Port Arthur, and the destruction of the Russian armies. Possibly she undervalued the resisting power of Port Arthur, and the carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway, hoping to achieve the early capture of the fortress, and then victory over such forces as Russia might have deployed. Or, perhaps, her army was, in the circumstances, deemed sufficiently strong to attain both objects. Or, again, the Japanese may have thought that, in spite of the necessity for taking Port Arthur, the Russian army must be attacked and beaten, before it became formidable in organisation and numbers.

Whatever motives may have prompted her military policy, Japan, in the event, possessed decisive preponderance of force neither in front of Port Arthur, nor in the field.

But for the determination of her infantry, and the resolution of her higher commanders, this fact might well have led to disaster. Neither at Liao-Yang, nor at the Sha-Ho, did the Japanese possess sufficient force to gain decisive victories, and the cause of their weakness was the large number of troops that had been absorbed in the siege of Port Arthur.

The resistance offered by this fortress made Liao-Yang an indecisive battle, and gave Russia time in which to collect so many troops, that, even after the fall of the place, the Japanese failed to gain, at Mukden, a decisive victory.

On the other hand it is believed that had two or three extra divisions been detailed to besiege Port Arthur, this

place would have fallen by assault, after a few weeks' siege; and long before the Russians could have made really serious efforts for its relief, or could have assembled a sufficiently large army in Manchuria, to give them the advantage in the subsequent campaign.

Japanese plan.

The plan actually adopted by Japan was an enveloping advance of three armies, from widely different directions —the Yalu, Ta-ku-shan, and Dalny—on Liao-Yang, whilst a fourth army besieged Port Arthur.

Converging operations, though they menace the enemy's communications, involve risk of defeat in detail. They were, however, doubtless forced on Japan, by the political necessity for initial occupation of Korea, and the immobility of the Russians was probably known, and counted on. Moreover, in so mountainous a country as Southern Manchuria, some dispersion of force would have been necessary for purposes of supply, unless Japan made adequate arrangements for rapidly utilising the Port Arthur railway as it fell into her hands. But then her advance would have been frontal.

Having adopted a plan of convergent operations from separate bases, Japan's object should have been to exercise such simultaneous and vigorous pressure, from all directions, as to prevent concentration of hostile force against any one of her separated armies. At the same time these should have made every effort to attain, as soon as possible, tactical contact with one another, by rapid, but well-regulated advance on a common objective.

Russian objects.

Russia's objects were naturally, to a great extent, the converse of those of the Japanese.

Japan wished for rapid and early success, Russia desired time to collect her scattered forces.

Such development of resources might be accomplished if Russia's Far Eastern fortresses correctly carried out, with the assistance of her Siberian field troops, their delaying functions.

Whilst fortifying and provisioning, Port Arthur, and Vladivostock, for lengthy sieges, Russia should, therefore,

have prepared to manœuvre with the troops not required to garrison these places, so as to draw on themselves, and away from the fortresses, the Japanese armies. At the same time, pending the collection of an army adequate to undertake the offensive, the Japanese, as opportunity offered, might have been harassed and exhausted by minor engagements, and attacked in detail, if chances, as actually happened, occurred.

Whether the Russian Eastern squadron should have fought a decisive action with the Japanese, or awaited the arrival of the reinforcements, is a difficult question to answer.

The solution of the problem depended on the probable date when naval reinforcements from Europe might be expected. If likely to be long delayed, the natural inclination would be to risk all in a decisive naval action.

Such resolution might have been taken, having regard to the fact that long waiting in port might be harmful to the machinery of the vessels, and deleterious to the efficiency of the crews, and might even, as was the case, result in the destruction of the fleet from land.

Russian plan.

As to the Russian plan it is not easy to speak, for, in effect, the operations, up to the battle of Liao-Yang, were a series of half-measures.

This tends to confirm the report that the Russian councils were divided, one party advocating that the defence of Port Arthur should be intrusted solely to the garrison; the other that every effort should be made for its assistance.

III

Japanese calculations.

WHEN initiating, in the autumn of 1903, the diplomatic pressure which finally resulted in war, Japan, practically secure, through the British alliance, from the interference of third parties, seems to have calculated that her navy was capable of beating, in detail, the divided portions of the Russian fleet, and that her army could cope, successfully, with any force that Russia could maintain in the Far East.

The confidence of the Japanese in their navy was fully justified. But the unwise dispositions of the Japanese armies, the resistance offered by Port Arthur, the slowness of the Japanese military deployment, the quantities of supplies obtained by Russia from Manchuria and Mongolia, and the unexpectedly efficient working of the Trans-Siberian railway, enabling Russia to place in the field a larger force than Japan had contemplated, upset the Japanese calculations. Japan was therefore obliged, not only to augment her active army, but to so modify her recruiting laws as to enable larger masses of men to be placed in the field.

February 1904.

Trusting, however, in her power to beat Russia, Japan continued to press for Russia's evacuation of Manchuria, until, on February 6th, 1904, negotiations were broken off, and diplomatic relations with Russia severed. (See Appendix III.)

On the same day the Japanese navy sailed to attack the Russian squadron at Port Arthur, a few ships being detached to destroy a couple of small Russian cruisers lying at Chemul-po, and to convoy a force of 2500 men, destined to occupy Seoul, the capital of Korea.

At 3 a.m. on 9th, the Japanese troops landed in face

of the Russian cruisers, and railed at once to Seoul. The next day the Russian ships were sunk when issuing from the harbour.

Meanwhile, admiral Togo had surprised the Russian squadron lying outside Port Arthur, and had torpedoed three of the largest ships.

Whilst these events were taking place, mobilisation orders had been issued in Japan, at 2 p.m., on February 6th, to the Guard, 2nd and 12th divisions, and to the fortresses of Tsushima and Hakodadi.

The Japanese had originally intended to secure possession of Southern Korea, at any rate, by landing the 12th division at Fu-san and moving it, by march route, eighteen stages to Seoul; and had already made arrangements for supply along the road.

After the first naval success it was, however, determined to use Chem-ul-po as the port of disembarkation.

In February the mouth of the Yalu, Ta-ku-shan, and Ying-kow are all ice-bound, and do not become clear of ice until the middle of March, so that the Japanese could not, at that time, have taken advantage of their temporary command of the sea by landing troops at those places.

The gain, by adoption of such a course, would have been shortened lines of communication had command of the sea been maintained; but the force at Ying-kow, at any rate, would have been somewhat exposed, owing to its proximity to Liao-Yang, where the Russians were assembling, and transports sailing to Ying-kow must have passed relatively close to Port Arthur.

On February 14th, the 12th division railed to Nagasaki, where it embarked in six groups of transports, of which the first sailed at noon, on 15th. By 21st, the whole division had landed at Chem-ul-po, and a detachment had occupied Ping-Yang.

Simultaneously two regiments of the 4th division were despatched to Chem-ul-po, and garrisons placed in Fu-san, Ma-sam-po, and Gen-san. Mobilisation had, meanwhile, March.

proceeded in Japan, and by March 4th, the Guard and 2nd divisions had concentrated at Hiroshima, ready to embark under the command of general Kuroki.

Chin-am-pho, the port of Ping-Yang, was reported clear of ice on March 10th, and as the 12th division had now assembled in sufficient force at the latter place, to secure the landing, it was decided to disembark, here, the Guard and 2nd divisions.

By 29th the troops were all on shore, and the 12th division well to the north of Ping-Yang.

Information now reached general Kuroki, that, with the exception of 1500 to 2000 Russian cavalry, no hostile troops were south of the Yalu.

The Japanese, therefore, pushed forward parties towards the river Yalu, to at once bridge the rivers Che-chen and Tai-ing, to form supply depots, and to reconnoitre roads.

The result of this reconnaissance was that all roads were found to be bad, and the coast road alone was reported fit for the movement of a large force. The whole country was, moreover, stated to be destitute of supplies.

In these circumstances, it is for consideration whether Kuroki would not have been better advised to have marched only the 12th division towards the Yalu, sending the Guard and 2nd divisions northwards, by ship, at any rate to Bo-to and Ri-ka-ho, thus following the precedent of the Vimeiro campaign.

This course would have been less fatiguing, and not more risky, than marching by detachments along one bad road, and would have saved valuable time.

Probably, however, shipping was not available for the purpose.

April. On April 1st, sufficient supplies having been collected at An-ju, Kuroki pushed on a force under general Asada, who, by 7th, had reached Ri-ka-ho, where a supply depot was formed.

On the latter date the main body of the Japanese marched northwards, throwing out towards Yong-pyong a weak flank

guard, which was to halt there until the main body had passed An-ju, and then march to Chang-Syong.

The advanced guard reached Wi-ju on April 8th, and on 21st, the army was concentrated near that place, whilst the flank detachment stood at Chang-Syong. Lines of supply had also been established to Ri-ka-ho, Bo-to, and Qui-em-pho.

During these operations, the 1st and 3rd divisions had, on April 1st, concentrated at Hiroshima, whilst the 4th division had mobilised and was standing at Osaka, and an artillery brigade, of 108 guns, was also ready to take the field. In April, these divisions had been quietly embarked in a fleet of about a hundred transports, which sailed to Chin-am-pho, as they were ready, unescorted, though protected by the operations of the Japanese fleet against Port Arthur.

By May 1st, the three divisions had concentrated at Chin-am-pho under general Oku, ready either to assist Kuroki in forcing the passage of the Yalu, by landing between that river and Ta-ku-shan, or, if not required by the 1st army, to invade the Liao-Tung peninsula. May.

As it is hardly conceivable that the Japanese can have been ignorant of the weakness of the Russian Yalu detachment (see Appendix IV), it seems to have been excess of caution that held Oku's detachment in hand so long, for the greater delay in attacking Port Arthur, the more formidable would be its fortifications.

Meanwhile, war had been formally declared on February 10th, and, on the same date, the Czar had issued a ukase, ordering the mobilisation of the troops in the Siberian military district, and in the districts of Perm, Viatka, and Kazan.

Between February 9th and 12th, most of the powers, including China, published declarations of neutrality.

Japan and Korea entered into an agreement on February 23rd, under which Japan, in exchange for the right to use certain places in Korea for military purposes, guaranteed the integrity of the country.

On February 29th, general Kuropatkin was appointed commander-in-chief in Manchuria, and general Linevitch in the Ussuri district, but both were under the orders of admiral Alexiev, the viceroy.

Admiral Makarov was given command of the Russian Far Eastern squadron on February 16th, and on the same day the viceroy transferred his headquarters from Port Arthur to Mukden.

Meanwhile, the Japanese had made several abortive attempts to enclose the Russian fleet, which had taken refuge in Port Arthur, within the confines of the harbour, by sinking vessels across the mouth.

By April 12th, the Russian fleet had been so far repaired as to be able to leave Port Arthur, but on this day, the battleship *Petropavlovsk*, with Makarov on board, was sunk by a floating mine, and another battleship was injured by the same means.

By the end of April, the opposing forces had reached roughly the strength, and had attained the distribution given in Appendix IV, the bulk of the Russian field troops being, apparently, in the neighbourhood of Liao-Yang and Ying-kow, and on the Yalu. [See also Map 2.]

Probably the acquisition, by the Japanese, of command of the sea, disinclined the Russians to risk more troops in the Liao-tung peninsula than were required for the defence of Port Arthur.

At any rate no arrangement seems to have been made to hold points where the disembarkation of Japanese troops was possible; or to place a mobile force in some central position such as Pu-lan-tien, whence troops could march, with relative rapidity, to oppose a landing at Port Adams, or Pe-tsi-wo. The coast-line was watched by cavalry, but this was the only measure taken.

But this same factor of sea-power induced considerable dispersion of force, for, in addition to the garrison of Vladivostock, there were strong detachments on the Yalu, and at Ying-kow, the former separated by 180 miles of rough

APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AND STRENGTH, AT END OF APRIL, 1904. 2



APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AND STRENGTH, 27th MAY, 1904. 3



country from Liao-Yang, the latter, even, some 70 miles from that place, though connected with it by a railway.

In theory the policy of detaching strong forces, such as those at the Yalu and at Ying-kow, to delay the advance of an enemy and to gain time for the assembly of an army is attractive. In practice such detachments more often than not become seriously compromised in performing their difficult task, and even if they escape disaster, their continuous and necessary retirement is apt to react unfavourably on the *morale* of the men.

Perhaps, then, the Russians should have watched the Yalu, Ying-kow, and, in addition, Ta-ku-shan, and the Pe-tsi-wo neighbourhood, with weaker but more mobile forces. These would have been under no temptation to give battle, and, whilst being well placed to obtain information, would have delayed, or at least imposed caution on the Japanese, who might, at first, have overestimated the Russian strength. The main army could have been retained in central positions, such as Hai-cheng and Kai-chou, every effort being made to render it ready to strike.

As has been remarked, it is probable that the dispositions actually made by the Russians were a compromise between the policies of two contending factions. The Russian general staff is said to have computed, that whereas the Japanese, except in winter, could disembark in Manchuria a considerable force within six weeks of the first order to mobilise, Russia could not assemble, even in Northern Manchuria, an army of six corps and six cavalry divisions, in less than six months.

A strong party of Russian strategists, headed by the late general Dragomirov, therefore advocated the abandonment of Port Arthur, and the withdrawal of the Russian troops to Harbin, or even further north, until sufficient numbers had been collected to ensure victory, and the Japanese had been weakened by the long northward march, with its line of communication, and inevitable detachments. Another faction, however, desired the maintenance of communication with

Port Arthur at all costs, and considered that retirement would be impolitic.

On May 1st, general Kuroki defeated the detachment of general Zasulitch on the Yalu, and on the same date, probably to cover the sailing of general Oku's transports, the Japanese again attempted to block up the mouth of the harbour of Port Arthur.

Before the battle of the Yalu, Kuroki had been informed that he must be prepared to wait on that river for one month, as it was not expected that Port Arthur would be blockaded on the land side before June. This accomplished, a converging movement on Liao-Yang, and the Russian field armies, would be undertaken, by the army of general Oku moving up the Liao-tung peninsula, by a force advancing from Ta-ku-shan, and by general Kuroki's army marching from the Yalu.

During this interval, general Kuroki was, apparently, to collect transport, to perfect supply arrangements for his advance through the hilly country on Liao-Yang, and, whilst, by his presence on the Yalu, acting as a deterrent to Russian enterprises against Port Arthur, to avoid compromising himself with large hostile forces.

Oku's ships were weather-bound for some days, at Chin-am-pho, after the victory at the Yalu, but on May 4th, guarded by gun and torpedo boats, and preceded by a naval landing party, the first group, of twenty vessels, containing the 3rd division, was able to sail.

The selected landing place, Kow-shi bay, was a few miles south of Pe-tsi-wo, where the Japanese force which captured Port Arthur had disembarked in 1894, and was believed to offer greater facilities than the latter. Kow-shi was, however, by no means an ideal port. It possessed a shallow muddy foreshore of considerable extent, and was exposed to easterly winds, though somewhat sheltered by the Elliott islands. But it was sufficiently far from Port Arthur (fifty to sixty miles) to render serious interruption of the landing operations, by troops from that place, improbable; and transports coming from Japan need not pass close to the Russian

warships, as would have been the case had a landing been effected on the west coast of the Liao-tung peninsula.

On May 5th, the ships sighted Kow-shi, where a few Cossacks were observed, but the weather was too rough to render landing practicable, so the Japanese seem to have sailed to the Elliott islands. Here a shallow haven had been selected as night anchorage for the vessels, and protected, by a boom, against a Russian torpedo-boat attack.

It was hoped that even if the enemy's torpedo boats damaged the transports, the passengers could easily be saved in the shallow water, whilst the cargoes would, without much difficulty, be salvaged.

On 6th the disembarkation commenced, the naval covering party being first put ashore, then a battalion, then more infantry, and some cavalry. Pe-tsi-wo was now occupied, the few Russians in the place retiring northwards; a detachment, too, was despatched to Pu-lan-tien to cut the railway, but did little beyond skirmish with the small Russian garrison.

By May 16th, general Oku, though the field hospitals and supply and ammunition columns had not landed, was able to march the 3rd division towards Chin-chou, whilst the 1st and part of the 4th division had taken up a position at Pu-lan-tien, and along the Ta-sha river, facing northwards.

Between May 15th and 23rd, the 5th division and the 1st cavalry brigade arrived from Japan, and the trains of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th divisions were landed, together with half of an artillery brigade.

General Oku issued orders, on 21st, for the 1st, 3rd, and 4th divisions to advance to Chin-chou, where the Russians were known to be holding a strongly fortified position, whilst the 5th division, with detachments of the 3rd and 4th divisions, and the 1st cavalry brigade, held the line Pu-lan-tien and the Ta-sha river.

On 26th Chin-chou was captured, and on the same day 14,000 Russians were driven from Nan-shan.

The 11th division disembarked at Yen-ta-kou on May 24th, and on 27th reached Chin-chou.

The 1st and 11th divisions were now, with some Kobi brigades, constituted into a 3rd army, under general Nogi, and such troops as had landed, marched on Port Arthur, occupying, by 31st, Dalny, Ta-lien-wan, and Nan-ke-ling.

The 3rd, 4th, and 5th divisions, with the 1st cavalry brigade, and the 1st artillery brigade, were, at the same time, grouped into the 2nd army under general Oku.

The 3rd and 4th divisions and the artillery brigade were now moved to Pu-lan-tien, to support the 5th division, and the cavalry. These had, for several days, been skirmishing with a Russian force of 1600 sabres and six guns, pushed southwards under general Samsonov, and thought, by the Japanese, to be probably the advanced guard of a larger force.

On May 19th, the 10th division, forming the nucleus of the 4th Japanese army, had begun to disembark at Ta-ku-shan, under general Kawamura.

Kuroki, too, finding supply difficult at An-tung, and perhaps also to help Kawamura, had, on May 19th, advanced the main body of the 1st army to Feng-huang-cheng, detaching the 12th division to Ai-yang-pien-meng.

After the battle of the Yalu, the Russians, owing to the movement of a Japanese detachment towards Sai-ma-chi, became seriously alarmed for Mukden. Troops under Rennenkamf, amounting to a Cossack brigade, 2000 infantry, and two horse batteries, were therefore pushed to Sai-ma-chi, and two or three battalions began to fortify the passes near Len-shan-kuan to support Zasulitch, who had retired to that place. At the same time another Cossack brigade, under Mischenko, was sent to watch the coast-line near Ta-ku-shan.

Madridov, also, who was still on the upper Yalu, made, on May 10th, a raid into Korea, against the Japanese line of communications, attacking An-ju, but was easily beaten off by its garrison of less than a hundred men.

During the remainder of May, nothing occurred except a few Russian reconnaissances from Sai-ma-chi.

The augmentation of the Russian army, had, meanwhile, been proceeding, and towards the end of May the forces had reached a respectable total. (See Appendix V, and Map 3.)

In these circumstances, the Russians, who had suffered two serious reverses, should have decided definitely whether their policy was to be one of offensive, or of retrograde until a large army had been assembled.

Alexiev, the viceroy, being in favour of vigorous action, thought that something ought to be done to check the Japanese, known to be widely separated, and not credited with large numbers. He therefore, on May 19th, directed Kuropatkin to assume the offensive, giving him the alternative of either attacking Kuroki, or, whilst holding Kuroki, of marching against Oku.

Before undertaking any considerable operation of war the main question to be decided is whether the results are likely to be decisive; if not, the undertaking will rarely be worth inception. The attempt may even be disastrous, for if a leader plays for lower stakes when the enemy is aiming at decision, he stands to win pence and to lose pounds.

Kuropatkin's first consideration should therefore have been, which, if either alternative, would lead to decisive results.

From this point of view he made a correct selection in deciding to attack general Oku, for the defeat of general Kuroki, though it might have delayed the Japanese operations, would not have ruined their plan of campaign.

But, by crushing Oku, the Russians would not only, in all probability, have paved the way for the destruction of the larger portion of the Japanese army, but would have reopened the road to Port Arthur, and perhaps saved the Russian fleet.

Having determined to strike at Oku, the next point for decision should have been in what force the operation was to be undertaken.

Here again it should only have been necessary to follow one of the great principles of war, and to strike with every

available man, cutting down necessary detachments to the lowest possible limits. But "to do is not so easy as to know what 'twere good to do," and Kuropatkin was set no easy task to decide how many men would be required to deal with Kuroki and Kawamura, and how many to secure his line of communication against Japanese forces which might be landed at Ying-kow, or even at Shan-hai-kuan.

Lastly, assuming that the Russian general decided to march southwards with the bulk of his troops, he must weigh the all-important questions of supply, time, and space, to discover whether his plan was really capable of execution.

It is an axiom that continuous pressure on the enemy is the very soul of the convergent system of strategy, which depends greatly for its success on the exertion of simultaneous pressure, on the enemy, from the various directions in which the army is moving.

It was to be expected, then, that the combined forward movement of the Japanese armies would be vigorously prosecuted, and that, if any army were attacked, the others would at once exercise the greatest pressure on the Russians to relieve it.

It is therefore clear, that in this, as in all operations of war, a Russian success could hardly be obtained unless the Japanese were kept in ignorance, up to the moment of decisive attack on Oku, of the Russian projects.

But to adopt the defensive towards the 1st and 4th armies, whilst an attack was made on Oku, would indicate, to the Japanese, the Russian plan. Whilst troops were marching against the 2nd army, Kuroki and Kawamura must, therefore, be led to believe that they were about to be attacked. Finally, a simultaneous offensive must be undertaken against the three armies, though only pressed home against Oku, and the garrison of Port Arthur must sally against the besiegers.

Oku, too, must not be permitted to discover that the decisive blow was about to fall on his army, lest he should

fall back on Nan-shan, whilst the others pressed forward on to the Russian communications.

Keller, who had superseded Zasulitch, and Rennenkamf, had between them some 18,000 sabres and bayonets, opposed to Kuroki's 34,000; and Mischenko, but 2000 sabres against Kawamura's 11,000 sabres and bayonets. It would seem, then, that Kuropatkin should have reinforced Mischenko with one infantry brigade, that is 6000 men, who would have required about one week to reach Hsui-yen, whilst their movement would have deceived the Japanese. With these numbers, and having regard to the nature of the country in which the operations were to be conducted, Keller and Mischenko should have been able to contain the 1st and 4th armies, whilst a decisive blow was struck at Oku.

If a brigade were left at Ying-kow, and a force at Kai-chou, the remaining troops, less depots, and small garrisons of, say, half a brigade, in all, at Liao-Yang and Mukden, would have numbered some 55,000 sabres and bayonets.

With these Kuropatkin could have moved against Oku, who, to oppose him, could have mustered about 35,000 fighting men.

Possibly, had he displayed energy, Kuropatkin might, with the help of the railway, have collected this force at Wa-fang-tien in a fortnight, that is, during the first week in June, when Oku would probably have been in the neighbourhood of Pu-lan-tien, if not farther north.

It is thought, then, that Kuropatkin, had he acted in whole-hearted fashion, might towards the beginning of June have taken the offensive with fair prospects of success. But the Russian general, who seems to have leaned rather to the procrastinating policy of Dragomirov, was content to adopt a half-measure—a decision in which he may have been influenced by a demonstration made, in the neighbourhood of Kai-chou, early in June, by the Japanese fleet.

Only on May 27th did he reply to the viceroy's suggestion, June.
and it was not until June 7th, that he addressed, to general Stackelberg, a memorandum ordering a forward movement.

In this Stackelberg was directed to advance southwards with the 1st Siberian corps and other troops, so as to draw against himself, and away from Port Arthur, as large a Japanese force as possible. But Stackelberg was warned that he was not to become entangled in a decisive action against superior forces, though he was to capture Nan-shan, and then march on Port Arthur.

On receipt of these ambiguous instructions, Stackelberg began to advance his detachment, mainly by rail, to Teh-li-tzu. On June 10th Kuropatkin countermanded the movements of a portion of Stackelberg's troops, owing to the operations of the 10th Japanese division, but the units were soon allowed to proceed again, and, eventually, some 27,000 bayonets, and 2000 to 3000 sabres, were massed at or near Teh-li-tzu.

Samsonov had, meanwhile, retired on Teh-li-tzu when the 2nd army moved to Pu-lan-tien, but had again advanced to Wa-fang-tien, on receiving from Stackelberg a reinforcement of two battalions.

Early in June the Japanese heard, both from local spies and from their intelligence service in Europe, that the Russians were about to attack Oku.

On 2nd, Kawamura was therefore ordered to hold himself in readiness to advance towards Kai-chou and menace the Russian flank, whether or not his division had completed its disembarkation.

At this time there was, as has been stated, in front of the 10th division, only Mischenko's detachment, holding the passes south of Hsui-yen; but, to make the movement thoroughly effective, Kuroki was ordered to send to Kawamura, a force of one brigade, two squadrons, and two batteries, under general Asada.

Asada left Feng-huang-cheng on June 6th, and, on 8th, he combined with part of the 10th division in an attack on Hsui-yen, which easily drove off Mischenko's force.

As the Russian operations now seemed to be hanging fire,



APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AND STRENGTH 30th JUNE, 1904. 5



Japanese headquarters ordered Kawamura not to advance beyond Hsui-yen.

He therefore halted and intrenched.

This fact, as has been stated, considerably influenced Kuropatkin's plans, for, seeing that the Japanese had not advanced beyond Hsui-yen, he allowed Stackelberg to continue his concentration on Teh-li-tzu.

On 12th, Oku being ready to move from Pu-lan-tien, Kawamura was directed to proceed towards Hai-cheng as soon as he could, leaving Asada to watch Hsi-mu-cheng.

Kuroki, too, was ordered to advance, and so distract Russian attention from Oku.

But supply difficulties prevented the movement of the 1st army, so that Kuroki was only able to push forward some detachments, in addition to sending Asada to the 10th division.

Keller was, however, deceived by these movements, and thinking that Kuroki meant to attack his right, began to mass troops on this flank.

Meanwhile, Oku had commenced his march from Pu-lan-tien, and by 13th, the 3rd and 5th divisions were, with the artillery brigade, at Wa-fang-tien, the 4th division near Fu-chou, and the cavalry brigade on the right flank; the 6th division, which had now landed, was following some marches in rear.

Why Oku advanced before the arrival of the 6th division is not quite clear. Possibly policy dictated the move, or perhaps the Japanese were anxious as to the 1st and 4th armies, though to risk the defeat of Oku, to help them, unless they were believed to be in serious straits, was hardly sound strategy; or it may be that they wished to retain the initiative, not allowing this advantage to pass to the enemy.

On June 15th the Japanese defeated the Russians at Teh-li-tzu, driving in their right, but did not follow up the success with any vigour; in fact there was practically no pursuit.

The only other incidents, worth mention, which took

place at this juncture, were some readjustments of troops on the Russian side, when Rennenkamf was strengthened at the expense of Keller, whilst Mischenko was reinforced.

In looking at the table showing the number of troops in Manchuria on June 15th (Appendix VI, and Map 4), the large garrison of Vladivostock is noteworthy, as demonstrating the containing effect of sea-power.

The presence of half this force in Manchuria might, at this period, have turned the scale in favour of the Russians.

After the battle of Teh-li-tzu, the 1st and 9th East Siberian divisions, now known as the 1st Siberian corps, retired to Kai-chou, covered by Samsonov's cavalry, and remained in this neighbourhood until the end of the month.

During June, Mischenko's detachment was again reinforced, and a general southward movement made towards Ta-shih-chiao, where a position was fortified. (See Appendix VII and Map 5.)

The dispositions of the Russian troops appeared, in fact, to indicate an offensive in force against Oku, and perhaps it would have been well for the Russians had they now definitely decided either to advance or to retire, instead of continuing a wasteful policy of half-measures.

Apparently Kuropatkin would have liked to have withdrawn his southernmost forces north of Hai-cheng, for the operations of Kuroki and Kawamura had rendered the Russians anxious as to the safety of the corps of Stackelberg and Zarubaiev. But the viceroy, Alexiev, who was continually urging Kuropatkin to adopt the offensive, on the ground that the strength of the Japanese had been exaggerated, forbade such retirement, which would have been detrimental to Port Arthur, as showing that the Russians had, for the moment at any rate, abandoned all idea of its relief.

On the Japanese side, the 2nd army, probably owing to transport and supply difficulties, hardly made any advance northwards, and on June 30th, was only thirteen miles north of Teh-li-tzu.

The 10th division, which in accordance with the orders of

marshal Oyama, the Japanese commander-in-chief, had moved slowly on Hai-cheng, was, soon after the victory of Teh-li-tzu, ordered to halt and await the advance of the 2nd army.

On receipt of these instructions, Kawamura determined to attack, about June 26th, the Chi-pan-ling and Ta-ling passes, by which date he calculated that Oku should have reached Kai-ping.

On 24th, just as all arrangements were completed, Kawamura, in common with the other generals, was notified that as the Russian fleet could still leave Port Arthur, and render sea transport of supplies precarious, the combined advance on Liao-Yang must be delayed until after the rainy season, that is, until September. At the same time news came from Oku, that, owing to transport difficulties, the 2nd army could not, for the moment, advance.

Thus the Japanese, already beginning to feel the drag on their operations, of the fortress of Port Arthur, which was sheltering the enemy's fleet, proposed to abandon the initiative, a step likely to bring serious consequences in view of the dispersion of their forces.

Kawamura, nevertheless, decided that it would be wise to secure his position, by clearing the passes, and, by 27th, had taken both Chi-pan-ling and Ta-ling, driving off Mischenko's detachment.

Meanwhile, Keller had, as a result of Teh-li-tzu, been ordered to send one brigade to An-shan-tien, and to make, with the remainder of his force, a demonstration towards Feng-huang-cheng; an operation which, if it had any effect, would be more likely to increase than to relieve pressure on Stackelberg.

Keller, therefore, mustered eight battalions, and advancing in two columns, reached a point ten miles from Feng-huang-cheng, unopposed. He then retired, and on arriving at Lenshan-quan, on June 18th, received orders to remain on the defensive.

No sooner had Keller withdrawn, than Rennenkamf

attacked the 12th division at Ai-yang-pien-meng, but soon drew off.

The two Russian generals seem to have acted independently, thereby reducing the chances of success.

On June 24th, the 1st army commander also moved forward to occupy the passes over the main Feng-shui-ling range, for by doing so, though drawing nearer to the enemy's masses, he would limit the Russian power of manœuvre. The army marched north-westwards in three columns, owing to the mountainous nature of the district, the Guards on Erh-chia-pu-tsz, the 2nd division on Len-shan-kuan, and 12th division by Sai-ma-chi. Before this advance Keller and Rennenkamf fell back, so that, by 27th, the Guard and 2nd divisions were holding the Mo-tien-ling and neighbouring passes, and the 12th division a pass twelve miles west of Sai-ma-chi—sometimes called North Feng-shui-ling. Rain now fell heavily, quite disorganising the communications of the 1st army.

It has been suggested that, under the original Japanese plan of campaign, the 1st army was intended to move on Hai-cheng, and not towards Liao-Yang, and that the primary object of the Japanese leaders was to concentrate their own forces rather than to envelop the Russians. The direction actually taken by Kuroki's army is ascribed to the influence of topography, and to the fact that the only practicable roads from the Yalu to the Liao converged on Liao-Yang.

In 1894, the army which crossed the Yalu did march on Hai-cheng. It appears, then, that if the Japanese had desired Kuroki's army to move on Hai-cheng, sufficient roads would have been available for the purpose. It is probable, therefore, that the Japanese deliberately moved the 1st army by the more northerly routes, with the object of at once preventing Russian operations towards Port Arthur by the menace thus offered to the Russian line of communication, and of keeping the 1st army in a position from which it could envelop the Russian left in any locality

south of Mukden. No doubt it was calculated that the Russians could not quickly overwhelm Kuroki in the hilly country lying south-east of Liao-Yang, and that the attraction of Port Arthur, and the presence of the other two armies, would tend to lessen the probability of such a counter-stroke. Possibly the Japanese hoped, after the rapid capture of Port Arthur, to apply to the Russians the enveloping tactics actually attempted at Mukden, with the 3rd army as left wing, and Kuroki's army in a more favourable position than was their right on that occasion.

Whilst these events had been taking place inland, the Russian fleet had, on June 23rd, put to sea, but was driven back into the harbour by the Japanese. On June 26th the 3rd army captured a ridge known as Ken-san, about ten miles from Port Arthur, subsequently repulsing several attempts to retake the position.

At about this time the 3rd army was reinforced by the 9th division and 4th Kobi brigade. (For positions of troops see Appendix VII, and Map 5.)

During the early part of July, the Russians showed a good deal of activity in the eastern theatre of war, a couple of battalions attacking Mo-tien-ling, whilst Rennenkamf continually, but without success, harassed Kuroki's line of communication, with the object of trying to find out his dispositions. The operations were all apparently undertaken to obtain information, for, owing to Kuroki's inertness after his advance, whilst the other armies were relatively active, and to the westward movement of Asada, the Russians thought that Kuroki's army was stealing a march on them. Kuroki, in fact, was at one time reported to be marching towards Ta-ku-shan and Port Arthur, or, as another rumour had it, to be concentrating on his right, preparatory to crossing the Tai-tzu river, and advancing on Mukden—a movement of which the Russians were a good deal afraid. July.

Not satisfied with the result of the earlier operations, and since the cavalry was not able to pierce the Japanese

outpost lines, Keller, on July 17th, attacked the Japanese positions at and near Mo-tien-ling, with one brigade of the 10th corps, and twelve battalions of the 3rd and 6th East Siberian divisions. With these troops he succeeded, though at somewhat heavy cost of life, in discovering that the Japanese 1st army had not materially altered its dispositions. Kuropatkin thereupon determined, on the arrival, in Southern Manchuria, of the 1st and 17th European corps, expected about the middle of August, to attack and drive back Kuroki, whose position was thought to be menacing to Liao-Yang; though it does not appear that the Russians had valid grounds for assuming that the Japanese would remain quiet for so long a period.

Kuroki now delivered a counter-attack, when, on July 19th, the 12th division drove a Russian force, of some 7000 men, with twenty-four guns, from Chao-tao, whence they not only prevented direct communication between the 2nd and 12th divisions, but could have attacked, in flank, the Mo-tien-ling position.

From Chao-tao a road led to Mukden, via Pen-si-hu, so that the Japanese exploit again made Kuropatkin doubt whether the 1st army was not contemplating a movement against his communications.

The Russian commander-in-chief, who, on the news of Teh-li-tzu, had at once hurried southwards, now hastened to An-ping, directing portions of the 10th corps, newly arrived from Russia, to march to Yu-shu-lin-tzu, and drive the Japanese back towards Sai-ma-chi.

At this period, the Japanese armies in Manchuria were still without a commander-in-chief in the theatre of war, marshal Oyama not having yet arrived from Japan. Such procedure, closely copying the action of Moltke in 1866, is open to criticism, for the rival armies were now in such close contact that decisive events, which could not well be controlled from Tokyo, might take place at any moment. Oyama should, therefore, more especially since the activity of the Russians had no doubt shown the danger of post-

poning the advance until September, and as the Russian fleet was no longer formidable, have ere now placed himself where he could closely supervise the operations of his forces.

But Kuropatkin's action was much more reprehensible, for his continued movements must have dislocated the arrangements of his staff, and his presence, in localities where detachments of his army had suffered reverses, was likely not to improve, but to prejudice his grasp of the general situation, by leading him to attach undue importance to local incidents.

Kuropatkin's journeys are said to have been prompted by the fact that he mistrusted the capacity of his subordinate generals. But such meddlesomeness would tend to aggravate rather than to mend matters, and all the Russian leader's energies were required for the organisation, and even training of his army. Many regiments possessed newly raised battalions; the East Siberian brigades had recently been expanded into divisions, and were full of drafts of men who had never seen a magazine rifle; and the transport train was not efficient. Moreover, the Russian armies were parcelled into a series of independent detachments, without cohesion, or knowledge of one another's movements. Not even the force opposing Kuroki was under one commander.

It is a matter of experience that no one leader can efficiently control more than five or six units. It would seem, then, that Kuropatkin should have done as he afterwards did, divided his troops into two or three armies, each under a responsible commander. Probably, however, the men were lacking.

No sooner had Kuropatkin reached An-ping, than news came of the advance of Oku's army, on July 23rd, doubtless undertaken to relieve pressure on Kuroki. This general's isolated position was, most likely, causing anxiety to the Japanese, who had probably heard of the movement of troops eastwards from Liao-Yang.

Kuropatkin at once posted southwards, only to arrive

after the action of Ta-shih-chiao, when Oku drove back the 1st and 4th Siberian corps, both under general Zarubaiev, of the 4th corps, which was most severely engaged.

The position of Ta-shih-chiao, on one of the spurs flung westwards into the Liao plain from the Feng-shui-ling group of mountains, had been fortified, so it is curious that the Russians, having accepted battle, offered so moderate a resistance, for they fought merely a rear-guard action. Apparently Kuropatkin, in view of Kuroki's position at Mo-tien-ling and Chao-tao, did not desire to involve his southern detachment too deeply, but at the same time did not wish to give up Ying-kow without a struggle. Zarubaiev had therefore been ordered not to commit himself, and as a result, the Japanese gained the prestige of a victory, and the Russians sacrificed lives to no purpose.

On 25th and 26th, the 2nd army halted at Ta-shih-chiao, occupying Ying-kow on the latter date.

On 28th, communication was opened between the 2nd and 4th armies, and the 5th division was detached to reinforce general Nodzu's command. This army had, after the capture of Chi-pan-ling and Ta-ling, skirmished, in the area south of Hsi-mu-cheng, with Mischenko's detachment.

Towards the end of July marshal Oyama assumed direct command of the Japanese armies. Coupling this fact with the advance of Oku's force to Ta-shih-chiao, it may therefore be assumed that the Japanese policy of delay until September, had now been definitely abandoned.

After Ta-chih-chiao the Russians fell back to Hai-cheng, and as a result of this contraction of frontage, were now in a more favourable position than at any previous period of the campaign. They were occupying, with 140,000 sabres and bayonets, a semicircle of about sixty miles radius, whereas the Japanese, with not more than 100,000, were spread over quite eighty-five miles; moreover, owing to the drawing of the 4th army towards the 2nd, probably with the object of placing as strong a force as possible near the Port Arthur road, a gap of quite thirty miles of mountainous


Scale of Miles
0 20 40 60 80 100
Russians
Japanese
Figures represent numbers in thousands
Mukden
Liao Yang
3
6
14
23
18
31
61
Ying-kow
35
25
45
Port Arthur
25
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country existed between the right of the 4th and the left of the 1st army. (See Appendix VIII, and Map 6.)

Kuropatkin could now, without much countermarching, have attacked the 2nd and 4th armies, who combined mustered about 61,000 sabres and bayonets and 300 guns, with 75,000 bayonets, 8500 sabres, and 350 guns, whilst he attacked and contained, with some 40,000 bayonets, 3500 sabres, and 172 guns, Kuroki's army of 37,000 rifles and sabres and 152 guns.

Or, conversely, he could have moved against Kuroki with about 55,000 bayonets, 5000 sabres, and 200 guns, whilst holding the 2nd and 4th armies with 60,000 bayonets, 7000 sabres, and 282 guns.

Kuropatkin's reserve was, however, so meagre, that in neither case was it probable that the numerical preponderance he could bring to bear would be decisive, whilst whichever fraction of the Japanese was attacked, must be met more or less directly in front, unless, indeed, the troops at Liao-Yang could turn Kuroki's right by Pen-si-hu.

As already remarked, before taking the offensive, Kuropatkin should have considered where success was most likely to produce decisive results.

Kuroki's army certainly most nearly menaced the Russian line of communication, and for this reason its defeat would have been advantageous to the Russians. But Kuropatkin's forces were so disposed that he could not easily envelop Kuroki's left, separate this army completely from the 4th army, and drive the former towards Feng-huang-cheng; moreover, success against Kuroki's left would not necessarily involve the retirement of Oku and Nodzu.

Still less would the victory be decisive, if Kuropatkin, moving his Liao-Yang troops to Pen-si-hu, rolled up the 12th division; for though, perhaps, this division could be more easily defeated than any other portion of the Japanese forces, a success against the Japanese right would tend only to bring the armies into one straight line, not to cause their ruin.

Similarly, the defeat of the 4th army, though it would doubtless inconvenience the Japanese, and would probably cause Kuroki to fall back, would not oblige them to raise the siege of Port Arthur; and since Nodzu lay in a hilly country, rapid success, so necessary to prevent envelopment by the Japanese wings, would not be easy.

Oku, on the other hand, directly covered the most important of the Japanese lines of supply, to Ying-kow and Dalny, and also the siege of Port Arthur. If he could be driven back and routed, the Japanese armies would be in a sorry plight.

Hence, it seems that the Russian stroke should have been delivered against Oku's army, which, by using the railway, could also be most quickly attacked. Besides, the ground where the battle would take place was more favourable to the Russian organisation and armament than the mountains, and the physical difficulties of the hills would help to delay Kuroki and Nodzu, when they attempted to exert pressure to assist Oku.

However, Kuropatkin seems to have intended nothing more than a direct attack on the 12th division, with the fractions of the 10th corps already designated for the purpose.

But before even this operation could take place, marshal Oyama, hearing from Kuroki that the Russians appeared to be massing against the right of the 1st army, wisely decided to anticipate the enemy's offensive, and to spoil their plan by a forward movement by the whole 1st army, on July 30th and 31st. This operation was to be combined, apparently, with a simultaneous advance by the other two armies, and with active raids against the Russian line of communication, by the Chinese Hun-huse brigands.

On 31st, the 1st army was successful in defeating Keller's detachment, and portions of the 10th corps, and drove them back to the ridges enclosing, on the east, the valley of the Tan river.

On news of this reverse, Kuropatkin, fearing for Liao-Yang and his line of communication, directed those troops which

had been in the neighbourhood of Hai-cheng to fall back to a strong and carefully intrenched position along the ridge of hills near An-shan-tien. This retrograde movement was also due to the fact that Oku had succeeded in interposing, after but slight resistance, some troops between the 2nd and 4th Siberian corps; whilst the 4th army had, on July 31st, taken Hsi-mu-cheng, driving back Mischenko. The 4th army thus closed to within five miles of the 2nd army.

The Japanese occupied Hai-cheng on August 3rd, and the result of the operations undertaken towards the end of July, was therefore to reduce the combined frontage to about sixty or seventy miles. But Kuroki's army was not more than twenty-five or thirty miles from Liao-Yang, whilst the 2nd and 4th were still quite forty-five miles from that city. At the same time the country to be traversed by Kuroki was the more difficult, so that in point of time, the three armies were perhaps equally distant from the town. August.

Kuroki's advanced position had, however, practically committed the Japanese to a converging attack on Liao-Yang, for his army, which should have formed the mobile wing of the Japanese forces, could now only manœuvre with difficulty and risk. Had Oyama's hand not been forced by the threat against the 12th division, and had the 1st army force been held back on the line Chao-tao to Geb-ato, for instance, and the 2nd and 4th armies pushed on to An-shan-tien, the Russians would have been in a more difficult position, whilst the Japanese would have run no greater risk. The 2nd and 4th armies could then have attacked the enemy's front, and the 1st been used to envelop his left flank, wherever the battle for Liao-Yang was fought.

Heavy rain fell at the beginning of August, which, combined with the fact that the Japanese were also probably waiting for the result of the first and abortive assault on Port Arthur, delivered between August 20th and 24th, put an end to active operations, on a large scale, for nearly a month.

During this interval, the Russians were still lying south

APPROXIMATE POSITIONS ON 4th SEPTEMBER, 1904. END OF BATTLE OF YIAO YANG.



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and no idea of offensive seems to have been entertained by the Russian general. The initiative was therefore left to the Japanese, and fearful lest, on the news of the failure of the assault on Port Arthur, the Russians should seize this advantage, they recommenced their converging advance on Liao-Yang.

As before, the 1st army was first committed to action, with the object, it is said, of causing the Russians to evacuate the An-shan-tien position.

The Japanese, as a result, lost all power of manœuvre, except with such troops as could, at considerable risk, be withdrawn from the battle frontage. But, it would, apparently, have been to the Japanese advantage had the Russians stood at An-shan-tien, for their envelopment by Kuroki could then have been undertaken without the necessity of placing his army astride the Tai-tzu river.

Kuropatkin's plan appears to have been to hold the positions at An-shan-tien, and east of An-ping, sufficiently long to oblige the enemy to show his hand and force. Having accomplished this, the army was to retire on the intrenchments that had been made round Liao-Yang, then, pivoting on this bridge-head, it was to manœuvre on both banks of the Tai-tzu; and if the enemy divided his force and placed it astride the river, it was to fall, in superior numbers, on one or other fraction.

Except that the troops holding the advanced positions were liable to defeat in detail, and if not beaten, must, at any rate, have been subjected to the demoralising influence of another retirement, the plan, though cautious, was reasonable. But in the event Kuropatkin failed to carry out his conception, and was defeated. (See Map 8.)

IV

September. THE strategical operations, proper, of the Russo-Japanese war, may be said to have ended with the commencement of the battle of Liao-Yang, but the subsequent operations were on so extended a scale, that it is proposed to deal, in outline, with events leading up to the battle of Mukden.

After their defeat at Liao-Yang, the Russians retired northwards with stolid deliberation, unpursued by the Japanese, the main body reaching the neighbourhood of Mukden on September 6th.

Kuropatkin's first impulse seems to have been to evacuate Mukden, and retreat to Tieh-ling, a town about forty miles north of the Manchu capital, where an offshoot from the Manchurian mountains is again projected into the Liao plain, offering a position suitable for defensive tactics.

But circumstances soon caused the Russian commander to change his mind. In the first place the Japanese pursuit ceased. Then political pressure appears to have been brought to bear on him from Russia, through the viceroy Alexiev, to discontinue the retirement. Then, again, the Russians were much dependent for meat supply on Hsin-ming-ting, and were naturally unwilling to abandon to the enemy, Mukden, a town lying in a rich grain-growing district, and of considerable political importance.

It was therefore decided to halt at Mukden, and the army was quartered in this neighbourhood, as follows:—

Of the cavalry, Grekov's Orenburg Cossack division kept touch with the Japanese along the Sha and Shi-li rivers; Mischenko, with the Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade, stood

eastwards, as far as the Fu-shun to Pen-si-hu road; and the cavalry division, under Samsonov, watched the country east of Fu-shun. Besides these, there were the customary detachments wide to both flanks.

The 10th and 17th corps remained, with the 2nd and 4th Siberian corps, south of the Hun river, and were employed in constructing bridge-heads to the railway and Imperial road bridges, in the shape of a semicircle of forts, round a radius from Hun-ho-pu to Yan-su-chian-tzu.

The 1st Siberian corps proceeded to Fu-ling, six miles east of Mukden, the 3rd to Fu-shun, twenty miles further east. The two then began to intrench the line of the Hun from Mukden to Fu-shun, constructing works on both banks of the river. The 5th Siberian corps was placed between Mukden and Hsin-ming-ting; and the 1st corps, now arriving from Europe, had its headquarters at Pu-ho, fifteen miles north of Mukden. The 5th East Siberian corps, which had been broken into detachments during the battle of Liao-Yang, seems still to have been disseminated. But, later, apparently, portions of this and of the 5th Siberian corps were amalgamated, and known as the 5th corps.

Soon after Liao-Yang, the Czar, believing that the defeat of the Russians had perhaps, in part, been due to the fact that Kuropatkin's army was too large for one man to manage, decided to form two armies in Manchuria, under admiral Alexiev as commander-in-chief, one to be commanded by Kuropatkin, the other by general Grippenberg, at that time commanding the Vilna army corps.

This appointment, perhaps, turned Kuropatkin's thoughts to projects for retrieving his reputation.

The fact that the numbers and strength of the Russian army had been much increased also made an offensive appear to be promising; for there had arrived from Europe, the 1st corps, drafts to replace casualties, Q.F. guns in substitution for those of older pattern, up to that time in use by the Siberian corps, and the 6th Siberian corps was on its way to the seat of war.

Before attempting to attack the Japanese, Kuropatkin, taught by his experience at Liao-Yang, proceeded to delegate his authority, and to decentralise command, by organising his forces into three groups or armies. Of these, the Eastern detachment, lying east of Mukden, was composed of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Siberian corps, with the Siberian Cossack division, under general Stackelberg. The western detachment of the 10th, 17th corps, and portions of the 5th European and 5th Siberian corps, now known as the 5th corps, with the Orenburg Cossack division, was under general Bilderling. A central force consisting of the 1st corps, the 4th Siberian corps, and the 6th Siberian corps, when it came up, with Mischenko's Trans-Baikal Cossack division, was under the commander-in-chief. In addition, the usual strong mixed forces watched both flanks.

Attention was also given to mapping, or to revising maps of the area round Mukden, but apparently little was really done, for Stackelberg's detachment is said to have possessed but few maps at the time of the Sha-Ho battle.

Whilst the Russians were thus engaged, the Japanese, exhausted by their efforts at Liao-Yang, had halted, the 1st army on the line Hei-yin-tai to Lo-ta-tai, the 2nd and 4th armies south of the Tai-tzu, and west and east of Liao-Yang.

About September 14th, marshal Oyama seems to have decided to undertake further offensive operations in a month's time, by which date, no doubt, drafts to make good the losses of Liao-Yang would have arrived, as well as the 8th division.

Accordingly, instructions were issued to this effect, each army was allotted a district in which to advance, and the troops were warned, that, in future, frontal attacks, when unaccompanied by enveloping movements, were to be avoided as far as possible. This last provision exactly coincided with tactical instructions promulgated by the Russians about the same time.

To the 1st army was assigned the Ta-lien-kou to Pu-tsao-

yai road, and the district eastwards as far as Pen-si-hu. The 4th army was to use the roads on either side of the railway, and the 2nd army the roads westward as far as the right bank of the Hun. The reserve, of Kobi brigades, was to march west of the railway, and behind the right of the 2nd army.

It was not until September 10th that the bridges over the Tai-tzu, at Liao-Yang, were repaired, and the 2nd army began to cross the river and to intrench itself on the line Shan-tai-tzu to Ta-pa-tai-tzu.

The 4th army, which commenced, about the same time, to move to the north of Tai-tzu, took up the line Nan-tai to La-ni-pu.

The 1st army lay mainly between La-ni-pu and the Yen-tai coal mines, but Umezawa's detachment was about fifteen miles to the east, at Ping-tai-tzu; apparently partly for the purpose of reconnoitring the district allotted to the 1st army, partly because Ping-tai-tzu is an important valley centre, whence roads lead to Pen-si-hu, and thence to Chao-tao and the Yalu.

As has been stated, both commanders were contemplating offensive operations, and for this purpose each wanted information of the enemy's dispositions.

Though the masses of Russian cavalry made it difficult for the Japanese patrols to penetrate the enemy's outpost line, the Japanese service of spies seems to have afforded them fairly accurate information of the Russian dispositions; and, after all, cavalry, more often than not, can only confirm, or show to be false, news obtained from other sources. At any rate, Oyama knew that the whole Russian front and flanks were covered by cavalry; that the 5th Siberian corps was reported west of Mukden, the 10th and 17th corps round, or close to the city, the 1st and 2nd Siberian corps east of Mukden; but the 3rd Siberian corps was not located. He was also aware that works were being constructed north of the Sha-Ho, and east of Mukden, and that reinforcements, in the shape of the 1st European and 6th Siberian corps, were coming up.

It has been said "that rivers and mountains, like other complications in the art of war, afford additional opportunities to skill and talent, and additional embarrassments to incapacity"; and, indeed, the presence, in the theatre of operations, of the great Hun river, and of the mountains north of Pen-si-hu, fully exemplify the truth of this remark.

The Hun river certainly complicated the problem presented to Oyama, for he could not, without placing his army astride so serious an obstacle, carry out a converging movement against the Russians, nor could he, without considerable risk, attempt to turn, after the manner of Lee, or envelop their right flank. On the other hand, the Hun would protect the Japanese left, and render, difficult, attack by the Russians from this direction.

Perhaps the Japanese commander-in-chief might have tried to surprise the enemy by crossing the whole, or at any rate the greater, part of his army, over the Hun and Tai-tzu, near Hsiao-pei-ho. Then marching between the Hun and Liao rivers, he could have attacked the Russian right, thus turning the Hun and the fortifications south and east of Mukden and, at the same time, using the Hun as a line of supply.

Such plan would have demanded the temporary uncovering of the main line of supply from Ying-kow and Dalny. But a fortified Liao-Yang should have sufficiently protected the line of communication, until Japanese pressure on the Russian communications had obliged the latter to abandon any enterprises that might have been undertaken south of Mukden. Moreover, if advancing southwards in force, the Russians would probably have sent a detachment west of the Hun, and would have, therefore, placed themselves astride the river.

If unable to adopt so bold a course, Oyama, relying on the Hun to protect his left, could repeat the tactics of Liao-Yang, by advancing directly on Mukden with the 2nd army, and moving the 1st and 4th armies, in echelon behind the 2nd, through the hills, towards Fu-shun. Here they could

probably, with ease, force the passage of the Hun, but supply in the hill area might be difficult.

Or he could imitate Lee's action in 1862, and detach Kuroki to move round the Russian left whilst the rest attacked, or remained fronting, the Russians.

In any case, either the passage across the Hun, or the march through the hills, would be a slow proceeding, which would increase the risk that the enemy might probe the plan, and counter-attack before its development.

Or, again, he could adopt a less ambitious, though probably not less risky plan, and act as he apparently intended, making a direct advance on Mukden and Fu-shun, and trusting to Kuroki to overlap and envelop the enemy's left.

At any rate the situation of the two armies, now fronting each other, and astride their lines of communication, rendered necessary either a bold turning movement, or an equally dangerous, though to outward appearance less risky frontal advance against the Russian works; and the last course would be the least likely to lead to decisive results.

The alternatives presented to the Russian commander-in-chief much resembled those placed before Oyama.

About the middle of September, the information available to Kuropatkin inclined him to believe that two Japanese divisions were between Nan-tai and Shan-tai-tzu, that four divisions were immediately north of Liao-Yang, two divisions near the Yen-tai coal mines, and two divisions between Ping-tai-tzu and Pen-si-hu. He knew, moreover, that Liao-Yang was fortified, for he had made the works, and he believed that all the Japanese troops were intrenched.

There were several courses open to the Russian leader. He could utilise the Hun as a line from which to manœuvre, constructing bridges, and building bridge-heads at, say, Chan-tan, at Hun-ho-pu south of Mukden, and at Fu-shun, and keeping his army, with the exception of his cavalry, north of the river. But this plan would be unenterprising, and therefore a confession of weakness and inferiority.

Or he could, whilst fortifying Hun-ho-pu to secure his communications, and covering his front with cavalry, who would be especially active in the hill area, march the bulk of his army down the right bank of the Hun, and cross the river south of Chan-tan and Hei-kou-tai. This plan would involve the passage of the Hun, a broad river, in somewhat close proximity to the Japanese left, but the blow would fall near the Japanese main line of communication.

Or, again, the Russian general could move his army southwards, astride the Hun, attacking the Japanese in front with one portion, and when their attention was fully engaged, throwing the remainder across the river on to their left flank. In this case there would be risk of defeat in detail, for the enemy might envelop the troops east of the Hun Ho, or might even make a counter-attack towards Fu-shun. But if they advanced on Fu-shun, their movements in the hills, especially if opposed, would be slow, and their blow would not so nearly menace the Russian line, as would his own operations the Japanese communications.

Or, the Russians, advancing from Mukden and Fu-shun, might try to envelop the Japanese right at Pen-si-hu, whilst closely engaging their front. In order that the enveloping movement might come as a surprise to the enemy, it should take place after his front had been attacked. Objections to this project would be that the Russian armament was not well suited to hill warfare, for they had only three or four mountain batteries; that supply would be difficult; that movements in mountainous country are always slow, but are particularly so when opposed; that the Japanese main line of communication was many miles distant, and that therefore to sever it would be difficult; also that there would be risk of defeat in detail, for the enemy, whilst holding the Russian left in the hills, might attack their centre, and envelop their right.

Again, the Russians might advance in three converging masses with the object of enveloping the enemy, though, having regard to the fighting power of the Japanese, they

APPROXIMATE POSITIONS EARLY IN OCTOBER, 1904.



had hardly sufficient numerical preponderance to justify hopes that envelopment would be successful. Or, they might move in double echelon from their centre, holding back both wings, so as to meet and counter the enveloping tactics practised by the Japanese. Such procedure would lead to a desperate frontal battle, without prospect of decisive victory.

The plan actually adopted by Kuropatkin was an attack on the Japanese right, for which the detachment of Stackelberg was designated, the purpose of the movement being to draw the Japanese reserves in an easterly direction. This accomplished, the Russian right and centre, which would have been withheld from close action, could, it was hoped, attack with success.

To this plan it may be objected that the main operation, though to be directed against the troops covering the principal Japanese line of supply, was to be a mere frontal attack, and therefore more likely to be costly than decisive. Moreover, the Japanese might consider that an advance against the Russian left, would afford more effective relief to their own right, than the direct despatch of reinforcements to this flank.

(For positions of troops, see Appendix X, and Map 9.)

In criticising the Russian dispositions it may be remarked that it might have been more advantageous had Kuropatkin, instead of putting his reserve behind his centre, in position to directly reinforce either wing, added, from the beginning, one corps to his left wing, and placed two corps along the Sha-Ho to the east, and three corps to the west of the railway. The three groups could then have come into action, successively, from left to right, whilst the corps west of the railway could have outflanked the enemy's left. At the same time, such of his 17,000 cavalry as were not required for local protection, might, since the Japanese cavalry was not numerically formidable, have been formed into two masses of, say, 7000 and 10,000, the larger to operate against the Japanese right, the smaller against their left wing.

The flank detachments should also, if not quite abolished, have been very much reduced in strength, so as to enable effort to be concentrated at the decisive point.

The arrangement of the Japanese army may be criticised in the sense that it was perhaps better posted for a defensive battle covering Liao-Yang, than for the offensive movement which Oyama is said to have contemplated, for long marches to either flank would have to be made before the troops could be in position to initiate an enveloping movement.

Oyama seems to have received early intimation of the enemy's projects. On September 28th, the actual date on which Kuropatkin issued his general plan of action, [with only a reservation that the time for its inception was to be notified later,] the Japanese commander-in-chief informed his army leaders that the Russians might, at any moment, move in force against Ping-tai-tzu, and that arrangements must, therefore, be made against this contingency.

October. Again, on October 2nd, a Russian army order was published, and copied in the Press, announcing that the time had come for the Russian army to take the offensive, and drive the enemy southwards.

This may have been regarded by the Japanese as a blind, for in spite of this warning, they were in some degree surprised by the enemy's offensive.

But, as happened throughout the war, the Russian operations were so slow and hesitating, that the Japanese, by a vigorous offensive, were able to deprive the enemy of his initial advantage.

After severe fighting, the armies halted, exhausted and facing one another, on the banks of the Sha river, where they settled down, in close contact, to await—the Russians the arrival of reinforcements, before again undertaking the offensive, the Japanese the release of their 3rd army by the capture of Port Arthur. (See Map 10.)

The viceroy Alexiev was recalled soon after the Sha-Ho battle, leaving Kuropatkin free to direct operations, and to continue the work of organising the army.


APPROXIMATE POSITIONS AT END OF SHA HO BATTLE.
Scale of Miles.
10 5 0 10 20 30
Russians
Japanese
Liao R.
Hsin-ming-ting
Mukden
Hun R.
Sha R.
Liao Yang
Tai-tzu R.
W.D.B


APPROXIMATE POSITIONS, NEW YEAR, 1905.
Scale of Miles
10 5 0 10 20 30
Russians
Japanese
Hsin-ming-ting
Mukden
Hun-ho-pu
Tao-shan-tun
Chan-tan
Hei-kou-tai
San-chia-tzu
Shi-tai-tzu
Yaltai
Ku-chia-tzu
Pu-tsao-yai
Tung-kou
Yang-kou
Hua-ling
Lang-tung-kou
Yentai
Liao Yang
Pen-si-hu
Hsing-ching-ting
W.D.B

For some months the Russians devoted themselves to reorganisation, and to the absorption of reinforcements. Both sides also busily intrenched, and whilst bickering was frequent, it rarely assumed serious proportions, notwithstanding that the armies, in places, were not fifty yards apart. November and December.

The first event, worthy of note, to happen in the winter was the fall of Port Arthur on January 1st, 1905. (For positions of the armies, see Appendix XI, and Map 11.) January, 1905.

This occurrence made it certain that the Japanese would soon receive an accession of three or four divisions. The Russians having now completed the organisation of their army, and being in sufficient numbers to warrant hope of a successful attack on the enemy, Kuropatkin seems, therefore, to have thought the moment propitious for an offensive, more especially because the political situation in Russia was such as to render the government anxious for a victory.

Two great obstacles stood in the way of active measures—the shortness of the days, and the coldness of the time of year.

In spite of the rigorous climate, Kuropatkin decided to attack the Japanese, hoping, perhaps, that the Russians, inured to cold, would support the inevitable hardships better than the enemy.

Before taking the offensive, the Russian leader, either with the object of discovering if any troops from Port Arthur had reached the armies, or to alarm the enemy as to his communications, sent round the Japanese left, a force of about fifty squadrons, with half a dozen batteries, and a few infantry, all under Mischenko.

The raid ended on January 11th, and was so far successful, that the Russians learnt that no troops of the 3rd army had reached Liao-Yang.

Kuropatkin now resolved to roll up the Japanese left, but proposed to use for this purpose, only about 30,000 men, drawn from the 8th and 10th corps, the Rifle corps, and the 1st and 6th Siberian corps.

There seems no doubt that, having regard to the frontage

occupied by the two armies, the numerical superiority of the Russians, some 100,000 men, and the strength of the Russian front line, behind which manœuvre should not have been difficult, Kuropatkin possessed the power to deal a serious blow on either flank. This the Japanese would find difficult to parry, unless troops were withdrawn from the first line, in which case there would be risk of the front being broken.

The left flank of the Japanese was most inviting; here the country was not so difficult as were the eastward hills, the distance to be traversed by the Russians would be less than would be required to turn the enemy's right, and the Japanese left was nearer their main line of communication. If, then, the left were broken, the enemy's line of supply would be in serious danger, and, in addition, it was believed that the Japanese did not anticipate an attack on this flank.

On the other hand, the Japanese reserves were thought to be standing near Yentai station, and therefore well placed to reinforce the left.

Forewarned is forearmed, and a primary condition of success in war, is, therefore, that the enemy shall be misled, and that the blow, when delivered, shall come as a surprise.

The Russians, however, neglected this rule, for, from January 13th onwards, the Russian right began to show unusual activity, a balloon usually raised at Sha-ho-pu, moving westwards, whilst on 17th and 18th, cavalry occupied Ssu-fang-tai, west of Chan-tan.

It may of course be said that these manœuvres might have been a ruse to draw the enemy's attention westwards; and this fact constitutes one of the great disadvantages of the defensive, in that the defender can rarely be certain whether the enemy's movements are a stratagem, or the prelude to an attack.

But the Japanese possessed other information of the Russian intentions, for, on the night of January 24th, six


APPROXIMATE POSITIONS 20th FEBRUARY 1905.
Scale of Miles.
10 5 0 10 20 30
Russians
Japanese
Liao R.
Hsin-ming-ting
Mukden
Hun R.
Hei-kou-tai
Shi-liho
Yentai
San-chia-pao
Shan-ko-yu-shu
Huang-ni-wa
Hsiao-pei-ho
Yang-chia-wan
Liao Yang
Tzi-tzu R.
Feng-chia-pu
Hui-ling
Hsing-ching-ling
Wei-tzu-yu
Pao-tzu-yen
W.D.B

Russian soldiers, who surrendered to the Japanese in different portions of the frontage held by the armies—and such desertions were unfortunately frequent, especially amongst the Jews in the Czar's service—all reported that an attack would be made, on 26th, against the Japanese left.

In spite of this, the Japanese were somewhat taken aback, when, on 26th, the Russians attacked, in force, the village of Hei-kou-tai. They were, however, driven back after three days' hard fighting.

As at the Sha-Ho, the Russians lost their initial advantage through the undue deliberation of their movements, and no serious operations took place against the Japanese front, to prevent reinforcement of the threatened point.

The Japanese contented themselves with beating off the attack, probably, because they were unwilling to become involved in a decisive battle, before the arrival of the 3rd army.

In the interval between the battle of Hei-kou-tai and that of Mukden, no stirring events occurred; but, as a result of this action, both sides increased their fortified frontage, the Japanese continuing to hold Hei-kou-tai, and the neighbouring villages, in force, whilst the Russians threw up intrenchments west of Chan-tan. February.

In other respects the Russians do not seem to have altered their dispositions, but the arrival of the 3rd army, and the completion of Kawamura's 5th army, caused some changes to be made in the arrangement of the Japanese troops. (See Appendix XII, and Map 12.)

The annual thaw, which usually begins early in March, and would render the rivers unfordable, and the roads and fields heavy, was now imminent. It was therefore to be presumed, that, in spite of the cold, one or both commanders would assume the offensive in the interval, more especially since the Japanese, now that the 3rd army had arrived, could not, for some time at any rate, expect further reinforcement.

Towards the middle of February, the Russians did decide

again to attack the Japanese, and even before this date the latter had worked out a plan of attack.

The experience of the Sha-Ho battle had taught the Russians the local resisting power inherent in mountain positions, and whilst railways had been run to various portions of the Russian frontage, thus facilitating supply, none had been laid far into the mountains south of Fu-shun. The feeding of a large force in this locality would therefore have demanded quantities of transport, which could probably only be procured with difficulty. Moreover, to have turned the Japanese right, would have required a long detour, for Kawamura's army was some distance east of Pen-si-hu; and success, if attained, would probably have been local rather than decisive, for the enemy's line of communication lay many miles from the 5th army. Attack on the right was also apparently expected by the enemy, for, according to Kuropatkin's information, the bulk of the 3rd army had been sent to Kawamura. Then, again, the armament of the Russian army, possessing as it did but few mountain guns, was not well suited to hill warfare; and lastly, if he moved a number of troops eastwards, Kuropatkin would, in some degree, uncover his own communications, and render himself liable to counter-attack west of Mukden.

On the other hand, the position of the Russian reserves, the alignment of the auxiliary railways, the armament of the Russians, their preponderance in cavalry, and the level nature of the country, would facilitate operations against the Japanese left. By adopting this plan, Kuropatkin would be retaining the bulk of his army near Mukden, and his line of communication, and it might reasonably be hoped that Kawamura's advance would be sufficiently long retarded, to enable decisive success to be gained against the Japanese left; though here would be met the enemy's reserves.

Kuropatkin, therefore, decided to attack the Japanese left, but without attempting envelopment, the intention being, apparently, to crush the enemy by weight of numbers, about

three corps being used for the offensive, whilst the remainder kept their positions.

This plan may be characterised as a half-measure, and it would have been wiser to have withdrawn certainly one, probably better still two corps, from the strongly fortified frontage, and to have placed a mass of four or five corps west of the Hun, covered by 10,000 or 15,000 cavalry. The enemy's right and front might then have been attacked, and when these had been closely engaged, the stroke might have been launched against their left.

The Japanese, however, had already adopted a formation calculated to at once meet envelopment by the enemy, or should he remain on the defensive, to facilitate the enclosing of his forces; the 3rd army being placed behind the left, the 5th behind the right flank. They had moreover decided to assume the offensive, on February 20th, their plan, apparently, stopping short at nothing less than the envelopment of the Russians, the 5th army operating against the enemy's left, the 3rd army against his right.

In order, however, to deceive the enemy as to their intentions, and to induce him to send his reserves eastwards, thus facilitating the deployment of the 3rd army, Kawamura was to move first.

This stratagem succeeded, and to it the Japanese were a good deal beholden for their victory.

That the Japanese plan was rather beyond the capacity of their forces, is shown by the event.

In these circumstances, it would probably have been better to have reduced Kawamura's strength, and added these troops, as well as the general reserve, which was retained behind the centre far into the battle, to the 3rd army.

This army would then have comprised about five divisions, and its operations would probably have been decisive.

By withdrawing cavalry from the divisions of the 2nd and 4th armies, where it had not much scope, a larger mass might also have been placed on the left, with advantage to the Japanese operations.

V

THE strategical lessons of the Russo-Japanese war are those which throughout history have clamoured for recognition, but have never, apparently, been thoroughly appreciated.

Often governments have courted disaster by living in the present, by disregarding future possibilities, and by pursuing, regardless of consequences, policies likely to end in disaster.

So Russia, hypnotised by the vastness of her empire, and encouraged by the exaggerated fear of her actions displayed by certain European ministries, embarked thoughtlessly on an ill-considered policy of expansion. This brought her face to face with an apparently weak, but determined foe, whose very existence was threatened by Russian pretensions.

Russia's policy, in this particular, outstripped her strategy, that is, her forces were not in position to impose her wishes, should they lead to conflict with Japan.

As a result, the great northern power paid the usual penalty for unpreparedness, bad organisation, and unsound distribution of force. She lost the initiative, was obliged to conform to the operations of the enemy, and to push into the front line, as they arrived in the theatre of war, a heterogeneous collection of units, who were without cohesion.

As always happens in such circumstances, councils were divided, plans hastily arranged, and as hastily abandoned, generals had no confidence in one another, nor in their men, and the troops, sharing this feeling, mistrusted their leaders.

Even when projects promised success, they were marred by faulty execution.

Fighting as they were in the midst of a semi-hostile population, and dependent to a great extent on their single line of railway to Europe, the Russians were also, from the first, forced to make large detachments to guard their communications, as to the security of which they were naturally sensitive.

Russia was therefore obliged to accept defeat from a weaker nation, who, through careful preparation, and sound organisation, which go far to ensure success in war; and with the help of judicious alliances, was able to beat a more powerful rival.

Neither wealth, resources, numbers of population, nor even armed force, are therefore decisive factors in war. More important than these are foresight, preparation, and organisation.

Russia's policy of expansion was not national; it was rather the policy of a few ambitious men. The support of the nation, an important item in war, was therefore lacking, and the soldiers went to the front unwillingly, or even under compulsion.

Consequently, though the Russians fought well, they fought without enthusiasm, and their generals could not rely on this factor. But the Japanese people entered heart and soul into the contest, inspiring their soldiers to noble deeds.

The difficulty of remedying errors in initial deployment is clearly shown by the course of the campaign. The Russians never overcame the original drawback of their local weakness; the Japanese laboured, throughout, under the disadvantage inherent in the false strategy of pursuing a double objective, unless possessed of great preponderance of force.

The Japanese plan was faulty, in that effort was not concentrated against the decisive point, whilst the projects were somewhat beyond the capacity of the national resources.

Not only was the power of resistance of the Russian troops quartered in Manchuria esteemed too lightly, but the transporting capacity of the Trans-Siberian railway was also undervalued.

Nor was war declared at the most favourable moment, from a military and meteorological point of view.

Want of foresight, too, was displayed in not sufficiently discounting the influence of the climatic and topographical conditions in Manchuria, which undoubtedly delayed the Japanese operations, to the advantage of the Russians.

Still, vigorous execution enabled the nation to achieve a considerable success; the movements of the armies were successfully co-ordinated in such a manner as to afford one another support; and the menace of the 1st army to the Russian line of communication produced the expected effect.

The whole course of the operations, in fact, again proves that it is not so much ability to plan, as resolution to carry through, that is required to make successful war; though, naturally, a good plan, well executed, is the ideal to be attained.

Command of the sea also proved a valuable asset to Japan, in forcing Russia to strongly guard the fortress of Vladivostock, and in causing her generals to be diffident of risking troops in the Liao-tung peninsula.

The value and importance of the initiative is another lesson of the war.

He who is obliged to follow the enemy's lead ceases to be a free agent, a fact which adversely affects his judgment, rendering him weak and vacillating.

The initiative does not belong in perpetuity to the assailant, to him who first attacks, for the defender, by an early counter-stroke, may reverse the positions.

Circumstances will not always permit a belligerent to attack first, but it is to be remembered that the longer the initiative is left to the opponent, the greater become his chances of success.

The strong and weak points of enveloping strategy stand out clearly. There is no magic, calculated to ensure success, in enveloping strategy, that is, in converging movements on several lines of operation. Far from it, this form of war is the most risky, and the general who adopts exterior lines, deliberately, or of necessity, separates his forces, affording the opponent the desired opportunity of beating them in detail.

But converging movements favour envelopment, and envelopment, if successful, is decisive, a fact which tempts commanders to run the risks its inception entails.

War would be fairly easy were the game played, even blindfold, on a chessboard; with no factors of weather, or topography, to disturb calculations; with men of wood, not delicate human beings, with which to make moves; and with full knowledge of the enemy's dispositions.

It is the presence of these disturbing elements that makes war so difficult an art; for even in countries with settled climates, the influence of weather on the health of the men, or on the mobility of the army, may, at any moment, prejudice the best-laid plans.

But a more variable factor, even than weather, is human nature, and if a wide margin must be left to allow for the effect of climate, a wider is required to discount human eccentricities.

If ignorance of the enemy's position and movements be added to the plot, it is clear that no plan of operations, not elastic, has great chance of success.

Kuropatkin's wavering attitude may have, and probably did, influence, that of his subordinate generals, but it cannot be said that they executed his plans with the spirit he had the right to expect. Yet generous co-operation is one of the foundations of success in war.

It is not, at present, easy to say how much or how little either commander was influenced by political pressure, and to what extent the course to be pursued, was dictated from localities far from the seat of war.

The general policy to be followed in war rests with the National Government, but interference in the details of the conduct of a campaign cannot but lead to disaster, as history has shown time and again.

Training for war is an important part of peace preparation, but is, owing to the innate conservatism of human nature, perhaps the most difficult portion of what may be called peace strategy.

Men's minds habitually seek refuge in rules, vainly hoping thereby to solve life's difficulties and dilemmas. As a result, though formalism spells ruin in war, the Russians certainly, the Japanese in some degree, were found behind modern requirements in their training, and both paid for their fault by useless sacrifice of life. The difficulty of keeping training up to date lies mainly in the fact that it is not possible, in peace, to pronounce definitely on the influence that will be exercised by improvements in armament. Moreover, officers and men dislike the trouble of changing methods in which they have been trained, and which may, in the past, have stood the test of war.

A lesson of this war is that if a sound plan vigorously executed is the foundation, good information is the keystone of military success. An efficient service of intelligence cannot be improvised, it must be carried on by men whose minds have been trained in these matters. Of this the Japanese were aware, and though, in some respects, their topographical information was faulty, their intelligence service in Europe, combined with a local system of spies, who were assisted by the friendly Chinese population, usually afforded early and accurate news of the enemy's dispositions and intentions.

The Russian intelligence department is said to have been ill organised; and it is even stated that few, if any, officers at Russian headquarters were able to read the Japanese writing, and that documents which fell into their hands could not therefore be deciphered.

In contrast, too, to the silence of the Japanese press, the

Russian newspapers published details of the mobilisation of troops, and the despatch of reinforcements, which laid bare to the enemy the strength of the opposing army.

Lastly, the great difficulty of war is demonstrated by the failure of the Russian leader in this campaign.

Kuropatkin was no fool as judged by ordinary standards. To those who knew him he appeared a clever, cultured man, well read in military literature. He was reckoned resolute, he possessed much of that war experience which is rated so high, and had distinguished himself on service.

He seemed, therefore, to possess the qualifications required in a general. Yet he failed. The weight of responsibility was too great for him, and, in reality, he lacked the character to carry through his plans, and to dominate the will of his opponent.

Character may be an inborn quality, like strength of arm, or swiftness of foot, but character can be formed and developed, and "to teach taste is inevitably to form character." But if there has been acquired the ambition to labour to perfect knowledge and judgment; the will to overcome difficulties not to be beaten by them; the sentiment that "nothing has been done whilst anything remains undone, and that to fail is better than not to attempt"; a great step will have been made towards the formation of a character fit to take command, should fortune so shape the career.

APPENDIX I

RUSSIAN ORGANISATION

A Normal Army Corps consisted of—

Two infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and corps engineers.

An Infantry Division included—

Two brigades, each of two, four-battalion regiments; one artillery brigade of six or eight batteries, each of eight guns; and an engineer company.

A cavalry division comprised two brigades, each of two, six-squadron regiments, with two horse batteries. Total: 3000–3500 sabres or lances, and 12 guns.

Total strength of an army corps: about 28,000 rifles, 3500 sabres, 124 guns.

Of the corps that took part in the war, the following, which belonged to the active European army, were approximately of the above strength: 1st, 4th, 10th, 16th, 17th.

The 5th and 6th Siberian Corps were composed of European reserve units, and numbered 28,000 rifles and 96 guns.

The 4th Siberian Corps was made up of Siberian reserve units, and possessed 28,000 rifles and 64 guns.

The 2nd Siberian Corps included East Siberian troops, and reserve units, and possessed 27,000 rifles and 80 guns.

The 1st and 3rd Siberian Corps were formed in Eastern Siberia before the war, and numbered 22,000 rifles and 80 guns.

None of the Siberian corps had special corps cavalry, but Cossack divisions, and smaller units, were attached to them as required.

ARMAMENT.—That of the artillery was of a heterogeneous nature. About one-third of the field batteries possessed a modern 3 in. Q.F. gun, with shield; firing a practically smokeless powder, and throwing a shrapnel up to 6000 yards with time fuse, and 7000 yards with percussion fuse. The remainder of the field guns were principally

muzzle-loading weapons, of 3·42 calibre. There were a few mountain guns, and a proportion of heavy artillery and howitzers.

The cavalry carried sword, a rifle similar to that of the infantry, sometimes a bayonet, and the front rank had, also, usually a lance. Of rifle ammunition, 45 rounds were on the man, and 24 rounds in the regimental transport.

The infantry weapon was a ·3 charger-loading rifle, each charger holding five cartridges. The rifle was sighted to 2100 yards, and weighed nine pounds. Each man carried 120 rounds in his pouches, bandolier, and kit bag.

Equipment and Rations.—Each infantry man had usually, on his person, biscuit and salt for two and a half days; and eighty men per company were equipped with spades. The total weight carried by the infantry soldier, including clothing, was sixty pounds.

Of reserve rations, there were, in Vladivostock and district, at the beginning of the war, three months' supplies; in the Port Arthur command, twelve months' food; and eight months' in the Siberian military district.

Engineers.—Pontoon units had from 300–400 yards of bridging material, and many engineer companies possessed a light field park.

The European companies had forty miles of cable and wire, and there were four East Siberian telegraph companies, each with sixteen miles of wire. There were also, in the army, three telegraph companies with Marconi wireless equipment, for maintenance of communication between the Commander-in-Chief and army commanders.

Machine Guns.—Several divisions had eight-gun machine-gun companies.

Mounted Scouts.—Most divisions possessed companies of mounted scouts.

APPENDIX II

JAPANESE ORGANISATION

The army was organised on a territorial system. There were thirteen districts, each furnishing one division, and one Kobi brigade.

Four new divisions, and Kobi brigades, were raised in 1904.

A division included two brigades, each of two, three-battalion regiments; one cavalry regiment; six, six-gun batteries; and three companies of engineers.

Total: 11,400 rifles, 430 sabres, 36 guns, 830 engineers.

The 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th divisions had mountain guns only; the 7th division had half field and half mountain guns; the remainder possessed field guns.

A Kobi brigade consisted of two, two-battalion regiments, and numbered 3500 rifles.

A mixed Kobi brigade was composed of one infantry brigade of two, three-battalion regiments; three batteries; and one company of engineers. Total: 5000 rifles, ? sabres, 18 guns, 280 engineers.

An artillery brigade consisted of three regiments, each of six, six-gun batteries.

A cavalry brigade comprised two regiments, of four squadrons each.

ARMAMENT.—The field and mountain guns were of the same calibre—2·95 inches. Both fired a practically smokeless powder, and the field gun ranged to about 5000 yards. After the Sha-Ho battle, the field guns were provided with shields.

There were batteries of 4·72 howitzers, and heavy guns of various kinds.

The artillery carried both shrapnel, and high explosive shell.

The cavalry were armed with a sword, and with a carbine sighted to 1500 yards.

The infantry possessed a rifle of ·256 calibre, sighted to 2280 yards, weighing about eight and a half pounds, and loaded by means of a charger carrying five cartridges.

Of ammunition, 150 rounds were supposed to be on the man, and 60 rounds on the ammunition mules.

RATIONS, ETC.—Each man had, on his person, two days' rations; and two-thirds of the men carried an intrenching tool strapped to the knapsack.

ENGINEERS.—The bridging sections possessed 153 yards of bridge, and a telegraph section had 36 miles of air line and cable.

MACHINE GUNS.—In 1904–5 each division was given fourteen Hotchkiss guns. These were organised into two six-gun batteries, and one two-gun section.

APPENDIX III

TABLES SHOWING THE APPROXIMATE DISPOSITIONS AND NUMBERS OF THE ARMIES

COMBATANT TROOPS, LESS ARTILLERYMEN

JAPANESE

BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY, 1904.

1st division, 1st Kobi brigade . .	Tokyo.
Guard, Guard Kobi brigade . . .	Tokyo.
2nd division, 2nd Kobi brigade . .	Sendai.
3rd division, 3rd Kobi brigade . .	Nagoya.
4th division, 4th Kobi brigade . .	Osaka.
5th division, 5th Kobi brigade . .	Ujina.
6th division, 6th Kobi brigade . .	Kumatoto.
7th division, 7th Kobi brigade . .	Hokkaido.
8th division, 8th Kobi brigade . .	Hirosaki.
9th division, 9th Kobi brigade . .	Kanazawa.
10th division, 10th Kobi brigade . .	Hijemi.
11th division, 11th Kobi brigade . .	Marugame.
12th division, 12th Kobi brigade . .	Kokura.

Depot troops in addition.

Grand total: 245,000 rifles, 10,500 sabres, 828 guns, 14,000 engineers.

RUSSIANS

Vladivostock (Ussuri) district

BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY, 1904.

1st, 2nd, 6th, 8th East Siberian rifle brigades.
2nd brigade of the 31st division.
2nd brigade of the 35th division.
Two regiments of cavalry.
One engineer battalion.
Fourteen batteries.
Fortress troops.
Railway troops.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Field troops . . .	33,500	1,500	112
Fortress troops . . .	3,500	—	—
Railway troops . . .	3,500	—	—
Total	40,500	1,500	112

Kuan-tung peninsula, and Southern Manchuria

3rd, 4th, and 7th East Siberian rifle brigades.
Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade.
One engineer battalion.
Five batteries.
Fortress troops.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Field troops . . .	21,000	1,400	40
Fortress troops . . .	2,500	—	—
Total	23,500	1,400	40

On the railway south of Harbin

5th East Siberian rifle brigade.
One cavalry brigade.
Two batteries.
Railway troops.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Field troops . . .	5,500	1,300	12
Railway troops . .	7,500	—	—
Total	13,000	1,300	12

RUSSIANS (*continued*)

Grand total.	Rifles.	Sabres.	Field Guns.
Field troops . . .	60,000	4,200	164
Fortress troops . . .	6,000	—	—
Railway troops . . .	11,000	—	—
Frontier guards . . .	13,500	8,000	48
Total	90,500	12,200	212

APPENDIX IV

JAPANESE

South of Wi-ju, and Chang-syong

END OF APRIL.

1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.
2nd division.
12th division.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	33,500	1,000	126	800

Chin-am-pho

Under general Oku, in transports.
1st division.
3rd division.
4th division.
Half an artillery brigade.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	33,500	1,000	162	800
Grand total .	67,000	2,000	288	1,600

RUSSIANS

Towards Shan-hai-kuan

END OF APRIL.

	Rifles.	Sabres.
General Kossagovski.	1,400	250

RUSSIANS (*continued*)

Neighbourhood of Liao-Yang

5th East Siberian rifle division.
1st Siberian infantry division.
One brigade 10th corps.
One brigade 17th corps.
Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade.
Twelve squadrons Cossacks.
Six companies engineers.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total	27,500	4,300	140

Near Ying-kow

1st and 9th East Siberian rifle divisions.
Six squadrons dragoons.
One battalion engineers.

Teh-li-tzu, and Pu-lan-tien

One brigade, five squadrons, and one horse battery.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total	20,000	700	64

Near An-tung, and Ta-ku-shan

Lieutenant-general Zasulitch.
3rd and 6th East Siberian divisions.
Mischenko's Cossacks.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total	18,000	2,900	72

East of Kuan-tien-hsien

Colonel Madridov.
Two squadrons and two companies of mounted scouts.

Port Arthur, and neighbourhood

4th East Siberian rifle division.
7th East Siberian rifle division.
Two companies engineers.
Three battalions fortress troops.
One squadron.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Field guns.
Total	25,500	120	64

RUSSIANS (*continued*)

Vladivostock and district

2nd East Siberian rifle division.
8th East Siberian rifle division.
Ussuri cavalry brigade.
Fortress troops.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Field guns.
Total . . .	21,500	1,000	56

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Field Guns.
Field troops . . .	67,000	8,300	276
In fortresses . . .	47,000	1,120	120
Railway and frontier troops	24,500	8,000	48
Grand total . .	138,500	17,420	444

APPENDIX V

JAPANESE

Feng-huang-cheng, and Ai-yang-pien-meng

27TH MAY.

1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.
2nd division.
12th division.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	30,000	1,000	128	2,000

Nan-shan, Pu-lan-tien, Ta-sha river, and Yen-ta-kou.

2nd army, general Baron Oku.
1st division.
3rd division.
4th division.
5th division.
11th division.
1st cavalry brigade.
An artillery brigade (less one regiment).

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers
Total . .	55,000	3,200	234	4,000

JAPANESE (*continued*)

Ta-ku-shan

Nucleus of the 4th army.
10th division.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	11,000	400	36	300
Grand total .	96,000	4,600	398	6,300

RUSSIANS

Towards Shan-hai-kuan

27TH MAY.

General Kossogovski.

Rifles.	Sabres.
1,400	250

Liao-Yang and neighbourhood

5th East Siberian rifle division.
2nd brigade 31st division, 10th corps.
2nd brigade 35th division, 17th corps.
Portions of 2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions.
Various Cossack and artillery units.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . . .	37,000	4,000	118

South of Wa-fang-tien.

Major-general Samsonov.

Sabres.	Guns.
2,600	6

Ying-kow, Kai-chou, Hai-cheng, and neighbourhood

Lieutenant-general Stackelberg.
1st East Siberian rifle division.
9th East Siberian rifle division.
Part of 2nd Siberian reserve division.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . . .	27,500	200	80

RUSSIANS (*continued*)

North of Feng-huang-cheng

Lieutenant-general Count Keller.
3rd East Siberian rifle division.
6th East Siberian rifle division.
Part of 2nd Siberian reserve division.
One Cossack regiment and horse battery.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
14,000	600	54

Sai-ma-chi.

Major-general Rennenkamf.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
2,100	2,100	14

East of Sai-ma-chi

Colonel Madridov.

Rifles and Sabres.
700

Hsui-yen

Major-general Mischenko.

Sabres.	Guns.
2,000	6

Port Arthur, and Nan-shan

Lieutenant-general Stoessel.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Field Guns.
25,500	120	64

Vladivostock

Lieutenant-general Linevitch.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Field Guns.
22,000	3,600	64

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Field Guns.
Field troops . . .	82,500	11,950	278
In fortresses . . .	47,500	3,720	128
Railway and frontier guards . . .	34,300	8,000	48
Grand total . .	164,300	23,670	454

APPENDIX VI

JAPANESE

Advancing from Feng-huang-cheng, and Ai-yang-pien-meng

15TH JUNE.

1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guard division (less Asada brigade).
2nd division.
12th division.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	25,000	1,000	128	2,500

North of Ta-ku-shan, and at Hsui-yen

4th army, general Kawamura.
10th division.
Asada brigade of Guards.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	16,500	400	36	800

Teh-li-tzu

2nd army, general Baron Oku.
3rd division.
4th division.
5th division.
1st cavalry brigade.
Artillery brigade.
6th division (coming up).

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	45,000	2,800	252	3,000

Advancing on Port Arthur

3rd army, general Baron Nogi.
1st division.
11th division.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	23,000	430	72	1,600
Grand total .	109,500	4,630	488	7,900

RUSSIANS

Liao-Yang, and Mukden

15TH JUNE

Portions of 1st brigade, 31st division, and of 1st Siberian division.

Cossack and artillery units.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total	12,500	1,500	46

Ta-shih-chiao, Hai-cheng, and Ying-kow

Bulk of 4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions).

2nd brigade 31st division.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total	21,000	2,200	54

Towards Shan-hai-kuan

General Kossogovski.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total	1,500	250	8

Feng-shui-ling range

Lieutenant-general Count Keller.

3rd East Siberian rifle division.

Part of 6th East Siberian rifle division.

One Cossack regiment, and one horse battery.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total	12,600	600	54

Sai-ma-chi

Major-general Rennenkamf.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total	3,500	2,200	16

Hsing-ching-ting

Lieutenant-colonel Madridov.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total	700	1,000	4

RUSSIANS (*continued*)

Chi-pan-ling, Ta-ling

Major-general Mischenko.
Part of the 4th Siberian corps.
Cossacks, and horse guns.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total	10,500	2,000	38

Teh-li-tzu

Lieutenant-general Stackelberg.
1st East Siberian rifle division.
9th East Siberian rifle division.
2nd brigade 35th division.
Cossack units.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total	27,000	2,500	94

Port Arthur

Lieutenant-general Stoessel.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Field Guns.
Total	25,500	120	64

Vladivostock

Lieutenant-general Linevitch.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total	22,000	3,600	64

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Field Guns.
Field troops . . .	89,300	12,250	314
In fortresses, etc. . . .	47,500	3,720	128
Railway, etc., guards . .	34,300	8,000	48
Grand total . . .	171,100	23,970	490

APPENDIX VII

JAPANESE

Motien-ling, and North Feng-shui-ling

30TH JUNE.

1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guard division (less Asada brigade).
2nd division.
12th division.
Umezawa's mixed Kobi brigade.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	30,000	1,000	152	2,600

Chi-pan-ling, and Ta-ling

4th army, general Count Nodzu.
10th division.
Asada brigade of Guards.
10th Kobi brigade.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	21,000	430	54	1,000

Near Kai-chou

2nd army, general Baron Oku.
3rd division.
4th division.
5th division.
6th division.
1st cavalry brigade.
An artillery brigade.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	45,000	2,800	252	3,200

Kensan

3rd army, general Baron Nogi.
1st division.
11th division.
One or two Kobi brigades.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	26,000	450	72	1,600
Grand total	122,000	4,680	530	8,400

RUSSIANS

Liao-Yang, and Mukden

30TH JUNE.

Various detachments.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
8,000	1,500	14

Harbin, and Kirin

Garrisons.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
3,000	400	8

Towards Shan-hai-kuan

General Kossogovski.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
1,500	250	8

Chao-tao, and North Feng-shui-ling

Major-general Rennenkamf.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
3,500	2,200	26

West of Mo-tien-ling

Lieutenant-general Count Keller.

Portions of the 3rd and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions.

Cossacks.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	6,500	600	24

On route to join Keller.

Rifles.	Guns.
6,500	24

Hsing-ching-ting

Lieutenant-colonel Madridov.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
700	1,000	4

RUSSIANS (*continued*)

Tang-chi, Chi-pan-ling, and Ta-ling

Major-general Mischenko.
Part of 4th Siberian corps.
2nd brigade 35th division.
Cossacks and horse guns.

	Bayonets.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	16,000	1,800	72

South of Kai-chou

Major-general Samsonov.

Sabres.	Guns.
3,000	12

Kai-chou, and Ying-kow

Lieutenant-general Stackelberg.
1st East Siberian rifle division.
9th East Siberian rifle division.
Cossacks and horse guns.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	29,000	750	50

Hsi-mu-cheng

Lieutenant-general Zasulitch.
Portions of 5th and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions.
Cossacks and horse guns.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	10,500	1,500	46

Hai-cheng, and Ta-shih-chiao

Lieutenant-general Zarubaiev.
Portions of 4th Siberian corps and of 31st division.
Cossacks.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	24,000	800	160

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Field Guns.
Field troops .	109,200	13,800	448
In Fortresses, etc.	47,500	4,120	128
Railway and frontier guards . .	34,300	11,000	48
	191,000	28,920	624

APPENDIX VIII

JAPANESE

Attacking the Russian positions at Yu-shu-lin-tzu, Pen-ling, and To-wan

31ST JULY.

1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.
2nd division.
12th division.
Umezawa brigade.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	36,000	1,000	152	2,000

South of Hsi-mu-cheng

4th army, general Count Nodzu.
5th division.
10th division.
10th Kobi brigade.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	25,000	850	90	1,000

Ta-shih-chiao, and south of Hai-cheng

2nd army, general Baron Oku.
3rd division.
4th division.
5th division.
1st cavalry brigade.
Artillery brigade.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	33,000	2,400	216	2,400

Besieging Port Arthur

3rd army, general Baron Nogi.
1st division.
9th division.
11th division.
Two or three Kobi brigades.
Naval brigade.
Siege train.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	45,000	450	378	1,600
Grand total .	139,000	4,700	836	7,000

RUSSIANS

Near Kou-pang-tzu

31ST JULY.

General Kossogovski.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
1,500	250	8

Liao-Yang, Mukden, Kirin, Harbin

Garrison and drafts.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
15,500	2,100	64

An-ping, Yu-shu-lin-tzu, and Pen-ling

Lieutenant-general Sluchevski.

10th corps (9th and part of 31st divisions).

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	22,500	750	88

To-wan, in Lan valley

Lieutenant-general Count Keller.

3rd East Siberian rifle division.

6th East Siberian rifle division.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	17,000	1,750	72

Pen-si-hu

Major-general Lubavin.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
2,000	1,000	12

East of Pen-si-hu

Lieutenant-colonel Madridov.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
1,500	1,000	8

Marching eastwards from Liao-Yang

Part of 17th corps.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
11,500	750	72

RUSSIANS (*continued*)

South of Hai-cheng

Major-general Mischenko.
Cossack brigades.

	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . . .	5,000	48

Hai-cheng and neighbourhood

Lieutenant-general Stackelberg.
1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian divisions.)
Lieutenant-general Zasulitch.
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division).
Lieutenant-general Zarubaiev.
4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions).
Part of 31st division.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	60,000	1,700	234

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Field Guns.
Field troops .	131,500	14,300	606
In fortresses, etc.	47,500	4,000	128
On railways, etc.	34,300	11,000	48
	213,300	29,300	782

APPENDIX IX

JAPANESE

East of the ridge dividing the lower portions of the Lan and Tan rivers

25TH AUGUST.

1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.
2nd division.
12th division.
Umezawa brigade.
A Kobi brigade.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	45,000	1,200	170	3,000

JAPANESE (*continued*)

Shan-in-tzai, and towards Hai-cheng

4th army, general Count Nodzu.
5th division.
10th division.
10th Kobi brigade.
20th Kobi brigade.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total. .	27,000	850	112	1,700

Between Hai-cheng and An-shan-tien

2nd army, general Baron Oku.
3rd division.
4th division.
6th division.
2nd Kobi brigade.
Artillery brigade.
1st cavalry brigade.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total. .	35,000	2,400	240	2,800

Besieging Port Arthur

3rd army, general Baron Nogi.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
	40,000	450	378	1,600
Grand total .	147,000	4,900	900	9,100

RUSSIANS

Tai-tzu R., Kung-shan-ling, An-ping, etc.

25TH AUGUST.

General Bilderling.
10th European corps (general Sluchevski).
17th European corps.
3rd Siberian corps (general Ivanov).
2nd cavalry brigade (general Lubavin).

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total. .	53,000	4,200	330

RUSSIANS (*continued*)

Mukden, Kirin, Harbin

Garrisons and drafts.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
20,000	350	24

Towards Ta-wan, on Liao R.

General Kossogovski.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
1,500	250	8

East of Pen-si-hu

Lieutenant-colonel Madridov.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
3,000	650	24

An-shan-tien, Sha-Ho village

Lieutenant-general Stackelberg.
1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian divisions).
Lieutenant-general Zasulitch.
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division and part of 71st division).
Lieutenant-general Zarubaiev.
4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions).
Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade.
Ural Cossack brigade.
Siberian Cossack division.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total. .	50,000	7,000	200

Liao-Yang and neighbourhood

Lieutenant-general Dembovski.
5th Siberian corps (5th and part of 71st divisions).
35th division.
General Samsonov's cavalry

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total. .	30,000	4,000	80

RUSSIANS (*continued*)

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Field Guns.
Field troops . .	157,500	16,450	666
Fortresses, etc. .	47,500	4,000	128
Railway, etc. .	34,300	11,000	48
	239,300	31,450	842

APPENDIX X

JAPANESE

South of Yentai coal mines, Ping-tai-tzu, etc.

BEGINNING OF OCTOBER.

1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guards division.
2nd division.
12th division.
Umezawa's brigade.
2nd cavalry brigade.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	42,000	2,100	120	3,000

La-ni-pu to Nan-tai, but bulk still south of the Tai-tzu

4th army, general Count Nodzu.
5th division.
10th division.
10th Kobi brigade.
20th Kobi brigade.
Artillery.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	25,000	300	170	1,700

Nan-tai to Shan-tai-tzu, but some troops still south of the Tai-tzu

2nd army, general Baron Oku.
3rd division.
4th division.
6th division.
1st cavalry brigade.
Artillery brigade.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	35,000	2,600	138	2,400

JAPANESE (*continued*)

Besieging Port Arthur

3rd army, general Baron Nogi.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	45,000	450	396	1,600

Liao-Yang

General reserve.
2nd Kobi brigade.
3rd Kobi brigade.
11th Kobi brigade.
Two artillery brigades.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	26,000	430	144	
Grand total .	173,000	5,880	968	8,700

RUSSIANS

Advancing on and between the Fu-shun to Wei-ning-ying, and the Fu-ling to Ping-tai-tzu roads

BEGINNING OF OCTOBER.

Eastern force.
Lieutenant-general Stackelberg.
1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian rifle divisions).
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian rifle division, and part of 54th division).
3rd Siberian corps (3rd and 6th East Siberian rifle divisions).

Moving on Hsiao-chia-ho-tzu

General Rennenkamf's detachment.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	60,000	7,000	194

Guarding left flank as far as Sai-ma-chi and Hsing-ching-ting road

Colonel Madridov, and others.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
3,500	1,800	32

RUSSIANS (*continued*)

Guarding right flank as far as Liao river

Detachments of generals Dembowski and Kossogovski.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
11,000	3,000	48

Advancing southwards astride the railway

Western force.
General Bilderling.
10th army corps (9th and 31st divisions).
17th army corps (3rd and 35th divisions).
Part of Orenburg Cossack division.

West of the Hun Ho

5th army corps (portions of 71st and 54th divisions).

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	50,000	4,500	222

South of Mukden

General reserve.
4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions).
1st corps (22nd and 27th divisions).
6th Siberian corps (55th and 72nd divisions).

In touch with enemy

Mischenko's cavalry.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	55,000	3,200	326

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Field Guns.
Field troops .	179,500	19,500	822
Fortresses, etc. .	45,000	4,000	128
Railways, etc. .	34,000	11,000	48
	258,500	34,500	998

APPENDIX XI

(See Map 11)

JAPANESE

From south of Hua-ling to Tung-kow

1ST JANUARY, 1905.

1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.
2nd division.
12th division.
Umezawa brigade.
Two Kobi brigades.
Artillery.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Enginsers.
Total . .	44,000	1,200	180	3,000

Pu-tsao-yai to Putilov hill

4th army, general Count Nodzu.
10th division.
Two or three Kobi brigades.
Artillery.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	20,000	600	96	450

Ku-chia-tzu to Ta-tai
Cavalry to Hei-kou-tai

2nd army, general Baron Oku.
3rd division.
4th division.
6th division.
1st cavalry brigade.
Artillery.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	33,000	2,400	204	2,400

JAPANESE (*continued*)

East of Pen-si-hu

2nd cavalry brigade.

Sabres.	Guns.
1,500	6

Near Yen-tai station, and at Lang-tung-kou

General reserve.
5th division.
8th division.
Four or five Kobi brigades.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	40,000	800	108	850

Besieging Port Arthur

3rd army, general Baron Nogi.
1st division.
7th division.
9th division.
11th division.
Two or three Kobi brigades.
Naval brigade.
Siege train.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	53,000	450	396	2,000
Grand total .	190,000	6,950	990	8,700

RUSSIANS

South-east of Mukden

1ST JANUARY, 1905.

1st army, general Linevitch.
1st corps (22nd and 37th divisions).
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division, and 1st Siberian division).
3rd Siberian corps (3rd East Siberian division, and part of 78th division).
4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian reserve divisions).

RUSSIANS (*continued*)

Thirty miles east of Pen-si-hu

General Alexiev's detachment.
Portions of 6th East Siberian, and of 71st divisions.
Part of Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	90,000	6,500	320

Hsing-ching-ting

Colonel Madridov's force.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
1,200	750	4

Connecting Alexiev, and Madridov

General Maslov's Siberian reserve brigade.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
4,000	200	8

West of Putilov hill, to Chi-tai-tzu

3rd army, general Bilderling.
6th Siberian corps (55th division and Orenburg Cossacks).
17th corps (3rd and 35th divisions).
5th corps (54th and 61st divisions).

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	60,000	4,000	240

San-chia-tzu, to Chan-tan

2nd army, general Kaulbaurs.
1st Siberian corps (1st and 9th East Siberian divisions).
8th corps (14th and 75th divisions).
10th Corps (9th and 31st divisions).
Rifle corps (three rifle brigades).
Mischenko's Cossacks.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	90,000	3,000	320

Hun-ho-pu, and Tao-shan-tun

General reserve.
Portions of 16th corps, and of 6th Siberian corps.
Heavy and other artillery.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	20,000	200	206

RUSSIANS (*continued*)

Between Hun, and Liao rivers

Rennenkamf's detachment.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
3,000	5,000	48

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Field Guns.
Field troops .	268,200	19,650	1,146
Fortresses, etc. .	43,000	4,000	128
Railways, etc. .	25,000	11,000	48
	336,200	34,650	1,322

APPENDIX XII

JAPANESE

Between Wei-tzu-yu, and Pao-tzu-yen.

20TH FEBRUARY, 1905.

5th army, general Kawamura.
11th division.
Three or four Kobi brigades.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	25,000	600	72	2,000

From Hua-ling, to south of Feng-chia-pu

1st army, general Baron Kuroki.
Guard division.
2nd division.
12th division.
Umezawa brigade.
5th Kobi brigade.
Artillery, etc.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	39,000	1,200	180	3,000

JAPANESE (*continued*)

South of Feng-chia-pu, to Ling-shen-pu

4th army, general Count Nodzu.
6th division.
10th division.
Two or three Kobi brigades.
Artillery.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers
Total . .	35,000	850	142	1,700

Ling-shen-pu, to Hei-kou-tai

2nd army, general Baron Oku.
4th division.
5th division.
8th division.
Two Kobi brigades.
Artillery.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	42,000	1,000	204	3,000

Yang-chia-wan, Huang-ni-wa, and Hsiao-pei-ho

3rd army, general Baron Nogi.
1st division.
7th division.
9th division.
Artillery.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	30,000	1,200	270	1,400

San-chia-pao, to Shan-ko-yu-shu

1st cavalry brigade.
2nd cavalry brigade.

	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . . .	3,000	12

Shi-li-ho, and Yen-tai station

General reserve.
3rd division.
Three or four Kobi brigades.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
Total . .	25,000	350	42	400
Grand total .	196,000	8,200	922	11,500

Russians

South-east of Mukden

20th FEBRUARY, 1905.

1st army, general Linevitch.
1st army corps (22nd and 37th divisions).
2nd Siberian corps (5th East Siberian division and 1st Siberian division).
3rd Siberian corps (3rd East Siberian division and part of 71st division).
4th Siberian corps (2nd and 3rd Siberian divisions).
Siberian Cossack division.

Thirty miles east of Pen-si-hu

General Alexiev's detachment of part of 6th East Siberian and of 71st division, with a portion of Trans-Baikal Cossack brigade.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	90,000	6,500	356

Hsing-ching-ting neighbourhood

Colonel Madridov's force.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
1,200	750	4

Connecting Alexiev, and Madridov

General Maslov's Siberian reserve brigade.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
4,000	200	8

South of Mukden

3rd army, general Bilderling.
5th corps (54th and 61st divisions).
6th Siberian corps (55th division and Orenburg Cossacks).
17th corps (3rd and 35th divisions).

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	60,000	4,000	240

RUSSIANS (*continued*)

South-west of Mukden

2nd army, general Kaulbaurs.
1st Siberian corps (1st, 9th, and part of 6th East Siberian divisions).
8th corps (14th and 75th divisions).
10th corps (9th and 31st divisions).
Rifle corps (three rifle brigades).

Between the Hun and Liao rivers

Rennenkamf's detachment.
Mischenko's Cossacks.
Caucasus cavalry brigade.
Part of 5th Siberian corps.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	90,000	8,000	356

South of Mukden

General reserve.
16th corps (25th and part of 41st divisions).
72nd division of 6th Siberian corps.

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
Total . .	35,000	300	240

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Field Guns.
Field troops .	280,200	19,750	1,204
Fortresses, etc. .	15,000	3,000	80
Railways, etc. .	25,000	11,000	48
	320,200	33,750	1,332

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