


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
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# JAPANESE CHESS

(SHŌ-NGI)

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棋  
經

THE SCIENCE AND ART  
OF  
WAR OR STRUGGLE

PHILOSOPHICALLY TREATED

CHINESE CHESS

(CHONG-KIE)

AND

I-GO

BY

CHŌ-YŌ

董陽詒

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EURASIAMERICA

NEW YORK:

THE PRESS CLUB OF CHICAGO

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TO MY ESTEEMED FRIEND

EDWIN F. BROWN,  
ONE OF THE GENIUSES IN THE  
GAME OF HUMAN AFFAIRS,  
THIS WORK IS INSCRIBED BY

THE AUTHOR.



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DATE Oct 15<sup>th</sup> 1906.

*Chas. H. Mason*  
2/2/15





## PREFACE

1. Inspired by the grand economy of the nature which reveals itself into the causes and effects governing all things from the universe down to molecular existences, admiring the almost incomprehensible foresight, clear plans and diplomatic movements of Thomas Paine, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and that sort of personages, and the tactics and strategy of George Washington—those who won the victory in a colossal chess game of humanity in which they stood for the side of pure democracy;—thus inspired, while the little Japanese of the small little island Empire are contesting with the gigantic and most puissant Russian Autocrat, the writer dares say that it is not merely a great number of population, nor enormous amount of pecuniary wealth, nor an immensely extensive territory, nor a considerable superiority of naval and military materiels, nor all these conditions put together that one belligerent power compels another to do what the former wants.

2. It is a union of minds and hearts, others being equal, on the part of the people whose each *protects* the other, and who support one another according to causes and effects of predestination that one group of men wins over the other. How the thirteen young colonies did cause the powerful fatherland to succum at the mercy of their will? We know it perfectly well.

3. Many say that the Japanese are of small bodily constitutions and their works are consequently small, but they forget that whatever small things they do are worked most carefully and perfectly, and that the personages that can perfectly finish the small objects can easily produce ponderous works according to conditions and circumstances, as the small works are apt to be taken as valuable models for magnificently massive ones. They, in fact, produced many wonderful works at home many centuries ago to the latest hour. For these little ones it would not be difficult to make battleships, even however big, because their minds and hearts have been practically drilled and experienced.

4. Who remarked that the Japanese do not have a mathematical head? There should be a limit to hypercriticality! The Far East has produced thinkers, scientific men, diplomats, practical business men and so on. There has been a great secrecy—the writer says secrecy, for the public does not know somehow, though openly practiced—to have pleasingly developed the faculties or their healthy brains, which have been and are naturally *a priori* flexible and adaptable to the fullest extent. This great secrecy has been the playing of the *Science* and *Philosophy* and *Art of War*, a national game of *Chess*, of which the true orientals are the greatest players in the world. The game or rather the science which they play, nay! practice—from the oldest to the youngest who are to think sanely, from the wealthiest to the poorest, from the highest down to the lowest, from the most learned to the ignorant, from the highest priest to the *misosuribōzu* (valet priest, or page).

5. The chess play with an exhaustive attention and constant practice in the land of the rising sun is without exaggeration equal to that of billiard, bowling alley, cards and the last of all—chess, and something else more, put together in this country. They play it in summer evenings on verandas, along the streets, at the shop entrances, where passers-by would look at the

beautiful operations of technique of struggles on a small war field of chessboard.

6. They would not suffer summer heat—whenever the weather is too hot to do anything, they gather their heads to ponder over critical movements of fleet, navies, and battalions, divisions and armies—they do not seem to sleep ever.

7. In winter they play it within houses, while enjoying true native original tea, and deliberately thinking and planning with utmost considerations. Before entertainments, either at public places or at private houses, begin, the guests or members are hospitably accommodated with chessboards and pieces, and fine tea in small cups, accompanied by sweet things to heighten the taste and flavor of the beverage—they are playing here and there, smiling and laughing—their beautiful and skilful hands full of strategy and tactics, watched by their friends and acquaintances and admirers.

8. The *jinrikisha-men* are, at street corners, and in summer in shady nooks, playing Chess, while they are waiting for patrons. Aye! the little Japanese have drilled their minds with their chess playing and made the brains comparatively larger with regard to bodily constitution after a fashion of ceaselessly working ants and bees. They understand the importance of union of which protection and supports of each and every other are to be paramount.

9. What will be the difficulties, as far as human mind concerns, as regard to mathematics or anything else, for the people that can not have *ennui* at all, and who can see many hands at once—some of them able to discern fifty or a hundred different hands ahead or blindfold play a game simultaneously with 3 or 10, even fifteen games, or more, the most complicated contests founded upon scientific combinations of movements of navies, armies, etc., on diminutive war-fields of a board?

1. The Japanese were playing Chess whenever they had time, in time of peace, also of war, before the European intru-

ders went there, so that it is natural that, having trained their minds, they could see the advantage of modern diplomacy, warships, and ponderous weapons.

2. The little people with a comparatively large quantity of gray-matter in their intellectual case have improved Chess according to their peculiar ingenuity of inventions, discoveries and the assimilating power of adaptability, as they did so in the lines of the Chinese works of art and many others, and have so come out as to surpass their masters, and, as at the latest times, they have improved the most modern warfare weapons implements and other things, such as for example, the Shimose gunpowder, the Japanese rifles, wireless telegraphy, medicinal discoveries, and therapeutic advancement.

3. This Japanese Chess, thus improved, is the most highly developed, most interesting and most scientific and philosophical of all the games ever invented and known. It plainly illustrates the secret intricacies and combinations and permutations of causes and effects of every human affair as a factor of nature. Playing this game cultivates business tact, keeps up strategy and tactics, improves diplomacy and strengthens the mental faculties.

4. That little Japan has come out to surprise the world through the realm of beautiful works, diplomacy and warfares: there might be few who do not at all play this game in her army, from the highest officers, Field-Marsals, down to privates, soldiers and the carriers of supplies and provisions; in her navy from admirals down to mere sailors; in diplomatic department, from the minister to the telephone or gate-keepers; from the premier—cabinet officials—to footmen; the rich and poor.

5. For ages ago, many of the best known generals and great personages played chess, even of very primitive state: Gotama Buddha, Julius Cæsar, Charlemagn, William the Conqueror and others it is said, and it is very well known that Napoleon played well, and that celebrated historian Henry Thomas Buckle, Charles Dickens, and Thomas Henry Huxley. And

all the great Japanese personages of yore played, of course, to the deepest and highest degree, the most highly contrived game.

6. Some of the richest Japanese have presented many hundred chessboards and as many sets of pieces to the hospitals, for the soldiers, in this present war, and there is no exaggeration to say that every one of these sets are incessantly patronized by the wounded, who would enjoy to bring up the past and speculate for the future in association with the games.

7. Certain the writer dares say it is that almost all the Dai Nipponese concerned in the present Manchurian War are dexterious players of a game of the true Oriental Science and Art of War or Struggle.

8. The writer is wholly convinced that if any one would a little study the easy movements of the pieces of this fascinating chess war, he will, without doubt, understand how the brain is easily improved and his nerves will be tempered and hardened; and the author fully hopes that his mental faculty, brightened, sharpened and advanced by manœuvres, tactics, diplomacy, strategy of wise men and generals on minimized battlefields on a small board upon a table—the maps of real warfares or struggles—would surely contribute one of the greatest shares for the *everlasting promotion* of the GREATEST REPUBLIC, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, the FIRST in *peace* and FIRST in the hearts of all nations, and for its *supremacy to oversee* and *direct* the whole world for the sake of SUBLIME HUMANITY.

C.—Y.

Chicago, 0:10 A. M. Fourth of July, 1904.



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
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








Each of the divisions, or branches of the two Trees is divided, as in the minute or quantity or quality abstractly, with relation to matter; and bodies, and is consequently interwoven with physical considerations.



stocks, into PURE or ABSTRACT, which, respectively, considers element or mag-  
 MIXED or APPLIED, which treats of magnitude or element as subsisting in material



# JAPANESE CHESS

## THE SCIENCE AND ART OF WAR OR STRUGGLE

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### CHESSOLOGY

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#### DEFINITION, ITS POSITION AND FUNCTIONS.

1. Japanese Chess, or what we may vaguely call so here at present, is of a very great antiquity, and it is a descendant of the family of that which originated or was invented in time immemorial, or at least 5,000 years ago. The game has acquired a great and unique importance throughout the empire; mainly, no doubt, in consequence of its peculiarly and soothingly extreme, yet inviting, difficulty. It is the subject of a most extensive literature which would fill up quite a large library, and its study has become more that of a science and a philosophy than a mere recreation.

2. *Chess*, or rather, *Chessology*, in its simple definition, is the most abstract of all the sciences, and is played, or rather practiced, as an intellectual pastime, the most purely intellectual of all the games of skill. It is founded upon a self-evident truth working irresistibly and uniformly in all spaces at all times. Chessology, in its largest sense, treats of the principles of the science of human struggles conceivable and symbolized in the shortest, smallest and least possible time, space and force and played as the highest and most intellectual game to develop and *train* the *Mind*, by virtue of amusement accompanied with competition; the term *Chess* is mainly to mean the art of skill and practice of Chessological game; and the latter is sometimes for convenience sake to be used to

mean either of both terms. It reveals the Idealistic and Artistic, as well as the beautiful, combinations symbolizing every known element of nature essential for struggles. Chess is the stronghold of abstract science and philosophy. (See and digest *Mochingoma*, pp. 86-116.) It is the Sovereign in the domain of all games.

3. Chess, a clear well and factory of patience, a regulator or governor of the Mind, has an extraordinarily flexible nature, comparable to the attributes of water, in a visible and tangible domain, electricity in the physical world and ether in space. Again, Chess is the conception and action out of enlivened imaginations, formed most commonly in regular numbers as to space, time and force, and it contains the impassioned expression which is in the countenances of all sciences and philosophies, and more concise in work than in actual warfares and struggles.

4. It is simple, sensuous and impassioned; that is, simple in conception, abounding in sensible images, and in forming them all with the spirit of the Mind. Brevity, the soul of wit, consisting in the compactness and exactness of the thought, not in the curtailed expression of it, is the only fundamental principle of Chessology.

5. In Chess, beauty of thought and that of style should be revered to the fullest extent, for Chess is to elevate the altitude of Mind. There is embodied in Chess the repetition in a most condensed and most economized form of ideas, based upon experiences and observations and synthetic speculations, thus producing the effect of conciseness. The reason that conciseness is energy permeates Chess. The different players can develop the mission of Chess in their minds as large as their respective storage of knowledge expands.

6. Chessology, or Chess viewed from a wide standpoint of our present knowledge, in its entirety with especial reference to the part played by man, is to aim at reaching the highest *training* of Mind for the settlement of struggles, whatsoever conceivable by man, making them welcome and pleasure to himself.

7. It is, thus in brief, an abstraction of the highest kind of knowledge and of the universe of struggles and speculations conceivable by the human mind.

7a. Chess, in a general sense, has appeared in some or other form in times immemorial, though the term *chess* itself and all its cognate words were derived from the Persian tongue. (s 3, p. 36.) It has come out at the same time with the formation of human mind, at the same time when the fingers begun to be used for counting numbers for human intellectual need. It has been improved, revolutionized and specialized in one way or another; and there are at present many kinds of Chess, but really branches, or divisions according to the law of Evolution (the last part, s. 8a, p. 103; s. 4c, p. 115). The game is now played in all civilized countries and some others, and it is the only universal game that there is. The game was played in ancient Rome (s. 3, p. 36), and previously in early Greece; in Egypt antedating the period of the Pharaohs; in India long before the birth of history; and in China thousands of years ago. As according to the true and highest sense of the term, there is the only one *History*, and such a history as that of the United States, or English history or any other national history, is a *mere story* for contribution to the *Unity of Stories*—the History of Civilization—, so the time has arrived to have produced what is called Chessology (s. 8, p. 17; s. 3-4c, p. 115; s. 4, p. 109). But for grasping this high conception or abstraction of Chess, chessplayers are very far from perfectly understanding Chess in both general and *pure*, or abstract sense of the term, and especially the grand beauty of Japanese Chess—the *Calculus* of Chessology. (Study and digest the *Tree of Chessologics* bet. pp. 14-15.)

8. CHESSOLOGY, or CHESSOLOGICS is in the highest and rigidest sense the Ultra-Philosophic-Science—both the Philosophy and Science of treating with *training the Mind* in the fewest vivid symbolization by *minimum* abstract condensation and *maximum* application for the MAXIMUM harvestage in struggles of all known principles of knowledge, the sum of human wisdom, for the most highly organized co-operation: CHESS—Applied Chessology—the Art of the Chessological treatment of *all kinds of spheres* of knowledge, or the Art of an actual duel of wits and knowledge. It profits the players MAXIMA by virtue of *Minima*. It may be popularly defined as “a nutshell in which the Infinitude lies.”—*Kazan* (s. 2a, p. 29; see “*Chestnuts*,” s. 3, p. 36 Hux.; s. 6a, p. 56; s. 7aa, p. 60).

8a. Just as there is no such a science as Mathematics or Chemistry or Astronomy of this or that country, so there is no other Chessology but the purest one only (s. 4, p. 109; s. 8, p. 111). As game or an Art practicable and productive, Chess in the purest and highest significance is an abstraction, pure intellect and knowledge rendered into visible symbols of all human struggle-elements. It shows the student at first only the seemingly most important points, and then the others gradually to be discovered when further and deeper studied, as in the case of heavenly bodies. (s. 9, p. 35; s. 8, p. 88.) This abstraction embodied in Chess of all struggle-elements is in its manifestations like sunlight viewed through stained glass by ordinary as well as special persons, whereas profound Chessologists take or generalize them as an entity. Chess in general is, therefore, a method or formula for abstraction of all struggles of which there are such grandest incessant struggles at the time of peace as International commerce, International competition for political supremacy and the like, and what is popularly and limitedly known as "war," is the most conspicuous at present as a legacy of savagism. Hence, the term chess attached with the local names in adjective such as the European, Oriental, Chinese or Korean, is a chessological corollary or demonstration or formula, and what is so-called a war-game is a concrete problem of chessological treatment of things pertaining to only military works; hence, the French, German, American game of war, or siege-game (s. 2, p. 29; 7, p. 111). They are the formulas or offsprings evolved out of the principles of Chess, that is, struggles in absolute Chessdom according to the necessities and capabilities of the mind of persons in different localities and speciality. (s. 2, p. 39.) Checkers is a branch also. Those branches are related to each other in Chessology in such a similar way as Arithmetic, Algebra, Geometry, Trigonometry (plane and spherical), Calculus, and others are in Mathematics. (See the *Tree of Chessologies*, bet. pp. 14-5; s. 3a, p. 70.) A chessological principle teaches us that the fighting men—all concerned in actual warfares or struggles—are the sorts of chesspieces as war-field is a chessboard; and chessologists, including naval and military tacticians and strategists, may consider wars, that is, bloody struggles as a part of Applied Chessological Knowledge or Arts. As just as Mathematics pervades all physical sciences, Chessology permeates all reasoning.



8b. The greatest aim of Chessology is to seek the absolute *peace* and *happiness* in the domain of all struggles of the self-interested human aggrandisement of things, as "to return violence (brute force) for violence is wrong."—(*Kazan*), "*Bō-wo motté Bō-ni Kōru, Kore Hi nari*" (Chinese sage's in Japanese), and lastly to secure that same peace even in the struggle of peace itself *versus* struggles: "The soft conquers well the hard."—*Kazan*, "*Jū yok Kō-wo seisu*" (Chinese sage's in Japanese), as "the meek and *soft* shall inherit the earth."—*Tyndale*, and "a *soft* answer turneth away wrath."—Prov. xv., 1, as "no wind has broken a twig of a weeping willow."—*Kazan*; "the pen is mightier than the sword," and "Chess *checks* and *checkmates* struggle or war."—*Kazan* (s. 5, p. 208). In *struggles* are included any struggles, such as that of a tribe against another, a tribe against a nation, a nation *versus* another, an individual against another, a political party against another, freedom *versus* despotism, trusts or capitalists *vs.* unions or laborers, boycott *vs.* strike, economy *versus* extravagance, imperialism *vs.* democracy; monarchy or plutocracy or religiocracy or timocracy or stratocracy or all like these put together *vs.* SOCIALISM, and the like.

9. Peace! Peace! Let there be peace!

Some say that war brings peace, but it is not very satisfactory! Hence, The Hague Tribunal has been instituted, and even then wars devastated the territory of peace; hence the treaties of arbitrations are trying to *checkmate* the horrible wars; and even then it might be doubtful to let them cease entirely, hence commerical relations founded upon intellectual knowledge for a practical, peaceful life are needed to *checkmate* warlike struggles. (s. 2, 3, p. 29.) Thus even arbitration or peace conference itself comes under the head of struggle.

1. Struggles needing, consciously or unconsciously, the measurements of time, distance (locality) and force—Logistics — the science and art of meeting with them come under the *training* by Chess of the *Mind*. Chessology, the most abstract and severe of all sciences, *trains* the human *Mind* the only source of intellectual activity, to prepare through the *most irresistible mental pastime, amusement and competition*, to meet with future complicating ramifications of energy, by the aid of the fewest possible symbols, to expose the largest possible influence or spheres of inter-relations of both mental and physical actions.

2. Chessology is the basis of all the discipline and training of the human mind, deliberately prepared to meet with the events of struggles. It points out the chief elements or factors of failures and successes in the ceaseless strife for competitions or existences;—in the severest and most abstract way as possible and through soothing powers of intellectual amusement and competition, it innately leads the players to, and it teaches them, the principles of training and nursing the MIND to be developed into a more highly tempered and sounder *Mind*, which is the paramount Sovereign Lord of all sciences, arts and philosophies:—Hence, Chess is the most abstract of all the departments of knowledge; consequently, it undergoes a change, both subjective and objective, according to the different strata of the players, respectively different minds.

3. Chess is unquestionably and keenly susceptible of any ideas conceivable and impressive whatever, whether of the matter or the spirit or even extra-natural speculations. All sciences are to become a basis, or pay their tributes for the employment of mental energy, in the Science and Art of struggles in life; the right and the proper application of them by virtue of the Science of training the human Mind through intellectual amusement and competition—APPLIED Chessology—is a special Art in itself—CHESS. It opens to the players the general course of intellectual development.

4. Chess, which is worthy to be praised as the mother of Logic and Mathematics, is simpler to be practiced for the culture of the Mind than the latter which are heavier and comparatively somewhat cumbersome. Consequently Chess is easily practiced and exercised, and, in fact, played by the oldest and the most learned as well as by the youngest and unschooled children because of its being subjective, whilst Logic and Mathematics are only to be handled by the especially cultured. Chess forms mind and intellectual strength which are positively indispensable to Logic and Mathematics which are not consciously necessary in playing chessological game. Hence, “CHESSOLOGICS, or Chess Knowledge is an indispensable and positively necessary part of education.”—*Danzō-Kikzan*. (s. 2a, p. 29; s. 3, p. 36.)

5. Chess invigorates the power of mind and endows the players with the power and habit of the concentration of mind. It produces a strong frame and fineness of mind;—in brief, Chess-

ologics harnesses the Sovereign Mind. The unfolding and formation of an individual character are, therefore, left to practice, and those of an individual judgment are thus theoretically secured perfectly well.

6. Washington, speaking of Thomas Paine—who constantly and successfully stirred and kept up the spirit of the Revolutionary Soldiers by repetitions of his motto, "These are the times to try our souls," when he saw the soldiers' hardships—remarked "Thomas Paine's pen did more than the sword;" the pen mightier than the sword, the result of *Mind*, the soul of Chessology. (s. 8b, p. 19; s. 8, p. 47; s. 3, p. 115; Arts. 26, 28, 30-1, p. 204-5.)

7. Napoleon, a chessplayer over the board, in war and diplomacy, said "Before entering upon an undertaking I have meditated for a long time, and have foreseen what might happen. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly, secretly, what I have to say or do, in a circumstance unexpected by other people; it is reflection and meditation." He made himself by deliberation and premeditation, active flower of his mind. (s. 3, p. 36; s. 2, p. 117.)

7a. It is not a large size and a huge population, nor enormous resources of a country, nor the superior number of the best cruisers, nor the first class battleships, nor a few best diplomatists, nor all those combined that one nation wins victories over another; but a larger mass of people of the nation should have their MIND trained as all other matters follow it. In the Manchurian campaign, the "Yellow Rats" in Russian terminology showed in every way their trained *mind* on battle fields. The Japanese naval success was due entirely to the *personnels* of their fleet. The Russian materials, except torpedo boats and destroyers, was considerably superior to their extremely despised foe's. The whole Muscovite tragedy plainly exposes that the need of *Chessologically training* the most essential factor of the *personnels*, that is, Mind, is paramount importance for men, as shown by the Japanese navy and army, acted and moved like a clockwork exactly after the manner of chesspieces on a war-field board. (ss. 5, 6, p. 27; s. 4, p. 51; pp. 117-186.)

8. Human actions in whatever ways attributed are traceable to the *thought*, or *conception*, or *mental images*, the productions of the *Sovereign Mind*, whereby universal truths or permanent arrangements of elements of struggles are expressed and sym-

bolized in Chess. (5, p. 54.) What is then our estimation of the value of Chess, in which are expressed *conception* in the most flexible ways from the smallest to the largest in the least possible limit of space, time and force, and besides, with the greatest intellectual amusement by the most soothing competitions not shared by the other sciences, arts and philosophies and by which the *Sovereign Mind* is harnessed and it is trained to take its own right course in every way? It is THE HIGHEST of all sciences and arts and philosophies, and the SUPREME GUIDE OF THE HUMAN AFFAIRS.

9. Because "I think, therefore I am", because "Know thyself, Γνώθι σεαυτόν", and because the first and the greatest distinction between *man* and the other animals or living existences and, in fine, between a wise man and other men, is the *thought* or *Mind* which makes the former divine and lets him govern the latter, therefore Chessology, a reservoir of wisdom—philosophic science and scientific philosophy— of drilling or training the *Mind*, the thinking principle, with *minimum* condensed principles for the *maximum* fruitage of its application, is the highest of all the departments of knowledge, the power itself. (See s. 5, p. 54 and s. 7, p. 111.)

1. To have thus perfected Chess and exalted it to this resplendent zenith is traceable to a spark of the *burning mind*, trained and nursed in the brains of the far eastern Geniuses, whose minds have been in turn heightened by Chess itself. Japanese Chess is the mastery, and can never be otherwise, in the sphere of *Chessdom*. (s. 7, p. 21; ss. 4-4c, p. 115; s. 2, p. 117.)

2. Chessplaying cultivates the habit of attention, strengthens the power of observation, speculation, the reasoning by induction and deduction, produces equanimity, makes one exact and recreates very much by amusement in concentrating the power of the mind, and especially by taking possession of the intellectual faculties and diverting them from their accustomed routine grooves. The organ of thought, after being much occupied in business or greatly worried by cares, or in any way set by disappointments and painful reflections, finds in the absorbing and abstracting properties of chessological game that temporary relief which the lighter pastimes will not always bring. Here there is the reason which is not far from being understood.

3. Here acts a principle of something like homœopathic work.

Anxieties, cares and sorrows are caused by looking forward to or apprehending things to come, and as such, are neutralized by that foresight which the conduct of the chessological game demands. Chess thus checkmates an unnecessary nervous excitement. Then, Chess, nursing previous preparation or readiness of mind and, thus, doing away with unexpected contingencies, has peacefully succeeded in subduing or utterly checkmating irritability of temper and nervous excitability, for the understanding of the nature could almost pierce into future contingents. (See s. 3 p. 16; ss. 5-6, p. 27.) Chess calls one away from gambling and dissipations into which almost all other games are apt to drive him; Intelligence *vs.* Brute instinct! A game of Chess cures vanity and a conceit forever. (ss. 5-6, p. 27; s. 9, Art. 22, p. 204.)

3a. The question, whether or not Chess, however the greatest of intellectual games, might be too much of a strain on the mind, could be chessologically answered in regard to whether or how far it may become a recreation or an excessive and hurtful exertion, because Chessology itself by reason of the highest intellectuality commands us to ascertain where there is just such a degree of playing as to bring out the most useful, harmless and pleasant recreation for checkmating the violent effort. Chess is the recreation itself; it solves Strain *vs.* Recreation! (s. 8b, p. 19.)

4. Chess is the most and the best fitted for old folks to enjoy their rest from taking out-of-door exercises during younger age, and to be delighted in teaching their youngsters with their experiences and speculative ideas. The old do not realize that they are becoming older; it refreshes and rejuvenates their mind, and gives to the young the power of competitions and patience, and cultivates endurance and foresight, and endows them with the virtues of the elder people.

5. This chessological game is the only game in which the old people and the young can congenially play together without making each other tired at all and forget and entirely discard their seniority and juniority that are, in other departments of games and knowledge, constant bone of contentions, in despising each other's inferiority in their operations and practical skill. Chess teaches the players this essential advantage of the game and encourages them in sustaining union of minds and hearts, however old or young,—mutual pro-

tection and support—co-operation in their whole life careers (pp. 129-186; s. 9, p. 163; s. 8, p. 169). It is the only democratic game in which the players do not exclude any class of men, and no castes are tolerated. 王公將相有種乎 "*Wang Kung Tsëang Seang yew Chung wu,*" in Chinese; and in Japanese, "*Ô Kô Shô Shô Shu aran ya!*" 'Is there any *stock (caste)* whosoever of King (emperor, or any other chief), Dukes (nobles), Generals and ministers (assistants, advisers, secretaries)?' A war-game *Kriegspiel*, the newest and youngest offspring of Chess, is only fitted profitably for military officers, and not possibly for naval persons, and not even for ordinary soldiers, simply because of its being made only for military leaders, and consequently and certainly not for others (see ss. 7-9, p. 70-3; ss. 6-4, p. 99), for it is too stiff; that is, too concrete for high ideals of human life, as mere militarism is a source of a caste system or a despotism. (See 3a, p. 23.)

6. Why the Far Eastern people are progressing in every line of their actions can be easily discerned by this game of struggles in life. It is now an open secret art, as a key to elevate the Mind. (s. 4, p. 8.)

7. Chessological principle being the most flexible of all of those of sciences and philosophies, its practical art or game is played in both the easiest and most difficult ways possible, and it is enjoyed through the advantages of the most abundant power of the greatest mental amusement accompanied with the most exhaustive mental competition.

8. There is not at all a least exaggeration whatever in regard to the merit of all the foregoing statements when we know that all the factors, besides amusements and competitions, of all the human struggles ever conceivable by men, are perfectly embodied in the apparently small board with only—in the case of the Japanese— $9 \times 9$  squares or slightly rectangular sections, simply marked by exoterically straight lines, over which the seemingly small and unworthy insignificant chess-pieces are to be moved by any sane man. (See ss. 6, 6a, 7, p. 56-8.)

9. Some think that chessplaying is interesting as well as instructive, yet a time is taken a great deal, besides none of profit. But, Chess is, on the contrary, a live and beneficial pastime—and not at all a dull game for mere recreation; it

teaches how a time (also space, and force, of course), however short (small), is important, and when considered from purely chessological standpoint, the practice of drilling the mind will finally recompensate more than what they think a great loss by an exorbitant use of time. Chess, in this way, serves the players to turn *ennui* into account by making himself exact, and thus making the game absolutely productive. For the *Mind* is the sovereign pilot, compass, guiding force of human actions and intellectual functions; and that governing supreme energy, when trained by chessological principles, will make the players to enable to employ and adjust the time to the most advantageous extent which ordinary or superficial and hypercritical people complaining of the amount of time to be used in chess can never conceive or realize for their whole lives, because even the least wastage of energy or three elements—space, time and force—is forbidden in Chess, and Chess trains the *Mind* in the most economical ways to employ a least fraction of the energy to the greatest possible culmination of the advantages. In brief, "Chessology is the most severe teacher of the Science of Economy."—*Öhen-Ö*. (s. 4. p. 20.)

ga. Some think that chess is a difficult game, and almost every English pocket dictionary defines it as "a difficult game"; but this is utterly a mistake. The idea of difficulty works as a stumbling block in a way of encouraging chess beginners. Real chessological difficulty exists only when it stares at the face of experts. Non-difficulty for ordinary amusement purpose is the beauty of the game. (See s. 7 above, and s. 2, p. 50.) The moves may be learned in half an hour, and a few days' practice will evoke a sufficient amount of skill to afford pleasure both to the learner himself and even to his tutor. The intelligent novice will soon be convinced that an ignorant manipulation of the chesspieces does not conduce to success, and he will seek for instruction in the right manner to open the game; the various debutes are, after all, simple, and he will find no difficulty in acquiring them, one after another. This nobly accommodating attribute of making chess in one way the easiest, and in the other, the most difficult game (7, p. 24), is a most beautiful factor of the supremacy of Chessology in the ocean of scientific pleasures of knowledge. (s. 9c, Art. 31, p. 205.)

1. When many months—several years, or centuries, or

ages of warfares or struggles of innumerable kinds are involved in the shortest possible time on a struggle field of the chess board, real chessological game players cannot afford to complain of the loss of time,—if they can do so, they are not chess players! They play chess as they think, but they do not. 'Shōngi sashi no Shōngi shiraz, chessplayers! you do not know Chess!'—*Kazan*.

2. Several weeks, one hour a day, will suffice for this purpose, unless his power of understanding be checked by obstinacy, indolence or self-esteem, and the rest goes with his natural capacity. A mere average intelligence is sufficient for a very fair amount of proficiency and strength; while an intellect not much above the common men will suffice to lead right up to the tolerably recognized class of players; that is, those to whom the masters of the game can only concede some small odds of "*Fuhyo*, an infantry piece and move," and the like. (ss. 4, 5, 6, p. 190.)

3. In regard with any persons who already play European chess, they would be able fairly to play the Japanese within half an hour or less and soon to make himself par his former self in interesting in his new line but with uncomparably far greater enjoyment accrued from sound reasoning of the latter than the former. A player, even as a beginner, cannot help to become very easily and deeply interested in chessworks when he could independently discover there something, however seemingly insignificant, which would reveal itself to his instinct, association of his ideas and reasoning. (ss. 2-2a, pp. 28-9.)

4. Those wishing to improve will find it very beneficial to play upon even terms with players stronger than themselves; for a persistence in taking odds, besides having a discouraging and debilitating effect upon the weaker player, takes the game out of its proper grooves, and tends to produce positions not naturally or unchessologically arising in the ordinary course of the game, as developed from the recognized openings. The reception of odds incapacitates a player from acquiring an insight into the principle of Chessology, and from comprehending the latent meanings and conceptions upon which combinations and a proper plan of struggles or warfares are founded; while play on even terms throws the player at once upon his own judgment, and by causing him to study his op-



ponent's play, leads necessarily to a material improvement in his own style.

5. The habit of patience and conformity with orders and observance of the rules of refined etiquette is absolutely cultivated by chessologic practice. (Sees.7,(20),p.203.) The author, when a mere boy, watching his grandfather playing *Igo* (pp. 210-214), was told once a while by his mother that he should not disturb the welfare of the players; and she referred to the square pit on the back of the chessboard and *Igo-board* (see pp. 210-4). She stated that when bystanders would make trouble or lead rough conducts around players, or say or remark or suggest about plans or take the side of one, or when one player would have acted any mean unmanly unchivalrous campaign on the stage of struggles, the player himself so provoked could punish the impolite irresponsible fellows by killing the offender on the spot and by putting his head chopped off on the back pit turned upside down. The mother said that it was for the purpose to have the hollow part, and that the killed deserved to have been punished because of a violation of strict fundamental laws, and ethical rules of etiquette of the *Samraism*, the first principle of the then governing class of people. (s. 4, p. 51.)

6. She said that none were chastised on that score by the Lord of the land. How in Japan's olden time the governing class of people valued the chessological Art or Science of struggles, commonly known as *Shōngi* (*Chess*), and *Go*, (4 p. 212) we can even at present easily imagine. Whether the square pit of a severe form was carved in the down side of the board block of wood for the purpose, or just for an ornament, a strong moral effective power upon the part of the youngsters, the parents of youths, should have been certainly remarkable. Thus, there was a way of a Spartan training of mind and discipline of orders. This very spirit of the *Samrai-no-Michi*, *Bushidō*, the doctrine of Chivalry rules the country; (see s. 4, p. 51.); and it checkmated China and Russia (see pp. 129-186). This *Bushidō* has preserved the nation in sound state never to have been conquered by a foreign nation. (Arts. 18-22, pp. 113; 203-4.)

7. With a moderate expenditure of time and mental labor, there might be acquired a playing both amusing and

instructive, and training intellectual knowledge based upon an appreciation of the chessological principles and empirical formulæ representing the generalized experiences of the players.

8. In the dead winter and infernal summer days when out-of-door exercises are often unpracticable the utilitarian amusement is nothing but sublime.

9. Baseball and football, especially, are by *rough* competition for athletic or muscular development; and the chessological game, by *quiet* and *soothing* competition and amusement for mental strength and intellectual development; the latter may be mentioned as the *Jūjuts*, the *Soft Art*, of the *Mind*. When mental gymnastics is needed, Chess is only the best recourse to which every one in any walk of life should appeal. (s. 3, p. 23.)

1. The chessological principles permeate any branches of knowledge, because Chess is the philosophic science of training the human *Mind*, the sole source of human actions and knowledge, and the other sciences are not so active as Chess to stimulate the Mind for investigations (s. 2a, p. 29). The latter works to do so by direct mental competitions, and with a reinforcement of the sublime intellectual amusement: direct competition and amusement almost utterly lacking in other sciences and philosophies.

2. That knowledge develops through natural means—observations, experiences, experiments, their associations and assimilations, comparisons, generalizations, discoveries and inventions—by successive failures through inclemencies, is exactly embodied in Chessology, the extract and abstract of the sum of knowledge condensed and expressed by the cardinal principles of Chess, of which the interpretations are established by conformity with natural laws and probably even extra-natural speculations of interactions and uniformity of nature—and these interpretations by virtue of different mental capacities of the different players actuate the equivalences of corresponding forces in proportion with time and distance and their inter-relationship. Being purely abstract, Chess when represented as concrete, depending upon the different mental attitudes of persons, would, therefore, stand as a business game for a business man, as a military game (as already schemed as a war-game, suggested by the chessological principles) for an army man, as a naval game for a navy man, as shown by a Japanese

battleship commander who played a live Japanese Chess game by substituting the subordinate officers for the pieces of the game-board chalk-marked on the deck of the ship involved in the present war, as a real and true war-game for a war-man, man of warfare, as a philosophical solution for a deep thinker or a speculator, as a love game for all persons concerned in the affairs, as politics for a politician or a statesman, a diplomatic game for diplomats, its application upon international law to settle international struggles. Why is it that the Japanese are versed in the laws? They say that they are born diplomats. But how? (See the *Tree of Chessologics*, bet. pp. 14-15.)

2a. Many consider life as a game of chess, or chess as a game of life (see s. 8b, p. 19; s. 3, p. 36, Huxley), and painters have treated life as such thereby a man is figured as playing over the board against Destiny or Fate, an untangible form behind the scenes (Huxley s. 3, p. 36). To some persons, Chess appears to be rendered as a synonym with the love game. Charles Dickens remarked: "Love [intellectual affection, the only lasting love] that has a game of chess in it can *checkmate* any man and solve the problem of life." (s. 7, p. 45.) To a military man Chess is—in fact, looks like—a military game. But many identify Chess as seen by entirely dropping the fundamental principles of chessology (ss. 3a, 4, p. 32-3). The student must not confound the terms and meanings of a military game, or so-called war-game, and Chess as a war-game or military game. He should clearly understand the distinctions in order to taste and to digest the principles exhaustively demonstrated.

3. A war-game, which is not really a war-game in its present form and sense, but a military game—hence, a *so-called* war-game—is one of the promiscuous problems made concrete out of Chessology, just as an arithmetical question, one of miscellaneous concrete examples rendered out of mathematical solutions in symbols of facts to be determined. It means that the construction of the latent meanings of the chesspieces, their movements, squares and all other factors depends upon the individual party's state of mind, which Chess endeavors to elevate. (See 8-8b, p. 17-9; pp. 108-112.) If checkers, a branch of Chessology, could be fairly interpreted as, and paralleled with, the drill of a battalion or a regiment, Chess rendered severely concrete exhibits the strategic movements of armies. Every

chessplayer should not even a minute forget that Chess is the highest abstraction, so that blood-thirsty struggles in savagery, commonly known as wars, occupy in the rigidest eyes of Chessology a very small part of Applied Chessologies (s. 8a, p. 18; s. 3, p. 36, Hux.), while a military game under the name of a war-game conducts only the movements of armies, or land forces. (s. 5, p. 208.)

4 A highly advanced, refined, scientific training of the mind, which Chess nurses even to the highest degree and finish, is required in order clearly to see the essence of Chess, especially the movements of the chess-pieces. All other sciences and philosophies, and speculations pay Chess their respective abstract tributes, essential to the struggles in human affairs. Chessology is a reservoir of mental power; it gives at first and receives the reward—so that it is a science of 'to give and take' or *vice versa* to reach a desired end, HOPE. (s. 7a, p. 73.)

5. The Chinese name for chess is the most beautifully appropriate one, which will be explained presently. It describes almost exactly the meaning or the principle of Chess.

6. The Mathematic-Astronomical and Astrological (s. 4, p. 108) Ancient Chinese expressing Chess by this name could exactly divine the scientific truth of nature; it is surely to embody all the abstract elements and essential attributes conceivable of knowledge. The Chinese nomenclature, from a chessological view point, clearly and wisely depicts both concretely and esoterically the general aspect of the most abstract and majestic of all the departments of knowledge, which is power. Now, the term *Knowledge* in Chinology has been, according to the Ancient Chinese sages, 聖人, *Shin-Jin*, idealized, idiographed and pictographed as 學, *heō*; 臼, originally, 臼, stands for a mortar; 𠬞, originally 𠬞, or 𠬞, 𠬞 or the like indicating some small things, anything to be put in a mortar, thus, 𠬞, —pounded, powdered or cleaned; 杵, 'or originally, 杵, a pestle; and 子, originally 子, a man; so that the entire character suggesting that a man with a pestle pounds or polishes something in a mortar.

7. The whole character, standing for *Knowledge*, is to convey the meaning that a mere acquisition of *Knowledge* is not enough, but should be pulverized or cleaned and digested for practical purposes; that it should be classified or you must

systematically reason, whence 學, *heō*, means Science or Philosophy. (See s. 4, p. 37; s. 1, p. 95.) (See the Figures pp. 38-49 and digest.) The way to understand the latent meanings of chessological matters and chessonyms (see ss. 9, 9a, 3, p. 47-8; pp. 70-73) is very necessary and the most important, and indispensable to get the perfect enjoyment out of Chess.

8. Make yourself divine and digest the principles of *Mochingoma* (pp. 86-186). Now, the Chinese call Chess "Chong-Kie" 象棋, "Chong," 象, originally, an elephant, secondly symbolized to stand for 天, Heaven, or the Universe, as in the case of the old Hindus, with whom the *Ultra*-ancient Chinese participated in knowledge, thereby the white elephant, the symbol of the Universe; then meaning phenomena or the phases of the Universe, whence meaning changes or figures or appearances equivalent to the character 形, as seen in the phrases 現形, "present forms" equivalent to 現象, or 顯象 "present forms or figures or phases," and as shown by 氣象臺, literally, force, power or spirit or energy for the first character, the second, "Chong" in Chinese and "Shō" in Japanese, the phases, phenomena, of the Universe, and the last, a tower; the whole meaning the Astronomic-Physical Observatory. So that Chess called "Chong-Kie," by the ancient Chinese sages conveys a wider meaning according to their first conception of the invention of the game than a mere imitation of wars or battles, and even the Science and Art of War in the sense of a mere military version of the term. "Kie" 棋 meaning game, *Chess*, "Chong-Kie," fairly and appropriately signifies the game of the Science and Art of Struggles (*Phenomena*); hence, as in s. 8-8b, p. 17-9, it loyally serves *Chess* to invent CHESSOLOGICS, and it immemorially far antedates any known works on tactics and strategy (ss. 4-5 p. 207-8; ss. 2-3, pp. 210-2).

9. The learner should positively keep in his mind that the character "Chong," elephant, used as the name of two chess-pieces decidedly designating an elephant in the Chinese game, is, entirely in its meaning, different from, and has nothing whatsoever to do with "Chong" in the name of "Chong-Kie." (See s. 6, p. 209.)

1. Considering from the standpoint of evidences gathered from all the storage of knowledge concerning Chess, Chessology or Chess represents, and treats of, a synopsis, the group of general

*principles of currents of struggles of phenomena*, which are impossible to be *vividly* stated in a certain least number of books, or monuments however compact; and consequently the circumstances, conditions and their details, which are not definitely stated even in extraordinary abstract ways, are to be clearly interpreted, and to be solved, by the expounders of events to be met with, according to the principles unchangeable and esoterically inscribed in the *Chessologic* synopsis.

2. Chess, in its vivid manifestations of struggles, in comparison with other sciences and arts, may be comparable to the difference between moving pictures and the ordinary stiff ones, thrown upon curtains in front of an audience.

3. Many—a thousand and one things—should be considered in actual warfares, as even an only sympathetic hurraing of outsiders or non-combatants in favor of the friends has told a great deal. (s. 5a, p.92.) Chessology, treating of only the purely abstract principle and concrete affairs within the jurisdiction of its own principle, tells how to foresee, and meet with, the mental activities of opponents on the minimized limited field, and it points out how to contemplate against all intrigues and other evil actions on the other part. Actual martial affairs go together with topography, mountains, rivers, lakes and so forth, and climates—peculiar diseases—rain and so on, which, being entirely concrete, are not considered, except in application, in the purely abstract science, in which the difficulties to be met with intricate combinations of the movements of the chesspieces are transposed, that is, interpreted or made equivalent to the topographical as well as accidental obstacles and contingent courses. From the most pure and strictly chessological point of view, Chess is then the most rigid and abstract Science and Art of struggles, including, of course, both the naval and the military sciences, and the arts and others; even actual wars become then thus the Applied Arts in a sense. (s. 8, p. 103.)

3a. How many war or military experts, and those who applied *common* chess and a *so-called* war-game as a means to foresee the outcomes of campaigns, might feel today ashamed, as the case may be, of their utter failures of forecasting the Manchurian campaign, Japan-Russian and also Japan-Chinese wars. (s. 3, p. 50-1.) Chess treats of the mental

activities, and a test of the intelligence and skill, and their differences in regard to their *motives* or *motions* of navies or armies and statesmen, diplomatists and others, but not directly topographical matters and all other concrete things—these latter, such as emergencies and physical matters, depending upon conditions and circumstances, being considered as exactly the same on both sides so that to be neutralized, and being left over, to be solved or interpreted by the differently active *mind* of the different players, according to certain circumstances and conditions. (s. 8, p. 103; digest the *Mochingoma*.)

4. Battles, or wars are generally governed by what we call a game of chance or guess work, as far as human power of penetration into future is concerned, because they depend on various uncertain things and matters, which we do not at all know, and it is impossible to know what would happen the next minute or a second ahead, except by mere assumptions or suppositions, and even such as international complication, and even only a mere supposition of it, and very surely, naval struggles should be considered in a serious way; but these last are not considered in even that which is so-called a war-game, *Kriegspiel*, a concrete, hence fixed or stiff, form or representative of a part of that *Chess*, which comprises them all in the most abstract ways and treats of them all in the most *flexible* and *transposable* symbols or *Chessological Figures*. (See s. 1, p. 31; ss. 9-3 pp. 47-9; pp. 70-73.) Actual wars or struggles are from the chessological view the practices or Applied Arts based upon the principles revealed in the science. What is called *Kriegspiel*, war-game, because of its narrowness in application and stiffness, in regard to its position in the domain of Chess, is best comparable to a position of practical arithmetic in its relation with the Science of Numbers and Mathematics. (See s. 9, p. 73-s. 2, p. 75.)

5. Thus Chessology treats of only abstract principles of incomprehensibly varied movements of *forces* of adversaries or belligerents in a least limited extent of *space* and within a least period of *time* and it deals with abstraction of concrete motives of each corps. Chess in theory is, therefore, not at all a guessing contest or work, nor a game of chance, but it holds exactness, intelligence and skill—the actual mind, because every chessological contingency, whether affirmative or

negative, a second, a minute or more so ahead, is to be known beforehand within the minds, in theory, of the contestants, and because Chess only leads, by means of chessological symbols of wits, the Mind to prepare for, and to meet with, and conquer, emergencies, inclemencies and topographical obstacles whenever and wherever happened to be in the way.

6. While military science and Chess or rather Chessology in its simple and limited sense are the same in principle, the movements of elements of actual warfares can not be judged so easily as by the self so-called, or "so-said-before," military and Chess experts, for every detail and particular should be carefully, that is, concretely investigated, sometimes, for a long time during which entirely new contingencies might appear beyond the reach of forecasters; but the former is a part of the latter in its highest sense which, when deeply studied and made an *Applied Art*, would surely give the student the concrete idea in connection with the action of the former. The great importance in regard to the difference between war or martial games, a part of Chessology and actual manœuvering is that in a war-game the pieces do not move on their own accord, while soldiers do so, and while the pieces can be moved on without meals, the soldiers can not sometimes have a time to accomodate themselves with meals according to something like the enemy's sudden threatening in many ways, and thus hunger itself (or mutiny or riot) on the part of the friendly side becomes an ally of the enemy and betray its masters; and even these can be conceived in Chess, especially CHESS PROPER, in a different degree, because of its flexible abstraction, according to the different mental capacities of the players. (See the *Tree of Chessologics* bet. pp. 14-15; *Mochingoma* pp. 85-186.)

7. Chessology treating of only essential and fundamental factors or elements covering all struggles, it would be quite superficial on the part of players to think that any struggles or wars can be exactly in appearance represented on the chess board. Such players should be aware that there are degrees of mental capability to apply the chessological symbolic formulæ upon ordinary occurrences of struggles. How it will be preposterous to think, without a proper acquisition of the Science of Numbers, that higher Mathematics should be used



in daily business, and arithmetic, in all scientific calculations; of course, the persons who had digested the principles of Number-science can calculate as all calculation is founded upon two methods, addition and subtraction, whatever kind of numerical difficulties there may be.

8. So with Chessology, practically, the *Highest Abstract Science of inter-relations and inter-actions, and inter-reactions of space, time and force*, Chess primarily treating of three elements of the existence of Universe explains to us how struggles appear abstractly, and how Chess itself is applied upon struggles.

9. Although a drop of rain is nothing for an ordinary one, yet to a philosopher or a scientific man, there is conveyed an idea of universal gravitation, a great mass of atomic and molecular elements, and ice, water and steam, and mighty ocean; and to a poet or a musician, it is grander and more thrilling than the greatest production of musical or poetic composition; so Chess inspires an expert or thoughtful player to a wonderful exposition of the great secret Science and Art of *training the Mind*, the Lord of human actions, to be prepared to struggle with struggles to be turned out as pleasures. (s. 8a, p. 18; s. 8, p. 87.)

1. Our place and our physical self among infinities, or even in our country, or city, or town, or any locality, are so insignificant that without being interdependent, either consciously or unconsciously, among ourselves, and things and affairs, we cannot exist; and in Chess these interdependencies and the powers of repulsions and attractions and their combinations and permutations are beautifully represented, and especially, so in Japanese Chess.

2. Although number concept is purely independent of the notions of space (locality), time (motion) and force (power), an immediate result from the laws of thought, yet finding the recourse to arithmetical and mathematical evidences, positive advantage is in Chess surely gained by a purely abstract mission of the number, as the number of the squares on the game board does not literally mean only, in the case of the Japanese, nine ( $9 \times 9$ ), for they indicate an *infinite* sum of innumerable squares to cover space, time and force conceivable by an individual mind. (See Chessonym, ss. 9-3, p. 47-9.)

3. The Japanese experts say that they can discern generally the characters of persons in playing the game of Chess more

than anything else. Indeed, by Chess, certain persons' characters in general forms, whether business or military men, or what not, can be fairly ascertainable. Cæsar without doubt played, if he did as it is said, over the chessboard with the same skill, in the same manner and according to the same mental movements he showed in his war-field. Charles Dickens, the great novelist, as a chess player who used aptly to call problems "*chestnuts*" (see *Nutshell*, s. 8, p. 17), which is wittily figured (s. 1, p. 43; s. 3, p. 35-49), treated his characters, it is said, in accordance with the style of chess playing as he rarely created them. The great biologist, Thomas Henry Huxley, said (Allegory s. 7, p. 45) that the life and fortune of every one of us would depend upon winning a game of Chess (s. 2-2a, p. 28-9); that it is a game which has been played for untold ages (s. 7a, p. 17,) and every man and woman of us is one of the two players of his or her own game; that the chessboard is the world, the pieces are the phenomena of the Universe, and the rules of the game are the laws of Nature, (s. 8-8b, p. 17-9); that the player on the other side (s. 2a, p. 29), is hidden from us. "The player is always fair, just and patient. He never overlooks a mistake or makes the smallest allowance for ignorance. To the man who plays well the highest stakes are paid, and he who plays badly is checkmated without haste, but without remorse." A Chessologist can imagine how the great scientist as a chess player played over the board, and in what way of his exhaustive investigations he accomplished his immortal works. "I hold every man a chess player at his game board."—*Kazan*. It is very interesting to know that Napoleon devotedly played chess as said somewhere, but he played in such a way that when he could see that he was beaten, he had sometimes scattered the pieces by scraping with both hands over the board, and lo! his whole life career has happened and resulted in almost such a manner.

3a. Thus, from psychological aspect, Chess works as a vane of current of thought and finely reveals a spark of temperament, an inborn factor of cerebral organ; and on the other hand, Chess assigning us disciplinary exercises for the intellect and character, produces and *disciplines* the strict disciplinarians. From the foregoing statements chessological thinkers should come to the conclusion that *Chessology* dealing only

with workings of Mind in regard to time, locality and force in the simplest abstraction of the highest kind is the soul of Sciences and Philosophies and Extra-natural creations, because the Mind is the inmost core of knowledge *synonymous* with power. (Art. 31, p. 205.)

4. It is extremely necessary, in order perfectly to understand the mission of Chess, thoroughly to digest the statements herein exposed by *referring* to the *references* to *references*, and by formulating inferences by deduction or induction from premises, for there are condensed in this text all the elements and primary factors of phases governing all the struggles which are chessologically serviceable differently according to the different recipients' different storages of knowledge. "*Manan 學 de Toki-ni Kore-wo narae*," 'Learn and practice it at times' (ss. 6-1, pp. 30-1; s. 1, p. 95). "*Doksho Hyappen Gi onozkara tsüz*," 'Reading hundred times there comes out the real meaning of its own free will and accord.'—*Kazan*. For, in Chess and Chessology, there are preserved all the mental works thinkable, most simplified and abstracted. The scope of CHESSOLOGY ranges over the worldly Wisdom, just as that of the calculus over the whole field of Applied Mathematics. (See ss. 3-4, p. 10; s. 8-8b, p. 17-9; s. 2, p. 28; s. 3a, p. 32; ss. 4, 4a, p. 114.)

## THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE USE OF FIGURES IN CHESSOLOGY.

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1. For the purpose of aiding those who might be discouraged by apparent difficulties of Chess, every possible means of the propaganda for the chessological principles and game is to be used to let them perfectly understand how easy it is to play the game and learn the meaning of the factors of Chess according to their mental capacities based upon their amount and quality of knowledge (s. 5, p. 54), because there is none other besides so easily, in spite of the greatest Science, understood and played, for all the elements considered in Chess are the most flexible and easily adaptable.

2. Now, since Chessology treats of the art of an actual duel of wits and knowledge, commonly known as Chess; because brevity is the soul of wit; because Chess is the briefest, concisest and most abstract of all the departments of knowledge; and because Chess is the most sensitive of all and any Figures, therefore, the way to understand the Figurative Words, or Expression or Symbols, is unboundedly important in the study of Chess. They help a great deal the chessological student and player to be able to understand the latent meaning of the names of the chess-pieces, *Koma* or pieces—Chessonyms. (See ss. 9-3, pp. 47-8; pp. 54-67.) Therefore, the strenuous cultivation of the power of understanding the use of Figures, either mentally, or in every line of expressions of knowledge, is to the extremest degree indispensable in Chessdom (s. 5, p. 54).

3. That knowledge is power, and that "God said 'Let there be light, and there was light'," which is one, if not the most, of the most beautiful Figurative Expressions, appeal differently to different calibers of the different contents of the human head. It will be in the same way when we state that *Chess is Mind. Chessology is the Mind of all sciences and arts and philosophies.* The statement is true when that knowledge is power and "God said, 'Let there be light and there was light'," is true. The statement is differently understood by

different persons with different mental calibres. (s. 5, p. 54.) The laymen bystanders, in the chessological point of view, might not be able to conceive the exact mission of Chess and they may imagine other way. But it being the greatest aim on the part of the chessologist that they themselves should be thrown out of the mouths of cares, anxieties, or sorrows (ss. 2-3, p. 22), and that there should be peace (ss. 8-9, pp. 17-20) the chessological student may allow the bystanders to utter and comment as the latter conceive because the differences of amounts of knowledge govern the case. "*Itan-wo semru-wa kore Gai nomi,*" "There is an only injury in pressing the truth upon a heretic."—*Kazan*. Now, then, clearly to prove that *Chess is Mind*, or *Chessology is the Mind of knowledge*, let us have a recourse to some of the Figures, and apply them in the course of playing chess games, or giving lectures on chessological subjects.

4. Words are frequently the greatest stumbling blocks for true abstract conceptions of things and ideals, because the abstract has nothing to do with the terms, words or names. Words and their meanings may change a thousand and one times in regard to the *Koma* pieces of Chess, but the chessological principles remain the same without being impaired, even to the least *infinitesimal* fraction. The author himself does not mind the paradoxical names of Queen, Bishop, or what not, in the occidental branch of Chess. Translated into *non-poetic* concrete language, the abstract names and propositions may be more simply at first expressed, but the ideas of the great mass of the students may be made later on unprofitably stunted, contrary to the first motive of Chessology. (See s. 5, p. 23; s. 6, p. 40; pp. 72-75; *Kriegspiel* below.) For the chess-pieces the *elastic* names with transitional abstract meanings are preferable, while the reality and the abstract are interchangeable, as attributes of the *Koma* pieces named as such a one, so and so, or their representatives.

5. The writer thus uses interchangeably the terms *king, dictator, emperor, president, chief*, or any leader or head, for a name is nothing for the purpose when there is an assumed existence of a power only *de facto*, because of making the sovereign power as an abstract entity; and it is the same way with the names of the other chess-pieces. (See ss. 9-3, p. 47-8; ss. 4-6, p. 51-56; ss. 6-9, p. 72-3; s. 5, p. 76.)

6. Military men understand Chess from their own individual capacities and go into *particulars* (see Aristotle below), as seen in what is called a war-game, *Kriegspiel*, by thinking that Chess is not enough for operations, manœuvres and others of armies at their own disposal; but in fact, Chess let them do so by their being taught only abstract reasoning, and the war-game only expresses in *concrete* words what Chess expresses in figurative abstract ways, so that the war-game is an applied art or chess, very far from *pure* Chess Proper. In the case of Chess the terms conveying warlike capabilities have been only esoterically utilized for competitive purposes without special reference to their original significance. In a sense from the standpoint of ideal military men, Chess is a war-game itself, the most severely simplified and abstracted, and dignified as in proportion as Mathematics has glorified itself far above mere counting figures. (See s. 8-8b, pp. 17-9; s. 4, p. 33; ss. 9-5a, p. 108-110.)

7. To understand the proper meaning and mission of the names of Chess *Koma* pieces, what are called Figures under Figurative Language or Expression in the Rhetoric would, to the greatest extent, help, and give great pleasures to, the chess student to solve the movements, actions and intentions of the pieces and, in fine, *Chess* itself. Understanding these Figures, the student would better adopt them as the means in the case of Chess and it is worth while to cultivate their wit to understand the powers of the Figures as the brevity is the soul of wit, and the Figures are for wit or brevity, and because Chess with the most expressive Figures ever created by an ingenious association of ideas is the briefest, most concise miniature of the Universe (s. 3, p. 35; s. 7, p. 45).

7a. No other department or its parts of knowledge and art is so widely used in Figurative Expressions concerning human affairs as Chess and its requisites because of vivid association of ideas reflected upon human Mind from Nature (s. 8-8b, p. 17-9; ss. 2-2a, p. 28-9; ss. 6-8, pp. 30-1). The terms, chess, chessboard, chess-pieces, and *Fu* or pawn and the phrases containing those words have been continually employed in allegory and other figures of speech and expressions (Huxley and Dickens s. 3, p. 35-6; s. 7, p. 45).

8. The part that we are now to consider should be, to the

fullest extent, almost exhaustively explained, digested and assimilated, for it is the most important and the greatest assistance or factor in Chess, especially the Japanese, and it causes Chess to reveal itself to be transcendental and the supremest, the most sublime and the most abstract of both speculative and positive philosophies and sciences—*Ultra-Philosophic-Science*.

9. Those Figures are *Equivocation, Paradox, Repetition* and *Allegory*, and the chief and the most important Figures profitably adaptable for Chessology are Metonymy, Synecdoche, Personification and, besides, from a different source, Eponymy, which will be presently explained fully. A full explanation of these Figures is worth remembering; and when the student might think that the chess-pieces do not convey a same advantageous meaning, as they think it ought to, it would be very beneficial to refer to these methods, if not the terms, for the chessological purposes.

1. While the uses of Figures are not absent from orations, from essays, even from the commonest speech of daily life, the ideas accruing from the Figures, if not very themselves, are very important and indispensable for Chessology and chess-pieces and other factors to be rightly conceived by the student as in the same degree as they are essential to poetry, because "*Chess is a symbolic epic poem of universals of struggles in nature.*"—*Ohen-O*.

2. Aristotle said: "Poetry is more philosophical and worthy of attention than history, for poetry speaks of UNIVERSALS, but history, of *particulars*."

3. Now chess players should not forget that Chess is a poetry of all sciences and philosophies, for it reveals *universals* by the most severe abstract symbols, but all other sciences and philosophies, when compared with Chess, speak of particulars by long arguments, discussions and all kinds of statements, while CHESSOLOGY, of the *training of Mind* in the smallest and least possible space, time and force, together with purely intellectual competition and amusement which all of the others entirely lack. *Poetry needs the Figures, so CHESS claims them*, as CHESSOLOGY deals with the severest abstraction of the highest kind of universals.

4. The *Ideal*, the constant aim in poetry, and the *practical*, the constant aim in oratory, are both the constant aim in Chess

through domain of the *highest intellectual competitive amusement*; and besides, the *Artistic* in Chess should be strictly observed in regard to combinations of movements of pieces and also the players' conducts.

5. The *Prophetic* in poetry—although sometimes thought unreal because of its being imaginative, yet resting on the deepest truth—on the truth that underlies incidents of experience and is fundamental in human nature—is indispensable for purpose of proper understanding of the elements of Chess affairs.

6. *Personification* endowing the lower animals and inanimate objects with attributes of human beings; as, "I am glad," said the bee, "to hear you grant that I came honestly by my wings and my voice;" "the mountains and the hills shall break forth before you into singing, and all the trees of the field shall clap their hands;" "Nature who is undoubtedly the most graceful artist, hath, in all of her ornamental works, pursued variety, with an apparent neglect of regularity."—*Blair*. This Figure is very highly useful in *Chessologics* so that chess players and students would have absolute freedom of rendering Chess into practical or Applied Chessology.

7. *Epigram* and *Irony*. Epigram is the Figure of apparent contradiction and ends in a point or turn of wit; as, a man who is always professing to be satisfied with nothing is satisfied with nothings.—*Dollas*. The *Irony*, that of real contradiction; the former means something different from what is expressed: the latter expresses the opposite of what is meant, bestows praise in such a manner as to convey disapprobation and professes belief in a statement for the purpose of casting ridicule upon it. The spirit of a pithy or witty saying or any saying characterized by wit and point helps the student to comprehend the meaning of the pieces and the other elements of Chess.

8. *Simile*, comparing two things together, in order to show that they have qualities in common, as fortune is as fickle as the wind! In Chess, the power of *simile* is constantly needed.

9. *Adaptability*, the principal test of the usefulness of a simile. "The parts of a climax grow in importance as a wedge grows in thickness, the most forcible, standing last and making the deepest impression." (s. 7aa, p. 60.) This is beautifully revealed in Chess, especially the Japanese.

1. *Metaphor* is a simile without the form of comparison,



one object being spoken of not as like another, but as another; as, "Man, thou pendulum 'twixt smile and tear." A metaphor is affirmed by some to consist in things, by others to consist in words. Aristotle comprehended synecdoche under the term metaphor. He says: "A metaphor is a transposition of a noun from its proper signification, either from the genus to the species or from the species to the genus or from species to species." "The ink of female logic is blotted all over with tears, and justice in their courts is forever in a passion."—*Thackeray*. "Laughter and tears are meant to be the wheels of the machinery of sensibility. One is windpower, the other waterpower. That's all the difference."—*Holmes*. For a practical transposition of *pure Chessologics* to an Applied Knowledge or Art, this Figure is especially important in order to cherish constantly the assimilating associations of ideas to be practicalized, so that Chess being thus made productive to the fullest degree can fulfill its omnipotent mission.

2. *The Force* of simile and metaphor lies in the readiness of men to perceive and accept a comparison. Wisdom is said to consist in the ready and accurate perception of analogies; and in Chessdom, this Figure is unboundedly useful to reproduce an Applied Art, or Chess.

3. *Anti-Climax* may have the effect of wit, that is, an amusement by the collocation of ideas that at first seem incongruous. "Two nations are divided by mutual fear and mountains."

4. *Antithesis*, or contrast of words in similar construction, adds force; and the power of this Figure is excellently represented in Japanese Chess.

5. *Climax*, what we see in the first clause prepared for the second, the second for the third, etc., in an increasing scale of interest and importance. In the case of Japanese Chess, the force of climax is beautifully exposed as in poetry and essay.

6. *Paradoxes* are seemingly absurd in appearance and language, but true in fact; and they should be constantly kept in the Mind of chess players, as Chess is full of paradoxical associations and useful results, of which Japanese Chess is very rich. "A king is not a king, nor a queen, a queen."—*Kazan*. "A king is not an emperor, nor an emperor, a king, yet he is an imperial king or royal emperor, and even a president, as a pawn becomes a queen."—*Danzō*.

7. Of Grote, the historian of Greece, and Mrs. Grote, Sidney Smith once wittily said: "I do like them both so much, for he is so ladylike, and she is such a perfect gentleman."

8. "A beau is everything of a woman but the sex, and nothing of a man beside it."—*Fielding*.

"Life would be tolerably agreeable if it were not for its pleasures."—*Lewis*.

9. *Equivocation, equivocal words*, those that may be taken in more senses than one. Trench says: "The calling two or more different things by one and the same name (*æque vocare*), (hence *equivocation*) is the source of almost all errors in human discourse. He who wishes to throw dust in the eyes of an opponent, to hinder his arriving at the real facts of a case, will often have to recourse to this artifice, and thus to *equivocate* and *equivocation* have attained their present secondary meaning." "A king is not a king, or a queen, not a queen, or a bishop, not a bishop, and a castle, not a castle."—*Kazan*.

1. *General words*, instead of individual words, though often affected by many, are needed in transposing and understanding the latent meanings of elements of Chess

2. *Metonymy*, literally signifying a change of name, interchanging terms, as, when we transpose:

(1) *The concrete* and the abstract; as, the *crown*, for *royalty*; the *sword*, for *military power*; *Cæsar*, for the *sovereign power*; the fatal cup, for *poison*, etc., *Her Majesty*, for the *Queen*; *His Impudence*, for an *impudent fellow*; etc., etc.

(2) *The effect and the cause*; as, drunkenness for *wine*; *sunshine* for the *sun*; gray hairs for *old age*.

(3) *The author and his works*; as, "I am reading *Bacon*." "Some say '*Bacon* wrote *Shakespeare*.'"—*Chō-Yō*.

3. *Synecdoche*, literally the understanding or receiving of one thing out of another, puts a part for the whole, as *fifty sail* for fifty ships. Chess players should cultivate the association with this Figure.

4. The force of this Figure consists in the greater vividness with which the part or species is realized, and is indispensable for Chessonyms.

5. *Hyperbole*, a statement made more impressive by representing things to be greater or less, better or worse, than

they really are. Japanese Chess superbly exposes this force. (Art. 8, p. 201.)

6. Hyperbole is distinguished from falsehood because its statements are not expected to be literally believed, and is subject to the limit imposed upon irony. It should be used only as the expression of strong feeling and only where strong feeling is appropriate.

7. *Allegory*, a continued comparison, or a composition in which the language is *Figurative* throughout, to which the fable and the parable belong (s. 5, p. 116; s. 9a. p. 204). In all these compositions, *abstract truths* are represented by sensible objects, or human affairs are described under the image of the lower animals, and of the *processes of nature*. This also involves *personification*, which see. The force of this method of association of ideas is extremely important for Chess, especially, the Japanese which is the perfect *allegory* of the abstraction of the highest kind of the Nature. (Huxley and Dickens, s. 3, p. 35-6; s. 7a, p. 40.)

8. *Eponym*, the Greek word meaning a name, as of a people, country and the like, derived from that of an individual, that is, one's name given to the people, country and the like. It is a "namesake," "one from or for whom something or somebody is named." The power of understanding the force of this Figure makes Chessonyms useful and serviceable in the extreme for understanding the real meanings of chess-pieces, and Chess as a whole. (s. 9. p. 47.)

9. Modern science has adopted this special word for convenience sake, for certain, imaginary personages, invented to account for a city's, tribe's, or nation's name, while summing up its individuality. Although popular tradition always asserts that the eponymous city-founder or ancestor gave his name to his family, race or city, and the like, yet in reality, the contrary is invariably the case, the race's, nation's, or city's name being transferred to him, as our far distant posterity might express "Japan checkmated China and his neighbor Russia."—*Danzō*. The Eponym is really only that name, transferred into a traditional person by a *bold and vivid poetical Figure of Speech*, which, if taken for what it is, makes the beginnings of political history remarkably easy and clear to be comprehended. Without this Eponym, there

can hardly be understood the Holy Scriptures, the oldest and important document of any nation, the most ancient writings in existence in regard to the Genesis of nations and races.

1. In the course of their early history, in order rightly to understand it and appreciate its bearing and full value, we must not forget that almost every name is that of a *people*, a *tribe*, a *stock* or a *horde*, not that of a *man*. It was a common fashion among the *Oriental*s and adopted by the ancient European nations to express by this Eponym the kindred relations of nations and their differences. Both for brevity and clearness, such as what we may call *Historical Figures* are extremely convenient. So that they must have been suggested by a proceeding most natural in ages of traditional statements of the earliest histories and in a tribe explaining its own name by taking it for granted that it was that of its founder.

2. Abraham is not one individual person, but a horde of shepherds and the name itself clearly shows philologically and means the *outcast Brahmins*, the descendents of the Brahmins in North-Western India, the believers of the Supreme Brahm, God. So Adam or Cain or Noah or Moses is not the name of an individual. (ss. 9-3, 47-8; Diag. III and s. 5, p. 70.)

3. The real name of the Assyrians is Asshur, because their kingdom was founded by one named Asshur.

4. The Aramœans are called so, because their founder's name was Aram; and the Hebrews named themselves from a similarly supposed ancestor Heber. These and several more nations used languages so much alike that they could understand each other and had so many common features in looks and characters that their founders, Asshur, Aram, Heber and so forth were made descendants or sons of one great progenitor, Shem, first son of Noah.

5. It is a kind of parable, which is extremely plain and clear when there is the key to it, and nothing is easier than to translate it into the sober, positive and concrete forms of speech. It is explained thus:—A large portion of humanity distinguished by certain features more or less peculiar to itself, one of several great races, has been called the Shemitic race, the race of Shem. The same is with the subdivisions of the white race composed of nearly all the European Nations and personified under the name Japhet, as third son of Noah. And

the same it is with the sub-races, originally white and broken up into many fractions, both scattered tribes and great nations, all showing a decided likeness to each other;—they are summed up as the whole under the name of Ham called or assumed as their common progenitor, second son of Noah.

6. Both scientific men and churches have long admitted that the genealogies of the people of Genesis should be understood as above stated.

7. St. Augustine, one of the earliest and greatest church Fathers, wisely said that the name there represents "nation, not men," "*Gentes nonhomines.*" (*De civitate Dei*, XVII, 3.) There is also literal truth in them. If all mankind comes from one human couple, its every fraction must surely have had some one particular progenitor, ancestor or father, only in so remote a past that his actual name or individuality can not possibly have been remarked, so that every people naturally gave him its own name. Many of these names show by their own very nature that they could not have exposed individuals; some are plural, as Mizraim, "the Egyptians."

8. Some have the article, as "the Armorite, the Hivite." There is one with the name of a city, as Sidon, "the first born of Canaan." Sidon was the greatest maritime city of the Canaanites, who kept an undisputed supremacy over the rest, hence "the first born." The name meaning "fisheries" is appropriate for a city on the sea, at first a settlement of fishermen. "Canaan" personified in a common ancestor, as one of the four sons of Ham, is really the name of a vast tract of land, peopled by many tribes and nations, all differing in many ways, yet manifestly of one race; whence "the sons of Canaan."

9. To facilitate and rightly to understand the mission of Chess, after digestion of the lubricating flexible terms seen before, the term Chessonym, Chessological Figures, or symbolic names, may be, according to the same ideas and methods for our purpose and convenience sake, coined to signify the transferred, transformed, or transposed nomenclatures in a way to be called Chessological Figures of Expression or Symbols. Yet the coinage of such terms may not positively be necessary except to show how easily to be understood, because of chess factors themselves being already the severest and most abstract signs, and the greatest necessity may be to adopt the terms

used elsewhere outside of Chessology—not the terms, but the spirit of them—and apply the ideas of flexibility of things and names upon chessological elements, because the beauty of chess symbols, especially, the Japanese, surpasses all the other allied signs. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that by this scientific method the true mission of Chess is most advantageously interpreted and exposed for the sake of great benefits on the part of student and for the vigorous encouragement of chessological propaganda.

9a. It should be, moreover, plainly understood and acknowledged upon the deep chess-thinkers' part, that but for creation of *Chessological Terms and Figures or Expressions*, MENTAL TOOLS, the initiator of Chessology, the true—legitimate—Science of Chess, who has, after the most exhaustive investigations of Chessologic Evolution, crystallized and reduced to the Ultra-Philosophic-Science the principles of Chess, whereof checkers, or in Japanese, *Hasami-Shōngi* (s. 6a, p. 82), a war-game, *Igo* and chess in general are literally the unfledged nestlings, that is, preparatory course formulas, so to speak, provisional trial methods to pay their respective tribute to the main Chess in the highest sense, would have been utterly at a loss to have easily exposed a key to the grand principles of the mission of Chess Proper and located the Science of CHESSDOM in the appropriate position which it naturally occupies in the domain of knowledge. (See the *Tree of Chess-ologics*, bet. pp. 14-15; ss. 8-8a, pp. 17-18; pp. 115-116.)

1. As in the same way as we understand the word "day" in Genesis to have meant "a period of time," "a group of ages," so every piece or a line or a square at Chess conveys a meaning expressed in a Figure of Chess; as, for instance, a *Fu*, pawn or soldier means either a soldier, or a torpedo boat or a group or *troupe* of foot soldiers, infantry, a company, a detachment, a battalion, a regiment, a division or a fleet or an army of laborers, fighting men whether on sea or land or business clerks, according to its position on the chessboard and depending upon the different amount of different ammunitions in the different storages of knowledge on the part of the players.

2. From what we have exhaustively considered before as far as Chess is concerned, we have as follows:—

3. *Chessonym* or *Chessological Figure* is a symbolic name

or an algebraic sign put on a *Koma*, chess-piece, or the board itself, as an index of the function of an element or groups of elements in struggles; hence *Chessonymy*, the method of using the Figure for brevity's sake, hence *chessonymous*. (See pp. 54-81.) Chessboard in Chessology is a compressed or minimized representative, that is, rendered into a small diminutive scale, of a wide field of space, so that it is a sort of *Chessonym* itself. (See s. 2, p. 35; s. 7a, p. 59.)

4. For the same purpose, even Astrological terms and surely Mathematical symbols may be abstractly conceived and adapted to the most advantageous way without a least thought of their original significance.

5. The profuse Repetitions of words and phrases are made in order to help the reader without inducing them toward reference to them several times, because this work is not intended for orations or rhetorical purposes, but simply to let the student know how, in an easy way, to understand the principles of Chessology and to learn the game. (s. 6, p. 56.)

6. To use repeatedly the Japanese terms is to make the student thoroughly acquainted with the shades of meanings of them, as whenever there is any difference whatever in words and names, there is some difference in some way of feeling, appreciating or understanding them. For a term is sometimes extended to include words that have very nearly the same meaning (synonyms), but which express shades of difference in significance. Using many times the same explanatory expressions, phrases or terms in many ways is to make the student very well acquainted with the meanings of them, so that troubles, however insignificant, to refer back to them many times would be entirely avoided. (s. 6, p. 56.)

# JAPANESE CHESS

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## ITS FUNCTION AND POSITION AS THE CALCULUS OF CHESSOLOGICS.

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1. It is strange, it seems, that few foreigners, if any, have tried to study the Far Oriental Chess, except that one German superficial hyper-critic remarked in a newspaper that Japanese Chess is not amusing and contrary to reasons. Why they did not study it is probably that persons visiting there, who would have played it, might not generally deeply be learned in Chessology, because in the first place, Chess, even Occidental, is thought as a difficult game and those writers, who are famous in a certain line of works, might not have thought it entirely different from other games in point of principle and considered it unworthy to deal with. (s. 9a, p. 25.)

2. For a novice or a learner, Japanese Chess known as *Shōngi*, literally a commander's, or admiral's or general's game, is, at first, when compared with ours, much simpler and easier to know the movements of the pieces, which are decidedly simpler than ours, but become afterwards more complicated and intricated, and produce interesting and fascinating strategic and tactical combinations of manœuvres and beautifully logistic operations something like real and vivid warfares and somethings more. As to the Occidental Chess the movements upon the part of pieces are at first comparatively cumbersome, whereby arises a vague conception of chessological difficulty, an obstacle for extension of Chessdom, of which the Japanese is entirely free. (s. 9a, p.25.)

The author confines himself almost entirely to the principle of Japanese Chess; and analysis of problems would not be at present exhaustive, only touching some of the best ones, and others left only to be produced some time soon.

3. It is strange that the Russians fixed or checkmated Napoleon, the well-known chess-player, and the Japanese have cornered the former by the power of Japanese Chess in



almost miraculous manner, which otherwise could not be achieved, and which Occidental chess could not have worked; hence, out of or for the Occidental chess, a war-game has come as a sort of supplementary assistance. Ignorance is dangerous, and there is positively no exception against the premise, hence the necessity to secure knowledge which is power. There is a fine writer represented as a military or war expert and fore-caster, as well as first-class chess player, who contributed to a very widely known, authoritative and reliable paper his credit-able (as far as exquisiteness is concerned) writings with earnest criticism and severe contra-statements on the Japanese move-ments, strategy and tactics (worthy to be noticed from a nega-tive point of view) in the Japan-Russian war; and these writings were the great subjects of discussions of his then utter failures, seemingly military ignorance and misunderstanding; and the writings entirely disappeared at a certain stage of his contri-butions. He is a chess expert, though spoken of as an amateur player. If he had ever known such as Japanese Chess, he could never have made such terrible mistakes as he did, because he as a chess author is one, if not the foremost, of the Occidental chess expounders and advocates a perfect unity of the 'science of chess and military science.' The mistakes are not purely his own, but he was only a victim of circumstances and acci-dents of the time; Frederick, Napoleon, Moltke, and many other great generals, and many personages known as great chess players did not know the Far Eastern Chess. The contributor just as many—almost all—other western chess players and experts did not know that there is another way—the Far Oriental Chess to drill the Mind through the power of amusement and competition—just as many—almost all—astronomers until some years ago did not discern Neptune beyond Uranus and *innumerable* amounts of larger sun-systems than our own solar dominion. They could never know *Chessologics* just as the students of the Science of Calculation could not penetrate into the wonderful depth of Cal-culus before Newton and Leibnitz exposed the most delicate mathematical attributes of the Universe. ( See ss.7,8,9,p. 113-4.)

4. A great wonder that how, in Japan, chess playing is common, national and universal there, that how expert chess-players, each and every other severely examine themselves by competitive struggles, and nine grades of diplomas (*Sho-*

*dan*, literally first step, up to *Ku-dan*, ninth step) are honorably awarded, duly recognized and highly respected among those master chess-players themselves, and that how the Japanese have improved Chess to the highest culmination and abstraction of all scientific, philosophical and speculative knowledge; but when we know that they have considered from time immemorial that their country has been founded upon the science of government supplemented with military ethical department of knowledge making the warlike science and art as a means of self-defense, then we cannot but help to see them achieved in the improvement of Chess. Their swords, the weapons of self-defense, compared with which Damascus blade is a child's toy, the finest of all the fine and beautiful works there, have been symbolized in a superbly appropriate Figure, as the spirit of Japan, Yamato-damashi, Japanese spirit—temper, namely loyalty, chivalrous spirit and patriotism—and their country has never experienced a foreign conquest. This spirit is represented in Chess in a beautiful exquisite way (see ss. 5-6, p. 27). In fine, cutting the discussion short here for fully to be stated very soon, before Japanese Chess the other formulas or branches of chessological science are seen aghast. If an exaggeration may be here allowed, it would be almost safe to have uttered that the Occidental chess-play, when compared with the Japanese, is a child's play. The range of difference between the Japanese and Occidental chess is far wider and in reality infinitely greater than that between the latter and checkers. Occidental analysis can never have beautiful combinations as well as permutations as the Japanese. Such is plainly seen in the analysis of both sides, the former having only the remnants of chessmen and the latter, sometimes but rarely, keeping only a few pieces left, but almost always with the captured pieces, *Mochingoma* and *Naru* Promotion Method, for finish, thus producing literally kaleidoscopic aspects. (Digest thoroughly *Mochingoma*, pp. 86-186; *Naru* Promotion, ss. 4-2, pp. 187-190.) Japanese Chess creates the stupendously beautiful constellations—developments and combinations—of chess *Koma* pieces that the Occidental chess can never at all display. Thus, there can be superbly and transcendently pictured on the Japanese chessboard a skeleton map of, or key to, war-field, the skirmishing and making reconnaissance attacks and defenses of any kind conceivable

along the entire front and rear as well. Hence by these means of chessological principle and practice, the Japanese mind could brilliantly, though almost instinctively, display their splendid naval and military movements and glaring victories along the Yalu and at Liaoyang, Port Arthur, Mukden and elsewhere in the greatest human infernal struggle ever exhibited. All war experts unanimously opined and asserted that the Japanese have achieved what Napoleon, Moltke and other great generals could not dream at all for a moment. It is then safe to say that in Japanese Chess—Chessology which has given the nation the vitality and co-operative spirit and actions—there is condensed the sum of the real original Japanese wisdom as a whole intellectual entity. It is the full embodiment in symbols of intellectuality itself. If the Occidental chess could be justly paralleled with the treatment of strategic movements of armies of two belligerent nations, the *Shōngi*, the Far Eastern Chess displays none other less than the strategic and tactical movements of navies and armies of any number of nations, as noted admirals and generals moved their navies and armies against their common enemy over an extensive war-field in a concerted plan, together with, at the same time, the strategic and tactical complications of international games of diplomacy and statesmanship (s. 6, p. 87; s. 4, p. 90; pp. 117-65).

4a. As to the intrinsic merits of both branches of Chessological Tree, it is true in every way as provable by vivid evidences that Lopez, Sarratt, Staunton, Anderssen and Paul Morphy, the wizard of Chess and other Western chess generals (s. 4c, p. 115) could not see nor imagine further than what they could observe and develop on the Occidental chessboard, whereas, the Japanese have passed the antiquated and stereotyped stages of yore which the Western greatest chess masters have been playing and pursuing, as the Far Oriental Chess can give the expert players conception of all those results—movements, developments, combinations and evolutions—which have been exposed by the Western chess. Because of the latter being very limited and stiff as the result of primitive conventionality, it can not easily expose and develop all the Chessologic essential factors, while the Far Eastern not only keeps the best parts of severely conventional modes but also discharges its duty of

phenomenally solving all the human struggles. The relation and position of the Occidental and Oriental Chess in CHESSOLOGY may be very well compared respectively with those of elementary Algebra and Calculus in Mathematics, or maybe, those of simple Arithmetic and Higher Mathematics in the Science of Calculation. The Western chess is mainly governed by the principle of Involution, hence the less becomes the number of chess-pieces on board after captures, the larger the units become as philosophically and scientifically considered, and consequently become afterward stiffer and stiffer, and, therefore, hands to play become plainer and plainer, and after childish and tedious machination of movements of pieces the players often make out, or rather manufacture, "drawn-games." Japanese Chess, on the other hand, wields a wand of the principle of Evolution, and consequently the units after captures can or may be conceived as constant or as convertible according to the players' individual mental capacity (s. 5. pp. 85-116); hence, the units or pieces keeping the flexibility and full freedom the contrivances and combinations of offensive and defensive operations become instructive and amusing, and create constant progression of intellectual pleasures, and ugly "drawn" contest except beautiful end is never produced. (s. 5a, p. 55.)

5. This Japanese game of Chess, evolved out, or a branch, of that great antiquity which is the common forefather of the so-called chess of this or that country, is played by two persons or parties as ours but with forty pieces, instead of thirty-two of ours, or small wooden (usually) blocks called *Shōngi-no Koma*, or sometimes simply *Koma*; and the term *Koma*, literally colt, 駒, has come to be used by suggestion of its association with, and resemblance to, stepping or running from a square to another in a fashion of a colt's hopping and gallopings. Chessonymy shows that *Koma* is also written as 碁馬, literally, *Ko*, game [on cross-lined board] and *MA*, horse, a Figure of Speech for hopping and galloping on the part of horses in significance of movements of pieces across the lines or sections over the chessboard (war or struggle game field), and it means 'chessmen'; hence *Koma-wo sasu*, 'to move a chessman.' The term *Koma*, 駒, thus the Mind, will, the thoughts, the reason, and the meaning, figuratively derived from a colt, *Koma*, is beautifully expressed in the Japanese figurative phrase, *Kokoro-no Koma*, (*Kokoro*, Mind; *no*, of or per-

taining to; *Koma*, a colt), the Mind, will, the thoughts, the reason, the fancy, imagination, the meaning, which the author expresses esoteric-chessonymously as *Mind-Force*, and it is poetically, philosophically and every and other wise, the best and appropriately fitted for the *pieces* at Chess from the highest conception of Chessological Art. "*Hyōtan-no Yō-ni Kokoro-ga bratskeba Kokoro-no Koma-ga Doko-e deru yara!*"—Literally, 'If mind swings and rocks like a goard, where will the *mental colt* go out!'—meaning, 'If mind is unsettled, how will be the thought!'—*Hakzen-Kazan*. "*Koma* is the Chessplayer's transfiguring and transmigrating *alter ego* in fact."—*Kazan*. "*Kokoro Koko-ni arazareba, mité mie-zu, kiité kikoe-zu, kuratté So-no Ajiwai-wo shira-zu*" (from Confucius in Japanese): 'If there is not Mind, though looked at, it is not seen; though heard, not heard; though eaten, the taste is not known:—concentrating the Mind, each *Koma* symbolizes a sort of temporary incarnation of Chessplayer's thought or *alter ego*.—*Kazan*. (s. 2, p. 38.) "Since Chess is a miniature nature or microcosm of the Infinitude, the broader becomes a chessplayer's knowledge, the wider and more interesting becomes the understanding of Chess which gives chessplayers a power of divination, wherefore acquire knowledge and digest it by virtue of the Calculus of Chessologics."—*Kazan*. See "*Chong-Kie*" ss. 5-1, pp. 30-1, and ingraft *Koma* on it and understand how beautifully and philosophically CHESSOLOGY has come out. (s. 7a, p. 17; ss. 8-8b, p. 17-9; ss. 4-5, p. 115-6.)

5a. In the Occidental Chess what is known as 'drawn-game' is a meaningless result of antiquated conventionality, an inexcusable imperfection in that branch of Chessological Tree (p. 14-5; ss. 7-9 [p. 113-4]). If there might be only one or very small *per cent.*, it might be allowable; but, moreover, when a majority of games can be reduced into 'drawn-games,' it is without a least doubt inadmissible in any intellectual games whatsoever. And such compromising outcomes unsatisfactory for both contestants make Chess degraded as well as farcical (s. 4, p. 100). Such 'drawn battles,' ties, could be perhaps permitted in an age of utter darkness when there were no accurate scales in existence. But, in the time of enlightenment when there is a need for scales and measurements so accurate that one-millionth part of an inch or an ounce is to be considered even in the

material world, such an inaccurately compromising habit to do things by halves as that nursed by many 'drawn-games' should not be inculcated under any circumstances and conditions under the keen and delicate supervision of *Chessology*, a nest of *Mind*. No such tedious unproductive and forlorn performance and hopeless amusement on the part of both combatants as 'drawn-games' are at all procurable in Japanese Chess play. On that score *Chessology* puts the Eastern branch very far above the Western (4 above; p.49). This has been achieved by no other than inauguration of the *Tengoma*, or *Mochingoma* (s. 5, pp. 86-186) aided by clever means of *Naru Promotion Method* (ss.4-2, pp. 187-190). Therefore, that the very contest in Occidental chess is decided by a certain number of *only* wins for either side, '*draws*' *not counted*, gives the strongest verdict for the intrinsic merit of its far advanced brother, the *Science Philosophy of Struggles*.

6. The author tries to maintain the Japanese chessonyms in many ways as it seems to be the best to do so; and why do we keep Japanese Chess terms is because a different treatment needs a correspondingly different name with a different shade of meanings, and because it is the best in many ways to prevent equivocal misnomenclatures from being produced in future in connection with the Occidental game. Those chesspieces, *Koma*, are (see description in Diagrams I, II and III; pp.70-74.) on a cross-lined board, divided into eighty-one squares or almost always slightly rectangular sections, instead of sixty-four checkered like ours. Marking out thus a square board into eighty-one square divisions is in order clearly to determine and denote the respective values of movements of the *Koma* pieces.

6a. This board with its divisions ( $9 \times 9$ ) is not at all of arbitrary work, but conveys a deeply calculated plan of a part of space (charts or maps), marked with latitudes and longitudes (s. 1, p.68), with which the *Yoko* and *Taté*, rank or line and file on the chessboard correspond; whence the rectangular board. 9, the largest digit, the highest in a unit of all the scientific scales and the most glorious core of the numbers 360, 180, 90 and their parts given to the degrees of circle, latitudes and longitudes and

mathematical triangular measurements, and 9, three times three primary elements of struggle—locality, force and time—thus showing the *first step* of eternal progression, powerfully governs the Japanese board; and thus, 9 conveys us the meaning of the idealistic, mathematical and exactly governing points between *maxima* (of any and even the Infinitude) and *minima* (even the *infinitesimal*). It is the *minimum* and *maximum* boundary between numeral scales, however either indefinitely increasing or decreasing. In each scale, 9 is the supreme. The grandest sum of the repetitions *ad infinitum* of scales with 9, the highest digital number, makes or reaches the Infinitude and *ad infinitum* dividing the Infinitude by 9 limits the magnitude of any infinitesimal. If any number other than 9 would be assigned, it—say 10 or more—produces too much or redundant power for the chessological purpose, but if it—say 8 or lower number be put on the stage, it results in too little; that is, in both cases, not quite right limit is brought when tried by severely scientific test. When the decimal system was established in France, in order to extend it to the circle, its circumference was divided into 400 ( $=8 \times 5 \times 0$ ), which have assumed the name of degrees; but 400 being an inconvenient number, from not allowing so many divisions as 360 ( $=9$  side-wise added, or  $=4 \times 9 \times 0$ ), the ancient division has been resumed showing that even the modern greatest and most powerful scientific sages could not change the bright nimbus 9 of the creation of Nature. Aside from the sublime character of 9,

1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	18, 9, 0
3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	27, 9, 0
4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	36, 9, 0
5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	45, 9, 0
6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	54, 9, 0
7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	63, 9, 0
8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	72, 9, 0
9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	81, 9, 0

we have the feline 9 vitalities and 9 tailors to make a man; and the mysterious paradox of casting out 9; and when we have 9 digits, all the counting machines can be made to figure up all the numbers there are in our knowledge; 9 times 9 completes the Multiplication Table for all mathematical purposes. In almost all respects

when any higher treatment of logistic and pure mathematical designs to have been completed is considered, 9 is preferable to 8 (ss. 5-6a, pp. 212-3); and the Table with more than  $9 \times 9$  produces the results to show the repetitions of the same units.

Now, the author has got to show the divisibility of the two numbers 8 and 9 as follows:—

(A)	(B)
(1) $8 \div 2 = 4$	(1) $9 \div 2 = 4.5$ (=9 side-wise added).
(2) $8 \div 3 = 2.66 +$ indivisible	(2) $9 \div 3 = 3$
(3) $8 \div 4 (= 2 \times 2) = 2$	(3) $9 \div 4 = 2.25$ (=9 side-wise added).
(4) $8 \div 5 = 1.6$	(4) $9 \div 5 = 1.8$ (=9 side-wise added).
(5) $8 \div 6 (= 3 \times 2) = 1.33 +$ indivisible.	(5) $9 \div 6 = 1.5$
(6) $8 \div 7 = 1.14285$ $714 +$ indivisible.	(6) $9 \div 7 = 1.285714 +$ indivisible.
(7) $8 \div 8 = 1$	(7) $9 \div 8 = 1.125$ (=9 side-wise added).
(8) $8 \div 9 (= 3 \times 3) = .88 +$ indivisible.	(8) $9 \div 9 = 1$

There are four indivisibles out of eight divisions, the three (2), (5) and (8), because of 3, and (6), and four divisibles.

There is *only one* indivisible out of 8; 7 divisibles of (B) against 4 of (A); out of divisibles, (1), (3), (4) and (7), giving the quotients which, when the digits sidewise added and by casting out the nines, will become  $9=0$ .

When we add all the digits, the sum becomes 45, which is numerically just a half of 9, and which being summed sideway and by casting out 9, becomes 0. Thus,  $1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9=45=9=0$ . In every way, 9, the king of the digits, has proven itself to be the perfecting number, the governor of numerical scales;—9 gives the board the meaning that the surface covered by  $9 \times 9$ , thereby 9 dissolvable into three, represents an abstract room scientifically reduced out of an immense space interlaced with force and time. (See Chessonym, p. 46-9.) This, together with the *Tengoma* or *Mochingoma* and *Naru* Promotion Method (5, p. 86; 4, p. 187) has given Japanese Chess the highest position in Chessdom. (See the *Tree of Chessologics* bet. pp. 14-15; s. 8-8b, pp. 17-9; for rectangular sections and board, s. 7 below.)

7. In placing the board before two persons there is no need to specify directions, unless it is a little rectangular and not perfectly square; and the rectangular board with correspond-



ing small rectangular sections seems to be natural and artistic (Diags., pp. 60-65; s. 1, p.68), and is perfectly, though accidentally and independently, in unison with the plan of Mericator's map, and the board coincides with a general view of spaces included by the latitudes and longitudes of both terrestrial and celestial globes, whereupon the north and south of the equator display the elongated and somewhat rectangular forms of the spaces within the lines on the surface. And the board is to be placed between two persons at the shortest sides as one sees northward on a fine geographical map and the other, southward. (ss. 5-6a, pp. 212-3.)

7a. There are two sets of the pieces, *Koma*, each with its appropriate name, an algebraical sign or character or letter, so to speak, *nom de guerre*, of each twenty, of eight kinds and seven sizes, called "men" in ours, and placed in three rows, and with various powers or values according to their ranks. These sets of pieces with the titular dignitaries or nominal appellations, all convertible terms (ss. 9-6 pp. 47-9), as before fully mentioned and called *Koma* in Japanese, denoting a seaman or a soldier, a pawn, a company, a torpedo boat, a battalion, a brigade, a torpedo flotilla, etc., and any craft, singly or in groups, or *en masse*, according to the mental capacity of the player, so to speak, each piece representing a conveyance or train for the player's *alter ego*, in fact, are arranged opposite each other, except two—*Hisha* and *Kak*, which see (the Diags. I, II and III, pp. 60-65)—and attack, defend and capture like hostile navies or armies, as in our chess only with technical differences. These pieces have no distinction of black and white so that a great convenience is observed as the friendly and adverse pieces are shown, when put on the board, by the opposite directions of letters or characters marked on them as it will be seen soon; and there is also no alternate distinction, because of the chessological abstraction needing severe simplicity, of white and black on checkered board as on our Occidental board. The chessboard is, therefore, very easily made in every possible way by the players themselves, and the chess pieces made on the spot, whenever and wheresoever they would like to play and are serviceable to the greatest extent, as far as the principle is concerned. One can very easily make a chessboard and pieces, *Koma*, out of paper or wood or anything

just suitable for a practical purpose, because just to guide the directions of movements of the *Koma*, as there is mentally no need to have the lines at all, and because mere names or signs to be put on the pieces which have no necessity of being shaped or carved into standing statuette-like fashions.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1	香車	桂馬	銀將	金將	王將	金將	銀將	桂馬	香車
2		飛車						角行	
3	歩兵	歩兵	歩兵	歩兵	歩兵	歩兵	歩兵	歩兵	歩兵
4									
5									
6									
7	歩兵	歩兵	歩兵	歩兵	歩兵	歩兵	歩兵	歩兵	歩兵
8		角行						飛車	
9	香車	桂馬	銀將	金將	王將	金將	銀將	桂馬	香車

DIAGRAM I ; See the Reverse.

The Diagrams I, II and III pp. 60-65, will best display and explain the name and position of each *Koma* piece at the commencement of the game. (ss.4-5, p.202-3; Prob.pp.215-229)

7aa. It would be very interesting and instructive for students to conceive of the esoteric meaning out of Japanese Chess force-

pieces, *Koma*, or MIND-FORCE pieces. They are the most synthetic productions out of an abstraction of the highest kind. They are not concrete representations of mere human individual forces as we see in the Occidental 'chessmen,' the statuette-like carvings, the fruits of primitive conceptions




DIAGRAM I ; BACK. See the Obverse and ss. 4-2, pp. 187-190.

of human bodily elements of mere savage war—like melancholy and gloomy playthings of children living in the neighborhood of graveyard—tombstones. On the other hand, the circular flat disks are the remnants of primitive contrivances,

natural as they are, as in checkers, and Chinese and Korean chess. But, in order to have produced Japanese Chessological Mind-Force pieces, *Koma*, there has been required the highest conception of artistic, scientific and philosophical principles. Without this rigid conception, Japanese Chess force-pieces could

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

	<b>SHV</b> <b>SHV</b>	<b>MA</b> <b>MA</b>	<b>SHO</b> <b>Gin</b>	<b>SHO</b> <b>Kin</b>	<b>SHO</b> <b>O</b>	<b>SHO</b> <b>Kin</b>	<b>SHO</b> <b>Gin</b>	<b>MA</b> <b>MA</b>	<b>SHV</b> <b>SHV</b>
1	<b>KYŌ</b> <b>KEI</b>	<b>KEI</b> <b>SHV</b>	<b>Gin</b> <b>SHV</b>	<b>Kin</b> <b>SHV</b>	<b>O</b> <b>SHV</b>	<b>Kin</b> <b>SHV</b>	<b>Gin</b> <b>SHV</b>	<b>KEI</b> <b>KO</b>	<b>KYŌ</b> <b>KAR</b>
2		<b>SHV</b> <b>HI</b>						<b>KO</b> <b>KAR</b>	
3	<b>HYŌ</b> <b>FU</b>	<b>HYŌ</b> <b>FU</b>	<b>HYŌ</b> <b>FU</b>	<b>HYŌ</b> <b>FU</b>	<b>HYŌ</b> <b>FU</b>	<b>HYŌ</b> <b>FU</b>	<b>HYŌ</b> <b>FU</b>	<b>HYŌ</b> <b>FU</b>	<b>HYŌ</b> <b>FU</b>
4									
5									
6									
7	<b>FU</b> <b>HYŌ</b>	<b>FU</b> <b>HYŌ</b>	<b>FU</b> <b>HYŌ</b>	<b>FU</b> <b>HYŌ</b>	<b>FU</b> <b>HYŌ</b>	<b>FU</b> <b>HYŌ</b>	<b>FU</b> <b>HYŌ</b>	<b>FU</b> <b>HYŌ</b>	<b>FU</b> <b>HYŌ</b>
8		<b>KAK</b> <b>KŌ</b>						<b>HI</b> <b>SHA</b>	
9	<b>KYŌ</b> <b>SHA</b>	<b>KEI</b> <b>MA</b>	<b>Gin</b> <b>SHŌ</b>	<b>Kin</b> <b>SHŌ</b>	<b>O</b> <b>SHŌ</b>	<b>Kin</b> <b>SHŌ</b>	<b>Gin</b> <b>SHŌ</b>	<b>KEI</b> <b>MA</b>	<b>KYŌ</b> <b>SHA</b>

DIAGRAM II FRONT. The transdiagram, Transliteration and Transcripts of the Diagram I Front. See the Reverse.

not be produced, while all the others now in existence are not at all fitted to the sacred mission of the highest Science-Philosophy (see s. 8 pp. 17-9, 40, 111). Each Japanese piece peculiarly

cut and not easily to be described at a glance and like a wedge-shape, as seen in Fig. A, p. 66, is to be construed as to mean a Mathematical Symbol standing for a force in a space—Physico-Trigonometrical contrivance to convey the knowledge of a part of space containing force. The thinner part, so to




DIAGRAM II. BACK. See the Obverse and Diagram I. Back and also *Naru* Promotion ; ss. 4-2, p. 187-190.

speak, vertex, is to be so directed toward the adversary that the pieces are construed so as to be driven in or forced into adamantine rocks of resistance in struggles (s. 9, p. 42). These inductive reasonings are plainly seen as in Fig. A, which show

the generally similar form or dimension for all denominations of pieces only with very little gradual differences in their sizes, shapes and sides of polygonal figures indicating apparent (exoteric) value of force-pieces, *Koma*; thus the similarity

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




DIAGRAM IIIa, showing the abbreviations or initials of literal translations of the names on the front of Japanese Chess pieces. See Diagram III, E, H, K, L, or P standing for one and the same highest dignitary or Chief: E, for an emperor; H, a head or Chief; K, king; L, a leader; P, president.

of form, isomorphism, with gradual changes in sizes having produced artistic aspect keeping imaginary approximate value of the force-pieces. They are decidedly and purely mathematical figure of blocks without directly touching the misleading



	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1	General Gold. *E. Opposite, Same as	General Gold. *D. Opposite, Same as	General Gold. *G. Opposite, Same as	General Gold. *G. Opposite, Same as
2		Flying Squadron of Charioteers, Cannoniers, Warships, etc. See the other side, the same. *King, Dracon.		
3	Gold General. *g. Opposite, Same as	Gold General. *g. Opposite, Same as	General Gold. *g. Opposite, Same as	Gen. Gold. *g. Opposite, Same as
4		Step, the	Promotion	Step, the
5				
6				
7	i Foot Soldiers, Scouting Torpedo Ships, etc. *Gen. Gold signed g.	l A Corps of Fighters on foot; a Fleet of Scout- ing Ships, etc. *Gen. Gold signed g.	l A Corps of Foot Soldiers, a Company of Fighters, etc. *Gold General signed g.	l A Corps of Scouts, a Company of Privates, etc. (Promoted becomes Gen. Gold.) g.
8		Captain General Diagonalis, Flying or Flank- ing Squadrons of Sharpshooters, etc. (When promoted, Dracon-Hippos.)		
9	NA Flowers of Charioteers, Cannoniers, Naval Squadron, Artillery Corps. (When promoted becomes Gold General.) g.	C Cavalry Corps, Dragoons, Horsemen, (When turned and promoted becomes Gen. Gold.) G.	S General Silver. (When promoted and turned back, becomes General Gold.) G.	G General Gold, standing for the Flowers of Fighters; an Army Corps of the most hardened Veterans.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)



	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1	General Gold. *G. Opposite. Same as	Gold General *G. Opposite. Same as	General Gold. *D. Opposite. Same as	General Gold. *E. Opposite. Same as
2			<b>D</b> Captain General etc. *Viceroy Generalissimo Dracón-Híppos. See other side. same.	
3	General Gold. *g. Opposite. Same as	Gen. Gold. *g. Opposite. Same as	Gen. Gold. *g. Opposite. Same as	General Gold. *g. Opposite. Same as
4	L i n e			
5	B o u n d a r y			
6	C a m p			
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\*N.P. standing for "When *noru* promoted and turned over, it becomes."

III.

eres on the pieces on the Diagram I. the front. (See Sec. 5, p. 70—Sec. 4, on *Naru*, Diag. III. b, and see ss. 4-2, pp. 187-190.



outfits (tiara, hood, crowns, etc.,) of human corporal element—blood and flesh and other concrete things. The cuneiform force-pieces called *Koma*, *Mind-Force*, mathematically signify the typical and primary shapes of solid pieces hewn out of




DIAGRAM IIIb, Showing the abbreviations or initials of literal translation of the names on back of Japanese Chess pieces. See ss. 42, *Naru Promotion*, pp. 187-190. Notice and remember that except **D** and **f** there are four styles of **G** only.

sphere with their vertex at its centre and the base on the surface. These force-pieces, as if they were synopses of mathematics, consisting of both parallel and inclined lines, a series of squares, rhombs, parallelograms, triangles and rhomboid,

prismoid, pyramid, hence acute, right and obtuse angles, consequently conveying any mathematical idea possible in angularity, plane and solidity, thus keeping all the primary factors of Science of Form, Morphology—these force-pieces display beautifully, practically and artistically, in the severest representation or symbol of primary theorems,




FIG. A. (s. 7aa, pp. 60-66.)

*a* showing a large piece as if it were seen from the bottom; *b* as seen from the top; *c* from bottom to top obliquely; *d* from top to bottom obliquely; *e* and *f* representing two Commanders-in-chief, see s. 2a, p. 69; *j*, *k* and *l*, Infantry corps pieces; *g*, General Gold size; *i*, Cavalry size; *h*, Artillery or Navy piece size.

every possible figure of the highest mathematical abstraction, therewith are used as indexes strongly impressive ideo-pictographic Chinese characters, the Chinese poetic figures, not abbreviated but entire (see Diag. I front, pp. 60-1). They have been the profoundest chessologists and not mere chess players who have adopted these highest conceptions of Mathematics, Physics, Philosophy and Poetry for chessworks.

7b. For facilitation of chessological propaganda, chess-pieces, as other chess matters, should be severely abstract, when this Science-Philosophy has the highest position in knowledge. The tombstone-like pieces with figure-heads, kings' and queens' crowns, bishops' tiaras, horseheads, movable castles and posts are detrimental in way of rightly comprehending the grand principle of Chess upon the part of students except the deeply thinking chessplayers and chessologists, especially in the United States where no king nor queen nor bishops have anything

to do with warfares, so that the symbols for concrete corporality are sometimes to be done away with and would be changed to suit the local usages as in the case of a war-game. But the mathematical principle applied can never change on account of Chess going to different nations or climes. Therefore, since Chessology is the highest in knowledge, Chess Proper should keep the symbols of the highest conceptions of elements of struggles in order to give students facilitation in making acquaintance with chessological virtue and technicality. It is quite worthy for students to remember that on account of the *Mochingoma* and *Naru* Promotion Method which are fully seen very soon and other devices, Japanese Chess occupies in the kingdom of chessological amusements a much larger dominion of pleasurable benefits than that part in which the Occidental chess, checkers, cards and a war-game put together give us enjoyment (see pp. 7-11; s. 7, p. 73).

8. To facilitate the understanding of the principles covering both branches of Chessdom, it would be necessary often to state the comparative methods with diagrams of both of them. In Europe and America, chess-playing is not very old, only beginning as yet. The readers might, the writer hopes, study this Oriental branch of Chess as the earliest ardent beginners of the Occidental chess players did at first in Europe. In order to be a chessologist, one should learn *both branches*, just as to be a Mathematician, one should study all the divisions of the Science of Calculation.

9. *Notation*: the necessity for some method of recording the moves and games of Chess has been recognized from a very early period. It is to be regretted in both branches of *Chessdom* that no universal notation with perfect scientific convenience has been adapted; as it is, the systems in vogue in Europe are all more or less dependent upon the language of the nation using them. In the Occidental side the modern systems of the notation are separable into two ways with essential differences; the one adapted by English and Latin speaking countries (France, Italy and others) has reference to the pieces, though cumbrous yet more descriptive and intelligible, and the other adopted by Germany and northern Europe has reference mainly to the board, and is more concise, exact and simpler than the former. And both could have been satisfactorily unified.

1. In the Japanese notation they have put only numerical figures, as it is easily supposed in the Diagram, thereby the numbers from 1 to 9 diverges from the right top corner to the left and down, though very simple, but not simple enough to save our energy of sight, as it makes a little confusion. In this work the *writer's own method*, called probably the *Scientific Method*, is to be used for the greatest convenience sake because of his eagerness rapidly to distribute the knowledge of the *true SCIENCE and ART of WAR or really STRUGGLE* within a shorter period of time than otherwise. A number preceding an inclosed or signed digital number, as 1 (1), 8 (1), etc., will surely *economize mental or sight energy* more than any other way. Why to begin from the left lateral number-figures is because of the method precisely in conformity with the clock-wise habits of civilized reading and writing. Thus, the locations are very easily found out, as we are accustomed to see geographical maps, especially as in the case of Mericator's maps. (See 6a, 7, p. 56-58).

2. The dash (—) signifies "goes to"; × or ; , "takes or capture"; ch. or +, "check (*Ôté*)"; ‡ , "checkmate (*Tsumi*)"; and n., or p., "promotion *naru*"; ○, "put on or re-employ a *Mochingoma*"; M, or T, "*Mochingoma, or Tengoma.*" See *Mondai*, pp. 215-129. For illustration of recording and practicing, the top of the Diagram representing a *Shōngi-ban*, a chessboard, is considered as an enemy's side.

1—3 by (1)—(9), twenty-seven squares of one side and 7—9 by (1)—(9), another set of twenty-seven squares are considered as the original camp fields; and the two lines between 3 and 4, and 6 and 7, the original boundary or friendly or *Naru* (Promotion) lines. The central square is sometimes popularly known as *Miyako*, the Capital, and the four corner squares, closets. Continually checking to checkmate or fix the Chief (king, or emperor or any head) on the Capital square, or on one of the four corner squares, the former is popularly expressed as *Miyako zeme*, or fixing a sovereign or commander in the Capital, and the latter, *Setsuin zeme*, fixing him in a closet. There is another checkmate to fix a chief on the original square which he has or had occupied at first, *Izuwari zume*, fixing him while idly sitting on his own home square. (s. 6, 8 p. 117-8; s. 3, p. 140). These fancy ceaseless checkmatings are

done by the stronger player to show his skill of the game in a mode of jokes, and are very useful for practices on the part of the most skillful players by their constant choice of the best and most beautiful possible movements fitted to their idealistic and artistic manly decency. (See ss. 3-4, p. 41; Arts. 18-19, s. 6, p. 203.)

2a. 王 and 王 of  $\bar{O}$ -, and *Gyok- $\bar{O}$ -*, *Shō*, literally, General King, *nom de guerre*, designate and distinguish a chief (king or leader) and another, respectively, the first one known as  $\bar{O}$  being supposed as a legitimate royal being, a royalist, a loyalist and the other, the second, known as *Gyok- $\bar{O}$* , an usurper, a traitor, an intriguer or a pretender; but according to the doctrine of chessologically governmental principle, there should always fairly be assumed a good cause or reason or provocation on the part of the second as in the case of the American or French or an apparent Russian revolution (see s. 8-9, p. 17-9; ss. 3-4, p. 41), and as it is said that "chess was invented for the purpose of quenching the human warlike thirst by transferring the spirit of bloody struggles into the quiet idealistic competitive amusements."—*Danzō*. The stronger or skillful player ought naturally to have the former, the weaker, the latter; or the beaten one, the second, and the victor, the first. In the Japanese problems (which see pp. 115-123), the supposed enemy's Chief is always assigned with the second character, *Gyok- $\bar{O}$*  王. *Shō* given above means Commander or Chief. (s. 5, p. 208.)

2b. The distinction has been made out of an ancient Chinese political notion, the theory of a universal empire, *Uni-Imperialism*, that there is none everywhere under heaven and even at the end of the earth that is not the only one king's subject nor land: *Fu Ten-no Shita,  $\bar{O}$  To-ni arazaru nashi*; *Sottō-no Hin,  $\bar{O}$  Shin-ni arazaru nashi*, (the Japanese pronunciation). The second character, as far as its nature is concerned, is extraordinarily beautiful, as it means precious stone or jewel. The assumption of distinction has been suggested by the conspicuous difference between the two figures—a dot.

3. Japanese Chess pretty well shows how the Japanese have generally trained their mental capacities for Mathematics, warfares and business. The old as well as the young play Chess whenever they have a time and opportunity; they are, by

virtue of their Chess, drilling their heads all the time, and they seem to be born statesmen, tacticians, strategists or diplomatists.

3a. Now, the student cannot but clearly understand by the foregoing and following statements that just as combinations of the branches of pure Mathematics—Arithmetic, or the science of number, Geometry, or the science of quantity (in extension), and Algebra, or the science of operations—have given rise to Trigonometry and Analytical Geometry, so Japanese Chess, well comparable in parallel with the latter two and Calculus, is worthy to be regarded as having absorbed the tributes of the best part of each chessological branch, and also philosophies and sciences, and perfectly established Chessology (s. 8, p. 17; *Tree of Chessologies* bet. pp. 14-15).

4. Turning now to the elements of the game, the accompanying Diagrams I, II and III represent the chessboards, and it will be perceived that they respectively consist of eighty-one squares. In the Diagram I, the chesspieces, *Shōngi-no Koma* (s. 5, p. 54), with their corresponding names, are arranged as they should be at the commencement of a war on the chessboard. In the Diagram II, there are shown the transcripts or pronunciations of the names, while the Diagrams above and III show by numbers and letters the denominations of the squares as to have been already explained, and the Diagram III gives the literal translations or skeleton meanings of names expressed in Chinese characters or figures on the pieces *Koma* on the Diagram I, and the transcripts in the Diagram II. The Diagrams IIIa and b, which see, show the abbreviations, etc.

5. The vertical rows of squares are called *Taté* (lengthwise or warps); those which run right-angled with the *Taté*, *Yoko* (crosswise, or woofs), and those running obliquely, "*Sujikai*" or "*Nanamé*" (diagonals). Each party has twenty pieces or there are in all, forty, with seven different sizes on a battlefield or campaign on the chessboard (see *Koma*, the Diagrams, pp. 60-65), and for analysis, abbreviations are used for convenience sake in the present work, as shown after each name there. Those twenty pieces are:—(See Chessonymy, ss. 9-3, p. 47-8.)

(1) 1 An emperor or a king (王將 one assumed as the real



sovereign and the other 玉將, a pretender, a traitor, a reformer or revolutionist, or the like). (See s. 2a, p. 69). The signs are **E**, **K**, **L**, **P** and **H**. (s. 2a, p. 69 ; s. 7, p. 72.)

(2) 2 Generals Gold, abbreviated as **G**, and known as *Kin-Shō*, 金將 (*Kin*, gold and *Shō*, Commander, admiral or general).

(3) 2 Generals Silver (Lieutenant-, Major-, or Brigadier-Generals), abbreviated as **S**, and addressed as *Gin-Shō* 銀將 (*Gin*, Silver and *Shō*, admiral or Commander or general).

(4) 2 Groups or dragoons of Cavalry, or cavalry scouts, abbreviated as **C** and designated as *Keima* 桂馬 (*Kei*, literally the Oleafragrans, that is, picked and *Ma*, horse), maybe the vanguard, with an independent body of Cavalry, making a forced march, or the best cavalry, or 'submersible' (under water) torpedo-boat destroyer scouts.

(5) 2 Charioteer or artillery corps, or patrolling cruisers, or scout fleet, or navy named *Kyōsha* 香車 (*Kyō*, literally fragrant hence, chosen and "*Sha*," war-car or-ship [of the deserts]) the corps of the best marksmen in gunnery, abbreviated as **NA** or **X** or **N** and placed on the squares of the end rows or woofs of the board, and maybe the second or assistant plenipotentiary.

(6) 9 Infantries, abbreviated as **i** and known as *Fuhyō*, 歩兵 sometimes simply *Fu*, 歩 or often *Hyō* 兵 (sailors or pawns) on the third in front of, or from, the end rank or king's row; and there are the

(7) 2 Highest warlike (apparently) dignitaries, except Chief, one called *Kakukō* 角行 (literally, corner-goer) and the other, *Hi-Sha* 飛車 (literally, flying war-cars, and esoterically, war-ships, too) respectively recognized, maybe, as Captain-General and Field Marshal—the former may be designated Grand Duke Diagonalis, abbreviated as **D**, when promoted *Ryūma* 龍馬 (literally, dragon-horse, hence *Dracohippus*) signed as **D**; and the latter, Prince Flying Warcarship or Navyartillery, abbreviated as **F**, when promoted, becoming *Ryūō* 龍王 *King Dracon* signed **f**—the former being put in front of the left cavalry corps, *Keima*, in the rear of the Infantry next the left end file, "*Taté*," and the latter, on the opposite corresponding square at the right of each side. Captain-General Grand Duke Diagonalis may be understood as commanding an army of selected sharpshooters on horseback, or the best cavalry

or the wisest diplomatist ; and Field-Marshal, Prince Dracon, named Flying Warcarship, a large flying army or squadron of artillery or warships, or maybe the Chief Plenipotentiary or Special Ambassador. (s. 7, p. 72.)

6. In cases where there is no distinction implied as already mentioned elsewhere, the word 'piece' or *Koma* is to be understood to include *piece* and *pawn*, that is to say, any piece or pieces many times expressed as forces. Try not to use the term "men" in Japanese Chess, for it might mislead the students to understand the true meaning. (s. 6, p. 49; s. 6, p. 56.) Some persons from lack of vivid imagination and abstract knowledge may think it as only one individual or a small group of men. Any pieces should not be construed so narrowly as literally to mean only an individual piece or *man* as commonly known and spoken of by novice in the Occidental game, while meaning it in a broader sense among the thoughtful experts; and the Japanese never mention it by a '*man*' or '*men*' but by *Koma* (s. 5, p. 54) with the proper names, which way is apt to convey to the minds of even tyro or novice the conception of adjustability of volumes of pieces to any sizes of groups of things or persons or soldiers according to their state of mind. An only exception seems superficially and narrowly to be the emperor or king piece which stands apparently alone, but which even, when both theoretically and practically analyzed, represents by connotation a Chief surrounded by his ministers of state, courtiers, civil advisers, headquarters general staff and others. Therefore, according to the imagination, a degree of speculative power and mental capacity (*Kokoro-no Koma*, s. 5, p. 54) of a player, only one piece connotes a great deal else far more than a piece designated by a mere nomenclature. (See Chessonyms, ss. 9-3 p. 47-8.)

7. Thus a king or an emperor means in *Chessology* any *head* or *chief* of a group of men or a community; as a Potentate of a state, a President of a republic, Emperor or King, a Manager or President of a business firm, a Dictator or a Protector of a country, and any official *de facto*, together with his whole staff, a Council of War, Executive Officers, the Board of Directors, Advisers, Ministers of the Departments of his Government, Privy Council, and so forth. General Gold named as such may mean an admiral or a general and a council of war, together

with, and commanding, a brigadier, or a regiment, or a division, or an army of National, or Imperial Body Guards; Prince Flying Warcarship (*Hi-Sha*), an admiral and a council together with, and leading, a fleet or the whole navy, or it may mean a Field Marshal together with, and commanding, an army of the best selected sharpshooters in gunnery or a commander-in-chief of army and navy in one locality; Diagonalis (*Kakkō*), a squadron or fleet of the most powerful and swiftest warships, scouts, or a fleet of submarine or 'submersible' (under-water) torpedo boats of mosquito-hornet type. All the pieces are thus connotatives or Chessonyms. The larger the business or navy or army to be represented the smaller should be a unit.

7a. "*Chessological King* means a symbol for even any or every thing or a desired end to be invented or discovered or fixed or checkmated."—*Kazan*. (s. 3, p. 36: s. 5, p. 76.) "And other chessological dignitaries and pieces stand for tools or machines or any idea or anything else for the purpose to accomplish or reach a desired end."—*Kazan*.

8. All pieces except a chief (emperor or king) and only three with one other, General Gold, arriving at a promotion square or entering the enemy's original campground becomes a Gold General, or Gold (*Kin*) as simply addressed or mentioned. (pp. 60-9, 187-9.) The belt of squares 4-6 by (1)-(9) across the centre of the board between the original camp grounds of both players is considered as the Middle Ground, and in arranging the two hostile adversaries at the commencement, the Middle Ground should be left unoccupied. An emperor or king is placed on the middle square of the last rank of each side, and by the king's both sides are placed Generals Gold and Silver, Cavalry and Navyartillery in order toward each end of the Potentates' or Sovereigns' *Yoko* (rank).

9. The Movements—Development, Mobilization, Manœuvre and Operation—and powers or values of chess-pieces, *Koma Forces*, along with the peculiar terms used in Chess, may be briefly described in the following pages: The distances on chessboard are not arbitrary, but are founded upon proper calculations for disposition according to the mental capacity of an individual player, by whose idea the distances may be considered to be liable to change for causes and to suit the

circumstances, conditions and conveniences. (s. 6a, p. 56.) In order to have exactly applied Chess for the services in war, it is very important, necessary and interesting, too, to know, even upon the part of beginners, that what is termed "The Arms" of the service in war is Artillery, Infantry and Cavalry, which constitute the main and combatant part of every army or its line. Artillery prepares the victory, Infantry achieves or accomplishes it, and Cavalry finishes and completes it and obtains its fruits, while Artillery as an arm is mainly defensive, Infantry both defensive and offensive, and Cavalry, offensive. These are perfectly and beautifully displayed in Chess, especially in Japanese Chess, decidedly hundred times or *ad infinitum* more than in any other chess or branches of *Chessologics* (see *Tree*).

9a. And we should remember that the navy, sea power, as a vital part of the equipment of a great modern decent nation is duly respected and honored in the domain of Japanese Chess. In fact, Navy (sea forces) and Army (land forces) are the *Two Wings of War* in virtue of the most blessed nations. Naval or maritime and military forces for justifiable and legitimate self-defense are the two essential warfare factors to keep an enlightened decency on the part of the modern civilized nations. Let us now consider how the sea powers or forces at present stand, and why they are respected in Chess. Naval experts in the United States use Russia as a warning for a decent first-rate nation, and point to the Russian plight as argument for several battleships. A beaten nation without a strong navy and with almost hopeless outlook before her is for an argument to reorganize the American navy. There may be authorized the largest battleships ultimately to cost \$8,000,000 each, as the President and his expert assistants hope. The total cost of maintaining the navy, when all of the ships shall have been completed, will be approximately \$80,000,000 a year, which economical experts do not think as extravagant for a wealthy nation like America, in comparison with England, France and Germany.

1. All experts of the American navy opine that there are needed more new fighting ships of first-rate caliber to maintain the symmetrical and effective increase of the navy. The naval department wants the congress authorization of six new torpedo boats, six destroyers, five scout cruisers, two squadron colliers,

a gunboat, two river gunboats and a steam launch for use in Chinese rivers in addition to the battleships, the urgency feature. (See p. 136-7.)

2. The President, the greatest international statesman, the agent of civilization and the *King of humanity* and all of the naval experts are more insistent upon the battleships, as the backbone of the navy than ever before. The Far Eastern war has demonstrated beyond peradventure that the value of battleships could not be overestimated. So greatly impressed the American naval thinkers are as to use Captain Klado, a Russian officer's gloomy views about Russia's future, as an argument for the augmentation of the United States navy to great size and efficiency, to the end that it may never happen that the country finds itself in such a predicament as unhappy Russia is at present. (See ss. 1, 2, 3, p. 177-8.) And all the Americans would be perfectly delighted to establish the largest possible naval institutions in the world in spite of the national tradition against the maintenance of a large standing army. France has a great program for reorganization of her navy for which she will expend \$200,000,000 at the rate of \$20,000,000 annually, despite objections of socialists. England though already far above the other nations in this respect is strengthening her sea power in incessant advance. Such is the condition of *One Wing of War*, sea force, an essential factor of international struggles, and a very important arm in Chessology. These sea forces are, however, not at all duly realized, not at all considered and honored in what is so-called a war-game, which has been originally suggested by Chess and made concrete by an army man from his standpoint who could see only a part, a military essence, in chessological game. (See ss. 2-3, p. 28-9; 3a-4, p. 32-3.) Chess which we have inherited as a legacy of humanity from the ancient sages of at least 5,000 years ago has kept every essential factor in warfares and struggles of any kind. And Japanese Chess has perfectly expressed the chessological principles and technicality by symbolizing the naval forces and their requisites as just as the other factors of all struggles in the Universe.

3. The pieces, *Koma*, are to be moved to, according to certain rules, settled or established or fortified on, a square, vacant or captured, over unoccupied squares, except the Cav-

alry or Submersible Torpedo Fleet *Koma*, the knight, which is alone free from this latter restriction, which see presently (s. 2, p. 89, *Keima*). A piece is thus said to *occupy* a square when it stands upon it on the game board. A piece is said to be *threatened* by another, when the former may be taken by an adversary or hostile one. A piece covered by a friendly one is said to be *protected*;—this protection necessarily giving the covered piece immunity from capture while it may not be taken without the risk of retaliation. A piece covers or commands only such squares as come under its power;—hence, the *expressions*, range, protection, or cover of a friendly supporting body and to overlap and envelope an enemy's flank by which the players would be profitted to a great extent. A piece—an army corps or its part—will be found generally to show its own front, *flank* and *rear* by its position, and the disposition of the adjacent pieces. The forces should be supported each other or they must be within range of easy protection. The *Koma* pieces representing navies or armies or their parts should not be necessarily scattered out over or across the entire board, and must support their flanks in fear of being turned; they may achieve the desired end (s. 7a, p. 73) by a recognized arrangement or method always in conformity with some of the various modes secured from struggles in general or observations or experiences in war, or suggested by the study of naval and military sciences or common sense. (s. 3, p. 26; s. 2, p. 28; s. 8, p. 130; s. 9, p. 204.)

4 Now returning to the subject of the pieces in detail, we will here begin from about the Chief in game.

5. The emperor or king—Head, Leader or Czar, Kaiser or Chief or President or Sultan or the like (one and the other the writer designates as such simply to break the monotony of the game, leaving the reality untouched at all)—that is the most important *Koma-piece* on the board, as the game entirely depends upon his safety, moves only one square at a time in any direction—forward, backward, laterally or diagonally—except when into check. (s. 3, p. 36; s. 7, p. 72.)

6. Captain-General, Grand Duke Diagonalis—maybe, Diagonal-Goer—moves toward any distance along the diagonals whether backward or forward, thereby being no limit to his range, except when his progress is stopped by any *Koma* sup-

ported or protected or re-enforced by another, and also, when *naru* or *kaeru* (promoted), besides holding his original full power, he proceeds onto any one of squares next round himself that is the first square along the file and rank on which he is situated, and, when promoted, he assumes the title of Viceroy Dracohippus, *Ryūma* (*Ryū*, dragon and *Ma*, horse). Of Promotion, *Naru*, or *Kaeru*, see Diags. I and II, both back, pp. 60-3; s.4,-2, p. 187-190. Before *Naru*, Diagonalis corresponds to the diagonal duty of Queen, that is, Bishop. When promoted *naru*, assuming the new name, he has the movements correspond-




FIG. 1a.




FIG. 1b.

The Arrow shows which way to move.

ing to the diagonal motion of Queen or Bishop and also four, but only once at a time, first square movements of Castle; thus illustrated by Fig. 1, a and b.

7. Field Marshal Prince Navyartillery or Flying Warcar-ship, *Hi-Sha* (literally, flying war-car; originally, car or ship), moves in any straight direction to any distance along lengthwise and crosswise of the squares, (rank and file), that is, forward, backward or later-

erally but not diagonally, thereby his range being unlimited like his colleague Diagonalis' motions, except that his advance is resisted by any *Koma* piece sup-




FIG. 2a.




FIG. 2b.

ported, protected or re-enforced by another and he proceeds, when promoted, *naru* or *kaeru*, onto any one of four corner

squares nearest round himself, keeping his previous full force, that is to say, the first squares of Diagonals. When promoted, he is to assume the title of King Dracon—maybe, Dracon Deva—*Ryū-Ō* (*Ryū*, dragon and *Ō*, king). Before promoted *naru*, Prince *Navyartillery* corresponds to the cross straight line duty of Queen, that is, that of Castle, or Rook. When *naru* promoted, the four first square movements of Bishop are added, only once at a time.

8. The above is illustrated thus—as Fig. 2, a and b.

9. General Gold (*Kin-Shō*; *Kin*, gold and *Shō*, general or admiral), a commander of National, or Imperial Body Guards, moves once at a time onto any one square next around the section on which it stands except the two lower corners or diagonal squares backward; and on the part of Gen. Gold there is at all no *Naru*, *Kaeru*, or Promotion. [The arrow root shows the way and position where it should stop.]




FIG. 3.

1. General Silver (*Gin-Shō*, *Gin*, Silver, and *Shō*, admiral or general) commander of, probably, a fleet of cruisers, a division or a regiment, possibly, of National, or Imperial Body Guards, moves once at a time onto any one square next and around its own already occupying square except on its two sides or lateral and one straight down back squares, as illustrated by Fig. 4a, and when *naru*, or *kaeru* (promoted) if the owner wishes to have it do so pending on his tactics or at his options, it moves




FIG. 4a.




FIG. 4b.

The Arrow root shows the way of the original movements, and positions to stop. and acts in exactly the same capacity as Gen. Gold, thereby no difference in every respect, as illustrated by Fig. 3 and 4 a and b. See *Naru*, or *Kaeru* (Promotion) pp. 187-190.



2. *Keima* (literally, speedy horse—see s. 5(4), p. 70: s. 3, p. 75) explained as Cavalry or Dragoons, maybe Submersible Torpedo Fleet, surely meaning a commander, together with a corps—




FIG. 5a.

may be a regiment or a division or any—of soldiers on horseback, as no cavalry can work without a chief, has a peculiar mode of moving which it is not easy to describe at all. This cavalry *Koma* piece is an ex-




FIG. 5b.

traordinarily useful and important one and when employed appropriately, is decidedly effective; it acts particularly by its shock, and is the only *Koma* which can venture to work almost desperately raiding around an opponent's flanks with impunity if not prevented by adequate counter manœuvres. It proves essentially a harassar. Its range is not unlimited like that of the *Koma* piece just noticed, but is, in a peculiar way, restricted in operations, and is not, in some way, subjected largely to the restrictions placed upon the *Koma*. It has a very eccentric move, marching over two squares diagonally. To state very




FIG. 5c.

minutely, it moves one square left<sup>6</sup> or right<sup>1</sup> on one row, *Yo-ko* (rank or woof)<sup>8</sup> or<sup>2</sup> and then two<sup>4</sup> or<sup>3</sup> squares forwardly on the row at





FIG. 5d. See Fig. 7, p. 89.

right angles to the first, or, in other words, two squares and then one right or left in two forward directions, or again in other expression, moves from one corner of any rectangle of three squares by two to the opposite corner in two forward directions right or left, or in a different wording, it moves describing the diagonal of a parallelogram of three squares by two left

or right in two forward directions, without a least reference whatever to interposing *Koma* as shown by Figs. 5a, b and c.

3. Thus, *Keima*, Cavalry, or Cavalry Scouts, or Torpedo-boat Destroyer Scouts, with the greatest speed may vault or can jump over any intermediate *Koma* pieces of any order, whether adverse or friendly; it is the only *Koma* which possesses this privilege to move over an intervening *Koma*; and when *naru* or *kaeru* (promoted) if the owner wishes to let it be so within a limitation as by Fig. 5d, it acts as Gen. Gold as shown by Fig. 3. See *Naru* or *Kaeru* (Promotion).

4. *Kyōsha* (*Kyō*, literally, fragrant or aromatic, *Sha*, lit., a vehicle; hence the selected charioteers; originally, ship [of the



(1) to (9)

FIG. 6.

deserts] or war car)—a squadron or a division, of artillery or a fleet, of warships—marches in only one forward direction to any distance along the *Tatē* (file) on which it stands, its range being unlimited unless stubbornly resisted by a *Koma* piece supported or protected or re-enforced by another until the last end square, where it is restricted and when it advances onto this end section, it should positively *naru* (be promoted) because if not *naru*, it can not be moved at all for future pur-

pose on account of its becoming stone-dead contrary to the principle of Chessology, though it needs not be promoted (*naru*), if the owner pleases it be so, on the other squares included in 2—3 by (1)—(9) or 7—8 by (1)—(9) within the *Naru* line of the adversary's original camp ground or territory as shown by Fig. 6; and when it *naru* (is promoted), it acts as a *Kin-Shō*, Gen. Gold. See *Naru*, Promotion; Diags. I and II, both back, p. 60-65; s. 4-2, pp. 187-190.

5. *Fuhyō*, commonly contracted and very well recognized simply as *Fu* or *Hyō*, sailors, footmen or soldiers, the pawns—the Infantry *Koma* pieces meaning sometimes maybe a division or a company or a squadron or a brigade or a torpedo flotilla—moves only one square ahead on the *Tatē* (files), and when *naru* (promoted) at the option of the owner, act as *Kin-Shō*, Gen. Gold; and when they are unpromoted at the owner's will and as such, arrive on the last (end) square of the files on which they stand, they must positively *naru* (be promoted) however despite the owner's order of any kind, for if not promoted, they can not be treated in any other way, except by being captured by the enemy or becoming positively inactive and unmovable in contradiction to the chessological principle, that is, actually dead or committing suicide. See *Naru* (Promotion), Diags. I and II, back, p. 60-5; s. 4, p. 187-9.

6. Technical Terms.—The following is an alphabetical list of the chessological terms exhaustively gathered and also the terms both the Western and the Far Eastern in general use being given here for practical purposes for facilitating of propaganda and the chessologic treatise. Especial attention is needed for the perfect digestion of the principles of *Mochingoma* and *Naru*, *Kaeru*, Promotion Method.

6a. *Akiōté* (Discovered check or check by discovery). See *Ōté*.  
*Akitōshi*, *Sukitōshi*, *Tsukitōshi*, which see, the same as *Open file*.

*Blindfold chess*, or *chess sans voir*. See *Mekakushi Shōngi* or *Mekura shōbu*.

Capture (*Ikedoru* or *Toriko-ni suru*, which see).

Check.—See *Ōté*.

Checkmate (see *Tsumi* or *Tsumu*, *Tsunda* and also *Ōté*).

*Chess sans voir*, or blindfold chess. See *Mekakushi Shōngi* or *Mekura shōbu*.

Debut—(See *Uchidashi*).

Discovered Check—(See *Ōtē*).

Dominion, Territory—(See *Ryōbun*).

Double Check—(See *Ōtē*).

*En Passant*.—There is no need to consider about *en passant* in Japanese Chess.

*En prise* (see *Hitoridachi* or *Ippondachi*).

*Futeishiki*, an Irregular Opening.—(See *Uchidashi*.)

*Gambit*.—An opening of the game in which one player, at the beginning voluntarily sacrifices part of his force—often an Infantry *Koma*, a pawn, but even a very important one—for the purpose of taking up an attacking position with the pieces or for the sake of an ultimate advantage. “Gambit” is a word derived from the Italian *gambetto*, a tripping up of the heels.

*Go-men*, *Shitsurei*, or *Shikkei* which see.

*Hasami-Shōngi* (*Hasami*, lit., to put, place [and take] between two other pieces, or things, as in cutting with scissors and *Shōngi*, chess), a Checkers. See *Tobi-Shōngi*.

*Hasami-uchi* (*uchi*, lit., to beat, strike or attack). An attack on each flank or front and rear at the same time. See *Hasami* of *Hasami-Shōngi* above. *Tobi-Shōngi* which see.

*Hikkurikaeru*, or *Kaeru*.—See *Naru*.

*Hishatē*, an opening.—See *Uchidashi*.

*Hishatē Ōtē*.  
*Hishatori Ōtē*. } See *Ōtē*.

*Hitoridachi*, or *Ippondachi* (*En prise*). A *Koma* piece is said to be *Hitoridachi*, or *Ippondachi* when it is in a position to be assaulted and captured by an opposing *Koma*, and is not properly protected nor fortified.

7. *Ikedoru*, *Toriko-ni suru*, or *Toru* (capturing). The *Koma*, chesspieces, being placed, the players begin the engagement by moving alternately; each planning to gain a numerical superiority by capturing his opponent's *Koma*, as well as such advantages of position as may conduce to victory. Capturing, taking, imprisoning, killing, wounding or annihilation is always shown and performed by lifting the captured *Koma* piece from the game board and placing the captor on its square; in other words, a *Koma* is carried away by removing it from the board and letting the capturing *Koma* piece occupy the position of

the captured; in short, capturing is effected by the *Koma* pieces having occupied the square of the *Koma* taken, the latter being then removed from the board. In taking, each piece except Cavalry, *Keima* (speedy horses), moves some one of its ordinary moves, while the Cavalry alone can take an enemy's *Koma* by jumping with full speed over the intervening *Koma* or unoccupied space. An emperor or a king, Captain-General, Field Marshal, Generals Gold or Silver, Artillery or Navy and Infantry *Koma* may capture any foe *Koma*, which stands anywhere within their respective ranges, and the Cavalry or Cavalry scouts can capture the adverse *Koma* which stands upon one of the two squares to which they can leap. The Chief or emperor cannot capture any piece which is protected or supported by another piece. See *Tottenaru*, "take and change," under Promotion (s. 7, p. 187-8; s. 5, p. 195). The object of the game is to fix, but not to capture, though it practically amounts to the same result, a chief or an emperor or a king of the opposing party. This is effected by an attack so planned that it is impossible, either by moving the opposing emperor or king or by interposing another piece, to prevent him from being taken on the next move; that is, by placing the opposing chief or king in an "*Ôté*" (literally, king's hand or turn), a check from which he cannot escape.

7a. The term "*capture*" in Chess means in the highest sense *transposition or conversion*."—*Kazan*. (Digest *Mochingoma*, pp. 86-186.)

8. Although the chief, emperor or king, can never be captured, according to the chessological technicality, but when any piece, *Koma* of troupes, attacks him, he is said to be "in *Ôté* (king's turn or hand)" and the fact of his being so attacked may or may not be, according to circumstances, announced by the attacking player, saying "*Ôté*," a check. (See s. 3, p. 89, under *Te-ni-wa*.)

9. For, sometimes among the very skillful players as there being no need of announcement of his emperor's being in an "*Ôté*, a check," because he should take care of his own affairs, and consequently, maybe no remark about the situation, there are some who need to be trained in their actions, so that if the player whose emperor is in *Ôté* does not realize that his chief is in check, and tries to do something which has nothing

whatever to do with his own Head, and even attacks his antagonist, the adverse party might, as a sort of joke, in order to break the monotony of a dull entertainment, take up and treat for a moment the emperor as an ordinary soldier *Koma*, so as to give the other a caution that he should be more attentive and mindful of his own business, and then return the emperor on his own square camp palace when the owner is conscious of his absent mindedness. (See laws of chess, s. 6 p. 198; Arts. 18-19, p. 203.)

Whenever the emperor is in this situation the imperial king must move from the place, palace or square he occupies or be screened from the check by the interposition of some one of his own subjects, *Koma*, or *Mochingoma*, a captured piece (s. 5, p.86) or the attacking *Koma* must be captured.

1. If, however, the royal emperor, being thus in check, *Ōtē*, and if there is, either in hands or on the board, no *Koma* piece which can be interposed, and the checking *Koma* cannot be taken; that is to say, when there is no means of rescuing the king from check, or if he can not escape capture by his opponent's next move, it is then said to be "*Tsunda* (cornered and fixed)," whereupon the game terminating, the player whose king has been thus "*Tsunda*," checkmated, is the undisputed loser. The position of the emperor, when in check, being the same as that of any other piece when exposed to be captured, with the only difference that the imperial Chief cannot be taken, the infantry soldier *Fu-hyō* even gives him a check or checkmates him in the same way that he captures; but either out of a sort of respect toward imperial dignity from a standpoint of military etiquette or to treat a foe Sovereign with the highest possible honor, or to make the finishing touch beautiful without mean, greedy cruelty, it might be, as many Japanese feel ashamed to play dirty hands, better not to checkmate him with a mere soldier *Koma*, though there is no popular nor strict limitation against it, except at the risk of possibly being considered as playing a mean and sarcastic trick lacking decency on the part of the stronger player. (See s. 2, p. 166; Arts. 18-19, p. 203.)

2. One emperor can not give check to the other Chief, king, nor can an emperor be moved into check; that is, the two Potentates can, of course, never meet, as they would be

in check to each other. The game therefore always stops one move short of the actual (though practically) capture of the sovereign of one party.

Irregular Opening, *Futeishiki*.—See *Uchidashi*.

"*J'adoube*."—See *Shikkei*; and sec. 7, p. 198.

*Kaeru*, change, a contraction of *Torikaeru* (exchange), which see.

*Kaeru*, *Kayaru*, *Hikkuri kaeru*, or *Naru* which see.

*Kakuté*.—See *Uchidashi*.

*Kakuté Ōté*,  
*Kakutori Ōté*, } See *Ōté*.

*Kurai*.—See *Value of Koma*.

3. *Machigoma* (*Machi*, waiting and *ngoma*, *Koma*). When a *Koma* on the board is moved to another square or a *Koma* out of the hand—a captured one—(see *Mochigoma* pp. 86-186) is put on the board apparently with no direct importance in a way to give an emperor an "*Ōté*" or checkmate, except idly waiting for an enemy's Chief, possibly or maybe, coming out just toward the place while there are other or no ways, the *Koma* is said to be a *Machigoma*, conveying the meaning that the player is trying to take an advantage of an opportunity meanly to move or place the *Koma* for some future operation in a coward and unsoldier-like manner and in too much careful or cautious way against an opponent chief, while there might be or when is surely some other better, more direct and beautiful hand than this tedious waiting—indolent, indirect, passive—action. An authoritative expert in Japan refrains from playing any ordinary hand against an adversary's Head or his opponent himself, without bringing out some direct and active, fine and beautiful combinations of the powers of the *Koma*. (s. 1, p. 84; s. 2, p. 166.)

4. There is no restriction against playing "*Machigoma*," but when the players advance, they will take a much more direct effective course as Chessology commands them. *Machigoma* is generally considered cowardly because of lack of beautiful idealistic movements on the part of a player's piece, either in a direct attack or offensive or some other plans.

*Maté*.—See *Checkmate*.

*Matta* } signifies "wait." See pp. 198-200. *Matta* is equivalent to "hold on," or "wait"; *Matté*, equivalent to "please wait," or "please hold on."

4a. *Mekakushi Shōngi* or *Mekura Shōbu* (*Blindfold Chess* or *Chess san voir*).—The game mentally played without sight of board or *Koma* pieces. This almost mysterious and inexplicable feat seems not to be altogether one of memory, as is generally supposed, but it is rather the result of a special faculty not necessarily corresponding with that for ordinary chess.

In this chessplaying there is needed construction of the game in such a way that the player can meet the moves of his opponent and corner the *Koma* chesspieces into various intricate complexities from which in order to obtain a victory are evolved hidden arrangements and cryptic combinations superior to those of his antagonist; and he causes the latter to follow the same movements that reproductions of the opponents are made as foundation on which the player invents his dovetailed works for his own desirous building to be established. The paramount is his own ideal composition, apparently paradoxical and chimerical to others, and not the movements on the part of enemy. The blindfold chessplayer is a designer and the other contestant, a supplier of labor and what not, the former wants. He helps himself to play the game. When a Chessologist delicately analyzes the facts relating to the Nippon-Russian war, he will surely be able to find Japan identified with a blindfold chessplayer and Russia with a victim.

5. *Mochigoma*, or *Mochigoma*, or *Tengoma* (*Te*, hand; *Koma*, chesspiece: *Mochi* keeping in hand or store; *ngoma*, *Koma*, Mind-piece). See and digest thoroughly the Definition and functions of *Chessology*, pp. 15-49. The *Tengoma*, or *Mochigoma* means the chesspiece, *Koma*, captured from an opponent's side, for either disablement or utilization or both in fact. This method or means aided by the *Naru* Promotion Method, the prominent distinction between Japanese and European Chess in Chessologies corresponds to what distinguishes Calculus from ordinary algebra. The *Mochingoma* are to be interpreted as somethings to have been captured either to disable the enemy's forces or to cut off the adversary's re-enforcements coming out with ample provisions, supplies and ammunitions, or for advantageous use in behalf.



and at the pleasure, of the victorious player—somethings which give the conqueror a power in an equivalent form of either a fleet, or a fort or a brigade, or a division, or ammunitions or provisions or captured war horses or the like. (s. 4, p. 90.) It is not necessarily to be considered that every *Koma* piece captured should surely be a merely individual representative of a single man or a group of troupes that ought to have been killed or wounded, either destined to die or be crippled so as not to appear again on a war theatre. (s. 1a, p. 95; s. 1, p. 168.)

6. There have been many instances in which even the prisoners in war or enemy's fortresses or supplies have been used solely for the conqueror's benefits either in the way of spies or active engagements against their former sovereignty (pp. 180-186). They were the greatest generals who could use their old enemies. Napoleon employed the conquered—Austrians, Spaniards, Italians and Germans. So was Alexander the Great! (See pp. 117-186.) There have been many commanders, admirals or generals or kings with their followers who surrendered themselves to their enemies and fought against their former sovereigns in behalf of their previous dreadful enemies.

7. In the Japan-Chinese war, the Chinese coolies were to the greatest extent employed by the Japanese victors for the transportation of provisions, supplies and ammunition, and the Chinese merchants and farmers too contributed their parts accrued from obligations of their being conquered (p. 102); and at the highest tide of the Japan-Russian war, the former could and did employ the latter prisoners to work for the Japanese, whether government or private, so that the results should have been beneficial to the general economy of the situations. The Japanese used the captured Russian transports, and they mended and used the sunken Russian warships and floated off Chemulpo, Korea. Why, if the things are not to be used for the enemies themselves, did the Russians destroy their warships, fortresses, arsenals, railway stations, docks and many other things before the "Yellow Monky's" invasion of Manchurian territory, which itself had to be used against the previous occupants? (See pp. 180-6.)

8. When we understand that the *Koma* should have conno-

tations of powers to be inter-exchangeable, in the largest possible way, with their equivalents of energy in proportion with, and according to, the capacity of mental activity on the part of a player, there is nothing chimerical in paradoxical transformations of the *Koma* pieces manipulated in the hands of a conquering or capturing party. Every *Koma* piece in its secondary meaning has much wider scope than an ordinary player would give it the power or value, and in fact, all of the names of the pieces, *Koma*, should include secondary meaning expressed in *Chessonymous Symbolic Figures*. (See pp. 15-49.) With the pieces of such esoterically elastic capacity there can without doubt be no difficulty experienced in representing the various navies and armies, and business affairs, either ancient or modern, in any of their phases of formations. While uncultured primitive or ordinary men looking up at the starry skies think that they see a vast—only vast—number of gleaming and twinkling spots of light studded over the blue dome of the firmament, stars are to a Herschel the grand system of the universe incessantly whirling through space with incomprehensible velocity, yet never varying by a pin point from their predestinated careers; a mere falling apple is to a Newton an inspiration of universal gravitation to keep all the heavenly bodies in order; a Franklin flying a kite captures and employs the ordinarily inconceivable and formidable lightning electricity for the human faithful servants. (See 3-3a, p. 36.)

9. So if a study of Chessology be properly kept up, it can not but help to prove to be immense importance to advanced players or beginners too, and exert the most direct and the keenest influence upon the adequate solution of the great tactical and strategical problems and the general as well as concrete movements of the currents of the world's affairs of the present day. (s. 3-3a, p. 36.)

1. It therefore follows that according to purely technical limitations of the Japanese chessological principle, the captured *Koma* pieces, *Tengoma* or *Mochingoma*, except three *Koma* pieces—*Kyōsha* (Artillery corps or a fleet of warships), *Keima* (Cavalry), and *Fu* or *Hyō* (Infantry corps)—may be used again anywhere upon unoccupied sections, to the best advantageous manner, on the warfield of the board, by, and

at the pleasure of, the party who had taken, killed or captured or made them prisoners, that is to say, converted them into another equivalents, the different modes of the *Mind-Force* itself. (s. 1a, p. 95.)

2. The three captured *Koma* pieces above mentioned as the exceptions can not positively again be put on the squares from which they can not next move on: *Fu* and *Kyōsha* can not be put on the last row, or end *Yoko*, rank, and *Keima*, or simply *Kei*, not on the last and second rows, *Yoko*, of the adversary's side, as illustrated by Fig. 7. See *Promotion Naru*.




FIG. 7.

(A) in Fig. 7 shows the last row of the squares where a captured *Kyō*, or *Fuhyō*, *Fu* or *Hyō*, a *Tengoma* or *Mochingoma*, can not again be put on. When a *Kyōsha* or a *Fuhyō* goes on a square there, it should positively *naru*. (See *Nifu* and *Suitori*, or *Nameru* pp. 186-193.)

(B) in Fig. 7 shows the two rows of the squares where

the captured *Keima*, Cavalry (Horse), can not be again put on; and if it goes there either from a previous position where it was re-put or otherwise—then surely on the end row—it should positively “*naru*.” In other words, the captured Cavalry *Keima* piece can not be re-employed on the squares included in 1—2 or 8—6 by (1)—(9) of the adversary's side, lest it is *naru* and because actually dead as it can not move unless it be promoted “*naru*” and consequently it should “*kaeru*” be promoted. See p. 79 Fig. 5d. When it moves from a square, on which the captured Cavalry piece had been re-employed, onto one of the squares above mentioned, it should be positively “*naru*” or promoted, even against the will of the owner, for if it does not “*naru*,” it is dead there only to become either a stumbling block in the way of the master's own operations or an entirely inactive simpleton or a mere food of the enemy, in contradiction to the chessological principle.

3. It is usual among players to try to know the plans that

the opponent has in his mind by asking him what captured *Koma* he has in his hand, the phrase being "*Te-ni-wa*," "*O-Te-ni-wa*," or "*Te-ni*." (*Te*, hand and *O*, honorific prefix; meaning "in your Honor's hand," a contraction of "What captured *Koma* are in your possession?") But, better not ask, because an ordinary player can easily be posted in the matter so as to know what and how many pieces the other party has. Yet the *Mochingoma* should be as carefully concealed as possible not to show the real facts of affairs to the antagonist, because it is the enemy's business to find them as in real warfares. The *impenetrable secrecy* of the movements of the *Koma* pieces and that of motives upon the part of chessplayers are extraordinarily necessary any and every wise. *Diplomacy* in CHESSDOM as that in the greatest business or international struggle-game not alone consists of *silence*, the *gold*, and *secrecy*, the *diamond*, as well as, in addition, creates them and also instructs the actors or players how to use them in order to make themselves wise. The Applied Abstraction of tactics and strategy of diplomacy of the highest kind is a plan of a fertile chessplayer's brain. The Japanese diplomacy is as flexible as their military tactics each nursed and hardened on the severe drill ground of the highest Chessdom. With this means pertaining to a part of the *Mochingoma*, chessplayers in general should elevate themselves much higher than they are now and must not condescend as low as at present in communities of knowledge, but they should convert themselves into *Chessologists*, the students of HIGHER CHESSOLOGICS. It is noteworthy and instructive to know how the Eastern Chessologic little islanders have gotten out of the bottom of modern international whirlpool of struggles, without saying much of their previous abilities to have preserved themselves never conquered in the eyes of the History of the World. They out and out show their chessological flexibility in every action just as that in the *Mochingoma*; and to keep that elasticity in this department of the *Mochingoma*, *silver*—"to talk"—should be entirely out of its circulation in Chessdom, but let the phrase, *keep gold*, be the motto for the nation of Chess. Beware of war correspondents or bystanders as well as spies! (See *Ôtô* and s. 7, p. 82; s. 1, Art. 8, p. 201; s. 7, p. 203.)

4. This part of Chess needs to be clearly digested and thor-

oughly understood for it is utterly new for the readers who are accustomed to hear of, or play, only the Western branch of Chessdom. The meaning of the captured *Koma*, the Mind-Force piece, carries a very wide, or in fact, unbounded range of thoughts, founded upon deep knowledge of human affairs which are to be dealt with by the light of scientific and philosophical as well as speculative analyses. For the sake of letting the chess pleasure seekers be thoroughly digested within a small room of statements, let us assume "*Mochingoma* (*Koma* in or on hand)," the captured pieces, represent the things or articles or men captured from the enemy, that is, the supplies, ammunition, provisions, rifles or cannon, gold or silver either in money, or in kind, rivers or heights, a fortress or a village, a stronghold or a seashore for drying fishermen's nets, or anything and everything else, including, literally even prisoners to be at a disposal of the victorious party, as easily seen in the great Alexanderian or Napoleonic war, Thirty Years War, or especially any wars coming out of alliances, or a great international diplomatic game. (ss. 8-2, p. 118; ss. 2-4, p. 123-4.) The Japanese Cavalry consisting of small men on their native ponies spoken of as "*monkeys on horses*" suddenly and frequently attacked the world-wide famous invincible Cossacks in overwhelming *mêlée* and annihilated or forced the latter to retire in utter route capturing their finest horses for their own use. The Japanese raised almost all of the Russian sunken first class battleships and other war crafts and repair them for their own benefits (s. 8, p. 163; s. 6, p. 183) while they were still warring. The famous white horse (*Kobuki*) which the Russian iron general Stoessel, Commander at Port Arthur, loved as the finest pet and dearest friend, carried the Japanese general around on his back with his former saddle at Mukden and other Manchurian battle localities (s. 1, p. 168). The horse and his saddle are working in co-operation as the *captured live chesspieces Koma*. Thus it is with the significance of the *Mochingoma* at first understanding. See Conversion, s. 7a, p. 83.

5. Now then an independent army, or a division, or a *corps dé reserve* comes in! And they are symbolized and represented by the *Mochingoma*. There are scouting cruisers and torpedo boats and destroyers, and also decoys and traps. There are, utterly independent of the main fighting forces, Extraordinary

Auxiliary Reserve Corps of group of skilful soldiers or sharpshooters (*Yūgeki Tai*, *Yū-hei*, *Yū-tai*) under the most able commander who at his will in any time would help to the greatest advantage any part, in touch with enemy, of friendly side whenever he sees fit to act as he could penetrate into situations on war-field; and besides, there are newly purchased and manufactured warlike *materiels*. They are not yet represented in so-called war-game, in fact, military chess, nor Occidental nor any other chess except Japanese Chessological Formula. To overcome those material advantages and disadvantages for and against each other belligerents, the *Tengoma*, or *Mochingoma* together with *Naru* Promotion Method has been successfully installed and express them in Chessological Figures, to serve in development of the chessological *Calculus* formula. Messenger pigeons, "rat skin ear-muffles," the *Kairo* (Japanese pocket stoves) and others, which are not ordinarily thought of and which are not positively shown and are impossible to be conceived in *Kriegspiel*, because of too concrete affair, in as much as they become either decided allies, or bitter enemies, and they are positively to be conceived and recognized in Chess and they are symbolized beautifully by the captured pieces, *Mochingoma*. (sec. 9-3 p. 47-8; pp. 38-49.)

5a. The observance by all powers of strict Neutrality cleverly so-called in international diplomatic term can be wisely kept up in favor of both belligerents or others and themselves as far as politically disinterested governments of nations representing a certain mass of people are concerned; but the will or self-interested sympathy and a mere interest of some people in affairs can not be morally or commercially prevented from contributing certain help to the warring parties, best exemplified by the actions on the part of American citizens and British subjects and French and German people in Japan-Russian War (s. 3, p. 32; s. 4, p. 112; s. 4-6 p. 137; s. 7, p. 169; s. 12, p. 170). And neutrality itself favors often one or other of fighting nations. And even a national government depending on an alliance with another on one hand observes a strict neutrality in warfares concerning the latter and a third nation—esoterically against the third!—on the other hand, whilst a fourth explicitly preserving a neutrality secretly puts an alliance into practice in the interest of the third (*e. g.* Japan-Russian

War most delicately in complication with French, English and German governments' attitudes). Such will, self-interest and sympathy are sometimes far more detrimental to one or other combatant than the open aids; these non-calculated and unforeseen contingencies are, abstractly by means of Chessological Figures (s.9-3, p. 47-8) and esoterically, interpreted in chessological formula depending upon the *Tengoma* or *Mochingoma*, according to the chessplayers' mental calibre. But, a war-game, really military chess, can not at all represent them simply because of a concrete proposition too material to conceive of a higher idea.

6. Then, again, even an enemy's internal troubles—dissatisfaction, or ignorance on the part of the people or a family, a riot, a rebel, a traitor or an assassin or mutiny or humiliating passivity or no will-power—have often espoused the cause of the friendly side (ss. 1-2, p. 117; s. 7, p. 131; ss. 1-3, p. 177-8); and the abstract *Mochingoma* represent them! Thus any physical and intellectual and speculative elements and some new resources including reservists, unexpected volunteers whether from inside or outside and, even international or personal sympathies, the captured "eggs and onions," and so forth, every wise detrimental to the enemy and, consequently, conceivable profitably upon the friendly part, are figuratively expressed in Chessonymic Symbols by the *Mochingoma*. They, if treated in concrete way other than the most flexible abstract symbolic *Mochingoma*—which has raised Chess to a position of the severest, most abstract, most figuratively flexible and consequently the highest of all sciences, philosophies and speculations—would cover an immense field of ground on which a game might be played, and which is *too realistic to be played* for the highest and most intellectual amusement by any and every body, and which is not *highly idealistic*, hence not *artistic*, and consequently not enough to absorb highly intellectual pursuits and struggles. So even the most stubborn resistance upon the part of enemy can be utilized as a *Mochingoma* most beneficially by and for the friendly side, thus espousing the latter, as the resistance—obstacle—on the part of water, railroad surface and so forth lets ship, locomotive and others respectively proceed smoothly with great rapidity. (s. 8b, p. 19; s. 3, p. 112; s. 7, p. 120; s. 8, p. 142.)

7. In physics, we know the Conservation of Energy, thereof light, heat, magnetism, electricity or motion or force is only a mode equivalent to, and the same of, each and every other and is treated as such by scientific experts who have been the bright gainers in that line of struggles of investigations of the unknown facts and of discoveries and inventions. That "Time is Money," Work is Money, therefore Time is Work, Distance (space or locality) is Work, Space is Money, and so forth in Chessologic-Logical Figures, is absolutely true in the eyes of Mathematics and all kinds of Economy, and those terms are transposable to each and every other to attain a desired end. Therefore, the principle of Economy has taught us that "*All the Exchangeable Commodities have Marketable Value*" of which the reverse—All the things with Marketable Value are Exchangeable—is true, and in question of its economical application to a small or large detail, no sane one doubts, and the persons who are versed in the practice and theory of this line are the gainers in this dominion of struggles to bestow wealth upon an individual or any community or a nation and the world.

8. Power, force, energy (potential or kinetic) and motion—a power being that which initiates or terminates, accelerates or retards, motion in one piece; that which produces or destroys, increases or lessens, motion in anything—whatsoever cognizable by man—and taking into consideration an action and reaction, opposite and equal, and inter-relationships of material and mental energy—they are the attributes of the *Conservation of Energy* and consequently the *Indestructibility of Power* infallibly treated in Physics, Science of *Forces* (Dynamics) and Philosophy. So it is with the *Chessological Koma MIND-FORCE* pieces: any piece once put on the game board or taken off it means constantly or permanently some form or other of action or reaction, whether Kinetic or Potential, and through a vast number of intermediate stages, keeps its indestructible energy, an exponent of the player's mental capacity; and after combinations, re-combinations and permutations and re-permutations, the same one piece works its own perpetual office of either arithmetical or geometrical or any other progression or rotation of the discharging of its usefulness not only once more beginning a similar cycle of changes but undergoing also



indefinite numbers of the passing phases of the changes.

9. Struggles produce fresh pictures of which the situations look quite similar, yet seldom if ever, exactly the same. The problems for the struggles in which a man is, plays or acts, are endless; the plans, purposes and the means being at one's own disposal in many ways, and various innumerable factors, combinations of causes and effects, bring onto the stage of struggles a kaleidoscopic view to be changed by a mere accident into inexplicable phenomenal phantasmagoria. Any and every phase or move of *Koma*, chess Mind-Force piece, means something apparently and concretely equivalent; yet analytically in abstract, it signifying something infinitely different according to the different finish of different brains, thereby countless synthetic operations are beautifully displayed by the *Mochingoma Method* on the game board of struggles.

1. We know "Knowledge (學) (s. 5-1 pp. 30-1; s. 4 p. 37) is Power" which the greatest and most ancient sages demonstrated and left for us: Knowledge has found for us the principles of Economy, Physics, and other Sciences and Philosophy. Now then this same knowledge tells us that, according to the principle of Chessology, the *Mochingoma*, the captured *Koma*, does not mean simply and literally only *men* captured which would make Chess, whether the Western or the Japanese, ludicrous and equal with "jumping a rope," or inferior to *ninepins*. (s. 6a, pp. 56-58; s. 6a, p. 213.)

1a. All the foregoing statements with no alternative show that the captured *Koma* chesspieces, the *Mochingoma*, thus represents in Chessological Figures or Symbols all those parts or modes concerning to human struggles of the whole existence which are governed by the Conservation of Energy and are equivalent to each and every other and are reducible to one and same factor keeping the attributes of all descriptions of what is explained by a long list of such abstract words as *elasticity*, *flexibility*, *indestructibility*, *modification*, *transformation*, *exchangeability*, *transferability*, *transfiguration*, *transposability*, *metamorphosis*, *interchangeability*, *convertibility*, *inter-exchangeability* and the like (ss. 6-2 pp. 183-6). All these chessologically lubricating terms are the keys to unlock the hidden treasures of the *Mochingoma* and had better be kept in the minds of players for understanding the *perfect view* of CHESS PROPER

(see the *Chessologic Tree* p. 14-5). The Occidental chess almost entirely lacks and does not fully conceive these delicate and expressive means to solve Scientific-Philosophical abstraction of the highest kind, hence stiff and extremely limited in the developments of the movements of pieces (s. 2, p. 50; s. 5a. p. 55-6), and consequently it *can not* vividly exhibit and also fully develop and freely improve the movements of navies and armies in real warfares (s. 4, p. 51-3). This Western chess, thus in consequence of non-contrivances and non-devices of the *Mochi-ngoma* together with *Naru Method*, except 'queening a pawn' and farcical 'castling a king,' could never brilliantly in abstraction express the struggles carried on by Alexander, Cæsar, Napoleon, Moltke and others, while Japanese Chess can not only do more than it can express but also creates and instructs styles of struggles. Therefore, what were beyond dreams ever dreamed by Napoleon and Moltke could never brightly be exposed on the Western game board, whereas the Far Eastern Chessological Art—*Chess Proper*—has instinctively instructed the Japanese, not only admirals and generals but also almost every one interested in struggles, how to do what Napoleon, Moltke and others could never perform, as clearly and astonishingly shown by strategy and tactics on the part of the true Orientals focused on Port Arthur, Liaoyang, Mukden, and the Korean Straits producing the facts almost chimerical from standpoint of modern European military science and overwhelmingly surprising the whole world and destined to revolutionize naval and military sciences theorized and practiced previously to the present war the greatest ever waged (Fig. 9, s. 7. p. 141; Figs. 10, pp. 181-4). These facts and reasoning decidedly explain why the Western Chessological branch could never tightly rule the minds of military men without saying of even business men and, moreover, even naval *personnels*, and why it has allowed a war-game to shoot out (ss. 9-2 p. 108) as a sucker on a large branch of *Chessological Tree*, and why it has permitted Checkers and playing cards so much time, while the Far Oriental branch has vigorously controlled the thinking principle of diplomatists, scientific men, personages of deep philosophic speculations, both naval and military men and others in every walk of life (see pp. 7-11; s. 6a, p. 82; 5a, p. 110).

2. Eponyms and Figures (which see pp. 15-49, and digest thoroughly) put this case in their jurisdictions. In the eyes of chessological principle, the MOCHINGOMA are *convertible* and *inter-exchangeable* because of their each and every other's being in some or other equivalent at the will of, and according to, the knowledge of the players of the game; in fact, they are the apparently temporary indices, yet INDESTRUCTIBLE EXPONENTS OF CONSERVATION OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWER upon the part of the players, according to whose mentality the *Mochingoma* powers would have been differently interpreted in regard to the uses of their functions. (s. 3, p. 26; s. 2, p. 28; s. 3, p. 75-76.)

3. The object here upon the part of Chessological student is to have a clear acquaintance with the developments, combinations, and permutations of force, space and time for which any amount of ideals or mental energy may be applied or substituted, for each influences the others and each force interpenetrates into the others as radiant energy, a grand working power, in a fashion of the sidereal sources, and modes of a solar energy, and molecular or ethereal activities through the Universe. Hence, *acquire knowledge* (s. 5, p. 55).

4. The reciprocal relations of the three primary essential elements, force, space and time, and mental actions upon them produce their corresponding effects in the affairs of struggles; and those effects and causes and *vice versa* are so innumerable that if the chess-pieces were intended to suit only one purpose as in the case of a war-game, *Kriegspiel*, the youngest branch of Chess (ss. 5-4, pp. 23-30), the pieces are not powerful enough for expressing and illustrating the highest conception, but, on the contrary, become too concrete and consequently only too inflexible, too stiff, to be able to meet with an especially complex plan which is so much to be developed in abstract details that the game can not otherwise represent and occupy a point of the mean effect of *maximum* and *minimum* influences—those of the greatest common divisors and least common multiples of numerical values of things and actions which come to play.

5. The quality and quantity of the force that things exercise upon each other in connection with space and time should be considered. The qualitative and quantitative values of relations are

differently conceivable, even in spite of their uncompromising rigidity, by different players, according to their respectively different amount and quality of mental storage of knowledge; for instance, as a result of the Applied Chessology, one, whenever he plays Chess, thinks of the grand actions upon the part of the world's greatest generals or diplomatists or reformers, while some might think of a local mob riot. The science of numbers associates the notion of space, force and time, the three primary elements of struggles or chess with numerical scale in chessological principle. The numbers—here represented by the numbers of squares and pieces and their movements (values or powers) and limits of time—which are the free creations of human Mind, act as a means of distinguishing concretely and sharply the differences of things; but although they are however sharply to fix things by their strict values, yet the same numbers with exactly the same acting powers are sometimes, nay! almost all the times, *to bring forth different results of different ways of their being differently used according to the different mental storages of knowledge*, for if every man is equal to the other in every respect, the value of the same number is bound to be conceived as the same in *power of its being used to the most available way*, but alas! no individuals are exactly equal in every respect, and therefore their values are differently and variedly appreciated and used accordingly. (s. 4-4a, p. 115.) This part is superbly performed by the *Mochingoma*.

5a. Not only the above is perfectly executed, but also—the most important it is!—the *Mochingoma Method*, the *Lord Sovereign CALCULUS of CHESS PROPER*, the *Calculus of CHESS-LOGICS*, symbolizes, or in fact, directs solutions of problems containing *unknown quantities* and *uncertain qualities* of future contingencies in all struggles conceivable by human *Mind*. (S. 5, p. 33; s. 5a. p. 92.)

6. This can be easily understood by any person with good sense, whereof there is not at all required a deep mathematical nor technical philosophic knowledge. The long series of simple inferences by the plain matter-of-fact analyses of the chains of ordinary chesspieces' movements and their ordinary combinations betray generally the natural laws of numerical values of the *Koma* pieces (force), space (distance represented by squares) and time (to move). The great character of the

*Mochingoma*, together with the *Naru* Promotion Method, (see s. 6, p. 76-s. 5, p. 81; 186-9,) is one that gives to Chessdom an elastic repetition of scales as those tones, Octavo, in Music and the scales in the Decimal, or Metrical System, containing ten each, but containing the highest single digital number NINE, the scales being registered lower and higher.

7. The statements heretofore given contain all the essential fundamental speculations and evidences for absolutely indispensable foundations of the *Mochingoma* Method, by which the greatest and most fruitful advancement in Chessdom has thus been produced to the highest idealistic finish.

8. In accordance with the writer's first purpose, because of this subject exposing the most positive and the greatest difference between the Western and the Far Eastern branches of the chessological game, he has thus minutely restricted himself to the consideration of the series of speculations and philosophical missions of the scientific *Mochingoma* in Japanese Chess, the most ingenious improvement, nay, invention ever achieved in the domain of Chess, positively having made it the most vivid representative in the smallest, yet, in a sense, the largest, scope of scale, of the severest and the highest abstract of all the sciences, and philosophies and speculations.

9. The writer seems to be the first that has investigated carefully, philosophically speculated and dared exhaustively to state the principle of the *Mochingoma*, because it is largely, amongst others, here that there is the grandest secret beauty of developments and combinations of phases of chess *Koma* pieces far superior to the Western chess.

1. The *Mochingoma* principle coupled with the *Naru Kaeru* Promotion Method (s. 6, p. 76-s. 5, p. 81; 186-9,) culminates without an alternative in the august proof of the combinations and permutations and re-combinations and re-permutations and *vice versa ad infinitum* of time, space and force with all the struggles for existences or supremacy in every line of human vital activities, which Chessology covers and governs.

2. An indication of the *Mochingoma* of certain relative strengths upon the part of both parties can be, easily in vague way, though with a perfect truth, explained by approximate figures;—thus, suppose on a war field, one party (A) with 500,000 is against the other (B) with 500,000 men, exactly

the same though never to exist in a real struggle or war but on an abstract chessboard. Now suppose if a part of A's were lost, say 2,000 were killed, then there remained 498,000 against the original 500,000, the others being equal; and while such a fractional part, a very small percentage,—only  $\frac{2}{500} \%$  (.004) of the whole troop of men, army—only four mills out of one dollar in comparison—might, however in a small degree, curtail one party, it would certainly add an advantage to the other;—or suppose that this only 2,000 ( $\frac{2}{500} \%$ ) might have been in possession of a very important strategic stronghold, however small in size, which, being captured, might have completely turned a chance, luck or risk, from one to the other, then this 2,000, though exactly same in figures as in the first case, would be very different in connotation of the powers or attributes accruing from situations (space and time).

3. The former, for the present purpose, may be taken as a unit—2,000 soldiers dead on a plain—even which would give the other a benefit; so that the latter 2,000 means a certain benefit plus the stronghold which the opponent once occupied and which might be used by the new possessors twice, thrice, ten or more times advantageously than the original occupants, as the natural strength of the ground has been proven sometimes and many times not to be completely available against the *united strength of men* especially with discipline and trained skill. (pp. 117-183.)

4. Gibraltar, Quebec, Sebastopol, and Port Arthur (and probably, Vladivostok also) have been proven most decidedly. The natural advantage and united human strength with trained skill should in theory go together to harvest a fortunate result, but such a case has been very rare as both parties have been otherwise than equal in every respect, in which case there would have existed no victory nor loss! This kind of events is beyond the dominion of arbitrary ruling and mere speculations and must always adapt itself to circumstances and conditions, for instances, such as seen in the Japan-Chinese and Japan-Russian war, the greatest ever witnessed in the World's History, with the most modern and most scientific, formidable and keenest appliances and mechanism, on both sides of the belligerent nations, so that many observers have been decidedly compelled to remark that the Japanese are born strategists

and tacticians, and besides, have a warlike union of peculiar quality. Then, at the least estimation for convenience sake, the invaluable stronghold to be used as an almost redundant vigor on the part of the captors represents originally and literally 2,000 men, for no fortress is available without garrisons or first-class defenders—and in this case all of the 2,000 are supposed to be already dead, thus not to work any more. (s. 8b, p. 105-8, a double knowledge and victory.)

5. Now very well then, scientific-philosophically, and esoterically, the *Koma* piece standing for 2,000 men can be safely, in the estimation of, and according to, the mental functions of the captors, used for a stronghold which would make the weakest and those who get a *poor start* as exemplified by the Chinese and Russians, however most powerful, especially at Port Arthur, driven by the force of circumstances and conditions, through struggles for competitions or existences, a battle field of life or death, compelled, now and then, to do anything the strongest wants or sometimes the weakest, the conquered, a beaten nation might be obliged, simply because of having lost a stronghold, to *subsist on crumbs* or *die*. (See pp. 126-8; s. 6, p. 143 and 177-186.)

6. The statements given above being only the direct abstraction, we have something else like a corollary: Those advantages which would accrue out of the capture are to be indicated by, say, from *zero*, (0), (though no such *zero* advantage when rightly handled by experts), which is at the least possible in any case, up to *ad infinitum* powers, since that same number might become a source of the causes of the utter defeat in warfare or may be more, according to the mental as well as physical powers of the enemy, when the whole nation might be swallowed up by the stronger on account of even such a small percentage of primary loss. It is then to be justifiable to say that it is quite correct and very conservative to confer in some form or other the *force*, which the defeated had lost, upon the captor in addition to what is kept without a loss,—this force being the smallest percentage compared with *ad infinitum* while it is comparatively the largest compared with *zero*, (0), so that this force to be given becomes a fair, perhaps too small, award for the captor—the percentage being exactly  $\frac{1}{250}$  per cent., considered only from point of number, yet which

might contain a majestically strategic point to turn the whole affairs upset. And even then, a mere numerical power has been proven many times not to be a criterion for a victory. There are many kinds of allies and foes, not only from the outside, but also inside, and the inside enemies have been proven more dreadful and formidable than the external opponents. These factors are clearly shown by the *Mochingoma*. (s. 8b, p. 105, a double victory.)

7. In Manchuria, every time the Russians had reverses and misfortunes, men and ammunitions lessened on account of the islanders' fine marksmen and sharpshooters; and while the number of the Russians stood almost the same all the time from the beginning of the campaign, the Japanese sent by virtue of their sea power a division after a division, men after men, into the field of battle. The guns and ammunitions captured which might not at all have been used by the invaders must have, without a least doubt, greatly reduced the fighting force of the other side. Think of a large amount of money conservatively estimated to have been \$25,000,000, besides large provisions and ammunitions captured by the "Yellow Monkeys," as the Russians had used to address their opponents. Can we ever idly think that the "Yellow Monkeys" would never at all use these captured articles? What kind of *traitors*, or *intrigues* for Russia? A little bit of chance, or an accident—a loss or a gain of very small percentage of the whole enormous forces—is destined to be turned into a powerful account. Simply because the Russians lost a chance at first or could not see their opponents' energy treated with, philosophically and scientifically, in reality, chessologically the enemy could be able to push the ponderous "Bear" back, whereupon Japan got a fishery concession and anything else she wanted from the Korean government, and could fish along and around the peninsular coasts for realization of enormous amounts of money, even while the war was going on, and also, the islanders have been able to catch otters and seals and whales along the islands off the coasts of the Eastern Russia without sea forces—meaning an equivalence of tens of millions of dollars, a good sum of money for fishermen, consequently, for Japan, in the time of war. (See p. 169.) Under the same category comes the Japanese work of salving the sunken Russian ships at Port Arthur and Chemulpo.



8. All of these advantages have sprung up out of a simple cause. In warfares, whether actual or suppositional, all of these matters should be represented in some form or other equivalences. From a strict standpoint of military tactics and strategy, some may assert their non-reliance upon any extra affairs not calculated before in their minds; yet in fact, when re-enforcements are needed, other causes which enforce these re-enforcements are needed to be considered. The capturing of a fortress might mean tens of millions of dollars to encourage the spirits of a nation, and consequently the spirit of the soldiers would be augmented as much, and therefore the spirit encouraged might mean twice or three times or more over the actual and original number of them in fighting capacity. These phenomena should not be put outside of deep considerations in an abstract manner. Actual warfares are somehow apparently different from what ordinary chess players could have understood by the movements of the chess *Koma* pieces on the board; for instance, both belligerent parties can never be equal even at the first of a campaign; the nature of the ground occupied by one party is very different from that possessed by the other; one party might be on islands and the other, far inland, and so on; their prime activities, that is to say, their mental attitudes may be sometimes entirely just opposite, etc. Yet, in the severest jurisdiction of chessological principle and technicality, those apparent differences are nothing of the kind that the common chess players would think to be; but on the contrary, they have been deeply considered and deliberately canceled as treated in mathematical equations, and neutralized without an alternative because of their being plainly concrete factors which can be translated vividly into *abstract language* of the highest kind founded upon the bright light of human all-powerful mind. (See s. 6, p. 43; ss. 2, 3, p. 108-109).

8a. Once more let the student here ponder over the abstract nature of the *Mochingoma* in application to concrete factors of struggle on account of the great importance in Chessology. Since captured, Port Arthur, Liaoyang, Mukden and other positions (s. 6, p. 183; s. 1, p. 186) were, in a Chessological Figurative sense, turned into dreadful enemies to Russia; that is, they bestowed tremendous advantages upon Japan, so to speak, the captures identical with the advantages accrued

therefrom, or the positions (locality) themselves, represent, and are equivalent to, the Japanese capability, Mind-Force, which secured them, or in other words, the transposition or transference into the adversary's side of friendly side's *materiel* force to be contrariwise employed at the disposal of the *personnels*, or in reality, Mind-Force of enemy. By means of the foregoing exhaustive statements, let the student clearly understand how the Japanese capability to have captured the positions occupied by their antagonists or the *positions* themselves can be chessologically convertible into another modes, the formidable foes to the former masters. As a numerical illustration is clearly advantageous for an explanation, the subject is here on purpose treated with only by means of indemnity in some form which might have been supposably yet possibly demanded, if peace asked, at different stages of an *Applied Chessological Art* of the greatest drama the world has witnessed. Russia could at first very easily settle the international matters with Japan previous to the break of their diplomatic negotiation, with nothing to have been lost upon the part of ever greedy Russia (s. 1a, p. 170). Next, right before the surrender of Port Arthur, Russian price of peace could be a nominal indemnity representing, that is, equivalent to, a convertible action on the part of always generous Japan, say about \$25,000,000. After its inevitable surrender, the indemnity standing for an equivalent to the transposable and interchangeable capacity of the *Mind-Force* of *personnel* of the victorious nation might have been a little more, say about \$50,000,000. After the defeat at Liaoyang, it might have been probably in the neighborhood of \$150,000,000; after Mukden defeat, \$500,000,000; after the loss of Tieling and before the greatest sea fight, \$800,000,000; and after the greatest naval defeat, \$1,500,000,000 or \$2,000,000,000, or practically more could be claimed; because of physical as well as mental guarantees, or converted assets (s. 4, p. 168-s. 1a, p. 170); and if there were no other decent nations besides Japan herself, and consequently nothing to be considered at all concerning the then international sentiments and her future modest purposes, Russia could be compelled to do anything her enemy would have desired to obtain as a reward for greedy mischiefs of over a hundred years, and even the whole Russia in Asia, besides

an enormous indemnity, might have been ceded to the Japanese victors, who hold all the trumps of the *Mochingoma*—then, no prestige any more, nor even an ice-bound port. Thus, a force or capability, whether *personnel* or *materiel*, of indestructibility and convertibility, estimated, when captured, in money, then known as an indemnity equivalent to the position, or the position itself in brief or in chessological term is transposable or transferable from one side to another (winner) simply according to capability of batteries of *Minds* which form both intellectual and physical attributes, the real *personnels*, indispensable to struggles (s. 8-8b, p. 17-9). Then, as stated elsewhere as to the principle of inter-relationship, inter-action and inter-reaction, indestructibility, convertibility and inter-exchangeability of *materiel* force in proportion to *personnel*, or strictly speaking, MIND-FORCE, the positions captured have been turned into treacherous enemies against the former occupants, and they have, moreover, served since then, as loyal friends to the former enemies (ss. 6, p. 183; s. 2, p. 186). Therefore, *materiel* advantages captured and reducible to an equivalent to the real essential power of *personnel*, *Mind-Force*—here Port Arthur, Mukden and others—must be seriously considered and duly treated in Chess as CHESSOLOGY dictates; and Japanese Chess permeated with the activity of *Evolution* reveals phenomenally and divinely wise treatment of the captures of this kind. All these factors are splendidly and abstractly symbolized by the *Mochingoma*, assisted by *Naru Promotion Method*. These phases of factors of struggles can never be fully exercised by the Occidental chess characterized as it is by *involution*, whereby the number of symbols of real units or chesspieces becoming unavoidably and constantly less and less on the board, the larger units the less number of pieces represents, which is mathematic-logically and inconveniently, too, an absurdity itself and also next an impossibility in this age of EVOLUTION.

8b. It has been elsewhere mentioned that ignorance (whence, riots, rebels, mutiny, jealousy, envy, and the like, when warring with another) on the part of friendly side espouses the cause of the opponents (s. 4, p. 79). Knowledge takes advantage of the other's ignorance, so to speak, the former captures the latter; in other words, ignorance on the part of one is converted

into usefulness or turned into account in favor of the other; or the less the education or the more ignorance on the part of one side, the more the advantage belongs to the other. For an example, the ignorant Russian soldiers attacked the Japanese who were shooting from behind a pile of things, and the latter run away. When the Russians captured the things, they found the pile of books or literatures written in the Russian tongue. When they found the useful information for themselves, they begun to think and communicate their ideas and views about their enemies and themselves as well, and they came to realize the fact that they were on the wrong side. Or the prisoners having been educated even for a short length of time and kindly treated by their enemy were returned to their own side unconditionally or otherwise, and they told their friends what their enemies were and how they themselves were wrong in being instigated by their selfish superiors. At each occurrence of this kind, there was loosened or chessologically broken a tie made by ignorance, or absence of knowledge. This is mentioned in order to show convertibility, or a transposable function by illustration of a chessological factor, the others being equal in every respect. Suppose, thus,

Russia + ignorance (= — knowledge) = (or *vs.*) Japan + knowledge (= — ignorance).

But since the Japanese utilized the other's ignorance, we have by transposition

$R = J + 2 \text{ knowledge} (= - 2 \text{ ignorance}).$

Now, because ignorance can never overcome knowledge, the original

$R = J + 2 \text{ knowledge} (= - 2 \text{ ignorance}),$  or

$R = J + 2 (\text{knowledge} [= - \text{ignorance}])$

shows roughly, yet paradoxically, that the Russian ignorance produces a double effect, namely, espousing the opposite cause by making twofold effective the Japanese knowledge, or absence of ignorance. Then, the Japanese having turned the enemy's ignorance into their own utility, the assumed equation, though true enough for chessologic convenience, is more than absurdity itself when we consider large odds, the difference between the two phases of Mind. Therefore, let us see the transposition through chessological deduction by assuming

Russia and Japan at first equal in all respects on the board of war,

thus,  $R = J$ ;

then, add ignorance and knowledge to the respective sides. But there being the differences between the two, we have a chessological deduction out of the intellectual, that is, *real personnel equation* as follows:

$R + \text{ig.} (= - \text{know.}) > J + \text{know.} (= - \text{ig.})$  from ignorance's point of view, and

$R - \text{know.} (= + \text{ig.}) < J - \text{ig.} (= + \text{know.})$  from knowledge's point of view.

But the Japanese taking advantage of the ignorance of the Russians transposed, or converted it to the highest degree of utility,

$\therefore R < J + \text{know.} (= - \text{ig.}) - \text{ig.} (= + \text{know.})$ , that is,

$R < J + 2 \text{ know.} (= - 2 \text{ ig.})$ , or

$R < J + 2 (\text{know.} = - \text{ig.})$

which holds true and shows that the Russian ignorance or inactivity of the *personnels* is worth exoterically twice the knowledge upon the part of the other side; in other words, against Russia, a double ignorance probably meaning utterly no ignorance in Japan from Russian point of view of knowledge and a double knowledge probably meaning almost divine wisdom when considered from, or compared with, the Muscovite standard of education; and Russia = constant inclination toward *zero* or possibly = 0 in point of intellectual liabilities or assets in regard to the present war; but meaning chessologic-esoterically that knowledge is all-powerful. For an example, the Japanese navy having annihilated the Russian armada involves a double victory, the first, the former having entirely defeated the latter, and secondly, the former keeps the whole navy unmolested just as at first. Yet, in a sense of chessologic-esoterical fact, the victory in this particular case is infinitely formidable, because the magnitude of the far Oriental navy kept in the same condition as previous to the war plus the captured Russian warships in consequence of mutiny and unskill is infinitely larger than the Muscovite's, for the latter is in *zero*, 0, condition, to-wit, as any is infinitely larger than *zero*, 0, as Russia can not do anything unless a huge navy together with first class trained PERSONNELS might come down spontaneously in favor

of the Russians. If the Russians had fought the battles (with the islanders) with the same amount and degree of the courage and all other requisites for the strictly chessologically organized co-operation as the Japanese, then the former could surely defeat the Japanese, quantitatively in every way, but alas! they entirely lacked Minds, the inmost marrow of *personnels*. There are innumerable examples like the above in the history of struggles and such are chessologically, though otherwise impossibly, symbolized by means of *Mochingoma*. (ss. 4-6, pp. 100-1.) Disappointment and encouragement, respectively, on the part of one and the other, and the like come under the same category and are reducible to the same chessological deduction represented by some *Mochingoma* standing for *unknown* and *uncertain quantities* and *qualities*, which the Occidental chess can never betray at all.

9. To try, outside of the central and highest realm of *Chessdom*, to represent exhaustively every detail of the different factors in struggles by pieces of the least possible number on the game board of the smallest possible space, and to be operated and manipulated with the shortest time possible; to represent all of the elements and their innumerable sub-elements in the struggles in life, by means of any pieces, in detail and concrete ways, is ordinarily impossible, except with legitimate chesspieces *Koma*, with the least, smallest domain of anything, to cover all the factors and elements, in both larger and smaller scales. That which is so-called a war-game, *Kriegspiel*, suggested by the Chessological principle and is to be considered as its chess branch, or rather a part of *Applied Chessologics* truly comparable to practical arithmetic in relation to Higher Mathematics, could not represent each and all of the factors of struggles or, at least, all of even military affairs.

1. But, only the abstract general conceptions can perfectly accomplish to show everything conceivable by the human Mind; this is the only way. Practical Arithmetic mainly works with only concrete numbers and Pure Mathematics, with abstract symbols: so, *Kriegspiel*, the war-game, really stiff concrete materials, and *Chess*, the driest, yet the most elastic flexible abstract!

2. From the apparent solutions of the chessological affairs, both combating sides are assumed as exactly the same in

every respect; but, from the initiated experts' understanding of them, there are very wide range of differences in every respect—in interpreting every factor represented on the board, as in actual warfares or human struggles; and, therefore, the largest, unequivocal and intolerable, clearest difference is in the *Mind*, which is the main factor.

3. And this last human light could not be assumed on the board, but only left with *discipline* and *training* to be developed. (See definition of Chessology and functions, pp. 15-37.) Superficial chessplayers are apt to conduce actual motions of only armies to the merely apparent principles of a game of Chess, while the real expounders of Chessology cannot but help to connotate the affairs on the chessboard as to show, in general, the directions of the military warfares, only small parts of human struggles formulated in Chessology to train the *Mind*, the fundamental *source of the factors* of human existence.

4. A thought would in a moment clear up an opposition, if any, against the logicity of these assertions. Just as Alchemy, Astrology and merely *counting with fingers* have been the forefathers of modern Astronomy, Chemistry and Mathematics, so Chess has been the ancestor of, and produced, *Chessology* (7a, p. 17); so, though *Chess* was originally invented or created in imitation of actual movements of men in warlike operations, the former could not and can never be, in the ordinary men's conceptions, an exact copy of the latter except in the intelligent brains: Chess had no satisfaction to be only the copy of military affairs, but has accomplished its Supreme *Duty* to guide them, an evidence being the production of such a game as *Kriegspiel* which, we feel sorry to say, has been allowed to be invented on the score of inadequate character of the Western branch of Chess (s. 8-8a, pp. 17-8; ss. 2-3, p. 28-9).

5. Again, Chessology, out of which so-called *Kriegspiel*, really a *mere* military chess, was produced, is not only satisfied in training the military minds, but it also treats of naval struggles which no *Kriegspeil* considers as yet. A navy should receive a due respect in warfares (see pp. 72-5), as it is what the writer would call *One Wing of War*, without which any modern decent foremost nations cannot exist, and this naval training of the *Mind* is clearly in abstract solved in *Chessology*, and the *Krieg-*

*spiel*, a child of Chess, does not as yet consider the fact on its game board, simply because being made *concrete* by a merely military officer after being suggested by the Western chess which he could not understand *abstractly*.

5a. Keeping the captured pieces, *Mochingoma*, in hand and not inclining to show each other's own next hands are extremely fascinating as an exponent of human watchful and speculative instinct, and betray a strong resemblance to playing cards. The repeated utilization of the captured *Koma* piece gives the chessplayer a far deeper pleasure and much more interesting and instructive developments and operations than cards in all ways bestow enjoyment on the players, because in Japanese Chess, there all the trumps and other factors are represented to the greatest extent, and because those trumps and their combinations with others are played beautifully *ad infinitum* at the will according to the chessplayers' resourceful state of Mind. Such artistic and idealistic combinations and permutations and *re-combinations* of *re-permutations* as ever produced by the *Chess Proper* can never be evolved out by playing cards. The captured pieces being re-enlisted into the service bring forth scientific pleasures as of an original investigation on account of their being repeatedly converted to use in accordance with mathematical calculation, whether consciously or otherwise. For while in all methods of playing cards there prevails a game of chance since the first handling of cards depends upon mere chances, Chess involves no chance-game whatsoever, except the size of an individual intellectual reservoir. Thus, by virtue of re-admittance of use of *Mochingoma*, Japanese Chess absorbs entirely the most essential attributes (movement, development and operation, if any) of cards, whereby cards as inutility and inadequacy for promotion of knowledge have been thrown out of the world of intellectual instructive pleasures. Hence, *Mochingoma*, assisted by *Naru* Promotion Method, have succeeded to have made Japanese Chess to be able to perfect the legitimate Chessological game or Art, that is, Chess Proper without allowing checkers (*Hasami-Shōngi* (s. 6a, p. 82,) and cards a great liberty for merely killing a time to little or no purpose, and also after all without letting a so-called war-game offshoot from Chess and declare its independence (s. 3, p. 115). Checkers-playing is, in Japan, a children and ordinary women's game.



6. Chess has thus come out to soar up higher and higher; **not** satisfied with military functions, it has passed to drill navy besides, and again not satisfied only with them, but also, it inaugurating itself as CHESSOLOGY treats of *training the human Mind* so as to be able to meet with *all struggles* that there are.

7. Suppose that international arbitration makes success in the naval and military disarmament of so-called civilized nations by a proportional reduction of their forces similar to the joint disarmament of Chile and Argentina, then an estimation of a conception of forces or pieces in a war-game would positively be reduced, or the war-game itself should be continually and suddenly modified, because of a concrete problem and because of simply being used for military, and for neither war, in a true and large sense, nor other, purpose (s. 8-8b, p. 17-8; s. 3, p. 137).

Suppose that the Hague Conference or Tribunal or Arbitration Treaty stops wars from military as well as naval standpoint of view, then the *Kriegspiel*, even were it a real war-game, would have no room to play (s. 8-9, p. 17-9). As long as human creatures will be existing, there should surely be *struggles* in some form or other, wherein human *Mind* always plays its sovereignty. Nothing there is sublime like mental training in the human existence, as the *Mind* is the only criterion of superiority over all the other creatures, and among men. (s. 9, p. 22.)

8. In fine, Chessology teaches us the principle how to let us be able to meet with struggles and to strengthen and train the players' *Mind*. It is an abstract science of the highest and grandest kind, and it is the most *flexible formula*, making itself the most and highest philosophic-science of all the sciences and philosophies as judged by the treatment of the *Mind* in every way *minimum* to cover all in *maximum* degree. Chessology is in a word the Ultra-Philosophic Science.

9. This part has been achieved by the ingenious Japanese of yore. Then superficially thinking, Chess originally invented concretely to represent military elements in time immemorial cannot at present convey in a concrete way the exact meaning of the modern improvements of ways and means of transportations and communications, but it has surprisingly and fortunately left with us a conception of them by abstract

symbols, which *esoterically* cover all things or works not covered by *exotery*. Now, all, we know, paradoxical representations of all elements necessary to all human struggles can be accomplished by means of chess *Koma* pieces, especially the *Mochingoma*, the most powerful and the grandest of symbols, and the *Naru Method*.

1. To use the *Mochingoma*, the captured *Koma* pieces, is the same as to use in Mathematics and Arithmetic, by repetition, the same digits over and over again, when numbers beyond 9 are to be counted, but only the scales are different! In the case of the *Mochingoma* to be re-used, they are to be conceived as symbols to represent not only the repetitions of the same powers, different in scales, but also the qualitative characters to be developed to meet with any necessities, even contingent, in all struggles. (s. 4-5, p. 97; s. 8a, p. 103; s. 8b, p. 105.)

2. So then, only to think that the captured *Koma* pieces are only re-employed in exactly the same way as in the original or previous conditions is an attribute of a huge ignoramus, who, without being able to conceive certain marvelous results and factors out of combinations and permutations of a cause and its effect, does not know himself what kind of a simpleton he might be.

3. This re-employment, and even many times repeated uses, of the captured ones is to be understood as not to use the prisoners but the *abilities* (*even resolution or determination* and, moreover, *even resistance*) *themselves to have captured* them and to have re-employed them as equivalents to re-enforcements or reservists newly recruited and every and any thing else conceivable by, and at the unlimited disposal of, the captor's own interpretations about the matters, because actions and re-actions are opposite and equal in force, and because the deductions of elements of struggles on the part of the enemy are proportionately to increase the power of friendly forces in some or other form exactly equivalent to the volume of the force reduced or lost on the adversary's part. (s. 6, p. 93; s. 8a, p. 103; s. 8b, p. 105; ss. 6, 8, p. 118; s. 9, p. 122; s. 9, p. 123.)

4. There are still, besides innumerable elements already stated before for a victory, what are to be interpreted and

symbolized in Chess according to the player's mental capacity. Napoleon sold Louisiana to the United States of America; the American Revolutionary heroes borrowed money from France, which had supported the former to succeed in their struggles, and the French under La Fayette and other Europeans assisted America; and they were not at first calculated in the minds of the Americans, but they did nevertheless help the Revolution. The *Mochingoma* as the *Chessological Calculus* works for them.

5. Japan and Russia have floated their war bonds in their respective allies, France, Germany, United States and England, which are at least *sympathetic*, though really neutral, from a war point of view. Even there are what are said to be "moral supports." (s. 5a, p. 92; s. 1a, p. 170.) They are sometimes formidable converted weapons against either of the belligerent parties. All these matters and every and any thing relating to struggles should be, in the *minimum* scale, counted in footing up a total for the bill of victory; and to accomplish this, the most flexible abstract symbols, the most easily convertible ones, are necessary, and have been proven to be the perfect satisfaction in Japanese Chess. Such are the *Mochingoma* (s. 3, p. 115; ss. 8-2, p. 120.)

6. Some might allege that they have nothing to do with the original matter, but when they understand the whole meaning as to relations of one thing to another as fully stated elsewhere, they are bound to keep each and every other of all elements to struggles and victory;—a source of great differences in an end!

7. The Western Chess has been modified and improved—very different from that which was played by an inventor and his successors for over forty or fifty centuries—and Japanese Chess has been in the same way. The demonstrated result of an issue deeply investigated between these two improvements is plain enough to come to the conclusion that the Occidental chess, as at the present time, is nearer the original invention and as yet very primitive, limited, local, stiff and antiquated, and inadequate in order easily to make *Chess* the Highest Abstract Science as it is natural as it is legitimate.

8. The Far Eastern Chess has been civilized to promote the tactics, strategy and the mental movements of rational persons,

not only soldiers but also statesmen, upon whom the soldiers should depend and *vice versa*, and also even commercial battles, and business characters—a more practical and more easily applicable to the modern actual warfares and consequently any line of works or struggles comparable to war in a common sense of the word. (ss. 4-5, p. 109.)

9. At the time when the making of rifles, guns, gunpowder, war-cars and -ships, and a thousand and one other things have been modified and invented, the ordinary chess players and experts, who would be apt to think that they are able, without the considerations of their merits, to forecast and foretell the movements of the navies and armies and, naturally, others, would be possibly liable to make mistakes unless they do figure the efficiencies and ranges of materials improved according to chessological abstraction of different phases and phenomena of the Universe. "Don't look upon only a part, but the whole of a chessboard (*Zen Kyok-ni Manako-wo sosogu*)" is a motto for the chess players and laymen, too. Think of Cleopatra's nose; if she had had a very little different tip to her nose, the whole world might have been entirely different! (See s. 3, p. 50-1; Arts. 8-9, p. 201.)

1. Then we may assert thus: Chess, an invention or creation in imitation of sea and land battles or naval and military struggles, at first, should meet with the general things and spirit of an age in struggles for existences, competitions, or supremacy; if not, it would fall down level with a sort of dice lottery! an entirely different proposition from which Chess experts claim that it is a Science—it has past beyond as a pastime. Very well then, the fundamental principle of the re-use of the *Mochingoma*, the captured *K ma* pieces, is to be understood as the most formidable factor to treat of Chess as the Science and Art of War or properly Struggle, or the training of the Mind, CHESSOLOGY, the highest of all Sciences and Philosophies on account of the very *best training* of Mind, the center of the human Universe. (s. 9, p. 22.)

2. When Chess is to be treated as a Science, not as a game of pastime, we can no longer allow any method of primitive and non-applicable stiff kind of treatments of the pieces on the chess game board, for all of the sciences have progressed so far during some centuries. (s. 7a, p. 17; ss. 4-5, p. 109.) If

Chess would remain still to be thought as a mere pastime work, and not as one to train the Mind, it would be only worthy to be looked upon as a brother game to cock-fights, wherefrom to save there has been established only the *Mochingoma* Re-employment with an assistance of the *Naru* Promotion Method.

3. Action and reaction of *Transposition* or *Conversion* or *Re-employment* of the captured *Koma* pieces, *Mochingoma*, exactly betray those of *minus* and *plus* in Mathematical equation or differences (pp. 107-8) and those of Mathematical factors or elements which produce negative or positive powers or exponents of quantities, and, in addition all those of qualities, whether Psychic or Chemical or what not, that Mathematics does not govern at all. (s. 6, p. 21; s. 5, p. 119; s. 7, p. 157; s. 2, p. 201.)

3a. Japanese Chess, therefore, equipped, as exhaustively dealt with before, with these formidable, yet *soft* contrivances and devices, has saved the principles of the legitimate Science of Chess, *Chessology*, from being lost into oblivion of their full benefits and from being looked upon as a game, though said only a difficult one, little or no higher than checkers or cards, and at last, saved Chess Proper, an exponent of Chessologic Truth, from being considered as an unproductive pastime game in the dim eyes of a so-called war-game and military science which are just on the contrary but a small function of *Chessology*, (see s. 8-8b, p. 17-9; pp. 28-34; s. 5a, p. 110).

4. In recapitulation, we have the following:—The scope of the *Mochingoma* ranges over the entire domain of the phases of struggle-forces or -elements, and an account of its developments involves that of those paramount paradoxes which have been checkmated or cleared in the *desiderata* offered by training Mind, or securing Wisdom, as just as Calculus with the scope of ranging over the whole field of Applied Mathematics has overcome the chief difficulties in the problems offered by Astronomy, Engineering, Mechanics, and Physical Science generally.

4a. In the *Mochingoma*, all quantities and qualities represented by the *Koma* pieces, except mere constants, are regarded as changing from one value to another, when applied to differently appreciative force (s. 5, p. 97), depending upon the extent of intellectuality of chessplayers, by continual operation or

progression (s. 8, p. 94) or by infinitesimal differences or differentials in the handling of the pieces, as in the case of all quantities treated of in Calculus.

4b. The invention or discovery by the Japanese of the fundamental importance of the *Mochingoma* assisted by *Naru Promotion Method* constitutes and has completed the *discovery* of CHESSOLOGY.

4c. The invention of the utility of the captured chesspieces, the *Mochingoma*, as well as *Naru Promotion Method*, the improvement of ordinary promotion method, has culminated with the Japanese. And there need be, therefore, no surprise at the *discovery* and *establishment* of CHESSOLOGY, for after incessant works of the *Ultra-Ancient* Chinese, Hindoos, Persians, Arabians and the Europeans represented by Ruy Lopez and other aspirants after improvements, the matters are fully ripe for the *generalization* made by the author.

5. Supposing that the reader has thoroughly digested the statements and principles, we have, in the following few pages, two extremely attractive Chessological Parables, the most famous stories of the sieges interlaced with commercial as well as financial and diplomatic relations. They are the most interesting and instructive of the skilfully combined works, manœuvres, operations, the tactics and strategy of navy and army, the *TWO WINGS OF WAR*, and diplomacy: they exemplify the typical results of Chessological Co-operations of essential elements of struggles, one, the most modern and the other, the most ancient, the *Sieges of Tyre and Port Arthur*. When Chess players would, now and then, think in a poetical way, instead of their narrowly strict addiction to actual warlike pieces, navy and army, soldiers and seamen, and diplomats, not only in the above sieges, but also all other campaigns, that is to say, when they would render the concrete ordinary narrations of struggles of all kinds, not only the above siege and diplomatic stories, but also others, into the abstract language, *POETIC CHESSOLOGICAL FIGURES* (s. 5, p. 70-3; ss. 9-3, pp. 47-8) especially supported by the heaven-born *Mochingoma* and *Naru Promotion Methods*, the Chessologists would without a least doubt enjoy and make productive their competitive amusement a hundred times more than otherwise.

## ALEXANDER'S SIEGE AND DESTRUCTION OF TYRE OF THE PHœNICIANS,

AS A CHESSOLOGICAL PARABLE EXEMPLIFYING TYPICAL CHESS-  
OLOGIC CO-OPERATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF  
STRUGGLES REPRESENTED BY THE MOCHINGOMA.

1. The Persians—the then (about B. C. 337—) representative Asiatics—anticipated Alexander's design to invade Asia. It would have been a wise policy on the part of the Persians to have collected in the Propontis and the Northern Ægean sea the largest possible fleet, kept a careful watch on his movements and tried to intercept his heavily laden vessels. Mentor, a Rhodian, and the best Persian strategist, urged his course to be taken. His advice was that, with the whole Persian naval force together with the entire Phœnician fleet, the Persian King would have the supremacy over the sea, that the Grecian troops who already crossed the straits would be powerless in every way, and that the war seat might become Macedonia where Alexander might tremble for his hereditary dominion. (See s. 7, p. 136-7; pp. 172-9.)

2. It seems to have been sound and worthy to have been tried. (See ss. 1-4, pp. 177-8.) Even then, the policy adopted might not have brought success, because unique was Alexander's genius (s. 7, p. 21), and great, Asiatic unreadiness and fickleness. (s. 8, p. 113.) The catastrophe would certainly have been delayed and the entire course of history would at this point have possibly altered. (s. 9, p. 114.) But Mentor's counsel was not taken. (s. 6, p. 93; ss. 1-8, pp. 177-9.)

3. Alexander with 35,000 men crossed the Hellespont; and the war became a land war, the fleets becoming comparatively unimportant. Phœnicia, which might have largely played the game of the struggle between Asia and Europe, did not appear in the front, was not called upon for any effort and became quite a second-rate power.

4. The Persian land-commanders were jealous of Mentor and of the navy. They desired to have Alexander defeated by land, and did not want the glory of his discomfiture to be carried off by a Rhodian. They belittled nautical affairs, and did not conceive their importance. (See s. 9a, p. 135; s. 7, p. 137; s. 1, p. 138.) They perhaps distrusted the Phœnicians because of their lately being in arms against them, and doubted that a Phœnician victory was a thing highly to be desired. (s. 6, p. 93.)

5. Between B. C. 336 and B. C. 333, the year of the battle of Issus, Phœnicia played a part purely negative; faithful to Persia, but did not actively support her, kept away from Alexander, yet never impeded his plans; was a bystander and not a player in the game; a spectator, but not an actor, in the drama before the eyes of men; waited passively

to see how the struggle would end and to know which of the two combatants was to be her chief. (s. 6, p. 93.) But, with the complete defeat of the Persian army on the Issus, in November, B. C. 333, the circumstances (p. 102, secs. 6, 7) were upset.

6. Their flight beyond the Euphrates and their dispersion left the whole of Syria and Phœnicia open to Alexander and let the various Phœnician cities immediately determine what course they should pursue. Alexander did not pursue his flying enemy nor send his expeditions right away into the heart of the Persian Empire. He thought it very important to separate from Persia the sources of her naval forces, Phœnicia and Egypt, and determined, without proceeding further, to subjugate and own these provinces to get his communication with Greece, and thus make Persia powerless on the sea. (s. 3, p. 49; Art. 12a, p. 202.)

7. Therefore, he, soon after Issus, sent a strong force to obtain Damascus and, a few months later, marched southward along the Phœnician sea-coast.

8. The Phœnician cities, it seems, never exchanged any common counsel, nor ever acted in concert. (s. 1-2 p. 7.) They were, perhaps, surprised by Alexander's resolution. They possibly expected, almost to the last, that he would march eastward after his flying Persians. On the contrary, Alexander soon, about the beginning of winter, left Issus and marched southward. Crossed the Orontes and the ridge terminating in Mt. Casius, he entered the Phœnician low country and was near Marathus, a part of the dominion of the Arcadian prince, Gerostratus, then absent from home, serving with his naval contingent among the Persian fleet in the Ægean. But Gerostratus was represented, when absent, by his son, Strato, who staid at home to conduct the government. The regent, under the circumstances, deemed it best to submit unqualifiedly, and meeting Alexander, offered him a crown of gold, besides surrendering to him not only Marathus and the adjacent towns upon the mainland, but also Aradus, an island off the Syrian coast. (s. 6, p. 93.)

9. The next was Byblus with a separate sovereignty under a prince named Enylus, who, like Gerostratus, was serving with the Persian fleet under Phamabazus and Autophrates. Left to itself, Byblus followed the example of Marathus and Aradus, submitting itself easily to the Macedonian power, whereto it could never have resisted. (s. 6, p. 93.)

1. The next was Sidon, then the queen of the cities, and the original parent of them all, and the founder of Phœnician prosperity. If a city was for independence, Sidon, because of its ancient prestige, glories and recent position, might have done so. On the contrary, Sidon hated the Persians on account of their bloody and perfidious proceedings which had, about eighteen years before, marked the recapture of their city by the army of Ochus. (s. 6, p. 93.)

2. Sidon, glad of the prospect of Persian downfall, hailed joyfully a change expected for her advantage. Alexander was yet at a distance, and the Sidonians sent envoys to meet and invite him to their city.



The Macedonian monarch readily accepted the request and Sidon quietly became his. (s. 6 p. 93.) But as Strato, the king, serving on board the Persian fleet, was reputed to have Persian leanings, Alexander deposed him from his sovereignty, and ordered Hephæstion to select successor for his throne. Hephæstion picked up a certain Abdalonymus, distantly related to the royal family, who, being poor, became a gardener.

3. Tyre now only remained to follow its mother city, and unconditionally submit so that




FIG. 8.—The City of Tyre at the time of Alexander.

the eldest son of the sovereign, and sent it to meet Alexander, to present him with a crown of gold, other valuable gifts, and supplies for his army, and to declare formally that the Tyrians were ready to do whatever he dictated. (s. 5, p. 86; s. 4, p. 90; ss. 7-8, p. 94; s. 12-2, p. 95; s. 8b, p. 105; s. 3, p. 112.)

5. The martial king made a gracious reply. He praised the city's good behavior, accepted the presents, and commanded the deputies to inform their government that he would soon enter the city to offer a sacrifice to Hercules. The Greeks long identified their own Hercules with the Phœnician Melkarth, whose temple in Tyre was of the highest and was greatly venerated. (s. 3, p. 115.)

6. The Macedonian kings descended, they claimed, from Hercules, and therefore, the sacrifice to him was natural, and gave the city an honor. The Tyrians, however, saw a Macedonian design forever to possess their city, which the Persians had never protected. They were not ready to place themselves so absolutely in Alexander's yoke, and therefore sent a deliberate reply that they would conform to his wishes, but that they would not admit within their town either Mace-

ditionally submit so that Alexander would be satisfied with his accomplishment of the subjection of Phœnicia and he might wholly attend to the conquest of Egypt. But there were difficulties. Tyre wanted to be on the same terms under Alexander as she was and flourished about two hundred years under the Persians. (Art. 31, p. 205.)

4. Her king, Azemilchus, being absent, serving on the Persian fleet like the other princes, the city chose a deputation consisting of the most eminent men, even

donians or Persians and that—the king, if he was to sacrifice to Hercules, might do so without visiting the island, as there was another temple of Melkarth in Palætyrus on the opposite shore, they said, even more venerable than the island shrine. (ss. 3, 4-6, p. 137.)

7. Any resistance always incensed Alexander. Upon the Tyrian's answer, he became violently angry, and at once dismissed the embassy with fierce menaces, saying that if they would not open their gates to him he himself would break their gates down. Yet the islanders did not *softly answer*, but determined to resist him. (8b, p. 19; s. 6, p. 42; ss. 4-6, p. 137.)

8. They have been, therefore, charged by a Greek historian with foolish and headstrong rashness and bringing their fate upon themselves. Their conduct could not, however, be imprudent. Alexander then had no naval force worth counting, though the Phœnician towns on the mainland and even Aradus were subdued; their squadrons serving (under Autophradates) in the Ægean sea were not certain to desert the Persian cause, and embrace the Macedonian. (s. 5, p. 86—s. 5, p. 116.)

9. Even suppose they did, they could not, it seemed reasonable, act vigorously against their own blood. The inclination of Cyprus with a considerable fleet was also uncertain. Now, taking the worst, supposing that Marathus, Aradus, Byblus, Sidon and even Cyprus should give in to the conqueror and unite against their own kindred, generally having common cause with them in the past, it would have been natural to think that they could not be able to effect anything.

1. Tyre once defeated the combined navies of the rest of Phœnicia with a squadron of thirteen ships. She might repeat her victory. Even if blockaded and reduced to an extremity, there might be expected help from the powerful colony Carthage with the fleets occupying almost the whole of the Mediterranean. Carthage would not allow the extinction of her mother city. The Tyrians were not left to conjecture upon this question. (s. 5, p. 91; s. 4, p. 112.) A Carthaginian embassy visited Tyre just about the time when Alexander made his demands bent upon taking part in a certain annual ceremony, which the colony and the mother city jointly celebrated.

2. The ambassadors, upon hearing of the strait in which the Tyrians were placed, encouraged them in favor of a bold policy, bidding the citizens to resist and stand a siege, and promising them that very soon the Carthaginian squadrons would come to their relief. (See ss. 4-5, p. 112-3; ss. 4-5, p. 137; pp. 155-6; s. 5, p. 181.)

3. Whether Alexander would take the course already pursued, or patiently sit down opposite the island, or construct a mole to join their city to the mainland, they had not any, even the slightest, inkling of it. Such a method of attack did not enter into the known military resources of the age. (s. 7, p. 141; ss. 1-6, p. 142-3; s. 8, p. 160; s. 3, Art. 12 and 12a, p. 202.) The idea had been only once conceived by a powerful commander, having at his disposal an inexhaustible supply of animal and human force, and moreover, already bridged the sea and made a peninsula into an island—the fantastic Xerxes—but even then the work

had not been seriously made and very soon given up. (s. 9a, Art. 23, p. 204.)

4. The Tyrians cannot be accused of their ignorance of a proceeding with no precedent, and they may have deemed it impossible to carry it out successfully. (s. 8b, p. 204.) The mainland and island had a channel between them nearly half a mile wide at the narrowest place. The channel was at first shallow but rapidly deepened and near the city walls where washed, was about twenty feet deep. There were strong currents, too, and when the southwest wind blew, the sea rushed fiercely through the channel, proving dangerous to navigate. The Tyrians were not probably afraid of being captured by means of a work of the kind Alexander constructed, as Constantinople never dreaded being taken by means of a mole thrown out from Asia into the Bosphorus. (ss. 1-6, p. 142-3.)

5. Moreover, the Tyrians hoped that Persia would not suffer such an important city to have surrendered without a strenuous effort to save it. The entire Macedonian force in Syria and Phœnicia did not amount to fifty thousand men. (s. 1, p. 7; s. 4, p. 143 and s. 8, p. 172.) Those soldiers were already scattered in order to hold the important towns of Marathus, Sidon, Byblus, Damascus and others, so as to prevent surprises, besides watching Tyre opposite the mainland. Very soon they would have to scatter more widely to gather provisions. The islanders might have expected the Persians, at least, to have hung upon the skirts of the Macedonian army, to have harassed Alexander by a guerilla warfare, and to have made it difficult to carry on a siege. The Tyrians did not know how complete was the defeat of the Persian forces in Issus, and also they did not at all size Persian imbecility and lack of initiative. (See and compare p. 138-9; s. 1, p. 168.)

6. The Tyrians themselves, being daring, full of resources, vigorous and enterprising, it was almost impossible for them to anticipate the apathy upon the part of Darius after Issus, or imagine that when there was threatened a province, the most vital importance to Persia and besides the most valuable part of her dominions, nothing whatever at all would be made to deliver itself and, instead, the great King would calmly sit down and devise proposals of peace, while his active adversary Alexander was making himself the master of cities and a territory carrying together with them also the dominion of the sea, deciding more than half the struggle in the game being already waged for a Universal Empire. (s. 1a, p. 95; s. 3, p. 122; 8a, p. 103.)

7. The resistance begun. The king, Azemilchus, probably received a message requiring him to leave the combined Persian fleet cruising in the Ægean, and to hasten home in order to defend the capital with his squadron. Light vessels and triremes were collected from many places. The city walls were mounted with war engines for throwing stones and darts on any vessels that might dare to approach them; all capable to bear arms got them; they forged new arms, constructed new engines, and made every preparation possible to resist an attack.

8. Meanwhile, the Macedonian assailants had no navy, or none at all able to oppose the Tyrian fleet completely commanding the sea; consequently neither adversary, for a time, was able to strike a blow at the other.

9. Now the Macedonian resolution came. With the dogged determination which characterized him and was one of the main causes of success, he resolved to construct a solid mole, two hundred feet wide, across the channel, from the mainland to the islet so as to be able to take his engines to the walls, and to press the siege in the usual way. Putting in operation the services of several thousand laborers, he began the work where easiest near the shore. Piles were driven at intervals into the soft mud, the sea bottom; stone, boughs of trees, rubbish, and whatever material were dumped into the water from the boats or the shore to fill up the intervals between the piles and make a solid structure. (s. 3. p. 112.)

1. At first, easy was the work, as the water was shallow, the shore near, and the Phœnician vessels unable to get near enough to do the laborers much harm. There was in the near vicinity a plentiful supply of materials, because Palætyrus, stretched along the shore for several miles opposite Tyre, was in ruins, deserted by its inhabitants, and the crumbling houses and walls were easily pulled down, and the stone conveyed to the mole edge. (s. 9c, Art. 31, p. 205.)

2. In Libanus and perhaps in Anti-Libanus, where the workers suffered occasional losses from the attacks of the Arab neighbors, there was cut wood for the piles. The Tyrians often effected landings, and cut off bodies of the working men bringing up stone. But quite rapid was the progress until the deeper water came, when there came the difficulties, and it was only by the most strenuous efforts that any further perceptible advance was possible. (ss. 5-5a, p. 97-8.)

3. The current in the strait always worked its own way amidst the interstices of the mole, washing holes in the side and face, and loosening the structure. A storm came, the waves broke over the top of the work, and the damage enlarged. (s. 5, p. 91-2.) The deepening of the water needed the increase of materials so that even if the *mountains* were put in, the sea absorbs them and none the shallower. (s. 3, p. 23.)

4. After a time the Tyrians also brought their ships close to the mole, and attacked with missiles the men pushing the work forward, so distracting their attention, and causing them to seek safety. Macedonians received these attacks by hanging sails and curtains of hides between the Tyrian boats and their workmen, to intercept the missiles and by building two lofty wooden towers on the foremost part of their mole, wherefrom projectiles were discharged at the nearest ships.

5. Then the Tyrians resolved to burn the new works which greatly counter-checked them, and also seriously to damage the mole. They fitted up one of their largest horse transports as a fire-ship, loaded with brushwood and other combustibles, and on the prow they erected two masts, each with a projecting arm, therefrom a cauldron was suspended, filled with sulphur and bitumen, and everything else to kindle a flame. (s. 7a, p. 73; s. 4, p. 143.)

6. Loading the stern of the vessel with stones and sand depressed it consequently elevating the prow, which was prepared to glide over the mole and bring itself into contact with the towers. All the fore part of the vessel was piled with torches, resin, and other inflammable matters. Watching a time when the wind blew straight from the seaward, they manned the oars, spread the sails, and ran their fireship at full speed upon the mole, burning the combustibles at the prow as they went near, and transferring the oarsmen from the fireship into boats dropped astern with the utmost alacrity. (s. 7a, p. 73.)

7. The enterprise was completely successful. The two towers and all the more important siege works, brought forward to the foremost part of the mole, were in a blaze, and, as there were no means to extinguish the flames, were soon consumed. The occupants of the towers were either burnt to death or were captured as they attempted to save themselves by swimming.

8. "The cauldrons swung around from the masts, scattered their contents over the mole; the Tyrian triremes, anchoring just beyond the reach of the conflagration, kept off by their flights of arrows all who attempted to quench it; and the townsmen, manning their small boats, set fire to all the machines which the flames from the fireship had not reached, and pulled up the stakes which formed the exterior face of the mole. The labor of the Macedonians for several weeks was lost; a heavy sea accompanied the gale of wind, which had favored the conflagration, and penetrating into the loosened work, carried the whole into deep water." (s. 5a, p. 92; s. 9c. Art. 31, p. 205.) (Kendrick, "Phœnicia," p. 418.)

9. Alexander, great as was his military skill, and stubborn as was his determination, as yet did nothing to have his purpose put into effect. When he returned from an expedition against the Arabs, who annoyed his wood-cutters in the Anti-Libanus, there were left hardly any traces of his mole. He had to begin a new work made broader than the former one; and instead of taking directly across the strait in a straight line, from east to west, he inclined it at an angle from northeast to southwest, so as to defy the prevalent wind, and not have its flank exposed to the furious wind. He commanded the construction of new machines to replace the ones destroyed by the fire. (s. 3, p. 112.)

1. Again the solid structure, composed of wood, stone, rubbish, and earth, was pushed out from the shore and advanced into the sea even more rapidly than before. Whole trees with all their branches were dragged to the water edge and thrown into the channel, solidified into a mass with stones and mud, and followed by another layer of trees treated in the same way. Then the Tyrians devised to welcome the new tactics. Their divers plunged into the sea, at some distance, and secretly approaching the work under the water, fixed hooks to the projecting ends of the boughs, and dragging the trees out by sheer force, brought down large portions of the gigantic towering. (s. 8. p. 174.)

2. Alexander saw that all of his efforts would fail if he could not contest with the Tyrians the mastery of the sea, and either destroy

their navy or check it. (ss. 9a—2, p. 74-5; s. 6, p. 174; ss. 7-3, pp. 174-8.) He decided, therefore, to fetch whatever vessels he had, and to try to get other ships in addition. To do this, he went himself to Sidon, and got opportunely just as the squadrons of Aradus, Byblus and Sidon quitted the fleet of Autophradates, and, finding that Alexander was the master of their respective cities, sailed into port.

3. The joint squadron numbered eighty vessels, and Alexander had no difficulty indicating to the captains what to do, and to serve under him, even against Tyre. (ss. 4-6, p. 90-93.) Soon there joined him ten ships of Rhodes, ten from Lucia, and three from Soli and Mallus. (ss. 4-6, p. 90-3.) There was from Macedonia a single penterconter, *fit emblem of the Macedonian naval inferiority*. (s. 1, p. 7; s. 5. pp. 86-116: s. 3, p. 112.)

4. Alexander might have felt uncertain whether his fleets were strong enough against the Tyrian; but, then, the princes of Cyprus heard of Alexander's occupation of Phœnicia, and resolved to side with him rather than the greatest Monarch Darius, brought to Sidon and placed at his disposal their powerful fleet of one hundred and twenty ships, making his navy two hundred and twenty-two, comprising the most and the best part of the Persian navy. (ss. 4-6, p. 90-3.) There was now no hesitation to let him determine to test, as soon as possible, the relative sea strength of the Tyrian fleet and of that which he had collected. (p. 107; s. 3, p. 112.)

5. But his vessels needed the completion of their equipments for immediate active service, and some practice in nautical manœuvres. Eleven days were assigned for preparations; and then, having put on board a strong body of his best soldiers, whom he hoped to utilize in the encounter, if the Tyrians would fight fair and not make the combat one of tactics and manœuvring, he sailed for Tyre in order to battle, himself leading the right division of the fleet, which, advancing from the north, held open the sea, and so affronted the greater danger. Craterus and Pnytagoras of Salamis led the left wing. (s. 4, p. 90; s. 8, p. 163; s. 6, p. 183—s. 9, p. 185.) Their unexpected approach quite surprised the Tyrians with no information of the great accession to his naval strength; they wondered at the advance toward them of a fleet more powerful than their own; they were astonished at the perfect order of the approach, and the precision of all the movements; and they resolved to decline to battle offered them, to be in port, and block with ships the mouths of their harbors. (s. 4. p. 90.) Alexander sailed up near the entrance to the Sidonian harbor, but, seeing the precautions on the part of the islanders, refrained from making any general attack, while the order of his Phœnician captains was, however, such that some of them could not be restrained from charging the outermost of the Tyrian triremes, three of which were sunk, the crews escaping by swimming. (ss. 7-8, p. 174.)

6. Having passed the night with his whole fleet sheltered under the lee of his mole, he, the next morning, divided it to two bodies; the Cyprian vessels with Admiral Andromachus were to keep watch on the Sidonian

port, while the rest of the fleet, passing on through the narrow channel separating the mole from the islet, supervised the Egyptian harbor, near which, at the southwestern corner of the mole, Alexander's own tent was pitched.

7. The fate began to tell Tyre one thing certain, if the Tyrians could not risk a naval engagement and recover the mastery of the sea, as Alexander's workmen, no longer impeded in their labors by the attacks of the Tyrian vessels, finished the mole, and brought it up to the city walls. Its towers were near enough, and were armed with more formidable and numerous engines. Other engines, the works of Cyprian and Phœnician artists, were put in the horse transports and the heavier class of triremes and with these, demonstrations were made against the walls north and south of the mole, while the main attack was from the mole itself. (ss. 7-9, p. 141-2; s. 1—p. 144.) Every plan for assault and defense then known in warfare was resorted to on both sides. (s. 7, p. 141; s. 6, p. 154; pp. 158-179.)

8. The Tyrians had lowered into the sea huge blocks of stone to keep Alexander's boats at a distance, and prevent them from playing the ponderous battering-ram. These blocks the Macedonians tried to weigh up by means of cranes; but, because of the unsteadiness of their vessels, there came no sufficient reward, a difficulty which they thought to meet by anchoring their vessels. But the Tyrians sent out boats well protected from missiles, and rowing under the sterns and prows of Macedonian Galleys, cut the cables which moored them. (s. 7, p. 141; s. 6, p. 154; ss. 8-9, p. 172-173.)

9. Alexander then anchored armed ships to watch the cables, but the Tyrians used their born divers, whose movements could not be seen (s. 8, p. 174.), and the cables were cut just as before. Finally the Macedonians thought of the use of chains instead of ropes, and so got the better of the divers. They succeeded in fastening nooses around the blocks, and by dragging from the mole, bore them off into deep water.

1. There came the time when the Tyrians themselves felt that nothing but a naval victory could save them. (s. 3, p. 143.) As Alexander's fleet had been divided, it was open to them to choose their adversary, and to contest separately with either the Cypriote or the Greco-Phœnician squadron. They decided to attack the former, and to make every effort to take them by surprise. Previously sails were spread before the mouth of the harbor, wherein their plans could not be overlooked. The day came for the attack; they selected thirteen of their best ships—three quinqueremes, three quadriremes and seven triremes—and waiting until noon, when the Cyrian sailors would be having their meal, and Alexander would be in his tent, they secretly put out from the harbor the picked crews and picked men-at-arms in their ships, and stealthily in a single file until near the enemy. (s. 6-7, p. 139.)

2. Then came the boatswan's customary cry; the rowers cheered, and the oars were plied with vigor; and a fierce onset was upon the Cypriote fleet, which was suddenly surprised and thrown into the utmost con-

fusion. The ships of Pnytagoras, the king of Salamis, and Androcles, the king of Amathus, and those of Pasicrates, a Thurian, were borne down and sunk in the first charge; others fled, and were chased and ran ashore.

3. There was a general panic; and the Cyprian fleet would have been annihilated, were Alexander not back there earlier than usual, and unless he began to check such a disaster. A portion of the Cypriote fleet were off the north part of the mole, with their crews disembarked. Alexander manned these vessels as quickly as possible, and sent them, as fast as they were ready, to blockade the Sidonian harbor and to stop the egress of more vessels. He then crossed the mole to its southern shore, and manning as many ships as he could, he took them round the island into the northern bay, where the Tyrian and Cyprian fleets were desperately fighting.

4. The people ashore saw the movement and tried madly to signal to their sailors, but to no effect. The noise and confusion made their signals remain unobserved until too late. The sailors, seeing the situation, took flight, but not until Alexander was upon them. A small portion of the ships merely got back to the harbor; all of the others were disabled or taken, before they could enter the haven. The crews and the men-at-arms jumped into the water, and saved themselves by swimming to the friendly shore.

5. The last chance—effort—failed! Yet the Tyrians would not give in. With an admirable fertility of resources and a determined resistance, they still met every attack upon the walls. To deaden the force of the stones sent from the catapults, and the blows of the battering-ram, there were let down leather bags filled with seaweed from the walls at the point assailed. Wheels set in rapid motion intercepted the darts and javelins thrown into the town, turning them aside or blunting or smashing them. (s. 7a, p. 73.)

6. When the towers on the mole were brought near the defenses to throw bridges from them to the battlements so as to put soldiers on the inside, the Tyrians flung grappling-hooks among the soldiers on the bridges, caught in the bodies of some, mangling them terribly, dragged their shields from them, and hauled and hurled others into the air, dashing them into pieces against the wall or upon the ground. Masses of red hot metal were hurled against the scaling assailants. They showered sands heated to a glow upon the foes near the wall; the sands went through the joints of the armor, and caused intolerable pain, so that the coats of mail were torn off and flung aside, whereupon the sufferers became soon disabled by lance assaults and missiles.

7. The battering-rams were attacked by engines newly made for the purpose. They brought sharp scythes fixed to long poles into contact with the ropes and thongs used in working them, and cut them through. Wherever the wall gave way, the defenders made an inner wall for the outer demolished one,

8. Now there is in sieges a tactical axiom, *the attack has the superiority over the defense*. (See ss. 6. p. 139; s. 4, p. 141; pp. 141-186, and Arts. 12-13, p. 202.)



9. Alexander, after failures, planned a general assault, from which he anticipated success. (s. 2, p. 28.) The wall opposite the mole being strong there could be made no impression on it, so that he had for a time put his efforts entirely on the battering of the sea-wall north and south of the mole. A considerable impression was made on the southern side of the town, where the wall was broken and a portion sunk into the sea.

1. Alexander made this as the point where his chief effort should be given. Ordering his main fleet to attack both harbors while sending a number of vessels around the town and menace the defenders all around, he himself led the southern assault. First enlarged the breach considerably by means of the ships with battering-rams, he drew these ships off, and advanced the attack with two vessels only—vessels provided with boarding-bridges, and carried the *élite* of his arm—one, that of Adetus, which he manned with the Hypaspists, the other, that of Coenus, having on board a portion of the phalanx. He himself accompanied the Hypaspists.

2. The bridges were thrown across and rested on the breached walls, giving the soldiers a firm and stable footing, and then the conflict was short. Adetus, the first to quit the bridge, fell pierced by a lance when he alighted on the wall, but he encouraged his fellows to advance and soon they drove the defenders from the breach, and fully occupied it.

3. Alexander mounted among the first, and seeing the royal palace near, directed his soldiers to proceed there, and thus gaining ready access to the rest of the city. Meanwhile, Alexander's Phœnician fleet had broken through the obstacles along the entrances to the southern harbor, and, attacking the ships inside, crippled or drove them ashore. The Cyprians, at the same time, sailed into Sidonian harbor seemingly not blocked, and held at their mercy the northeastern portion.

4. The outer circuit of the walls was thus occupied in three places; and the resistance, it seems, would have ceased, but the Tyrian spirit was not daunted. Some, shutting themselves up in their houses, mounted to the roof, wherefrom stones and other missiles were flung down upon the heads of the Macedonians. Others went into a sacred building and the Agenorium, and barricading entrance, defended desperately, though attacked by Alexander himself, until they were at last overpowered and killed almost to a man.

5. There was a general carnage in the streets and squares, the Macedonians being exasperated by the length of the siege, the stubbornness of the resistance, and the fact that during the siege the Tyrians publicly massacred, or sacrificed a number of their prisoners upon the battlements. Eight thousand were, it is said, slain in the *mêlée* two thousand others, taken prisoners with their arms in their hands, were crucified on the sea-shore by the order of Alexander. The women, children and slaves were sold to the number of thirty thousand. Those who escaped consisted of a certain number of the women and children saved by the Carthagenians before and during the siege: a few hundred males, scarcely more, whom the Sidonians spared and secreted in their

ships, and a small body of prominent personages, who, with the king, Azemilchus, and some Carthagenian sacred envoys, had taken refuge in the Temple of Melkarth, when the town was stormed.

6. These persons were spared. If the resistance of Tyre was a crime, it would have been more just to have punished the king and the members of the government, and not upon the two thousand unfortunates whose blackened corpses disfigured the Phoenician sea-shore for months, attesting the brutality rather than the power of the conqueror. To celebrate his success, before marching on against Egypt, Alexander entered Tyre in a sacred procession, with his soldiers in their full armor, and mounting to the Temple of Melkarth, offered his much desired sacrifice to Hercules.

7. His fleet defiled before the temple as a part of the ceremony, followed by gymnastic games and torch-races. As memorials of his triumph, he consecrated to Hercules the battering-ram which made the first impression upon the walls, and a Tyrian ship, used in the service of the god, which he had captured in the course of the siege.

8. He quitted the city half burnt, half ruined, and almost wholly without inhabitants, content, it would seem, with his work having trampled out the only eastern spark, shown him, of independence.

9. The siege lasted seven months, from the middle of January to the last of July, B. C. 332. Tyre ceased to be a city for a while, but the advantages of the site, and the energy of the people flocked back after Alexander's death, soon made it again a wealthy and flourishing city. (s. 5, p. 181—s. 9, p. 185.)

When the student exhaustively compares this Siege of Tyre and that of Port Arthur in the following pages, the chessological elements, rendered concrete, which he cannot but help to find in them, should extremely aid his perfect digestion of all the attributes of the *Mochingoma*, a Calculus, unboundedly useful for both *Pure* and *Applied Chessologics*.

## THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR.

### A FACTOR OF THE MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN OF THE JAPAN-RUSSIAN WAR, AS A CHESSOLOGIC PARABLE EXHIBITING ALL THE TYPICAL CO-OPERATION OF FUNDAMENTAL STRUGGLE-ELEMENTS SYMBOLIZED BY THE MOCHINGOMA.

1. The four greatest campaigns we have of struggles covering the parts of Asia and Europe, the source of which motive having been always to establish a Universal Empire, stretching geographically over both continents. 1. Persian Empire. 2. Macedonian Empire. 3. Genghis Khan Mongol Chinese Empire. 4. Russian Manchurian Empire.

2. Korea, unfortunately, has been in a position like Denmark or Belgium, Netherlands or the country about the Dardanelo-Bosphorus, and while relations between Japan, China and Korea have been kept up for centuries, the weakest has suffered as a sort of prey.

3. The most prominent of their relations were:—

A. D. 201, in the regime of the famous Japanese Elizabethian Empress, she subdued Korea, China being back of the latter.

A. D. 1268, the Emperor, Kublai Khan, of China sent his embassy to Japan. Japan gave no answer.

A. D. 1269, Chinese embassy went to Tsushima, an island of Japan.

A. D. 1273, He sent his envoy to Japan.

A. D. 1274, Yen Dynasty China invaded Tsushima.

A. D. 1275, Tokimune had a Chinese embassy killed not to let him carry the national aspect to China.

A. D. 1279, Japan had Shufuku (Chow-Fuk) and his staff of Chinese embassy killed.

A. D. 1281, China sent its invincible Armada to Japan and almost all of them were either drowned or killed, as the "Divine-sent hurricane" re-enforced the innocent islanders. (s. 5, p. 91; s. 5a, p. 98; ss. 4-5, p. 112-3; ss. 8a-8b, p. 175-6; s. 5a, p. 181; Fig. 10d, p. 184.)

A. D. 1592, Hideyoshi, a Japanese Napoleon, best known as Taikō, provoked with the way Korea acted, whereto he sent an expedition and defeated a Chinese army backing her.

4. Korea doubly obeyed both powerful neighbors, through the advantage of the then lack of facilities for information and communication, and was paying tributes to them both. Then Russia, seeking the eastern extension of her much desired Universal Empire secured the rich territory around the Amoor River with a port from China, when the latter had a serious trouble of which the former had taken advantage, and obtained from Japan Saghalien Island, and then Russia's greedy aim craved to devour Manchuria of China, and lastly Korea, and thus not only in the East, but also in the world to make herself

the most powerful autocratic nation of a sort of a Universal Empire with an intention to dictate all other nations. So that whenever there were any troubles in or about China or Korea, Russia pleased with the opportunities put her fingers in some way or other. In fine, Korea has come to have one more step-sovereign.

5. When Japan and China had something to do with Korea, Czar was delighted. When Japan had complained of Korean action and restrained herself from taking action on account of evading the complications with China, Russia suggested Japan to go ahead and certainly acted the same toward China. On the score of the national intention completely to punish and subdue Korea, Japan suffered a civil war in 1877, when the government was for anti-expedition, and the pro-expedition party was suppressed. The cause was that the government considered the country as not yet ripen enough to struggle with either China or Russia or, possibly, both or other greedy powers.

6. During and after the expeditionary struggles of the veteran military experts and foresighted personages, both equally patriotic, loyal and imperialistic, the best flowers of Japan then considered rebels, as the leader, with a Galibaldi, General Saigō, the elder, the father of the present Japanese soldiers, revered as a Taikō and the chief of the Imperial Restoration, were dead, and a statesman, Ōkubo, a teacher of the present statesmen, assassinated as the result of the Korean affairs.

7. Previously Japan and China had trouble about Ryūkyū Islands, but fixed the matter. Formosa was the cause, it having been said that the aborigines had eaten the Ryūkyū Islanders drifted there.

8. Japan has always advocated a unity of the eastern countries, as she could smell smoke of the European fire of aggrandisement, and the Korean and Chinese could not thoroughly understand it, as the Japanese, who could discern the principles of self- and co-protection.

9. From an early date, however, Li Hung Chang watched the growing power of Japan and foresaw the possibility that in time China would have to measure strength with her. In anticipation of that time, Port Arthur continued to be strengthened; it was made the base of a powerful fleet, which was simultaneously organized. A short glance back over the history of this fortress will explain the sentimental reasons which have inspired Japanese determination to turn the Russians out of their greatest naval and military base. (s. 3, p. 112.)

1. If Port Arthur had any existence prior to 1870 it was so insignificant as to be of no account. In that year, however, on the eve of the great struggle in the west, a number of French nuns and native Christian converts were massacred at Tientsin. France was too busy to exact reparation, but any moment the fanaticism might single out the occupied, and then, there would be trouble indeed.

2. So the Chinese government had Li Hung Chang act as Governor of Chili, and for nearly a quarter of a century he remained in control of this huge slice of the Chinese Empire. His term of office was fruitful of progress. He had an army equipped and drilled according to the Western ideas; he fortified Taku

**FORTIFIED BY LI HUNG  
CHANG.**

on the Tientsin River; he created a fleet, and then found a fortress at Port Arthur, commanding Chili Bay, opposite Wei-hai-wei.

3. The important strategic position of this fort was pointed out to Li Hung Chang by foreign advisers. His own military experience and skill saw quickly their advice, as he was cunning, yet he was very haughty toward Japan. (s. 8b, p. 19; s. 6, (18), p. 203.)

4. The design and the carrying out of the fortifications, on which huge sums of money were spent, were intrusted to a German officer of artillery, and so efficiently carried out by him, that in 1884, when China became involved in hostilities with France, both the sea and land defenses were already so formidable that the French commander-in-chief positively declined to act on the suggestion of his government to take possession of the port, unless furnished with a more powerful fleet and an army of at least 20,000 men.

5. A little later on, a famous Chinese Admiral Ting, on his flagship Chin-yen, accompanied by her sister battleship, Ting-yen, the then two world famous first-class warships and cruisers, composing the North Ocean Squadron, went to Yokahama, literally to display them to the Japanese as a demonstration. He invited the prominent Japanese officers to see the then greatest oriental pride; and Japan did not have them and became envious of them, and could not have them (s. 1, p. 7), but the Japanese experts could see the Chinese inferiority to the islanders in discipline of naval exercises, the Chinese then very noticeably having their national dress for the naval uniforms, and the guns and parts of machinery rusted. (*Mind* pp. 15-37; Arts. 8-9, p. 201.)

6. And, therefore, in 1894, when the long threatened war with Japan occurred, the fortress was in a far more formidable condition than the previous decade, when Admiral Courbet declined to meddle with it, and it was then considered to be impregnable both by sea and land.

7. The Japanese army after landing at Pitsewo and siezing Tailen Bay made Kinchou its jumping off point for the land assault on Port Arthur. The famous Peiyang (North Ocean) squadron had been already reduced to impotency, which might have been averted by Ting's views to have attacked the southern coasts of Japan being taken up, but in vain (s. 6, p. 93; ss. 1-2, p. 117). The attack began November 21, 1894, at daybreak, and by a little after midday all of the inland forts had been carried.

8. Then the troops advanced upon the coast defenses. By four o'clock, Golden Hill, bristling with artillery, had been captured, and almost simultaneously the triumphant strains of the Japanese National Anthem

#### KIMI-GA YO!

(Singing three times in honor of the Tenshi.)

*Long live the Golden Age of the Master*

*Until thousands of years after thousands of years shall come and go,  
Until the pebble stones form into one solid rock*

*And over it all, the heavy moss shall cling and grow.—*

(Translated by the Author.)

were borne up the hillside from Port Arthur itself, which told the victors on the hills that their companions in arms in the town had completed their task in spite of the Chinese garrison of over 20,000 men.

9. A conquest of the western forts would have been made on the following day, but when they advanced they found that the Chinese gunners had fled.

1. China was considered by the other nations as a great power until the Japanese war, for she had trained soldiers, and disciplined under European instructors the more powerful navy than Japan. Everywhere they said that Japan could for a short while do something against China, but very soon she would have been defeated, that Japan could not stand long against such a large country as China, that China is fifteen or twenty times as large as Japan, and she has a population of over 450,000,000 people, more than ten times the size of the other, and that the Chinese wealth is enormous compared with the Japanese. In spite of their great sympathy with Japan, they—ninety-five or more out of a hundred—were pessimistic over Japan. (s. 1-2, p. 7.)

2. How many were given odds for offers over the world, even at the seat of war or in the East. It was miraculous how the fine Chinese navy comprising two, then well-known, battleships, considered the finest in the world, could be destroyed or captured by the Japanese, the two rarest sister battleships blown up, and Admiral Ting after sending all off board his dearest *friend*, his flagship, committed suicide by taking poison in spite of the Japanese recommending him to have himself surrendered. If the Chinese did not have a sense to stop the war as soon as possible, Japan wanted to force China to sign a treaty of peace at her capital, Peking. Thus the Japanese captured Port Arthur from the Chinese in 1895. Great was the surprise all the world over.

2a. While all these affairs were going on in regard to the ways carried on by the Chinese central government, the Southern Chinese did not at all help the Peking Government in the matters whether out of hatred toward the main government or envy or slighting the matter, or not, almost as much as the strangest disinterested foreigners would. This fact the Japanese could forecast by their keen observation of the Celestials' peculiar lack of political co-operative functions between the provinces and main government. (s. 6, p. 93; s. 7, p. 137.)

3. During all these years, what is called the Ex-territorial Treaty an old convention between Japan and all of the other *civilized* and the most favorable nations as one party, had been going on to be revised through wise diplomacy so that Japan has come out to be able to make a treaty with any nation as she will. (s. 7, p. 42.)

4. Meanwhile Russia willingly agreed to revise it in a favorable way, while the war was going on, so that Japan could not but help thinking that Russia was a very friendly nation. Before the end of the year, owing to the action of Russia, backed by Germany and France, Japan was compelled to hand back the hard won prize. The pretext of their *most friendly advice* had been that the Japanese occupation of a part of the mainland would have been a cause of breach of the Eastern

peace. The territory returned to China after the treaty of peace already conferred upon Japan was not Port Arthur alone, but that peninsula Liaotung of Manchuria on which the port is located, and also Wei-hai-wei, a naval station, opposite Port Arthur, both on the neck of the Pechili Gulf commanding the Chinese metropolis. (s. 7, p. 94; s. 1, Art. 8, p. 201.)

5. The greatest mass of the Japanese was provoked and determined to fight at stake, even the alliance of the three (really, four) powerful nations, though England fully sympathizing could not side with her brotherly "Eastern Englanders" on account of her colonial disturbance. Both the army and the navy seemed delighted to have defied them. The National Diet did not show any signs of fear in involving in a fresh war. The Privy Council and Cabinet Members were looked upon by the public, and stated in their papers, as the cowards.

6. All of a sudden the Shujō, His Imperial Majesty, declared that his people should be peaceful and patient when other friendly nations advised them not to possess a part of the main land, as the very acquisition was a cause of disturbance of the Eastern peace.

7. "Peace has been my Majesty's ideal. We had the war with China simply for the sake of peace, which she had disturbed in Korea. Nothing but peace has been our aim! What the *most civilized* and *elderly progressed* nations advise us not to disturb the peace, may our people adopt for the sake of humanity," dictated His Majesty. (s. 7, p. 42; Art. 8, p. 201; s. 2, Art. 10, p. 206.)

8. "Be peaceful and patient, my subjects," His Majesty repeated. The patriotic loyal subjects thrilled and sobbed, and became patient and calm in a way after a hurricane. (ss. 7-8, p. 94; ss. 12-2, p. 95-7; Art. 26, p. 113.) When Japan asked Russia about what would be the return to Japan herself as a recompensation for the return of the territory to China, Russia replied haughtily that Japan herself should settle the matter with China. (Art. 18, p. 203; Art. 29, p. 205.)

9. Japan accepted the *friendly* advice, but there was no *friendly* reward; Japan could not re-war by this time and certainly in repudiation of the acceptance and *behind time*, and beside, China, guarded at her gate by the *bear*, *eagle* and a *polite* diplomat, could do anything that she wanted to and the "Eastern Yankees" were compelled to be satisfied with only 50,000,000 taels (then about \$27,000,000) for a large tract of land, on which Russia might have implicitly put a fair price \$2,000,000,000 at least.

1. Li, the chief commissioner, Chinese Special Embassy to the treaty and one of the shrewdest and most cunning diplomats of the time, when about to be going on board the boat homeward, looking toward his staff, put his tongue out in suggestion of what he had dealt with Russia beforehand about the treaty and its consequences. (s. 4, p. 33.)

2. Patience, a potential Energy! (ss. 7-8, p. 94.) In nature there always has been a compensation. (s. 12-3, p. 95-7.) What was returned to China was nominally to China, as events turned out, Port Arthur had been "leased" to the Czar, really given to Russia herself. Li Hung Chang being envious of Japan, Russia could manage the affairs as she

wanted, because Li was, moreover, known as a decidedly pro-Russian factor of Chinese diplomacy.

3. The powers made Japan give up her right. Russia took possession; however, the powers did not make Russia give up, even her fraudulent trick. But, on the contrary Germany obtained Kaichou, France, her share and Great Britain, Wei-hai-wei; and Japan, which revealed China's feebleness in such glaring colors to the world, was the only nation which had not gained soil on the mainland, and even in Korea, which her troops had overrun, she saw Russian influence becoming day by day more glowingly powerful.

4. Meanwhile the Chinese troubles, popularly known as the Boxers' War, occurred. Japan sent, as suggested, as she was the nearest, the largest number of soldiers, and the other nations sent their soldiers. Long after the highest tide of the struggles Germany sent an army under her Field Marshal Count, which was utterly not needed then.

5. Russia sent a large army over Manchuria; practically no work against the Boxers was done. When the war ceased, the United States and Japan were not inclined to demand the indemnity, but the powers, including even the small nominal nations, had the two countries joined to ask for the indemnities. Japan demanded just or nominal expenditures; the United States, a round sum of actual costs, merely guessed, as there was no way to determine the costs, and afterward found that there was many times over the costs, and the national government is suffering to know what to do with the indemnity, as there is no item for such a rascal exaction whatever. France asked for a great deal more than actual expenses. Germany demanded an enormous amount as costs, which surprised the other nations. Russia, however, made no demands for a while; then she tried to get a large concession from the Chinese government, but in vain. Then Russia turned away and demanded a greatly augmented sum, as an indemnity, over \$150,000,000, which, being more than all the demanded sums totaled, the other nations made Russia reduce to her minimum demand, and even then her claim was the head of the list, and Germany the second of the claimants. (s. 1, Art. 8, p. 201.)

6. Russia seemed to keep the Manchurian province by developing railways and building barracks and many others. Japan protested against Russia's actions. The United States had communicated diplomatic notes to Russia and other powers. Russia did not conform to the agreements, which she twisted in many possible ways. The Russian scheme for dominating not only Manchuria, but also Korea and all of the Eastern seas as well, made excellent headway.

7. Russia, with feverish haste, proceeded to carry her great Siberian Railway down to her new base; large sums of money were spent on new fortifications; a new naval scheme for providing what was hoped would be a supreme fleet for the Pacific was taken in hand; thousands of Chinese were set to work to make great docks at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, and the building of a nominally commercial port at Dalny was commenced; all these plans, entailing the expenditure of huge capital,



were begun immediately; the railway had reached the sea, and the world looked on, admiring and amazed.

8. At Vladivostok also, new fortifications were erected and equipped; along the railway, blockhouses were set up, each with a small body of soldiery; new military depots sprung up at Harbin and Mukden and elsewhere; strategic points were garrisoned on the Yalu, and even Yongampho, in Korea itself, was really seized, nominally as a commercial port, whereto the Muscovite troops, however, were sent there, as everywhere.

9. The Japanese protested against the Russian non-conformity with agreements and treaties. The Japanese government had a wise view of affairs and the National Diet suggested the Cabinet and prayed the Emperor to fight Russia. The Diet was dissolved on that score, and the new members were to be elected. The Japanese government proposed to Russia to arrange and concede affairs to a proper extent. Russia delayed as usual, as long as possible. While Japan desired to have a friendly treaty to evade the horrors of war, Russia showing the willingness to negotiate the matters in an amicable way, delayed, pretended and put up something impossible besides sending her warships and soldiers to the East and developing railways, and doing everything else for war.

9a. The Japanese, prominent in every line of public life, and in commercial and industrial circles, visited every inch of not only Manchuria, as well as Asiatic Russia, and many were in St. Petersburg. They could perceive, more than the Russians themselves, the currents of the nihilistic and revolutionary movements in large cities and towns; the massacres of the Jews could tell them a general trend of the whole Russian situation. The scandalous and unscrupulous lower officers injudiciously criticized their worthless superiors, and made vain oppositions; ignorant and haughty higher officers, after vain glory, mercilessly treated their intellectual subordinates. Both government officials and the people, both sea and land forces, and every individual in fact were working in their own way, so to speak, as something like a strict neutrality to each other and their own nation. (s. 5, p. 131; s. 2a, p. 132; ss. 1-4, p. 117.) The vodka is to the Russian an *elixir vite*, and a constant drink of it is the sovereign remedy of their social struggles; the icons, their saviors; dissipations, their salvation. The bribery is their lucrative trade, and favoritism, their right and duty. Alexieff at Port Arthur was at a loss to know what to do with himself when the naval officers threatened to resign on account of the military men's conduct at one time, and at other time the army men retaliated the same, because of the sea-fighters' negligence (s. 4, p. 117). While such was the case, rotten to the core, in matters *personnel*, the *materiels* as a natural consequence were putrid to the marrow, guns and all machineries rusted, in spite of formidable equipment of invincible fortifications and armadas. The Japanese statesmen, tacticians, strategists and intellectual public at large—Chessologicians (pp. 7-11)—should have considered all these factors of struggles, before the nation desperately to wage a reward begun to respond to the Russian schemes. Thus, Japan figured up all these

facts and put the total to her credit in the balance of victory (ss. 8a-b, pp. 103-8; s. 4, p. 178-9). But since a war is a game of chance (s. 4, p. 33), and against humanity, Japan regarded the war, if it had to come, as betting herself annihilation or existence as a nation because Russia was known as the most powerful and most resourceful military nation. The whole people continuously cried: A war with the Bear is inevitable sooner or later; let it come the soonest as possible, ere the Russian preparation would have been accomplished; a Manchurian expedition at the earliest—a grand victory or death to a man.

1. The Japanese declared that Russia put up a demonstration merely to scare Japan. The members of the Lower Branch of the National Assembly, all the papers, and the people, in fact, were against the slow and too cautious actions on the part of their government.

2. The government sincerely, if not apparently, took a mild view, and acted as such, but it felt depressed between two warlike people—the despotic bloodthirsty bureaucrats and the meek, yet bold countrymen, the patriotic subjects. The "Eastern Yankees" prepared to force the issue and take the initiative action rather than wait. They knew the price, and were ready to pay in full in blood and treasure, for Port Arthur stood as an insult to the nation. Perhaps had not these things been true, even the indomitable little mischievous "Yellow Monkeys" would have sickened of the task. (Arts. 12-12a, s. 3, p. 201-2.)

3. Japan could see what Russia meant. A war does not come when it appears. There were always a series of motives and actions as causes and effects. (See Arts. 8-9, p. 201; Arts. 8-9, p. 206.) Hence, the Japan-Russian War.

4. Russia tried to make Korea the centre of this campaign so that she could soar over the islands of the rising sun, from the southern shore of Korea, and let the double headed eagle pounce upon them as his prey, but alas! in vain. Thus Manchuria became the center of the war. In this war Port Arthur attracted the sharpest attention from the world.

5. The siege of the "Eastern Sevastopol" was not the longest, nor the most thrilling in history. The Russians fought and died as did the fighting men elsewhere. The Japanese assaulted and died, as did the men at arms in all the other great sieges. They dug mines, as did the men at Vicksburg, and they blew up fortifications and the men in them, as the men did at Petersburg.

6. But the Manchurian War has been, as far as the large number of fighting men and deadly, ponderous weapons of modern devices are concerned, as yet the largest of all the campaigns in the stories of warfare; and the story of Port Arthur is one of the most brilliant chapters in the story of killing and dying. The whole may serve as a lesson to *checkmate* infernal horrors of the science and art of killing and being killed. (See ss. 8-8b, p. 17-9; s. 7, p. 143; s. 1, p. 163-s. 5, p. 167.)

7. Chessologists must study the siege in five parts when he considers it as an *Applied Chessological Knowledge* or Science. (s. 8a, p. 18.) The first part was the diplomacy between

Japan and Russia and other international diplomatic relations, especially the United States and England. (ss. 2-3, p. 28-9.)

8. The second, the naval manœuvering and fighting, the elimination of the Russian fleet as a factor in the war. (s. 9a-2, p. 74-5; s. 8, p. 138-p. 143; s.6, p. 174; s. 3, p. 178; Art. 12a, p. 202.)

9. The third, the blocking of the channel and the massing of troops, the preliminary fighting and isolation of Port Arthur.

1. The fourth, the whirlwind assaults and the hail of iron which compelled the Russians to give up the hopeless struggles.

2. The fifth, to know the whole board of the struggles. (s. 9, p. 114; s. 2(9), p. 201.)

3. The Czar some time previously proposed the PEACE CONFERENCE, at which the world was surprised, hence the Hague Tribunal.

But, behold! All nations have built warships and battleships, Russia, especially.

4. Meanwhile, there came the humanitarian alliance between Japan and Great Britain, which was practically aimed at checkmating the brutal, greedy devastation of modern enlightenment on the part of the "northern bear," climbing on French support, and then, soon as natural, that was followed by the Russo-Franco alliance, while the pathetic motive for the unity of the Anglo-American brotherly good wishes has been stronger than ever, when there had arisen the Anglo-Franco treaty to appeal their international troubles to an amicable arbitration instead of war, thereby appeared a wedge in the Russo-Franco union. (s. 9, p. 42; s. 7aa, p. 60-6.)

5. Besides, there was as ever the immaterial, yet warm, and strongly sympathetic feeling on the part of the greatest mass of the American people towards their traditional friends, the intellectual weapons in Asia of the Anglo-American civilization. Thus we have glanced a peculiar moral unity of the Anglo-American-Japanese spirit. Spirit of practical life, possibly much stronger than a written treaty of an alliance! (s. 5a, p. 92; s. 2, p. 120.)

6. Now and again, against Russia, the protests of some form or other were raised by this power or that, especially by Japan, but they were ignored or parried and the work went on, while the whole people of Japan thought it better to have begun the war two years or one, or at the latest, previous autumn of 1904, because Japan could see under the Muscovite scarecrow mask the real Russian aspect of threatening demonstrations in the East.

7. There were rumors that there were some trifling and constant struggles among the Russian naval and military officers and sailors and

soldiers even at Port Arthur, the corner-stone of, and the key to, the building of Russian Eastern suzerainty, so that whenever the Japanese cruisers, doing patrol duty, heard certain noises or gun practice in the direction of and about Port Arthur, it was common among the Japanese seamen to remark that the Russian navy and army were fighting among themselves, and that how it would be interesting and amusing—delightful—to see them fight. And it was true that the Russian navy and army officers and even sailors and privates were jealous and envious of each and one another about trivial matters (ss. 1-4, p. 117).

8. Russia needed peace (ss. 3-8, pp. 119-120), only until, at the earliest, the summer of 1905, and then Admiral Viceroy Alexieff believed he would be prepared for any eventualities.

**GREAT PROGRESS MADE.** Japan refused to wait until then, but struck the first blow, February 8, 11 P.

M., 1904, the moment when the string of the diplomatic negotiation was broken, on the fleet at Port Arthur, to avenge the wrongs done her by the haughty Muscovites. (s. 3, Art. 12a, p. 201-2.)

9. On that day the entire Russian fleet, composed of seven battleships, eight cruisers and over thirteen destroyers, were at anchor in the outer-road.

**THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR.**

1. Calm, yet very dark was the night! A Russian officer said, "a very good night for a torpedo attack!" The Russian flotilla had left early in the morning to manoeuvre and at 7:30 P. M. had not returned. There was a signal from the flagship that orders to repel a torpedo attack would be issued later, but that the guns should not be loaded. The fleet was to have gone somewhere the next morning, but at 8 P. M., there was an order that steam should not be made ready. Admiral Stark in command was entertaining his officers ashore, in honor of his wife's birthday; and many other officers were also on shore enjoying themselves in a circus, cafés and clubs, with no suspicion whatever. The naval and military officers and men, each jealous of the superiority of other force and vainly gossiping about the other's inferiority, drank only for the health of each own side of the fighting forces, and dissipations swayed the perfectly invincible stronghold. (s. 6, p. 93; s. 4, p. 117; s. 9a, p. 135; s. 7, p. 137.) A war was not expected! Diplomacy would have postponed it, it was thought. (See Arts. 8-9, pp. 201 and 206.)

2. A few months before, Kuoropatkin, then minister of war, had visited Japan, and when returning homeward, had a conference with the Viceroy Alexieff, and the ministers to Tôkyô and Peking, the chief officers of the secret service and other well-informed Russians.

3. Japan dares not fight so powerful a nation as Russia! in chorus they uttered. (See s. 3, p. 131; s. 6, p. 137; Arts. 8-9, pp. 201 and 206.)

4: It was too late to have changed his superior's self-conceited determination when Baron Rosen, the minister to Japan, and personally the Japanese dearest Russian friend, realizing the earnest motive on the part of Japan, sent precautions to his government stating that unless a liberal concession for the Japanese demands was to be conferred on

them, a war was an inevitable visitor and Japan felt welcome of its appearance. There was only one exception: He was a painter, who, having had friends in the oriental artists, had visited the Far East, as he appreciated the Eastern works of art. (See Preface s. 3, p. 7; pp. 7-11.) After over a month's stay there, going around after beautiful works which he unboundedly praised, he visited Rosen just before his departure, when he saw at the Russian Legation his patriotic countrymen speaking of the warlike situation and prospect in a great favor, as natural, of their nation. He jumped to his feet and said, "Rosen! Rosen! Turn back this way! Russia cannot fight Japan. The people here are kind, sympathetic, polite, clean and artistic! I tell you Russia cannot fight this nation." (See sec. 9, p. 35; s. 8-9, p. 88; pp. 113, 130-145, 201.) The artist could measure the nations by an intrinsic capability (s. 3, p. 112); all others measured them by a loose bulk of appearances. (s. 8, p. 185; Art. 29, p. 205.)

5. No wonder, vigilance was relaxed! and the aggressive policy of Russia toward China was more rigorous than ever. This feeling of safety secured the whole fleet. The admiral was preparing for some great demonstration to overawe Japan by a display of his formidable fleet. A formidable mistake! If the Japanese had taken advantage of it, they might have destroyed him entirely. Not was there the slightest precaution on the Russian's part; there was no single patrol boat out. (s. 5, p. 181.)

6. The Japanese could fight the first battle to a finish; and the foreign experts do not understand why the Japanese did not do so; they could have had it all their own way. The Russians were utterly helpless. There were only nineteen Japanese torpedo boats sent against the entire Russian Oriental navy and the rest of the fleet was kept back—fortunate for the Russians. (See ss. 6-8c, p. 174-7; Arts. 2, 3, 8-9, p. 206.)

7. The Russian torpedo flotilla did not return. At eleven P. M., when the Japanese torpedo squadron rushed upon the battleships, they were mistaken for them, and could approach within a talking distance. At a range of not more than 400 yards they went through the entire Russian fleet, and without warning discharged flight after flight of their torpedoes at the hulls of the nearest Russian vessels, as they passed, escaping to the sea before a single searchlight was hardly turned on. (ss. 2-5, pp. 79-81, and gambit; Arts. 12 and 12a, p. 201.)

8. The greatest disorder and confusion ruled all the Russian vessels; and their searchlights hunting for the enemy blinded only their own friends on other vessels. (s. 6, p. 93.) Officers were ashore at a circus and everywise, as said before; and almost before the men in the forts that loomed on the hills above knew what was being done, the three of the best of the Russian warships, the *Retvizan*, the *Czarevitch* and the *Pallada*, damaged, ready to sink, listed over, still at anchor, were eliminated for the time being. (s. 2, p. 99-100, s. 5-5a, p. 181; s. 3, p. 201; Arts. 12 and 12a, p. 201.)

9. The officers of the *Pallada* actually saw the bubbles of three torpedoes passing by, when they suspected the situation and went to

quarters. They opened fire, and Admiral Witgoeft signaled, "What are you firing at?" (Art. 12, p. 206.)

1. If the Japanese had known how utterly unprepared the Russians were, they might have sunk or disabled the entire fleet. (Arts. 8, 9, p. 206.) Out of twenty-four eight-inch torpedoes discharged, only three, on account of the utter darkness, took effect (Art. 12a, p. 201-2): 1. The *Czarevitch* was struck abreast of her forward turret below the water line; outer and inner skins were blown through; bulkheads buckled and water tight hatches in the protected deck sprung out of shape and made leaky, repaired as suggested by a Scotch engineer and finished in time to accompany the fleet on August 10th. 2. *Pallada* was struck by a torpedo abreast of the after-smoke pipe, below the water line and outside of a coal bunker. A hole was broken through the outer skin about seven feet in diameter, and an elliptical depression 20×12 feet was made in her side. The shock caused about fifty cartridges in the 12-pound magazine to explode. Repairs were completed about March 22. 3. *Retvizan* got an injury similar to that of the *Czarevitch*, and was similarly repaired by means of a cofferdam, according to a Hollander's demonstration, the dry dock being too small for her accommodation, and she afterwards took part in the other engagements. Her repairs, completed on March 22, were made of boiler plates, the armor plate being taken off and replaced. Her six inch, and 12-pounder guns were used in shore-defenses.

2. The Japanese fleet did not follow up their advantage and strike the Russians in confusion ——— a subject of comment among the foreign professional circles everywhere. The only reason was that the Japanese thought that it was unwise to take any risk, because if their fleet had been disabled the entire coast of Japan would have been exposed to the enemy. Japan should have taken care of warships, and, moreover trained officers and men. (ss. 1-3, pp. 74-5; ss. 6-8c, p. 174-7.)

3. The war had thus begun. Russia, not expecting the attack for a week at least, or a month or may be never at all, was caught asleep. (Arts. 8 and 9, p. 206.) Terror reigned in Port Arthur. The town was in the wildest excitement. (s. 6, p. 93.) The Japanese ships drew off, and while the Russians were clamoring over the first disaster, protesting or whining against the warlike action on the part of Japan, without the ceremoniously formal declaration of war, Japan making the *first firing* of guns to have crippled as the *formal* declaration, the Japanese ships rushed upon them, losing death and destruction as they came. (Art. 12a, p. 201-2.) Meanwhile, there came a declaration from the Bureaucrats that they will checkmate Japan so that Russia would have a treaty of peace at no other place than Tōkyō; and then in European newspapers and magazines there were stated "Yellow Peril" is ferociously coming to devastate the most highly enlightened nations, with an intention to have them excited and act against their common enemy 'Yellow Monkeys.' The Grand Dukes and the war party considered this a great work of diplomacy while Japan had her ablest diplomatists in the capitals of all civilized countries and her communications passed in delicate net-

works in checkmating the Russian intrigues, which the intellectual persons acknowledged as such. (s. 9, p. 114; s. 8, p. 185; s. 2 p. 201.)

4. Before Russia could recognize the situation and the Russians at Port Arthur realized what was being done, February 9, 2 A. M., the Japanese attacked again, damaging and sinking the Russian ships. The *Poltava* being a wreck and the *Diana*, *Novik* and *Askold*, crippled and shattered, were settling in the harbor. At the first blow Japan had eliminated the Russian fleet from the situation, at least for weeks. (s. 5, p. 181; Arts. 12 and 12a, p. 201; s. 11, p. 206.)

5. On Feb. 9 and 10, the Japanese manœuvred for their landings. With the Japanese fleet watching the harbor mouths, and with their transports secured from molestation by the Russian fleet, they appeared under an escort of warships in Pigeon Bay, and in Tailienwan Bay, seeking landing places. (s. 4, p. 161.)

6. On Feb. 13, the day that the Russian gunboat, *Yenesei*, was blown up, the Japanese attempted a landing in small force on Tailienwan Bay, above Dalny, (s. 4, p. 161.) but withdrew when the Russians appeared in greater force. On that same day the Japanese bombarded Port Arthur from the sea. (s. 12a, p. 201.)

7. The large basin by the Mount Gold was the base of the Russian fleet that was destroyed by both the Japanese and the Russians. The




Fig. 9. A Bird's Eye View of Japan's Scientific Bombardment of the "Six-times Sevastopol."

other waters, except the approach from the sea, are useless for navigation purposes, being merely mud flats, flooded at high tide. The

position of the town is such that it was easily shelled by high angle fire from the sea. The Japanese were engaged in an exploit of the plans of the overland bombardment of Port Arthur. The Japanese warships to the south and southwest of Port Arthur could not be seen by the forts, but those warships were in communication by wireless telegraphy with war boats farther out to sea, which were in a position to know whether the firing was effective. The measures were taken with an instrument, Telemeter. First with a stop watch, the time was obtained between the flash of the gun and the report. This gave the distance between the firing and the observation ships. The Telemeter was then brought into use, triangles were obtained and errors in gunnery were corrected by means of wireless telegraphy. The base line for the metrical operation was obtained by two cruisers, which took up a certain position at known distance from each other. The result was that the shells, as the writer was told by well known correspondents just happened to be in the town of Port Arthur, hit the Russian ships in the harbor, and the shells missing a strike did not fall farther than fifteen yards from the ships. (s. 7a, p. 73; s. 3, p. 140; Arts. 12 and 12a, p. 201; ss. 5-6a, p. 212-3.)

8. Feb. 14, Cossacks cut up the Japanese detachment on the Tai-lienwan Bay shores.

The torpedo attack and bombardment of Port Arthur was continued on Feb. 15 and 16, the bombardment being timed to draw attention from the efforts to land on Tai-lienwan Bay. The first force landed Feb. 16, and a part of it was repulsed by being cut to pieces, on Tai-lienwan Bay, by Cossacks, but the Japanese landed enough men to hold a station and continued to increase the force from day to day. Russia smarting under the defeat at Port Arthur, blamed Admiral Viceroy Alexieff and on Feb. 18, word went from St. Petersburg that Alexieff was to be recalled and really deposed and Major General Pflug would be in temporary charge at Port Arthur, until the arrival of General Stoessel. Alexieff in a furious rage resigned, but was persuaded to resume his duties. (s. 6, p. 93)

9. On Feb. 21, fresh disaster overtook the Russians at Port Arthur, when four destroyers were lured outside the harbor and captured after being crippled. Alexieff, a dethroned popular hero, left Port Arthur for Mukden Feb. 22, and his departure marked the end of the second period of the siege.

1. The Russian fleet was crippled, but not destroyed. The Japanese realizing that even should one great battleship escape, the vast fleet of transports then carrying thousands of troops from Japan to Elliott Island, where the base had been established, would be in peril, determined then to block the harbor of Port Arthur to prevent the egress of the Russian warships. The first attempt to block the channel was made Feb. 24, three transports heavily loaded each with a crew of volunteers willing to die in the attempt, were driven into the outer harbor with instructions that they be sunk in the narrow channel between the Tiger's Tail Light and the Golden Hill promontory. There were so many volunteers that they were picked by lot. (s. 1a, p. 194.)

2. The lights flashed from the electric cliffs, and the battleships and



forts, caught the wooden vessels as they steamed forward under a rain of iron. One reached the Golden Hill, but was sunk before it touched the channel, and two driven from their course by the hail of iron, sank in the outer harbor. The attempt to duplicate the feat of Santiago had failed. The men who manned the vessels shaved their heads bare as a token of their having felt ashamed of the failure, but they made themselves again the volunteers for the next attempt in order to wipe out their first dishonor. (s. 3, p. 120.)

3. The Japanese prepared to repeat the manoeuvre, but a new figure appeared on the scene. He was Makaroff, sent to take charge of Port Arthur fleet, and who arrived March

**MAKAROFF APPEARS.** Hauling the crippled ships into the great dry docks he set to work to repair the damage. (s. 1, p. 125.) On March 27, the Japanese made their second attempt to block the channel, sending vessel after vessel loaded with stone, and manned by little crews of heroes, into the harbor. The forts and the Russian ships belched iron and fire, and one after another the wooden ships were blown to pieces and sunk; and the Russians were overjoyed at the result, and St. Petersburg reverberated with echoes of exaltation at having helped themselves, as the Japanese hoped, detrimental to the Russians. (s. 1a, p. 194.)

4. Two pushed into the channel, but sank too far to the south side of the gateway and it was left open. The Japanese crews, seeing failure, killed themselves or were blown up by the torpedoes from the Russian torpedo boats, that, under the fire from the forts, ran alongside and blew the merchantmen into driftwood.

5. The second attempt had failed and it was not until April 13, that the Japanese had their revenge. On that day the Japanese hid a part of their fleet behind islands, and sent the lighter, faster vessels in among the mines they had strewn around the fortress.

6. The Russians repaired ships steamed out and the Japanese fled rapidly, with the Russians in pursuit. (s. 1, p. 125.) Suddenly Makaroff

**RUSSIANS FALL INTO TRAP** saw something was wrong and signaled  
**LAI'D BY THE ISLANDERS.** the recall, but too late. The Japanese were steaming out with their battleships to cut the Russians off from Port Arthur.

The Russians fighting at long range turned and fled, with the Japanese in pursuit. Suddenly the great battleship Petropavlovsk was lifted from her course. A geyser sprang up in the sea. The great vessel reeled and went down like a lump of lead. Markaroff, worthy of his naval heroism, perished with his crew, a meel for the fish and food for the seaweeds, and only a few were saved by the Norvik, which gallantly rushed to the rescue.

7. There was a personage, a celebrated Russian war-scene painter. He as a personal friend of Makaroff was on board the flagship as an investigator of originality. His main object was well known as to checkmate by his vividly horrible descriptions and realistic representations, the terrors of modern ponderously weaponed wars, a butchery the art

of the wholesale massacres of men after antiquated glory; he was, in a dream-like fashion, swallowed down in the turbulent eddies of boiling bubbles of the element, gushed out from the huge engine boiler. Before he could realize himself able to have checked the horrors of wars, he himself as a victim of his sympathetic heart went to the bottom of the sea. He himself no other than Vereshchagin, being greater in the eyes of the learned than Russia itself, the circle of enlightened people everywhere felt sad at the loss of him, one of the dearest friends of the civilized world, more than his country. (See s. 8, 9, pp 18-19; p. 133; s 4, p. 138.)

8. The Russians fled again, but before they reached safety the Strasherin was blown up. Ouktomski took command and on April 22, a fresh horror was added, for a launch crowded with officers blew up, killing them all.

9. The Japanese made their third attempt to seal Port Arthur, on May 3, and this time their volunteer heroes were partially successful, sinking three stone-laden merchantmen in the channel and blocking the passage except for small vessels until they were removed by the Russian dynamite. (pp. 121-223.)

1. Secure at least—if only for a short time—the Japanese, on May 4, began landing troops in large numbers. The sea between Elliott Islands and Tailienwan Bay was black with transports, and by night a formidable Japanese army was encamped on the peninsula. On May 5, the last transport left for Port Arthur, narrowly escaping capture by Japanese scouts. (s. 4, p. 91; s. 6, p. 93.)

2. The Japanese main army was landed at Pitsewa and Port Adams, on both sides of the narrow neck north of the fortress. May 5, the railway to Liaoyang was cut, and the move, that was to seal Port Arthur, was begun. The Japanese were preparing to start the siege in earnest, and the first move was to prevent the arrival of re-enforcements from Kuoropatkin's army at the north, where Alexieff had become a great obstacle to the famous Russian General's plan.

3. May 10, the Japanese fleet bombarded Port Arthur from behind the hills to the westward and the bombardment was continued at intervals for ten days, doing small damage. (s. 3, p. 76.)

4. May 21, began the five days' fight, that culminated in the bloody battle of Nanshan Hill, May 26, 1904. The Russians were defeated, but at a terrible cost, and the Japanese, after occupying Dalny, planted a circle of Japanese guns around the outer ring of Port Arthur's forts.

5. May 26, the real movement on Port Arthur commenced. The Japanese sweeping all before them, after terrible fighting like demons, captured Kinchau and Nanshan Hills, with the terraces upon terraces of the forts, driving the Russians back with heavy losses and throwing the army entirely across the peninsula. The whole world was stricken with a great surprise as they thought the Japanese could never attack the enemy by a frontal assault. (s. 3, p. 76.) During the summer nearly all of the fighting was done by the torpedo boats, with a very little damage to the enemy. (s. 7, p. 162.)

6. On May 27, the siege was fairly begun; with the Japanese war-ships lying like watch dogs in the offing; the stronghold was cut off by land and sea. The opposing forces at this time were estimated to be about

THE REAL SIEGE  
WAS FROM MAY 27.

100,000 Japanese to about 38,000 Russians in the fortress.

7. From May 30 to June 3, fresh thousands of Japanese troops were landed at Dalny, the Japanese clearing the mines from the harbor and establishing a permanent base of operations. The Japanese used fish-nets to scrape out the mines put down by the Russians along Dalny, and near the mouth of Port Arthur. (s. 7a, p. 73; s. 7-9, p. 125.)

8. Port Arthur was cut off from the world, but between the Japanese and their goal were over fifty miles of hills, many fortified and held by dangerous bodies of Cossacks. Without rest the Japanese pushed southward and on May 13, the Japanese army occupied Dalny, the Russians offering only feeble resistance.

9. On June 23, the Russian fleet came out of the harbor, and the Japanese sent their torpedo flotillas against it. There were not less than ten direct attacks, but all the damages were suffered by the torpedo boats themselves.

1. In the meantime Kuoropatkin was urged to send re-inforcements south to the aid of the fortress, and Stackelberg, with a force of 30,000 men, started for the relief. He was intercepted by General Oku, and the battle of Vafangow, one of the worst disasters the Russians had yet met, followed on June 14, and that stopped the talk of relief. Stoessel and his heroes were left to their fate.

2. During June and July a number of the outlying forts were captured by the Japanese, whose bombardment, although incessant and terrific, seemed to have no effect on the main defenses. Green and Wolf Hills were taken and Takushan followed.

3. At dawn on July 9, the Russians came out with numerous vessels at their head to clear away the mines. The Japanese destroyer flotillas fought them until about 4 P. M., when the Russians withdrew inside the port, without any damage on either side. The main Japanese fleet took no part in either of these engagements.

4. On one occasion a Russian battleship was for two days surrounded and harassed by a flotilla of six Japanese torpedo boats, but escaped unharmed, though numerous projectiles were launched at her.

5. The Japanese looked upon their remaining battleships, it being admitted that one has been sunk, as the very life of the nation. It is therefore the Japanese policy never to permit their battleships to be within the zone of danger, as their naval experts greatly envied and very well remember the efficiency of the two large battleships, Ting-yen and Ching-yen, in the Chinese-Japanese war. Their other craft, cruisers, torpedo boats and destroyers, they are at any and all times willing to risk, but not their battleships. These three battleships form the bulwark and substance of the Japanese navy, and the Japanese navy has Russia beaten as long as it commands the sea. (See ss. 9-21, pp. 73-75; pp. 138-9, and 174-9.)

6. For nearly a month then the campaign was one of skirmishing and preparation, the Japanese steadily advancing southward and pushing back the Russians into the outer lines of the defenses of Port Arthur itself.

7. On June 23, there was a sea fight, in which the Japanese sunk two Russian vessels. During all of the southern movement of the army the navy kept up its bombardment of the port, waiting and watching lest the Russian ships should escape. When the real fighting began, the Russians had a force estimated at 34,000 men in Port Arthur fortress; the Japanese, a force estimated at 140,000 on the peninsula, with bases on Pigeon Bay, as well as at the main base at Dalny.

8. The Russian outer line of defense was forty-two miles long, extending in a circle around the city, with every hill fortified. It was against this line of defenses that the Japanese first rushed.

9. Encouraged by the rout of the Russians at Kinchau and Nanshan, the Japanese threw themselves forward with great determination and on July 4 and 6, after terrific fighting secured their first lodgment in the outer defenses, capturing four hills and forcing the Russians to evacuate others. The

#### THIRD PERIOD OF THE SIEGE.

fighting had begun auspiciously for the Japanese, but on July 10, they met with reverses calculated to stagger the nation. Rushing forward with almost fanatical bravery they attempted to sweep the Russians from the hills to the northeast of the fortress and were slaughtered by thousands. Mines exploded under them, and the great guns withered them by regiments and although driven back at many points, they gained three hills and held them. The price that they paid was estimated by the Russians as 28,000 men, and the Japanese were silent as to their losses. (s. 3, p. 90; s. 9, p. 95.)

1. The night attack gave the Japanese new advantages, however, and taught them caution. On July 12, they pushed their advantage and at the price of 4,000 men, drove the Russians back and pushed a mile nearer the citadel. On July 13, Field Marshal Ōyama arrived and took command of the Japanese armies. With the arrival of Marshal Ōyama on the scene July 14, as commander-in-chief of the armies, a message was sent to Stoessel demanding the surrender of the fortress or its capture by storm, as the alternative. Stoessel refused and told the enemy to march on. In the assault that followed, the whole regiments were wiped out. An attempt was made by the Russians to recapture Takushan, but it failed. The Japanese held the hill 845 feet high, and their guns protected to some extent their sapping operations against the inner forts. (s. 3, p. 119—; s. 3, p. 120; s. 1 p. 168.)

2. On July 26, 27, 28, the fighting on land was desperate and almost continuous, and finally the triumphant Japanese took, by desperate charges, Wolf and Green Hills—important positions that dominated part of the inner line of forts. Marshall Ōyama left for the north on August 2, satisfied that Port Arthur would fall within a short time.

3. The bombarding and fighting were almost continuous until August

10, when the Russian fleet seeing that capture or destruction were inevitable, steamed out of the harbor in a desperate attempt to break through the Japanese line of steel and fire. Battered, torn and sinking, part of the ships broke through the line and escaped capture, only to haul down their colors in neutral ports. Four turned back to Port Arthur

#### FATAL SORTIE

MADE BY THE  
RUSSIAN FLEET.

in their desperation and many of the others were sunk. In this and previous sea-struggles, there were blown the Russian vessels struck on their own mines. The Russian navy exclaimed: "How far our own mines inflict calamities upon ourselves!" On land the Japanese, paying a life for every foot of ground gained, advanced steadily the sappers and engineers pushing forward their lines persistently under the belching guns of the fort crowned hills. The Russians first struggled desperately to block every Japanese advance, and then met the concentrated artillery fire of the Japanese with its kind. Latterly, since the Japanese began running parallels and transverses and extending mines, the Russians have been constantly making sorties. They rushed into the Japanese trenches and engaged in ferocious struggles with the engineers and pioneers.

4 With desperate courage the Japanese continued to close in upon the fortress, progressing stage by stage. The Japanese infantry never failed to respond when asked to make an assault on almost impossible positions, and when the troops gained a foothold they generally held it with unflinching determination. (s. 4, p. 91; s. 6, p. 93; s. 3, p. 112.)

5. On August 10, came the sensational dash of the Russian fleet, to which the Japanese fleet gave chase, and what ought to have been the final finishing battle of the campaign; but again somehow or other, the Japanese, though considerably stronger in ships and guns did not take advantage of their opportunities. At the dawn the entire Russian squadron tried to escape from Port Arthur, but was not entirely free from the port until 9 A. M. The fleet consisted of six battleships, four cruisers, and eight destroyers. On the day previous to this sortie the *Retvizan* was five times struck by shells from an eighteen-inch gun which the Japanese had brought into operation on shore, one shell going through the decks and bursting on the protected deck at the lower edge of the armor, opening seams in her side and filling two of the smaller compartments with water. On the same day the *Peresviet* was struck three times, but was not severely damaged.

6. Outside of the harbor, the Japanese torpedo flotilla steamed ahead of the Russian column at a safe distance, floating mines which greatly interfered with its maneuvering. About noon the engagement began, about Round Island, thirty miles east of Port Arthur, lasting about forty minutes.

7. At 1 P. M., the Russian fleet had fought its way through the Japanese line, and headed for Shang-tung Peninsula on its way to the open sea. The Japanese fleet continued to be reinforced until it consisted of a first squadron of five battleships, a second squadron of one armored

and three protected cruisers, a third squadron of one armored and four protected cruisers, and an old battleship, and a flotilla of thirty torpedo boat destroyers. The Japanese gradually overhauled the Russians. At 5 P. M., a second engagement began and continued until sunset, when the Russian fleet scattered in disorder, pursued by the Japanese, but managed to escape capture or serious damage.

8. After dark the Japanese torpedo boats attacked the Russians without injuring them. Before noon on August 11, they had returned separately to Port Arthur, the battleships, Retvizan, Probieda, Poltova, Peresviet and Sevastopol, and the protected cruiser Pallada, all crippled or disabled later by Japanese land guns. Of the other vessels, in a running fight, Admiral Witgoeft was killed on the flagship Czarevitch, which was a wreck and three destroyers went into Kiao-chou Bay; the Askold, badly battered and one destroyer reached Shanghai. The Novik went to Kiao-chou, but sailed again for Vladivostok, but, finally caught and destroyed by Japanese cruisers, on August 21, off Korsakoff. One destroyer went to Chefoo and was seized by the Japanese; one went ashore near Wei-hai-wei, and one was last seen near Jig-wei Island on the Korean coast. The Diana escaped to Saigon. None of the Japanese vessels appeared to have been so much injured as to have been put out of the fighting line.

9. The night after the battle the Czarevitch, very much battered and bruised, although far from *hors de combat*, was attacked six or eight times by Japanese torpedo boats, but repelled them without suffering further damage. At this time she was steaming about four knots an hour, with her hand steering gear. Her admiral, the chief of staff, and the navigator had all been killed, with many others, hence her *personnel* must have been much demoralized. When she reached Tsing-tau, the only damage she had suffered lay in her foremast and her steering gear. The latter was quickly repaired. None of her guns were disabled, and her armor showed only five hits, none of them serious. (pp. 105-7.)

1. The Germans urged her officers to put her in order, and go out for a fight the next day, but the Russians were perfectly satisfied to tie up out of danger in a neutral port. The Diana, which escaped to Saigon, repelled a torpedo boat off Kiao-chu. The Japanese destroyer Murakmo, after night fall, on the 10th, attacked a vessel of the Pallada type, and discharged a torpedo at a distance of 400 yards, but missed its target. Burin, the Russian destroyer, was chased ashore the next morning in Yung-ching Bay, and was abandoned and blown up by her crew. (s. 6, p. 93.)

2. On August 14, by daring and fierce assaults on the outer forts, the Japanese swept the Russians from the two hills, capturing several. During August, the fighting around the fortress was fast and furious. August 15, Japanese by desperate charges stormed and captured Sushiy Hill, Lang Mountain and White Wolf Hill, completely enveloping the fortress. The end seemed near, and further resistance, useless, and on August 16, the Japanese demanded the surrender of the fortress and offered to permit all non-combatants to leave, and granted the Rus-

sians permission to bury the dead. Stoessel considered the offer until the next day, August 17, when he refused to surrender or to send the non-combatants out of Port Arthur. Meantime the Japanese had mounted over three hundred guns on the hills around the town and were pouring a constant rain of iron and shells upon the forts and the city itself. The buildings were in ruins, the forts broken, the warehouses and oil tanks burned, and the public buildings blown to pieces. The people lived in holes in the ground, and even then they were not safe.

3. On August 19, the situation became so unbearable that the Russian vessels, remnants of the fleet, driven out by shells of the Japanese, crawled outside the harbor and lay under the shelter of the forts in the outer hills. The bombardment continued, growing more desperate every hour, and in a desperate assault, Taku Mountain was captured. August 20 and 21, Fort 25, one mile from Golden Hill, was breached and the Japanese took it by storm. That day they took forts that they could not hold, because of the terrible effect of the Russian shells, but they mounted, on Fort 25, guns that swept the entire town. The artillery duel vied with fearful clashes and clacks of thunders and lightnings. Four hundred Japanese cannon roared night and day. The infantry, fighting in relays, stood in the trenches ready to rush forward at any opening.

4. The Russians, whose lines of defense were compressed to less than ten miles, manned them with 590 guns to a mile, a cannon every eighty-eight feet, and hurled death at an advancing foe. The Japanese, fighting in relays, secured rest, but the Russians fought day and night. August 22, Russian fire silenced Japanese guns in some of the captured forts. General Stoessel sent word to a friend in Moscow, saying, "Farewell forever, Port Arthur will be my tomb." That day the Japanese began the three days' assault, which they declared, would give them the fortress. That day they captured Etseshan and Outeshan Forts, and the same day the Sevastopol, moving outside of the harbor, struck a mine and was wrecked.

5. The Port Arthur Novoe Krai contained pathetic references to the last stand of the last ship of Russia's Asiatic squadron. Even General Stoessel, who had been silent in respect to the navy since August 10, issued an order lauding the battleship Sevastopol and Captain Essen, who for five nights withstood the numerous attacks of torpedo flotillas, till at last the death rattle sounded through the gaping wounds in the Sevastopol's sides and Russia's Asiatic fleet was no more.

6. "Nothing could exceed the unflinching devotion of the men who nightly and calmly went forth into the roadstead in the face of certain and ultimate destruction. The only other expression of the Russian fleet is the expression of the feeling of helplessness of everyone, as ship after ship succumbed to the huge Japanese shells."

7. August 19 and 20, an attack was on Panlung Mountain. Electric wire entanglements protected the latter position. The Japanese artillery first shelled the Panlung fortifications fiercely, and then on August 21,

the Japanese infantry charged and were beaten back, owing to the deadly fire from Russian machine guns and the insufficiency of the preliminary destruction of the wire entanglements.

8. The Japanese were also forced to abandon a fort southeast of Keekwan Mountain, which was captured after a desperate fighting, owing to the enfilading fire of the neighboring forts. During the morning of August 22, the Japanese troops forming the centre army charged the east fort on Panlung Mountain and by noon had captured two-thirds of it.

9. The Russians continued to hold the keep, resisting desperately, aided by the fire of the west fort, and forced the Japanese to abandon the position occupied. The Japanese centre immediately reformed, stormed, captured and held the west fort, forced the abandonment by the Russians of the east fort and mastered the entire position.

1. On the night of August 23, the Japanese center, with the right co-operating, attacked the heights northwest of Wangtai and the north fort east of Keekwan Mountain, but the troops were forced to abandon the attack on account of the heavy losses sustained from Machine-gun fire from every direction.

2. August 24, two Russian destroyers were reported to be sunk by mines. That night the ranks of the Japanese were decimated by the furious shrapnel fire of the Russians that they were forced to retire to the valley below the captured forts and what might have been a successful assault, with the capture of the fortified ridge east of Port Arthur, was converted by the Russian tactics into a repulse, redeemed in part by the wonderful fighting qualities of the Japanese infantry and their refusal to accept what seemed to be the inevitable. (s. 5. p. 86; s. 5. p. 116; s. 2, p. 171; s. 2, p. 189.)

3. From August 19 to 24, the Japanese casualties were 14,000! The centre division alone lost 6,000 and a single regiment lost 2,500. Only six officers and 200 men of this regiment were left after the fight. The retention of the Banjusan forts gave the Japanese a foothold on the fortified ridge as a result of six days' general assault. The Japanese determination, capability and success showed enough what the future would have brought to them. (s. 3, p. 112.) But the experiment was so costly that it was not repeated. From this time onward, while fierce fighting at close quarters, bayonet charges and the use of hand explosives were frequent, the Japanese depended chiefly on sapping and dynamite to reduce the fortress.

4. Aug. 25, the Russians centered their fire on the Japanese trenches leading to Rihlung Mountain. A detachment of 100 Russians then advanced and attacked the Japanese miners. Thirty Russians charged into the trenches and twenty were killed before the survivors retired. Aug. 27, the Russians again shelled the Japanese miners, and twenty Russians charged the Japanese twice, throwing bombs into the trenches.

5. Aug. 27, in the morning the Russians concentrated their artillery fire, attacked the entire Japanese line and were repulsed. Until the end of the month and the first week in October the Russians continued to attack and shell Panlung Mountain. They managed seriously to damage



the new Japanese works there and to hamper the operations of the Japanese miners.

6. Aug. 28 and 29, the Japanese bombarded the Russian fleet. Seven or eight shells struck the Russian warships. The Japanese completed mine to within forty yards of Fort Kuoropatkin.

7. Sept. 9, the Japanese mines had reached within about forty yards of Fort Kuoropatkin and about 200 yards east of the northern forts on Keekwan Mountain and some fifty yards from Fort Suishying.

Sept. 12, The Japanese discovered that the Russians were endeavoring to mine Panlung Mountain, and frustrated the attempt.

8. The afternoon of Sept. 19, the Japanese using siege and naval guns, opened a general bombardment and at 6 o'clock in the evening made assaults on Forts Suishying and Kuoropatkin and on a Russian position on 203-Meter Hill.

9. The attack was continued at dawn Sept. 20, with the result that the Japanese occupied Fort Kuoropatkin in the forenoon of that day. They also captured four additional forts southeast of 174 Meter Hill, inflicting serious casualties on the retreating Russians.

The Japanese attacked 203-Meter Hill from the east, north and west during the night and a company of the Japanese managed to reach and secure a foothold on the northwest point on the summit of the hill, which the Japanese prepared as a base for further operations, and then endeavored to capture the entire position.

The Russians, however, were re-enforced and desperate fighting followed. The gallant little company of the Japanese, without food or water, managed to hold the position throughout Sept. 21, and until the night of the 22d, when they retreated. During the fight the Japanese threw bombs and stones at the Russians.

1. Sept. 21 and 22, small company of the Japanese captured and then held positions forty-eight hours against desperate attack without food and water; finally forced to retreat.

Sept. 25, one hundred Russians attacked the Japanese miners at Rihlung Mountain, twenty killed; survivors retire.

Sept. 28, The Russian fleet was bombarded, seven or eight shells hitting the ships.

Sept. 30, The battleships Peresviet and Pobieda were hit five times.

Oct. 2, The Russians at night attacked the Japanese miners and the siege line, but were repulsed after a fierce battle.

Oct. 3, The Russian fleet was again shelled; Poltava, Peresviet and Pobieda hit. During the night of Oct. 4, the Japanese surprised the Russians and destroyed two guns on Yenchiang Hill. These moves continued throughout the early part of October, the Russians varying the routine now and then.

2. Oct. 5 to 9, the Russians repeatedly attacked the Japanese miners. The Japanese continuously bombarded forts, city and fleet.

Oct. 10, the Russians made a night attack on the west fort on Panlung Mountain, using dynamite and were again repulsed.

Oct. 11, the Japanese captured the railroad bridge south of Lungyen. Oct. 12 and 13, Japanese shells set fire to the Peresviet, apparently disabling her. They also set fire to another warship, name unknown, in continued bombardment.

Oct. 16, the Japanese centre, taking advantage of a bombardment, stormed and captured a fort in the center of Rihlung Mountain after a struggle. The Russians left behind them 100 dead, one field gun, one small gun and two machine guns.

Oct. 17, a desperate fighting razed around Sungshu Mountain and 203 Meter Hill.

Oct. 18, The Japanese captured some Russian prisoners who said that the fate of Port Arthur was near at hand, and that the food supply was insufficient and that the Russian battalions were greatly reduced numerically. Stoessel called for a "Forlorn Hope" dash. They added that Gen. Stoessel was giving rewards in money and medals for 400 volunteers to make the sortie and destroy the Japanese guns. From Oct. 18, the Japanese continued to drive their trenches further forward, the Russians desperately resisting.

4. Oct. 24, the Russians ran a traverse from east of Keekwan mountain and dynamited the Japanese traverse; a conflagration raged at Port Arthur during the afternoon.

Oct. 25, the Japanese guns sunk a thousand ton steamer in the harbor. The next day, the 26th, began the most desperate and the most prolonged tremendous general assault, the object of which was to compel the surrender of Port Arthur on or before Nov. 3, the Tenshi's (Emperor) birthday. The closing days of October brought notable successes to the besiegers, but they also met with serious reverses.

5. On Oct. 28, two-hundred and eight Japanese shells proved effective and wrecked many Russian guns and damaged forts on 203-Meter Hill and several strong positions, wrecking the counterscarps of Rihlung and Sungshu forts and captured "P" Fort between east Keekwan and Panlung mountains. They lost 2,000 men in this operation and were forced to abandon the positions.

6. Oct. 30, the Japanese took forts on Keekwan Mountain, after desperate fighting in the tunnels, in which they lost 1,500 men. These positions were later re-taken by the Russians at a heavy cost. November was marked by furious battles, the Japanese gaining ground almost inch by inch.

Nov. 4, the supreme attempt to give Port Arthur as a birthday gift to the Shujō was conceded to be a failure, although in a final assault, Nov. 4th, several minor positions were captured by the Japanese.

7. Nov. 5, at this time the Japanese—hearing from Russian prisoners that the rank and file of the garrison were discontented and inclined to rebel at the terrific cost of maintaining the defense—issued a statement to the Russian soldiery offering terms of surrender. Ignoring Stoessel, they released some of the prisoners and instructed them to make the terms known to their comrades. The letter fell into Stoessel's hands,

and he directed that future bearers of letters of the sort should be hanged, and the attempt failed. (s. 8b, p. 106.)

Nov. 5 and 6, the Japanese were repulsed in an attempt to carry Etse Fort by storm.

8. Nov. 9, hundreds of the heaviest of the Japanese guns began a new bombardment of the shipping in the harbor and several shells damaged the Russian warships. On the 13th, the Russians were repulsed in a sortie. An event which interested the whole world was the escape of the Russian torpedo boat destroyer, Rastoropny, from Port Arthur, which on the night of November 16, in a blinding snowstorm, eluded Tōgō's patrolling craft and reached Chefoo with dispatches from Stoessel to the Czar announcing the failure of the Japanese to gain great advantage in the great attack recently concluded.

9. Nov. 17, a few hours after the Rastoropny arrived at Chefoo, it was blown up by its own crew to prevent its capture by the Japanese, who were waiting outside the harbor.

Nov. 18, there was the destruction by the Japanese of another Russian arsenal and magazine.

1. November 21, the German steamer Batelan was captured while attempting to run the blockade.

Nov. 22-23, vast stores of coal, part of Stoessel's winter supply, were ignited by Japanese shells and consumed.

Nov. 26, the Japanese began a general assault on Rihlung, Sungshu and Keekwan Forts, but although they reached the inside, they were driven out with fearful loss.

2. Moved by the necessity of completely wiping out the Port Arthur fleet, before the Baltic fleet could arrive in hostile waters, that the Japanese heavy warships could be released to

"CAPTURE MAIN FORTS AT  
ANY COST,"

WAS THE ORDER.

meet it, another general assault to capture positions absolutely dominating all parts of the harbor at any cost was the order from Tōkyō. This assault, after

days of fighting, ferocious and bloody as any since the war began, resulted in the capture, on Nov. 30, of 203-Meter Hill. The crews of all the Russian war vessels were landed and apparently no effort was made to move the ships. The Japanese now turned their attention to the torpedo boat destroyers, and, when these had been destroyed, the guns were directed against the steamers and transports in the harbor.

3. To capture 203-Meter Hill the Japanese drenched the timber works of the trenches with kerosene and started a furious fire, which was fanned by a strong gale. The Japanese advance was very slow. They were obliged to make roads with bags of earth. It was a sudden decision to make a night attack that brought victory to the Japanese. Nothing was officially known as to the extent of the Japanese casualties, but it was estimated that in this fighting, 15,000 Japanese lives were sacrificed, but since the capture of this position resulted in the complete destruction of the Russian fleet, with the exception of one battleship, within a few days, it was regarded by experts everywhere, as worth the

full cost of the "butcher's bill," for the only warship in the harbor able to escape from the line of fire from 203-Meter Hill was the battleship Sevastopol, and that sank on December 15. It went down after being torpedoed some half dozen times by torpedoers, who braved her point blank fire in the work.

4. Dec. 1, the capture of 203-Meter Hill by the Japanese army before Port Arthur was officially confirmed. The army commenced a bombardment against the hill at dawn on November 30, and made several charges before 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Owing to the enemy's stubborn resistance the charges failed. At five o'clock in the afternoon the Japanese forces advanced against the southeastern portion of the hill, made a fierce charge, and reached within thirty meters of the summit. At seven o'clock, with the re-enforcements the Japanese charged to the top, which was occupied by the Japanese forces. Against the northeastern part of the hill the Japanese also charged, and at eight o'clock the entire fort on the summit fell into their hands. The Russians left heaps of dead bodies on the eastern side of the hill, but the Japanese had no time to investigate. The towering forts of 203-Meter Hill, which dominate the entire harbor, were taken at the point of the bayonet, and heavy Japanese naval guns, dragged with incredible labor to the top of eminence, now command every nook and cranny of the harbor, where lie the remnants of the Russian fleet, and of the town and all its forts still in Russian hands.

5. The Japanese big guns could chop Admiral Wiren's battleships to pieces, one by one, at their leisure, and the Russian sea commander must either blow up his fleet or make another sortie from the harbor, only to meet the victorious, the Japanese squadron. "The siege will be 90 per cent. finished, when the Japanese get 203-Meter Hill," was uttered, and the fall of the fortress of Port Arthur seemed to have taken place at any moment, and the houses through Tōkyō have been decorated with flags and bunting.

6. The Japanese bombardment stopped for a time, while the hand-to-hand conflict went on in the trenches on the hill, but started again, and the Japanese brought all of their largest naval guns into play. The fire was directed by balloons, carrying telephones, by which the Japanese artillery commanders learned almost immediately the effect of every shot fired. With this aid the Japanese guns searched every vulnerable place in the town. (s. 7a, p. 73.)

7. December 1 and 2, the Japanese guns, planted with enormous difficulty on 203-Meter Hill, began bombardment of the Russian warships and docks, which destroyed the remnants of the Port Arthur fleet, with the exception of the battleship Sevastopol, and a few of the torpedo boats and destroyers. December 3, the Russians attempted to capture 203-Meter Hill, but were repulsed with a loss to Stoessel's troops, estimated at 3,000 men. The next day, General Stoessel asked for, and was granted

six-hours' armistice to bury the dead of both sides. December 6, came the finishing capture of 203-Meter Hill, and its succeeding catastrophes to the Russian fleet. The famous strategic hill overlooked every foot of Port Arthur and the harbor. From its crest the Japanese officers were able to direct the fire of the heavy guns beyond with such unerring aim that the Russian ships in the harbor were rendered useless or sunk. The destruction of the fleet was followed by the loss of the great forts north of the city, one by one. (s. 4, p. 91.)

8. December 7, about these days the Baltic fleet warships, comprising the best of the remaining element of the Russian navy, were on all sides of Africa, working their way singly or in groups to a secret rendezvous somewhere in the Indian Ocean. They were accompanied by a host of volunteer cruisers, transports, repair and store ships and colliers; and had Africa been an

TWO SQUADRONS STEAMING  
TOWARD SECRET RENDEZ-  
VOUS TO PLAN FOR  
SEA BATTLE.

objective of their hostile movement, they could hardly have surrounded that continent more completely. The Armada of the invincible Amadas! Some were hurrying forward at full speed, others were waiting in more or less friendly ports, coaling and provisioning, while still others were working their way from port to port through the Mediterranean to the far east. The entire fleet would have soon been on the last stage of the journey to a secret meeting place in the Indian Ocean known only to the Russians themselves, where the concentrated fleet would have prepared to meet the enemy. (s. 3, pp. 89-90.) They were surely satisfied in thinking that the Japanese could never know their positions while the latter were taking advantage of their non-communication with the land on the part of the mid-Ocean Russians. (s. 5, p. 86; s. 6, p. 93; s. 9, p. 95.)

9. The approximate location of the secret rendezvous in the Indian Ocean was determined with reasonable accuracy. It was fixed by strategists near the Chagos archipelago, a group of coral islands, practically uninhabited, forming a dependency of the British colony of the Mauritius and situated 2,100 miles southwest of Aden and 2,350 miles northwest of Delagoa bay, on the east coast of Africa. Some of the authorities were of the opinion that the rendezvous would have taken place off the small island of Minicoy, a coral stoll some 350 miles to the west of the southern end of India and about 900 miles north of the Chagos group (s. 5a, p. 92).

1. The two detachments of the Baltic fleet: Proceeding via the Cape of Good Hope, under Vice-Admiral Rojestvensky. Five battleships with a tonnage between 13,516 and 13,600 and about 18 knots each; three cruisers and several large transports, and others. The four battleships are new vessels and among the best warships afloat. They carry four twelve-inch and twelve six-inch guns each, and are protected by nine-inch Krupp armor on the water line. One battleship has four ten-inch guns and eleven six-inch guns. There are a new cruiser and two old cruisers which have been re-constructed and modernized.

SQUADRON IN TWO  
DETACHMENTS.

2. Proceeding by the Red Sea, under the command of Rear-Admiral Folkersah: Two battleships, five cruisers, more than ten destroyers and two volunteer fleet and several transports. The warships are old, but

RED SEA FLEET.  
carry four twelve-inch guns and six or eight six-inch weapons each. The cruisers, new modern ships, except one old vessel. The destroyers are of a type built for hard work at sea. The transports are for the most part well known mail boats, purchased in Germany and are very fast at sea, carrying an armament of six-inch and four 7-inch guns. The volunteer cruisers are also armed steamers of high speed, serviceable for scouting or for the attack upon commerce. (s. 8a, p. 103; s. 8b, p. 105.)

3. For the first time since the siege began, the Novoe Krai, whose sole aim was seemingly to inspire the garrison, betrayed signs of pathetic hopelessness of even the most heroic resistance, and discussing the battle of 203-Meter Hill, says: "The fighting at 203-Meter Hill lasted sixteen days, until December 6, when 'death, which had no rest for sixteen days, ceased her work.' Barashoff, Hunt Master of the Czar, had held a conference with the Japanese in reference to protect the hospitals from the Japanese shells. The conference resulted in making the Red Cross flags larger and also the painting of the same on the sides of the hospitals. 'The hill received on its breast the hammering of 800-pound shells, which split even the rocks and went through eighteen-inch steel as though paper.' "Who but Providence can save us from these thunderbolts?" "We do not expect the Baltic fleet. We do not expect relief, it is impossible to describe, but Russia will know what her sons have suffered. It is past human genius to describe Port Arthur's sufferings as they really are."

4. "December 7, sinking of the Russian battleship, Poltava, was officially announced; December 9, the destruction of the entire Russian fleet, with the exception of the Sevastopol, officially announced. On the eleventh, the Japanese cruiser Saiyen (formerly Chinese, taken in 1894,) was announced sunk by a mine off Port Arthur, and thirty-nine of her crew including the captain, drowned. On the thirteenth, furious fighting and bombardment continued, and the city of Port Arthur suffered heavily; many conflagrations followed.

5. The following day (14) every part of Port Arthur wrecked, and the harbor being visible from 203-Meter Hill, the Japanese shells reached every part of the town and harbor. The streets were deserted and but few soldiers did patrol duty. Many buildings were burned and others shattered. The shelters of the harbor present a strange appearance, with turrets, masts and the funnels of warships showing just above the water, for the future temporary resting places for sea gulls. There was not a vessel left afloat in the harbor. The docks and buildings on the water front were torn and burned. No birds could fly around! No wild, nor tamed animals as well as the sons of the "Northern Bears" could dare go out to hunt after their food! (s. 5, p. 101.)

6. The Japanese were working their advance on the shores of Pigeon Bay on comparatively level ground against the famous Tai Yankow, Itseshan and Antzeshan forts. The approaches to the fortifications were easy, but the forts were enormously strong, and the near approach was all the more difficult as the sapping of the trenches would have been done through the frozen ground. The naval guns mounted on 203-Meter Hill were able to cover the advance of infantry against any of the western forts. (ss. 1-5, p. 122; Art. 31, p. 205.)

7. Meanwhile, on the Manchurian field, the Japanese usually had something to cover themselves, or hid in the Chinese corn plantations, from which they could discharge their guns and be hardly seen by the enemy. Japanese ingenuity took advantage of a strong wind, blowing in the right direction, and set fire to a village, and thus screened themselves, by smoke clouding along the ground, from the Russian guns. (s. 3, p. 75; s. 3, p. 89-90; s. 3, p. 112; s. 3, p. 115.)

8. On the night of December 14, the Japanese torpedo flotilla made a gallant and brave series of attacks against the Russian turret ship Sevastopol. The flotillas arrived outside the entrance to Port Arthur about midnight. The leading flotilla, and a special torpedo-boat, partly for an attack and partly for reconnoiter, approached the Sevastopol at 1 o'clock, and under the searchlights and fire of the enemy's ships and shore batteries, they attacked her. (s. 8, p. 126; Arts. 12-12a, p. 201.)

9. A shell struck a Japanese torpedo-boat, wounding three sailors, and four shots hit another boat. Subsequently the flotillas attacked, acting independently. Flotilla A. advanced first for the purpose of destroying the defenses protecting the Sevastopol and also to draw and divert the fire under the enemy's searchlight. (s. 12a, p. 201-2.) The other flotillas approached successively and bravely continued the attack from 2 until 4 o'clock in the morning, then approached the closest and delivered the most vigorous attack. (Art. 12, p. 201-2.)

1. While retreating, one torpedo-boat received several shots simultaneously, her commander and five others being killed. The boat lost her freedom of motion and the other boat went back to the rescue and despite the heavy firing endeavored to save her. While towing the boat the enemy's shells severed the hawser. This other boat was also hit and one man was killed. Subsequently several shells hit and almost disabled the rescuing boat, which forced the officer in command to abandon his comrade ship, which was sinking. However, he steamed back and rescued the crew and abandoned the torpedo-boat to her fate. (s. 3, p. 75-6.)

2. A boat belonging to the same flotilla was struck by a shell, killing one of the crew and wounding the commander and two sailors. A boat was hit and one of the crew killed and five wounded. The boat was temporarily disabled, but her comrade ships protected and rescued her. (s. 3, p. 75-6.) All the other boats bravely facing the enemy's fire succeeded in delivering attacks without suffering any damage. (s. 8, p. 126.)

3. The Japanese torpedoes took effect. The Sevastopol had lowered at the bows considerably, facing toward the south-southeast. She did

not change her position in the current. She was anchored in shallow water close inshore. It is a source of great satisfaction with the Japanese that their torpedo attacks were delivered without the least confusion. Each boat rendered material assistance to its comrades. The skillful manœuvring and bravery of the officers and men inspired the nation with a deep feeling of satisfaction and confidence. (s. 2, p. 7; ss. 7-1a, pp. 169-170.)

4. December 15, 3 P. M.—the turret ship Sevastopol, the last battleship of the Russian Port Arthur fleet, was still afloat, but was apparently damaged, finally, torpedoed repeatedly and sunk; Japanese torpedoing crews, defying her point blank fire, lost seventy-four men, killed and wounded. The Russians were simply made helpless.

5. The Japanese experts assert that they found that the very sinking was from taking off the Kingstone and setting water into the vessels on the part of the Russians. (s. 6, p. 93.)

6. The commander of the naval guns overlooking Port Arthur said: "The to-day's bombardment was principally directed against the arsenal and torpedo storehouse at the Tiger's Tail Peninsula and the vessels anchored in that vicinity. The storehouse was set on fire, and burned in about an hour. About six shells struck the ships, and three vessels used for various purposes were destroyed. One took fire and sunk. The bombardment of the buildings caused serious damage."

7. The Japanese fleet were thus left free to go into dock, all of the warships in Port Arthur being destroyed. (Arts. 12-12a, p. 201-2.) The Japanese could now do anything they wanted for preparation to meet the Baltic Armada, the Russian second pride, which already exposed cowardice by destroying the English trawlers as Japanese torpedoboats.

In St. Petersburg, December 15, much disgust is manifested over the manner in which a notorious Russian adventurer swindled several newspapers abroad by fictitious stories of Russia having received secret information about the North Sea incident. (s. 6, p. 93.)

The Russian authorities expressed confidence in the testimony to be submitted to the international commission in Paris. A commander, wounded in the leg during the battle of High Hill, heading a party of seven Russians who left Port Arthur December 16, bearing dispatches for St. Petersburg, said: "The Japanese were compelled to clamber up the slopes of the hill, in many cases without firing, in the face of the most murderous deluges ever poured from rifles and machine guns. It seems strange to me that flesh and blood would be able to stand our fire, even for a minute. The Japanese went down in companies and squads, but there were always others coming forward. Their fanatical bravery was beyond praise, as was that of our own men. Sometimes the fighting was hand to hand, with the muzzles of the rifles at the breasts of the combatants, the bayonets being used as swords. The side of the hill was strewn with bodies, and the snow was crimsoned with the blood of the wounded, some of whom had crawled into it, seeking its coldness as surcease for their dying agonies."



8. December 19, 1:30 P. M., a Japanese camp follower, who saw a portion of the fighting at 203-Meter Hill coming from Dalny, said that

**TAKE FORT BY STORM:  
FIGHT BEHIND HEAPS  
OF THE DEAD.**

Commander Mizzeneoff's description of the fighting is not exaggerated. The Russians repeatedly brought up re-inforcements until it seemed as though the entire garrison must have been in

that section. The Russian dead were indiscriminately mingled with the heaps of Japanese dead. The slope of 203-Meter Hill being very smooth and steep, the Japanese prepared for their advance by shelling the hill-side; the shells in exploding hollowed out foot-holds. In some instances the Japanese found protection behind the heaps of their own dead.

9. December 19, the Japanese were forwarding men, guns, and torpedo boats to Formosa and the Pescadores, in order to be ready to attack the Baltic fleet at its rendezvous. 203-Meter Hill, captured at such an enormous cost, has been abandoned by the Japanese, as it was commanded by the other forts. (s. 3, p. 75-6.)

1. The Japanese army stormed and captured North Fort on East Keekwan mountain, after exploding a mine under the fortifications. A junk from Port Arthur brought a number of the Chinese who reported that four Japanese torpedo-boats were sunk during the attacks on the Russian ship Sevastopol, which sought refuge under Golden Hill. The Japanese they said were spreading false reports of their successes in order to facilitate the negotiation of fresh loans abroad. (Arts. 8-9, p. 201.)

2. December 19, the capture of the North Keekwan Mountain fort was a brilliant spectacle. For weeks the Japanese had been tunneling two shafts forty feet in length with four branches. They laid seven mines, which were exploded December 18, 1904. (s. 7a, p. 73; s. 8b, p. 105.)

3. The two attacking parties were composed of volunteers and those participating in the first attempt vowed to capture the fort or die. The soldiers of the first force were distinguished by red badges. They remained in the moat during the explosion of mines, having charged prematurely, and many were killed by the debris. The second body of assaulters, distinguished by white badges, was in the saps during the explosion and was prevented from charging immediately, the mouths of the saps having been filled with the debris. The explosion made two huge rents in the north walls, through which the assaulters charged the enemy, winning the trenches in front of the wall and killing the remainder of the garrison in the rear of the fort. ((s. 5, p. 33; s. 3, p. 75-6; s. 5a, p. 93.)

4. On the nineteenth, 5 A. M., the Japanese naval bombardment sunk a torpedo-boat at Port Arthur. The Russians had prepared around the fort at Panlung a moat 600 yards long and thirty feet wide, which they filled with petroleum to a depth of several feet, then covered it with wood and straw. In the course of an attack upon the fort early in December, the Japanese storming party sank into the morass, which the Russians fired with an electric fuse. (s. 7a, p. 73; s. 3, p. 112; s. 9, p. 122; s. 3, p. 127.)

5. The fierce conflagration lasted all night and day, and hundreds of Japanese were burned to death, but the second night, the trench having dried up, the Japanese advanced in small detachments, protected by large wooden shields (s. 3, p. 75-6), and engaged in a savage bayonet fight. The Japanese captured the position and made prisoners of 152 Russians. (ss. 2-6, pp. 99-101.)

6. Gen. Stoessel in his dispatches to the emperor, after telling of reported assaults by the Japanese from November 20 down to December 5, which were repulsed, said of the assault of November 26: "The help which God sent us on the birthday of our mother, the Czarina, gave us further victory." In the attack of December 5, General Stoessel reported General Tserpinsky was fatally wounded, and dead a few hours later. The German embassy said that there was no truth whatever in the renewed reports of an Anglo-German movement looking to mediation in the Japan-Russian war. (s. 5a, p. 92; Arts. 8-9, p. 201.) The Russians in Port Arthur were likely to run short of ammunition, ere long, as the magazines belonging to the north fort of west Taiyankan and Yehutsun exploded during the bombardment of December 17, 1904. The loss of ammunition was supposed to be great. The capture of the north fort of Keekwan Hill made a serious gap in the defenses of the northeast section. (Arts. 12-12a, p. 201-2.) "Take the fort or die," was the watchword of the Japanese; many fell by the explosion. The Japanese were now able to get to the old Chinese wall, which, notwithstanding its thickness of twelve feet, was not likely to be able to withstand attacks with dynamite.

7. It was fairly ascertained that the Russian battleship Sevastopol was rendered unseaworthy by the torpedo attacks, and there was no need for the Japanese to show further heroism to destroy it. The few Russian destroyers left unharmed, remained inside of the harbor at night but through the day they steamed up and down in the outer harbor under cover of the batteries.

8. December 20, all Japan was ringing with the praises of the heroes of the assault of the Keekwan Mountain fort.

December 20, 5 A. M., the Japanese capture of the Keekwan fort was a complete surprise to the Russian garrison, there having been no preparatory bombardment. The Japanese sappers drove shafts forty feet under the parapet of the fort from the escape-ment and the moat. (s. 3, p. 120; Art.

#### EXPLODE TWO TONS OF DYNAMITE.

8, p. 206.) In these, two tons of dynamite were exploded simultaneously, completely wrecking the interior of the fort, while the siege and shrapnel guns shelled the Russian troops in the vicinity.

9. A detachment of Japanese infantry made a headlong but premature rush, and sixty of them were buried under a mass of debris, greatly delaying the attack. Despite this mischance another volunteer force dashed forward and captured the parapet. In the meantime the Russians had been strongly re-enforced, and a fierce hand-to-hand struggle **with** bayonets and grenades was continued till nearly midnight, when

the Russian survivors returned to the city and the fort was captured. Its construction showed the utmost scientific skill and knowledge.

1. December 20, a Japanese cruiser seized the British steamer *Nigretia*, bound for Vladivostok; an examination showed that she had a large quantity of contraband of war on board. The *Nigretia* had on board officers and men of the Russian torpedo-boat destroyers, who had escaped from internment at Shanghai, and were attempting to regain the Russian lines. The British steamer, *King Arthur*, was captured, while attempting to leave Port Arthur, by a Japanese guard ship. The *King Arthur* took supplies to Port Arthur. Both were sent to Sasebo for trial before the prize court. (s. 6, p. 93.)

2. December 15, operations began and, on the twenty-fifth, were completed Christmas morning by which all of the Russian advanced positions west of Port Arthur fell into the hands of the Japanese, after severe fighting.

3. December 28, the famous fortress-crowned Rihlung Mountain was stormed and captured after twenty-nine hours of desperate fighting and months of preparation. Japanese casualties, 1,000, including forty-nine officers killed and forty-eight officers wounded; Russian loss, 200 men and forty-three guns.

4. December 31, an eye witness of the onslaught against Port Arthur said that in one attack the Japanese ran into a terrific hail of shells from quick firers, leaving 4,000 killed and wounded on the field, after a few hours. The Russians lost half a detachment of 500 men at one of the positions between Pigeon bay and the new city, where heavy firing had been going on. He was employed by the Japanese to assist in the removal of the dead and wounded, and picked up the body of a Russian Major-General, whose rank he recognized by his uniform and insignia.

5. Meanwhile, December 31, the Russians at Mukden felt happy, though their diet was dog meat. A Russian war correspondent who inspected the quarters occupied by the officers and men at the front, said—"One could hardly imagine a greater contrast than that afforded by the hungry, tired army that settled down here after the battle of Liao-Yang and the army now resting south of Mukden. The men lived in dug-outs, but most of the officers' huts were above ground. Aside from the fact that there were only five officers to the hut, and the latter contained more decorations, there was little difference between the men's and the officers' quarters. Everyone was well fed and comfortable. The dug-outs were all shell proof, and each had a stove, with sleeping ledges around the side. The men were provided with bedding, warm underwear, mostly of Chinese manufacture, and Chinese boots, which were better than could be bought in Russia. Bath houses were provided, one for the officers of each company, and one for the men. The water was heated twice weekly, the separate laundry houses were always supplied with hot water, and there was no dampness in the buildings set apart for the washing and drying of clothes or in the living quarters. The officers and men partook of the same fare, which was distributed twice daily in big

coppers from the camp kitchens. A ration consisted of a pound of meat and two and one-half pounds of bread with tea, twice daily.

"There were short rations of sugar, leather, sewing materials and reading matter. There was little sickness, owing to the care taken with the drinking water. There was a guard at each well. Some companies were compelled to use water from the Shakhe river. Water parties went to the banks unarmed. There was a general truce protecting water parties of both sides, and much chaff between Russians and Japanese were exchanged across the river. The temperature was 6 degrees below zero (Fahrenheit) and was expected to be colder."

6. Then Rihlung already fell on Dec. 28. The next day the Japanese forces attacking Port Arthur stormed and captured the formidable stronghold on Sunshu mountain (*Canon Hill*, West Rihlung). It is one of the most important commanding positions before the city and of the fortress' inner defenses; really the Japanese possessed the key to Port Arthur's inner defenses, by which the fall of the beleaguered fortress was inevitable within a month according to military experts, an immense advantage to the besiegers. The Russian quick firers mowed down the Japanese soldiers; 4,000 Japanese fell in the attack on the new city. And very early morning—4 and 5 o'clock—on January 1, the forts on Panlung and Wantai mountains were captured.

7. Conservative military observers insisted that this finally brought the end in sight. This opinion was given the more credence since the same experts predicted that, when the Japanese captured the Rihlung fort, the fall of Sungshu Mountain was inevitable. The only thing necessary to the early successes of the Japanese army was that they should have held the positions. The Japanese were able, for the first time, to attack the main defenses of the fortress through an enfilading fire on three sides. (s. 3, p. 75.) As soon as they succeeded in planting heavy artillery on Rihlung, the Russians were unable to withstand long the Japanese flanking attacks. (s. 4, pp. 52-53.) Critics declared that no army in the world could have done better at Port Arthur than the Japanese, and that, if they had captured the fortress any sooner than they did, it would have been a military miracle. It was said that, frontal attacks being the hardest, the Japanese would not dare to assault from the front, yet they attacked their enemy from all sides, and accomplished with intuitive quickness the means to their desired end. (s. 8, p. 126.)

8. The capture by the Japanese of Shungshu Mountain and Panlung Mountain with their strong forts and Fort "H" practically shattered the last of the inner defenses and left the Russians entirely at the mercy of the Japanese fire, the former strong, true, friendly allies thus literally revolting against their former masters. (Digest pp. 86-

INNER DEFENSES  
TO SURRENDER.

SHATTERED, PORT  
ARTHUR FORCED.

128; ss. 5-7, p. 86-7; ss. 3-6, pp. 100-101; ss. 8, p. 103; ss. 1-3, p. 112.)

9. Bright, clear and calm, as in Japan, was the morning about Port Arthur, January 1, 1905, the day that the Japanese keep as a synonym with Peace, when the thunders with no wind nor rain but with hurricane of fire accompanied by rumbling earthquakes were roaring and echoing among the chains of hills and mountains and lightnings with heavy thunderbolts flashing and adding their illuminations to the prismatic hues over the skies, while the Japanese commander was early receiving the New Year's camp callers, many of whom producing their new odes and poems for their country and commander, at the same time when in their country there were flying New Year's presents sent for the absent soldiers' homes from their co-patriotic villagers and townsmen. The commander said to a native correspondent, "Here in the camp there is nothing to suit a celebration of the occasion, but the *Toso* (special perfumed *sake* drunk only at New Year's day) sent from Yokohama school children has been received yesterday. Let us participate in drinking for the nation's everlasting fortune." (s. 8. p. 17.)

1. "Give the Japanese a button," said an English Major Lynch-Blosse, "and they will show you a button not only as good as yours but fifty times better. It is the same thing with their artillery. They have taken European models and made guns better than any European government pos-

JAPANESE USING A  
MARVELOUS WEAPON.

sesses. These guns have beaten the Russians. They have as many as ten batteries of these special guns, not one of which have the Russians captured, for, rather than have one taken, the Japanese will sacrifice a company or a whole battalion.

2. "This special gun uses a 456-pound shell, while the gun itself is covered by a steel casement modeled after the shell of a tortoise. This covering works on the finest system of steel springs to go up or down, so that the moment the gun ceases to fire, it is completely protected. No shot can possibly pierce this casing.

3. "Then the shell used by this special gun is also a product of the Japanese ingenuity. (s. 2, p. 10; s. 7, p. 113-s. 5, p. 116.) It is timed to break into thirty-two separate parts and each of these parts contains its own explosive. Also the shell flying from the mouth of the gun has the flattest trajectory in the world. Every other gun discharges a shell that describes more or less of a curve and only hits anything near the point at which it is aimed. This Japanese shell, on the contrary, in all its course never gets higher than four or five feet above the ground. Everything in the shell's line of fire gets hit when it finally explodes. It would open up a lane through a regiment and then burst among the ammunition wagons a mile beyond.

4. "The destructiveness of this shell is tremendous, unexampled and amazing. To it is due the immense widening of the dangerous zone, that the war correspondents talk about. Its flat trajectory is obtained by a rifling process on the part of the Japanese. The gun is not rifled by being bored after the barrel is complete, but the rifling is obtained by a twist in the steel material itself, while the barrel is being made. The process secures much better results than the old superficial rifling, while the gun itself is not spoiled by a part of the shell being left in the rifling every time it is fired."

5. Here we should not leave off without mentioning the highest explosive ever discovered, which was carefully kept secret by the Japanese until the war. Experts the world over have been utterly surprised by the most ferocious devastations of the shells containing this powder. The Russians, the deep believers in *icons* and ignorants *en masse*, believed at first that the islanders were literally playing a magic. (s. 8b, p. 105-8; s. 3, p. 164.)

6. Port Arthur at the moment of the surrender was described by a Russian naval officer: "Nothing could withstand the Japanese. As

for the hospitals, no words can adequately depict their horrors. They were worse than battle-fields. They

were gorged with broken, shell-torn bodies and with men in the grip of mortal diseases. So terrific was the shell fire that few of the hospitals escaped injury, and many men were blown to fragments in their cots.

7. "The nauseating odor of human blood and of festering wounds poisoned the air of the wards and even sickened the Sisters of Charity, accustomed as they were to such experience. So fetid and powerful was the stench that the Russian ladies attending the wounded had to keep their nostrils plugged with cotton and wool saturated with *eau de cologne* to avoid being overcome by miasma.

8. "Many suffered from loathsome ulcers on the mouth caused by eating horse flesh, itself tainted, but the only animal food that we could get.

9. "The Sisters of Charity and the volunteer nurses worked day and night in these slaughter-houses. They fainted at their posts from want of food. The shrieks and the moans of the wounded, the death rattle of the dying and the curses and yells of the men undergoing operations with-

out anæsthetics, all combined to make the place a *perfect inferno*. Severed limbs and puddles of curdling blood met one's gaze on every hand, It was a relief to rush from the foul atmosphere and the horrible sights, even if the shell-torn streets were the only alternative.

1. "Heroism of a great majority of the wounded is something never to be forgotten. Men who had received wounds that did not incapacitate them from duty would stagger into the hospitals, and after dressing their own wounds would snatch up the accoutrements and hurry back to the trenches. (s. 5, p. 101.)

2. "From first to last the Japanese delivered fifty-six assaults. The sacrifice of life was unparalleled. We killed them by regiments, but fresh assaults were delivered the next day. Recently the bombardment was much more effective than it had been. Those infernal shells were too much for even hardy Russians. The fortress was being torn to pieces.

3. "Had General Stoessel waited longer, the garrison would have been reduced to a mass of corpses. General Smiroff himself favored the surrender and the garrison, scourged by a daily hurricane of fire, unanimously supported him, yet the poor fellows wept when the first message asking what terms would be granted was sent to the Japanese. The soldiers, half starved and racked by disease, stood in the trenches staring stupidly at one another, with sunken eyes, while the officers, prostrated by the thought of giving up the fortress, actually sobbed like bereaved women as if their hearts would break. The men seemed dazed by the impending calamity which we knew nothing could ward off. We wandered about like mourners in a graveyard, and such Port Arthur was."

4. Following the severe fighting of December 31, and the morning of January 1, a flag of truce was sent early Sunday night by the Russian commander from Port Arthur; prior to the request for the armistice the Japanese had captured another important fort station, known as Signal Hill, actually followed by the negotiation for surrender.

5. A few minutes later there appeared an aid-de-camp of the Russian general, accompanied by two orderlies. He asked to be escorted through the Japanese lines to the Japanese general's headquarters, stating that he was the bearer of an important communication from the Russian Commander-in-Chief to the Japanese commander.

6. The communication was a proposal looking toward the surrender of the remnants of the Russian position and garrison, asking the latter for terms, whereby the former would have handed his sword. Owing to the importance of the matter, the Japanese general deferred replying to the proposal at once, but immediately communicated the substance of it to the General Headquarters at Tōkyō.

7. General Stoessel's appeal to the Czar, dated January 1, 1905: "We shall be obliged to capitulate, but everything is in the hands of God. We have suffered fearful losses. Great Sovereign! pardon us. We have done everything humanly possible. Judge us, but be merciful. Nearly eleven months of uninterrupted struggles have exhausted us—have compassion for us. About eleven thousand are alive, and of this number

the majority are sick and, being obliged to act on the defensive without even short intervals for repose, are worn out, or reduced to mere shadows."

8. The simple announcement, "Port Arthur has surrendered to the Japanese," was made in Tōkyō, January 2, 1905. Earlier in the day, a cable message from the commander at Port Arthur was posted: "I received a letter relating to the surrender of the garrison from Gen. Stoessel, the Commander, Sunday night at nine o'clock." This preliminary cable, and the final announcement of the surrender, was received amid the scenes of the wildest enthusiasm. Tōkyō was wild over the news of Port Arthur's fall; and not only Japan, but all of the civilized nations and enlightened people were filled with great joy.

9. There were communications between the Japanese General and Tōkyō, which were followed by the surrender on terms acceptable to both generals.

1. The Russian commander, realizing that his supply of food and ammunition were well nigh exhausted, his men worn out by months of extreme suffering, and

A NEW YEAR'S  
PRESENT.

but a fraction of the original garrison left, was ready to accept any honorable terms (s. 5, p. 101; s. 8a, pp. 103-105), and these, January 2, 12 M., were granted by the Japanese commander, who was very anxious to take the fortress as a New Year's present, a gift of Sunday, a day of rest to the Japanese nation.

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## THE JAPANESE FIND FORTRESS AN INFERNO

HEROIC GARRISON REDUCED TO A MERE HANDFUL OF ABLE-BODIED FIGHTING MEN—HATRED BETWEEN TWO ARMIES DISAPPEARED AND COMBINED HOSPITAL CORPS TO RELIEVE DISTRESS.

2. Pursuant to the terms of the surrender at Port Arthur the Japanese have taken possession of all the forts, and the non-commissioned officers with all the privates have been taken prisoners. They were mobilized, and the two armies fraternized, and where the bitterest hatred was displayed a few days before, there was shown the best of feelings. By the terms, considered magnanimous, the officers were paroled and permitted to wear their side arms. A supplementary agreement provides for the unparoled release of all civil officials at Port Arthur, who have not served as volunteers in the Russian navy or army. The officers were required to sign agreements not again to engage in war against Japan. A display was made by the Russian officials of all the mines and underground workings of the fortress. Stoessel was treated with the greatest and highest honor a soldier could receive.



3. The first work of the Japanese army upon entering the fortress was the relief of the distress among the half starved and disease-ridden garrison. The condition of the men left alive and who escaped the terrific shell-fire of the Japanese is pictured as a veritable *inferno*. According to the Russian Officers, the Garrison originally numbered 35,000 men. Of this number 11,000 were killed, 16,000 sick or wounded, while only eight thousand were left to occupy the forts.

4. Two thousand of these were unable to fight. During the fight in its last days, 265 *per cent.* of the garrison were put out of condition. This remarkable fact was due to the wounded men returning to the trenches after their wounds were dressed. Some were wounded two or three times. All of the Russian hospital corps were retained to act with the Japanese in caring for the sick and wounded.

5. The whole aspect serves as a lesson on what Russia must do and how she must change her methods to achieve a final victory in the civilized human affairs. It shows Japan what she undertook, when such enormous losses were entailed in capturing even a small empty-handed garrison driven to the last ditch. (ss. 8a-b, p. 18-19.)

6. Russia has had eleven months of hard but valuable experience in the art of war, under the new conditions imposed by modern technical requirements. It was a costly training, but valuable. (s. 8a, p. 18.)

7. The Russ said, in an even more strongly worded statement, "Had the Japanese been able to cut off the last train which reached Port Arthur, the blockade would have found the fortress even worse prepared. Well may those few remaining heroes say: 'We have done our duty, but you, O people of St. Petersburg, and of Russia, have you done all that you could or should have done. Russia cannot afford to quit during a losing fight. The time has now come for every one to put shoulder to shoulder against the wheel and redeem the prestige lost in the far east.'" (s. 6, p. 21; Arts. 26, 28, 30-1, p. 204-5.)

8. Few incidents of the whole war have aroused more bitter criticism than the blunt announcement, officially issued by the general staff that

STOESSEL TO BE TRIED  
BEFORE COURT MARTIAL  
FOR THE SURRENDER OF  
PORT ARTHUR. SUCH IS  
THE LAW OF RUSSIA.

Gen. Stoessel will have to go home and stand court-martial for surrendering the Port Arthur fortress. While this is an ancient regulation and according to law, it is bitterly resented on all sides that such an announcement should have been gratuitously made in the same

bulletin containing Gen. Stoessel's appeal to the emperor for "Merciful judgment on a garrison reduced to shadows, who have done all that was possible for human beings to uphold the honor of Russia in the face of her enemies."

9. The *Novoe Vremya*, despite the suspension of the Russ, says: "By all means let us have a court-martial, and make it, if possible, severe. The cruel judge will, perhaps, deal leniently with those who have given their blood and their lives for their country. Perhaps, also, the court will determine why a fortress known to be threatened with blockade is not

supplied with the necessary food and munitions to enable it to hold out. Perhaps such a court would bring to light many dark hidden things, and expose the creeping underground enemies of Russia, who are infinitely more dangerous to the nation than the foe who fights in the open." Now, in Chessologics, every thing or action detrimental to one and advantageous to another, who loses it for his own fullest profit, is to be calculated and is manipulated by *Mochingoma*. (s. 6, p. 93; s. 9a, p. 135; s. 7, p. 137.)

1. And there are the hundred times huger foes at home than the Eastern Englanders. Those intestinal foes, whether consciously or not, make themselves great allies of the Russian enemy. Gen. Nogi, who lost his only two children in the war, keenly feels the sacrifice of the Japanese lives involved in the success of his plan. He refers to Gen. Stoessel as the hero of Port Arthur, and emphasizes the fact that the surrender leaves fame untarnished. Stoessel said, "I heard that your only two sons were dead." Nogi replied, "One was in Nanshan and the other, 203-Meter Hill, both defied death." Stoessel remarked, "It is out of my conception to think that three out of one family have been in the army. No other way on my part than to think that you are divine." He questioned the Japanese commander where Kuoropatkin was then located; and when he was informed of his colleague's situation in Mukden, he uttered his surprise by saying that it was reported that the Russian Commander-in-Chief was already down on the peninsula (s. 5, p. 121). Then, continuing, he said "I have a fine horse and the best kind of saddle down there for him. I request you that your excellency, as I present him to you, will take care of him very kindly," showing how the great general loves and regards even a mute creature at the last moment of the vast discouragement; and the greatest majority of the Muscovites was not a Stoesselian type of strong patriotic firm frame of mind. The Japanese general replied that, if the horse was transferred to the proper authority, as he himself could not receive him, he will recommend him to the official to provide for him. (s. 5, p. 86; s. 4, p. 91.)

2. According to the terms, all the forts and their accessories at Port Arthur were *transferred* into the hands of the fair possessors of "The Six Times Sevastopol," who may use them at their will in the future, according to the capacities of their Minds.

3. Japan withdrew its fleet, except a few blockading vessels, from the entrance to Port Arthur, and brilliantly terminated one of the most memorablenaval campaigns in the History of Civilization. (Art. 8, p. 201.)

4. It is very important to know in a glimpse how the national economy of both nations stood at the time.

The Russians thus held Port Arthur against the fierce attac.

Length of siege.....	(Approximate) 8 months.
Japanese Army.....	100,000
Russian Defenders.....	35,000
Japanese Loss.....	45,000
Russian Loss.....	25,000
Russian Far Eastern Naval Loss, Warships.....	\$75,000,000

5. The Statement of the Russian War finances from the highest sources:

The war expenses up to Nov. 23.....	\$238,000,000
The army.....	161,500,000
The navy.....	41,000,000
Various military requirements.....	35,500,000
Average per month.....	22,000,000
6. The outstanding credits up to the same time were.	126,000,000
of which the army.....	83,000,000
the navy.....	31,000,000
Miscellaneous expenses.....	12,000,000
TOTAL WAR EXPENSES FOR THE YEAR.....	364,000,000
The statement then shows that the treasury pos- sesses.....	149,000,000
Stock of gold to secure note circulation.....	620,000,000

7. The statement adds: A comparison of the finances of Russia and Japan is to the advantage of Russia, and quite probable that Russia will resort to another loan in 1905, of about an equal amount of those of 1904. A portion will be placed at Berlin and the balance at Paris, both the capital cities of Russia's well nigh friendly nations. Japan, besides raising the war fund at home, secured a \$50,000,000 loan in the United States and England, each a half. Japan's war bonds floated abroad were practically to secure their sympathy with herself, the cash being left in New York and London to pay for the things bought in the respective countries, as the public and the papers were against the loan abroad, for the countrymen could meet the necessary pressure of the need of the time.

8. While Russia was showing enormous resources for the furtherance of the war for almost unlimited number of years, and, while the world at large believing it to be so, was at a loss to find how the small island empire could stand financially against the gigantic Czardom, that there in the Empire of the little groups of small islands, the nobles, wealthy merchants and collectors of rare things sold their treasures home and abroad to contribute their shares, that the associations of ladies' hair-dressers, barber shopkeepers and others had saved a part of daily earnings of their members for the fund—that school children saved their portions (see pp. 7-11; s. 8, p. 17) out of their pencil and paper expenses, economizing their juvenile extravagancies and that the students of the National Normal school taking care of the usual profusion of coal and wood for the stoves, contributed their shares, and besides, among others, even such a little, yet in result, wonderfully immense, attention to have raised a large amount of money for the soldiers at the winter quarters as to supply what the Japanese call *Kairō* (little pocket stove) to keep their hands warm—told the significance of a verdict for a victory in the war. There was no reason other than, for the soldiers in the war field, to serve their country to a man or to die. (s. 8, p. 17; p. 52: s. 3, p. 76.)

9. When they have realized, at this moment of warring, that Japan needs a powerful volunteer fleet, millions of the countrymen are pouring

their shares for the fund. This kind of sacrificing things is comparatively nothing with them, when the reader would know that in 1868 when the government announced its reliance upon the national public opinion and equality on the part of the people for the National Solidification of popular affairs, one and all the nobles presented, in the name of the emperor without any stipulation about considerations or desire for any returns, their whole estates, together with all properties—local political treasury and others accrued from them except their itemized strictly individual belongings—swords and pocket money and the like others, Utopian quixotic action realized! The estates were proportionately and without partiality distributed among the people. How diametrically different have been these clean-minded nobles from their titled associates, Russian Grand Dukes and nobles. (s. 2b, p. 69; s. 4-6, p. 134; s. 8b, p. 176.)

While Russia has come to have felt that at home and at Paris there could be no prospect to float her loans and while she realized herself unable to raise the war fund, the no-business-like islanders had the means at home for the fund to push the Manchurian war forever as long as their international trading would not be curtailed, and their *business at home is kept on, under the protection of their navy, One Wing of War*. (See s. 9-2, pp. 73-75; s. 3, p. 76.)

1. Thus, there were clearly shown the answers to the problems of the different results of different appreciations and applications of the same things on the part of the two belligerent nations; one noted for cleanliness in work, and especially Mind, liberality, patience, bee- and ant-like industry, lastly co-operations high and low, the necessity of humanity; and the other disreputed for dirty greed in every way, oppression, haughtiness, castles in wind, at last, intrigues, rebels, assassins, revolutionists, wholly lacking *chessological protections* and coverings. (See pp. 7-11; especially, s. 2, p. 7; s. 8, p. 9; s. 3, p. 75-6; ss. 5-5a, pp. 97-8.)

1a. Japan finally triumphed splendidly in Economical domain during the war. The \$150,000,000 borrowed in America and London each a half the amount in addition to the previous \$50,000,000 loan would be enough to carry on warlike operations another year on the same tremendous scale of the year past. The American financiers wanted to secure all loan. In order to secure sympathetic union with both nations, Japan parted it into two, thus showing no partiality. Japan could raise more money in both countries if she badly needed it, while Russia was at a loss to find what to do in financial world. Subscriptions for the Japanese loans were over five and thirteen times in America and London, respectively; and the subscriptions in the former were mostly by private individuals. There were thus no economical difficulties at all to be worried on the part of the Japanese. While Russia possessing one-sixth of the earth keeps a most wonderful amount of assets and abundant resources and has cramps in pecuniary veins, Japan is breaking under the economical strains. Russian utterly blind over-confidence in one way or other has not been realized; her air-castle betrays realities. Russia had a full confidence in her vast superiority to her adversary without a least idea of her own far inferiority of her seamen to her opponents, and the war

began. Her most important and strongest fleet, the Eastern navy, was annihilated without effecting any blow on her foe. Then Russia positively believed in her military invincibility yet could not realize her soldiers' rotten cores, and her famous army with very well-known Cossacks was utterly beaten. Next, Russia has come to depend on a religion of golden calf, but in vain; and her divine foe has come out, as it were with a magical wand, easily to dig out any amount of gold out of the richest mines of American cities and London. (s. 8a, pp. 103-105.)

It is approximately stated that Japanese spoils near Mukden amounted in ammunitions, supplies and others .....\$ 1,750,000  
 The Russian pecuniary loss ..... 255,000,000  
 Chinese Eastern Railroad ..... 250,000,000  
 Port Arthur and Dalny ..... 250,000,000  
 Cost of war up to April, 1905 ..... 600,000,000

Again it may be here stated, though not chronologically, but for convenience's purpose that after the annihilation of the Baltic invincible squadron in Japan Sea, May 27th and 28th, 1905, there came the third offer for subscriptions of the new large issuance of Japanese government bonds. The subscriptions received the same day were so large, not alone in the large money capitals, New York, London, Chicago and Berlin, as well as the small centers where they were received, that official announcement was sent out at noon that the lists will be closed at the close of banking business the same day. In New York, the Japanese government loan was over-subscribed four or five times, and no subscriptions were received after banking closing hours the same day. The German allotment of this large loan had been over-subscribed about ten times London reported at noon that the allotment was over-subscribed twelve times. The total loan was \$150,000,000, and it was allotted equally between the United States, Great Britain and, this time, Germany. (s. 8a, pp. 103-105.) This was thus done abroad while there was over-subscribed continual floating of \$5,000,000 and up home loans at times. (s. 8a, pp. 103-105.)

2. In the decade of quiet patient preparation, Japan held as her immediate objective point—her only thought—"The Eastern Gibraltar." (s. 3-3a, pp. 35-36; s. 7-7a, pp. 72-3; s. 5, p. 76.) Ever since the war began, nay! since 1895, "Take Port Arthur." was the soul inspiring cry. To capture it was the centre of the entire campaign, and from the first moment the great efforts were turned there. They might have waited a year and forced the surrender merely by waiting. (s. 7a, p. 73; s. 6 (3), and s. 9, p. 198; Arts. 24-5, p. 204.)

3. The surrender of Port Arthur after being cut off from

the world for 219 days marks the close of probably the most remarkable siege in the history of war.

4. In no other modern siege were the defenses of the besieged army so impregnable, and the spirit and resources of the attacking forces so irresistible. Port Arthur is the strongest place ever besieged. What the Japanese accomplished almost staggers belief. Any other army in the world could not have made such progress. Port Arthur is as strong as six Crimean Sevastopols, all situated on hills arranged in mutual supporting groups, connected by tramways and telephones and backed by a massive wall, making the movements of the troops from one to another possible.

5. It was said many times that Port Arthur would soon be captured, but meanwhile they strongly depreciated the oversanguine tone of the remarks which, since August, had been promising the speedy reductions of the fortress, thereby depriving the army of a part of the credit for its wonderful achievements.

6. Built on the rings of high hills, surrounding the harbor, the Russian forts defied direct assault, as the Japanese soon learned to their cost, and the capture of the outer ridges only exposed the captors to the concentrated fire of all Russian guns on the next chain of defenses. So the Japanese had to settle down to cutting parallel trenches, up to the very mouths of the Russian guns, before fort after fort and chain after chain of breast works were wrested from the gallant defenders. The wonder is that the fortress fell in 219 days. With any other army besieging it, Port Arthur might have stood until relief came. Japan lost nearly 50,000 men in killed and wounded during the siege, and Russia probably 30,000.

7. The siege has been marked by bravery, gallantry and desperation unequalled, and hardly excelled in the history of war. Instances of heroism that would have set the world ringing under less striking events were dwarfed by the magnificent conduct of both the forces. By sea there were torpedo-boat dashes, examples of superb recklessness, and the big war ships plowed through the mines with a heroic disregard for life, to give battle or in a wild effort to escape.

8. By land the Japanese hurled themselves against the positions said to be impregnable. They faced and scaled the

rocky cliffs and heights crowned with batteries covered with barbed wires, and crowded with defenders, suffering losses that would have appalled any European army. There were used by the islanders all kinds of instruments, contrivances and devices known in the domain of sciences to take advantage of intricacies and interactions of Chessological primary factors—time, force and space. (s. 7a, p. 73.)

9. In the doomed fortress the people lived under a devastating rain of Shimose shell and shrapnel. On scanty rations, besieged on every side, knowing that hope of succor or escape was vain, the garrison fought with a stubbornness that has evoked the admiration of the world. They met the Japanese untiring assaults with a grim valor that won even the praise of their foe, and the fighting was waged with a recklessness that often refused truces to bury the dead and collect the wounded. Over corpse-filled trenches, men fought hand to hand with cold steel and clubbed guns, and, at short range, hurled at each other hand-grenades filled with high explosives. The whole story is one of undaunted courage and sublime bravery on both sides. (s. 7a, p. 73; ss. 5-7, p. 126.)

1. The papers of the world with one accord praised the heroic work of the Port Arthur garrison; and its record furnishes an object lesson both to Russia and to Japan and to the world.

2. The "Gibraltar of the East," declared impregnable the world over, was captured, for the second time: the men of the East have accomplished the impossible. The world said at first that Japan could not defeat China, but she did.

3. Naval and military experts declared that the Japanese could never take Port Arthur from the Chinese. They swept over the fortifications without stopping. Then the experts declared that the forts were not properly manned.

4. The Russians went, built new forts, bound the hills together with walls of iron and stone, tightened with the best cement, mounted upon them the latest and best of artillery and manned the defenses with the flower of the Russian army. They said that Japan was not able to fight Russia, that Russia was too large, but Japan did fight Russia, and successfully.

5. The experts then declared that nothing but starvation could reduce the fortifications, but the little yellow men did it. The cost was fearful—probably 45,000 little yellow heroes

have fallen in the assaults, nearly twice as many as there were Russian defenders, but they captured the fortress.

6. Foreign naval, as well as military experts, the bystanders or onlookers in Chessdom discussing the conditions and circumstances of the situations remarked that the Japanese were too cautious, did not take a risk by which, when successful, they could save time and men and finish the war earlier or that they did not take advantage of opportunities in this naval (or land) war in the same way as in the war with China. Whatever ways of comments may arise, ably trained and friendly men should not be sacrificed at random from a Chessological point of view. (s. 6, p. 139; Arts: 28 & 29, p. 205.)

7. Battleships, especially men whose minds are trained for a long time and who could not be produced in a month or half a year or more, the men, the real *personnels*, more than battleships, should not be lost without great caution. The Eastern admirals and generals, Chessological experts, remarked that the officers and men would do anything as ordered by their superiors, but that they feel sorry when they go calmly to a destination, so that they need to take care of them.

8. The Japanese tried to capture the enemy's boats as in the war with China. That is their peculiar hobby. When the French Admiral Courbet told proudly a Japanese naval *attaché* on his flagship how he brilliantly crushed the Chinese warships, the young officer calmly remarked "That's not difficult. We, the Japanese, capture them!" (ss. 4-6, p. 129-131.) Let the student know how and why they could secure this peculiarity. The district over which the Dai Nipponese little islands are scattered, occupying the northwest corner of the Pacific, the largest Ocean, covers a very large area annually visited by the strongest and most frequent hurricanes in the world—for the people there at National crises, the Divine Wind, *Kami-Kaze* (s. 3, p. 129)—the same locality is celebrated for the strength and most frequency of the severest earthquakes, the foremost in the world three or more times in average a day and very common to notice creaking houses within a few days—and famous for submarine earthquakes very often conferring upon the southern seashore inhabitants occasional tidal waves swallowing them together with other living creatures and washing away houses and devastating soils—there being many large active volcanoes



sending up the whirlpools of massive cloudy smokes, turned in night into vast bright columns of burning flames of subterranean infernal conflagrations, sometimes with shocks together with rumbling noises and once in a while bringing indescribably terrific eruptions suddenly splitting mountains and emitting torrents of molten lavas over villages and towns with human victims;—the same position is celebrated for the greatest ocean stream, the famous Japan Current, known as *Kuroshio*, washing the southern rocky dangerous and traitorous coasts of the islands full of precipitous upheavals and slides standing perpendicularly at places above and below the surface of the largest body of the warmest running water over the deepest extensive bottom of the grandest ocean in the world, the Pacific;—this Eastern Archipelago, addressed by the people as the Divine Country, *Shinkok*, very different from Cuba, running parallel with the latitudes within torrid rays of the sun and very different from Madagascar and the Philippine Islands entirely bathing in tropical climates—Nippon stretching from the southwest very nearly tropical region toward the northeast then directly up to the north, thus practically a *natural museum* of almost all climes and conditions except two extremest earthly temperatures, hence the people able to go to the far south as well as cold Manchuria to fight on land;—the compact part of the earth with such most favorable conditions as several thousands of miles of coast lines with innumerable inlets and bays, variegated rivers and creeks and labyrinthian valleys and dales, and such as long ranges of the picturesquely rugged and volcanic hills and mountains, comparable, as far as the nature of land is concerned, with Greece with its indented coasts and its Archipelago plus the favorable climatic conditions of Scotland on the north and Ireland down along the northern France, Spain and round the southern Spain and along the southern France toward around Italy:—

8a. What are then not expected there? They are associated with almost all kinds of inclemencies which have drilled and hardened them. They are the sons and pupils of the strongest hurricanes and the most powerful earthquakes and tidal waves, their fathers and teachers. While the mountains are lofty enough to have produced the excellent mountaineers, Japan is the only natural university with its complete curriculum

for sailors and seamen, divers and swimmers, naval *personnels*. Thus, the whole country itself being something like the greatest navy with tremendous volcanic smokestacks and floating on and between the oft tempestuous waters, warm and cold—the Japanese born under such natural conditions and circumstances play chess or chessological hide-and-peek with violent inclemencies, and eat almost all kinds of seaweeds and, of course, fish and itself even raw and sliced and considered delicate. On account of cold mountainous regions and because of the manners and habits of wrestling with, and catching or checkmating porpoise, grampus and monstrous whales and others in cold winter, they have naturally been trained so as to be able to go to the freezing land and to fight polar bears on both land and sea in snows over the sheets, and among broken pieces, of ice. They being accustomed with damp and sultry rainy season, when rice is to be planted and taken care of, are hardened like ducks or divers, cormorants or penguins, so that they could not be troubled with any wet weather on Manchurian battleground of mud, however deep.

8b. Can they have expectation for paradise after death other than their perfect satisfaction with earnest discharge of human duty. The present aspect of panorama of infernal phenomena should be enough for once for all existences. They cannot help to understand the chessological importance of time, space and force associated with ideas of present human existences depending upon causes and effects of predestination. They are destined to take coolly and in subdued manner the human terrific eruptions of struggles. For the sake of the National Honor they consider their lives lighter than a feather of a sparrow and they are prepared to disintegrate like their glorious National Emblem, *cherry blossoms*, scattered away before sudden violent rain storm; for the sake of their idealistic humanity and the pride of honor and compassions, sources of present *paradise*, they are ready, as habitual with them, not to claim *Frais de guerre* in any guise and display, in cool, yet optimistic, manner, *Utopian quixotic actions*. (s. 2b, p. 69; ss. 4-6, p. 134; s. 9, p. 169.) The Japanese thus born in the Northern Pacific Ocean are born fishermen and famous whalers and adventurous seafarers as known from their having pirated and devastated, some ages ago, along Chinese and Korean

coasts, the Philippines, Siam and Cochin-Indo-China as the Norsemen did along the Northern Europe. To them there is no chessological distinction between the captures of from the largest whales down to little minnows. (s. 8, p. 17; s. 6a, p. 56.) To eat raw fish meat, they should keep the fish alive as long as possible. They have been dexterous whalers who are very fond of eating every part of leviathan and consider it the most delicious. What can we expect from such beings? Fine seamanship and seafaring of the first degree have been natural with them. They want chessologically to treat the unseafaring enemy as a school of fish or whales.

8c. They should have known what they were doing. They knew that it was impossible for Japan during the war to have obtained new battleships. They could afford to use as well as lose any numbers of torpedo-boats made at home and abroad, and they have known that the mosquito lancers are the best for certain especial purpose to be achieved by the specially trained experts, the *personnels* with MIND, and that battleships, however of tremendous sizes, and a navy, however invincible as far as the *material* is concerned, if not with the true *personnels*, could not be as available of producing a desired end. Thus, both the opening and closing scenes of the world's greatest naval drama have gloriously proven the efficiency of *trained skill*, the product of rightly *having trained Mind*, as shown by the proper employment of *Fuhyō* to the fullest extent of its usefulness and merit. (s. 7a, p. 73.)

9. Russia during the war could gladly give forty or fifty millions of dollars apiece for modern battleships equipped, the guns equaling the range of the guns on the Japanese fleet; Japan, also could give any price for them, to make sure of the balance of power against all the warships that Russia may send to the East.

1. Captain Klado, a Russian naval officer, tried patriotically to stir his government and the people to realize that the only hope for Russia was to send out re-inforcements for Rojestvensky to enable him to outweigh the Japanese fleet and recover the sea power. He stated that in this recovery there lies Russia's only hope in the war with Japan. That anything of real value could be done on land without the co-operation of sea strength is entirely unsound. He truthfully stated that the fall of Port Arthur was of importance *only because* it cost Russia her fleet rendezvoused in that harbor.

2. The Russian admiral's deplorable and unaccountable return with his ships after the sortie of August, 1904, he speaks of as the crowning disaster of the war. (ss. 3-1, pp. 146-148.) Futile is all hope that Russia may achieve success without the sea command, as shown by his review of the whole naval and military situation. (s. 3, p. 76; *One and Two Wings of War*, pp. 74-5.)

3. He says that supposing Russia has the most favorable outlook for the future campaign, it is impossible for Russia to do more than to keep the Japanese in check; that the Siberian railway cannot maintain more than 400,000 men at the front, and that number Japan can certainly equal; that the Japanese cannot be pushed back, except by turning the immense movements and such movements require a large preponderance of force, and this numerical preponderance Kuoropatkin can never get as long as Japan sways the sea; and that as long as the naval situation stands the same, the best that Russia can have is *status quo* in Manchuria, that is, Japan has Korea, Port Arthur and practically everything that she thinks worth having. At last, as a *Chessologic* thinker forecasted, the smallest Island Nation with the union and perfect *co-operation* of trained MINDS has come out to dictate the largest and the most formidable, in *materiel*, Empire of Bureaucracy to do anything whatever Japan wants (pp. 7-11; s. 5, p. 101), provided that her similarly interested and traditional friend, the United States and her clever ally, England might not advise her otherwise (s. 9, p. 114; s. 2, p. 201), or had she not been herself checkmated by her own sincere interestedness in the grand principle of humanity, or that Japan waging this war as a self-defense would not be satisfied without a long lasting peace to secure which Japan might not greedily impose upon Russia the payment of indemnity or tribute of one cent, as previously shown by the former with magnanimity and earnest kindness toward Korea and China and others (s. 8b, p. 19).

4. May the bystanders suggest or mutter about the ways and means of which the actual contestants alone are concerned. But, the Eastern Islanders, nevertheless, secured the most brilliant victory. Japanese Chessologic Art Proper has made their minds. Who could know, before the beginning of the wars, how the Chinese and Russians were so almost chimerically defeated, when 99 *per cent.* of the bystanders were saying that

they were far superior to the Japanese in every way, and even some Japanese high officers could not help humbly thinking it miraculous to have had lucky success. (s. 8, p. 185; Art. 29, p. 205.) The East Islanders knew how and when to take risks. The victories were secured simply because the antagonists were not cautious everywise, nor had had a *good start*, nor aware of chessological exactness and conciseness of the principles and applications of the elements—time, space and force—of struggles. The unpreparedness of the fortress, as well as others a result of usually haughty vainglories of a nation without democratic foundation of education which is the only main cause (Arts. 8-10, p. 206) of a unity of different vital factors of the nation—ignorance on which riots, strikes, boycotts, rebels and revolutionists, and unpatriotic feelings are based, taking advantage when their country was involved in war with another—all these espoused the cause of the other. (s. 8b, p. 105.)

5. The Chinese could not do anything at all. The Russians did nothing at all except sinking defenseless transports. The Russian gun practice was bad everywise. Their gunners could not hit anything. They did not damage or sink a single boat; almost all the damages that the Japanese suffered was from the mines. (ss. 8-8b, pp. 103-108.)

6. The siege, which will go down in the *History of Civilization* as the first great siege after the invention of high explosives and long range guns, marks an epoch in naval and military history. (ss. 8a-8b, pp. 18-9; s. 7, p. 42; s. 2, p. 201.)

7. The Japanese were fighting for more than the mere capture of Port Arthur. They were fighting to satisfy a national demand; to wipe out the insult forced upon them by the triple alliance. To them Port Arthur was as much almost as driving the Russians back from Manchuria.

8. Russia has proven to be as weak a nation as China; although both are the largest, only next the British Empire, in regard to the extent of territories, yet in result they are in about the same situations. China lost many simply because she showed herself to be weaker than what she had been previously considered and treated as the powerful one. Russia should recede from Manchuria and give up many, and already lost prestige from even China, and Thibet practically the Russian Protectorate by strong unwritten treaty, of which, during the Manchurian

campaign, England taking the advantage of the Russian helplessness easily made herself the protectorate by a written treaty, would not do anything any more with Russia. One of the most serious features of Port Arthur's fall is the effect upon the already questionable neutrality of the Chinese. Loss of prestige in the eyes of the orientals is tremendously much more serious than the strategical value of the fortress.

9. China having been impressed with a marked effect of the Japanese successes, Pro-Japanese sentiments on the part of her government are more openly expressed than ever. They place very large orders for arms and ammunitions while Japan is warring with Russia. Cash payment causes surprise. (s. 5a, p. 92; s. 7, p. 102; s. 8b, p. 108; s. 5, p. 113.) The "*Yellow Monkeys*" influence predominates all over the Chinese government both central, and local, and the people. To capture the town and the fortifications of Port Arthur, Russia's theatre of carnage, the Japanese sacrificed more of their men, it is said, than the men sent there by the Czar for the purpose of defense and repulse. After eleven months of almost unparalleled resistance by the Russian army its surrender was made to the enemy.

1. Whatever the cost of blood and money—the patriotic and chivalric remittances—has involved in the war, Japan's price, however, is nothing for the prize won. Sentiment more than strategy—a motive not for aggrandizement of a selfish brutal nation a cause of nearly all inter-national troubles—a sense of self defense or struggle for existence and for the promotion of the true oriental humanity—promoted the capture of the "Far Eastern Gibraltar." This "Gibraltar" was invested and captured from Russia just as, on November 21, 1894, it was captured from China. Port Arthur regained means to Japan the wiping out of a national dishonor, and the sacrifice of blood and treasures is not regretted by Japan.

2. Japan captured Port Arthur together with its adjacent territory from China, in the war of 1894, as a fruit of centuries after centuries work with one national aim for the mainland, and that the prize be easily snatched by Russia supported by the other greedy nations rankled in the breast of every true Oriental, Nipponese, for a decade. The holding of this fortress was the main point of Russia's offense, and its re-conquest was more to be desired by Japan than many rich cities or the

whole of Manchuria, because it embodied the earliest hopes of the Eastern Islanders of revenge. What the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was to France, the trick by which she was robbed of Port Arthur has been to Japan and decidedly much more. The events of the spring of 1895 burnt into the hearts of the subjects of the empire of the glorious rising sun.

3. More to Japan than the conquest of Manchuria, or a protectorate over Korea was the driving out of the Muskovite brutality from the tip of the Liaotung peninsula. This had to be done even if the last reserve, a man and a cent—in Nippon, "the land from which the sun has risen"—must have been sacrificed.


4. Thus second capture by a Japanese army of Port Arthur not only wipes out all Japanese dishonor of 1895; but, moreover, has decidedly made Japan an associate of the six first-rate naval and military nations of the world. The time has arrived to have proven that this age is not that of a mere militarism or a warlike actions. (ss. 8b-9. p. 19.) This war has been an outcome of a struggle for supremacy between the Anglo-Saxon commercial policy of civilization, the democracism and a mere military pluto-aristocratic thirst of territorial acquisition of a vast dominion for a barren glory after a manner of the Persian or Roman Empire or the great Mogol Chinese Empire under Genghis Khan.

5. Thank a unity of three nations, Anglo-American-Japanese views for the sake of humanity. (s. 2, p. 120.)

Thus, this siege of months ended in the capture of "The Six-times Sevastopol," the principles being one and the same in all struggles, very well comparable to the siege of Tyre, the most noted of the navy and army combined in ancient history, one having occurred in the Southwestern Asia in the Persian-Macedonian struggle and the other in the far Eastern Asia.

5a. Since the general aspects at the beginning of the war (pp. 133-146) and especially Port Arthur siege could forecast in a chessological abstraction an outcome of every trend of the whole campaign and because this "Eastern Gibraltar" struggle is the *focus* and *vane* of all streams of chessologic factors of the main struggle and, again, because the people who could recapture "The Six-times Sevastopol" had to have felt it easy to capture Harbin and Vladivostock and could do so easily, as

chessologic analyses show, the author does not therefore indulge in this work to take up the subjects on chessologic strategy



Black rectangular Figures Japaense forcea; white, Russians.

FIG. 10 a. The Japanese entire line in advance on Mukden covering along the 130 miles, the Japanese right and left wings far up to envelope the Russians by double flanking, the left consisting of the Port Arthur Victors, and the right, shrewd cautious and bold flowers and center, of the invincible moving rocks of the picked fighters. (s. 3, p. 75; s. 4, pp. 52-3.)

ty tragedies (ss. 4-4a, pp. 51-3; ss. 1-1a, p. 95) and that Russia, however equipped with the latest modern weapons of which some were far superior to the Japanese, was utterly defeated and her entire fleet annihilated, the first class battleships and other crafts, together with famous admirals, destroyed or captured, simply on account of her lack of education (mind) of her people (ss. 5-1, pp. 20-22; ss. 4-4a, p. 51-3; ss. 1-1a, p. 95),

and tactics practicalized in other parts, however instructive, of the whole campaign; but he considers it enough here for our purpose only to mention that there were fought at Liaoyang, Mukden, and in the Korean Straits the most stupendous marine and land battles the greatest ever witnessed in the grandest and most thrilling war of tremendous scale ever occurred in the world's history of wholesale bloodthirs-




FIG. 10 b. The map showing the Japanese army again attempting to surround the remnants of the Russian army illustrates relative positions of Tie Pass, captured by the Japanese, in relation to the objective, Harbin, of the retreating Russian army and presents the approximate relative positions of the main forcea of the two armies.



the result having been perfectly in accordance with the Ultra-Philosophic-Scientific principle of Chessology. The ways of the victories won by the Japanese in the naval battles in Yellow Sea (Japan-Chinese War), at Port Arthur and Korean Straits and the battles on land exquisitely explain how the Far Easterners planned and executed almost instinctively and in a manner of spontaneous turn of mind through their hereditary Oriental-chessologic discipline all the developments and co-operations of the naval and military forces in concerted plans.

6. When we carefully study in a chessological way the incidents and sequences causes and effects of the war, and when we *generalize and state them in symbols*, the *CHESSOLOGIC Figures of Expressions*, the philosophers and scientific men in Chessdom can not help appreciating the mission of invention and its adaptation of the principles of the *Mochingoma*. (See pp. 86-116.) The best weapons of the enemy's side have frequently been serviceable to the other side. There were several formidable guns at Port Arthur, as elsewhere, which the Japanese were not compelled to charge; yet these formidable pieces of artillery, like many of their fellows manufactured for the Czar, once captured in the attack on Fort Takushan and other forts, were used with telling effect on their former owners. The formidable forts themselves worked furiously against their former dearest friendly masters in behalf of their newly gotten possessors. The railways and their stations, arsenals and barracks, provisions and supplies, warships, transports and even contrabands of war not at all pre-calculated in the Minds of the victors, deserted their former sovereign masters and served



FIG. 10 c. A map showing military situation Manchuria. A cross indicates Gunshu Pass, scene of reported cutting off of a portion of the Russian army by Japanese forces.




FIG. 10 d. A bird's eye view of the World's Greatest Sea Battle, May 27-28, 1905, whereby Russia's formidable Armada was smashed by Japan's invincible warships. The black vessels, the Japanese; the white, the Russian. The greatest naval struggle off the Tsu Islands in the Korean Straits is here shown with the route of the Russian warships to the waters where they were annihilated. The bird's eye illustrates how the Japanese navy initiated and finished the attacks, destroyed or captured over twenty-four best Russian warcrafts. There are marked the course of the conflicting fleets, the localities where the battleships and cruisers were sunk and other thrilling incidents in the far Eastern marine tragedy. The Russian fleet left the South China Sea, May 24, and passing through the channel between Formosa and Luzon, sailed into the Eastern Sea and entered the Korean Strait the morning May 27. In the afternoon the battle began east of the Tsu Islands, where the Russians suffered the greatest losses, mainly through the torpedo boat attacks, and the ships not sunk were driven ashore on the coast of Iwami province, Japan. Thirty miles southeast of the Tsu Island, behind which a Japanese division was hidden and whence it attacked the Russian rear. We see an approximate location of Liancourt Rocks where four Russian warships surrendered Sunday morning, May, 28. A part of the Japanese navy whose base was Masampo, Korea, in delivering the attack, passed through the channel between the Tsu Islands and forced the Russian fleet ashore on the Japanese coast. The main division, however, proceeded around the north of the Tsu Islands and beautifully checkmated the Muscovite Armada.

their former enemies much more practically and much more loyally than their former owners and makers. For *they are to work the best for any one who is able to employ them the BEST* as they are not mere playthings or dolls, but things made by persons with trained minds skilfully to have yoked the elements of struggles—space, time and force;— and *they are the things made for men*, whether the makers, purchasers or friends or enemies, who have *trained* their *minds* sharply to take advantage of time, force and space, according to the *different calibers of the different storages of knowledge*. (s. 5, p. 86-s. 5. 116; especially, ss. 7-1, pp. 94-5; s. 2, p. 97; s. 7, p. 102.)

7. Lastly, the Eastern Six-Times Sevastopol itself as in the case of any other fortresses has come out to work against the former occupants; strongly serviceable factors of the friendly side, sometimes and many times, turning out as their much stronger, more dreadful and bitter enemies to their former sovereign masters than against their former antagonists.

8. The indestructible force of all these things was transposed by means of chessologically inter-exchangeable vitalities of all the Japanese strugglers supporting and protecting each other and every other as a unity, the ideal whole. The chessological co-operations demonstrated by the Japanese skill, enterprise and fortitude on the waters and her effective power on land, the fruitage of training and disciplining the *Mind* of the people, have made the nation the *Dictator* of the East whose power and influence in the commercial, political and martial struggles of the Eastern Asia will, to the greatest extent, interest all the *civilized* nations. That these results are thus secured finds its sole cause in the only *MIND* which *Chessology* has primarily trained. The Japanese are born *chessologicians*! The different make-up of the *Minds* have produced the widely different results. The Russians as the Chinese have ignorantly to the *maximum* degree underestimated the Japanese, while the latter carefully and chessologically overestimated the capabilities of the former two to the *maxima* in all points; so that the most thoughtful Japanese have come to consider the outcomes phenomenally yet paradoxically to have been reached. (s. 4, p. 178; Art. 29 and 31, p. 205.)

9. A highly advanced, refined scientific mental training is, as elsewhere many times stated, required in order clearly to

see the essence of the movements of the chess pieces. Now the student having once committed these plots and counter-plots to memory or other ways he becomes equipped with a technique, whereby he would become able or competent to project and execute any design as well as to detect and foil every machination of their antagonist.

1. Comparing Alexander's Tyre Siege and that of Port Arthur, it would appear to ordinary students that they are entirely different from each other, but from a purely chess-logical point of view, these differences are only modifications or ramifications of factors or elements of struggles, the modifications depending upon different circumstances and conditions involved in inter-relations and inter-actions in the sphere or influence of space, time and force. The same principles govern the works of both the besieger and the besieged; the principle being one and always the same, any other warfares or struggles are governed by the very same principles.

2. The two foregoing stories of the most famous sieges by both navy and army having been concisely given to expose the attributes, elements and functions of the *Mochingoma*, the student, when digested enough its apparent and latent meanings, cannot help to come to the conclusion that Chess in general—especially Occidental—though it may be generally and appropriately considered as embodying all of the principles of warfares in the most abstract way—Chess has been absolutely perfected by the Japanese genius in having invented the *Mochingoma*, and *Naru Promotion Method* (pp. 86-116 and 187-190) to give more flexible applications by the repetitions of the elements of struggles—by the production of the *Calculus in Chesslogics*. [The Dissertations on *Mochingoma* ends; look back s. 5. p. 86.]

3. *Mondai* (problem—*Mon*, lit., question, and *dai*, subject)—an imaginary position concealing artfully the winning line of play that has to be disclosed in accordance with given conditions.

*Nakabisha* (lit., middle *Hisha* or Flying war-car or -ship)—See *Uchidashi*.

*Nameru* (lit., lick off); *Namatoru* (lit., lick and take off). Unconditionally to take off the board the second of *Nifu* (a double *Fu*—pawn—on the same file) by helping and profiting the party himself against whom, despite a previously appearing *Fu*, there is put on the board the second *Fu* from

among the *Mochingoma*, the captured pieces in his opponent's possession. The same as *Suitori* (which see), lit., to take it in easily as by merely "breathing in." See *Nifu*, and *Tadatoru*.

*Nametoru*. See *Nameru*.

*Naosu*.—[Excuse me,] I adjust! See *Shikkei* or *Gomen*.

4. *Naru* (Promote or turn over or change), *Natta* (Promoted, turned over, changed) and *Naraseru* (to cause to be promoted, turned over, changed; to let it be promoted, turned over, changed) —the same as *Kaeru* (turn over), and *Hikkurikaeru* (turn over, upside down, topsy turvy).

The three lateral rows on both sides toward the players (see Diagrams 1111 bet. pp. 64-5), that is, (1—3) × ((1)—(9)) and (7—9) × ((1)—(9)), the two parallelograms, are considered to be the original fortified or defended dominions of the two belligerent parties, and the middle three lateral rows between them, (4—6) × ((1)—(9)), a primarily neutral or an original disputed, or the Middle Ground.

5. Now, the former two three-lateral rows being assumed as within the strongly defensive original lines beyond or through which each of the friendly or adversary's *Koma* pieces should or would, with great difficulties, struggle, or try to pass, some *Koma* pieces having penetrated through the passes are to *naru* or be promoted under regulations of the *Koma*'s official duties at the option of the owner who sent them into the enemy's line.

6. All the *Koma* pieces, except the Chief (king or emperor) and Generals Gold, can be promoted at the option of their owners when they penetrate into, or proceed within the third rows of squares (ranks) on the chessboard of the sides of adversaries (see the Diag. 1111, bet. pp. 64-5) while a *Fuhyō* (simply *Fu*, or *Hyō*), an Infantry *Koma* piece, a *Kyōsha* (simply *Kyō*), artillery or naval piece and *Keima* (simply *Kei*) Horse, Cavalry, must be, regardless of the owner's option, promoted on a certain square under the pure technical limitation of the chessological principle, of which you will see presently.

7. Field Marshall Prince Navyartillery, also known as Flying Warcarship *Hisha*, and Captain-General Grand Duke Diagonalis also maybe known as Diagonal-Goer, when promoted, become, respectively, King Dracon (see pp. 76-8) and Viceroy Drakohippos (see pp. 76-7); and all the others, when promoted, become Generals Gold or simply Gold, that is, assume

the duties and act as such. The three *Koma* pieces——*Keima*, Cavalry, *Kyōsha*, a naval fleet or artillery, and all the Infantry *Koma* commonly known *Fu*, *Hyō* or *Fuhyō* (pawn)——must be promoted regardless of the owner's wishes when they march onto the squares beyond which they cannot at all, unless to have been promoted, advance nor retreat elsewhere in accordance with their regular movements;——more expressively, when they move on the last positions, that is, when they arrived on the ninth squares from each other adversary's side, the extreme rows of the squares on the board toward each party, they must *naru*, be promoted, because if they do not *naru*, be elevated, they cannot be moved, that is, nothing can be done whatever with them and they are therefore practically dead. A *Koma* can be promoted at the same time when the *Koma* captures another, whose fortified or otherwise position the former then occupies, and the action of doing such is said as *Tottē naru* (lit., take and turn over, capture and be promoted [at the same time]. (See Capture, *Ikedoru*, s. 7, p. 82.)

8. When promoted (*natta*), a *Koma* should be turned upside down, showing its back face different from that which had been at the time when it was at the commencement of the struggle. See all the *Koma* showing their front and back in Diagrams I, II and IIIa and b, pp. 60-65.

9. When a captured piece is again put on the board (see the *Mochingoma*, the captured pieces, pp. 86-116), it is laid anywhere to its greatest advantage in the same way with the same front face as on the original field and it is entitled to be promoted as in the same way as treated with as above before they had been captured; but when it is again put on within the three rows (ranks), that is, enemy's original fortified domain, it may be, at the option of the owner, promoted at the time when it is moved to another quarter whether inside or outside of the three rank rows of the adversary's previously fortified territory. But in the case of re-employment of the three *Koma* pieces—*Fuhyō*, *Kyōsha* and *Keima*—their limitations as to their re-occupations of squares should be positively obeyed. (See ss. 1-2, pp. 88-89.)


9a. This *naru* promotion may be appropriately and chess-onymously for facilitation's sake, except in the case of *Hisha*, Warcarship, and *Kakkō*, Diagonalgoer, translated or rather

coined as “*Kinning or goldening a piece* (from *kin*, or gold in *Kin-Shō*, Gen. Gold and Japanese phrase, *Kin-ni naru*, to become Gold [General]),” to meet with the spirit of the phrase, “*queening a pawn*.” Of the ‘*Naru*’ of *Hisha* and *Kakkō*, we can not say as “*Kinning or goldening a piece*” because of their not turning into *Gold* [Gen.] and also, on account of their own peculiar ‘*Nari*’ (adjective from ‘*Naru*’)-*Kurai*, Figurative Dignity. (See Diag I, II and III.)

1. “*Queening a pawn*” would be a ridiculous performance if we do not understand it chessonymously by esoteric connotation of the meaning of trans-modifications of force or vitality (See pp. 86-116.) There is in exotery literally no “*Queening a pawn*” in the Science and Art of War—nay!—all kinds of Struggles.

2. *Nifu* (a double *Fu*; *ni*, two and *Fu*, or *Fuhyō*, a soldier or an infantry).—Two Infantry pieces, pawns, *Fuhyō*, must not be put on the same file, *Taté*, by means of the re-employment of a *Fuhyō*, a *Mochingoma*, a captured piece (which see); but when a *Fuhyō* piece previously appeared on the board had already been *naru* promoted, that is, turned over, the second

(1).....to.....(9)



(1).....to.....(9)

These two *Fuhyō*, pawns, Infantry pieces, soldiers, on one and same file, not turned over, not *natta*, not upside down, said to be a *Nifu* (a double *Fu*.)

Two or more 9's on the same one file, (*Fuhyō* turned over, *natta* promoted), hence not a *Nifu*.

+This *Fuhyō* not promoted *natta*, just put on the board, hence not a *Nifu* because of 9 above or below on the same and one file.

Fig. 11.

9

9

or the third *Fu* piece can be put on; so that any number of the *Fuhyō*, Infantry pieces, turned upside down, may be put in appearance on the same file, but only one *Fuhyō*, if any, not turned over, should be present on the same file on the part of a friendly side; as illustrated by Fig. II. See *Nameru*, *Suitori* and *Tadatoru*.

This chessological technicality of re-employment of the captured Infantry pieces delicately to be treated according to the *Mochingoma* and *Naru* Promotion Method has come out of a keen and wise conception of fine distinctions of two or more pieces of the same kind in appearance; for the promoted *Fu* piece needs more thoughts and imaginations (s. 5, p. 54; s. 7-7a, p. 72-3; s. 5, p. 81) than a mere corps of seamen or privates or foot-soldiers and the like.

3. *Nijū Ōté*.—See *Ōté*.

Odds.—See *Orosu* and *Otosu*.

Open file.—*Akitōshi*, *Sukitōshi* and *Tsukitōshi* which see.

Opening.—See *Uchidashi*.

4. *Orosu* or *Otosu* (lit., take down, let fall), the same as *Odds*.—A term applied to the advantage which the stronger player should give the weaker: thus if the players are nearly matched, the one may give the other the first chance to move a piece or remove an Infantry *Koma* piece *Fuhyō*, usually one in front of a *Kyōsha* (Warshipcar, Navyartillery) pending the stronger player's skill, or the removal of *Warshipcar* (*Kyōsha*) or Cavalry *Koma*, *Keima* from the better player's forces may be fair *Orosu*, odds.

5. When the odds of an Infantry piece *Fuhyō* and others are given, it is almost always to be understood to be somewhat as follows:—

1st. Either (right or left at the option of the weaker or by an agreement) of the *Fuhyō* in front of a *Kyōsha* (a navy or artillery called *Navyartillery* or *Warcarship*),

2nd. The pawn in front of *Diagonalis*,

3rd. Both *Fu* in front of *Kyōsha*, called *Warshipcar* or *Navy-artillery*,

4th. Either of *Kyōsha* (a navy or artillery *Koma*),

5th. Both *Kyōsha*,

6th. One *Kyōsha* (a *Navyartillery Koma*) and its next neighbor, (*Keima*, a *Cavalry Koma*),



- 7th. Both *Kyōsha* and one *Keima* (Horseman),  
 8th. Both *Kyōsha* and both *Keima*,  
 9th. Both *Kyōsha* and both *Keima*, and four *Fuhyō*, *Koma*  
 above the *Kyōsha* and the *Keima*,  
 10th. Either *Diagonalis* or Prince *Navyartillery* or *Flying*  
*Warshipcar*,  
 11th. Both *Diagonalsky* and Prince *Flying Warshipcar* (Prince  
*Navyartillery*),  
 12th. Both Grand Duke *Diaongalis* and *Flying Warshipcar*,  
 and both *Kyōsha* (a navy or artillery *Koma*),  
 13th. Those of the 12th. (above) and also both *Keima*,  
 14th. All but only Gens. Gold and Silver (and the Chief, of  
 course).

6. These latter are, however, practically unnecessary methods in conceding large odds. There is a chessological joke known as *Fu-san-mai*, that is, one party has three *Fuhy* in his hand and the Chief, emperor or king or any) on the board; and he begins, but when the other party is acquainted with the trick, the former could not play it, because he had first to put a *Fu* in front of *Diagonalis*, so that the other party would prepare for the trick.

7. *Ōtē* (check); see *Ikedoru*.—The Japanese utter or express *Ōtē* for *check*, but not necessarily as a warning; it expresses simply somewhat a sort of a demonstration of enjoyment out of a victory and pushing on against an enemy and attacking the Chief (an end or emperor or king or president). It is an enemy's business to warn himself and to know whether beaten or to beat the other, as it is a part of the tactics or operations just as in cases of other captures. (s. 3, p. 89-90.)

8. *Akiōtē* (lit., check by opening), Discovered check.—An attack which is opened on the Chief (emperor or king) by the removal of an intervening piece. In other words, a "check by discovery" is given when a player, by moving one of his pieces checks with another of them.

9. *Hishatē* or *Hishatori Ōtē*: the former, lit., "either Prince Warshipcar's hand or the King's hand;" the latter, "take the *Flying Car* or King." If the party being attacked by a check of this kind tries unconsciously to move or to let *Flying Warshipcar* run away instead of helping the Chief, there would be a rumor from the stronger or among the lookers-on that an

'unskilled *chesser* ("chessist?") takes much greater care of Flying Warcarship than King,' "*Heta Shōngi Ō yori Hisha-wo Daiji garu.*" (See *Kakuté Ōté* below.)

1. *Kakuté Ōté*, or *Kakutori Ōté*; the former, lit., "either Diagonalis' hand or king's hand;" the latter, lit., "take Diagonalgoer or King:" these are when they are in such a position that a *Koma* piece attacks both the Chief and the other at the same time so that when the former moves away or is screened by an interposing *Koma* piece because he cannot be otherwise, the latter may be made a prisoner, and the situation of thus being trapped is known as *Tenbin* (a scale), or *Ryōtenbin* (both sides of a scale), and the action to trap, as "*Tenbin- or Ryōtenbin-ni kakeru or kakaru.*" 'put on both sides of a scale.'

2. *Ryō-Ōte*, *Nijū Ōté*, a Double Check, as the phrase implies, means attacking the Chief (a desired end, emperor or king) at once with two *Koma* pieces, of which one in this case giving check by discovery (*Akiōté*), so that a piece, by being moved, not only gives check itself, but also discovers a previously masked attack from another (*Akōité*).

3. *Otosu* or *Orosu* which see, the same as *Odds*.

Power of *Koma* pieces.—See *value of Koma*.

Problem.—See *Mondai*.

Promotion.—See *Naru*.

Regular or Irregular Openings; *Teishiki* or *Futeishiki*.

—See *Uchidashi*.

4. *Ryōbun* (Dominion or territory).—A part of chess-board occupied or fortified by the *Koma* of both players either at the commencement of, or at any time, while playing, the game: while playing, it represents a part of a battle-field or a struggle ground covered by the friendly or adversary's pieces; see *Diag. III*, and pp. 68-70 for the original dominion, at the commencement, possessed by the forces of each belligerent party, the original camp boundary, or *dominion*.

5. *Ryō-Ōté*, a double check, *Nijū Ōté*, which see.

*Ryōtenbin* and *Ryōtenbin-ni-kakeru* or *Kakaru*.—See *Hishaté- or Kakuté-Ōté* under *Ōté*.

*Shikkei* or *Shitsurei* (Lit., [I] lose respect or reverence), *Gōmen* (excuse or pardon me).—"Shikkei or Gomen, *naoshité* (from *Naosu*)" is an expression necessary before *Koma* piece may be touched for the purpose of adjustment; *Naosu*, adjustment or *J'adoube*.

6. *Suitoru*, *Nameteru*, *Tadatoru* or *Nameru*, which see, to take a *Fuhyō* in as 'being sucked in' when there occurs a double *Fu*, *Nifu*, which see.

*Sukitōshi*, an open file.—See *Tsukitōshi*.

*Tadatoru* or *Tadatori*.—Lit., just *only* take it off as no cost (as a prize *Koma* piece) without condition whatever on the part of the player against whom a *Fu*, a pawn, is re-put on board as a double *Fu*, *Nifu* which see. See *Nameru* or *Suitoru*.

7. *Tegoma*, see *Tengoma*.

*Teishiki*, or *Futeishiki*;—(Regular or Irregular Openings).—See *Uchidashi*.

*Tenbin* and *Tenbin-ni-kakaru*, or *-kakeru*. See *Ōtē* and *Kakutē* or *Hishate-Ōtē*.

*Tengoma*.—See *Mochingoma*.

8. Time limit.—There prevails, generally, among amateurs and, sometimes, even pretty expert players, no limit of time in which the players think out the movements of a *Koma* piece in their turns as in the same way as the Western chess. A slow unthoughtful player, whether the Western or Oriental, taking an advantage of the fact that the time is not considered in ordinary game other than a special tournament, makes the other party tired and so lose an interest in the game, while, if in actual movements of navies, armies and others, he cannot be expected that he should occupy such a time. The non-limitation in regard to time is an unallowable and inexcusable defect upon the part of players—even beginners or amateurs—of such a practical and scientific game, and this neglected defect should be positively done away with, and the duration of time applied ought to be universally settled in some way or other; and the habit of regulating a limitation of time ought to be formed at the earliest stage of the study of Chess. (Arts. 23–25, p. 204.) If for mere practices, and certainly not for pure enjoyments on the part of the weaker party, the players of about the same degree of skill in fighting capacity should be coupled, for, if not, the superior might fall into a habit of procrastination, against which Chessology severely warns players. (ss. 9–3, pp. 24–26.) For careful and thoughtful players two minutes might be surely enough to set a *Koma* piece into motion, so that one minute might, then, according to the

scope of the skill and mental capacity of a player who would like to apply a game of Chess to a war-field, mean one month, one week, half a month or a year or in distance one mile or a half a mile or less, or one mile a train and the like. (s. 6, Art. 12, p. 199.)

9. There is a condition of modern chess play under which each player is compelled to make a certain number of moves—generally twenty—in each hour (one move in three minutes). The time is recorded by an ingenious arrangement of clocks, one being set going when the other is stopped. If this sort of method would be universally adopted, chess game would become both a purely and strictly scientific pastime and a nobly mental economic exercise. If two parties would *always* agree about the minutes shortest as possible in which they ought to move the *Koma* pieces, it would be very pleasurable, and perfectly compatible with the mission of *Chessologics*. Between first-class experts, any length of *time limit* may be agreed in order to produce beautiful combinations of the artistic movements of the *Koma* pieces and to bring out meritorious solutions and priceless analyses.

1. *Tobi-shnōgi* (*Tobi*, jumping—*Shōngi*) a checkers. See *Gomok-narabé* and *Jūrok-musahu*.

1a. *Tokkaeru*. (Colloquially,—*Tōkyō*,—'take and change'), and a contraction of *Torikaeru* (lit., take and trade); *Kaeru*, exchange.—'Koma-wo torikaeru', to exchange *Koma* pieces; the capture of a *Koma* in return for the loss of one of equal or different value, signifying to give a certain piece of the player in exchange for the adversary's piece to have an advantage either to open a way for the next movement, or to have a piece even with far less power exchanged for his much more prominently powerful *Koma* piece simply to use again a peculiar virtue of the former inferior *Koma* for a certain particular service, for an instance, to exchange such a powerful *Koma* piece as *Diagonalis* or *Flying Warshipcar* for a *Keima*, Cavalry *Koma* piece, or even a *Fu*. (ss. 1, 3, pp. 142-3.)

2. "*Tokushitē-torikaeru* or *-tokkaeru* or *-kaeru*", 'to win exchange,' is to capture a General Kin (Gold) in return for the loss of a General Silver, or *Keima*, a cavalry *Koma*, and so forth, that is, the superior piece for an inferior one:

3. "*Sonshitē-torikaeru* or *-tokkaeru* or *-kaeru* (lit., lose but

exchange)," 'to lose the exchange,' is to exchange the *Koma* of a higher rank or a value for one of an inferior power, as for an instance to capture a Gen. Silver or a Cavalry *Keima* in return for the loss of a General Gold, or a *Fuhyō* for even Prince Flying Warshipcar.

4. These exchanges are for either making a road for another to let it be able to discharge its full duty, or clearing a battleground or using a special merit of power of an inferior *Koma* captured, or reducing an opponent's force. See *Ikedoru*.

5. *Toriko*, a prisoner, and *Toriko-ni suru*', Capture, *Ikedoru* which see.

*Toritē naru* or *Tottē naru*.—See *Naru*.

*Toru*, Capture.—See *Ikedoru* and also *Torikaeru*.

*Tottē-naru*.—See *Naru*, promotion. Understand that here are the beautiful treatments of movements of chess pieces in representing the *convertibilities* of factors of struggles.

*Tsukitōshi*, *Akitōshi* or *Sukitōshi*, an open file.—A file on which no *Koma* piece of either party is standing.

*Tsumeru* (fix), *Tsumi* (noun or adjective, *pack* or *fix*), *Tsumu* (checkmate), and *Tsunda* (fixed or checkmated—(lit., packed, cornered, cannot move, fixed).—A position in which the emperor, king or Chief cannot avoid capture on his opponent's next move. The term, checkmate, is from the Persian *Shah mat*, 'the king is dead.' See *Ikedoru* p. 82.




FIG. 12.  
Showing the beginning  
of the *Kakute* method.

FIG. 13.  
Showing the beginning  
of the *Nakabisha* method.

FIG. 14.  
Showing the beginning  
of the *Hishate* method.

6. *Uchidashi*, Opening or Debut, (*Uchi*, to strike, and *dashi*, to be out).—A certain set method of commencing the game. The various methods of beginning the game have been the subjects of much study and are so complex as to elude anything like exhaustive analysis. All openings of repute have distinctive titles; *Teishiki* and *Futeishiki*, the Regular and Irregular openings, *Nakabisha*, *Hishaté*, *Kakuté*, etc. See Figs. 12, 13 and 14.

7. The study of the openings is the most difficult and practically endless, and should not be begun until the student has some practical acquaintance with the game. The best way is to see a game played by others. See Figs. 15 and 16, p. 202-3.

8. Value or Power or *Kurai* (rank) of *Koma* pieces.—The relative worth of Japanese Chess *Koma*, as 'men' of the Western, cannot be definitely, and surely the former more than the latter, stated on account of the increase and decrease of their powers according to the situation of a game, the *Mochingoma* and *Naru* Methods or circumstances of the hands to move, but striking an average and supposing the worth of an Infantry *Koma*, *Fuhyō*, a private piece, a pawn to be represented by unity—as the unit—the following is a tolerably enough average estimate of the comparative values of the *Koma* for ordinary practical purposes:—

9. <i>Fuhyō</i> , Infantry <i>Koma</i> .....	1
<i>Kyōsha</i> , Navyartillery <i>Koma</i> .....	3
<i>Keima</i> , Cavalry <i>Koma</i> .....	4
<i>Gin-shō</i> , General Silver <i>Koma</i> .....	7
<i>Kin-shō</i> , General Gold <i>Koma</i> .....	9
<i>Kakkō</i> , Captain-General Diagonalis.....	18
<i>Hisha</i> , Flying Warcarship, Field Marshall Prince Navy- artillery... ..	18

1. The last two have the advantage and disadvantage over each other under circumstances and conditions as each cannot perform what the other can, and some players prefer one to another almost all the times depending perhaps on habits of being accustomed to enable themselves to use one more advantageously than the other. Sometimes the less powerful *Koma* pieces are needed for the best advantages to achieve a victory, that is, to finish a game, so that the more powerful ones are exchanged for weaker *Koma*, and to do this, young novices or

unwary persons would be very glad to exchange them forgetting that it is a sort of bait. (See *Torikaeru*, exchange and 7, p. 191.) It is very strange on the part of beginners that they seem unconsciously to value Prince Navyartillery (*Hisha*), or Grand Duke Diagonalis (*Kakkō*) more than the Chief (a desired end, or Emperor-King) and to forget that the King is in danger.

2. "*Ō yori Hisha-wo daiji garu heta Shōngi*," 'An inferior poor unskilful chess player, he values and treats his Prince Navyartillery better than his Emperor,' 'Unskilful chessplayers prize their Bishop (or Queen) much more than their King!'

### THE LAWS OF JAPANESE CHESS.

3. In spite of the main rules governing chessological play being identical through the world, there are as yet several minor questions awaiting a general settlement—a sure need of a *Hague Tribunal* in regard to the laws in the Occidental and Oriental branches of struggles in Chessdom; and the laws of the Far Eastern Japanese Chess are in a somewhat settled and, though not perfect, yet satisfactory condition; and the following are the principal prevailing regulations of the game and enforced without injustice.——

4. (1.) In every fresh game between fresh players (except *Makenuké Jumban*, *Tobiiri Makenuké jumban*, *Torincké Jumban*, which see Art. (9) p. 199, a continual tournament), the first move after all of the *Koma* pieces are arranged so as to play, is settled by taking chance of a sort of lottery, that is, a lot to be drawn for the first move, in which an Infantry *Koma*, a sailor-soldier piece is picked by one party (sensibly, the weaker one maybe, appropriate and fair! there being no practical difference at all), and then the other party would utter "*Kin* (Gold)" or "*Hyō*" or "*Fu*" for his side, and the thrower, of course, takes the other without saying anything; and the Infantry piece is thrown on the board, and the one who could have guessed or hit his side will begin—move the first.

5. (2). A move once made, by having moved a *Koma* piece and left hold of it, can not be retracted. "*Matté* (Please wait)" or "*Matta* (wait, or hold on)" should not be allowed under any circumstances except for some special purpose to practice or study, thereof once, or twice, or thrice, allowed by permission and announcement on the part of the stronger when the weaker would ask to be permitted.

6. (3). You, a player whose turn it is to play, touching a *Koma* piece must move it, except you give notice of adjusting the *Koma*, that is, a *Koma* touched must be moved, if it can be legally: but as long as you retain hold, you can play it where you like. The move is completed as soon as the hand is withdrawn from the *Koma* piece played to another square. If you can capture one of your own *Koma* pieces by error your adversary may have it replaced or not. If you touch a *Koma* that cannot move, your antagonist may compel you to play your Chief (a main end, or emperor-king or President) unless the emperor be unable to move.

7. When you touch your *Koma* for the mere purpose of adjusting them, you are bound to say so—*Shikkei*, 'I beg pardon, 'J' *adoube*' or words to that effect (see 5, p. 192). Touching any of your own *Koma* or those of your adversary (except accidentally) without previously saying *Shikkei*," "I adjust, *Naoshimasu*" or "*J'adoube*" or the like, you may be compelled to move or capture (as the case may be) the *Koma* so touched; if this cannot be done you must move your Chief, but if that likewise be impossible, there is then no penalty. If you make a false or an illegal move or capture, you must, at the choice of your opponent, and according to the case, move your own *Koma* legally, capture the *Koma* legally, or move any other *Koma* legally movable. That the offender shall move his Chief (*a main object*, or emperor-king) is the usual demand in practice. Any such illegality, after four moves have been made on each side without knowledge of the fact, is waived and the game must be played out as it stands. Should the Chief be left in check, all the moves subsequently made must be retraced and the check replied to.

8. (4). (See Art. 3 above.) If you make a false move, your enemy may either cause you to retract it and move your Chief (*a desired end*, or king) or he may claim that the false move shall stand, or that you shall make a legal move with the same *Koma*, at his pleasure. A false or an illegal move, and all moves made subsequently must be revoked, and legal moves made in their stead.

9. (5). (See Art. 3 above.) If you touch one of your adversary's *Koma*, the enemy may compel you to take that *Koma*, or if that be impossible, to move your Chief (*a principal factor*,



or emperor or king) provided he can move without going into check.

1. (6). On the emperor being checked, due notice is not required to be given; when your emperor is attacked you are bound to have a duty to notice it, and if you do not notice its situation, your antagonist may consider you inferior or careless or take it out for a moment away off the board to conceal it as a joke on you or a moral punishment inflicted upon you, while you are thinking to move further or some way else so that you would feel ashamed of your ignorance of the present event or absent mindedness. (See *Ôté*, s. 7, p. 192.)

2. (7). In the second game between the same parties as in the first, the first move is made by the first winner.

3. (8). If, in the second game, the first victor is beaten then a third game may be held; and the victory—2 to 1—for a finish for the time is considered to have been settled. (s. 5a, p. 55.)

4. (9). In a certain place or entertainments where there are many players, what may be termed "*The beaten one out*," "*Makenuké Junban*," a contraction of "*Tobiiri-makenuké Junban*," is sometimes held, that is, a continual tournament, or the continuous games are to be kept in which the victorious remaining at the board, a fresh force or party would go up to meet the former victor who would be knocked out if beaten, so that the first victorious or the strongest if possible to have been continuously winning might remain to the last.

5. (10). A player who gives the odds of *Koma* is entitled to the first move.

(11). *Matta-naraz* (see s. 4, p. 86, and ss. 5-6, Arts. 2-3 pp. 197-198).

6. (12). Each player must move within a specified time which is better to be fixed generally 30 seconds, or so, or from one to four minutes by previous engagement. The time of consideration of a move is not very sharply limited for an ordinary case (see *Time-Limit*, s. 8, p. 193). One minute for a move may be enough for only pastimes of ordinary persons; and for deeper and professional players more time or less or one minute may be allowed, but under any circumstances it would better have been pre-arranged or agreed before entering into the game. Five minutes a turn is the average time required by skilful players,

but the length of this limit may be altered by agreement. A player leaving the game unfinished, without his opponent's permission, loses such a game.

7. (13). Both parties may, by consent, leave a game just as it stands, either with the *Koma* pieces on the board, or with them disbanded, or put away, thereby when to take it up to be played again, they are to be re-arranged in exactly the same way as before, the first mover being the one who was to have been the party to have played just before they deranged the combinations of the *Koma* pieces.

8. (14). If any dispute arises about the laws, both parties are to agree as to an umpire whose decision is to be regarded as final.

#### THE CHESSOLOGICAL PRACTICE AND CONDUCT OF THE GAME.

9. In the Chessological practice and the game conduct, the following hints, precepts and rules will be found generally very useful and serviceable:—

(1). The Chessological game has not been exhausted; the reply to every possible move being not known even by all great masters.

(2). The rules for playing are of but little use. The only method to become a good player is to study the analysis laid down in works on the subject, and to know them by heart. (See Art. (4) below.)

(3). The best way to attain a higher degree of accomplishment is to play with the superior.

(4). To practice and improve the Chessological works, next to playing with the superior, is to play with good players.

1. (5). Next to (3) and (4) above, nothing will conduce to improvement more than looking on at two expert chessists' manoeuvres whilst they are playing.

(6). Wanting the above (3-5) advantages, there is no branch of the Chessological study better calculated to advance the skill of a learner than the attentively playing over recorded games and openings between first-rate players from books or Journals.

(7). Never touch a *Koma* without moving it, nor suffer your adversary (mind your business only) or yourself to infringe any other of the laws of the game.

(8.) It is advisable to calculate what the position will be after a capture, as the position is sometimes intentionally left as a trap, *Ruse de guerre*. (See (9) below.)

2. Ascertain the truth or falsity of your opponent's intention in his movements, as there is an Art of "*Kyokyo Jitsujits*," literally, 'ruse, sham; reality, truth.' (s. 7, p. 42; s. 9, p. 114; s. 5, p. 130; s. 5, p. 131; s. 7, p. 133; s. 6, p. 143.)

" \* \* The noble Brutus  
Hath told you, Cæsar was ambitious;  
\* \* \* \* \*  
Here, under leave of Brutus and the rest,  
(For Brutus is an honorable man;  
So are they all, all honorable men;)  
\* \* \* \* \*  
But Brutus says, he was ambitious;  
And Brutus is an honorable man."—

*Marcus Antonius, Cæsar, Shakespeare.* (s. 7, p. 133; s. 2, Art. 10 p. 206.)

(9.) To prevent blunders and oversights, always endeavor to perceive the motive of your adversary's move before you play; and often look round the board to see whether you are or are not losing sight of any better move than the one you intend, whether or not you are suffering yourself to be tempted by a bait. 'Look round all over the board: "*Zen-Kyok* (or *Zen-Kyok-men*)-*wo miru*. (See Art. 8 above; s. 9, p. 114; s. 5, p. 130; s. 5, p. 131; s. 6, p. 143; Art. 8, p. 206.)

3. (10.) It is not good play to push for a king early in the game.

(11.) When a player is in a cramped position it is often disadvantageous to have the move. Temper and harden yourself and wait for good omen,' "*Nettë Kahō-wo maté*."—*Danzō*. 'Even misfortune, if kept for three years, would turn into luck [usefulness],' "*Wazawai mo san Nen okeba, Yō-ni tatsu*."—*Kazan*. (s. 5, p. 131; s. 4, p. 132—s. 9a, p. 135.)

(12.) Seek to let your style of play be attacking; and to remember the gaining or losing of time in your measures is the element of gaining or losing the game. *Attaté Kudakero*, 'strike and break.' (See pp. 121-186.) Cast your dice, as Cæsar and Napoleon did and the Japanese threw theirs in the Japan-Chinese and Nippon-Russian Wars. (s. 7, p. 134; ss. 8-1, pp. 138-140.)

(12a.) A student must remember that 'slow skill does

not [sometime] surpass unskillful quickness,' "*Kōchi-wa Sessoku-ni shikaz.*"—*Kahō*. Try to put yourself in offensive position, for an attacking action is much more wholesome than defensive work or humiliating passivity. "*Hatsu Ōtē Me-no Kusuri,*" 'The first check, a medicine for eyes—*Ōhen-Ō*. (s. 8, p. 126; s. 8, p. 138.)

(12a.) Divide up the adversary's force, whenever you can.

(13.) As soon as the player has any advantage in force, he should exchange whenever he can. (See *Torikaeru* ss. 1a-4, p. 194-5 and 12 above.)

(14.) Having the move does not always win.

4. (15.) It is not compulsory at all to take.

(16.) Remembering that there are many ways, when you are the first player, the openings—springing from your playing first the left General Silver to the side of Grand Duke Diagonalis and diagonally above the *Keima*, Cavalry corps, and then the Infantry *Koma* above General Silver, and thirdly letting the general march forward and then push up the *Fu*




FIG. 15.

above the Duke and diagonally push General Silver up; or first pushing the Infantry corps *Fu* in front of Prince Flying Navy-artillery, then the same *Fu* pushed up and again the same and others—are some of the best that you can adopt; *but do not adhere to any one or two openings only*. See Fig. 15, and *Uchidashi*, s. 6, p. 196.

5. (17.) If you wish to adopt a purely defensive opening, you may play, first, the left Gen. Gold onto above Gen. Silver and then the latter to the left diagonal section of the Chief (emperor, president or king), and the right Gen. Gold to the left side of Prince Flying Warshipcar, then the right Gen. Silver to the left side of Gen. Gold, and move the Chief to the right or straight up between two Generals Silver, when you have a convenient time and so on; but do not follow any only one defensive opening, for there are many. See Fig. 16 and *Uchidashi*, s. 6, p. 196.




FIG. 16.

6. (18.) 'Never violate etiquette even though while playing with an enemy;' "*Teiki to yuedomo go Kō-no Rei-ni somuk nakaré.*—*Masashigé*. The players should be polite and respectful to each other, however very intimate. (See ss. 5-6, p. 27; s. 3, p. 131; Art. 22, p. 204.)

(19.) Lose always with a good temper, and bear your opponent's faults with a good grace. 'The quick-tempered person is a sure loser;' "*Tan Ki-wa son Ki.*"—*Kazan*.

7. (20.) Never interfere when you are an onlooker. (See ss. 5-6, p. 27 about impolite conduct.) *Okamé hachi Moku* (a proverb, Lit., *Okamé*, land-eyes, *hachi*, eight, *Moku*, eyes): There can be seen many ways or judgments from the standpoint of a bystander, or disinterested or unconcerned persons. If a person unconcerned expresses about a certain point of manoeuvres even in a vague way a party might get a suggestion by way of a hint for an available move detrimental to the other, as

irresponsible war newspaper correspondents are dangerously mischievous (see s. 3, p. 90), as International Diplomacy is a part of *Applied Chessologic Diplomacy*. Or a remark is a nuisance to the players. "*Okamé de mité wa Wakaranu*," 'regarding it from the standpoint of an unconcerned person, it cannot be understood.'

8. (21.) Passers-by should not interfere unless earnestly asked by a playing party, unless the board or *Koma* has been wrongly placed, or unless a false or an illegal move has been made in which last case, however, they have no right whatever to interfere until a move has been made in reply. (See ss. 5-6, p. 27.)

9. (22.) Roughness, sarcasm, noisiness, impropriety, carelessness, meanness, and the like that show lack of *refined attributes of good character in a polished man* should be thoughtfully and deliberately shunned. Remember that Chessology treats of, and is, the perfect abstract condensation and poetry of all the affairs ever conceivable and practicable by the *Enlightened Mind*. (See ss. 5-6, p. 27.)

9a. (23.) "If you ever happen in chess-playing to have a moment for any other than the then chess struggle, think of the most beautiful and glorious facts you can recollect in the History of Civilization (s. 7a, p. 17) and international as well as national stories and compare your tactical and strategic movements in vivid association of ideas, highly *artistic* and *idealistic*, with the best works told or done by meritorious personages (s. 2 and 5, p. 16; s. 4, p. 41)."—*Kazan*.

(24.) "Never play a mean and deplorable trick, but be noble."—*Kazan*. "Do not hear nor see nor go near by, nor practice, nor even think of a "*horse trading*" trick, lest you might be contaminated with the disease, as chessboard is too rigid and sacred to permit any wastage of time, space and force, and as chess-playing clearly outlines and without an excuse exhibits the very true character of chessplayers."—*Danzō*. "Keep only beauty in your mind."—*Kahō*.

9b. (25.) Whenever you practice Chess, try always to limit your own time the shortest as possible for every movement in order to form a habit of saving a time (s. 9, p. 24; s. 1, p. 25-6; ss. 8-1, p. 193-4).—*Kazan*. "Move your *Koma* haste slowly."—*Kazan*.

(26.) "Whenever you have pretty well exhausted, with

a sure finish in a clear view, all your beautiful resources to meet with your opponent's hands, never indulge in uselessly monotonous movements of your *Koma*, unless there is a certain surprisingly interesting and artistic turn of chance well forecasted."—*Kazan*. (s. 5, a, p. 55; s. 2, p. 171.)

(26a.) If there is hope to win, continue your struggle with equanimous determination. (s. 3, p. 112.)

(27.) Whenever you know your game is lost, it is best to resign it at once. (s. 9, p. 24; s. 8a, p. 103-5; s. 8, p. 193.)

(28.) Act cautiously, but not timidly. (s. 6, p. 139; ss. 6-8c, p. 144-177; s. 8, p. 185.)

(29.) Never be timid against your strong opponent, nor overconfident against a weaker antagonist. (s. 8, p. 102; and same as above Art. 28.)

(30.) Be not discouraged over a situation where there is no way for demonstration to win. (s. 3, Art. 11, p. 201.)

9c. (31.) Extreme difficulties are conquered by self-reliance and patience; "*Per aspera ad astra!*"—*Kansas*. The object of Chess is to crush or untie the knots of difficulties (s. 6, p. 21; s. 9a, p. 25), for "Chess is, in a tangible way, the Science-Philosophy of strict QUESTIONS and their ANSWERS, the paramount necessities for *Mind* to acquire knowledge—*why, when, how, because* (∴), *therefore* (∴), *then, thus, Yeses, Noes*, and the like complimented with *buts* and *ifs*."—*H. E. Athen*; and because it is, therefore, "the *Encyclopedia*, or nursery for all Sciences, Philosophies and Religions."—*S. O. Crates*. (s. 4, p. 20; s. 6, p. 21; s. 1, p. 28; s. 3, p. 41; ss. 1-5, p. 122; s. 6, p. 157.)

(32.) Do never get favors beyond the Chessological jurisdiction of customary rules, nor give them away, lest the habit to be loose might be formed.

(33.) Aim to win, not necessarily to be brilliant; but if there were two or more ways, always pursue for practice the best elegant, interesting and instructive hand as "the beautiful *Mind* has *peace* and *happiness*." (s. 8b, p. 19; s. 4, p. 41.)

1. A few cautions about the moving and handling of *Koma* chess pieces:—

(1.) "*Ni-Fu-wo kinzu*," there is forbidden a double *Fu*: a player cannot put a captured Infantry corps, *Fu*, on the same file where another *Fu* (sailor-soldier or pawn) already appears as such without legally being turned back or over, that is, *naru*

promoted; if he does it even unconsciously and his adversary notices it, the latter may take it up, and in a way of "licking it off" and *swallowing it up*—a joke to break a monotony—capture it as a prize *Koma* of struggle or war. See *Nifu*, s. 1, p. 104.

(2.) "*Keima-no Atama-ni Gin tayasuna!*" do not be without General Silver right over the head of the enemy's Cavalry corps *Keima*; that is, be careful to have General Silver on the top of a *Keima* of the adversary.

2. (3.) "*Keima-no Takatobi Fu-no Ejiki,*" *Keima!* a Cavalry corps jumping high up may become a private's prey, that is, if it marches on high up too quick, an enemy's mere private would easily devour it. Be careful when to let one's own Cavalry *Keima* advance to the front in too much of a hurry.

(4.) "*Kaku-no Atama-ni Fu-wo tsukero,*" Put on an Infantry *Koma Fu* on the head of the adversary's Diagonalis.

(5.) "*Kaku-no Atama-no Fu-wo tsuké,*" push up a *Fu*, (a friendly pawn) toward the head of the adversary's *Kak*, Diagonalis.

(6.) "*Te-no-naki Toki-wa Hashi-no Fu-wo tsuké.*" When there is no hand available, push on a *Fu* forward on the extreme file of the board. 'Standing still' is going back! (See Art. 12, p. 201.) Scout the enemy's plan.

(7.) "*Fu-no naki Shōngi-wa maké Shōngi.*" a chess game without a *Fu* (private) on or in hand, the loss of the game; that is, if one does not keep a *Fu* captured, as a *Mochingoma*, he suffers so much that he might lose the game.

(8.) "*Yudan tai Teki,*" unpreparedness is a great enemy; negligence is a formidable foe. (See pp. 138-9, 143, 198-9.)

(9.) "*Sakinzure-ba Hito-wo seisu,*" 'Gaining a vantage gives one an advantage over others.' (pp. 138-9, 143, 198-9.)

(10.) *Katté, Kabto-no O-wo shimeru,*" 'When victory is gained, fasten the helmet tight.' (s. 7, p. 42; s. 7, p. 133; s. (8), p. 201.)

3. (11.) Better try always to possess a *Fuhyō*, privates, Infantry corps, on hand, because it is so convenient to intervene between two hostile pieces, or push an operation forward, that if it is properly used, a loss being less, a gain would be surely greater.

(12.) Think before you act [Do not leap before you think], as "*Kōkai-wa Saki-ni tataz,*" 'a regret does not stand before.' (See Arts. 8-9, p. 201.)



CHINESE CHESS

3. Here is represented a Chinese chessboard with the pieces arranged for playing, as Fig. 17. (See s. 2, p. 28—s. 3a, p. 32.)




FIG. 17.

4. The Chinese have been for many centuries acquainted with Chess under a form not very unlike the Occidental branch of the Chessological game. Yet the rules for playing are very different from those of the Hindostanese and its descendents'

modified offsprings, so that it gives us a strong suggestion to let it be a quite, though only apparently, independent origin on account of the peculiar feature of a central space or strip called "The Sacred Barrier or River," the *Kiaihō* or *Hōkiai*, 界河 or 河界, literally, the river boundary or boundary river lying across the board at the middle from its ends at the players' sides. (*Digest the Tree of Chesslogics* between pages 14-15.)

5. The origin of the Chinese chessological game is also of very great antiquity, and the reputation of an inventor of the game for the sake of getting clean riddance of brutal, bloodthirsty struggle or *war* is generally yet fabulously attributed to the great sage WU WANG, 武王 (lit., Martial King) 1120 B.C., the son of MUN WANG (lit., Literary [*Enlightened*] King). (s. 8 b, p. 19.) It certainly and immemorially far antedates any known writings on tactics and strategy (ss. 6-9, pp. 30-31) such as *Lok-Tao* and *Sam-Liah* 六韜三略, the two famous Ancient Chinese books on military tactics [and strategy] the former by CHOW KUNG (Prince), a sage, B. C. 1110 and the latter by HUANG SHAK KUNG, a sage and received directly from him by Chang Liao a celebrated warrior B. C. 217. The board has, as ours, sixty-four spaces, divided by the river, with thirty-two on each side, which may be considered to consist of a row of eight squares making in all  $8 \times 9 = 72$  (sidewise added  $= 9 = 0$ ) squares, and is played with sixteen pieces called *Kie-tsze* 棋子, literally, game-men, on each side, the two at the corners having equal power, and the next two called *Ma* (Horses) having a move equivalent to that of the European knight. The chief differences are that the Chinese adversaries are separated by a river over which some pieces cannot pass, while commander, the "king," is confined to a square on nine moves only; and that the pieces are placed upon the intersections of the lines forming the board, instead of on the squares. (s. 6a, p. 56—s. 7, p. 59; s. 2a, p. 69.)

6. As the pieces are to be put on the crossings or intersections of the lines, there are ninety positions ( $9 \times 10 = 90 = 0$ ) or stands for the sixteen pieces which each player employs, making 26 more than the Occidental ( $8 \times 8 = 64$ ) and 9 more than the Far Oriental game ( $9 \times 9 = 81 = 9 = 0$ ). The pieces are like our checkermen in shape but with their names incised or cut on the top on each side of each of the seven kinds, and with its red or

sometimes black and white, colors for distinctions. The four squares with the diagonal lines at each edge (towards the players) about the middle are the headquarters of the *Sui* 帥, or Commander-in-Chief or Field Marshal on the black side and the *Ch'ung* or *Tsëang* 將 or Generalissimo on the white side; and outside of the headquarters the Chief and his two *Sze* 士, or officers or secretaries cannot move. On each side of the two headquarters there are *Chong* 象, an elephant (the white party) or *Shong* 相, an adviser or secretary (the black), a horse, *Ma* 馬, and *Sha* 車, chariot, and their values or powers are less, though similar, than the Occidental (English) bishop, knight and rook, or castle (English); and the chariot is the most powerful.

7. Two cannoniers, 炮 or 砲 *Paou* which move like our castles, or rook and capture like our knight, stand at first in front of the horses. 5 *Sotz* 卒 (the white) and 5 *Piao* or *Pien* 兵 (the black), privates or pawns guard the banks of the river, and they cannot return when they once cross it after the enemy and cannot be promoted when they arrive at the last row. Each piece is put down in the point where it has captured its piece, except the cannoniers. On account of the chief being not taken, the main object of each player is to give him a checkmate in his headquarters by prevention of his movement except into check. It is here worth while to know that the different Chinese characters here have nothing chessologically to do with the *black* and *white* as long as the nature of their meanings and their positions and values are kept up to meet with the first motive of chess works, that is to say, the characters, *Sui* and *Tsëang*, *Chong* and *Shong*, and *Sotz* and *Piao* may change their sides as shown by Fig. 17, when distinguished by two colors or parties. (s. 7a, p. 59; s. 6, p. 212-3.)

7a. The combinations in the Chinese chessological game are apparently more restricted because of the want of a queen and the limited moves of the pieces than the Occidental chess, though the former has its own superbly characteristic elements of skill, and it has been the elder branch, or precursor of Japanese Chess.

8. Chess is much played by literary men as well as women—usually for small stakes, as the Chinese are born betters, while the Japanese, on the contrary, generally hate to bet, but they are delighted to wage a victory by displaying beautiful skill merely for skill's sake.

9. Chinese chess reveals a sort of game half way between our Occidental checkers (draughts) and chess, thus becoming great deal like a link between the two, and it serves as a link between the European and Japanese Chess, in regard to the coloring and uncoloring as well as the titular appellations of the chess pieces and concerning the number of lines on the board. Chinese chess is not fully developed, but remaining, yet in a way, primitive, is, still, very far from being the most flexible to meet with the abstract treatments of struggles in human affairs, and consequently, moreover, with the abstract conception of phenomena of the Universe. (ss. 7a,8a, pp. 17-8.)

### IGO, WEI-KI

1. Besides chess, there is in the Eastern Asia another game allied to Chess Proper in point of exquisite conception and execution, though not in point of the highest abstraction of the nature of things, but played less frequently, yet one of the ancient Chessological games in the Chinese Empire, which has been for a long time played to the fullest extent in Japan. This game cannot positively escape from Chessological jurisdiction. The author touches the fewest striking points of the subject in order to show the Chessologist the relations of Chess Proper and chess in general and this game, and their spheres of intellectual amusement worlds. (See the *Tree of Chessologies*, between pp. 14-15; ss. 8-8b, pp. 17-9.)

2. The game is called in Chinese, *Wei-ki*, 圍碁—*Wei*, surround, and *Ki*, game stone-pieces—and pronounced in Japanese *Igo*, so that, literally, *surrounding game pieces*. The pieces are called *Shak*, 石 (stone), in Chinese, and *Seki* (stone), or *Goishi* (game stone) or *Ishi*, in Japanese, and the game is played by two parties. It is by some said that it was common in the time of 'Perfect men' 聖人, *Shing-jin*, sages and the writer asserts that it is probably even earlier than chess in general and certainly than Chess Proper (see the *Tree of CHESSOLOGICS* (bet. pp. 14-15). This is originally and purely *Ultra-Ancient* Chinese, as far as the author is concerned in an investigation of the matter, though the nature of square system chessologically indicates itself surely to have had something to do with chess in general (ss. 7-1, pp. 30-31; ss. 4-5, p. 207-8). It is in Japan played very widely next Chess in point of range and

circle of their popularity, and it is there considered as classical, and played by a smaller sphere of rather seemingly very exclusive people than Chess.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)




FIG. 18.

An Igo-board with Igo-pieces arranged partially according to one of the best operations.

2a. The experts in both Japanese Chess and Igo, or *Wei-ki* remark that the former is at first easier to be played and studied than the latter, but that the former becomes more difficult and complicated to be mastered and more interesting than the latter. The author cannot deny this empirical statement because of everlasting combinations and permutations of *Koma* pieces under the auspices of the *Mochingoma*

and *Naru* Methods, while *Igo* cannot confer the Chessologian with conception, except human struggles 'to take and to give' or *vice versa* (s. 4, p. 30), of all the phases or phenomena or struggles in the Universe. When we exhaustively analyze both these games, *Igo* has the limitation, however enormously large, producible and procurable by combination and permutation, while Japanese Chess can never be bounded until it coincides with Eternity. And it is utterly safe to mention that Chess Proper is much more both scientific and philosophical than *Igo*, which is, of course, by far higher than any kind of checkers in existence. *Igo* is to be considered as the highest kind of draughts or checkers on account of taking up the pieces between the stepping stones and jumping lines.

3. *Igo* is really the highest development of checkers (draughts) with which the European checkers compared is a play of children, as just as there is a similarly wide difference between the Occidental and Japanese Chess. By the way, there is another and simpler, yet fascinating, game named *Gomok-narabé* (Jap.), a lining of five pieces, a sort of checkers, played, with the *Igo*-pieces, on the *Igo*-board, though not necessarily in a chessological sense at all required for the play, as it has nothing whatever to do with *Igo*. This game is played as a pastime by women and children, and also men to a certain extent. It is the easiest and peculiarly fascinating and instructive game. (s. 7a, p. 17; s. 8a, p. 18.)

4. *Wei-ki*, *Igo*, or simply *Go* Art in Japan is or may be at present said to be the classical or rather Aristo-plutocratic game, while the Chessological Art proper, *Shōngi* or Chess, the popular or rather National Game.

5. The square board has 324 (=9=0, added sidewise) squares or sections, 18 (=9=0) each way, consequently, 19 intersections on each side and 361 over the board, while the number of 'stone' pieces, half of which, 180 (=9=0), each party employ, hence, one intersection being left unconsidered so as to make the numbers even, as 360, so that the number of pieces to have occupied the points of intersections would never be exhausted and never reach the full size of its game under proficient. (s. 6a, pp. 56-58.)

6. The pieces are black and white, as those of almost all other chessological games, except Japanese Chess, the *Calculus*

of CHESSOLOGICS, wherein the color distinction becomes utterly detrimental to a high and deep conception of the abstraction of the highest kind. (s. 7a. p. 59.) They are to be put on the crossings, or intersections of the lines, making 361 of which 1 may be considered in the same way as 1 of 101 or 1001 to produce lucky number, though in this case, it may be, and is positively an accident. In *Igo*, or *Wei-ki* game there are 360 pieces, the circular and flat disk about three-quarters of an inch in diameter and thinner at the edge, each party having 180 either white or black, so that the centre may be considered to be that of a circle and sphere, and occupied by the first odd number and be honored as the first radiating point of space; and 360 here as in the case of degrees of a circle, being the esoterical result of 360 days of a year. (See ss. 6, 6a, 7, pp. 56-58.) It is very important to think how the intersections in both Chinese chess and *Wei-ki*, *Igo*, are used to have produced or exhibited the grand influence of *nine*, and how in Japanese Chess they have adopted the severest simplification of all the powers evolved out of *nine*, the highest digital number created by human *Mind*. Thus, from what concerns of lines and their intersections, angles and others, it is plainly seen that *Igo* surely occupies a position in *Chessologics* which exactly corresponds to the part Geometry performs in Mathematics.

6a. It is, now, therefore, plainly seen that *Igo*-board may be considered or is practically a compressed sheet of a sphere, that is, it symbolizes a circle, whereby we have, therefore, 360, its half 180, its fourth 90 and their similar consecutive parts corresponding to degrees of a sphere and circle; that Chinese chess is based upon a quadrant, but expressed in notation with  $9 \times 10$  (= 1 and 9), whereof 1 is, under the severest chessologic test, a redundant surplus for the highest part of *Chessologics*; and that Japanese Chess board represents the fundamental abstract factor or a *maximum* and *minimum*, that is, a mean point, (9), a *unit* of a quadrant of a circle which generates the whole or a sphere or the space of the *Infinitude*. (s. 6a, p. 56—s. 7, p. 59.) As long as the space is measured by an angle of a triangle (whose 3 interior, or two right, angles =  $180^\circ$ ) and as long as the right angle is expressed by  $90^\circ$  and Metrical or Decimal System is in existence, Japanese Chess plan is at the pinnacle of CHESSOLOGY;

consequently Octonal System can have under the strict supervision of Sciences and Philosophies no room, except for certain purposes, for a time being, in *Chessologies*.

7. The object of the *Go* opponents is to surround each other's pieces and take them up from the intersections that they occupy or neutralize their power over those near them. The antagonists attack, defend and capture the pieces, whether from front, flank, both flanks, or rear, or all sides. The capture of the pieces does not largely, except the locations captured, convey the meaning of the *capture* in chessological sense of *conversion* or *transposition* (s. 7a. p. 83; digest *Mochingoma*). Putting the *Ishi* on the *Go*-board may be justly interpreted as a sort of the *only use* of the *Mochingoma* (which see) in a literal sense but not captured pieces; and instead of checking and check-mating a king (symbolic representative), the occupation or acquisition of space, equivalent to the amount of capabilities (s. 3, p. 112), and not a mere sum of the captures, is the main aim to reveal the significance of an extent of the sphere of influence in the domain of struggles. A piece is to be put down anywhere on the board according to the rules of the game and skill of each player, who continues to do so alternately, capturing his opponent's locations as nearly or so as all the intersections are used or until both could see that no more skill can play at all.

8. Then the players will fill up with the captured pieces the positions from which the pieces were taken away and the locations the enemy could not occupy, and count the remaining intersections that are unfilled, and the amount of the numbers left tells the fact—a victory, a verdict.

The author forecasts in considering the differences between Chess and *Go*, or *Igo* that the latter would take far longer time than the former, if ever to be studied and played in other parts of the world, on account of lack, in the Western world of amusements, of affinity in regard to *Igo*, a kind of affinity existing in the two principal divisions or branches of Chessdom.

9. The author fully believes that some time in the future the game here now outlined in a scientific philosophical consideration would be taken up by many Western intellectual amusement seekers as it is one of the fewest and most interesting and fascinating as well as instructive intellectual competitive amusements to be treated of by principles of CHESSOLOGY.



# MONDAI—(PROBLEM) I.

Here are Given Fifteen MONDAI (Problems) Shown as Solved.

The first is in details shown so as to give a student the facilitation easily to be acquainted with signs, etc. For Abbreviations, see Diagrams III, IIIa, and IIIb, pp. 64-65, and for the signs, sections 1-2, p. 68.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

1			E		N				1
2			D			!			2
3	i			F	S				3
4			C			i			4
5		C	C			D			5
6			D						6
7									7
8									8
9									9

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

**A Friendly Side, Always Offensive With Unceasing Checks Given to an Opponent; Without a TENGOMA (T), or MOCHINGOMA (M) at the Beginning.**

**AN ADVERSARY'S SIDE.**

1. **F** (Field Marshal Prince Flying Navyartillery)—(goes to) 1(4) n. or p. (*naru* promoted as **f**), ch. or + (check).

1. **E** (Chief, **K**, **L**, **H**, or **P**) × or : (takes or captures) **f**,—(goes to) 1(4).

2. **D** (Diagonalis, Captain-General Diagonalgoer) × or : (takes or captures) **G** (*natta* promoted Cavalry),—(goes to) 2(3), n. or p. (*naru* promoted as **D**) + (check).

2. **E** × or : (takes or captures) **D**,—2(3).

3. **D**—(goes to) 4(5), ch. or +.

4. **O** (put on or re-employ) **C** (Cavalry) **M** or **T** (a *Tengoma*, or *Mochingoma*) 4(4), +.

3. **S** (General Silver) × or : (takes or captures) **D** (Diagonalis),—(goes to) 4(5).

5. **C**—(goes to) 3(2), ch. or + (check).


4. **E**—(goes to) 1(3).

6. **C**—3(3), ‡ (checkmate).

5. **E**—1(2).

## MONDAI—(PROBLEMS) 2.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

## A FRIENDLY SIDE;


With No MOCHINGOMA in Beginning.

1. NA (Navyartillery)—6(8), + by discovery on account of D.
2. F (Flying Squadron of Navy or Artillery)—5(5), +.
3. C (Cavalry)—7(6), ch. or +(ck.).
4. D—5(6) +.
5. F—5(9), n. or p. +.
6. f (promoted F)—5(5), +.
7. C—5(7), +.
8. f × S—2(5), +.
9. OSM, 3(7), +.
10. O i (Infantry corps) M 2(6), ch. or +.
11. NA—2(8), †.

## ADVERSARY.

1. × g or : D,—8(9).
2. E × or : F,—5(5).
3. E—4(5).
4. E × or : D,—5(6).
5. E—4(5).
6. E—3(6).
7. E—2(7).
8. S (Gen.Silver) × or : f,—2(5):
9. E × or : g,—1(6).
10. E—1(7).

MONDAI—(PROBLEM) 3.



A FRIENDLY SIDE ;  
With No TENGOMA at First.

1. **C**—2(7), n. or p., +.
2. **D**—1(6), n. p., +.
3. **F**—1(8), n. p., +.
4. **f**—1(5), +.
5. **f**—2(4), + (ch).
6. **f**—4(4), +.
7. **f**—5(3), +.
8. **OIM** 7(1), +.
9. **f**—5(1), +, (double):
10. **f**—9(1), +.
11. **f**—9(4), +.
12. **f**—9(2), †.

ADVERSARY.

1. **E** × **G** (promoted **C**).
2. **E** : **D**, —1(6).
3. **E**—2(5).
4. **E**—3(4).
5. **E**—4(3).
6. **E**—5(2).
7. **E**—6(1).
8. **E** × **i**, —7(1).
9. **E**—8(2).
10. **E**—8(3).
11. **E**—8(2).

## MONDAI—(PROBLEM) 4.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

1						N	E	S	1
2						C			2
3						N		!	3
4						!	C	S	4
5				C	D	S		D	5
6								F	6
7					F		!		7
8									8
9									9

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

A FRIENDLY SIDE;  
No MOCHINGOMA at First

1. C—2(9), n. p., +.
2. D: i—4(7), +.
3. S—2(8), n. p., +.
4. D—3(7), n. p., +.
5. F—3(6), but not promoted *naru*, +.
6. F—3(8), but non-promoted, +.
7. O i M 2(9), +.
8. F: i, —3(9), but not *naru*, +.
9. O i M 2(8), +.
10. S—3(8), n. p., +.
11. G (promoted S)—2(9), ‡.

ADVERSARY.

1. E: C, —2(9).
2. NA (N): D, —4(7).
3. E × G (promoted S, —2(8):
4. E: D, —3(7).
5. E—2(8).
6. E—1(9).
7. E: i, —2(9).
8. E—1(8).
9. E: i, —2(8).
10. E—1(8).

MONDAI—(PROBLEM) 5.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

1	!		D!	G					1
2	S		!						2
3			f		F	g			3
4	i		K	N	A				4
5		G			S				5
6	S!			D	C				6
7		S		N					7
8						i			8
9									9

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

A FRIENDLY SIDE;

With a FUHYO as a TENGOMA at First.

1. S—3(2), +.
2. S × G,—5(2), +.
3. OGM 5(4), +.
4. F—3(2), n. p., +.
5. D (receding or drawing back)—  
3(1), n. p., +.
6. D—4(2), +.
7. i—3(1), n. p., +.
8. OIT, 2 (2), +.
9. NA—1(4), n. p., +.
10. FU—1(2), n. p., +.
11. g—2(2), +.
12. D—5(5), +.
13. OFM 3(2), +.
14. OSM 2(2), +.
15. D—3(1), †.

ADVERSARY.

1. f: S,—3(2).
2. f × S,—5(2).
3. f × G,—5(4).
4. E: F,—3(2).
5. E—3(3).
6. K(E)—2(2):
7. K—1(2).
8. K—1(3).
9. GOLD: g (natta Kyō),—1(4).
10. K: g,—1(2).
11. K: g,—2(2).
12. f: D,—5(5),
13. K—1(2).
14. K—2(1).

## MONDAI—(PROBLEM) 6.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

1		<b>N</b>		<b>g</b>					1	
2	<b>!</b>					<b>!</b>	<b>N</b>		2	
3		<b>!</b>	<b>S</b>			<b>g</b>		<b>i</b>	3	
4	<b>C</b>		<b>!</b>				<b>D</b>		4	
5				<b>!</b>	<b>S</b>		<b>!</b>	<b>S</b>	<b>D</b>	5
6				<b>N</b>		<b>g</b>			6	
7						<b>E</b>		<b>G</b>	7	
8								<b>f</b>	8	
9					<b>G</b>			<b>f</b>	9	

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

## A FRIENDLY SIDE;

With a KEIMA as MOCHINGOMA at First.


- G** (General Gold)—7(7), +.
- D** (*Ryūma*) × or : **G**,—7(7), +.
- OMC** 9(7), + or ch. (check).
- OST** 8(5), + or ch. (check).
- D**—6(5), ch.
- f** : **G**,—8(5), ch.
- f**—7(6), ch.
- OGT** 4(5), ch.
- f**—4(6), +.
- g**—3(5), ch.
- f** × **i**,—2(6), +.
- f**—2(5), +.
- C**—2(2), n. p. (must *naru*), ch.
- OIT** 2(3), ch.
- f**—1(4), † (*Tsumi*, checkmate).

## AN ADVERSARY.

- G** (*Natta* promoted General Silver) × or : **G**,—7(7).
- f** (*Ryūdō*) : or × **D**,—7(7).
- f** : or × **C**,—9(7).
- G** × or : **S**,—8(5).
- E** : **D**,—6(5).
- E**—5(6).
- E** × **S**,—5(5).
- E** × **G**,—4(5).
- E**—3(4).
- E**—2(3).
- E** × **g**,—1(4).
- E**—1(3).
- NA** × **G**,—2(2).
- E**—1(2).

MONDAI—(PROBLEM) 7.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

A FRIENDLY SIDE;


AN ADVERSARY.

With a S (General Silver) as a MOCHINGO-MA.

- |                              |                          |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. D—3(7), n. p., +.         | 1. C × D,—3(7).          |
| 2. D—1 (6), ch.              | 2. F : D,—1(6).          |
| 3. O M S 2(9) ch.            | 3. L (E, H, K, P,)—4(8). |
| 4. f—2(8), ch.               | 4. L—5(9).               |
| 5. i × S,—6(9), ch.          | 5. L × i,—6(9).          |
| 6. O S T 7(8), ch.           | 6. E—7(9).               |
| 7. f—6(8), ch.               | 7. E—8(8).               |
| 8. S—8(7), ch. by discovery. | 8. E—9(7).               |
| 9. f—9(8), ch.               | 9. E—8(6).               |
| 10. f—9(6), +.               | 10. E—7(5).              |
| 11. f—8(5), †.               |                          |

## MONDAI—(PROBLEM) 8.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

A FRIENDLY SIDE ;  
MOCHINGOMA, a G.

AN ADVERSARY.

1. O T G 4(8), check.
2. F—4(7), check.
3. D : G (*Natta* C),—5(6), ch.
4. F—5(5), n. p., ch.
5. f—5(7), ch.
6. g—2(8), ch.
7. C—1(8), n. p., ch.
8. f—4(8), +.
9. f—2(8), +.
10. O C M 3(7), +.
11. D—2(4), n. p., †.

1. H (E, K, P, L) : G,—4(8).
2. E × F,—4(7).
3. H : D,—5(6).
4. L—4(7).
5. H—3(8).
6. H : g,—2(8).
7. H × G,—1(8).
8. K—1(7).
9. K—1(6).
10. E—1(5).



MONDAI—(PROBLEM) 9.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

1			<b>D</b>						1
2	<b>g</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>!</b>			<b>g</b>			2
3	<b>S</b>	<b>f</b>		<b>!</b>					3
4					<b>F</b>				4
5	<b>!</b>			<b>K</b>					5
6		<b>i</b>	<b>b</b>						6
7				<b>b</b>					7
8				<b>C</b>	<b>i</b>				8
9									9

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

A LEGITIMATE SIDE;  
MOCHINGOMA, G G (2G's).


THE OPPOSITE.

1. O M G 5(3), ch.
2. f-4(3), ch.
3. D-3(2), +.
4. O M G 4(2), +.
5. D-2(2), n. p., +.
6. S : F, -4(2), n. p., +.
7. O F T 5(6), +.
8. D-5(5), +.
9. F-3(6), n. p., +.
10. g-2(5), +.
11. f-1(6), †.

1. g : G, -5(3).
2. K : f, -4(3).
3. L × D, -3(2).
4. F × G, -4(2).
5. L-4(3).
6. L-5(4).
7. K-4(5).
8. L-3(5).
9. L-2(4).
10. L-1(3).

## MONDAI—(PROBLEM) 10.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

## THE OFFENSIVE PARTY;

To begin with MOCHINGOMA, a C and  
2 FUHYO.


1. **G**—7(2), +.
2. **S**—6(3), +.
3. **f**—6(2), +.
4. **OTC** 9(2), +.
5. **OTi** 8(1), +.
6. **F**—8(2), +.
7. **OTi** 7(2), ch.
8. **S**—5(3), +.
9. **G**—4(2), †.

## THE DEFENSIVE PARTY.

1. **L** × **G**,—7(2).
2. **E**—7(1).
3. **NA** : **f**—6(2).
4. **NA** : **C**, n. p.
5. **E**—6(2).
6. **g** : **F**,—8(2).
7. **g** : **i**,—7(2).
8. **L**—5(2).

MONDAI—(PROBLEM) II.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

AN ATTACKING SIDE;

MOCHINGOMA, a Cavalry Corps and two FUHYO.


1. **G**—8(2), +.
2. **D**: **F**,—8(2), n. p., ch.
3. **f**—8(4), +.
4. **OMI** 8(1), ch.
5. **OFT** 6(1), +.
6. **f** × **g**,—8(1), +.
7. **OMC** 8(2), +.
8. **OMI** 7(2), ch.
9. **f**: **G**,—5(1), +.
10. **OGT** 6(1), +.
11. **D**—4(1), ch.
12. **OIT** 5(1), +.
13. **C**—6(3), +.
14. **g**—4(3), †.

A DEFENSIVE SIDE.

1. **F**: **G**,—8(2).
2. **E** × **D**,—8(2).
3. **E**—7(1).
4. **g** × **l**,—8(1).
5. **H**: **F**,—6(1).
6. **G**—7(1).
7. **H**—6(2).
8. **G**: **l**,—7(2).
9. **H** × **f**,—5(1).
10. **H**—4(2).
11. **E**: **D**,—4(1).
12. **E**—4(2).
13. **G**: **C**,—6(3).

## MONDAI—(PROBLEM) 12.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

A FRIENDLY SIDE;  
MOCHINGOMA, a G and Five FUHYO.


1. O T G 2(3), +.
2. D—3(1), n. p., ch.
3. O T i 4(1), ch.
4. D : g,—2(3), n. p., +.
5. O T i 5(1), +.
6. O T i 6(1), ch.
7. O T i 7(1), ch.
8. O T i 8(1), +.
9. O N A M 7(1), †.

AN ADVERSARY.

1. g (promoted NA) × G,—2(3).
2. E : D,—3(1).
3. H × i,—4(1).
4. F × D,—2(3).
5. E × i,—5(1).
6. E × i,—6(1).
7. H : i,—7(1).
8. E—6(1).

# MONDAI—(PROBLEM) 13.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

**An Offensive Party, with a G and 3 Cavalry Corps Pieces.**

**A DEFENSIVE SIDE.**

1. **D** × **G** (*natta* **C**), —1(9), n. p., ch.
2. **OMC**, 3(8), ch.
3. **D**—1(8), ch.
4. **OMC** 3(7), ch.
5. **D**—1(7), +.
6. **OMC** 3(6), ch.
7. **D**—1(6), +.
8. **OMC** 3(5), +.
9. **D**—1(5), +.
10. **F**—1(1), n. p., +.
11. **OMG** 3(3), ch.
12. *f* : —1(4), ch.
13. **D** : *f* , —3(3), +.
14. **OTF** 2(3), +.
15. *f*—4(4), +.
16. **F**—2(1), n. p., +.
17. *f*—7(1), +.
18. *f* × **G**, —7(4), ch.
19. *f*—7(1), ch.
20. **OTG** 6(4), check.
21. *f*—7(4), †.

1. **H**—1(7).
2. *f* : **C**, —3(8).
3. **H**—1(6).
4. *f* × **C**, —3(7).
5. **E**—1(5).
6. *f* : **C**, —3(6).
7. **E**—1(4).
8. *f* : **C**, —4(5).
9. **H**—1(3).
10. **H**—2(3).
11. *f* × **G**, —3(3).
12. **H**—3(2).
13. **H** × **D**, —3(3).
14. **H**—4(2).
15. **H**—5(1).
16. **H**—6(2).
17. **H** × *f*, —7(1).
18. **H**—6(2).
19. **H**—6(3).
20. **E** × **G**, —6(4).

## MONDAI—(PROBLEM) 14.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

1	g	f	o						1
2	o								2
3		!	!	!	!	S	!	!	3
4						E		D	4
5	F								5
6		o							6
7		C						N A	7
8					b	!			8
9									9

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

## FRIENDS;

## ENEMIES.

With DIAGONALIS as a MOCHINGOMA.

- |                      |                  |
|----------------------|------------------|
| 1. D—5(8), ch.       | 1. E—4(6).       |
| 2. O M D 6(8), ch.   | 2. E—4(5).       |
| 3. D—6(7), ch.       | 3. E—4(4).       |
| 4. D—7(7), +.        | 4. E—4(3).       |
| 5. D—7(6), +.        | 5. E—4(2).       |
| 6. D × i,—8(6), +.   | 6. g : D,—8(6).  |
| 7. O I T 5(2), +.    | 7. G : i,—5(2).  |
| 8. F—3(1), n. p., +. | 8. E : f,—3(1).  |
| 9. f—2(1), +.        | 9. E—4(2).       |
| 10. O C T 6(3), +.   | 10. G : C,—6(3). |
| 11. f—5(1), ‡.       |                  |

MONDAI—(PROBLEM) 15.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

1	S	X	B						1
2	!	S		F	!	i			2
3		O	D	C	N				3
4					C		N	A	4
5		N	A		i			i	5
6						G			6
7									7
8							C		8
9									9

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

Allies; With a Flying Navyartillery, HISHA,  
a TEGOMA, or MOCHINGOMA, at First.

FOES.

1. C—1(3), n. p., +.
2. F: i,—2(1), n. p., +.
3. O T F 1(1), +.
4. C—2(4), n. p., X.
5. F—2(1), n. p., +.
6. f X S,—2(4), +.
7. O M S 5(6), +.
8. f—4(4), +.
9. O M S 2(7), +.
10. f—4(6), +.
11. O M I 3(6), +.
12. S—1(7), but not n. p., +:
13. S O M I 2(6), +.
14. S S: D,—2(6), +.
15. O M D, 4(8), ch.
16. D—3(7), n. p., ch.
17. D—4(6), n. p., ch.
18. D—6(6), +.
19. Dbackward—5(5), +.
20. D—3(3), +.
21. D—5(5), +.
22. NA—3(7), n. p., †

1. S: G,—1(3).
2. S: f,—2(1).
3. K—2(3).
4. S: G,—2(4).
5. K—3(4).
6. K—4(5).
7. D: S,—5(6).
8. K—3(7).
9. K X i,—2(6).
10. D: f,—4(6).
11. D: i,—3(6).
12. K—1(6).
13. D: i,—2(6).
14. K: S,—2(6).
15. K—3(6).
16. K—4(5).
17. K—5(6).
18. K—4(5).
19. K—3(4).
20. K—4(5).
21. K—4(6).

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