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DAVID BAUMGARDT: HIST OF MOD ETHICS; MATERIALS; 1963

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Duplikate
(Einzelseiten)
zur Gesch. der
modernen Ethik,
die an Joe
Frank geschickt
wurde

15/6. 1963

Unter den grossen Führern des nachkantischen Idealismus hat sich ohne Zweifel auch Hegel in stärkstem Ausmass als Ethiker gefühlt.

Allerdings die alte zwanzig=bändige Ausgabe der Werke enthält keine einzige Schrift, die in ihrem Titel Bezug auf die Moralphilosophie nimmt.

Erst 1893 ervöffentlichte Georg Mollat eine Jugendarbeit aus dem Nachlass, die als System der Sittlichkeit bezeichnet wird; und erst 1913 hat Georg Lasson einige Zusätze zu dieser Schrift zum Abdruck gebracht.

Aber all dies hindert nicht, dass sich in der Tat mitten in fast allen Schriften Hegels ein intensives Ringen um eine Theorie des Sittlichen vorfindet, ein Ringen, das bis heute noch keine ausreichende Würdigung erfuhr.

Schon Hegel selbst hat seine moral~~sche~~theoretischen Grundgedanken besonders gern nach 2 Fronten abzugrenzen gesucht, sowohl nach der Seite eines moralphilosophischen Empirismus, wie er ihn etwa in der historischen Rechtsschule verkörpert zu sehen glaubte, als auch nach der Seite des Formalismus Kants und Fichtes.

In ~~Wik~~ Wirklichkeit aber liegt hier doch eine nach allen Seiten so orginale und tiefe Leistung vor, dass auch der Historiker der Ethik sich noch weit mehr als bisher mit dem Problem Hegel wird beschäftigen müssen.

Schon in den frühsten theologischen Jugendschriften, deren geordnete Herausgabe Hermann Nohl zu danken ist, leben die Probleme der Ethik stark im Vordergrunde.

Und wie fast alle seine jugendlichen Zeitgenossen wie Schelling oder Friedrich Schlegel oder Humboldt, so strebt auch Hegel zwar von Anfang an leidenschaftlich über die ganze Aufklärungswelt des 18. Jahrhunderts hinaus; und doch bleibt er zugleich vorerst noch mächtig im Bann der reinen Vernunftethik des kategorischen Imperativs befangen.

So schreibt er noch 1795 in Bern ein „Leben Jesu", indem er seinem

Idealbild Christi nur genz betont die Züge des reinen Antonomiemoral-predigers im Sinne Kants beilegt.

Ja selbst die extremsten Positionen der Kantschen Ethik werden hier mitvertreten, so z. B. wenn Hegel meint: die christliche Nächstenliebe ziele nicht etwa auf ein Gefühl der Liebe, sondern nur auf eine rein intellektuelle Achtung vor dem Gesetz der Menschheit im Nebenmenschen.* 1) (s. Hegels theol. Jugendschr. ed. Nohl, 1907, z. B. S 84, 154

Und nicht nur in seiner theoretischen Grundauffassung des Sittlichen, auch in dem innersten aktivistischen Pathos seiner damaligen Briefe bleibt Hegel noch ganz vom Geiste Kants und Fichtes beherrscht.

Ein Vierteljahrhundert später hat er nur das, was ist, als vernünftig und als ethisch anerkannt und er hat dann über alle Ungeduld des weltreformierenden Meinens gespottet. 2)

1795 aber ist er - besonders in diesen Briefen an Schelling - noch ganz erfüllt von einer Ethik der Tat im Sinne des kühnsten deutschen Freiheitsidealismus, und so fordert er es hier wörtlich: Das was sein soll, muss sich endlich mächtig erheben gegen die Indolenz dessen, was ist. 3)

Zwar beschäftigt er sich schon von den Tübinger Jahren an nachhaltig mit dem Problem der Volksreligion; und so lockt es ihn immer wieder, die Schönheit einer sinnlich sittlichen Volksreligiosität herbeizuwünschen als Ergänzung zu dem überstrengen Purismus der kritischen Vernunftmoral. 4)

Aber die entscheidende Abkehr von Kant und Fichte erfolgte doch erst in der Zeit seiner Uebersiedlung von Bern nach Frankfurt, und das Jahr 1797, in der Zeit der wiederbelebten Freundschaft mit Hölderlin, damals als sich in der ganzen jüngeren philosophischen Generation die Hinneigung zum Pantheismus und zum identitätsphilosophischen Denken in den verschiedensten Formen vollzog.

Noch in der ersten Fassung der Schrift über die Positivität des Christentums" war Jesus für Hegel nur der grosse Kämpfer gegen die tote Positivität des Judentums, der Kämpfer gegen alle

(extra copy p13) (3

theonomisch gebundene Moral, der nur die unbedingte Unterwerfung unter das Sittengesetz der reinen Vernunft verlangte. 5)

Nun aber in den Fragmenten über den „Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal" in den Jahren 1798 und 99 erlebt Hegel des Problem des Sittlichen in völlig verwandelter Gestalt.

Auch der Gehorsam gegen den Selbstzwang der Kantschen Tugend - so sprcht er es jetzt entschieden aus - ist doch noch Knechtschaft.

Christus aber wollte statt dessen nur „Tugenden ohne Herrschaft und ohne Unterwerfung" d. h. „Modifikationen der Liebe." 6)

Und so können wir es denn von hier aus Schritt für Schritt verfolgen, wie Hegel sich gerade von diesen Jahren ab immer weiter in die dunkelsten Labyrinthe der Problematik des Sittlichen hineingewagt ~~hte~~ hat, und wie er dann diese Arbeit fruchtbar machte für den Aufbau seines späteren Systems.

1798 glaubt er allerdings vorläufig noch alle die Gegensätze zwischen Pflicht und Neigung, zwischen Sollen und Sein und zwischen Herrschen und Dienen, alle die schwersten Spannungen innerhalb des Sittlichen, die sich ihm bisher aufgetan hatten, ineinander ausgleichen zu können durch einen „mystischen Pantheismus der Liebe" ganz im Geiste des Hölderlinschen Hyperion.

Dann aber erwacht doch auch schon zu derselben Zeit der entschiedene Wille zur begrifflichen Kritik an allen den älteren moralischen Grundvorstellungen, die er nun ihrem ganzen Gehalt nach, aber auch rein begrifflich=methodisch, zu überwinden trachtet.
Zwar die ausführliche Kritik der Kantschen Metaphysik der Sitten, die er 1798 schrieb und die Rosenkranz noch gekennt hat, ist leider inzwischen unter den Manuskripten des Nachlasses verloren gegangen. 7)

Dafür findet sich aber ein reicher Ersatz in den Jenaer Abhandlungen, die Hegel gemeinsam mit Schelling in dem „kritischen Journal" 1801-3 herausgab; ja ~~auch~~ noch bis in die Phänomenologie und selbst bis

Schluss fehlt ← ? (RB)

Hist.
Modern
ethics (German)
(CB)

Hist
modern
ethics

Idee, verbunden.

Und diese Einheit der Idee verkörpert sich nun wieder, wie Hegel damals zeigen wollte, in der Besonderheit von Ständen, in einem Militäradel, einem Bürger - und einem Bauernstand.

Alle diese Besonderheiten bestehen nur für das Allgemeine und das Allgemeine nur um des Besonderen willen.

Haym hat behauptet, Hegel habe bei der ~~mähren~~ näheren Ausmalung seines damaligen Staatsideals die platonische Republik vor Augen gehabt.

Rosenzweig verweist in seinem 1920 erschienen Werke „Hegel und der Staat" auf die Ständeschichtung des friderizianischen Gemeinwesens.

Aber alle diese Debatten müssen natürlich für meinen heutigen ganz knappen Ueberblick über die Ethik Hegels zurücktreten.

Und ausserdem haben sich auch gerade die Einzelheiten der Staatslehre in der endgültigen Formung des Systems stark geändert.

Die entscheidende Vorstufe aber zu dieser späteren Fassung des Systems bildet die „Phänomenologie des Geistes", die 1807 erschien, und die auch wieder innerhalb ihrer grossen Schilderung der dialektischen Entwickelung des Geistigen überhaupt eine breite Darstellung der moralischen Phänomene bietet.

So hat Hegel in allen den Kapiteln über „Lust und Notwendigkeit", über das Gesetz des Herzens und den Wahnsinn des Eigendünkels", über die Tugend und den Weltlauf", über das geistige Tierreich", über die gesetzgebende" und die gesetzprüfende Vernunft" in höchst instruktiver" Art eine grosse Kette von Momenten des Moralischen in einer oft ausserordentlich belebten und drastisch barocken Kraft zur Anschauung gebracht.

Nur auf eine nähere Analyse dieser Kapitel will ich jetzt ~~allerdings~~ nicht mehr eingehen.

Zur Geschichte der modernen Ethik.

Über die Idee

Hegels

Vortrag, gehalten vor der Habilitationskommission der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Berlin am 22.12.1924

von Max Bamgardt

Tri.-Obs. a. d. Kais. Jos.

Jetzt

Die ~~letzte~~ neuste Darstellung ~~von~~ Falks in seiner „Geschichte der Ethik" Bd. II kann nur als ~~der~~ ungenügend gelten. Sie wird weder der begrifflichen Differenzierung der Methode noch auch dem immanenten Gehalt ~~der~~ und der Ausdehnte der Kantischen Problematik gerecht. Sie löst die ganze Gedankenarbeit des größten ~~der~~ panlogistischen Systems ~~nur~~ in einen alten naiven Positivismus und Sozialdämonismus im Sinne des Falkschen Denkens selbst auf.

Unter den großen Führern des nachkantischen Idealismus hat sich ohne Zweifel auch Hegel in stärkstem Ausmaß als Ethiker betätigt.

Allerdings die ~~fünf~~ 18-bändige alte Ausgabe der Werke enthält keine einzige Schrift, die in ihrem Titel irgendwie Bezug auf die Moralität, Ethik nähme. Erst 1893 hat H. Nohl aus dem Nachlaß eine bisher unveröffentlichte kleinere Jugendarbeit Hegels, die als solche mit dem Titel: System der Sittl. noch nicht bezeichnet wird, herausgegeben. Hat Georg Lasson in seiner kritischen Neuausgabe der Werke einige Zusätze zu dieser Schrift dem Text beigefügt.

Aber all dies ändert nichts, daß in der Tat bei Hegel - eingestreut in die großen Systeme - Hauptwerke eine ausgebildete Theorie der Sittl. vorliegt. Hegel selbst hat diese Theorie in ihrer Eigenart besonders gegenüber Kant u. Fichte nachdrücklich u. ausführlich abgegrenzt. Aber auch heute besteht über diese Theorie nicht nur ~~keine~~ Übereinstimmung, sondern es hat auch für die Ethik der Gegenwart noch lebendigen systematischen Wert.

Schon die Dissertation, durch die Hegel sich den Magistertitel erwarb, behandelt ein ethisches Thema: de limitibus officiorum humanorum. Aber der Rudolf Haym hat sich nicht in seiner Biogr. Hegels mit Recht gegen Rosenkranz darauf hingewiesen, daß die Autorschaft Hegels des Philosoph. gegenüber dieser alten d. theolog. Jugendschrift sehr fraglich ist, daß nach den Angaben von Schwab u. K. H. Fischer mit Hegel, sondern der Prof. der Eloquenz A. F. Bock als der Verfasser jener Abhandlung anzusehen sei. Wohl, H. hat jene Dissert. nur verteidigt. Damit würde also von selbst die religionsphilosophische Moral. Abhandlung von besonderer Bedeutung für die Stellung, die Hegel zur Moral einnahm, überflüssig werden. Viel wichtiger ist dagegen die Stellung, die Hegel in seinen theol. Jugendschriften zum Problem der Moral einnahm als die politische Entwürfe. Aus diesen Jugendschriften, deren Herausgabe wir Herrn. Nohl verdanken, geht allgemein anerkannte Verdienst, erstmals hervor, daß Hegel damals schon in der Tat von der in der späteren Tübinger u. Berner u. Berliner Zeit [illegible]

Betrachten wir nun zunächst die Hedegeit H's, so sind hier
noch wichtiger als die polit. Entwürfe die großen religionsgeschichtl.
Studien des Philos. Durch die Wiederentdeckg u. die Neuausg. dieser
theol. Jugendschr. hat sich H. Noll 1 allgem. anerkanntes Verdienst
erworben, u. es ist in der Tat auch für d. Verständnis d. Neg.
Ethik aufschlußreich aufschlußreicher anfschlußreich zu sehen, wie stark
noch in den größten Teil jener theolog. Arbeit die Partizipation
für die Kantische Moralphil. gewesen ist.
noch in dieser ist ~~H. hat~~ bei aller Selbständigkeit gegenüber Kant, als Moraltheologie für s. Moralbegriff
H. hat hier nur den Gehalt Lehre, sondern auch die Terminol. Kants übernommen
der krit. Moralbegriff
vollständig zu weiteren Ausführungen
Strenge.

Da sich d. Abh. üb. d. Leben Jesu sind sogar die extremsten Positiv. der K'schen
Ethik mitbestimmen, so wenn H. hier behauptet: die christl. Nächstenliebe
ziele nicht etwa auf 1 Gefühl der Liebe, sondern nur auf eine rein intellektuelle
vor dem Gesetz der Menschheit im Nebenmenschen. Die Gottheit aber kenne den
Affekt der Liebe nicht, sie sei unfähig von etwas anderem affiziert zu
werden als nur von dem ewigen Gesetz d. Sittlichkeit.

Aber auch in d. Fragmenten üb. Christ. u. Volksrelig. wird es ganz im Sinne
betont: in 1 Psych. d. Moral müsse d. rein Moralität von d. Sinnlichkeit in
abstracto genau geschieden werden.
H. ebenso heißt es ganz Kantisch in d. 1. Fassung der Schrift üb. d. Positiv.
d. Christentums: der Hauptsitz d. Herrschaft des Moralischen bestehe allein in dem Gehorsam
gegen d. sittl. Gesetz.

Da H. hat in jenen Jahren, etwa von 1793 bis 1795 in seinem Geist
nicht nur

In dem Jahrzehnt zwischen 1790 u. 1800 (bis etwa 1797 zunächst) vollzieht sich der Bruch mit der Kantischen Moralphilos. stand, wobei sich die Folgerichtigkeit mit der sie Hegel dachte. So beschäftigt H. sich in den Fragmenten über Volksrel. u. Christent. ganz ausgesprochen mit Kant. Eine ausführliche Kritik der Kantischen Moralphilosophie findet sich in der Phänomenologie. Hier betont H. daß in einem System der Moral nicht die Moralität von der Sittlichkeit getrennt werden darf.

Ja in der Abhandlung über das Leb. Jesu hat Hegel sogar die extremste Position der Kantischen Ethik mitvertreten, indem er die höchste Tugend, die auf Liebe beruht, als die Gottheit selbst bezeichnete. In der Schrift über die Pos. d. chr. Rel. heißt es noch, daß die Gottheit sich mehr von etwas anderem affiziert fühlen soll als von dem Gesetz der Sittlichkeit.

In Übereinstimmung damit stellt sich noch in der Schrift über die Pos. d. chr. Rel. der ganze Sinn der Rel. u. der Moral als ein Fordern gegen das Sittengesetz dar.

Ja abgesehen von dem Gebrauch der Kantischen Moralterminologie ist Hegel auch in jenen Jahren, während seiner Hauptschaffenszeit in Bern durch sein gesamtes reformatorisches Pathos noch sehr weit von der Entstellung einer späteren Moralkonzeption entfernt.

Die entscheidende Abkehr von der Kantischen Ethik erfolgte für Hegel erst durch die Lektüre der Kritik der Urteilskraft. Hegel schrieb nach dem Erscheinen der Kritik der Urteilskraft eine ausführliche Kritik, die leider nicht vorgelegen hat, die aber, wie wir aus Hegels eigenen Worten wissen, eine Hauptschrift geworden ist.

Aber schon in dem Fragment über Religion, das wahrscheinlich 1798 entstanden ist, wird Kant scharf angegriffen. Hier wird von wirklicher Abwendung gegen die Kantische Ethik noch nicht gesprochen. Aber in einem anderen Fragment, das wahrscheinlich früher entstanden ist, wird Kant bereits verspottet. Das Fragment über Religion und Recht, das wahrscheinlich 1798/99 entstanden ist, enthält bereits eine Kritik der Kantischen Ethik, die sich gegen die Kantische Ethik wendet.

Das Fragment über Religion und Recht, das wahrscheinlich 1798/99 entstanden ist, enthält bereits eine Kritik der Kantischen Ethik, die sich gegen die Kantische Ethik wendet.

So wenn in der Schrift über die Ethik d. Kant. n. weiter
Kat-Kegels
Abhandlung in der ganzen Zeit, sowohl in der Schrift wie Hab n.
Vorles., wie n. Offs. wie beson. in dem sel. wichtigen Aufsatz
ib. Vg dieser Polemik die Kegl. Moralität als gutes Prinzip
Kat hat noch nicht nur die Phanom
Pflicht wird bis in die Rechtspfl. fortgesetzt.

Es ist zweifellos, gerade in der Entgegensetzung z. die Ethik K's
u. Fichtes hat H. die Grundrichtung verfehlt. Moralphänom
n. wie wieder daher noch heute gerade v. Kant aus den
besten Zeugn. u. den besten eigne Überl. über die Ethik K's
erstens abgelehnt wird.

[Überall in allen anderen Aufsätzen zeigt sich in der Frage,
welche ib. Volksrel. u. Christent. wie in der Schrift
hat H. nicht ganz die Seite aus der Terminologie der K'schen
Ethik ganz verlassen, sowohl in der Frage wie in der Lösung.
H. hat hier dann übrigens auch die Ziele in der Forderung speziell
u. das einzige Ziel d. Moral sei d. Gehorsam gegen das Sittengesetz.

So wird es z.B. in d. Fragmenten ib. Volksrel. u. Christent. besond. betont,
ebenso deutlich
u. ebenso ganz kantisch heißt es auch in d. 1. Fassung
d. ersten Teil d. Moral in d. Schrift ib. d. Positivität d. Christ.

Kegel wird d. Wesen d. Vorgangs d. Moralität, wie d. Vorles. u. diese Polemik gegen d. Kat. Ethik zeigen.

K. hatte gelehrt: nur das Handeln ~~n. dem kateg. Imperativ~~ ist sittlich. Das sittl. indiff. Verhalt. ist dasj., das für das 1 Inhalte, ~~1 Materie des Begehrungsvermögens bestimmend ist~~ bestimmt wird, durch die Vielheit der Materien d. Begehrungsvermögens. Dem entgegen gibt es aber ein rein formales Einheitsgesetz des Handelns, 1 Gesetz, das nur fordert, d. Maxime der Willkür müsse die Form der Taugl. zu 1 allg. Naturges. besitzen. Dieses Gesetz ist d. kateg. Imp.: Handle so

II. Dies heißt also nur das Handeln, n. diesem r. formal. Vernft ist n. K. 1 sittl. Verhalten.

Diesen Formalism. d. Ethik hat H. mit aller Energie zu überwinden gesucht. Er hat es oft als seine Aufgaben genannt, sich grade der Probleme des Materialen anzunehmen u. in 1 Briefe an Voss# schreibt er grade: seine wissensch. Ziele seien die Philosophie deutsch sprechen zu lehren u. d. Unfug (I S. 52) des Formalism. zu beseitigen. (I S. 413)

U. in d. Tat, die Argumente gegen die formale Ethik haben nirgends wie der im 19. Jahrh., weder bei Schl., noch bei Herbart und bei Beneke, eine solche Beweiskraft u. 1 solche Schärfe erreicht, die wir gerade bei H. gewonnen haben.

H. hat vollkommen überzeugend dargetan, daß jedes formale Gesetz in d. Eth. notwendig 1 Materie d. Handelns als mitbestimmend voraussetze.

Heg. erkennt es zunächst an, daß K. überhaupt in der Eth. allgemein gültige Sätze festzulegen suchte, hierin wie besonders in d. 1. Teil der Abhandlg. von Naturrecht ausgeführt wird, die große Überlegen.

Lebenslauf.

Der Unterzeichnete ist am 20. April 1890 in Erfurt als Sohn des Kaufmanns Samuel Baumgardt und seiner Ehefrau Regina, geb. Herzfelder, als Angehöriger der mosaischen Religion geboren. Von Ostern 1896 bis 1899 besuchte ich die Vorschule zu Erfurt, von 1899 an das dortige Gymnasium

~~[illegible] d. form. [illegible] als [illegible] alle die [illegible] kann [illegible]~~

So ~~wollte~~ [illegible] K. schon d. form. Vernftgesetz entscheiden, daß die Annahme 1 Begriffs unmöglich sei, [illegible] sich unmöglich.

~~hat d. Krit. d. Moraltheorie gegenüber jeder rein empiristischen~~

Hegel ist allerdings der k. Moraltheorie nicht völlig gerecht geworden. Er ~~hat den~~ überall, vor allem die tiefe synth. Bedeutung, die das pr. Vernftges. bei Kant besitzt, Er hat das Wesen des Vernunftgesetzes der synth. Sinne der Einheit d. Apperz. nicht erkannt. So hat er ~~[illegible]~~ fälschlich behauptet: die Identität, die Allgemeingültigkeit die im pr. Vernftges. K.s ausgedrückt sei, bedeute nur die analytische Identität [illegible] Sinne des Satzes vom Widerspruche. In der Tat. v. Tautologie...

Hierin ist zweifellos der Begr. der Eth. nach d. [illegible] d. [illegible] d. Naturgesetze. so wie ihn K. gemeint hat, ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] Sittenbegr. für sein Sittengesetz verwerten wollte, nicht getroffen.

Trotzdem hat H. nicht etwa die eth. Vernftgesetze selbst abgelehnt, er hat bes. in der Abhgkeit ~~[illegible]~~ anerkannt: daß K. überh. in d. Eth. allgemeingültige Vernftsätze festzustellen suchte, hierin.

Um so gewaltiger ist daher d. Nachdruck, mit dem H. die Materiallosigkeit d. K'schen Ethik bekämpft. Den ~~[illegible]~~, in dem 1 formales Vernftges. für die Moral s. ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] Bedeutung habe, hat H. nicht erfaßt. Dagegen die ~~[illegible]~~ alle die Anh. [illegible] kann die er nachwies, daß 1 r. formales Vernftgz. niemals der einzige Bestimmungsgrund d. Sittl. sein kann, daß d. Ethik stets

Kath K. konsequent blos formale Verpflichtung ist, ganz für sich
ohne jeden mitbestimmenden Inhalt festgehalten, so hätte er hiermit
in seinem Prinzip kein einziges bestimmtes Pflichtgebot festlegen
können. Es entsteht vielmehr, wie dies besonders die Abhandlg. üb.
das Recht z. Lügen aus Philanthropie d. Moralität d. Ethik
notwendig (Gedränge I 244) V. In Wahrheit aber hat, wie
dies d. Abhandlg. üb. Glaub. u. Wissen formulirt, K. über jeden Inhalt
von Tugendpflichten empir. Aufschluß verlangt. Jeder
Jeden aber ist in d. Ethik empir. Verschiedenheiten als Inhalt des Pflichtgebots aufzustellen, so ist jede dieser Materien fähig, in 1 formales Prinzip
dieser Weise für sittl. Gesetz gemacht werden könnte. Für 1 formales
Verfahren ist die 1 der entgegen. Verschied. so gleichgültig als die
andere; jede kann als Princip. I 353.

K. hatte erklärt: wenn es für 1 allgem. Gesetz erhoben würde, daß man
jederzeit Depositen verleugnen dürfe, so würde niemand mehr Geld
deponieren. Es sei demnach 1 Kennzeichen der unsittl. Maxime, daß sie
als allgem. Prinzip gedacht, sich selbst aufhebt

Gegenüber diesen Argumenten hat K. oft - sogar noch in d. Schr. Vorlesg. über
die Geschichte d. Philos. - 1 blosses Gegenbeispiel aufgestellt, nämlich d. Bei-
spiel von der Wohltätigk. Wenn alle Menschen Armen geholfen, so gäbe es bald
keine Armen mehr. Mit diesem Beispiel zeigte K. allerdings, daß er nicht nur die Maxime der Geldverleugnung, allgemeinen
angewandt, nicht selbst vernichtet, sondern ebenso die offenbar sittl. Maxime der Armenhilfe

keine Armen mehr oder konstruiere d.h. wo es den, die noch helfen könnte d. jedenfalls aber fiele in beiden Fällen die Hilfe weg. D.h. sie denkt: auch die Maxime d. Wohltätigk. hebt mit allgem. gedachte selbstag. Pflicht 354 trotzdem hebe weder K. noch seine allgem. deshalb die Wohltät. für unsittl. halten.

Trotzdem hebe gerade K.d. Wohltätigk. nicht für unsittlich gehalte, u. die Welt ist durchaus berechtigt.

Also Weder die Wohltätigkeit noch irgend 1 anderer Inhalt 1 Maxime kann durch Abstr. form. Vernftges. als sittl. oder unsittl. gekennzeichnet werden. Es ist dahin mit d. Tat voll berechtigt, wenn K. glaubt, durch alle diese Akte Argumente die Unsittlichkeit des inhaltlich wertfreien von materiale Momenten für die Ethik Lösung der Sittl. bewiesen zu haben.) Eine Moraltheorie, die wie die K'sche jedes materiale Moment von der Mitbestimmung des Sittl. ausschließen will, ist in d. Tat nicht

Nur die weitere Polemik, gegen angebliche Folgeerscheinungen der kantischen Ethik hat K. zu starken Übertreibungen geführt, sogar in seiner Polemik noch weiter gegangen: er hat sogar wohl in d. verzweifelten Abwehr gegen die den Abstand zu K, bekämpfte, K. habe absichtlich in s. Ethik die Absolutheit des Formalen mit der reinen Bedingtheit des Materialen vermischt. Der Aufbau dieser Ethik kennt keine Stufen und die gesamte Ganze gestaltet sich. Jeder der K'schen Ethik in tiefster Sinn aufgefaßt bemüht sich

Ja in d. verschiedenen seiner Abhandlungen hat K. sogar ausgesprochen, die Kantische Ethik sei in ihr Inhaltlosigkeit für das Handeln, zum Leichtsinn; die Moral der Tatbestände, der Naturrecht, ja sogar die Theorie d. Unsittl. selbst wie der auch die schön. u. die religiös. Deklamation, die schaden soll, aber nicht aufhalten kann, die nur Langeweile macht, die wesenlose Abstr. d. Sittl. deshalb ist völlig in ihrer Idealhaftigkeit. mit der Idealhaftigkeit

§ 258 Fried. Allg.

/ ja d. Freiheitsbegr.

Der Satz, Eigentum ist Eigentum — so sagt K. in d. Abhdlg. üb. d. Naturrecht — kann nur die Bedeutung haben: die Identität, die dieser Satz in s. Form ausdrückt, ist absolut. Dagegen hat K. (statt dessen wurde dieser Satz) die Bedeutung untergeschoben: die Materie selbst, nämlich d. Eigentum, ist absolut. (I 354/55) Und so wurde in Kant's Ethik überall dem Universellen, der Bedingung des Inhalts die Absolutheit d. Form untergeschoben. (stellt I 354) "Die sei d. Norm der W. Gesetz. d. r. Ver." "Nach dieser Vorschrift" hat nun K. eine besondere Tugend geschaffen. Er nahm die Tugendpflicht, ja die Unsittlichkeit selbst, dort wo Gesinnung, Ernsthaftigkeit zu Ausschlag kommen wird, da sei eben Verantwortlichkeit i. im Gegensatz zu d. Sittl. Unsittlich. gesetzt.

Nach d. Prinzip. der Kantischen Ethik könne jede beliebige Inhalt der absoluten Sittl. Gültigkeit fähig werden; es sei nur Tugendhaftigkeit, wenn für die Vorschrift jed. Inhalts mit Gesinnung Ernst gemacht würde.

Daher setzte die Kant. Moralth. in Stande, gefährlichste Probabilismus, ja sie führte mit ihm die moral. Kunst d. Jesuiten od. mit die Prinzip. treien Gewissenlosigkeitslehre, sie versteckte blöde Künstelei von Grundsätzen die blöd bourgeoise Moral.

Oder wie es in d. Schrift Glaub u. Wiss heißt: K. forderte nur die leere Form des subjekt. Bewußtseins, das sich selbst gesetzt habe.
Aber dies notwendig subjekt. Wissen u. die Tugend fühlt sich zum Pflichtsatz.
Die wesentlose Abstraktion der K'schen Moralbegr. deckt sich mit d. Abstraktheit der Begr. d. franz. Revolut., wie auch d. K. behauptete,

K.

Aber

die Pflicht um d. leeren Pflicht willen, wie K. sie fordert, sei 1 leere Redensart (Fülle) oder wie d. Phrase (dies) weites Ausfüllen, sieht (Stoffe) dekl. die erbauen soll, aber nicht aufbauen kann, die in Tode nur noch Langeweile macht.

Da die Abhdlg. üb. d. Naturrecht erklärt sogar: der leere Freiheitsbegr. (den wie K. konstruiert) habe, stehe außerhalb der Wissensch. denke nur darauf hin, daß die Voraussetzung der er entstammt, die Zustände eines aufgelösten Volkes sei

Von diesem Kantischen (hier) Kritizismus aus ist nun zugleich, wie schon gesagt, auch (2) (1) (neg. methodisch) bester erster Einblick in Hegels eigne, (philos. positive) Methode u. die (method. grundsätzliche) eigentl. Stärke zu erlangen (gewinnen)

Falschen Stellen wir nach 1 die (method. Hauptsatz d. Kant. Kritik) Meinung gegen K. zusammen, so wird m. Meinung der Grundfehler der kritischen Ethik der, daß sie eine (a priori notwendige) Synthese, (methodisch notwendige) Einheit, den K. sogar. Kant eben hatte, wo der. d. krit. Ethik fehlt / völlig unhaltbare fixierte Spaltung zwischen allen Momenten d. Sittl. einführt

Diese Bestimmung einführte Zweifel ~~der~~ absol. gelte der Form des Sittl. u. 1 völlig zufälliger Inhalt.

Es gäbt nicht, der Versuch, jedes mater. Best. nach aus der Ethik ~~aufzustellen~~ zu stellen, K. hat vergeblich versucht, jedes material. Kriterium des Sittl. aus der Ethik auszuschalten. Für K. bedeutet nicht 1 absol. gelte der Form des Sittl. unter Jedenfalls hat K. kein methodisches Mittel festgehalten: in d. Ethik 1 vollkommene Bestimmung von Form u. Inhalt

Der Form nach, es habe aber in Wahrheit der Inhalt 1 völlig mannigfaltige

fixierte Spalte, zwischen alle Momente des Sittl. eingeschl.

bestellt (u. K. in d. Ethik ganz vollkommene Bestimmung

Für K. zwischen der Form u. Inhalt

die der Vernft, des Einheit Ideellen, der Einheit, des Allgem. Gültigen

des Bestimmt, der Grund, des Subj. d. Orts, d. Sollens, hinaus gestrebten, ja

völlig entgegensetzt sind die allen diesen Begr. aber völlig entgegen stehen

bei K. auf d. Seite des Inhalts die Begriff. d. Inhalts, des Reellen, der Einzelh. der Verh., des Besonderen, des

Zufälligen, der Materie, des Objektes, des bloßen Seins.

K's method. Endziel aber ist die völlige Lösung aller dieser bei K. einander entgegengesetzten Begriffs-Momente

Auch d. Kg. der r. Vern. hatte 1 Einheit von Verstand u. Sinnlichk., von Allgemeingültigem u. Besonderem aufgezeigt. Aber für die Bestimm. Methode der Ethik bleiben d. allgem. gültige Form u. d. vielfält. Inhalt stets begriffl. voneinander gestrecken, nur die notwendige Verbindung dieser Momente

so besonders oft gezeigt worden, von zeitlos metaphys. Begriffsentwickl. u. rein histor. Prozessen

~~trotz der Spaltung~~ wurde r. rational ~~am Faktum d. Spaltung~~ aufgewiesen.

Die Meth. H's aber ~~geht~~ will weiter mehr. ~~Sie setzt~~ Die dial. Meth., wie H. sie lehrt, ~~setzt~~ behauptet von vornherein gerade als ihren 1. Grundsatz die völlige Identität von Form u. d. Identität Inh. u. ~~die völlige~~ ja überhaupt 1 letzte Identität könnte aller ~~anderen~~ einander widerstreitenden Begriffe. Hierin besteht eben rein methodisch jener große diktatorische Zug des H'schen Denken, der auf Drehungen bes. hervortritt. u. ebenso, was Alle einander ~~widerstreitenden~~ entgegengesetzten Begr. sollen von dieser dialekt. Meth. verflüssigt werden u. nur als Momente 1 höheren orga. Einh. sollen sie aufbewahrt ~~ausgedrückt erscheinen~~ sein.

~~Alle diese Begr. sind innerhalb des ges. Hegelschen Phil. als ideal durch erklärt.~~ ~~In den Begr. der absol. Idee ist~~ u. zwar soll in der Begr. d. abs. Idee diese coincidentia oppositorum erfüllt ~~Alle einander widerstreitenden~~ von Ideelle u. Reele ~~den Begr. sinken für die dial. Methode infolge ihrer flüss. Natur zu Momenten 1 orga. Einheit ab.~~

Wie es das große Gleichnis aus der Vorrede z. Phän. erklärt: auch d. Knospe verschwindet 1 Pflanze wird v. Blüte widerlegt u. ebenso wird die Blüte durch die Frucht ~~für~~ als 1 falsches Das. erwiesen ~~erklärt~~. U. doch bedeutet die Wahrh. üb. die Pfl. 1 orga. Einh. dies. entgeg. Bestimmungen. Ganz ebenso müssen ~~enthält~~ drückt auch d. Wahrh. üb. das Sittl. 1 orga. Einh. aller seiner – auch der disparatesten Momente ausdrücken.

Für Diese dial. Meth. kann es daher kein Sollen mehr geben, das fest fixiert ~~dem~~ d. Sein gegenüberstände, sondern wie es schon der Aufsatz üb. d. Wiss. des Sittlichen andeutet, ~~besond.~~ für d. prakt. Phil. Hegel's gibt es nur 1 höheres Sein, das ~~das Sollen~~ die Pflicht u. die Neigung, des Verst. u. Wirklichkeit als nur jenseitige Momente seiner selbst unter sich hat.

Diese höhere, dem einzig wahrhafte Sein kann aber natürlich nicht mehr durch d. Verstand begriffen werd.

Der Verstand, der an d. Satz d. Widerspr. gebunden bleibt, muß gerade
Zus. aller Hypothesen, die Idee
den einzig sicheren Satz, der als Hypothesen annehmen. D. Verstand kann aber
nur das Nächste, das Endliche, das Bedingte begreifen. Die spekul. Ver. aber erkennt als die Wahrheit, wo die gegensätzlichen Momente
die abstr. Idee.

Nach dieser Grundlegung der dialekt. Methode ist es nun leicht
leicht Jugendfragment: das Leben d. Idee aufzuheben.
wurde d. gegensätzlichen Momente, Konkretes u. Abstraktes, wird die Synthese Abstr. u. Konkr. wie auch in die Synthese verschiedenartig konkrete gestellt
in der abstr. Idee sind alle Gegensätze gesetzt
der Gegensätze
die Einheit Thesen, indem sie nachweist, daß jede Thesis in sich
jede Thesis in sich
in ihren Gegenteil ist eine Anti-Thesis
aufhebt u. das Thes. u. Antithes. ihre höhere Einheit wieder in
1 Synthesis finden muß.
Jede Thes. selbst aber kann nur bestehen, insofern sie als eine einseitiges
Moment der abstr. Idee, total bildet, die abstr. Idee aber, d. absol.
Ganze besteht nur insofern, als es sich in der Vielheit seiner Momente entfaltet.
Verschiedenheit.
Die Phän. bildet 1 Kreis oder wie die Hegel'sche Logik sonstlich, 1 Kreis
von Kreisen, mit 1 gerade Linie. Es ist mittelbar relativ, weil
d. Phil. anfängt; jedes Moment führt zum Ganzen u. das Ganze wieder zu
einzelnen
jed. Momente, wie jeder Punkt des Kreises zugleich als Anfangspunkt und
als Endpunkt des- u. desselben Bewegung gelten kann.

Zeit die ältesten Hegelbrgs. / ~~negrafen~~
Lton Hayms ~~u. neuerdings~~ ebenso wie u. neuerdings Joël, Heinrich Ebr., Holz u. Thiele
haben mit Recht darauf hingewiesen, daß jene Schrift mit d. Jahre
offenbar als der Schlußstein derjenigen ~~Frankfurter~~ Manuskripte
wir die Hoffnung als N° 1. Hefte angesehen werden sollte
N° 2 des Satzes dieses Titel N° 1 Hefte Systems von Ehebung u. Entwurf
herausgegeben wurde.

Dieses 1. Systems Hegel unterscheidet sich von der späteren Fassung der
H'gel. Philosophie vor allem dadurch, daß sie hier die absolute Idee
als d. höchste Manifestation des absoluten Geistes gilt, während später das absol.
Wissen als diese höchste Absolute gilt erscheint.

Jede in der 1. Form des dialekt. Ethik
in der noch
größere Fülle sich
barocke Konstruktionen finden
z. B. im Syst. d. Sittl. die Stufen d. Sittl. die Persönlichkeit
die Stufen des Staats

Entsprechen sich zweifellos die späteren system. Schrift. Hegel's in ganzen
der Inspirierte näher kommend als in ersteren Schriften auf die Inspirierte angelegt tiefer stehend wirkend
gehaltvoller in sorgfältiger Ausgeführt als die früheren, Hrdelb. Hauptdialekt.
selbst
allerdings vor Hg. stets nach seinem ganzen Formalismus
ohne solche vorgenommenen oder künstlichen
Einteilungen Gewaltsamkeiten, manche Systematisierungen Gewaltsamkeiten, gelegentlich abgebrochen worden.

Hier wird ist die Verbindung der Glieder des dialekt. Prozesses in den früheren
Schriften noch lockerer u. vielgestaltiger gehalten als in d. späteren
das ethische Moment
Wind. hat mit m. Unrecht gerade die Phänom. des Geistes für
das schwierigste Stück der ges. philos. Liter. erklärt. Aber nicht stellt
auch das oft Syst. d. Sittl. der Phänom. an Dunkelheit kaum nach,
Gewirre
zumal da dieser Systementwurf oft sehr sehr zahlreiche Lücken
Lücken
Lücken enthält, da er öfters nach die Terminolog. Hegels mißverstehen
da er in der Poetik u. in der Jetztzeit die Jüdischgriechische weiter hinter
der Phänomenol. zurückbleibt.

Mit diesen Grundbegriffen d. dialekt. Meth. glaubte nun K.,
wie er in d. Rechtsphilos. sagt, auch das sittl. Univers
konstruiren zu können.

Nur in der Prolegom. die i. J. 1808 - II gehaltenen 1840 v. Rosenkranz herausgeg. wurde, hat K. die dial. Meth. mit derselben Pflichtlehre nicht ausdrücklich in Anwendung gebracht. Dafür kann aber auch d. Prolegom. in keiner Weise als 1 langathmige Darstellg K'scher Lehren angesehen werden, sondern sie enthalten nur 1 sympathetischen Kommentar zu den Worten Kants zu Anfang der Moralph. über d. angeb. radikalen Hang zum Bösen.

Nur so erklärt es sich, daß K. hier noch i. J. 1808 während seiner Nürnberger Rektorzeit eine ganze Anzahl K'scher Moralbegr. gebrauchte, ja daß die ganze Eintheilg in Pflichten gegen sich selbst, gegen d. Familie, gegen d. Staat u. gegen andere noch mehr an K. u. Fichte als an N. Gierke.

Dagegen finden sich Worte in den lange unterdrückt. Jugendwerk, in d. Lehre d. Sitte, wie d. dialekt. Meth. darin durchgeführt.

Frage nach einem höchsten <u>apriori formalen</u> Grundsatz, scheint mir als ein spezifisch grundlegendes Problem in der Ethik in keiner Weise umgehbar zu sein.[1)]

Gegenüber dem Kantischen Formalismus, ja allgemein gegenüber jedem formalen Apriori (sowohl in der Ethik wie in der Philosophie überhaupt) ist nun neuerdings in der modernen Phänomenologie, am eindeutigsten von Max Scheler, Protest erhoben worden.

Prüfen wir daher

hier wie überall in seiner Ethik vermeidet, alle ihr vorliegenden moral. Phän. nur in dialekt. Prinzipien zu lösen zu suchen

Nur die freie Verwendung der dialek. Methode, die volle Identifiz. dialektische
[illegible] aller kantischen Gegensätze ist schon in d. 1. Fass. d. Sittl. von 1803 an aufgezeigt und dargelegt. In der Kette moral. Phän. an die Hand d. dialekt. Methode
Leistung in der Reihe der N'schen Ethik besteht Uebergang darin, daß N.

So enthält bereits das 1. Moment des Sittl., von dem d. Syst. d. Geistes ausgeht, d. spez. Gefühl [illegible] Unterschied von Verpf. u. Tug. v. Pflicht u. Neigung, ja auch wie H. mit seinen besond. spez. Gefühle
besond. ausgeführt wird die Verb. v. Allgem. u. Besonderen
Kraft zu der Mensch allgem. Seite, aus Seite an Menschen u. es entsteht daraus das Verh. von
indem d. Mensch nämlich d. spez. Gefühl folgt u. s. Bedürfnisse befriedigt,
leistet er zugleich allgem. Arbeit, schafft Werkzeuge u. Besitz. Mittel d. Verk. besonderen Gefühl.
ist also, wie H. (zugleich) Allgem. gesetzt. Verschaft u. Knechtschaft
dabei will

Aber das Besitzergreifen des Menschen bleibt an d. toten Gütern nicht stehen,
es erstreckt sich auch auf den Mitmenschen u. so entsteht mit
Beziehung
den Verhältnis von Person zu Person, tritt auch d. Verh. von Herrsch.
u. Knechtschaft.

Auch dieses Verh. d. natürl. Sittl. bedeutet für H. eine Ein-Setzung von Gegensatz
u. Besonderen. Der Herr ist für den Knecht das Allgem. Gültige, die
Indiff. d. Sittl., dem die Besonder. des Knechtes eingeordnet ist. Der Mangel dieses Verhältnisses
ist es nur dem, daß das Allgemeingültige, das hier als der Herr gesetzt ist,
aber nur 1 besondere Person darstellt.

~~Die höchste Form, die die Identität~~

Die Gegensätze, die ~~in~~ die natürl. Sittl. ~~bereits~~ enthält, müssen daher noch in 1 ausgeprägten Form ihre Identität finden, und diese Gestalt ist ~~in~~ die Familie ~~sowie~~.

~~In d. Familie~~ Die Mitglieder 1 Familie bleiben nicht mehr bloße Besonderh., sondern sie bild. 1 ~~natürliche~~ Allgem. Man u. Frau und Kind leben hier ~~nur~~ in wechselseitiger ~~beiderseitiger~~ Ergänzung als 1 Ganzes ~~unmittelbar einfachen sittlich~~ u. der Ganze ~~bedeutet~~ wieder ~~unmittelbare~~ in der Form seiner Teile.

Überall also in d. natürl. Sittl. u. besonders in der Fam. besteht 1 unbewußte Harmonie zwischen den Gegensätzen ~~Allgem. u. Besonderen~~ das Besondere findet sich hier überall ins Allgem. ~~ohne Gewalt~~.

Diese Identität d. Gegensätze wird aber nur durch d. dialekt. Prozeß bewußt

in den Phänomen, die K. in 2. Abschn. seines Systems der Sittl. darstellt. Diese Abschnitte trägt die Überschrift: Das Negative od. d. Verbrechen u. Gewalt d. u. a. den Diebstahl, die zwecklose Zerstörung, den Mord u. auf den Zweikampf der Völker, d. Krieg

In allen diesen Phänomenen weist jede wirkl. Allgemeinheit zerstört zu sein, es weist nur die Willkür des Besonderen zu herrschen.
Aber H. weist, daß auch auf dieser Stufe der negativen Tätigk. die Einheit aufgehoben ist, indem zugleich mit der Vernichtung des Verbrechers sein Gewissen oder u. die sittliche Gesetzlichkeit gesetzt ist. Ja auch der Krieg lehrt u. Hegel gerade, daß der Einzelne nicht als Einzelner Recht hat, sondern nur als Glied des Staates mit d. Allgem., welche Einheit es gerade durch den Tod im Kriege für das Allgem. im Kriege tut dokumentiert.

Die höchste bewußte Gestalt, in der alle Gegensätze
Die höchste Einheit des Sittl. ist daher u. Hegel der Staat. Der Staat ist
u. Syst. d. Sittl. desjenige Ganze, in den alle Gegensätze des Sittl. Staates
wieder u. doch zugl. zur Einheit verbunden sind.

Total ist nichts anderes als Volk, wie dies auch in den III. Teil des Entwurfs
über die Naturr. entwickelt wird. gleichzeitig
Die absol. Sittl. entwickelt sich
Der Staat ist d. Volk. der absol. Idee

Der Abschnitt üb. d. absol. Sittl. enthält alle die Gruppen
von Gegensätzen, die in den Abschnitten üb. die natürl. Sittl. u.
üb. das Verbrechen vorhanden
u. diese Einheit der Idee verkörpert sich zu Ständen, wie
Hegel damals lehrte, in der Besonderheit von Bauern, Stand,
Bürger u. Gewerbsstand. Alle diese Besonderheiten
für das Allgem. wollen u. d. Allgem. nur in das Besondere
will.

Der 1 Staat ist aber nicht 1 Menge [illegible]

[illegible]

Haym hat behauptet, Heg. habe bei der näheren Ausmalung seines damaligen Staatsideals die platonische Republik vorgeschwebt, Rosenzweig verweist in seinem ~~kürzlich~~ 1920 erschienenen Werk Hegel u. d. Staat auf d. preussische Stände~~staat~~ordnung etwa zur Zeit Fried. d. Grosse.

Aber Alle diese Debatten u. überhaupt alle eigentlich staatsphilos. u. rechtsphilos. Theorien

~~H~~Es müssen aber ~~natürlich~~ bei 1 dieser Untersuchung der Ethik H's zurücktreten ~~in den~~ Hintergrund ~~treten~~ bleiben. U. ~~Ausserdem haben~~ sich auch gerade die Einzelheiten der Staatslehre in der endgültigen ~~Fassung~~ Form des Systems ~~späteren Schriften H's Phil.~~ stark geändert gegenüber d. Syst. [illegible]

Grundlegend bleibt für die Ethik H's nur 1 Satz aus d. ~~Aufsatz~~ Abhandlg. üb. d. Naturrecht aus d. J. 1802/1803: die Sittlichkeit d. Einzelnen ist bloss 1 Pulsschlag des ganzen Systems, der Sittl. Aller. Oder wie es schon in d. Aufs. üb. d. Naturrecht heisst

Der Grundfehler d. Ethik u. Politik [illegible] ist es, dass sie die Einzelheit bloss [illegible] sich [illegible] zum Prinzip machten. I 396 Der Staat ist aber nicht 1 atomist. Haufen, 1 [illegible] Vielheit von Individ., sond. 1 organ. Einheit. §273

Das Volk ~~aber~~ ist d. Natur eher als d. Einzelne. Deshalb läge es schon in dem Volke Sittl. 1 Allgem. oder Sittl. zu bedeuten. I 394 (Das Individ. hat in Sittl. nur soviel Sittl. Tugend ~~Sittl.~~ als es in d. allgem. Geist übergeht. Das Recht des Staates ist höher als andere Stufen des [illegible] gegen [illegible] wie dies Recht [illegible]

schon d. Alten lehrten u. wie H. dauernd wiederholt hat, d. Sittlichkeit

Auf diese [illegible] konnten sie durch 1 nachträgliche [illegible] Erklärung der [illegible] abs. [illegible] I 398 des [illegible] Staat [illegible] 1 Naturrecht lehren, das in 1 Naturrecht [illegible] ist zu 1 [illegible] recht [illegible]

Da aber auch die einzelnen souverän. Staaten in Krieg in Widerspruch zueinander treten, so ist der höchste Prätor der noch über den einzelnen Staaten steht, der höchste Gestaltung der Sittl. allein d. Weltgeschichte als das Weltgericht. §340 Das Recht des Weltgeistes ist d. uneingeschränkte Absolute.

[illegible]

Die entscheidende [illegible]

stoven Lande gemäß leben, [illegible] Jünger 1 wohleingerichteten Volkes
sein.
Die Unvollkommenheit ist nur in dem Fichte 1 Festigkeit, in d. Fortgang d. Fichte
wahrhaft formal. Sittengesetzes. (Mollat S. 15)
In der absol. Sittl. aber ist alle Einzelheit aufgehoben
Und diese Idee der absol. Sittl. [illegible] allein durch die
dial. Meth. setzen zu können
Hiermit schließt sich K. in s. Ph. des Geistes
[illegible] zu seiner Hauptaufgabe gemacht hat, nach jeder
Richtung d. Unvollkommenheit d. dialek. Methode zu demonstrieren
Die entscheidende Vorstufe aber zu dieser letzten Form des Systems bildet die Ph. d. Geistes, die 1807 erschien
durch diese Phän. d. Geistes, die K. f. 1807 erschien u. die 1st. Propädeutik
zu dem endgültigen System bildet, [illegible] die methodisch
allem, die Unvollkommenheit der dialek. Denkens zu demonstrieren suchte.
Aus diesem Grunde geht die Phän. [illegible] eine ganze Reihe von moral. Phänom.
[illegible] daß alle diese Phänom. zugleich ihr Gegenteil enthalten, u. daß
sie damit stets auf 1 höheres Prinzip verweisen, das das ursprünglich
und reine Gegensatz zu überwundene Synthese verlangt u. das schließlich
alle diese Systeme. [illegible] in der Idee, Idee des absol. Wissens
[illegible] Abschluß kommen können.
So behandelt z. B. d. Kapitel üb. Lust u. Notwendigk., wie schon K. Köstlin bemerkte,
so hat K. alle in den Kapit. üb. Lust u. Notwendigk. in d. Abschnitt
u. endlich in den Kap. üb. die Gesetzgeb. u. gerechtigkeitspflege Vorstufen in höherer und höherer
eine große Zahl von Momenten des Moralischen dialektisch zu verzeichnen. Der Inhalt selbst
ist die Krankheit, wenn auch öfter in künstliche Konstruktionen Kants des dial. Prinzip darstellend
aber gerade hier am charakteristischsten die Lebendigkeit - die Kunst der Darstellung
gerade erhöht hier den Reiz. Und deshalb die Phän. d. Geistes nicht nur

treffend die Dialektik des Faustischen Menschen, wenigstens des Faust in
Beginn der goetheschen Dichtung. In dieser Bewußtseinslage, hat sich der
Mensch wie K. [illegible] den Teufel ergeben
Verstand [illegible] will nur individuelle durch den Sinn der Begierde.
faustische
Dieses Streben der indiv. Lust glaubt völlig frei zu sein, aber indem
der Gegenstand d. Begierde aufgezeigt wird, wird zugleich 1 feste gesetzl.
der Notwendiges
Zusammenhang. K.

II. So ist also hier 1 Gewahrsein d. Freiheit in der indiv. Lust zugleich mit
der Wahrung der Notwendigkeit dialektisch verbunden.

Hier wird die Synthese d. Freiheit von Lust u. Notwendigk. zum Bewußtsein, weil aber also
dabei u. Regel notwendig zugleich auf 1 höhere Bewußtseinsstufe, auf
der das indiv. Bewußtsein von einer Lust mit 1 Notwendigen, mit 1 Gesetz
bewußt
sich weiß. Diese Bewußtseinslage heißt in der Phän. die von dem Gesetz
des Herzens.

Aber auch dieses Gesetz des Herzens führt wieder zu 1 neuen Gegensatz.
im
zu 1 moral. Phän. führt, [illegible] notwendig wieder durch s. Verwirklichung in
neuen Gegensätzlichkeiten. Indem nämlich das indiv. Gesetz Lust des eigenen
Herzens zum Gesetz aller erhoben werden soll, so stehen dem durchaus die
Gesetzen anderer Herzen entgegen. Würde das moral. Selbstbewußtsein trotzdem
auf dieser Stufe bleiben, so würde es also zum Fahnen d. Tugendhelden
werden.

Dieser Gegensatz kann deshalb nur überwunden werden, wenn sowohl das Gesetz des eigenen wie das der anderen Wesen aufgehoben wird d. h. wenn das Selbstbewußtsein als d. wahrhafte Gesetz d. Tugend aller Wesen das allen Güte erkannt wird.

Indem aber nun das vernünftige Selbstbewußtsein die Tugend verwirklichen will, ergeben sich wiederum neue Widersprüche

Der Tugend entgegen steht nämlich der Weltlauf, gegen den sich das Bewußtsein von Güte, das noch keine Wirklichkeit ist, wohl will, aber der Weltlauf ist so nicht übel mißt, er nicht enthält nämlich auch allen überall, da wo er angefaßt wird, das verwirklichte Gute selbst.

Das vernünftige Selbstbewußtsein von der Tugend muß also erkennen, daß seine Tugend mit der Güte der Wirklichkeit identisch ist u. sein muß, d. h. also, daß seine Sache die Sache selbst ist u. sein muß

Diese Satzverhältnisse u. in den Ausdrücken: d. gesetzl. Tiere u. d. Pflanze u. d. Sache selbst dargestellt.

Es heißt nämlich dort, daß auch die hier erreichte Identität noch einen aufgelösten Zwiespalt enthält. Ja diese Identität von allgem. u. indiv. Sache wird sogar als Zeitung empfunden, indem jedes vernünftige Selbstbewußtsein bei sich selbst an diese Identität von indiv. u. allgem. Natur denkt, bei anderen Individuen aber sehr gut d. indiv. u. allgemeine Sache unterscheiden.

Die totale Identität von allg. u. indiv. Inhalt des Handelns
kann daher für das vom Selbst. aus der allg. gültige gesetzgebende
Vernunft, durch d. in ihr autonome Vernunftgesetzgeb. gegeben sein

~~U. anderer Stelle d. Phä. in den beiden folgend. Abschnitten wird~~
daher nun wieder die Kritik an K. ausführlich erneuert.
H. weist in d. 6e. Abschnitt in die Gesetzgeb. u. Gesetzgebung
Kants nach, daß die anton. Vernunft bei K. gar kein Inhalt selbst
selbst, daß sie ihn hören muß, daß aber auch diese Norm
für ~~allerlei~~ Inhalte des Sittl. nicht ausreicht.

Der bloße Gegensatz zwischen gr. Gesetz u. sittl. Inhalt, zwischen
Vern. u. Wirklichkeit muß daher aufgelöst werden in die Identität von
Vern. u. Wirkl., die nach H. als der reale, d. obj. Geist bezeichnet wird.
Dieser obj. Geist ist aber u. H. zunächst das, was man in d. Syst.
d. Sittl. u. in der Lehre über d. Naturr. behandelt u. das sittl. Gemeinwesen,
der Staat u. zwar hier genauer als der Staat, wenn er in abgeschlossenen Staaten
das Ab, das Vir ist u. d. Wir, das Ich ist.
In diesem sittl. Leben d. Volkes ist nun wieder zu unterscheiden: das menschl.
u. das göttl. Gesetz. Das göttl. od. auch unterirdische Gesetz ist das Gesetz der Familie
Ahnen, das in der Familie wirkt u. seine Individualität am Leibe hat
(Phän. S. 308) während das menschl. Gesetz (Phän. S. 297) das aber das am Tag liegende ist, das
die Sitten u. die Satzungen des Gemeinwesens darstellt u. wird von dem Man

in der rein apriorischen, in der notwendigen, aber höchsten Einheitsform jedes vernünftigen Willens gegeben sein.

Als Dichter oder als Herder verstehen wird, wie alles Hegel
dies alles unter Heranziehung des Antigonekonfliktes näher belenchtet.
Sophokl.
Indem der Mensch in den tragischen Konflikt, wie in d. Antigon. d. Sophokl.,
sich in sittlich. Handlg bewußt gegen eines dieser Gesetze wendet,
wird zugleich auch das Zwiespältige in jener Welt des sittl. Gemeinwesens
offenbar, bis eben damit auch jene Welt Gestaltung der Sittl.
zerfällt in 1 bloßes Rechtsgesetz des Zerfalls wird, um sich
erst wieder über das Reich des sich entfremdeten Geistes zur
letzten höchsten Stufe des objekt. Geistes zu erheben.
Und diese letzte höchste Stufe des Sittl. ist für die Phänomenolg.
der objekt. seiner selbst gewisse Geist, die Moralität.
Auf diesen Abschnitt üb. die moral. Weltanschauung wird dann noch
in der Logik, in dem Kap. üb. d. Idee des Guten, zurückgewiesen
Logik in diesem Abschnitten über d. moral. Weltansch. wird dann noch
1x der ganze bisher gewonnene Gegensatz zu Kant aufgezeigt
u. Hegel hier in d. Tat festhält, alle Imperative K's, alle Gegens.
von Neigung u. Pflicht, von Pflicht u. Sittlichkeit, von Vernunftform u. Inhalt
die Ethik als Pflichtethik darin aus dem sie stammt, alle Imperative Ks

a.d.Ph. Ph.n.s. d.Verh.d.
moral. Gesch Gesch.d.Ph. ja selbst d. Guten u. Bösen dadurch, daß sie überwunden
von Pflicht u. Vrkl. durch d. Leb. der sie selbst gewiß Geist
moral.
daß alle diese Widersprüche in d. höchste obj. in d. sein
selbst gewiß moral. Gut. Leben aufgehoben sind, bewußt sein. kann
ja auch in der H'schen Logik (wird aber
wird noch über auf diese Abstraktion d.h. auf
Guten noch nicht auf die Stelle des moral. Gesetzes zu sc.

Übergang zur Absolutheit zurückgewiesen.

Trotzdem enthält nun zweifellos mit d. Ph. i. d. Encyklop. der philos. Wissensch. m. in etwas erweiterter
Fassung i. d. Rechtsphil. das letzte u. reifste veröffentl. Werk,
die endgültige Form der H'schen Ethik
enthalten.

Da aber auch diese letzte Darstellg. dort nur wenige
den bisher erwähnten Systemform bietet, so müssen auch diese
Abweichungen noch kurz angegeben, aber kurzer krit. Überblick
über d. ganze H'sche Ethik möglich ist.

Auch die Encyklopäd. selbst wieder wie der unreifste Syst. d.
Sittlichkeit von d. rel. Gefühl aus u. sie setzt diese rel. Gefühle als die
höchste Entwicklungsstufe des dort behandelten subj. Geistes

Dann aber wird der Weg des obj. Geistes ganz ebenso wie in der Rechtsphil.
nur in
den letzten unreifsten Werke

wird in 3 große Teile geteilt, in die Sphäre des abstrakt. Rechts, d. d. Sphäre d. Moral u. endlich die der Sittlichk.

Unter dem Recht überhaupt versteht H. hier eben, wie es im 1 Zusatz zur Rechtsph. heißt, nicht nur d. bürgerl. abstrakte Recht, sondern auch die Moralität, d. Sittl. u. d. Weltgeschichte

Das abstr. formel. Recht ist dasjen., in dem das Individ. nur als abstrakte juristische Person in bloßer äußerer Sache als freies Dasein gibt.

Die Sphäre des bürgerl. Privatr. gehört noch nicht in d. Ethik sie bezeichnet nur die Stufe des rein legal verhaltenden Willens, der Wille wird hier nur in s. Bez. auf äußere Sache, es wird nur das Recht an es wird hier nur die unmittelbare Verh. von Willen u. äußerer Sache, das Recht des Willens auf äußere Dinge, d.h. Verträge, Tausch, Vertragsrecht, Unterschr. d. Person als äußerliches, als Vertragschließen u. dgl. angesehen. Rechtspers.

In der Sphäre des bürgerl. Rechts handelt es sich nur um die abstrakte Person in ihrer unmittelbaren Beziehung auf äußere Dinge, d.h. nur als äußerliches, als Vertragschließendes u. dgl. Nur dieser Wille, der nicht wie K. sagt, äußeres Dasein gibt, ist Person in Sinne des abstrakt. Rechts.

Dagegen d. Stufe, die nach d. Ausdr. wie in d. Rechtsph. hier für sich selbst im Gegens. zur Welt reflektiert wird, der Sphäre der Moralität, ist nur, was bezeichnet, daß auf die Person

das K. u. das die ganze Rechtsphil.

U. Dieses Reich d. Moral. ist n. H. eben dasjenige, was d. Kr. wirklich gesetzt wurde, ist n. dann sollte man H. endgültig seine Stellung zu K. die Rk. in seiner Überwindung K's endgültig klargestellt.

Die Sphäre der Moral, die K. allein einseitig berücksichtigt, Rk. bezieht nämlich auf das abstrakte Subjekt des Rechts, H. aber will gerade diese einseitig formalobjektive abstrakte Moral.

K. u. Die Moral ebenso wie Rk. nur d. subj. Vorsatz für sittl. relevant, H. aber gerade gegen K. legt in d. Absch. nb. d. Vorsatz u. d. Schuld, daß auch die Konseq. 1 Handlung für die sittl. Zurechnung gleichgültig sei. §118

Die Moral, die Rk. weiß nur die subjekt. Absicht, H. aber legt in d. Absch. üb. d. Absicht u. d. Tat, daß auch das eigene Volk u. d. Tat anderer als der sittl. Inhalt beabsichtigt gewesen sei. Denn so heißt es in d. Rechtsphil.: „der Mensch ist 1 Lebendiges, welches selbst u. Bedürfnisse. Daß er aber 1 Lebendiges ist mit Fleisch, sondern [§123 Zusatz] u. trotzdem hat er 1 Recht u. Bedürfnisse. Zu u. Zweck z. machen. Das Volk ist nicht 1 Ganzes ohne d. Recht" §130

Der Standp. K's u. d. Standp. der abstrakt. Moral kann nicht. „Recht" u. H. nur 1 abstraktes formelles Gewissen setzen. H. aber legt in das Gewissen, wie wir von d. bloßen Moral allein gefordert wird, ist ein Vorbild stets auf d. Tat, eine Tat selbst.

Gewissen u. d. Gewissen ist: das Recht

[Rechtsph. §139]

das Subjekt, das mit zugleich 1 Inhalt an sich hat, das bloße für alle Subjekte, wie es
absch. K. lehrt, 1 reine bloße Form, die mit 1 Inhalt an sich als Inhalt hat,

In diesem bloß formellen Gesetze, halbleeren
1 solches rein formelles Gesetz hat z. K., wie es auch K. lehrt, haben n. Hegel
sowohl die Moral. wie der Jos die Wurzel des Guten wie des Bösen,
es mit Jesu Bewußtsein Jos
Kleiner Kreis

Das wahrhafte Gewissen aber muß die objek. Sphäre d. Pflichthaftes
mit der subjek. Gesinnung der moral. Gesinnung vereinen [§ 137]

Diese Vereinig aber ist (nach K. der) d. Standp. der Sittl. gegeben.

In d. Sphäre d. Sittl. nach K. die Sache des bloß formell. moralisch.
Subjekts (nach dem Inhalts, das nur für sich ist, in
der Reflexion, d. Guten, die nur an sich ist) auf
Dies an u. für sich gültige Gestaltung des Gut.
der sittl. Völk. K. gegeben, in den Ideen der Tat, der
bürgerl. Gesellsch., des Staates u. als völk. sittl. Völk. der
Weltgeschichte. In der Familie wie Staaten in der Weltgesch. tat sich sittl.
Gesetz mit seinem Inhalte in concreto verwirklicht
Vernunft, so K. hat es ausdrücklich Hegel bei d. Idee des Staates wie sie
besond. empir. Staaten vor Augen hebt, aber auch nicht bloß
jedesmal sei sollender Staat, leeres Ideal, sondern d. Einheit
von Begr. u. Wirkl., wie H. sie lehrte, die Idee als der wirkl. Gott
d. h. also es gilt in der Wirkl. das Wesentliche, in dem Ver. d. Wirkl.
d. Idee zu sehen.

R. § 258

Vor bezog auf diese Idee des Staates [deleted: hat N. meistens]
den Ausspruch der Antike welcher alt: das Ziel des sittl. Strebens
Bürger eines wohl regierten Staates zu sein, Bd. XIII 276



Also nur das was sich in der Weltgesch. als wesentlich verwirklicht, kann auch von der Ethik in höchster Linie als sittlich (anerkannt u. gewollt) werden.

Die Weltgeschichte aber ist nur die höchste Gestaltung des objekt. Geistes, wie dessen Entfaltung in verschiedenen Momenten durch d. dialekt. Methode darstellbar ist.

Diese dialekt. Methode kann nun festen Inhalte nicht mehr in den Tugenden eine aufstellbaren werden als ganze gelte, wie sie H. sie als die ersten sittlich haltbare aufstellen wollte.

Das moderne sittliche Denken muß darauf bestehen, daß eben flüssige Begr., wie sie die Methode H's voraussetzt, nicht mehr als Begr., sondern nur als feste Symbole, nicht als Inhalte dienen, rabiat, sondern rein als Inhalte der Intuition gelten müssen.

H. vor allem kann die Behauptung der Identität der Gegensätze, die d. dialekt. Ethik beherrscht, heute in keiner Weise mehr wie zu H's Zeiten als begriffl. bewiesen angesehen werden.

Trotzdem muß, wie ich glaube, d. Denken H's auch von der Gesch. d. Ethik

als groß angesehen werden

Es besteht zunächst darin, d. H. ganz besonders übergehend
die Unmöglichkeit einer formalen Ethik in Kant's dargelegten Sinne.
Dann aber vor allem in der Tugend- in d. Tugendverschiedenheit, wie der H. d. Dialektik selbst
1 große Fehl moral. Prinzipien selbst darstellt, u. in der Tugend mit
der er die Antinomie wie er selbst sagt der Moralität der Moral erfaßt
Fr selbst K. Fischer hat hier freilich in sehr auffallender Weise von
der Moralprobl. H's aus auf die Kehrseite dessen, Grundes.

Wird nun vollends nach d. Forderung v. Troeltsch die Dialektik
nicht als Denk- und Leistung einer spiritualistisch-Metaphys.
verwertet, sondern nur als Ordnungs- u. Verarbeitungsprinzip für empir.
Material, so wird hinfällig die Bedeutung H's für den Teil
modern. Ethik.
d. h. für die Probl. Zusammenfassung der inhaltlichen Metaphysik.

Endlich möchte ich noch besonders hinweisen auf die Lehre, die die Idee des Staates u. der Weltgeschichte bei H. resp. für d. Theorie d. Ethik besitzen.

H. hat, wie er es selbst ausspricht mit der Idee des Staates u. d. Weltgesch. vor allem die Physik setzen wollen, aus dem heraus u. weshalb denen sich jeder einzelne Inhalt des [illegible] wahren ethischen Lebens bewerten lassen könne.

Gewiß kann man heute nicht mehr die Einzelheiten des Hegel'schen Weltbildes u. der Hegel'schen Geschichtsauffassung als absolut gültige Inhalte absolut gültiger Systeme der Sittlichkeit für uns bedeutsame ~~Lehren~~ Lehrsätze ansehen. Aber was das absolute System der Hegel'schen Philos. auch kann nicht wie der Pantheismus [illegible] bestimmte faktische Lehren des Spinozismus u. der Weltgeschichte als die absolut gültigen ethischen Phänomene deduzieren H. das immanente Totalität bedeuten, [illegible] die Weltgesch. für die für alles empir. Total.

Aber in dem eben allgemeinen viel begegnet sich allerdings gerade die moderne materiale Ethik mit dem Ziele Hegel's: auch die mod. Ethik sucht wieder nach obigen Weg auf stets neu modifizierbaren u. zu erweiternden Systeme. Grundsätzlich allen möglichen Inhalte des Sittl. gegenüber, aus der heraus d aus welcher jeder einzel. Inhalt sittl. bewertet wird.

Ein solches Ganze, dessen Stärke aus der Harmonie seiner Glieder
hervorgeht, eine solche reife Blüte des Geistes in sich hatte
auch N., wie er in d. Rechtsphil. formelhaft aufzustellen versucht, in
den Lagen des Krieges u. Unfriedens [unbekannte] Ziel der sittl. Ehe
stets die Mode. jedenfalls N. viel näher als der [strenge] Formal.
der Kantisch. Ethik oder [einem] rein auf [Gesetz] beruhenden Utilitarismus oder allen anderen einseitigen ethischen Systemen.
u. die sittl. Tatsache der [Verbindung] oder einem ganz unzureichenden [Nebeneinander] aller [sittlichen] Kräfte
stehen.

Schon aus dieser Tendenz, statt der [Analyse] weit ausführlichere [Darstellung]
d. N'schen Ethik als sie bisher vorgelegt wurde, dürfte noch
der [Darstellung] sollte nicht ohne nähere Würdigung
ges. aus der über gegebenen Übersicht [wurde hervorgehen] Vorbei
[soll] sein können und die hier vorliegende Arbeit
der
die begriffl. method. Grundzüge

Dem 1 r. formales Verpflgs. kann man analytisch nur aussagen, daß das gesetzte s. Begriffe nach gesetzt ist. Ob aber es aber wirklich (sei) das Eigentum überhaupt zu respektieren oder nicht, dies kann durch d. Verpf. K. 1 r. form. Verpflgs. nicht erklärt werden. Der Habit. Satz K. vid. in Va. besagt analytisch nur einen Inhalt des Wollens, nach dem Satz des Widerspr. auf seine Tätk. od. Untätk. prüfen wollen. Jeder Inhalt wird erkannt nach dem Satz der k'schen Typik bei seiner Prüfung durch allgem. realisiert, wo al. ob. jeder der Inhalt für 1 allg. synth. Naturgesetz bleibe.

Hegel irrt also in der Ak, wie er d. formal. Charak. des k. Verpflgs. auffaßt, aber darin daß er die Alleinbetonung des formalen Momentes in der k. Ethik beanstandet, hier bleibt es wie ich glaube, bis heute k. gegenüber im Recht.

H. hat nicht etwa d. eth. Verpflgs. selbst irgendwie abgelehnt, er hat besonders im 1. Teil d. Abhdlg. üb. d. Naturrecht ausdrückl. anerkannt: es ist ihm bedeutsam, daß er a. St. überall gilt. Verstöße anzuprangern müsse, darin besteht die große Überlegenh. d. kr. Moraltheorie gegenüber jed. rein empirischen Lehre ebenso wie gegenüber der gesamten rein histor. Rechtsschule.

Aber gleichgültig wie das Urteil d. Verpflgesetzl. anerkannt gesehen wird, jedenfalls kann für jede Setzung des Sittl. das mater. Moment irgendwie ausgeschaltet werden. Die folgende Bedeutung der Hegelschen Kant-Kritik beruht daher vornehmlich darauf, daß sie die Unzulänglichkeit, wie ich glaube, für den Nachweis dafür, daß Unentbehrlichkeit des Materialen Probe der Ethik zu kurz kommt, prinzipiell nicht einsieht.

H. hat es völlig überzeugend dargetan, daß d. K'sche Moraltheorie nur insofern das formale Moment als d. alleinige Bestimmung des Sittlichen gelten konnte, K. selbst ein Verh. zu einer Ethik darum Materie des Ethischen voraussetzte. Hätte

Lebenslauf.

Ich bin am 20. April 1890 in Erfurt als Sohn des Kaufmanns Samuel Baumgardt und seiner Ehefrau Regine, geb. Herzfeld ev. als Angehöriger der mosaischen Religion geboren. Von 1896 bis 1899 besuchte ich die Vorschule zu Erfurt, von 1899 an das dortige Humanistische Gymnasium, das ich Ostern 1908 mit dem Zeugnis der Reife verließ. – Von Ostern 1908 bis zum August 1914 studierte ich an den Universitäten Freiburg i/B, München, Wien, Heidelberg und Berlin, um am 24. September 1914 in Berlin

Es ist daher zweifellos: so unkantisch N. in allen sittlichen Begriffen überhaupt die bedeutendsten Resultate, wie Tugend, Sittlichkeit in die Methode der kantischen Ethik muß dort wesentlich gerade von K. aus gesucht werden.

gegeben sein wie in der Ethik die Erkenntnis von der Sittlichkeit oder Unsittlichkeit von Handlungen u.s.w. Ja auch für die Kunsttheorie kann niemals die Erkenntnis von der Schönheit oder der Hässlichkeit von Kunstwerken etwa durch Wahrnehmung rein erfahrbar sein, so wenig wie für die Wirtschaftstheorie die Erkenntnis des Wertes" von Gütern.

~~Est ist nur ein ewig~~

Nur infolge dieses Grund

~~Nur infolge dieses G~~

wie bes. in d. sehr wichtig. Abhandl. üb. die N. selbst hier d. Moral lehre K's u. Fichtes als die Systeme d. wirklichen Vorzüge in wesentl. miteinander identifiziert, u. er hat dieser Polemik gegen die Kant-Fichtesche Moralphilos. so große Bedeutung beigemessen, daß er sie noch in d. Phän. d. Geistes wiederholt fortgesetzt hat, für daß er sie selbst noch in der Rechtsphil. d. Phil. wiederholt

Es ist zweifellos, gerade in d. Entgegensetz gegen d. Ethik Kants hat N. die Methode seiner eigenen Ethik Moraltheorie ausgebaut, u. auch wir werden daher noch heute gerade von K. aus den besten Zugang u. d. besten ersten Einblick in die dialekt. Methode der Ethik gewinnen können; abgesehen davon, daß die N'sche Kantkritik auch an sich noch für d. Gegenwart die größte Beachtung verdient.

die Moralterminologie Kants gebraucht, auch den ganzen aktivistischen Pathos seiner damaligen Briefe steht er jedenfalls K. viel näher als der Einstellung, die er später in seiner eigenen Moraltheorie einnahm

H. hat später auch die Ethik nur das, was ich, als vernünftig erklärt u. über alle Unvernunft des weltreformierenden Menschen ~~im Verstehen dessen, was ich, das Ziel der Ethik~~ ~~Goethe~~, u. er hat über ~~alle, Kritik der Tugend, Weltverbesserer~~ ~~alle wollende Philos. etc~~ Menschlichkeit erhoben gespottet.

1795 aber ist er besonders in Briefen an H. noch ganz erfüllt von Ethik der Tat im Sinne K's u. er fordert hier wörtlich das: wie es sein soll muß sich mächtig erheben gegen die Indolenz dessen, was ist.

Die entscheidende Abkehr von d. krit. Ethik erfolgte für H. offenbar erst um die Zeit seiner Übersiedlung von Bern nach Frankfurt, (im d. Jahr 1797 als sich seine allgem. Wendung zum Pantheismus vollzog)

Der Philosoph schilderte, wie Rosenkr. in s. Leben Hegels berichtet i. J. 1798 eine ausführliche Kr. der K'schen Metaphys. d. Sitten. Das Manuskript dieser Krit. hat Rosenkr. nicht vorgelegen, ist jedoch ungewiß, wie Nohl angibt, verloren gegangen.

Hierfür besitzen wir aber nun Fülle von wichtigen Argumenten gegen d. K'sche Ethik in sehr vielen anderen Hegelschriften, so schon in d. Abhdlg. üb. d. Geist d. Christentums u. weiter vor allem in d. Aufsatz über d. wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, sowohl in d. Aufsatz üb. Glauben u. Wissen, wie in d. Krit. des

Diese faustische Lust der indiv. Lust glaubt völlig frei zu sein, aber inde, der Gegenstand der Begierde aufgezeigt wird, wird zugleich ein fester Zusammenhang der Dinge, ein Notwendiges erlebt.

Es ist also hier die Freiheit der indiv. Lust zugleich mit der Erfahrung der Notwendigkeit streng verbunden

Diese Zusammenhang von Lust u. Notwendigkeit weist daher z. Hegel notwendig zugleich auf 1 höhere Bewusstseinstufe, auf der das Individ. von Anfang an seine Lust mit einem Notwendigen, mit 1 Gesetz vereint. Diese Bewusstseinslage heißt in d. Phän. die vom Gesetz des Herzens.

Aber auch dieses Gesetz des Herzens fällt wieder durch seine Verwirklichung in neuen Gegensätzlichkeiten. Indem nämlich das Gesetz des eigenen Herzens zum Gesetz aller Herzen werden soll, so stehen dem durchaus die Gesetze anderer Herzen entgegen. Würde das moral. Selbstbewusstsein trotzdem auf dieser Stufe bleiben, so würde es also zum Wahnsinn des Eigendünkels werden.

Dieser Eigendünkel kann deshalb nur überwunden werden, wenn sowohl das Gesetz des eigenen wie das der anderen Herzen aufgegeben wird d.h. wenn als das wahrhafte Gesetz alle Herzen das allgemeine Gute, die Tugend erkannt wird.

Indem aber nun das persönl. Bewusstsein die Tugend verwirklichen will, ergeben sich wieder neue Widersprüche.

Der Tugend entgegen steht nämlich der Weltlauf, sagt H. das Bewusstsein von 1 Guten, das noch keine Wirklichkeit ist, wirklich will. Aber der Weltlauf ist, wie H. sagt, so übel nicht, er enthält nämlich,

auch schon überall das [redacted] angefaßt wird, das verwirklichte Gute selbst.

Das ver. Selbstbew. von der Tugend ist also erkennen, daß seine Tugend mit den Guten der Wirklichkeit identisch, mit ihm eins ist, d.h. also, daß seine Sache die Sache selbst mit ihm. sei ist.

Seinen Sachverhalt hat H. dargestellt in den Abschn. des dritten Teiles

Es zeigt sich, daß auch die hier erreichte Identität noch einen ungelösten Zwiespalt enthält. Da diese Identität von allgem. u. individ. Sache wird sogar als Setzung empfunden, indem jetzt ver. Selbstbew. nur bei sich selbst an diese Identität von individ. u. allgem. Inter. glaubt, bei anderen Individ. aber sich zwischen der individ. u. der allgem. Sache unterscheidet.

Diese höhere Identität von allgem. u. individ. Inhalt des Handelns kann daher für das ver. Selbstbew. nur durch allgem. gültige gesetzgebende Ver. gegeben sein, d.h. nur durch kantonale Denkgesetzgebung.

(In dieser Stelle der Kritik erreicht Hegel in allgemeiner Linie den Pol, des Verh. d. Ver, der Wirkl.

In dieser sittl. Welt des Volkes ist noch das göttliche Gesetz = positives Gesetz der Religion, in Fülle wirksam, sein Dasein an Völkerbrauch (S. 297, 300), positives Gesetz an Tage liegend, Satzung des Gemeinwesens von den Alten als Bürgerrecht streng verehrt. Jeder aber für sich trägt Kenntnis wie in Antig. in der sittl. Handlung. Mannigfaltigkeit eines jeden Gesetzes ist wieder zwiespältig wie Welt des sittl. Gemeinwesens sittliche bis ebenso auch jene Gestalten der sittl. Zerfalls, wo ist sich wiederholt. Reichtum Abgeleiteten Geistes zu letzter leichter Tiefe [illegible].

Biographie
D. B.

Lebenslauf.

Unterzeichneter ist am 20. April 1896 in Posen als Sohn des Buchhändlers Samuel Baumgardt und seiner Ehefrau Regina, geb. Spanzfeldt, alle Angehörige der mosaischen Religion geboren. Von 1896 bis 1899 besuchte ich die Vorschule zu Posen, von 1899 an das dortige Humanistische Gymnasium, das ich Ostern 1908 mit dem Zeugnis der Reife verließ. – Von Ostern 1908 bis zum August 1914 besuchte ich die Universitäten Freiburg i/B., München, Wien, Heidelberg und Berlin, um am 24. September 1914 in Berlin die Prüfung zum doctor philosophiae cum laude zu bestehen. Vom Herbst 1914 an nahm ich den größten Teil des Krieges in der Front. Die Promotion erfolgte, da ich erst 1919 aus dem Kriege zurückkehrte, am 9. Februar 1920. Das Thema meiner alle valde laudabilis bezeichneten Dissertation lautete: „Der Begriff der objektiven Möglichkeit in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft und in der modernen Erkenntnistheorie und Gegenstandstheorie." In etwas veränderter Fassung erschien die Arbeit als Ergänzungsheft 51 der Kantstudien.

David Baumgardt.

Hegel

Oder wie es auch die Phänomenologie und die Rechtsphilosophie wiederholen: die formale Ethik vertrete eine "nur", leere Rednerei", eine Produktion von Tautologieen, eine "hohle Deklamation", die erbauen soll, aber nichts aufbauen kann, die nur Langeweile macht, die wesenlose Abstraktion ihrer Begriffe denke sich völlig in ihrer Leichtigkeit und Hellheit mit den Grundbegriffen der französischen Revolution (wie das übrige auch Fried. Schlegel und Schelling behaupteten), ja der leere Freiheitsbegriff Kants und Fichtes denke sich zur Hinrichtung hin, daß die Wissenschaft, die es entstammt, die Erkenntnis eines entsetzlichen Todes sei.

jedenfalls aber: Hegel hat methodisch stets daran festgehalten:

in der Ethik K's besteht eine vollkommene Bewegung von

Form und Inhalt, von Ideellem und Reellem, von Pflicht und

Glück, von Vernunft und Neigung, von Begriff und Anschauung,

von Geltendem und Seiendem, von Natürlich u. Übersinnlichem

Recht, von Allgemein-Gültigen und Besonderem, Zufälligen, von Sollen

und Sein, von Einheit und Vielheit.

H. eigenes Ziel aber ist die völlige Versöhnung aller dieser entgegengesetzten Momente.

Auch die K. d. r. Vern. hatte eine Einheit von Verstand u. Sinnlichkeit, von Allgemein-Gültigen und Besonderem aufgezeigt.

Aber für die transzendentale Methode d. kritischen Erkenntnistheorie blieben die allgemein-gültige Form u. d. vielfältige Inhalt stets begrifflich voneinander geschieden, nur die notwendige Verbundenheit dieser Momente wurde rational am Faktum der Erfahrung aufgewiesen.

Die Methode H's aber will weit mehr.

Die dialektische Methode, wie H. sie lehrt, behauptet gerade von vornherein als ihren 1. Grundsatz die Identität von Form u. Inhalt, ja überhaupt eine letzte höchste Identität aller einander widerstreitenden Gegensätze.

Hegel besteht eben ~~[illegible]~~ jenen großen dialektischen Zug des Wirklichen Denkens, den auch Plethey besonders hervorhob.

Alle einander ~~[illegible]~~ entgegengesetzten Gegensätze sollen von dieser dialektischen Methode reflexiert werden, nur als Momente einer höheren, organ. Einheit, ~~war~~ sollen sie aufbewahrt erscheinen.

Wie es der große Gleichnis aus der Vorrede zur Phänomenolog. erklärt: man könnte auch sagen, die Knospe einer Pflanze wird von der Blüte widerlegt, u. ebenso wird die Blüte durch die Frucht als ein falsches Dasein erwiesen.

Und doch bedeute die Wahrheit über die Pflanze eine organische Einheit dieser entgegengesetzten Bestimmungen. — Ganz ebenso müsse auch die Wahrheit über das Sittliche eine organische Einheit alle seiner — auch der disparatesten Momente ausdrücken.

Für diese dialektische Methode kann es daher kein Sollen mehr geben, das fest fixiert der Sinnlichkeit gegenüber stände, sondern wie es schon der Ansatz über den Geist des Christentums andeutet: für die spekulative Ethik K's gibt es nur ein Sollen, das die Pflicht und die Neigung, die Vernunft u. die Sinnlichkeit als nur einseitige Momente seiner selbst unter sich hat.

Sein Ideal, das einzig wirkliche Sein (kann aber natürlich nicht mehr durch den Verstand begriffen werden. und das völlig Begreifliche aber unwahre

Der Verstand, der an den Satz des Widerspruchs gebunden bleibt, muß gerade die Einheit aller Widersprüche, die Idee, den einzig wahren Begriff als das Unbegreifliche ansehen. —— Der Verstand kann ~~eben~~ seinen Manen nach die Vernunft nur zum Sollen bringen, wie dies schon vor Hegel ~~Fichte~~ Jacobi betont hatte.

Die spekulative Vernunft aber erkennt als die Wahrheit, als das Ganze alle Gegensätze die absolute Idee.

In der absoluten Idee sind wohl die Gegensätze zwischen Konkretem und Abstraktem wie die zwischen verschiedenartigen konkreten Gestaltungen getilgt.

Die Philosophie aber lehrt die Einheit dieser Widersprüche erkennen, indem sie zeigt, daß jede einseitige Bestimmtheit, die der Verstand setzt, daß jede Thesis irgendwelche Art sich in ihren Gegenteil, in eine Antithesis aufheben muß, und daß Thesis und Antithesis ihre höhere Einheit wieder in einer Synthesis finden müssen.

Jede Thesis selbst aber kann nur bestehen, insofern sie ein einseitiges Moment der absoluten Idee bildet, die absolute Idee aber, das absolute Ganze aber besteht nur insofern, als es sich in der Verschiedenheit seiner Momente entfaltet.

Die Philosophie bildet einen Kreis oder wie die Wissenschaft es formuliert einen Kreis von Kreisen, nicht eine gerade Linie. Es ist unmittelbar relativ, womit die Philosophie anfängt; jedes Moment führt zum Ganzen; und das Ganze wieder zu jedem einzelnen Moment, wie jeder Punkt eines Kreises zugleich als Anfangs- und als Endpunkt ein- und desselben Bewegens gelten kann.

[illegible]

In der Sphäre des Sittlichen ist das bloß formelle moralische Subjekt, das nur „für sich" ist, vereint mit den abstrakten Inhalten des Rechtlichen, die nur „an sich" sind.

Diese an- und für sich gültigen Gestaltungen des Guten, sind aber n. H. in den Ideen der sittl. Wirklichkeit gegeben, in den Ideen der Familie, der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, des Staates und als der höchsten sittl. Wirklichkeit, der Weltgeschichte.

In der Familie, im Staate, in der Weltgeschichte überhaupt haben sich sittl. Gesinnung zusammen mit sittl. Inhalten verwirklicht.

Nur so hat es H. ausdrücklich formuliert – bei der Idee des Staates muß man nicht besondere empir. Staaten vor Augen haben, (§258 Zusatz) aber auch nicht ein bloß gedachten sein sollenden Staat, ein leeres Ideal, sondern es gilt hier die Einheit von Begriff u. Wirklichkeit, wie H. sie lehrte, d.h. also: es gilt in der Wirklichkeit das Vernünftige und in den Vernünftigen das Wirkliche der Idee zu sehen.

0056

In bezug auf diese Idee des Staates hat daher H. mehrfach den Ausdruck der Antike wiederholt: das Ziel der sittl. Bildung ist: als Bürger eines wohlregierten Staates erzogen zu sein.

Das Volk ist der Natur nach eher als der Einzelne. Deshalb läge es schon in dem Worte Sittlichkeit, ein Allgemeines oder Sitten zu bedeuten.

Oder wie es schon in dem Aufsatz über das Naturrecht hieß: die Sittlichkeit des Einzelnen ist nur ein Pulsschlag des ganzen Systems, der Sittl. Aller.

Also nur, was ist im Staat, ist in der Weltgeschichte verwirklicht, kann auch von den Einzelnen im höchsten Sinne als sittliche Inhalt anerkannt und gewollt werden gelten.

Die Weltgeschichte aber ist nur die höchste Gestaltung des objektiven Geistes, wie dessen Entfaltung in seinen verschiedenartigen Momenten durch die dialektische Methode erkennbar ist.

Diese dialektische Methode kann nun freilich heute nicht mehr in dem Sinne gelten, in dem Hegel sie als die einzig streng begrifflich haltbare aufzeigen wollte.

Das moderne kritische Denken muss darauf bestehen,
dass eben flüssige Begriffe, wie sie die Methode H's voraus-
setzt, nicht mehr als Begriffe, sondern nur als freie Symbole,
deren dass sie
Leiter, nicht mehr als Inhalte des reinen Denkens sondern
nur als Inhalte ~~der Anschauung~~ gelten müssen. eines intuitiv verstandenen angesehen sind.

Und vor allem ~~[illegible]~~ die Identität der Gegensätze,
die die dialektische Ethik behauptet, kann heute in keiner
Weise mehr wie zu Hegel's Zeiten als begrifflich bewies-
ber angesehen gelten werden.

Trotzdem muss wie ich glaube, die Leistung H's
auch von der Geschichte der Ethik als sehr gross (wesentlich)
gewertet anerkannt werden.

Sie besteht zunächst darin, dass H. ganz besonders über-
zeugend die Unmöglichkeit einer rein formalen, einer inhalts-
freien Ethik darzulegen vermocht.

Dann aber vor allem in der Tiefe und in der Eindring-
lichkeit, mit der der Denker selbst eine große Zahl moral-
scher Phänomene und Inhalte dargestellt hat und in der Ur-
sie, mit der er, wie er dies selbst nennt, gerade die Antinomik
der Momente der Moral erfaßte.

Selbst kurze Zeit hat hier freilich in sehr auffallbarer Weise
von der Moralproblematik H's auf das jenseits von
Gut und Böse Nietzsches verwiesen.

Wird nun vollends nach der Formulierung von Troeltsch
die Dialektik nicht als Denk- und Seinsprinzip einer spe-
zifisch-ethischen Metaphysik verwertet, sondern nur als
ein Ordnungs- und Durchdringungsmittel für empirisches
Material, so wird hiermit die Bedeutung des Hegelschen
Denkens für einen Teil der modernen Ethik d. h. für die Probleme
eines Zusammenhangs der inhaltlichen Moralphänomene noch
erhöht.

Hegel hat, wie er es selbst ausspricht, mit der Hilfe des Prinzips der dialektischen
Weltkampf vor allem ein zusammenhängendes System
heraus und innerhalb dessen erst jeder einzelne Inhalt des Sittlichen nach seiner
wahren ethischen Bedeutung bewertbar werden
solche Totalbeziehung sowohl als allen möglichen
Rangordnung der Werte und der Begründung
— Es ist freilich heute wieder: diese Rangordnung
der dialektischen Weltkampf ergangen. Und besonders
K's können heute keinen Anspruch mehr auf Gelten-

System
Können. — Ein solches System aber, eine
sittlich-differenten Phänomene, eine solche
wird auch von der gegenwärtigen Philos. gewiß
ist nicht durch das sehr dehnbare Prinzip
des dies sehr vielen künstlichen Konstruktionen
Raben.

Endlich möchte ich noch besonders hinweisen auf die Bedeutung, die die Idee des Staates und der Weltgeschichte bei H. wesentlich methodisch für eine Theorie der Ethik besitzen.

H. hat, wie er es selbst ausspricht, mit der Idee des Staates und der Weltgeschichte vor allem ein System setzen wollen, aus dem heraus und innerhalb dessen erst jeder einzelne Inhalt des Sittlichen nach seiner wahren ethischen Bedeutung bewertbar werden könne.

Es können heute nicht mehr die rein rein künstlich konstruktiven Gesetze

Gewiß können nun heute nicht mehr die Einzelheiten des H'schen Staatsbildes und die Einzelheiten der H'schen Geschichtsauffassung als die absolut gültigen Inhalte eines absolut gültigen Sittlichkeitssystems angesehen werden.

Es ist heute nicht mehr möglich, den Begriff der Idee des Staates und der Weltgeschichte als Grundlage für ein System der Ethik zu benutzen.

Es können besonders die rein künstlich konstruktiven Gesetze der dialektischen Geschichtsauffassung Hegels nicht die Grundlage für ein System der Ethik bilden.

Das System der Werte, das die gegenwärtige Philosophie
sucht, kann nicht wie der Pantheismus bestimmte
faktische Ordnungen des Staatlichen und der Weltgeschichte
nur mit Hilfe der verdeckten dialektischen Prinzipien
als die absolut gültigen ethischen Phänomene deduzieren.

S. 11.

Aber in dem einen allgemeinsten Ziele begegnet sich
allerdings gerade die moderne materiale Ethik
mit dem Ziele Hegels: auch die moderne
Ethik sucht wieder nach einem obersten – wenn auch
stets neu modifizierbaren und zu erweiternden Zusammenhang
aller möglichen Inhalte des Sittlichen, aus welchem Zusammen-
hang heraus erst jeder einzelne Inhalt als sittlich charakterisierbar
wird. Auch die moderne Ethik, wenigstens die maßgebende, will
mit Hilfe alle faktischen Werte des Lebens möglichst voll
in alle umfassenden Einheit
II. Ein solches Ganze, dessen Stärke aus der Harmonie seiner
Glieder hervorgeht, eine solche reiche Gliederung des Sittlichen
in sich hatte auch Hegel, wie er es in der Rechtsphilosophie
formuliert, aufzustellen gesucht. Auch
Ein solches metaphysisches Ganze will
raffinierte Theorie der Ethik aufstellen.

Und in dem drängenden Ringen um ein volles inhaltliches
Bild des sittlichen Universums steht die Moderne jeden-
falls Hegel viel näher als einem bloßen ethischen Formalismus
oder einem viel ganz unzulänglich simplifizierenden Utilitaris-
mus oder allen anderen einseitigen ethischen Systemen.

Schon aus diesen Gründen scheint mir eine
weit ausführlichere Analyse der H'schen Ethik als sie
bisher von Zodl gegeben wurde, durchaus notwendig.

Und auch die eben gegebene Darstellung der begrifflich
methodischen Grundzüge sollte und konnte natürlich wesent-
lich nur versuchen, einen Überblick über das hier vorliegende
Material zu geben.

Die gegenwärtige Philos. lebt weder in einem ähnlichen Kampfe um eine metaphys. Ethik
wie Leibniz in einem ähnlichen drängenden Ringen um ein inhaltliches metaphys.
Bild des sittl. Univ. u. hierin steht sie jedenfalls in Grunde mit Hegel auf
einer Seite gegen die Kritiker der alten gegen jeden bloßen moraltheor. Empirismus
jeden Intellektualismus oder gegen alle anderen einseitigen oder unzulänglich empiristischen
Moraltheorien ebenso wie hier gegen alle bestehenden Utilitarismus oder jeden
anderen einseitigen oder unzulänglichen empiristischen Theorien der Moral. Aus
allen diesen Gründen ist, wie ich glaube

Hegel

Keine Schrift im Titel Bezug auf die Moralphilosophie (nur das bis 1893 unveröffentlichte „System der Sittlichkeit") und bisher auch

Keine ausreichende Würdigung der Hegelsche Ethik (da Zoll sehr unzulänglich ist)

Wie Schelling, Fiedr. Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Humboldt zunächst noch bei völlig andersartigen inneren Tendenzen doch stark beeinflusst durch Kant und Fichte

Christus im Leben Jesu 1795 noch ganz reiner Autonomiemoralpredigt, ebenso Briefe an Schelling aus derselben Zeit ganz erfüllt vom Pathos des rein idealistischen Freiheitsaktivismus

Daneben nur zaghafte die Beschäftigung mit dem Problem der Volksreligion

Entscheidende Abkehr von Kant und Fichte um 1798 (Hölderlin, Hinwendung zum Pantheismus und zur Identitätsphilosophie)

Liebe die Überwindung aller Spannungen innerhalb des Sittlichen. Deshalb um 1798 mystischer Liebespantheismus im Geiste des Hölderlinschen Hyperion.

Dann schon 1802 in „wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts" bereits ausführliche Kritik begriffliche am moralischen Empirismus wie formalen Apriorismus. Die absolute Sittlichkeit schon hier im vollkommenen Kunstwerk des Staates als einer absoluten Indifferenz aller Gegensätze beschlossen.

Die panlogistisch-dialektische Methode innerhalb der identitätsphilosophischen Grundanschauungen erst in der inneren Abwendung von Schelling und im partiellen Rückgriff auf die Reflexionsphilosophie gewonnen.

Jetzt erst die Gegensätze der Reflexionsphilosophen nicht im Absoluten ausgelöscht, sondern erhalten, aber bewusst auseinandergezwungen.

Mit diesen Grundbegriffen der Dialektik nun auch von dem jugendlichen System der Sittlichkeit an das sittliche Universum konstruiert.

Nur in der philosophischen Propädeutik 1808-1811 Dialektik ganz zurückgestellt, offenbar aus Gründe pädagogischer Akkomodation.

Analyse des Systems der Sittlichkeit

In der „Phänomenologie" nicht der Staat, sondern der objektive Geist selbst gewisse Geist in der Färbung des großen weltgeschichtlichen Individuums (vielleicht im Hinblick auf Napoleon) die höchste Stufe des Ethischen.

In der Encyklopädie und Rechtsphilosophie in der Sphäre des abstrakten Rechts nur die abstrakte Person in ihrer Gegenheit auf äußere Dinge berücksichtigt.
In der Sphäre der Moralität nur das formelle Gewissen im Gegensatz zur Welt.
Erst in der Sphäre der Sittlichkeit die Moralität des Subjektes, das nur für sich ist, vereint mit Inhalten des Rechts, die nur an sich sind, gestaltet in der Familie, der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, dem Staate und der Weltgeschichte.

— Hegel die moralistischen weltanschaulichen Lügen der und auch die theoretische Unzulänglichkeit der rein formalen Gesinnungsethik kraftvoll überwunden und weit tiefer als die Eudämonisten und die Sozialoptimisten auf die tiefsten Probleme der Erfolgsethik hingewiesen.

„Die Sittlichkeit, die in der Macht liegt" mit schlichtester Wucht betont, ja ständig völlig jenseits von Gut und Böse eingestellt.

Allerdings auch eine verhängnisvolle Verführung der besser politischen Ethik selbst von Hegel aus. Und der unbedingte Glaube an die innere Sittlichkeit im Weltgeschehen nicht weniger unbeweisbar als der moralische Optimismus Kants und Fichtes. Auch alle Fundamente des spekulativen Paralogismus heute gewiß nicht mehr rezipierbar. ~~Aber der tiefe Ernst der Inhaltsethik~~ Aber die geniale Kritik am ethischen Formalismus, die an Schlegel stark über Beneke, Herbart, Baader, ja auch über Schleiermacher und Nietzsche hinausgeht, die Energie mit der hier nach einer metaphysischen Totalbeziehung, einem religiösen Ordnungszusammenhang verlangt, alles Phänomen des Sittlichen gesucht wird, eine Rangordnung der Werte erstrebt wird, sie müssen auch den Historiker der Ethik in noch viel höherem Maße als bisher zur Beschäftigung mit dem Problem Hegel auffordern.

Hierfür besitzen wir aber nun einen reichen Ersatz in sehr vielen anderen Hegelschriften, so schon in der Abhandlung über den „Geist des Christentums“, und weiter vor allem in den Aufsätzen der Jenaer Zeit, in der Schrift über „Glauben und Wissen“ wie in der „Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems“ und besonders in der wichtigen Abhandlung „über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts“, ja noch in der „Phänomenologie“, in der Encyklopädie und in der „Rechtsphilosophie“.

In allen diesen Schriften hat es Hegel oft sehr ausführlich versucht, die wichtigsten bisherigen Methoden der Ethik zu kritisieren, d. h. in erster Linie eben Kant und Fichte, deren Lehren er im wesentlichen miteinander identifizierte, dann aber auch besonders den moralischen Empirismus und den ethischen Historismus in der Gestalt der historischen Rechtsschule.

So war das Ziel Hegel's in der Tat sehr ähnlich dem der modernen Ethik: zugleich die Überwindung des apriorischen Formalismus und die Überwindung aller bloß empiristischen Moraltheorien.

Und aus diesem Grunde sind auch alle die Argumente Hegel's, die heute noch (von höchstem Interesse, besonders die ersten beiden Kapitel der Abhandlung über das Naturrecht und die Kritik, die in der Rechtsphilosophie sowohl an Kant und an Fichte wie an Savigny und an Hegel selbst wird.

Nur die Polemik gegen einige angebliche Folgen des ethischen Formalismus hat Hegel zu besonders starken Übertreibungen veranlaßt, wenn er in den verschiedenen, jenen Abhandlungen aufgestellt wollte, die Ethik Kants führe in ihrer Inhaltslosigkeit zum „Jesuitismus", zu einer „Moral der Taschenspielerei", zum „Pharisäismus", ja selbst zu einer Theorie der Unsittlichkeit.

Jedoch sieht man ab von diesen Übertreibungen, so ist zweifellos Hegel noch heute mit seiner Kritik der verschiedenen ethischen Systeme weitgehend im Recht.

Hegel?

Dann aber wird das Recht des objektiven Geistes, ganz ebenso wie in der Rechtsphilos. nur in 3 große Teile geteilt, in die Sphäre des abstrakten Rechts, in die Sphäre der Moralität und endlich die der Sittlichkeit.

Unter dem Recht überhaupt versteht H. hier eben, wie es in einem Gegensatz zur Rechtsphilos. heißt, nicht nur das bürgerliche abstrakte Recht, sondern auch die Moralität, die Sittlichkeit u. die Weltgeschichte.

In der Sphäre des bürgerlichen abstrakten Rechts handelt es sich nur um die abstrakte Person in ihrer unmittelbaren Beziehung auf äußere Dinge d. h. lediglich um den Menschen als Eigentümer als Vertragschließenden u. dergl. — Nur um diese Willen der sich wie Hegel sagt, ein äußeres Dasein gibt, ist eine Person im Sinne des abstrakten Rechts.

Nur äußere Satzungen, nur Gesetze, die die rein Gesinnung der Taten unbeachtet lassen müssen, Gesetze, die nur das äußere, aber nicht das innere Wohlverhalten der Menschen ins Auge fassen, nur solche äußeren Satzungen macht das Wesen des bürgerl. Rechts u. der Jurisprudenz aus

Dagegen die Stufe der Moralität ist nach der Encyklopäd. wie nach der Rechtsphilos. erst damit bezeichnet, daß hier auf die Persönlichkeit u. auf die innere Seite der Persönlichkeit für sich im Gegensatz zur Welt reflektiert wird.

Und dies Reich der abstrakten Moralität ist ist nach Ch. Chr. dasjenige, das K. u. die ganze Reflexionsphilos. fälschlich bereits für die ganze Sphäre des Sittlichen gehalten habe.

Die Sphäre der Moralität, die K allein berücksichtigt, geht nämlich nur das abstrakte Subjekt des Sittlichen in Frage.

Hegel aber will gerade jede nur einseitig formal-subjektivistische Moralität überwinden.

Kant und die abstrakte Moralität erklären nur den subjektiv-vernünftigen Vorsatz für sittlich relevant. Hegel aber geht im Gegensatz hierzu in dem Abschnitt über den Vorsatz und die Schuld, daß auch die Konsequenzen einer Handlung, an denen der Handelnde schuldig wird, für die sittliche Beurteilung mit gleichgültig sein können.

Hegel tritt also hier offen gegen die extreme Gesinnungsethik auf für das partielle Recht der Erfolgsethik Partei ergreifend genommen. (§ 119 Zusatz)

Die bloße Moralität, der Standpunkt Kants, erklärt weiter:
nur die subjektive Absicht ohne jede Angabe eines
Inhalts sei das sittlich Ausschlaggebende. — Hegel
aber zeigt in dem Abschnitt über die Absicht und das Wohl, daß
auch daraus das eigene Wohl und das Wohl anderer als der
Inhalt des Sittlichen beabsichtigt und gesetzt werden müsse.

Denn so heißt es in der Rechtsphilosophie (§ 123 Anm.): der Mensch ist ein
Lebendiges, und er hat als solches seine Bedürfnisse. Daß er aber
ein Lebendiges ist, ist nicht Zufälligkeit, sondern vernunftgemäß,
und insofern hat er ein Recht, seine Bedürfnisse zu seinem
~~Recht~~ Zweck zu machen

Das Wohl ist nicht ein Inhalt ohne das Recht, aber auch das
Recht nicht ohne das Wohl. Es soll nicht heißen:
fiat justitia und als Folge: pereat mundus (§ 130)
Hegel tritt also höchst entschieden für die ausgesprochene Inhaltsethik
ein.

Der Standpunkt Kants und der Standpunkt der abstrakten
Moralität können endlich u. U. überhaupt nur ein abstraktes
formelles Gewissen setzen.

H. aber zeigt ~~zeigt~~ in dem Kapitel: Das Gute und das Gewissen: jede nur für sich seyende, nur für sich beschlossene Jede Gewißheit, wie sie von der bloßen Moralität gefordert wird, ist in Wahrheit stets auf dem Sprunge, ins Böse umzuschlagen. [§ 139]

Ein solches rein formelles Gewissen, wie K. es lehrt, ist n. Hegel notwendig sowohl die Wurzel des Guten wie des Bösen, ~~es ist jenseits von Gut und Böse.~~

Das wahrhafte Gewissen aber muß ~~die~~ objektive Pflichtinhalte mit der subjektiven Gesinnung der moralischen Gewißheit vereinen.

Diese Vereinigung aber ist für H. (wie auch durch d. Encykl. u. die Rechtsphilos.) den Standpunkt der Sittlichkeit im Gegensatz zur Moralität setzt.

Unter den großen Führern des nachkantischen Idealismus hat sich ohne Zweifel auch Hegel in stärkstem Ausmaß als Ethiker gefühlt.

— Allerdings die alte 18-bändige Ausgabe der Werke enthält keine einzige Schrift, die in ihrem Titel ~~[illegible]~~ Bezug auf die Moralphilosophie nimmt.

Erst 1893 ~~[illegible]~~ veröffentlichte Georg Mollat aus dem Nachlaß Hegels eine kleine Jugendarbeit ~~[illegible]~~ die als System der Sittlichkeit bezeichnet wird, und erst 1913 hat Georg Lasson in seiner kritischen Neuausgabe der Werke einige Zusätze zu diese Schrift zum Abdruck gebracht.

Aber all dies hindert nicht, daß in der Tat bei Hegel – ~~[illegible]~~ in die großen systematischen Hauptwerke – eine ausgedehnte Theorie des Sittlichen vorliegt, eine Theorie, die [illegible] Hegel selbst hat diese Theorie in ihrer Eigenart besonders gegenüber Kant und Fichte nachdrücklich und ausführlich abgegrenzt.

Aber auch heute noch besitzt ~~[illegible]~~ wie ich glaube, gerade in ihren methodischen Grundzügen, die ich hier vor allem klar legen möchte, ein starkes und lebendiges Interesse. Wirklichkeit besitzt diese Theorie aber weil derselbe ein Typus

Betrachten wir nun zunächst die Werdezeit Hegel's, so sind hier noch wichtiger als die politischen Entwürfe die großen religionsgeschichtlichen Studien.

Durch die Wiederentdeckung und die Herausgabe dieser theologischen Jugendschriften hat sich Herman Nohl ein allgemein anerkanntes Verdienst erworben,

und es ist in der Tat auch für die Ethik Hegels
~~das Verständnis~~ der ~~Hegelschen Ethik~~ sehr aufschlußreich zu sehen, wie
stark noch in den größten Teil jener Abhandlungen die
Parteinahme für die kantische Moralphilosophie gewesen
ist.

K. hat sich in dieser theologischen Jugendarbeit nicht
nur den Schall, sondern auch die Terminologie der kritischen
Moralethik in weitem Umfang zu eigen gemacht.

Ja in der Abhandlg. über das „Leben Jesu" sind sogar die
extremsten Positionen der kantischen Ethik mitvertreten,
so wenn K. hier behauptet: die christliche Nächstenliebe
~~stehe nicht etwa auf einer Stufe der Sittlichkeit sondern nur~~
auf eine rein intellektuelle Achtung vor dem Gesetz
der Menschheit im Nebenmenschen. — Die Gottheit
aber kenne den Affekt der Liebe nicht, sie sei unfähig
von etwas anderem affiziert zu werden als nur von dem
ewigen Gesetz der Sittlichkeit.

— Aber auch in den Fragmenten über Volksreligion u.
Christentum wird es ganz im kantischen Sinne betont: in einem
System der Moral müsse die reine Moralität von der Sinnlichkeit
in abstracto genau gesondert werden.

Unter den großen Führern des nachkantischen Idealismus hat sich ohne Zweifel auch Hegel in stärkstem Ausmaß als Ethiker gefühlt.

— Allerdings die alte 20-bändige Ausgabe der Werke enthält keine einzige Schrift, die in ihrem Titel Bezug auf die Moralphilosophie nimmt.

— Erst 1893 veröffentlichte Georg Mollat aus dem Nachlaß Hegel's eine kleinere Jugendarbeit, die als System der Sittlichkeit bezeichnet wird; und erst 1913 hat Georg Lasson in seiner kritischen Neuausgabe der Werke einige Zusätze zu dieser Schrift zum Abdruck gebracht.

Aber all dies hindert nicht, daß in der Tat bei Hegel – eingestreut in die großen systematischen Hauptwerke – eine ausgedehnte Theorie des Sittlichen vorliegt, eine Theorie, die leider bisher noch keine ausreichende Darstellung gefunden hat.

Hegel selbst hat diese Morallehre in ihrer Eigenart besonders gegenüber Kant u. Fichte nachdrücklich und ausführlich abgegrenzt.

— Aber auch heute noch besteht, wie ich glaube, diese Lehre gerade in ihren methodischen Grundzügen, die ich hier vor allem klar legen möchte, ein starkes und lebendiges Interesse.

Betrachten wir zunächst die Werdegeschichte Hegel's, so sind hier noch wichtiger als die publizierten Entwürfe die sogenannten religionsgeschichtlichen Studien.

Durch die Wiederentdeckung und die Herausgabe dieser „theologischen Jugendschriften" hat sich Hermann Nohl ein allgemein anerkanntes Verdienst erworben,

S. 80: Verfl. gebricht Tötlichkeit als Pflicht
S. 81 Sittengesetz allein nicht die erste Pflicht der Verfl.
S. 83 Kiel - Tode weihen, gehen, aber nicht die Forderung des Sittengesetzes
S. 83 Aus Stellung für die Pflicht ist zu handeln
S. 87 oben Kateg. Imperat.
S. 98 Endzweck
99 oben Stellung vor Pflicht
100 Mitte: Würde
102 Pflicht für jeden
109 Mitte: Destin des Menschen - Gelassenheit gegen das sittliche Gesetz der Vernunft
153 oben Zweck der Moral: Religion - Moralität
[148 - 157 sehr Inder]
Dilthey Bd. IV. S. 287.
" " " S. 81 letzter Abschnitt: Liebe und Neigung als Gefühle, Richtung der Gesinnung - die Tugend
[Dilthey S. 89: Hegel: Kant = Abh. Tugend, aber sehr Pflicht
" S. 94: Jesus will Tugenden ohne Vorsatz u. ohne Unterwerfung Asketik Unterwerfung nicht das eigene Selbst, sondern Modifikation der Liebe, Aufgabe der Entgegensetzung des Verstandes (v. S. 98 Mitte) s. Nohl S. 293

und es ist in der Tat auch für die Ethik Hegel's sehr aufschlußreich zu sehen, wie stark noch in dem größten Teil jener Abhandlungen die Partei nahme für die Kantische Moralphilosophie gewesen ist.

——— Hegel hat sich in diesen theologischen Jugendarbeiten nicht nur den Gehalt, sondern auch die Terminologie der kritischen Morallehre in weitem Umfang zu eigen gemacht.

Ja in der Abhandlung über das „Leben Jesu" sind sogar die extremsten Positionen der Kantischen Ethik mitvertreten, so z. B. wenn Hegel hier behauptet: die christliche Nächsten-liebe ziele nicht etwa auf ein Gefühl der Liebe, sondern nur auf eine rein intellektuelle Achtung vor dem Gesetz der Menschheit im Nebenmenschen. (S. 84) — Die Gottheit aber kenne den Affekt der Liebe nicht, sie sei unfähig, von etwas anderem affiziert zu werden als nur von dem ewigen Gesetz der Sittlichkeit. (S. 78)

Aber auch in den Fragmenten über „Volksreligion und Christentum" wird es ganz im Sinne Kants betont: in einem System der Moral müsse die reine Moralität von der Sinnlichkeit in abstracto genau gesondert werden.

Hierfür beruft sich aber nun eine Fülle von wörtlichen Argumente
gegen die K'sche Ethik in sehr vielen anderen Abhandlungen, so schon
in d. Abhandlg. über d. Geist des Skeptizismus, und weiter vor allem
in den Aufsätzen der Jenaer Zeit, sowohl in der Schrift über
Glauben u. Wissen wie in der „Differenz des Fichteschen u. Schellingschen
Systems" wie besonders in der wörtlich Abhandlg. über die wissen-
schaftliche Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts.

Es hat hier die Moralleh K's und Fichtes als die Systeme
seines unmittelbaren Vorgängers im wesentlichen miteinander
identifiziert, und es hat dieser Polemik gegen die Kant-
Fichtesche Moralphilos. eine so große Bedeutung zugesprochen, daß
es sie noch in d. Phänomenologie des Geistes wiederholt.

Da in allen wörtlichen späteren Grundrissen Hegels die reine Ethik K's
enthalten, findet sich gerade an den entscheidendsten Stellen
die Kritik K's und erst an der Hand dieser Kritik die Weise
Überwindung der kritischen Ethik. Moralphilosophie Lehre zugleich die Ver-
neinung jeder bloß positiven Ethik

Es ist daher zweifellos: es ist auch die gesamte geistesgeschichtliche
Atmosphäre ist, die sich in der Moralleh K's aussprich, ein Einblick
in die methodischen Grundzüge der panlogistischen Ethik muß daher
wesentlich gerade von K. ausgenommen werden.

H. ebenso heißt es ganz kantisch in der 1. Fassung der Schrift über die Positivität des Christentums": das Wesen der Moralität bestehe allein in dem Gehorsam gegen das Sittengesetz (S. 165)

Da H. hat in jenen Jahren etwa von 1793-97 mit nur die Moralterminologie K's gebraucht, auch mit dem ganzen aktivistischen Pathos seiner damaligen Briefe steht er jedenfalls K. viel näher als der Darstellung, die er später in seinen eigenen Moraltheorien einnahm.

K. hat später auch für die Ethik nur das, was ist, als vernünftig erklärt und dann über alle Ungeduld des weltreformierenden Menschen gespottet.

1795 aber ist er besonders in seinem Briefe an Schelling noch ganz erfüllt von einer Ethik der Tat im Sinne Kants und fordert hier wörtlich: das, wie es sein soll, muß sich mächtig erheben gegen die Indolenz dessen, was ist.

Die entscheidende Abkehr von der kritischen Ethik erfolgte für H. offenbar erst um die Zeit seiner Übersiedlung von Bern nach Frankfurt, um das Jahr 1797, als sich seine allgemeine Wendung zum Pantheismus vollzog.

Der Philosoph schrieb wie Rosenkranz in s. „Leben Hegels" berichtet, i. J. 1798 eine ausführliche Kritik der K'schen Metaphysik d. Sitten. Das Manuskript ist jedoch, wie Noll angibt, verloren gegangen.

Kant hatte gelehrt, das sittlich indifferente Verhalten ist dasjenige, das durch bloßen Inhalte bestimmt wird, durch die Vielheit von Materien des Begehrungsvermögens.

Dem entgegen gibt es aber ein rein formales Einheitsgesetz des Handelns, ein Gesetz, das nur fordert, die Maxime der Willkür müsse die Form der Tauglichkeit für ein allgemeines Naturgesetz besitzen. Dieses Gesetz ist der kategorische Imperativ:

Das heißt also: nur das Handeln, das durch d. kateg. Imperativ, das durch ein rein formales Vernunftgesetz bestimmt wird, ist n. K. ein sittliches Verhalten.

Diesen Formalismus in d. Ethik und seine weitgehenden Folgerungen hat nun Hegel mit aller Energie zu überwinden gesucht.

Ja in einem Brief an Paß schreibt er sogar: seine wichtigsten Ziele seien die Philos. deutsch Systeme zu leben und den Unfug des Formalismus zu beseitigen.

Und in der Tat: die Argumente gegen die formale Ethik überlebt haben weder im 19. Jahrh. noch bei Feuerbach noch bei Beneke eine solche Bewirkung und eine solche Schärfe erreicht wie gerade bei Hegel.

nach den Inversen ihrer Methode
auf sich beziehen. Jede wahrhaft in sich
Hegel ist allerdings der kritische Moraltheorie nicht völlig
gerecht geworden. Er übersah vor allem die die komplizierte begründete u. die, wenn glaube, sehr tief und weit reichende
transzendentale Sinnbedeutung, die d. praktische Vernunftgesetz bei Kant besitzt,
d. h. hat das Wesen des Vernunftgesetzes in dem synthetischen
Sinne der Einheit der Apperzeption nicht erkannt.

So hat er fälschlich behauptet: die Einheit, die Allgemein-
gültigkeit, die in dem p. Vernunftgesetz K's ausgedrückt sei,
bedeute nur die analytische Identität im Sinne des
Satzes vom Widerspruche. In der Deduktion von Tran-
szendentalen bestehe allein das wahre Verdienst einer Autonomie d.
p. Vern.

Hegel irrte also völlig in der Art, wie er den formalen Charakter
des kritischen Vernunftgesetzes auffaßte. Aber dein daß er
die Allenbetonung des formalen Momentes in der Moralethik
bekämpfte, darin bleibt er allerdings, wie ich glaube, bis
heute K. gegenüber im Recht.

K. hat nicht etwa die ethische Vernunftgesetzlichkeit selbst
zugunsten einer empirischen Zustandsethik
~~überhaupt~~ abgelehnt; er hat es besonders in der Abhandlung
über das Naturrecht ausdrücklich hervorgehoben ~~anerkannt~~: es ist ein Verdienst
K's, dass er in der Ethik überhaupt allgemein-gültige
Vernunftsätze aufgestellt wollte.

Hirni verkennt die grosse Überlegenheit der kritischen Moraltheorie
gegenüber jeder rein empirischen Sittenlehre ebenso wie gegenüber
der gesamten rein historischen Rechtsschule.

(Aber gleichgültig was als das Wesen der Vernunftgesetzlichkeit
angesehen wird, jedenfalls kann in keiner Fassung des
Sittlichen das materiale Moment irgendwie umgangen werden.

Es ist daher in der Tat sehr bezeichnend, wenn K. glaubt,
die Unentbehrlichkeit des Materials der in Ethik könne nur
müsse im Gegensatz zu K. nach allen Richtungen hin ausdrücklich
bewiesen werden.)

Nur die ~~weitere~~ Polemik gegen angebliche Folgeerscheinungen
der formalen Ethik bei K. in starken Übertreibungen gefunden,
findet sich

so z. B. wenn er in den verschiedenen seiner Abhandlungen
ausführte, daß die Ethik K's [m. Fichte] führe in ihrer Inhalts-
losigkeit zum ~~Phantasmus~~ Jesuitismus, zu einer Moral der Tarten-
spielerei, zum Pharisäismus, ja selbst zu einer Theorie der
Unsittlichkeit.

Aber wie es auch die Rezensenten d. Kritik der Rechtsphilos. wieder-
holen: die kritische Ethik verfiele in eine leere Rednerei, eine
hohle Deklamation, die erbauen soll, aber nicht aufbauen kann,
die nur Langeweile macht, die wesenlose Abstraktion ihrer
Begriffe decke sich völlig in ihrer Leerheit und Hohlheit
mit den Grundbegriffen der französ. Revolution (Rechtsphil. §29
wie dies auch
Fried. Schlegel u. Schelling behaupteten),
ja der leere Pflichtbegriff K's [m. Fichte] deute nur darauf hin,
daß die Wissenschaft, der er entstammt, die Erkenntnis eines
aufgelösten Volkes sei. Jedoch [illegible] aber von der Ab-
[illegible] Hegel mit [illegible] Methoden vorgehabte wie Hegel
in Rezz.: [illegible] übergiebt [illegible], der Inhalt u. die Form [illegible]
der Ethik wie der Logik [illegible] gebe es [illegible]. Der Satz gegen alle
Formalismus, [illegible] Methode ist das
Schlagwort, unter dem sich die Hauptmasse der Hegelianer gegen
die Kantische Ethik u. d. Rechtsphil. [illegible]

Der Imperativ a. Inhalt d. Kantischen Ethik sei in der Tat unfähig oder nicht gewillt gewesen
das Problem der ethischen Gesetzlichkeit zu lösen, beantworten. Aber auch auf der andern Seite,
auf der Seite des formalen Imperativismus, [illegible] methodischer Mangel. Der Hauptmangel des
ethischen Formalismus [illegible] Hegel der, daß [illegible] die vollständige [illegible] bestimmt zwischen
Form u. Inhalt, Gesetz u. Begriff d. Sache völlig unfaßbare Auseinander-

Begründen wollte, das wichtigste über die dialektische Methode u. mit diesen Grundbegriffen wollte nun Hegel, wie er in der Rechtsphil. sagt, das sittliche Universum aufbauen.

Mit diesen Grundbegriffen der dialektischen Methode glaubte nun Hegel, wie er in der Rechtsphilos. sagt, in der Tat auch das gesamte sittliche Universum konstruieren zu können.

Nur in der philosophischen Propädeutik, die 1840 von Rosenkranz herausgegeben wurde, ist die dialektische Methode nicht mit demselben Nachdruck wie sonst zur Anwendung gebracht.

Dafür kann aber auch die Pflichtenlehre der Propädeutik, noch weniger als wohl Haym die Zugabe als eine strenge Darstellung Hegelschen Lehre gelten, sie bekennt sich offenbar weit mehr zu späterer, bestimmte gebräuchliche Formeln

Auch nur so erklärt es sich auch, daß H. noch hier wieder seiner Nürnberger Rektorzeit eine ganze Anzahl Kantscher Moralbegriffe gebrauchte, ja daß die ganze Einteilung in Pflichten gegen sich selbst, gegen den Staat und gegen Andere eher an Kant oder Fichte als an Hegel erinnert.

Dagegen ist nun klar in den lange unveröffentlichten Jugendwerk, in dem System der Sittlichkeit von 1802/3, die dialektische Methode durchaus vorgebildet, wenn auch öfters noch mit Schellingscher Terminologie durchsetzt mitverwandt ist, u. wenn gleich überhaupt Hegel mit dieser Schrift, wie man öfter mit Recht aufmerksam gemacht, noch in großer Nähe der Romantik steht.

Wenn hier auch noch seltsam dunkel [illegible] Schellingsche Terminologie dauernd in das neue genetische Denken sich drängt, nur mühsam aus der alten Schelling. Terminologie

Bereits die älteren Hegelmonographieen, ebenso wie Rodl, Kenrick, Ueberweg und neuerdings Adolf Lasson haben mit Recht darauf hingewiesen, daß jene Schrift über die Sittlichkeit offenbar als der Vollendstein derjenigen Manuskripte anzusehen ist, die schon immer als H's erstes System galten und die 1915 auch unter diesem Titel von Ehrenberg und Lasson herausgegeben wurden.

Jedenfalls aber ist schon in diesem System von 1803 die volle dialektische Identifizierung aller Begriffsgegensätze, wie sie eben darstellte, vollkommen deutlich da, und der Reiz und die Leistung der H'schen Ethik besteht nun eben darin, daß H. hier in dem System der Sittlichkeit wie überall in seiner ~~Ethik~~ später Ethik es versucht, alle ihm wirklichen, moralischen Phänomene nur mit Hilfe des dialektischen Prinzips zu einer großen Einheit zusammenzuschließen, und dafür in der Hilfe des Dialektischen das gültige Kennzeichen, alle wirklichen Tatsachen zu begreifen, sieht.

So bedeutet bereits das 1. Moment der Ethik, von dem das System der Sittlichkeit ausgeht, das praktische Gefühl, nach Hegel eine dialektische Einheit von Vernunft und Sinnlichkeit, von Pflicht und Neigung, ja auch wie besonders angedeutet wird, von Allgemeinem und Besonderem.

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Mit seinem besonder praktische Gefühle erfaßt nämlich mit der Mensch Allgemeines, Werkzeug und Besitz, ja schließlich auch Besitz an Menschen. Und es entsteht damit zuletzt das Verhältnis von Herrschaft und Knechtschaft.

Auch dieses Verhältnis der natürlichen Sittlichkeit, die Herrschaft, bedeutet aber für H. nur eine höhere In-eins-Setzung von Gegensätzen. — Der Herr ist nämlich für den Knecht ~~das Allgemein-Gültige~~ die Indifferenz der Bestimmtheiten, das Allgemein-Gültige, dem die Besonderheit des Knechtes eingeordnet ist. ——— Der Mangel dieses Verhältnisses besteht nun darin, daß das Allgemein-Gültige, das hier als der Herr gesetzt ist, selbst nur eine besondere Person darstellt.

Die Gegensätze, die die natürliche Sittlichkeit enthält, müssen daher noch in einer ausgeprägteren Form ihre Identität finden, und diese Gestaltung ist n. Hegel in d. Familie gegeben.

Die Mitglieder einer Familie bleiben nicht mehr bloße Besonderheiten, sondern sie bilden eine natürliche Allgemeinheit.

Mann und Frau und Kind leben hier miteinander in wechselseitiger Ergänzung als ein Ganzes, und das dumpf empfundene Ganze bestätigt sich wiederum nur in der Forderung seiner Teile.

Diese Identität der Gegensätze wird aber nun wieder in der natürl. Sittl. durch das dialektische Prinzip bewußt aufgehoben, die H. nun seinen dialektisch durch die Phänomene

2. Abschnitt des Systems der Sittl. darstellt.

Dieser Abschnitt trägt die Überschrift: das Negative oder das Verbrechen und er behandelt u. a. den Diebstahl, die [illegible], den Mord u. auch den Zweikampf der Völker, den Krieg.

In allen diesen Phänomenen scheint jede sittl. Allgemeingültigkeit zerstört zu sein, es scheint hier bewußt nur die Willkür des Besonderen zu herrschen.

Aber H. zeigt, daß auch auf dieser Stufe der negativen Sittlichkeit die Einheit aller Gegensätze des Ethischen wieder besteht, indem zugleich mit der Vernichtung des Verbrechers sein Gewissen und die strafende Gerechtigkeit gesetzt ist. Ja auch der Krieg lehrt u. H. gerade, daß der Einzelne nicht als Einzelner Recht hat, sondern nur in dem Bewußtsein seiner Einheit mit dem Allgemeinen, welche Einheit er gerade durch den Tod für das Allgemeine, für den Staat, im Kriege dokumentiert.

Die höchste über selbst bewußte Gestaltung des Sittlichen ist daher
~~v. Hegel~~ zunächst der Staat.
Der Staat ist nach dem System d. Sittl. dasjenige Ganze,
in dem alle Gegensätze des Sittlichen bewußt erhalten werden
und doch zugleich zu einer wahren Totalität, zu der Wirklichkeit
der sittl. Idee verbunden sind.
Und diese Einheit der Idee verkörpert sich nun wieder, wie
H. damals ~~lehrte~~ wollte, in der Besonderheit von Stände, einem
Militär-Adel, einem Bürger- und einem Bauernstand.
Alle diese Besonderheiten bestehen nur für das Allgemeine und
des Allgemeine nur um des Besonderen willen.

Haym hat behauptet, Hegel habe bei der näheren Ausmalung
seines damaligen Staatsideals die platonische Republik vorgeschwebt,
Rosenzweig verweist in seinem 1920 erschienen Werke Hegel u. der
Staat auf die preußische Ständeordnung etwa zur Zeit Friedrichs
des Großen

Aber alle diese Debatten u. überhaupt alle eigentlich Staats- und rechtstheoretischen
Fragen müssen natürlich bei einer bloßen Untersuchung der Ethik Hegels zurückbleiben
Und außerdem haben sich auch gerade die Einzelheiten der Staatslehre in der end-
gültigen Fassung des Systems stark geändert.

Die entscheidende Vorstufe aber zu dieser späteren
Fassung des Systems bildet die Phän. des Geistes, die 1807
erschien, in der die ihren allgemeinsten methodischen Tendenz (Thema)
nach vor allem die Unentbehrlichkeit der dialektischen Auffassung des
Denken
Geistigen zu demonstrieren sucht.

Dagegen aber bietet eben die Phän. insofern
über große allgemeine dialektische Entwickelungsschilderungen des Geistigen überhaupt
eine breite Darstellung der moral. Phänomene selbst.

So hat H. in allen den Kapiteln üb. Lust u. Notwendigkeit,
über das Gesetz des Herzens u. den Wahnsinn des Eigendünkels,
über die Tugend u. den Weltlauf und weiter in den Abschnitten
über das geistige Tierreich und über die gesetzgebende wie die
gesetzprüfende Vernunft in höchst instruktiver Art eine große
Kette von Momenten des Moralischen rein dialektisch auseinan-
dergesetzt u. in eine oft außerordentlich belebten und drastische
Bildersprache zur Anschauung gebracht.

Leider kann hier nur auf eine nähere Analyse dieses
Kapitels nicht eingegangen werden. Besonders
wichtig bleibt es allgemein für die
Phänomenologie: die letzte höchste Stufe des Absoluten
ist nämlich nicht der Staat oder die Weltgeschichte, sondern
den Napoleon lediglich das, was H. hier den objektiven seinen selbst
gewissen Geist, die Moralität nennt, der offenkundig die Führung
des großen weltgeschichtlichen Individuums hatte:
hat.

Erst in diesen Abschnitten über die moral. Weltanschauung
wird daher noch einmal der ganze bisher erreichte
Gegensatz zu Kant aufgezeigt, und Hegel hat hier
in der Tat geglaubt, alle Dualismen Kants von Pflicht und
Glück, von Vernunft und Inhalt, ja auch den Gegensatz
zwischen dem Bösen und seiner Verneinung dadurch zu überwinden,
daß er alle diese Widersprüche in den objektiven, seinen selbst
gewissen Geist verlegt sein ließ, in dem moral. Weltgesetz

Nur hier in diesem objektiven, seinen selbst gewissen Geist sollen jetzt alle
Paradoxien zwischen der schönen Seele, zwischen der moralischen Gesinnung
und der nicht-moralischen übermoralischen Tugend, zwischen der konventio-
nellen Moralität und der moralischen weltgeschichtlichen Handeln in
einer versöhnt sein.

Ja auch in der Hegel'schen Logik, in dem Kapitel über die Idee des Guten wird noch ~~schon auf~~ diese Abschnitte der Phänomenologie ~~hin auf die~~ Darstellung des moralischen Geistes in seinem Übergang zum absoluten Zurückgewiesen.

Trotzdem enthält nun zweifellos nicht die Phänomenologie, sondern erst die Encyklopädie der philos. Wissenschaften in erweiterter Fassung die Rechtsphilosophie von 1820 die endgültige Form der Hegelschen Ethik.

Da aber eben diese letzte Darstellung noch wichtige Modifikationen gegenüber den bisher erwähnten Systemformen besitzt, so müssen auch diese Abweichungen noch kurz angegeben werden, ehe ein kurzer kritischer Überblick über die ganze Ethik möglich wird.

Auch die Encyklopädie geht wieder wie das unveröffentlichte System der Sittlichkeit von dem praktischen Gefühl aus, und sie setzt dieses prakt. Gefühl als die höchste Entwickelungsstufe des dort behandelten subjektiven Geistes.

Hegel hat es völlig überzeugend nachgewiesen, daß der Empirismus und der Historismus in der Ethik kann die Antike des Sittlichen zur ~~Sittlichkeit~~ zufällig gegebene Aufgaben, er kann die Moral nur in die Sphäre des Zufälligen setzen. — „Der Haß gegen alle ethischen Gesetze ... ist das Schiboleth, an dem sich der Schwachsinn des Historismus zu erkennen gibt," so heißt es in der berühmten Anmerkung gegen Haller in der Rechtsphilosophie.

Der Empirismus und der Historismus alter Zeiten ist in der Tat nicht fähig oder nicht gewillt gewesen, das Problem der ethischen Gesetzlichkeit tiefer zu beantworten.

Aber auch auf der anderen Seite, auf der Seite des formalen Apriorismus bestehen ebenso schwere methodische Mängel.

Der Hauptmangel des ethischen Formalismus ist nämlich nach Hegel der, daß hier eine vollständige Zerreißung besteht zwischen Form und Inhalt, Allgemein und Besonderem d. h. eine völlig unhaltbare Auseinanderreißung von Ideellem und Reellem, von Pflicht und Glück, von Vernunft und Neigung, von Geltendem u. Seiendem, von Naturrecht u. historischem Recht, von Allgemein-Gültigem und Besonderem-Zufälligem, von Sollen u. Sein, von Vorsatz und Schuld, Abstrakt u. Voll, Einheit u. Vielheit.

Hegel's eigenes Ziel aber ist nun gänzlich verschieden
hiervon die völlige Versöhnung aller dieser einander
entgegengesetzten Momente.

Auch die K. d. r. Vern. hatte allerdings eine Einheit
von Verstand und Sinnlichkeit, von Allgemein-Gültigem
und Besonderem aufgezeigt.

Aber für die transzendentale Methode der kritischen
Erkenntnistheorie blieben die allgemein-gültige Form
und der vielfältige Inhalt stets begrifflich voneinander
geschieden; nur am Faktum der Erfahrung
wurde die notwendige Verbundenheit dieser Momente
rational aufgewiesen.

Die Methode Hegels aber will weit mehr.

Unter den großen Führern des nachkantschen Idealismus hat sich ohne Zweifel auch Hegel in stärksten Ausmaße als Ethiker gefühlt.

Allerdings die alte 20-bändige Ausgabe der Werke enthält keine einzige Schrift, die in ihrem Titel Bezug auf die Moralphilosophie nimmt.

Erst 1893 veröffentlichte Georg Mollat aus dem Nachlaß eine kleinere Jugendarbeit, die als System der Sittlichkeit bezeichnet wird, und erst 1913 hat Georg Lasson einige Ansätze in diese Schrift zum Abdruck gebracht.

Aber all dies hindert nicht, daß sich in der Tat - mitten ~~eingestreut~~ innerhalb ~~in fast~~ aller Schriften Hegels - ein intensives Ringen um ~~die Probleme~~ eine Theorie des Sittlichen vorfindet, ein ~~Ringen~~ Theorie, die bis heute noch keine ausreichende Würdigung erfuhr.

Schon Hegel selbst hat seine ~~moralphilosophischen~~ theoretischen Grundgedanken besonders gern nach 2 Fronten abzugrenzen gesucht, sowohl nach der Seite eines ~~moralphilosophischen~~ theoretischen Empirismus, wie er ihn etwa in der historischen Rechtsschule verkörpert zu sehen glaubte, als auch vor allem nach der Seite des Formalismus Kants und Fichtes.

—— Aber in Wirklichkeit liegt hier der, über all dies hinaus eine nach allen Seiten so originale und tiefe Leistung vor, daß auch der Historiker der Ethik sich noch weit mehr als bisher mit dem Problem Hegel wird beschäftigen müssen.

Schon in den frühesten ~~größeren Arbeiten~~, ~~die wir von dem Philosophen besitzen~~, ~~schon in den~~ theologischen Jugendschriften, deren ~~Wiederentdeckung~~ herausgabe Hermann Nohl zu danken ist, leben die Probleme der Ethik stark im Vordergrunde.

Und

wie fast alle seine jugendlichen Zeitgenossen, wie Schelling
~~und~~ der Friedrich Schlegel, ~~Schleiermacher~~ Wilhelm von und Humboldt, so steht
auch Hegel zwar von Anfang an innerlich leidenschaftlich über die
ganze Aufklärungswelt des 18. Jahrhunderts hinaus; und
doch bleibt er zunächst noch zugleich mächtig voerst im Bann der reinen
Vernunftethik des kategorischen Imperativs befangen.

—— So schreibt er noch 1795 in Bern ein „Leben Jesu", indem er
seinem Idealbild Christi nur ganz betont die Züge des reinen
Autonomiemoralpredigers im Sinne Kants beilegt.

—— Ja selbst die extremsten Positionen der Kantschen Ethik werden
hier mitvertreten, so z. B. wenn Hegel ~~für~~ meint, die christliche Nächsten-
liebe ziele nicht etwa auf ein Gefühl der Liebe, sondern nur auf
eine rein intellektuelle Achtung vor dem Gesetz der Menschheit
im Nebenmenschen.

Und auch schon in den Fragmenten über
„Volksreligion und Christentum", in der Tübinger Zeit, wird es ganz
im Sinne Kants betont: in einem System der Moral muß die
reine Moralität von der Sinnlichkeit in abstracto genau gesondert
werden.

—— Und ja nicht nur in seiner theoretischen Grundauffas-
sung des Sittlichen, auch in dem innersten aktivistischen Pathos
seiner damaligen Briefe wird H. noch ganz vom Geiste Kants und
Fichtes beherrscht.

Im Vierteljahrhundert
später hat er nur das was ist als vernünftig und als ethisch anerkannt und

Hdr. II. Teil S. 15
I. Klarer Distrikt
II. Deutung = Teile
III. Von Lipsius zum Konkreten
IV. Vollständigkeitsfrage
S. 13 Allein im Dunkeln, deshalb größte Vorsicht. Nichts so selten u. unglaublich, daß es nicht Bahnbrecher. Aber ausgedacht sollen.

Lit.: Jahrbb., J.T., Prog. Tag.
Leipzig. N.N. Brockhaus, Rochmia
Zeitg. N. d. Dtsch., Ges., N. Fr. Pr.
Frankf. Zeit., Die schöne Literat., Königsberg Hart.
Zeitg. Tageblatt, Hannov. Kurier
Histor. Zeitschr., Euphorion, D. Literat. Bibl.-Saal
Jurist. Kairos, Philos. Jahrb. f. Philos. u. spekul. Theol.
Stimmen f. Geist, Archiv für Polit. u. Gesch.
Prag XVI (Smichow) 841 = Stefansky
Briefe der Liebe = Liebe // Symposion
~~Die Urkatastrophe, Zeit. Volksbl. Bonifax~~
~~Adolph Stifter Archiv~~
~~Leuthen~~, Litt. Welt, Kosmos

Euphorion
Leo Hebr. bes.; ~~Kabbalistik~~
Knorr v. Rosenr., Helmont = Kabbala
Herder, Hamann, Novalis = "
Überweg
Erkenntn.: Hegelgegner S. 66 :/
besser in d. Anfgl.
Kafka, G. Psychopathologie;
K. Kafka // L. Gerardi, Braunschweig, Karl Leon
Hartleben: Eros
Biographik, Zeitg, Reflektion = Daniel Jan.
Rée, Mauthner = Nietzsche

Galilei: Abhängigkeit der Bewegungen des Himmelskörpers in d. Fernwirkung

Nachwirkung, Hinter = Vorstufe 19. Jh.
Heinze-Wundt.
Cogito ergo = Hdbr. IV 2. S. absolute XV. 9
" bei Augustin. rd. 15,9
Finalität, Karikatur
Aufzg. Jd. Oekonomie
Tierreich

glans pinealis 15,13
Spinoza - eben, 16,
Leibniz
Aufzg. Jd. 16,8

Pfgk. 6874, 300 M

Welch 1 Schicksal welch 1 Chaos, welch 1 Gegenst. des Widerspruchs, Richter aller Dinge, ... Gefäß d. Wahrheit, Anhäufung von Unsicherheit, Ruhm u. Auswurf des Weltalls

bdgfbvn hetfgbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb-bnfhrbvhrzfgdbcc

cbdhrtcbfhrzvbfhrzvgfhvnbbbbbbnmbv

mnbvc bnmm nhbvcxxzhuhXCGBnvCgbHJnKMmbvCGbb nnnnnnnnbbhc

njuhgvftredscfgzuj mkiommbv

Atomistik { Leibniz, Meyer, Damerow, Liebe

Malebranche = Spinoza

Gebhardt: res fixae

aeg

Freundlichkeit, ...

Desc. = Inspirationsgs. = Princip. IV.

Cassirer: L's System S. 60ff.

De civitate dei XI 26. = cogito ergo sum — Wenn ich nicht täuschte, bin ich

Pico 900 Thesen als Titel: De omni scibili

l'art de persuader

Nach Hobbes–Tönnies

Le coeur a son ordre l'esprit a le sien, qui est par principe et démonstration, le coeur en a un autre. Jesus Christ, St. Paul, Augustin voulaient échauffer, non instruire. Havet III ? XVI ?

Gott u. Welt 1503

Üb. d. letzt. Dinge 1504

1795 aber ist er besonders in Briefen an Schelling noch
~~ganz~~ erfüllt von einer Ethik der Tat im Sinne des ~~Fichte~~ ...
~~Reformwillen des~~ deutschen Freiheitsideals - d so fordert er dann hier wörtlich
wörtlich ~~an Schelling die folgenden Worte~~: das was sein soll, muß sich allein
~~sagen~~ die Tat gegen das was ist.

Zwar beschäftigt er sich ~~auch~~ in den Tübinger Jahren ~~mit~~ nachhaltig mit dem Problem
der Volksreligion und des Todes in einer wieder, die Schönheit eine wirkliche
~~wirkliche~~ Volksreligion ~~dringend~~ verbindende als notwendige
~~sagen~~ ~~oder die absolute~~ Forderung gegen den überlebten Prunk der
reinen Vernunftmoral. Aber die entscheidende Abkehr von Kant u. Fichte
erfolgte doch erst in der Zeit seiner Übersiedlung von Bern nach Frankfurt um das Jahr
1797, in der Zeit der wiederbelebten Freundschaft mit Hölderlin, damals als sich
in der ganzen jüngeren philos. Generation die Hinwendung zum Pantheismus und
Identitätsphilos. ~~vollzogen hat~~ vollzogen hatte.

Noch in der 1. Fassung der Schrift über die Positivität der Christusreligion war
Jesus für Hegel der große Lehrer gegen alle Werkgerechtigkeit (Nohl 154) gegen
gegen die tote Positivität des Judentums, der große Kämpfer gegen alle blinde
~~Heiligkeit~~ gebundene Moral, der nur die unbedingte Unterwerfung unter das
Sittengesetz der reinen Vernunft verlangte.

Nun aber in den Fragmenten über den Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal
~~nach Nohl Herbst~~ des Jahres 1798 - 99 ~~entstanden~~ erhebt sich Hegel das Problem
des Christentums in völliger Neuartigkeit. Gegenstand
sind die Gehorsam gegen das Selbstgegebene der Kantschen Tugendgesetze, so strikt
es von jetzt ab aus - ist doch noch Knechtschaft. Christus aber - ~~er gleicht es jetzt~~
~~Wahl, in vollkommener~~ wollte statt alle den Tugenden, ohne Gesetz und ohne Unterwerfung, d.h. die
Liebe" (Nohl 293).

Und so kann wie es dann von hier aus Schritt für Schritt weitergeht
wie Hegel sich von Kant - die Frage
das Problem ~~stellt~~ aber nicht mehr ~~gestellt~~ wagt
Aber sie wird ~~nicht~~ mehr gestellt und wie sie dann diese
~~Aufgabe~~ ~~Frage~~ mehr für sein eigenes System.

1798 glaubt er allerdings vorläufig [illegible] noch alle die Gegensätze zwischen Pflicht u. Neigung, Sein u. Sollen, und zwischen Verstand und Sinnen, alle die schweren Spannungen innerhalb des Sittl. Lebens, die mit ihm bisher aufgetan hatten, miteinander versöhnen zu können durch eine mystische Panlogismus der Liebe ganz im Geiste des Hölderlinschen Hyperion.

Dann aber erwacht das ganz moderne begrifflich Kritik an der eigenen, tief innerlich aber auch rein begrifflich [illegible] zwar

Allerdings die ausführliche Kritik der Kantischen Metaphysik der Sitten, die Hegel 1798 schrieb – d die Rosenkranz noch [illegible], ist leider ungedruckt verloren gegangen. (Nicht die Analyse der Gegensätze der Reflexionsphilosophie, die Hegel hier [illegible] Verhältnis [illegible] Sittlichkeit, wie sie in der Liebe [illegible] Verbindung [illegible] Tugend [illegible] Verbindung der Gegensätze [illegible])

Dafür [illegible] eine ganz wichtige aus der Jenaer Abhandlung, die Kants Lehre [illegible] der ganzen kritischen Epoche [illegible] Kant [illegible] Schule, die [illegible] Kants ein reines Imperativ [illegible] Begriffe Tugend [illegible] Übergang von der Endlichkeit zur Tugend [illegible] Gesetz [illegible] die höchste Aufgabe [illegible] Imperativ [illegible] Kant [illegible] Kritik [illegible] Ethik [illegible] Formalismus [illegible] Gesetzlichkeit [illegible] Kant [illegible] wird besonders energisch [illegible] der Kritik [illegible] Ethik [illegible] Formalismus [illegible] die moralische Gesinnung. So entwickelt er schon 1802 besonders klar in der Kritik über die rationale Gesetzlichkeit der Kantischen Ethik. Der Imperativ in der Ethik, der eine nur formale Gesetzlichkeit ausspricht, enthalte in dieser Form von sittlichen Grundsätzen [illegible] Hegel kann [illegible] Hegel [illegible] Ethik allgemeingültige [illegible] Form [illegible] Tugend [illegible] Moral stets nur in die Sphäre des Zufälligen [illegible] Hegel [illegible] Tugend, alle Gesetze begründen.

ja wie später in der Rechtsphilosophie ausdrücklich heißt: auf die ganze Kantische Rechtsschule, die auf der Kluft Kants ein reines Imperativ [illegible] Begriffe Tugend [illegible] Übergang von der Endlichkeit zur Tugend [illegible] Gesetz [illegible] die höchste Aufgabe [illegible] Imperativ [illegible] Kant [illegible] Kritik [illegible] Ethik [illegible] Formalismus [illegible] Gesetzlichkeit [illegible] Kant [illegible] wird besonders energisch [illegible] der Kritik [illegible] Ethik [illegible] Formalismus [illegible] die moralische Gesinnung. So entwickelt er schon 1802 besonders klar in der Kritik über die rationale Gesetzlichkeit der Kantischen Ethik. Der Imperativ in der Ethik, der eine nur formale Gesetzlichkeit ausspricht, enthalte in dieser Form von sittlichen Grundsätzen [illegible] Hegel kann [illegible] Hegel [illegible] Ethik allgemeingültige [illegible] Form [illegible] Tugend [illegible] Moral stets nur in die Sphäre des Zufälligen [illegible] Hegel [illegible] Tugend, alle Gesetze begründen.

der Sein hat ein reines Imperativ [illegible] Begriffe Tugend [illegible] Übergang von der Endlichkeit zur Tugend [illegible] Gesetz [illegible] die höchste Aufgabe [illegible] Imperativ [illegible] Kant [illegible] Kritik [illegible] Ethik [illegible] Formalismus [illegible] Gesetzlichkeit [illegible] Kant [illegible] wird besonders energisch [illegible] der Kritik [illegible] Ethik [illegible] Formalismus [illegible] die moralische Gesinnung. So entwickelt er schon 1802 besonders klar in der Kritik über die rationale Gesetzlichkeit der Kantischen Ethik. Der Imperativ in der Ethik, der eine nur formale Gesetzlichkeit ausspricht, enthalte in dieser Form von sittlichen Grundsätzen [illegible] Hegel kann [illegible] Hegel [illegible] Ethik allgemeingültige [illegible] Form [illegible] Tugend [illegible] Moral stets nur in die Sphäre des Zufälligen [illegible] Hegel [illegible] Tugend, alle Gesetze begründen.

der Sein hat ein reines Imperativ [illegible] Begriffe Tugend [illegible] Übergang von der Endlichkeit zur Tugend [illegible] Gesetz [illegible] die höchste Aufgabe [illegible] Imperativ [illegible] Kant [illegible] Kritik [illegible] Ethik [illegible] Formalismus [illegible] Gesetzlichkeit [illegible] Kant [illegible] wird besonders energisch [illegible] der Kritik [illegible] Ethik [illegible] Formalismus [illegible] die moralische Gesinnung. So entwickelt er schon 1802 besonders klar in der Kritik über die rationale Gesetzlichkeit der Kantischen Ethik. Der Imperativ in der Ethik, der eine nur formale Gesetzlichkeit ausspricht, enthalte in dieser Form von sittlichen Grundsätzen [illegible] Hegel kann [illegible] Hegel [illegible] Ethik allgemeingültige [illegible] Form [illegible] Tugend [illegible] Moral stets nur in die Sphäre des Zufälligen [illegible] Hegel [illegible] Tugend, alle Gesetze begründen.

Gerade umgekehrt aber steht es im formalen [illegible] Formalismus Kants und Fichtes [illegible] Doktrin der franz. Revol. Hier ist man wohl zur Form von allgemeingültigen Gesetzen vorgedrungen. Aber es fehlt jede Möglichkeit [illegible] Erfüllung dieser Formgesetze mit Inhalt.

Und eben von diesem Gedanken aus, hat Hegel die Ethik Kants u. Fichtes, die [illegible] ist H. in der Tat innerhalb des 19. Jahrhunderts zum weitesten größten Kritiker des ethischen Formalismus geworden, die Kraft seiner Beweisführung ist hier erreicht, weder von Schiller, Baader noch von Feuerbach, weder von Beneke noch von Nietzsche wieder erreicht worden ist.

Nur manche [illegible] mehr der Jenaer Abhandlung [illegible] Rücksichtslosigkeit seiner Kritik [illegible] auf andere Abhandlung über die Kritik [illegible] allgemein [illegible] z. B. wenn er [illegible]: die formale a[illegible] Ethik führe infolge der Unbestimmtheit ihres Inhalts gerade bis zu [illegible] die Auffassung des Sittlichen, eine Spaltung zwischen allen gegensätzlichen Begriffen, die nur reflexionsphilos. Auseinandersetzungen von Gesetzesform u. Inhalt, von Sittl. u. Sinnlichkeit, von Individuum [illegible] notwendig.

Die Quintessenz aber dieser ganzen Kritik [illegible] überall, die ganze Ethik Kants u. Fichtes kann die Starrheit ihrer reflexionsphilos. gegensätzlichen Begriffspaare, wie kein [illegible] die Gegensätze zwischen Gesetzesform u. Inhalt, zwischen Individuum u. Gemeinschaft [illegible] dergl. organisch überwinden. [illegible] Schellings [illegible] absolute Indifferenz aller dieser Reflexionsgegensätze [illegible] Hegel [illegible] Lösung all dieser Widersprüche der Sittlichkeit zu kommen. Und [illegible] 1802 [illegible] der letzte Teil der Hegelschen Abhandlung über das Naturrecht [illegible] Staates in seiner [illegible] absolute organ. Totalität der Sittl. [illegible] aufgezeigt [illegible] der absoluten [illegible] der [illegible] Wirklichkeit des Volkes [illegible] absolute Sittlichkeit als [illegible] Sittlichkeit aller [illegible] in allen Lebensbeziehungen [illegible].

Hiermit aber hat sich Hegel erst dort den Hauptteil des Rechtsbegriffs erworben, aus dem er sich sein späteres System der Ethik erbaut hat. Der eigentliche Horizont seiner Philosophie, die [illegible] erhält der [illegible] direkt. Rückgriff auf begriffliche [illegible]

das ergste Monst seines Philosophiens, jedoch die pantlogistisch-dialektische Methode
deshalb des Identitätsstandpunktes hat er als erst in seiner weiteren Abwendung von
Schelling und in seinen positiven Rückgriff auf die vorkritische Reflexionsphilos. Kants.
Fichtes sobern konnte.
Der Begriff des Absoluten, wie ihn Schl. dann gewonnen hatte, war nicht für alle Gegensätze
der Reflexionsphilosophie doch nur ausgelöscht und negiert, aber nicht bewusst
überwunden, dieses Absolute blieb daher, wie Hegel später spottete, nur die Nacht
Nacht der Leere der Identität, 1 Nacht, in der alle Kühe schwarz sind (Phänomenol.
Meier S. 12)
Hegels grosses Ziel aber wird es nun, alle diese bisher unauflöslichen Gegensätze
in jener Zeit der innere wie der äussere grade in jenen Jahren von 1803 bis 1806,
neue grosse Ziel gesetzt, alle diese völlig innerhalb seiner Idee des Absoluten,
alle Gegensätzlichkeit des Sittlichen innerhalb seiner Idee des Absoluten Sittlichen
zu überwinden.
Die Stufe Kants u. Fichtes endete eben, wie Hegel meinte, mit
einer völligen
Auseinanderlegung von Begriff u. Anschauung, von Form u. Inhalt,
Hegels grosses Ziel aber wird es nun, alle diese bisher unauflöslichen Gegensätze
innerhalb des sittl. Lebens u. des innerhalb theoretischen Denkens durch eine gegenseitige
ebenso durch
u. wieder lebendige Negation auseinander innerhalb zu vollen

AR797 11/21

DAVID BAUMGARDT Hist of Mod Ethics; MATERIALS. Misc; c1964.

11/21

Check for inclusion
in Hist. Mod. Ethics

Ass "Man's Morals & God's" will 145
Commentary

Related newspaper articles

Taken home
6/28/67

2 Folders

of lectures

for Joe Frank

Hist. of Modern Ethics

U. Franck

GE 2-5919

17 Ostend Rd

Island Park, L.I.

Returned
1/2/67

4/29/67

Taken by Ursula Franke

notes on Hist mod Ethics

List of 2'r Col. lectures

Pendle Hill Lectures

List of printed material

more notes (rough)

Returned

7/2/67

Copies needed
Hist. Mod. Ethics

check for need of subject

Feuerbach - newspaper article
Hartmann - Ethik
Mier Kierkegaard: Sich für Wahrheit ... lassen

6 pp Kant - (German)

47 pp Age of Kant + Bentham

~~2~~ p. Egoism

14 pp. Phenomenology

~~6 pp Kant~~

in dark red folder marked by D.

Look up re Hist. Mod. Ethics

1959 Communism + World Peace (?)
New Outlook N.Y.

1959 Unlösbare moralische Konflikte. Ihre Auslegung im Judentum, Christentum, und der Existentialphilosophie
Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte, Köln, Jg. 11 or 11
Sept 4, 297 ff

. Look in Jewish Topics

Follow-up ——

Prof. Bayliss — Was David's review of his Ethics (on Hermes) published & where?

Re: "Is Hedonism bankrupt?" — find out word before "moralist" + ~~co~~ insert it also in Frank's copy

Mark (German or English)

In editing lectures (published) one must be careful to check printed material which, not unpublished, will be assembled for topical publication.

Therefore, it is well to know content of publications existing.

83 a ?

Chateaubriand

Look for

(1) old 92 ~~—~~ found

new 100 / 122a

---

(2) 122b ~~—~~ 122e

(from Enlightenment to Last Flowering of Metaphysics

look for

---

(3) 122f to conclusion

look for

---

§ 3a ~~only~~

look for

Phenomenology 1-14 incl

---

others look for

---

from "Herder on"

Look for

(1) old 92 ~~—~~ found

new 100 + 122a

---

(2) 122b ~~—~~ 122e

(from Enlightenment to Last Flowering of Metaphysics

---

look for

(3) 122f to Conclusion

---

look for

§ 3a ~~only~~

---

look for

Phenomenology 1-14 incl

---

others look for

---

from "Herder on

~~Plans~~ Plans

*printed ~~C.S. Phil 159 - Course - Columbia 1955~~ (with lectures)

Ch X - Typed - German Ethics Victorian Age

published (5) " German - Jewish Ethicists

Lazarus + Steinthal somewhat changed (- also printed Copy)

typed

Ch XIV - French Positivism

(1) French Sociological Schl

Ethics of Emile Durkheim + Lucien Lévy-Bruhl

(also a ~~tan~~ copy with p13 back notes by D. but crossed out

1-Drunk - 1-kept

Typed

" Story of modern Ethics - 4p. 2 copies

" It is an amazing + paradoxical fact:" ending with " I am well aware of what highest emotions these are. May they prove to be not more presumptuous."

typed The Age of Kant and Bentham 47 pp (some a's + b's)

6 p. typed Kant

typed Phenomic Ethics from p. 48-54a

54b-66 is Louis De Bonald (1754-1845)

from 67-91 - Role of Religion + the Church in Ethics

14 pp. Phenomenology - Edelenbos

Typed ✓ German Ethics (placed with Lectures 1918-1933)
(looks like a lecture) "One of my friends who is a professor at the Sorbonne p1-14 end ... "never be felt the same"

Typed ✓ (lecture) "I am afraid (certain) p1-18+ (with lectures) ✓
"because I want to hear to discuss your objections"

Typed ✓ begins with last of discussion on Cohen re Kant + Marxism. Middle of p. is beginning
"Johann Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805)"
all pp. marked "1+2" = 7 pp.
last p. has "Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803)
(unfinished)

Typed ✓ starts p. 83b 84 "In the preface of revised edition of his "Genius of Christianity" (1802) Chateaubriand, he recalled to blame himself..." 122a
(evidently Chateaubriand) (goes on to p. 93-5
"Minor French Associates of Idealistic Ethics"
(then) p. 122a-g "From Enlightenment to the Last Flowering of Metaphysics" (but unfinished)

* printed Libr. living philosophers -
Typed pp 1-39 end "There is, in Ernst Cassirer's vast work... dogmatic types of moral phil. criticized by him"
This is printed as "Cassirer's the Chaos in Modern Ethics"
also in German pp 1-13

Typed (p.1-15 mid in German - with a pencil part outline) (p.3 one extra)
(Title) "Zur Geschichte der modernen Ethik"
(There are many German handwritten pages which may be what is typed but many more pages.)

~~1 sheet typed~~ "Plans for Work" p.1

1 sheet "On Kant's Critique of Judgment" Put with 2nd copy in any folder
(other side) / Introd. VI, Meredith, p.28 ...."

~~5 pp. "G. S. Philosophy 15/- History of Modern Ethics"~~

Lectures on Herma (on manila paper
Mar 1927, 1928, 1929
"Geschichte der modernen Ethik
(seit Kant)"

2 pp Epicurus - 1 copy

From Ewd's list as
taken from Testaccruft

1946 Ethics of Motives + Conseq (#3 on typed list
(is there an unabridged copy?) reg for JL of Phil - Columbia
for Jos Franks (short?)

1956 Chem of moral Experience
for JL Phil 10/11/56

1959 Shawinnee + World Peace
needed? find typed copy
or type from new Outlook

1944 Pantheism's Ethics
Upbk Amer Phil Society

Hist Mod Ethics

? Existenzielle Freedom Emotive Ethics
and Holiness 1957
Destructive Ed (Granger)

Man's Morals & God's Will
Commentary 1950

See box with newspaper.

" " " pkgd brown envelopes

Jon Hurt mod Ethics

We need

Ethics in mysticism

from Bader folder,

according to plan of David

RJ3

Also well to

see if there is a

other Bentham folder (?) + perhaps

something in Hurt mod. ethics

& there —

Lectures various cities USA

List of these among papers

Get for Hostmod Ethics

"Learning and World Peace"

Harper 1948

also

Third Inter American Congress

of Philos

Publicaciones de la Sociedad Cubana

de Filosofia, El Tercer Congreso

Interamericano de Filosofia, 1950

Diss Verfasserschaft ① Hist Mod. Ethics

(publ. 1930) Über einige Hauptmethodenfragen der modernen Ethik
(von Kant bis zur Gegenwart)

publ. 1954-5 Aus dem Weltbruch des Englischen Empirismus

1953 Ethical Nihilism + Justification of Value
Philosophie des valeurs éthiques

1959 Problem + Tradition in
Ernst C + die moderne Wertethik

1928 ? Die Ethik in der nachkantischen phil

2 typed copies Library
1950 Utilitarianism, Collier's Ency N.Y.

1946 Ethics of Nietzsche + Ethics of Conscy
Gl Phil Col.
Erf Ppethik

ethics in suppression from Bradley folder

any other Bentham? perhaps something on
ethics there for Ive.

David Ave lectures various cities USA
There is a list of these.

(from Testscript ?) 2

"Comments on Contemporary American Moralists"

Need full copy "Ethics of Motives +
Ethics of Consequences"
(we have only abstract >
from Jl of Phil 1946.
Is it Gesammmelte Aufsätze oder
Ethos Aufsätze ?)

E W D's memo to Frank re her route

Search
Mystical Ethics in Franz von Baader,
Henrik Steffens (Norwegian)
Søren Kierkegaard (Dane)

Also see newspaper articles

REPORTS FROM RECIPIENTS OF GRANTS FROM THE RESEARCH FUNDS

DAVID BAUMGARDT, Library of Congress

Grant No. 746 (1944), $900. Preparation of a volume on the history of modern ethics.

During the five months (May to September 1944) for which I was awarded a grant I have revised and completed the third volume of my *History of Modern Ethics.* This volume deals, above all, with Bentham's later ethical ideas which are scattered in the twenty-two parts of his juristic works and his anonymously published writings.

I have analyzed this material for the first time and am going to print in this volume some Bentham manuscripts hitherto unpublished. Among numerous other points, I tried to show why Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who were acquainted only with French popularizing editions of Bentham's works, misinterpreted the whole trend of his philosophy of morals. The best known of these French editions of Bentham's works, Etienne Dumont's *Traités de législation civile et pénale, ouvrage extrait des manuscripts de M. Jérémie Bentham,* three volumes, 1802 (revised editions in 1820 and later), must be regarded in many respects as a distortion of Bentham's most acute epistemological analyses. Bentham's radical teaching that, for epistemological reasons, even the

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Printed in U. S. A.

motives of the vilest criminal should not be considered as bad in themselves was diluted by Dumont to the quite different doctrine that in truth all men are good and there is no original sin. It was such "popularizations" of Bentham's thought which led Engels in one of his letters to the remark that "der Kerl" Bentham is "arg langweilig und theoretisch" and Marx to the observation that Bentham was but a "genius in the way of burgeois stupidity."

I further try to demonstrate why it was only philosophic vagueness in the formulation of the French *Déclaration des droits de l'homme* but not political reaction which impelled Bentham to call the French bill of rights "nonsense upon stilts."

Bentham's last book, the *Deontology,* two volumes, 1834, is, as I could illustrate by special examples, to a large extent only a work of his secretary John Bowring; and it is therefore misleading, as is generally done, to quote carelessly from this last work. On the basis of all the new material which I am presenting I have tried to give a detailed rejoinder to the question of whether Benthamism is "bankrupt," a question answered in the affirmative by F. H. Bradley and most contemporary moralists. The manuscript of this volume is now with the Princeton University Press.

An article which deals with Lack of References and Legendary Quotations in contemporary ethics has been expanded during the summer months and I have just read the proofs. It will appear in the *Journal of the History of Ideas.* For the same journal I also wrote in September an essay on Bentham's censorial method in ethics.

Finally I have worked during the last summer on a survey of a history of modern ethics to be published in one volume.

REPORTS FROM RECIPIENTS OF GRANTS FROM THE RESEARCH FUNDS

DAVID BAUMGARDT, Library of Congress

Grant No. 795 (1945). A brief survey of the problems of modern ethics from Kant to the present day.

During the summer of 1945 (May to September) I completed two chapters of my survey of modern ethics, the one dealing with the age of reason, mainly represented by Kant and his followers, the other analyzing the ethics of evolutionism in France.

In Kant and neo-Kantianism the ethical problem centers around the question of the validity of moral laws; in the French intuitive and inductive schools of ethics as well as in the French anthropological school represented by Émile Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, and even in the evolutionism of Bergson, the exploration of the "sources" of moral ideas form the core or the exclusive object of investigation. These two rather disparate sets of ethical questions have often been confused. Answers concerning the origin of moral concepts have been regarded as justifications of the validity of these concepts and vice versa. Only by differentiating these two lines of approach do we become aware of the fruitfulness of these endeavors.

Kant has been generally misinterpreted in this respect. Although he explicitly refused to base his categorical imperative on any intuitive moral sense or feeling, he is commonly supposed to imply an inner sense of duty or an inner voice of conscience as the source of his moral law. I have tried, for the first time, to interpret the meaning of the categorical imperative in strict analogy to the supreme law of Kant's philosophy of nature—an analogy suggested by Kant himself. Kant placed the greatest emphasis on the demonstration of the validity of laws *a priori* in his *Critique of practical reason* and, in the same way, he tried to give reasons for the validity of his supreme law *a priori* in ethics. Only in this way, I think, can the greatness of his goal and the reason for his failure be adequately evaluated.

In a number of essays which will be printed in 1946 I have dealt with the following questions in modern ethics: the ethics of Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, and Karl Jaspers in "Rationalism and the philosophy of despair" accepted by the

Reprinted from YEAR BOOK OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY, 1945, 204–205
Printed in U. S. A.

Sewanee Review; "Toward a Copernican turn in ethics," to be brought out in *Eoon* edited by the University of Jerusalem; "Cultural bridges in ethics" and "Comments on contemporary American moralists," to be published in the *Proceedings of the Sixth Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion* in which I took part; "Ernst Cassirer and the chaos in modern ethics," to appear in the next volume of *The library of living philosophers.*

BAUMGARDT, DAVID. 1945. Bentham's "censorial" method. *Jour. Hist. of Ideas.* 6 (4): 456–467.
—— 1946. Tocqueville in 1946. *Educational Forum* 10 (2), pt. 1: 169–172.

? copy needed
put with folder with Plans

In brown ① folder

4 pp ✓ Theses on Comparative Studies in Moral Philosophy + extra
1 p ? ✓ " on Ideal Moral Ethics - 1 extra
1 p ? ✓ " as to the choosing a real Ideal - extra
2 p ? ✓ During summer 1945 .. of Living Philosophies extra

(2 ? ✓ Philosophers and Freedom of Thought in
not others ? ! Times of Danger"
Unesco Conf of Philosophers Mexico 1950
35 pp ? (some a's + b's) Put with Lectures
✓ "Toward a Copernican Turn in Ethics"
(repeated included also
"Ethical Nihilism + Justification of Value"

(8 pp numbered from 2 to 7

1 p ✓ extra #4 "Iran Commission's Mailbag"

8 pp ✓ 1 extra Abstract + Essay (with DeWolf folder)
" Is Scientific Ethics Possible + Desirable

6 pp (above #4 "Hedonism" "bankrupt" plus abstract making 7 p.
3 Copies - rather difficult to choose)

17 pp ✓ "Crisis in Modern Ethics" Put with Lectures
one MS typed. One MS handwritten
supposedly #4 14 pp but more. "Existentialist Ethics"

(1) ✓

(2)
Brown Folder

2 pp ✓ "Hauptmotive für eine Kopernikanische Wendung in der Ethik"

5 pp ✓ "Science, Ethics & Metaphysics" mimeograph
9 pp ✓ typed

8 pp ✓ mimeographed "Ruled and Running" typed "Bridges for Moral & Cult Leaders"

6 pp ✓ abstracts (1 different) small hand written sheet
"Ethics of Motives & Ethics of Consequences"
very difficult to choose

17 pp ✓ (two wrongly numbered)
11 pp ✓ ? "Moral Lessons of the Day"
3 pp ✓ ? "Religious & moral lessons of today"
1 p ✓ ? "Are our Ideals self-evident"...

1 p ✓ ? "Toward a new Bill of Duties"

1 p ~~duplicate~~ (2 copies not) "On Kant's Critique of Judgment"

2 Reviews on Philosophen-Lexikon by Ziegenfuss
2-typed-same
1 " - diff
1 handwritten also diff

(2)

(3)

Brown Folder

23 pp. ? "Movements, Defects & Contemporary Ethics"

3 pp. ? Commentary on Prof Sidney Hook's essay

2 pp. ? Resume Prof Brunswick's Paper at 8th International Congress of Phil.

14 pp. ? "Die Unzulänglichkeit ethischen Philosophierens Ethik"

sent with proofs, 6/4

Review Ch. A. Bennett's Ethics D.H.T. Co. May 1958 973 pp.

Lum Gerum

Do pp. ? "Throughout last few years ... moral earthquake which ~~I~~ experienced in the old world."

Miscellaneous — Reviews

Review √ "Nature & Man" by Paul C. Weiss

← 3 copies (~~to be compared for identification~~ ~~copy not received~~)

4 copies √ - single sheet "A Kierkegaard Anthology ed by Robt Bretall

1 sheet √ "Kierkegaard: Philosophical Fragments"

2 sides 2 copies

1 pr 2 sides) √ Heraclitus: one copy only Fragmente (unfinished)

√ Hartmann: Ethik S. 356 . . . √ Egoismus" one copy only

Jest Mod Ethics

1960 Gott und Ethik - Mitteilungsblatt, Tel Aviv
Apr. 8, 196

1959 Unlösbare moralische Konflikte, Ihre Auslegung
im Judentum, Christentum und der
Existentialphilosophie, Zeitschrift für
Religions- und Geistesgeschichte, Köln
Jg. 11, Heft 4, 297 ff

Same as Conflictos Morales insolubles

1958 Phenomenology of Moral Experience, Jl of Phil, Ny - Oct. 11

~~1960 Georg Steyn - Aufbau N.Y. p 8. Sept. 2~~
1950 " - Hebrew Encycl - Chaim Weizmann ed. Jerusalem

1950 Johann G. Herder - Hebrew Encyc, Jerusalem ed. Weizmann

1950 Jeremy Bentham " "

1950 Man's Morals + God's Will - Commentary

1937 Feuerbach, 1937 Jaspers, 1959 Hartman, 1959 Husserl, Pelikan 1959
Meyerhoff, 1958 Berezon

(copy of letter sent to probably Prof. Ayer 1 - English Philosopher
but I believe David was disappointed Ayer didn't
do it. - Ros B)

As noone can feel a greater gratitude to Great Britain
~~Mr I~~ and ~~to the~~ greater admiration of the acumen of British
philosophers / I literally owe my escape from sure death under
the Nazis to my English friends, especially to the University of
Birmingham where I ~~have been~~ was visiting professor and honorary
research fellow from 1935-39) I read, of course, your ~~most~~ interesting
essay
work special interest.

So may I turn to you with a question which has disturbed
me for a long time. Could you explain why contemporary English ethics
is filled with penetrating analyses about the right and the
good, the non-naturalness of the concept of good and yet takes
the meaning of "good" and "right" for granted in the sense of Judeo-
Christian morality. The question of why there is a consistent moral
thought represented by all statemen and most businessmen of
the world which, out of moral conviction, considers the killing of
thousands of people or the knocking out of a business rival ethically
much better, morally much more justified than meekly yielding
in any contest of power, this fact which ~~is~~, in my opinion, signifies
a problem ~~that is~~ even more basic than any inquiry into the difference
between "ought" and and "the good". I have not yet seen discussed in contemporary
over Ethics,

English thought.

Of course, I do not wish you to waste your time in answering this letter. But ~~I know~~ if you would discuss this point I just tried to indicate briefly, many of my friends in many countries in any British philos. periodical, I know would be very grateful to you.

An 379 11/22

DAVID BAUMGARDT: HISTORY MED. ETHICS, LECTURES; 1955-1956

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History of Modern Ethics

1955-56

These lectures were prepared by D.B. to be given at Columbia University. However, he never actually gave them.

I suggest that they make an excellent basis for a book on modern ethics - especially part II thereof.

H. Franck

5 Typed copies - pages 1-39 Part I
pages 1-100 " II

+ handwritten manuscript - pages part I
pages 1-93 - part II

0130

Columbia Univ. 1955/56

G. S. PHILOSOPHY 159--HISTORY OF MODERN ETHICS

PROFESSOR DAVID BAUMGARDT

I. THE MASTERS OF ETHICAL METHODOLOGY

Immanuel Kant

*Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by T. K. Abbott, 1889.

The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, trans. by Otto Manthy-Zorn, 1938.

Jeremy Bentham

*An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. by Laurence J. Lafleur (The Hafner Library of Classics), 1948.

II. OPPONENTS TO THE ETHICS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND RELIGIOUS ETHICISTS

Louis de Bonald

Oeuvres, Vol. VI, 1845, "Pensées sur divers sujets".

Joseph de Maistre

Les Soirées de Saint Pétersbourg, 1821.

Robert de Lamenais

Paroles d'un Croyant, 1834.

Louis Bautain

Philosophie Morale, 2 Vols., 1842.

Edmund Burke

Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790. Reprinted in practically all the editions of Burke's works.

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi

Jacobi an Fichte, 1799, Werke, Vol. III, 1816.

Franz von Baader

"Ueber Kants Deduktion der praktischen Vernunft und die absolute Blindheit derselben" about 1809, Saemtliche Werke, 1850 ff., Vol. I.

Jaime Luciano Balmez

Filosofia Fundamental, 1846.

Piotr Y. Chaadayev

"Philosophische Briefe", 1829-1831 or later German ed.

III. ENGLISH, ITALIAN, GERMAN, FRENCH POETS

William Blake
"The Marriage of Heaven and Hell", 1793. Reprinted in practically all the editions of Blake's works.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge
The Friend, 1809f, originally issues of a periodical, published in book form in 1812 or later editions.
Table Talk, many editions and see John Henry Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher, 1930.

Alessandro Manzoni
Osservazioni sulla morale cattolica, parte edita, 1819, parte inedita, 1910.

Johann Gottfried Herder
Gott, trans. by F. H. Burkhardt, 1949, (The Hafner Library of Classics).
Kalligone, 1800.

Johann Friedrich Schiller
"Ueber Anmut und Wuerde" ("On Grace and Dignity")
"Briefe ueber die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen" (Both essays trans. in larger editions of Schiller's works).

François Auguste Chateaubriand
Génie du Christianisme, esp. Vol. I, 1802.

IV. METAPHYSICAL ETHICS

Johann Gottlieb Fichte
Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre, 1796 ("Science of Rights" ed. by A. E. Kröger, 1869).
*System der Sittenlehre nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre, 1798.
Popular Works, trans. by William Smith, 2 Vols., 1848f, 1889.

Thomas Carlyle
Sartor Resartus, 1833f, 1838.
On Heroes. Hero Worship and the Heroic in History, 1841.

Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher
*"Ideen zu einem Katechismus der Vernunft für edle Frauen", Athenaeum, ed. by Friedrich Schlegel, 1798.
Monologen, 1800 (Werke ed. by Otto Braun, 1910-1913, Vol. IV)
"Ethik" 1812/13, "Ethik", 1814/16 in Werke, ed, by Otto Braun, 1910ff, Vol. II.

Karl Christian Friedrich Krause
Vorlesungen über die Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaft, 1829
System der Sittenlehre ed. by Hohlfeld und A. Wünsche, 1888.

Henrik Steffens
Caricaturen des Heiligsten, 1819/22.

Arthur Schopenhauer
*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 1819, especially book IV (The World as Will and Idea, trans. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, 1883).
The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, ed. by Irwin Edman, 1928.
Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, 1841.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
Die Phanomenologie des Geistes, 1807 (Phenomenology of Mind, trans. by J. Baillie, 1931, selected chapters on "Lust und Notwendigkeit", "Das Gesetz des Herzens und der Wahnsinn des Eigendünkels", "Die Tugend und der Weltlauf", "Das geistige Tierreich", "Die gesetzgebende und die gesetzprüfende Vernunft"

Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, 2nd ed., 1827 (Hegel's Philosophy of Mind trans. from the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences by William Wallace, 1894.

*Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, 1821 (Philosophy of Right, trans. by W. Dyde, 1896; by T. M. Knox, 1942; The Ethics of Hegel trans. select. from his "Rechtsphilosophie" by J. M. Sterett, 1893.

Christopher Jacob Boström
Grundlinien eines philosophischen Systems, 1845 (?), 1923.

Antonio Rosmini Serbati
Trattato della coscienza morale, 1839, 1844.
Sistena filosofico, latest ed., 1850, reprinted in Opere, 1842-45, Vol. I.
The Philosophical System of Antonio Rosmini Serbati, trans. by Thomas Davidson, 1882.
Sistema filosofico, latest ed., 1850, reprinted in Opere, 1842-45, vol. I.

Vincenzo Gioberti
Del Buono, 1842.

V. ECLECTICS

Salomon Maimon
Kritische Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Geist (Critical Investigations into the Human Mind), 1797.

"Versuch einer neuen Darstellung des Moralprinzips und Deduktion seiner Realität" in Berlinische Monatschrift, 1794.

Victor Cousin
Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien, 1837. "Lectures on the True, Beautiful, and Good", ed. by O. W. Wight, 1852, 1893.

Théodore Jouffroy
Cours du Droit naturel, 2 Vols., 1834.

Charles Secretan
La Philosophie de la Liberte, 1849.

William Godwin
Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on on General Virtue and Happiness, 1793.

James Mackintosh
A Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, 1831.

Dugald Stewart
Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers, 1828.

William Ellery Channing
Memoir, 1848.

Johann Friedrich Herbart
Allgemeine Praktische Philosophie, 1808.
Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie, 1813.

Bernard Bolzano
Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft (anonymously published) Vol. I, 1834.

Jakob Friedrich Fries
Handbuch der Praktischen Philosophie, mainly Vol. I, 1818.

VI. EMPIRICISM

Benjamin Franklin
Autobiography, ed. by John Bigelow, 1868, especially "Rules of Conduct."

Friedrich Eduard Beneke
Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten, 1822.
*Grundlinien des natürlichen Systems der praktischen Philosophie, 1837-40, especially Vol. I, 1837.

Ludwig Feuerbach
Sämtliche Werke, ed. by W. Bolin und F. Jodl, 1903-11, Vol. X., 1911.

Gustav Theodor Fechner
Über das höchste Gut, 1846.

James Mill. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. 1829
vol.II
A Fragment on Mackintosh. 1835

F.H. Bradley. Ethical Studies. 1876 or later ed.

Fried. Nietzsche. Will to Power Works

J.S. Mill. Utilitarianism .

Lucien Levy-Bruhl. Ethics and Moral Science. 1905

Nicolai Hartmann. Ethics. 1932

R.A.Tsanoff. The Moral Ideals of our Civilization. 1942

Max Stirner
Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, 1845.

Auguste Comte
Cours de philosophie positive, 6 Vols., 1830-1842, esp. Vol. IV., 1839.
La philosophie positive par Auguste Comte résumée par Jules Rig, Vol. II., 1881.

Richard Hildreth
Theory of Morals, 1844.

Giovanni Domenico Romagnosi
Assunto primo della scienza del diritto naturale, 1820, 3rd ed., 1832.

Aleksandr Ivanowich Hertzen
"Vom anderen Ufer", 1849, in Ausgewählte Schriften ed. by Alfred Kurella, 1949.

VII. RELIGIOUS EXISTENTIALISM

Søren Kierkegaard
*Frygt og Baeven, 1843 (Fear and Trembling, trans. by Walter Lowrie, 1941).
Gjentagelsen, 1843 (Repetition, trans. by Walter Lowrie, 1941).

Part I of Columbia
University lectures on History
of Modern Ethics

p. 1-39

In all probability, many of you may have heard of the strange scene in one of the plays of the Austrian comedian, Johann Nestroy. A Jewish corporal shouts there at a Jewish baitallion: Eyes right! and promptly it resounds from the ranks: "Why right, why not left?" The fun which here is poured at Jewish soldiers - it would be quite out of place in regard to the modern Israeli army - can be applied with at least equal reason to all philosophers. Philosophers, too, ask throughout their lives: "Why?" And even when they recognize that to certain types of Why no answer can be given, they still ask why one then can't ask any longer: why? So, being philosophers here in this course, we, too, have to ask: Why ethics at all? And why history of ethics?

First the major question: Why ethics at all? To the common man and to everyone, even that rather uncommon man, the philosopher, as long as we are active in life it seems to be quite redundant to engage in any discussion of a philosophy of morals or ethics. Morality goes without saying says the busy businessman, the statesman, the lawyer and the physician. Why ponder over what morality is. The question is only to implant into life, to put ethical principles into practice. What the principles are that is well known since the days of Adam (One can often hear what the moral law demands from us).

Kant: European Enlightenment, German Pietism, spirit of the Prussian civil service (Preussischer Beamtengeist) and its sense of strict duty/ trends of the time
But Kant's style of thought very different from that of the great representatives of English or French enlightenment, far more constructive and emotional
Locke, Hume, D'Alembert, la Mattrice

Before I become acquainted with you, it may be good to make myself a bit acquainted to you. And I think we should not plunge into the history of ethics itself tonight. At least in our first hour it may be quite enough to be entertained (concentrate) by a few preliminary observations. Some of you may have heard of that strange and funny scene in one of the comedies (travesties) (Judith and Holofernes, 7.Scene) in which a Jewish corporal shouts at his soldiers Eyes left and immediately it resounds from the ranks: "Why left?" Why not right? Such ridicule would be quite out of place as far as the modern Israeli army is concerned. But if applied to the majority of philosophers it would be quite adequate. For philosophers are just those people who ask throughout their lives: Why? And even if one cannot ask any longer Why, they still ask: Why no more whys? As all of us in this course are supposed to be philosophers we too have to ask: Why ethics, why history of ethics?

Why ethics? This seems to be indeed a quite appropriate question because philos. ethics itself is apparently something superfluous in the eyes of many people.

Most widespread belief that everyone knows what is ethical good, what evil, the difference between good and evil, between what is ethical and what not - even the insipid and even children.

Morality goes without saying. No need for endless dicsussions. On the contrary, as you can often hear, all we need is not more knowledge of moral principles but putting into practice our knowledge of them.

Return to the eternal values in daily life, not in class-rooms and on pulpits only.

But if someone is such a dope that he doesn't know, religion will take care of that. "The Bible told me so"
One has only to open the Bible

10 commandments in 2nd and 5th Book of Moses
Sermon on the Mountain
Golden Rule - Perhaps most famous commandment of 3rd Book: Love thy neighbor as thyself

Hillel: While I stand on one foot, teach me the whole Tora. What is hateful to you, do not to your neighbor, Sed. Moed, Massechat Schabbat 31a, Soucins Part II, v.I, p.140.

LC Catalog: Ethics see rel. indifference

But even most religious minds of the middle ages and up to the present day were not satisfied with replacing ethics by the commandments of religion. So important that their validity should be also secured by merely secular thought.
So they found given two fold way:
Revelation on Sinai and through Christ

Implanted in our minds, engraved on our hearts
Innate, inborn ideas
Voice of consciousness
moral sense
common sense
sense of fairness
justice
moral reason
practical reason
right reason
} moral intuition
" divination

Old Testament: Not murder
" " but " in war permitted

New Testament: Whosoever shall strike thee on thy right cheek
" " I came not to send peace but a sword
" " He that has no sword let him sell his coat and buy one

But again you may hear many voices which say

> We do not need religion or a special moral sense
> The law of a country (of a nation) will see to it
> that at least the minimum of ethical requirements
> is fulfilled
> Frankfurter in Harvard Law Review "In Memoriam;Robert

But neither Frankfurter nor Herman Cohen nor any one else would or could rightfully say, that the law could take the place of (be a substitute for) phil. ethics.
Moreover, neither common sense nor religion can really fulfill the function of a moral philos.
Let me explain this quite concretely first as far as law is concerned. Government employee Taubert did nothing illegal whatsoever. But as Eisenhower himself said, ethics was involed. Legally correct behaviour and high intelligence were not enough to be qualified for holding a high government position. Ethics too was required in addition to legal correctness. So he lost his job. So if one can lose one's job by acting legally quite correct but not quite correct in the field of ethics, it is certainly worthwhile to explore most carefully what ethics is.
Or take a far more instructive case: Conscientious objectors at 1st world war and 2nd world war not registering for military service. Here morality demanded not even to fulfill the minimum of moral requirements laid by law. This minimum was already too much for certain sensitive moral persons.
So you see there are a lot of especially important and delicate questions which neither religion nor common sense can adequately handle but which must definitely be brought before the form of phil. ethics. And these problems increase

when we look beyond the realm of Judaeo-Christian morality.

Primitive tribes or men of past centuries.

Westermarck, Lucien Lévy Brühl, Emile Durkheim
Bentham: shameless to eat in public
Fidjan islanders

Yet finally, there are quite alarming differences and clashes between concrete ethical opinions even within our own Western civilization. I think primarily of the quite fundamental contrast between the morality of power and that of generosity, charity, and helpfulness.

Goebbels on the eve of World War II

Free speech, free press preconditions of any moral political life.

Free speech, free press to Communists lack of political discipline, signs of weak, inefficient political government

Internationalmindedness should - lack of patriotism, polit. treason

Peacefulness — Utopian dream, no nice dream, preparedness for war

Our paramount values: friendliness, kindness, helpfulness

To them " " " =
signs of decadence and frailty

We: their <u>brutality barbaric</u> - they see in us <u>lack of vitality and strength</u>

Nietzsche much profounder and subtler thinker than generally realized, developed and most instructively analysed in master-morality

but already Plato - Bentham wolf in Bible

And again not only in our whole Western but even within Judaeo - Whosoever shall strike thee on thy right cheek turn to him the other also
Matthew 5:39, Luke 6:29

Love thy enemies: not only fool but traitor,
Massive retaliation

And the representative of power morality

Matthew 10;34: I came not to bring peace but a sword

Luke 22;36: He that has no sword, let him sell his coat and buy one.

Plenty of material

Why history of ethics? — A.K.Roger, English and American Phil. since 1800

Weakening and confusing

History of physics - Galileo, Bruno, Bacon — Max Wentscher, Theod. Litt

History of chemistry - Air, water, fire, earth alchemy, phlogiston — Jodl, Dittrich

Hegel absorb

Law - Intention - Sittlichkeit
abstract right, abstract morality - Ethical State
Henry Brotmeyer, William Torrey Harris, Denton J.Snider

Alfred Fouillé: Critique des systèmes de morale contemporains, 1893
Emile Fagnet: Politiques et Moralistes au XIXe siecle, 1898-1900, 3 ws.

If we leave Macchiavelli out of the picture, the philos's break with the world of ideas of the MA by no means perfect.

Even reformation carried along very much of dominating medieval religious beliefs.

Fool at his own risk

Refinement of earlier thought

If confused, the original thought not too valuale

Not to be ashamed of previous generations of thinkers of the past 80 years, philos.= healthy thing, job Konigsberg -London, followers caring not for the other hero.

Kant 10 Son of European Enlightenment. Great movement that came to full flowering in the 17, and esp. 18th century.
(Enklings in de dignitate hominis (?))

Determine his place in the history of ideas

Renaissance. Giovani P.d.Mirand. on his deathbed to don the monkish garb. Separation from the primary belief in

revealed religion. King had lost his head

Heine: himmlische Garnison

Locke, Hume — Systematic secular thought independent without basic reliance on any Biblical teaching reference to revelation

D'Alembert, la Mettrie much cooler, merely intellectual attitude

Germany and Kant more emotional, conservative and constructive

2) Rel. Pietism: inner religious feeling, piety of feeling devotional sensitiveness, goodness of intentions, purity of heart

3) Rigorous discipline, stern sense of duty in the army and civil service under Fried.Wil.I, Friedr.II, whose reign filled (main part of Kant's) life

4) Weak physical constitution and strong willpower s. D.W. Gotshalk, Univ. of Illin., The heritage of Kant, 1939

Neither life nor a story

Language= grey wrapping paper

Must learn Kantian like Böhmian language

No beauty in the sense of eloquence and elegance but expressiveness

No youthful fire of imagination

No easy flow of charm

No graceless pedant, acute and subtle pro and con weighing every sentence loaded, charged with meaning,

the product of long and finest, mature deliberation

Next to nothing on Kant's inner life in his youth

Kiss through the air (about 1900 surprise to most, Herder's report -1792 Entwurf z/ Beförd. 1795 - learned Kant scholars)

Wasianski; Borowki; Jachman, Metzger, all 1804

Not only queer and odd

Lampe Irritability: Handkerchief - Trees, Rooster

Widow - never East Prussia

Set their watches - but late after Rousseau - His daily routine so strictly regulated that he went for a walk every day exactly at the same time.

But Westminster Bridge

French Revolution - Dinner Table

Eternal Peace despite glories of Prussian armies

1785 "Groundwork" - Paton Grundleg. Z.M.d.S.

Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals

" " " " Metaphysics of Ethics

* T.K.Abbott in Critq. and other works of the Theory of Ethics 1873, 1889 etc., ed. Otto Manthy-Zorn 1938

Kant on the Moral Life, ed. J.W.Scott, 1924

Insert: see note below *

1788 Crit.

1797 Met. der Sitten

" Anfangsgr. d. Rechtslehre

" " d. Tugendehre

And now let us go right into the centre of K's phil. of morals

You certainly know: the gist of K's ethics is his teaching of the famous so-called categorical imperative.

But you will agree it is of little use to memorize K's various formulas of the cat. imp. unless we understand what he meant by them and what he aspired to do by establishing these so often quoted principles.

And to understand propetly which role the cat.imp. plays in

* Herbert J. Paton (Oxford) The Categ. Imp. 1946 (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals)
D.W. Gotshalk: "The Central Doctrine of the Kantian Ethics"
The Heritage of Kant, 1939 ed by D.F. Bowers

K's thought, I believe the best, most instructive thing to do is to go out from that idea which K. himself called the "highest point" of his system to which all his other ideas must be affixed must be fastened (not, as Max Mueller transl., simply connected with, but even nailed to).

Terrifyingly learned

Disturbingly sophisticated

Throughout our lives we are, so to speak, witness to a never-ending stream of data of consciousness which runs through our minds.

What these data are, varies, of course; There are, primarily

visual impressions of shapes and colors of things

but also sweetness or bitterness of food we taste

smoothness or roughness of objects we touch

various odors . . . . we smell

noises . . . . we hear

historical events . . . we remember

or now ethical concepts . . we concentrate on

Generally we are interested only in the meaning, in the contents of all these many given data we experience

Aware only of this material in our conscience, of this multitude of ever changing experiences

Many people, laymen and even scientists never care for anything else

But there is one other entirely different factor (element) active in our consciousness that is, on the whole, lost sight of, quite unnoticed, quite neglected. This is our Ego which experiences all the multitude of our data of c., a uniting bond which holds together everything we can possibly become conscious of.

If there were in us not such an all uniting ego, we could not experience anything. So to speak, only <u>broken pieces, fragments</u> of consciousness in our hand an these pieces were not understood and <u>could not be understood</u> at all.

As K. points out in special detail, in 1st ed., we would not be able to remember anything of the past because our conscience would be only punctiform not reaching back even to the nearest past.

We would not be capable of recognizing anything, even if it had been ~~presented~~ presented to us just a moment earlier.

We would not be able to compare the similarities and differences of anything; as for the comparison too, we must have a bond of consciousness holding together the two things to be compared.

But this comparing, remembering and recognizing only through one and the same Ego. Through a unity of apperception.

When our attention is directed toward unity we do not deal with <u>what</u> we understand but <u>how</u> we understand anything

Nietzsche ~~broke~~ split personalities down mentally.

If unity <u>ceases</u> to be, consc. ceases to be, of necessity

The contents of a conscious. of animals are evidently often completely different from the human type of c.

<u>Dog</u>'s world not built up essentially on visual perception but on scents; not eye, but nose main organ of experience.

<u>Flies</u> a space of only 2 dimensions.

1) Kant: <u>logical presupposition</u> of all possible experience
   Not temporary " , not preceding in time

2) Think of syllogism: all men mortal

3) Not innate) idea either. This could be <u>accidental</u>, dependent
   " inborn) on quite individual chances valid under the
   <u>hypothesis</u> that the structure of a human or

animal consc. has just <u>these</u> and <u>those characteristics</u>
and could have also other ones.

4) then unity only hypothetically valid
but this " is categorically, apodicticly valid, a <u>categorical</u>
law a priori = being <u>prior</u>, earlier but <u>not in time</u>, valid
<u>beforehand without regard to</u> (?)
<u>logically a priori</u>, not earlier in time

5) It is accidental that our human <u>spatial order</u> has 3 dimensions
logically possible that 4 or 5 or 2 like insects
But not " " " we have 2 types of space not
<u>referable</u> to each other
Try to think it out: 2 different spaces nothing to do with each
other.

6) <u>One space</u>
One <u>time</u>

7) (Kant:) The fact "I think all this" must be able to <u>accompany</u>
all my ideas

8) That is not <u>explicitly</u> but <u>implicitly</u> the one I, one Ego
must always be there in our consc. even if explicitly
we are not aware of it.

9) Ego= Object ?

10) To <u>experience</u> anything means <u>manyfold material in form of unity</u>
Always <u>multitude</u> of <u>contents</u>, of <u>material</u> of consciousness
unity of <u>form</u>
So one formal law of unity superior to all other laws
and a priori valid, categorically valid in all knowledge
and in all ethics

Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time
hold good as a principle of universal legislation.

leaves a deposit, amount of money with me, did not ask for a receipt.

No written document

My <u>inclination</u>, my <u>duty</u>

Only if I fulfill my duty, am I a man of good will.

Of good will, however, Kant says what Herbert J. Paton calls in a dramatic statement: It is impossible to conceive anything in the world or even out of it which can be taken as good without limitation save only a good will. Like a jewel shining by its own light, a thing which has its whole value in itself. Reverence (Achtung) for the law of duty = the motive, not an inclination. Because the moral act is not motivated by any inclination, and because the categ. imperative does not contain any <u>concrete</u> item determining the moral act, therefore the moral act is free, <u>not</u> determinated by any desire or impulse that could make us servile.

As you may have noticed, I have intentionally not given you a detailed list of literature on our subject. It is my ambition to enable you to read the works of the great and the minor modern moralists themselves. And it is a fact - a deplorable fact, but after all a fact - that the literature on the history of mod. ethics is not too good.

The literature on the history of modern epistemology
" " theory of knowlege

ranks much higher. Especiallt as far as our most complicated thinkers, Kant and Bentham, are concerned, not even the work by Tsanoff, the only volume I recommended you, seems to me satisfactory. So I must offer you here my own interpretation of Kant and Bentham as I developed this in 2 books of mine; and you are cordially invited to criticize my interpretation to your

heart's delight. But we always have to go back to the original works of past thinkers and not, e.g. to ~~them~~ Heidegger's Kant-interpretation. I know H. still enjoys an esp. high reputation despite his membership in the Nazi party. In Germany and France this is already over.

And now, as I have been asked to do so, let me give you a provisional list of all the thinkers and their works with which we will deal here in this winter course.

Otto Manty Zorn, 1938
T.K. Abbot, Critq.
J. W. Scott. Kant on the Moral Life.
Bentham: An Introd. to the Princ. of Morals and Legisl., printed in 1780, 1st. ed.1789, 2nd ed. 1822
A Fragment on Government, anonymously 1776

~~Gr~~ French trad., religious ethics:

François Auguste Chateaubriand: Génie du Christianisme, 1802
Louis de Bonald: Pensées sur divers sujets. Oeuvres complètes. 1817-30, 1845 Vol.VI
Joseph de Maistre: Soirées de Saint Pétersbourg, 1821 (started in 1806)
Robert de Lamenais: Paroles d'un Croyant, 1834

Perhaps Louis Bautain: Philosophie Morale, 2 vol.1842
" Théodore Jouffroy: Cours du Droit naturel, 2 vols.1834

Auguste Comte: Cours de philosophie positive, 6 vols.1830-42
Victor Cousin: Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien, 1837
Charles Secrétan: La Philosophie de la Liberté, 1849
Emile Littré
Jules Simon LeDevoir, 1854
Claude Henri Saint Simon: Le nouveau Christianisme, 1825
Charles Fournier
Pierre Joseph Proudhon: Qu'est ce que la Propriété, 1840
Tschaadajew, Philos. Letters
Alexander Herzen
Bjelinsky
J.H.Bridges: A General View of Positivism, 1948, 1880, transl. by p.260ff, p.262."Substitution of Love of Humanity for Love of God"

William Blake: The marriage of Heaven and Hell, illustrated, 1793
Samuel Taylor Coleridge: The Friend, 1809 f. originally issues of a periodical, as a book 1812
Table Talk
John Henry Muirhead: Coleridge as Philos. 1930
Thomas Carlyle: Sartor Resartus, 1833f, 1838
On Heroes, Hero Worship and the Heroic in History, 1841

J.S.Mill: Utilitarianism in Dissertations and Discussions, 1859
Utilitarianism, 1861
On Bentham, 1838
James Mill: Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind

Perhaps John Ruskin. Unto this Last, 1862

James Mackintosh: A Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philos. 1831
Dugald Stewart: Philos. of the active and moral powers, 1828
William Godwin: Enquiry concerning political justice and its Influence on general virtue and happiness, 1793
Benjamin Franklin: Poor Richard's Almanac
Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain, 1725. Repr. 1785 (?)
Thomas Jefferson
Benjamin Rush: The Influence of Physical Causes on the Moral Faculty, 1786

Perhaps William Ellery Channing: Memoir, 1848

Thomas Paine: The Age of Reason, 1794: Common Sense, 1776
Benjamin Rush: The Influence of Physical Causes on the Moral Faqity, 1786
Henry Thoreau: Walden or Life in the Woods, 1854
Richard Hildreth: Theory of Morals, 1844

Flowering of Metaphysics ethics

Solomon Maimon
Herder, Kalegione, 1800
Schiller
Franz Hemsterhuis
F.H. Jacobi: Allwin
Max Stirner
J. G. Fichte
Friedr. Wilh. Jos. Schelling
Georg Wilh. Fr. Hegel
Fried. Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher, Grundlinien, 1 Kritik d. bisherig. Sittenlehre
Ethik, 1812
Karl Christian Friedr. Krause
Henrik Steffens, Norwegian
Baader
Schopenhauer, 1819: Die Beiden Grundprobl. d. Ethik, 1841
Fundament d. Moral
Freiheit d. natl. Willen
Jacob Fried. Fries: Handbuch d. pr. Philos. 1818
Joh. Friedr. Herbart: Allg. prakt. Philos. 1808,
Lehrbuch z. Einl. d. Eth. 1813
Friedr. Ed. Beneke: Grundlag. z. Phys. d. Sitten, 1822
Grundlinien d. natürl. Systems d. prakt. Phil. 1837, 40
(Czech.) Bernard Bolzano: Lehrbuch d. Religionswiss. (anony.) 1834; 4 vols.
Ludwig Feuerbach: Sämtl. Werke, 1846, ed. by himself
Gustav Theod. Fechner: U. D. höchste Gut, 1846

Antonio Serbati Rosninis: Filosofia del diritto, 1839
Pasquale Galluppi: Filosofia della volontà, 1846, half-Kantian
Giovanni Domenica Romagnosi: Assunto primo della scienza del diritto naturale, 3rd ed. 1832

Kierkegaard: Fear and Trembling, 1843
Elentheropulos, Makrakis
Jaime Luciano
Balniez, El critico, 1857

In textbooks popular, widespread, very simple expositions of

K's ethics

Pure reason limited, no causality beyond the world of our senses
" immortality
" God

Faculty which just commands the cat. imp. of pract. reas. does better.
Trivial, trite, hackneyed, redundant, tauntological, not worth pondering - - - Kantian language
Herbart: no simple faculties. Reason, will = complex
Nietzsche by virtue of intellect. virtue become virtuous
Axel Hägerström: Kant's Ethik, 1802 (1902?)
Kant: Critique, critical philos. not glamorous (Relig.i.bl.V)
not roof first
demonstrate why cat. imp. valid against all dogmatism
Modern Engl. Philos.
You can't criticize a faculty, organ. It's there or not.
" can " achievements of what a faculty does, products of the faculty.
And that's, of course, what K. does

Now today we definitely have to conclude our thorny analysis of K's ethics and at least start with Bentham.
Not so silly as the procedure in one of Molière's comedies where the fact that popy makes you sleepy is explained by the

dormitive power of poppy.

To summarize: Why did K. set up such a cumbersome, vexatious and merely formal law of ethics as the categ. imp. Why did he not give some concrete rules of behavior such as the 10 commandments, thou shalt not murder - he was an avowed pacifist- not steal. Honor thy father and mother.

Explain this with or without reference to the unity of app.

Only strictly formal principles have an indisputable, incontestable, unshakable, unassailable validity

If we would take into account the permanently changing, shifting, varying, altering material, content of our thoughts, only maxims of pursuit of our changing desires, pursuit of changing pleasures

Old Stoic and Spinoza's teaching:

to rise above all our fickle and fleeting, fluctuating whims, impulses, caprices

Mightiest sovereign tyrant indulging in all his uncontrollable passions, moods, not free, but poorest victim of his blind desires, playball of his arbitrary feelings.

Only he who paradoxically obeys the law of universal reason can free himself from the bonds of merely capricious action

autonomous, self-legislative

So Kant: Only reverence, esteem for law, apodictic law makes free, independent self-reliant

could exclaim: 2 things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them, the starry heavens above and the moral law within (Conclusion of Pract. Reason)

From this freedom there offers itself a limited outlook into a higher metaphy. world higher than anything science can experience.

No causality

Never certain that we fully complied with cat. imp. then we would be not only moral but holy. Therefore in an endless process opportunity to reach this perfect state of mortality.

Worthiness of happiness and actual happiness never identical.

God guarantor of it

to be believed, postulated, though never capable of scientific demonstration

Glauben, Belief and Knowledge

Differences d. F. u. Sch. system of phil.

Ub.d.verschiedene ways of treatment of natural law, 1803

Hegel: Jenaer Abhandl.

self-destruction - annihilation, own mullification

Help the poor

Love of enemy

Celebacy, neither moral nor immoral. Sidgewick: The methods of Ethics, A.D. Lindsay: Kant 1934

Rudeness, Making unhappy = Bolzano : Lehrbuch d. Religionswissenschaft, 1839

Older Diplomacy and general lying

Kant made a great number of further moves, to save the strict validity.

If oneself is cold, pitiless, not cooperative toward fellowmen one may need their help, = Appeal to self interest

Never means, only end in itself. Criminal executed, K. for execution. Member in a kingdom of ends.

End a priori = Rational idea of mankind

K = Great aim, great aspiration

Bentham too a strictly valid principle, to which everything "fastened" as to Unity of app.

J. S. Mill right. "The great critical thinker of his age and his country."

One of the greatest and most constructive representatives of Enr. enlightenment.

Completely untouched by the age of <u>political restoration and romanticism</u> following the French Rev. in Europe.

Many of his numerous radical suggestions for social and political reform have <u>come to be adopted</u> only now.

Essays on "Principles of Internat. Law" 1786-89 vol II

He recommended inthe 18th century

1. league of nations, as we have it now here in N.Y.
2. arbitral tribunal for the peaceful settlement of intern. disputes, as we have it in The Hague
3. Emancipation of women
4. " " colonies, special essay
5. Exclusion of corporal punishment in school discipline
6. Limitation of capital phnishment
7. Prevention of cruelty tow. animals
8. Inaugurator

Greatest reformer of English law.

Now today we must not look back to Kant any longer, only in connection with leading anti-Kantians such as Herder, Sal. Maimon, Benecke and Hegel we may briefly return to him. But now we must immediately leap to Jeremy Bentham.

What B's life-time? 1748-1832

Almost the age of another famous European: <u>Goethe</u>: 1749-1832

Kant about a quarter of a century younger, died about a quarter of a century earlier

What the major profession: Jurist, law reformer, political scientist

Admitted to the bar at Lincoln's Inn in London but never practiced law to the dismay of his ambitious father

Dissuaded his clients from going to court, or as he put it in the pictoresque language of his 18th cent. English: I found a course or 2 at nurse for me which I did my best to put to death.

Instead of practicing law, he went into writing on the philoss of law and had the fantastic idea he could earn a living that way and marry, something to which his father again objected

But he wrote indeed a youthful masterpiece, a slashing attack on the perhaps most widely read and respected English jurist of that epoch, on Sir Will. Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of Engl.

Only 7 pages comment of the introd. chap. in Frag. on Gov.

Sect 2 & 3 of Frag. on Gov. in Comment on the Commentaries, 1928.

My dear colleague, to whom incidentally I owe my being here with you also wrote a very attractive small book, The Ed. of Jer. Benth., 1931, covering ca. the first 3 decades of B's life and correspondence.

And does anyone know where the most detailed biogr. of B's later years is to be found? vol. X, first half of XI, Works, 1843

Now back to the first book anonymously publ. exactly in the year of the Amer. Rev. Considerable success. Jurists asked themselves: Who author of this work of a superior mind?

Lord Sheldon, Graphic report in preface of 2nd ed. of Fragm. 1828

House of the Hobhouses where I was there a guest

Extremely independen tmind he remained throughout his life.
Do you know ~~ex~~ of some of his radical sugg. for social and political reform came to be adapted only in the 20th century.
Introd. to the Princ. of M. printed in 1780, appeared in 1789
2nd enlarged ed. 1823.
Only few books publ. by himself later.
Traités de Législ. ed. by Etienne Dumont, formerly secretary of Mirabeau friends and students.
A Table of the Springs of Action, printed 1815, publ. 1817
Deontology or the Science of Morality, 1834. "In thy Holy Cross I glory - Not hurt each other. Limits of Jurispr. Defined,1945
Now concentrate on Intr. Not such a self-assured simpleton
Characterist. of Love of fun and superior self-irony. Dream,ca 1780
First mention of utilitarian, not J.S. Mill, not 1802 to Dumont or 1781, not later than 1780

Now after the 1st few sentences many moralists inclined to bamg the book shut angrily

1. B's 1st statement implies that everything we do determined by pleasure feeling. In the case of the Martyr, self-tormentor it seems evident to Chesterton pain is preferred to pleasure (p.186ff) no pleasure-seeking. Prefers happiness to serve his cause to the end to the misery that would be caused by deserting it.
2. Utility principle. Indian,Aristippus, Democritus, Epicurus 2nd ed. great happi. principle in Cesare Beccaria, Claude Adrian, Helvetius, Joseph Priestley, oxygen 1774, David Hume. Difficult to find an author of 18th cent. apart f. Kant which not partially [utility principle]

3. In case of the criminal: Pleasure not at all good (p.211ff) Pleasure alright it it stood alone, bad because connected with painful consequences (chap.II, sect.4, Limits of Jur. Defined, 1945, p.115f

H. W. B. Joseph: Some Problems in Ethics, 1931. World worse because of criminal's pleasure

Surgeon: enjoys skill, enjoys unavoidable ~~xix~~ pain of patient prefering it to false sentimentalism

Schadenfreude: Satisfaction, pleasure felt on account of the misfortune of others. Betrays the will to bring about suffering of others.

3. Naturalistic Fallacy

4. The Right and the Good

5. Dangerousness = Not usefulness of utility principle

6. Trying not ordering, impelling actions

Further Indirect proofs,demonstration of validity of great. happ.

direct: analysis of the elements of human action

Indirect:

~~xxxx~~ Other principles ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ do not work.

A. Asceticism, chap.II inconsistent

a) Christ. mystics: Pain valuable if brought upon us, not if brought upon others, hope of reward in life to come

b) Moralists (like Stoics) Pain = no evil therefore:may be approved but need not be approved

B. Sympathy - Antipathy chap.II, sect.14, note

Moral sense- Lord Shaftebury, Francis Hutcheson

Different moralist = different moral senses

Common sense (James Beattie, Thomas Reid) =

popular ed. of more aristocr. moral sense

Fitness = Samuel Clarke, C.D. Broad

a) ethical relation) The most fitting candidate for the
b) factual relation) Republ. but the least fitting candidate for the Democrats who are out to beat Republ. from the moral point of view

(Natural Justice , Right Reason, Natural Equity, Good Order,
(Natural Law , Law of Reason

William Wollaston

Kant: We ought to do what we ought to do, analyti.,

synthet. Power Morality = the weaker has to serve
" " the equal of the stronger
see Comment on the Commentaries

Benjamin Franklin: A Dissertation. On Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain, Incl. for stealing a horse = truth too

9) Doctrine of the elect

10) Repugnancy to nature. Exposing weak children = frequent with Greeks and Romans = nct natural with Greeks and Romans

Chap. 7-12: Analysis of Elements of Acts

Motives: Oxford p. 119, chap. 10 par.3, sect.30 Ich 266

Dispositions " p. 131 " XI, par.1f " 275
Sum of his main motives

Intentions " p.93f " IX " 15 " 253

Conseq. " p.153f " XII " 1 " 6 " 283f

" p.157 " XII " 12 " 284

Measurement " p.29f " IV sect.2to sect.4

Def. of Ethics " p.310 " XVII par.1, sect.2-3

Ethics at large (sect.2) = law and ethics. OUr ethics = private ethics.

Intensity, Duration
Certainty - Uncertainty
Propinquity - Remoteness
Fecundity Purity
Extent

Now may I suggest that we no longer allow ourselves being swept away with indignation about Benth. or praise of him -- I will stop the praise - as far as possible - and you the indignation,

though it may be doubtful whether we both will succeed. Anyhow, let's settle down to analyze B's teaching without beginning with praise or blame. We are still with the case of the martyr.

In Chap. I, par.1, B. clearly says: Pleasure and pain govern us in all we do.... This evidently implies that even the martyr must seek his pleasure in following his course of action and exposing himself consciously to the punishment of death. Bentham did not teach that man always goes after <u>his own pleasure directly</u> and is unable to <u>make sacrifices for others</u> to be <u>unselfish.</u> But he insists even in unselfishness man must have an interest in unselfishness, a "self-interest in selflessness".

Selflessness must be more <u>attractive</u> to him than sheer selfishness.

No alledged identity of all interests of men. This Mill.

Now all pleasure in itself methodological abstract. from

all other experiences ——— good
bad

all pain
<u>Criminal</u>

Now tonight we must march on -- at least in our 2nd hour -- from B. to the French traditionalists.

But first let us try to determine -- each of us --

1) whether the greatest happ. princ. is a <u>mere truism</u> because it seems evident that the ethical goal must always be the common good, the public welfare
2. or whether B.'s utility princ. is an <u>outrageous nonsense</u> -- as Mr. Los Santos thinks -- because Max Scheler seems to be evidently right: utility and pleasure seeking can only be the <u>lowest value</u> in any scale of values.

3. or whether B. is not somewhat more subtle, though his teaching may have to be very much refined today.

I. Most elementary objections to gr. happ. princ.

a. Man does not always desire pleasure

Nietzsche Sometimes pain = martyr

b. Pleasure not always good

Sometimes bad = criminal

II. Indirect proofs of the valid. of the maximisation.

It is a strange fact. At the close of the 18th cent. England and Germany gave birth to the fathers of modern ethical thought. But France, the country that took the most revolutionary action at that time produced in about the same years the most conservative moral theories. The most vitriolic attacks against the spirit of the French Revol. were directed by French speaking thinkers of that epoch, especially the two leading so-called traditionalists, both members of the higher nobility. Louis Vicomte de Bonald and Le Comte Joseph de Maistre, who was born in Savoy, and further the poet Francois Auguste Chateaubriand.

All these thinkers and their associates violently attacked the very principles of the French Rev. and of all secular ethics, to which K. and Benth. adhered.

In the 12 vs. of Bonald and in De Maistre's works and the 12 vs. of Chateaubriand, Bentham, as far as I noticed is never mentioned.

Only M.de Stael, who in some respect also belongs to this group of French thinkers, although he lived twice for some time in England, said that the early 19th century would later not be

called the time of Napoleon but that of Bentham.

Kant is, as far as I saw, only once named by Bonald and that very contemptuously. Bonald said that K.'s proof of the existence of God so weak that atheism did not even do him the honor to refute him.

But the command of God, Christian revelation is to all these thinkers the ultime point of reference in all their ethical arguments.

Theonomic, not autonomous ethics

Insistence on Autonomy is according to Chateaubriand lack of the basic ethical virtue$ humility, humbleness.

Kant and Bentham contradict each other only within the framework of secular ethics.

These tradtitionalists contradict all the principles of secular ethics itself.

So the contrast between basic moral convictions and fundamental struggle of ethical ideas which we have followed up so far, was considerably enlarged by these French thinkers. And generally this has not been taken into account sufficiently.

I hope you will have noticed that, intentionally, I spent more than two thirds of our time on Kant and Bentham. For I believe it is of little use to race through the teachings of numerous thinkers without having some firm ground on which to build up one's knowledge.

The ethics of K. and Benth. are often said to be easy to understand. But I hope you have realized by now that this simplicity is deceptive. Their efforts to give secular ethics a firm basis to rest on are far more subtle than is generally realized.

I recently read in the N. Y. Times, which is certainly today politically the most informative newspaper in the world, but

culturally unfortunately, not always so instructive :"Americans must make money. This is their categ. imperative." I trust none of you would be able any longer to speak of Kantian ethics in such a loose and absolutely misleading manner.
Now we started last week to speak of a group of religious ethicists, the so-called traditionalists in France.

The main contrasts are these:

1. In secular ethics: Natural reliance on the power of human reason (human rationale), confidence in what the individual grasps as self-evident.
   In Theonomic ethics: This self-assuredness is called false pride, haughtiness, arrogance. Baader: emotions of self-intoxicated fools
   Chateaubriand: humility - basic intellectual and ethical virtue. Baader: admiration and reverence
   Baader: cogitor a Deo, ergo sum
   I and my thinking are nothing. I am created by God and exist only because I am sustained by him.
2. It is not the reasoning of the individual that primarily counts but the reasoning of the community and its elementary unit, its elementary cell, the family. Society, the community, not the individual is, as Bonald said, sole dépot, the true repository, the very seat of moral judgment
3. Not reasoning at all, but "le pouvoir discrétionnaire" intuitive sense of discrimination, nice perception, spiritual divination.

4. To Kant and Bentham the time in which they lived was an epoch of <u>decisive intell. progress</u>.
   "What is <u>Aufklärung?</u>" enlightenment
   To the tradi**t**ionalists <u>decay</u>, dissolution of all time-honored natural bonds in society. Wisdom of old infinitely superior to all new so-called intell. progress and intell. improvement.
   Bentham reference to wisdom of our ancestors, the <u>Chinese argument</u>.
   Bentham and Kant, too, some connection with the past.
   Bentham with Epicurus' hedonism, Kant with Stoicism.
   Bonald: Greeks <u>eternal infants</u> (éternellement enfants)
   De Maistre: "la menteuse Grèce" = <u>mendacious and audacious</u> Greece, <u>corrupters</u>
   Tschaedajew: Philos. Briefe: Greeks seducers of mankind
5. Progress to Eternal <u>Peace</u>: Kant, devils
   Zum ewigen Frieden
   Bentham: Principles of International Law
   De Maistre: War <u>divine ** in itself</u>. <u>A law of the universe</u>. Perhaps the most passionate modern <u>eulogy</u> on war.
   Hangman, inquisition praised.
6. Bentham especially critical of the spirit of old and modern language, the <u>tyrany</u> of law, the <u>partiality</u> of law. <u>Father of semantics</u>.
   Bonald, de Maistre, Baader: Language = the <u>embodiments of deepest moral wisdom</u>. Even <u>etymological peculiarities</u> almost <u>sacro-sanct</u>.

Louis Vicomte de Bonald (1754-1840) resigned in 1792 before the

execution of Louis XVI from the official positions he held in Southern France, lived in exile in Constance and Heidelberg in Germany until 1797. Napoleon I is said to have been impressed by the stubbornness of Bonald's political anti-revolutionary convictions and tried to win him over. But Bonald served his country only later, espec. unto Louis XVIII who made him a member of the Acad. Française and a member of the French Upper House. As a Deputy of France he contributed decisively to the abolition of divorce in his country.

The sanctity of the family plays also in his ethics a major role. The triad of functions which are at work in the family, the function to be morally needed of

	also religi.,	politi.,country
father	God	King
mother	priests	nobility & administration
children	congreg.	people

Etymology taken from Leibniz, that can, können, King, Khan, or latin potestas, French pouvoir, pater, Engl. father means practically all over the ~~gl~~ globe the active will-power and executive power in country life.

Inequality of men = moral ideal

Pleasure = vulgar "Pensées sur divers sujets et discours politiques" : Le bonheur est vulgaire et familier. Il n'y a de noble que le malheur"
Misfortune and ~~suf~~ suffering = noble

Alphonse de Lamartine wrote an ode on Bonald under no minor title than "Le Génie". Religious conservatives like Paul Bourget, Maurice Barrès, but also such secular minds as Charles Maurras Georges Sorel.

Le Comte Jöseph de Maistre (1753-1821) born in Savoy, at that time an independent kingdom. After the occupation of Savoy by the French Revolutionary army, de Maistre fled to Lausanne, Switzerland, and then lived from 1803-17 as Ambassador of his exiled King Charles Emanuel IV at the Court of the Russian Czar Alex. I, trying in vain there to get some decisive help from the Russian sovereign for his monarch. Died politically embittered in Turin in Italy.

Les Soirees = evening talks between a count, a senator and a chevalier ranging permanently from discussions of the existence of God down to talks about the value of drinking tea or the delight in comic opera. But in the center nevertheless, religious and moral problems.

A voice in every human breast says "The Godhead has spoken, one must shut one's eyes and obey."

Man's cradle should be surrounded by dogmas.

Nothing more important than firm prejudices, his moral views should be formed before his reasoning power awakens.

The doubts of reason like annoying mosquitos
Reason can only chase them away and they will return
Only religion can kill them

Charles Baudelaire, the poet of Les Fleurs du Mal, called Maistre a veritable seer.

Alfred de Vigny, though not an uncritical admirer, a "prophetic tempest". About the end of the 19th century.

G. Sorel: Reflections sur la violence

The Abbé Louis Bautain: De l'enseignement de la Philos. en France, 1833: Desc. responsible.for the inauguration of modern atheism

Philosophie Morale, 1842: Only the highest creative power = God can be also the highest legislative power. Man nothing of his own. Maintain our nobility in thanking God for the noble nature he gave us.

To my special regret I was under considerable misapprehensions up to last week. I always thought that we would still have six hours on hand for our discussions. But I was told a few days ago that there will be no classes during the Midyear examinations.
So today we will have our last session in this term. I had planned to travel fast through our remaining material.
Still it would have been surface travelling. But now have to fly over our topics and I can offer only a bird's eye view.

This has many disadvantages but also one advantage. Probably you will see the general contrasts and connections between large trends of thought more clearly.
And, after all, if some of you plan to attend my course in the spring term, they will see that the problems we have to deal with today will turn up again in the ethical thought of the last century, in the period reaching from the middle of the 19th century to 1956.
In this epoch again there will be Kantians, Benthanites, metaphysical ethicists, avowed religious thinkers, positivists, eclectics and existentialists.
Now I have to mention only one religious thinker in France, first connected with the traditionalists but then separating from them and the Roman Church in general, Robert de Lamenais.
Robert de Lamenais, after the appearance of his I. work, Essai

sur l'indifférence en matière de religion, 1817-1824, was first hailed by French religious writers as "another Bossuet", the last of the Church fathers. But then, in his "Paroles d'un Croyant of 1834 he subscribed to at least some of the principles of the French Rev., "sanctified the barricades", as Baader said, "blessed" every soldier fighting tyranny and social injustice. Rejected by Rome, though now much of his program adopted by the Cath. Church.

Going from France to England

Edmund Burke (1729-1797), statesman, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790

raised his voice before Bonald, De Maistre

French Rev. thinks to fight human prejudices but it fights in truth against human nature

Not only the individual but past and future generations must be taken into account in shaping political and moral decisions.

intimate friend Goethes, Herders, great stylist, Fichte.J * Plato

Hamams, Joh.Georg (?)

F. H. Jacobi, in Glaub.& Wissen 1802, noch von Hegel Glaubens-philos., opened one of the greatest philoc. debates in German and European history

in Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn", 1785, 1789 (2)

Herder: Gott — Berufung auf Lessing
Goethe
Lavater — Mendelssohn * in bringing his MS to the printer

Irrational love higher than rational love

"I do not wish to be freed from dependence on love to be blessed only by the haughtiness of reason. If the highest thing in the world is a naked ego with its independence and liberty, then reason becomes to me a malediction and I curse my existence"

The heart, faith higher than understanding and reason.
Strong influence on Baader, though B. much richer and subtle in his thought. Influence even on Kierkegaard.
Baader, today veritable Renaissance in Germany and even in France
3 vs. explicitly based on my book
He too, opposed the French Revol. Üb. K's Ded.d.pr.V.u.d.absoluten Blindheit.
But wished to remain a true liberal. Problems of the working class in the beginning of industrial era more important than questions of the constitution of the state. More than 10 years bef. Communist Manifesto full freedom of assembly for proletar.
Philos. of mythology

Jaime Luciano Balmez (1810-48_, Catalonian priest, prof. of mathematics in Barcelona, the most important Spanish thinker of the first part of the 19th century. El protestantismo comparado con el catolicismo, 1844; only catholicism principle of harmony in European civilization.
In his Filosofia fundamental, 1846, I saw mainly a type of medieval scholastic metaphysics a little modernised.
Also in his El criterio: Here too, theonomous ethics "In our inmost sould there shines an inextinguishable light which has been kindled by the hand of our Creator and this light makes us distinguish between good and evil".
Filled with genuinely perceptive psychol. and moral observations.

seems identical ("Pride contains malice and aggressiveness
(Vanity contains far more weakness

Piotr. Y. Chaadayev (1794-1856) Philosophical Epistles, 1829 in MS form distributed, "like a shot in a dark night" = Alex. Herzen
Philos. of History. Russia immature. Morality of ancient Greece, esp. of Homer education for vice opposed to ethics of Renaissance

and Protestanti. The ethics of the united medieval church = moral ideal. 4 new epistles recently in MS in Archives of Academy of Science in Moskow discovered.

William Blake: (1757-1827) The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,1793
So much hidden that they are generally not evaluated as such: the principles of master morality, of power formulated there, esp. in "Proverbs of Hell".

De Quincy: Confessions of an Opium Eater, 1822 , Murder as Fine Art,
Oscar Wilde, Alexander Bain
Stirner, Nietzsche George Sorel

Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) The Friend, 1809f, originally issues of a periodical, publ. in book form in 1812, Aids to Reflection, 1825, Table Talks; John Henry Muirhead: Col. as Philos. 1930.

Neben Bentham von J. S. Mill geehrt, Studied German metaphysicians, Schelling, Norwegian Steffens and Jean Paul

Ethics of Motives: (Muirhead p. 152f) Who would value love for the sake of services and not services for the sake of love? "Nab sees alone the outward fruit. But God" the inward spring.

Alessandro Manzoni (1785-1883) Author of "Promessi sposi"

Osservazione sulla morale cattolica, 1819, 1910

Catholic ethics wise by recognizing man's permanent search for happiness and even more so by drawing ∉ the attention away from earthly happiness to one in the life beyond

Joh. Gottfried Herder (1744-1803)

Gott, 1787 = Spinoza's Eudaemonism

Kalligone 1800: Hypermoralization

Joh. Friedr. Schiller (1759-1805) Not Kant's methodology, only results

Uber Anmut u. Würde (On Grace and Dignity) 1793

Briefe über die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen, 1795

François Auguste Chateaubriand, Genie du Christianisme 1802,

vol. I. Humility, Faith, Hope, Charity

Joh. Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814)

From F. to (Schelling, Schleiermacher, Krause,) representatives
(Steffens, Schopenhauer) of Philoso=
)phy of Identity

to Hegel a development of considerable inner logic

as from Locke to Berkely and Hume.

Very imperious, self-assured, domineering, passionately active, hot tempered personality. This reveals itself very strongly in his ethics. F. himself taught, "what a philos. one has depends on what a man one is." A philos. not a dead piece of household furniture whish one keeps or gives away. It is the living expression of a living and struggling human being. 1. Einl. in. d. W.

Kant, as you will remember, leads in his C. of pure reason only to the borderline between the world of observable phenomena and metaphy. In his Cr. of pure Reas., one might say, he just touched on and hinted at a world of metaphy. The ego which obeys a law of pure reason not subject to any inclination, is in fact, no longer an object of the empirical world but belongs to a metaphysical world of pure reason. Fichte, being an impulsive lover of speculative metaphysics did not want to heed K.'s many warnings against metaphys. teachings. No interest in a detailed study of Kr. d. r. Vern. So he argued: if there is an ego of pure practical reason, as he took for granted from K., must not this ego be considered the true metaphys. root of all existence?

This metaphys. Ego of K.'s Cr. of Pr. Reason, is, therefore, to Fichte, the true metaphys. source of all reality. All true

existence is thus, so to speak, nothing but this vast reservoir of moral universal power of a world ego.

law of causality from one event to another
" " thing " "

The true metaphys. origin of all empir. things not another thing, not even a God but Tathandlung, original moral action.
So abundant that to reveal itself, to become manifest, it creates a hurdle for itself, an obstacle, a counterpart, a non-ego.
This the world. The world of our senses only material for our duty, material to exercise our moral power.
The material of the moral action such that by the infinite continuation of this action the empirical ego would become completely independent, absolutely free = 1798. Similarly Sittenlehre 1812.
Not satisfactory. But moral metaphysics one of the most grandiose attempts to link the finite world with the infinite.

Fried. Wilh. Joseph Schelling (1775-1854)
went in his metaphys. one step further. If the ego produces nature then nature somehow in the ego and this reflection lead to Spinoza's

identity of ego and nature
thought and being
organic and inorganic world
subject - object
mind - matter
conscious - non conscious reality
body - soul

Only a few scattered, meager and quite unrevealing remarks on ethics in his works.

There are other German and a Norwegian metaphys. who took over.

New epoch, Spain, Belgium, Hungary

K. Chr. F. Krause (1781-1832): Vorles. üb. Grundwahrheiten d. Wissenschaft, 1829 (fundamental principles)

The 1 God - unity of Nature and Reason = Sphere of union,

out of which organically all other good can and should be explained and developed.

Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768-1834):

the highest good / absolute reality = identity / union of) reason and nature

In Draft to his Ethics 1812/13) Various empirical goods
Ethics 1814/16) deducible by either an "organizing"or a "symbolizing" method

If the organizing method is an identifying one

the ethical values of commerce, law, state

" " " " " an individualizing one

ethical values of property, free association (gen.society)

If the symbolizing method is an identifying one

Science, Faith, School

" " " " is an individualizing one

Feeling, Revelation, Church

Very vague, old Aristotel. belief that by a scheme, dividing a general concept into exhaustive subdivisions, you have scientifically explained the meaning and function of the concept.

Far more influential and valuable:

championship of emancipation of women

Katechismus der Vern. für edle (noble) women, 1798

(Dilthey Leb. Sch. v. I, 1906, 1920) Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin. Vindication of the Rights of Women 1795-97

Covet the wisdom of men

Do not conclude a marriage which has to be broken and dissolved

Monologen, 1800: Every individual = 1 microcosm of the universe
mirror "
microcosm
fully develop what he is, his individuality

Georg Wilhelm Friedr. Hegle(1770-1831, died probably of cholera)
From the end of 18th century adherent of philos. of identity
But as he explained in the famous preface to Phen. of Mind 1807
written almost under the thunder of battle of Jena

Identity night all cows black

dialectical method

Not contradictory- i.e. absolute contrasts

Only contrary concepts, isolated elements of a larger whole

1. Phenomenol. Indi. changing free. Pleasure runs into necessity of world order, instead of sweet joy - bitter resistance. Lust und Notwendigkeit.

2. Indiv. free pleasure-seeking therefore changed into general necessary law of the indiv. heart. Against this

law of the individ. heart the laws of other ind. hearts	) The laws of the heart and the insanity of sheer individual ind. arrogance

3. General law of all hearts = virtue against the way of the world

The world not in such a bad way. Virtue in it embodied already

4. Making my virtue identical with devotion to a good cause in the world

" " " and the affairs of the world to become the same

5. Others have other causes

6. Only general law of morality for all within the general course of events.

Other more simplified and less psychologically grounded dialectical processes developed in Philosophy of Right, 1821, or more briefly in Outlines of an Encyclop. of phil. sciences, 2nd ed. 1827
With his extraordinarily fine historical sensitiveness 2 spheres
Motives-Conseq. united.

I Abstract formal Right - Law - concerned only with consequences of action. Property - contract = Wrong-doing (fraud,crime)

II Morality only with motives, intentions, purposes

1. Purpose good - but responsibility Vorsatz-Schuld
2. Intention - welfare Absicht+d.Wohl
3. Conscience - coupled with genral good (Gute und Gewissen)

Ethical Life

Family-// Civil Society // State - single nation // world history

Norwegian Henrik Steffens (1773-1845)

Caricatures of the Holiest, Identity, but evil in it too

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860)

Identity but no longer, this metaphysical unity of phenomena, characterized as things and their metaphys. source

reasonable, the metaphysical = blind impulse,
" drive
" will (like late Schelling)

Only purpose to negate blind will

Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881)

Sartor Resartus 1833f, 1838

On Heroes, Hero Worship and the Heroic in History, 1841

Fichteaner

Christopher Jacob Boström

Human vetenskapssamt skrifter (posthumous 1916)

Grundlinien 1 philos. Systems 1923

Each human individual, so to speak, an idea of all reality, of God, and will find his ethical perfection and happiness in living fully out his potentialities as such a member of all meta-physical reality. "Concrete, positive rationalism", called by B. more Leibniz and philos. of identity than Kant.

Antonio Rosmini Serbati (1797-1855). priest. Trattato della concienza morale 1839. Sistema filosofico. 1850

The philos. syst. of A.R. by Thomas Davidson 1882

May be called a mixture of scholasticism with philos. of identity in the service of religious belief in revelation and in the perfect man, Jesus Christ (Sist.214) In the merely philos. part of the system (which calls itself a kind of introd. to the teaching of revelation) it is stressed that morality always concern the consideration of the whole of reality = 221 and the adequate estimate of every real entity = 203

Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-52), theologian and statesman, Del Buono, 1842. Origin of the good is l'ente, true reality, God which created all l'esistente. The moral imperative to be deduced from l'ente.

37a

William Ellery Channing, Memoire, 1848

American "Schleiermacher". If we explore man to determine "likeness to God". From eilightenment to transcendentalism

Joh. Friedr. Herbart (1776-184..)

Allgem. prakt. Philos., 1808 Lehrbuch z. Einl. in d. Phil. 1813

S. Ideen: Innere Freiheit, Wohlwollen, Recht, Equity
Inner freedom, Perf., benevolance, the Right and the Equitable

Steinthal perfection
(1781-1848)

Bernard Bolzano, Czech, Logician. Lehrbuch d. Religionsw.1834, vol. I

Catholiz. and Eudemonism

Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) Handbuch d. prakt. Philos.

Vernunft says what is good. Religion highest aim: inner tranquility

Eclectics

Salomon Maimon (1753-1800), von Kant und Fichte. Schiller und Goethe
Versuch einer neuen Darstellung des Moralprinzips u. Deduction seiner Realität, 1794 (Attempt at a new exposition of moral...)
Critical Investigations into the Human Mind, 1797

Victor Cousin (1792-1867), Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien, 1837.
"Lectures on the True, Beautiful and Good,"by O.W.Wight, 1893, 1852, historian of philos.
Influenced by Schelling and Kant and Scottish School who wrote a preface to Hubert Beckers' transl. of Cousin's Schrift on Germ. and French Phil. in Fragments philos.

Apriori= innate concepts with Thomas Reid "la raison comme une faculté du vrai, du beau et du bien"

Theodore Jouffroy (1796-1842) Cours du droit naturel, 1834
Natural Law and religion. Man has innate consciousness of self-perfection. Psychology free of metaphys. teaches us this. But religion too desirable.

Charles Secrétain (1815-95) La philos. de la Liberté
"Absulute will" "I am what I want to be" But truly free only by love of God (Lecture 20f)

William Godwin (1756-1836) Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness, 1793. Natural law and hedonism

James Mackintosh A dissertation on the progess of Ethical Philos. 1831. Against Benth: heart = seat of virtue and religion. Nevertheless pleasure-seeking not illegitimate. Von Guyan indukt. Jodl dedukt.

Dugald Stewart Philos. of the active and moral Powers, 1828
Moral feelings = half intuitiv innate, half acquired

Empiricism

Benjamin Franklin Autobiography 1868 Rules of Conduct

Fried. Edward Benecke (1798-1854) Grundlag. z. Physik d. Sitten

Grundlinien des natürl. Syst. d. prakt. Phil. 1837-40. vol. I

Bentham Traités

Scale, gradation of goods or values. Mere experience shows pleasure of eye and ear higher than that of lower senses more happiness better than less happiness. Social welfare morally more important than indiv. welfare.

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) Sämtliche Werke, ed. W. Bolin and Jodl, 1903-11, v. X, 1911

Ethics = empirical as much as medicine. Mutual happiness in sexual desire

Virtue = one's own happiness in alliance with that of others. Duty commands pleasure. Negation only exception

Conscience is the violated and wounded desire for happiness of another person raging and gnawing in my own bowels (Ardigò)

Gustav Theod. Fechner (1801-1887) Über d. h. Gut, 1846

Maximum of happiness = high aim

Max Stirner (1806-56) Der Einzige (?) und sein Eigentum. 1845

August Comte (1798-1857) Cours de Philos. positive, 6 vs. 1830-42

A General view of Posit., transl J.H.Bridges 1848

Seat in the Head, Altruism not checked by self preservation would be destructive, deprived of proper guidance.

Richard Hildreth (1807-1865) Theory of Morals, 1844

James Mill (1773-1836) Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 1829. Fragment on Mackintosh, 1835 . Associations of pleasure with all the pleasurable feelings of a fellow creature

Giovani Domenico Romagnosi (1761-1835) Assunto primo della scienza

<u>del diritto naturale</u>, 3rd ed. 1832

Unnecessary to explore true substance. Empirical "feeling for the other".

Part I of Columbia
University lectures on History
of Modern Ethics.

p. 1–39

In all probability, many of you may have heard of the strange scene in one of the plays of the Austrian comedian, Johann Nestroy. A Jewish corporal shouts there at a Jewish battallion: Eyes right! and promptly it resounds from the ranks: "Why right, why not left?" The fun which here is poured at Jewish soldiers - it would be quite out of place in regard to the modern Israeli army - can be applied with at least equal reason to all philosophers. Philosophers, too, ask throughout their lives: "Why?" And even when they recognize that to certain types of Why no answer can be given, they still ask why one then can't ask any longer: why? So, being philosophers here in this course, we, too, have to ask: Why ethics at all? And why history of ethics?

First the major question: Why ethics at all? To the common man and to everyone, even that rather uncommon man, the philosopher, as long as we are active in life it seems to be quite redundant to engage in any discussion of a philosophy of morals or ethics. Morality goes without saying says the busy businessman, the statesman, the lawyer and the physician. Why ponder over what morality is. The question is only to implant into life, to put ethical principles into practice. What the principles are that is well known since the days of Adam (One can often hear what the moral law demands from us).

Kant: European Enlightenment, German Pietism, spirit of the Prussian civil service (Preussischer Beamtengeist) and its sense of strict duty/ trends of the time
But Kant's style of thought very different from that of the great representatives of English or French enlightenment, far more constructive and emotional
Locke, Hume, D'Alembert, la Mattrice

Before I become acquainted with you, it may be good to make myself a bit acquainted to you. And I think we should not plunge into the history of ethics itself tonight. At least in our first hour it may be quite enough to be entertained (concentrate) by a few preliminary observations. Some of you may have heard of that strange and funny scene in one of the comedies (travesties) (Judith and Holofernes, 7.Scene) in which a Jewish corporal shouts at his soldiers Eyes left and immediately it resounds from the ranks: "Why left?" Why not right? Such ridicule would be quite out of place as far as the modern Israeli army is concerned. But if applied to the majority of philosophers it would be quite adequate. For philosophers are just those people who ask throughout their lives: Why? And even if one cannot ask any longer Why, they still ask: Why no more whys? As all of us in this course are supposed to be philosophers we too have to ask: Why ethics, why history of ethics?

Why ethics? This seems to be indeed a quite appropriate question because philos. ethics itself is apparently something superflucus in the eyes of many people.

Most widespread belief that everyone knows what is ethical good, what evil, the difference between good and evil, between what is ethical and what not - even the insipid and even children.

Morality goes without saying. No need for endless dicsussions. On the contrary, as you can often hear, all we need is not more knowledge of moral principles but putting into practice our knowledge of them.

Return to the eternal values in daily life, not in class-rooms and on pulpits only.

But if someone is such a dope that he doesn't know, religion will take care of that. "The Bible told me so"

One has only to open the Bible

10 commandments in 2nd and 5th Book of Moses
Sermon on the Mountain
Golden Rule - Perhaps most famous commandment of 3rd Book: Love thy neighbor as thyself

Hillel: While I stand on one foot, teach me the whole Tora. What is hateful to you, do not to your neighbor. Sed. Moed. Massechat Schabbat 31a. Soucins Part II, v.I, p.140.

LC Catalog: Ethics see rel. indifference

But even most religious minds of the middle ages and up to the present day were not satisfied with replacing ethics by the commandments of religion. So important that their validity should be also secured by merely secular thought. So they found given two fold way:

Revelation on Sinai and through Christ

Implanted in our minds, engraved on our hearts
Innate, inborn ideas
Voice of consciousness
moral sense
common sense
sense of fairness
justice
moral reason
practical reason
right reason

} moral intuition
" divination

Old Testament: Not murder
" " but " in war permitted

New Testament: Whosoever shall strike thee on thy right cheek
" " I came not to send peace but a sword
" " He that has no sword let him sell his coat and buy one

But again you may hear many voices which say

> We do not need religion or a special moral sense
> The law of a country (of a nation) will see to it
> that at least the minimum of ethical requirements
> is fulfilled
> Frankfurter in Harvard law Review "In Memoriam;Robert

But neither Frankfurter nor Herman Cohen nor any one else would or could rightfully say, that the law could take the place of (be a substitute for) phil. ethics.

Moreover, nither common sense nor religion can really fulfill the function of a moral philos.

Let me explain this quite concretely first as far as law is concerned. Government employee Taubert did nothing illegal whatsoever. But as Eisenhower himself said, ethics was involed. Legally correct behaviour and high intelligence were not enough to be qualified for holding a high government position. Ethics too was required in addition to legal correctness. So he lost his job. So if one can lose one's job by acting legally quite correct but not quite correct in the field of ethics, it is certainly worthwhile to explore most carefully what ethics is.

Or take a far more instructive case: Conscientious objectors at 1st world war and 2nd world war not registering for military service. Here morality demanded not even to fulfill the minimum of moral requirements laid by law. This minimum was already too much for certain sensitive moral persons.

So you see there are a lot of especially important and delicate questions which neither religion nor common sense can adequately handle but which must definitely be brought before the form of phil. ethics. And these problems increase

when we look beyond the realm of Judaeo-Christian morality.

Primitive tribes or men of past centuries.

Westermarck, Lucien Lévy Brühl, Emile Durkheim
Bentham: shameless to eat in public
Fidjan islanders

Yet finally, there are quite alarming differences and clashes between concrete ethical opinions even within our own Western civilization. I think primarily of the quite fundamental contrast between the morality of power and that of generosity, charity, and helpfulness.

Goebbels on the eve of World War II

Free speech, free press preconditions of any moral political life.

Free speech, free press to Communists lack of political discipline, signs of weak, inefficient political government

Internationalmindedness should - lack of patriotism, polit. treason

Peacefulness — Utopian dream, ~~x~~ no nice dream, preparedness for war

Our paramount values: friendliness, kindness, helpfulness

To them " " " =
signs of decadence and frailty

We: their <u>brutality barbaric</u> - they see in us <u>lack of vitality and strength</u>

Nietzsche much profounder and subtler thinker than generally realized, developed and most instructively analysed in master-morality

but already Plato - Bentham wolf in Bible

And again not only in our whole Western but even within Judaeo - Whosoever shall strike thee on thy right cheek turn to him the other also
Matthew 5:39, Luke 6:29

Love thy enemies: not only fool but traitor,
Massive retaliation

And the representative of power morality

Matthew 10;34: I came not to bring peace but a sword

Luke 22;36: He that has no sword, let him sell his coat and buy one.

Plenty of material

Why history of ethics? — A.K.Roger, English and American Phil. since 1800

Weakening and confusing

History of physics - Galileo, Bruno, Bacon — Max Wentscher, Theod. Litt, Jodl, Dittrich

History of chemistry - Air, water, fire, earth alchemy, phlogiston

Hegel absorb

Law - Intention - Sittlichkeit
abstract right, abstract morality - Ethical State
Henry Brotmeyer, William Torrey Harris, Denton J.Snider

Alfred Fouillé: Critique des systèmes de morale contemporains, 1893
Emile Fagnet: Politiques et Moralistes au XIXe siecle, 1898-1900, 3 ws.

If we leave Macchiavelli out of the picture, the philos's break with the world of ideas of the MA by no means perfect.

Even reformation carried along very much of dominating medieval religious beliefs.

Fool at his own risk

Refinement of earlier thought

If confused, the original thought not too valuale

Not to be ashamed of previous generations of thinkers of the past 80 years. philos.= healthy thing. Job Konigsberg -London, followers caring not for the other hero.

Kant 10 Son of European Enlightenment. Great movement that came to full flowering in the 17 and esp. 18th century. (Enklings in de dignitate hominis (?))

Determine his place in the history of ideas

Renaissance. Giovani P.d.Mirand. on his deathbed to don the monkish garb. Separation from the primary belief in

revealed religion. King had lost his head

Heine: himmlische Garnison

Locke, Hume — Systematic secular thought independent without basic reliance on any Biblical teaching reference to revelation

D'Alembert, la Mettrie much cooler, merely intellectual attitude

Germany and Kant more emotional, conservative and constructive

2) Rel. Pietism: inner religious feeling, piety of feeling devotional sensitiveness, goodness of intentions, purity of heart

3) Rigorous discipline, stern sense of duty in the army and civil service under Fried.Wil.I, Friedr.II, whose reign filled (main ~~were~~ part of Kant's) life

4) Weak physical constitution and strong willpower s. D.W. Gotshalk, Univ. of Illin., The heritage of Kant, 1939

Neither life nor a story

Language= grey wrapping paper

Must learn Kantian like Böhmian language

No beauty in the sense of eloquence and elegance but expressiveness

No youthful fire of imagination

No easy flow of charm

No graceless pedant, acute and subtle pro and con weighing every sentence loaded, charged with meaning,

the product of long and finest mature deliberation

Next to nothing on Kant's inner life in his youth

Kiss through the air (about 1900 surprise to most, Herder's report -1792 Entwurf z/ Beförd. 1795 - learned Kant scholars)

Wasianski; Borowki; Jachman, Metzger, all 1804

Not only queer and odd

Lampe Irritability: Handkerchief - Trees, Rooster

Widow - never East Prussia

Set their watches - but late after Rousseau - His daily routine so strictly regulated that he went for a walk every day exactly at the same time.

But Westminster Bridge

French Revolution - Dinner Table

Eternal Peace despite glories of Prussian armies

1785 "Groundwork" - Paton Grundleg. Z.M.d.S.

Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals

" " " " Metaphysics of Ethics

* T.K.Abbott in Critq. and other works of the Theory of Ethics 1873, 1889 etc., ed. Otto Manthy-Zorn 1938

Kant on the Moral Life, ed. J.W.Scott, 1924

Insert: see note below *

1788 Crit.

1797 Met. der Sitten

" Anfangsgr. d. Rechtslehre

" " d. Tugendehre

And now let us go right into the centre of K's phil. of morals

You certainly know: the gist of K's ethics is his teaching of the famous so-called categorical imperative.

But you will agree it is of little use to memorize K's various formulas of the cat. imp. unless we understand what he meant by them and what he aspired to do by establishing these so often quoted principles.

And to understand propelly which role the cat.imp. plays in

* Herbert J. Paton (Oxford) The Categ. Imp. 1946 (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals)
D. W. Lotshalk: "The Central Doctrine of the Kantian ethics."
The Heritage of Kant, 1939 ed. by D. F. Bowers

K's thought, I believe the best, most instructive thing to do is to go out from that idea which K. himself called the "highest point" of his system to which all his other ideas must be affixed must be fastened (not, as Max Mueller transl., simply connected with, but even nailed to).

Terrifyingly learned

Disturbingly sophisticated

Throughout our lives we are, so to speak, witness to a never-ending stream of data of consciousness which runs through our minds.

What these data are, varies, of course; There are, primarily

visual impressions of shapes and colors of things

but also sweetness or bitterness of food we taste

smoothness or roughness of objects we touch

various odors . . . . we smell

noises . . . . we hear

historical events . . . we remember

or now ethical concepts . . we comcentrate on

Generally we are interested only in the meaning, in the contents of all these many given data we experience

Aware only of this material in our conscience, of this multitude of ever changing experiences

Many people, laymen and even scientists never care for anything else

But there is one other entirely different factor (element) active in our consciousness that is, on the whole, lost sight of, quite unnoticed, quite neglected. This is our Ego which experiences all the multitude of our data of c., a uniting bond which holds together everything we can possibly become conscious of.

If there were in us not such an all uniting ego, we could not experience anything. So to speak, only broken pieces, fragments of consciousness in our hand an these pieces were not understood and could not be understood at all.

As K. points out in special detail, in 1st ed., we would not be able to remember anything of the past because our conscience would be only punctiform not reaching back even to the nearest past.

We would not be capable of recognizing anything, even if it had been presented to us just a moment earlier.

We would not be able to compare the similarities and differences of anything; as for the comparison too, we must have a bond of consciousness holding together the two things to be compared.

But this comparing, remembering and recognizing only through one and the same Ego. Through a unity of apperception.

When our attention is directed toward unity we do not deal with what we understand but how we understand anything

Nietzsche broke [split personalities] down mentally.

If unity ceases to be, consc. ceases to be, of necessity

The contents of a conscious. of animals are evidently often completely different from the human type of c.

Dog's world not built up essentially on visual perception but on scents; not eye, but nose main organ of experience.

Flies a space of only 2 dimensions.

1) Kant: logical presupposition of all possible experience
   Not temporary " , not preceding in time

2) Think of syllogism: all men mortal

3) Not innate)
   " inborn) idea either. This could be accidental, dependent on quite individual chances valid under the hypothesis that the structure of a human or

animal consc. has just <u>these</u> and <u>those characteristics</u>
and could have also other ones.

4) then unity only hypothetically valid
but this " is categorically, apodicticly valid, a <u>categorical</u>
law a priori = being <u>prior</u>, earlier but <u>not in time</u>, valid
<u>beforehand without regard to</u> (?)
<u>logically a priori</u>, not earlier in time

5) It is accidental that our human <u>spatial order</u> has 3 dimensions
logically possible that 4 or 5 or 2 like insects
But not " " " we have 2 types of space not
<u>referable</u> to each other
Try to think it out: 2 different spaces nothing to do with each
other.

6) <u>One space</u>
One <u>time</u>

7) (Kant:) The fact "I think all this" must be able to <u>accompany</u>
all my ideas

8) That is not <u>explicitly</u> but <u>implicitly</u> the one I, one Ego
must always be there in our consc. even if explicitly
we are not aware of it.

9) Ego= Object ?

10) To <u>experience</u> anything means <u>manyfold material in form of
unity</u>
Always <u>multitude</u> of <u>contents</u>, of <u>material</u> of consciousness
unity of <u>form</u>
So one formal law of unity superior to all other laws
and a priori valid, categorically valid in all knowledge
and in all ethics

Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time
hold good as a principle of universal legislation.

leaves a deposit, amount of money with me, did not ask for a receipt.

No written document

My inclination, my duty

Only if I fulfill my duty, am I a man of good will.

Of good will, however, Kant says what Herbert J. Paton calls in a dramatic statement: It is impossible to conceive anything in the world or even out of it which can be taken as good without limitation save only a good will. Like a jewel shining by its own light, a thing which has its whole value in itself. Reverence (Achtung) for the law of duty = the motive, not an inclination. Because the moral act is not motivated by any inclination, and because the categ. imperative does not contain any concrete item determining the moral act, therefore the moral act is free, not determinated by any desire or impulse that could make us servile.

As you may have noticed, I have intentionally not given you a detailed list of literature on our subject. It is my ambition to enable you to read the works of the great and the minor modern moralists themselves. And it is a fact - a deplorable fact, but after all a fact - that the literature on the history of mod. ethics is not too good.

The literature on the history of modern epistemology
" " theory of knowlege

ranks much higher. Especiallt as far as our most complicated thinkers, Kant and Bentham, are concerned, not even the work by Tsanoff, the only volume I recommended you, seems to me satisfactory. So I must offer you here my own interpretation of Kant and Bentham as I developed this in 2 books of mine; and you are cordially invited to criticize my interpretation to your

heart's delight. But we always have to go back to the original works of past thinkers and not, e.g. to ~~their~~ Heidegger's Kant-interpretation. I know H. still enjoys an esp. high reputation despite his membership in the Nazi party. In Germany and France this is already over.

And now, as I have been asked to do so, let me give you a provisional list of all the thinkers and their works with which we will deal here in this winter course.

Otto Manty Zorn, 1938
T.K. Abbot, Critq.
J. W. Scott. Kant on the Moral Life.
Bentham: An Introd. to the Princ. of Morals and Legisl., printed in 1780, 1st. ed.1789, 2nd ed. 1822
A Fragment on Government, anonymously 1776

~~Or~~ French trad., religious ethics:

François Auguste Chateaubriand: Génie du Christianisme, 1802
Louis de Bonald: Pensées sur divers sujets, Oeuvres complètes, 1817-30, 1845 Vol.VI
Joseph de Maistre: Soirées de Saint Pétersbourg, 1821 (started in 1806)
Robert de Lamenais: Paroles d'un Croyant, 1834

Perhaps Louis Bautain: Philosophie Morale, 2 vol.1842
" Théodore Jouffroy: Cours du Droit naturel, 2 vols.1834

Auguste Comte: Cours de philosophie positive, 6 vols.1830-42
Victor Cousin: Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien, 1837
Charles Secrétan: la Philosophie de la Liberté, 1849
Emile Littré
Jules Simon LeDevoir, 1854
Claude Henri Saint Simon: Le nouveau Christianisme, 1825
Charles Fournier
Pierre Joseph Proudhon: Qu'est ce que la Propriété, 1840
Tschaadajew, Philos. Letters
Alexander Herzen
Bjelinsky
J.H.Bridges: A General View of Positivism, 1948, 1880, transl. by p.260ff, p.262."Substitution of Love of Humanity for Love of God"

William Blake: The marriage of Heaven and Hell, illustrated, 1793
Samuel Taylor Coleridge: The Friend, 1809 f. originally issues of a periodical, as a book 1812
Table Talk
John Henry Muirhead: Coleridge as Philos. 1930
Thomas Carlyle: Sartor Resartus, 1833f, 1838
On Heroes, Hero Worship and the Heroic in History, 1841

J.S.Mill: Utilitarianism in Dissertations and Discussions, 1859
Utilitarianism, 1861
On Bentham, 1838
James Mill: Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind

Perhaps John Ruskin, Unto this last, 1862

James Mackintosh: A Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philos. 1831
Dugald Stewart: Philos. of the active and moral powers, 1828
William Godwin: Enquiry concerning political justice and its Influence on general virtue and happiness, 1793
Benjamin Franklin: Poor Richard's Almanac
Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain, 1725, Repr. 1785 (?)
Thomas Jefferson
Benjamin Rush: The Influence of Physical Causes on the Moral Faculty, 1786

Perhaps William Ellery Channing: Memoir, 1848

Thomas Paine: The Age of Reason, 1794: Common Sense, 1776
Benjamin Rush: The Influence of Physical Causes on the Moral Faculty, 1786
Henry Thoreau: Walden or Life in the Woods, 1854
Richard Hildreth: Theory of Morals, 1844

Flowering of Metaphysics ethics

Solomon Maimon
Herder, Kalegione, 1800
Schiller
Franz Hemsterhuis
F.H. Jacobi: Allwin
Max Stirner
J. G. Fichte
Friedr. Wilh. Jos. Schelling
Georg Wilh. Fr. Hegel
Fried. Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher, Grundlinien, 1 Kritik d. bisherig. Sittenlehre
Ethik, 1812
Karl Christian Friedr. Krause
Henrik Steffens, Norwegian
Baader
Schopenhauer, 1819: Die Beiden Grundprobl. d. Ethik, 1841
Fundament d. Moral
Freiheit d. natl. Willen
Jacob Fried. Fries: Handbuch d. pr. Philos. 1818
Joh. Friedr. Herbart: Allg. prakt. Philos. 1808,
Lehrbuch z. Einl. d. Eth. 1813
Friedr. Ed. Beneke: Grundlag. z. Phys. d. Sitten, 1822
Grundlinien d. natürl. Systems d. prakt. Phil. 1837, 40
(Czech.) Bernard Bolzano: Lehrbuch d. Religionswiss. (anony.) 1834; 4 vols.
Ludwig Feuerbach: Sämtl. Werke, 1846, ed. by himself
Gustav Theod. Fechner: U. D. höchste Gut, 1846

Antonio Serbati Rosnini$: Filosofia del diritto, 1839
Pasquale Galluppi: Filosofia della volontà, 1846, half-Kantian
Giovanni Domenica Romagnosi: Assunto primo della scienza del diritto naturale, 3rd ed. 1832

Kierkegaard: Fear and Trembling, 1843
Elentheropulos, Makrakis
Jaime Luciano
Balniez, El critico, 1857

In textbooks popular, widespread, very simple expositions of K's ethics

Pure reason limited, no causality beyond the world of our senses
" immortality
" God

Faculty which just commands the cat. imp. of pract. read. does better.

Trivial, trite, hackneyed, redundant, tauntological, not worth pondering - - - Kantian language

Herbart: no simple faculties. Reason, will = complex

Nietzsche by virtue of intellect. virtue become virtuous

Axel Hägerström: Kant's Ethik, 1802 (1902?)

Kant: Critique, critical philos. not glamorous (Relig.i.bl.V) not roof first

demonstrate why cat. imp. valid against all dogmatism

Modern Engl. Philos.

You can't criticize a faculty, organ. It's there or not.
" can " achievements of what a faculty does, products of the faculty.
And that's, of course, what K. does

Now today we definitely have to conclude our thorny analysis of K's ethics and at least start with Bentham.
Not so silly as the procedure in one of Molière's comedies where the fact that popy makes you sleepy is explained by the

dormitive power of poppy.

To summarize: Why did K. set up such a cumbersome, vexatious and merely formal law of ethics as the categ. imp. Why did he not give some concrete rules of behavior such as the 10 commandments, thou shalt not murder - he was an avowed pacifist- not steal. Honor thy father and mother.

Explain this with or without reference to the unity of app.

Only strictly formal principles have an indisputable, incontestable, unshakable, unassailable validity

If we would take into account the permanently changing, shifting, varying, altering material, content of our thoughts, only maxims of (pursuit of) our changing desires, pursuit of changing pleasures

Old Stoic and Spinoza's teaching:

to rise above all our fickle and fleeting, fluctuating whims, impulses, capriceg

Mightiest sovereign tyrant indulging in all his uncontrollable passions, moods, not free, but poorest victim of his blind desires, playball of his arbitrary feelings.

Only he who paradoxically obeys the law of universal reason can free himself from the bonds of merely capricious action

autonomous, self-legislative

So Kant: Only reverence, esteem for law, apodictic law makes free, independent self-reliant

could exclaim: 2 things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them, the starry heavens above and the moral law within (Conclusion of Pract. Reason)

From this freedom there offers itself a limited outlook into a higher metaphy. world higher than anything science can experience.

No causality

Never certain that we fully complied with cat. imp. then we would be not only moral but holy. Therefore in an endless process opportunity to reach this perfect state of mortality.

Worthiness of happiness and actual happiness never identical.

God guarantor of it

to be believed, postulated, though never capable of scientific demonstration

Glauben, Belief and Knowledge

Differences d. F. u. Sch. system of phil.

Ub.d.verschiedene ways of treatment of natural law, 1803

Hegel: Jenaer Abhandl.

self-destruction - annihilation, own mullification

Help the poor

Love of enemy

Celebacy, neither moral nor immoral. Sidgewick: The methods of Ethics, A.D. Lindsay: Kant 1934

Rudeness, Making unhappy = Bolzano : Lehrbuch d. Religionswissenschaft, 1839

Older Diplomacy and general lying

Kant made a great number of further moves, to save the strict validity.

If oneself is cold, pitiless, not cooperative toward fellowmen one may need their help, = Appeal to self interest

Never means, only end in itself. Criminal executed, K. for execution. Member in a kingdom of ends.

End a priori = Rational idea of mankind

K = Great aim, great aspiration

Bentham too a strictly valid principle, to which everything "fastened" as to Unity of app.

J. S. Mill right. "The great critical thinker of his age and his country."

One of the greatest and most constructive representatives of Emr. enlightenment.

Completely untouched by the age of <u>political restoration and romanticism</u> following the French Rev. in Europe.

Many of his numerous radical suggestions for social and political reform have <u>come to be adopted</u> only now.

Essays on "Principles of Internat. Law" 1786-89 vol II

He recommended inthe 18th century

1. league of nations, as we have it now here in N.Y.
2. arbitral tribunal for the peaceful settlement of intern. disputes, as we have it in The Hague
3. Emancipation of women
4. " " colonies, special essay
5. Exclusion of corporal punishment in school discipline
6. Limitation of capital phnishment
7. Prevention of cruelty tow. animals
8. Inaugurator

Greatest reformer of English law.

Now today we must not look back to Kant any longer, only in connection with leading anti-Kantians such as Herder, Sal. Maimon, Benecke and Hegel we may briefly return to him. But now we must immediately leap to Jeremy Bentham.

What B's life-time? 1748-1832

Almost the age of another famous European: <u>Goethe</u>: 1749-1832

Kant about a quarter of a century younger, died about a quarter of a century earlier

What the major profession: Jurist, law reformer, political scientist

Admitted to the bar at Lincoln's Inn in London but never practiced law to the dismay of his ambitious father

Dissuaded his clients from going to court, or as he put it in the pictoresque language of his 18th cent. English: I found a course or 2 at nurse for me which I did my best to put to death.

Instead of practicing law, he went into writing on the philoss of law and had the fantastic idea he could earn a living that way and marry, something to which his father again objected

But he wrote indeed a youthful masterpiece, a slashing attack on the perhaps most widely read and respected English jurist of that epoch, on Sir Will. Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of Engl.

Only 7 pages comment of the introd. chap. in Frag. on Gov.

Sect 2 & 3 of Frag. on Gov. in Comment on the Commentaries, 1928.

My dear colleague, to whom incidentally I owe my being here with you also wrote a very attractive small book, The Ed. of Jer. Benth., 1931, covering ca. the first 3 decades of B's life and correspondence.

And does anyone know where the most detailed biogr. of B's later years is to be found? vol. X, first half of XI, Works, 1843

Now back to the first book anonymously publ. exactly in the year of the Amer. Rev. Considerable success. Jurists asked themselves: Who author of this work of a superior mind?

Lord Sheldon, Graphic report in preface of 2nd ed. of Fragm. 1828

House of the Hobhouses where I was there a guest

Extremely independen tmind he remained throughout his life.
Do you know ~~mx~~ of some of his radical sugg. for social and political reform came to be adapted only in the 20th century.
Introd. to the Princ. of M. printed in 1780, appeared in 1789
2nd enlarged ed. 1823.
Only few books publ. by himself later.
Traités de Législ. ed. by Etienne Dumont, formerly secretary of Mirabeau friends and students.
A Table of the Springs of Action, printed 1815, publ. 1817
Deontology or the Science of Morality, 1834. "In thy Holy Cross I glory - Not hurt each other. Limits of Jurispr. Defined.1945
Now concentrate on Intr. Not such a self-assured simpleton
Characterist. of Love of fun and superior self-irony. Dream,ca 1780
First mention of utilitarian, not J.S. Mill, not 1802 to Dumont or 1781, not later than 1780

Now after the 1st few sentences many moralists inclined to bang the book shut angrily

1. B's 1st statement implies that everything we do determined by pleasure feeling. In the case of the Martyr, self-tormentor it seems evident to Chesterton pain is preferred to pleasure (p.186ff) no pleasure-seeking. Prefers happiness to serve his cause to the end to the misery that would be caused by deserting it.
2. Utility principle. Indian,Aristippus, Democritus, Epicurus 2nd ed. great happi. principle in Cesare Beccaria, Claude Adrian, Hêlvetius, Joseph Priestley, oxygen 1774, David Hume. Difficult to find an author of 18th cent. apart f. Kant which not partially [utility principle]

3. In case of the criminal: Pleasure <u>not at all good</u> (p.211ff) Pleasure alright it it stood alone, bad because connected with painful consequences (chap.II, sect.4, Limits of Jur. Defined, 1945, p.115f

H. W. B. Joseph: <u>Some Problems in Ethics</u>, 1931. World worse because of criminal's pleasure

<u>Surgeon</u>: enjoys skill, enjoys unavoidable ~~xkx~~ pain of patient prefering it to <u>false sentimentalism</u>

<u>Schadenfreude</u>: Satisfaction, pleasure felt on account of the misfortune of others. Betrays the will to bring about suffering of others.

3. <u>Naturalistic Fallacy</u>

4. <u>The Right and the Good</u>

5. Dangerousness = Not usefulness of utility principle

6. <u>Trying</u> not ordering, impelling actions

Further <u>Indirect</u> proofs,demonstration of validity of great. happ.

<u>direct:</u> analysis of the elements of human action

<u>Indirect</u>:

xxxx Other principles ~~xhxpxixixx~~ do not work.

A. Asceticism, chap.II inconsistent

a) Christ. mystics: Pain valuable if brought upon us, not if brought upon others, hope of reward in life to come

b) Moralists (like Stoics) Pain = no evil therefore:may be approved but <u>need not be approved</u>

B. Sympathy - Antipathy chap.II, sect.14, note

<u>Moral sense</u>- Lord Shaftebury, Francis Hutcheson

Different moralist = different moral senses

<u>Common sense</u> (James Beattie, Thomas Reid) =

popular ed. of more aristocr. moral sense

Fitness = Samuel Clarke, C.D. Broad

a) ethical relation) The most fitting candidate for the
b) factual relation) Republ. but the least fitting candidate for the Democrats who are out to beat Republ. from the moral point of view

(Natural Justice , Right Reason, Natural Equity, Good Order,
(Natural Law , Law of Reason

William Wollaston

Kant: We ought to do what we ought to do, analyti..
synthet. Power Morality = the weaker has to serve
" " the equal of the stronger

see Comment on the Commentaries

Benjamin Franklin: A Dissertation. On liberty and Necessity.
Pleasure and Pain, Incl. for stealing a horse = truth too

9) Doctrine of the elect

10) Repugnancy to nature. Exposing weak children = frequent with Greeks and Romans = nd natural with Greeks and Romans

Chap. 7-12: Analysis of Elements of Acts

Motives:	Oxford	p. 119,	chap.	10	par.3,	sect.30	Ich	266
Dispositions	"	p. 131	"	XI,	par.1f		"	275
Sum of his main motives								
Intentions	"	p.93f	"	IX		" 15	"	253f
Conseq.	"	p.153f	"	XII	" 1	" 6	"	283f
"		p.157	"	XII		" 12	"	284
Measurement	"	p.29f	"	IV	sect.2to sect.4			
Def. of Ethics	"	p.310	"	XVII	par.1, sect.2-3f			

Ethics at large (sect.2) = law and ethics. OUr ethics = private ethics.

Intensity, Duration
Certainty - Uncertainty
Propinquity - Remoteness
Fecundity Purity
Extent

Now may I suggest that we no longer allow ourselves being swept away with indignation about Benth. or praise of him -- I will stop the praise - as far as possible - and you the indignation,

though it may be doubtful whether we both will succeed. Anyhow, let's settle down to analyze B's teaching without beginning with praise or blame. We are still with the case of the martyr.

In Chap. I, par.1, B. clearly says: Pleasure and pain govern us in all we do.... This evidently implies that even the martyr must seek his pleasure in following his course of action and exposing himself consciously to the punishment of death. Bentham did not teach that man always goes after <u>his own pleasure directly</u> and is unable to <u>make sacrifices for others</u> to be <u>unselfish.</u> But he insists even in unselfishness man must have an interest in unselfishness, a "self-interest in selflessness".

Selflessness must be more <u>attractive</u> to him than sheer selfishness.

No alledged identity of all interests of men. This Mill.

Now all pleasure in itself methodological abstract. from all other experiences ——— good / bad

all pain
<u>Criminal</u>

Now tonight we must march on -- at least in our 2nd hour -- from B. to the French traditionalists.

But first let us try to determine -- each of us --

1) whether the greatest happ. princ. is a <u>mere truism</u> because it seems evident that the ethical goal must always be the common good, the public welfare
2. or whether B.'s utility princ. is an <u>outrageous nonsense</u> -- as Mr. Los Santos thinks -- because Max Scheler seems to be evidently right: utility and pleasure seeking can only be the <u>lowest value</u> in any scale of values.

3. or whether B. is not somewhat more subtler, though his teaching may have to be very much refined today.

I. Most elementary objections to gr. happ. princ.

a. Man does not always desire pleasure

Nietzsche Sometimes pain = martyr

b. Pleasure not always good

Sometimes bad = criminal

II. Indirect proofs of the valid. of the maximisation.

It is a strange fact. At the close of the 18th cent. England and Germany gave birth to the fathers of modern ethical thought. But France, the country that took the most revolutionary action at that time produced in about the same years the most conservative moral theories. The most vitriolic attacks against the spirit of the French Revol. were directed by French speaking thinkers of that epoch, especially the two leading so-called traditionalists, both members of the higher nobility. Louis Vicomte de Bonald and Le Comte Joseph de Maistre, who was born in Savoy, and further the poet Francois Auguste Chateaubriand.

All these thinkers and their associates violently attacked the very principles of the French Rev. and of all secular ethics, to which K. and Benth. adhered.

In the 12 vs. of Bonald and in De Maistre's works and the 12 vs. of Chateaubriand, Bentham, as far as I noticed is never mentioned.

Only M.de Stael, who in some respect also belongs to this group of French thinkers, although he lived twice for some time in England, said that the early 19th century would later not be

called the time of Napoleon but that of Bentham.

Kant is, as far as I saw, only once named by Bonald and that very contemptuously. Bonald said that K.'s proof of the existence of God so weak that atheism did not even do him the honor to refute him.

But the command of God. Christian revelation is to all these thinkers the ultime point of reference in all their ethical arguments.

Theonomic, not autonomous ethics

Insistence on Autonomy is according to Chateaubriand lack of the basic ethical virtue# humility, humbleness.

Kant and Bentham contradict each other only within the framework of secular ethics.

These tradtitionalists contradict all the principles of secular ethics itself.

So the contrast between basic moral convictions and fundamental struggle of ethical ideas which we have followed up so far, was considerably enlarged by these French thinkers. And generally this has not been taken into account sufficiently.

I hope you will have noticed that, intentionally, I spent more than two thirds of our time on Kant and Bentham. For I believe it is of little use to race through the teachings of numerous thinkers without having some firm ground on which to build up one's knowledge.

The ethics of K. and Benth. are often said to be easy to understand. But I hope you have realized by now that this simplicity is deceptive. Their efforts to give secular ethics a firm basis to rest on are far more subtle than is generally realized.

I recently read in the N. Y. Times, which is certainly today politically the most informative newspaper in the world, but

culturally unfortunately, not always so instructive :"Americans must make money. This is their categ. imperative." I trust none of you would be able any longer to speak of Kantian ethics in such a loose and absolutely misleading manner.
Now we started last week to speak of a group of religious ethicists, the so-called traditionalists in France.

The main contrasts are these:

1. In secular ethics: Natural reliance on the power of human reason (human rationale), confidence in what the individual grasps as self-evident.
   In Theonomic ethics: This self-assuredness is called false pride, haughtiness, arrogance. Baader: emotions of self-intoxicated fools
   Chateaubriand: humility - basic intellectual and ethical virtue. Baader: admiration and reverence
   Baader: cogitor a Deo, ergo sum
   I and my thinking are nothing. I am created by God and exist only because I am sustained by him.
2. It is not the reasoning of the individual that primarily counts but the reasoning of the community and its elementary unit, its elementary cell, the family. Society, the community, not the individual is, as Bonald said, sole depot, the true repository, the very seat of moral judgment
3. Not reasoning at all, but "le pouvoir discretionnaire" intuitive sense of discrimination, nice perception, spiritual divination.

4. To Kant and Bentham the time in which they lived was an epoch of <u>decisive intell. progress</u>.
   "What is <u>Aufklärung?</u>" enlightenment
   To the tradi6ionalists <u>decay</u>. dissolution of all time-honored natural bonds in society. Wisdom of old infinitely superior to all new so-called intell. progress and ~~i~~tell. improvement.
   Bentham reference to wisdom of our ancestors, the <u>Chinese argument</u>.
   Bentham and Kant, too, some connection with the past.
   Bentham with Epicurus' hedonism, Kant with Stoicism.
   Bonald: Greeks <u>eternal infants</u> (éternellement enfants)
   De Maistre: "la menteuse Grèce" = <u>mendacious and audacious</u> Greece, <u>corrupters</u>
   Tschaedajew: Philos. Briefe: Greeks seducers of mankind
5. Progress to Eternal <u>Peace</u>: Kant, devils
   Zum ewigen Frieden
   Bentham: Principles of International Law
   De Maistre: War <u>divine ~~it~~ in itself</u>. <u>A law of the universe</u>. Perhaps the most passionate modern <u>eulogy</u> on war.
   Hangman, inquisition praised.
6. Bentham especially critical of the spirit of old and modern language, the <u>tyrany</u> of law, the <u>partiality</u> of law. <u>Father of semantics</u>.
   Bonald, de Maistre, Baader: Language = the <u>embodiments of deepest moral wisdom</u>. Even <u>etymological peculiarities</u> almost <u>sacro-sanct</u>.

Louis Vicomte de Bonald (1754-1840) resigned in 1792 before the

execution of Louis XVI from the official positions he held in Southern France, lived in exile in Constance and Heidelberg in Germany until 1797. Napoleon I is said to have been impressed by the stubbornness of Bonald's political anti-revolutionary convictions and tried to win him over. But Bonald served his country only later, espec. unto Louis XVIII who made him a member of the Acad. Française and a member of the French Upper House. As a Deputy of France he contributed decisively to the abolition of divorce in his country.

The sanctity of the family plays also in his ethics a major role. The triad of functions which are at work in the family, the function to be morally needed of

	also religi.,	politi.,country
father	God	King
mother	priests	nobility & administration
children	congreg.	people

Etymology taken from Leibniz, that can, können, King, Khan, or latin potestas, French pouvoir, pater, Engl. father means practically all over the globe the active will-power and executive power in country life.

Inequality of men = moral ideal

Pleasure = vulgar "Pensées sur divers sujets et discours politiques" : Le bonheur est vulgaire et familier. Il n'y a de noble que le malheur"
Misfortune and suffering = noble

Alphonse de Lamartine wrote an ode on Bonald under no minor title than "Le Génie". Religious conservatives like Paul Bourget, Maurice Barrès, but also such secular minds as Charles Maurras Georges Sorel.

Le Comte Jöseph de Maistre (1753-1821) born in Savoy, at that time an independent kingdom. After the occupation of Savoy by the French Revolutionary army, de Maistre fled to Lausanne, Switzerland, and then lived from 1803-17 as Ambassador of his exiled King Charles Emanuel IV at the Court of the Russian Czar Alex. I, trying in vain there to get some decisive help from the Russian sovereign for his monarch. Died politically embittered in Turin in Italy.

Les Soirees = evening talks between a count, a senator and a chevalier ranging permanently from discussions of the existence of God down to talks about the value of drinking tea or the delight in comic opera. But in the center nevertheless, religious and moral problems.

A voice in every human breast says "The Godhead has spoken, one must shut one's eyes and obey."

Man's cradle should be surrounded by dogmas.

Nothing more important than firm prejudices, his moral views should be formed before his reasoning power awakens.

The doubts of reason like annoying mosquitos
Reason can only chase them away and they will return
Only religion can kill them

Charles Baudelaire, the poet of Les Fleurs du Mal, called Maistre a veritable seer.

Alfred de Vigny, though not an uncritical admirer, a "prophetic tempest". About the end of the 19th century.

G. Sorel: Reflections sur la violence

The Abbé Louis Bautain: De l'enseignement de la Philos. en France, 1833: Desc. responsible.for the inauguration of modern atheism

Philosophie Morale, 1842: Only the highest creative power = God can be also the highest legislative power. Man nothing of his own. Maintain our nobility in thanking God for the noble nature he gave us.

To my special regret I was under considerable misapprehensions up to last week. I always thought that we would still have six hours on hand for our discussions. But I was told a few days ago that there will be no classes during the Midyear examinations.
So today we will have our last session in this term. I had planned to travel fast through our remaining material.
Still it would have been surface travelling. But now have to fly over our topics and I can offer only a bird's eye view.

This has many disadvantages but also one advantage. Probably you will see the general contrasts and connections between large trends of thought more clearly.
And, after all, if some of you plan to attend my course in the spring term, they will see that the problems we have to deal with today will turn up again in the ethical thought of the last century, in the period reaching from the middle of the 19th century to 1956.
In this epoch again there will be Kantians, Benthanites, metaphysical ethicists, avowed religious thinkers, positivists, eclectics and existentialists.
Now I have to mention only one religious thinker in France, first connected with the traditionalists but then separating from them and the Roman Church in general, Robert de Lamenais.
Robert de Lamenais, after the appearance of his I. work, Essai

sur l'indifférence en matière de religion, 1817-1824, was first hailed by French religious writers as "another Bossuet", the last of the Church fathers. But then, in his "Paroles d'un Croyant of 1834 he subscribed to at least some of the principles of the French Rev., "sanctified the barricades", as Baader said, "blessed" every soldier fighting tyranny and social injustice. Rejected by Rome, though now much of his program adopted by the Cath. Church.

Going from France to England

Edmund Burke (1729-1797), statesman, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790

raised his voice before Bonald, De Maistre

French Rev. thinks to fight human prejudices but it fights in truth against human nature

Not only the individual but past and future generations must be taken into account in shaping political and moral decisions.

intimate friend Goethes, Herders, great stylist, Fichte, J * Plato

Hamams, Joh.Georg (?)

F. H. Jacobi, in Glaub.& Wissen 1802, noch von Hegel Glaubens-philos., opened one of the greatest philoś. debates in German and European history

in Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn", 1785, 1789 (2)

Herder: Gott
Goethe
Lavater

Berufung auf Lessing

Mendelssohn * in bringing his MS to the printer

Irrational love higher than rational love

"I do not wish to be freed from dependence on love to be blessed only by the haughtiness of reason. If the highest thing in the world is a naked ego with its independence and liberty, then reason becomes to me a malediction and I curse my existence"

The heart, faith higher than understanding and reason.
Strong influence on Baader, though B. much richer and subtle in his thought. Influence even on Kierkegaard.
Baader, today veritable Renaissance in Germany and even in France 3 vs. explicitly based on my book
He too, opposed the French Revol. Üb. K's Ded.d.pr.V.u.d.absoluten Blindheit.
But wished to remain a true liberal. Problems of the working class in the beginning of industrial era more important than questions of the constitution of the state. More than 10 years bef. Communist Manifesto full freedom of assembly for proletar.
Philos. of mythology

Jaime Luciano Balmez (1810-48). Catalonian priest, prof. of mathematics in Barcelona, the most important Spanish thinker of the first part of the 19th century. El protestantismo comparado con el catolicismo, 1844; only catholicism principle of harmony in European civilization.
In his Filosofia fundamental, 1846, I saw mainly a type of medieval scholastic metaphysics a little modernised.
Also in his El criterio: Here too, theonomous ethics "In our inmost sould there shines an inextinguishable light which has been kindled by the hand of our Creator and this light makes us distinguish between good and evil".
Filled with genuinely perceptive psychol. and moral observations.

seems identical ("Pride contains malice and aggressiveness
(Vanity contains far more weakness

Piotr. Y. Chaadayev (1794-1856) Philosophical Epistles, 1829 in MS form distributed, "like a shot in a dark night" = Alex. Herzen Philos. of History. Russia's immature. Morality of ancient Greece, esp. of Homer education for vice opposed to ethics of Renaissance

and Protestanti. The ethics of the united medieval church = moral ideal. 4 new epistles recently in MS in Archives of Academy of Science in Moskow discovered.

William Blake: (1757-1827) The Marriage of Heaven and Hell.1793
So much hidden that they are generally not evaluated as such: the principles of master morality. of power formulated there, esp. in "Proverbs of Hell".

De Quincy: Confessions of an Opium Eater. 1822 . Murder as Fine Art.
Oscar Wilde. Alexander Bain
Stirner. Nietzsche George Sorel

Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) The Friend. 1809f, originally issues of a periodical, publ. in book form in 1812, Aids to Reflection. 1825. Table Talks: John Henry Muirhead: Col. as Philos. 1930.

Neben Bentham von J. S. Mill geehrt, Studied German metaphysicians, Schelling, Norwegian Steffens and Jean Paul

Ethics of Motives: (Muirhead p. 152f) Who would value love for the sake of services and not services for the sake of love? "Nab sees alone the outward fruit, But God" the inward spring.

Alessandro Manzoni (1785-1883) Author of "Promessi sposi"

Osservazione sulla morale cattolica. 1819, 1910

Catholic ethics wise by recognizing man's permanent search for happiness and even more so by drawing ~~d~~ the attention away from earthly happiness to one in the life beyond

Joh. Gottfried Herder (1744-1803)

Gott. 1787 = Spinoza's Eudaemonism

Kalligone 1800: Hypermoralization

Joh. Friedr. Schiller (1759-1805) Not Kant's methodology, only results

Uber Anmut u. Würde (On Grace and Dignity) 1793

Briefe über die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen, 1795

François Auguste Chateaubriand, Génie du Christianisme 1802,

vol. I. Humility, Faith, Hope, Charity

Joh. Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814)

From F. to (Schelling, Schleiermacher, Krause, Steffens, Schopenhauer) representatives of Philosophy of Identity

to Hegel a development of considerable inner logic

as from Locke to Berkely and Hume.

Very imperious, self-assured, domineering, passionately active, hot tempered personality. This reveals itself very strongly in his ethics. F. himself taught, "what a philos. one has depends on what a man one is." A philos. not a dead piece of household furniture whish one keeps or gives away. It is the living expression of a living and struggling human being. 1. Einl. in. d. W.

Kant, as you will remember, leads in his C. of pure reason only to the borderline between the world of observable phenomena and metaphy. In his Cr. of pure Reas., one might say, he just touched on and hinted at a world of metaphy. The ego which obeys a law of pure reason not subject to any inclination, is in fact, no longer an object of the empirical world but belongs to a metaphysicalY world of pure reason. Fichte, being an impulsive lover of speculative metaphysics did not want to heed K.'s many warnings against metaphys. teachings. No interest in a detailed study of Kr. d. r. Vern. So he argued: if there is an ego of pure practical reason, as he took for granted from K., must not this ego be considered the true metaphys. root of all existence?

This metaphys. Ego of K.'s Cr. of Pr. Reason, is, therefore, to Fichte, the true metaphys. source of all reality. All true

existence is thus, so to speak, nothing but this vast reservoir of moral universal power of a world ego.
Law of causality from one event to another
" " thing " "
The true metaphys. origin of all empir. things not another thing, not even a God but Tathandlung, original moral action.
So abundant that to reveal itself, to become manifest, it creates a hurdle for itself, an obstacle, a counterpart, a non-ego.
This the world. The world of our senses only material for our duty, material to exercise our moral power.
The material of the moral action such that by the infinite continuation of this action the empirical ego would become completely independent, absolutely free = 1798. Similarly Sittenlehre 1812.
Not satisfactory. But moral metaphysics one of the most grandiose attempts to link the finite world with the infinite.

Fried. Wilh. Joseph Schelling (1775-1854)
went in his metaphys. one step further. If the ego produces nature then nature somehow in the ego and this reflection lead to Spinoza's identity of ego and nature
thought and being
organic and inorganic world
subject - object
mind - matter
conscious - non conscious reality
body - soul

Only a few scattered, meager and quite unrevealing remarks on ethics in his works.

There are other German and a Norwegian metaphys. who took over.

New epoch, Spain, Belgium, Hungary

K. Chr. F. Krause (1781-1832): Vorles. üb. Grundwahrheiten d. Wissenschaft, 1829 (fundamental principles)

The 1 God - unity of Nature and Reason = Sphere of union,

out of which organically all other good can and should be explained and developed.

Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768-1834):

the highest good / absolute reality = identity / union of) reason and nature

In Draft to his Ethics 1812/13) Various empirical goods
) deducible by either an
Ethics 1814/16) "organizing"or a "symbo-
) lizing" method

If the organizing method is an identifying one

the ethical values of commerce, law, state

" " " " " an individualizing one

ethical values of property, free association (gen.society)

If the symbolizing method is an identifying one

Science, Faith, School

" " " " is an individualizing one

Feeling, Revelation, Church

Very vague, old Aristotel. belief that by a scheme, dividing a general concept into exhaustive subdivisions, you have scientifically explained the meaning and function of the concept.

Far more influential and valuable:

championship of emancipation of woman

Katechismus der Vern. für edle (noble) women, 1798

(Dilthey Leb. Sch. v. I, 1906, 1920) Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin, Vindication of the Rights of Women 1795-97

Covet the wisdom of men

Do not conclude a marriage which has to be broken and dissolved

Monologen, 1800: Every individual = 1 microcosm of the universe
mirror "
microcosm
fully develop what he is, his individuality

Georg Wilhelm Friedr. Hegle(1770-1831, died probably of cholera)
From the end of 18th century adherent of philos. of identity
But as he explained in the famous preface to Phen. of Mind 1807
written almost under the thunder of battle of Jena

Identity night all cows black

dialectical method
Not contradictory- i.e. absolute contrasts
Only contrary concepts, isolated elements of a larger whole

1. Phenomenol. Indi. changing free. Pleasure runs into necessity of world order, instead of sweet joy - bitter resistance. Lust und Notwendigkeit.
2. Indiv. free pleasure-seeking therefore changed into general necessary law of the indiv. heart. Against this

law of the individ. heart the laws of other ind. hearts	) The laws of the heart and the insanity of sheer individual ind. arrogance

3. General law of all hearts = virtue against the way of the world

The world not in such a bad way. Virtue in it embodied already

4. Making my virtue identical with devotion to a good cause in the world

" " " and the affairs of the world to become the same

5. Others have other causes
6. Only general law of morality for all within the general course of events.

Other more simplified and less psychologically grounded dialectical processes developed in Philosophy of Right, 1821, or more briefly in Outlines of an Encyclop. of phil. sciences, 2nd ed. 1827
With his extraordinarily fine historical sensitiveness 2 spheres
Motives-Conseq. united.

I Abstract formal Right - law - concerned only with consequences of action. Property - contract = Wrong-doing (fraud,crime)

II Morality only with motives, intentions, purposes

1. Purpose good - but responsibility Vorsatz-Schuld
2. Intention - welfare Absicht+d.Wohl
3. Conscience - coupled with genral good (Gute und Gewissen)

Ethical Life

Family-// Civil Society // State - single nation // world history

Norwegian Henrik Steffens (1773-1845)

Caricatures of the Holiest, Identity, but evil in it too

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860)

Identity but no longer, this metaphysical unity of phenomena, characterized as things and their metaphys. source

reasonable, the metaphysical = blind impulse,
" drive
" will (like late Schelling)

Only purpose to negate blind will

Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881)

Sartor Resartus 1833f, 1838

On Heroes, Hero Worship and the Heroic in History, 1841

Fichteaner

Christopher Jacob Boström

Human vetenskapssamt skrifter (posthumous 1916)

Grundlinien 1 philos. Systems 1923

Each human individual, so to speak, an idea of all reality, of God, and will find his ethical perfection and happiness in living fully out his potentialities as such a member of all metaphysical reality. "Concrete, positive rationalism", called by B. more Leibniz and philos. of identity than Kant.

Antonio Rosmini Serbati (1797-1855), priest. Trattato della concienza morale 1839. Sistema filosofico. 1850

The philos. syst. of A.R. by Thomas Davidson 1882

May be called a mixture of scholasticism with philos. of identity in the service of religious belief in revelation and in the perfect man, Jesus Christ (Sist.214) In the merely philos. part of the system (which calls itself a kind of introd. to the teaching of revelation) it is stressed that morality always concern the consideration of the whole of reality = 221 and the adequate estimate of every real entity = 203

Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-52), theologian and statesman, Del Buono. 1842. Origin of the good is L'ente, true reality, God which created all l'esistente. The moral imperative to be deduced from l'ente.

37a

William Ellery Channing, Memoire, 1848

American "Schleiermacher". If we explore man to determine "likeness to God". From elightenment to transcendentalism

Joh. Friedr. Herbart (1776-184..)

Allgem. prakt. Philos., 1808 Lehrbuch z. Einl. in d. Phil. 1813

S. Ideen: Innere Freiheit, Wohlwollen, Recht, Equity
Inner freedom, Perf., benevolance, the Right and the Equitable

Steinthal perfection
(1781-1848)

Bernard Bolzano, Czech. Logician. Lehrbuch d. Religionsw.1834, vol. I

Catholiz. and Eudemonism

Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) Handbuch d. prakt. Philos.

Vernunft says what is good. Religion highest aim: inner tranquility

Eclectics

Salomon Maimon (1753-1800), von Kant und Fichte. Schiller und Goethe
Versuch einer neuen Darstellung des Moralprinzips u. Deduction seiner Realität, 1794 (Attempt at a new exposition of moral...)
Critical Investigations into the Human Mind, 1797

Victor Cousin (1792-1867), Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien, 1837.
"Lectures on the True, Beautiful and Good,"by O.W.Wight, 1893, 1852, historian of philos.
Influenced by Schelling and Kant and Scottish School who wrote a preface to Hubert Beckers' transl. of Cousin's Schrift on Germ. and French Phil. in Fragments philos.

Apriori= innate concepts with Thomas Reid "la raison comme une faculté du vrai, du beau et du bien"

Theodore Jouffroy (1796-1842) Cours du droit naturel, 1834
Natural law and religion. Man has innate consciousness of self-perfection. Psychology free of metaphys. teaches us this. But religion too desirable.

Charles Secrétain (1815-95) La philos. de la Liberté
"Absulute will" "I am what I want to be" But truly free only by love of God (Lecture 20f)

William Godwin (1756-1836) Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness, 1793. Natural law and hedonism

James Mackintosh A dissertation on the progess of Ethical Philos. 1831. Against Benth; heart = seat of virtue and religion. Nevertheless pleasure-seeking not illegitimate. Von Guyan indukt. Jodl dedukt.

Dugald Stewart Philos. of the active and moral Powers, 1828
Moral feelings = half intyuitiv innate, half acquired

Empiricism

Benjamin Franklin Autobiography 1868 Rules of Conduct

Fried. Edward Benecke (1798-1854) Grundlag. z. Physik d. Sitten

Grundlinien des natürl. Syst. d. prakt. Phil. 1837-40, vol. I

Bentham Traités

Scale, gradation of goods or values. Mere experience shows pleasure of eye and ear higher than that of lower senses more happiness better than less happiness. Social welfare morally more important than indiv. welfare.

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) Sämtliche Werke, ed. W. Bolin and Jodl, 1903-11, v. X, 1911

Ethics = empirical as much as medicine. Mutual happiness in sexual desire

Virtue = one's own happiness in alliance with that of others. Duty commands pleasure. Negation only exception

Conscience is the violated and wounded desire for happiness of another person raging and gnawing in my own bowels (Ardigò)

Gustav Theod. Fechner (1801-1887) Über d. h. Gut, 1846

Maximum of happiness = high aim

(2)

Max Stirner (1806-56) Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, 1845

August Comte (1798-1857) Cours de Philos. positive, 6 vs. 1830-42

A General view of Posit., transl J.H.Bridges 1848

Seat in the Head. Altruism not checked by self preservation would be destructive, deprived of proper guidance.

Richard Hildreth (1807-1865) Theory of Morals, 1844

James Mill (1773-1836) Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 1829. Fragment on Mackintosh, 1835 . Associations of pleasure with all the pleasurable feelings of a fellow creature

Giovani Domenico Romagnosi (1761-1835) Assunto primo della scienza

<u>del diritto naturale</u>. 3rd ed. 1832

Unnecessary to explore true substance, Empirical "feeling for the other".

History of Modern Ethics

Part II of
Lectures prepared by D.B. for Columbia
University, but never given

Typed pages 1-100
(typed by U.F. 1968)

As you will have learned from the Information Bulletin, this course is meant to be a <u>continuation</u> of a previous one in the winter session. But I plead that none of the newcomers be afraid of that. Whether we like this or not, we have to go back, though of course not in full detail, to thinkers of the early 19th century.

We have to do this at least for two reasons

(1) "<u>repetitio est mater studiorum</u>". Repetition is the mother of all study and this is valid also for those who attended the winter course. And

(2) what is far more important - in the last century we meet again and again with <u>followers</u> and even a good deal of <u>ardent disciples</u> of philosophers of the early period.

There are in all countries of Western civilization:

<u>Neo-Kantians</u>: Charles Renouvier, Cohen, Herbert J. Paton

<u>Benthanites</u>: 2 Mills, Hildreth

Neo-<u>Hegelians</u>: William Wallace, Hutchenson Stirling (<u>The Secret of Hegel</u>, 1865) Bernard Bosanquet

Thomas Hill Green, F.H. Bradley, Edward Caird (<u>Evol.</u> of Religion)

Henry Brokmeyer, William Torrey Harris, Denton J. Snider (<u>Social Institutions</u>, 1901), <u>Journal of Speculative Philos</u>. 1867

Marx, Lassale

Adherents of <u>Fichte</u>: Carlyle, Maire de Birk Biran called by Victor Cousin the French Fichte, Hugo Münsterberg, (<u>Philos. d. Werte</u>, 1908,1921)(1863-1913), Charles Secrétan

<u>Arthur Schopenhauer</u>: Eduard v. Hartmann 1842-1906, Philipp Mainländer 1841-76, Julius Bahnsen -1881

Jacob Friedr. Fries (1773-1843): Leonard Nelson, Kr. d. p. V., 1917

K. Chr. Fr. Krause (1781-1832): Heinrich Ahrens (Paris-Bruxelles) Ungarn, Cours de droit naturel 1838

G. Tiberghien Esquisse de philos. morale, 1854

J. Sanz del Rio -1869

Max Stirner, Nietzsche, Oscar Wilde

Master-morality Will Blake

Alex. Bain partly in polemics against F. H. Bradley, see Bain: Dissertations on leading philos. topics, 1903

Now to have our general setting straight:

We started with the 2 thinkers, whom I should like to call the masters of the methodology of secular ethics, Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham. When did they live? Both of them, you will remember, made decisive efforts, to find a firm basis for all valid moral judgment.

Kant saw this basis in the motive which impels man to act or in the consequences of the act? Bentham?

But both what in common? Foundations of secular ethics

In contrast to this, French ethics in opposition to the principles of the French Revolution based all valid moral judgment on what?

Who are these thinkers? Bonald and De Maistre

Now, again we may say, even this religious and secular ethics have something in common, namely they both try to provide the basis for the validity (to prove the validity) of the ideals of the Judeo-Christian, Buddhist and Chinese tradition: namely to prove that generosity, benevolence, kindness and altruism, are the highest moral values.

But if we want to understand the whole of the develop. of mod. ethics, we have to enlarge once more the horizon of ethical

problems. In which way? Any overemphasis on Altruism, Selflessness = according to Nietzsche "Zur Genealogie d. Moral" = fixed idea "eine fixe Idee". The self should be maintained in every good action, not denied.

Strength, power, vitality.

Along with these arguments of power-morality (master-morality) go to a certain extent the various moral concepts of the ethnological school in ethics.

Theodor Waitz, generally counted among the adherents of Joh. Friedr. Herbart: Anthropologie der Naturvölker, 1859: I think in East Sudan: Good to take the wives of others. Bad to be deprived of one's wives by someone else.

Adolf Bastian (1826-1905)

partly Wilh. Wundt

Edward Westermark, in Helsingfors

Emile Durkheim

Lucien Lévy Brühl

Now, quite a lot ofpeople may say, we cannot take the whole master-morality seriously and we think the ethical ideas of primitive man are irrelevant.

To us only the ethics of love and altruism can count

We may admit that this ethics of the great world religions can be based on religious revelation or these ideals of selflessness and kindness can be taught on a purely secular basis.

But no other system of values than that of love as supreme value can be valid.

But people who argue this way, forget that in the political life of great and small nations, in fact, power politics and not the Jewish-Christian teaching of love of one's enemy is practiced.

And even in the life of the individual it seems to me very impor-

tant to see how far power and strength count even there and not only love.

So I want to read to you now some passages from a poet, painter and thinker, who, I think, has rightly been called an advocate of power morality and even a kind of forerunner of Nietzsche (Rudolf Kassner: Die Kunst, die Mystik u.d. Dichter, p.50; Heñene Richter W.B. 1906, p.67) namely William Blake.

Many analysts of Blake's works deny this. One of his biographers, Alexander Gilchrist, even reports that in the middle of the 19th century James Smetham and others regarded Blakes's philos. reflections, I quote "rather as we regard the gentle or exalted incoherences of a dear friend". Still often Blake is appreciated only as the author of sweet, pleasant poetry and the sweet painter of angels and other divine and etherical appearances.

But please judge by yourselves a few quotations from W. Blake's The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, written about 1793, perhaps 1790 already, which the poet Algernon Charles Swinburne called about the greatest book of"the 18th century in the line of ... spiritual speculation".

I have intentionally made you acquainted with these ethical phantasies of Will. Blake, because I think it is important that you never take the term "ethics" in too narrow a sense as is done far too often. If as you can very frequently hear, all main moral probl. are, in fact, solved since the days of Adam; and the main thing is only that we act morally according to principles definitely fixed since the creation, then why do we sit here?

There are groups of ethicists in France, Engl. and Germany who are especially interested in the psychological question of whether our basic moral ideas are inborn, innate in the human mind or acquired, slowly developed by experience of individuals

and societies

1) those who assume that the fundamental concepts of morality are innate are representatives of the ? intuitive

gained by observation and experience

2) Now those moralists who believe in moral ideas inherent in all human thought generally couple this belief with the conviction of the universal validity of these ideas. They suppose without hesitation that if an idea is inborn it must be also of necessity absolutely valid. Is this belief correct? : Innate conviction concerning the truthfulness of all sense-perception for "every human being that enters this world"

Tonight we can fortunately start with comparatively simple questions. There are in the development of modern ethics numerous thinkers whom I called eclectics in the short bibliography of which you have I hope already received copies or can receive them now from the Office of the Dep. of Phil. in Philosophy Hall. With the exception of they are on the whole somewhat dull figures. But the picture of the history of modern ethics would be not correct if I would not sacrifice them at least one evening.

I called these philos. eclectics because they mix (or combine) two or even more basic principles in their ethical teaching. For instance, the Kantian principle of stern duty with the promotion of happiness, or what is most frequent some secular with some religious principles, or the intuitive with the inductive method. We can, of course, deal here only with a small select number of these eclectics. And the same applies to the perhaps even larger group of ethical empiricists or ethical positivists who emerged

everywhere in Western civilization from the early 19th century to the present day. There are however, among the positivists, several rather different nuances of teachings.

Connected with the name of Darwin ? Evolutionary Ethics Spencer -- Durkheim -- Levy Bruhl -- Westermark; the youngest group of positivists in Europe and in this country calls itself how? Logical pos. or Vienese circle, Carnap, Reichenbach, A.J. Ayer, Bertrand Russell. These log. posit. are generally far more radical in their ethical teachings than the posit. of the 19th century.

Now please let me not forget to ask you concerning all our sessions. Whenever you see difficulties in what I try ~~f~~ to develop or whenever you wish to add something of your own, please let me know. I wish you to feel quite free and at ease in our discussions and speak out quite frankly any criticism ~~mf~~ or any other misgivings inquirings you may have.

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As I have already said these eclectics and the positivists of the 19th century fortunately do not present too many difficulties. But, unfortunately, their teachings are not too satisfactory either. Nevertheless I want and must also make you acquainted with less convincing, less gratifying types of ethics.

Let me mention, first, a so-called half-Kantian, Halb-Kantianer, as the Gemmans call these thinkers, a man who is very little known now, though Kant himself and Fichte, the poets Schiller and Goethe and others thought once very highly of him. Kant called him <u>once his mostxxxxx acute critic</u>.

This philosopher was a real <u>vagabond</u>, a type <u>almost without another example</u> in modern history. For years he really made his

living begging from town to town as a tramp.
He was born in the Polish Ghetto, named himself after the great Jewish thinker of the early Middle Ages, and told the story of his life in a memorable work of general cultural interest transl. also into English.
At 11 years married. Spanking at the hands (of mother-in-law)
Then fled from Poland to Germany and Holland, was at the brink of suicide until he finally gained the esteem of leading thinkers and men of letters of his time.
With special acuteness Maimon stressed the fact that Kant no deduction of the validity of his merely formal categ. imp.

? what formula?

Great efforts to supplement by some other principle, even the legitimate pursuit of happiness.
But this combination would not do. He seemed to have realized this himself at the end of his life.

Then among these ecletics to be mentioned a number of French thinkers once very influential at least in France: Victor Cousin historian and philos. , "Du Vrai" 1837, tr.1852 and later.
And Théodore Jouffroy, Cours de Droit naturel, (Course on Natural law) 1834.
To these may be added Jules Simon and Bersot or Saisset whose works were published after the middle of the 19th, therefore not mentioned in my first bibliogr. Jules Simon and his very much read Le Devoir (The Concept of Duty) which appeared in 1854 and in many later editions, was like Cousin politically active in several French governments.
All these French eclectics speak of inborn, innate ideas of

morality in us.
But they think in addition to this that this secular belief should and can be strengthened by religious belief.
Jules Simon in Le Devoir 1854, e.g. simply states that there are basic ideas of justice and morality inherent in our spirit. But ultimately this idea of "la justice éternelle, obligatoire, universelle repose en Dieu" (ultimately the idea of an eternal, obligatory and universally valid justice has its seat in God).
Victor Cousin and later Charles Renouvier interpret Kant's practical reason also as "la faculté du bien .. dans notre esprit" and he identifies Kant with Thomas Reid's common sense.
Would you aggree that K's pr.reason means simply such an inborn faculty offering us such ready made ideas about morality?
Kant rejected Francis Hutcheson's moral sense explicitly and would also that of Thomas Reid.
In any case these French eclectics Cousin, Bersot, Saisset, also called spiritualists and Jouffroy definitely wish to enlarge even the foundations of their ethical teaching by religious beliefs rather different from Kant's mere postulates.
Similarly the Swiss Charles Secrétan †1895, La philos. de la Liberté, 1849 and later ed. 1879 assumes an innate feeling of free will to chose the moral good, I am what I want to be,with the belief that true liberty to be found finally only in the love of God.
In earlier English literature eclecticism existed even between the intuit. and induct. school. There is to be mentioned Dugald Stewart: Philos. of the active and moral Powers of Man 1828
James Mackintosh: Dissertatinn on the Progress of Ethical Philos. 1830/31

Dug. Stewart speaks (Works VI p.213) of "implanted moral faculties" but (p.229) he adds, "the power of adventitious causes that is of ideas inductively acquired .. is so great that there is perhaps no particular practice which we may not be trained to approve or to condemn." And in his Philos. Essays, 1810, he goes so far as to say that some moral "principles arising from circumstances in which all the situations of mankind must agree are to be regarded as part of human nature no less than the instinct of suction." (Part II, essay 1, chap. VI)
But if this is so if ideas inductively gained by experience and training can become as much an "essential of our nature as the implanted instict of sucking, what then of a basic difference between the intuitive and inductive schoal in ethics?

James Mackintosh vigorously criticized by James Mill in his A Fragment on Mackintosh, 1835, p.306: "Religion and morals place the seat of virtue in the heart,.. the amiable temper". But he too grants Bentham that entirely empirical feelings of pleasure may legitimately determine the course of an ethical act.
So Fried. Jodl in his Gesch. d. Ethiek 1912 could count him among the representatives of the intuitive school, of the inductive school.... Jean Marie Gujan in his La morale anglaise contemporaine, 1879

But if such quite opposite classifications can be rightly made by two able historians of phil. the suspicion is, I think, justified that the whole difference between the intuitive and the inductive doctrine in ethics is not too clearly marked and is certainly today of almost no relevance.

In Roberto Ardigo Harold Hoffding: Ethik 1888
G. Heyman's: Einf. in.d.Ethik auf Grundlage d.Erfahrung,1914
E. Mack, Erkenntnis und Irrtum 1905

In this country
William Ellery Channing and his Discourse "Likeness to God" 1828, may be called eclectic.
You may look up this discourse best now in my colleague Joseph Blau's ed. American Philosophical Adresses. 1946. So it would certainly be preferable to insert this more modern reference in you list.
Channing explicitly states there that God "dwells in us" and therefore we can rely on inferring from our very nature the essence of what is ethical and what not.
Such reflections can, I think, quite properly be called an eclectic combination of empirical and religious motifs in ethics.

Even more markedly is such an eclecticism in the ethics of the great Czech Logician Bernard Bolzano. In his Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschat (Manual of the philos. of religion) 1834 he insists on the indispensableness of revelation and at the same time admits that our own empirical nature can teach us: the greatest welfare of all must be the genuine aim of all morality

The German Jacob Friedrich Fries does not basically refer to revelation in his Handbuch d. prakt. Phil. 1818, bu he, too, thinks that religion could and should adquately supplement our natural a priori insights into the essence of good and evil. Only a philos. of relig. or "Weltzwecklehre", a metaphys. interpretation of the ~~zuzk~~ total aim of being can teach us that the highest eternal good is life which has its value in its own genuine beauty.

Tonight, fortunately, we still have to deal with comparatively simple, elementary questions.

Last week ww had just started to discuss Heymann (or Hermann) Steinthal and we should continue this now, at least quite briefly. St. is not on your list because his main ethical work was published only in 1885, that is <u>long after the time limit</u> of this bibliogr.
But as St. considered himself very much <u>of an adherent</u> of Herbart we'd better <u>insert</u> him here.
Now Herb. was dissatisfied with the formalism of K.'s cat. imper. He too wished to establish strictly valied, absolutely universal principles of ethics, principles which are logical presuppositions of all valid moral thinking. But H. wished to present somewhat less formal principles than the cat. imp. And he thought that he could name five such principles which are quite universally valid, a priori valid, and yet somewhat more concrete than K.'s supreme law of morals.
Does someone remember

1) Inner freedom
2) perfection
3) benevolence
4) the right (Recht)
5) and the equitable (Billigkeit)

St. in his <u>Allg. Ethick</u> 1885 adopted this scheme, these 5 ethic. principles with only minor modifications.

(Tonight, fortunatly, we still have to deal with comparatively simple, elementary questions. We had just stated to discuss Steinthal and ~~should~~ continue this now)
<u>Joh. Friedr. Herbart</u>, a very influential German educationalist, FINALLY, MAY BE NAMED AN ECLECTIC IN a somewhat different regard. In his <u>General Practical Philos</u>. (Allg. Prakt. Philos.) 1808 and his <u>Lehrbuch z. Einleitung in die Philos</u>.(Introd. to Phil.) 1813, he emphasizes that K.'s merely formal law of morals will certainly not do. Nevertheless he thinks that there are <u>5 less for-</u>

mal concepts a priori at our disposal. It is a priori evident in his opinion that these 5 ideals: inner freedom, perfection, benevolence, the right and the equitable are basic moral principles.

But then Herbart, too, admits that even these 5 a priori concepts are not sufficient to enlighten us in any concrete case.

Our "heart", too, along with empirical observation must be consulted, if we want to apply a priori ideals to concrete life.

Schopenh.: Herb. had brains but used them wrongside out, inside out.

Chaim Heymann Steinthal, one of the founders of mod. ethnological psych. and leading in German philos. of language still in 1885, in his General Ethics (Allgemeine Ethik) adheres to Herbart's 5 ethical ideals a priori with only minor modifications.

But he makes good for that by a considerable number of fine and instructive empirical observations in the application of these 5 very abstract concepts. St., e.g., stated already quite clearly what often is regarded as an original idea of a later moralist and is more vaguely indicated in earlier literature, namely the fact that objects of the agreeable and useful are generally destroyed by the enjoyment while intellectual goods remain untouched and can often please a great multitude of people at the same time. Also St.'s remarks on law and morality are still quite instructive. Law only the bank of the river morality, though often in turn influencing the course of the river.

Among the philos. eclectics ["Grandseigneur sansculotte"
Get up M. Le Comte, you are destined to do great things today.]

Even such French socialists as Claude Henri, Comte de Saint Simon, in his Nouveau Christianisme, 1825 stresses on the one hand the necessity of exploring social facts but on the other hand, he lets the conservative partner in a dialog explicitly refer to God and his church which already demanded throughout the ages the improvement of the conditions of the workers and all the poor.

And Pierre Joseph Proudhon in his De la Creation de l'ordre dans l'humanité, 1843 demands recognition of social empirical facts and at the same time respect for an eternal and absolute law of morals in all his ethical discussions.

Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) Autobiography ed. by John Bigelow, 1868, Rules of Conduct. Of all the well known reflections on ethics in modern times, there are perhaps none more homespun, plain and unsophisticated than these rules. Does anyone know the 12 virtues which he especially wished to cultivate
1) Temperance, 2) Silence 3) Order 4) Resolution 5) Frugality 6) Industry 7) Sincerity 8) Justice 9) Moderation 10) Cleanliness 11) Tranquility 12) Chastity

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EMPIRICISM OR POSITIVISM IN ETHICS

A very powerful trend observable in the whole history of ideas: That ethical methodology which in the build-up of ethical beliefs is determined ~~b~~ to rely exclusively on data or concepts or facts accessible by immediate experience.

But it is amazing and very instructive to see how many rather different details were unearthed by this one and the same method.

Friedr. Eduard Beneke (1798-1854) Grundlegung z. Physik der Sitten 1822; Grundlinien des nat. Syst. d. prakt. Phil.

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1837, v. II, 1840. p. 40, vol. II Special moral teachings, III law Scale, "gradation of moral goods or values"

1) Mere experiences show that pleasure of the eye or ear higher thanthat of lower senses
2) More happiness morally better than less happ.
3) Social welfare morally more important than merely indiv. welfare

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Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72) Sämtl. Werke, ed. Wilhelm Bolin and Friedr. Jodl, 1911, v. X; Ethical Fragments (1850-70)
Started as an adherent of Hegel but then became one of the most important or, perhaps the most influential German leader in the revolt against German metaphysics about the middle of the 19th century. Influenced for a short time the socialists Karl Marx and Friedr. Engels and many other members of the intellectual movement which called itself Young Germany. Essence of Christend. 1841; Essence of Religion 1848/9

a) In his ethical fragm. he insists that ethics must be as empirical, built up on pure experience, as medicine
b) Fought against all as he called them "bloodless", anemic, "abstract", "ghostlike" ideas such as doing one's duty in ethics for duty's sake unswayed by any inclinations, purely rational conscience.(Who: Kant colosus as Scheler)
c) "Duty demands enjoyment. Renonciation, asceticism and self-denial are only regrettable exceptions to the rule"
d) "Conscience is the violated and wounded desire for happiness of another person, a desire of a fellowman raking and gnawing in my own bowels" (likes graphic language)
e) Virtue is one's own happiness in alliance with that of others.

Gustav Theod. Fechner (1801-87): Discoverer of the Fechner-Weber law that intensities of perceptions grow in proportion to logarithm of intensities of the irritation in the senses.
Über d. höchste Gut (On the greatest Good) 1846; maximum of pleasure. Hope of a time when asceticism and monasteries unnecessary. The arts will be sanctified.
Roberto Ardigó similar attitude toward ascetic Christendom

Is this consistent sound psychology?

Max Stirner (1806-56) D. Einzige und sein Eigentum (The Ego and His Own) (The unique Ego and his property, what he owns) 1845, tr. by Steven Byington, N. Y. 1907. Transl. into French (2) Danish, Russian, Spanish (2), Dutch, Engl., Ital.
Empirical Observation of ~~tr~~ the facts of life justifies only Extreme Egoism and Anarchism and Stirner's work represents perhaps the most radical program of an ethics of complete egotism and total, pure self-regard. Nietzsche is infinitely more constructive and even idealistic.
Stirner argues that up to now all revolutions in theory and practice have only supplanted one idol by another one.
They demanded ~~xxxxx~~ instead of the worship of God, the worship of Humanity; instead of the adoration of Christ the adoration of an abstract ideal of Virtue; instead of a King or an emperor some other chief of state or some other collective authority.
But Stirner exclaims: Away with all these ghosts and idols

Away with all knee-~~xxxx~~ bending before any authority. ~~Xx~~ Stirner starts his book right away with some often quoted outbursts of indignation: How many things are said to be my concern! Justice, truth, my country, all my fellowmen and 1000 other things should be my concern.
Only I myself should never be my concern! How absurd!

I do not care even for <u>good and evil.</u>
I myself am neither good nor evil. ~~It~~ I will care only for myself.
This sounds very consistent and in its <u>consistency</u> quite <u>alarming</u>.
But could you say why it is neither so consistent nor so alarming?
There is some truth in it. <u>Bentham</u>, Aug. <u>Comte</u> and very many other moralists fought for the partial moral recognition of self-regarding interests.
If I would <u>not care</u> at all for myself, I would soon <u>no longer</u> be able to <u>care for others</u>.
But <u>Hillel</u> What kind of a creature am I then?
If I would care <u>only for myself</u>, I would <u>not serve this way myself best</u>. I would become only a puppet, a ball for the play of my own <u>unruly</u> passions. I would try to rule everything but could not rule myself, could not <u>master</u> my own more and more <u>blindly demanding emotions</u> which would, in the end, completley tyrannize me, my own <u>self</u>. I would thus no longer give the <u>appearance</u> of a <u>mighty, free, sovereign being</u>, but only the <u>picture</u> of a <u>helpless slave</u>, the most <u>miserable</u> slave, a slave in the hands of <u>his own uncontrollable wild desires</u>; not a proud <u>sovereign of his own fate</u> but only an <u>arrogant</u>, tyrannical and yet <u>helpless child</u>.

In contrast to <u>Stirner</u>, that <u>enfant terrible of radical ethical</u> empiricism, August <u>Comte</u>, (1798-1857) the founder and leader of French positivism in the 19th century is a far more moderate and poised thinker.
<u>Cours de philosophie positive</u>, 6 vols. 1830-42
<u>Discours sur l'esprit positive</u>, 1844 (<u>The positive philos. of A.C.</u> by Harriet Martineau, 1853 neben Jules Rig
In his whole system of phil: 3 epochs: Theological (in religious terms), Metaphysical (abstract), Emphasis on scientifically established facts. 6 sciences leading from <u>elementary abstract mathe-</u>

matics to the more and more complex sciences: Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Sociology.

Comte's Ethics is to be found espec. in v. IV of Cours de phil. posit., mainly under the title "Physique sociale"

Egoistic and social feelings are both factual elements of all our conscious life, though social interests often weaker.

But self regarding emotions are also especially needed.

Without them our moral nature would not be improved by destroyed. Men would ruin each other if there were only blind egoism. But also blind altruism not checked by the impulso to self-preservation would be destructive. We need the guidance of social and selfish interests.

Herder: If there were only altruism in human nature, all of us would be only patients and nurses in a great hospital

Pinnacle of positivism reached when Comte, by reference to the phrenology of Gall, assures us that any ethics of egoism can be simply refuted by the fact, that along with a special point in the human brain where the selfish impulses are located, there is another point which is the seat of the self-less impulses.

In his later writings

Systeme de Politique Positive, 4 vs.1851-54
Calendrier Positiviste
Catechism Positiviste, 1852

Comte developed his positivism into a veritable secular religion. The concept of God is there replaced by that of humanity which he called le Grand Être. The days of the year are named not after saints but after discoverers and great men of science.

The motto of the Systeme de Politique Positive is L'amour pour principe
et l'ordre " base
le progrès " but

Other moral slogans of Catechisme positive are Vivre pour l'autrui, ed. 1891, p.30; Ne faire rien qui ne soit avouable, ed.1874,p.299f

In these later writings, perhaps under the influence of his friend Clotide de Vaux, C. also wished that masculine intelligence should in the end, be subjected to feminine tenderness. And how strong the altruistic impulses were in Comte himself, you may perhaps infer from the fact that he suggested for the positivistic society of the future 84 holidays per year. If this is not benevolence I don't know what else deserves the name. If I remember rightly these are more holidays than in Thomas Morus Utopia (6 hours per day) 1516

" Campanella Cieri Solis, City of the Sun, 1612

Pierre Lafitte (1823-1903), the most faithful French adherent of Comte

Emile Littré (1801-81), author of the Dictionnaire de la langue française (1863-69) did not subscribe to the later teachings of Comte and emphasized far more than Comte himself the relativity of moral judgments in various epochs, and individuals; s. his essay "Des origines organiques de la morale", 1870

Richard Congreve (1818-99)
Frederick Harrison (1831-23) } represented 2 rival congregations of English positivists

John Henry Bridges: Disc. sur l'esprit posit. engl. (?)

Richard Hildreth (1807-1865) a Boston lawyer was up to a few years ago remembered only as the author of a History of the U.S. and a novel. This novel Archy Moore, later entitled The White Slave became the forerunner of all similar anti-slavery literature. But now his philos. writings, too, are somewhat more appreciated

Theory of Morals 1844
" of Taste
" " Politics

H.'s Theory of Morals does not delve into all the real subtleties of Bentham's methodology. But some main points of a consistent utilitarian ethics are here grasped quite well.

I will mention only one observation of this kind: H. obviously

rightly thought that one of the reasons for the most widespread rejection of pleasure and happiness as a criterion of morality was obviously the distrust in the objectivity of all our feelings. Feelings seems to be merely subjective. Abstract concepts seem to guarantee a far greater objectivity. The same objection haw been made for a long time to the objective validity of sense perceptions.

Still Kant had to struggle against this prejudice, the belief that our subjectively changing sense data cannot provide objective material for objective judgments about nature. Kant coined therefore the memorable sentence: "Our senses have to be freed from the charge of fraud". The same applies, however, in contrast to Kant, also to ethics.

There is now a Columbia doctoral dissert. published by Martha M. Pingel. An American Utilitarian Richard Hildreth as a Philos. 1948, and as Miss Pingel explicitly refers to an essay of mine on The forgotten Moralist I may, perhaps be allowed to do the same, if you should have a more detailed interest in Hildreth. Incidentally, this is the only publication of mine in which I dared jump into American philos.

James Mill (1773-1836), author of a History of British India AND AN English goverment official in the India House was a very stauch adherent of Bentham, but infinitely more rigid, narrow-minded, stern, very austere and of a far more dubiously monolithic stature than his teacher.

His principal philosophic work is Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 2 vs. 1829. It is of what Nietzsche once called an almost insultingly primitive clearness and distinctness.

He himself said of the work that in it he wanted to make the human mind as plain as the road from Charing Cross to St. Paul's Cathedral in London and if you ever saw this road it is very plain indeed.

Leslie Stephen was not wrong when he thought that James Mill's analysis of the mind almost gets rid of the mind itself.

On ethics Mill has hardly more to say than this: From our early youth we have heard that our parents and other elderly people praised actions which promoted greater happiness and condemned actions which lead to greater pain.

So to us, too, trends of behavior which bring about more pleasure remain associated with the term morally good; trends of behavior which create more pain remain connected with the term morally evil; and that is all he has to say about the origin, the meaning and the validity of ethical predicates.

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was certainly a mind much superior to that of his father. The MS of his Autobiography is, as you may know, here at Col. U. and was edited with hitherto unknown additions from this MS in 1924 by J.J. Coss.

From this Autob. we can infer how he must have suffered from early youth under the revoltingly rigorous system of education of his father. The poor boy had to learn Greek at the age of 3, and when he had reached 8 he had to read Homer in the original and so on. Though he was a youthful prodigy, all this was evidently somewhat too much for him. So at the age of 20 he had to go through a serious depression, a deep melancholy.

He was freed from these very depressed feelings as he reports, rather strangely when he suddenly came across a moving scene in reading the Memoirs of the French dramatist and novelist

Jean Francois Marmontel whom Voltaire had appreciated. At the bedside of a dying father, he felt suddenly and rather miraculously edified and relieved from his grave depression. I don't think one must be an orthodox Freudian to understand this whole event much better than obviously J.S.M. himself was able to interpret it in consequence of his filial piety.

Now in his main ethical writing, the essay called Util., reprinted from Fraser's Magazine in 1863 (now I think available at the Hafner Library) J.S.Mill advocated primarily one major improvement of Bentham's ethics (s. auch Plato Republik IX) "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied / better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied /. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides." Höffding wanted to say a good word p.101 for the fool. Tsanoff: Does Socr. know well enough the immense happiness of a fool or a pig? If a fool has not the ability and the wish to become wise, we should not look down on him.

If Socrates is dissatisfied, really dissatisfied, not perhaps enjoying his melancholy dissatisfaction, as might be inferred from Mill, he is less of an ideal to be envied than the happy fool.

If qualitative differences (not mere degrees of intensity) are introduced, the door is opened to all sorts of uncritical, capricious evaluations.

Who decides right from the beginning without any critical examination what is the qualitatively higher pleasre?

The higher, more valuable pleasure should be determined ~~by~~ as ~~f~~ the result of our analysis, not presupposed before the analysis.

You certainly have noticed by now that ethical positivism has been a most powerful movement in the last 100 years of the history of philos.

It is still perhaps the most widespread trend in modern ethics.

Please don't get impatient, therefore, impatient if we still have to deal with quite a number of ethical empiricists even of the older, more elementary type of the 19th and early 20th century.

Tonight we still have to deal with quite a number of moral positivists in various countries: Italians, Austrians a Greek, a Dane, a Dutchman and a Russian

Giovanni Domenico Romagnosi (1761-1835) Assunto primo della scienza del divitto naturale, 3rd ed. 1832.
Romagnosi stressed that it is quite unnecessary to explore any metaphysical essence, the true substance of morality. Enough to see everywhere in our experience a moral "feeling for the other" at work.

This is evidently marked empiricism, positivism in ethics.

And toward the end of the 19th century we have in Roberto Ardigò and his La Morale dei Positivisti, 1879 qäite a similar moral positivism clearly marked.

He emphasized especially that experience shows again and again that no society and particularly no complex society can exist without constant altruistic and not merely egoistic activities of man. And he sees this especially

confirmed by the factual, steady growth of altruistic international associations in the modern world. But like Fechner and others, he points out: by advocating Christianasceticism, true altruism cannot be strengthened. This can be done only by a scientific, positivistic analysis of the permanent impulses by which progressive societies live.

Now let us turn to that Danish thinker who was the most honored philosopher Denmark had about the turn of the last century (1843-1931), Harold Höffding whose Ethik appeared in 1888, in his later years the grand old man not only of Danish philosophy but of Denmark herself (Jacobsen/Carlsberg Foundation) Emile Meyerson: adopted her as his daughter, took the other road.

Höffding justifies his strict ethical empiricism by using quite an engaging (ansprechend) analogy:

If we look at chains of high, "snow covered" mountains from far away, they seem to hover in the air. But if we come nearer, we realize that they are firmly, solidly grounded in the earth. It's exactly the same with high ethical ideals. At first glance, they seem to be of superhuman origin, ideas in the sense of Plato, concepts which throne far above all lower, earthly human affairs.

But at closer range, on any more exact, penetrating scrutiny, these ideas, too reveal themselves as earthbound and that means to Höffding anchored in humannature, grounded in human experience, human consciousness. In this way he excludes every attempt to use metaphysical or theological foundations of ethics. Even if we wish to acknowledge only the authority of the Church, or of some metaphysical inspiration, the voice

of God himself, it is in the end our human nature, our human consciousness, which make this decision to submit to an authority outside our perhaps human nature.

p.58: The "highest authority in ethics is, therefore, always the conscience, the moral feeling of man. Even if I have confidence only in the conscience of someone else, not in my own, and obey, therefore, his moral command, it is my conscience which decides to abdicate this way.

p.58f: Conscience may err objectively, subjectively we have nothing else but must support it by reasoning.

The Dutchman Gerardus Heymans stresses even in the title of his main ethical work the emphasis on empiricism.
Einführung in die Ethik auf Grundlage der Erfahrung, 1914

Heymans rejects in detailed discussions all ethics of consequences, utilitarianism and others and insists that moral experience itself shows that in our ethical judgment we always think the motives of men of decisive relevance, not the consequences.

I have a rather uneasy feeling that some of us still do not see quite clearly what we discussed in our last session. And what would be even worse, some of you may get the impression that there is little or no real life in all these debates of the moralists whom we had to mention.

So let us definitely try to straighten this out tonight. Of course, right from the beginning all of us should be aware of one point: If one wishes to listen only to edifying, ingpfiring addresses about the beauty of morality, one should turn primarily to religion and not to philosophy. I would

not subscribe to the famous saying by Schopenhauer. I would say that to preach morality well is not easy. Only hackneyed trite sermons flow so easily from the mouth and the pen. But in any case, to analyze ethical questions philosophically and do it properly is quite a difficulttask. And in times of ethical crises or in personal moral conflicts, it may become of the greatest (crucial, vital) importance to see here clearly.

And with this in mind, let us please return now to the question which was so often in the center of all ethical discussions especially in ancient Greece and in the last century here and in Europe: Criticism and defence of hedonism. We ran into these problems again when we talked about G. Heyman's detailed polemics against all ethics of consequences. Now, I had suggested that we clearly distinguish between Motive and consequence.

The facts of experience itself reveal,according to Heymans, that we can speak of morality only with regard to springs of action and types of human character (p.47ff). And only if the motives and the character are not subjectively self-centered but animated by an objective attitude toward the world (p.241ff) e.g. telling the truth only for the objective truth's sake (p.242f) only then can we talk of ethical behavior.

The categorical imperative should, according to Hymans be expressed simply by the command "Have an objective will", "Wolle objektiv" (p.264), or in the words of Karl Strumpf quoted by Heymans (p.241f) Vom ethischen Skeptizismus.1909, p.24: Ethische Gesinnung ist "sachliche Gesinnung", the moral

attitude directed toward the objective state of affairs.

Dagegen

1) Common ethical language and common ethical judgment certainly place the emphasis on motives but common language and common thought speak also of the rise and the setting of the sun and yet all this thought might have to be revised scientifically in order to become consistent in itself and unambiguous if practically applied.

2) Very vague; Highest commands:

3) Have an objective will, have objective motives,

(Heymans p.238 rightly observed that his categ. imp. is almost identical with that of Theod. Lipps quoted by Freud Die ethischen Grundfragen, 1905, p.146: "Rein u. allseitig objektiv bestimtes Wollen" = sittl.Wollen; and very similar to Franz Brentano's Vom Ursprung sittl. Erkenntnis: 1889 (also transl. into Engl.): A fact: Good is what can evidently be loved with right love)

in fact very decisively takes the consequences into account and is, therefore, only seemingly a strict ethics of motives.

Abroteles Eleutheropulos (1870 in Istambul-), a Greek who taught at the University of Zurich in Switzerland.

He too demands in his Philosophie, Allgemeine Weltanschauung, 1911, that all philos. argument must be based on the acceptance of empirical facts as facts (p.4). And the cardinal fact in ethics, according to Eleuth. is the fact that man has a much wider control over his emotions than animals. (?Rusty) El. thinks even that animals do not have consciousness at all, that consciousness in the proper sense of the word can be ascribed only to man (p.68,54). The supreme law in Eleuth.'s ethics runs therefore as follows "Man should be considered and esteemed as man". From this he deduces that man should be respected in his individual abilities. But e.g. in Prof. Kant's formulas this is

not infered from such a formula and the formula is so vague that I think, nothing specific can be deduced from it at all. But especially what do you think of the following argument: El. believes from his supreme ethical law follows that man should not regard feelings of happiness as his ethical aim but he should not altogether suppress his sensual impulses either; asceticism and celibacy demand the ~~xxx~~ exstirpation of our sensual life; and this goes too far.

Josef Popper-Lynkeus, The Right to Live and the Duty to Die (1878), The Individual and the Evaluation of Human Existences (1910). Methodologically again much more radical than Eleuth. and Popper-Lynkens is Ernst Mach (1836-1916) born in Czechoslovakia, physicist and philos. teaching in Graz and Wien. In his Erkenntnis and Irrtum, 1905, transl. into French and Russian, maliciously attacked as reactionary "idealism" by Lenin, he urges (p.102) that ethics and law are not sciences but only cultural technologies. Nevertheless they are scientifically more tenable the more they are based on the strict observation of facts.

therefore, far more plausibly than Eleutheropulos starts right away with the demand that every human individual must be respected as an individual and represents as such a supreme value. No duty to die for one's country in war.

Finally there are some remarks on ethics by a Russian, Aleksandr Ivanowich Hertzen (1812-1870). They are to be found in a work of his which is a kind of history of philosophy and entitled "Vom anderen Ufer", 1849 (From the other Bank of the River, From another Shore). These observations by Hertzen show again to what entirely different interpreta-

tions the simple reference to seemingly evident human experience may lend itself, how completely differentthings may be read out of the moral experience of different men. Hertzen was a wealthy Russian aristocrat who in writing attacked the Czar, was emprisoned and then fled Russia, lived in Western Europe from where his inflamatory revolutionary newspaper articles were smuggled into Russia and e.g. his essay on the Russian serf entitled "Baptized Property" certainly contributed much to the abolishment of serfdom in Russia toward the end of the 19th century. (Ausgewählte Schriften ed. Alfred Kurella, 1949 p.438ff)

Probably out of deep disappointment over the failure of the liberal revolutionary movements in Europe he pointed out that it is utterly mistaken to pronounce any ethical judgments at all. Moreover, he emphasized that it indicates one of the lowest degrees of understanding of man and history to evaluate anyone or anything morally.

To play the role of the moral judge at all reveals a childish attitude. It is the point of view of children liking to be fed with Aesopian fables. It is ~~xxxx~~ as immature to call a man or a historical movement moral or immoral as it is to impute ethical attributes to animals and name the hare a coward or the lion a hero.

Now we have to deal with only 2 more varieties of positivistic theories in ethics of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. One is evolutionary, the other sociological-ethnological ethics. Who is or who are the best known representatives of evolution?

Already Jean Baptiste de (Monet de) Lamarck, in his

Philosophie Zoologique, 1809, stated: It is quite mistaken to start the study of factual moral phenomena with man in whom the phenomena appear in a very complex way. One has to start with the study of morals in animals.

There is evolution in the lives of the species. Certain organs and functions are slowly supplanted by others and all this should be taken into account by the zoologist and the moralist.

Charles Darwin (1809-1882) The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation of Sex, 1871, 2 vs. (What is this origin according to Kant?). Refers to Kant's invocation of the sublime origin of duty; but he thinks that the facts of natural history show the sense of duty is a half innate or half acquired natural altruistic instinct necessary for the preservation of any species and noticeable already in many animals. Blind anti-social, egoistic impulses are generally destructive for the group and the individual. And Darwin already referred in his Desc. of Man to "our great philos. Herb. Spencer"

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) perhaps the most widely admired philos. at the end of the 19th century, the classic representative of positivistic evolutionary ethics. Through him, probably more than through Darwin, the very term evolution became the most used or misused philos. term of the whole civilized world at that time.

An evolutionary ethics was already developed by Spencer in 1851 in his Social Statics 8 years before Darwin's first great work On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural

Selection, 1859. But Spencer's principal work is A System of Synthetic Philosophy, 10 vs. and the last 2 big vols. entitled Principles of Morality (1862-1896). All these volumes make highly unemotional, dry and rather tedious reading.

There can hardly be any doubt that even 50-100 years ago at the time of their greatest glory they were more admired than read. As in the case of Comte's 6 vs. it was therefore much welcomed that F.Howard Collins brought out already in 1889 An Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy in one big vol., a summary of the whole work as far as it had appeared at that time. But unfortunately, this abridged version of Spencer's work gives an even considerably duller impression than the original and this says very much. The original refers to a large amount of anthropological and psychological details, while the epitome is farè more vaguely abstract.

Nevertheless, Spencer offers of course, a number of views with which every student of the history of ethics should familiarize himself. His most characteristic statement is perhaps the terse and simple definition "good is the relatively more evolved conduct, bad is the relatively less evolved (developed) conduct. (Collins 1889, p.517, "The Data of Ethics", III, 8) There you have evolutionistic ethics in a nutshell. Some complication however comes in by Spencer's partial criticism and partial adoption of hedonism. Spencer objects to the utilitarianism of Bentham, of Henry Sidgewick and others because in his view they consider happiness as the immediate aim of man.

Spencer is very emphatic in saying that is not a proximate end of our actions at all. So if Spencer hadn's been thoroughly British, he could have subscribed to Nietzsche's saying: It's not man who seeks pleasure, it's only the Englishman.

But Spencer was after all British enough to insist that the ultimate aim of man is indeed happiness. He tried to show that perfection of nature, virtuousness and rectitude of motive can never be used consistently as ultimate principles of ethics unless they are connected with the concept of producing happiness (Collins p.518,III,11-14; A Syst. of Synth. Philos; Vol.X Principles of Morality, Part I; Data of Ethics chap.III, Par.12-14). Even if ascetics torture themselves to please the godhead, still they must, in the end, enjoy ingratiating themselves with this diabolical god more than they suffer from their self-torture (System of Synthetic Philos. V.X "Principles of Morality", Part I Data of Ethics chap. III, par.16, Collins p.519,III, 15)

So Spencer concedes to the hedonists: the final aim must always be pleasure, gratification, enjoyment, happiness, blessedness, all only different names for what is ultimately the same. "Pleasure .. is as much a necessary form of moral intuition" he says, "as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition." (Ibid, chap.III,par.16, Collins p.519, III, 16).

But despite this fundamental concession made to hedonism Spencer insists that not the ultimate end but the immediate, the "proximate" ends are of decisive significance in ethics, and on this point only the knowledge of evolution can come to ourproper rescue.

Evolution shows it is true we always remain dimly aware of the fact that our ultimate aims are pleasures. But between this final and our present aims more and more complex means are superimposed in the course of evolution and these means of obtaining ultimate pleasure then become the most important issue. Spencer, therefore, assures us that only a closer study of these means developed in the evolution of man will disclose to us far more concrete ethical aims of man than utilitarianism can do by pointing only to the final aim: happiness.

Evolution, however, proves, according to Spencer, quite clearly that e.g. the primitive strife for happiness by belligerent aggression is in the evolution of man supplanted by[a] far more efficient search for lasting happiness through peaceful cooperation. The militant society was and must of necessity be developed into the peace promoting industrial society (e.g.Collins p.401,528).

So this is what evolution teaches us quite concretely from (4) the sociological point of view according to Spencer, the ethical superiority of ~~her~~ the peace loving over the war and robbery loving society. But even seen from the physical, the biological and the psychological viewpoint evolution can give us some quite definite concrete ethical information.
(1) In the physical world, Spencer sees a permanent development from incoherent, indefinite but homogeneous states of matter and motion to coherent, definite and heterogeneous (diversified, variegated) shapes and movements of matter. And the same process he thinks is going on steadily and necessarily in moral conduct: the evolution from movements of incoherent, indefinite, homogeneous behavior to coherent, definite, heterogeneous behavior; and the later stage of

development is exactly because of its being later in evolution necessarily the morally better, more valuable one

ms. II 24 (Tsanoff (?): The criminal may show far more coherent behavior than the honest citizen)

(2) From the biological viewpoint evolution shows greater and greater adjustment (adaptation) of the functions of our vital organs to the conditions of our environment. To care for more and more adequate functioning of our body is, therefore another concrete, proximate demand of ethics to reach the ultimate general demand: happiness. Furthering our biological health is thus also a concrete condition of attainment of moral health.

(3) From the psychological point of view evolution demonstrates, in the opinion of Spencer, that subordination of a dangerous desire for a dangerous pleasure becomes more and more dominant and even by heredity more natural until finally -- we may trust - the psycholog. sense of duty will disappear completely and acting according to obligation, the moral act will become exactly the same as the natural act. So evolution tends always in the end to the production of prolonged and happier life and teaches us at least 4 general absolutely valid concrete rules in addition to the general abstract one: pursuit of happiness

from the physical viewpoint:		the greatest possible coherance and variety of motions
" " biological	"	: the greatest possible adaptat. of our organisms to our environment
" " psychol.	"	: the greatest possible identification of duty and pleasure
" " sociolog.	"	: the greatest possible transformation of the militant state into the state of voluntary and peaceful cooperation

(1) Partly not so much more concrete than general hedonism

(2) Partly far more controversial than principle of general hedonism

(3) Our belief in and details the necessity of evolution -- or 18th century enlightenment -- no longer so unshakeable, imperturbable. Hedonism wiser, more restrained, critical, open-minded than this dogmatic confidence in evolution.

A very large number of ethicists in the 19th century, not only in England and this country but all over the globe adopted in one way or the other evolutionary ethics. We cannot pile up too many names here. You will find a good deal of American evolutionary moralists discussed in Herbert W. Schneider's A History of American Philos. 1946; Richard Hofstadter's Social Darvinism in American Thought (1860-1915) 1944, esp. Chapt. on "The Vogue of Spencer". A specially queer and amusing detail is there, e.g. that as early as in 1843 a Chief Justice of Rhode Island, Job Durfee, hailed the invention of the steam power as the peak (pinnacle) of evolution in the cosmos. Somewhat outdated by the use of electricity and atomic energy.

But to show how many deviations from Spencer's optimistic evolutionary ethics are possible it may be sufficient to mention e.g.

The biologist Thomas Henry Huxley = I think an uncle of the novelist Aldous Huxley and the biologist Julian Huxley - in his Evolution and Ethics 1893, does not simply share Spencer's optimistic thought that evolution itself will and must lead to the growth of altruism. He thinks

that is natural evolution brutal egoism, the "survival of ~~t~~ the fittest" the right of the strpnger dominate. But Morality teaches sympathy with the weak and demands the support of the suffering and therefore this can be maintained only in a permanent struggle, against the law of evolution. Not evolution itself will lead to ethical behavior. Only in the fight against evolution can morality be obtained. The English Alfred Barrat wrote even (Physical Ethics 1869), physically felt pleasure must in the end turn us to ~~morality~~ morals exactly as the compass needle always turns to the North pole.

Even far more pessimistic and even gloomy - in contrast to Spencer - is the evolutionary ethics e.g. of William Winwood Reade (1838-75) in his The Martyrdom of Man 1872. In the opinion of Reade evolution shows, above all, that every generation must suffer for the sake of the following one. But the following one is nevertheless, not happier. Science, the insight into all these details of evolution, alone can give us some consolation. Gives a whole history of mankind from this view-point.

Tonight we have to deal with only 2 more ethical positivists who had a very widespread influence, 2 Frenchmen, Emile Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. Then we can close this long chapter on positivism of the 19th and 20th centuries and can go over to metaphysical ethics. Mr. Monroe, I am sure will help us most gently to make a proper transition f/rom positivism to metaphysics in histalk on the ethics of Henri Bergson and we will try then, explain also quite clearly what the difference is between empirical pòsitivistic ethics and metaphys. ethics. Now back to D.

II.

E. Durkheim's (1858-1917) L'Education Morale appeared in 1925 after his death and he sometimes, e.g. in an earlier important work Les règles de la méthode sociologique (The rules of sociol. methodology), 1895, preferred to characterize himself as a rationalist rather than a positivist. So I think it will be most useful and instructive to see quite lucidly right from the beginning how much D's ethics is based on strictly positivistic experience, on strict empirical observation and how different his method is from all older European rationalism.

Desc., Spinoza, Hugo Grotius, Leibniz and other rationalists of this type tried to base all their teachings on logical insights which are as evident as mathematical truths. If e.g. we say 2 + 2 make four, we do not have to watch and to check whether 2 + 2 apples make 4 but 2 + 2 cherries make perhaps 5 and 2 + 2 books make perhaps 6. We know beforehand a priori -- independent of any object we may see or imagine — 2 + 2 make four, because the very meaning of the number 2 and the number 4 implies this, the law of numbers itself demands this logically.

To Durkh. all such evident logical or mathematical insights are not good enough in ethics, because they are linked up with the minds of individuals and their inner feelings of evidence . Durkh. wants to base all his ethical teaching on objective, given facts, facts of group life, des faits sociaux, sociological facts.

He implies it is a topsy turvy view of the universe to build up anyknowledge of any reality on the introspective feeling of evidence of individuals. In the humanities the individual seems to be the element and the building stone

ax of society. But in fact, it is not. Society builds up the individual, not the individual society. The group molds the character of its members. The indiv. can take shape only within society. Society is prior to the individual. Therefore not psychol. or even logic should be the basis on which ethics can be established but sociology. It is a hopelessly wrong point of departure to turn first to one's own conscience and consciousness to hope that by a single glance into our inward life we could gain objectt. knowledge in ethics.

According to Durkh., previous ethicists relied in vain first and foremost on what introspection taught them. But they discovered there only such general abstract notions in ethics as (1) utility, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, (2) perfection of man (3) the dignity of man.

But all moralists who base their teachings on such abstract general concepts reveal, according to D., in fact no more than some subjective inner convictions of their own. You see here 2 quite opposite concepts of objective validity objectively at work. To the older rationalism: objective is above all what is mathematically logically self-evident, what cannot possibly be doubted (suspected) as erroneous. Any given facts were considered only as empirical, incidental or accidental data, products of chance which logically could have turned out to be quite different. Logically it would be quite plausible e.g. that the earth have 2 or more satellites, not only one; that men in addition to their legs and arms have wings like the birds.

Therefore to the older rationalists all merely factual truths cannot guarantee strict objective validity, as the facts may change and mere facts as such can never be demonstrated to be true by purely logical insights. Stricly objective truth is only that which is based on exact logical reasoning or, as Leibniz phrased it, vérités de raison, reasoned truths rank always higher than mere vérités de faits, merely factual truths.

Durkheim, however, thinks exactly the other way round. To ~~Durkheim~~ him: Insight into something objectively self-evident is still bound up with some inner subjective feeling of evidence. Sociological facts, however, are objective because they are quite superior to anything connected with the mere individual and its thinking as an indiv. subject.

Now inspecting the morality of group life in all its various types, D. unearths as the first characteristic of morality the <u>regularity of habits</u> which every society <u>imposes on its members</u>. There are a very large number of <u>special</u>, <u>precise</u>, <u>definite</u> <u>concrete</u> prescripts, rules which every group expects to be obeyed. ~~Tgs~~ These maxims concern the situations which <u>present themselves most frequently</u> in life. And according to a <u>valuable observation</u> of D., this regularity in moral conduct which society demands is an obvious analogy to <u>organic periodicity in the human body</u>. Next to this regular performance of certain moral acts, Durkheim places the <u>authoritative</u> character with which every society <u>imposes</u> its moral commands on the individual. Regularity of moral habits and authority by which each member of a group is subjected to them can, then, be put together and make the more complex phenomenon that can be named: the

spirit of discipline, l'esprit de discipline. This spirit of discipline, the authoritative character with which every group demands a certain regular conduct from its members is therefore, called by D. the 1st basic element of morality.

The 2nd element of moral behavior is seen by D. in the devotion of the individual to super-individual ends, "des fins impersonelles, des fins supra-individuelles;" and there are, in his ~~mmy~~ opinion, only 2 types of concrete "superior beings" whom we can serve, a godhead or a social group. But the godhead can never be an object of scientific empirical research. So there is left to the scientist only one phenomenon of reality, which is empirically observable and this is society.

Attachment to a group
Moral authority
regularity of habits / needed for the health of the individual himself

Thes~~e~~ are required not only in the interest of society. The individual does not renounce part or the whole of his true nature by dedicating himself to group life. On the contrary, only by this devotion can he fully realize and maintain his own nature.

In a special work, Le Suicide: Etude sociologique in 1897 Durkheim tried to exemplify the importance of man's attachment to society by some interesting statistic observations. He found: Suicide occurs 3 times as much with bachelors as with married men; twice as much in childless marriages and it even grows in inverse proportion to the number of children in the family. Now does this imply that the lack of social bonds favors immorality as D. seems to infer from these sociological findings? Are there not enough counter-instances which would rather obviate and offset and

invalidate such vague conclusions? For example: Do the fewer social ties which monks and nuns have with group life, condition any greater immorality? ~~Were~~ Were not such greatest moral reformers as Socrates, Christ and some of the Jewish prophets unmarried or childless? And what about thinkers of such outstanding morality as Kant, Bentham, Nietzsche, Pascal, Plato and others all unmarried? But be this as it may, Durk. thinks by stressing his 2 or 3 essential characteristics of morality he can bring about a full reconciliation between such old rival schools, such hostile camps as that of the ethics of duty and that of the ethics of the good.

Schleiermacher had already tried to do this in his Pflichten und Güterlehre, doctrine of duties and doctrine of moral goods. Hegel, when he insisted that only morality, dutiful motivation in addition to abstract right can from the good ethical life and who is the Oxford author of a comparatively recent book on the Right and the Good, 1930, in which also especially these 2 basic concepts of ethics are extensively discussed? Prima facie duties more basic than search for the good, happiness. Durkheim offers for this reconcili. between duty and the good a few particularly persuasive formulas. Duty, he says, quite interestingly, is nothing but society in as much as it imposes rules on us and assigns restrictions to our egoistic impulses. The good is nothing but society in as much as it something much greater than we ourselves and allows us therefore to gain an indubitable enrichment by our attachment to it.

ms. II 30a

Finally, D. also tries to face the most crucial problem that ethics has to raise at all times and to which we too

must come back so often, the conflict between 2 opposite and even contradictory systems of morality. He evidently thought that he could answer these questions, too, by introducing a third and final characteristic of all group morality. He alludes, unfortunately only too briefly, to Socrates' and Christ's protest against an antiquated ethics dominating their nation. And he emphasizes that even in such ethical revolutions as those led by Socrates and Plato or by Jesus it is only an old moral authority which is abolished, an authority that has outlived its value but it is not ethical authority altogether which is dethroned.

The great moral reformers never protest against the spirit of discipline itself. They turn only against an outdated moral discipline. And they put a new type of authority into the place of the old one. In this way even the moral revolutionaries prove that authority of the group over the individual is indispensable, a new will of the group can be considered even in these cases as the will of the individuals themselves.

So the third character of morality is this, according to D., that a law of authority seemingly imposed by the group is, in fact, acknowledged by the individual at the same time as his own law, as a law of autonomy, of self-legislation. Now do you think this is a satisfactory solution of the most vital problem of ethics and the struggle between two completely different moral convictions?

Take e.g. the conflict between Catholic and Protestant morality in the age of Reformation, or the fight of Voltaire and other leaders of the European enlightenment against the

morality of all organized religion, against all churches and against the moral importance of all religious rites and ceremonies.

In such great conflicts it is small comfort to be told that even <u>then</u> moral authority is never destroyed (annihilated, nullified) altogether and to hear that only a new moral discipline takes the place of an older one. What we really want to know then is whether the new morality is <u>better than</u> the previous one, whether it means an <u>improvement</u> or perhaps a <u>retrogression</u>.

It may sound most <u>reassuring</u> to many people that there is always some authority in group life. But this strong assurance only <u>obscures</u> the main point at issue. In times of great ethical crises anti-religious morality against the ethics of organised religion, <u>communistic</u> morality against <u>the ethics of free enterprise</u>, our <u>primary concern</u> must be to look around for a criterion, a standard to decide which of these types of ethics is the superior one. Or we must <u>frankly admit</u> that there is no <u>such touch stone at all</u>.

But in D., this cardinal (greatest, fundamental) question ethics must raise is completely evaded and instead an answer is given only to quite a different and comparatively <u>minor</u> query. When mankind is confronted with basic moral decisions, then it does not give us the slightest assistance to know that some moral authority will never cease to exist. What alone could help us is to understand which of the two contending kinds of morality <u>deserves</u> to exist and to prevail.

If Durkheim had fully faced the very core of these

ethical problems he might well have realized that the age-old search for some criterion of true morality, cannot be as such ignored as it is with him. It is true, it seems to be mere introspection to seek after a strictly objective and evident universal principle of ethics --a principle by which we could clearly distinguish between morality and immorality, especially in times of ethical crises. Nevertheless the search for such a principle is certainly anything but a merely subjective or dispensable whim, as Durkheim obviously believed it to be

Lucien Lévy Bruhl (1857-1939) gives at least an implicit answer to that central question concerning a universal criterion of true and false moral authority. In his La morale et la science des moeurs 1903, he, in fact, frankly admits that there is no such absolutely general and objective standard of distinction between morality and immorality. Seen without embellishment the upshot of his detailed analyses, is simply that it is in vain and even unscientific to call for a universally valid criterion of judgment in ethics and to expect the philos. to provide one.

But then Lévy B. goes further and wants to assure us that it is also quite unnecessary to look out for any abstract general mark of distinction between good and evil.

Descriptive sociology, he thinks, can and should now -- once and for all -- take (and fill) the role of all those old and utopian endeavors to establish a normative universally valid ethics. Or do you perhaps remember how exactly L.B. formulated this idea? "Scientific knowledge of the laws of social reality must be substituted for .. speculations on ethical concepts and feelings." That is to say, what we need now, is no

longer general ethics, but the most careful (a penetrating) exploration of the concrete moral rules, "les moeurs", the mores of our and other civilizations and a full understanding of the relations between these moral ideas and all other relevent social facts.

As I mentioned already, Levy Bruhl (is fond of) wanted to degrade general ethics by comparing it with pre-Socratic Greek metaphysics. There too all details of the universe were explained out of a single general substance, water, fire or air and so on. kx (Now has someone today some new idea as to whether) Now what do you think: Is this analogy between this ancient fire and water metaphysics and general ethics (is) tenable)?

General ethics does not presuppose one substance common to all phenomena but one principle as a criterion for judging all phenomena consistently. That's something entirely different. And modern natural science has by no means given that up. It is true modern science does not assume the existence of general substances but it insists on the presupposition of universal principles, universal standards of judgment. I would mention e.g. as such a principle that allphysical phenomena must be verified in the end, in some way by data of the senses.

So I do not think that discredit can be brought on general ethics by wrongly comparing it with primitive Greek metaphysics. But Lev. Br. uses, of course, many more devices to talk us out of universal principles of ethics. He argues e.g. that the voice of our conscience will by no means grow weaker by the fact that we know and understand why our conscience developed sociologically exactly this way. This can readily be granted. But this is not of the slightest relevance when our

conscience stands at the crossroads and we want to know in which direction our conscience should further develop.

One may be able to explain most perfectly why in 1917 a communist ethics held out special promises to a defeated and impoverished people. The Zarist regime had neglected the long overdue industrialization of the vast country and so on. But understanding all these sociological conditions certainly does not answer the far more weightly question: Was the new communist morality so superior that it was justified in ruthlessly extirpating all resistance to itself?

But is this knowledge that all our moral judgments are largely socially conditioned any substitute for seeking after a general criterion to distinguish between moral values and disvalues.

One may be able to explain most perfectly why Russia was sociologically destined to give rise to a communist morality and Italy to a fascist morality after the first world war. But all this enlightenment by "la science des Moeurs" is not of the slightest relevance when we must ask ourselves in such moral revolutions: Is the New moral code really superior or an inferior one? And this is certainly a question of infinitely greater, even practical weight than any problems of moral sociology.

In the case of Nietzsche's master morality and the ancient Greek cynics Lévy Bruhl admits that by these general ethical teachings men are thrown into very grave conflicts with established morality. And of course, Lévy B.'s sociology of morals could give no assistance in such basic moral clashes. But L.

Bruhl brushes these objections aside by the remark that such revolts in ethics concern only a very small circle of refined or paradoxical minds.

In 1903, it certainly seemed comparatively justified to say something like that. But in the last 2 decades of his long life Lévy B. most likely himself realized that this argument no longer held true. For, soon after the first world war, not a few eccentrics but millions of fascists adopted wholeheartedly an even grossly vulgarized version of Nietzsche's master morality; and many more millions became completely bewildered in their thoughts and feelings and could not any longer see whether the new or the old moral order was the more valuable one.

Perhaps it is quite useful to visualize for a moment this concrete moral situation a tiny bit more closely. In such critical hours of historical and ~~xxxx~~ moral decisions there are always people who think e.g.: a true liberal must give even cruel illiberalism a chance. Otherwise he would no longer be a liberal himself. Such a view has all the best virtues of a sham truth. It can bribe millions and has bribed them in Europe after the first world war. But just on such points, it may be of some real value to think out a general principle of morals far more consistently.

It may sound paradoxical but, I think, it is after all, a simple demand of consistent logic that a liberal must be liberal toward everything safe illiberalism and intolerance. Do you agree?

Or take another example: in great moral conflicts you may frequently hear that cruelty is not immoral. Natural itself is cruel. But again one must ask: Is it true that nature is always

cruel? And if it were: is it unalterably cruel? And is strong -- not weak -- generosity perhaps far superior to cruelty? Or other examples: Under every national dictatorship free speech is considered as an irresponsible lack of political discipline, any internationalmindedness as a lack of patriotism. And you can hardly imagine what a confusion of moral feelings can be brought about by such a re-evaluation of values in a former democracy.

So to repeat: in all such clashes of opposite moral views even the best sociological explanation of the origin of these views cannot be of any avail. We need, instead, something like a discussion of abstract moral principles in general ethics. And it is interesting to see in which way even Lévy-Bruhl cannot help pay some tribute to this insight. He admits that on his sociological science of mores some "art rational moral" (rational moral art) can and should be built up. He never grants that the quest for a supreme moral criterion of objective validity is, in fact, irrepressible. But he admits, I quote, "in doubtful cases --presented to our conscience we must decide on the course which in the actual state of knowledge seems the most reasonable".

But this advice, of course, would mean that Lévy B.'s new positivistic moral science returned, on this crucial point, even to the very poorest of all the old-fashioned types of speculative ethics which it wished to depose once and for all. For what is reasonable in a great moral dispute is certainly far more controversial than what is most beneficient or what complies with any other universal criterion of general ethics.

In 1938, e.g., Neville Chamberlain said it was morally unreasonable that Hitler wanted to annex more than the Northern part of Czechoslovakia. Others found every annexation unreasonable and immoral. But Hitler thought that to swallow the whole of a

neighboring country was perfectly reasonable and fully ~~x~~ justified according to his most primitive type of master morality. So I think one has to realize quite clearly that sociological ethics cannot figure as an adequate substitute for general universally valid ethics. Nevertheless in their acute analyses, Durkheim and L.B. certainly did most meritorious work in emphasizing the importance of social conditions in morals, and in giving most valuable characterizations of the social origin, the conditions and the social functions of moral ideas.

Henri Bergson (1859-1941) the most celebrated French philos. of ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ the first half of the 20th century, one may say, fully shares Durkheim's views, as far as any socially established and sanctioned morality is concerned. But he emphatically denies that this is the whole of ethics.

In his only work on ethics, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (the two sources of morality and religion) in 1932, he insists that there are 2 essentially different attitudes in man's moral life and these attitudes have a noticeably different origin and equally different aims. One of these 2 types of morality is that of "la societé close", of closed group life. This common, most frequent (ordinary, usual, customary, established) kind of morality can be characterised only in a way similar to Durkh.'s description. There we have a rigid code of quite definite, concrete, fixed behavior prescribed by the community of which we are a member. The authority of the group which imposes such special precise rules is not questioned by the common man. This is the moral life of "l'âme close", of the "closed soul" which is permanently exposed to the pressure

of the group and simply obeys its commands. So the closed soul is essentially nothing but part of "la société close", a "closed society" and shub up in its community life, the conduct of this closed soul remains comparatively stable, static, always subservient to its environment.

In marked contrast to all this, "l'ame ouverte", the open soul, leads a definitely dynamic, creative life, never held down by the dictates of any closed group but opening itself up to all mankind to a fraternity of all men. There is no longer a simple submission to the collective will of any limited group but, instead, a free, voluntary following the appeal (the call, voice) of a moral genius, a great moral leader or one's own higher moral intuition.

Whenever we advance to open morality, we can, thus throw off the burden of fixed social rules and we enter the free world of the Imitatio Christi. Bergson wished to explain all higher ranking ethics of the open soul by pointing especially to the peculiar character of the moral counsel given in the New Testament. Jesus, Bergs. emphasizes, did not lay down rigid, fixed rules of a closed moral group life but he indicated primarily a new way of life, a new freer breezing of the whole spirit of morality. Bergson admits that the single admonitions of the Gospels often seem to be paradoxical or even contradictory. But exactly these paradoxes and seeming inconsistencies reveal, in Berg.'s opinion, the specifically dynamic character of Christian ethics. For any real movement is a paradox. A flying arrow permanently moves and nevertheless paradoxically stays and stops during every moment of its movement in one place.

Soa snapshot cannot give any accurate picture of a galopping horse any more than any static, strict moral rules

can characterize the "élan vital", the vital urge impulse in the open soul and its morality. And the step which open morality takes from subjugation to the will of the group forward to the love of mankind, means not only a mere quantitative enlargement of the objects of ethics but a qualitative difference in moral devotion, an entirely new moral attitude, a liberation of man for a fully creative life freed from the fetters of the interests of any restricted group or nation.

So the moral life of the open soul is the life in the élan vital, a life with and in the core of all reality, an immersion into the very heart of all things, a life of intuition and great vision and this is according to Bergson: metaphysics. Now what does metaphysics mean? Literally, that which comes after physics, μετὰ . In fact, it is generally believed that the term originally meant no more than the title of a work by Aristotle, which in the arrangement of his writings was just placed after the physical treatises. But now metaphysics definitely means : Any inquiry that transcends the realm of our world of common experience. Any philosophical investigation that deals with the beyond of empirical phenomena.

The greatest flowering of metaphysical ethics in modern times, however, doubtless took place in Germany. And at the beginning of this powerful movement, there stands a thinker who did not wish to become a full fledged metaphysician but tried to hold a position quite near the borderline between metaphysics and the empirical world. Who is this philos.? Of course, Kant, and Kant still today has a very large following all over the globe. Do you remember some of the English, German and French Kantians whom I mentioned briefly before?

Herbert J. Paton: The categoral imperative, 1947

" " " : The moral law, 1953, mainly of K.'s Fundamentals of the Metaphysic of Morals

Thomas Hill Green: Prolegomena to Ethics, 1883

Prichard: Does Moral Phil. rest on a Mistake? Mind, 1912

W. D. Ross, 1930

Charles Renouvier, La Science de la Morale, 2 vs. 1869, 2nd ed. 1908

Durkheim

Marburg school, Cohen, Cassirer

And there are, of course, many more Kantians in the field of ethics.

So I think, in accordance with special requests, I got from you, we should first develop quite briefly what Kantianism itself means in ethics.

There is a vast amount of literature which practically says no more than this: K. was a man of stern duty. Therefore right from the start he urged upon us the obligation to obey a supreme moral law unconditionally. But you will see, with only this in mind, it is quite impossible to do full justice to any of the many complicated analyses of the Kr. of pr. R. K. places a special emphasis on building his ethics up in a very farreaching analogy to his epistemdogy, his theory of theoretical knowledge his Kr.of Pure R. He very often uses exactly the same terms in the titles of the various chapters of the 2 works, the C.of P.and Pract. R.

Therefore, I think the best, the most instructive way to get at the gist of Kantian ethics is to procede from that idea which K. himself called the "highest point" of his whole philos. to which all his other ideas must be affixed, must be fastened.

What is this principle? Transc. Unity of Apper. Now the name of this principle may sound disquietingly learned and complicated but its meaning is certainly quite simple and clear, as you will see. And I think, on the adequate understanding of this principle far more emphasis should be placed as is usually done. We may say, throughout our lives we are <u>witness</u>, so to speak, to a never ending stream of data of consciousness which runs through our minds. What these data are, varies of course. There are primarily visual impressions of shapes and colors of things but also perceptions engendered by our senses of touch, of smell, of taste, of hearing.

Pictures, noises, odors, impressions of sweetness or bitterness, impressions of smoothness or roughness of objects. Remembrances of past events. And at the moment, I hope, we are all mainly thinking of ethical concepts.

Now generally and rightly we are <u>interested</u> only in the <u>meaning</u> or the <u>contents</u> of all these <u>many given</u> data we experience. We are <u>aware</u> only of this <u>material</u> in our conscience of this multitude of ever changing experiences. Many people, laymen and even <u>scientists</u> never <u>care</u> for anything else. But there is one other entirely different element (factor?) active in our consciousness which is, on the whole, lost sight of (quite unnoticed, quite neglected). This is our Ego which experiences all the multitude of our data of consciousness. It is a <u>uniting</u> bond which holds together (binds, ties together) everything we can possibly become conscious of. If there were in us not such an all uniting Ego, we could not experience anything. We would have only <u>broken</u> pieces, fragments of consciousness in our hand and these pieces <u>were not understood</u> and <u>could not be understood</u> at all.

As Kant points out in 1st ed. of Cr.Pure R.: Without remaining one and the same Ego we would not be able to remember anything of the past because our conscience would be only punctiform, not reaching back even to the last previous experience, just passed. We would not be capable of recognizing anything even if it had been presented to us just a moment earlier. We would not be able to compare the similarities and differences of anything as for the comparison, too, we need a bond of consciousness holding together the two things to be compared. Even in split personalities, in certain cases of insanity, patients think e.g. that they were a famous general yesterday and are a great filmstar -- or the prince of Monaco -- now. And yet even they still must have a unity of apperception. If they had no uniting Ego, they would not be able to think that they represented 2 different egos.

If the unity of the Ego ceases to be, consciousness itself ceases to be of necessity. So when our attention is directed toward this ~~unit~~ unity of consc. we do not deal with what we understand but with how we understand anything.

The contents of the consciousness of animals are evidently different from those of man. The mole,e.g. does not live at all in a world of visual impressions and the dog lives far more in a world of scents than we do. His main organ is not the eye but the nose. Even a man blind from birth generally develops much more refined tactile perceptions than we do. To the flies space has only 2 dimensions. But no matter how different these data of experience may be in different creatures there certainly is no consciousness without a uniting Ego, a unity of Apperception of all the experienced items.

~~There was one group of German thinkers around the end~~

Ms.44a

So if we would act according to this purely formal cat. imp.. we would according to K. not be determined by any material of experience, by any concrete desire. We would then act strictly out of duty, not driven by any concrete inclination.

Only "Achtung", respect for a universally valid objective law of all consciousness would move us, not any merely subjective wishes and impulses. And so we would become independent of all ever changing contents of our motives. And paradoxically only in strict obedience to a completely formal law would we become truly free.

I hope you can see now why it certainly was not a meaningless fancy or sheer pedantry that K. so consistently stressed the rigid formalism of his supreme ethical law.

But unfortunately an extraordinary number of Kantians in all countries have more or less watered down the acuteness of all these methodol. reflections of the master.

There was one group of German thinkers around the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries who paid more attention perhaps to the acumen of K.'s conceptual analyses than any other Kantians. Who were these philosophers? Marburg school: Esp. Herm. Cohen, Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer, and to them there should be added at least one non-German, a Swede Axel Hägerström and his extensive vol. Kants Ethik, 1902.

Herm. Cohen in his K's Begründung der Ethik, 2nd ed. 1910 tried in a specially instructive way to improve some details of K's methodology. But, unfortunately, we have of course no time to go into these details.

Ernst Cassirer WAS PERHAPS THE MOST encyclopedic mind of the past generation. He generally maintained faithfulness to Kant's ethics in his writings. But shortly before his death (10 years ago) he wrote me that he now felt much nearer to my un-Kantian views; and this letter has meanwhile been published.

In France, Charles Renouvier, in his La Science de la Morale, 1869, 2nd ed. 1908, presupposes on the whole without any basic critical examination that Kant was right to build ethics up on the concepts of duty and free will. Renouvier also takes over K's moral postulates of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. In his firm belief in free will, Renouvier went even so far as to write a half amusing and interesting treatise Uchronie (l'Utopie dans l'histoire); Esquisse historique apocryphe du development de la civilisation européenne tel qu'il n'a pas été, tel qu'il aurait put etre, 1876, 2nd ed. 1901. A Sketch of European Civilization how it could have developed but did not. Quite strangely, in his L'Education Morale, 1925, even Durkheim thinks that his sociological ethics has most in common with Kant simply because the concepts of duty and authority play in Durkh.'s theory, too, an essential rle.

Finally, in England, too quite a number of thinkers who opposed hedonism wanted to return -- at least partly -- to K. e.g. Thomas Hill Green in Prolegomena to Ethics, 1883, p.485: "The ultimate good is a perfection of the human spirit resting on the will to be perfect."

H. A. Prichard in his famous essay Does Moral Philosophy rest on a Mistake? Mind, 1912, and

W. D. Ross in his The Right and the Good, 1930, and his Foundations of Ethics 1939.

Both Ross and Prichard wish to stress the concept of duty, Ross that of prima facie duties in agreement with Kant.

Herbert J. Paton, however, represents an even far more ~~K~~ marked Kantianism in his The Categor. Imp., 1947; The Moral law, mainly based on K's Fundamentals of the Metaphys. of Moral 1953. Paton offers only a highly conservative and simplified Kantianism. But this may be enough about some of the best known Kantians of the 19th and 20th centuries. (Green Sidgwick 1873, Bradley, Unamuno).

Tonight we have to trace Kantianism, Fichteanism, Hegelianism and other types of metaphys. ethics down to the present day.

I, therefore, wish to repeat as briefly as possible what K's Categ. Imperative means. Categorical means: absolutely valid, valid a priori. It does not mean inborn, innate.

K's supreme law of ethics, the Cat. ~~Imp~~ Imp. represents the Unity of App. in the field of morals and as we saw, this Unity of App. means a logical presupposition of all possible experience. It does not mean that just from the time of their birth the minds of men are organized in such a way that they like to unite everything they apperceive.

Valid a priori, categorically valid, means far more. It means, applied to this case, that it is logically unthinkable to have consciousness at all without a highest uniting Ego. In certain cases of insanity, patients believe e.g. that they were a famous general yesterday and are a great film star -- or the prince of Monaco -- now. And yet even <u>they</u> still must have a unity of Apperception. If they had no uniting Ego, they would not be able to even think that they represent 2 different egos at various times.

So the Unity of Apperception does not <u>precede</u> all our other experiences in time by being an innate idea <u>in us</u>. It precedes logically in the way of a premise of a syllogism. Once more, in the terribly tried syllogism .·. we do not have first an event a that all men die but we have relations between thoughts which are valid independently of all time-relations.

(1) So it is a logical, not a temporary Priority by which we know e.g. that all our experiences of space must be ultimately united in 1 space. Try to think that you have 2 different types of space which have nothing to do with each other and you will realize at once that you are logically forced to think these 2 spaces as parts of only one. Logically, the Unity of App. forces you to think that way. And the same applies to time. Any time we can think of must be part of one and the same general time.

(2) Logically, we are <u>not at all</u> obliged to think in terms of a 3 dimensional space. Certain insects see the world in only 2 dimensions. A <u>superman</u> may live in a spatial order of only 1 or <u>4 or more</u> dimensions. All that is <u>factually</u> possible. But it is <u>logically</u> impossible to perceive anything in 2 quite different

types of space not <u>referable to each other</u>. The law of the Unity of Apperception prevents us from being able to do this.
(3) One and the same Ego, one unchanging I myself must be latently present in all my changing experiences. Or as Kant says quite simply: The "<u>I think</u>" must be able to accompany all my other ideas."
(4) Of course we cannot and we should not <u>always</u> think of this Unity of App. <u>explicitly</u> but <u>implicitly</u> it must be in my mind as long as I am conscious of anything. It must be there even when I am not expressly <u>aware</u> of it.

To experience anything means to have manyfold concrete experiences in the shape of one supreme necessary unity. All we can say about the concrete contents, the material, of our experiences is dependent on the inborn or acquired structure of the human mind and on other factors. All our judgments in this respect are, therefore, correct only under the <u>hypothesis</u> that other factors do not change. These are thus statements which are only hypothetically true, although the underlying hypotheses may be very well established.

But the law of the highest formal unity of all experience is categorically valid. It is not dependent on any other condition or hypothesis and on any <u>changing</u> factors of consciousness. And so we have here only this <u>one</u> purely formal law of unity superior to all other laws and a priori, categorically apodictly valid in all <u>theoretical</u> and in all <u>ethical</u> knowledge.

All these are the decisive reasons why K. kept his Cat. Imp. entirely free from the reference to any specific duty.

Could you please repeat the principal formal formula of the Cat. Imp.? Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation.

Now the man who gave K.'s cat. imp. a <u>definite turn to</u> the metaphysical, the first name in the succession of the so-called German idealists and avowed metaphysicians in the 19th century is Joh. Gottl. Fichte (1762-1814). He, too, still has followers even in the 20th century and we will soon speak about them. But I think it <u>pays</u> to give <u>Fichte first</u> special attention.

Fichte once said in his first Introd. to the Wissenschaftslehre, Science of Knowledge, 1797, and this is quite a famous saying: "The philos. you hold depends on the kind of man you are. A philos. is not a dead piece of furniture, of household goods which one might keep or give away just as one pleases. A true philosophy is animated by the soul of the man who has it." This certainly holds true for Fichte himself. He was a man of an ever burning passion for intell. action, extremely conscious of his work, <u>imperious</u>, <u>dominating</u> and even <u>domineering</u>. <u>Uncompromising</u> or even aggressive and harsh in his insistance on the <u>conclusiveness</u> of his argument and convictions. He was a man of <u>striking moral courage</u> and has several times given quite obvious proofs of that.

Primarily, Fichte certainly was an <u>educator by passion</u>. Already when as a young man, in 1788, he was hired by a Swiss couple as a tutor of their 2 young children, Fichte immediately tried to educate the parents as well. This was certainly a sound idea. But it soon became equally certain that the parents did not like it at all that the hired tutor put down in a diary the daily blunders which the parents made in the education of their children.

I hope you will not mind my inserting quite a brief biographical and characterological sketch of Fichte. In the

case of such a strange and colorful personality, this may be not useless for the better understanding of his philosophy and may also be of some use as a change from our abstract analyses.

Afterxx A few years after his stay in Switzerland, F. ran into a skirmish even with his students at the University of J. He opposed the rather questionable conduct of some secret unions, secret fraternities or orders at the university. The students took revenge, smashed the windows of his house in 1795 and he had to flee for some time from Jena. But he did not yield.

Around the year 1800, however, he had to go through an even more significant and serious conflict, a famous controversy on atheism. The very orthodox Government of Saxony accused Fichte of irreligion and threatened to prohibit Saxon students from attending the U. of Jena, if actions were not taken against the philosopher. Goethe, the poet who was far more of a freethinker than Fichte and who was his superior in the ministry of education in Weimar, would have liked to settle the irksome matter by a compromise. To Goethe the best way out seemed to censure the philos. formally but to let him go on teaching practically undisturbed.

But Fichte was not the man to submit to such a compromise. On the contrary, he took the offensive and tried to show in a number of highly spirited pamphlets that he represented the case of true religion and his accusers in Saxony were bigoted, superstitious reactionaries. The mere title of some of these treatises may give you some idea of F.'s temperament unfolded there. "Appeal to the Public against the Charge of Atheism, a pamphlet which should be read first before it is confiscated", 1799. Another title runs as follows: "Report on the latest

Philosophy as clear as daylight. An Attempt to force the Reader to understand" 1801. And the title page of an earlier writing on the French Revol. speaks an equally bold language. It gives as place and date of publication Heliopolis, City of the Sun, in the last year of the old darkness.

But in this controversy on Atheism, Goethe finally voted against the maintenance of F.'s professorship and so the philos. was dismissed from his University, and only years later could he find other positions in Erlangen and Berlin where he became the 1st elected Rector of the University of Berlin.

As the most important example of F.'s moral resoluteness is commonly mentioned the delivery of his Adresses to the German Nation, highly patriotic lectures given in the winter of 1807 to 1808 in the very face of Napoleon's army of occupation in Berlin. F.'s nationalism never went so far as later German chauvinism did. He still wished to respect cosmopolitan feelings and international obligations Nevertheless it certainly was fearless and daring enough to arouse the Germans to new national pride under the very eyes of hostile French troups in the same city.

And yet, in another instance, F.'s moral courage seems to me to have been even greater. But unfortunately, this case is recorded in detail only in one of the big folios of Max Lenz' Hist. of the U. of Berlin. A Jewish student from Eastern Europe had been insulted by a German colleague and had refused to challenge the aggressor to a duel. Thereupon, according to the German code of honor, the offended man, not the offender was to be suspended from the University. But F. -- in oppositon to all his colleagues -- sided with the insulted student and even resigned from his Rectorship on this account.

In the case of the "Address to the German Nation" the philosopher was, after all, sustained by the warm sympathy

and the general support of his compatriots. But in the other instance he stood alone even against his ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ colleagues and friends and this certainly seems to be the greater courage.

As this will be our last session, we'll have to cover considerably more ground than usual. You know I very much prefer to limit the topics and to have a pretty penetrating discussion of them. Nevertheless[19] let's see how much we can get out even of a fairly hasty treatment of a good deal of complicated material.

Of course, one can approach the ethics of Fichteanism from many different angles. But to us it may be enough tonight to understand in the simplest manner in which way Fichte himself pushed forward from Kant into a new metaphysics of ethics.

We may say, K.'s categ. imp. is conceived as the supreme law of every moral Ego, the highest principle of <u>self-legislation</u>, of <u>autonomy</u>. But K. had placed all the emphasis on the <u>law</u>-element of this self-legislation. To Fichte, however, the self in the metaphysical sense of the word gains infinitely more weight than the law-factor. The same basic term, self-legislation, thus receives, in the <u>mouths</u> of these 2 thinkers the accent on a different syllable and this, then, leads to a world of difference.

The Ego which remained in K. ethics a merely formal concept, grows out in Fichte to the metaphysical source of the whole universe. And this can perhaps best be understood in the following way: Fichte fully agrees with Kant: in all our empirical knowledge of the world we remain limited to the understanding of mere <u>phenomena</u>. We can speak there only of the appearances of things but never of the things in themselves.

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However, Kant's ethics -- and this was Fichte's conviction ~~right~~ *right* from the beginning -- could pave for us the way to reality itself. Of course, true reality could not possibly be a thing. If we would naively believe it were a thing, we would have ~~a~~ to ask immediately: What is the cause of this thing and so on ad infinitum: what is the cause of the other cause. The law of causality cannot permit us to stop these questions.

But if we turn to K.'s moral Ego and its self-legislative power then we can free ourselves completely from all these molesting and insoluble problems. Then we fidd there what earlier metaphysicians such as Descartes or Spinoza were always searching for in vain, a "genuine causa sui", a cause of itself, something that is exclusively determined by itself.

But this uncaused cause, this self-produced reality can never be a thing among other things, it can never be some substance, however perfect. Spinoza and Descartes were hopelessly mistaken in this, according to F. The true uncaused cause cannot be a thing, a substance. It can be only what F. called "Tathandlung", throughout action, original moral action, original moral will power. The essence of metaphysical reality ~~is~~ is thus revealed as a moral world Ego of infinite ethical energy and activity, an ordo ordinans not ordo ordinetus (an ordering order not an ordered order); natura naturaus not natura naturate (creative not created nature).

And this vast reservoir of moral vigor is so abundant and overflowing with strength that to reveal itself fully, to become fully manifest to itself, it must create a hurdle for itself, an obstacle, a counterpart, it must, as F. says, "posit" a Non-Ego. And this Non-Ego is the world, the world

of our senses. The world we see around us exists, therefore, according to F. only for <u>one</u> reason, to be material for our duty, to enable us to exercise, to train our moral power. I quote from "The material of the moral action is such that by the infinite continuation of this action even the empirical Ego would become entirely independent, absolutely free" = Syst.d.Sittenl. 1798, System of Ethics, Doctrine of Morals "Science of Ethics" tr. by A.E.Kroeger; Similarly "Sittenlehre" 1812.

Fichte changed his terminology on many points in his later writings. He then no longer speaks of the Ich, as in the Wiss. L., i.e. the metaphys. Ego. He then calls the metaphysical reality, e.g. "The Divine Idea that lies at the bottom of all appearance" (Erlangen lecture über "Wesen des Gelehrten", Nature of the Scholar, 1805. Or he speaks in the title of one of his best known treatises of "Imitation into the Blessed Life", 1806. But <u>strength</u> of <u>moral</u> activity always remained his <u>main</u> theme. And still in this "Imitation" he observes e.g. significantly and sarcasticly that it is not enough to wait for <u>burial</u> to acquire a blessed life. One has to do something <u>before</u> that.

Now you may rightly feel that all these speculations on a moral metaphys. World Ego have little to do with scientific thinking. In fact, many of F.'s more popular writings sound more like <u>sermons</u> and <u>poetry</u>. And practically all the German metaphysicians since Kant were in close contact and were great lovers and <u>admirers of German poetry</u>. Nevertheless, ø if one has any interest in the age old search for absolute, metaphys. reality then F.'s metaphysics is, I think, one of the <u>most grandiose attempts</u> to link the finite, limited world

of our daily experience with the infinite which none of us will ever be able to describe adequately.

Thomas Carlyle (1795 who lived up to 1881) was far less of a systematic mind than F. But in his temperament and eloquence he comes very near to the German metaphysician. In his Sartor Resartus, Taylor Retaylored 1833f, 1838, he opposes all doubt, all despair and all dependence on pleasure seeking by, as he phrases it, an everlasting Yea, a Yea of moral courage. His treatise on Hero, Hero Worship and the Heroic in History, 1841 is certainly one of the best known glorifications of heroism and will power in the 19th century. And like F. Carlyle throughout thinks, that the cardinal sin, the greatest vice, the very root of all ~~immorality~~ immorality is sloth, laziness, and cowardice.

In his essay on Labor, in the work entitled Past and Present, 1843, he anounces e.g. "the latest Gospel in this world is, Know thy work and do it... Work on it like a Hercules". All this is doubtless especially in line with F.'s pathos and F.'s metaphys. exaltation of will power.

Incidentally, how much of an orator Carlyle was may be inferred from the report that he could speak for hours on the beauty of silence -- Darwin told us this. And Carlyle did not seem to notice at all that the longer and more eloquently one speaks of the value of silence the more one weakens one's own thesis.

In the 20th century, e.g. Hugo Münsterberg (1863-1916) at Harvard founder of the institute of experimental psychology characterized himself as a Fichtean. He explicitly stated that he wished "to combine F's moral idealism with the physiolog. psychology" and the philos. of values of our time.

In his Eternal Values, which appeared in German as Philos. der Werte, 1908, 2nd ed. 1924, he assumes like F. that ~~that~~ there is a Super Ego ("Über-Ich") at the bottom of all reality and this metaphysical root of everything is moral action. In realizing moral values, we live in the most intimate contact with the heart of all actuality. This core of all existence is moral deed, moral effort.

Now, the metaphys. movement which led from Kant to Fichte and from there to Schell. and Hegel is one of the very few quite coherent developments of thought in the history of philos.

Each of these German metaphysicians takes his departure exactly from the point where his predecessor paused and leads from there one step further.

Kant had stated no more than this: action according to the cat. imer. is independent of all determination by the empirical world, the world of phenomena. But he had not gone so far as to permit that this free action can be conceived as reality in itself, because it is superior to the whole phenomenal world.

Fichte makes precisely this move: he proclaims that moral free action, the moral Ego is the true metaphysical essence of all reality, not a thing in itself but an energy in itself. This moral world Ego is the gist and the source of everything that exists.

Friedr. Wilh. Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) first fully adopted Fichte's ethical idealism in quite an uninhibited enthusiasm of youth. At the age of 20 he published 2 treatises which almost could have been written by Fichte himself. The title of one of these earliest philos. writings by Schelling

reads significantly Vom Ich als Prinzip d. Philos. od. über das Unbedingte im menschlichem Wissen, 1795 (On the Ego as the basic Principle of Philos. or about the Unconditional in human knowledge). But later Schelling went on and argued this way: If, as Fichte rightly showed, the Ego posits (produces, originates) the Non Ego, then nature, the Non-Ego, must be somehow included (contained) in the Ego right from the beginning. There must in truth be right from the start a higher metaphys. unity and even identity of Ego and Nature.

An absolute sameness (identicalness, a self sameness, complete union) of Ego and nature, Thought and Being, the organic and inorganic World, subject and object, Mind and Matter, Reason and natural instinct, Conscious and Non-conscious Existence, Soul and Body, and so on. And this metaphys. belief, the belief in an ultimate identity of all polarities of life became, then, in the 19th and even the 20th centuries one of the most widely acclaimed articles of faith in European metaphysics.

This so-called philos. of identity or identity philos. was, of course, closely connected with the Renaissance of Spinozism in German thought. For in Spinoza, too, Mind and Matter were already metaphysically identified in one substance: Deus sive Natura.

From the point of the history of ideas it is interesting to see how after the great admiration of a philosophy of moral will power in K. and Fichte, a younger generation created quite a different climate of opinion. The rational will was, then no longer honored as the all dominating force of reality. The quiet sway of non-rational nature was thought to be at least the equal of the conscious energy of man. So it is very

characteristic that the great and very profound humorist Jean Paul could ridicule F.'s teaching on the Ego which out of itself creates the Non-Ego. J. Paul compares this Fichtean doctrine with a talk between 2 people who want to speak French but cannot do more than repeat to each other endlessly: Monsieur, monsieur, a rather monotonous dialogue.

The poet Heinrigh Heine even more in the manner of a gross satire asked sarcasticly: If Prof Fichte produces the whole world out of the Ego it should be interesting to hear what Mrs. F. has to say about that.

So the young Schelling certainly was not the only opponent of Eichte in his generation. He was only an early and very ~~impressive~~ impressive mouthpiece of this modern philos. of identity. Schelling himself never developed an ethics on this basis. And later under the influence of the powerful mysticism and the mythological philos. of Franz v. Baader, ← Schelling turned away from the thought of his youth. The few scattered meager remarks on morality in his works are rather unrevealing.

But other German and non-German thinkers took over.

Even in Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) you can find quite a number of traces of Schelling's philos. of identity, e.g. in his famous essay on "the Oversoul" publ. first, I think, in his "Essays" in 1865. This metaphys. reality, the Oversoul, is described by Emerson in terms strikingly similar to those of Schelling. I quote: The Oversoul is "that Unity.. within which every man's particular being is contained and made one with all other." It is "the eternal One", that "deep power in which v. the act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object are one. Every

right action is submission to it", to this oversoul. Schelling, ~~xxxx~~ too, used the term Weltseele, World-Soul, which means, in fact, the same as the "oversoul" and the term Weltseele appeared even as the title of one of Schelling's writings.

Perhaps the most elaborate ethics of this metaphysies of identity is to be found in the writings of the best known German theologian of the 19th century, Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768-1834). The bulk of these MSs were published only 40 years ago, about 100 years after they were written; and in these drafts to a universal system of ethics 1812/13 1814/16 Schleiermacher tries again and again to deduce all the basic moral goods and duties from the highest metaphysical reality, the "identity of Reason and Nature".

I do not wish to torture you with memorizing the following details. It may be enough if you get the main point. An Americ. philos. Rich. B. Brandt, recently publ. a book on Schl. Sch. argues

(1)If the highest good, the supreme union of Mind and Matter is organized, that means materialized by an identifying method, that is by stressing what is identical in public institutions then we hate the ethical phenomena ~~xx~~ of law, state and commerce.

(2) If the highest good is organized, materialized by an individualizing method, by stressing what is individual in life, then we have the ethical phenomena of indiv. Property, free Association and general Society.

(3) If the highest good is symbolized, intellectualized by an identifying method, then we have to deal with the general ethical phenomena Science, Thought and School.

(4) If the highest good is symbolized by an individualizing method then we are concerned with the ethical phenomena Feeling, Revelation, Church.

In a larger volume, an American philosopher, Richard B. Brandt, analyzed only recently again Schleiermacher's relations to identity philospphy. But I do not think that the details of this metaphysical ethics of Schleierm. can still be of great help to us today. They offer hardly more than a good sample of a very old hope, the belief that if one divides a general concept such as the identity of nature and reason into all possible subclasses one can sufficiently explain the meaning and the function of the concept and the subdivisions.

Far more relevant and near to real life seem to me Schleiermacher's ideas about the emancipation of women. He put them down especially in his Confidential Letters on the Lucinde, a very bold novel of his friend, the romantic Friedr. Schlegel, and in a manifesto generally ascribed to him, Kat. d. Vernunft für edle Frauen (Catechism of reason for noble, sensitive women). This is a very witty kind of paraphrase of the 10 commandments and you find there such exhortations to women as these:

10 Covet the wisdom of man

9 But do not prettify their barbarism and do not bear false witness to that.

10 Do not conclude a marriage which has to be broken and dissolved

and something that sounded unheard of to older authoritative education:

5 Honor the individuality and even the caprices of your children

In his treatise Monologen (Monologues) in 1800, Schleiermacher stressed quite in the sense of the philos. of identity: That every individual is a microcosm, a small universe,

> is a mirror of the macrocosm, the whole world

and so man should fully develop his individuality as a faithful image of the whole cosmos.

Outside Germany, the philosophy of identity of a strange German metaphysician was amazingly much propagated by his devoted adherents in Belgium, Austria, Hungary and Spain. This was the philos. of Karl Christ. Fried. Krause.

Krause, too, thought that out of the highest sphere of union between Nature and Reason, which he called also God, all moral values can organically be explained.

The best known followers of Krause were Guillaume Tiberghien in Brussels, Heinrich Ahrens in Austria and especially Julian S. Del Rio in Spain and other so-called Spanish "Krausistas" up toward the end of the 19th century. Even such a sound empirical observer as the famous educator Friedrich Froebel was influenced by Krause.

Krause himself thought that with him and his new terminology a new era of history had begun and he wanted to include in a peaceful, harmonious fraternity not only all men but also the inhabitants of other celestial bodies.

The Italians, Antonio Rosmini Serbati (1797-1855) and Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-52), who had numerous followers, also shared part of the ideas of the ethics of identity. And the same applies to the Norwegian Henrik Steffens (1773-1845) AND THE Swede Christopher Jacob Boström (1797-1866), part of

whose writings appeared only long after his death, 30 or 40 years ago.

And as late as in 1918, Salomon Friedländer published a brilliant work ƒ entitled Schöpf. Indiff. (Creative Indiff.). There, too, a final coincidence of all differences and contrasts of life is presupposed and the ethical aim is, according to Friedl., to combine even the valuable energies misdirected in hatred with those misdirected in valueless love until they form a higher perfect ethical unity.

But of course by far the most important representative and a kind of consummator of the metaphysics of identity is Georg Wilh. Friedr. Hegel (1770-1831). One may say that the stream of influence going out from Hegel never ran completely dry. Up to about the middle of the 19th century he almost dominated the whole philosophical life of Germany. Then, after German Hegelianism had broken down, in 1865 James Hutchinson Stirling published in England his eulogy on Hegel in his The Secret of Hegel, in which he praised Hegel's system in the most glowing colors; literally he said: It is a gigantic dream palace of thought, filled to the brim with gold-and marble reflections.

And then - up to about the First World War -, quite a number of English and American thinkers engaged in extensive studies of Hegel, translations of his work and acceptance of some part of his teachings:

In England:

Edward Caird
William Wallace
David George Ritchie, Darwin and Hegel 1893
Sir James Black Baillie
John M. Ellis Mc Taggart, Studies in the Hegel Dialectic
" in Hegels's Cosmology
Commentary on H.'s Logic, 2nd 1931

Andrew Seth Pringle Pattison, The Devel. from K. to Hegel
Bernard Bosanquet and Lord Haldane
Richard Burdon Haldane, the well known statesman, The Pathway to Reality, 1903/4

As to this country, of course, especially the St.Louis Hegelians must be mentioned.

Henry Brokmeyer
William Torrey Harris
Denton J. Snider: Universal Psychology, 1901-06

They founded a Hegelian periodical: Journal of Speculative Philos. 1867

Further e.g. Elisha Mulford: The Nation, 1881
Alfred H. Lloyd: Dynamic Idealism, 1898

More literature in Herbert W. Schneider: A History of American Phil. 1946

But again when the interest in Hegel definitely died down in England and America, especially Germans and Italians had taken it up once more, e.g. Wilh. Windelband and Richard Kroner. And the 2 best known Italians of the past generation Benedetto Croce and Giovani Gentile tangibly subscribed to basic Hegelian principles in connection with older Italian Hegelianism in Bertrando Spaventa and others.

In France even in Simone de Beauvoir's existentialism, a special interest in Hegel is still alive in her Pour une morale de l'ambiguité, 1947 and in this country e.g. in Herbert Marcuse work on Hegel, Reason and Revolution, 1941.

As they said themselves more than 100 years ago, Karl Marx and Friedr. Engels had Hegel's system put on its head. They had completely rejected H's idealism and replaced it by a radical materialism. Nevertheless, they and the whole communist movement all over the globe faithfully stuck to Hegel's method of philosophizing up to this day.

When 25 years ago, older office furniture of the University of Berlin was distributed among the members of the faculty, I received a wooden chair from which, probably Hegel, Fichte, Schelling and Schleiermacher had once lectured. But unfortunately the mere possession of this chair does not make one fit to interpret these thinkers better. And especially Hegel is certainly one of the most difficult philos. writers.

There was a legend that on his deathbed he said that only one man ever understood him. But then he suddenly turned to the other side of his bed adding: Ah, and even he misunderstood me. Of course, I think this is a mere legend. Far more plausible Heinrich Gustav Rotto, the editor of H.'s lectures on aesthetics, certainly the greatest stylist among the master's personal students, described particalarly well the manner and diction of H's lectures. He reported how seemingly dry but how accurate the flow of H.'s speech was whenever he spoke about most intricate and subtle abstract themes. And suddenly there appeared mightly flashes of inspiration in his difficult analyses -- inspirations like streaked lightenings, illuminating an immense range of new insights by grandiose or baroque images and analogies. But when Hegel wanted to make quite a simple practical announcement, e.g. that there would be no lecture the following week or that class would start one hour earlier, then he grew somewhat irritated, interrupted himself by coughing, started afresh; and in the end, it was not even <u>too</u> clear what he wanted to say.

Now the question is, of course, how to approach best such an <u>enigmatic</u> thinker and how -- in the shortest possible time -- to grasp something of the extraordinary <u>spell</u> he has held over so many disparate minds.

Hegel was a friend of Schelling and the great German poet Fried. Hölderlin from the time of their common studies at the University of Tübingen and I definitely think one can understand the pith of Hegelianism in the simplest way if one sees it in its proper relation to the teaching of the young Schelling. Throughout his mature thought, H. remained an adherent of Sch.'s identity philos. He too always urged that, right from the beginning, we must assume a supreme metaph. union between all differences, contrasts, disparities, discrepancies everywhere in thought and reality.

And therefore he praised Spinoza so highly and warmly and insisted that every true philos. should first and foremost bask in the pure ether of Spinoza's metaphysics, in Spinoza's belief in only one all-embracing metaphysical substance of reality.

But then in the famous preface of his "Phenomen d. Geistes" (Phenomenology of Mind), 1807 Hegel wished to supplement Sp.'s and Schell.'s teachings in a very decisive way. Some of you certainly know the baroque analogy by which he wished to depart from Schel. without mentioning Sch.'s name? That means, the Philos. of Identity is quite correct as far as it goes. But it gives only half the story. We may say night and darkness have a most useful funcion. They help us realize the oneness of all things. But of course light is even more needed to see and understand the relations of all things to each other in their oneness.

In other words: after having put together all concepts and all realities into one unity we must also learn to unfold, unfurl them again out of this union. And what is the name of the method to do (achieve) this unfolding? Derived from διαλέγεσθαι, dialogos

in English Dialogue. And a dialogue, or better to say, a talk and countertalk does not consist only of one statement and another opposite one, but the whole dialoque is in addition to this: a union between the 2 contrary announcements. So the dialectical method teaches us to see in every event, in every thing and every concept

(1) not only 1 side of the picture and not only the other, but the 2 opposite sides together

(2) We should never be satisfied with one simple thesis or one simple antithesis but must always progress to an adequate synthesis of the 2 contrary statements, and this synthesis may generally form a new thesis to be supplemented by a new antithesis and new synthesis

(3) Or we may express the nature of the dialect. method in many more other ways. We may say, as Hegel once indicated: The seat of truth is only the whole infinite reality. Our judgments, however, can reflect only on very small parts of that whole. So our statements always have to be more and more enlarged and qualified to come nearer the truth

(4) And perhaps noone before Hegel has warned mankind more against seeing any phenomenon of nature or history or the human mind in isolation, in separation from the others. In principle, probably noone has made us more aware of the subtle play and interplay of polar, hostile and reconciling, atoning tendencies in the whole realm of the humanities, in the arts, in religion, economics, politics, jurisprudence and so on.

(5) Perhaps the most graphic and yet penetrating description of the dialectical method was provided by Hegel in his Wissensch. d. Logic (Science of Logic), 1812/16. He speaks

there of a threefold way in which every antithesis and synthesis is necessarily related to its lower thesis. The lower thesis must be aufgehoben, I should like best to transl. this German term in this context by the Engl. term absorb, the lower thesis must always be absorbed by the higher antithesis and synthesis:

(1) in the way of a criticism, a correction, a partial negation, a partial annihilation, showing that the original statement is too limited

(2) the lower thesis must be absorbed in the way that it is in part preserved, retained, stored up, and thus part confirmed

(3) the lower thesis must be absorbed in the way that it now becomes enriched, enhanced, elevated, enlarged and refined by the higher ones.

(6) Do you recall the rather grotesque way in which Hegel in the Preface of the Phil. of Mind described the nature of plant life in dialectical terms? Neither the bud of a plant nor its full flowering nor its fruit can contain the full truth about vegetable life. As Hegel provocatively phrases this in dialectical terminology, the bud is confuted by the full blossom and the full flowering is demonstrated by the fruit as a false existence.

Goethe was indignant when he heard how Hegel applied such dry logical categories to the rich, and pulsating, thriving life of nature. But, of course, Hegel intentionally used this paradoxical language to show how his logical method could be applied to everything. And I think there is on the whole far more challenging humor and irony in Hegel than is generally realized and appreciated. Liberator - liberated. So much the worse for the facts.

Now, thesis, antithesis and synthesis, naturally, do not contain in Hegel <u>contradictory</u> concepts such as black and non-black but only contrary ideas such as e.g. black and green, black and red would be.

And it would be entirely mistaken to try to predict with logical precision what a Hegelian antithesis and synthesis would be after having heard of the thesis. There is in Hegel a free creative play and playfulness rather than mere logic when he shows this or that polar, dialect. tension at work and the main purpose is to show everywhere the manyfold and complex inner contrasts and similarities esp. in phenomena of our cultural life. Thus, in his various works, Hegel could describe the main traits of ethical facts in rather <u>variegated colors</u>.

I very much hope that you will get some impression of the ease and freedom with which Hegel speaks of whole series of dialectical relations in moral life, even if we contemplate only very few of them in an extremely condensed and sketchy way. In his <u>Phenom. of Mind</u>, 1807, e.g., in the chapter (1) Lust u. Notwendigkeit (Pleasure and Necessity), Hegel starts with a description of the independence, the unconstraint which the naive man feels in searching for pleasure and the confidence he has to gain it. But dialectically

(a) instead of sweet joy man encounters only too often bitter disappointment.

(b) instead of complete liberty he becomes more and more aware of the necessity with which he is subject to strict laws of nature.

So free pleasure-seeking and the recognition of necessitation, compulsion, by laws must be united in a higher synthesis. And this synthesis is explained in a 2. chap-

ter called very colorfully

(2) The Law of the Heart and the Insanity of sheer individualism of individual arrogance. Here the individual imposes a law on himself in obedience to nature, a law of the heart. But dialectically this law of the heart finds its opponents of course, in the laws of the hearts of other individuals. And if anyone would ignore the hearts of others, he would reveal nothing but the insanity of sheer, radical individualism, of individual arrogance. Therefore in the dialectical development of the moral life both the law of one's heart and that of others must be abandoned and instead a law binding all hearts, all inclinations of individuals must be adopted, a law of virtue. But again, in this phase of morality new dialectical tensions arise, as H. tries to show in the chapt.

(3) D. Tugend u.d.Weltlauf (Virtue and the way of the world). As soon as virtue applies itself to the world and wants to reform, improve, the way of the world the virtuous must realize that, as Hegel says, "the world is not in such a bad way". Much virtue is already embodied in the world. Therefore virtue must dialectically advance from righteous indignation and opposition tothe world.

(4) The virtuous must identify himself with morality in life. He must feel that his personal concern and the general good cause he serves are one and the same

(5) But again, there are latent potential conflicts hidden even in this sphere. As much as an individual may identify himself with a general good cause others claim the same for themselves concerning quite different causes.

(6) So only a universal law of morality covering all possible good causes can offer here a synthetic solution. And so

on.

A much more simplified scheme of dialect. processes is developed in H.'s Grundlinien d. Philos. des Rechts, his Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 1821, newly translated in 1942 by T. M. Knox -- or an even briefer version in H.'s Outlines of an Encyclopädia of philos. Sciences, 2nd, 1827

In these 2 works mostof the complicated psychological sidelights are removed. Instead, everything is centered around one great problem. With his extraordinarily fine historical sensitiveness H. had obviously realized that all vital problems of mod. ethics can best be reviewed if they are grouped under the heading: conflict between the ethics of good will and the ethics of good consequences. So this latest version of H.'s ethics starts with a discussion of legality, the law of the courts, or as H. calls it, Abstract Right.

In this lowest sphere of morality, we may say: essentially nothing but the external conduct of a person counts. It cannot be the primary task of the lawgiver or a judge to examine whether someone paid taxes out of fear of punishment or out of patriotism. No matter what the motives of a man are, -- as long as these motives bring about legally correct consequences, the requirements of the law are met. A court of justice must be satisfied with the fact that a person respected the property of his neighbor: The court has generally not the slightest obligation to explore whether property rights were respected out of fear of imprisonment or out of the noblest moral motives of fairness. Men are thus regarded here, as H. says, only as abstract personalities in relation to external things, as owners of property, partners to a contract, not as people of flesh and blood with specialmotives and feelings.

Therefore, according to Hegel, a dialectically higher stage of morality can be reached only if the inner motives of men are fully weighed and not only the lawfulness of their overt acts.

In the 2nd Part of his Philos. of Right under the title "Morality", Hegel focusses thus mainly the role of human motives in the largest sense of the word and he tries to determine their proper place in the whole field of morality.

The Motives, the purpose, the intention of an act and the voice of conscience are, in the eyes of Hegel, of utmost moral importance. They all represent the side of inwardness in moral life; and all morality would remain crude and uncouth if the inner spirit of ~~human~~ an action were not recognized as its animating soul in contrast to all the tangible effects of the act. As we can read twice in Hegel's Philos. of Right: it was a marked shortcoming of ancient Greek Ethics that in the Oedipus tragedy the hero was made fully responsible for a ~~parricide~~ parricide committed without any purpose and knowledge. And yet the brief chapter "Purpose and Responsibility" (Der Vorsatz und die Schuld) tries above all to bring home to us how much dialectically the purpose of an act is connected with the responsibility for its consequences. Even the highest moral purpose cannot free man from farreaching responsibility for bad consequences of his acts.

Again in the chapter "Intention and Welfare" (Die Absicht und das Wohl) it is urged that without good intentions no ethical aim can be obtained. In contrast to lunatics and children the moral agent must know beforehand of the moral quality of his action.

But it is even more stressed that the good will alone is not, as K. taught, "a good without limitation", an absolute value in itself. According to H., the inner will, the "enthusiasm" of the heart has necessarily to be supplemented, -- supplemented dialectically by the achievement of good results, by the creation of welfare, including the well-being of the agent himself.

Hegel rejects the ancient saying: Fiat justitia, pereat mundus, The world may perish, if only justice is done. Eudaemonism is not banished from his ethical system He wished the partial truth which he concedes to hedonism respected. And he, therefore, explicitly states, I quote, "Welfare without right is not a good, but right without welfare is not the good either."

Hegel is often fond of playing upon words. So he uses quite an impressive pun concerning all these questions. He condemns the merely analytic Understanding for its teaching that the subjective and objective ends of an act are "mutually exclusive". It is, he says, only the dissective Understanding which brings all elements of reality to a standstill andthus, isolates them from each other. But dialectical metaphysical Reason and Intuition make us grasp the original flow of reality and free us from all artificial abstractions. Sheer good will, separated from all other elements of action is such a mere abstraction. Or, as one of H.'s famous sayings runs, "the laurels of mere willing are dry leaves that never were green." On the other hand, the denial of the greatness of good will, the assumption that even the genius cares for nothing but his personal welfare was equally mocked at by H. when he ridiculed, I quote, "those valet psychologists for whom there are no heroes not because

there are no heroes but because
these psychologists are only valets.

In the chapter on Good and Conscience (Gute und d. Gewissen) H. points again in the same direction and protests vigorously ~~and~~ against another tearing apart of subjective and objective elements of action.

Coscience, he explains, is the knowledge from within of what is right and good and, I quote, "it would indeed be a sacrilege to violate this sanctuary" wherever conscience really knows what is objectively moral. But as H. exclaims with F. H. Jacobi, (140, Knox 99) "how many men have committed the worst of misdeeds" with a perfect feeling of self-righteousness and good conscience. Therefore, H. warns again in this chapter against seeing any elements of moral life in isolation. Conscience -- in itself indispensably valuable -- can become most dangerous if in H.'s words "it conceives itself as the final court of appeal", and as the sole "arbiter and judge of moral truth" (140 Knox 102). Subjective conscience unavoidably needs what H. calls the "immersion" into objective moral principles -- the obj. u. prin. which are incorporated and have gained life in the basic ethical institutions and organizations of mankind, in the family, civil society and the state.

Therefore, the whole 3rd part of H.'s Ph. of Right is entitled "Ethical Life" and tried to display how all the abstract elements active in law and subjective morality are here, more and more generally, dialectically united. It has often been said that H. was overimpressed by the power and efficiency of the Prussian State of his time. There is a good deal of truth in this. It certainly sounds like an unbelievable idealization of the morality of states when H. claims for the state the right to be "venerated as a secular deity". (Add.272) It looks like an

intolerable hyperbolic metaphor when he sees in the state the moral "mind on earth" (165), the incarnation of all ethical efforts of a nation. But it should not be lost sight of that, in the end, all individual states, too, are,according to Hegel, fully subject to dialectical opposition by other states, and no particular state can ever lay claim to absolute moral authority. States go to war against each other; and so in their conflicts only the history of the world becomes the final moral judge.

At the end of his Philos. of Right H. explicitly proclaims that world history exclusively is the world's highest tribunal of moral judgment. With H. this statement has an essentially optimistic ring. He believed that despite all tragedy and misery mankind has to go through, Reason and the higher moral powers will ultimately triumph.

What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational, he daringly wrote in the Preface to the Philos. of Right. But we may see in H.'s concluding ethical remarks also a far more restrained and melancholy meaning hidden. If only world history is the highest judge in all matters of morality, then it is, of course, granted that in great moral world conflicts noone can foresee who represents the higher moral power: We ourselves will know only after the event and this certainly spells considerable resignation though there is probably much deep truth in it.

Now, as we do not have time enough to consider the many types of Engl. Hegelianism in any detail, I hope quite a brief reference to a comparatively less technical work by Bernard Bosanquet may convey at least some impression of the peculiarity of this British movement.

Bosanquet's Some Suggestions in Ethics appeared in 1918 and there he discusses such topics as "Living for Others", "Value and Goodness", "Doubting the Reality of Evil" with much English common sense and no specific use of Hegelian terminology. And yet very soon in his discussions, there appears the following observation: The basic fact is -- now I quote -- that "we are an infinite spirit lodged in a finite environment" (p.10). An infinite spirit manifesting itself in finite conditions, this is certainly Hegelian enough.

Then B. proceeds by pointing out that "living wholly for others" seems to be nothing ~~by~~ but highest unqualified virtue. But, in fact, to say so, would betray a dangerously uncritical attitude in ethics. Before I put myself entirely into the service of my fellowmen, I should not forget to ask myself first: "What have I to offer to others?"

Or as Hegel put it, whom Bosanquet does not quote in this context: "Love thy neighbor! Yes, but love him with understanding." There are, as Bos. rightly says, too many busybodys whose would-be service may be the mere trifling of vain self-gratification.

So Bosanquet tries to show that it is ultimately not at all: persons who count in ethics but impersonal values. Even love, ~~it~~ Bos. insists, is not concerned mainly with persons. Love is, I quote, "an imperious value which may descend on any persons and transcends all others in the severity with which it rules and refashions a personality. Persons are to love like facts to truth, a medium in which something is revealed greater and deeper than the particulars concerned" (p.11f). Individuals are only "the vehicles of values" (p.84)

These are, ~~to~~ of course, old philos. convictions which

may be traced as far back as to Plato. But, again, their formulations are especially akin to Hegel. Modern English metaphysicians generally do not make any such consistent thoroughgoing use of the dialect. method as did Hegel and his many orthodox German followers.

Nevertheless, even in such a popularizing treatise as Bosanquet's "Suggestions in Ethics" you can hear that good and evil are "antagonistic existences" both of which are ultimately absorbed in a higher whole of "perfection"; and it is only "our finiteness" which makes us believe that good and evil are absolutely "antagonistic existences." This is, of course, truest Hegelianism as much as the further observations that in all our conduct "value" stands "against value" (p.8) and that there is, I quote, "always something to be affirmed and something to be let go" (p.10). How essentially dialectical relations are at issue in ethics Bos. tries to show by a rather telling example.

He refers to Bernard Palissy, the French inventor of enameled pottery in the 16th century. Palissy once burnt his wife's furniture only to keep his kiln alight. According to Bos. even such an action must not be judged in isolation and simply condemned as immoral. Or, as Bos. dryly remarks,"Palissy may have misjudged the value of a new enamel as against kindness to his family." Nevertheless, here too, as everywhere, we are, confronted with a "question of value against value" (p.9). But, of course, wemay add and Bos. would hardly object: If the thesis was to respect the property of one's wife and the antithesis to burn it for the sake of one's art, the synthesis would be to further one's art and yet not to destroy the possessions of the family.

Now, at the same time when H.'s influence waned and vanished in Germany and rose in England and the U.S. in the 2nd part of the 19th century, a violent opponent of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel gained a rapid ascendance in their native country. He is Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), the leading pessimist of modern times and certainly a man to live with whom could make anyone a pessimist as well. Would you care to hear some biogr. anecdotes about him?

Even his mother, a novelist and acquaintance of Goethe, mentioned in Thomas Mann's The Beloved Returns wrote him once: It is part of my happiness to know you are well but part also not to be obliged, to convince myself personally of your well-being. Your permanent aggressive grumblig and ill humour give me bad days and sleepless nights.

When Schopenhauer sent his mother his doctoral dissert. entitled The 4-fold root of the principle of adequate reasoning, the mother amusedly referred to the term root and asked him whether his treatise was written for the use of young pharmacists. Schopenhauer irritatedly answered: Mother, my thesis will still be read when no copy of your novels will any longer be found in any attic. But the mother, not slow, retorted immediately in good fighting trim: Certainly the whole circulation of your work will then be still on sale.

After a few years of very unsuccessful lecturing at the Univ. of Berlin, Schop. retired to the City of Frankf. on the Main and dedicated his whole life exclusively to writing. But though he had no contact with the world of practical affairs, he nevertheless knew how to save his financial interests very ably. The banker with whom his father had invested the family funds before his death wrote the Schopenhauers one day that he

had to declare himself a bankrupt because large flocks of Merino sheep he possessed in Australia had perished in an epidemic. The banker, therefore, suggested that he paid the family Schop. back some part of their funds and the philos.'s mother and sister conceded. But Sch. himself insisted on being fully paid and he did so in very unusual business correspondence. He wrote the banker e.g. that if he would accept his proposal, he would feel himself to be worthy of being driven to pasture along with the banker's marino sheep. And he added he wanted it to be known to all business men that one can be a philosph. and must ~~m~~ not be a fool on this account. Finally, he really received back every cent due to him.

One of my teachers as a boy had still seen Sch. walking through the streets of Frankf. And he vividly described the gait and gestures with which the great pessimist strode along, ~~mmdi~~ pounding the pavement with his big umbrella, stopping suddenly and looking around absent-mindedly and defiantly and then strolling along again. Once a young policeman who had just come to town asked him: Sir, you behave so strangely. Who are you? Whereupon Sch. is said to have looked straight into the face of thepolice officer and ansered: My dear young friend, If ~~y~~ I could tell you this who I am I would be an even greater phil. than I am now.

He doubtless created one of the most lucid systems of thought in the history of philos. and not only as a thinker but also as a writer he decisively influenced artistic minds such as the composer Richard Wagner, the young Thomas Mann and many others.

Schop., too, -- like Fichte and his successors -- tried to build up a metaphysics and ethics in some connection with Kant's critical philos. In the 1st book of his principal work The World as Will and Idea, 1818 he emphasizes with Kant, that

the whole world we see around us in space and time and in the shape of data of our senses cannot be the world in itself, the ~~ø~~ things in themselves. And from this Schop. infers that all we see and taste and hear and smell and touch is nothing but a phantom, an illusion. Incidentally, had K. argued the same way? No, K. admitted ~~tx~~ that we can never obtain any knowledge of the things in themselves. But what we grasp by our senses enables us, nevertheless, to orientate ourselves in reality. The senses show us only the appearances of things, only phenomena. But, according to K., they do not deceive us, they allow us to understand the world in our way.

To ~~Sw~~ Sch., however, the world in space and time is only a mirage, a fata morgana, fiction, a delusion, phantasm, phantasmagory, phantasmagoria, a deception, a feint, blind, make-believe, fake, dream.

The naive realist feels quite certain that there is an infinite space outside ourselves. It never occurs to him (enters his mind) that space may be only a scheme, an idea within himself.

Man is thus compared by Sch. with a fly, an insect which has some drops of perfume, of musk, on his wings. Wherever this fly appears, there is a smell of musk. To this insect all the heavens seem to smell of perfume. But in fact, the odor is, of course, not in the outside world beforehand. It is only carried into the world by the insect; and only therefore it is noticeable everywhere how far and high this insect may ever fly.

Thus there seems to ~~ø~~ us to be a world in space add time always outside ourselves. But this universe is only our idea, and not a reality in itself. This is the essence of Schop.'s theory of knowledge, of his epistemology developed in the 1st

book of his principal work, entitled the "World as Idea".

The 2nd book entitled "The World as Will" presents, then, his metaphysics e.g. in the following way: If I lift my arm, I can see a movement of a body through the air in time and space. But this is only the outside appearance of what is going on. There is something entirely different happening within, inside myself; --an effort, an impulse, a will is manifesting itself. And of course, only this inside story can reveal to us the true character of reality itself. Even my body is only an external phenomenon. My will to live and to act is the true kernel of myself. And this insight is, then, applied by Sch. to the whole of the universe.

What we perceive by our senses is only external appearance, a façade view of the world which hides from us the essence of the matter. We see a thousand things dispersed in space and time. But in fact all of them are exactly the same as we are, if seen from the inside: they are one and the same will to exist and to maintain themselves in existence. You certainly see: there is some partial family likeness between Schop.'s will to exist and to live and Fichte's metaphys. Tathandlung, action, evergy and later Bergson's élan vital, vital impulse. But there is one decisive difference: Bergson's vital drive essentially tends toward greater perfection and Fichte's will is an entirely rational power. Sch. however concentrates exactly on the irrational characteristics we may discover in the will.

In great detail he points out again and again that the will can never reach a final aim to f rest. It is by its very nature: insatiate desire, a drive that can never arrive at its goal. As soon as one end is achieved, the will must drive on to another. It is always in want of something. It never can

stand still. And this want means pain, suffering. Or if we do not seem to have any more needs as sometimes may be the case in priviledged society, then we are threatened by lapsing into boredom and ennui, dullness which can often hurt as much or even more than other types of pain. Suffering from wants and misery cause the pains of the lower classes of society and the pains of weekdays. Suffering from boredom and monotony cause the pains of the higher classes of society, the pains of Sundays and Holidays.

So, to will means: to go through never ending pain. As Schop. tries to show in the 3rd book of his work, in contemplating and admiring great works of art, our suffering from the will to live may be temporarily somewhat relieved. But it can never be stilled (quieted, silenced) this way.

The lasting solution can be only the complete negation, the mortification and suffocation of the will to live. This theme becomes, therefore, the main topic of Schop.'s ethics in the 4th and last book of his work. Suicide is no solution, in his opinion. For, in the self-murderer there is still far too violent a will to live. Moral Salvation can be reached only by following the example of great Christian ascetics and mystics, by fleeing from the haste and heat of desire, by letting wither all craving for life, by dying to the world and by trying to enter quietly, without brute force, the door of the absolute Void, the Nihil, that Nothing which according to Schop., was called Nirvana in Indian Philos., although modern sanscritists think that Nirvana has, in fact, a somewhat different meaning.

More than 20 years after The World as Will and Idea,

Schopenhauer published a much smaller work "The 2 Fundamental Probl. of Ethics", 1841 (Die beiden Grundprobleme d. Ethik). In the 2 treatises of which this vol. consists Schop. did not abandon his principal metaphysi. thesis that the highest virtue is the negation of the will to live. He always insisted that the world far from being the best of all possible worlds -- as Leibniz had taught - is in fact the worst possible. For, as he wished to show in detail, this world is so bad that if it were only a little worse, it could no longer exist, and it is worthy of negation by us.

But in the treatise "On the Basis of Morality" in the 2 Fund. Schop. grants that as long as our will to live is not extinguished altogether, the fundamental virtue must be compassion, compassion not only with the never ending pains of man but also of animals. For all living creatures are, according to Schop. expressions and manifestations of one and the same metaphysical will to live and therefore, as Indian philos. expressed it, wherever we see a carrier of life, we must recognize Tat wan asi, That are thou, There go I. And as far as compassion is only negative, as far as it refrains only from hurting other living beings so far is it only justice. Positive compassion, however, is loving kindness by helping others and relieving their suffering.

And opposed to these 2 virtues are the 2 main vices: Egoism, which does not care for the pains of others and Malice, which even enjoys hurting other life.

Of the followers of Schop. I wish to name only in passing the best known whose life-time reaches into the 20th century. Ed. v. Hartmann. His ∯ Philos. of the Unconscious (Phil. d.

Unbewussten) in 1868, transl. also into English, was a remarkable success. In him Sch.'s pessimism took one especially perplexing turn. He advocated the spread of culture mainly for one reason: to make us more intensely aware of the unavoidability of pain and suffering and to accelerate, in this way, the preparedness for negation of the will to live.

A mind, however, infinitely superior to Ed. v. Hart. was another German who also took his start from Schop. in his earliest writings. But then he outgrew this pessimistic metaphysics and ethics very powerfully. He is F. Nietzsche.

It is impossible to give in brief even the faintest idea of the richness and subtelety of Nietz; the psych. and historian of world-civilization. His ethical leitmotifs, however, can perhaps be characterized in a nutshell as follows:

In a very limited sense N. always adhered to Sch.'s view that the essence of reality is will, desire, the will to live. But almost from the beginning, the vehemence, the impetuosity, the restlessness of desire is to N. no reason for pessimism and despair, as it was for Sch. In one of his latest writings, "Toward a Genealogy of Morals" in 1887, N. justified his opposition to Schop. in one pointed epigramatic sentence. In the razor-like sharpness of many of his formulas, he says: Man can desire rather the nihil, the nothing than not desire at all. We can rather cling to an absolute void than to give up desiring altogether. Therefore Schop.'s hope of a definite extinction of all will to live is to Nietz. a utopian dream. Reality, as a whole, the will to existence, cannot be blotted out. Life cannot be extirpated by any ascetic ideals. On the contrary, life

can be made tolerable to us only if we enlarge it, intensify it, enhance, enrich it and elevate it to a higher level. The incarnation of such a stronger and fuller life is called by Nietzsche the life of the superman. Nietz. ridiculed the idea that with his superman he had thought of a new species in the sense of Darwin. He now and then refers to Cesar and Napoleon as supermen. But the picture of this higher type of human life which he develops in his principal work, his Zarathustra, does not invoke at all the image of a powerful statesman or a warlord and even far less that of a brutal, ruthless tyrant, a blond beast. It is a religious reformer, an educator and a thinker whom N. has chosen to present all his main ethical teachings, Zarathustra or Zoroaster, the half legendary founder of the ancient Persian religion. One does Nietzsche grave injustice if one sees in him a forerunner of Hitler.

Nietzsche did not subscribe to any of the 3 basic articles of faith of German national socialism. He was not a socialist and he frankly detested and abhorred any narrow-minded nationalism and antisemitism. He never indulged in any self-adulation of Germanic, Nordic virtues. Even in his latest overwrought outbursts against Christian asceticism and in his partial defense of the vitality of the blond brute, he refers to the vigor of many ancient/ races, including Arabs and Japanese.

In all his major valuable writings N. primarily insists that power and strength are by no means immoral in themselves even for the attainment of ascetic ideals. On the contrary, vigor and rigor of self-discipline and of will power are indispensable. It is according to N. a basic error to believe that true morality can grow out of mere meakness and weakness.

He called all these beliefs "Herd- or slave-morality" and he demanded a complete re-valuation or transvaluation of all values in this respect.

The will to live cannot be oppressed and far less be annihilated. Therefore it should in N.'s opinion be developed to a legitimate will to power and even be sanctified as such. The great moral life is only that which is lived with so much zest that it can say to itself: Da Capo: Once again, that it can welcome an eternal recurrence.

And the highest virtue is to N. not obedience to duty or meek friendliness but what his Zarath. calls "Radiant virtue" (Schenkende Tugend), an overflow of generosity, of spending itself benevolently out of an over-abundance of life and power.

In this way, the principal topics of N.'s ethics (1) the will to power, (2) the superman, (3) the re-evaluation of values, (4) Eternal Recurrence of Life (5) and Radian Virtue are linked together.

Jean Marie Guyan, the sensitive French moralist, step-son of Alfred Fouillée, who died at the age of 34, comes quite near to some of these Nietzschean ideas, esp. to that of a radiant virtue. Nietz. himself felt this when he read Guyan's Esquisse d'une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction, 1885. Guyan, too, stresses that life is far less saving, storing up and preserving energy than spending it, using it up, living it out, and that thus free creative morality stands much higher than any fulfillment of duty imposed by obligations and sanctions.

But a world rather different from that of Nietzsche and Guyan opens up when we now enter Christian Existentialism ~~in~~

in Kierkegaard (1813-55), Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers. Why is this modern movement of thought of which K. is the father, called existentialism? The simplest explanation for this is perhaps one of the observations of K. in which he blames the philosophers that they are almost exclusively interested in the essences, the given data and ø characteristics of things, the structure of the universe, and like Hegel, in the ø relations between all parts of reality.

And -- so continues K. -- in pondering over the essences of things philosophers have neglected to think of their own existence and of the uniqueness of their specific individual spiritual needs in complete absentmindedness. K., however, was determined not to fall victim to this kind of impardonable absent-mindedness and heedlessness.

How he fulfilled this promise let us inspect briefly only by turning to one of his best known teachings, his depiction of 3 stages on the Way of valuable Life. 3 Stages on the Way of Life is the title of a work publ. by K. in 1845. But similar ideas appear also in his other writings. The lowest of these 3 stages of life is according to K., the esthetic attitude. The artistic man lives a considerably higher life than the man absorbed only in daily, practical routine. The arts lead us in numerous ways to see the Infinite even in a single tree or a bird. When a poet describes a thunderstorm he and we are not interested in a scientifically correct report of concrete physical facts. The thunderstorm serves only as a symbol for wonveying to us the feeling of the grandeur, the overpowering majesty of all nature. As K. omce phrased it, every artist, burns up all concrete finite things in the fire

of his imagination of the Infinite. But of course the arts can deal with reality only by way of imagitiveness, of fancy; the arts themselves cannot shape reality and master it by actual action.

Higher than the esthetic stage of life ranks, therefore, the sphere of moral deeds. Especially in his book entitled Repetition, 1834, K. describes in detail how the moral man tries to approach the Infinite by valuable conduct. He can do so only by ever repeated acts of duty. By an energetic leap, all esthetic contemplation, all delight in changing scenes, in colorful varieties of experience must be abandoned. In this sphere only the steady, faithful work for the general welfare the service under uniform rules only an ever renewed devotion to a common cause can count.

But this field of social action in no way represents to K. the highest value. We are truly confronted with the Infinite only in quite a different religious way. We are face to face with the deepest riddles of reality only in the greatest moral crises of our lives. The trial of Abraham, this awe-inspiring old myth of the Old Testament is to K. the prototype of all the gravest moral experiences imaginable.

K. explains this in great dramatic detail in one of his most impressive works, "Fear and Trembling", also published in 1843. Seen from the average, the common point of view, the sacrifice, the murder of a man is certainly a crime. And God's command to Abraham to slaughter Isaac, his only beloved son, is doubtless one of the most repellent and replusive ideas mankind can conceive. And yet reality may place each of us at any time before decisions similar to that Abraham had to make.

A pacifist may have to fight and kill in defence of his country. Or we may have to chose between other alternatives each of which may be clearly evil. Then no universal moral law can assist us any longer but only faith. Then we can no longer travel on the broad highways of generally accepted ideas. Each of us must then climb his own steep and narrow path to his own salvation -- as a solitary, lonely individual. And this concept of the solitary individual remains a central one in K.

Contemporary existentialism has worked out a rich variety of variations on these basic themes of K. Like K. in his Fear and Trembling, Martin Heidegger in his Sein udd Zeit (Being and Time), in 1927 also sees in anxiety, in anguish of the individual the fundamental trait (characteristic) of human existence. This anxiety shows itself in the care for our daily needs, in handling the material means for our subsistence. And this apprehension reveals itself also in the solicitude, the concern for our fellowman. The supreme type of anxiety, however, is for Heideg. as for Kierkeg. the concern about ~~xxx~~ our own highest destination.

In the face of the greatest conflicts of life we must never yield to convention and live and die as everybody does. Under tension, we must always feel challenged to shape out our inmost being, to summon to life the hero, the full individual (singular) strength of our existence and our conscience in the fight against mental and physical death and in the lasting struggle against that great nothingness that surrounds and threatens all true reality.

In French Existentialism this responsibility of every individual for his own nature is stressed even more bluntly

and almost primitively. In his L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme (Exist. is Humanism) 1946 (?) Jean Paul Sartre, the well KNOWN playwright, says: "Man is originally nothing", or, as Simone de Beauvoir puts it in her Pour une morale de l'ambiguité (For an ethics of ambiguity) 1947, man is "at first a useless passion" but then, as Sartre adds, "man is entirely what he wills himself to be after his thrust toward existence."

In contrast to this French, and Heidegger's atheistic existentialism Karl Jaspers comes again much nearer to K's Christian thought. In his Der Philos. Glaube (philos. Faith) 1948 and in the III. vol. of his earlier work Philosophie 1932, Jaspers paints the plight of man in colors often reminiscent of Kierk. As he emphasizes, in the great decisions of life we must be always open to the divine, even if transcendant reality, the unfathomable Godhead, should never open itself to us, should never speak to us (p.103).

And according to Jaspers perhaps the highest insight into eternal reality can be won only in man's disaster, in his being dashed to pieces in front of the transcendant Infinite.(Mr.Boonin)

But, unfortunately, latest other developments in the ethics of the 20th century seem to offer in their ultimate results a picture no more hopeful than ~~X~~ most types of existentialism. And yet I do not think that we must conclude on a pessimistic note/

George Edward Moore of Cambridge, Engl. left a marked imprint ~~of~~ on the development of English and American ethics by his Principia Ethica in 1903. He tried to show there at great length that the very term good is undefinable and that it is -- as he calls it -- a naturalistic fallacy to explain good in such naturalistic terms as pleasure.

But this early work by G.E.Moore and his Ethics of 1911 evidently had no sceptical tendencies. On the contrary, he argued that the color yellow is also indefinable and nevertheless we know very well what yellow is and so we know what good and what other moral values mean. But in his latest writings, esp. in his "Reply to my Critics", 1942 (Library of Living Philos.) Moore is far less positive on all these points.

Contemporary Ethics of Values in Germany is much more self-assured and tends far more to metaphysics than Moore's highly self-critical conceptual analysis. And yet....

Max Scheler in his influential work Formalism in Ethics AND Material Ethics of Values completed in 1916, tried to draw a sharp line of demarkation between moral goods and moral values. He entirely grants that we can learn only from experience what concrete moral goods are under changing circumstances. For instance, a very rough and ready example - generally a good lunch is a good but to a sick person it may be a serious evil. A bitter tasting medicine and even fasting may be much better.

So the goods which the moral agent should offer to his fellowmen may differ in the extreme from case to case. But despite all these changes, the moral values which guide us in presenting all possible different goods remain entirely the same. Whether we give our fellowmen -- a lunch or a medicine -- it remains the same moral value which we have in mind, the value of his health, the maintenance of his vitality. And so Scheler enumerates 4 principal types of moral value which

-- in contrast to all changing moral goods -- can never change to a disvalue.

The values of the agreeable are lowest in rank.

Then follow the values of vitality.

Above them figure values of intellect, cultural values.

And on the top stands the value of the holy, the religious value.

Even this gradation of values is, according to Scheler, self-evident apriori.

Nicolai Hartmann, however, in his Ethics, 1926, thought it necessary to enlarge Sch's scheme of 4 values to -- as he says -- a whole "Heaven", a veritable "Firmament of Values". At the same time, Hartmann admitted that any gradation of values is much more complicated than Scheler had believed. So Hartmann mentioned, e.g. that the Nietzschean value, "love of the remotest", love of a higher type of man in the f future may rank higher than love of one's neighbor. And yet, love of the fellowman near to us, though not the higher, is nevertheless the stronger, the more urgent value.

The very last ethical movement, however, which I have to mention now, is perhaps in its methodology the most radical and skeptical one of all. It is logical positivism which originated in Austria and then flourished throughout the last 20 years mainly in this country and in England.

Rudolf Carnap of Chicago stated it quite categorically in his Philosophy and Logical Syntax in 1935: "Propositions of normative ethics, whether they have the form of rules or the form of values statements, have no theoretical sense," are theoretically meaningless.

And A.J.Ayer in England in his Language, Tr Truth and Logic, 1938, repeated: "Moral judgments do not come under the category of truth and falsehood".

Bertrand Russell, however, expressed the same even more provocatively in his Religion and Science, 1935 and Human Knowledge, 1948: "A difference as to values -- he states -- is one of tastes not one as to any objective truth."

Finally only one brief observation on emotive ethics which avowedly departs from practically the same presuppositions as logical positivism. Charles L. Stevenson, the main representative of emotive ethics argues in his Ethics and Language, 1944 that an essential part of any ethical statement must always be an imperative. But if I pronounce an imperative, e.g. "Shut the Door" it would be absurd to get the reply "Prove it." An imperative may be obeyed or disobeyed. But it cannot lend itself to proof or disproof.

Hand Reichenbach, Stephen Edelston Toulmin, Cambridge Engl. An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics, 1950 and Charles Stevenson have tried to mitigate the moral radicalism of their positivistic theories on several minor points. Nevertheless I believe C.I.Lewis of Harvard is right, their main argument "destroys the basis for any valid" ethical reasoning.

But I repeat: I do not think that all these skeptical voices of logical positivists and emotive ethicists should and must have the last word in ethics. I tried to answer ethical skepticism in a bulky work in 1952. And each of us must thus fight his own way to a constructive clarity.

I am afraid that unavoidably sometimes you may have felt somewhat overwhelmed by the complexity of our problems. And yet I should be very grateful if you would keep our discussions in friendly rememberance. I very much hope that our talks may serve you at least as a guard against the acceptance of any ethics which could be put to shame by what we discussed here together.

5

History of Modern Ethics

Part II of lectures prepared by D.B. for Columbia University, but never given.

Typed page 1-100
(by U.F. 1968

As you will have learned from the Information Bulletin, this course is meant to be a <u>continuation</u> of a previous one in the winter session. But I plead that none of the newcomers be afraid of that. Whether we like this or not, we have to go back, though of course not in full detail, to thinkers of the early 19th century.

We have to do this at least for two reasons

(1) "<u>repetitio est mater studiorum</u>". Repetition is the mother of all study and this is valid also for those who attended the winter course. And

(2) what is far more important - in the last century we meet again and again with <u>followers</u> and even a good deal of <u>ardent disciples</u> of philosophers of the early period.

There are in all countries of Western civilization:

<u>Neo-Kantians</u>: Charles Renouvier, Cohen, Herbert J. Paton

<u>Benthanites</u>: 2 Mills, Hildreth

Neo-<u>Hegelians</u>: William Wallace, Hutchenson Stirling (<u>The Secret of Hegel</u>, 1865) Bernard Bosanquet

Thomas Hill Green, F.H. Bradley, Edward Caird (<u>Evol. of Religion</u>)

Henry Brokmeyer, William Torrey Harris, Denton J. Snider (<u>Social Institutions</u>, 1901), <u>Journal of Speculative Philos</u>. 1867

Marx, Lassale

Adherents of <u>Fichte</u>: Carlyle, Maire de Biran called by Victor Cousin the French Fichte, Hugo Münsterberg, (<u>Philos. d. Werte</u>, 1908,1921)(1863-1913), Charles Secrétan

<u>Arthur Schopenhauer</u>: Eduard v. Hartmann 1842-1906, Philipp Mainländer 1841-76, Julius Bahnsen -1881

Jacob Friedr. Fries (1773-1843): Leonard Nelson, Kr. d. p. V., 1917

K. Chr. Fr. Krause (1781-1832): Heinrich Ahrens (Paris-Bruxelles) Ungarn, Cours de droit naturel 1838

G. Tiberghien Esquisse de philos. morale, 1854

J. Sanz del Rio -1869

Max Stirner, Nietzsche, Oscar Wilde

Master-morality Will Blake

Alex. Bain partly in polemics against F. H. Bradley,

see Bain: Dissertations on leading philos. topics, 1903

Now to have our general setting straight:

We started with the 2 thinkers, whom I should like to call the masters of the methodology of secular ethics, Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham. When did they live? Both of them, you will remember, made decisive efforts, to find a firm basis for all valid moral judgment.

Kant saw this basis in the m[illegible]ve which impels man to act or in the consequences of the act? Bentham?

But both what in common? Foundations of secular ethics

In contrast to this, French ethics in opposition to the principles of the French Revolution based all valid moral judgment on what?

Who are these thinkers? Bonald and De Maistre

Now, again we may say, even this religious and secular ethics have something in common, namely they both try to provide the basis for the valikity (to prove the validity) of the ideals of the Judeo-Christian, Buddhist and Chinese tradition: namely to prove that generosity, benevolence, kindness and altruism, are the highest moral values.

But if we want to understand the whole of the develop. of mod. ethics, we have to enlarge once more the horizon of ethical

problems. In which way? Any overemphasis on Altruism, Selflessness = according to Nietzsche "Zur Genealogie d. Moral" = fixed idea "eine fixe Idee". The self should be maintained in every good action, not denied.

Strength, power, vitality.

Along with these arguments of power-morality (master-morality) go to a certain extent the various moral concepts of the ethnological school in ethics.

Theodor Waitz, generally counted among the adherents of Joh. Friedr. Herbart: Anthopologie der Naturvölker, 1859: I think in East Sudan: Good to take the wives of others. Bad to be deprived of one's wives by someone else.

Adolf Bastian (1826-1905)

partly Wilh. Wundt

Edward Westermark, in Helsingfors

Emile Durkheim

Lucien Lévy Brühl

Now, quite a lot ofpeople may say, we cannot take the whole master-morality seriously and we think the ethical ideas of primitive man are irrelevant.

To us only the ethics of love and altruism can count

We may admit that this ethics of the great world religions can be based on religious revelation or these ideals of selflessness and kindness can be taught on a purely secular basis.

But no other system of values than that of love as supreme value can be valid.

But people who argue this way, forget that in the political life of great and small nations, in fact, power politics and not the Jewish-Christian teaching of love of one's enemy is practiced.

And even in the life of the individual it seems to me very impor-

tant to see how far power and strength count even there and not only love.

So I want to read to you now some passages from a poet, painter and thinker, who, I think, has rightly been called an advocate of power morality and even a kind of forerunner of Nietzsche (Rudolf Kassner: Die Kunst, die Mystik u.d. Dichter, p.50; Heilene Richter W.B. 1906, p.67) namely William Blake.

Many analysts of Blake's works deny this. One of his biographers, Alexander Gilchrist, even reports that in the middle of the 19th century James Smetham and others regarded Blakes's philos. reflections, I quote "rather as we regard the gentle or exalted incoherences of a dear friend". Still often Blake is appreciated only as the author of sweet, pleasant poetry and the sweet painter of angels and other divine and etherical appearances.

But please judge by yourselves a few quotations from W. Blake's The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, written about 1793, perhaps 1790 already, which the poet Algernon Charles Swinburne called about the greatest book of"the 18th century in the line of ... spiritual speculation".

I have intentionally made you acquainted with these ethical phantasies of Will. Blake, because I think it is important that you never take the term "ethics" in too narrow a sense as is done far too often. If as you can very frequently hear, all main moral probl. are, in fact, solved since the days of Adam; and the main thing is only that we act morally according to principles definitely fixed since the creation, then why do we sit here?

There are groups of ethicists in France, Engl. and Germany who are especially interested in the psychological question of whether our basic moral ideas are inborn, innate in the human mind or acquired, slowly developed by experience of individuals

and societies

1) those who assume that the fundamental concepts of morality are innate are representatives of the ? intuitive gained by observation and experience

2) Now those moralists who believe in moral ideas inherent in all human thought generally couple this belief with the conviction of the universal validity of these ideas. They suppose without hesitation that if an idea is inborn it must be also of necessity absolutely valid. Is this belief correct? : Innate conviction concerning the truthfulness of all sense-perception for "every human being that enters this world"

Tonight we can fortunately start with comparatively simple questions. There are in the development of modern ethics numerous thinkers whom I called eclectics in the short bibliography of which you have I hope already received copies or can receive them now from the Office of the Dep. of Phil. in Philosophy Hall. With the exception of they are on the whole somewhat dull figures. But the picture of the history of modern ethics would be not correct if I would not sacrifice them at least one evening.

I called these philos. eclectics because they mix (or combine) two or even more basic principles in their ethical teaching. For instance, the Kantian principle of stern duty with the promotion of happiness, or what is most frequent some secular with some religious principles, or the intuitive with the inductive method. We can, of course, deal here only with a small select number of these eclectics. And the same applies to the perhaps even larger group of ethical empiricists or ethical positivists who emerged

everywhere in Western civilization from the early 19th century to the present day. There are however, among the positivists, several rather different nuances of teachings.

Connected with the name of Darwin ? Evolutionary Ethics Spencer -- Durkheim -- Levy Bruhl -- Westermark; the youngest group of positivists in Europe and in this country calls itself how? Logical pos. or Vienese circle, Carnap, Reichenbach, A.J. Ayer, Bertrand Russell. These log. posit. are generally far more radical in their ethical teachings than the posit. of the 19th century.

Now please let me not forget to ask you concerning all our sessions. Whenever you see difficulties in what I try ~~d~~ to develop or whenever you wish to add something of your own, please let me know. I wish you to feel quite free and at ease in our discussions and speak out quite frankly any criticism ~~of~~ or any other missivings inquirings you may have.

See ms. T 4b

As I have already said these eclectics and the positivists of the 19th century fortunately do not present too many difficulties. But, unfortunately, their teachings are not too satisfactory either. Nevertheless I want and must also make you acquainted with less convincing, less gratifying types of ethics.

Let me mention, first, a so-called half-Kantian, Halb-Kantianer, as the Germans call these thinkers, a man who is very little known now, though Kant himself and Fichte, the poets Schiller and Goethe and others thought once very highly of him. Kant called him once his most acute critic.

This philosopher was a real vagabond, a type almost without another example in modern history. For years he really made his

living begging from town to town as a tramp.
He was born in the Polish Ghetto, named himself after the great Jewish thinker of the early Middle Ages, and told the story of his life in a memorable work of general cultural interest transl. also into English.
At 11 years married. Spanking at the hands (of mother-in-law)
Then fled from Poland to Germany and Holland, was at the brink of suicide until he finally gained the esteem of leading thinkers and men of letters of his time.
With special acuteness Maimon stressed the fact that Kant no deduction of the validity of his merely formal categ. imp.

? what formula?

Great efforts to supplement by some other principle, even the legitimate pursuit of happiness.
But this combination would not do. He seemed to have realized this himself at the end of his life.

Then among these ecletics to be mentioned a number of French thinkers once very influential at least in France: Victor Cousin historian and philos. , "Du Vrai" 1837, tr.1852 and later.
And Théodore Jouffroy, Cours de Droit naturel, (Course on Natural law) 1834.
To these may be added Jules Simon and Bersot or Saisset whose works were published after the middle of the 19th, therefore not mentioned in my first bibliogr. Jules Simon and his very much read Le Devoir (The Concept of Duty) which appeared in 1854 and in many later editions, was like Cousin politically active in several French governments.
All these French eclectics speak of inborn, innate ideas of

morality in us.
But they think in addition to this that this secular belief should and can be strengthened by religious belief.
Jules Simon in Le Devoir 1854, e.g. simply states that there are basic ideas of justice and morality inherent in our spirit. But ultimately this idea of "la justice eternelle, obligatoire, universelle repose en Dieu" (ultimately the idea of an eternal, obligatory and universally valid justice has its seat in God).
Victor Cousin and later Charles Renouvier interpret Kant's practical reason also as "la faculté du bien .. dans notre esprit" and he identifies Kant with Thomas Reid's common sense.
Would you aggree that K's pr.reason means simply such an inborn faculty offering us such ready made ideas about morality?
Kant rejected Francis Hutcheson's moral sense explicitly and would also that of Thomas Reid.
In any case these French eclectics Cousin, Bersot, Saisset, also called spiritualists and Jouffroy definitely wish to enlarge even the foundations of their ethical teaching by religious beliefs rather different from Kant's ~~mere~~ mere postulates.
Similarly the Swiss Charles Secrétan †1895. La philos. de la Liberté, 1849 and later ed. 1879 assumes an innate feeling of free will to chose the moral good. I am what I want to be, with the belief that true liberty to be found finally only in the love of God.
In earlier English literature eclecticism existed even between the intuit. and induct. school. There is to be mentioned Dugald Stewart: Philos. of the active and moral Powers of Man 1828
James Mackintosh: Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philos. 1830/31

Dug. Stewart speaks (Works VI p.213) of "implanted moral faculties" but (p.229) he adds, "the power of adventitious causes that is of ideas inductively acquired .. is so great that there is perhaps no particular practice which we may not be trained to approve or to condemn." And in his Philos. Essays, 1810, he goes so far as to say that some moral "principles arising from circumstances in which all the situations of mankind must agree are to be regarded as part of human nature no less than the instinct of suction." (Part II, essay 1, chap. VI)
But if this is so if ideas inductively gained by experience and training can become as much an "essential of our nature as the implanted instict of sucking, what then of a basic difference between the intuitive and inductive school in ethics?

James Mackintosh vigorously criticized by James Mill in his A Fragment on Mackintosh, 1835, p.306: "Religion and morals place the seat of virtue in the heart,.. the amiable temper". But he too grants Bentham that entirely empirical feelings of pleasure may legitimately determine the course of an ethical act.
So Fried. Jodl in his Gesch. d. Ethik 1912 could count him among the representatives of the intuitive school; of the inductive schools.... Jean Marie Gujan in his la morale anglaise contemporaine, 1879

But if such quite opposite classifications can be rightly made by two able historians of phil. the suspicion is, I think, justified that the whole difference between the intuitive and the inductive doctrine in ethics is not too clearly marked and is certainly today of almost no relevance.

In Roberto Ardigo Harold Hoffding: Ethik 1888
G. Heyman's: Eing. in.d.Ethik auf Grundlage d.Erfahrung,1914
E. Mack, Erkenntnis und Irrtum 1905

In this country William Ellery Channing and his Discourse "Likeness to God" 1828, may be called eclectic.
You may look up this discourse best now in my colleague Joseph Blau's ed. American Philosophical Adresses, 1946. So it would certainly be preferable to insert this more modern reference in you list.
Channing explicitly states there that God "dwells in us" and therefore we can rely on inferring from our very nature the essence of what is ethical and what not.
Such reflections can, I think, quite properly be called an eclectic combination of empirical and religious motifs in ethics.

Even more markedly is such an eclecticism in the ethics of the great Czech Logician Bernard Bolzano. In his Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschat (Manual of the philos. of religion) 1834 he insists on the indispensableness ofrevelation and at the same time admits that our own empirical nature can teach us: the greatest welfare of all must be the gejuine aim of all morality

The German Jacob Friedrich Fries does not basically refer to revelation in his Handbuch d. prakt. Phil. 1818, bu he, too, thinks that religion could and should adquately supplement our natural a priori insights into the essence of good and evil.
Only a philos. of relig. or "Weltzwecklehre", a metaphys. interpretation of the ~~zuzk~~ total aim of being can teach us that the highest eternal good is life which has its value in its own genuine beauty.

Tonight, fortunately, we still have to deal with comparatively simple, elementary questions.

Last week ww had just started to discuss Heymann (or Hermann) Steinthal and we should continue this now, at least quite briefly. St. is not on your list because his main ethical work was published only in 1885, that is <u>long after the time limit</u> of this bibliogr.
But as St. considered himself very much <u>of an adherent</u> of Herbart we'd better <u>insert</u> him here.
Now Herb. was dissatisfied with the formalism of K.'s cat. imper. He too wished to establish strictly valied, absolutely universal principles of ethics, principles which are logical presuppositions ofall valid moral thinking. But H. wished to present somewhat less formal principles than the cat. imp. And he thought that he could name fiwe such principles which are quite universally valid, a priori valid, and yet somewhat more concrete than K.'s supreme law of morals.
Does someone remember

1) Inner freedom
2) perfection
3) benevolence
4) the right (Recht)
5) and the equitable (Billigkeit)

St. in his <u>Allg. Ethi&k</u> 1885 adopted this scheme, these 5 ethic. principles with only minor modifications.

(Tonight, fortunatdy, we still have to deal with comparatively simple, elementary questions. We had just started to discuss Steinthal and ~~continue~~ should continue this now)
<u>Joh. Friedr. Herbart</u>, a very influential German educationalist, FINALLY, MAY BE NAMED AN ECLECTIC IN a somewhat different regard. In his <u>General Practical Philos</u>. (Allg. Prakt. Philos.) 1808 and his <u>Lehrbuch z. Einleitung in die Philos</u>.(Introd. to Phil.) 1813, he emphasizes that K.'s merely formal law of morals will certainly not do. Nevertheless he thinks that there are <u>5 less for-</u>

mal concepts a priori at our disposal. It is a priori evident in his opinion that these 5 ideals: inner freedom, perfection, benevolence, the right and the equitable are basic moral principles.

But then Herbart, too, admits that even these 5 a priori concepts are not sufficient to enlighten us in any concrete case.

Our "heart", too, along with empirical observation must be consulted, if we want to apply a priori ideals to concrete life.

Schopenh.: Herb. had brains but used them wrongside out, inside out.

Chaim Heymann Steinthal, one of the founders of mod. ethnological psych. and leading in German philos. of language still in 1885, in his General Ethics (Allgemeine Ethik) adheres to Herbart's 5 ethical ideals a priori with only minor modifications.

But he makes good for that by a considerable number of fine and instructive empirical observations in the application of these 5 very abstract concepts. St., e.g., stated already quite clearly what often is regarded as an original idea of a later moralist and is more vaguely indicated in earlier literature, namely the fact that objects of the agreeable and useful are generally destroyed by the enjoyment while intellectual goods remain untouched and can often please a great multitude of people at the same time. Also St.'s remarks on law and morality are still quite instructive. Law only the bank of the river morality, though often in turn influencing the course of the river.

Among the philos. eclectics ["Grandseigneur sansculotte"
Get up M. Le Comte, you are destined to do great things today.]

Even such French socialists as Claude Henri, Comte de Saint Simon, in his Nouveau Christianisme, 1825 stresses on the one hand the necessity of exploring social facts but on the other hand, he lets the conservative partner in a dialog explicitly refer to God and his church which already demanded throughout the ages the improvement of the conditions of the workers and all the poor.

And Pierre Joseph Proudhon in his De la Creation de l'ordre dans l'humanité, 1843 demands recognition of social empirical facts and at the same time respect for an eternal and absolute law of morals in all his ethical discussions.

Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) Autobiography ed. by John Bigelow, 1868, Rules of Conduct. Of all the well known reflections on ethics in modern times, there are perhaps none more homespun, plain and unsophisticated than these rules. Does anyone know the 12 virtues which he especially wished to cultivate
1) Temperance, 2) Silence 3) Order 4) Resolution 5) Frugality 6) Industry 7) Sincerity 8) Justice 9) Moderation 10) Cleanliness 11) Tranquility 12) Chastity

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EMPIRICISM OR POSITIVISM IN ETHICS

A very powerful trend observable in the whole history of ideas: That ethical methodology which in the build-up of ethical beliefs is determined ß to rely exclusively on data or concepts or facts accessible by immediate experience.
But it is amazing and very instructive to see how many rather different details were unearthed by this one and the same method.

Friedr. Eduard Beneke (1798-1854) Grundlegung z. Physik der Sitten 1822; Grundlinien des nat. Syst. d. prakt. Phil.

1837, v. II, 1840, p. 40 vol. II Special moral teachings, III law Scale, "gradation of moral goods or values"

1) Mere experiences show that pleasure of the eye or ear higher than that of lower senses
2) More happiness morally better than less happ.
3) Social welfare morally more important than merely indiv. welfare

Mo. II, 10

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72) Sämtl. Werke, ed. Wilhelm Bolin and Friedr. Jodl, 1911, v. X; Ethical Fragments (1850-70)
Started as an adherent of Hegel but then became one of the most important or, perhaps the most influential German leader in the revolt against German metaphysics about the middle of the 19th century. Influenced for a short time the socialists Karl Marx and Friedr. Engels and many other members of the intellectual movement which called itself Young Germany. Essence of Christend. 1841; Essence of Religion 1848/9

a) In his ethical fragm. he insists that ethics must be as empirical, built up on pure experience, as medicine
b) Fought against all as he called them "bloodless", anemic, "abstract", "ghostlike" ideas such as doing one's duty in ethics for duty's sake unswayed by any inclinations, purely rational conscience.(Who: Kant colosus as Scheler)
c) "Duty demands enjoyment. Renunciation, asceticism and self-denial are only regrettable exceptions to the rule"
d) "Conscience is the violated and wounded desire for happiness of another person, a desire of a fellowman raking and gnawing in my own bowels" (likes graphic language)
e) Virtue is one's own happiness in alliance with that of others.

Gustav Theod. Fechner (1801-87): Discoverer of the Fechner-Weber law that intensities of perceptions grow in proportion to logarithm of intensities of the irritation in the senses.
Über d. höchste Gut (On the greatest Good) 1846; maximum of pleasure. Hope of a time when asceticism and monasteries unnecessary. The arts will be sanctified.
Roberto Ardigò similar attitude toward ascetic Christendom

Is this consistent sound psychology?

Max Stirner (1806-56) D. Einzige und sein Eigentum (The Ego and His Own) (The unique Ego and his property, what he owns) 1845, tr. by Steven Byington, N. Y. 1907. Transl. into French (2) Danish, Russian, Spanish (2), Dutch, Engl., Ital.
Empirical Observation of the facts of life justifies only Extreme Egoism and Anarchism and Stirner's work represents perhaps the most radical program of an ethics of complete egotism and total, pure self-regard. Nietzsche is infinitely more constructive and even idealistic.
Stirner argues that up to now all revolutions in theory and practice have only supplanted one idol by another one.
They demanded instead of the worship of God, the worship of Humanity; instead of the adoration of Christ the adoration of an abstract ideal of Virtue; instead of a King or an emperor some other chief of state or some other collective authority.
But Stirner exclaims: Away with all these ghosts and idols

Away with all knee-bent bending before any authority. Stirner starts his book right away with some often quoted outbursts of indignation: How many things are said to be my concern! Justice, truth, my country, all my fellowmen and 1000 other things should be my concern.
Only I myself should never be my concern! How absurd!

I do not care even for <u>good and evil.</u>
I myself am neither good nor evil. ~~It~~ I will care only for myself.
This sounds very consistent and in its <u>consistency</u> quite <u>alarming</u>.
But could you say why it is neither so consistent nor so alarming?
There is some truth in it. <u>Bentham</u>, Aug. <u>Comte</u> and very many other moralists fought for the partial moral recognition of self-regarding interests.
If I would <u>not care</u> at all for myself, I would soon <u>no longer</u> be able to <u>care for others</u>.
But <u>Hillel</u> What kind of a creature am I then?
If I would care <u>only for myself</u>, I would <u>not serve this way myself best</u>. I would become only a puppet, a ball for the play of my own <u>unruly</u> passions. I would try to rule everything but could not rule myself, could not <u>master</u> my own more and more <u>blindly demanding emotions</u> which would, in the end, completley tyrannize me, my own <u>self</u>. I would thus no longer give the <u>appearance</u> of a <u>mighty, free, sovereign being</u>, but only the <u>picture</u> of a <u>helpless slave</u>, the most <u>miserable</u> slave, a slave in the hands of <u>his own uncontrollable wild desires</u>; not a proud <u>sovereign of his own fate</u> but only an <u>arrogant</u>, tyrannical and yet <u>helpless child</u>.

In contrast to <u>Stirner</u>, that <u>enfant terrible of radical ethical</u> empiricism, August <u>Comte</u>, (1798-1857) the founder and leader of French positivism in the 19th century is a far more moderate and poised thinker.
<u>Cours de philosophie positive</u>, 6 vols. 1830-42
<u>Discours sur l'esprit positive</u>, 1844 (<u>The positive philos. of A.C.</u> by Harriet Martineau, 1853 neben Jules Rig
In his whole system of phil: 3 epochs: Theological (in religious terms), Metaphysical (abstract), Emphasis on scientifically established facts. 6 sciences leading from <u>elementary abstract mathe-</u>

matics to the more and more complex sciences: Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Sociology.

Comte's Ethics is to be found espec. in v. IV of Cours de phil. posit., mainly under the title "Physique sociale"

Egoistic and social feelings are both factual elements of all our conscious life, though social interests often weaker.

But self regarding emotions are also especially needed.

Without them our moral nature would not be improved by destroyed.

Men would ruin each other if there were only blind egoism. But also blind altruism not checked by the impulse to self-preservation would be destructive. We need the guidance of social and selfish interests.

Herder: If there were only altruism in human nature, all of us would be only patients and nurses in a great hospital

Pinnacle of positivism reached when Comte by reference to the phrenology of Gall, assures us that any ethics of egoism can be simply refuted by the fact, that along with a special point in the human brain where the selfish impulses are located, there is another point which is the seat of the self-less impulses.

In his later writings

Système de Politique Positive, 4 vs. 1851-54
Calendrier Positiviste
Catéchism Positiviste, 1852

Comte developed his positivism into a veritable secular religion.

The concept of God is there replaced by that of humanity which he called le Grand Être. The days of the year are named not after saints but after discoverers and great men of science.

The motto of the Système de Politique Positive is L'amour pour principe
et l'ordre " base
le progrès " but

Other moral slogans of Catéchisme positive are Vivre pour l'autrui, ed. 1891, p.30; Ne faire rien qui ne soit avouable, ed. 1874, p.299f

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In these later writings, perhaps under the influence of his friend Clotide de Vaux, C. also wished that masculine intelligence should in the end, be subjected to feminine tenderness. And how strong the altruistic impulses were in Comte himself, you may perhaps infer from the fact that he suggested for the positivistic society of the future 84 holidays per year. If this is not benevolence I don't know what else deserves the name. If I remember rightly these are more holidays than in Thomas Morus Utopia (6 hours per day) 1516

" Campanella Cieri Solis, City of the Sun, 161[illegible]

Pieme Lafitte (1823-1903), the most faithful French adherent of Comte
Emile Littré (1801-81), author of the Dictionnaire de la langue française (1863-69) did not subscribe to the later teachings of Comte and emphasized far more than Comte himself the relativity of moral judgments in various epochs, and individuals, s. his essay "Des origines organiques de la morale", 1870

Richard Congreve (1818-99)
Frederick Harrison (1831-23) } represented 2 rival congregations of English positivists

John Henry Bridges: Disc. sur l'esprit posit. engl. (?)

Richard Hildreth (1807-1865) a Boston lawyer was up to a few years ago remembered only as the author of a History of the U.S. and a novel. This novel Archy Moore, later entitled The White Slave became the forerunner of all similar anti-slavery literature.
But now his philos. writings, too, are somewhat more appreciated

Theory of Morals 1844
" of Taste
" " Politics

H.'s Theory of Morals does not delve into all the real subtleties of Behtham's methodology. But some main points of a consistent utilitarian ethics are here grasped quite well.
I will mention only one observation of this kind: H. obviously

rightly thought that one of the reasons for the most widespread rejection of pleasure and happiness as a criterion of morality was obviously the distrust in the objectivity of all our feelings. Feelings seems to be merely subjective. Abstract concepts seem to guarantee a far greater objectivity. The same objection haw been made for a long time to the objective validity of sense perceptions.

Still Kant had to struggle against this prejudice, the belief that our subjectively changing sense data cannot provide objective material for objective judgments about nature. Kant coined therefore the memorable sentence: "Our senses have to be freed from the charge of fraud". The same applies, however, in contrast to Kant, also to ethics.

There is now a Columbia doctoral dissert. published by Martha M. Pingel, An American Utilitarian Richard Hildreth as a Philos. 1948, and as Miss Pingel explicitly refers to an essay of mine on The forgotten Moralist I may, perhaps be allowed to do the same, if you should have a more detailed interest in Hildreth. Incidentally, this is the only publication of mine in which I dared jump into American philos.

James Mill (1773-1836), author of a History of British India AND AN English goverment official in the India House was a very stauch adherent of Bentham, but infinitely more rigid, narrow-minded, stern, very austere and of a far more dubiously monolithic stature than his teacher.

His principal philosophic work is Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 2 vs. 1829. It is of what Nietzsche once called an almost insultingly primitive clearness and distinctness.

He himself said of the work that in it he wanted to make the human mind as plain as the road from Charing Cross to St. Paul's Cathedral in London and if you ever saw this road it is very plain indeed.

Leslie Stephen was not wrong when he thought that James Mill's analysis of the mind almost gets rid of the mind itself.

On ethics Mill has hardly more to say than this: From our early youth we have heard that our parents and other elderly people praised actions which promoted greater happiness and condemned actions which lead to greater pain.

So to us, too, trends of behavior which bring about more pleasure remain associated with the term morally good; trends of behavior which create more pain remain connected with the term morally evil; and that is all he has to say about the origin, the meaning and the validity of ethical predicated.

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was certainly a mind much superior to that of his father. The MS of his Autobiography is, as you may know, here at Col. U. and was edited with hitherto unknown additions from this MS in 1924 by J.J. Coss.

From this Autob. we can infer how he must have suffered from early youth under the revoltingly rigorous system of education of his father. The poor boy had to learn Greek at the age of 3, and when he had reached 8 he had to read Homer in the original and so on. Though he was a youthful prodigy, all this was evidently somewhat too much for him. So at the age of 20 he had to go through a serious depression, a deep melancholy.

He was freed from these very depressed feelings as he reports, rather strangely when he suddenly came across a moving scene in reading the Memoirs of the French dramatist and novelist

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Jean Francois Marmontel whom Voltaire had appreciated. At the bedside of a dying father, he felt suddenly and rather miraculously edified and relieved from his grave depression. I don't think one must be an orthodox Freudian to understand this whole event much better than obviously J.S.M. himself was able to interpret it in consequence of his filial piety.

Now in his main ethical writing, the essay called Util., reprinted from Fraser's Magazine in 1863 (now I think available at the Hafner Library) J.S.Mill advocated primarily one major improvement of Bentham's ethics (s. auch Plato Republik IX) "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied / better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a foöl satisfied /. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides." Höffding wanted to say a good word p.101 for the fool. Tsanoff: Does Socr. know well enough the immense happiness of a fool or a pig? If a fool has not the ability and the wish to become wise, we should not look down on him.

If Socrates is dissatisfied, really dissatisfied, not perhaps enjoying his melancholy dissatisfaction, as might be inferred from Mill, he is less of an ideal to be envied than the happy fool.

If qualitative differences (not mere degrees of intensity) are introduced, the door is opened to all sorts of uncritical, capricious evaluations.

Who decides right from the beginning without any critical examination what is the qualitatively higher pleasre?

The higher, more valuable pleasure should be determined ~~by~~ as ~~i~~ the result of our analysis, not presupposed before the analysis.

You certainly have noticed by now that ethical positivism has been a most powerful movement in the last 100 years of the history of philos.

It is still perhaps the most widespread trend in modern ethics.

Please don't get, therefore, impatient if we still have to deal with quite a number of ethical empiricists even of the older, more elementary type of the 19th and early 20th century.

Tonight we still have to deal with quite a number of moral positivists in various countries: Italians, Austrians a Greek, a Dane, a Dutchman and a Russian

Giovanni Domenico Romagnosi (1761-1835) Assunto primo della scienza del divitto naturale, 3rd ed. 1832. Romagnosi stressed that it is quite unnecessary to explore any metaphysical essence, the true substance of morality. Enough to see everywhere in our experience a moral "feeling for the other" at work.

This is evidently marked empiricism, positivism in ethics.

And toward the end of the 19th century we have in Roberto Ardigò and his La Morale dei Positivisti, 1879 qtite a similar moral positivism clearly marked.

He emphasized especially that experience shows again and again that no society and particularly no complex society can exist without constant altruistic and not merely egoistic activities of man. And he sees this especially

confirmed by the factual, steady growth of altruistic international associations in the modern world. But like Fechner and others, he points out: by advocating Christianasceticism, true altruism cannot be strengthened. This can be done only by a scientific, positivistic analysis of the permanent impulses by which progressive societies live.

Now let us turn to that Danish thinker who was the most honored philosopher Denmark had about the turn of the last century (1843-1931), Harold Höffding whose Ethik appeared in 1888, in his later years the grand old man not only of Danish philosophy but of Denmark herself (Jacobsen/Carlsberg Foundation) Emile Meyerson: adopted her as his daughter, took the other road.

Höffding justifies his strict ethical empiricism by using quite an engaging (ansprechend) analogy:

If we look at chains of high, "snow covered" mountains from far away, they seem to hover in the air. But if we come nearer, we realize that they are firmly, solidly grounded in the earth. It's exactly the same with high ethical ideals. At first glance, they seem to be of superhuman origin, ideas in the sense of Plato, concepts which throne far above all lower, earthly human affairs.

But at closer range, on any more exact, penetrating scrutiny, these ideas, too reveal themselves as earthbound and that means to Höffding anchored in human nature, grounded in human experience, human consciousness. In this way he excludes every attempt to use metaphysical or theological foundations of ethics. Even if we wish to acknowledge only the authority of the Church, or of some metaphysical inspiration, the voice

of God himself, it is in the end our human nature, our human consciousness, which make this decision to submit to an authority outside our penmal human nature.

p.58: The "highest authority in ethics is, therefore, always the conscience, the moral feeling of man. Even if I have confidence only in the conscience of someone else, not in my own, and obey, therefore, his moral command, it is my conscience which decides to abdicate this way.

p.58f: Conscience may err objectively, subjectively we have nothing else but must support it by reasoning.

The Dutchman Gerardus Heymans stresses even in the title of his main ethical work the emphasis on empiricism.
Einführung in die Ethik auf Grundlage der Erfahrung, 1914

Heymans rejects in detailed discussions all ethics of consequences, utilitarianism and others and insists that moral experience itself shows that in our ethical judgment we always think the motives of men of decisive relevance, not the consequences.

I have a rather uneasy feeling that some of us still do not see quite clearly what we discussed in our last session. And what would be even worse, some of you may get the impression that there is little or no real life in all these debates of the moralists whom we had to mention.
So let us definitely try to straighten this out tonight. Of course, right from the beginning all of us should be aware of one point: If one wishes to listen only to edifying, inspiring addresses about the beauty of morality, one should turn primarily to religion and not to philosophy. I would

not subscribe to the famous saying by Schopenhauer. I would say that to preach morality well is not easy. Only hackneyed trite sermons flow so easily from the mouth and the pen. But in any case, to analyze ethical questions philosophically and do it properly is quite a difficulttask. And in times of ethical crises or in personal moral conflicts, it may become of the greatest (crucial, vital) importance to see here clearly.

And with this in mind, let us please return now to the question which was so often in the center of all ethical discussions especially in ancient Greece and in the last century here and in Europe: Criticism and defence of hedonism. We ran into these problems again when we talked about G. Heyman's detailed polemics against all ethics of consequences. Now, I had suggested that we clearly distinguish between Motive and consequence.

The facts of experience itself reveal,according to Heymans, that we can speak of morality only with regard to springs of action and types of human character (p.47ff). And only if the motives and the character are not subjectively self-centered but animated by an objective attitude toward the world (p.241ff) e.g. telling the truth only for the objective truth's sake (p.242f) only then can we talk of ethical behavior.

The categorical imperative should, according to Hymans be expressed simply by the command "Have an objective will", "Wolle objektiv" (p.264), or in the words of Karl Strumpf quoted by Heymans (p.241f) Vom ethischen Skeptizismus,1909, p.24: Ethische Gesinnung ist "sachliche Gesinnung", the moral

attitude directed toward the objective state of affairs.

Dagegen

1) Common ethical language and common ethical judgment certainly place the emphasis on motives but common language and common thought speak also of the rise and the setting of the sun and yet all this thought might have to be revised scientifically in order to become consistent in itself and unambiguous if practically applied.

2) Very vague; Highest commands:

3) Have an objective will, have objective motives

(Heymans p.238 rightly observed that his categ. imp. is almost identical with that of Theod. Lipps quoted by Freud Die ethischen Grundfragen, 1905, p.146: "Rein u. allseitig objektiv bestimtes Wollen" = sittl.Wollen; and very similar to Franz Brentano's Vom Ursprung sittl. Erkenntnis: 1889 (also transl. into Engl.): A fact: Good is what can evidently be loved with right love)

in fact very decisively takes the consequences into account and is, therefore, only seemingly a strict ethics of motives.

Abroteles Eleutheropulos (1870 in Istambul-), a Greek who taught at the University of Zurich in Switzerland.

He too demands in his Philosophie, Allgemeine Weltanschauung, 1911, that all philos. argument must be based on the acceptance of empirical facts as facts (p.4). And the cardinal fact in ethics, according to Eleuth. is the fact that man has a much wider control over his emotions than animals. (?Rusty) El. thinks even that animals do not have consciousness at all, that consciousness in the proper sense of the word can be ascribed only to man (p.68,54). The supreme law in Eleuth.'s ethics runs therefore as follows "Man should be considered and esteemed as man". From this he deduces that man should be respected in his individual abilities. But e.g. in Prof. Kant's formulas this is

not infered from such a formula and the formula is so vague that I think, nothing specific can be deduced from it at all. But especially what do you think of the following argument: El. believes from his supreme ethical law follows that man should not regard feelings of happiness as his ethical aim but he should not altogether suppress his sensual impulses either; asceticism and celibacy demand the extirpation of our sensual life; and this goes too far.

Josef Popper-Lynkeus, The Right to Live and the Duty to Die (1878), The Individual and the Evaluation of Human Existences (1910). Methodologically again much more radical than Eleuth. and Popper-Lynkeus is Ernst Mach (1836-1916) born in Czechoslovakia, physicist and philos. teaching in Graz and Wien. In his Erkenntnis and Irrtum, 1905, transl. into French and Russian, maliciously attacked as reactionary "idealism" by Lenin, he urges (p.102) that ethics and law are not sciences but only cultural technologies. Nevertheless they are scientifically more tenable the more they are based on the strict observation of facts.

therefore, far more plausibly than Eleutheropulos starts right away with the demand that every human individual must be respected as an individual and represents as such a supreme value. No duty to die for one's country in war.

Finally there are some remarks on ethics by a Russian, Aleksandr Ivanowich Hertzen (1812-1870). They are to be found in a work of his which is a kind of history of philosophy and entitled "Vom anderen Ufer", 1849 (From the other Bank of the River, From another Shore). These observations by Hertzen show again to what entirely different interpreta-

tions the simple reference to seemingly evident human experience may lend itself, how completely differentthings may be read out of the moral experience of different men. Hertzen was a wealthy Russian aristocrat who in writing attacked the Czar, was emprisoned and then fled Russia, lived in Western Europe from where his inflamatory revolutionary newspaper articles were smuggled into Russia and e.g. his essay on the Russian serf entitled "Baptized Property" certainly contributed much to the abolishment of serfdom in Russia toward the end of the 19th century. (Ausgewählte Schriften ed. Alfred Kurella, 1949 p.438ff)

Probably out of deep disappointment over the failure of the liberal revolutionary movements in Europe he pointed out that it is utterly mistaken to pronounce any ethical judgments at all. Moreover, he emphasized that it indicates one of the lowest degrees of understanding of man and history to evaluate anyone or anything morally.

To play the role of the moral judge at all reveals a childish attitude. It is the point of view of children liking to be fed with Aesopian fables. It is ~~axxk~~ as immature to call a man or a historical movement moral or immoral as it is to impute ethical attributes to animals and name the hare a coward or the lion a hero.

Now we have to deal with only 2 more varieties of positivistic theories in ethics of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. One is evolutionary, the other sociological-ethnological ethics. Who is or who are the best known representatives of evolution?

Already Jean Baptiste de (Monet de) Lamarck, in his

Philosophie Zoologique, 1809, stated: It is quite mistaken to start the study of factual moral phenomena with man in whom the phenomena appear in a very complex way. One has to start with the study of morals in animals.

There is evolution in the lives of the species. Certain organs and functions are slowly supplanted by others and all this should be taken into account by the zoologist and the moralist.

Charles Darwin (1809-1882) The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation of Sex, 1871, 2 vs. (What is this origin according to Kant?). Refers to Kant's invocation of the sublime origin of duty; but he thinks that the facts of natural history show the sense of duty is a half innate or half acquired natural altruistic instinct necessary for the preservation of any species and noticeable already in many animals. Blind anti-social, egoistic impulses are generally destructive for the group and the individual. And Darwin already referred in his Desc. of Man to "our great philos. Herb. Spencer"

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) perhaps the most widely admired philos. at the end of the 19th century, the classic representative of positivistic evolutionary ethics. Through him, probably more than through Darwin, the very term evolution became the most used or misused philos. term of the whole civilized world at that time.

An evolutionary ethics was already developed by Spencer in 1851 in his Social Statics 8 years before Darwin's first great work On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural

Selection. 1859. But Spencer's principal work is A System of Synthetic Philosophy. 10 vs. and the last 2 big vols. entitled Principles of Morality (1862-1896). All these volumes make highly unemotional, dry and rather tedious reading.

There can hardly be any doubt that even 50-100 years ago at the time of their greatest glory they were more admired than read. As in the case of Comte's 6 vs. it was therefore much welcomed that F.Howard Collins brought out already in 1889 An Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy in one big vol., a summary of the whole work as far as it had appeared at that time. But unfortunately, this abridged version of Spencer's work gives an even considerably duller impression than the original and this says very much. The original refers to a large amount of anthropological and psychological details, while the epitome is farê more vaguely abstract.

Nevertheless, Spencer offers of course, a number of views with which every student of the history of ethics should familiarize himself. His most characteristic statement is perhaps the terse and simple definition "good is the relatively more evolved conduct, bad is the relatively less evolved (developed) conduct." (Collins 1889, p.517, "The Data of Ethics", III, 8.) There you have evolutionistic ethics in a nutshell. Some complication however comes in by Spencer's partial criticism and partial adoption of hedonism. Spencer objects to the utilitarianism of Bentham, of Henry Sidgewick and others because in his view they consider happiness as the immediate aim of man.

Spencer is very emphatic in saying that is not a proximate end of our actions at all. So if Spencer hadn's been thoroughly British, he could have subscribed to Nietzsche's saying: It's not man who seeks pleasure, it's only the Englishman.

But Spencer was after all British enough to insist that the ultimate aim of man is indeed happiness. He tried to show that perfection of nature, virtuousness and rectitude of motive can never be used consistently as ultimate principles of ethics unless they are connected with the concept of producing happiness (Collins p.518,III,11-14; A Syst. of Synth. Philos; Vol.I Principles of Morality, Part I; Data of Ethics chap.III, Par.12-14). Even if ascetics torture themselves to please the godhead, still they must, in the end, enjoy ingratiating themselves with this diabolical god more than they suffer from their self-torture (System of Synthetic Philos. V.X "Principles of Morality", Part I Data of Ethics chap. III, par.16, Collins p.519,III, 15)

So Spencer concedes to the hedonists: the final aim must always be pleasure, gratification, enjoyment, happiness, blessedness, all only different names for what is ultimately the same. "Pleasure .. is as much a necessary form of moral intuition" he says, "as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition." (Ibid, chap.III,par.16, Collins p.519, III, 16).

But despite this fundamental concession made to hedonism Spencer insists that not the ultimate end but the immediate, the "proximate" ends are of decisive significance in ethics, and on this point only the knowledge of evolution can come to our proper rescue.

Evolution shows it is true we always remain dimly aware of the fact that our ultimate aims are pleasures. But between this final and our present aims more and more complex means are superimposed in the course of evolution and these means of obtaining ultimate pleasure then become the most important issue. Spencer, therefore, assures us that only a closer study of these means developed in the evolution of man will disclose to us far more concrete ethical aims of man than utilitarianism can do by pointing only to the final aim: happiness.

Evolution, however, proves, according to Spencer, quite clearly that e.g. the primitive strife for happiness by belligerent aggression is in the evolution of man supplanted by[a] far more efficient search for lasting happiness through peaceful cooperation. The militant society was and must of necessity be developed into the peace promoting industrial society (e.g.Collins p.401,528).

So this is what evolution teaches us quite concretely from (4) the sociological point of view according to Spencer, the ethical superiority of ~~t~~ the peace loving over the war and robbery loving society. But even seen from the physical, the biological and the psychological viewpoint evolution can give us some quite definite concrete ethical information.
(1) In the physical world, Spencer sees a permanent development from incoherent, indefinite but homogeneous states of matter and motion to coherent, definite and heterogeneous (diversified, variegated) shapes add movements of matter. And the same process he thinks is going on steadily and necessarily in moral conduct: the evolution from movements of incoherent, indefinite, homogeneous behavior to coherent, definite, heterogeneous behavior; and the later stage of

development is exactly because of its being later in evolution necessarily the morally better, more valuable one

ms II 24 (Tsanoff (?): The criminal may show far more coherent behavior than the honest citizen)

(2) From the biological viewpoint evolution shows greater and greater adjustment (adaptation) of the functions of our vital organs to the conditions of our environment. To care for more and more adequate functioning of our body is, therefore another concrete, ~~mmm~~ proximate demand of ethics to reach the ultimate general demand: happiness. Furthering our biological health is thus also a concrete condition of attainment of moral health.

(3) From the psychological point of view evolution demonstrates, in the opinion of Spencer, that subordination of a dangerous desire for a dangerous pleasure becomes more and more dominant and even by heredity more natural until finally -- we may trust - the psycholog. sense of duty will disappear completely and acting according to obligation, the moral act will become exactly the same as the natural act. So evolution tends always in the end to the production of prolonged and happier life and teaches us at least 4 general absolutely valid concrete rules in addition to the general abstract one: pursuit of happiness

from the physical viewpoint	:	the greatest possible coherance and variety of motions
" " biological "	:	the greatest possible adaptat. of our organisms to our environment
" " psychol. "	:	the greatest possible identification of duty and pleasure
" " sociolog. "	:	the greatest possible transformation of the militant state into the state of voluntary and peaceful cooperation

(1) Partly not so much more concrete than general hedonism

(2) Partly far more controversial than principle of general hedonism

(3) Our belief in and details the necessity of evolution -- or 18th century enlightenment -- no longer so unshakeable, imperturbable. Hedonism wiser, more restrained, critical, open-minded than this dogmatic confidence in evolution.

A very large number of ethicists in the 19th century, not only in England and this country but all over the globe adopted in one way or the other evolutionary ethics. We cannot pile up too many names here. You will find a good deal of American evolutionary moralists discussed in Herbert W. Schneider's A History of American Philos. 1946; Richard Hofstadter's Social Darvinism in American Thought (1860-1915) 1944, esp. Chapt. on "The Vogue of Spencer". A specially queer and amusing detail is there, e.g. that as early as in 1843 a Chief Justice of Rhode Island, Job Durfee, hailed the invention of the steam power as the peak (pinnacle) of evolution in the cosmos. Somewhat outdated by the use of electricity and atomic energy.

But to show how many deviations from Spencer's optimistic evolutionary ethics are possible it may be sufficient to mention e.g.

The biologist Thomas Henry Huxley = I think an uncle of the novelist Aldous Huxley and the biologist Julian Huxley - in his Evolution and Ethics 1893, does not simply share Spencer's optimistic thought that evolution itself will and must lead to the growth of altruism. He thinks

that is natural evolution brutal egoism, the "survival of the fittest" the right of the stronger dominate. But Morality teaches sympathy with the weak and demands the support of the suffering and therefore this can be maintained only in a permanent struggle against the laws of evolution. Not evolution itself will lead to ethical behavior. Only in the fight against evolution can morality be obtained. The English Alfred Barrat wrote even (Physical Ethics 1869), physically felt pleasure must in the end turn us to morality morals exactly as the compass needle always turns to the North pole.

Even far more pessimistic and even gloomy - in contrast to Spencer - is the evolutionary ethics e.g. of William Winwood Reade (1838-75) in his The Martyrdom of Man 1872. In the opinion of Reade evolution shows, above all, that every generation must suffer for the sake of the following one. But the following one is nevertheless, not happier. Science, the insight into all these details of evolution, alone can give us some consolation. Gives a whole history of mankind from this view-point.

Tonight we have to deal with only 2 more ethical positivists who had a very widespread influence, 2 Frenchmen, Emile Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. Then we can close this long chapter on positivism of the 19th and 20th centuries and can go over to metaphysical ethics. Mr. Monroe, I am sure will help us most gently to make a proper transition from positivism to metaphysics in histalk on the ethics of Henri Bergson and we will try then, explain also quite clearly what the difference is between empirical positivistic ethics and metaphys. ethics. Now back to D.

II.

E. Durkheim's (1858-1917) L'Education Morale appeared in 1925 after his death and he sometimes, e.g. in an earlier important work Les règles de la méthode sociologique (The rules of sociol. methodology). 1895. preferred to characterize himself as a rationalist rather than a positivist. So I think it will be most useful and instructive to see quite lucidly right from the beginning how much D's ethics is based on strictly positivistic experience, on strict empirical observation and how different his method is from all older European rationalism.

Desc., Spinoza, Hugo Grotius, Leibniz and other rationalists of this type tried to base all their teachings on logical insights which are as evident as mathemtical truths. If e.g. we say 2 + 2 make four, we do not have to watch and to check whether 2 + 2 apples make 4 but 2 + 2 cherries make perhaps 5 and 2 + 2 books make perhaps 6. We know beforehand a priori -- independent of any object we may see or imagine -- 2 + 2 make four, because the very meaning of the number 2 and the number 4 implies this, the law of numbers itself demands this logically.

To Durkh. all such evident logical or mathematical insights are not good enough in ethics, because they are linked up with the minds of individuals and their inner feelings of evidence . Durkh. wants to base all his ethical teaching on objective, given facts, facts of group life, des faits sociaux, sociological facts.

He implies it is a topsy turvy view of the universe to build up an yknowledge of any reality on the introspective feeling of evidence of individuals. In the humanities the individual seems to be the element and the building stone

sx of society. But in fact, it is not. Society builds up the individual, not the individual society. The group molds the character of its members. The indiv. can take shape only within society. Society is prior to the individual. Therefore not psychol. or even logh should be the basis on which ethics can be established but sociology. It is a hopelessly wrong point of departure to turn first to one's own conscience and consciousness to hope that by a single glance into our inward life we could gain objeckt. knowledge in ethics.

According to Durkh., previous ethicists relied in vain first and foremost on what introspection taught them. But they discovered there only such general abstract notions in ethics as (1) utility, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, (2) perfection of man (3) the dignity of man.

But all moralists who base their teachings on such abstract general concepts reveal, according to D., in fact no more than some subjective inner convictions of ∫their own. You see here 2 quite opposite concepts of objective validity objectively at work. To the older rationalism: objective is above all what is mathematically logically self-evident, what cannot possibly be doubted (suspected) as erroneous. Any given facts were considered only as empirical, incidental or accidental data, products of chance which logically could have turned out to be quite different. Logically it would be quite plausible e.g. that the earth have 2 or more satellites, not only one; that men in addition to their legs and arms have wings like the birds.

Therefore to the older rationalists all merely factual truths cannot guarantee strict objective validity, as the facts may change and mere facts as such can never be demonstrated to be true by purely logical insights. Stricly objective truth is only that which is based on exact logical reasoning or, as Leibniz phrased it, vérités de raison, reasoned truths rank always higher than mere vérités de faits, merely factual truths.

Durkheim, however, thinks exactly the other way round. To ~~Durkheim~~ him: Insight into something objectively self-evident is still bound up with some inner subjective feeling of evidence. Sociological facts, however, are objective because they are quite superior to anything connected with the mere individual and its thinking as an indiv. subject.

Now inspecting the morality of group life in all its various types, D. unearths as the first characteristic of morality the <u>regularity of habits</u> which every society <u>imposes on its members</u>. There are a very large number of <u>special, precise, definite concrete</u> prescripts, rules which every group expects to be obeyed. ~~Tgs~~ These maxims concern the situations which <u>present themselves most frequently</u> in life. And according to a <u>valuable observation</u> of D., this regularity in moral conduct which society demands is an obvious analogy to <u>organic periodicity in the human body</u>. Next to this regular performance of certain moral acts, Durkheim places the <u>authoritative</u> character with which every society <u>imposes</u> its moral commands on the individual. Regularity of moral habits and authority by which each member of a group is subjected to them can, then, be put together and make the more complex phenomenon that can be named: the

spirit of discipline. l'esprit de discipline. This spirit of discipline, the authoritative character with which every group demands a certain regular conduct from its members is therefore, called by D. the 1st basic element of morality.

The 2nd element of moral behavior is seen by D. in the devotion of the individual to super-individual ends, "des fins impersonelles, des fins supra-individuelles;" and there are, in his ~~mmm~~ opinion, only 2 types of concrete "superior beings" whom we can serve, a godhead or a social group. But the godhead can never be an object of scientific empirical research. So there is left to the scientist only one phenomenon of reality, which is empirically observable and this is society.

Attachment to a group
Moral authority
regularity of habits / needed for the health of the individual himself

Theyx are required not only in the interest of society. The individual does not renounce part or the whole of his true nature by dedicating himself to group life. On the contrary, only by this devotion can he fully realize and maintain his own nature.

In a special work, Le Suicide: Etude sociologique in 1897 Durkheim tried to exemplify the importance of man's attachment to society by some interesting statistic observations. He found: Suicide occurs 3 times as much with bachelors as with married men; twice as much in childless marriages and it even grows in inverse proportion to the number of children in the family. Now does this imply that the lack of social bonds favors immorality as D. seems to infer from these sociological findings? Are there not enough counter-instances which would rather obviate and offset and

invalidate such vague conclusions? For example: Do the fewer social ties which monks and nuns have with group life, condition any greater immorality? ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ were not such greatest moral reformers as Socrates, Christ and some of the Jewish prophets unmarried or childless? And what about thinkers of such outstanding morality as Kant, Bentham, Nietzsche, Pascal, Plato and others all unmarried? But be this as it may, Durk. thnks by stressing his 2 or 3 essential characteristics of morality he can bring about a full reconciliation between such old rival schools, such hostile camps as that of the ethics of duty and that of the ethics of the good.

Schleiermacher had already tried to do this in his Pflichten und Güterlehre, doctrine of duties and doctrine of moral goods. Hegel, when he insisted that only morality, dutiful motivation in addition to abstract right can from the good ethical life and who is the Oxford author of a comparatively recent book on the Right and the Good, 1930, in which also especially these 2 basic concepts of ethics are extensively discussed? Prima facie duties more basic than search for the good, happiness. Durkheim offers for this reconcili. between duty and the good a few particularly persuasive formulas. Duty, he says, quite interestingly, is nothing but society in as much as it imposes rules on us and assigns restrictions to our egoistic impulses. The good is nothing but society in as much as it something much greater than we ourselves and allows us therefore to gain an indubitable enrichment by our attachment to it.

Ms. T 30a

Finally, D. also tries to face the most crucial problem that ethics has to raise at all times and to which we too

must come back so often, the conflict between 2 opposite and even contradictory systems of morality. He evidently thought that he could answer these questions, too, by introducing a third and final characteristic of all group morality. He alludes, unfortunately only too briefly, to Socrates' and Christ's protest against an antiquated ethics dominating their nation. And he emphasizes that even in such ethical revolutions as those led by Socrates and Plato or by Jesus it is only an old moral authority which is abolished, an authority that has outlived its value but it is not ethical authority altogether which is dethroned.

The great moral reformers never protest against the spirit of discipline itself. They turn only against an outdated moral discipline. And they put a new type of authority into the place of the old one. In this way even the moral revolutionaries prove that authority of the group over the individual is indispensable, a new will of the group can be considered even in these cases as the will of the individuals themselves.

So the third character of morality is this, according to D., that a law of authority seemingly imposed by the group is, in fact, acknowledged by the individual at the same time as his own law, as a law of autonomy, of self-legislation. Now do you think this is a satisfactory solution of the most vital problem of ethics and the struggle between two completely different moral convictions?

Take e.g. the conflict between Catholic and Protestant morality in the age of Reformation, or the fight of Voltaire and other leaders of the European enlightenment against the

morality of all organized religion, against all churches and against the moral importance of all religious rites and ceremonies.

In such great conflicts it is small comfort to be told that even <u>then</u> moral authority is never destroyed (annihilated, nullified) altogether and to hear that only a new moral discipline takes the place of an older one. What we really want to know then is whether the new morality is <u>better than</u> the previous one, whether it means an improvement or perhaps <u>a retrogression</u>.

It may sound most <u>reassuring</u> to many people that there is always some authority in group life. But this strong assurance only <u>obscures</u> the main point at issue. In times of great ethical crises anti-religious morality against the ethics of organised religion, <u>communistic</u> morality against <u>the ethics of free enterprise</u>, our <u>primary concern</u> must be to look around for a criterion, a standard to decide which of these types of ethics is the superior one. Or we must <u>frankly admit</u> that there is no <u>such touch stone at all</u>.

But in D., this cardinal (greatest, fundamental) question ethics must raise is completely evaded and instead an answer is given only to quite a different and comparatively <u>minor</u> query. When mankind is confronted with basic moral decisions, then it does not give us the slightest assistance to know that some moral authority will never cease to exist. What alone could help us is to understand which of the two contending kinds of morality <u>deserves</u> to exist and to prevail.

If Durkheim had fully faced the very core of these

ethical problems he might well have realized that the age-old search for some criterion of true morality, cannot be as such ignored as it is with him. It is true, it seems to be mere introspection to seek after a strictly objective and evident universal principle of ethics --a principle by which we could clearly distinguish between morality and immorality, especially in times of ethical crises. Nevertheless the search for such a principle is certainly anything but a merely subjective or dispensable whim, as Durkheim obviously believed it to be

Lucien Lévy Bruhl (1857-1939) gives at least an implicit answer to that central question concerning a universal criterion of true and false moral authority. In his La morale et la science des moeurs 1903, he, in fact, frankly admits that there is no such absolutely general and objective standard of distinction between morality and immorality. Seen without embellishment the upshot of his detailed analysis, is simply that it is in vain and even unscientific to call for a universally valid criterion of judgment in ethics and to expect the philos. to provide one.

But then Levy B. goes further and wants to assure us that it is also quite unnecessary to look out for any abstract general mark of distinction between good and evil.

Descriptive sociology, he thinks, can and should now -- once and for all -- take (and fill) the role of all those old and utopian endeavors to establish a normative universally valid ethics. Or do you perhaps remember how exactly L.B. formulated this idea? "Scientific knowledge of the laws of social reality must be substituted for .. speculations on ethical concepts and feelings." That is to say, what we need now, is no

longer general ethics, but the most careful (a penetrating) exploration of the concrete moral rules, "les moeurs", the mores of our and other civilizations and a full understanding of the relations between these moral ideas and all other relevent social facts.

As I mentioned already, Levy Bruhl (is fond of) wanted to degrade general ethics by comparing it with pre-Socratic Greek metaphysics. There too all details of the universe were explained out of a single general substance, water, fire or air and so on. kx (Now has someone today some new idea as to whether) Now what do you think: Is this analogy between this ancient fire and water metaphysics and general ethics (is) tenable)?

General ethics does not presuppose one substance common to all phenomena but one principle as a criterion for judging all phenomena consistently. That's something entirely different. And modern natural science has by no means given that up. It is true modern science does not assume the existence of general substances but it insists on the presupposition of universal principles, universal standards of judgment. I would mention e.g. as such a principle that allphysical phenomena must be verified in the end, in some way by data of the senses.

So I do not think that discredit can be brought on general ethics by wrongly comparing it with primitive Greek metaphysics. But Lev. Br. uses, of course, many more devices to tak us out of universal principles of ethics. He argues e.g. that the voice of our conscience will by no means grow weaker by the fact that we know and understand why our conscience developed sociologically exactly this way. This can readily be granted. But this is not of the slightest relevance when our

conscience stands at the crossroads and we want to know in which direction our conscience should further develop.

One may be able to explain most perfectly why in 1917 a communist ethics held out special promises to a defeated and impoverished people. The Zarist regime had neglected the long overdue industrialization of the vast country and so on. But understanding all these sociological conditions certainly does not answer the far more weighty question: Was the new communist morality so superior that it was justified in ruthlessly extirpating all resistance to itself.[2]

But is this knowledge that all our moral judgments are largely socially conditioned any substitute for seeking after a general criterion to distinguish between moral values and disvalues.

One may be able to explain most perfectly why Russia was sociologically destined to give rise to a communist morality and Italy to a fascist morality after the first world war. But all this enlightenment by "la science des Moeurs" is not of the slightest relevance when we must ask ourselves in such moral revolutions: Is the New moral code really[3] superior or an inferior one? And this is certainly a question of infinitely greater, even practical weight than any problems of moral sociology.

In the case of Nietzsche's master morality and the ancient Greek cynics Lévy Bruhl admits that by these general ethical teachings men are thrown into very grave conflicts with established morality. And of course, Lévy B.'s sociology of morals could give no assistance in such basic moral clashes. But L.

Bruhl brushes these objections aside by the remark that such revolts in ethics concern only a very small circle of refined or paradoxical minds.

In 1903, it certainly seemed comparatively justified to say something like that. But in the last 2 decades of his long life Lévy B. most likely himself realized that this argument no longer held true. For, soon after the first world war, not a few eccentrics but millions of fascists adopted wholeheartedly an even grossly vulgarized version of Nietzsche's master morality; and many more millions became completely bewildered in their thoughts and feelings and could not any longer see whether the new or the old moral order was the more valuable one.

Perhaps it is quite useful to visualize for a moment this concrete moral situation a tiny bit more closely. In such critical hours of historical and ~~mmm~~ moral decisions there are always people who think e.g.: a true liberal must give even cruel illiberalism a chance. Otherwise he would no longer be a liberal himself. Such a view has all the best virtues of a sham truth. It can bribe millions and has bribed them in Europe after the first world war. But just on such points, it may be of some real value to think out a general principle of morals far more consistently.

It may sound paradoxical but, I think, it is after all, a simple demand of consistent logic that a liberal must be liberal toward everything safe illiberalism and intolerance. Do you agree?

Or take another example: in great moral conflicts you may frequently hear that cruelty is not immoral. Natural itself is cruel. But again one must ask: Is it true that nature is always

cruel? And if it were: is it unalterably cruel? And is strong -- not weak -- generosity perhaps far superior to cruelty? Or other examples: Under every national dictatorship free speech is considered as an irresponsible lack of political discipline, any interrationalmindedness as a lack of patriotism. And you can hardly imagine what a confusion of moral feelings can be brought about by such a re-evaluation of values in a former democracy.

So to repeat: in all such clashes of opposite moral views even the best sociological explanation of the origin of these views cannot be of any avail. We need, instead, something like a discussion of abstract moral principles in general ethics. And it is interesting to see in which way even Levy-Bruhl cannot help pay some tribute to this insight. He admits that on his sociological science of mores some "art rational moral" (rational moral art) can and should be built up. He never grants that the quest for a supreme moral criterion of objective validity is, in fact, irrepressible. But he admits, I quote, "in doubtful cases --presented to our conscience we must decide on the course which in the actual state of knowledge seems the most reasonable".

But this advice, of course, would mean that Levy B.'s new positivistic moral science returned, on this crucial point, even to the very poorest of all the old-fashioned types of speculative ethics which it wished to depose once and for all. For what is reasonable in a great moral dispute is certainly far more controversial than what is most beneficient or what complies with any other universal criterion of general ethics.

In 1938, e.g., Neville Chamberlain said it was morally unreasonable that Hitler wanted to annex more than the Northern part of Czechoslovakia. Others found every annexation unreasonable and immoral. But Hitler thought that to swallow the whole of a

neighboring country was perfectly reasonable and fully ~~fx~~ justified according ~~to~~ his most primitive type of master morality. So I think one has to realize quite clearly that sociological ethics cannot figure as an adequate substitute for general universally valid ethics. Nevertheless in their acute analyses, Durkheim and L.B. certainly did most meritorious work in emphasizing the importance of social conditions in morals, and in giving most valuable characterizations of the social origin, the conditions and the social functions of moral ideas.

Henri Bergson (1859-1941) the most celebrated French philos. of ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ the first half of the 20th century, one may say, fully shares Durkheim's views, as far as any socially established and sanctioned morality is concerned. But he emphatically denies that this is the whole of ethics.

In his only work on ethics, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (the two sources of morality and religion) in 1932, he insists that there are 2 essentially different attitudes in man's moral life and these attitudes have a noticeably different origin and equally different aims. One of these 2 types of morality is that of "la societe close", of closed group life. This common, most frequent (ordinary, usual, customary, established) kind of morality can be characterized only in a way similar to Durkh.'s description. There we have a rigid code of quite definite, concrete, fixed behavior prescribed by the community of which we are a member. The authority of the group which imposes such special precise rules is not questioned by the common man. This is the moral life of "l'âme close", of the "closed soul" which is permanently exposed to the pressure

of the group and simply obeys its commands. So the closed soul is essentially nothing but part of "la société close", a "closed society" and shub up in its community life, the conduct of this closed soul remains comparatively stable, static, always subservient to its environment.

In marked contrast to all this, "l'ame ouverte", the open soul, leads a definitely dynamic, creative life, never held down by the dictates of any closed group but opening itself up to all mankind to a fraternity of all men. There is no longer a simple submission to the collective will of any limited group but, instead, a free, voluntary following the appeal (the call, voice) of a moral genius, a great moral leader or one's own higher moral intuition.

Wgeb Whenever we advanee to open morality, we can, thus throw off the burden of fixed social rules and we enter the free world of the Imitatio Christi. Bergson wished to explain all higher ranking ethics of the open soul by pointing especially to the peculiar character of the moral counsel given in the New Testament. Jesus, Bergs. emphasizes, did not lay down rigid, fixed rules of a closed moral group life but he indicated primarily a new way of life, a new freer breezing of the whole spirit of morality. Bergson admits that the single admonitions of the Gospels often seem to be paradoxical or even contradictory. But exactly these paradoxes and seeming inconsistencies reveal, in Berg.'s opinion, the specifically dynamic character of Christian ethics. For any real movement is a paradox. A flying arrow permanently moves and nevertheless paradoxically stays and stops during every moment of its movement in one place.

Soa snapshot cannot give any accurate picture of a galopping horse any more than any static, strict moral rules

can characterize the "élan vital", the vital urge impulse in the open soul and its morality. And the step which open morality takes from subjugation to thewill of the group forward to the love of mankind, means not only a mere quantitative enlargement of the objects of ethics but a qualitative difference in moral devotion, an entirely new moral attitude, a liberation of man for a fully creative life freed from the fetters of the interests of any restricted group or nation.

So the moral life of the open soul is the life of in the élan vital, a life with and in the core of all reality, an immersion into the very heart of all things, a life of intuition and great vision and this is according to Bergson: metaphysics. Now what does metaphysics mean? Literally, that which comes after physics, μετὰ . In fact, it is generally believed that the term originally meant no more than the title of a work by Aristotle, which in the arrangement of his writings was just placed after the physcal treatises. But now metaphysics definitely means : Any inquiry that transcends the realm of our world of common experience. Any philosophical investigation that deals with the beyond of empirical phenomena.

The greatest flowering of metaphysical ethics in modern times, however, doubtless took place in Germany. And at the beginning of this powerful movement, there stands a thinker who did not wish to become a full fledged metaphysician but tried to hold a position quite near the borderline between metaphysics and the empirical world. Who is this philos.? Of course, Kant, and Kant still today has a very large following all over the globe. Do you remember some of the English, German and French Kantians whom I mentioned briefly before?

Herbert J. Paton: The categoral imperative, 1947

" " " : The moral law, 1953, mainly of K.'s Fundamentals of the Metaphysic of Morals

Thomas Hill Green: Prolegomena to Ethics, 1883

Prichard: Does Moral Phil. rest on a Mistake? Mind, 1912

W. D. Ross, 1930

Charles Renouvier, La Science de la Morale, 2 vs. 1869, 2nd ed. 1908

Durkheim

Marburg school, Cohen, Cassirer

And there are, of course, many more Kantians in the field of ethics.

So, I think, in accordance with special requests, I got from you, we should first develop quite briefly what Kantianism itself means in ethics.

There is a vast amount of literature which practically says no more than this: K. was a man of stern duty. Therefore right from the start he urged upon us the obligation to obey a supreme moral law unconditionally. But you will see, with only this in mind, it is quite impossible to do full justice to any of the many complicated analyses of the Kr. of pr. R. K. places a special emphasis on building his ethics up in a very farreaching analogy to his epistemdogy, his theory of theoretical knowledge his Kr.of Pure R. He very often uses exactly the same terms in the titles of the various chapters of the 2 works, the C.of P.and Pract. R.

Therefore, I think the best, the most instructive way to get at the gist of Kantian ethics is to procede from that idea which K. himself called the "highest point" of his whole philos. to which all his other ideas must be affixed, must be fastened.

What is this principle? Transc. Unity of Apper. Now the name of this principle may sound disquietingly learned and complicated but its meaning is certainly quite simple and clear, as you will see. And I think, on the adequate understanding of this principle far more emphasis should be placed as is usually done. We may say, throughout our lives we are <u>witness</u>, so to speak, to a never ending stream of data of consciousness which runs through our minds. What these data are, varies of course. There are primarily visual impressions of shapes and colors of things but also perceptions engendered by our senses of touch, of smell, of taste, of hearing.

Pictures, noises, odors, impressions of sweetness or bitterness, impressions of smoothness or roughness of objects. Remembrances of past events. And at the moment, I hope, we are all mainly thinking of ethical concepts.

Now generally and rightly we are <u>interested</u> only in the <u>meaning</u> or the <u>contents</u> of all these <u>many given</u> data we experience. We are <u>aware</u> only of this <u>material</u> in our conscience of this multitude of ever changing experiences. Many people, laymen and even <u>scientists</u> never <u>care</u> for anything else. But there is one other entirely different element (factor?) active in our consciousness which is, on the whole, lost sight of (quite unnoticed, quite neglected). This is our Ego which experiences all the multitude of our data of consciousness. It is a <u>uniting</u> bond which holds together (binds, ties together) everything we can possibly become conscious of. If there were in us not such an all uniting Ego, we could not experience anything. We would have only <u>broken</u> pieces, fragments of consciousness in our hand and these pieces <u>were not understood</u> and <u>could not be understood</u> at all.

As Kant points out in 1st ed. of Cr.Pure R.: Without remaining one and the same Ego we would not be able to remember anything of the past because our conscience would be only punctiform, not reaching back even to the last previous experience, just passed. We would not be capable of recognizing anything even if it had been presented to us just a moment earlier. We would not be able to compare the similarities and differences of anything as for the comparison, too, we need a bond of consciousness holding together the two things to be compared. Even in split personalities, in certain cases of insanity, patients think e.g. that they were a famous general yesterday and are a great filmstar -- or the prince of Monaco -- now. And yet even they still must have a unity of apperception. If they had no uniting Ego, they would not be able to think that they represented 2 different egos.

If the unity of the Ego ceases to be, consciousness itself ceases to be of necessity. So when our attention is directed toward this ~~unit~~ unity of consc. we do not deal with what we understand but with how we understand anything.

The contents of the consciousness of animals are evidently different from those of man. The mole,e.g. does not live at all in a world of visual impressions and the dog lives far more in a world of scents than we do. His main organ is not the eye but the nose. Even a man blind from birth generally develops much more refined tactile perceptions than we do. To the flies space has only 2 dimensions. But no matter how different these data of experience may be in different creatures there certainly is no consciousness without a uniting Ego, a unity of Apperception of all the experienced items.

~~There was one group of German thinkers around the end~~

Ms. 44a

So if we would act according to this purely formal cat. imp., we would according to K. not be determined by any material of experience, by any concrete desire. We would then act strictly out of duty, not driven by any concrete inclination.

Only "Achtung", respect for a universally valid objective law of all consciousness would move us, not any merely subjective wishes and impulses. And so we would become independent of all ever changing contents of our motives. And paradoxically only in strict obedience to a completely formal law would we become truly free.

I hope you can see now why it certainly was not a meaningless fancy or sheer pedantry that K. so consistently stressed the rigid formalism of his supreme ethical law.

But unfortunately an extraordinary number of Kantians in all countries have more or less watered down the acuteness of all these methodol. reflections of the master.

There was one group of German thinkers around the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries who paid more attention perhaps to the acumen of K.'s conceptual analyses than any other Kantians. Who were these philosophers? Marburg school: Esp. Herm. Cohen, Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer, and to them there should be added at least one non-German, a Swede Axel Hägerström and his extensive vol. Kants Ethik, 1902.

Herm. Cohen in his K's Begründung der Ethik, 2nd ed. 1910 tried in a specially instructive way to improve some details of K's methodology. But, unfortunately, we have of course no time to go into these details.

Ernst Cassirer WAS PERHAPS THE MOST encyclopedic mind of the past generation. He generally maintained faithfulness to Kant's ethics in his writings. But shortly before his death (10 years ago) he wrote me that he now felt much nearer to my un-Kantian views; and this letter has meanwhile been published.

In France, Charles Renouvier, in his La Science de la Morale, 1869, 2nd ed. 1908, presupposes on the whole without any basic critical examination that Kant was right to build ethics up on the concepts of duty and free will. Renouvier also takes over K's moral postulates of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. In his firm belief in free will, Renouvier went even so far as to write a half amusing and interesting treatise Uchronie (l'Utopie dans l'histoire); Esquisse historique apocryphe du development de la civilisation européenne tel qu'il n'a pas été aurait put etre, 1876, 2nd ed. 1901. A Sketch of European Civilization how it could have developed but did not. Quite strangely, in his L'Education Morale, 1925, even Durkheim thinks that his sociological ethics has most in common with Kant simply because the concepts of duty and authority play in Durkh.'s theory, too, an essential rle.

tel qu'il

Finally, in England, too quite a number of thinkers who opposed hedonism wanted to return -- at least partly -- to K. e.g. Thomas Hill Green in Prolegomena to Ethics, 1883, p.485: "The ultimate good is a perfection of the human spirit resting on the will to be perfect."

H. A. Prichard in his famous essay Does Moral Philosophy rest on a Mistake? Mind, 1912, and

W. D. Ross in his The Right and the Good, 1930, and his Foundations of Ethics 1939.

Both Ross and Prichard wish to stress the concept of duty, Ross that of prima facie duties in agreement with Kant.

Herbert J. Paton, however, represents an even far more ~~M~~ marked Kantianism in his The Categor. Imp., 1947; The Moral law, mainly based on K's Fundamentals of the Metaphys. of Moral 1953. Paton offers only a highly conservative and simplified Kantianism. But this may be enough about some of the best known Kantians of the 19th and 20th centuries. (Green Sidgwick 1873, Bradley, Unamuno).

Tonight we have to trace Kantianism, Fichteanism, Hegelianism and other types of metaphys. ethics down to the present day.

I, therefore, wish to repeat as briefly as possible what K's Categ. Imperative means. Categorical means: absolutely valid, valid a priori. It does not mean inborn, innate.

K's supreme law of ethics, the Cat. ~~Imp~~ Imp. represents the Unity of App. in the field of morals and as we saw, this Unity of App. means a logical presupposition of all possible experience. It does not mean that just from the time of their birth the minds of men are organized in such a way that they like to unite everything they apperceive.

Valid a priori, categorically valid, means far more. It means, applied to this case, that it is logically unthinkable to have consciousness at all without a highest uniting Ego. In certain cases of insanity, patients believe e.g. that they were a famous general yesterday and are a great film star -- or the prince of Monaco -- now. And yet even <u>they</u> still must have a unity of Apperception. If they had no uniting Ego, they would not be able to even think that they represent 2 different egos at various times.

So the Unity of Apperception does not <u>precede</u> all out other experiences in time by being an innate idea <u>in us</u>. It precedes logically in the way of a premise of a syllogism. Once more, in the terribly tried syllogism ∴ we do not have first an event ∅ that all men die but we have relations between thoughts which are valid independently of all time-relations.

(1) So it is a logical, not a temporary Priority by which we know e.g. that all our experiences of space must be ultimately united in 1 space. Try to think that you have 2 different types of space which have nothing to do with each other and you will realize at once that you are logically forced to think these 2 spaces as parts of only one. Logically, the Unity of App. forces you to think that way. And the same applies to time. Any time we can think of must be part of one and the same general time.

(2) Logically, we are <u>not at all</u> obliged to think in terms of a 3 dimensional space. Certain insects see the world in only 2 dimensions. A <u>superman</u> may live in a spatial order of only 1 or <u>4 or more</u> dimensions. All that is <u>factually</u> possible. But it is <u>logically</u> impossible to perceive anything in 2 quite different

types of space not referable to each other. The law of the Unity of Apperception prevents us from being able to do this.
(3) One and the same Ego, one unchanging I myself must be latently present in all my changing experiences. Or as Kant says quite simply: The "I think" must be able to accompany all my other ideas."
(4) Of course we cannot and we should not always think of this Unity of App. explicitly but implicitly it must be in my mind as long as I am conscious of anything. It must be there even when I am not expressly aware of it.

To experience anything means to have manyfold concrete experiences in the shape of one supreme necessary unity. All we can say about the concrete contents, the material, of our experiences is dependent on the inborn or acquired structure of the human mind and on other factors. All our judgments in this respect are, therefore, correct only under the hypothesis that other factors do not change. These are thus statements which are only hypothetically true, although the underlying hypotheses may be very well established.

But the law of the highest formal unity of all experience is categorically valid. It is not dependent on any other condition or hypothesis and on any changing factors of consciousness. And so we have here only this one purely formal law of unity superior to all other laws and a priori, categorically apodictly valid in all theoretical and in all ethical knowledge.

All these are the decisive reasons why K. kept his Cat. Imp. entirely free from the reference to any specific duty.

Could you please repeat the principal formal formula of the Cat. Imp.? Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation.

Now the man who gave K.'s cat. imp. a definite turn to the metaphysical, the first name in the succession of the so-called German idealists and avowed metaphysicians in the 19th century is Joh. Gottl. Fichte (1762-1814). He, too, still has followers even in the 20th century and we will soon speak about them. But I think it pays to give Fichte first special attention.

Fichte onee said in his first Introd. to the Wissenschaftslehre, Science of Knowledge, 1797, and this is quite a famous saying: "The philos. you hold depends on the kind of man you are. A philos. is not a dead piece of furniture, of household goods which one might keep or give away just as one pleases. A true philosophy is animated by the soul of the man who has it." This certainly holds true for Fichte himself. He was a man of an ever burning passion for intell. action, extremely conscious of his work, imperious, dominating and even domineering. Uncompromising or even aggressive and harsh in his insistance on the conclusiveness of his argument and convictions. He was a man of striking moral courage and has several times given quite obvious proofs of that.

Primarily, Fichte certainly was an educator by passion. Already when as a young man, in 1788, he was hired by a Swiss couple as a tutor of their 2 young children, Fichte immediately tried to educate the parents as well. This was certainly a sound idea. But it soon became equally certain that the parents did not like it at all that the hired tutor put down in a diary the daily blunders which the parents made in the education of their children.

I hope you will not mind my inserting quite a brief biographical and characterological sketch of Fichte. In the

case of such a strange and colorful personality, this may be not useless for the better understanding of his philosophy and may also be of some use as a change from our abstract analyses.

A few years after his stay in Switzerland, F. ran into a skirmish even with his students at the University of J. He opposed the rather questionable conduct of some secret unions, secret fraternities or orders at the university. The students took revenge, smashed the windows of his house in 1795 and he had to flee for some time from Jena. But he did not yield.

Around the year 1800, however, he had to go through an even more significant and serious conflict, a famous controversy on atheism. The very orthodox Government of Saxony accused Fichte of irreligion and threatened to prohibit Saxon students from attending the U. of Jena, if actions were not taken against the philosopher. Goethe, the poet who was far more of a freethinker than Fichte and who was his superior in the ministry of education in Weimar, would have liked to settle the irksome matter by a compromise. To Goethe the best way out seemed to censure the philos. formally but to let him go on teaching practically undisturbed.

But Fichte was not the man to submit to such a compromise. On the contrary, he took the offensive and tried to show in a number of highly spirited pamphlets that he represented the case of true religion and his accusers in Saxony were bigoted, superstitious reactionaries. The mere title of some of these treatises may give you some idea of F.'s temperament unfolded there. "Appeal to the Public against the Charge of Atheism, a pamphlet which should be read first before it is confiscated", 1799. Another title runs as follows: "Report on the latest

Philosophy as clear as daylight. An Attempt to force the Reader to understand" 1801. And the title page of an earlier writing on the French Revol. speaks an equally bold language. It gives as place and date of publication Heliopolis, City of the Sun, in the last year of the old darkness.

But in this controversy on Atheism, Goethe finally voted against the maintenance of F.'s professorship and so the philos. was dismissed from his University, and only years later could he find other positions in Erlangen and Berlin where he became the 1st elected Rector of the University of Berlin.

As the most important example of F.'s moral resoluteness is commonly mentioned the delivery of his Adresses to the German Nation, highly patriotic lectures given in the winter of 1807 to 1808 in the very face of Napoleon's army of occupation in Berlin. F.'s nationalism never went so far as later German chauvinism did. He still wished to respect cosmopolitan feelings and international obligations. Nevertheless it certainly was fearless and daring enough to arouse the Germans to new national pride under the very eyes of hostile French troups in the same city.

And yet, in another instance, F.'s moral courage seems to me to have been even greater. But unfortunately, this case is recorded in detail only in one of the big folios of Max Lenz' Hist. of the U. of Berlin. A Jewish student from Eastern Europe had been insulted by a German colleague and had refused to challenge the aggressor to a duel. Thereupon, according to the German code of honor, the offended man, not the offender was to be suspended from the University. But F. -- in opposiiton to all his colleagues -- sided with the insulted student and even resigned from his Rectorship on this account.

In the case of the "Address to the German Nation" the philosopher was, after all, sustained by the warm sympathy

and the general support of his compatriots. But in the other instance he stood alone even against his ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ colleagues and friends and this certainly seems to be the greater courage.

As this will be our last seesion, we'll have to cover considerably more ground than usual. You know I very much prefer to limit the topics and to have a pretty penetrating discussion of them. Nevertheless let's see how much we can get out even of a fairly hasty treatment of a good deal of complicated material.

Of course, one can approach the ethics of Fichteanism from many different angles. But to us it may be enough tonight to understand in the simplest manner in which way Fichte himself pushed forward from Kant into a new metaphysics of ethics.

We may say, K.'s categ. imp. is conceived as the supreme law of every moral Ego, the highest principle of <u>self-legislation</u>, of <u>autonomy</u>. But K. had placed all the emphasis on the <u>law</u>-element of this self-legislation. To Fichte, however, the self in the metaphysical sense of the word gains infinitely more weight than the law-factor. The same basic term, self-legislation, thus receives, in the <u>mouths</u> of these 2 thinkers the accent on a different syllable and this, then, leads to a world of difference.

The Ego which remained in K. ethics a merely formal concept, grows out in Fichte to the metaphysical source of the whole universe. And this can perhaps best be understood in the following way: Fichte fully agrees with Kant: in all our empirical knowledge of the world we remain limited to the understanding of mere <u>phenomena</u>. We can speak there only of the appearances of things but never of the things in themselves.

However, Kant's ethics -- and this was Fichte's conviction ~~right~~ right from the beginning -- could pave for us the way to reality itself. Of course, true reality could not possibly be a thing. If we would naively believe it were a thing, we would have ~~a~~ to ask immediately: What is the cause of this thing and so on ad infinitum: what is the cause of the other cause. The law of causality cannot permit us to stop these questions.

But if we turn to K.'s moral Ego and its self-legislative power then we can free ourselves completely from all these molesting and insoluble problems. Then we fidd there what earlier metaphysicians such as Descartes or Spinoza were always searching for in vain, a "genuine causa sui", a cause of itself, something that is exclusively determined by itself.

But this uncaused cause, this self-produced reality can never be a thing among other things, it can never be some substance, however perfect. Spinoza and Descartes were hopelessly mistaken in this, according to F. The true uncaused cause cannot be a thing, a substance. It can be only what F. called "Tathandlung", throughout action, original moral action, original moral will power. The essence of metaphysical reality ~~is~~ is thus revealed as a moral world Ego of infinite ethical energy and activity, an ordo ordinans not ordo ordinatus (an ordering order not an ordered order); natura naturaus not natura naturate (creative not created nature).

And this vast reservoir of moral vigor is so abundant and overflowing with strength that to reveal itself fully, to become fully manifest to itself, it must create a hurdle for itself, an obstacle, a counterpart, it must, as F. says, "posit" a Non-Ego. And this Non-Ego is the world, the world

of our senses. The world we see around us exists, therefore, according to F. only for one reason, to be material for our duty, to enable us to exercise, to train our moral power. I quote from "The material of the moral action is such that by the infinite continuation of this action even the empirical Ego would become entirely independent, absolutely free" = Syst.d.Sittenl. 1798, System of Ethics, Doctrine of Morals "Science of Ethics" tr. by A.E.Kroeger; Similarly "Sittenlehre" 1812.

Fichte changed his terminology on many points in his later writings. He then no longer speaks of the Ich, as in the Wiss. L., i.e. the metaphys. Ego. He then calls the metaphysical reality, e.g. "The Divine Idea that lies at the bottom of all appearance" (Erlangen lecture über "Wesen des Gelehrten", Nature of the Scholar, 1805. Or he speaks in the title of one of his best known treatises of "Imitation into the Blessed Life", 1806. But strength of moral activity always remained his main theme. And still in this "Imitation" he observes e.g. significantly and sarcastiely that it is not enough to wait for burial to acquire a blessed life. One has to do something before that.

Now you may rightly feel that all these speculations on a moral metaphys. World Ego have little to do with scientific thinking. In fact, many of F.'s more popular writings sound more like sermons and poetry. And practically all the German metaphysicians since Kant were in close contact and were great lovers and admirers of German poetry. Nevertheless, if one has any interest in the age old search for absolute, metaphys. reality then F.'s metaphysics is, I think, one of the most grandiose attempts to link the finite, limited world

of our daily experience with the infinite which none of us will ever be able to describe adequately.

Thomas Carlyle (1795 who lived up to 1881) was far less of a systematic mind than F. But in his temperament and eloquence he comes very near to the German metaphysician. In his Sartor Resartus, Taylor Retaylored 1833f, 1838, he opposes all doubt, all despair and all dependence on pleasure seeking by, as he phrases it, an everlasting Yea, a Yea of moral courage. His treatise on Hero, Hero Worship and the Heroic in History, 1841 is certainly one of the best known glorifications of heroism and will power in the 19th century. And like F. Carlyle throughout thinks, that the cardinal sin, the greatest vice, the very root of all ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ immorality is sloth, laziness, and cowardice.

In his essay on Labor, in the work entitled Past and Present, 1843, he anounces e.g. "the latest Gospel in this world is, Know thy work and do it... Work on it like a Hercules". All this is doubtless especially in line with F.'s pathos and F.'s metaphys. exaltation of will power.

Incidentally, how much of an orator Carlyle was may be inferred from the report that he could speak for hours on the beauty of silence -- Darwin told us this. And Carlyle did not seem to notice at all that the longer and more eloquently one speaks of the value of silence the more one weakens one's own thesis.

In the 20th century, e.g. Hugo Münsterberg (1863-1916) at Harvard founder of the institute of experimental psychology characterized himself as a Fichtean. He explicitly stated that he wished "to combine F's moral idealism with the physiolog. psychology" and the philos. of values of our time.

In his Eternal Values, which appeared in German as Philos. der Werte, 1908, 2nd ed. 1924, he assumes like F. that ~~that~~ there is a Super Ego ("Über-Ich") at the bottom of all reality and this metaphysical root of everything is moral action. In realizing moral values, we live in the most intimate contact with the heart of all actuality. This core of all existence is moral deed, moral effort.

Now, the metaphys. movement which led from Kant to Fichte and from there to Schell. and Hegel is one of the very few quite coherent developments of thought in the history of philos.

Each of these German metaphysicians takes his departure exactly from the point where his predecessor paused and leads from there one step further.

Kant had stated no more than this: action according to the cat. imer. is independent of all determination by the empirical world, the world of phenomena. But he had not gone so far as to permit that this free action can be conceived as reality in itself, because it is superior to the whole phenomenal world.

Fichte makes precisely this move: he proclaims that moral free action, the moral Ego is the true metaphysical essence of all reality, not a thing in itself but an energy in itself. This moral world Ego is the gist and the source of eveyything that exists.

Friedr. Wilh. Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) first fully adopted Fichte's ethical idealism in quite an uninhibited enthusiasm of youth. At the age of 20 he published 2 treatises which almost could have been written by Fichte himself. The title of one of these earliest philos. writings by Schelling

reads significantly Vom Ich als Prinzip d. Philos. od. über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen, 1795 (On the Ego as the basic Principle of Philos. or about the Unconditional in human knowledge). But later Schelling went on and argued this way: If, as Fichte rightly showed, the Ego posits (produces, originates) the Non Ego, then nature, the Non-Ego, must be somehow included (contained) in the Ego right from the beginning. There must in truth be right from the start a higher metaphys. unity and even identity of Ego and Nature.

An absolute sameness (identicalness, a self sameness, complete union) of Ego and nature, Thought and Being, the organic and inorganic World, subject and object, Mind and Matter, Reason and natural instinct, Conscious and Non-conscious Existence, Soul and Body, and so on. And this metaphys. belief, the belief in an ultimate identity of all polarities of life became, then, in the 19th and even the 20th centuries one of the most widely acclaimed articles of faith in European metaphysics.

This so-called philos. of identity or identity philos. was, of course, closely connected with the Renaissance of Spinozism in German thought. For in Spinoza, too, Mind and Matter were already metaphysically identified in one substance: Deus sive Natura.

From the point of the history of ideas it is interesting to see how after the great admiration of a philosophy of moral will power in K. and Fichte, a younger generation created quite a different climate of opinion. The rational will was, then no longer honored as the all dominating force of reality. The quit sway of non-rational nature was thought to be at least the equal of the conscious energy of man. So it is very

characteristic that the great and very profound humorist Jean Paul could ridicule F.'s teaching on the Ego which out of itself creates the Non-Ego. J. Paul compares this Fichtean doctrine with a talk between 2 people who want to speak French but cannot do more than repeat to each other endlessly: Monsieur, monsieur, a rather monotonous dialogue.

The poet Heinrigh Heine even more in the manner of a gross satire asked sarcasticly: If Prof Fichte produces the whole world out of the Ego it should be interesting to hear what Mrs. F. has to say about that.

So the young Schelling certainly was not the only opponent of Fichte in his generation. He was only an early and very ~~important~~ impressive mouthpiece of this modern philos. of identity. Schelling himself never developed an ethics on this basis. And later under the influence of the powerful mysticism and the mythological philos. of Franz v. Baader ← Schelling turned away from the thought of his youth. The few scattered meager remarks on morality in his works are rather unrevealing.

But other German and non-German thinkers took over.

Even in Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) you can find quite a number of traces of Schelling's philos. of identity, e.g. in his famous essay on "the Oversoul" publ. first, I think, in his "Essays" in 1865. This metaphys. reality, the Oversoul, is described by Emerson in terms strikingly similar to those of Schelling. I quote: The Oversoul is "that Unity.. within which every man's particular being is contained and made one with all other." It is "the eternal One", that "deep power in which .. the act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object are one. Every

right action is submission to it", to this oversoul. Schelling, ~~xxxx~~ too, used the term Weltseele, World-Soul, which means, in fact, the same as the "oversoul" and the term Weltseele appeared even as the title of one of Schelling's writings.

Perhaps the most elaborate ethics of this metaphysics of identity is to be found in the writings of the best known German theologian of the 19th century, Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768-1834). The bulk of these MSs were published only 40 years ago, about 100 years after they were written; and in these drafts to a universal system of ethics 1812/13 1814/16 Schleiermacher tries again and again to deduce all the basic moral goods and duties from the highest metaphysical reality, the "identity of Reason and Nature".

I do not wish to torture you with memorizing the following details. It may be enough if you get the main point. An Americ. philos. Rich. B. Brandt, recently publ. a book on Schl. Sch. argues

(1)If the highest good, the supreme union of Mind and Matter is organized, that means materialized by an identifying method, that is by stressing what is identical in public institutions then we have the ethical phenomena ~~xx~~ of law, state and commerce.

(2) If the highest good is organized, materialized by an individualizing method, by stressing what is individual in life, then we have the ethical phenomena of indiv. Property, free Association and general Society.

(3) If the highest good is symbolized, intellectualized by an identifying method, then we have to deal with the general ethical phenomena Science, Thought and School.

(4) If the highest good is symbolized by an individualizing method then we are concerned with the ethical phenomena Feeling, Revelation, Church.

In a larger volume, an American philosopher, Richard B. Brandt, analyzed only recently again Schleiermacher's relations to identity philospphy. But I do not think that the details of this metaphysical ethics of Schleierm. can still be of great help to us today. They offer hardly more than a good sample of a very old hope, the belief that if one divides a general concept such as the identity of nature and reason into all possible subclasses one can sufficiently explain the meaning and the function of the concept and the subdivisions.

Far more relevant and near to real life seem to me Schleiermacher's ideas about the emancipation of women. He put them down especially in his Confidential Letters on the Lucinde, a very bold novel of his friend, the romantic Friedr. Schlegel, and in a manifesto generally ascribed to him, Kat. d. Vernunft für edle Frauen (Catechism of reason for noble, sensitive women). This is a very witty kind of paraphrase of the 10 commandments and you find there such exhortations to women as these:

10 Covet the wisdom of man

9 But do not prettify their barbarism and do not bear false witness to that.

10 Do not conclude a marriage which has to be broken and dissolved

and something that sounded unheard of to older authoritative education:

5 Honor the individuality and even the caprices of your children

In his treatise Monologen (Monologues) in 1800, Schleiermacher stressed quite in the sense of the philos. of identity: That every individual is a microcosm, a small universe,

> is a mirror of the macrocosm, the whole world

and so man should fully develop his individuality as a faithful image of the whole cosmos.

Outside Germany, the philosophy of identity of a strange German metaphysician was amazingly much propagated by his devoted adherents in Belgium, Austria, Hungary and Spain. This was the philos. of Karl Christ. Fried. Krause.

Krause, too, thought that out of the highest sphere of union between Nature and Reason, which he called also God, all moral values can organically be explained.

The best known followers of Krause were Guillaume Tiberghien in Brussels, Heinrich Ahrens in Austria and especially Julian S. Del Rio in Spain and other so-called Spanish "Krausistas" up toward the end of the 19th century. Even such a sound empirical observer as the famous educator Friedrich Froebel was influenced by Krause.

Krause himself thought that with him and his new terminology a new era of history had begun and he wanted to include in a peaceful, harmonious fraternity not ~~si~~ only all men but also the inhabitants of other celestial bodies.

The Italians, Antonio Rosmini Serbati (1797-1855) and Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-52), who had numerous followers, also shared part of the ideas of the ethics of identity. And the same applies to the Norwegian Henrik Steffens (1773-1845) AND THE Swede Christopher Jacob Boström (1797-1866), part of

whose writings appeared only long after his death, 30 or 40 years ago.

And as late as in 1918, Salomon Friedländer published a brilliant work ℔ entitled Schöpf. Indiff. (Creative Indiff.). There, too, a final coincidence of all differences and contrasts of life is presupposed and the ethical aim is, according to Friedl., to combine even the valuable energies misdirected in hatred with those misdirected in valueless love until they form a higher perfect ethical unity.

But of course by far the most important representative and a kind of consummator of the metaphysics of identity is Georg Wilh. Friedr. Hegel (1770-1831). One may say that the stream of influenee going out from Hegel never ran completely dry. Up to about the middle of the 19th century he almost dominated the whole philosophical life of Germany. Then, after German Hegelianism had broken down, in 1865 James Hutchinson Stirling published in England his eulogy on Hegel in his The Secret of Hegel, in which he praised Hegel's system in the most glowing colors; literally he said: It is a gigantic dream palace of thought, filled to the brim with gold-and marble reflections.

And then - up to about the First World War -, quite a number of English and American thinkers engaged in extensive studies of Hegel, translations of his work and acceptance of some part of his teachings:

In England:

Edward Caird
William Wallace
David George Ritchie, Darwin and Hegel 1893
Sir James Black Baillie
John M. Ellis Mc Taggart, Studies in the Hegel Dialectic
" in Hegels's Cosmology
Commentary on H.'s Logic, 2nd 1931

Andrew Seth Pringle Pattison, The Devel. from K. to Hegel
Bernard Bosanquet and Lord Haldane
Richard Burdon Haldane, the well known statesman, The Pathway to Reality, 1903/4

As to this country, of course, especially the St.Louis Hegelians must be mentioned.

Henry Brokmeyer
William Torrey Harris
Denton J. Snider: Universal Psychology, 1901-06

They founded a Hegelian periodical: Journal of Speculative Philos. 1867

Further e.g. Elisha Mulford: The Nation, 1881
Alfred H. Lloyd: Dynamic Idealism, 1898

More literature in Herbert W. Schneider: A History of American Phil. 1946

But again when the interest in Hegel definitely died down in England and America, especially Germans and Italians had taken it up once more, e.g. Wilh. Windelband and Richard Kroner. And the 2 best known Italians of the past generation Benedetto Croce and Giovani Gentile tangibly subscribed to basic Hegelian principles in connection with older Italian Hegelianism in Bertrando Spaventa and others.

In France even in Simone de Beauvoir's existentialism, a special interest in Hegel is still alive in her Pour une morale de l'ambiguite, 1947 and in this country e.g. in Herbert Marcuse work on Hegel, Reason and Revolution, 1941.

As they said themselves more than 100 years ago, Karl Marx and Friedr. Engels had Hegel's system put on its head. They had completely rejected H's idealism and replaced it by a radical materialism. Nevertheless, they and the whole communist movement all over the globe faithfully stuck to Hegel's method of philosophizing up to this day.

When 25 years ago, older office furniture of the University of Berlin was distributed among the members of the faculty, I received a wooden chair from which, probably Hegel, Fichte, Schelling and Schleiermacher had once lectured. But unfortunately the mere possession of this chair does not make one fit to interpret these thinkers better. And especially Hegel is certainly one of the most difficult philos. writers.

There was a legend that on his deathbed he said that only one man ever understood him. But then he suddenly turned to the other side of his bed adding: Ah, and even he misunderstood me. Of course, I think this is a mere legend. Far more plausible Heinrich Gustav Rotto, the editor of H.'s lectures on aesthetics, certainly the greatest stylist among the master's personal students, described particalarly well the manner and diction of H's lectures. He reported how seemingly dry but how accurate the flow of H.'s speech was whenever he spoke about most intricate and subtle abstract themes. And suddenly there appeared mightly flashes of inspiration in his difficult analyses -- inspirations like streaked lightenings, illuminating an immense range of new insights by grandiose or baroque images and analogies. But when Hegel wanted to make quite a simple practical announcement, e.g. that there would be no lecture the following week or that class would start one hour earlier, then he grew somewhat irritated, interrupted himself by coughing, started afresh; and in the end, it was not even <u>too</u> clear what he wanted to say.

Now the question is, of course, how to approach best such an <u>enigmatic</u> thinker and how -- in the shortest possible time -- to grasp something of the extraordinary <u>spell</u> he has held over so many disparate minds.

Hegel was a friend of Schelling and the great German poet Fried. Hölderlin from the time of their common studies at the University of Tübingen and I definitely think one can understand the pith of Hegelianism in the simplest way if one sees it in its proper relation to the teaching of the young Schelling. Throughout his mature thought, H. remained an adherent of Sch.'s identity philos. He too always urged that, right from the ǵ beginning, we must assume a supreme metaph. union between all differences, contrasts, disparities, discrepancies everywhere in thought and reality.

And therefore he praised Spinoza so highly and warmly and insisted that every true philos. should first and foremost bask in the pure ether of Spinoza's metaphysics, in Spinoza's belief in only one all-embracing metaphysical substance of reality.

But then in the famous preface of his "Phenomen d. Geistes" (Phenomenology of Mind), 1807 Hegel wished to supplement Sp.'s and Schell.'s teachings ina very decisive way. Some of you certainly know the baroque analogy by which he wished to depart from Schel. without mentioning Sch.'s name? That means, the Philos. of Identity is quite correct as far as it goes. But it gives only half the story. We may say night and darkness have a most useful funcion. They help us realize the oneness of all things. But of ocurse light is even more needed to see and understand the relations of all things to each other in their oneness.

In other words: after having put together all concepts and all realities into one unity we must also learn to unfold, unfurl them again out of this union. And what is the name of the method to do (achieve) this unfolding? Derived from διαλέγεσθαι . dialogos

in English Dialogue. And a dialogue, or better to say, a talk and countertalk does not consist only of one statement and another opposite one, but the whole dialoque is in addition to this: a union between the 2 contrary announcements. So the dialectical method teaches us to see in every event, in every thing and every concept

(1) not only 1 side of the picture and not only the other, but the 2 opposite sides together

(2) We should never be satisfied with one simple thesis or one simple antithesis but must always progress to an adequate synthesis of the 2 contrary statements, and this synthesis may generally form a new thesis to be supplemented by a new antithesis and new synthesis

(3) Or we may express the nature of the dialect. method in many more other ways. We may say, as Hegel once indicated: The seat of truth is only the whole infinite reality. Our judgments, however, can reflect only on very small parts of that whole. So our statements always have to be more and more enlarged and qualified to come nearer the truth

(4) And perhaps noone before Hegel has warned mankind more against seeing any phenomenon of nature or history or the human mind in isolation, in separation from the others. In principle, probably noone has made us more aware of the subtle play and interplay of polar, hostile and reconciling, atoning tendencies in the whole realm of the humanities, in the arts, in religion, economics, politics, jurisprudence and so on.

(5) Perhaps the most graphic and yet penetrating description of the dialectical method was provided by Hegel in his Wissensch. d. Logic (Science of Logic), 1812/16. He speaks

there of a threefold way in which every antithesis and synthesis is necessarily related to its lower thesis. The lower thesis must be aufgehoben, I should like best to transl. this German term in this context by the Engl. term absorb, the lower thesis must always be absorbed by the higher antithesis and synthesis:

(1) in the way of a criticism, a correction, a partial negation, a partial annihilation, showing that the original statement is too limited

(2) the lower thesis must be absorbed in the way that it is in part preserved, retained, stored up, and thus part confirmed

(3) the lower thesis must be absorbed in the way that it now becomes enriched, enhanced, elevated, enlarged and refined by the higher ones.

(6) Do you recall the rather <u>grotesque</u> way in which Hegel in the <u>Preface of the Phil. of Mind</u> described the nature of plant life in dialectical terms? Neither the <u>bud of a plant</u> nor its <u>full flowering</u> nor <u>its fruit</u> can contain the full truth about vegetable life. As Hegel provocatively phrases this in dialectical terminology, the bud is <u>confuted</u> by the full blossom and the full ƀ flowering is demonstrated by the fruit as a false existence.

Goethe was <u>indignant</u> when he heard how Hegel applied such dry logical categories to the rich, and pulsating, thriving life of nature. But, of course, Hegel <u>intentionally</u> used this paradoxical language to show how his logical method could be applied to everything. And I think there is on the whole far <u>more challenging humor and irony</u> in Hegel than is generally realized and appreciated. Liberator - liberated. So much the worse for the facts.

Now, thesis, antithesis and synthesis, naturally, do not contain in Hegel <u>contradictory</u> concepts such as black and non-black but only contrary ideas such as e.g. black and green, black and red would be.

And it would be entirely mistaken to try to predict with logical precision what a Hegelian antithesis and synthesis would be after having heard of the thesis. There is in Hegel a free creative play and playfulness rather than mere logic when he shows this or that polar, dialect. tension at work and the main purpose is to show everywhere the manyfold and complex inner contrasts and similarities esp. in phenomena of our cultural life. Thus, in his various works, Hegel could describe the main traits of ethical facts in rather <u>variegated colors</u>.

I very much hope that you will get some impression of the ease and freedom with which Hegel speaks of whole series of dialectical relations in moral life, even if we contemplate only very few of them in an extremely condensed and sketchy way. In his <u>Phenom. of Mind</u>, 1807, e.g., in the chapter

(1) Lust u. Notwendigkeit (Pleasure and Necessity), Hegel starts with a description of the independence, the unconstraint which the naive man feels in searching for pleasure and the confidence he has to gain it. But dialectically

(a) instead of sweet joy man encounters only too often bitter disappointment.

(b) instead of complete liberty he becomes more and more aware of the necessity with which he is subject to strict laws of nature.

So free pleasure-seeking and the recognition of necessitation, compulsion, by laws must be united in a higher synthesis. And this synthesis is explained in a 2. chap-

ter called very colorfully

(2) The Law of the Heart and the Insanity of sheer individualism of individual arrogance. Here the individual imposes a law on himself in obedience to nature, a law of the heart. But dialectically this law of the heart finds its opponents of course, in the laws of the hearts of other individuals. And if anyone would ignore the hearts of others, he would reveal nothing but the insanity of sheer, radical individualism, of individual arrogance. Therefore in the dialectical development of the moral life both the law of one's heart and that of others must be abandoned and instead a law binding all hearts, all inclinations of individuals must be adopted, a law of virtue. But again, in this phase of morality new dialectical tensions arise, as H. tries to show in the chapt.

(3) D. Tugend u.d.Weltlauf (Virtue and the way of the world). As soon as virtue applies itself to the world and wants to reform, improve, the way of the world the virtuous must realize that, as Hegel says, "the world is not in such a bad way". Much virtue is already embodied in the world. Therefore virtue must dialectically advance from righteous indignation and opposition tothe world.

(4) The virtuous must identify himself with morality in life. He must feel that his personal concern and the general good cause he serves are one and the same

(5) But again, there are latent potential conflicts hidden even in this sphere. As much as an individual may identify himself with a general good cause others claim the same for themselves concerning quite different causes.

(6) So only a universal law of morality covering all possible good causes can offer here a synthetic solution. And so

on.

A much more simplified scheme of dialect. processes is developed in H.'s Grundlinien d. Philos. des Rechts, his Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 1821, newly translated in 1942 by T. M. Knox -- or an even briefer version in H.'s Outlines of an Encyclopädia of philos. Sciences, 2nd, 1827

In these 2 works mostof the complicated psychological sidelights are removed. Instead, everything is centered around one great problem. With his extraordinarily fine historical sensitiveness H. had obviously realized that all vital problems of mod. ethics can best be reviewed if they are grouped under the heading: conflict between the ethics of good will and the ethics of good consequences. So this latest version of H.'s ethics starts with a discussion of legality, the law of the courts, or as H. calls it, Abstract Right.

In this lowest sphere of morality, we may say: essentially nothing but the external conduct of a person counts. It cannot be the primary task of the lawgiver or a judge to examine whether someone paid taxes out of fear of punishment or out of patriotism. No matter what the motives of a man are, -- as long as these motives bring about legally correct consequences, the requirements of the law are met. A court of justice must be satisfied with the fact that a person respected the property of his neighbor: The court has generally not the slightest obligation to explore whether property rights were respected out of fear of imprisonment or out of the noblest moral motives of fairness. Men are thus regarded here, as H. says, only as abstract personalities in relation to external things, as owners of property, partners to a contract, not as people of flesh and blood with special motives and feelings.

Therefore, according to Hegel, a dialectically higher stage of morality can be reached only if the inner motives of men are fully weighed and not only the lawfulness of their overt acts.

In the 2nd Part of his Philos. of Right under the title "Morality", Hegel focusses thus mainly the role of human motives in the largest sense of the word and he tries to determine their proper place in the whole field of morality.

The Motive$, the purpose, the intention of an act and the voice of conscience are, in the eyes of Hegel, of utmost moral importance. They all represent the side of inwardness in moral life; and all morality would remain crude and uncouth if the inner spirit of ~~human~~ an action were not recognized as its animating soul in contrast to all the tangible effects of the act. As we can read twice in Hegel's Philos. of Right: it was a marked shortcoming of ancient Greek Ethics that in the Oedipus tragedy the hero was made fully responsible for a ~~parricide~~ parricide committed without any purpose and knowledge. And yet the brief chapter "Purpose and Responsibility" (Der Vorsatz und die Schuld) tries above all tobring home to us how much dialectically the purpose of an act is connected with the responsibility for its consequences. Even the highest moral purpose cannot free man from farreaching responsibility for bad consequences of his acts.

Again in the chapter "Intention and Welfare" (Die Absicht und das Wohl) it is urged that without good intentions no ethical aim can be obtained. In contrast to lunatics and children the moral agent must know beforehand of the moral quality of his action.

But it is even more stressed that the good will alone is not, as K. taught, "a good without limitation", an absolute value in itself. According to H., the inner will, the "enthusiasm" of the heart has necessarily to be supplemented, -- supplemented dialectically by the achievement of good results, by the creation of welfare, including the well-being of the agent himself.

Hegel rejects the ancient saying: Fiat justitia, pereat mundus, The world may perish, if only justice is done. Eudaemonism is not banished from his ethical system He wishes the partial truth which he concedes to hedonism respected. And he, therefore, explicitly statzes, I quote, "Welfare without right is not a good, but right without welfare is not the good either."

Hegel is often fond of playing upon words. So he uses quite an impressive pun concerning all these questions. He condemns the merely analytic Understanding for its teaching that the subjective and objective ends of an act are "mutually exclusive". It is, he sx says, only the dissective Understanding which brings all elements of reality to a standstill and thus, isolates them from each other. But dialectical metaphysical Reason and Intuition make us grasp the original flow of reality and free us from all artificial abstractions. Sheer good will, separated from all other elements of action is such a mere abstraction. Or, as one of H.'s famous sayings runs, "the laurels of mere willing are dry leaves that never were green." On the other hand, the denial of the greatness of good will, the assumption that even the genius cares for nothing but his personal welfare was equally mocked at by H. when he ridiculed, I quote, "those valet psychologists for whom there are no heroes not because

there are no heroes but because
these psychologists are only valets.

In the chapter on Good and Conscience (Gute und d. Gewissen) H. points again in the same direction and protests vigorously ~~and~~ against another tearing apart of subjective and objective elements of action.

Coscience, he explains, is the knowledge from within of what is right and good and, I quote, "it would indeed be a sacrilege to violate this sanctuary" wherever conscience really knows what is objectively moral. But as H. exclaims with F. H. Jacobi, (140, Knox 99) "how many men have committed the worst of misdeeds" with a perfect feeling of self-righteousness and good conscience. Therefore, H. warns again in this chapter against seeing any elements of moral life in isolation. Conscience -- in itself indispensably valuable -- can become most dangerous if in H.'s words "it conceives itself as the final court of appeal", and as the sole "arbiter and judge of moral truth" (140 Knox 102). Subjective conscience unavoidably needs what H. calls the "immersion" into objective moral principles -- the obj. u. prin. which are incorporated and have gained life in the basic ethical institutions and organizations of mankind, in the family, civil society and the state.

Therefore, the whole 3rd part of H.'s Ph. of Right is entitled "Ethical Life" and tried to display how all the abstract elements active in law and subjective morality are here, more and more generally, dialectically united. It has often been said that H. was overimpressed by the power and efficiency of the Prussian State of his time. There is a good deal of truth in this. It certainly sounds like an unbelievable idealization of the morality of states when H. claims for the state the right to be "venerated as a secular deity". (Add.272) It looks like an

intolerable hyperbolic metaphor when he sees in the state the moral "mind on earth" (165), the incarnation of all ethical efforts of a nation. But it should not be lost sight of that, in the end, all individual states, too, are,according to Hegel, fully subject to dialectical opposition by other states, and no particular state can ever lay claim to absolute moral authority. States go to war against each other; and so in their conflicts only the history of the world becomes the final moral judge.

At the end of his Philos. of Right H. explicitly proclaims that world history exclusively is the world's highest tribunal of moral judgment. With H. this statement has an essentially optimistic ring. He believed that despite all tragedy and misery mankind has to go through, Reason and the higher moral powers will ultimately triumph.

What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational, he daringly wrote in the Preface to the Philos. of Right. But we may see in H.'s concluding ethical remarks also a far more restrained and melancholy meaning hidden. If only world history is the highest judge in all matters of morality, then it is, of course, granted that in great moral world conflicts noone can foresee who represents the higher moral power: We ourselves will know only after the event and this certainly spells considerable resignation though there is probably much deep truth in it.

Now, as we do not have time enough to consider the many types of Engl. Hegelianism in any detail, I hope quite a brief reference to a comparatively less technical work by Bernard Bosanquet may convey at least some impression of the peculiarity of this British movement.

Bosanquet's Some Suggestions in Ethics appeared in 1918 and there he discusses such topics as "Living for Others", "Value and Goodness", "Doubting the Reality of Evil" with much English common sense and no specific use of Hegelian terminology. And yet very soon in his discussions, there appears the following observation: The basic fact is -- now I quote -- that "we are an infinite spirit lodged in a finite environment" (p.10). An infinite spirit manifesting itself in finite conditions, this is certainly Hegelian enough.

Then B. proceeds by pointing out that "living wholly for others" seems to be nothing but highest unqualified virtue. But, in fact, to say so, would betray a dangerously uncritical attitude in ethics. Before I put myself entirely into the service of my fellowmen, I should not forget to ask myself first: "What have I to offer to others?"

Or as Hegel put it, whom Bosanquet doesnot quote in this context: "Love thy neighbor! Yes, but love him with understanding." There are, as Bos. rightly says, too many busybodys whose would-be service may be the mere trifling of vain self-gratification.

So Bosanquet tries to show that it is ultimately not at all: persons who count in ethics but impersonal values. Even love, Bos. insists, is not concerned mainly with persons. Love is, I quote, "an imperious value which may descend on any persons and transcends all others in the severity with which it rules and refashions a personality. Persons are to love like facts to truth, a medium in which something is revealed greater and deeper than the particulars concerned" (p.11f). Individuals are only "the vehicles of values" (p.84)

These are, of course, old philos. convictions which

may be traced as far back as to Plato. But, again, their formulations are especially akin to Hegel. Modern English metaphysicians generally do not make any such consistent thoroughgoing use of the dialect. method as did Hegel and his many orthodox German followers.

Nevertheless, even in such a popularizing treatise as Bosanquet's "Suggestions in Ethics" you can hear that good and evil are "antagonistic existences" both of which are ultimately absorbed in a higher whole of "perfection"; and it is only "our finiteness" which makes us believe that good and evil are absolutely "antagonistic existences." This is, of course, truest Hegelianism as much as the further observations that in all our conduct "value" stands "against value" (p.8) and that there is, I quote, "always something to be affirmed and something to be let go" (p.10). How essentially dialectical relations are at issue in ethics Bos. tries to show by a rather telling example.

He refers to Bernard Palissy, the French inventor of enameled pottery in the 16th century. Palissy once burnt his wife's furniture only to keep his kiln alight. According to Bos. even such an action must not be judged in isolation and simply condemned as immoral. Or, as Bos. dryly remarks,"Palissy may have misjudged the value of a new enamel as against kindness to his family." Nevertheless, here too, as everywhere, we are, confronted with a "question of value against value" (p.9). But, of course, wemay add and Bos. would hardly object: If the thesis was to respect the property of one's wife and the antithesis to burn it for the sake of one's art, the synthesis would be to further one's art and yet not to destroy the possessions of the family.

Now, at the same time when H.'s influence waned and vanished in Germany and rose in England and the U.S. in the 2nd part of the 19th century, a violent oppoment of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel gained a rapid ascendance in their native country. He is Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), the leading pessimist of modern times and certainly a man to live with whom could make anyone a pessimist as well. Would you care to hear some biogr. anecdotes abut him?

Even his mother, a novelist and acquaintance of Goethe, mentioned in Thomas Mann's The Beloved Returns wrote him once: It is part of my happiness to know you are well but part also not to be obliged, to convince myself personally of your well-being. Your penmanent aggressive grumblig and ill humour give me bad days and sleepless nights.

When Schopenhauer sent his mother his doctoral dissert. entitled The 4-fold root of the principle of adequate reasoning, the mother amusedly referred to the term root and asked him whether his treatise was written for the use of young pharmacists. Schopenhauer irritatedly answered: Mother, my thesis will still be read when no copy of your novels will any longer be found in any attic. But the mother, not slow, retorted immediately in good fighting trim: Certainly the whole circulation of your work will then be still on sale.

After a few years of very unsuccessful lecturing at the Univ. of Berlin, Schop. retired to the City of Frankf. on the Main and dedicated his whole life exclusively to writing. But though he had no contact with the world of practical affairs, he nevertheless knew how to save his financial interests very ably. The banker with whom his father had invested the family funds before his death wrote the Schopenhauers one day that he

had to declare himself a bankrupt because large flocks of Merino sheep he possessed in Australia had perished in an epidemic. The banker, therefore, suggested that he paid the family Schop. back some part of their funds and the philos.'s mother and sister conceded. But Sch. himself insisted on being fully paid and he did so in very unusual business correspondence. He wrote the banker e.g. that if he would accept his proposal, he would feel himself to be worthy of being driven to pasture along with the banker's marino sheep. And he added he wanted it to be known to all business men that one can be a philosph. and must ~~m~~ not be a fool on this account. Finally, he really received back every cent due to him.

One of my teachers as a boy had still seen Sch. walking through the streets of Frankf. And he vividly described the gait and gestures with which the great pessimist strode along, ~~mmdt~~ pounding the pavement with his big umbrella, stopping suddenly and looking around absent-mindedly and defiantly and then strolling along again. Once a young policeman who had just come to town asked him: Sir, you behave so strangely. Who are you? Whereupon Sch. is said to have looked straight into the face of thepolice officer and ansered: My dear young friend, If ~~y~~ I could tell you this who I am I would be an even greater phil. than I am now.

He doubtless created one of the most lucid systems of thought in the history of philos. and not only as a thinker but also as a writer he decisively influenced artistic minds such as the composer Richard Wagner, the young Thomas Mann and many others.

Schop., too, -- like Fichte and his successors -- tried to build up a metaphysics and ethics in some connection with Kant's critical philos. In the 1st book of his principal work The World as Will and Idea, 1818 he emphasizes with Kant, that

the whole world we see around us in space and time and in the shape of data of our senses cannot be the world in itself, the ~~w~~ø things in themselves. And from this Schop. infers that all we see and taste and hear and smell and touch is nothing but a phantom, an illusion. Incidentally, had K. argued the same way? No, K. admitted ~~xx~~ that we can never obtain any knowledge of the things in themselves. But what we grasp by our senses enables us, nevertheless, to orientate ourselves in reality. The senses show us only the appearances of things, only phenomena. But, according to K., they do not deceive us, they allow us to understand the world in our way.

To ~~Sm~~ Sch., however, the world in space and time is only a mirage, a fata morgana, fiction, a delusion, phantasm, phantasmagory, phantasmagoria, a deception, a feint, blind, make-believe, fake, dream.

The naive realist feels quite certain that there is an infinite space outside ourselves. It never occurs to him (enters his mind) that space may be only a scheme, an idea within himself.

Man is thus compared by Sch. with a fly, an insect which has some drops of perfume, of musk, on his wings. Wherever this fly appears, there is a small of musk. To this insect all the heavens seem to smell of perfume. But in fact, the odor is, of course, not in the outside world beforehand. It is only carried into the world by the insect; and only therefore it is noticeable everywhere how far and high this insect may ever fly.

Thus there seems to ~~b~~ us to be a world in space and time always outside ourselves. But this universe is only our idea, and not a reality in itself. This is the essence of Schop.'s theory of knowledge, of his epistemology developed in the 1st

book of his principal work, entitled the "World as Idea".

The 2nd book entitled "The World as Will" presents, then, his metaphysics e.g. in the following way: If I lift my arm, I can see a movement of a body through the air in time and space. But this is only the outside appearance of what is going on. There is something entirely different happening within, inside myself; --an effort, an impulse, a will is manifesting itself. And of course, only this inside story can reveal to us the true character of reality itself. Even my body is only an external phenomenon. My will to live and to act is the true kernel of myself. And this insight is, then, applied by Sch. to the whole of the universe.

What we perceive by our senses is only external appearance, a façade view of the world which hides from us the essence of the matter. We see a thousand things dispersed in space and time. But in fact all of them are exactly the same as we are, if seen from the inside: they are one and the same will to exist and to maintain themselves in existence. You certainly see: there is some partial family likeness between Schop.'s will to exist and to live and Fichte's metaphys. Tathandlung, action, evergy and later Bergson's elan vital, vital impulse. But there is one decisive difference: Bergson's vital drive essentially tends toward greater perfection and Fichte's will is an entirely rational power. Sch. however concentrates exactly on the irrational characteristics we may discover in the will.

In great detail he points out again and again that the will can never reach a final aim to ∉ rest. It is by its very nature: insatiate desire, a drive that can never arrive at its goal. As soon as one end is achieved, the will must drive on to another. It is always in want of something. It never can

stand still. And this want means pain, suffering. Or if we do not seem to have any more needs as sometimes may be the case in priviledged society, then we are threatened by lapsing into boredom and ennui, dullness which can often hurt as much or even more than other types of pain. Suffering from wants and misery cause the pains of the lower classes of society and the pains of weekdays. Suffering from boredom and monotony cause the pains of the higher classes of society, the pains of Sundays and Holidays.

So, to will means: to go through never ending pain. As Schop. tries to show in the 3rd book of his work, in contemplating and admiring great works of art, our suffering from the will to live may be temporarily somewhat relieved. But it can never be stilled (quieted, silenced) this way.

The lasting solution can be only the complete negation, the mortification and suffocation of the will to live. This theme becomes, therefore, the main topic of Schop.'s ethics in the 4th and last book of his work. Suicide is no solution, in his opinion. For, in the self-murderer there is still far too violent a will to live. Moral Salvation can be reached only by following the example of great Christian ascetics and mystics, by fleeing from the haste and heat of desire, by letting wither all craving for life, by dying to the world and by trying to enter quietly, without brute force, the door of the absolute Void, the Nihil, that Nothing which according to Schop., was called Nirvana in Indian Philos., although modern sanscritists think that Nirvana has, in fact, a somewhat different meaning.

More than 20 years after The World as Will and Idea,

Schopenhauer published a much smaller work "The 2 Fundamental Probl. of Ethics", 1841 (Die beiden Grundprobleme d. Ethik). In the 2 treatises of which this vol. consists Schop. did not abandon his principal metaphysi. thesis that the highest virtue is the negation of the will to live. He always insisted that the world far from being the best of all possible worlds -- as Leibniz had taught - is in fact the worst possible. For, as he wished to show in detail, this world is so bad that if it were only a little worse, it could no longer exist, and it is worthy of negation by us.

But in the treatise "On the Basis of Morality" in the 2 Fund. Schop. grants that as long as our will to live is not extinguished altogether, the fundamental virtue must be compassion, compassion not only with the never ending pains of man but also of animals. For all living creatures are, according to Schop. expressions and manifestations of one and the same metaphysical will to live and therefore, as Indian philos. expressed it, wherever we see a carrier of life, we must recognize Tat wan asi, That are thou, There go I. And as far as compassion is only negative, as far as it refrains only from hurting other living beings so far is it only justice. Positive compassion, however, is loving kindness by helping others and relieving their suffering.

And opposed to these 2 virtues are the 2 main vices: Egoism, which does not care for the pains of others and Malice, which even enjoys hurting other life.

Of the followers of Schop. I wish to name only in passing the best known whose life-time reaches into the 20th century. Ed. v. Hartmann. His ϕ Philos. of the Unconscious (Phil. d.

Unbewussten) in 1868, transl. also into English, was a remarkable success. In him Sch.'s pessimism took one especially perplexing turn. He advocated the spread of culture mainly for one reason: to make us more intensely aware of the unavoidability of pain and suffering and to accelerate, in this way, the preparedness for negation of the will to live.

A mind, however, infinitely superior to Ed. v. Hart. was another German who also took his start from Schop. in his earliest writings. But then he outgrew this pessimistic metaphysics and ethics very powerfully. He is F. Nietzsche.

It is impossible to give in brief even the faintest idea of the richness and subtlety of Nietz; the psych. and historian of world-civilization. His ethical leitmotifs, however, can perhaps be characterized in a nutshell as follows:

In a very limited sense N. always adhered to Sch.'s view that the essence of reality is will, desire, the will to live. But almost from the beginning, the vehemence, the impetuosity, the restlessness of desire is to N. no reason for pessimism and despair, as it was for Sch. In one of his latest writings, "Toward a Genealogy of Morals" in 1887, N. justified his opposition to Schop. in one pointed epigramatic sentence. In the razor-like sharpness of many of his formulas, he says: Man can desire rather the nihil, the nothing than not desire at all. We can rather cling to an absolute void than to give up desiring altogether. Therefore Schop.'s hope of a definite extinction of all will to live is to Nietz. a utopian dream. Reality, as a whole, the will to existence, cannot be blotted out. Life cannot be extirpated by any ascetic ideals. On the contrary, life

can be made tolerable to us only if we enlarge it, intensify it, enhance, enrich it and elevate it to a higher level. The incarnation of such a stronger and fuller life is called by Nietzsche the life of the superman. Nietz. ridiculed the idea that with his superman he had thought of a new species in the sense of Darwin. He now and then refers to Cesar and Napoleon as supermen. But the picture of this higher type of human life which he develops in his principal work, his Zarathustra, does not invoke at all the image of a powerful statesman or a warlord and even far less that of a brutal, ruthless tyrant, a blond beast. It is a religious reformer, an educator and a thinker whom N. has chosen to present all his main ethical teachings, Zarathustra or Zoroaster, the half legendary founder of the ancient Persian religion. One does Nietzsche grave injustice if one sees in him a forerunner of Hitler.

Nietzsche did not subscribe to any of the 3 basic articles of faith of German national socialism. He was not a socialist and he frankly detested and abhorred any narrow-minded nationalism and antisemitism. He never indulged in any self-adulation of Germanic, Nordic virtues. Even in his latest overwrought outbursts against Christian asceticism and in his partial defense of the vitality of the blond brute, he refers to the vigor of many ancient/ races, including Arabs and Japanese.

In all his major valuable writings N. primarily insists that power and strength are by no means immoral in themselves even for the attainment of ascetic ideals. On the contrary, vigor and rigor of self-discipline and of will power are indispensable. It is according to N. a basic error to believe that true morality can grow out of mere meakness and weakness.

He called all these beliefs "Herd- or slave-morality" and he demanded a complete re-valuation or transvaluation of all values in this respect.

The will to live cannot be oppressed and far less be annihilated. Therefore it should in N.'s opinion be developed to a legitimate will to power and even be sanctified as such. The great moral life is only that which is lived with so much zest that it can say to itself: Da Capo: Once again, that it can welcome an eternal recurrence.

And the highest virtue is to N. not obedience to duty or meek friendliness but what his Zarath. calls "Radiant virtue" (Schenkende Tugend), an overflow of generosity, of spending itself benevolently out of an over-abundance of life and power.

In this way, the principal topics of N.'s ethics (1) the will to power, (2) the superman, (3) the re-evaluation of values, (4) Eternal Recurrence of Life (5) and Radian Virtue are linked together.

Jean Marie Guyan, the sensitive French moralist, step-son of Alfred Fouillée, who died at the age of 34, comes quite near to some of these Nietzschean ideas, esp. to that of a radiant virtue. Nietz. himself felt this when he read Guyan's Esquisse d'une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction, 1885. Guyan, too, stresses that life is far less saving, storing up and preserving energy than spending it, using it up, living it out, and that thus free creative morality stands much higher than any fulfillment of duty imposed by obligations and sanctions.

But a world rather different from that of Nietzsche and Guyan opens up when we now enter Christian Existentialism ~~in~~

in Kierkegaard (1813-55), Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers. Why is this modern movement of thought of which K. is the father, called existentialism? The simplest explanation for this is perhaps one of the observations of K. in which he blames the philosophers that they are almost exclusively interested in the essences, the given data and characteristics of things, the structure of the universe, and like Hegel, in the relations between all parts of reality.

And -- so continues K. -- in pondering over the essences of things philosophers have neglected to think of their own existence and of the uniqueness of their specific individual spiritual needs in complete absentmindedness. K., however, was determined not to fall victim to this kind of impardonable absent-mindedness and heedlessness.

How he fulfilled this promise let us inspect briefly only by turning to one of his best known teachings, his depiction of 3 stages on the Way of valuable Life. 3 Stages on the Way of Life is the title of a work publ. by K. in 1845. But similar ideas appear also in his other writings. The lowest of these 3 stages of life is according to K., the esthetic attitude. The artistic man lives a considerably higher life than the man absorbed only in daily, practical routine. The arts lead us in numerous ways to see the Infinite even in a single tree or a bird. When a poet describes a thunderstorm he and we are not interested in a scientifically correct report of concrete physical facts. The thunderstorm serves only as a symbol for conveying to us the feeling of the grandeur, the overpowering majesty of all nature. As K. once phrased it, every artist, burns up all concrete finite things in the fire

of his imagination of the Infinite. But of course the arts can deal with reality only by way of imagitiveness, of fancy; the arts themselves cannot shape reality and master it by actual action.

Higher than the esthetic stage of life ranks, therefore, the sphere of moral deeds. Especially in his book entitled Repetition, 1834, K. describes in detail how the moral man tries to approach the Infinite by valuable conduct. He can do so only by ever repeated acts of duty. By an energetic leap, all esthetic contemplation, all delight in changing scenes, in colorful varieties of experience must be abandoned. In this sphere only the steady, faithful work for the general welfare the service under uniform rules only an ever renewed devotion to a common cause can count.

But this field of social action in no way represents to K. the highest value. We are truly confronted with the Infinite only in quite a different religious way. We are face to face with the deepest riddles of reality only in the greatest moral crises of our lives. The trial of Abraham, this awe-inspiring old myth of the Old Testament is to K. the prototype of all the gravest moral experiences imaginable.

K. explains this in great dramatic detail in one of his most impressive works, "Fear and Trembling", also published in 1843. Seen from the average, the common point of view, the sacrifice, the murder of a man is certainly a crime. Add God's command to Abraham to slaughter Isaac, his only beloved son, is doubtless one of the most repellent and replusive ideas mankind can conceive. And yet reality may place each of us at any time before decisions similar to that Abraham had to make.

A pacifist may have to fight and kill in defence of his country. Or we may have to chose between other alternatives each of which may be clearly evil. Then no universal moral law can assist us any longer but only faith. Then we can no longer travel on the broad highways of generally accepted ideas. Each of us must then climb his own steep and narrow path to his own salvation -- as a solitary, lonely individual. And this concept of the solitary individual remains a central one in K.

Contemporary existentialism has worked out a rich variety of variations on these basic themes of K. Like K. in his Fear and Trembling, Martin Heidegger in his Sein und Zeit (Being and Time), in 1927 also sees in anxiety, in anguish of the individual the fundamental trait (characteristic) of human existence. This anxiety shows itself in the care for our daily needs, in handling the material means for our subsistence. And this apprehension reveals itself also in the solicitude, the concern for our fellowman. The supreme type of anxiety, however, is for Heideg. as for Kierkeg. the concern about ~~xxx~~ our own highest destination.

In the face of the greatest conflicts of life we must never yield to convention and live and die as everybody does. Under tension, we must always feel challenged to shape out our inmost being, to summon to life the hero, the full individual (singular) strength of our existence and our conscience in the fight against mental and physical death and in the lasting struggle against that great nothingness that surrounds and threatens all true reality.

In French Existentialism this responsibility of every individual for his own nature is stressed even more bluntly

and almost primitively. In his L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme (Exist. is Humanism) 1946 (?) Jean Paul Sartre, the well KNOWN playwright, says: "Man is originally nothing", or, as Simone de Beauvoir puts it in her Pour une morale de l'ambiguité (For an ethics of ambiguity) 1947, man is "at first a useless passion" but then, as Sartre adds, "man is entirely what he wills himself to be after his thrust toward existence."

In contrast to this French, and Heidegger's atheistic existentialism Karl Jaspers comes again much nearer to K's Christian thought. In his Der Philos. Glaube (philos. Faith) 1948 and in the III. vol. of his earlier work Philosophie 1932, Jaspers paints the plight of man in colors often reminiscent of Kierk. As he emphasizes, in the great decisions of life we must be always open to the divine, even if transcendant reality, the unfathomable Godhead, should never open itself to us, should never speak to us (p.103).

And according to Jaspers perhaps the highest insight into eternal reality can be won only in man's disaster, in his being dashed to pieces in front of the transcendant Infinite.(Mr.Boonin)

But, unfortunately, latest other developments in the ethics of the 20th century seem to offer in their ultimate results a picture no more hopeful than ~~K~~ most types of existentialism. And yet I do not think that we must conclude on a pessimistic note/

George Edward Moore of Cambridge, Engl. left a marked imprint ~~af~~ on the development of English and American ethics by his Principia Ethica in 1903. He tried to show there at great length that the very term good is undefinable and that it is -- as he calls it -- a naturalistic fallacy to explain good in such naturalistic terms as pleasure.

But this early work by G.E.Moore and his Ethics of 1911 evidently had no sceptical tendencies. On the contrary, he argued that the color yellow is also indefinable and nevertheless we know very well what yellow is and so we know what good and what other moral values mean. But in his latest writings, esp. in his "Reply to my Critics", 1942 (Library of Living Philos.) Moore is far less positive on all these points.

Contemporary Ethics of Values in Germany is much more self-assured and tends far more to metaphysics than Moore's highly self-critical conceptual analysis. And yet....

Max Scheler in his influential work Formalism in Ethics AND Material Ethics of Values completed in 1916, tried to draw a sharp line of demarkation between moral goods and moral values. He entirely grants that we can learn only from experience what concrete moral goods are under changing circumstances. For instance, a very rough and ready example - generally a good lunch is a good but to a sick person it may be a serious evil. A bitter tasting medicine and even fasting may be much better.

So the goods which the moral agent should offer to his fellowmen may differ in the extreme from case to case. But despite all these changes, the moral values which guide us in presenting all possible different goods remain entirely the same. Whether we give our fellowmen -- a lunch or a medicine -- it remains the same moral value which we have in mind, the value of his health, the maintenance of his vitality. And so Scheler enumerates 4 principal types of moral values which

-- in contrast to all changing moral goods -- can never change to a disvalue.

The values of the agreeable are lowest in rank.

Then follow the values of vitality.

Above them figure values of intellect, cultural values.

And on the top stands the value of the holy, the religious value.

Even this gradation of values is, according to Scheler, self-evident apriori.

Nicolai Hartmann, however, in his Ethics, 1926, thought it necessary to enlarge Sch's scheme of 4 values to -- as he says -- a whole "Heaven", a veritable "Firmament of Values". At the same time, Hartmann admitted that any gradation of values is much more complicated than Scheler had believed. So Hartmann mentioned, e.g. that the Nietzschean value, "love of the remotest", love of a higher type of man in the g future may rank higher than love of one's neighbor. And yet, love of the fellowman near to us, though not the higher, is nevertheless the stronger, the more urgent value.

The very last ethical movement, however, which I have to mention now, is perhaps in its methodology the most radical and skeptical one of all. It is logical positivism which originated in Austria and then flourished throughout the last 20 years mainly in this country and in England.

Rudolf Carnap of Chicago stated it quite categorically in his Philosphy and Logical Syntax in 1935: "Propositions of normative ethics, whether they have the form of rules or the form of values statements, have no theoretical sense," are theoretically meaningless.

And A.J.Ayer in England in his Language, Tr Truth and Logic, 1938, repeated: "Moral judgments do not come under the category of truth and falsehood".

Bertrand Russell, however, expressed the same even more provocatively in his Religion and Science, 1935 and Human Knowledge, 1948: "A difference as to values -- he states -- is one of tastes not one as to any objective truth."

Finally only one brief observation on emotive ethics which avowedly departs from practically the same presuppositions as logical positivism. Charles L. Stevenson, the main representative of emotive ethics argues in his Ethics and Language, 1944 that an essential part of any ethical statement must always be an imperative. But if I pronounce an imperative, e.g. "Shut the Door" it would be absurd to get the reply "Prove it." An imperative may be obeyed or disobeyed. But it cannot lend itself to proof or disproof.

Hand Reichenbach, Stephen Edelston Toulmin, Cambridge Engl. An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics, 1950 and Charles Stevenson have tried to mitigate the moral radicalism of their positivistic theories on several minor points. Nevertheless I believe C.I.Lewis of Harvard is right, their main argument "destroys the basis for any valid" ethical reasoning.

But I repeat: I do not think that all these skeptical voices of logical positivists and emotive ethicists should and must have the last word in ethics. I tried to answer ethical skepticism in a bulky work in 1952. And each of us must thus fight his own way to a constructive clarity.

I am afraid that unavoidably sometimes you may have felt somewhat overwhelmed by the complexity of our problems. And yet I should be very grateful if you would keep our discussions in friendly rememberance. I very much hope that our talks may serve you at least as a guard against the acceptance of any ethics which could be put to shame by what we discussed here together.

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WHAT IS LEFT OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

David Baumgardt
Columbia University

As is well known, Kant emphatically rejected Francis Hutcheson's assumption of a moral sense in ethics because such an "inner" faculty could not guarantee any objective moral knowledge.[1] But if one reads even best known expositions of Kant's ethics, one sees practically no explanation given on how there could be such a gulf of difference between Kant's "objective" practical reason and the moral sense allegedly merely subjective. After all, the mere term "practical reason" called the "origin" of the categorical imperative [2a] cannot guarantee the objectivity of that imperative any more than the moral sense deserves to be termed merely subjective and "erpirical".

If all these claims and counterclaims[2b] would concern only a matter of

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[1] I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788, Lehrsatz IV, Anmerkung II, ed. by Kehrbach, 1878, p. 49; and see "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten" in Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by Preussische Akademie der Vissenschaften, Abteilung I, vol. IV, p. 442, note, transl. in H. J. Paton, Kant's Goundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 1953, p. 110.

[2a] See e.g. Herbert James Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 1946, p. 31. Compare ibid.,p. 245 where Paton explains the actual meaning of "practical reason" and "the categorical imperative" as follows: "A rational agent must have direct insight into the principles of rational action", that is, primarily into the categorial imperative. But if this were so, there would be no difference whatsoever between practical reason and a common moral sense.

[2b] Samuel Alexander, Moral Order and Progress, 1899, p. 155, tries to characterize at least Kant's moral "Triebfeder a priori", the a priori reverence for the categorical imperative as "moral sense".

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terminology ~~they~~ Hey would hardly be worth mentioning. In fact, however, we meet on this point with the most vital tendency of Kant's ethics and, without its proper understanding, the central meaning of his moral thought is, in ~~my~~ my opinion, inaccessible. In view of the extraordinary importance which Kant's categorical imperative has regained in contemporary philosophy, in English neo-deontologism, in German neo-Kantianism and in American emotive ethics, a basic misjudgment of his moral philosophy is, of course, doubly regrettable.

The painstaking energy with which Kant built up his Critique of Practical Reason in strict analogy to the chapters of the Critique of Pure Reason has been ridiculed almost without exception[3a] as nothing but an amusing relic

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[3a] Emile Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl are among the very few thinkers who paid some attention to the similarity -- and not only the differences in the structure of Kant's ethical and epistemological main works. But the analyses of both these modern positivists considerably distort Kant's thought in the direction of their own empiricism.

True, in his L'éducation morale, 1934, pp. 124 f, Durkheim praises the Kantian parallel and "harmony between the theoretical autonomy of man and his obedience to moral duty. But all such concepts as self-legislation, categorical imperative and ethical duty acquire in the hands of Durkheim, the positivist, a meaning totally different from the strictly a priori character they possess in Kant.

L. Lévy-Bruhl, La morale et la science des moeurs, 1903, II, 3, Engl. translation 1905, p. 43, also points to the analogies in the tables of contents of the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Pure Reason. Still, he does nothing but deplore that Kant "forced himself to maintain the unity of reason under the duality of its functions" while, in fact, in the

of wig-wearing Germany of the eighteenth century. At best, Kant was "pardoned" for this love of symmetry as for the pigtail by which he still paid his tribute to the fashion of his day; for, after all, each of us, unconsciously or even unwillingly, has to make similar concessions to the spirit of the times.

Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the majority of the commentators on Kant's ethics place into the center of their analyses his Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals, the preliminary writing of 1785, rather than the mature principal work of 1788, the Critique of Practical Reason, the true supplement and analogy to the Critique of Pure Reason.[4a] Yet the paradoxical fact is -- and it cannot be seriously questioned -- that the fundamental justification of the validity of Kant's ethical principles is not given in his "Fundamentals of the Metaphysic of Morals" but only in his main ethical work, the Critique of Practical Reason.

Only in this basic work of modern ethics does he explicitly refer to the problem of a proof, a "deduction" of the validity of his supreme law of morals, and he does so in definite analogy to the "deduction" of his supreme theoretical laws such as the concepts of causality and other "categories a-priori" of the Critique of Pure Reason. These principal categories are shown to be a priori valid because they represent ways of the necessary unification of the multitude

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3a (cont.) opinion of Lévy-Bruhl -- like that of the overwhelming majority of Kant commentators -- all that counts is the differences between theoretical and practical reason.

4a In his The Moral Law, 1953, H. J. Paton goes so far as to rank Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals of 1785 -- rather than the Critique of Practical Reason with Plato's Republic and the Ethics of Aristotle.

of our experiences of nature and because, without such a supreme "unity of apperception" in all our study of nature and man, no grasp of the multitude of our perceptions themselves would be logically feasible. If there were not the unity of apperception of one and the same observing ego in my manifold observations of nature, I would never be able to observe anything, that is, remember several data at the same time and compare them with each other. There would be only isolated imprints on my consciousness without any association and, therefore, no knowledge at all. Studying manifold phenomena of nature, thus of necessity, presupposes an observer strictly uniting these given data in one single ego. Without this law of absolute formal unity, no multitude of natural appearances could come within our grasp in any way. The necessary formal unity of all our possible perceptions is, therefore, called by Kant "the highest point" to which his whole philosophy has to be "affixed".[4b] The purely formal unity of the categorical imperative, however, is nothing but the general law of unity of all perceptions applied to the field of morals, as Kant explicitly emphasized.[5]

Only for this reason did Kant stress again and again that a purely formal law alone can serve as an unconditionally valid law in ethics. As he repeated in all the three "Lehrsätze" preceding the formulation of the categorical imperative, as soon as we include the reference to some specific contents, to some "material", in our merely formal law of ethics, such a "material law" can no longer claim to be universally, categorically valid. Such a law containing the reference to a special aim of action is only hypothetically valid, valid merely under the hypothesis that this specific goal of action remains valuable,

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4b I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2nd edition, 1787, parag. 16, p. 134.

5 Lose Blätter aus Kants Nachlass ed. by Rudolf Reicke, 1899, Heft I, p. 14.

but not categorically valid under all possible conditions.

Kant's highest ambition, however, was to promulgate a supreme moral law obligatory without any restrictions or qualifications; and since the proclamation of the Golden Rule in the New Testament or even since much earlier times, countless popular, religious and philosophical types of ethics have evidently aspired to an end quite similar to that of Kant.

If Kant had consistently and exclusively pursued this goal, the analogy to his Critique of Practical Reason would have revealed that a purely formal law of ethics may indeed fulfill a very valuable function. It can show that, in the philosophy of morals analogous to the philosophy of nature, any pluralistic world view and even statistic science must be "towered" by a law of strict, formal unity which is the condition a priori of all possible knowledge of any ego. But for reasons which cannot and need not be analyzed in this brief paper, Kant himself finally deviated from the careful parallel he had drawn between the proceeding of general epistemology and ethics. While in his Critique of Pure Reason he was fully aware of a necessary supplementation to his supreme epistemological law by empirical research, in his ethics he hoped to be able to dispense with all empirical observation.

In all his ethical writings Kant piled up a considerable amount of acute argument to justify the self-sufficiency of a purely formal imperative in handling even any concrete empirical problems of ethics. But as I have tried to show in detail elsewhere, none of this reasoning is conclusive. Nor Voluntare is A.E. Taylor's defense of Kant acceptable in which he maintains that the moralist need no more a proof of the validity of concrete ethical rules than the physicist is in need of a proof of the law of falling bodies.[6] Drawing this type of

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6. A. E. Taylor, "Science and Morality" in Philosophy, 1939, p. 41.

(uniformly accelerated velocity

parallel between physics and ethics is certainly in no way permissible. For, first, Galileo thought, of course, a proof of the validity of his law essential and he provided an exact proof. Second, the physicist presents precise rules as to the cases in which a body falls and in which it ascends, while Kant ~~must~~ must remain entirely vague as to the cases in which, for instance, (the killing of an alleged spy is an act of praiseworthy moral love of one's country or sheer immoral murder, as the enemy of that country would have it.) Third, the physicist is always prepared to abandon or, at least, to modify the maintenance of validity of his empirical laws, while ~~such~~ most defenders of Kant (~~as A. E. Taylor~~) are entirely unwilling and unable to revise the validity of their moral laws on the basis of empirical observations previously not taken into account. Even J. S. Mill's strong summary statement on Kant's ethics is not unjustified. Kant fails, in his opinion, "almost grotesquely to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say, physical) impossibility in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct."[7]

More reference to the best known relevant passage in the Critique of Practical Reason may suffice to demonstrate briefly why all Kantian efforts in the field of concrete ethics must, of necessity, fail. In the note to "Lehrsatz III" Kant tried to show that the application of a merely formal imperative to a concrete case, e.g. the embezzlement of borrowed money, would immediately uncover the immorality of such a maxim of fraud. For, as Kant points out, if everyone would not pay back a loan, no one would lend money any longer and, thus, the self-annihilation of such a maxim would at once manifest its

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[7] J. S. Mill, Works (The New Universal Library), vol. III, p. 7, "Utilitarianism I".

wickedness. But Hegel already indicated in one of his earliest essays published in 1803 [8] that, for instance, the maxim of giving alms to the poor also leads to the self-destruction of that maxim. If everyone would give assistance to the poor, there would no longer be any poor left and, as Hegel ironically adds, perhaps no rich man either. Nevertheless, charity -- or, by the same token, -- universal love of our enemies are not immoral, although when generally practised, both these maxims bring about their self-abolition. The same applies to celibacy, as e.g. Henry Sidgwick[9] and A. D. Lindsay brought out;[10] even A. C. Ewing, in his defense of Kant, admits that not all maxims which generalized are "self-contradictory" are, therefore, immoral.[11]

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[8] G. W. F. Hegel, Werke, vol. I, 1832, p. 356, "Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts". Hegel repeated the same criticism of Kant in his lectures on the history of philosophy, ibid., vol. XV, p. 592.

[9] H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 1884, pp. 481f.

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[11] A. C. Ewing, "The Paradoxes of Kant's Ethics" in Philosophy, 1938, p. 50. Nevertheless, Ewing thinks Kant's criterion of morality "sometimes very useful" despite the admitted "difficulties about its application". According to Ewing, the criterion works wherever we are concerned with "ultimate principles" of ethics. But as Ewing grants that we can never definitely determine which principles of morals are ultimate and which are not, any defense of Kant along these lines must leave all the most decisive questions of ethics unanswered; the borderline between ultimate principles and non-ultimate, lower principles remains entirely fluid; and along with this complete lack of

Thus there are enough rules of action left which generalized lead to self-obliteration and are, nevertheless, not considered immoral; moreover, they are thought to be even highly moral by Kant himself.[12] And vice versa there are types of conduct which by no means effect self-cancellation -- like untrue exaggerations in advertising and Bolzano's strange imperative "Make everyone around you unhappy!"[13] -- and such ways of behavior which do not lead to self-nullification certainly are, all the same, immoral. In his essay "Can Reason be Practical", Herbert James Paton points out that "even if we consider ~~his~~ Kant's own attempts at developing a system ~~of~~ of concrete ethics ~~to~~ to be unsuccessful, there is all the more reason why we should ask whether it is possible to work out a better system on the basis of these principles, or at least on the basis of principles which are ultimate and universal and are presupposed by all

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decisiveness it cannot be decided at all which principles are immoral on account of their self-extermination and which are moral despite their self-abolishment by generalization. Nor can it be understood why the morality of ~~longer~~ lower concrete principles can stand "self-contraduction" when universalized and why only the highest principles cannot stand this test.

12 See e.g. Kant, "Metaphysik der Sitten", Werke, ed. by Ernst Cassirer, 1913ff, vol. VII, p. 212: "Wohltun ist Pflicht"; or ibid., vol. VII, pp. 265 ff. On the morality of love of our enemy see "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten", in Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaft, I. Abteilung, vol. IV, p. 399, translated by H. J. Paton in his Moral Law or Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 1953, p. 67. As to the morality of celibacy, see the life of the bachelor Kant himself.

13 Bernard Bolzano, Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft, 1839 (anonymously published), vol. I, p. 253ff.

particular rules of right action."[14] Even if we accept these weighty concessions made by Paton, we would be unable to let the matter rest there. Still in opposition to Paton, we would have to add that an ethics built up on these allowances would, in fact, justify even a moral philosophy so contrary to the spirit of Kant's ethics as hedonism based on the universal principle of the greatest happiness of all men. And this seems to me one of those numerous weighty reasons why a consistent Ledonism such that of Bentham should be taken far more seriously than is generally done today.

I have tried to give a detailed analysis of the merits and defects of Kant's ethics in a volume which became another victim of the Second World War, Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn unter den Vorlaufern der modernen Ethik, 1935, 382 pp. The book is to be found in a number of European and American libraries and was very favorably reviewed in leading English, French, Italian, American, Swiss and other periodicals. But as my publisher, Felix Meiner, wrote me, during the twelve years of the Nazi regime he was not permitted to advertise the volume; and in the last year of the war, all the copies in his possession but one were destroyed by prolonged airraids over Leipzig. I hope, however, to publish in the near future an analysis partly abridged, partly considerably enlarged of all these problems giving special consideration to the literature which appeared after the publication of my volume of 1933.

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[14] H. J. Paton, "Can Reason be Practical", Proceedings of the British Academy, 1943, p. 103.

over please

Although in contrast to Kant, he concedes a positive attitude of give and take to the most complex feelings of the human heart and strives at the same time the highest moral goal, the overcoming of the egoistic

Resumé

(#18 on typed list)

~~con~~ permissible

psych. - not ethical.

Kant rested ~~his~~ his ethics aim at no/higher ~~a~~ good ~~than~~ is supposed even in best known comments on his work. He was ~~not~~ satisfied with any dogmatic statements on a supreme law of practical reason or ~~a~~ test ~~for~~ in a rational moral sense or established ~~of~~ what is moral right and duty. He wished, ~~above all~~, in a strictly critical methodology why only a ~~certain~~ formal criterion can be the basis of any objective judgment in moral ~~matters~~. Despite an overwhelming array of subtle arguments ~~in support of~~ by K. tried to make all concrete application of his formal supreme law unambiguous he ~~not~~ failed in these efforts.

This fact forces us to ~~the~~ conclusion that his supreme moral law ~~has~~ he failed in this effort.

But ~~the~~ core of his principal theses will ~~and must~~ remain. In contrast to ~~the~~ ~~necessity~~ ~~condition~~ of the ~~strict~~ ~~his~~ strictness in ethics, ~~K. was~~ we need to stress ~~the~~ highest formal unity of apperception in morals as well as in physics. ~~Kant was right in calling~~ consciousness ~~the~~ indispensable of a unity ego for the understanding of any multitude of perceptions as well as the actions + he himself stressed the vital parallel between his supreme law - the C. of P. + Tract, ~~yet~~ ~~failed~~ deplorable ~~many~~ for reasons ~~not~~ completely ~~in the end~~ ~~clear~~ he deviated from this parallel.

In the vast literature on Kant, one cardinal point has been totally overlooked with especially adverse results. It is ~~generally~~ unnoticed ~~that~~ For ~~with~~ ~~Kant~~ this highest point of unity ~~was~~ can be consistently sought + ~~ask~~ as in ethics no consistent moral evaluation ~~is~~ can ever become possible, as K. successfully demonstrated ~~for the first time~~ same epistemology - in his part of the K./in the chapter on the Deduction of the categ. + the unity of apperc."

There is no other way of avoiding the fall into catastrophic relativism in ethics than a concrete application of the evaluation ~~to be~~ ~~taken~~ to ~~the~~ ~~actual~~ actual conflicts as in the

Regrettably ~~in~~ account of ~~the~~ ~~limited~~ time I had to leave many ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~notes~~ ~~in~~ my files.

At the suggestion of the PU Tutor - L (Congress, ~~Oct~~ will I gratefully heed a ~~paper~~ ~~request~~ I am sending you a ~~many~~ ~~several~~ of my sketches ~~of~~ ~~the~~ I have a large number of fair copies ~~of~~ my colleagues + the intellect ~~of~~ ~~from~~ ~~Letters~~ Answers + have practically ~~to~~ Europe, too. reveal this, ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~extent~~ ~~of~~ the ~~Tract~~ I would be ~~glad~~ obliged to you - if you would include ~~a~~ abstract ~~in~~ your ~~prog.~~ ~~of~~ on the Tract.

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WHAT IS LEFT OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

David Baumgardt
Columbia University

As is well known, Kant emphatically rejected Francis Hutcheson's assumption of a moral sense in ethics because such an "inner" faculty could not guarantee any objective moral knowledge.[1] But if one reads even best known expositions of Kant's ethics, one sees practically no explanation given on how there could be such a gulf of difference between Kant's "objective" practical reason and the moral sense allegedly merely subjective. After all, the mere term "practical reason" called the "origin" of the categorical imperative [2a] cannot guarantee the objectivity of that imperative any more than the moral sense deserves to be termed merely subjective and "empirical".

If all these claims and counterclaims[2b] would concern only a matter of

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[1] I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788, Lehrsatz IV, Anmerkung II, ed. by Kehrbach, 1878, p. 49; and see "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten" in Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by Preussische Akademie der Vissenschaften, Abteilung I, vol. IV, p. 442, note, transl. in H. J. Paton, Kant's Goundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 1957. p. 110.

[2a] See e.g. Herbert James Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 1946, p. 31. Compare ibid.,p. 245 where Paton explains the actual meaning of "practical reason" and "the categorical imperative" as follows: "A rational agent must have direct insight into the principles of rational action", that is, primarily into the categorial imperative. But if this were so, there would be no difference whatsoever between practical reason and a common moral sense.

[2b] Samuel Alexander, Moral Order and Progress, 1899, p. 155, tries to characterize at least Kant's moral "Triebfeder a priori", the a priori reverence for the categorical imperative as "moral sense".

terminology they would hardly be worth mentioning. In fact, however, we meet on this point with the most vital tendency of Kant's ethics and, without its proper understanding, the central meaning of his moral thought is, in my opinion, inaccessible. In view of the extraordinary importance which Kant's categorical imperative has regained in contemporary philosophy, in English neo-deontologism, in German neo-Kantianism and in American emotive ethics, a basic misjudgment of his moral philosophy is, of course, doubly regrettable.

The painstaking energy with which Kant built up his Critique of Practical Reason in strict analogy to the chapters of the Critique of Pure Reason has been ridiculed almost without exception[3a] as nothing but an amusing relic

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[3a] Emile Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl are among the very few thinkers who paid some attention to the similarity -- and not only the differences in the structure of Kant's ethical and epistemological main works. But the analyses of both these modern positivists considerably distort Kant's thought in the direction of their own empiricism.

True, in his L'éducation morale, 1934, pp. 124 f, Durkheim praises the Kantian parallel and "harmony between the theoretical autonomy of men and his obedience to moral duty. But all such concepts as self-legislation, categorical imperative and ethical duty acquire in the hands of Durkheim, the positivist, a meaning totally different from the strictly a priori character they possess in Kant.

L. Lévy-Bruhl, La morale et la science des moeurs, 1903, II, 3, Engl. translation 1905, p. 43, also points to the analogies in the tables of contents of the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Pure Reason. Still, he does nothing but deplore that Kant "forced himself to maintain the unity of reason under the duality of its functions" while, in fact, in the

of wig-wearing Germany of the eighteenth century. At best, Kant was "pardoned" for this love of symmetry as for the pigtail by which he still paid his tribute to the fashion of his day; for, after all, each of us, unconsciously or even unwillingly, has to make similar concessions to the spirit of the times.

Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the majority of the commentators on Kant's ethics place into the center of their analyses his Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals, the preliminary writing of 1785, rather than the mature principal work of 1788, the Critique of Practical Reason, the true supplement and analogy to the Critique of Pure Reason.[4a] Yet the paradoxical fact is -- and it cannot be seriously questioned -- that the fundamental justification of the validity of Kant's ethical principles is not given in his "Fundamentals of the Metaphysic of Morals" but only in his main ethical work, the Critique of Practical Reason.

Only in this basic work of modern ethics does he explicitly refer to the problem of a proof, a "deduction" of the validity of his supreme law of morals, and he does so in definite analogy to the "deduction" of his supreme theoretical laws such as the concepts of causality and other "categories a-priori" of the Critique of Pure Reason. These principal categories are shown to be a priori valid because they represent ways of the necessary unification of the multitude

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3a (cont.) opinion of Lévy-Bruhl -- like that of the overwhelming majority of Kant commentators -- all that counts is the differences between theoretical and practical reason.

4a In his The Moral Law, 1953, H. J. Paton goes so far as to rank Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals of 1785 -- rather than the Critique of Practical Reason with Plato's Republic and the Ethics of Aristotle.

of our experiences of nature and because, without such a supreme "unity of apperception" in all our study of nature and man, no grasp of the multitude of our perceptions themselves would be logically feasible. If there were not the unity of apperception of one and the same observing ego in my manifold observations of nature, I would never be able to observe anything, ~~i.e.,~~ that is, remember several data at the same time and compare them with each other. There would be only isolated imprints on my consciousness without any association and, therefore, no knowledge at all. Studying manifold phenomena of nature, thus of necessity, presupposes an observer strictly uniting these given data in one single ego. Without this law of absolute formal unity, no multitude of natural appearances could come within our grasp in any way. The necessary formal unity of all our possible perceptions is, therefore, called by Kant "the highest point" to which his whole philosophy has to be "affixed".[4b] The purely formal unity of the categorical imperative, however, is nothing but the general law of unity of all perceptions applied to the field of morals, as Kant explicitly emphasized.[5]

Only for this reason did Kant stress ~~it~~ again and again that a purely formal law alone can serve as an unconditionally valid law in ethics. As he repeated in all the three "Lehrsätze" preceding the formulation of the categorical imperative, as soon as we include the reference to some specific contents, to some "material", in our merely formal law of ethics, such a "material law" can no longer claim to be universally, categorically valid. Such a law containing the reference to a special aim of action is only hypothetically valid, valid merely under the hypothesis that this specific goal of action remains valuable,

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[4b] I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2nd edition, 1787, parag. 16, p. 134.

[5] Lose Blätter aus Kants Nachlass ed. by Rudolf Reicke, 1899, Heft I, p. 14.

but not categorically valid under all possible conditions.

Kant's highest ambition, however, was to promulgate a supreme moral law obligatory without any restrictions or qualifications; and since the proclamation of the Golden Rule in the New Testament or even since much earlier times, countless popular, religious and philosophical types of ethics have evidently aspired to an end quite similar to that of Kant.

If Kant had consistently and exclusively pursued this goal, the analogy to his Critique of Practical Reason would have revealed that a purely formal law of ethics may indeed fulfill a very valuable function. It can show that, in the philosophy of morals analogous to the philosophy of nature, any pluralistic world view and even statistic/ science must be "towered" by a law of strict, formal unity which is the condition a priori of all possible knowledge of any ego. But for reasons which cannot and need not be analyzed in this brief paper, Kant himself finally deviated from the ...ceful parallel he had drawn between the proceeding of general epistemology and ethics. While in his Critique of Pure Reason he was fully aware of a necessary supplementation to his supreme epistemological law by empirical research, in his ethics he hoped to be able to dispense with all empirical observation.

In all his ethical writings Kant piled up a considerable amount of acute argument to justify the self-sufficiency of a purely formal imperative in handling even any concrete empirical problems of ethics. But as I have tried to show in detail elsewhere, none of this reasoning is conclusive. Nor for instance e.g. is A.E. Taylor's defense of Kant acceptable in which he maintains that the moralist need no more a proof of the validity of concrete ethical rules than the physicist is in need of a proof of the law of falling bodies.[6] Drawing this type of

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6. A. E. Taylor, "Science and Morality" in Philosophy, 1939, p. 41.

parallel between physics and ethics is certainly in no way permissible. For, first, Galileo thought, of course, a proof of the validity of his law essential and he provided an exact proof. Second, the physicist presents precise rules as to the cases in which a body falls and in which it ascends, while Kant must remain entirely vague as to the cases in which, for instance, (the killing of a militarist thinks it his moral duty to go to war for his country while the pacifist condemns an alleged spy is an act of praiseworthy moral love of one's country or sheer any war as mass-murder. immoral murder, as the enemy of that country would have it.) Third, the physicist is always prepared to abandon or, at least, to modify the maintenance of validity of his empirical laws, while most such defenders of Kant (as A. E. Taylor) are entirely unwilling and unable to revise the validity of their moral laws on the basis of empirical observations previously not taken into account. Even J. S. Mill's strong summary statement on Kant's ethics is not unjustified. Kant fails, in his opinion, "almost grotesquely to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say, physical) impossibility in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct."[7]

Mere reference to the best known relevant passage in the Critique of Practical Reason may suffice to demonstrate briefly why all Kantian efforts in the field of concrete ethics must, of necessity, fail. In the note to "Lehrsatz III" Kant tried to show that the application of a merely formal imperative to a concrete case, e.g. the embezzlement of borrowed money, would immediately uncover the immorality of such a maxim of fraud. For, as Kant points out, if everyone would not pay back a loan, no one would lend money any longer and, thus, the self-annihilation of such a maxim would at once manifest its

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[7] J. S. Mill, Works (The New Universal Library), vol. III, p. 7, "Utilitarianism I".

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8 G. W. F. Hegel, Werke, vol. I, 1832, p. 356, "Uber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts". Hegel repeated the same criticism of Kant in his lectures on the history of philosophy, ibid., vol. XV, p. 592.

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[14] H. J. Paton, "Can Reason be Practical", Proceedings of the British Academy, 1943, p. 103.

LO QUE QUEDA DEL IMPERATIVO CATEGÓRICO

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Como bien se sabe, Kant rechazaba enfáticamente el tesis de Francis Hutchesor de un sentido moral existente en la ética, porque tal facultad "interior" no podría garantizar a ningún conocimiento moral objetivo.[1] Pero si uno lee hasta las obras mejor conocidas sobre la ética de Kant, uno no ve ninguna razón para la inmensa diferencia entre la razón "objetiva" y práctica de Kant y el sentido moral que alegadamente es meramente subjetivo. Después de todo, el término "razón práctica", llamada el "origen" del imperativo categórico[2] no puede garantizar la objetividad de aquel imperativo más que el sentido moral merece ser llamado meramente "subjetivo" y "empírico".

Si todas estas reclamaciones y contra-reclamaciones[3] se preocuparan con nada más que la cuestión de terminología, apenas valdrían la pena. Pero, la verdad es que encontramos en este asunto la tendencia más vital de la ética de Kant y, sin entenderlo correctamente, el significado central de su lógica moral es, en mi opinión, inaccesible. En vista de la importancia extraordinaria que el imperativo categórico de Kant ha alcanzado en la filoscfía contemporánea, en el neo-deontologismo inglés, el neo-Kantismo alemán, y en la ética emotiva americana, una interpretación incorrecta se hace, por supuesto, doblemente trágica.

La energía cuidadosísima con que Kant creó su Crítica de la Razón Práctica, en una analogía estrecha con los capítulos de Crítica de Razón Pura, se ha puesto en ridículo, casi sin excepción,[4] como nada más que una reliquia de la Alemania del siglo Dieciocho. En los casos de menos crítica Kant fué "perdonado" por su amor a la simetría, y en cuanto a sus costumbres anticuados, así pagaba su tributo a su época; y, la verdad es que todos nosotros, inconsciente hasta involuntariamente tenemos que ceder al espíritu de nuestra época.

Talvez esta sea una de las razones porque la mayoría de los comentadores de la ética de Kant ponen al centro de su análisis su obra "Fundaciones de la metafísica del Moral", la obra preliminaria del año 1785 en vez de la obra madura principal del año 1788, su Crítica de Razón Práctica, el verdadero suplemento y la analogía de Crítica de Razón Pura.[5] Pero, la paradoja en esto no se puede dudar y es que la justificación fundamental del valor de los principios éticos de Kant no se dan en su "Fundamentos de la Metafísica del Moral", sino en su obra ética principal Crítica de la Razón Práctica.

Solamente en esta obra básica de la ética moderna se refiere él al problema de una prueba, una "deducción" acerca del valor de su ley suprema de la moral, y lo hace en una analogía definida a la "deducción" de sus leyes téoricas supremas como los conceptos de la causalidad y otras "categorías a priori" de la Crítica de la Razón Pura. Estas categorías principales se muestran ser a priori porque representan medios para la unificación necesaria de la multitud de nuestras experiencias de la naturaleza y porque, sin tal "unidad de apercepción" supremo en todo el estudio de la naturaleza y del hombre, ninguna comprensión de la multitud de nuestras percepciones sería logicamente posible. Si no hubiera la unidad de apercepción del mismo ego que observa en mis múltiples observaciones de la naturaleza, nunca podría observar a nada, i.e., nunca podría recordar varios hechos a la vez y compararlos uno al otro. Habría nada más que impresiones isoladas sobre mi consciencia sin ninguna asociación y, por lo tanto, no habría ningún conocimiento. Estudiar a los múltiples fenómenos de la naturaleza por necesidad presupone un observador que una estrictamente a la información a un solo ego. Sin esta ley de absoluta unidad formal, ninguna multitud de ocurrencias naturales vendría a nuestra comprensión. La unidad formal necesaria de todas nuestras percepciones posibles es, por lo tanto, llamado por Kant el "cumbre más alto" a que su filosifía entera se ha "aligado".[6] La unidad puramente formal del

imperativo categórico, sin embargo, no es nada más que la ley general de la unidad de toda percepción aplicada al campo del moral, como explica específicamente Kant.[7]

Solamente por esta razón Kant dió tanto énfasis a que la ley puramente formal puede por sí servir como una ley totalmente válida para la ética. Como repetía en sus tres "Lehrsätze" procedientes a la formulación del imperativo categórico, en cuanto incluímos una referencia a algún contenido específico, a algún "material", en nuestra ley formal de la ética, tal "ley material" ya no puede ser válida universal y categoricamente. Tal ley que contiene la referencia a algún fin especial es válida solamente en hipótesis, válida solamente en el caso que este fin específico de acción quede válido, y no tiene valor categórico bajo toda situación posible.

La ambición más fuerte de Kant, sin embargo, era promulgar una ley moral suprema y obligatoria sin ninguna cualificación o restrcción; y desde la proclamación de la Regla Dorada en el Nuevo Testamento o hasta desde tiempos anteriores, muchísimas éticas de tipo popular, religiosas y filosóficas han querido llegar al mismo fin que Kant.

Si Kant hubiera seguido de una manera consistente este fin, la analogía a su Crítica de Razón Práctica habría revelado que una ley puramente formal de la ética de veras puede tener una función muy importante. Puede mostrar que, en la filosofía la moral que es análoga a la filosofía de la naturaleza, cualquiera vista plural, y hasta la ciencia de la estadística, tiene que ser dominado por una ley de unidad formal y estricta que es la condición priori de todo saber de cualquier ego. Pero, por razones que no se pueden y no necesitan considerarse aquí, Kant mismo finalmente dejó el paralelo que cuidadosamente había hecho entre los métodos de la epistemolcgía y la ética. Cuando en su Crítica de la Razón

Pura se daba cuenta de que tenía que suplementaria su ley suprema epistemológica mediante investigación empírica, esperaba en su ética poder dejar a un lado toda observación empírica.

En toda presentación ética Kant acumuló mucha argumentación astuta para justificar a un imperativo formal que basta en sí para considerar hasta problemas empíricos de la ética. Pero, como he tratado de demostrar en otros casos, esta manera de razonar no es conclusiva. Tampoco es la defensa que hace A. E. Taylor de Kant aceptable a base de que el moralista no tiene que tener ninguna prueba del valor de leyes éticas concretas más que el físico necesita prueba de la ley de cuerpos cayentes.[8] Hacer este tipo de paralelo entre la física y la ética no se puede permitir. Porque, primero Galileo pensaba, por supuesto, que una prueba del valor de su ley era esencial y mostró tal prueba. Segundo, el físico presenta a leyes exactas de los casos en que un cuerpo cae y asciende, mientras que Kant tiene que quedar siempre vago en cuanto a los casos en que, por ejemplo, la matanza de un alegado espía sea un acto de amor moral, digno de alabanza, que se hizo por el amor a patria, o que sea un acto de asesino inmoral, como diría el enemigo de ese país. Tercero, el físico está preparado siempre para abandonar, o siquiera modificar su punto de vista para mantener el valor de sus leyes empíricas, mientras que defensores de Kant, como A. E. Taylor, no están dispuestos y de veras son incapaces, para cambiar el valor de sus leyes morales en vista de observaciones empíricas que previamente no se consideraron. Hasta J. S. Mills en su observación fuerte de la ética de Kant no está fuera de razón. Kant falla, en su opinión, "casi grotescamente en mostrar que habría contradicción, alguna imposibilidad lógica y también física en que todo ser racional aceptara tales leyes que son horriblemente inmorales para su conducta".[9]

Referencia a uno de los pasajes mejor conocidos de Crítica de la Razón Práctica puede demostrar porque todos los esfuerzos de Kant en el terreno de la ética concreta tienen necesariamente que fallar. En la nota a "Lehrsatz III" Kant trató de mostrar que la aplicación de un imperativo formal a un caso concreto, por ejemplo el caso del desfalco de dinero prestado, revelaría de inmediato la inmoralidad de tal colmo, de tal fraude. Porque, como nos dice Kant, si todo el mundo no volviera dinero prestado, ya no se prestaría dinero y así tal máxima luego se anihilaría a sí mismo. Pero Hegel ha incidado ya, en una de sus obras tempranas publicada en 1803 [10] que, por ejemplo, dar limosna a los pobres conduce a la destrucción de aquel maxim. Si todo el mundo diera limosna a los pobres, ya no habria pobres, y, añade ironicamente, ni habría ricos tampoco. Sin embargo, la caridad, el amor universal a nuestros enemigos no son inmorales, aunque cuando se practican en general ambos maxims traen su destrucción por abolición. Lo mismo se aplica al celibato, como nos demuestran Henry Sidgwick[11] y A. D. Lindsay[12]; hasta A. C. Ewing, en su defensa de Kant, admite que no todos maxims que se generalizan se contradicen a sí son por lo tanto inmorales.[13]

Así es que quedan muchas leyes acerca de la acción que generalizados conducen a su propia destrucción, pero que, por lo tanto no se consideran inmorales; además, son tipos de conducta considerados por Kant[14] como muy morales. Y vice versa, hay tipos de conducta que de ninguna manera conducen a su propia destrucción, como exageraciones falsas de la propaganda, aún el estrafio imperativo de Bolzano "Haz toda persona a tu alrededor infeliz!"[15], y otras maneras de actuar que no conducen a tal destrucción, pero que son, sin duda, inmorales. En su ensayo "Puede la Razón ser Práctica?", Herbert J. Paton nos dice que "aunque consideremos a sus /Kant/ esfuerzos para desarrollar un sistema /de ética con-

creta/ como un fracaso, ha tanta más razón para preguntar si no es posible formular un sistema a base de estos principios o a lo menos a base de principios que son últimos y universales y que se presuponen por toda ley de acción recta."[16] Aunque aceptamos estos hondos pensamientos de Paton, no podríamos dejar el asunto ahí. Y en oposición a Paton, tendríamos que añadir que una ética creada sobre esa base de veras justificaría una filosofía tan distinta al espíritu de Kant como el hedonismo, que se basa en el principio universal de la mayor felicidad de todo hombre.

He tratado de dar un análisis detallado de los méritos y defectos de la ética de Kant en un volúmen que fué otra víctima de la segunda Guerra Mundial, Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn unter den Vorläufern der Modernen Ethik, 1933, 382 pp. El libro se encuentra en un número de bibliotecas de la Europa y la América y se revisó favorablemente en periódicos de Inglaterra, Francia, Italia, América, Suiza y otros países. Pero como me escribió mi redactor Felix Meiner, durante los doce años del régimen Nazi él no fué permitido dar a conocer al volúmen; en el último año de la guerra todas las copias en su posesión se destruyeron en el prolongado bombardeo de Leipzig. Espero, sin embargo, un análisis cortado en parte, y en otra aumentada de todos estos problemas, dando atención especial a la literatura que apareció después de la publicación de mi volúmen en al año 1933.

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As is well known, Kant emphatically rejected Francis Hutcheson's assumption of a moral sense in ethics because such an "inner" faculty could not guarantee any objective moral knowledge.[1] But if one reads even best known expositions of Kant's ethics, one sees practically no explanation given on how there could be such a gulf of difference between Kant's "objective" practical reason and the moral sense allegedly merely subjective. After all, the mere term "practical reason" called the "origin" of the categorical imperative[2] cannot guarantee the objectivity ~~claim to be more objective in itself~~ of that imperative any more than the moral sense deserves to be termed merely "subjective" and "empirical".

If all these claims and counterclaims would concern only a matter of terminology they would hardly be worth mentioning. In fact, however, we meet on this point with the most vital tendency of Kant's ethics and, without its proper understanding, the central meaning of his moral thought is inaccessible. In view of the extraordinary importance which Kant's categorical imperative has regained in contemporary philosophy, in English neo-deontologism, in German neo-Kantianism and in American emotive ethics, a basic misjudgment of his moral philosophy is, of course, doubly regrettable.

The painstaking energy with which Kant built up his Critique of Practical Reason in strict analogy to the chapters of the Critique of Pure Reason has been ridiculed almost without exception as nothing but an amusing relic of wig-wearing Germany of the eighteenth century. At best, Kant was "pardoned"

1/ I.Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788, Lehrsatz IV, Anmerkung II, ed. by Karl Kehrbach, 1878, p.49.

2/ See e.g. Herbert James Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 1946, p.31. Compare ibid., p.245 where Paton explains the actual meaning of "practical reason" and "the categorical imperative" as follows: "A rational agent must have direct insight into the principles of rational action", that is, primarily into the categorical imperative. But if this were so, there would be no difference whatsoever between practical reason and a common moral sense.

(Hist. Mod Ethics ?)

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PHENOMENOLOGY

Phenomenology ~~which~~ made its debut in the early writings of Husserl by claiming to be strict science, "strenge Wissenschaft," It has taken a turn to metaphysics in Scheler and Heidegger, and now the leadership of phenomenological existentialism is largely in the hands of poets. If, as I do, one values poetical or metaphysical philosophy and metaphysical poetry as a source of weighty ~~est~~ insights, metaphysical existentialism (should does) not give the slightest reason for dis~~turbance~~ conjecture. What alone is irritating and disastrously confusing, is the presentation of poetical insights as the only possible philosophical truth, or the claim that a tohu bohu of scientific and poetical aspirations is the only wisdom strictly and universally binding.

The ~~ambition~~ pretension of having hit upon the only original philosophical truth is generally the more marked, the more limited ~~is~~ the knowledge of the history of philosophy; and the superiority feeling is the stronger the more monotonous or meager the real insights are. By reference to Jaspers', Sartre's, and Simone de Beauvoir's as most recent ethical reflections, I wish ~~to show~~ briefly to do ~~how~~ full justice ~~can be done~~ to existentialism and to show, nevertheless, that its main motifs can be rendered productive only after considerable recast in the framework of a better founded theory of the meaning of life.

In Karl Jaspers' Der Philosophische Glaube, which appeared only about a year ago, the existentialist claim to originality is, perhaps, more temperate than anywhere else. Jaspers grants that the philosophical belief, the existentialist belief, in an absolutely

free moral responsibility of man, has very much in common with the beliefs of the Judaeo-Christian tradition and with earlier types of philosophical "Vernunfglaube," i.e., the belief in a higher reason contrary to all rational scientific understanding, such beliefs were fostered in the 19th century by Hegel, by Schelling, (especially by Schelling's late thought,) by Kierkegaard's (concluding) Definite Unscientific Postscript and --- what even Christian existentialists omit to notice -- by Franz von Baader.

But, like other existentialists, Jaspers obviously implies that as presently "man undergoes a more radical change than ever before in historical times," present existentialism represents a more radical and original philosophy than any earlier philosophy.[1] Like Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, Jaspers stresses that the fundamental existentialist experience of our free subjectivity is an insight superior to all knowledge of fixed clearly (observable) (feasible) outlined objects, including the understanding of ourselves as objects of scientific psychological observation. But far more than the atheistic existentialists, Jaspers (stresses) (urges) the "transcendent" secrets which surround any grasp of the "nature" of human existence in its contrast to "Seiendem," to all objects of the knowable world.

Jaspers is fully aware of the unspeakable paradox which is the subject matter of his philosophical belief. This subject matter cannot even properly be called the subject in contrast to all objects; it is only something "toward which" or "out from which" we can speak.[2] In fact, all that can be said about it, toward it and out from it is said by Jaspers only in metaphors.

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1 K. Jaspers, Der Philosophische Glaube, 1948, pp. 83, 118. Compare a similar view in Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence, 1949 p. 32

2 Ibid., p. 15.

This subject matter of existential thinking and existential living is characterized neither as subject nor as object but signified as the "Umgreifende," the "spanning round," "the embracing"[3] which is, in the terms of Schelling, experienced in the way of feeling, so to speak, a privy to the creation, "in Mitwissenschaft mit der Schöpfung,"[4] or, in terms of Franz Baader's existentialism, it is shaping and therefore not shapeable reality, "ungestaltbare, weil gestaltende" Wirklichkeit.[5]

This unconditioned "true subject" of Jaspers' existentialism can never be given in time but only "quer zur Zeit" as transversing time, across the time.[6] This subject matter can be "erhellt," "lit up," only by an appeal,[7] by a "Ruck," a shock of self-consciousness[8] in which man as existent in his freedom experiences himself as "a donation to himself from transcendence," "als sich geschenkt von der Transzendenz."[9] This truth withdraws from, is inaccessible to any "direct formulation";[10] and conversely (~~vice versa~~,) the divine does not speak through any human being in a definite but only in ambiguous ways.[11] Only a "floating guidance," "schwebende Führung," can come from the "umgreifende Atmosphäre" of genuinely experienced existence in past and present, never an objectivity identical for everyone.[12] In existence, there is no seizing of straws or saving planks,[13] no "leaning to anything fixed."[14] Living in existence is

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3 Ibid., p. 15.
4 Ibid., p. 19.
5 See D. Baumgardt, Franz von Baader und die philosophische Romantik, 1927, e.g., pp. 250ff.
6 K. Jaspers, Der philosophische Glaube, 1948, p. 32, 112.
7 Ibid., p. 33.
8 Ibid., p. 32.
9 Ibid., pp. 57, 114.
10 Ibid., p. 81.
11 Ibid., p. 80.
12 Ibid., p. 88.
13 Ibid., p. 123.
14 Ibid., p. 105.

living in the clear knowledge that God can never exist as any object exists.[15] Living in existence is "being driven by a spike,"[16] is being open to the divine even if the divine should never speak to you.[17]

But it is, in my opinion, confusing to hear that this grasping of existence or being filled with existence which can be characterized only by similes, analogies and metaphors is, nevertheless, said to proceed according to a method of scientific character.[18] It is reassuring to read that, though "Vernunft," existentialist reason is infinitely superior to the merely rational understanding, existentialist reason is never without rational understanding.[19] But, unfortunately, we hear far too little of how rational understanding can and is to be used by the higher reason of existentialist belief. We are told only that in the field of ethics which is of so vital relevance to every existentialist the Ten Commandments are "irrevocably valid"[20] -- a statement which is questioned by French existentialists who permit the killing of men and telling of a lie under many circumstances. And even less rewarding is the only ethical advice given in Jaspers' Die geistige Situation der Zeit and so often repeated by other existentialists, the Polonian exhortation: "To thine own self be true". Even if this moral advice is expressed by the German phrase "Zu tun was echt ist,"[21] it is, unfortunately, a rule to which Stalin, Hitler and Churchill alike may claim to have lived up.

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15 Ibid., p. 103.
16 Ibid., p. 110.
17 Ibid., p. 103.
18 Ibid., p. 29.
19 Ibid., p. 38.
20 Ibid., p. 127.
21 K. Jaspers, Die Geistige Situation der Zeit, 1931, p. 188.

The moral ideas developed by Sartre in his L'existentialisme est un humanisme are, however, evidently no more substantiated than those of Jaspers. To Sartre the absolute freedom of human existence freed from any relation to a non-extant deity is obviously an even more independent reality than to Jaspers. Man's existence precedes every essence, even his own one, his own nature.[22a] "First of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene and, only afterwards.. will he be something and he himself will have made what he will be."[22b] He is "at first..nothing"[23] or, as Beauvoir says, "a useless passion";[24] but later he is not only "what he conceives himself to be, but he is also only what he wills himself to be after this thrust toward existence."[25] Obviously differing on this point, too, from Jaspers, Sartre thinks that grasping the subjectivity of existence is a "simple..matter..easily arrived at"; it is seizing a truth "on everyone's doorstep", in fact the only "absolute truth" in comparison with which everything else is "only probable!"[26] "Man is condemned to be free..once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does..He can't start making excuses for himself..We are alone, with no excuse."[27] So far Sartre's existentialism could perhaps be called the most punitive, cruelly rigid (Puritanism) ever ~~pronounced~~ promulgated moral rigorism.

22a Sartre has, of course, taken over this view from Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, 1931, e.g. p. 42f, 117

22b J.P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme, 1946, p. 21f. (translated into English under the title Existentialism by Bernard Frechtman, 1947, p. 18)

23 Ibid., p. ? . (English translation, p. 18)

24 S. de Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l'ambiguité, 1947, p. 15. (translated into English under the title The Ethics of Ambiguity, 1948, p. 10)

25 J.P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme, 1946, p. 21f. (English translation, p. 18)

26 Ibid., p. 64f. (English translation, pp. 42f)

27 Ibid., p. 36f. (English translation, p. 27)

Orthodox Calvinism, making ~~finally~~ God responsible for the ultimate reprobation and moral damnation of the non-elect, seems in comparison with this type of existentialism conciliatory and humane. But in an age which makes toubhable things out of everything non-tangible, which objectivizes everything subjective and personal, this almost neurotic and harsh appeal to absolute subjectivity may be granted some edifying value. If, however, offered not only ~~in the way of~~ as an "austere"[28] sermon but as a philosophy which, despite some popularizing, "is intended strictly for specialists and philosophers"[29] -- an ambition strongly emphasized by Sartre -- then this philosophy says either almost nothing or it tries to maintain, without noticing it, ~~completely contradictory and~~ not only dialectically ambiguous ~~principles~~ but completely contradictory principles.

What is original in this philosophy is, unfortunately, quite untenable and what is tenable is certainly not original. If one takes the initial formulation of Sartre's ethical position seriously, it would present a highly original idea. The absolute truth and the only absolute truth would, then, be this: that ~~exclusively~~ only those men who in full awareness of their freedom "hurled themselves toward their future", such as for instance the Nazi Hermann Göring or any other courageous mass murderer, are honest and moral. But all those who "hide their complete freedom from themselves" by means of deterministic beliefs, or, as Sartre derogatorily says, "deterministic excuses,"[30a] i.e., men, opposed to the belief in free will[30b] like Abraham Lincoln or Emile Zola, the courageous defender of Dreyfus, would have to be called, "from a strictly

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28 Ibid., p. 16 . (English translation, p. 15)
29 Ibid., p. 16 . (English translation, p. 15)
30a Ibid., p. 64f. (English translation, p. 55)
30b at least according to William Herndon, Lincoln's law partner for many years, Lincoln "always was a fatalist .. Lincoln always, to me in our private conversations, said that there was no freedom of will, .. I always was a fatalist", see The Hidden Lincoln ed. by Emanuel Hertz, 1940, p. 167

unbiased point of view, .. cowards (lâches) or stinkers (salauds)"[31] (Sartre has, in my opinion, not given any cogent reason for his distinction between these two ~~abuses~~ epithets); and in addition to this, these determinists would have to be rejected as dishonest, as deniers of the only absolute truth and as adopters of an entirely incoherent attitude.[32a]

This part of Sartre's moral beliefs is certainly paradoxical and original to the highest degree but equally, it is unconvincing and poor as an ethical or metaphysical evaluation of human life. Such a theory would, in fact, be no more than Schopenhauer's or Kant's doctrine of freedom deprived of all its subtler philosophical background and its ample allowance for empiristic determinism. (p. 7b)

Sartre has doubtless been aware of the thinness of this part of his teaching and has, therefore, -- not very consistently -- added a supplement to the only fundamental truth of his ethical existentialism. He urges again and again: "When we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he is responsible for his individuality but that he is responsible for all men."[33b] In wanting freedom we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, and that the freedom of others depends on ours.. As soon as there is involvement, I am obliged to want others to have freedom at the same time that I want my own freedom."[34] But as Sartre knows only too well, he (has shares all) these optimistic altruistic beliefs (strictly in common) with Kant or, as one (might could) add with Fichte and numerous minor moralists. The difficulty is

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31 Ibid., p. 84 f. (English translation, p. 55)
32a Ibid., p. 81 f. (English translation, p. 53)
32b, 33a on p. 7b
33b Ibid., p. 24 . (English translation, pp. 19f)
34 Ibid., p. 83 . (English translation, p. 54)

Gabriel Marcel who certainly cannot be accused (suspected) of a lack of appreciation of Sartre's merits, rightly called Sartre's doctrine of absolute freedom completely "preposterous."[32b] Especially in his plays, Sartre evinced considerable sophistication and an incontestable mastery in depicting highly complicated infernos of human experience. There seems to me only one way to reconcile this subtlety with the oversimplification of his basic concept of free will: Thinkers like Fichte as well as Sartre evidently were so much under the spell of determinism in their earliest literary production, that they saw no way of gaining their independence of thought except by a total revolt against any givenness. Both thinkers originally felt so constrained to accept blindly what may be called the absurdity of reality, that in full protest against this they grew veritably obsessed by the idea of freedom.

Sartre himself has obviously not been aware of the thinness of his teaching on absolute individual freedom. In his Réflexions sur la question juive, for instance and in other contexts, he emphasizes the need for changing the perspectives of others to change their choices, and thus to effect "that freedom decides on other bases"[33a] -- a view which obviously makes the difference between freedom and determinism practically disappear.

But -- what is far more important, though certainly not very consistent -- Sartre himself adds a momentous supplement to the only fundamental truth of his ethical existentialism. → back to 7a

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32b/ G. Marcel, The Philosophy of existence, 1949, p.55. Marcel also fears (ibid., p.32) that the construction of a system of ethics not yet presented by Sartre will offer great difficulties and Marcel grants (ibid..p.33) that there is in Sartre "a certain taste and propensity for scandal."

33a/ J.P.Sartre, Réflexions sur la question juive, 1946, p.192

only that even Kant and Fichte could not give any conclusive reason for these ethical beliefs;[35a] and on the far more individualistic foundations of Sartre's existentialism, it is even less possible to couple his first absolute truth with his second one. There is evidently not the slightest difficulty ~~to~~ in denying this second "truth" even if the first one were to be accepted as absolutely valid. In his benevolent analysis of Sartre's ethics [35b] Francis Jeanson admits that in his original thought, in his La Nausée, Sartre did not reach the problem of the fellow man at all

History names too many great criminals who bravely complied with all that is characteristic of Sartre's free man but felt in no way inclined to respect the freedom of others for logical, ethical or practical reasons. Especially if a fellowman consistently renounces his freedom and if, as in Sartre's existentialism, no definite distinction can be made between the metaphysical and the merely empirical character of man, how can one be "obliged" to want the freedom of one's fellowman, despite (his (adoption of a deterministic attitude?) the fellowman's) own free (choice?) Contrary to all the heated assurances of Sartre, individual freedom in itself does not, ethically imply the freedom of others in any respect, either in the way of an analytic or a necessary synthetic link.

Yet, strangely enough, Sartre believes he to offers more than Kant by offering even less than his ingenious predecessor did. Sartre triumphantly reproaches Kant because of Kant's attempt at "constituting an ethics" by the merely "formal and the universal" in morals;[36] and I fully agree with Sartre that neither Kant nor anyone else

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35a For a detailed discussion of these questions see D. Baumgardt, Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn, unter den Vorläufern der modernen Ethik, 1933, pp. 3-194.

36 J.P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946, p. 85. (English translation, p. 55)

35b See Francis Jeanson, Le problème moral et la pensée de Sartre, 1947, p. 341

succeeded in this hopeless undertaking.[37] But to offer nothing at all in the place of others' failures does not seem to me a cause for justified pride.

Moreover, Sartre's justification for his offering no concrete ethics to replace Kantian or other traditional concrete codes of morals is based on a completely baffling (confusing (ed)) argument. Sartre frequently repeats: "We can not decide a priori what there is to be done" in moral action.[38] "Life has no meaning a priori..Value is nothing else but the meaning that you choose."[39] "The content (of moral behavior) is always concrete and thereby unforeseeable; there is always the element of invention. The one thing that counts is knowing whether the inventing that has been done, has been done in the name of freedom."[40] In his L'Imaginaire Sartre ~~had~~ warned us against any identification of the moral with the aesthetic (~~sic~~) ~~ethics-with-aesthetics~~.[41] But in his later work he makes ample use of at least one complete analogy between true, i.e., creative morality and true art. "Has anyone ever asked 'what painting ought he to make?'.. There is no definite painting to be made..the painting to be made is precisely the painting..the artist..will have made."[42] There are no "pre-established" ethical values anymore than pre-established aesthetic values.[43] One may subscribe to a good deal of what is said in this analogy between concrete aesthetic and ethical creation. ~~This~~ It would certainly be a bad painter who would first consult aesthetic rules and values and begin his creative work only after having finished his aesthetical

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37 For a detailed discussion of these questions see D. Baumgardt, Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn, unter den Vorlaufern der modernen Ethik, 1933, pp. 3-194.

38 J.P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946, p. 77. (English translation, p. 55).

39 Ibid., p. 89 (English translation. p. 58).

studies; and to the man of moral action no tiresome study of ethical systems is needed or often even possible before the time of action. The painter, the moral agent or an actor on the stage would ~~generally~~ certainly be ~~even~~ handicapped if in the midst of his creative work he ~~would~~ suddenly consulted aesthetic or moral laws or the principles of physiognomics. But all this does not prove in the least what Sartre wants to prove, namely that there are no aesthetic or ethical or physiognomic laws.

True, our insight into these laws may be permanently enriched by new creative achievements of great artists, moral personalities or great masters of the stage. But if there were no aesthetic or moral or physiognomic laws, there would be no criterion ~~of~~ for distinguishing between art and botching or between morality and crime. Everything done would be, then, equally ~~as~~ valuable ~~as~~ os valueless, and in morality as well as in the arts everything would be "arbitrariness of choice," would be absolute caprice - - a consequence necessarily to be drawn from what Sartre stated [44a] but a consequence he anxiously wished to avoid.

In other words, if we would wish to prove what Sartre wants to prove (namely, that the moralist need not or even should not search (~~for~~ out) concrete ethical values) we would have to refer to the analogy with a creative painter who ~~would~~ proudly announces: I need not or should not do any concrete painting. But the painter's task is to

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40 Ibid., p. 86. Compare p. ~~49~~ 75 (English transl. p. 56. Compare p. 49). Heidegger too, comes often dangerously ~~close~~ near very bold assurances of a similar questionable conclusiveness. See e.g. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 1931, p. 266 f. "Dem Dasein ist ~~keinerlei~~ inhaltliches Existenzideal vorzulegen und von aussen aufzuzwingen." Compare ibid., p. 294, 296, 298. But Sartre's utterances on this point are certainly even less guarded than those of Heidegger.

41 J.P. Sartre, L'Imaginaire, psychologie phénoménologique de l'imagination, 1940, p. 245

42 J.P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946, p. 75 (English translation pp. 49f).

43 Ibid., (Engl. trans. pp. 49f)

do concrete painting and the moralists task to build a concrete ethics. From Sartre's (point) statement however, that the painter does not look to aesthetics for advice about his concrete painting, it does not follow at all that there is no concrete aesthetics or ethics.

Even more simply speaking: the painter who does creative painting without consulting prefixed aesthetic values does not prove that there are no such values, and the man who acts morally out of a deep moral instinct does not prove that there are no moral laws. On the contrary, exactly such painters and agents justify the aesthetician's and moralist search for the elucidation of concrete aesthetics and concrete moral values.

Simone de Beauvoir's Pour une morale de l'ambiguité seems to me much richer and more instructive than Sartre's reflections on ethics. She holds the fundamental existentialist position in Heidegger's and Sartre's terms and like Jaspers she thinks the nihilist's attitude toward life and human action far more honest than that of the lukewarm, the tepid, the "sousohomme" who tries to "efface the agonizing evidence of his freedom"[44b] or "l'homme sérieux" who "looses himself" in some objective goal "accepted from society,. in order to annihilate his subjectivity;"[45] only the adventurous and the passionate man, the critic and the artist are ranked higher in her tentative hierarchy of men. But, as she insists, unlike the nihilist or other lower types of men, the true existentialist knowing of his lack of being

44a In this respect Julien Benda's charges that existentialism is „la révolte de la vie contre la pensée" is not unjustified, see J. Benda, Tradition de l'existentialisme, 1947, e.g. p. 7 and in Pour et Contre l'existentialisme, Grand Débat, 1948, p. 12

44b/S. de Beauvoir; Pour une morale de l'ambiguité, 1947, p. 65f. (Engl. transl. 1948, p. 45). As to Jaspers similar attitude toward nihilism see his Der philosophische Glaube, 1948, pp. 108f or his Philosophie, Vol. II, 1932, pp. 312ff on the "nihilistischen Selbstmörder" Compare K. Jaspers, Philosophische Logik, vol. I, Von der Wahrheit, 1941, p. 911. According to Gabriel Marcel, Philosophy of Existence, 1949, p. 19, "there is .. an intimate dialectical correlation between the optimism of technical progress and the philosophy of despair" in the world today.

45 Ibid.

denies it in the terms of Hegel ambiguous, dialectical language, affirms himself exactly by this acknowledgement and denial as a positive existence[46] and it is this existence of "freedom..from which..all values spring."[47]

In almost Fichtian terminology, the free will is here defined as "praising obstacles" and disclosing the world of values by conquering or not conquering these obstacles.[48] In any case, like Sartre, Beauvoir rejects any "ready-made value which offers itself from the outside to my abstract adherence,"[49] any ethical recipes;[50] and yet, in the end, she shows herself far more concerned about concrete ethics and an unambiguous criterion of morality than almost any other existentialist has done so far.

She confesses that, although there are no "ready-made solutions" in ethics, "it is useful for the man of action" and the moralist "to find out under what conditions" human "undertakings are valid."[51] And it is indeed amazing enough to see what the "new perspectives" are which she "discloses...on this basis."[52] They are, in fact, nothing but consistently eudaemonistic principles. It is, we read here, "logical, though this logic implies an outrageous absurdity"[53] - - but, of course, an absurdity only from the point of view of a blindly anti-hedonistic existentialism - - "de préférer le salut du plus grand nombre."[54] In difficult ethical decisions, we further hear, the criterion of morality is "that all things considered, the evil that one inflicts be lesser than that which is being forestalled."[55]

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46 Ibid., p. 19 . (Engl. transl. p. 13)
47 Ibid., p. 34 . (Engl. transl. p. 24)
48 Ibid., p. 40 . (Engl. transl. p. 28)
49 Ibid., p. 35 . (Engl. transl. p. 24)
50 Ibid., p. 187 . (Engl. transl. p. 134)

Under all circumstances, even the most fleeting enjoyment of any individual, if harmless to himself and others, has to be respected according to Simone de Beauvoir.[56] But if these entirely empirical, eudaemonistic criteria of morality are ultimately the only decisive ones, then, naturally the whole structure of Jaspers'[57] and Sartre's[58a] anti-eudaemonistic existentialism is shattered.

There is no need, then, for the protracted effort[58b] which Beauvoir made in her Pyrrhus et Cineas to demonstrate that to will oneself free means also to will all others free; and the numerous loud assertions which Sartre made for the same purpose would, then, be also as superfluous as they are inconclusive. Moreover, if the maximization of joy is the only ultimate criterion of morality, then we are, to our good fortune, completely freed from those vague and "absurd" existentialist criteria which say that "echt sein," true existentialist involvement and absolute free subjectivity can be the only guarantees of the truly valuable life. ~~We would~~ Only then would we be freed from the grossest absurdity to which Beauvoir honestly confesses,[59] namely, that according to the existentialists standard even the "true"

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51 Ibid., p. 188. (Engl. transl. p. 134)
52 Ibid., p. 188. (Engl. transl. p. 135)
53 Ibid., p. 159 (Engl. transl. p. 140)
54 Ibid., p. 159 (Engl. transl. p. 140)
55 Ibid., p. 209. (Engl. transl. 150)
56 Ibid., pp. 189f (Engl. transl. p. 135f)
57 See K. Jaspers, Der philosophische Glaube, 1948, e.g., p. 105 and Compare K. Jaspers, Philosophie, 1932, p. 231, vol. I, and Von der Wahrheit, 1947, e.g. p. 718
58a See J.P. Sartre, L'être et le néant, Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique, 1943, e.g., p. 720.
59 S. de Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l'ambiguité, 1947, p. 61. (Engl. transl. p. 42)

58b See S. de Beauvoir, Pyrrhus et Cineas, 1944, e.g. p. 96: "Seule la liberté d'autrui est capable de nécessiter mon être."

vitality, the wholehearted "Echtheit" and the indomitable sense of freedom of Hermann Göring ranks morally very high. How much or how little one may praise Göring on account of compliance with existentialist ethics, his infamy and moral blindness certainly stands out infinitely more clearly if judged by nothing but the criterion of consistent eudaemonism. No one - - not even Göring himself - can credit this outstanding gangster with any pangs of conscience concerning the greatest happiness or the greatest salvation of the greatest number.

To summarize as concisely as possible, contemporary existentialist ethics bogs down, in my opinion, on at least three vital points. Wherever this ethics moves in the field of empirical inquiry it lacks precision to a fatal degree. It leads not only to those ambiguities of which it is very proud but to untenable and often unnoticed self-contradictions. Its criterion of morality would, of necessity approve of the courageous criminal, if he believes in existentialist freedom, and would have to condemn the morally noblest fighter for a great cause, if he is an avowed determinist. A "truth" which necessarily leads to such consequences can certainly not be granted "absolute" validity; and (vice versa), when Sartre dismisses all scientific truth as only probable in comparison with his absolute existentialist truth, he betrays nothing but a grave misconception of verified necessity in science and empirical ethics.

inversely

From the metaphysical heights of Sartre's belief in absolute existentialist subjectivity, no way leads down to an empirically necessary respect of the "freedom and happiness"[60] of others; and

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60 Ibid., p. 201 . (Engl. transl. p. 144)

vice versa, from a consistent eudaemonistic principle as an empirical, hypothetical yet strict criterion of morality, no way leads back to any absolute truth of such rich contents as the existentialists ascribe to their alleged absolute truths.

Further -- and this, it seems to me, is no less important to any thinking individual -- what the existentialist presents as his fundamental problem opens doubtless a true abyss for gx gravest metaphysical speculation. But if these specualtions are offered as absolute truth or even as "simple truth" and as a truth of far higher certainly than any scientific empirical truth, then the harshness and self-assuredness of such claims can blind only epistemologically confused minds. The incomprehensible depths of the miracle and the meaning of human existence cannot be exhausted or even gauged by the definiteness of the statements into which Heidegger put his metaphysical paraphrases on Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phaenomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins.

If, according to Jean Wahl's interpretation of Jaspers, we are thrown into a night of anxiety in which the absolute reveals itself only in scattered flashes, like in intermittent strokes of lightening,[61] in that night there is, nevertheless, according to Nietzsche, bliss even deeper than despair. If according to the later thought of Sartre, "optimistic toughness"[62] is the principal attitude of the true existentialist, there remains the desperate nausea as the essentialist attitude in Sartre's own earliest type of existentialism; and there remains the electric glare of stale hopelessness in the night of hell so graphically

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61/ J. Wahl, Petite histoire de l'existentialisme, 1947, p.25
62/ J.P.Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946,p.58

described in Sartre's Huis clos. No absolute truths can be promulgated in any attempts to decipher the infinite background of our being. Absolute secrets may only be circumscribed here by fuller and fuller indications of probability, mainly by means of similes and a vision comparable to that of the poet.

Third, existentialism is certainly right in its protest against seeing man only as a product of historical and social forces which can be fully explained and sufficiently understood. No satiated philistine acquiescence in existing social conditions, no self-justification by these conditions, and no excited all-absorbing revolution do mgx sufficient justice to the most radical human needs of the individual. But metaphysical speculation[63] must not be allowed to see man only as jailed into society, or locked up exclusively in his free existentialist subjectivity and the relation of this individuality to his fellow-man. There is still the life of the cosmos, of non-human life and being against which the meaning of the life of man has metaphysically to be grasped. Only if this is done anew, as I have tried to do it, can we hope to outgrow Sartre's existentialism of anguish. Only thus can we secure a far more precise and basic criterion of morality than contemporary existentialism could; and we will then have progressed at least one small step further to a clearer and richer picture of these eternally tormenting and beatifying riddles which are called individual life.

63/ George Lukacs, Existentialisme en Marxisme (?). 1948. p.162 reproaches all existentialists including Kierkegaard for completely ignoring "la concrétisation marxiste des rapports historiques et sociaux entre les hommes par l'economie." But Lukacs' own philosophy suffers no less from abstractions than that of his opponents.

vice versa, from a consistent eudaemonistic principle as an empirical, hypothetical yet strict criterion of morality, no way leads back to any absolute truth of such rich contents as the existentialists ascribe to their alleged absolute truths.

Further - - and this, it seems to me, is no less important to any thinking individual - - what the existentialist presents as his fundamental problem opens doubtless a true abyss for gravest metaphysical speculation. But if these speculations are offered as absolute truth or even as "simple truth" and as a truth of far higher certainty than any scientific empirical truth, then the harshness and self-assuredness of such claims can blind only epistemologically confused minds. The incomprehensible depths of the miracle and the meaning of human existence cannot be exhausted or even gauged by the definiteness of the statements into which Heidegger put his metaphysical paraphrases on Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phaenomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. And the same applies even more to the pretended certainties of Sartre's existentialism. No absolute truths can be promulgated in any attempts of our deciphering the infinite background of our being. Only absolute secrets can be circumscribed here by fuller and fuller indications of probability mainly in the way of similes and a vision similar to that of the poet.

Third, existentialism is certainly right in its protest against seeing man only as a product of historical and social forces which can be fully explained and sufficiently understood. No satiated philistine acquiescence in existing social conditions, no self-

justification by these conditions and no excited all-absorbing revolution do sufficient justice to the most radical human needs of the individual. But metaphysical speculation must not be allowed to see man only jailed into society nor locked up exclusively in its free existentialist subjectivity and the ~~ration~~ relation of this individuality to his fellowmen. There is still the life of the cosmos, of non-human life and being against which the meaning of the life of man has metaphysically to be grasped. Only if this is done anew, as I have tried to do it, can we hope to outgrow Sartre's existentialism of "optimistic toughness"[61] and Heidegger's existentialism of anguish, can we secure a far more precise and basic criterion of morality than contemporary existentialism could; and we will have progressed thus at least one small step further to a clear and richer picture of those eternally tormenting and beatifying riddles which are called individual life.

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61 English translation p. 40.

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EXISTENTIALIST ETHICS
IN THE LIGHT
OF A NEW THEORY OF THE MEANING OF LIFE

(Jaspers, Sartre, De Beauvoir)

Existentialist Ethics

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EXISTENTIALIST ETHICS
IN THE LIGHT
OF A NEW THEORY OF THE MEANING OF LIFE

By

DAVID BAUMGARDT

Phenomenology ~~which~~ made its début in the early writings of Husserl by claiming to be strict science, "strenge Wissenschaft"; it has taken a turn to metaphysics in Scheler and Heidegger, and now the leadership of phenomenological existentialism is largely in the hands of poets. If, as I do, one values poetical or metaphysical philosophy and metaphysical poetry as a source of weightiest insights, metaphysical existentialism ~~does~~ should not give the slightest reason for disturbance. What alone is irritating and disastrously confusing, is the presentation of poetical insights as the only possible philosophical truth, or the claim that a tohu-bohu of scientific and poetical aspirations is the only wisdom strictly and universally binding.

The ~~ambition~~ pretension of having hit upon the only original philosophical truth is generally the more marked, the more limited ~~is~~ the knowledge of the history of philosophy; and the superiority feeling is the stronger the more monotonous or meager the real insights are. By reference to Jaspers', Sartre's, and Simone de Beauvoir's ~~as~~ most recent ethical reflections, I wish ~~to show~~ briefly to do full justice ~~can be done~~ to existentialism, and how, nevertheless, its main motifs can be rendered productive only after considerable recasting in the framework of a better founded theory of the meaning of life.

In Karl Jaspers' Der philosophische Glaube, which appeared only about a year ago, the existentialist claim to originality is, perhaps, more temperate than anywhere else. Jaspers grants that the philosophical belief, the existentialist belief in an absolute freedom of man, has very much in common with the beliefs of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, and with earlier types of philosophical "Vernunftglaube", i.e., the belief in a higher reason contrary to all rational scientific understanding. ~~As~~ Such beliefs were ~~cultivated~~ fostered in the 19th Century by Hegel, by Schelling, (especially in Schelling's late thought), by Kierkegaard's concluding ~~definite~~ Unscientific Postscript and -e- what even Christian existentialists omit

to notice - - but Franz von Baader.

But, like other existentialists, Jaspers obviously implies that as presently "man undergoes a more radical change than ever before in historical times," present existentialism represents a more radical and original philosophizing than any earlier philosophy.[1] Like Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, Jaspers stresses that the fundamental existentialist experience of our free subjectivity is an insight superior to all knowledge of fixed, clearly outlined facable objects, including the understanding of ourselves as objects of scientific psychological observation. But far more than the atheistic existentialists, Jaspers stresses the "transcendent" secrets which sorrdund any grasp of the "nature" of human existence in its contrast to "Seiendem," to all objects of the knowable world.

Jaspers is fully aware of the unspeakable paradox which is the subject matter of his philosophical belief. This subject matter cannot even properly be called the subject in contrast to all objects; it is only something "toward which" or "out from which" we can speak.[2] In fact, all that can be said about it, toward it and out from it is said by Jaspers only in metaphors.

This subject matter of existential thinking and existential living is characterized neither as subject nor as object, but signified as the "Umgreifende," the "spanning round," "the embracing"[2] which is, in the terms of Schelling, experienced in the way of feeling, so to speak, a privy to the creation, "in Mitwissenschaft mit der Schöpfung;"[3] or, in terms of Franz Baader's existentialism, it is shaping and therefore not shapeable reality, "ungestaltbare, weil gestaltende" Wirklichkeit.[4]

1/ K. Jaspers, Der Philosophische Glaube, 1948, pp. 83, 118. Compare a similar view in Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence, 1949, p. 32.
2/ Ibid., p. 15.
3/ Ibid. p. 19.
4/ See D. Baumgardt, Franz von Baader und die philosophische Romantik, 1927, e.g. pp. 250ff.

This uncodditioned "true subject" of Jasper's existentialism can never be given in time but only "quer zur Zeit," as transversing time, across the time.[5] This subject matter can be "erhellt","lit up", only by an appeal,[6] by a "Ruck", a shock of selfconsciousness[7] in which man as existent in his freedom experiences himself as "a donation to himself from transcendence", "als sich geschenkt von der Transzendenz."[8] This truth withdraws from, is inaccesible to any "direct formulation"[9]; and (vice versa, conversely,) the divine doesn't speak[10] through no human being in a definite but only in ambiguous ways. Only a "floating guidance," "schwebende Führung," can come from the "umgreifende Atmosphäre" of genuinely experienced existence in past and present; never an objectivity identical for everyone.[11] In existence, Here is no seizing of straws or saving planks,[12] no"leaning to anything fixed".[13] Living in existence is living in the clear knowledge that God can never exist as any object exists.[14] Living in existence is being "driven by a spike",[15] is being open to the divine even if the divine should never speak to you[16].

But it is, in my opinion, confusing to hear that this grasping of existence or being filled with existence, which can be characterized only by similes, onologies and methphors, is, nevertheless, said to proceed according to a method of scientific character.[17] It is reassuring to read that, though "Vernunft", existentialist reason, is infinitely superior to the merely rational understanding, existentialist reason is never without rational understanding.[18] But, unfortunately, we hear

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5/ K. Jaspers, Der philosophische Glaube, 1948, p.32, 112. 6/ Ibid., p.33. 7/ Ibid., p.32 8/ Ibid., pp.57, 114.
9/ Ibid., p. 81. 10/ Ibid., p.80. 11/ Ibid., p.88.
12/ Ibid., p.123. 13/ Ibid., p.105.
14/ Ibid., p.103. 15/ Ibid., p.110.
16/ Ibid., p.103. 17/ Ibid., p. 29
18/ Ibid., p.38.

far too.little of how rational understanding can and is to be used by the higher reason of existentialist belief. We are told only that in the field of ethics, which is of such vital relevance to every existentialist, the Ten Commandments are "irrevocably valid" [19a] -- a statement which is questioned by French existentialists who permit the killing of men and telling of a lie under many circumstances. And even less rewarding is the only ethical advice given in Jaspers' Die geistige Situation der Zeit, and so often repeated by other existentialists, the Polonian exhortation: "To thine own self be true.". Even if this moral advice is expressed by the German phrase "Zu tun was echt ist" [19b], it is, unfortunately, a rule to which Stalin, Hitler and Churchill alike may claim to have lived up.

The moral ideas developed by Sartre in his L'existentialisme est un humanisme are, however, evidently no more substantial than those of Jaspers. To Sartre, the absolute freedom of human existence freed from any relation to a non-extant deity is obviously an even more independent reality than to Jaspers. Man's existence precedes every essence, even his own one, his own nature. [20a] "First of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene and, only afterwards, will he be something and he himself will have made what he will be." [20b] He is "at first..nothing" [20] or, as Beauvoir says " a useless passion"; [21] but later he is not only "what he conceives himself to be, but he is also only what he wills himself to be after this thrust toward existence." [20] Obviously differing on this point, too, from Jaspers, Sartre thinks that grasping the subjectivity

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19a/ Ibid., p.127.

19b/ K. Jaspers, Die Geistige Situation der Zeit, 1931, p.188.

20a/ Sartre has, of course, taken over this view from Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, 1931, e.g. pp. 42f, 117

20b/ J.P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme, 1946, p.21f (translated into English under the title Existentialism by Bernard Frechtman, 1947, p. 18).

21/ S. de Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l'ambiguité, 1947, p.15 (translated into English under the title The Ethics of Ambiguity, 1948, p.10.)

of existence is a "simple..matter..easily arrived at"; it is seizing a truth "on every one's doorstep," in fact the only "absolute truth" in comparison with which everything else is "only probable".[22] "Man is condemned to be free..once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does..He can't start making excuses for himself..We are alone, with no excuse".[23] So far, Sartre's existentialism could perhaps be called the most punitive, cruelly rigoristic (id more rigorism) Puritanism ever promulgated.

Orthodox Calvinism, making finally God responsible for the ultimate reprobation and moral damnation of the non-elect, seems in comparison with this type of existentialism conciliatory and humane. But in an age which makes touchable things out of everything non-tangible, which objectivizes everything subjective and personal, this almost neurotic and harsh appeal to absolute subjectivity may be granted some edifying value. If, however, offered not only ~~in the way on~~ as an "austers"[24] sermon, but as a philosophy which, despite some popularizing, "is intended strictly for specialists and philosophers" - - an ambition strongly emphasized by Sartre - - then this philosophy says either almost nothing, or it tries to maintain, without noticing it, ~~completely contradictory and~~ not only dialectically ambiguous ~~principles~~ but completely contradictory principles.

What is original in this philosophy is, unfortunately, quite untenable, and what is tenable is certainly not original. If one takes the initial formulation of Sartre's ethical position seriously, it would present a highly original idea. The absolute truth and the only absolute truth would, then, be this, that (solely) only those men who, in full awareness of their freedom, hurled themselves toward their future, "are ~~honest and moral~~,

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22/ J. P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un humanisme (1946), p.64f (English transl. pp. 42f).
23/ Ibid., p.36f (English transl. p.27).
24/ Ibid., p.16 (Engl. transl. p.15)

such as for instance the Nazi Hermann Göring or any other courageous mass murderer, ~~are honest and moral~~. But all those who "hide their complete freedom from themselves" by means of deterministic beliefs, or, as Sartre derogatorily says, "deterministic excuses", i.e. men like Abraham Lincoln or Emile Zola, the courageous defender of Dreyfus, would have to be called, "from a strictly unbiased point of view, .. cowards or stinkers". (Sartre has, in my opinion, not given any cogent reason for his distinction between these two ~~abuses~~); and in addition to this, these determinists would have to be rejected as dishonest, as deniers of the only absolute truth and as adoptors of an entirely incoherent attitude.

This part of Sartre's moral beliefs is certainly paradoxical and original to the highest degree, but equally unconvincing and poor as an ethical or metaphysical evaluation of human life. Such a theory would, in fact, be no more than Schopenhauer's or Kant's doctrine of freedom deprived of all its subtler philosophical background and its ample allowance for empiristic determinism. Sartre has doubtless been aware of the thinness of this part of his teaching, and has, therefore, - - not very consistently - - added a supplement to the only fundamental truths of his ethical existentialism. He urges again and again: "When we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he is responsible for his individuality but that he is responsible for all men." In wanting freedom, we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, and that the freedom of others depends on ours. As soon as there is involvement, I am obliged

25b/ At least according to William Herndon Lincoln's law partner for many years, Lincoln always said there was no freedom of the will. I always was a fatalist. (Cf. Lincoln as revealed by Herndon's Letters, ed. by Emanuel Hertz, 1940, p. 167)

25c/ Ibid., p.84f (English transl. p.55).

26/ Ibid., p.81f (English transl. p.53)

27/ Ibid., p.24 (English transl. pp. 19f).

of a lack of appreciation of Sartre's merits, rightly called Sartre's doctrine of absolute freedom completely "preposterous."[26b] Especially in his plays, Sartre evinced considerable sophistication and an incontestable mastery in depicting highly complicated infernos of human experience. There seems to me only one way to reconcile this subtlety with the oversimplification of his basic concept of free will: Thinkers like Fichte as well as Sartre evidently were so much under the spell of determinism in their earliest literary production, that they saw no way of gaining their independence of thought except by a total revolt against any givenness. Both thinkers originally felt so constrained to accept blindly what may be called the absurdity of reality, that in full protest against this they grew veritably obsessed by the idea of freedom.

Sartre himself has obviously not been unaware of the thinness of his teaching on absolute individual freedom. In his Réflexions sur la question juive, for instance and in other contexts, he emphasizes the need for changing the perspectives of others to change their choices, and thus to effect "that freedom decides on other bases"[27a] - - a view which obviously makes the difference between freedom and determinism practically disappear.

But--what is far more important, though certainly not very consistent -- Sartre himself adds a momentous supplement to the only fundamental truth of his ethical existentialism. He urges again and again:"When we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he is responsible for his individuality but that he is responsible for all men."[27b] In wanting freedom we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, and that the freedom of others depends on ours..As soon as there is involvement, I am obliged there is in Sartre "a certain taste and propensity for scandal."

[26b] G.Marcel, The Philosophy of existence, 1949, p.55. Marcel also fears (ibid., p.3[illegible]) that the construction of a system of ethics not yet presented by Sartre will offer great difficulties and Marcel grants (ibid., p.33) that

[27a] J.P.Sartre, Reflexions sur la question juive, 1946, p.192.

[27b] J.P.Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946, p.24

to want others to have freedom at the same time that I want my own freedom."[28] But as Sartre knows only too well, he shares these optimistic altruistic beliefs (~~strictly in common~~) with Kant or, as one might add, with Fichte and numerous minor moralists. The difficulty is only that even Kant and Fichte could not give any conclusive reason for these ethical beliefs[29a] and on the far more individualistic foundations of Sartre's existentialism, it is even less possible to couple his first absolute truth with his second one. There is evidently not the slightest difficulty in denying this second "truth" even if the first one were to be accepted as absolutely valid. Even In his benevolent analysis of Sartre's ethics, Francis Jeanson[29b] significantly admits that, in his original thought, in his La Nausée, Sartre did not reach the problem of the other at all (fellowman).

History names too many great criminals who bravely complied with all that is characteristic of Sartre's free man, but felt in no way inclined to respect the freedom of others for logical, ethical or practical reasons. Especially if a fellowman consistently renounces his freedom and if, as in Sartre's existentialism, no definite distinction can be made between the metaphysical and the merely empirical character of man, how can one be "obliged" to want the freedom of one's fellowman, despite the fellowman's own free (adoption of a deterministic attitude?) choice? Contrary to all the heated assurances of Sartre, individual freedom in itself does not ethically imply the freedom of others in any respect, either in the way of an analytic or a necessary synthetic link.

Yet, strangely enough, Sartre believes he offers more than Kant by offering even less than his ingenious predecessor did. Sartre triumphantly reproaches Kant because of Kant's attempt at "constituting an ethics" by the merely "formal and the universal" in morals;[30] and I fully agree with Sartre that neither Kant nor anyone else succeeded in this hopeless undertaking.[29a] But to offer nothing at all in the place of others' failures

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28/ Ibid., p.83 (English transl. p.54)

29a/ For a detailed discussion of these questions see D. Baumgardt, Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn, unter den Vorläufern der modernen Ethik, pp.3- 1933, pp.3-194.

30/ J.P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946, p.85 (English transl. p.55)

29b/ See Francis Jeanson, Le problème moral et la pensée de Sartre, 1947, p.341

does not seem to me a cause for justified pride.

Moreover, Sartre's justification for his offering no concrete ethics to replace Kantian or other traditional codes of morals is based on a completely baffling confusion argument. Sartre frequently repeats: "We can not decide a priori what there is to be done" in moral action.[31] "Life has no meaning a priori..Value is nothing else but the meaning that you choose."[32] "The content of moral behavior is always concrete and therby unforseeable; there is always the element of invention. The one thing that counts is knowing whether the inventing that has been done, has been done in the name of freedom."[33] In his L'Imaginaire Sartre warned us against any identification of the moral with the aesthetic.[34] But in his later work he makes ample use of at least one complete analogy between true, i.e., creative morality and true art. "Has anyone ever asked 'what painting ought he to make?'.. There is no definite painting to be made..the painting to be made is precisely the painting..the artist..will have made."[35] There are no "pre-established "ethical values anymore than pre-established aesthetic values.[35] One may subscibe to a good deal of what is said in this analogy between concrete aesthetic and ethical creation. It would certainly be a bad painter who would first consult aesthetic rules and values and begin his creative work only after having finished his aesthetical studies; and to the man of moral action, no tiresome study of ethical systems is needed, or often even possible, before the time of action. The painter, the moral agent or an actor on the stage would certainly be handicaped if in the midst of his creative work, he suddenly consulted aesthetic or moral laws or the principles of physiognomics. But all this does not

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31/ Ibid., p.77 (Engl.transl. p.51).
32/ Ibid., p.69 (English transl.p.58).
33/ Ibid., p. 86. Compare pp.75f (English transl.p.56. Compare p.49). He-
34/ J.P. Sartre, L'imaginaire, psychologie phénoménologique de l'imagination, 1940, p.245
35/ J.P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946 pp.75f (English transl.pp.49f).

Zeit, 1931, p.266: Dem Dasein ist Rätselhaftes "unheimliches Existenzideal vorgehalten" und von anfragenden "Befremdlichkeiten" umgrenzt. Compare ibid. pp. 294, 296, 298. But Sartre's utterances, on this point, are certainly even more dangerously near (very bold) to deceitful, complacent assurances of a similar questionable conclusiveness. See e.g. Sein und Zeit, p. 310 (English transl. p. 294) and the less guarded Kern Hesse of Heidegger.

prove in the least what Sartre wants to prove, namely, that there are no aesthetic or ethical or physiognomic laws.

True, our insight into these laws may be permanently enriched by new creative achievements of great artists, moral personalities or great masters of the stage. But if there were no aesthetic or moral or physiognomic laws, there would be no criterion for distinguishing between art and botching, or between morality and crime. Everything done would be, then, equally valuable or valueless, and in morality, as well as in the arts, everything would be "arbitrariness of choice," would be absolute caprice [356] - - a consequence necessarily to be drawn from what Sartre stated, but a consequence he anxiously wished to avoid.

In other words, if we wish to prove what Sartre wants to prove (namely, that the moralist need not or should not search out for concrete ethical values) we would have to refer to the analogy with a creative painter who proudly announces: I need not or should not do any concrete painting. But the painter's task is to do concrete painting and the moralist's task to build a concrete ethics. From Sartre's statement, however, that the painter does not look to aesthetics for advice about his concrete painting, it does not follow at all that there is no concrete aesthetics or ethics.

Even more simply speaking: the painter who does creative painting without consulting prefixed aesthetic values does not prove that there are no such values, and the man who acts morally out of a deep moral instinct does not prove that there are no moral laws. On the contrary, exactly such painters and agents justify the aesthetician's and moralist search for the elucidation of concrete aesthetics and concrete moral values.

Simone de Beauvoir's Pour une morale de l'ambiguité seems to me much richer and more instructive than Sartre's reflections

356 / In this respect Julien Benda's charges that existentialism is "la révolte de la vaporeuse la pensée" is not unjustified, see J. Benda, Trahison de l'existentialisme, 1947 e.s. Paris and in Pour et Contre l'existentialisme, Grand Débat, 1948, p. 112.

on ethics. She holds the fundamental existentialist position in Heidegger's and Sartre's terms, and like Jaspers she thinks the nihilist's attitude toward life and human action far more honest than that of the lukewarm, the tepid, the "sousohomme," who, tries to "efface the agonizing evidence of his freedom"[36] or "l'homme sérieux" who "looses himself" in some objective goal "accepted from society.. in order to annihilate his subjectivity;"[36] only the adventurous and the passionate man, the critic and the artist are ranked higher in her tentative hierarchy of men. But, as she insists, unlike the nihilist or other lower types of men, the true existentialist, knowing of his lack of being, denies it in the terms of Hegel ambiguous, dialectical language, affirms himself exactly by this acknowledgment and denial as a positive existence[37] and it is this existence of "freedom..from which..all values spring".[38]

In almost Fichtean terminology, the free will is here defined as "pursuing obstacles" and disclosing the world of values by conquering or not conquering these obstacles.[39] In any case, like in Sartre, Beauvoir rejects any "ready-made value which offers itself from the outside to my abstract adherence,"[40] any ethical recipes;[41a] and yet, in the end, she shows herself far more concerned about concrete ethics and an unambiguous criterion of morality than almost any other existentialist has done so far.

She confesses that, although there are no "ready-made solutions" in ethics, "it is useful for the man of action" and the moralist "to find out under what conditions" human "undertakings are valid."[41b] And it

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36/ S. de Beauvoir; Pour une morale de l'ambiguité, 1947, pp. 65f (Engl. transl. 1948, p. 45). As to Jaspers similar attitude toward Nihilism see his Der philosophische Glaube, 1948, pp. 108f or his Philosophie, 1932, vol. II, pp. 312ff "über den nihilistischen Selbstmörder. Compare K. Jaspers, Philos. Logik, vol I, Von der Wahrheit, 1947, p. 911

37/ Ibid., p. 19 (Engl. transl. p. 13). 38/ Ibid., p. 34 (Engl. transl. p. 24)

39/ Ibid., p. 40 (Engl. transl. p. 28). 40/ Ibid., p. 35 (Engl. transl. p. 24.

41a/ Ibid., p. 187 (Engl. transl. p. 134) 41b/ Ibid., p. 188 (Engl. transl. p. 134).

According to Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence, 1949, p. 19, "there is .. an intimate dialectical correlation between the optimism of technical progress and the philosophy of despair" in the world of today.

is indeed amazing enough to see that the "new perspectives" are which she "discloses..on this basis."[42a] They are, in fact, nothing but consistently eudaemonistic principles. It is, we read here, "logical, though this logic implies an outrageous absurdity"[42b] - - but, of course, an absurdity only from the point of view of a blindly anti-hedonistic existentialism - - "de préférer le salut du plus grand nombre".[42c] In difficult ethical decisions, we further hear, the criterion of morality is "that all things considered, the evil that one inflicts be lesser than that which is being forestalled."[43a] Under all circumstances, even the most fleeting enjoyment of any individual, if harmless to himself and others, has to be respected according to Simone de Beauvoir.[43b] But if these entirely empirical, eudaemonistic criteria of morality are ultimately the only decisive ones, then, naturally, the whole structure of Jaspers'[44] and Sartre's[45a] anti-eudaemonistic existentialism is shattered.

There is no need, then, for the protracted efforts which Beauvoir made in her Pyrrhus et Cineas[45b] to demonstrate that to will oneself free means also to will all others free; and the numerous loud assertions which Sartre made for the same purpose would, then, be also as superfluous as they are inconclusive. Moreover, if the maximization of joy is the only ultimate criterion of morality, then we are, to our good fortune, completely freed from those vague and "absurd" existentialist criteria which say that "echt sein", true existentialist involvement and absolute free subjectivity can be the only guarantee of the truly valuable life. ~~He would~~ Only then would we be freed from the grossest absurdity

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42a/ Simone-de-Beauvo Ibid., p.188 (Engl.transl.p.135).
42b/ Ibid., p.189 (Engl.transl.p.140). 43a/ Ibid., p.209 (Engl.transl.150)
43b/ Ibid., pp.189f (Engl.transl.p.135f)
44/ See K.Jaspers, Der philosophische Glaube, 1948, e.g.p.105. Compare K. Jaspers Philosophie 1932, vol. I p.231 and
45a/ See J.P.Sartre, L'être et le néant, Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique, 1943, e.g.p. 720. Vander Walde Leet, 1947, e.g. p.718
45b/ See S. de Beauvoir, Pyrrhus et Cineas, 1944, e.g.p.96: "Seule la liberté d'autrui est capable de nécessiter mon être."

to which Beauvoir honestly confesses,[46] namely, that according to the existentialist standard even the "true" vitality, the wholehearted "Echtheit" and the indomitable sense of freedom of Hermann Göring ranks morally very high. How much or how little one may praise Göring on account of compliance with existentialist ethics, his infamy and moral blindness certainly stands out infinitely more clearly if judged by nothing but the criterion of consistent eudaemonism. No one - - not even Göring himself - - can credit this outstanding gangster with any pangs of conscience concerning the greatest happiness or the greatest salvation of the greatest number.

To summarize as concisely as possible, contemporary exsitentialist ethics bogs down, in my opinion, on at least three vital points. Wherever this ethics moves in the field of empirical inquiry it lacks precision to a fatal degree. It leads not only to those ambiguities of which it is very proud, but to untenable and often unnoticed self-contradictions. Its criterion of morality would, of necessity, approve of the courageous criminal, if he believes in existentialist freedom, and would have to condemn the morally noblest fighter for a great cause, if he is an avowed determinist. A "truth" which necessarily leads to such consequences can certainly not be granted "absolute" validity; and (inversely) vice versa, when Sartre dismisses all scientific truth as only probable in comparison with his absolute existentialist truth, he betrays nothing but a grave misconception of verified necessity in science and empirical ethics.

From the metaphysical heights of Sartre's belief in absolute existentialist subjectivity, no way leads down to an empirically necessary respect for the "freedom and happiness"[47] of others; and vice versa, from a consistent eudemonistic principle as an empirical, hypothetical

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46/ Ibid. S. de Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l'ambiguité, 1947, p.61 (Engl. transl. p.42).

47/ Ibid., p.201 (Engl. transl. p.144).

yet strict criterion of morality, no way leads up to any absolute truth of such rich contents as the existentialists ascribe to their alleged highest truths.

Further - - and this, it seems to me, is no less important to any thinking individual - - what the existentialist presents as his fundamental problem doubtless opens a frightening chasm for grave metaphysical speculation. But if these speculations are offered as absolute truth, or even as "simple truth," and as a truth of far higher certainty than any scientific empirical truth, then the harshness and self-assuredness of such claims can blind only epistemologically confused minds. The incomprehensible depths of the miracle and the meaning of human existence cannot be exhausted, or even gauged, by the definiteness of the statements into which Heidegger put his metaphysical paraphrases on Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins.

If, according to Jean Wahl's interpretation of Jaspers, we are thrown into a night of anxiety in which the absolute reveals itself only in scattered flashes, like in intermittent strokes of lightening,[48] in that night there is, nevertheless, according to Nietzsche, bliss even deeper than despair. If according to the later thought of Sartre, "optimistic toughness"[49] is the principal attitude of the true existentialist, there remains the deparate nausea as the essential attitude in Sartre's own earliest type of existentialism; and there remains the electric glare of stale hopelessness in the night of hell so graphically described in Sartre's Huis clos. No absolute truths can be promulgated in any

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48/ J. Wahl, Petite histoire de l'existentialisme, 1947, p.25.
49/ J.P. Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946, p.58.

attempts to decipher the infinite background of our being. Absolute secrets may only be circumscribed here by fuller and fuller indications of probability, mainly by (way) of similes and a vision comparable to that of the poet.

Third, existentialism is certainly right in its protest against seeing man only as a product of historical and social forces which can be fully explained and sufficiently understood. No satiated philistine acquiescence, ~~In~~ existing social conditions, no self-justification by these conditions, and no excited all-absorbing revolution do sufficient justice to the most radical human needs of the individual. But metaphysical speculation must not be allowed to see man only as jailed into society, [50] or locked up exclusively in his free existentialist subjectivity and the relation of this individuality to his fellow-man. There is still the life of the cosmos, of none-human life and being against which the meaning of the life of man has metaphysically to be grasped. Only if this is done anew, as I have tried to do it, can we hope to outgrow Sartre's existentialism of "optimistic toughness" and Heidegger's existentialism of anguish. Only thus can we secure a far more precise and basic criterion of morality than contemporary existentialism could; and we will then have progressed at least one small step further to a clearer and richer picture of those eternally tormenting and beatifying riddles which are called individual life.

[50] George Lukacs, Existentialisme ou Marxisme ? 1948, p. 162 reproaches all existentialists including Kierkegaard because they completely ignore "la concrétisation marxiste des rapports historiques et sociaux entre les hommes par l'économie." But Lukacs' own philosophy suffers no less from abstractions than that of his opponents.

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Existentialist Ethics
in the Light
of a New Theory of the Meaning of Life

by D Baumgardt

(Jaspers, Sartre, de Beauvoir)

Phenomenology ~~which~~ made its debut in the early writings of Hudder. by claiming to be strict science, 'strenge Wissenschaft." It has taken a turn to metaphysics in Scheler and Heidegger, and now the leadership of phenomenological existentialism is largly in the hands of poets. If, as I do, one values poetical or metaphysical philosophy and metaphysical poetry as a source of weighty insights, metaphysical existentialism (should) does not give the slightest reason for disturbances. ~~turbances.~~ comfiture What alone is irritating and desastrously confusing, is the presentation of poetical insights as the only possible phiksophical truth, or the claim that a tohu bohu of scientific and poetical aspirations is the only wisdom strictly and universally binding.

The ~~ambition~~ pretention of having hit upon the only original philosophical truth is generally the more marked, the more limited ~~is~~ the knowledge of the history of philosophy; and the superiority feeling is the stronger the more monotonous or meager the real insights are. By reference to Jaspers', Sartre's. and Simone de Beauvoir's ~~s~~ most recent ethical reflections, I wish ~~to show~~ briefly to do how full justice ~~can be done~~ to existentialism and to show, nevertheless, that its main motives can be rendered productive only after considerable recasting in the framework of a better founded theory of the meaning of life.

In Karl Jaspers's Der philosophische Glaube, which appeared only about a year ago, the existentialist claim to originality is, perhaps, more temperate than anywhere else. Jaspers grants that the philosophical belief, -- the existentialist belief, in an absolutely free moral responsibility of man, has very much in common with the beliefs of the Judeco-Christian tradition, and with earlier types of philosophical "Vernunfglaube", i.e., the belief in a higher reason contrary to all rational scientific understanding. ~~--~~ Such beliefs were fostered in the 19th century ~~cultivated by~~ Hegel, by Schelling, (especially in Schelling's late thought,) by Kierkegaards ~~Unfinite~~ (concluding) Unscientific Postscript and -e- what even Christian existentialists omit

to notice - - by Franz von Baader.

But, like other existentialists, Jaspers obviously implies that as presently "man undergoes a more radical change than ever before in historical times," present existentialism represents a more radical and original phidosophy than any earlier philosophy.[1] Like Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, Jaspers stresses that the fundamental existentialist experience of our free subjectivity is an insight superior to all knowledge of fixed clearly (outlinedly observable) facable objects including the understanding of ourselves as objects of scientific psychological observation. But far more than the atheistic existentialists, Jaspers (urges) the "transcendent" secrets which sorrdund any grasp of the "nature" of human existance in its contrast to "Seiendem," all objects of the knowable world.

Jaspers is fully aware of the unspeakable paradox which is the subject matter of his philosophical belief. This subject matter cannot even properly be called the subject in contrast to objects; it is only something "toward which" or "out from which" we can speak.[2] In fact, all that can be said about it, toward it and out from it is said by Jaspers only in metaphors.

This subject matter of existential thinking and existential living is characterized neither as subject nor as object but sighified as the "Umgreifende," the "spanning round," "the embracing"[2] which is, in the terms of Schelling, experienced in the way of feeling, so to speak, a privy to the creation, "in Mitwissenschaft mit der Schöpfung;"[3] or, in terms of Franz Baader's existentialism, it is shaping and therefore not shapeable reality, "ungestaltbare, weil gestaltende" Wirklichkeit.[4]

1/ K. Jaspers, Der Philosophische Glaube, 1948, pp. 83, 118 Compare a similar view in Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence, 1949, p.32.
2/ Ibid., p. 15.
3/ Ibid. p. 19.
4/ See D. Baumgardt, Franz von Baader und die philosophische Romantik, 1927, e.g. pp. 250ff.

This unconditioned "true subject" of Jasper's existentialism can neve. be given in time but only "quer zur Zeit" as transversing time, across the time.[5] This subject matter can be "erhellt","lit up", only by an appeal,[6] by a "Ruck", a shock of selfconsciousness[7] in which man as existent in his freedom experiences himself as "a donation to himself from transcendence", "als sich geschenkt von der Transzendenz."[8] This truth withdraws from, is inaccesible to any "direct formulation"[9]; and vice versa, (conversely) the divine does not speak through any human being in a definite but only in ambiguous ways.[10] Only a "floating guidance," "schwebende Führung," can come from the "umgreifende Atmosphäre" of genuinely experienced existence in past and present, never an objectivity identical for everyone.[11] In existence, there is no seizing of straws or saving planks,[12] no"leaning to anything fixed".[13] Living in existence is living in the clear knowledge that God can never exists as any object exists.[14] Living in existence is being "driven by a spike",[15] is being open to the divine even if the divine should never speak to you[16].

But it is, in my opinion, confusing to hear that this grasping of existence or being filled with existence which can be characterized only by similes, analogies and methaphors is, nevertheless, said to proceed according to a method of scientific character.[17] It is reassuring to read that, though "Vernunft", existentialist reason is infinitely superior to the merely rational understanding, existentialist reason is never without rational understanding.[18] But, unfortunately, we hear

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5/ K. Jaspers, Der philosophische Glaube, 1948, p.32, 112. Ibid., p.33
6/ Ibid., p.33. 7/ Ibid., p.32 8/ Ibid., pp.57,114.
9/ Ibid., p. 81. 10/ Ibid., p.80. 11/ Ibid., p.88.
12/ Ibid., p.123, 13/ Ibid., p.105.
14/ Ibid., p.103. 15/ Ibid., p.110.
16/ Ibid., p.103. 17/ Ibid., p. 29
18/ Ibid., p.38.

far too little of how rational understanding can and is to be used by the higher reason of existentialist belief. We are told only that in the field of ethics which is of so vital relevance to every existentialist the Ten Commandments are "irrevocably valid" [19a] - - a statement which is questioned by French existentialists who permit the killing of men and telling of a lie under many circumstances. And even less rewarding is the only ethical advice given in Jaspers' Die geistige Situation der Zeit and so often repeated by other existentialists, the Polonian exhortation: "To thine own self be true". Even if this moral advice is expressed by the German phrase "Zu tun was echt ist" [19b], it is, unfortunately, a rule to which Stalin, Hitler and Churchill alike may claim to have lived up.

The moral ideas developped by Sartre in his L'existentialisme est un humanisme are, however, evidently no more substantiated than those of Jaspers. To Sartre the absolute freedom of human existence freed ~~also~~ from any relation to a non-extant deity is obviously an even more independent reality than to Jaspers. Man's existence precedes every essence, even his own one, his own nature. [20a] "First of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene and, only afterwards.. will he be something and he himself will have made what he will be." [20f] He is "at first..nothing" [20b] or, as Beauvoir says " a useless passion"; [21] but later he is not only "what he conceives himself to be, but he is also only what he wills himself to be after this thrust toward existence." [20f] Obviously differing on this point, too, from Jaspers, Sartre thinks that grasping the subjectivity

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19a/ Ibid., p.127.
19b/ K. Jaspers, Die Geistige Situation der Zeit, 1931, p.188.
20a/ Sartre has, of course, taken over this view from Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, 1931, pp. 42f, 117
20f/ J.P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme, 1946 p.21 (translated into English under the title Existentialism by Bernard Frechtman, 1947, p. 18).
21/ S. de Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l'ambiguité, 1947, p.15 (translated into English under the title The Ethics of Ambiguity, 1948, p.10.)

of existence is a "simple..matter..easily arrived at;" it is seizing a truth "on every ones doorstep," in fact the only "absolute truth " in comparison with which everything else is "only probable".[22] "Man is condemned to be free..once ~~thrown~~ into the world, he is responsible for everything he does..He can't start making excuses for himself..We are alone, with no excuse".[23] So far Sartre's existentialism could perhaps be called the most punitive, cruelly ~~rigoristic~~ moral rigorism Puritanism ever ~~pronounced~~ promulgated.

Orthodox Calvinism making ~~finally~~ God responsible for the ultimate reprobation and moral damnation of the non-elect seems in comparison with this type of existentialism conciliatory and humane. But in an age which makes touchable things out of everything non-tangible, which objectivizes everything subjective and personal, this almost neurotic and harsh appeal to absolute subjectivity may be granted some edifying value. If, however, offered not only ~~in the way on~~ as an "austere"[24] sermon but as a philosophy which, despite some popularizing, "is intended strictly for specialists and philosophers"[24] - - an ambition strongly emphasized by Sartre - - then this philosophy says either almost nothing or it tries to maintain, without noticing it, ~~completely contradictory and~~ not only dialectically ambiguous ~~principles~~. but completely contradictory principles.

What is original in this philosophy is, unfortunately, quite untenable and what is tenable is certainly not original. If one takes the initial formulation of Sartre's ethical position seriously, it would present a highly original idea. The absolute truth and the only absolute truth would, then, be this that ~~exclusively~~ only those men who, in full awareness of their freedom "hurl themselves toward their future", ~~are honest and moral,~~

22/ J. P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme, 1946, p. 64f (English transl. pp. 42f).
23/ Ibid., p. 36f (English transl. p.27).
24/ Ibid., p. 16 (Engl. transl. p.15)

such as for instance the Nazi Hermann Göring or any other courageous mass murderer, are honest and moral. But all those who "hide their complete freedom from themselves" by means of deterministic beliefs, or, as Sartre derogatorily says, "deterministic excuses", i.e. men, like Abraham Lincoln[25b] or Emile Zola, the courageous defender of Dreyfuss, would have to be called, "from a strictly unbiased point of view, .. cowards or stinkers"[25d] + (Sartre has, in my opinion, not given any cogent reason for his distiction between these two abuses ~ ~); and in addition to this, these determinists would have to be rejected as dishonest, as deniers of the only absolute truth and as adopters of an entirely incoherent attitude.[26a]

This part of Sartre's moral beliefs is certainly paradoxical and original to the highest degree but equally unconvincing and poor as an ethical or metaphysical evaluation of human life. Such a theory would, in fact, be no more Schopenhauer's or Kant's doctrine of freedom deprived of all its subtler philosophical background and its ample allowance for empiristic determinism. Gabriel Marcel → to p. 6b

Sartre has doubtless been aware of the thinness of this part of his teaching and has, therefore, - - not very consistently - - added a supplement to the only fundamental truths of his ethical existentialism. He urges again and again: "When we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he is responsible for his individuality but that he is responsible for all men."[27b] In wanting freedom we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, and that the freedom of others depends on ours.. As soon as there is involvement, I am obliged

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25a/ Ibid., p. 84f (English transl. p. 55).
26b/ 26a/ Ibid., p. 81f (English transl. p. 53)
27a/ on p. 6b / 27b/ Ibid., p. 24 (English transl. pp. 19f).

25b/ At least, according to William Herndon, Lincoln's law partner for many years, Lincoln "always was a fatalist .. Lincoln always, to me in our private conversations, said that there was no freedom of the will .. I always was a fatalist"; see The Hidden Lincoln ed. by Emanuel Hertz, 1940, p. 167

Gabriel Marcel who certainly cannot be accused (suspected) of a lack of appreciation of Sartre's merits, rightly called Sartre's doctrine of absolute freedom completely "preposterous."[26b] Especially in his plays, Sartre evinced considerable sophistication and an incontestable mastery in depicting highly complicated infernos of human experience. There seems to me only one way to reconcile this subtlety with the oversimplification of his basic concept of free will: Thinkers like Fichte as well as Sartre evidently were so much under the spell of determinism in their earliest literary production, that they saw no way of gaining their independence of thought except by a total revolt against any givenness. Both thinkers originally felt so constrained to accept blindly what may be called the absurdity of reality, that in full protest against this they grew veritably obsessed by the idea of freedom.

Sartre himself has obviously not been aware of the thinness of his teaching on absolute individual freedom. In his Réflexions sur la question juive, for instance and in other contexts, he emphasizes the need for changing the perspectives of others to change their choices, and thus to effect "that freedom decides on other bases"[27a] -- a view which obviously makes the difference between freedom and determinism practically disappear.

But -- what is far more important, though certainly not very consistent -- Sartre himself adds a momentous supplement to the only fundamental truth of his ethical existentialism. → to p. 6a

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26b/ G. Marcel, The Philosophy of existence, 1949, p.55. Marcel also fears (Ibid., p.32) that the construction of a system of ethics not yet presented by Sartre will offer great difficulties and Marcel grants (ibid..p.33) that there is in Sartre "a certain taste and propensity for scandal."

27a/ J.P.Sartre, Reflexions sur la question juive, 1946, p.192

to want others to have freedom at the same time that I want my own freedom."[28] But as Sartre knows only too well, he (has all) these optimistic altruistic beliefs (strictly in common) with Kant or, as one could add with Fichte and numerous minor moralists. The difficulty is only that even Kant and Fichte could not give any conclusive reason for these ethical beliefs;[29a] and on the far more individualistic foundations of Sartre's existentialism,[29b] it is even less possible to couple his first absolute truth with his second one. There is evidently not the slightest difficulty in denying this second "truth" even if the first one were to be accepted as absolutely valid.

History names too many great criminals who bravely complied with all that is characteristic of Sartre's free man but felt in no way inclined to respect the freedom of others for logical, ethical or practical reasons. Especially if a fellowman consistently renounces his freedom and if, as in Sartre's existentialism, no definite distinction can be made between the metaphysical and the merely empirical character of man, how can one be "obliged" to want the freedom of one's fellowman, despite (the fellowman's) own free choice? Contrary to all the heated assurances of Sartre, individual freedom in itself does not imply the freedom of others in any respect, either in the way of an analytic or a necessary synthetic link.

Yet, strangely enough, Sartre believes to offer more than Kant by offering even less than his ingenious predecessor did. Sartre triumphantly reproaches Kant because of Kant's attempt at "constituting an ethics" by the merely "formal and the universal" in morals;[30] and I fully agree with Sartre that neither Kant nor anyone else succeeded in this hopeless undertaking.[29c] But to offer nothing at all in the place of others' failures

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28/ Ibid., p. 83 (English transl. p.54)

29a/ For a detailed discussion of these questions see D. Baumgardt, Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn, 1933, unter den Vorläufern der modernen Ethik, pp.3-194.

30/ J.P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946, p.85 (English transl. p.55)

does not seem to me a cause for justified pride.

Moreover, Sartre's justification for his offering no concrete ethics to replace Kantian or other traditional ~~concrete~~ codes of morals is based on a completely (confusing, baffling) argument. Sartre frequently repeats: "We can not decide a priori what there is to be done" in moral action.[31] "Life has no meaning a priori..Value is nothing else, but the meaning that you choose."[32] "His content [of moral behavior] is always concrete and therby unforseeable; there is always the element of invention. The one thing that counts is knowing whether the inventing that has been dome, has been done in the name of freedom."[33] In his L'Imaginaire Sartre warns us against any identification of the moral with the aesthetic.[34] But in his later work he makes ample use of at least one complete analogy between true, i.e., creative morality and true art. "Has anyone ever asked 'what painting ought he to make?'.. There is no definite painting to be made..the painting to be made is precisely the painting..the artist..will have made."[35] There are no "preestablished "ethical values anymore than pre-established aesthetic values.[35] One may subscibe to a good deal of what is said in this analogy between concrete aesthetic and ethical creation. It would certainly be a bad painter who would first consult aesthetic rules and values and begin his creative work only after having finished his aesthetical studies; and to the man of moral action no tiresome study of ethical systems is needed or often even possible before the time of action. The painter, the moral agent or an actor on the stage would certainly ~~generally~~ be ~~even~~ handicaped if in the midst of his creative work he suddenly would consult aesthetic or moral laws or the principles of physiognomics. But all this does not

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31/ Ibid., p. 77 (Engl. transl. p.51).
32/ Ibid., p. 89 (English transl.p.58).
33/ Ibid., p. 86. Compare p.75 (English transl.p.56. Compare p.49). Heidegger, too comes often dangerously near very bold assurance of a similar questionable conclusiveness. See e.g. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 1931, p. 266: Dem Dasein ist keinerlei "inhaltliches Existenzideal vorzuhalten und von aussen aufzuzwingen." Compare ibid., pp. 294, 296, 298. But Sartre's utterances on this point are certainly even less guarded than those of Heidegger.
34/ J.P. Sartre, L'Imaginaire, psychologie phénoménologique de l'imagination, 1940, p.245
35/ J.P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946 p.75 (English transl.pp.49f).

prove in the least what Sartre wants to prove, namely that there are no aesthetic or ethical or physiognomic laws.

True, our insight into these laws may be permanently enriched by new creative achievements of great artists, moral personalities or great masters of the stage. But if there were no aesthetic or moral or physiognomic laws, there would be no criterion for distinguishing between art and botching or between morality and crime. Everything done would be, then, equally (as) valuable (as) valueless and in morality as well as in the arts everything would be "arbitrariness of choice", would be absolute caprice - - a consequence necessarily to be drawn from what Sartre stated but a consequence he anxiously wished to avoid. [35F]

If we would wish
In other words, to prove what Sartre wants to prove (namely, that the moralist need not or even should not ~~serve~~ search out (for) concrete ethical values) we would have to refer to the analogy with a creative painter who would proudly announce: I need not or should not do any concrete painting. But the painter's task is to do concrete painting and the moralists task to build a concrete ethics. From Sartre's (point) statement however, that the painter does not look to aesthetics for advice about his concrete painting, it does not follow at all that there is no concrete aesthetics or ethics.

Even more simply speaking: the painter who does creative painting without consulting prefixed aesthetic values does not prove that there are no such values, and the man who acts morally out of a deep moral instinct does not prove that there are no moral laws. On the contrary, exactly such painters and agents justify the aesthetician's and moralist search for the elucidation of concrete aesthetics and concrete moral values.

Simone de Beauvoir's Pour une morale de l'ambiguité seems to me much richer and more instructive than Sartre's reflections

[35G] In this respect Julien Benda's charges that existentialism is "la révolte de la vie contre la pensée" is not unjustified, see J. Benda, Tradition de l'existentialisme, 1947, e.g. p. 7 and in Pour et Contre l'existentialisme, Grand Débat, 1948, p. 112

on ethics. She holds the fundamental existentialist position in Heidegger's and Sartre's terms, and like Jaspers she thinks the nihilist's attitude toward life and human action far more honest than that of the lukewarm, the tepid, the "sousohemme" who, tries to "efface the agonizing evidence of his freedom" [36] or "l'homme sérieux" who "looses himself" in some objective goal "accepted from society.. in order to annihilate his subjectivity;" [36] only the adventurous and the passionate man, the critic and the artist are ranked higher in her tentative hierarchy of men. But, as she insists, unlike the nihilist or other lower types of men, the true existentialist knowing of his lack of being denies it, (in the terms of Hegel ambiguous, dialectical language,) affirms himself exactly by this acknowledgment and denial as a positive existence [37] and it is this existence of "freedom..from which..all values spring". [38]

In almost Fichtean terminology, the free will is here defined as "raising obstacles" and disclosing the world of values by conquering or not conquering these obstacles. [39] In any case, like in Sartre, Beauvoir rejects any "ready-made value which offers itself from the outside to my abstract adherence," [40] any ethical recipes; [41a] and yet, in the end, she shows herself far more concerned about concrete ethics and an unambiguous criterion of morality than almost any other existentialist has done so far.

She confesses that, although there are no "ready-made solutions" in ethics, "it is useful for the man of action" and the moralist "to find out under what conditions" human "undertakings are valid." [41b] And it

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36/ S. de Beauvoir; Pour une morale de l'ambiguité, 1947, p. (Engl. transl. 1948, p.45). As to Jaspers similar attitude toward nihilis see his Der philosophische Glaube, 1948, pp.108f or his Philosophie, vol. II 1932, pp. 312ff on the "nihilistischen Selbstmörder". compare K. Jaspers, Philosophische Logik, vol. I, 24

37/ Ibid., p.19 (Engl. transl. p.13). 38/ Ibid., p.34 (Engl. transl. p.21

39/ Ibid., p.40 (Engl. transl. p.24). 40/ Ibid., p.35 (Engl. transl. p.21 24

41a/ Ibid, p.187 (Engl. transl. p.134) 28 41b/ Ibid, p.188 (Engl. transl. p.134)

Von der Wahrheit, 1941, p. 991. According to Gabriel Marcel, Philosophy of Existence, 1949, p. 19 "there is an intimate dialectical correlation between the optimism of technical progress and the philosophy of despair" in the world of today.

is indeed amazing enough to see what the "new perspectives" are which she "discloses..on this basis."[41a] They are, in fact, nothing but consistently eudaemonistic principles. It is, we read here, "logical, though this logic implies an outrageous absurdity"[42a] - - but, of course, an absurdity only from the point of view of a blindly anti-hedonistic existentialism - - "de préférer le salut du plus grand nombre".[42b] In difficult ethical decisions, we further hear, the criterion of morality is "that all things considered, the evil that one inflicts be lesser than that which is being forestalled."[43a] Under all circumstances, even the most fleeting enjoyment of any individual, if harmless to himself and others, has to be respected according to Simone de Beauvoir.[43b] But if these entirely empirical, eudaemonistic criteria of morality are ultimately the only decisive ones, then, naturally the whole structure of Jaspers'[44] and Sartre's[45a] anti-eudaemonistic existentialism is shattered.

There is no need, then, for the protracted efforts which Beauvoir made in her Pyrrhus et Cineas[45b] to demonstrate that to will oneself free means also to will all others free; and the numerous loud assertions which Sartre made for the same purpose would, then, be also as superfluous as they are inconclusive. Moreover, if the maximization of joy is the only ultimate criterion of morality, then we are, to our good fortune, completely freed from those vague and "absurd" existentialist criteria which say that "echt sein", true existentialist involvement and absolute free subjectivity can be the only guarantees of the truly valuable life. ~~We would~~ Only then would we be freed from the grossest absurdity

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41a/ Simone de Beauvoir Ibid., p.188 (Engl.transl.p.135).
42a/ Ibid., p.159, (Engl.transl.p.140). 43a/ Ibid., p.209 (Engl.transl.150)
43b/ Ibid., pp.189f (Engl.transl.p.135f)
44/ See K.Jaspers, Der philosophische Glaube, 1948, e.g.p.105 Compare K. Jaspers, Philosophie, 1932, p. 231 vol. I, and Von der Wahrheit 1947, e.g. p. 718
45a/ See J.P.Sartre, L'être et le néant, Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique, 1943, e.g.p. 720.
45b/

to which Beauvoir hónestly confesses,[46] namely, that according to the existentialist's standard even the "true" vitality, the wholehearted "Echtheit" and the indomitable sense of freedom of Hermann Göring ranks morally very high. How much or how little one may praise Göring on account of compliance with existentialist ethics, his infamy and moral blindness certainly stands out infinitely more clearly if judged by nothing but the criterion of consistent eudaemonism. No one - - not even Göring himself can credit this outstanding gangster with any pangs of consience concerning the greatest happiness or the greatest salvation of the greatest number.

To summarize as concisely as possible, contemporary existentialist ethics bogs down, in my opinion, on at least three vital points. Wherever this ethics moves in the field of empirical inquiry it lacks precision to a fatal degree. It leads not only to those ambiguities of which it is very proud but to untenable and often unnoticed selfcontradictions. Its criterion of morality would, of necessity approve of the courageous criminal, if he believes in existentialist freedom, and would have to condemn the morally noblest fighter for a great cause, if he is an avowed determinist. A "truth" which necessarily leads to such consequences can certainly not be granted "absolute"validity; and vice versa, inversely when if Sartre dismisses all scientific truth as only probable in comparison with his absolute existentialist truth, he betrays nothing but a grave misconception of verified necessity in science and empirical ethics.

From the metaphysical hights of Sartre's belief belive in absolute existentialist subjectivity, no way leads down to an empirically necessary respect of the "freedom and happiness" of others[47]; and vice versa, from a consistent eudaemonistic principle as an empirical, hypothetical

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46/ Ibid. S.de Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l'ambiguité, 1947, p.61 (Engl.transl.p.42).

47/ Ibid., p.201 (Engl.transl.p.144).

vice versa, from a consistent eudaemonistic principle as an empirical, hypothetical yet strict criterion of morality, no way leads back to any absolute truth of such rich contents as the existentialists ascribe to their alleged absolute truths.

Further -- and this, it seems to me, is no less important to any thinking individual -- what the existentialist presents as his fundamental problem opens doubtless a true abyss for ex gravest metaphysical speculation. But if these specualtions are offered as absolute truth or even as "simple truth" and as a truth of far higher certainly than any scientific empirical truth, then the harshness and self-assuredness of such claims can blind only epistemologically confused minds. The incomprehensible depths of the miracle and the meaning of human existence cannot be exhausted or even gauged by the definiteness of the statements into which Heidegger put his metaphysical paraphrases on Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phaenomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins.

If, according to Jean Wahl's interpretation of Jaspers, we are thrown into a night of anxiety in which the absolute reveals itself only in scattered flashes, like in intermittent strokes of lightening,[61] in that night there is, nevertheless, according to Nietzsche, bliss even deeper than despair. If according to the later thought of Sartre, "optimistic toughness"[62] is the principal attitude of the true existentialist, there remains the desperate nausea as the essentialist attitude in Sartre's own earliest type of existentialism; and there remains the electric glare of stale hopelessness in the night of hell so graphically

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61/ J. Wahl, Petite histoire de l'existentialisme, 1947, p.25
62/ J.P.Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946, p.58

described in Sartre's Huis clos. No absolute truths can be promulgated in any attempts to decipher the infinite background of our being. Absolute secrets may only be circumscribed here by fuller and fuller indications of probability, mainly by means of similes and a vision comparable to that of the poet.

Third, existentialism is certainly right in its protest against seeing man only as a product of historical and social forces which can be fully explained and sufficiently understood. No satiated philistine acquiescence in existing social conditions, no self-justification by these conditions, and no excited all-absorbing revolution do sufficient justice to the most radical human needs of the individual. But metaphysical speculation must not be allowed to see man only as jailed into society, or locked up exclusively in his free existentialist subjectivity and the relation of this individuality to his fellow-man. There is still the life of the cosmos, of non-human life and being against which the meaning of the life of man has metaphysically to be grasped. Only if this is done anew, as I have tried to do it, can we hope to outgrow Sartre's existentialism of anguish. Only thus can we secure a far more precise and basic criterion of morality than contemporary existentialism could; and we will then have progressed at least one small step further to a clearer and richer picture of those eternally tormenting and beatifying riddles which are called individual life.

63/ George Lukacs, Existentialisme on Marxisme (?), 1948, p.162 reproaches all existentialists including Kierkegaard for completely ignoring "la concrétisation marxiste des rapports historiques et sociaux entre les hommes par l'économie." But Lukacs' own philosophy suffers no less from abstractions than that of his opponents.

yet strict criterion of morality, no way leads back to any absolute truth of such rich contents as the existentialists ascribe to their alleged (~~absolute~~ highest) truths.

Further - - and this, it seems to me, is no less important to any thinking individual - - what the existentialist presents as his fundamental problem opens doubtless a true abyss for gravest metaphysical speculation. But of these speculations are offered as absolute truth or even as "simple truth" and as a truth of far higher certainty than any scientific empirical truth, then the harshness and self-assuredness of such claims can blind only epistemologically confused minds. The incomprehensible depths of the miracle and the meaning of human existence cannot be exhausted or even gauged by the definiteness of the statements into which Heidegger put his metaphysical paraphrases on Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phaenomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. And the same applies even more to the pretended certainties of Sartre's existentialism. No absolute truths can be promulgated in any attempts of our deciphering the infinite background of our being. Only absolute secrets can be circumscribed here by fuller and fuller indications of pr probabilty mainly in the way of seem similes and vision similar to that of the poet.

Third, existentialism is certainly right in its protest against seeing man only as a product of historical and social forces which can be fully explained and sufficiently understood. No satisted philistine acquiescence in existing social conditions, no self-justification by these conditions and no excited all-absorbing revolution do sufficient justice to the most radical human needs of the individual. But metaphysical speculation must not be allowed to see man only jailed into society nor locked up exclusively in its free existentialist subjectivity and

the relation of this individuality to his fellowmen. There is still the life of the cosmos, of non-human life and being against which the meaning of the life of man has metaphysically to be grasped. Only if this is done anew, as I have tried to do it, can we hope to outgrow Sartre's existentialism of "optimistic toughness"* and Heidegger's existentialism of anguish, can we secure a far more precise and basic criterion of morality than contemporary existentialism could; and we will have progressed thus at least one small step further to a clear and richer picture of those eternally tormenting and beatifying riddles which are called individual life.

*Engl. transl. p. 40

English translation p. 40

3rd International Congress of Philosophy
Mexico 1950

Existentialist Ethics
in the Light
of a New Theory of the Meaning of Life

(Jaspers, Sartre, De Beauvoir

Copy I

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unpleasable

Ethics

EXISTENTIALIST ~~METAPHYSICS~~

IN THE LIGHT

OF A NEW THEORY OF THE MEANING OF LIFE

By

DAVID BAUMGARDT

Thanks for D. B.
Yes, keen analysis & criticism is a pleasure
to render, the abstruse matter enjoyable!
Sam S.

Phenomenology ~~which~~ made its début in the early writings of Husserl by claiming to be strict science, "strenge Wissenschaft". It has taken a turn to metaphysics in Scheler and Heidegger, and now the leadership of phenomenological existentialism is largely in the hands of poets. If, as I do, one values poetical or metaphysical philosophy and metaphysical poetry as a source of weightiest insights, metaphysical existentialism should not give the slightest reason for disconcertment. What alone is irritating and disastrously confusing, is the presentation of poetical insights as the only possible philosophical truth, or the claim that a tohu bohu of scientific and poetical aspirations is the only wisdom strictly and universally binding.

The pretension of having hit upon the only original philosophical truth is generally the more marked, the more limited the knowledge of the history of philosophy; and the superiority feeling is the stronger the more monotonous or meager the real insights are. By reference to Jaspers's, Sartre's, and Simone de Beauvoir's most recent ethical reflections, I wish briefly to do full justice to existentialism and to show, nevertheless, that its main motifs can be rendered productive only after considerable recasting in the framework of a better founded theory of the meaning of life.

In Karl Jaspers's Der philosophische Glaube, which appeared only about a year ago, the existentialist claim to originality is, perhaps, more temperate than anywhere else. Jaspers grants that the philosophical belief, the existentialist belief in an absolute freedom of man, has very much in common with the beliefs of the Judeso-Christian tradition, and with earlier types of philosophical "Vernunftglaube", i.e., the belief in a higher reason contrary to all rational scientific understanding. Such beliefs were fostered in the 19th century by Hegel, by Schelling, (especially by Schelling's late thought,) by Kierkegaard's definite (concluding) Unscientific Postscript and -e- what even Christian existentialists omit

to notice - - by Franz von Baader.

But, like other existentialists, Jaspers obviously implies that as presently "man undergoes a more radical change than ever before in historical times," present existentialism represents a more radical and original philosophizing than any earlier philosophy.[1] Like Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, Jaspers stresses that the fundamental existentialist experience of our free subjectivity is an insight superior to all knowledge of fixed clearly outlined (facable) objects, including the understanding of ourselves as objects of scientific psychological observation. But far more than the atheistic existentialists, Jaspers urges the "transcendent" secrets which sorround any grasp of the "nature" of human existence in its contrast to all "Seiendem," to all objects of the knowable world.

Jaspers is fully aware of the unspeakable paradox which is the subject matter of his philosophical belief. This subject matter cannot even properly be called the subject in contrast to all objects; it is only something "toward which" or "out from which" we can speak.[2] In fact, all that can be said about it, toward it and out from it is said by Jaspers only in metaphors.

This subject matter of existential thinking and existential living is characterized neither as subject nor as object, but signified as the "Umgreifende," the "spanning round," "the embracing"[2] which is, in the terms of Schelling, experienced in the way of feeling, so to speak, privy to the creation, "in Mitwissenschaft mit der Schöpfung;"[3] or, in terms of Franz Baader's existentialism, it is shaping and therefore not shapeable reality, "ungestaltbare, weil gestaltende" Wirklichkeit.[4]

1/ K. Jaspers, Der Philosophische Glaube, 1948, pp. 83, 118. Compare a similar view in Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence, 1949, p. 32.
2/ Ibid., p. 15.
3/ Ibid. p. 19.
4/ See D. Baumgardt, Franz von Baader und die philosophische Romantik, 1927, e.g. pp. 250ff.

This uncodditiined "true subject" of Jasper's existentialism can never be given in time but only "quer zur Zeit" as transversing time, across the time.[5] This subject matter can be "erhellt", "lit up", only by an appeal,[6] by a "Ruck", a shock of selfconsciousness[7] in which man as existent in his freedom experiences himself as "a donation to himself from transcendence", "als sich geschenkt von der Transzendenz."[8] This truth withdraws from, is inaccesible to any "direct formulation"[9]; and vice versa, conversely the divine does not speak through any human being in a definite but only in ambiguous ways.[10] Only a "floating guidence," "schwebende Führung," can come from the "umgreifende Atmosphäre" of genuinely experienced existence in past and present, never an objectivity identical for everyone.[11] In existence, there is no seizing of straws or saving planks,[12] no "leaning to anything fixed".[13] Living in existence is living in the clear knowledge that God can never exist as any object exists.[14] Living in existence is being "driven by a spike",[15] is being open to the divine even if the divine should never speak to you.[16]

But it is, in my opinion, confusing to hear that this grasping of existence or being filled with existence, which can be characterized only by similes, analogies and metaphors is, nevertheless, said to proceed according to a method of scientific character.[17] It is reassuring to read that, though "Vernunft", existentialist reason, is infinitely superior to the merely rational understanding, existentialist reason is never without rational understanding.[18] But, unfortunately, we hear

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5/ K. Jaspers, Der philosophische Glaube, 1948, p.32, 112. 6/ Ibid., p.33. 7/ Ibid., p.32 8/ Ibid., pp.57, 114.
9/ Ibid., p. 81. 10/ Ibid., p.80. 11/ Ibid., p.88.
12/ Ibid., p.122, 123. 13/ Ibid., p.105.
14/ Ibid., p.103. 15/ Ibid., p.110.
16/ Ibid., p.103. 17/ Ibid., p. 29
18/ Ibid., p.38.

far too.little of how rational understanding ~~man~~ can and is to be used by the higher reason of existentialist belief. We are told only that in the field of ethics, which is of such vital relevance to every existentialist the Ten Commandments are "irrevocably valid" [19a] - - a statement which is questioned by French existentialists who permit the killing of men and telling of a lie under many circumstances. And even less rewarding is the only ethical advice given in Jaspers' Die geistige Situation der Zeit and so often repeated by other existentialists, the Polonian exhortation: "To Line yourself be true". Even if this moral advice is expressed by the German phrase "Zu tun was echt ist" [19b], it is, unfortunately, a rule to which Stalin, Hitler and Churchill alike may claim to have lived up.

The moral ideas developped by Sartre in his L'existentialisme est un humanisme are, however, evidently no more substantial ~~also~~ than those of Jaspers. To Sartre the absolute freedom of human existence freed ~~also~~ from any relation to a non-extant deity is obviously an even more independent reality than to Jaspers. Man's existence precedes every essence, even his own one, his own nature. [20a] "First of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene and, only afterwards.. will he be something and he himself will have made what he will be." [20b] He is "at first..nothing" [20b] or, as Beauvoir says " a useless passion"; [21] but later he is not only "what he conceives himself to be, but he is also only what he wills himself to be after this thrust toward existence." [20b] Obviously differing on this point, too, from Jaspers, Sartre thinks that grasping the subjectivity

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19a/ Ibid., p.127.
19b/ K. Jaspers, Die Geistige Situation der Zeit, 1931, p.188,
20a/ Sartre has, of course, taken over this view from Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, 1931, e.g. p. 42f, 117
20b/ J.P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme, 1946, p. 21f (translated into English under the title Existentialism by Bernard Frechtman, 1947, p. 18).
21/ S. de Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l'ambiguité, 1947, p.15 (translated into English under the title The Ethics of Ambiguity, 1948, p.10.)

of existence is a "simple..matter..easily arrived at"; it is seizing a truth "on every one's doorstep," in fact the only "absolute truth" in comparison with which everything else is "only probable".[22] "Man is condemned to be free..once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does..He can't start making excuses for himself..We are alone, with no excuse".[23] So far Sartre's existentialism could perhaps be called the most punitive, cruelly rigoristic (id moral rigorism) Puritanism ever promulgated

Orthodox Calvinism, making ~~finally~~ God responsible for the ultimate reprobation and moral damnation of the non-elect, seems in comparison with this type of existentialism conciliatory and humane. But in an age which makes touchable things out of everything non-tengible, which objectivizes everything subjective and personal, this almost neurotic and harsh appeal to absolute subjectivity may be granted some edifying value. If, however, offered not only ~~in the way of~~ as an "austere"[24] sermon, but as a philosophy which, despite some popularizing, "is intended strictly for specialists and philosophers"[24] - - an ambition strongly emphasized by Sartre - - then this philosophy says either almost nothing or it tries to maintain, without noticing it, ~~completely contradictory and~~ not only dialectically ambiguous ~~principles~~, but completely contradictory principles.

What is original in this philosophy is, unfortunately, quite untenable and what is tenable is certainly not original. If one takes the initial formulation of Sartre's ethical position seriously, it would present a highly original idea. The absolute truth and the only absolute truth would, then, be this: that ~~solely~~ only those men who, in full awareness of their freedom "hurled themselves toward their future" are ~~honest and moral~~.

22/ J. P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme, 1946, p.64f (English transl. pp. 42f).
23/ Ibid., p.36f (English transl. p.27).
24/ Ibid., p.16 (Engl. transl. p.15)

such as for instance the Nazi Hermann Göring or any other courageous mass murderer, are honest and moral. But all those who "hide their complete freedom from themselves" by means of deterministic beliefs, or, as Sartre derogatorily says, "deterministic excuses", [25a] i.e. men opposed to the belief in free will, like Abraham Lincoln [25b] or Emile Zola, the courageous defender of Dreyfus, would have to be called, "from a strictly unbiased point of view, .. cowards or stinkers" [25c] (Sartre has, in my opinion, not given any cogent reason for his distiction between these two (epithets) abuses) ; and in addition to this these determinists would have to be rejected as dishonest, as deniers of the only absolute truth and as adopters of an entirely incoherent attitude. [26]

This part of Sartre's moral beliefs is certainly paradoxical and original to the highest degree, but equally it is unconvincing and poor as an ethical or metaphysical evaluation of human life. Such a theory would, in fact, be no more than Schopenhauer's or Kant's doctrine of freedom deprived of all its subtler philosophical background and its ample allowance for empiristic determinism. Gabriel Marcel who certainly cannot be accused of suspected

Sartre has doubtless been aware of the thinness of this part of his teaching and has, therefore, - - not very consistently - - added a supplement to the only fundamental truths of his ethical existentialism. He urges again and again: "When we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he is responsible for his individuality but that he is responsible for all men." [27] In wanting freedom we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, and that the freedom of others depends on ours.. As soon as there is involvement, I am obliged

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25a Ibid., p.84f (English transl. p.55).
26 Ibid., p.61f (English transl. p.53)
27 Ibid., p.24 (English transl. pp. 19f).

25b At least according to William Herndon, Lincoln's law partner for many years, Lincoln "always was a fatalist.. Lincoln always, to me in our private conversations, said that there was no freedom of the will," see The Hidden Lincoln ed. by Emanuel Hertz, 1940, p. 167.

"I always was a fatalist"

of a lack of appreciation of Sartre's merits, rightly called Sartre's doctrine of absolute freedom completely "preposterous."[26b] Especially in his plays, Sartre evinced considerable sophistication and an incontestable mastery in depicting highly complicated infernos of human experience. There seems to me only one way to reconcile this subtlety with the oversimplification of his basic concept of free will: Thinkers like Fichte as well as Sartre evidently were so much under the spell of determinism in their earliest literary production, that they saw no way of gaining their independence of thought except by a total revolt against any givenness. Both thinkers originally felt so constrained to accept blindly what may be called the absurdity of reality, that in full protest against this they grew veritably obsessed by the idea of freedom.

Sartre himself has obviously not been unaware of the thinness of his teaching on absolute individual freedom. In his Réflexions sur la question juive, for instance and in other contexts, he emphasizes the need for changing the perspectives of others to change their choices, and thus to effect "that freedom decides on other bases"[27a] - - a view which obviously makes the difference between freedom and determinism practically disappear.

But--what is far more important, though certainly not very consistent -- Sartre himself adds a momentous supplement to the only fundamental truth of his ethical existentialism. He urges again and again:"When we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he is responsible for his individuality but that he is responsible for all men."[27b] In wanting freedom we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, and that the freedom of others depends on ours..As soon as there is involvement, I am obliged

[26b] G.Marcel, The Philosophy of existence, 1949, p.55. Marcel also fears (ibid., p.) that the construction of a system of ethics not yet presented by Sartre will offer great difficulties and Marcel grabts (ibid., p.33) that there is in Sartre "a certain taste and propensity for scandal."

[27a] J.P.Sartre, Reflexions sur la question juive, 1946, p.192

[27b] J.P.Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946, p.24

to want others to have freedom at the same time that I want my own freedom."[28] But as Sartre knows only too well, he shares all these optimistic altruistic beliefs strictly in common with Kant or, as one might could add with Fichte and numerous minor moralists. The difficulty is only that even Kant and Fichte could not give any conclusive reason for these ethical beliefs[29] and on the far more individualistic foundations of Sartre's existentialism, it is even less possible to couple his first absolute truth with his second one. There is evidently not the slightest difficulty in denying this second "truth" even if the first one were to be accepted as absolutely valid.

Even Francis Jeanson in his excellent analysis of Sartre's ethics[29b] significantly admits that in his original thought, in his *La Nausée*, Sartre did not reach the problem of the other at all.

History names too many great criminals who bravely complied with all that is characteristic of Sartre's free man but felt in no way inclined to respect the freedom of others for logical, ethical or practical reasons. Especially if a fellowman consistently renounces his freedom and if, as in Sartre's existentialism, no definite distinction can be made between the metaphysical and the merely empirical character of man, how can one be "obliged" to want the freedom of one's fellowman, despite his fellowman's own free adoption of deterministic attitude? Contrary to all the heated assurances of Sartre, individual freedom in itself does not ethically imply the freedom of others in any respect, either in the way of an analytic or a necessary synthetic link.

Yet, strangely enough, Sartre believes he offers more than Kant by offering even less than his ingenious predecessor did. Sartre triumphantly reproaches Kant because of Kant's attempt at "constituting an ethics" by the merely "formal and the universal" in morals;[30] and I fully agree with Sartre that neither Kant nor anyone else succeeded in this hopeless undertaking.[29] But to offer nothing at all in the place of others' failures

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28/ Ibid., p.83 (English transl. p.54)

29/ For a detailed discussion of these questions see D.Baumgardt, Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn, 1933 unter den Vorläufern der modernen Ethik, pp.3- 1933, pp.3-194.

30/ J.P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946, p.85 (English transl. p.55)

29b/ See Francis Jeanson, Le problème moral et la pensée de Sartre, 1947, p.341

does not seem to me a cause for justified pride.

Moreover, Sartre's justification for his offering no concrete ethics to replace Kantian or other traditional ~~concrete~~ codes of morals is based on a completely baffling confusing argument. Sartre frequently repeats: "We can not decide a priori what there is to be done" in moral action.[31] "Life has no meaning a priori..Value is nothing else but the meaning that you choose."[32] "The content [of moral behavior] is always concrete and therby unforseeable there is always the element of invention. The one thing that counts is knowing whether the inventing that has been done, has been done in the name of freedom."[33] In his L'Imaginaire Sartre had warned us against any identification of ethics with the moral with the aesthetic.[34] But in his later work he makes ample use of at least one complete analogy between true, i.e., creative morality and true art. "Has anyone ever asked 'what painting ought he to make?'.. There is no definite painting to be made..the painting to be made is precisely the painting..the artist..will have made."[35] There are no "preestablished "ethical values anymore then pre-established aesthetic values.[35] One may subscibe to a good deal of what is said in this analogy between concrete aesthetic and ethical creation. It would certainly be a bad painter who would first consult aesthetic rules and values and begin his creative work only after having finished his aesthetical studies; and to the man of moral action no tiresome study of ethical systems is needed or often even possible before the time of action. The painter, the moral agent or an actor on the stage would certainly be ~~even~~ handicaped if in the midst of his creative work he suddenly would consult aesthetic or moral laws or the principles of physiognomics. But all this does not

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31/ Ibid., p.77 (Engl. transl. p.51).
32/ Ibid., p.89 (English transl.p.58).
33/ Ibid., p. 86. Compare p.75f (English transl.p. 56. Compare p.49). Heidegger, too comes often dangerously near very bold assurances of a similar questionable conclusiveness. See e.g. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 1931, p. 266: Dem Dasein ist ferner ein "inhaltliches Existenzideal vorzuhalten und von ihm aufzuspringen". Compare ibid., pp. 294, 296, 298. But Sartre's utterances on this point are certainly even less guarded than those of Heidegger.
34/ J.P. Sartre, L'imaginaire, psychologie phénoménologique de l'imagination, 1940, p. 245
35/ J.P. Sartre, L'Existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946 pp. 75f (English transl.pp.49f).

prove in the least what Sartre wants to prove, namely that there are no aesthetic or ethical or physiognomic laws.

True, our insight into these laws may be permanently enriched by new creative achievements of great artists, moral personalities or great masters of the stage. But if there were no aesthetic or moral or physiognomic laws, there would be no criterion for distinguishing between art and botching or between morality and crime. Everything done would be, then, equally valuable or valueless, and in morality, as well as in the arts everything would be "arbitrariness of choice", would be absolute caprice -- a consequence necessarily to be drawn from what Sartre stated[35b], but a consequence he anxiously wished to avoid.

In other words, if we would wish to prove what Sartre wants to prove (namely, that the moralist need not or even should not search out for concrete ethical values) we would have to refer to the analogy with a creative painter who proudly announces: I need not or should not do any concrete painting. But the painter's task is to do concrete painting and the moralists task to build a concrete ethics. From Sartre's statement however, that the painter does not look to aesthetics for advice about his concrete painting, it does not follow at all that there is no concrete aesthetics or ethics.

Even more simply speaking: the painter who does creative painting without consulting prefixed aesthetic values does not prove that there are no such values, and the man who acts morally out of a deep moral instinct does not prove that there are no moral laws. On the contrary, exactly such painters and agents justify the aesthetician's and moralist search for the elucidation of concrete aesthetics and concrete moral values.

Simone de Beauvoir's Pour une morale de l'ambiguité seems to me much richer and more instructive than Sartre's reflections

35b/ In this respect Julien Benda's charges that existentialism is "la révolte de la vie contre la pensée" is not unjustified, see J.Benda, Tradition de l'existentialisme, 1947 e.g. p.7 and in Pour et Contre l'existentialisme, Grand Debat, 1948, [redacted]. p.112.

on ethics. She holds the fundamental existentialist position in Heidegger's and Sartre's terms and like Jaspers she thinks the nihilist's attitude toward life and human action far more honest than that of the lukewarm, the tepid, the "sousohomme" who, tries to "efface the agonizing evidence of his freedom" [36] or "l'homme sérieux" who "looses himself" in some objective goal "accepted from society.. in order to annihilate his subjectivity;" [36] only the adventurous and the passionate man, the critic and the artist are ranked higher in her tentative hierarchy of men. But, as she insists, unlike the nihilist or other lower types of men, the true existentialist knowing of his lack of being, denies it, (in the terms of Hegel ambiguous, dialectical language,) affirms himself exactly by this acknowledgment and denial as a positive existence [37] and it is this existence of "freedom..from which..all values spring". [38]

In almost Fichtean terminology, the free will is here defined as "pursuing obstacles" and disclosing the world of values by conquering or not conquering these obstacles. [39] In any case, like in Sartre, Beauvoir rejects any "ready-made value which offers itself from the outside to my abstract adherence," [40] any ethical recipes; [41a] and yet, in the end, she shows herself far more concerned about concrete ethics and an unambiguous criterion of morality than almost any other existentialist has done so far.

She confesses that, although there are no "ready-made solutions" in ethics, "it is useful for the man of action" and the moralist "to find out under what conditions" human "undertakings are valid." [41b] And it

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36/ S. de Beauvoir; Pour une morale de l'ambiguité, 1947, pp.65f (Engl.transl.1948, p.45). As to Jaspers similar attitude toward Nihilism see his Der philosophische Glaube, 1948, pp.108f or his Philosophie 1932, vol.II pp.312f über den nihilistischen Selbstmörder. Compare K. Jaspar, Philosophie (2nd ed.), vol.I, Von der Wahrheit, 1941, p.911. According to Gabriel Marcel, Philosophy of Existence, 1949, p.19 "Here is an intimate dialectical correlation between the optimism of technical progress and the philosophy of despair" of in the world of today.

37/ Ibid., p.19 (Engl.transl.p.13). 38/ Ibid., p.34 (Engl.transl.p.24

39/ Ibid., p.40 (Engl.transl.p.28). 40/ Ibid., p.35 (Engl.transl.p.24.

41a/ Ibid, p.187 (Engl. transl. p.134) 41b/ Ibid. p.188 (Engl. transl. p.134)

is indeed amazing enough to see what the "new perspectives" are which she "discloses..on this basis."[42a] They are, in fact, nothing but consistently eudaemonistic principles. It is, we read here, "logical, though this logic implies an outrageous absurdity"[42b] - - but, of course, an absurdity only from the point of view of a blindly anti-hedonistic existentialism - - "de préférer le salut du plus grand nombre".[42c] In difficult ethical decisions, we further hear, the criterion of morality is "that all things considered, the evil that one inflicts be lesser than that which is being forestalled."[43a] Under all circumstances, even the most fleeting enjoyment of any individual, if harmless to himself and others, has to be respected according to Simone de Beauvoir.[43b] But if these entirely empirical, eudaemonistic criteria of morality are ultimately the only decisive ones, then, naturally the whole structure of Jaspers'[44] and Sartre's[45a] anti-eudaemonistic existentialism is shattered.

There is no need, then, for the protracted efforts which Beauvoir made in her Pyrrhus et Cineas[45b] to demonstrate that to will oneself free means also to will all others free; and the numerous loud assertions which Sartre made for the same purpose would, then, be also as superfluous as they are inconclusive. Moreover, if the maximization of joy is the only ultimate criterion of morality, then we are, to our good fortune, completely freed from those vague and "absurd" existentialist criteria which say that "echt sein", true existentialist involvement and absolute free subjectivity can be the only guarantee of the truly valuable life. ~~He would~~ Only then would we be freed from the grossest absurdity

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42a/ Simone de Beauvoir Ibid., p.188 (Engl.transl.p.135).
42b/ Ibid., p.159 (Engl.transl.p.140). 43a/ Ibid., p.209 (Engl.transl.p.180)
43b/ Ibid., pp.189f (Engl.transl.p.135f)
44/ See K.Jaspers, Der philosophische Glaube, 1948, e.g.p.105. Compare
45a/ See J.P.Sartre, L'être et le néant, Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique, 1943, e.g.p. 720.

45b/ See S.de Beauvoir, Pyrrhus et Cineas, 1944, e.g. p.96: "Seule la liberte d'autrui est capable de nécessiter mon être"

(K. Jaspers, Philosophie, 1932 vol. I, p. 231 and Von der Wahrheit, 1947 e.g. p. 718)

to which Beauvoir honestly confesses,[46] namely, that according to the existentialist's standard even the "true" vitality, the wholehearted "Echtheit" and the indomitable sense of freedom of Hermann Göring ranks morally very high. How much or how little one may praise Göring on account of compliance with existentialist ethics, his infamy and moral blindness certainly stands out infinitely more clearly if judged by nothing but the criterion of consistent eudaemonism. No one - - not even Göring himself--can credit this outstanding gangster with any pangs of conscience concerning the greatest happiness or the greatest salvation of the greatest number.

To summarize as concisely as possible, contemporary existentialist ethics bogs down, in my opinion, on at least three vital points. Wherever this ethics moves in the field of empirical inquiry it lacks precision to a fatal degree. It leads not only to those ambiguities of which it is very proud, but to untenable and often unnoticed selfcontradictions. Its criterion of morality would, of necessity, approve of the courageous criminal, if he believes in existentialist freedom, and would have to condemn the morally noblest fighter for a great cause, if he is an avowed determinist. A "truth" which necessarily leads to such consequences can certainly not be granted "absolute"validity; and (vice versa, inversely), (if) Sartre dismisses all scientific truth as only probable in comparison with his absolute existentialist truth, he betrays nothing but a grave misconception of verified necessity in science and empirical ethics.

From the metaphysical heights of Sartre's belief in absolute existentialist subjectivity, no way leads down to an empirically necessary respect of the "freedom and happiness"[47] of others; and vice versa, from a consistent eudaemonistic principle as an empirical, hypothetical

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46/ Ibid. S. de Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l'ambiguité, 1947, p.61 (Engl. transl. p.42).

47/ Ibid., p.201 (Engl. transl. p.144).

yet strict criterion of morality, no way leads up to any absolute truth of such rich contents as the existentialists ascribe to their alleged ~~highest~~ absolute truths.

Further - - and this, it seems to me, is no less important to any thinking individual - - what the existentialist presents as his fundamental problem doubtless opens a frightening chasm for grave metaphysical speculation. But if these speculations are offered as absolute truth, or even as "simple truth," and as a truth of far higher certainty than any scientific empirical truth, then the harshness and self-assuredness of such claims can blind only epistemologically confused minds. The incomprehensible depths of the miracle and the meaning of human existence cannot be exhausted, or even gauged, by the definiteness of the statements into which Heidegger put his metaphysical paraphrases on Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins.

If, according to Jean Wahl's interpretation of Jaspers, we are thrown into a night of anxiety in which the absolute reveals itself only in scattered flashes, like in intermittent strokes of lightening,[48] in that night there is, nevertheless, according to Nietzsche, bliss even deeper than despair. If according to the later thought of Sartre, "optimistic toughness"[49] is the principal attitude of the true existentialist, there remains the desperate nausée as the essential attitude in Sartre's own earliest type of existentialism; and there remains the electric glare of stale hopelessness in the night of hell so graphically described in Sartre's Huis clos. No absolute truths can be promulgated in any

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48/J. Wahl, Petite histoire de l'existentialisme, 1947, p.25.
49/J.P. Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946, p.58.

attempts to decipher the infinite background of our being. Absolute secrets may only be circumscribed here by fuller and fuller indications of probability, mainly by way of similes and a vision comparable to that of the poet.

Third, existentialism is certainly right in its protest against seeing man only as a product of historical and social forces which can be fully explained and sufficiently understood. No satiated philistine acquiescence in existing social conditions, no self-justification by these conditions, and no excited all-absorbing revolution do sufficient justice to the most radical human needs of the individual. But metaphysical speculation must not be allowed to see man only as jailed into society, or locked up exclusively in his free existentialist subjectivity and the relation of this individuality to his fellow-man. There is still the life of the cosmos, of none-human life and being against which the meaning of the life of man has metaphysically to be grasped. Only if this is done anew, as I have tried to do it, can we hope to outgrow Sartre's existentialism of "optimistic toughness" and Heidegger's existentialism of anguish. Only thus can we secure a far more precise and basic criterion of morality than contemporary existentialism could; and we will then have progress at least one small step further to a clearer and richer picture of those eternally tormenting and beatifying riddles which are called individual life.

50/ George Lukacs, Existentialisme on Marxisme (?), 1948, p.162 reproaches all existentialists including Kierkegaard for completely ignoring "la concrétisation marxiste des rapports historiques et sociaux entre les hommes par l'économie." But Lukacs' own philosophy suffers no less from abstractions than that of his opponents.

Existentialism:

Jaspers
Sartre
Simone de Beauvoir

Existentialist Echoes in the Light of a New Theory of the Meaning of Life

Phenomenology will be made its debut in the early writings of Husserl by claiming to be "strenge Wissenschaft", strict science, has taken a turn to metaphysics: Scheler and Heidegger and is now largely the leadership of phenomenological existentialism is largely led by in the hand of poets. If, as I do myself, one values poetical or metaphysical philos. and philosophical poetry as a source of weightest insights, metaphysical poetical existentialism does not give the slightest reason for being disturbance disturbed. What alone is irritating and disastrously confusing, is the presentation of poetical insights as are the only possible philosoph. truth, or a claim to be/ todge-podge of scientific and poetical aspirations advertised as is the only wisdom strictly and universally binding. The ambition of having hit upon the only original philos. truth is generally the more marked, the more limited is the knowledge of the history of philos. and the superiority feeling is the stronger the more monotonous or meager the real insights are. By reference to Jaspers, Sarte's and Simone de Beauvoir's most recent ethical reflections I wish to show briefly how full justice can be done to existentialism and nevertheless its meta-motive can be rendered productive only after considerable recast in the frame-work of a better founded theory of the meaning of life.

In Karl Jaspers' Descartes und Kant which appeared only about a year ago, the existentialist claim to originality is, perhaps, more tempered than anywhere else. Jaspers grants

grants that the philos. belief, the existentialist belief in an absolute, free moral responsibility of man has very much in common with the belief of the Judeo-Christian tradition and with the Renaissance, the belief in a higher reason, contrary to all rational, scientific orderly, as well beliefs are cultivated in Hegel, in Schelling, especially in his late thought, and in Kierkegaard's "definite unscientific postscript" and whatever Christian Nietzsche existentialists omit to notice in Franz v. Baader. Nevertheless Kant, although Jaspers, too, like other existentialists, clearly implies that as recently as the 19th century "man undergoes a more radical change than ever before in historical times," present existentialism reports a most radical and original philosophizing than any earlier philosophy[83, 118]. Like Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir Jaspers stresses that the fundamental existentialist experience of our freedom, our subjectivity, is superior to all knowledge of fixed clearly tangible objects including the understanding of ourselves as objects of scientific psychological observation. But far more than all the atheistic existentialists, Jaspers urges the "transcendent" secrets which surround any grasp of the "nature" of human existence in its contrast to all "Seienden," all objects of the knowable world. Jaspers is fully aware of the unspeakable paradox which is the subject matter of his philosophical belief. This subject matter cannot even be properly called the subject in contrast to all objects but it is only something "toward which" or "out from which"[15] we can speak. And in fact all that can be said about it, toward it and out from it as said by Jaspers only in metaphors. The subject matter of existential thinking or existential living is neither subject nor object but called or signified as the "Umgreifende" characterized as

the "spanning round", the embracing" (p. 15) which is, in the terms of Schelling, experienced
in the way of being (so to speak) a privy to the creation, "in Mitwissenschaft mit der Schöpfung"
This unconstrued subject-meke of Jaspers' existentialism can never be given in time but
only "quer zur Zeit" transversal to time, across the time (p. 32, 112) it can
be "enhellt" lit up "only by an (spell = 33) appeal by a "Ruck", a shock of self-consciousness = 32
in which the man as existent is his freedom experience himself as donation to himself
from transcendence als sich "selbst geschenkt von der Transzendenz" = 57 (p. 114) This
truth withdraws from, is inaccessible to any "direct formulation" = 81 a vice
versa the divine speaks through no human being in a definite but only in ambiguous
ways = 80. Only a floating guidance, "schwebende Führung" can come from
the "umgreifende Atmosphäre" of genuinely experienced
existence = past and present, never an objectivity identical for everyone = 88
In existence, there is no (no seizing of stars or set saving planks = 123) clinging to a fixity (105.) conformately fixed "Living = existence is living in the clear knowledge
is driven by a spirit, (= 110) is / a being open to the divine even if (the divine) should never speak
to you = 103 (I existing in the clear knowledge that God can never exist like) an object exists
exists. = 103 living = existence is driven by a spirit = is being open to the divine even if the
divine should never speak to you" = 103

But

a 19 or in terms of Karl Jaeckel's existentialism it is sleeping and therefore not shepeable reality mögestaltbare, weil gestaltende Wirklichkeit in.

But it is, in my opinion, ~~disturbing~~ confusing to hear this grasping of existence or being filled with existence which can can be characterized only by similes, analogies and metaphors is nevertheless said to have thought a ~~scientific~~ character "thought method" = 29. It is certain re-assuring to read that though Kierkegaard's reason is infinitely superior to the mere rational understanding, existentialist reason is never without reason.' = 38. Just unfortunately, we hear far too little of how reason that is rational understanding, instead can and is to be used by the higher reason of existentialist belief. We are told only that in the field of ethics which is of so vital relevance to every existentialist, the ten commandments are irrevocably valid - a statement which is questioned by Sartre's existentialism which permits the killing of men and telling of a lie under certain circumstances. And even less rewarding is the only ethical advice given in Jaspers "Vernunft und Existenz" and so often repeated by the existentialists, the Polonius' exhortation: Be true to yourself. Even if this moral advice is expressed by the German phrase: Jeder muss sich selbst treu = Sinnhaftigkeit S. 188, it is, unfortunately, a rule according to which Stalin, Hitler and Churchill alike may claim to have lived up.

The moral ideas developed by Sartre in his "L'existentialisme est un humanisme" are, however, evidently no more substantiated by those of Jaspers. To Sartre the absolute freedom of human existence freed also from any relation to any non-existent deity is obviously an even more independent reality than to Jaspers. And then "existence precedes every essence, even his own one, his own nature. "First of all man exists, turns up, appears on the scene and only afterwards he .. will be something and he himself will have made what he will be ".. He is at first "nothing" "[18] or as Beauvoir says "a useless passion" [10]; but later he is not only "what he conceives himself to be but he is also only what he wills himself to be after this thrust toward existence". [18] Obviously differing on this point, too, from Jaspers, according to Sartre think that the grasping of existence is a "simple matter easily arrived at". [43] it is seizing a truth "on everyone's doorstep," in fact the only "absolute truth" in comparison with which everything else is "only probable" [42] "Man is condemned to be free .. once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does .. He can't obtain excuses for himself .. We are alone with no excuse." [27]

So far Sartre's existentialism could perhaps be called the most primitive, cruelly egoistic Puritanism ever pronounced, orthodox Calvinism making finally God responsible

for the ultimate reprobation and moral damnation of the non-elect seems in comparison with this type of existentialism conciliatory and humane. Just in an age of decadence when people want tangible things out of everything non-tangible, this almost neurotic appeal to absolute anti-objectivity subjectivity may be granted some edifying value. If however, offered, not only in the way of "austere" feast sermon but as a philosophy which despite some popularizing "is intended strictly for specialists of philosophers" = 15 specialist - an ambition strongly expressed by Sartre - then this philos. says either almost nothing or completely contradictory and not only dialectically ambiguous principles.

in this philos. is, unfortunately, quite untenable and what is originel seemingly tenable is certainly not of the highest originality. If one takes the initial formulation of Sartre's ethical position seriously, it would be a highly originel idea. The absolute truth and the only absolute truth would then be this that exclusively those men who in full awareness of their freedom direct themselves toward their existence future are honest and moral. But all those who "hides their complete freedom from themselves = 55 because by means of deterministic beliefs or as Sartre derogatorily says "deterministic excuses" = 55 i.e. men like Abraham Lincoln or (the Nazi Hesse Goring or Hitler as for instance or any other homicidal mass murderer)

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these 2 ~~typo~~ abuses -; and in addition to this, these determinists would have to
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entirely incoherent attitude = 53. This part of Sartre's moral beliefs has is certainly
paradoxical and original to the highest degree but almost equally unconvincing
and extremely poor as an ethical or metaphysical evaluation of human
life. Sartre has doubtless felt this and has, therefore, not very constantly,
added a supplement to his fundamental absolute truth of his ethical existentialism.
He stresses urges again + again: "When we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he
is responsible for his own individuality but that he is responsible for all men." = 19f. One discovers in the cogito not only himself
but others as well," one discovers "intersubjectivity" = 44f. "I in wanting freedom, we discover that it depends entirely on the
freedom of others and that the freedom of others depends on ours.. to soon as there is involvement, I am obliged to want others to have
freedom at the same time that I want my own freedom" = 54

But as Sartre knows only too well, all these statements strictly - even
with Kant or as one could add with Fichte. The difficulty is only that
even Kant and Fichte could not give any conclusive reason for
this ethical belief, and on the ground of Sartre's existentialism this
far more individualistic foundation

so

~~that taken by itself it would hardly deserve any criticism~~. Such a theory would be merely Schopenhauer's or Kant's doctrine of freedom deprived of
all their metaphysics. but typical of their ample allowance
for empiristic determin-

it is ~~for~~ even less possible to couple his first absolute truth with his 2nd one. There is evidently not the slightest difficulty to deny this 2nd ~~absolute~~ "truth" if ever if the first one were to be accepted as absolutely valid. History names too many great criminals who ~~shamelessly~~ bravely ~~fulfilled all the conditions~~ complied with all the that is characteristic of Sartre's free man ~~without~~ but felt in no way their ~~feeling~~ inclined to respect the freedom of others for logical, ethical or practical reasons. Contrary to all the heated assurances of Sartre ~~and the whole school of~~ ~~natural law~~, ethical, individual freedom in the sense of Sartre does not imply in itself the freedom of others in any respect, either in the way of an analytic or a necessary synthetic link.

Especially if a fellowman consistently renounces his freedom and if as in Sartre's existentialism no definite distinction can be made between the metaphysical and the merely empirical character of man, as in Kant can one be "obliged" to want the freedom of one's fellowman despite the fellowman's own free choice? contrary to Kant or Scheler

Yet ~~Sartre~~ Strangely enough Sartre nevertheless believes to offer more than Kant by offering even less than Kant in his ethics but in opinions predecessor did Sartre simplemindedly reproaches Kant because of Kant's attempt at constituting an ethics by the merely "formal and the universal" in morals = 55 and I fully agree with Sartre that neither Kant nor anyone else succeeded in this hopeless undertaking. But to offer nothing at all in the place of others' failures does not seem to me a cause for justified pride. On the contrary, the Sartre's justification of his offering nothing in concrete ethics the in replacement of Kantian or traditional concrete moral codes is based on a completely confusing argument.

"We can not decide a priori what there is to be done" in ethics = 51 "Life has no meaning a priori: it is up to you to give it a meaning that is worth while, or simply to recognize that in the absence of any meaning worth while, what you choose has a meaning" = 58

Sartre frequently repeats: "The content of a moral behavior is always concrete and therefore unforseeable; there is always the element of invention. The one thing that counts is knowing whether the invention that has been done has been done in the name of freedom." = 56 cf. 49 in his "L'imaginaire" 19

Sartre had warned against any identification of ethics with esthetics. Just in his later work he makes ample use of the at least of one complete analogy between true i.e. creative morality and true art. Has anyone ever asked "What penalty ought to be imposed?" "It is clear understood there is no definite penalty to be made .. the penalty to be made is precisely the penalty the artist will have made" = 50. There are no "pre-established" ethical ~~esthetic~~ values" any more than pre-established ethical values". = 49ff

One may fully subscribe to a good deal of all that is said in this analogy between concrete aesthetic and ethical creation. This would certainly be a bad painter who would first consult esthetic rules and values and begin his creative work only after having finished his study of esthetical studies; all to the man of moral action no tiresome study of ethical systems is needed or possible before the time of action. The painter, the moral agent or the actor on the stage would be greatly if in the midst of his creative work by he would consult esthetic or moral laws or the principle of physiognomy. But all this does not in the least prove what Sartre wants to prove by it: namely that there are no esthetic or ethical or physiognomic laws. True, our insight into these laws may be greatly enriched by new creative achievements of great artists, moral personalities or great masters of the stage. But if there were no esthetic or moral or physiognomic laws, there would be no criteria

of distinguishing between ~~good~~ art and ~~value~~ ~~Kitsch~~ botching ~~and~~ or between morality and crime. Everything done would be, then, as valuable as valueless and in ~~morality as well~~ as well as in the arts everything would be "arbitrariness of choice", would be caprice — a necessary consequence to be drawn from what Sartre stated but one he anxiously wished to avoid. In other words ~~and~~ ~~briefly speaking~~: the painter who does creative ~~painting~~ without consulting prefixed esthetic values does not prove that there are no such values and the ~~creative moral~~ man who acts morally ~~by this a deep~~ out of a deep moral instinct does not prove that there are no moral laws ~~values~~. On the contrary, exactly ~~such~~ painters and agents justify the estheticians' and moralists' search for ~~esthe~~ the elucidation of concrete esthetics and concrete moral values which are consciously or unconsciously realized — creativeness and morality. Or even more briefly speaking, ~~what Sartre wants to prove, needs that the moralist~~ ~~to prove~~ that ~~that~~ ~~are no prefixed values~~ does not need not or we should not search for concrete ethical values we would have to refer to the analogy with a creative painter who would proudly announce I need not or ~~should not~~ do concrete painting ~~and of course, not to ask~~ esthetics for advice about his concrete painting. For the painters' task is to do concrete painting and the moralist's task to build a concrete ethics. ~~But~~ From Sartre's point that the painter does not ~~ask~~ look to it does not ~~never~~ follow at all that there is no concrete esthetics and ethics.

Simone de Beauvoir's Pour une morale de l'ambiguité seems to me a richer and more instructive thought than Sartre's reflections on ethics. She develops an existentialist position in Heidegger's and Sartre's terms and like Jaspers she thinks the nihilist's attitude toward life and human action far more honest than that of the lukewarm, the tepid, the "sans homme" who flees and tries to hide his freedom from himself, efface the agonizing evidence of his freedom" = 45 or the "lone aérien" who "loses himself in the object" accepted from society in order to annihilate his free subjectivity"; only the adventurous and the passionate man, the critical artist are ranked higher in her tentative hierarchy of men. But, as she insists, unlike the nihilist or other lower types of men, the true existentialist knowing of his lack of being denies it nevertheless in the terms of Hegel's ambiguous, dialectical language, affirms himself by this acknowledged denial as a positive existence = 13 and it is this existence of "freedom from which all values spring" = 24. In almost Fichtean terminology, the free will is here defined as "risking obstacles" and disclosing the world of values by conquering or not-conquering these obstacles" = 28. In any case, like in Sartre, Beauvoir rejects any "ready-made value which offers itself from the outside to any abstract adherence," = 24, any ethical recipes = 134; and yet, in the end she shows herself far more concerned about concrete ethics

and an unambiguous criterion of morality like almost any other existentialist has done so far.

not locked up in secrecy, but locked up in the secret of free subjectivity — cosmos

no absolute truth but signifying a absolute secret

word to gerrited truth-keepers

anguish to protect but should be not used only to frighten

N. 71 Pyrrhus + Cineas

She confesses that although there are no "ready made solutions in ethics, it is useful for the man of action" and the moralist "to find out under what conditions" human undertakings are valid = "134 note

And it is indeed amazing enough to see what "the new perspectives" are which she "discloses on this basis." = 135 ibe They are, in fact, nothing but consistently hedonistic eudemonistic principles. It is logical, if we need here

implies an outrageous absurdity "= ~~XX~~ = 114 from the fact, of course, an absurdity only from the point of view of a blindly anti-hedonistic existentialism - "to pose as the salvation of the greatest number" = 114. In difficult ethical decisions we further fear the criterion of morality is "that all things considered, the evil that one inflicts be lesser than that which is being forestalled." = 150 And under all circumstances, even ~~in this case~~ the most fleeting enjoyment of an individual, if harmless to himself and to others, has to be respected, according to S. de B. = pp. 189 f resp.

But if these entirely eudemonistic empirical criteria of morality are it is ultimately only the decisive ... the ~~of course~~ naturally the whole structure of Jaspers's" = cf. Sartre's anti-eudemonistic existentialism is shattered.

There is no need, then for Beauvoir's protracted effort with Beauvoir made in her "Pyrrhus + Cineas" to demonstrate that to will freedom oneself free means also to will all others free, and

the numerous [illegible] assertions by Sartre to the same effect would, be, also be as superfluous as they are inconclusive. Moreover, if only the maxim action of endless joy is the ultimate criterion of morality, then, we are completely freed from the vague and "absurd" criteria of "echt sein", true existentialist involvement, absolutely free subjectivity, including even wholehearted "Echtheit" and the "true" vitality of Goering) = 42 are the can be the only guarantee of valuable life. He would only then be freed from the grossest absurdity to which Bean honestly confesses nearly Hot according to the existentialist standard even the wholehearted "Echtheit", the "true" vitality and the indomitable free subjectivity of Goering rank morally extremely high. However or however little one may value Goering on account of compliance with existentialist ethics, his moral standard can be no more definitely judged than the criterion of moral endeavour. None - not even Goering himself - can credit him with any pangs of conscience concerning the greatest happening or salvation of the greatest sin.

To summarize as concisely as possible: existentialist ethics bogs down, in my opinion,

on at least 3 vital points. Wherever his ethics moves in the field of empirical inquiry it lacks precision to a fatal degree, as it leads not only to those ambiguities of which it is very fond but to ~~unnoticed absurdities at~~ untenable odds ~~as~~ self-contradictions. Its criterion of morality would, of necessity, approve of the courageous criminal if he believes in existentialist freedom and would ~~condemn~~ the morally noblest fighter for a great cause if he is an avowed determinist. From the metaphysical heights of Sartre's belief in absolute existentialist subjectivity freedom no way leads down to any empirically necessary respect of the "freedom and happiness" of others. (cf. Being and Nothingness, 747.) In the field of the empirical science, there is no absolute truth. But if Sartre dismisses all scientific truth as only "probable" in comparison with his absolute existentialist truth he betrays not only a grave misconception of "verified" necessity in science and empirical ethics). Vice versa, from the acceptance of a consistent eudemonistic principle as an empirical hypothetical strict criterion of morality no way leads back to the necessary absolute truth of the existentialist contents as the existentialists ascribe to their alleged absolute truths. yet acceptance of the existentialist absolute truth. absolute truth in the sense of the existentialists likewise as absolute in the latter

Further - and this, it seems to me, is certainly no less important to any thinking individual - what the existentialist presents as his fundamental problem opens up doubtless as none other abyss for the gravest metaphysical speculation. But it is not free if these speculations are offered as absolute truth or are as "simple truth" ~~ed~~ as truth of the higher certainty of any scientific

"truth," which leads to such consequences, cannot be granted "absolute" validity, and vice versa,

egotistical [illegible] the harshness and self-assurance of such claims can only
exist in confused or weak minds. The unincomprehensible depths of the miracle
and the mean of human existence cannot be exhausted or grasped by definite
statements of Heidegger's [illegible] of Human Voids. Or Rilke: desires for the opposite.

And even far less does the pretended certainties of Sartre's popularized existentialist versions
the same applies even more to
No absolute truth can be objectively pronounced - these regions of the opposite background
of our being. Only absolute secrets can be circumscribed here by richer and richer
indications of probability, mainly - the way of similes and of poetical visions
similar to that of the poet Trakl.
Existentialism is certainly right in its protest against seeing man only as a product of historical and social forces and regards only [illegible]
can be fully explained and sufficiently understood [illegible]. No isolated philistine
acquiescence in merely social conditions and no excited all-absorbing revolution
does sufficient justice to the most radical human needs of the individual.
But metaphysical speculation must not be allowed
to see man only jailed into society nor locked up exclusively into its free
existentialist subjectivity and the relation of this subject individually to his fellowmen society.
Nor is still the life of the cosmos, and of non-human life and being against which the meaning of the life of men has to be
metaphysically

grasped. Only if this is done anew, as I have tried to do it can we hope
to outgrow de Sade's ~~definite~~ existentialia of optimistic toughness as
Heidegger's existentialia of anguish, ~~we can't~~ can secure a far more
precise and basic
stable and consistent criterion of morality than contemporary existentialia could;
and we will have progressed one small step further to a clear and richer
picture of the ~~human~~ life-forming and deathly riddles of our times which are
called individual life.

Jaspers - Ulrich

Ein Mahnbrief aus dem dunkelsten MA an die Town Hall Meetings in N.Y. im 20. Jhdt.

Der Mönch Internationalicus ~~aus der dunkelsten Zeit des~~ (nationelistischen ~~20.~~ Jahrhunderts) analysiert den finsteren Aberglauben, gen. Aufklärungswahn, ~~dass~~ er ~~für~~ jeden späteren Epoche des Nationalismus ~~des~~ darstellt. Darüber hinaus ~~Jahrhunderte~~ [illegible]

We got what we wanted: [illegible] Gottes vom Imperium, [illegible] des Dollars – [illegible]
[illegible] heilsgeschichtlichen Daseins [illegible] Lauf [illegible] in Kleinen Kriegen
You got what you wanted: Dollar and more dollars, ever more dollars, a real inflation of dollars
and that you put yourself in real fait: and bigger and bigger wars

Da ist fest davon durchdrungen bin, dass eine echte Religion nicht in Gegensatz zu dem idealen Hintergrund-gebilden u. Gesamtverhalten des Menschen stehen darf, so beginne ich, damit meine religiös. Überzeugung in Gegensatz zu dem später Gesagten darzulegen. Ich bin ein leidenschaftlicher Anhänger der Theologia negativa d.h. ich bekenne mich zu der kühnsten, freiheitlichsten vernunftgemäßen Idee, dass wir über die eigentliche Hintergründe, Abgründe u. Abmessungen des Kosmos und unseres eigenen Daseins nichts Definitives aussagen können. Eins rechtfertigen, das verehrungswürdige Wesen der Welt – in pantheistischer Sprachgebrauch u. auch bei Spinoza leider recht vieldeutig als Gott bezeichnet – ist unfassbar für den begrenzten menschlichen Verstand u. nicht zu begreifen, unmöglich für das kühl kalkulierende, empfindungsarme enge Fühlen des Menschen. Das bleibt wie ein tiefes Rätsel, das nicht umsonst von den erlauchtesten Geistern vieler Jahrhunderte, Augustin, Dionys. Areopagita, Maimonides, Meister Eckhart gestützt wurde, plausibler und mehr betone verehrungswürdiger Glaube zu sein. Derselbe wird hervorgerufen von [illegible] Generation von Aufklärern als krasser Irrationalismus verstanden werden. Diese gute Tante Hella nämlich ihr Kampfheft [illegible] Eigensinn soviel höher als alle objektive Vernunft, dass sie partout darauf bestehen, Gott wäre dann alle die Prädikate [illegible], die ihr [illegible] Vernunft für schön und gut hält. Dass Gott selbst ihnen dabei [illegible] ist [illegible] handgreiflicher Widerlegung ihrer Thesen, stört die Hexen – dann offenbar nicht im geringsten. Sie fühlen zwar das Prinzip der Verifizierung übergeistert Hypothesen als Tatsache, aber nie verifizierbar, bei ihrer wichtigsten Lebensaufgabe zu Rate zu ziehen. [Hamburg Scholastik: Engel auf Nadelspitze, eingefallene Scholastik des Volkes, zeitgenössisch aufgefasst erklärt in U.N.: Abgabe der Souveränität: Beibehalt der Souveränität.]

Extra pages
from
"Existentialist Ethics
in light of
New theory of meaning
of life"

of a lack of appreciation of Sartre's merits, rightly called Sartre's doctrine of absolute freedom completely "preposterous."[26b] Especially in his plays, Sartre evinced considerable sophistication and an incontestable mastery in depicting highly complicated infernos of human experience. There seems to me only one way to reconcile this subtlety with the oversimplification of his basic concept of free will: Thinkers like Fichte as well as Sartre evidently were so much under the spell of determinism in their earliest literary production, that they saw no way of gaining their independence of thought except by a total revolt against any givenness. Both thinkers originally felt so constrained to accept blindly what may be called the absurdity of reality, that in full protest against this they grew veritably obsessed by the idea of freedom.

Sartre himself has obviously not been unaware of the thinness of his teaching on absolute individual freedom. In his Réflexion sur la question juive, for instance and in other contexts, he emphasizes the need for changing the perspectives of others to change their choices, and thus to effect "that freedom decides on other bases"[27a] - - a view which obviously makes the difference between freedom and determinism practically disappear.

But--what is far more important, though certainly not very consistent -- Sartre himself adds a momentous supplement to the only fundamental truth of his ethical existentialism. He urges again and again: "When we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he is responsible for his individuality but that he is responsible for all men."[27b] In wanting freedom we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, and that the freedom of others depends on ours. As soon as there is involvement, I am obliged

26b/ G.Marcel, The Philosophy of existence, 1949, p.55. Marcel also fears (ibid., p.38) that the construction of a system of ethics not yet presented by Sartre will offer great difficulties and, arcea grabts (ibid., p.35) that there is in Sartre"a certain taste and propensity for scandal."

27a/ J.P.Sartre, Reflexions sur la question juive, 1946, p.192.

27b/ J.P.Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946, p.24

of a lack of appreciation of Sartre's merits rightly called Sartre's doctrine of absolute freedom completely "preposterous." 26b

The high sophistication and intelligence which Sartre generally reveals in his writings can be reconciled with the oversimplification of his basic concept of free will only by the fact that thinkers such as Fichte and Sartre - both first adherents of determinism and believers in the absurdity of a reality blindly to be accepted - have no other way of gaining their independence of thought than through a total revolt against any givenness and a veritable obsession by the idea of freedom.

Sartre himself has obviously been not quite unaware of the ~~ir~~ riskiness of his teaching on absolute individual freedom. In his Réflexions sur la question juive, for instance, and in other contexts, he emphasizes the need for changing the perspectives of others to change their choices, and to effect thus, that freedom decides on other bases" -- a view which obviously makes the difference between freedom and determinism practically disappear. But - what is far more important, though certainly not very consistent - Sartre himself adds a ~~supplement~~ momentous supplement

26 b / G. Marcel 55 Marcel also fears 32 that the construction of a system of ethics not yet presented by Sartre will offer grave difficulties and Marcel grants that there is in Sartre a certain taste and propensity for scandal" - 33

27a / J.P. Réflexions sur la question juive, 1946, p. 192

yet strict criterion of morality, no way leads ~~back~~ up to any absolute truth of such rich contents as the existentialists ascribe to their alleged ~~absolute~~ highest truths.

Further - - and this, it seems to me, is no less important to any thinking individual - - what the existentialist presents as his fundamental problem opens doubtless a (tempting horizon?) or even a true abyss for graver metaphysical speculation. But of these speculations are offered as absolute truths frightening chasm or even as "simple truths" and as a truth of far higher certainty than any scientific empirical truth, then the harshness and self-assuredness of such claims can blind only epistemologically confused minds. The incomprehensible depths of the miracle and the meaning of human existence cannot be exhausted, or even gauged, by the definiteness of the statements into which Heidegger put his metaphysical paraphrases on Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phaenomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins.

(And the same applies even more to the pretended certainties of Sartre's existentialism.) No absolute truths can be promulgated in any attempt to decipher the infinite background of our being. Only absolute secrets can be circumscribed here by fuller and fuller indications of probabilty, mainly in the way of seer similes and vision comparable to that of the poet.

Third, existentialism is certainly right in its protest against seeing man only as a product of historical and social forces which can be fully explained and sufficiently understood. No satisted philistine acquiescence in existing social conditions, no self-justification by these conditions, and no excited all-absorbing revolution do sufficient justice to the most radical human needs of the individual. But metaphysical speculation must not be allowed to see man only jailed into society or locked up exclusively in his free existentialist subjectivity and

If according to Jean Wahl's interpretation of Jaspers, we are thrown into a night of anxiety, in which the absolute reveals itself only in scattered flashes like instant strokes of lightning [48] (may perhaps only) be circumscribed here is, nevertheless, according to Nietzsche, blindness even deeper than despair. If according to Sartre, "existentialism is the principal attitude of the free existentialist, there remains also the nausea as a possible attitude of Sartre's own earliest type of existentialism, and stale hopelessness in the night of Sartre's Huis clos. there remains the intolerable, electric lighting of

48/ J. Wahl, Petite histoire de l'existentialisme, 1947, p. 25
49/ Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme, p. 58 and p. 40

yet strict criterion of morality, no way leads up to any absolute truth of such rich contents as the existentialists ascribe to their alleged highest truths.

Further - - and this, it seems to me, is no less important to any thinking individual - - what the existentialist presents as his fundamental problem doubtless opens a frightening chasm for grave metaphysical speculation. But if these speculations are offered as absolute truth, or even as "simple truth," and as a truth of far higher certainty than any scientific empirical truth, then the harshness and self-assuredness of such claims can blind only epistemologically confused minds. The incomprehensible depths of the miracle and the meaning of human existence cannot be exhausted, or even gauged, by the definiteness of the statements into which Heidegger put his metaphysical paraphrases on Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins.

If, according to Jean Wahl's interpretation of Jaspers, we are thrown into a night of anxiety in which the absolute reveals itself only in scattered flashes, like in intermittent strokes of lightening,[48] in that night there is, nevertheless, according to Nietzsche, bliss even deeper than despair. If according to the later thought of Sartre, "optimistic toughness"[49] is the principal attitude of the true existentialist, there remains the desperate nausea as the essential attitude in Sartre's own earliest type of existentialism; and there remains the electric glare of stale hopelessness in the night of hell so graphically described in Sartre's Huis clos. No absolute truths can be promulgated in any

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48/ J. Wahl, Petite histoire de l'existentialisme, 1947, p. 25.
49/ J.P. Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946, p. 58.

yet strict criterion of morality, no way leads (back) to any absolute truth of such rich contents as the existentialists ascribe to their alleged (absolute) truths.

Further - - and this, it seems to me, is no less important to any thinking individual - - what the existentialist presents as his fundamental problem (opens doubtless) a true abyss for gravest metaphysical speculation. But if these speculations are offered as absolute truth or even as "simple truth" and as a truth of far higher certainty than any scientific empirical truth, then the harshness and self-assuredness of such claims can blind only epistemologically confused minds. The incomprehensible depths of the miracle and the meaning of human existence connot be exhausted or even gauged by the definiteness of the statements into which Heidegger put his metaphysical paraphrases on Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phaenomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. And the same applies even more to the pretended certainties of Sartre's existentialism. No absolute truths can be promulgated in any attempts ~~of our~~ to decipher~~ing~~ the infinite background of our being. ~~Only~~ absolute secrets (can be circumscribed here by fuller and fuller indications of probability mainly in the way of seen similes and vision (similar) to that of the poet.

Third, existentialism is certainly right in its protest against seeing man only as a product of historical and social forces which can be fully explained and sufficiently understood. No satisted philistine acquiescence in existing social conditions, no self-justification by these conditions and no excited all-absorbing revolution do sufficient justice to the most radical human needs of the individual, But metaphysical speculation must not be allowed to see man only jailed into society nor locked up exclusively in his free existentialist subjectivity and

the relation of this individuality to his fellowmen. There is still the life of the cosmos, of non-human life and being against which the meaning of the life of man has metaphysically to be grasped. Only if this is done anew, as I have tried to do it, can we hope to outgrow Sartre's existentialism of "optimistic toughness" and Heidegger's existentialism of anguish, (Only thus) can we secure a far more precise and basic criterion of morality than contemporary existentialism could; and we will (then) have progressed ~~thus~~ at least one small step further to a clear(er) and richer picture of those eternally tormenting and beatifying riddles which are called individual life.

^ Existentialism, p 40

the relation of this individuality to his fellowman. There is still the life of the cosmos, of non-human life and being against which the meaning of the life of man has metaphysically to be grasped. Only if this is done anew, as I have tried to do it, can we hope to outgrow Sartre's existentialism of "optimistic toughness" and Heidegger's existentialism of anguish. Only then can we secure a far more precise and basic criterion of morality than contemporary existentialism could; and we will then have progressed thus at least one small step further to a clearer and richer picture of those eternally tormenting and beatifying riddles which are called individual life.

Lexikon (Engl. transl. p. 158 f. 40)

Science, Ethics and Metaphysics

3 copies (p. 1- 9)

1 handwritten copy (not collated)

For Frank

III INTER AMERICAN CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY, 1950

(T : B, 15)

SCIENCE, ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS

Contemporary epistemology has carried the criticism of --- modern and ancient ethics even farther than was done by the --- most radical opponents of Judaeo- Christian ethics in earlier - generations. In the 18th and 19th centuries, any criticism --- of fundamental concrete beliefs in ethics was considered a peak of moral radicalism. Mandeville was thought a radical because he taught us that private vices may be public benefits and virtures; Stirner because he rejected alturism as a value; Niet--- zsche because he insited that power is a far more basic moral-- value than benefolence. The criticism of our contemporary lo-- gical positivists goes much further. Bertrand Russell, Carnap- and Ayer reject philosophical or scientific ethics altogether.- By the principles of their philosophical theory of science, they are led to the conclusion ~~that any kind~~ of ethical statement -- which claims to be objectively valid is meaningless.

It is, I think, very gratifying that logical positivism -- and the so-called emotive ethics take this firm stand; and I -- fully agree with their criticism of normative ethics, of all--- ethics of values and all deontologism which try to base them--- selves on immediate, selfevident, instrinsically valid insights. I believe that the days of these types of ethics have gone. --- Their decline will follow the decline of the old types of sci-- entific metaphysics which lost their predominance in the 19th - century. These old systems of scientific metaphysics could ne- ver recover from the fatal blows which they suffered at the --- hands of David Hume, the French encyclopedists and Immanuel --- Kant. Logical positivism did the same critical service to all- types of scientific ethics which are, in one way or the other,- related to scientific metaphysics.

The principal attitude toward ethics which is shared by--- Wittgenstein, Carnap, Russell, Ayer and Charles L. Stevenson -- can be stated very briefly: judgments concerning morality lack- all basis of verification. The criterion of scientific truth is compliance with the rules of consiten thought, and with all --- observable facts of logical inference from facts. In ethics,-- however, no observable facts are available, Therefore, ethical judgments, being different from merely logical and mathematical statements, are not subject to sany criterion of truth and false- hood. They are neither true nor false. They are, as Russell-- observed, mere expressions of taste, (1) or, as Charles Steven- son emphasized, mere expressions of commands; and it makes no - sense to say that a taste or a command -- qua test or command- is true or false. Ethical judgments have, therefore, at best-- emotive but no cognitive meaning.

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(1) See B. Russell, Religion and Science, 1935, p. 250. In his Human Knowledge, 1948 , p. 398 f, the tone of similar statements by Russell is less committal; but the principal meaning of these later statements remains the same.

Compare pp 248, 255

Carnap and Stevenson tried to mitigate the harshness of these findings by two supplementary observations. Carnap granted that it is, of course, scientifically legitimate to analyse the emotions of approval of human behavior, and he called the science devoted to such analyses "psychological ethics" in contrast to philosophical or normative ethics. (2) But the term "psychological ethics" is certainly as misleading as a term "psychological chemistry" would be. No psychological analyses of the experiences of the color, the taste or the touch of sulphur can even be a substitute for the chemical analysis of the element sulphur and its atomic number in the periodical arrangement of elements. Nor can a psychological description of our feelings of approval or disapproval of an action be a substitute for the analysis of the moral value of that act.

In a somewhat different way, Chales L. Stevenson wished to save something of a scientific character for ethics. In contrast to Carnap, he admits that no psychological or sociological analyses of the feelings of approval or disapprovel of human behavior can justify or discredit objectively the morality or immorality of that behavior. But he emphasizes that approval of an act, which is a mere agreement in attitude, can be supported by "reasoned agguments, this agreement in belief may lead also to an agreement in moral attitude which - - taken by itself qua attitude - - can never have theoretical sense. (3) But for many reasons, such chances of reaching moral agreement do not seem to me sufficient for the foundations of any kind of ethics. For these chances are exactly in the most crucial cases practically nonextant.

The situation is, therefore, in my opinion far more clarified by the blund assertions of Ayer and Russell that moral judgments, statements concerning ethical value, do not come under the category of truth and falsehood because they cannot be verified by observable facts.

But the central question now becomes in my view, : is it definitely settled that - - even after a legitimate basic revision of the conventional phrasing of our moral statement - - no observable facts can ever be available for the verification of ethical judgments? This question seems to me completely lost sight of by all scientific criticism of ethical method. It is generally implied that if the common popular beliefs in given moral values or moral norms cannot be verified, no verification of any ethical statements is possible. Yet, after all, exact science does not offer either- and it should not offer - any verification of the popular beliefs in astronomy or chemistry.

Science no longer tries to verify or to confute the Paracelsian statements that the true nature of the element sulphur is something quarrelsome, and the true essence of the element

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(2) R. Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, 1935 p. 25.
(3) See C. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, 1944, e.g. pp. 322, 332.

salt something preserving, and that the only aim of chemis---- try can be a more detailed analysis of these escenses "quarrel$ some" and "preserving." Similarly, ethics is, in my view, ---- fully entitled to abandon the age old attempts at immediate in- sight into the true nature of ethical values or ethical laws -- and duties. Chemistry about 1800 was no more entitled to aban- don all its earlier methods of inquiry than ethics is today. -- When Dalton introduced the hypothesis "atoms are chemically --- unchangeable and the chemically changeable molecules are mere - compounds of atoms combined according to the law of multiple -- proportions," Dalton inaugurated for the whole of chemistry -- quite different scientific questions and verifications of scien tific statements than the alchemists ever dreamed of.

The most consistent representative of hedonistic ethics, - the great English jurist Jeremy Bentham, tried to build up a similarly revolutionary and promising method in the philo---- sophy of morals. He suggested abandonment of all search for -- elementary normative laws and values in ethics and replacement of factual feelings of pleasure and pain. For this reason only he insisted on the consistent use of the old greatest-happiness principle as a hypothesis for the foundations of verifiable --- statements in ethics.

The hypothecial character of his ethical principle was em- phasized by Bentham mainly in a MS which I am going to publish- for the first time, along with a detailed analysis of his many acute contributions to the establishment of a new critical ---- basis of moral philosophy - -a theory of morals which seems to me superior to any other epistemology of ethics. I do not advo cate, in any way, unqualified adherence to Bentham's thought. Practically all of his critical and constructive reflections on a new ethical methodology have to be infinitely refined. But- essentially his argument is sound and not exposed to any of --- those numerous stock-objections which are generally raised a-- gainst it without hitting anywhere the core of what is at issue.

C.I. Lewis, fully maintaining the aims and methods of ex-- act science, is certainly right in insisting that all objective value judgments concern the coherent whole of our satisfac---- tions in the same way as our objective judgments in the natural sciences concern the coherent whole of our perceptions. It must be granted that a strict moral arithmetic, an exact felicific- calculus, cannot be carved through in the sense in which Ben-- tham, in his earlier enthusiastic writings, had suggested it. -- But there is no doubt that fairly accurate estimates of the ba- lance of pleasures ans pains involved in action -- synthetic -- apprehensions of emotional wholes, as Lewis calls them -- are the factual and the only legitimate basis of all value judg---- ments, including all our moral statemtns.

This concession deprives ethics of the character of a ---- science of such high precision as physics or mhemistry; but it would grant the basic inquiry in morals an exactness obtaina-- ble presently in the treatment of cancer.

Naturally, it is impossible to refute, by the means of mere logic, anyone who insists that there are other hypotheses which may be better qualified to serve as the basic hypothesis in -- ethics than the consisten reference to satisfactions and dis-- satisfactions. But precisely the same difficulty exists in --- the fields of the natural sciences. If in physics or meteorolo gy a scientist prefers the hypothesis of innumerable personal- interventions of the spirits of our forefathers in the flow of

natural events, if he assumes that it is the spirits of the deceased General Washington or General Bolivar which brings about rain and sunshine and the maintenance of the law of gravity, there is nothing that can logically be said against such hypotheses.- All that can be said in favor of our hypotheses in natural or moral sciences is that, by ultimate reference to the sensual perceptions or the emotional satisfactions of living men, natural or moral phenomena become rationally comprehensible and predictable in a far greater detail than by reference to the psychic influences of any deceased authority, or by references to allegedly self-evident but, in fact, ambiguous moral obligations or values of traditional ethics. The principle of consistent eudaemonism is evidently no more capricious as to the interpretation of morality than the principles of coherent and consistent empirical observation is as regards the interpretation and evaluation of natural events. Taking all this and much more into account a consistent hedonism - - which, however, has never been built up as yet - - can claim considerably more scientific exactness in ethics than the presently dominant schools of neo-deontologism and the law of nature, or the various types of ethics of intrinsic values.

As to metaphysics, however, it is, in my opinion, hopeless and valueless to strive for anything like scientific precision. As the name metaphysics suggests, metaphysics concerns the knowledge of what is beyond the given mental and physical phenomena of the world of our experience. And no precise rational knowledge seems to me possible in a field which lies beyond all finite givenness. But to say this in full agreement with the principal tenets of positivism does not mean in any way in my view, agreements with Wittgenstein's much too famous dictum: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."(4)

To Wittgenstein's dogma of absolute rationalistic asceticism only those can subscribe who are obsessed by the idea that there is no genuine human understanding of anything outside the field of scientific knowledge. But there are poetry, the arts, and those greatest religious documents of mankind which are practically all written in poetical, non-scientific language.- None of these artistic expressions of men are silent concerning those insights of which one cannot speak in proper scientific terms. On the contrary, it is exactly the unspeakable of which they rightly try to speak in a peculiar way - - by indicating their metaphysical insights in emotionally tinged or emotionally saturated analogies, pictures and sounds.

These insights would become falsehoods if they claimed to convey rational scientific knowledge, as they, unfortunately, sometimes do in the mouths of convessors of questionable intellectual clarity. It would be absurd to insist that a great religious myth of Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus must be the correct scientific report of historical events, and that, as a "mere fairytale," the myth or the novel would have only entertainment value ~~but would convey no insight of relevance~~ without any relevance. Neither Goethe nor Mann cares for the historical Faust of the 16th century any more than El Greco for a photographycly true picture of Toledo.

But every artist cares, consciously or unconsciously, for-

---

(4) L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logic-Philosophicus, 1922 p. 188

the emotional and intellectual meaning of the whole of a human-experience which is always beyond the clearly limited obser---- vable facts. (These) artistic, poetical and religious insights-- are, therefore, of necessity never precise or even unambigu---- ous, as we can grasp the "beyond" only in ambiguous, though by-no means meaningless, terms. Ambiguity, a crime in science, is in metaphysics a virtue, as it indicates, there and in the ---- arts a greater richness of possible meaning.

Though these artistic and metaphysical utterances do not sin against the logical principle of identity, they definitely do not live up to the principle of verification by observable and-rationally inferred facts. Neither Goethe's nor Mann's des---- criptions of the devil is based on scientifically unseable----- observations. It would be definitely defeating the purpose of-a scientific work on the "descent of man" to use Michealangelo(s creation of man as pictorial material. But on the other hand-- even to the unprejudiced freethinker, it should be equally----- impossible to think the zoologist Ernst Haeckel's definition of God as a "gasiform vertebrate"(5) a metaphysically or religiously relevant observation.

None of us will ever become directly aware of the meaning-of any whole of our experience. Even the strictest rationalist, the scientist of complete self-limitaion and the most earthy--- bonbibant, give the whole of their experience some nonscien--- tific and non-empiristic meaning without being aware of it. --- Their absolute limitation of themselves to scienctific knowle-- dge, or to mere sensual enjoyment, implies the entirely unjusti fied belief that their limited experience is, nesessarily, "all that's to it," all tthe meaning that life possibly can have. But this belief, is to say the least, as unjustifiable as the - beliefs of the greatest artists and religious minds.

To emphasize one principal point once more, we have no --- guarantee that any of our poetical or religious interpretations of our lives and of nature contain absolute truth; they even do not contain truths of the limited but precise character of ---- science. All the great poets, the really great metaphysicians-and the founders of great religions have admitted that our grasp of the beyond of the meaning of our limited experience is only "patchwork," seeing "through a glass darly," and the greatest-- artistic creation is only a fragment giving nothing but a dim, faint glimpse of parts of that possible meaning of the whole of our lives.

Yet, whoever, in supracritical, restraint, shuts himself - up from all that metaphysics in its non-scientific aims has to offer, falls victim, generally without noticing it, to very--- poor, unformulated metaphysical interpretation of his life. --- Moreover, he who never ties to cultivate by means of artistic-- metaphysics, some meaning of the "beyond," of his limited ex--- perience - - a meaning which is, nevertheless adequate to this experience - - is certainly no less pitiable than he who has never tasted the glory of subjecting oneself freely to the dis-cipline of precise scientific research with all its rich and--- deep rewards of insights within the limits of exact knowledge.

The scientist and the critical metaphysician have to learn equally much from each other, or better stated, their insight-- should supplement each other; and metaphysics of this kinds is-- especially valuable as a superstructure to scientific ethics. In any case, I see no other way of protecting and guaranteeing-the integration of the main activities of intellectual life---- than that tjust sketched in the roughest outlines.

---

(5) E. Haeckel Die Welträtsel, 1903, p. 116 chap. xv sect. 1.

David Baumgardt
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Contemp. Epistemology

Russell

Ayer

Carnap.

etc.

Contemporary ~~ethical objectivists~~ ~~[illegible] valuation~~ [illegible] questions whether a special moral sense, ~~a~~ certain or ~~not~~ indefinable moral concepts can be ~~have~~ or ~~need~~ ~~can be~~ demonstrated ~~by reference~~ as allegedly intuited by. It is ~~incorrect~~ generally overlooked that, even in science, ~~the~~ data ~~demonstrate~~ as ~~by~~ in the sense of verifiable by ~~the senses only as~~ a hypothetical ~~dead~~ – a dead wood ~~can have reflection~~ can ~~never play the role of~~ e.g. metaphysics ~~for~~ ~~as~~ ~~centuries~~ have rejected. In ethics, ~~however~~ too, ~~a~~ only a ~~corresponding~~ hypothesis is at ~~the~~ our disposal; ~~the~~ hypothesis of the ~~same type~~ of the same type in science maximization of consistently and coherently satisfying feelings ~~parallel~~ parallel to ~~the~~ universally accepted scientific hypothesis of the maximization of consistently and coherently verify perceptions.

Isn't (between husband and wife) (we make enduring long comm devotion
& coming of con responsibility ad devotion) rank
even higher. We ardent repeat oath of eternal love & to make
between juveniles? Has it ~~never~~ met chance
that all the greatest apostles of romantic love
were ad ~~kept~~ remained foreign to it & ~~&~~
ed died yg. Jems, Fr. As., Tasso, Keats, & others?

S. Too many questions!

A. Later to friends: What an incorrigible romantic
this ~~very~~ high minded woman is. Probably she
~~wasn't~~ ~~Anglo Saxon~~ splendid. What a blend
of romance & Anglo-
Saxon drive for practical plainness of thought
simplicity make her
almost all her
~~wasn't~~ abstr. philos. & close theoretical reasoning.
But what ~~called~~ a shining, ~~&~~ pure & noble
soul!

S. My goodness, it ~~was~~ wasn't a ~~new~~ to call
~~he called~~ us Quakers even indirectly Pharisees. But despite all
his intellectual pride, what a poor, pitiable chap! One
certainly couldn't be hard on him.

Contemporary epistemology has carried the criticism of modern and ancient ethics even farther than was done by the most radical opponents of conventional ethics in earlier generations. In the 18th and 19th centuries any criticism of fundamental concrete beliefs in ethics was considered a peak of moral radicalism. Mandeville was thought a radical because he taught that private vices may be public benefits and virtues, Stirner because he rejected altruism as a value, Nietzsche because he insisted that power is a far more basic moral value than benevolence. The criticism of our contemporary logical positivists (goes) reaches much further: Bertrand Russell, Carnap and Ayer reject philos. or scientific ethics altogether. On the ground of the principles of their theory of science (philos. epistemology) they arrive at the conclusion that any kind of ethical statement which claims to be objectively valid is meaningless. I think it very gratifying that logical positiv. and the so-called emotive ethics take this firm stand and I fully agree with their criticism of normative ethics, and all ethics of values, as well as all deontologism which try to base themselves on immediate, self-evident, intrinsicly valid insights. I believe that the days of these types of ethics have gone and their decline will follow the decline of the old types of scientific metaphysics which (not) lost their predominance already in the 19th century. They, the old systems of scientific metaphysics which dominated the middle ages up to the end of the 18th century could not never recover from the death blows which Hume, and log. pos. did the same service to most types of scientific ethics which are related to scientific metaphysics. The French Encyclopedists and Immanuel Kant. The principal attitude of Wittgenstein, Carnap, Russell, Ayer + Charles Stevenson can be stated very briefly thus: judgments

concerning morality lack every basis of verification. The criterion of objective or scientific truth is compliance with the rules of consistent thought and with all observable facts. [For] Ethics, however no observable facts are available. Therefore ethical judgments lack different from merely logical and mathematical judgments are not subject to any criterion of truth and falsehood. They are neither true nor false. They are as Russell observed mere expressions of taste or as Stevenson emphasized, mere expressions of commands; and it makes no sense to say that a taste or a command qua taste and command are true or false. Ethical judgments have, therefore, at best emotive meaning but no cognitive meaning.

Carnap and Stevenson tried to mitigate the harshness of these findings by 2 supplementary observations. Carnap granted that it is, of course, scientifically legitimate to analyse the emotions of approval and disapproval of human behavior and he, misleadingly called such a science "psychological ethics" in contrast to philosophical or normative ethics. But the term "psychological ethics" is certainly as misleading as a term as "psychological chemistry" in contrast to "physical chemistry" would be. Although in chemistry, too, besides chemistry "psychological" observations are needed to obtain the physical facts concerning chemicals. But psychological analyses of the "psychological" presence of the color, the taste or the bonds of gold can never be a substitute for the chemical analysis of the element gold and its place in the row of elements. Nor can a verbal description of our feelings of approval of a action be a substitute for the analysis of their moral value of that act. In a slightly different way,

Logical truth is compliance with the rules of consistent thought and with all observable facts.

Religion + Science, 1935, p. 24. In his Human Knowledge Moore objects to Russell's statement that ethical statements are mere expressions of taste (1948, p. 398 f.)

but the original meaning of these statements remained the same.

Philos. + Logical Theories, 1935, p. 25

Charles L. Stevenson tried to save something of a scientific character for ethics. In contrast to Carnap he admits that no psychological or sociological analyses of the feelings of approval or disapproval of human behavior can justify them or discredit objectively the morality or immorality of that behavior. But he emphasizes that approval of an act which is a mere agreement in attitude can be supported by some "reasoned agreement" which is an agreement subject to the criterion of truth and falsehood; and if scientific agreement has been reached concerning all the supporting reasoned arguments, this agreement in belief may lead also to an agreement in moral attitude which in itself—qua attitude—can never be subject to the criterion of scientific truth or falsehood. But for many reasons such—often rather dismal—chances hopes of really moral agreement do not seem to me sufficient for the foundations of any kind of scientific ethics. It seems to me, therefore, far more clarified by the statements of Ayer and Russell that moral judgments, statements concerning ethical values do not come under the category of truth and falsehood because they cannot be verified by observable facts.

But the question is, in my opinion, more: Is it definitely settled that, even by after a legitimate transformation of the conventional meaning of our moral statements, no observable facts can ever be available for their verification? Of ethical statements this seems to me completely lost sight of by the scientific critics of ethical method. Yet, after all, exact sciences either do not attempt and would not offer—cannot offer either any verification of the conventional popular

It is usually implied that if the common popular belief in given moral values or moral norms can be verified, no verification is possible in ethics.

For these chances are exactly in the most crucial cases practically non-existent in the situation as it is.

Stevenson, Ethics and Language, 1944 e.g. pp. 322, 332

beliefs versions astronomy yeast or chemistry
formulations of astronomical ~~facts~~ statements ~~truth~~ in chemistry or
astronomy. Science does no longer try to answer verify or to confute
the Paracelsian statements that the true nature essence of sulphur is to be the element
something quarrelsome and the true nature essence of salt something preserving and that the only
aim of chemistry can be a more detailed analysis of these essences "quarrelsome" & "preserving"
and in the same way ethics is, in my view, fully entitled to its separate
Similarly
abandon the age old attempts at an immediate insight into the true
nature of ethical values or ethical laws and duties. Ethics is no less
entitled to re-state its problems after moore than chemistry was no more
chemistry since Lavoisier ~~was~~ & atomic ~~theory~~ since Copernicus ~~was~~ will a belief
When Dalton introduced the hypothesis "atoms are chemically unchangeable and chemically changeable molecules are mere
to re-state the problem of truth in chemistry and atomic theory. By introducing compounds of atoms
the hypothesis of chemically unchangeable atoms- combined
Dalton inaugurated and chemically changeable molecules being ~~mere compounds of atoms~~ according to the
for the whole of ~~pre-Lavoisier~~ chemistry quite different answers law of multiple proportion"
questions and verifications of statements to the ~~pre-Lavoisier~~ the alchemists
chemistry before
to H.M.S.
May 21st 1938. The most consistent representative of Hedonistic
Ethics suggested tried to build up
He suggested abandonment of all ~~normative~~ laws as a similar revolution and promising method
in the sphere of moral by suggesting the use of the greatest happiness
principle as a mere hypothesis for the construction of ~~for~~ more
This hypothesis is the key of his ethical principle was ~~explained~~ by
precise inquiry - the field of morals. J. S. did this in a MS letter
unpublished which I am going to publish for the first time along with
a detailed analysis of his ~~practical~~ contributions to a critical
foundation of ethics which I see to me superior to any other modern
epistemology of ethics. I do not advocate - in any way, a mere

replacement of them by statements (or factual) based
feelings of pleasure and pain and only for this
reason he insisted on the consistent use
of the old greatest happiness principle as a
hypothesis for the re-establishment of
foundation statements - ethics

adherence to J's thought. Practically all of his critical and constructive reflections on a new ethical methodology have to be instantly refuted. Just essentially they are sound and allow for a very few really refutable ~~free from all~~ not vulnerable by any of those numerous stock objections which are usually raised against them without hitting anywhere the core of what is at issue. (E.g. Lewis fully meeting the actual methods of exact science ~~scientific~~ is certainly right in insisting that in all objective value judgments ~~in all~~ concern the coherent ~~consistent~~ whole of our satisfactions in the same way as our objective judgments in natural sciences ~~physics~~ concern the consistent coherent whole of our perceptions. It must be granted that a strict moral arithmetic, an exact felific calculus as Bent. cannot be carried through in the sense in which Bent. in his earlier enthusiastic writings had suggested it. But there is no doubt that fairly accurate estimates of the balance of pleasures and pains involved in exactly calculable combinations

an action, synthetic apprehensions of emotional wholes as Lewis calls them are the factual and the only legitimate basis of all value-judgments including all our moral statements. This concession deprives ethics of the character of a science of as high precision as chemistry or physics but it would grant the basic inquiry in morals philosophy an scientific character of the type of meteorological ~~investigations~~ and an infinitely higher one as is obtainable presently in the scientific exploration of the causes of cancer or poliomyelitis paralysis. Naturally it is impossible to refute logically by the means of mere logic the possibility that anyone who insists these are other undated hypotheses will

may be better qualified to serve as the basic hypothesis - ethics the the
consistent reference to satisfactions & dissatisfactions - ethics first precisely
the same difficulty appears - the field of the natural sciences. If in physics
or meteorology a scientific investigation prefers the hypothesis of immediate personal
interventions of the spirits of our forefathers into the flow of natural
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or Zeus or whoever who by abort rain and sunshine ed the maintenance
of the law of gravity, there is nothing which can be logically be said against such
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There is evidently no less capricious principle for the interpretation and evaluation of morality than the principle of
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which, however, has never been built up as yet, could claim
to preserve considerably more scientific exactness than the presently dominant schools of neo-deontologism (or the various
and the law of nature
types of ethics of intrinsic values.

The principle of a consistent endeavor is evidently no more capricious as to interpretation of morality than the principle of coherent and consistent empirical observation is as regards the interpretation & evaluation of natural events.

As to metaphysics, however, it is in my opinion hopeless and useless valueless

to strive for a style like scientific ~~exactness~~ precision. As even the name metaphysics suggests, metaphysics concerns the knowledge of what is beyond ~~the experience~~ the of mental and physical phenomena of the world of our experience. And strictly speaking, no precise knowledge seems to me possible in a field which lies beyond all finite givenness experience. But to say this, of course, in full agreement with the principal tenets of positivism, does not mean, in my view, agreeing with Wittgenstein's famous dictum: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". To this ~~statement~~ saying but not Wittgenstein's article of faith of rationalistic ascetism only those can subscribe who are obsessed by the idea that there is no genuine human understanding of anything outside the field of scientific knowledge. But there are poetry and the arts and those greatest religious documents of mankind which are practically all written in poetical, non-scientific language. None of these artistic expressions of men are silent concerning those insights of which one cannot speak in proper scientific terms. On the contrary, it is exactly the unspeakable ~~is their proper~~ they try to speak of in a peculiar way -- indicating their metaphysical insights by the use of emotionally charged or even saturated analogies, pictures and sounds. These insights would become falsehoods if they would claim to convey rational scientific knowledge, as they, unfortunately sometimes do in the mouths of ~~questionable~~ confessors of questionable intellectual clarity.

It would be absurd
to insist that a great religious myth or Mr. Mann's Dr. Faustus must be
the correct report of historical events and as a "mere fairy tale" it would
would not
convey no insight of any value relevance. Neither Goethe nor
Mann
care for the historical Faust of the 16th century
they must
Nor Michelangelo carved for
in the Sistine chapel
a correct representation of the creation of man or El Greco for a photographic
true picture of Toledo. But every artist cares consciously or unconsciously
artist intended the
for the meaning of Faust's wholes of human existence which is always beyond
the clearly limited observable facts. These artistic, poetical and religious
insights are, therefore, of necessity, never precise or even unambiguous, and
as we can grasp the beyond only in ambiguous terms of finite terms.
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logical
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of the devil are based on scientifically useable (sensible) observations.
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on the other hand
the "descent of man" to use Michelangelo's creation of man as pictorial
even to be unprejudiced free-
thinker material or Greco's
it is certain equally impossible
be is no less besides the point to call them the
misses no less the mark
zoologist Ernst Haekel's definition of God as a gaseous, gaseiform
religiously relevant observation.

None of us will be ever become aware
directly aware of the meaning of any whole of our experience.

Even the strictest rationalist and the scientist of completest self-limitation of science or the most earthly bon vivant has no guarantee that give the whole of their experience, some non-scientific and non-empiristic meaning without being aware of it. Their absolute limitation to scientific knowledge ed to mere earthly enjoyment involves the consciously unjustified belief that their limited experience is, necessarily, all "that's to it," all the meaning that life possibly can have. But this belief is, to say the least, as unjustifiable as the belief of the greatest artists and religious minds. To emphasize one principal point once more, we have no guarantee that any of our poetical or religious interpretations of life our lives, and of nature contain absolute truth; they even do not contain truth of precise character of science. All the great poets, the really great metaphysicians and founders of great religions have admitted as the beyond of limited experience is only "patchwork"; and the greatest artistic creation is only a fragment giving only dim, faintest glimpses of parts of that possible meaning. But the man who is a supercritical metaphysical restraint shuts himself off from all that metaphysics in its non-scientific aims has to offer, who never tries to cultivate by means of artistic metaphysics to acquire some meaning of the beyond of his limited experience but adequate to this experience he is certainly no less pitiable than he who has never tasted what the glory of means to subject oneself to

"through a glass darkly" 1 Corinthians 13:12

the yearning fell, which urges to a very personified metaphysical interpretation of this life.

discipline of precise scientific research with all its rich and deep rewards of knowledge or insight within the limits of exact knowledge. The scientist and the critical artistic metaphysician have to learn equally from each other and specialty of this kind is valuable too as a superstructure to scientific ethics. I see in any case no other way of protecting and guaranteeing the integration of the main activities of intellectual life than the first I have just sketched in the roughest outlines.

Are our ideals self-evident?
Are we still spiritual adventurers?
(analogies between art, science + ethics)
[metaphysics]

compare with Science Ethics + Metaphysics

3 copies

page 1-3
- collated

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Cassirer

Correspondence with Prof Schilpp
" " Dr. Lutz

Also in folder
Toni Cassirer
p. 1-9
in German

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1 copy. Printed in The Library of Living Philosophers
The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer
1949

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Printed by

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" Erasmus

15. 3. 44

Cassirer

Für Ihre Aufsatz-Stelle will Ihnen so herzlich Dank vergelten.
Es hat mich besonders erfreut, weil ich aus ihnen ersehen habe,
wie nahe wir uns in unseren ethischen Grundanschauungen stehen.
Über die Kritik an G. E. Moore u. anderen englischen Ethikern kann ich wenig
sagen, - da Sie diese Dinge ja viel genauer kennen als ich. Was
den Ton der Kritik betrifft, so könnte er in Empfindung mit mindestens
etwas gemildert werden. Aber das ist lediglich Sache des persönlichen Temperaments und ich möchte es in diesem Punkte die Entscheidung ganz
Ihnen überlassen.

E. C.

October 5, 1965

Dr. Dieter Lutz
W. Kohlhammer Verlag
Stuttgart 1, Postfach 747
Urbanstrasse 12-14

Dear Dr. Lutz;

I hope you can continue to bear with me for writing you in English as the language I can best manage to use.

After careful search, a shorter German version has been found of the Cassirer essay which appeared in 1949 in Vol.VI of The Library of Living Philosophers.

The German version of this essay by Professor Baumgardt is entitled "Ernst Cassirer und die Ueberwindung des Chaos in der modernen Ethik" and is about one-third the size of the English version.

I wrote Prof. P.A. Schilpp, editor of The Library of Living Philosophers, asking for permission to have the German shorter version published. We need this permission from Dr. Schilpp to satisfy American copyright regulations. I am hopeful that this permission may be forthcoming soon so that I may be free to send you copy of the German version of the essay.

Please accept my regret for this long delay.

Sincerely yours,

Rose Baumgardt

(Mrs. David Baumgardt)

555 West Broadway
Long Beach, NY 11561

October 5, 1965

Dear Prof. Schilpp;

No doubt the enclosed copy of my letter of early September 1965) asking permission to have published in Germany a smaller version of my late husband's essay, "Cassirer and the Chaos in Modern Ethics" which appeared in 1949 in The Library of Living Philosophers) did not reach you.

May I please have y_our favorable reply at your earlient convenience.

Thank you most kindly for your attention.

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Rose Baumgardt

(Mrs. David Baumgardt)

Enc.

555 West Broadway
Long Beach, NY 11561
(early Sept 1965)

Professor P.A. Schilpp
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois

or 1830 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois

Dear Dr. Schilpp;

I was not quite sure where it might be best to address you, but hope this communication reaches you.

The W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart, is interested in publishing a German version of my late husband's essay "Cassirer and the Chaos in Modern Ethics" which appeared in The Library of Living Philosophers in 1949.

The typewritten copy of the English version consists of 39 pages (26 pages in print), whereas the German version (only lately come to hand) is but 13 pages.

Although I am not fully posted on "Copyright" regulations, I think that translations may be allowed in case of changes and/or "the piece" has been redone.

May the David Baumgardt Estate please have the permission to send the W.Kohlhammer Verlag a copy of the shorter German version of this essay for publication?

I well recall Prof. Baumgardt often having spoken with deep satisfaction of your interest in his thinking as an ethicist.

Thank you for a reply at your early convenience.

Sincerely yours,

Rose Baumgardt

(Mrs.) David Baumgardt

555 West Broadway
Long Beach, NY 11561

Early September 1965

Professor P.A. Schilpp
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois

or 1830 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois

Dear Dr. Schilpp;

I was not quite sure where it might be best to address you, but hope this communication reaches you.

The W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart, is interested in publishing a German version of my late husband's essay " Cassirer and the Chaos in Modern Ethics" which appeared in The Library of Living Philosophers in 1949.

The typewritten copy of the English version consists of 39 pages (26 pages in print), whereas the German version (only lately come to hand) is but 13 pages.

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Mrs. David Baumgardt
555 West Broadway
Long Beach, L.I.
N.Y., USA

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Urbanstraße 12-14
Telefon 245446
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Mrs. David Baumgardt
555 West Broadway
Long Beach, L.I.
N.Y., USA

19. Januar 1965
Dr.L/ba

Sehr verehrte gnädige Frau,

Herr Dr. Rühle, der sich z.Zt. im Urlaub befindet, hat mich gebeten, Ihr freundliches Schreiben vom 22.12.1964 zu beantworten. Mit Bestürzung haben wir erst durch diesen Brief erfahren, daß Herr Professor Baumgardt schon 1963 verstorben ist.

Ich hoffe, daß Sie uns dennoch bei unserem Anliegen weiterhelfen können. Bei dem von Herrn Dr. Rühle in seinem letzten Schreiben genannten Aufsatz handelt es sich um:

> David Baumgardt, Cassirer and the Chaos in Modern Ethics. In: The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. VI "The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer"; Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp.
> The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois 1949
> Page 575 - 605
> 577-603

Wir wären Ihnen zu großem Dank verbunden, wenn Sie unter dem Nachlass von Herrn Professor Baumgardt die von ihm schon begonnene deutsche Übersetzung des genannten Aufsatzes finden würden und uns diese für die deutsche Übersetzungsausgabe des genannten Werkes zur Verfügung stellen könnten.

Mit den besten Wünschen und freundlichen Grüssen bin ich

Ihr sehr ergebener

Dieter Lutz

(Dr. Dieter Lutz)

CASSIRER, Ernst, -- relative of the publisher Bruno C., the art dealer Paul C. and the neurologist Richard C., -- one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century, panhistor, his contributions to the ~~xix~~ theory of science being of no less importance than those to the humanities and the history of philosophy, born July 28, 1874 in Breslau, Germany, son of a well-to-do merchant, studied at the Universities of Berlin, Leipzig and Heidelberg and took his Ph.D. at the University of Marburg as a student of Hermann Cohen with whom he remained connected in a life-long friendship. In 1906 he started his brilliant teaching career at the University of Berlin and received a full professorship at the newly founded University of Hamburg in 1919. 1929/30 he served as the Rector of this University ~~of~~ and in 1933 he was deprived of his position by the Nazis, fled first to Oxford/England, then to the University of Göteborg/Sweden where he held a personal professorship and left on the last Swedish Second World War boat that crossed the Atlantic endangered by Nazi submarines in 1941. From 1941 to 1945 he was a visiting professor at Yale University, later at Columbia University and died from a heart attack in New York in the street near his University on April 13, 1945.

Cassirer's doctoral dissertation on "Descartes' Erkenntnistheorie" became part of his first major work on Leibniz' System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grunddlagen, 1902, supplemented in 1904ff by a valuable edition of Leibniz selected works. His polemics against Leonard Nelson, founder of the once influential neo-Friesian School, appeared in 1906 under the title Der Kritische Idealismus und die Philosophie des 'gesunden Menschenverstandes'. In 1906/07 he published the first two volumes of the most learned studies in the historical development of the problem of knowledge Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft

der neueren Zeit, a work which leads from the Renaissance to the end of the nineteenth century in its fourth volume. Along with the works of well-known philosophers and scientists of these centuries, numerous rather unknown writings receive here a penetrating investigation; and a wealth of important philosophical motifs has thus been unearthed in especial lucid analyses. The philosophical background of German classic and romantic poetry is the main topic of Freiheit und Form, 1916, and in Idee und Gestalt, 1921, followed in 1918 by Kants Leben und Lehre. These three volumes are meant for the scholar as well as a wider reading public; and the later publications on the history of ideas pay, according to their enlarged topics, more regard to general historical and religious movements than the "Erkenntnisproblem". They are Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance,1927, Die platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge, 1932, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung, 1932 (Engl. transl. in 1951) and Descartes, 1939.

Aside from this large and fruitful historical research Cassirer offers some of the most valuable constructive philosophical ideas in his systematic writings. His starting point was and remained the neo-Kantianism of Hermann Cohen. But as Cohen himself admitted, he soon outgrew the general philosophical position held by the Marburg School. In his Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, 1910, he showed a penetrating analysis why in mathematics, physics and chemistry the traditional preponderance of a concept of "substance" had to be replaced in these sciences by the concept of "function". In philosophy and science the commonsense view is to be abandoned that a world of substances and their movements could ever be mirrored by simple description. Instead of hoping in vain to present a faithful copy of

given existing things, the critical exploration of nature has to unveil merely precise functional relations between given phenomena on the basis of verifiable scientific hypotheses. In his Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie, 1921, and in Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik, 1937, (Engl. ed. in 19), these basic insights are extended to an analysis of the latest developments of contemporary physics and it is clarified in which sense the concept of given objects no longer precedes the concept of law but, in the inverse order, the concept of the object is dependent on the function of laws of nature. Yet, these laws and especially the law of causality refer no longer to acting forces in the universe but exclusively to functional connections between observable events. In the fourth volume of the "Erkenntnisproblem" in English, 1950 (in German in 1957) similar reflections are applied to the basic principles of biological and historical research and the concepts of "field" and "Gestalt" are given special considerations as "functional" concepts. Finally, in his Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, 1923 to 1929 (vol.I, Die Sprache, vol.II Das Mythische Denken, 1925, vol.III Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis) and in 1944 in his Essay on Man, Cassirer develops, on the basis of an overwhelmingly rich material of details, in which way language, mythology and science do not present different realms of objects of reality but vitally different symbolic expressions of understanding the world in which man lives, thinks and feels. The imposing framework of deeply original ideas offered in these principal works by C. has as yet not found sufficient recognition and adequate detailed evaluation.

Literature: Jospe, Alfred, Die Unterscheidung v.Mythos u.Religion bei Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer, 1932 - The Philos. Of E.C. (The Library of Living Philosophers, vol.VI, ed. by P.A.Schilpp, 1949 - Baumgardt, David, Introd. to 4 v. of essays by E.C. soon to appear in Agora Verl. Darmstadt, Germany

D.B.

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In 1906 he started his teaching career at the University of Berlin and received a full professorship at the newly founded Univ. of Hamburg in 1919. From 1929/30 he served as the Rector of this University and in 1933 he was deprived of his position by the Nazis, fled first to Oxford then to the Univ. of Göteborg/Sweden where he held a personal professorship and left on the last Swedish boat that crossed the Atlantic endangered by Nazi submarines in 1941 for the USA where he became a vis. at Yale Univ. & Columbia Univ. at Berkeley

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Toni Cassirer, wife the Labe only in mimeographed copies in the possession of friends detailed
The Living Legacy of E. B. Embree

ERNST CASSIRER

und sein Platz in der Geistesgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts

von

DAVID BAUMGARDT

ERNST CASSIRER
und sein Platz in der Geistesgeschichte des 20.Jahrhunderts

von
DAVID BAMGARDT

Die Aufpeitschung nationaler Leidenschaften während zweier langjähriger Weltkriege und die einzigartige Verdumpfung des offiziellen geistigen Lebens während der Herrschaft des Nationalsozialismus ist dem Wirken eines souverän weltbürgerlichen Denkers begreiflicher Weise nicht günstig in Deutschland gewesen. Viel eher konnten da erregt persönliche Bekenntnisphilosophien gedeihen, zumal wenn sie zugleich als Metaphysik des Seins überhaupt und als "neues" wie "realistisches" Denken auftraten. Nur von solchen Erwägungen her kann es verständlich werden, dass das staunenswert motivreiche und selten gar gedankenreife Werk Ernst Cassirers auch heute noch lange nicht genug Würdigung und Wirkung in Deutschland gar gefunden (erfahren) hat, während die Welt in ihm den universalsten Denker der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts ehrt, der an Weite des Wissens und der Denkperspektiven auch Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, Bertrand Russell und Benedetto Croce überragt.

Kann man jemandem Wirkung "zollen"?

In seinem ausserordentlich ausgedehnten literarischen Schaffen hat sich Cassirer bewusst von der Parteinahme für eine der üblichen Gegensätze zwischen Positivismus und Weltanschauungslehre, zwischen historisierender und rein systematischer Betrachtung ferngehalten. Seine Arbeiten zur Geistesgeschichte sind ebenso (bedeutungsvoll) belangvoll wie seine Schriften zu einer systematischen "Philosophie der symbolischen Formen", seine Beiträge zur Grundlegung der positiven Wissenschaften ebenso gehaltreich wie seine Analysen metaphysischer Problematik; und innerhalb der Wissenschaftslehre zeigt er sich gleichvertraut mit der beschreibenden wie der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft, eine heute nur zu spärliche Tugend unter den Philosophen. Vor allem aber hat er sich mit Recht aufs äusserste gestemmt gegen die bedenkliche Zerreissung der beiden Hauptthemisphären der philosophischen Thematik.

tiefgreifend scheint mir hier nicht der adäquate Terminus zu sein

gegen die katastrophale gegenseitige Verachtung zwischen Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften, die sich in der Gegenwart immer weiter ausgebreitet hat.

[Ohne eine Hand aber wie die Cassirers,) C. hat (die) Natur- und Geistesbetrachtung mit gleich synthetischer Kraft (meistern kann) gemeistert, wird gewiss nie wieder eine umfassendere Weltschau möglich werden. In (Aber in seiner) (der vornehmen und) vorbildlichen Freiheit von (Zurückhaltung vor) Originalitätshascherei, (die ihn stets auszeichnete,) hat Cassirer nie versucht (danach gesucht) für (seine Denkart und) die originale Eigenart seines umfassenden Weltbilds einen klingenden Namen zu sichern (prägen). Er hat nicht einmal dagegen protestiert, als blosser Mitarbeiter der gx sogen. Marburger Schule charakterisiert zu werden -- eine besonders bedauerliche Unterschätzung seiner Leistung. Er hat aber die Geringschätzung, der er damit bei Aussenstehenden (Flachköpfen) verfiel, mit Gleichmut ertragen.

Hermann/ Cohen, der bisher bedeutendste Fortbildner des kritischen Denkverfahrens Kants, hatte in Marburg um 1900 eine ansehnliche Zahl der fähigsten philosophischen Köpfe der Zeit um sich gesammelt, unter denen z.B. Paul Natorp, Kurd Lasswitz, Nicolai Hartmann, José Ortega y Gasset und / vor allem Cassirer mit durchaus eigenständigem Werk in die Philosophiegeschichte eingegangen sind. Wilhelm Dilthey und seine Schule arbeiteten damals in Berlin in ihrer philosophischen Forschung mit wesentlich literarhistorischen Kategorien, sie suchten die grossen Denkungsteine vor allem von der seelischen Eigenart der Philosophen und von der allgemeinen Zeitlage her zu verstehn. Die Marburger Schule aber hielt vorwiegend Ausschau nach allgemeingültigen präzisen Methoden, wie sie bei allem Wechsel in den Einzelheiten der Einstellung der Marburger Schule.

'Klingt nach trotzdem" soll es auch

Sie fügten "den Weltanschaungen" zu.Aber das ist zu banal um erwähnt zu werden u. bezeichnet auch keinen Unterschied zur

für die philosophische Grundlegung exakter Wissenschaft in Geltung bleiben. Daher lag Mer der Nachdruck auf einer neuen Auslegung mx und systematischen Verwertung der Forschungsmethoden der grossen Idealisten von Plato über Descartes zu Kant.

Das philosophiehistorische Schrifttum Cassirers

Aber während andere Mitglieder des Marburger Kreises sich auf Arbeiten über Plato, Kant und Allgemein idealistische Themen beschränkten, wagte sich der junge Cassirer beteits in seinem ersten grösseren Werk an ein besonders schwieriges Unterfange, eine Darstellung der Denkarbeit (philos.Leistung) des universalsten Wissenschaftlers der neuzeitlichen Philosophiegeschichte, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Das System des grossen Logikers, Mathematikers, Natur- und Geisteswissenschaftlers, das der Denker selbst nur in Skizzen und zahlreichen Briefen angedeutet hatte, wird hier in seinen "wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen" höchst dankenswert durchleuchtet (1902) und auch durch eine ≠ Auswahl aus seinen Schriften (1904ff) für die moderne Wissenschaftsproblematik fruchtbar gemacht. Noch in der meisterhaften Festrede, die Cassirer 1928 im Auftrag des Senats der Stadt Hamburg hielt, greift er auf Leibniz zurück und sieht nicht mit Unrecht in einem wohl durchdachten Protest Leibniz' gegen jede Versklavung eines Individuums eine wichtige Quelle für die Idee freiheitlicher republikanischer Staatsverfassungen.[1]

Viel weiter aber als der Band über"Leibniz' System" greift das zweite grosse Werk Cassirers aus, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit (2 Bände 1906/07).

1/ Siehe E. Cassirer: Die Idee der Republikanischen Staatsverfassung, Rede zur Verfassungsfeier am 11.August 1928, 1929, S.13f den Hinweis auf Leibniz' "Meditation sur la notion commune de la justice", erst 1893 veröffentlicht in /Georg Mollat's Mitteilungen aus Leibnizens ungedruckten Schriften, S.68

Der Umfang des Neulands, das hier für die Geschichte der Erkenntnistheorie durch die eindringliche Forscherarbeit eines einzigen Gelehrten erschlossen wurde, wird für immer erstaunlich bleiben. In den vier Bänden, zu denen sich das ursprünglich zweibändige Werk im Lauf der Jahre auswuchs, wird in instruktiven Analysen der grossen und zahlreicher fast unbekannter Denker von Nikolaus von Cues über Schelling und Hegel bis zu den Führern der Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts eine erdrückende Ausbeute an unschätzbaren originalen Einsichten in die Wandlungen des Erkenntnisproblems und seiner Lösungsversuche freigelegt. Aus buntester, verschiedenartiger religionsphilosophischer, metaphysischer und einzelwissenschaftlicher Einkleidung sind hier Grundfragen der Erkenntnistheorie abgelöst und in ihrer ständigen Verfeinerung für das zeitgenössische Verstehen erschlossen worden.

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Die Schöpfer der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft gefolgt von den grossen rationalistischen und empiristischen Erkenntniskritikern spielen dabei naturgemäss eine überragende Rolle. Aber selbst so vielfach irrationalistische Schöpfungen wie die Naturspekulationen des Paracelsus und die Religionsphilosophie Pascals fehlen nicht in dem Chor. Gerade in der knappen Analyse, die Cassirer der verzweifelten Vernunftfeindlichkeit der Pascalschen Pensées gewidmet hat, verrät sich ein Geist, dem bei betontem Willen zur Klarheit doch die Kraft zur Versenkung in dunkle seelische und denkerische Verstrickungen religiösen Fühlens nicht fremd geblieben ist.

Im 3. Band seines imposanten philosophiegeschichtlichen Werks hat Cassirer auch die diktatorisch "vornehme" intuitive Metaphysik Fichtes, die noch Kant selbst als unkritisches Denken ablehnte,

wie die metaphysischen Identitätsphilosophien Schellings und Hegels ausgiebig zu Worte kommen lassen. Wenn er aber mit sympathisierender Kritik und kritischer Sympathie von diesen hohen Gedankenkonstruktionen zu diszipliniertem Denken im Sinne Kants zurückleitet, so darf dies nicht als Mangel an denkerischem Wagemut gedeutet werden. Es ist gerade Cassirer's Stärke, dass er auch unkritisch spekulative Kerngedanken der grossen deutschen Metaphysiker in seinem umfassenden kritischen Gedankensystem zu verwerten versteht.

D.h. sowohl für Laien wir für Fachgelehrte.

Auch einer breiteren Leserschaft zugänglich sind die zwei Bände über Freiheit und Form (1916) und Idee und Gestalt (1921), in denen Gedankengut klassischer und romantischer deutscher Dichtung von Leibniz' Ästhetik aus über Lessing, Herder, Goethe, Schiller bis zu Hölderlin, Kleist und den ästhetisierden "Elementen der Staatskunst" Adam Müllers zur Darstellung gebracht ist. Nur zu leicht kann in diesen Essays die schlicht konservative Sprachhaltung über die selbständig eigene Gestaltungskraft der Analysen hinweg täuschen und sie vergessen machen, wie umgekehrt nur zu oft in den "neuen Denken" der Existenzphilosophen die kühne expressionistische Sprachkraft Armut und gedankliche Überlebtheit ihrer Motive zu verdecken pflegt. Mag man auch Seitenblicke in diesen Schriften wie eine gelegentliche Gegenüberstellung Luthers mit der mittelalterlichen deutschen Mystik nicht voll befriedigend finden, im Ganzen sind z.B. die Analysen Goethescher Naturbetrachtung in ihrem Verhältnis zu Kant und der mathematischen Physik pädagogische Meisterstücke in der Umsicht, mit der der Leser durch zahlreiche Klippen von Missverständnismöglichkeiten durchgesteuert wird. Der überzeugende Hinweis auf Hölderlin als den eigentlichen Inspirator des sogenannten "ältesten Systemprogramms des deutschen Idealismus",

"Nur manchmal geschwätzig" d.h. gedankenleerer. Aber J. auch der Gedankenärmste

das Franz Rosenzweig unmittelbar nach seinem Erwerb durch die Königliche Bibliothek in Berlin Schelling zugesprochen hatte,[1] ist bis heute meist nicht genug gewürdigt; und so haben auch diese halb popularisierenden Schriften ebenso wie der fassliche Band über Kants Leben und Lehre (1918 als letzter Band der Cassirerischen Kantausgabe erschienen) dem Leser, der auf tiefer ausgewogene Einsicht drängt, weit mehr zu bieten als mancherlei anspruchsvoller auftretende spätere Versuche am gleichen Gedankenmaterial.

Die weiteren eindringlichen gelehrten Arbeiten zur Philosophiegeschichte, Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (1927), Die platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge (1932), Die Philosophie der Aufklärung (1932) und Descartes (1939) geben dann der Darstellung allgemein historischer und religiöser Thematik breiteren Raum als die dem Thema nach begrenzteren historischen Schriften der Frühzeit getan hatten. Cassirers Werk über die europäische Aufklärung fand bald Nachfolge in zwei anderen wertvollen Stellungnahmen zum gleichen Stoffgebiet: Karl Joël's Darstellung der Geisteshaltung des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts im 2. Band seiner Wandlungen der Weltanschauung (1934) und Paul Hazard's 3 Bände La Pensée européenne au XVIIIe siècle (1946), nachdem schon vorher Bernhard Groethuysen in seiner Die Entstehung der bürgerlichen Welt- und Lebensanschauung in Frankreich (1927, 1930) ähnliche Aspekte eines Ausschnitts aus dem gleichen Thema in Angriff genommen hatte. Aber Cassirers "Philosophie der Aufklärung" wird mit seiner instruktiven Scheidung zwischen "esprit de système" und "esprit systématique" auch neben diesen drei anderen bedeutungsvollen Neubewer-

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1/ Siehe Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 22. März 1917, abgedruckt in Franz Rosenzweig: Kleinere Schriften, 1937; siehe dort besonders S.238ff.

tungen der Leistung der europäischen Aufklärung stets einen hohen Rang behaupten, in der Ausschälung von begrifflich durchgeformtem Gedankengehalt der Epoche ihnen wohl überlegen bleiben.

So sehr es jedoch zur Grösse Cassirers gehört, sich ständig an dem ungeheuren Gedankenerbe aus vergangenen Jahrhunderten zu messen, so wenig hat er sich gescheut, das Gleiche auch gegenüber den Zeitgenossen zu tun. Ohne laute Aggressivität, die meist nur von einem fragwürdigen Hang zur Selbstglorifizierung zeugt, aber mit überlegener Ironie ist er so 1906 Leonard Nelson, dem Führer der einst einflussreichen "Neufriesschen Schule", in einer besonderen Broschüre Der kritische Idealismus und die Philosophie des "gesunden Menschenverstandes" entgegengetreten. Und das Gleiche gilt von seiner Ablehnung des sachlich und geschichtlich unhaltbaren Kantbilds Martin Heideggers, dem Cassirer in den Kantstudien, in den Davoser Gesprächen und noch in seiner letzten grösseren Schrift [1] Widerpart hielt.

/Zu Kantbild. Gewiss das Grosse in der Kunst will und soll gar nicht eindeutig sein. Aber sind auch Deutungen 1 Philos. haltbar, die seinen eindeutigen Aussagen widersprechen wie Fichtes Interp. Kants, gegen die Kant protestierte. H. ist viel (fichteche heroisch ?) als K./

Cassirer und die zeitgenössische (deutsche und französische) Existenzphilosophie

Die Erlebnisechtheit und der spekulative Reiz der Existenzphilosophieen Heideggers, Sartres, Jaspers, Gabriel Marcels, Louis Lavelles, der Ernst und die Wucht der existentialistischen Religionsphilosophien Franz Rosenzweigs und Martin Bubers werden nicht angezweifelt, wenn darauf bestanden wird, dass der Sinn für Präzision des Denkens hier im Verhältnis zum philosophischen Kritizismus

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1/Siehe H.Herrigel's Bericht über diese Gespräche, Frankfurter Zeitung, 22. April 1929; Toni Cassirer: Mein Leben mit Ernst Cassirer, Privatdruck, und E.Cassirer, The Myth of the State, 1946, p.292f, wo Cassirer Heidegger mit Recht vorhält, dass er im Gegensatz zu Plato's und Kant's Kritizismus leugnet, es gäbe eine objektiv verpflichtende logische Methode des philosophischen Denkens.

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der vorangegangen Generation bedenklich geschwunden ist. Es bleibt unverzeihliche Einseitigkeit, wenn im Sinne der Spätphilosophie Schellings "alles bloss rationale Wissen" als "im Grunde nur nichtwissen des Wissens" gebrandmarkt wird, alles Erkennen des "Was" als geringwertig ohne Verstehen des "Dass" 1/ Es (ist nichts als) bleibt leider emphorische Parteilichkeit, wenn nur der Heideggersche "Einsprung ins Dasein" oder das Erleben des konkreten "Ich" in seiner "Korrelation" zum "Du" und zu Gott als Tugend gespriesen wird, und wenn demgegenüber das rein formale Ich der Einheit der Apperzeption, die Quelle aller exakt rationalen Erkenntnis, geradezu als Schande des Weltgeistes verlästert werden konnte. 2/
Es ist gefährlich blind so im eigenen "neuen Denken" nur Tugend ohne Gebrechen" und im älteren rationalen Denken wesentlich oder ausschliesslich Gebrechen ohne Tugend zu sehen.

In Nicolai Hartmanns und Jose Ortega y Gassets Auflehnung gegen den formalen, rationalen Idealismus ihrer Marburger Schulung, in der Weiterentwicklung der Phänomenologie von Max Scheler ab bis hin zu den Existenzphilosophien Heideggers, Sartres und Rosenzweigs ist bezeichnender Weise das Organ für die überlegene Präzision des mathematisch naturwissenschaftlichen Denkens mehr und mehr abgestorben. Fast alle die Repräsentanten des "neuen Realismus" und der Existenzphilosophie waren oder wollten nicht mehr imstande sein, die höhere Exaktheit mathematisch naturwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis zu würdigen; sie sahen in ihr nur

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1/ Siehe z.B. F.W.J.Schelling: Sämtliche Werke ed. K.F.A.Schelling. 1856ff. II.Abteilung, Bd.I. "Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie," S.563f. II.Bd.III.S.57ff; ebenda S.152: Es ist ein stolzer Name..Vernunftwissenschaft. Aber was ist ihr Inhalt? Eigentlich nur der beständige Umsturz der Vernunft..Was ihr.. zum Seienden wird, ist ein über die Vernunft Hinausgehendes."

2/ Siehe M.Buber, z.B. Ich und Du. 1923. S.78

niedere "Weltorientierung" (Jaspers)[1/], eine bloss "technische Auslegung des Denkens" im Gegensatz zu dem "ursprünglichen" existentiellen, mit konkretem Lebensgehalt erfüllten Denken.[2/] Und doch waren Physik und Chemie gerade in denselben Jahren der Blüte der Existenzphilosophie auf ihre Art mit sehr viel verlässlicheren Einsichten zu neuem philosophisch sehr folgereichem "Verstehn des Daseienden" vorgedrungen.

Teils mag es unbewusste Eifersucht auf die Triumphe der Relativitätstheorie, der neuen Atomforschung und Wellenmechanik gewesen sein - Gefühle des Neids gegenüber den Erfolgen "bloss empirischer" Forschung sind auch früheren Philosophengenerationen nicht fremd geblieben und das Gleiche gilt oft für Forscher gegenüber erfolgreichen Philosophen. Teils aber war es (einfach) offensichtliche Unkenntnis des Wesens und der hochkomplizierten Struktur moderner naturwissenschaftlicher Methodenlehre, die fast alle Existenzphilosophen verleitete, nicht nur zeitgenössisches Ingenieurwesen, sondern selbst die rein theoretische exakte Naturwissenschaft zu einem

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1/Siehe K.Jaspers: philosophie, 1932, Band I "Philosophische Weltorientierung". In seinem mehr rational gestimmten Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte, 1949, Teil II, Kap.IC warnt Jaspers zwar gleichermassen vor blindem "Glauben" an die Wissenschaft und blindem "Hass" gegen sie. Aber selbst hier betont er, dass auch die rein theoretische exakte Naturwissenschaft auf sehr gebrechlicher Grundlage beruhe, deren Fortbestehen auf Generationen nicht verbürgt werden könne -- eine düstere Prophezeiung, die nach der Wiederaufnahme der Prinzipien der exakten Akustik bei der jüngeren Pythagoräer und der stetigen Fortentwicklung der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft seit mehr als drei Jahrhunderten wenig Aussicht auf Erfüllung hat, es sei denn dass der Mensch sich selbst mitsamt seinem tiefer und angeblich besser fundierten existentiellen Denken in die Luft sprengt.

2/ Siehe z.B. M.Heidegger: Über den Humanismus, 1947, S.7: Schon "die Namen wie 'Logik', 'Ethik', 'Physik' kommen erst auf, sobald das ursprüngliche Denken zu Ende geht. Die Griechen haben in ihrer grossen Zeit ohne solche Titel gedacht." S.6: Es handelt sich in allem rein theoretischen Verhalten schon um eine "technische Auslegung des Denkens."

niederen, sogar des wahren Erfassen der Natur verfälschenden Denkgebilde[1] oder nur zu etwas wesentlich praktisch Nützlichem[2] zu degradieren.

Es ist kaum ein Zufall, dass die führenden Existenzphilosophen von Haus aus "Geisteswissenschaftler", Historiker wie Rosenzweig und Ortega y Gasset, Psychiater wie Jaspers, Dichter wie Marcel und Sartre, Philosophiehistoriker wie Heidegger sind und schon damit ohne nähere Vertrautheit mit Subtilitäten der exakten Naturforschung. Daher war etwa für Rosenzweig und schon für Kierkegaard der Vertreter des älteren "objektiven Idealismus" vor allem Hegel und seine spekulative "dialektische" Naturbetrachtung, nicht der an der Newtonschen Physik geschulte Kant der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft", dessen Überwindung die Existenzphilosophie viel grössere Schwierigkeiten gekostet hätte; und Jaspers konnte als Sieger über Hegel und blosse

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1/ Siehe M.Heidegger: Der Feldweg, 1953, S.4: "Der Mensch versucht vergeblich, durch sein Planen den Erdball in eine Ordnung zu bringen, wenn er nicht dem Zuspruch des Feldwegs eingeordnet ist." S.4: "Die Heutigen..halten" den "Lärm der Apparate fast für die Stimme Gottes.. Aber die Wenigen werden überall die Bleibenden sein," die "vermögen einst aus der sanften Gewalt des Feldwegs die Riesenkräfte der Atomenergie zu überdauern, die sich des menschliche Rechnen erkünstelt und zur Fessel des eigenen Tuns gemacht hat." Vergl. Franz Rosenzweig: "Das neue Denken" in Kleinere Schriften, 1937, S.395f: In der "neuen Erkenntnistheorie..tritt..an die Stelle der Widerspruchslosigkeit-und Gegenstandstheorien der alten und an Stelle des statischen Objektivitätsbegriffs jener ein dynamischer;..die hoffnungslos statischen Wahrheiten, wie die der Mathematik..sind von hier aus als der - untere - Grenzfall zu begreifen.., während die höheren und höchsten Wahrheiten, nur von hier aus als Wahrheiten begriffen werden können, statt zu Fiktionen, Postulaten, Bedürfnissen umgestempelt werden zu müssen. Von jenen unwichtigsten Wahrheiten des Schlages 'zwei mal zwei' ist vier, in denen die Menschen leicht übereinstimmen, ohne einen anderen Aufwand als ein bisschen Gehirnschmalz -- beim kleinen Einmaleins etwas weniger, bei der Relativitätstheorie etwas mehr -- führt der Weg über die Wahrheiten, die sich der Mensch etwas kosten lässt, hin zu denen, die er nicht anders bewähren kann, als mit dem Opfer seines Lebens, und schliesslich zu denen, deren Wahrheit erst der Lebenseinsatz aller Geschlechter bewähren kann."

2/ Siehe z.B. José Ortega y Gasset: Historia como sistema y del Imperio Romano, 1942, deutsch 1952, S.86f: "Was wirklich an ihr... der Physik... ist -- und nicht blosse Idee -- ist nur ihr Nutzen. Deswegen haben wir die Furcht vor der Physik verloren und mit der Furcht die Achtung, und mit der Achtung die Begeisterung."

Erforschung des Daseienden das Spätwerk Schellings feiern,[1] des Verächters exakter Naturwissenschaft, der von seiner Jugend her Verfechter einer phantastisch metaphysischen Naturspekulation gewesen war mit der Einführung eines Ost- und Westpols in die Lehre vom Magnetismus und dergleichen, der aber, wie selbst Rosenzweig betont, "vor lauter Programm"[2] fast nie zum vollendeten Werk kam.

"ist einfach zu psychologisierend" Psych. bedeutet seit Husserl: logische Thesen fachlich durch log. begründen. Es bedeutet keineswegs was ich hier tue - die psych. Motive, die l.Phil. antreiben psych. zu analysieren, ohne damit die Geltung seiner Phil. zu "widerlegen" oder zu "stützen".

Als emotionelle Triebfeder für die ganze Existenzphilosophie unserer Zeit aber wäre weiter zu nennen der übliche gegen gefühlsmässige Aufstand einer neuen Philosophengeneration gerade gegen die höchste Reife einer vorangegangenen Epoche. So erhoben sich die englischen Empiristen um 1700 gegen die rationalistischen Systembildner des 17. Jahrhunderts, die deutschen Romantiker und spekulative Köpfe wie Fichte, Schelling und Hegel gegen den Empirismus des Kritizismus Kants und die gesamte deutsch-französische und englische Aufklärung, die Positivisten des 19. Jahrhunderts gegen die Hegelsche Metaphysik und die Existenzphilosophie gegen den Positivismus. Alles Denken einer neuen Generation aber wird dann wieder zu "altem" Denken für ein späteres Denkergeschlecht; und deshalb kann dem Begriff "neues Denken" Das "neue Denken" lebt viel mehr im Wortgepränge des Sturm und Drang oder vielmehr des Barock, um meiner Meinung nach etwas mit "neuer Sachlichkeit" zu tun zu haben. Als Barock ist es wertvoll, obwohl längst nicht mehr neu.

1/ Siehe K.Jaspers: Schelling, Grösse und Verhängnis. 1955 und vergl. Walter Schulz: Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings. 1955.

2/ F.Rosenzweig: "Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus", Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. 1917. Kleinere Schriften. 1937.S.238: "Vor lauter Programm kam er nie zum vollendeten Werk, vor lauter 'Ideen' und 'Entwürfen'..'Nachrichten', Verheissungen und halben Erfüllungen nie zur ganzen Tat. "Ich werde" blieb sein letztes Wort, wie es sein erstes war."

den Hermann Herrigel für sine philosophischen Zeitgenossen in Anspruch nahm[1], gewiss nur eine höchst relative Geltung zukommen.

Damit ist, wie Rosenzweig freimütig bekennen musste, sein ausgesprochen "neues Denken" in den zwanziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts von der in Wahrheit sehr alten "rabies theologica"[2] oder metaphysica besessen, der alten "theologischen" oder metaphysischen "Raserei"; und ein solches metaphysisch -- theistisches oder atheistisches -- Eifern gegen die strenge kritische Denkzucht der positivistischen Wissenschaft des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts ist allen Existenzphilosophieen der Gegenwart eigen. Um so schwerer verträglich aber ist mit diesem Geständnis der Stolz, mit der die Existenzphilosophen insgesamt eine unmittelbar "erfahrende Philosophie"[3] oder das vermittelte Gewahrwerden einer Art Transzendenz jeder exakten Erforschung des Daseienden auch denkerisch überlegen finden.

So wuchs mit der Revolte gegen die vorangegangene Denkergeneration als die wohl stärkste emotionale Triebkraft der Existenzphilosophie der Ehrgeiz, die begrenzten Felder kritischen Denkens weit zu überfliegen und in ein Reich absoluten Seins vorzustossen (oder es zum mindesten zu berühren), ein Sein, das dem angeblich überbedächtigen Infanterieschritt der exakten Forschung unzugänglich bleiben muss. "Ich möchte unserer langsamen an Experi-

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1/ H.Herrigel: Das neue Denken, 1928, S.228f beruft sich ausdrücklich auf Rosenzweigs "neue" Existenzphilosophie. Aber im Ganzen versucht er umsichtiger, in sein neues Denken schon Galileis Funktionsbegriffe einzuschliessen un mit Ludwig Feuerbach (siehe etwa S.237) nur die ältere "statische" Metaphysik, Hegels "theologischen Idealismus" wie Spinozas "theologischen Materialismus", vom neuen Denken abzutrennen.

2/ Siehe F. Rosenzweig: Briefe ed. Edith Rosenzweig und Ernst Simon, 1935, S.626.

3/ F.Rosenzweig: Kleinere Schriften, 1937, S.379, zitiert von H.Herrigel: Das neue Denken, 1928, S.228.A.a.O.S.377f greift Rosenzweig die Philosophie der Neuzeit an, weil sie Welt- und Gotteserfahrung auf "etwas andres", das Ich, zurückführen will, anstatt "Welterfahrungen lieber auf -- die Welt und..Gotteserfahrungen lieber auf -- Gott" unmittelbar zu beziehen.

menten mühsam schreitenden Physik einmal wieder Flügel geben!"[1] die Philosophie muss zu dem "Dass" des Seins selbst, der Existenz selbst, durch "Erfahrung" vordringen und darf sich nicht mit der blossen vernunftgemässen Beschreibung des "Was", der Essenzen der Dinge, begnügen;[2] dies war schon die Haltung Schellings, des von der Existenzphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts am meisten anerkannten angeblichen "Vollenders"[3] der deutschen Metaphysik des 19. Jahrhunderts.

Tatsächlich aber kann es sich in diesem unvermittelten, "ursprünglichen Denken", in dieser unmittelbaren Erfassung einer höheren oder einer "fundamentaleren" Existenz nur um rein persönliches emotionales Ergriffensein, um Bekenntnis, aber nicht Erkenntnis handeln, gewiss um ein Denken, das in jeder Geistigkeit unnachgiebig Beachtung fordert, von dem aber trotzdem auch klar eingestanden werden muss, dass es sich nur in gleitenden Bildern und Analogieen äussern kann, die keineswegs allgemein verbindliche Wahrheitswerte vermitteln. Denn wie sehr diesen "höchsten Wahrheiten" allgemeiner Geltungswert mangelt, geht schon aus der ausserordentlichen Vielfältigkeit der Stimmungen und Stimmungsbilder hervor, mit der sich die verschiedenen Existenzphilosophieen voneinander abheben und gegeneinander streiten, während die exakten Wissenschaften dem gegenüber -- nach vorübergehender Skepsis gegen einige anscheinend zu revolutionäre Neuerungen -- eine einzig stetige Fortentwicklung ihrer Methoden und selbst ihrer Hypothesen aufweisen können

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1/F.W.Schelling in "Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus", abgedruckt in F.Rosenzweig, Kleinere Schriften, 1937, S.245

2/Siehe F.W.J.Schelling, Sämtliche Werke, 1856ff, II.Abteilung, Bd.I, S.563f, II.Abt. "Philosophie der Offenbarung", Bd.III, 1858, S.57f

3/Siehe z.B. Karl Jaspers, Schelling, 1955; Walter Schulz, Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings, 1955/

/"Die temporale Struktur alles Seienden" ist mehr als Bekenntnis. Weder C. noch ich, dessen Weltanschauung von der C.'s wesentlich unabhängig ist, leugnen "die temporale Struktur alles Seienden". Aber hier ist von etwas ganz Andersartigem die Rede, nämlich von der Existenz, dem Sein des Seienden bei Heidegger. Nur Aussagen über absolutes Sein (im Gegensatz zu Seiendem) nenne ich blosse Bekenntnisse./

Mit der positivistischen Wissenschaft scheint zwar Jaspers dauernd die Einsicht zu teilen, dass wir das Transzendente, das "Überseiende", das "Umgreifende" nie denkerisch ergreifen, dass wir vor ihm nur "verstummen" können;[1] und doch setzt er wie alle Existenzphilosophen dauernd die höchste Energie daran, in der Sprache des Erkennenden von der Transzendenz zu reden. Cassirer aber -- wie jeder tiefere Denker -- streitet mit den Existentialisten nicht darüber, dass die empirischen Wissenschaften das Sein -- ob es das eigene Sein oder das Sein des Göttlichen ist -- nie erfassen können. Aber er bestreitet mit Recht, dass es irgend einen anderen erkenntnismässigen Zugang zum Transzendenten geben kann. Alle Rede von absolutem Sein kann nur in mythologischen und religiösen Bildern erfolgen. Auf dem Boden theoretischer Erkenntnis aber ist alles Sprechen von Transzendenz noch Nachfahre alter Substanztheorien, nachdem der Begriff der Substanz im neuzeitlichen Denken längst in durchgängige Funktionsbegriffe aufgelöst und in ihnen aufgesogen wurde, wie Cassirer für die exakten Wissenschaften des 19. Jahrhunderts in seinem ersten grossen systematischen Werk Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff (1910), und dann vertieft für die Physik des 20. Jahrhunderts in Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie (1921), in Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik (1937)

1/ Siehe K. Jaspers: Philosophie, 1932, Band III, S.9.36; Der Philosophische Glaube, 1948, S.19

und selbst für die Geschichtsschreibung im 4. Band seines Erkenntnisproblems in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit (englisch 1950, deutsch 1957) bis in Einzelheiten hinein darlegte. Erkenntnismässig ebenso unhaltbar aber wie der Begriff der Transzendenz ist José Ortega y Gasset's existentialistischer Begriff der "historischen Vernunft,"1/ die nach Ortega das wahre metaphysiche innere Wesen alles Seins enthüllen soll.

Cassirers "Philosophie der symbolischen Formen"

Cassirer hat auf den metaphysischen Fanatismus der Existenzphilosophen und der deutschen Spekulation des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts nicht mit dem Gegenfanatismus eines engen positivistischen Weltbilds geantwortet, sondern er hat Hauptmotive dieser metaphysischen Spekulationen in seinem kritisch umgreifenderen Gesamtsystem in neuer Prägung fruchtbar zu machen gewusst. Mit der stillen, klaren Weite seines Blicks und auf Grund eines viel umfassenderen Wissens durchschaute er die schweren Einseitigkeiten existenzphilosophischer 2/ und älterer metaphysischer wie religiöser Gedankengebilde; und wohl mag es dabei zugegeben werden, dass sein Werk in der sprachlichen Formulierung zu ge-

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1/Auch für Jose Ortega y Gasset gibt es "gegenüber der reinen physikalisch-mathematischen Vernunft" eine höhere "erzählende Vernunft" (siehe Historia como sistema y del imperio Romano, 1942, deutsch 1952, S.67). Diese höhere "historische Vernunft" soll eine "intellektuelle Handlung" sein, "die uns in Berührung bringt mit der Wirklichkeit, durch die wir auf das Transzendente stossen" (ebenda S.82), "die Offenbarung einer Wirklichkeit, die über die Theorien vom Menschen hinausgeht" (ebenda, S.89), die "das Leben mit aller Eindringlichkeit...in seiner ursprünglichen Nacktheit darstellt" (ebenda, S.50), die "das Wirkliche desintellektualisiert, um ihm treu sein zu können" (ebenda, S.46). "Der Terrorismus der Laboratorien", "die physikalische Vernunft vermag uns nichts Klares über den Menschen zu sagen....das Fiasko der physikalischen Vernunft macht uns den Weg frei für die lebendige oder historische Vernunft" (ebenda, S.28, S.32f)

2/Ähnlich kritische Einstellungen besonders gegenüber Heidegger sind unter vielfach anderer verschiedenartiger Begründung z.B. von Aloys Wenzl in seiner umsichtigen Abhandlung "Fundamentalontologie -- Metaphysik oder Ende der Metaphysik?", Sitzungs-

messen oder gar zu besonnen konservativ wirkt gegenüber der expressionistischen Eruptionskraft der Diktion Heideggers. Aber ein Ähnliches Schicksal ist selbst dem geklärten, geruhsamen Altersstil Goethes und Kants widerfahren in seinem Gegensatz zu der impetuoseren Sprache der grossen Metaphysiker und Romantiker des 19. Jahrhunderts.

Durch die Reife, die Ausgewogenheit und die strengere Objektivität des Urteils wird Cassirers Philosophie der symbolischen Formen (3 Bände, 1923-1929, Band I: Die Sprache; Band II: Das Mythische Denken, 1925; Band III: Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis) mehr zukunftsweisend bleiben können als der zeitgenössische deutsche und französische Existentialismus, der geistesgeschichtlich unfruchtbar einseitige logische Positivismus, die zu sehr an Sprachgewohnheiten gebundenen, wenngleich scharfsinnigen, eng begrenzten logischen Kleinanalysen Oxfords und Cambridges, der hochfliegende metaphysisch-historisierende Ehrgeiz des Spaniers Ortega y Gasset und die dogmatisch engstirnige Pedantisierung der Spenglerschen Geschichtsphilosophie bei Arnold Toynbee. Alle diese Arbeiten stellen wesentlich ein Ende dar, den Abschluss einer Gegenbewegung gegen den unhaltbaren sensualistischen oder materialistischen Positivismus des 19. Jahrhunderts. Cassirers Werk aber deutet mit viel grösserer synthetischer, umfassenderer Denkkraft vorwärts.

Schon in seinem Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, in Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik und besonders im 4. Band des "Erkenntnisproblems" finden sich genug Vorklänge von Cassirers eigener Äusserung zu den Wissenschafts-und Kulturfragen unserer Zeit. Den vollen systematischen Rundblick über

berichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 1950, Heft 6, und in dem verdienstvollen Schriftum Fritz-Joachim von Rintelens vertreten.

sein Weltbild aber hat er nur in zwei seiner Hauptwerke gegeben, in der dreibändigen Philosophie der symbolischen Formen und in seinem bündig konzentrierten An Essay on Man. Es ist zweifellos

(from marginal notes)

"bündig k." ist sicher noch kein übertriebenes Lob. "Etwas gröbliche Vereinfachung". Ihr Brief scheint mir nicht angemessen. Auch für die Fachwelt in Amerika und Deutschland scheint mir der Essay nicht wertloser zu sein als etwa Jasp. Die geistige Situation d.Zeit, wenn der Essay auch bescheidener im Ton ist. Ist nicht "b.k." neutral genug?

nicht das irrelevanteste Stück von grausigem Hohn in der zeitgenössischen deutschen Geistesgeschichte, dass einem Denker vom Rang Cassirers von Staats wegen unter vielfacher Bedrohung seines Lebens die Veröffentlichgung der kondenziertesten und gewiss weder politisch noch sonstwie "anstössigen" Darlegung seiner Weltanschauung in deutscher Sprache untersagt wurde, dass er An Essay on Man englisch konzipieren, englisch 1944 veröffentlichen musste, und dass die ähnlich bedeutende Vorstufe hierfür, der 4. Band seines "Erkenntnisproblems", zwar noch deutsch in Schweden geschrieben war, aber auch zuerst nur in englischer Übersetzung 1950 in den Vereinigten Staaten erscheinen konnte.

Die an sich schlichten, aber ungemein folgenschweren Grundgedanken der "Philosophie der symbolischen Formen" können etwa folgendermassen formuliert werden: Es ist irreführend und vom Blickpunkt der hochentwickelten modernen Wissenschaft aus hoffnungslos verwirrend, wenn Metaphysik und Religion ihre Einsichten bis zum heutigen Tag als Wirklichkeitserkenntnisse darbieten, die prinzipiell in demselben Sinne Erkenntnisse seien wie die der Wissenschaften, abgesehen davon, dass sie auf die Erfassung der höheren transzendenten Wirklichkeit oder eines tieferen, gemeinhin verhüllten Inneren des Menschen und des Seins abzielen. Vor den Augen der Wissenschaft müssen solche Ziele Phantome,

nicht Lichtspender, sondern Irrlichter bleiben.

[Als Abstrakte Dichtung wäre sie vollkommen anzuerkennen. Aber sie will doch höhere phikos. Wirklichkeitserkenntnis sein.]

Nicht einmal im Anhang zu einer "reinen Vernunftethik" können Fragen der Metaphysik und Religion zum Austrag kommen, obwohl noch Kant dies angenommen hatte. Soll der Begriff der Wissenschaft selbst nicht vernebelt werden, so ist darauf zu bestehn, dass nur das, was letzthin durch empirisch gegebene Sinneswahrnehmung, Gefühle und Willensakte verifiziert werden kann, zum Thema eigentlicher Wissenschaft und eigentlicher Wirklichkeitserfassung geeignet ist. Innerhalb dieses bei aller Selbstbeschränkung unbegrenzt weiten Forschungsfeldes musste die naive Annahme von substantiellen Trägern, von einem Wirklichkeitshintergrund der Dinge, in eine rein funktionelle Zuordnung von individuellen Beobachtungen (in derPhysik und Chemie Messungen) zu generellen Gesetzen und universellen Prinzipien umgewandelt werden.[1] Während früher der Gegenstandsbegriff dem Gesetzesbegriff vorgeordnet war, ist er nun dem Gesetzesbegriff einer umfassenderen gesetzlichen Hypothese unter-und nachgeordnet;[2] und es ist sinnwidrig geworden, noch neben erforschten oder zu erforschenden Funktionszusammenhängen nach ihrem unerforschlichen substanziellen oder transzendenten Sein zu fragen, so sinnlos wie die Fragen nach der Substanz einer Zahl, aller Zahlen oder dem inneren Wesen, dem Absoluten Sinn, alles oder eines bestimmten Werdens sein würden.

Damit aber musste auch der Kausalbegriff aufhören, eine "Schicksalsfrage" eine Frage nach Tun und Erleiden von Dingen und Ereignissen zu sein,[3] wie er es vom primitiven Weltbild her Jahrtausende

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1/ Siehe Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik, 1937. (Göteborgs Högskolas Arsskrift XLII, 1936:3).S.44f, S. 68 und den ganzen II. Teil.

2/ Ebenda, S.163f, S.179, S.164: "Es gibt 'Gegenständlichkeit' oder objektive 'Wirklichkeit'" nur "sofern es Gesetzlichkeit gibt, nicht umgekehrt."

3/ Ebenda, S.147

geblieben war. "Das konstitutive, das wesentliche Merkmal der Kausalität" kann nur in der allgemeinen Forderung der statistischen oder sonstwie exakten Gesetzlichkeit bestehn,[1] in dem unumgänglichen Postulat einer "strengen funktionalen Abhängigkeit" von physikalischen Bestimmungsstücken zueinander. In diesem in sich konsequenten Weltbild der theoretischen Naturwissenschaft sind daher die Fragen nach transzendenter Wirklichkeit, nach einem Sein des Seienden oder dem Ursprung, dem "tiefsten Grunde" aller Tätigkeit, alles Werdens, gegenstandslos oder sogar sinnlos geworden,[2] so sinnwidrig wie das Forschen nach einer Quadratur des Zirkels.

Aber so sehr sich Cassirer in seinen wissenschaftstheoretischen Anschauungen auf den Boden eines "logischen Positivismus" und der höchstentwickelten physikalischen und chemischen Theorienbildungen stellt, er scheidet sich nachdrücklich von blossem Positivismus selbst Russellscher Prägung, indem er Fragen der Mystik, der Metaphysik, der Geschichts-, Kunst- und Religionsphilosophie nicht als wesentlich leere Phantastereien abtut. Er besteht nur darauf, dass das ~~Hnir~~ Hereinziehen solcher Problematik in das Gebiet des eigetlichen Wissens ihren Selbständigkeitscharakter zerstören und ihr Wesen verfälschen muss. Zugleich aber will er daraufhin nicht einer bequemen Annahme von "gebundener" oder "freier" Wissenschaft gegenüber "freiem" oder "gebundenem" Glauben das Wort reden. Er wehrt nur das naive Vorurteil ab, das alles, was nicht Gegenstand theoretischer Wissenschaft ist, unwahres, wertloses Phantasiegebilde sein müsse. Denn in Wahrheit ist der Lebenswert einer grossen Dichtung, einer grossen Religion oder Metaphysik in keiner Weise dadurch entwertet, dass

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1/ Ebenda, S.203

2/ Siehe Richard von Mises: "Über das naturwissenschaftliche Weltbild der Gegenwart" in Die Naturwissenschaften, 18. Jahrgang, 1930, S.892 und Cassirer "Determinismus", 1937, S.14.

er sinngemäss anderen Wertkriterien unterliegen darf und muss als der Wahrheits- und Wirklichkeitswert einer physikalischen Gleichung.

Wer in der Naturwissenschaft nur in dichterischen Gleichnissen reden oder Hymnen singen würde, entwertet damit zwar seine wissenschaftliche Forschung, aber nicht die Dichtung und nicht die Musik. Umgekehrt wer als Mythen- und Religionsstifter nur Wahrheit über die "Wirklichkeit", die Existenz Gottes und seiner Engel darbietet, offenbart damit nur, dass er nicht weiss und nicht fühlt, worum es den Griechen und noch Hölderlin in der Mythologie oder dem Juden und Christen in seinen religiösen Gleichnissen geht. Von irgendwelchen Gegenständen religiösen Glaubens Wirklichkeit -- wenn auch höhere Wirklichkeit -- im Sinne aller Realitätserforschung zu fordern, ist nichts als ein blindes Eingreifen in fremde Staatsrechte, wodurch das Wesen von Mythologie, Religion, Dichtung und Kunst nur entstellt werden kann.

Die uralten -- ahnungslosen oder dreisten -- Mischungen von innerlich verschiedenen Fragestellungen und Antwortbereichen können bloss zu intellektueller Verwirrung, zu Gewissenszwiespälten, Skepsis und Nihilismus führen. Nur die Einsicht, dass es sich in der Sprache, dem Mythos, der Religion, der Kunst und einer Gesamtdeutung der Geschichte um innerlich verschiedene "symbolische Formen", um autogene aber einander ergänzende Fragen- und Antwortmöglichkeiten handelt, kann hier Befreiung bringen und Wegweiser für die philosophisch verwirrten Gemüter unserer Zeit werden.

Man mag wohl einwenden, dass eine solche Philosophie der symbolischen Formen nur den Rahmen für eine grosse Weltanschauung bieten kann. Aber der gleiche Einwurf könnte auch gegen die drei "Kritiken" Kants geäussert werden, und er ist von Kants metaphysischen Nachfolgern erhoben worden. Es bleibt aber dabei

die Frage offen, ob es nicht heilsamer ist, sich einem kritischen, weit weltoffenen Geiste anzuvertrauen als entschlossenen Gläubigen von viel engerem geistigen Horizont, die nur auf wirre Wege und nur zu verblockten Wegenden führen können.

Je mächtiger das Werk der Wissenschaft und aller anderen "symbolischen" Ausdrucksformen des Menschen angeschwollen ist, desto bedenklicher wird es, diese Leistungen in eine plumpe Einheitsfront -- ob wir sie nun Metaphysik oder Philosophie überhaupt nennen -- einzureihen (aufmarschiern zu lassen). Die Devise kann nur heissen, wie Cassirer sie mit einer -- man darf wohl ohne Übertreibung sagen, einzigartigen -- Meisterung eines kaum übersehbaren Einzelmaterials gegeben hat: ∅ Getrennt marschieren und doch vereint schlagen!

Seien Sie bitte nicht zu empfindlich. Ich hoffe, dass die Anwendung 1 Moltke-worts auf C. so weit als Scherz aufgefasst werden kann, wie sie von mir gemeint ist. Oder was Besseres würden Sie vorschlagen?

Lebensgang

Cassirers Lebensgang zeigt innerlich dieselbe Stetigkeit und Harmonie der Entwicklung wie sein Werk. Aber äussere brutale Mächte haben es mit schwerer Tragik erfüllt. Am 28. Juli 1874 geboren als Sohn eines sehr wohlhabenden Breslauer Kaufmanns, verlebte er eine sorgenfreie Jugend besonders angeregt von den ausgedehnten geistigen Interessen und einer schönen Bibliothek seines Grossvaters mütterlicher Seite. Die geistige Atmosphäre dieser angesehenen Familie war die eines völlig emanzipierten Judentums, das z.B. charakteristisch bei einer selbstverständlichen Treue zu der angestammten Religionsgemeinschaft doch Ernst Cassirer mit dem weiten Feld des nachbiblischen jüdischen Schrifttums viel weniger vertraut werden liess als etwa mit der Anthropologie primitiver Völker Afrikas und Polynesiens.

An den Universitäten Berlin, Leipzig und Heidelberg erwarb sich der junge Cassirer bereits ein ungewöhnlich weites

Wissen, bis ihn eines Tags eine Vorlesung Georg Simmels so stark auf Hermann Cohens neue Kantinterpretation hinwies, dass er beschloss, den Meister des Neukantianismus selbst in Marburg zu hören. Seine Marburger Doktordissertation hatte die Erkenntnistheorie Descartes' zum Thema, sie wurde seinem Leibnizbuch als dessen erster Teil einverleibt; -- und nach dem Abschluss seiner Promotion (1899) stieg er dann rasch vom Schüler Cohens zu dessen lebenslangem Freunde auf. Seit 1902 lebte er in glücklicher Ehe mit Toni Bondi, einer Wiener Kusine, zuerst in München, dann in Berlin, wo er sich nach allerhand Widerstand 1906 habilitierte und als Privatdozent, später als nichtbeamteter ausserordentlicher Professor, eine sehr angesehene Lehrtätigkeit entfaltete.

Aber erst 1919 verlieh ihm die neugegründete Hamburger Universität ein Ordinariat, das bald stark zum wissenschaftlichen Ruf der jungen Hochschule beitrug. Für das Amtsjahr 1929/30 wählte ihn das Vertrauen der Fakultäten zum Rektor; und schon 1928 erkor ihn der Senat der Freien Reichsstadt zum Festredner für die Verfassungsfeier der Republik. Solche Ehrungen, die seltenen Bücherschätze der "Bibliothek Warburg", von dem Hamburger Kunsthistoriker Aby M.Warburg aufgebaut und die Freundschaft mit ihm wie mit weiten Kreisen der Hamburger Geistigkeit machten das Wirken Cassirers im dritten Jahrzehnt des Jahrhunderts zu den glücklichsten Zeiten seines Lebens, bis 1933 der Nationalsozialismus ihn zur Aufgabe seiner weithin gefeierten Lehrtätigkeit und zum Verlassen Deutschlands zwang.

Er nahm noch im gleichen Jahr seine Vorlesungsarbeit an der Universität Oxford in England auf und vertauschte sie von 1935-41 mit der Annahme einer persönlichen Professur an der

Universität Göteborg in Schweden. Aber auch von hier vertrieb ihn 1941 die drohende Besatzung der ganzen skandinavischen Halbinsel durch das nationalsozialistische Besatzungsheer in Norwegen. So hatte er auf dem letzten schwedischen Dampfer, der während des zweiten Weltkriegs über den von Minen und Unterseebooten durchseuchten Atlantischen Ozean fuhr, nach Amerika zu fliehn.

Schon 1914 hatte die Harvard Universität ihn zu einer Gastprofessur in den Vereinigten Staaten eingeladen. Nun nahm er die gleiche Stellung an der Yale Universität in New Haven und später an der Columbia Universität in New York an. Aber was er mit den besten Deutschen der Widerstandsbewegung noch für die Zeit vor dem Ausbruch des zweiten Weltkriegs erhofft hatte, den Fall Hitlers, sollte er nicht mehr erleben. Er erlag einem Schlaganfall auf der Strasse New Yorks in der Nähe der Columbia Universität am 13. April 1945

(Schl. ist "allergisch gegen Polemik"! offenbar nur gegen ——
nicht gegen Polemik gegen B.)

ERNST CASSIRER

und sein Platz in der Geistesgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts

von

DAVID BAUMGARDT

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Die Aufpeitschung nationaler Leidenschaften während zweier langjähriger Weltkriegr und die einzigartige Verdumpfung des offiziellen geistigen Lebens während der Herrschaft des Nationalsozialismus ist dem Wirken eines souverän weltbürgerlichen Denkers begreiflicher Weise nicht günstig in Deutschland gewesen. Viel eher konnten da erregt persönliche Bekenntnisphilosophien gedeihen, zumal wenn sie zugleich als Metaphysik des Seins überhaupt und als "neues" wie "realistisches" Denken auftraten. Nur von solchen Erwägungen her kann es verständlich werden,dass das staunenswert motivreiche und selten gedankenreife Werk Ernst Cassirers auch heute noch lange nicht genug Würdigung und Wirkung in Deutschland gefunden (erfahren) hat, während die Welt in ihm den universalsten Denker der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts ehrt, der an Weite des Wissens und der Denkperspektiven auch Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, Bertrand Russell und Benedetto Croce überragt.

Kann man jemandem Wirkung "zollen"?

In seinem ausserordentlich ausgedehnten literarischen Schaffen hat sich Cassirer bewusst von der Parteinahme für eine der üblichen Gegensätze zwischen Positivismus und Weltanschauungslehre, zwischen historisierender und rein systematishher Betrachtung ferngehalten. Seine Arbeiten zur Geistesgeschichte sind ebenso (bedeutungsvoll) belangvoll wie seine Schriften zu einer systematischen "Philosophie der symbolischen Formen", seine Beiträge zur Grundlegung der positiven Wissenschaften ebenso gehaltreich wie seine Analysen metaphysischer Problematik; und innerhalb der Wissenschaftslehre zeigt er sich gleichvertraut mit der beschreibenden wie der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft, eine heute nur zu spärliche Tugend unter den Philosophen. Vor allem aber hat er sich mit Recht aufs äusserste gestemmt gegen die bedenkliche Zerreissung der beiden Haupthemisphären der philosophischen Thematik,

tiefgreifend scheint mir hier nicht der adäquate Terminus zu sein

gegen die katastrophale gegenseitige Verachtung zwischen Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften, die sich in der Gegenwart immer weiter ausgebreitet hat.

[Ohne eine Hand aber wie die Cassirers,) C. hat (die) Natur- und Geistesbetrachtung mit gleich synthetischer Kraft (meistern kann) gemeistert, wird gewiss nie wieder eine umfassendere Weltschau möglich werden. In (Aber in seiner) (der vornehmen und) vorbildlichen Freiheit von (Zurückhaltung vor) Originalitätshascherei, (die ihn stets auszeichnete,) hat Cassirer nie versucht (danach gesucht) für (seine Denkart und) die originale Eigenart seines umfassenden Weltbilds einen klingenden Namen zu sichern (prägen). Er hat nicht einmal dagegen protestiert, als blosser Mitarbeiter der gx sogen. Marburger Schule charakterisiert zu werden -- eine besonders bedauerliche Unterschätzung seiner Leistung. Er hat aber die Geringschätzung, der er damit bei Aussenstehenden (Flachköpfen) verfiel, mit Gleichmut ertragen.

Hermann/ Cohen, der bisher bedeutendste Fortbildner des kritischen Denkverfahrens Kants, hatte in Marburg um 1900 eine ansehnliche Zahl der fähigsten philosophischen Köpfe der Zeit um sich gesammelt, unter denen z.B. Paul Natorp, Kurd Lasswitz, Nicolai Hartmann, José Ortega y Gasset und f vor allem Cassirer mit durchaus eigenständigem Werk in die Philosophiegeschichte eingegangen sind. Wilhelm Dilthey und seine Schule arbeiteten damals in Berlin in ihrer philosophischen Forschung mit wesentlich literarhistorischen Kategorien, sie suchten die grossen Denkungsteine vor allem von der seelischen Eigenart der Philosophen und von der allgemeinen Zeitlage her zu verstehn. Die Marburger Schule aber hielt vorwiegend Ausschau nach allgemeingültigen präzisen Methoden, wie sie bei allem Wechsel in den Einzelheiten

"Klingt nach trotzdem" soll es auch

Sie fügten "den Weltanschaungen" zu.Aber das ist zu banal um erwähnt zu werden u. bezeichnet auch keinen Unterschied zur Einstellung der Marburger Schule.

für die philosophische Grundlegung exakter Wissenschaft in Geltung bleiben. Daher lag hier der Nachdruck auf einer neuen Auslegung ~~ex~~ und systematischen Verwertung der Forschungsmethoden der grossen Idealisten von Plato über Descartes zu Kant.

Das philosophiehistorische Schrifttum Cassirers

Aber während andere Mitglieder des Marburger Kreises sich auf Arbeiten über Plato, Kant und Allgemein idealistische Themen beschränkten, wagte sich der junge Cassirer beteits in seinem ersten grösseren Werk an ein besonders schwieriges Unterfange~~n~~, eine Darstellung der Denkarbeit (philos.Leistung) des universalsten Wissenschaftlers der neuzeitlichen Philosophiegeschichte, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Das System des grossen Logikers, Mathematikers, Natur- und Geisteswissenschaftlers, das der Denker selbst nur in Skizzen und zahlreichen Briefen angedeutet hatte, wird hier in seinen "wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen" höchst dankenswert durchleuchtet (1902) und auch durch eine ~~z~~ Auswahl aus seinen Schriften (1904ff) für die moderne Wissenschaftsproblematik fruchtbar gemacht. Noch in der meisterhaften Festrede, die Cassirer 1928 im Auftrag des Senats der Stadt Hamburg hielt, greift er auf Leibniz zurück und sieht nicht mit Unrecht in einem wohl durchdachten Protest Leibniz' gegen jede Versklavung eines Individuums eine wichtige Quelle für die Idee freiheitlicher republikanischer Staatsverfassungen.[1]

Viel weiter aber als der Band über"Leibniz' System" greift das zweite grosse Werk Cassirers aus, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit (2 Bände 1906/07).

1/ Siehe E. Cassirer: Die Idee der Republikanischen Staatsverfassung, Rede zur Verfassungsfeier am 11.August 1928, 1929, S.13f den Hinweis auf Leibniz' "Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice", erst 1893 veröffentlicht in /Georg Mollat's Mitteilungen aus Leibnizens ungedruckten Schriften, S.68

Der Umfang des Neulands, das hier für die Geschichte der Erkenntnistheorie durch die eindringliche Forscherarbeit eines einzigen Gelehrten erschlossen wurde, wird für immer erstaunlich bleiben. In den vier Bänden, zu denen sich das ursprünglich zweibändige Werk im Lauf der Jahre auswuchs, wird in instruktiven Analysen der grossen und zahlreicher fast unbekannter Denker von Nikolaus von Cues über Schelling und Hegel bis zu den Führern der Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts eine erdrückende Ausbeute an unschätzbaren originalen Einsichten in die Wandlungen des Erkenntnisproblems und seiner Lösungsversuche freigelegt. Aus buntester, verschiedenartiger religionsphilosophischer, metaphysischer und einzelwissenschaftlicher Einkleidung sind hier Grundfragen der Erkenntnistheorie abgelöst und in ihrer ständigen Verfeinerung für das zeitgenössische Verstehen erschlossen worden.

Gibt es nicht auch unschätzbare Einsichten, die zu Gemeinplätzen wurden?

Die Schöpfer der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft gefolgt von den grossen rationalistischen und empiristischen Erkenntniskritikern spielen dabei naturgemäss eine überragende Rolle. Aber selbst so vielfach irrationalistische Schöpfungen wie die Naturspekulationen des Paracelsus und die Religionsphilosophie Pascals fehlen nicht in dem Chor. Gerade in der knappen Analyse, die Cassirer der verzweifelten Vernunftfeindlichkeit der Pascalschen Pensées gewidmet hat, verrät sich ein Geist, dem bei betontem Willen zur Klarheit doch die Kraft zur Versenkung in dunkle seelische und denkerische Verstrickungen religiösen Fühlens nicht fremd geblieben ist.

Im 3. Band seines imposanten philosophiegeschichtlichen Werks hat Cassirer auch die diktatorisch "vornehme" intuitive Metaphysik Fichtes, die noch Kant selbst als unkritisches Denken ablehnte,

wie die metaphysischen Identitätsphilosophien Schellings und Hegels ausgiebig zu Worte kommen lassen. Wenn er aber mit sympathisierender Kritik und kritischer Sympathie ∠ von diesen hohen Gedankenkonstruktionen zu diszipliniertere m Denken im Sinne Kants zurückleitet, so darf dies nicht als Mangel an denkerischem Wagemut gedeutet werden. Es ist gerade Cassirer's Stärke, dass er auch unkritisch spekulative Kerngedanken der grossen deutschen Metaphysiker in seinem umfassenden kritischen Gedankensystem zu verwerten versteht.

D.H. sowohl für Laien wir für Fachgelehrte.

Auch einer breiteren Leserschaft zugänglich sind die zwei Bände über Freiheit und Form (1916) und Idee und Gestalt (1921), in denen Gedankengut klassischer und romantischer deutscher Dichtung von Leibniz' Ästhetik aus über Lessing, Herder, Goethe, Schiller bis zu Hölderlin, Kleist und den ästhetisierden "Elementen der Staatskunst" Adam Müllers zur Darstellung gebracht ist. Nur zu leicht kann in diesen Essays die schlicht konservative Sprachhaltung über die selbständig eigene Gestaltungskraft der Analysen hinweg täuschen/ und sie vergessen machen, wie umgekehrt nur zu oft in den "neuen Denken" der Existenzphilosophen die kühne expressionistische Sprachkraft Armut und gedankliche Überlebtheit ihrer Motive zu verdecken pflegt. Mag man auch Seitenblicke in diesen Schriften wie eine gelegentliche Gegenüberstellung Luthers mit der mittelalterlichen deutschen Mystik nicht voll befriedigend finden, im Ganzen sind z.B. die Analysen Goetheschen Naturbetrachtung in ihrem Verhältnis zu Kant und der mathematischen Physik pädagogische Meisterstücke in der Umsicht, mit der der Leser ∠ durch zahlreiche Klippen von Missverständnismöglichkeiten durchgesteuert wird. Der überzeugende Hinweis auf Hölderlin als den eigentlichen Inspirator des sogenannten "ältesten Systemprogramms des deutschen Idealismus",

"Nur Jaspers manchmal geschwätzig" d.h. gedankenleerer. Aber J. auch der Gedankenärmste

das Franz Rosenzweig unmittelbar nach seinem Erwerb durch die Königliche Bibliothek in Berlin Schelling zugesprochen hatte,[1] ist bis heute meist nicht genug gewürdigt; und so haben auch diese halb popularisierenden Schriften ebenso wie der fassliche Band über Kants Leben und Lehre (1918 als letzter Band der Cassirerischen Kantausgabe erschienen) dem Leser, der auf tiefer ausgewogene Einsicht drängt, weit mehr zu bieten als mancherlei anspruchsvoller auftretende spätere Versuche am gleichen Gedankenmaterial.

Die weiteren eindringlichen gelehrten Arbeiten zur Philosophiegeschichte, Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (1927), Die platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge (1932), Die Philosophie der Aufklärung (1932) und Descartes (1939) geben dann der Darstellung allgemein historischer und religiöser Thematik breiteren Raum als die dem Thema nach begrenzteren historischen Schriften der Frühzeit getan hatten. Cassirers Werk über die europäische Aufklärung fand bald Nachfolge in zwei anderen wertvollen Stellungnahmen zum gleichen Stoffgebiet: Karl Joël's Darstellung der Geisteshaltung des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts im 2. Band seiner Wandlungen der Weltanschauung (1934) und Paul Hazard's 3 Bände La Pensée européenne au XVIIIe siècle (1946), nachdem schon vorher Bernhard Groethuysen in seiner Die Entstehung der bürgerlichen Welt- und Lebensanschauung in Frankreich (1927, 1930) ähnliche Aspekte eines Ausschnitts aus dem gleichen Thema in Angriff genommen hatte.

Aber Cassirers "Philosophie der Aufklärung" wird mit seiner instruktiven Scheidung zwischen "esprit de système" und "esprit systématique" auch neben diesen drei anderen bedeutungsvollen Neubewer-

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1/ Siehe Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 22. März 1917, abgedruckt in Franz Rosenzweig: Kleinere Schriften, 1937; siehe dort besonders S.238ff.

tungen der Leistung der europäischen Aufklärung stets einen hohen Rang behaupten, in der Ausschälung von begrifflich durchgeformtem Gedankengehalt der Epoche ihnen wohl überlegen bleiben.

So sehr es jedoch zur Grösse Cassirers gehört, sich ständig an dem ungeheuren Gedankenerbe aus vergangenen Jahrhunderten zu messen, so wenig hat er sich gescheut, das Gleiche auch gegenüber den Zeitgenossen zu tun. Ohne laute Aggressivität, die meist nur von einem fragwürdigen Hang zur Selbstglorifizierung zeugt, aber mit überlegener Ironie ist er so 1906 Leonard Nelson, dem Führer der einst einflussreichen "Neufriesschen Schule", in einer besonderen Broschüre Der kritische Idealismus und die Philosophie des "gesunden Menschenverstandes" entgegengetreten. Und das Gleiche gilt von seiner Ablehnung des sachlich und geschichtlich unhaltbaren Kantbilds Martin Heideggers, dem Cassirer in den Kantstudien, in den Davoser Gesprächen und noch in seiner letzten grösseren Schrift [1] Widerpart hielt.

/Zu Kantbild. Gewiss das Grosse in der Kunst will und soll gar nicht eindeutig sein. Aber sind auch Deutungen 1 Philos. haltbar, die seinen eindeutigen Aussagen widersprechen wie Fichtes Interp. Kants, gegen die Kant protestierte. H. ist viel (fichteche heroisch ?) als K./

Cassirer und die zeitgenössische (deutsche und französische) Existenzphilosophie

Die Erlebnisechtheit und der spekulative Reiz der Existenzphilosophieen Heideggers, Sartres, Jaspers, Gabriel Marcels, Louis Lavelles, der Ernst und die Wucht der existentialistischen Religionsphilosophien Franz Rosenzweigs und Martin Bubers werden nicht angezweifelt, wenn darauf bestanden wird, dass der Sinn für Präzision des Denkens hier im Verhältnis zum philosophischen Kritizismus

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1/Siehe H.Herrigel's Bericht über diese Gespräche, Frankfurter Zeitung, 22. April 1929; Toni Cassirer: Mein Leben mit Ernst Cassirer, Privatdruck, und E.Cassirer, The Myth of the State, 1946, p.292f, wo Cassirer Heidegger mit Recht vorhält, dass er im Gegensatz zu Plato's und Kant's Kritizismus leugnet, es gäbe eine objektiv verpflichtende logische Methode des philosophischen Denkens.

"Plato ist auch kein Denker der Präzision u. er lebte auch nicht im 19.Jhdt."

der vorangegangen Generation bedenklich geschwunden ist. Es bleibt unverzeihliche Einseitigkeit, wenn im Sinne der Spätphilosophie Schellings "alles bloss rationale Wissen" als "im Grunde nur nichtwissen des Wissens" gebrandmarkt wird, alles Erkennen des "Was" als geringwertig ohne Verstehen des "Dass" 1/ Es (ist nichts als) bleibt leider emphorische Parteilichkeit, wenn nur der Heideggersche "Einsprung ins Dasein" oder das Erleben des konkreten "Ich" in seiner "Korrelation" zum "Du" und zu Gott als Tugend gespriesen wird, und wenn demgegenüber das rein formale Ich der Einheit der Apperzeption, die Quelle aller exakt rationalen Erkenntnis, geradezu als Schande des Weltgeistes verlästert werden konnte. 2/ Es ist gefährlich blind so im eigenen "neuen Denken" nur Tugend ohne Gebrechen" umd im älteren rationalen Denken wesentlich oder ausschliesslich Gebrechen ohne Tugend zu sehen.

In Nicolai Hartmanns und Jose Ortega y Gassets Auflehnung gegen den formalen, rationalen Idealismus ihrer Marburger Schulung, in der Weiterentwicklung der Phänomenologie von Max Scheler ab bis hin zu den Existenzphilosophien Heideggers, Sartres und Rosenzweigs ist bezeichnender Weise das Organ für die überlegene Präzision des mathematisch naturwissenschaftlichen Denkens mehr und mehr abgestorben. Fast alle die Repräsentanten des "neuen Realismus" und der Existenzphilosophie waren oder wollten nicht mehr imstande sein, die höhere Exaktheit mathematisch naturwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis zu würdigen; sie sahen in ihr nur

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1/ Siehe z.B. F.W.J.Schelling: Sämtliche Werke ed. K.F.A.Schelling, 1856ff, II.Abteilung, Bd.I, "Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie," S.563f, II,Bd.III,S.57ff; ebenda S.152: Es ist ein stolzer Name..Vernunftwissenschaft. Aber was ist ihr Inhalt?! Eigentlich nur der beständige Umsturz der Vernunft..Was ihr.. zum Seienden wird, ist ein über die Vernunft Hinausgehendes."

2/ Siehe M.Buber, z.B. Ich und Du, 1923, S.78

niedere "Weltorientierung" (Jaspers)[1], eine bloss "technische Auslegung des Denkens" im Gegensatz zu dem "ursprünglichen" existentiellen, mit konkretem Lebensgehalt erfüllten Denken.[2] Und doch waren Physik und Chemie gerade in denselben Jahren der Blüte der Existenzphilosophie auf ihre Art mit sehr viel verlässlicheren Einsichten zu neuem philosophisch sehr folgereichem "Verstehn des Daseinden" vorgedrungen.

Teils mag es unbewusste Eifersucht auf die Triumphe der Relativitätstheorie, der neuen Atomforschung und Wellenmechanik gewesen sein - Gefühle des Neids gegenüber den Erfolgen "bloss empirischer" Forschung sind auch früheren Philosophengenerationen nicht fremd geblieben und das Gleiche gilt oft für Forscher gegenüber erfolgreichen Philosophen. Teils aber war es (einfach) offensichtliche Unkenntnis des Wesens und der hochkomplizierten Struktur moderner naturwissenschaftlicher Methodenlehre, die fast alle Existenzphilosophen verleitete, nicht nur zeitgenössisches Ingenieurwesen, sondern selbst die rein theoretische exakte Naturwissenschaft zu einem

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1/Siehe K.Jaspers: philosophie, 1932, Band I "Philosophische Weltorientierung". In seinem mehr rational gestimmten Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte, 1949, Teil II, Kap.IC warnt Jaspers zwar gleichermassen vor blindem "Glauben" an die Wissenschaft und blindem "Hass" gegen sie. Aber selbst hier betont er, dass auch die rein theoretische exakte Naturwissenschaft auf sehr gebrechlicher Grundlage beruhe, deren Fortbestehen auf Generationen nicht verbürgt werden könne -- eine düstere Prophezeiung, die nach der Wiederaufnahme der Prinzipien der exakten Akustik bei der jüngeren Pythagoräer und der stetigen Fortentwicklung der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft seit mehr als drei Jahrhunderten wenig Aussicht auf Erfüllung hat, es sei dann dass der Mensch sich selbst mitsamt seinem tiefer und angeblich besser fundierten existentiellen Denken in die Luft sprengt.

2/ Siehe z.B. M.Heidegger: Über den Humanismus, 1947, S.7: Schon "die Namen wie 'Logik', 'Ethik', 'Physik' kommen erst auf, sobald das ursprüngliche Denken zu Ende geht. Die Griechen haben in ihrer grossen Zeit ohne solche Titel gedacht." S.6: Es handelt sich in allem rein theoretischen Verhalten schon um eine "technische Auslegung des Denkens."

niederen, sogar des wahren Erfassen der Natur verfälschenden Denkgebilde 1/ oder nur zu etwas wesentlich praktisch Nützlichem 2/ zu degradieren.

Es ist kaum ein Zufall, dass die führenden Existenzphilosophen von Haus aus "Geisteswissenschaftler", Historiker wie Rosenzweig und Ortega y Gasset, Psychiater wie Jaspers, Dichter wie Marcel und Sartre, Philosophiehistoriker wie Heidegger sind und schon damit ohne nähere Vertrautheit mit Subtilitäten der exakten Naturforschung. Daher war etwa für Rosenzweig und schon für Kierkegaard der Vertreter des älteren "objektiven Idealismus" vor allem Hegel und seine spekulative "dialektische" Naturbetrachtung, nicht der an der Newtonschen Physik geschulte Kant der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft", dessen Überwindung die Existenzphilosophie viel grössere Schwierigkeiten gekostet hätte; und Jaspers konnte als Sieger über Hegel und blosse

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1/ Siehe M.Heidegger: Der Feldweg, 1953, S.4: "Der Mensch versucht vergeblich, durch sein Planen den Erdball in eine Ordnung zu bringen, wenn er nicht dem Zuspruch des Feldwegs eingeordnet ist." S.4: "Die Heutigen..halten" den "Lärm der Apparate fast für die Stimme Gottes.. Aber die Wenigen werden überall die Bleibenden sein," die "vermögen einst aus der sanften Gewalt des Feldwegs die Riesenkräfte der Atomenergie zu überdauern, die sich des menschliche Rechnen erkünstelt und zur Fessel des eigenen Tuns gemacht hat." Vergl. Franz Rosenzweig: "Das neue Denken" in Kleinere Schriften, 1937, S.395f: In der "neuen Erkenntnistheorie..tritt..an die Stelle der Widerspruchslosigkeit-und Gegenstandstheorien der alten und an Stelle des statischen Objektivitätsbegriffs jener ein dynamischer;..die hoffnungslos statischen Wahrheiten, wie die der Mathematik..sind von hier aus als der - untere - Grenzfall zu begreifen.., während die höheren und höchsten Wahrheiten^begriffen werden können, statt zu Fiktionen, Postulaten, Bedürfnissen umgestempelt werden zu müssen. Von jenen unwichtigsten Wahrheiten des Schlages 'zwei mal zwei' ist vier, in denen die Menschen leicht übereinstimmen, ohne einen anderen Aufwand als ein bisschen Gehirnschmalz -- beim kleinen Einmaleins etwas weniger, bei der Relativitätstheorie etwas mehr -- führt der Weg über die Wahrheiten, die sich der Mensch etwas kosten lässt,hin zu denen, die er nicht anders bewähren kann, als mit dem Opfer seines Lebens, und schliesslich zu denen, deren Wahrheit erst der Lebenseinsatz aller Geschlechter bewähren kann."

nur von hier aus als wahrheiten
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2/ Siehe z.B. José Ortega y Gasset: Historia como sistema y del Imperio Romano, 1942, deutsch 1952, S.86f: "Was wirklich an ihr, der Physik,.. ist -- und nicht blosse Idee -- ist nur ihr Nutz Deswegen haben wir die Furcht vor der Physik verloren und mi' der Furcht die Achtung, und mit der Achtung die Begeisterung

Erforschung des Daseienden das Spätwerk Schellings feiern[1], des Verächters exakter Naturwissenschaft, der von seiner Jugend her Verfechter einer phantastisch metaphysischen Naturspekulation gewesen war mit der Einführung eines Ost- und Westpols in die Lehre vom Magnetismus und dergleichen, der aber, wie selbst Rosenzweig betont, "vor lauter Programm"[2] fast nie zum vollendeten Werk kam.

"ist einfach zu psychologisierend" Psych. bedeutet seit Husserl: logische Thesen fachlich durch log. begründen. Es bedeutet keineswegs was ich hier tue - die psych. Motive, die l.Phil. antreiben psych. zu analysieren, ohne damit die Geltung seiner Phil. zu"widerlegen" oder zu "stützen". Das "neue Denken" lebt viel mehr im Wortgepränge des Sturm und Drang oder vielmehr des Barock, um meiner Meinung nach etwas mit "neuer Sachlichkeit" zu tun zu haben.

Als emotionelle Triebfeder für die ganze Existenzphilosophie unserer Zeit aber wäre weiter zu nennen der übliche ~~xxxx~~ gefühlsmässige Aufstand einer neuen Philosophengeneration gerade gegen die höchste Reife einer vorangegangenen Epoche. So erhoben sich die englischen Empiristen um 1700 gegen die rationalistischen Systembildner des 17. Jahrhunderts, die deutschen Romantiker und spekulative Köpfe wie Fichte, Schelling und Hegel gegen den ~~Empirixxxxxxxxxx~~ Kritizismus Kants und die gesamte deutsch-französische und englische Aufklärung, die Positivisten des 19. Jahrhunderts gegen die Hegelsche Metaphysik und die Existenzphilosophie gegen den Positivismus. Alles Denken einer neuen Generation aber wird dann wieder zu "altem" Denken für ein späteres Denkergeschlecht; und deshalb kann dem Begriff "neues Denken" Als Barock ist es wertvoll, obwohl längst nicht mehr neu.

1/ Siehe K.Jaspers: Schelling, Grösse und Verhängnis, 1955 und vergl. Walter Schulz: Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings, 1955.

2/ F.Rosenzweig: "Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus", Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1917, Kleinere Schriften, 1937,S.238: "Vor lauter Programm kam er nie zum vollendeten Werk, vor lauter 'Ideen' und 'Entwürfen'..'Nachrichten', Verheissungen und halben Erfüllungen nie zur ganzen Tat. 'Ich werde" blieb sein letztes Wort, wie es sein erstes war."

den Hermann Herrigel für seine philosophischen Zeitgenossen in Anspruch nahm[1], gewiss nur eine höchst relative Geltung zukommen.

Damit ist, wie Rosenzweig freimütig bekennen musste, sein ausgesprochen "neues Denken" in den zwanziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts von der in Wahrheit sehr alten "rabies theologica"[2] oder metaphysica besessen, der alten "theologischen" oder metaphysischen "Raserei"; und ein solches metaphysisch -- theistisches oder atheistisches -- Eifern gegen die strenge kritische Denkzucht der positivistischen Wissenschaft des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts ist allen Existenzphilosophieen der Gegenwart eigen. Um so schwerer verträglich aber ist mit diesem Geständnis der Stolz, mit der die Existenzphilosophen insgesamt eine unmittelbar "erfahrende Philosophie"[3] oder das vermittelte Gewahrwerden einer Art Transzendenz jeder exakten Erforschung des Daseienden auch denkerisch überlegen finden.

So wuchs mit der Revolte gegen die vorangegangene Denkergeneration als die wohl stärkste emotionale Triebkraft der Existenzphilosophie der Ehrgeiz, die begrenzten Felder kritischen Denkens weit zu überfliegen und in ein Reich absoluten Seins vorzustossen (oder es zum mindesten zu berühren), ein Sein, das dem angeblich überbedächtigen Infanterieschritt der exakten Forschung unzugänglich bleiben muss. "Ich möchte unserer langsamen an Experi-

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1/ H.Herrigel: Das neue Denken, 1928, S.228f beruft sich ausdrücklich auf Rosenzweigs "neue" Existenzphilosophie. Aber im Ganzen versucht er umsichtiger, in sein neues Denken schon Galileis Funktionsbegriffe einzuschliessen un mit Ludwig Feuerbach (siehe etwa S.237) nur die ältere "statische" Metaphysik, Hegels "theologischen Idealismus" wie Spinozas "theologischen Materialismus", vom neuen Denken abzutrennen.

2/ Siehe F. Rosenzweig: Briefe ed. Edith Rosenzweig und Ernst Simon, 1935, S.626.

3/ F.Rosenzweig: Kleinere Schriften, 1937, S.379, zitiert von H.Herrigel: Das neue Denken, 1928, S.228.A.a.O.S.377f greift Rosenzweig die Philosophie der Neuzeit an, weil sie Welt- und Gotteserfahrung auf "etwas andres", das Ich, zurückführen will, anstatt "Welterfahrungen lieber auf -- die Welt und..Gotteserfahrungen lieber auf -- Gott" unmittelbar zu beziehen.

menten mühsam schreitenden Physik einmal wieder Flügel geben"[1], die Philosophie muss zu dem "Dass" des Seins selbst, der Existenz selbst, durch "Erfahrung" vordringen und darf sich nicht mit der blossen vernunftgemässen Beschreibung des "Was", der Essenzen der Dinge, begnügen;[2] dies war schon die Haltung Schellings, des von der Existenzphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts am meisten anerkannten angeblichen "Vollenders"[3] der deutschen Metaphysik des 19. Jahrhunderts.

Tatsächlich aber kann es sich in diesem unvermittelten, "ursprünglichen Denken", in dieser unmittelbaren Erfassung einer höheren oder einer "fundamentaleren" Existenz, nur um rein persönliches emotionales Ergriffensein, um Bekenntnis, aber nicht Erkenntnis handeln, gewiss um ein Denken, das in jeder Geistigkeit unnachgiebig Beachtung fordert, von dem aber trotzdem auch klar eingestanden werden muss, dass es sich nur in gleitenden Bildern und Analogieen äussern kann, die keineswegs allgemein verbindliche Wahrheitswerte vermitteln. Denn wie sehr diesen "höchsten Wahrheiten" allgemeiner Geltungswert mangelt, geht schon aus der ausserordentlichen Vielfältigkeit der Stimmungen und Stimmungsbilder hervor, mit der sich die verschiedenen Existenzphilosophieen voneinander abheben und gegeneinander streiten, während die exakten Wissenschaften dem gegenüber -- nach vorübergehender Skepsis gegen einige anscheinend zu revolutionäre Neuerungen -- eine einzig stetige Fortentwicklung ihrer Methoden und selbst ihrer Hypothesen aufweisen können.

1/F.W.Schelling in "Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus", abgedruckt in F.Rosenzweig, Kleinere Schriften, 1937, S.245

2/Siehe F.W.J.Schelling, Sämtliche Werke, 1856ff, II.Abteilung, Bd.I, S.563f, II.Abt. "Philosophie der Offenbarung", Bd.III, 1858, S.57f

3/Siehe z.B. Karl Jaspers, Schelling, 1955; Walter Schulz, Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings, 1955/

/"Die temporale Struktur alles Seienden" ist mehr als Bekenntnis. Weder C. noch ich, dessen Weltanschauung von der C.'s wesentlich unabhängig ist, leugnen "die temporale Struktur alles Seienden". Aber hier ist von etwas ganz Andersartigem die Rede, nämlich von der Existenz, dem Sein des Seienden bei Heidegger. Nur Aussagen über absolutes Sein (im Gegensatz zu Seiendem) nenne ich blosse Bekenntnisse./

Mit der positivistischen Wissenschaft scheint zwar Jaspers dauernd die Einsicht zu teilen, dass wir das Transzendente, das "Überseiende", das "Umgreifende" nie denkerisch ergreifen, dass wir vor ihm nur "verstummen" können;[1] und doch setzt er wie alle Existenzphilosophen dauernd die höchste Energie daran, in der Sprache des Erkennenden von der Transzendenz zu reden. Cassirer aber -- wie jeder tiefere Denker -- streitet mit den Existentialisten nicht darüber, dass die empirischen Wissenschaften das Sein -- ob es das eigene Sein oder das Sein des Göttlichen ist -- nie erfassen können. Aber er bestreitet mit Recht, dass es irgend einen anderen erkenntnismässigen Zugang zum Transzendenten geben kann. Alle Rede von absolutem Sein kann nur in mythologischen und religiösen Bildern erfolgen. Auf dem Boden theoretischer Erkenntnis aber ist alles Sprechen von Transzendenz noch Nachfahre alter Substanztheorien, nachdem der Begriff der Substanz im neuzeitlichen Denken längst in durchgängige Funktionsbegriffe aufgelöst und in ihnen aufgesogen wurde, wie Cassirer für die exakten Wissenschaften des 19. Jahrhunderts in seinem ersten grossen systematischen Werk Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff (1910), und dann vertieft für die Physik des 20. Jahrhunderts in Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie (1921), in Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik (1937)

1/ Siehe K. Jaspers: Philosophie, 1932, Band III, S.9,36; Der Philosophische Glaube, 1948, S.19

und selbst für die Geschichtsschreibung im 4. Band seines Erkenntnisproblems in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit (englisch 1950, deutsch 1957) bis in Einzelheiten hinein darlegte. Erkenntnismässig ebenso unhaltbar aber wie der Begriff der Transzendenz ist José Ortega y Gasset's existentialistischer Begriff der "historischen Vernunft,"1/ die nach Ortega das wahre metaphysiche innere Wesen alles Seins enthüllen soll.

Cassirers "Philosophie der symbolischen Formen"

Cassirer hat auf den metaphysischen Fanatismus der Existenzphilosophen und der deutschen Spekulation des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts nicht mit dem Gegenfanatismus eines engen positivistischen Weltbilds geantwortet, sondern er hat Hauptmotive dieser metaphysischen Spekulationen in seinem kritisch umgreifenderen Gesamtsystem in neuer Prägung fruchtbar zu machen gewusst. Mit der stillen, klaren Weite seines Blicks und auf Grund eines viel umfassenderen Wissens durchschaute er die schweren Einseitigkeiten existenzphilosophischer 2/ und älterer metaphysischer wie religiöser Gedankengebilde; und wohl mag es dabei zugegeben werden, dass sein Werk in der sprachlichen Formulierung zu ge-

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1/ Auch für Jose Ortega y Gasset gibt es "gegenüber der reinen physikalisch-mathematischen Vernunft" eine höhere "erzählende Vernunft" (siehe Historia como sistema y del imperio Romano, 1942, deutsch 1952, S.67). Diese höhere "historische Vernunft" soll eine "intellektuelle Handlung" sein, "die uns in Berührung bringt mit der Wirklichkeit, durch die wir auf das Transzendente stossen" (ebenda S.82), "die Offenbarung einer Wirklichkeit, die über die Theorien vom Menschen hinausgeht" (ebenda, S.89), die "das Leben mit aller Eindringlichkeit...in seiner ursprünglichen Nacktheit darstellt" (ebenda, S.50), die "das Wirkliche desintellektualisiert, um ihm treu sein zu können" (ebenda, S.46). "Der Terrorismus der Laboratorien", "die physikalische Vernunft vermag uns nichts Klares über den Menschen zu sagen,...das Fiasko der physikalischen Vernunft macht uns den Weg frei für die lebendige oder historische Vernunft" (ebenda, S.28, S.32f)

2/ Ähnlich kritische Einstellungen besonders gegenüber Heidegger sind unter vielfach anderer verschiedenartiger Begründung z.B. von Aloys Wenzl in seiner umsichtigen Abhandlung "Fundamentalontologie -- Metaphysik oder Ende der Metaphysik?", Sitzungs-

messen oder gar zu besonnen konservativ wirkt gegenüber der expressionistischen Eruptionskraft der Diktion Heideggers. Aber ein ähnliches Schicksal ist selbst dem geklärten, geruhsamen Altersstil Goethes und Kants widerfahren in seinem Gegensatz zu der impetuoseren Sprache der grossen Metaphysiker und Romantiker des 19. Jahrhunderts.

Durch die Reife, die Ausgewogenheit und die strengere Objektivität des Urteils wird Cassirers Philosophie der symbolischen Formen (3 Bände, 1923-1929, Band I: Die Sprache; Band II: Das Mythische Denken, 1925; Band III: Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis) mehr zukunftsweisend bleiben können als der zeitgenössische deutsche und franzosische Existentialismus, der geistesgeschichtlich unfruchtbar einseitige logische Positivismus, die zu sehr an Sprachgewohnheiten gebundenen, wenngleich scharfsinnigen, eng begrenzten logischen Kleinanalysen Oxfords und Cambridges, der hochfliegende metaphysisch-historisierende Ehrgeiz des Spaniers Ortega y Gasset und die dogmatisch engstirnige Pedantisierung der Spenglerschen Geschichtsphilosophie bei Arnold Toynbee. Alle diese Arbeiten stellen wesentlich ein Ende dar, den Abschluss einer Gegenbewegung gegen den unhaltbaren sensualistischen oder materialistischen Positivismus des 19. Jahrhunderts. Cassirers Werk aber deutet mit viel grösserer synthetischer, umfassenderer Denkkraft vorwärts.

Schon in seinem Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, in Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik und besonders im 4. Band des "Erkenntnisproblems" finden sich genug Vorklänge von Cassirers eigener Äusserung zu den Wissenschafts-und Kulturfragen unserer Zeit. Den vollen systematischen Rundblick über

berichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 1950, Heft 6, und in dem verdienstvollen Schriftum Fritz-Joachim von Rintelens vertreten.

sein Weltbild aber hat er nur in zwei seiner Hauptwerke gegeben, in der dreibändigen Philosophie der symbolischen Formen und in seinem bündig konzentrierten An Essay on Man. Es ist zweifellos

(from marginal notes)

"Bündig k." ist sicher noch kein übertriebenes Lob. "Etwas gröbliche Vereinfachung". Ihr Brief scheint mir nicht angemessen. Auch für die Fachwelt in Amerika und Deutschland scheint mir der Essay nicht wertloser zu sein als etwa Jasp. Die geistige Situation d.Zeit, wenn der Essay auch bescheidener im Ton ist. Ist nicht "b.k." neutral genug?

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nicht das irrelevanteste Stück von grausigem Hohn in der zeitgenössischen deutschen Geistesgeschichte, dass einem Denker vom Rang Cassirers von Staats wegen unter vielfacher Bedrohung seines Lebens die Veröffentlichung der kondenziertesten und gewiss weder politisch noch sonstwie "anstössigen" Darlegung seiner Weltanschauung in deutscher Sprache untersagt wurde, dass er An Essay on Man englisch konzipieren, englisch 1944 veröffentlichen musste, und dass die ähnlich bedeutende Vorstufe hierfür, der 4. Band seines "Erkenntnisproblems", zwar noch deutsch in Schweden geschrieben war, aber auch zuerst nur in englischer Übersetzung 1950 in den Vereinigten Staaten erscheinen konnte.

Die an sich schlichten, aber ungemein folgenschweren Grundgedanken der "Philosophie der symbolischen Formen" können etwa folgendermassen formuliert werden: Es ist irreführend und vom Blickpunkt der hochentwickelten modernen Wissenschaft aus hoffnungslos verwirrend, wenn Metaphysik und Religion ihre Einsichten bis zum heutigen Tag als Wirklichkeitserkenntnisse darbieten, die prinzipiell in demselben Sinne Erkenntnisse seien wie die der Wissenschaften, abgesehen davon, dass sie auf die Erfassung der höheren transzendenten Wirklichkeit oder eines tieferen, gemeinhin verhüllten Inneren des Menschen und des Seins abzielen. Vor den Augen der Wissenschaft müssen solche Ziele Phantome,

nicht Lichtspender, sondern Irrlichter bleiben.

/ Als Abstrakte Dichtung wäre sie vollkommen anzuerkennen. Aber sie will doch höhere phikos. Wirklichkeitserkenntnis sein. /

Nicht einmal im Anhang zu einer "reinen Vernunftethik" können Fragen der Metaphysik und Religion zum Austrag kommen, obwohl noch Kant dies angenommen hatte. Soll der Begriff der Wissenschaft selbst nicht vernebelt werden, so ist darauf zu bestehn, dass nur das, was letzthin durch empirisch gegebene Sinneswahrnehmung, Gefühle und Willensakte verifiziert werden kann, zum Thema eigentlicher Wissenschaft und eigentlicher Wirklichkeitserfassung geeignet ist. Innerhalb dieses bei aller Selbstbeschränkung unbegrenzt weiten Forschungsfeldes musste die naive Annahme von substantiellen Trägern, von einem Wirklichkeitshintergrund der Dinge, in eine rein funktionelle Zuordnung von individuellen Beobachtungen (in derPhysik und Chemie Messungen) zu generellen Gesetzen und universellen Prinzipien umgewandelt werden.[1] Während früher der Gegenstandsbegriff dem Gesetzesbegriff vorgeordnet war, ist er nun dem Gesetzesbegriff einer umfassenderen gesetzlichen Hypothese unter-und nachgeordnet;[2] und es ist sinnwidrig geworden, noch neben erforschten oder zu erforschenden Funktionszusammenhängen nach ihrem unerforschlichen substanziellen oder transzendenten Sein zu fragen, so sinnlos wie die Fragen nach der Substanz einer Zahl, aller Zahlen oder dem inneren Wesen, dem Absoluten Sinn, alles oder eines bestimmten Werden/sein würden.

Damit aber musste auch der Kausalbegriff aufhören, eine "Schicksalsfrage" eine Frage nach Tun und Erleiden von Dingen und Ereignissen zu sein,[3] wie er es vom primitiven Weltbild her Jahrtausende

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1/ Siehe Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik, 1937, (Göteborgs Högskolas Arsskrift XLII, 1936:3), S.44f, S. 68 und den ganzen II. Teil.

2/ Ebenda, S.163f, S.179, S.164: "Es gibt 'Gegenständlichkeit' oder objektive 'Wirklichkeit'" nur "sofern es Gesetzlichkeit gibt, nicht umgekehrt."

3/ Ebenda, S.147

geblieben war. "Das konstitutive, das wesentliche Merkmal der Kausalität" kann nur in der allgemeinen Forderung der statistischen oder sonstwie exakten Gesetzlichkeit bestehn,[1] in dem unumgänglichen Postulat einer "Strengen funktionalen Abhängigkeit" von physikalischen Bestimmungsstücken zueinander. In diesem in sich konsequenten Weltbild der theoretischen Naturwissenschaft sind daher die Fragen nach transzendenter Wirklichkeit, nach einem Sein des Seienden oder dem Ursprung, dem "tiefsten Grunde" aller Tätigkeit, alles Werdens, gegenstandslos oder sogar sinnlos geworden,[2] so sinnwidrig wie das Forschen nach einer Quadratur des Zirkels.

Aber so sehr sich Cassirer in seinen wissenschaftstheoretischen Anschauungen auf den Boden eines "logischen Positivismus" und der höchstentwickelten physikalischen und chemischen Theorienbildungen stellt, er scheidet sich nachdrücklich von blossem Positivismus selbst Russellscher Prägung, indem er Fragen der Mystik, der Metaphysik, der Geschichts-, Kunst- und Religionsphilosophie nicht als wesentlich leere Phantastereien abtut. Er besteht nur darauf, dass das Hereinziehen solcher Problematik in das Gebiet des eigetlichen Wissens ihren Selbständigkeitscharakter zerstören und ihr Wesen verfälschen muss. Zugleich aber will er daraufhin nicht einer bequemen Annahme von "gebundener" oder "freier" Wissenschaft gegenüber "freiem" oder "gebundenem" Glauben das Wort reden. Er wehrt nur das naive Vorurteil ab, das alles, was nicht Gegenstand theoretischer Wissenschaft ist, unwahres, wertloses Phantasiegebilde sein müsse. Denn in Wahrheit ist der Lebenswert einer grossen Dichtung, einer grossen Religion oder Metaphysik in keiner Weise dadurch entwertet, dass

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1/ Ebenda, S.203

2/ Siehe Richard von Mises: "Über das naturwissenschaftliche Weltbild der Gegenwart" in Die Naturwissenschaften, 18. Jahrgang, 1930, S.892 und Cassirer "Determinismus", 1937, S.14.

er sinngemäss anderen Wertkriterien unterliegen darf und muss als der Wahrheits- und Wirklichkeitswert einer physikalischen Gleichung.

Wer in der Naturwissenschaft nur in dichterischen Gleichnissen reden oder Hymnen singen würde, entwertet damit zwar seine wissenschaftliche Forschung, aber nicht die Dichtung und nicht die Musik. Umgekehrt wer als Mythen- und Religionsstifter nur Wahrheit über die "Wirklichkeit", die Existenz Gottes und seiner Engel darbietet, offenbart damit nur, dass er nicht weiss und nicht fühlt, worum es den Griechen und noch Hölderlin in der Mythologie oder dem Juden und Christen in seinen religiösen Gleichnissen geht. Von irgendwelchen Gegenständen religiösen Glaubens Wirklichkeit -- wenn auch höhere Wirklichkeit -- im Sinne aller Realitätserforschung zu fordern, ist nichts als ein blindes Eingreifen in fremde Staatsrechte, wodurch das Wesen von Mythologie, Religion, Dichtung und Kunst nur entstellt werden kann.

Die uralten -- ahnungslosen oder dreisten -- Mischungen von innerlich verschiedenen Fragestellungen und Antwortbereichen können bloss zu intellektueller Verwirrung, zu Gewissenszwiespälten, Skepsis und Nihilismus führen. Nur die Einsicht, dass es sich in der Sprache, dem Mythos, der Religion, der Kunst und einer Gesamtdeutung der Geschichte um innerlich verschiedene "symbolische Formen", um autogene aber einander ergänzende Fragen- und Antwortmöglichkeiten handelt, kann hier Befreiung bringen und Wegweiser für die philosophisch verwirrten Gemüter unserer Zeit werden.

Man mag wohl einwenden, dass eine solche Philosophie der symbolischen Formen nur den Rahmen für eine grosse Weltanschaung bieten kann. Aber der gleiche Einwurf könnte auch gegen die drei "Kritiken" Kants geäussert werden, und er ist von Kants metaphysischen Nachfolgern erhoben worden. Es bleibt aber dabei

die Frage offen, ob es nicht heilsamer ist, sich einem kritischen, weit weltoffenen Geiste anzuvertrauen als entschlossenen Gläubigen von viel engerem geistigen Horizont, die nur auf wirre Wege und nur zu verblockten Wegenden führen können.

Je mächtiger das Werk der Wissenschaft und aller anderen "symbolischen" Ausdrucksformen des Menschen angeschwollen ist, desto bedenklicher wird es, diese Leistungen in eine plumpe Einheitsfront -- ob wir sie nun Metaphysik oder Philosophie überhaupt nennen -- einzureihen (aufmarschiern zu lassen). Die Devise kann nur heissen, wie Cassirer sie mit einer -- man darf wohl ohne Übertreibung sagen, einzigartigen -- Meisterung eines kaum übersehbaren Einzelmaterials gegeben hat: ɑ Getrennt marschieren und doch vereint schlagen!

Seien Sie bitte nicht zu empfindlich. Ich hoffe, dass die Anwendung 1 Moltke-worts auf C. so weit als Scherz aufgefasst werden kann, wie sie von mir gemeint ist. Oder was Besseres würden Sie vorschlagen?

Lebensgang

Cassirers Lebensgang zeigt innerlich dieselbe Stetigkeit und Harmonie der Entwicklung wie sein Werk. Aber äussere brutale Mächte haben es mit schwerer Tragik erfüllt. Am 28. Juli 1874 geboren als Sohn eines sehr wohlhabenden Breslauer Kaufmanns, verlebte er eine sorgenfreie Jugend besonders angeregt von den ausgedehnten geistigen Interessen und einer schönen Bibliothek seines Grossvaters mütterlicher Seite. Die geistige Atmosphäre dieser angesehenen Familie war die eines völlig emanzipierten Judentums, das z.B. charakteristisch bei einer selbstverständlichen Treue zu der angestammten Religionsgemeinschaft doch Ernst Cassirer mit dem weiten Feld des nachbiblischen jüdischen Schrifttums viel weniger vertraut werden liess als etwa mit der Anthropologie primitiver Völker Afrikas und Polynesiens.

An den Universitäten Berlin, Leipzig und Heidelberg erwarb sich der junge Cassirer bereits ein ungewöhnlich weites

Wissen, bis ihn eines Tags eine Vorlesung Georg Simmels so stark auf Hermann Cohens neue Kantinterpretation hinwies, dass er beschloss, den Meister des Neukantianismus selbst in Marburg zu hören. Seine Marburger Doktordissertation hatte die Erkenntnistheorie Descartes' zum Thema, sie wurde seinem Leibnizbuch als dessen erster Teil einverleibt; -- und nach dem Abschluss seiner Promotion (1899) stieg er dann rasch vom Schüler Cohens zu dessen lebenslangem Freunde auf. Seit 1902 lebte er in glücklicher Ehe mit Toni Bondi, einer Wiener Kusine, zuerst in München, dann in Berlin, wo er sich nach allerhand Widerstand 1906 habilitierte und als Privatdozent, später als nichtbeamteter ausserordentlicher Professor, eine sehr angesehene Lehrtätigkeit entfaltete.

Aber erst 1919 verlieh ihm die neugegründete Hamburger Universität ein Ordinariat, das bald stark zum wissenschaftlichen Ruf der jungen Hohhschule beitrug. Für das Amtsjahr 1929/30 wählte ihn das Vertrauen der Fakultäten zum Rektor; und schon 1928 erkor ihn der Senat der Freien Reichsstadt zum Festredner für die Verfassungsfeier der Republik. Soche Ehrungen, die seltenen Bücherschätze der "Bibliothek Warburg", von dem Hamburger Kunsthistoriker Aby M.Warburg aufgebaut und die Freundschaft mit ihm wie mit weiten Kreisen der Hamburger Geistigkeit machten das Wirken Cassirers im dritten Jahrzehnt des Jahrhunderts zu den glücklichsten Zeiten seines Lebens, bis 1933 der Nationalsozialismus ihn zur Aufgabe seiner weithin gefeierten Lehrtätigkeit und zum Verlassen Deutschlands zwang.

Er nahm noch im gleichen Jahr seine Vorlesungsarbeit an der Universität Oxford in England auf und vertauschte sie von 1935-41 mit der Annahme einer persönlichen Professur an der

Universität Göteborg in Schweden. Aber auch von hier vertrieben ihn 1941 die drohende Besatzung der ganzen skandinavischen Halbinsel durch das nationalsozialistische Besatzungsheer in Norwegen. So hatte er auf dem letzten schwedischen Dampfer, der während des zweiten Weltkrigs über den von Minen und Unterseebooten durchseuchten Atlantischen Ozean fuhr, nach Amerika zu fliehn.

Schon 1914 hatte die Harvard Universität ihn zu einer Gastprofessur in den Vereinigten Staaten eingeladen. Nun nahm er die gleiche Stellung an der Yale Universität in New Haven und später an der Columbia Universität in New York an. Aber was er mit den besten Deutschen der Widerstandsbewegung noch für die Zeit vor dem Ausbruch des zweiten Weltkriegs erhofft hatte, den Fall Hitlers, sollte er nicht mehr erleben. Er erlag einem Schlaganfall auf der Strasse New Yorks in der Nähe der Columbia Universität am 13. April 1945

(Schl. ist "allergisch gegen Polemik"! offenbar nur gegen —— nicht gegen Polemik gegen B.)

ERNST CASSIRER UND DIE MODERNE WISSENSCHAFTSLAGE

VON

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Ernst Cassirer und die moderne Wissenschaftslage

Ironie oder vielmehr Grausamkeit des Schicksals hat es mit sich gebracht, dass eines der Meisterwerke Ernst Cassirers, das deutsch geschrieben war, zuerst in englischer Übersetzung erscheinen musste. Erst jetzt sieben Jahre nach der Übertragung ins Englische, die von dem führenden amerikanischen Philosophen Charles W. Hendel betreut wurde, ist der vierte und letzte Band von Cassirers unausschöpflich reichem und umfangreichstem Werk, DAS ERKENNTNIS-PROBLEM IN DER PHILOSOPHIE UND WISSENSCHAFT DER NEUEREN ZEIT, in der Originalfassung zugänglich geworden.

Ernst Cassirer, zwei Jahrzehnte lang Zierde und zeitweilig Rektor der jungen Universität Hamburg, Denker von unbestritten internationalem Ansehn, kann als der letzte grosse Panhistor unserer Zeit vielleicht am ehsten mit Lord Bertrand Russell verglichen werden. Beide gingen von Leibniz aus, beide sind am schöpferischsten wohl als Erkenntnistheoretiker der exakten Wissenschaft und doch zugleich den geistesgeschichtlichen Disziplinen zugewandt. Aber Cassirer überragt Russell zweifellos beträchtlich an Weite, an Eindringlichkeit und an unbestechlicher Überparteilichkeit historischen Verstehens. Davon zeugt nicht zum wenigsten die ganz ungewöhnliche Fülle der Gedankenmotive dieses Bandes.

Auch wer nicht jeder Einzelheit der Linienführung zustimmen könnte, muss staunen u"ber die Kraft und die Kunst, mit der hier ein Gewirr von mannigfaltigsten wissenschaftlichen und philosophischen Gedankenstrebungen zu einem imposanten Einheitsbild gefügt ist. Eine radikal selbständig modernisierte kantisch kritische Grundeinstellung hat hier zu ausserordentlich klärenden Fundamentaleinsichten geführt. In engster Fühlung mit der Forschung der Einzelwissenschaften hat Cassirer durchgängig eine eindrucksstarke Front sowohl gegen den reinen Positivismus wie gegen metaphysische Spekulation in der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie aufrecht erhalten.

Der Raumbegriff, von dem die moderne Geometrie spricht, hat, wie er darlegt, nichts mehr zu tun mit der metaphysischen "ausgedehnten Substanz" des Descartes oder dem als "absolutes Ding" angesehenen dreidimensionalen Raum Newtons. Aber ebensowenig ist er ein empirisch gegebener Ge-

genstand im Sinne John Stuart Mills oder dem verfeinerten Sinn Moritz Paschs; er ist noch nicht einmal mit dem Rest von "Gegebensein" behaftet, mit dem er bei Kant als "~~nach~~- Anschauung a priori" erscheint. In einem glänzend verknappten Überblick über die internationale Arbeit an der Entwicklung der Nicht-Euklidischen Geometrien von Karl Friedrich Gauss, dem Russen Lobatscheffsky und dem Ungarn János Bolyai d.Jüng. zu ~~Peano~~, dem Italiener Giuseppe Peano zu Bernhard Riemann, bis zu Felix Klein zeig Cassirer, warum der Raum nur als die "abstrakte" umfassende "Form möglicher ~~Exis~~-Koe tenz" überhaupt gelten kann und eine bestimmte Geometrie nur als ein bestimmtes "Ordnungs-und Relationsgefüge" von "möglichem Beisammensein". Die Axiome einer Geometrie sind somit keinesfalls mehr "Behauptungen von absoluter Gewissheit" über irgendwelchen ontischen Gehalt; sie sind statt dessen als "freie" und doch in sich notwendig ~~gel~~ gültige "Ansätze" des Denkens erfasst, als "logische Leerformen möglicher Wissenschaften" (Hermann Weyl), als "Entwürfe und Vollzugspläne", die das Denken "zum Gebrauch bereitstellt".

Entsprechend aber erhellt es aus ähnlich aufschlussreichen Hinweisen auf die Bemühungen Sir William Hamiltons, Georg Cantors, Gottlob Freges und Bertrand Russells, J.W.R.Dedekinds, Henri Poincarés, Otto Hölders, Brouwers, Hermann Weylsuund anderer Zahlentheoretiker, in welchem Sinn die Zahl nur als die umfassende Form von Ordnung in der Abfolge, als allgemeinste Form von Reihenfolge von "Stellenordnung" anzusehen ist, und warum dabei jeder "Appell an die empirische Anschauung . .konkreter Dinge unzulässig" wird, sondern die gesamte Mathematik auf diese Weise nur als "reine Beziehungslehre" verstanden werden kann.

Im Bereich der Physik wird natürlich der empirischen Beobachtung ihr Recht zuerkannt. Physiker wie Gustav Kirchhoff und Ernst Mach vollbrachten eine befreiende Tat, als sie statt Erklärung aus Substanzen und Kräften reine Beschreibung der physikalischen Phänomene forderten. Aber so berechtigt ihr Kampf gegen ontische "Setzungen" war, so haltlos wurde ihre Kritik, als sie sich auch ge-

gen jede "Setzung physikalischer Theorie" wandte. Wenn Mach selbst den kritisch geklärten Atombegriff eine "Substanzvorstellung in ihrer naivsten und rohsten Form" nannte, wenner physikalische Begriffe und physikalische Gesetze nur als zusammenfassende Abbilder von empirisch beobachteten Phänomenen gelten lassen will, so konnte schon Heinrich Hertz solchen Annahmen entgegenhalten, dass Grundbegriffe der Physik nicht als Abbilder, sondern vielmehr als "Vorbilder" möglicher Erfahrung anzusehen sind.

Freie, spontane Hypothesenbildung, Verwendung von Begriffen dessen, was sich „nie und ~~nimmer hat~~ nirgends hat begeben" wie Bewegungen, auf die "keine äusseren Kräfte wirken", "ideale Gase" sind für die exakte mathematische Naturwissenschaft durchaus legitime Erkenntnismittel, durch die erst, wie Henri Poincaré es formulierte, der "Übergang vom 'fait brut' zum 'fait scientifique' möglich" wird und wie Pierre Duhem betont, theoretische Voraussetzungen und "Interpretation" sogar für die einfachste Tatsachenregistrierung sind in der Physik unenbehrlich.

Die zeitgenössische Physik aber ist noch viel weiter von blossen Wahrnehmungsdaten und zugleich von metaphysischer Spekulation abgerückt, indem z.B. in Niels Bohrs und Werner Heisenbergs Atomtheorien "raum-zeitliche Bilder" weithin als unzulänglich erklärt werden und nur durch "partielle Differentialgleichungen in einem abstrakten vierdimensionalen Raum" ersetzt werden können.

Die Biologie kann sich zwar an Präzision ihrer Methoden nicht im entferntesten mit der Physik und Mathematik messen. aber auch sie hat in ihrer Entwicklung von Linnés Botanik bis zur Forschung des 20. Jahrhunderts sowohl die metaphysische wie die rein beschreibende Begriffsbildung immer mehr zurückgedrängt und ist so ebenfalls zu bewusst freier wissenschaftlicher Hypothesenbildung vorgestossen. Der Metaphysiker Spinoza hatte alle Annahmen von organischer Zweckmässigkeit als anthropomorphe Wahngebilde aussseinem Weltbild verbannt. Dem Metaphysiker Aristoteles bedeutet die Entelechie, das, was sein Ziel in sich hat, geradezu die innerste Triebkraft und das Wesen alles Daseins. Die modernen biologischen Wissenschaften aber wollen sich prinzipiell

vom beiden gleich dogmatischen metaphysischen Thesen fern halten;und so verwirft Mathias Schleiden in seinen "Grunzügen der wissenschaftlichen Botanik" auch alle die "phantastischen Kinderträume" der Schellingschen und Hegelschen Metaphysik der organischen Natur. Aber ebenso erklärt er das ~~bessem~~- bloss empirisch beschreibende Klassifizieren für den Aufbau einer theoretischen Wissenschaft vom Leben als unzulänglich;und statt dessen versucht er,einer kausal erklärenden Biophysik als "induktiver Wissenschaft" den Weg zu ebnen.

In der französischen und englischen Biologie begnügten Georges Cuvier,A.P. de Candolle,Geoffroy de SaintHilaire und Charles Darwin sich ebenfalls nicht mit bloss tatsachenmässiger Beschreibung oder mataphysischen Dogmen,sondern führen Arbeitshypothesen ein zur Begründung erklärender Forschung. Inseinen Lecons ~~de~~-d'anatomie comparée" setzt Cuvier „lois de coexistence" zwischen den Gliedern jedes Organismus voraus. De Candolle legt in ähnlicher Weise in seiner „Théorie élémentaire de la botanique" den Begriff eines "Symmetrieplans in jedem Lebewesen zugrunde,einer regelmässigen,wenn auch oft verdeckten Symmetrie in der Anordnung seiner Organe. Geoffroy de Saint Hilaire nimmt weiter ausgreifend in seinen „Principes de philosophie zoologique," auch gesetzmässige Beziehungen zwischen den Organen verschiedener Lebewesen an;und Charles Darwin führt schliesslich zur Erklärung des "Ursprungs der Arten" fort,indem er über die inneren Strukturverhältnisse der Tiergattungen hinaus vor allem äussere Einflüsse unter dem Leitgedanken der natürlichen Zuchtwahl für eine Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lebewesen heranzieht. In Ernst Haeckels „Generellen Morphologie der Organismen" und bei zahllosen Darwinisten verhärtet sich zwar Darwins Hypothese zu einem alles beherrschenden Dogma. Aber in der nachfolgenden Forschung machen sich viel mehr kritisch besonnene und verfeinerte Untersuchungsmethoden bemerkbar ,in Wilhelm Roux' Abhandlungen zur "Entwicklungsmechanik,seinen Warnungen vor Überschätzung der Leistungen von DARWINS

und Haeckels Phylogenie und in Otto Bütschlis oder A.Naefs Parteinahme für "kausal-analytische" experimentelle Methodik in Verbindung mit "deskriptiver" und historisch phylogenetischer Forschung.

Hans Driesch's "Vitalismus" mag dem gegenüber wie ein Rückfall in verjährte dogmatische Metaphysik erscheinen. Aber auch Driesch hat in seiner späteren „Philosophie des Organischen" nicht mehr von einer "Seele" als „elementarem Naturfaktor" sprechen wollen, wie er dies zunächst im Anschluss an seine Experimente über organische Regulationen getan hatte, sondern nur noch von einem „Seelenartigen", einem „Psychoid". In der Biologie der letzten Jahrzehnte aber, bei John Scott Haldane, Jakob Johann von Uexküll, Emil Ungerer und in Ludwig von Bertalanffys „Theoretischer Biologie", 1932, hat besonders der „Gestaltbegriff", der Begriff der „Ganzheit", des „holism" zur kritischen Überwindung der Gegensätze zwischen vitalistischer und mechanistischer Deutung der Lebensphänomene verholfen. Denn der biologische Ganzheitsbegriff stellt eine manifeste Analogie zur zeitgenössischen Feldphysik her und legt damit die Bahn frei für kausale physiko-chemische Forschung wie für die Anerkennung organischer Ganzheitsgebilde.

Schliesslich aber hat es sich auch in der Geschichtsschreibung erwiesen, dass Weltgeschichte schwerlich mehr mit den Mitteln metaphysischer Spekulation dargestellt werden kann wie etwa im System Hegels. Zum mindesten als dogmatisch metaphysische These ist der Glaube des Panlogismus an die dialektische Entfaltung der Vernunft in der Geschichte unhaltbar geworden. Doch ebenso hat sich hier wieder mit der reinen Metaphysik der reine Positivismus überlebt. Leopold Ranke nimmt nur scheinbar Partei für strikten Tatsachenempirismus, wenn er „sein eigen Selbst gleichsam auslöschen" wollte- und nur schildern wollte, "wie es eigenlich gewesen" sei. So sehr er sich von allem metaphysischen System lossagte und auf peinsamstes Studium der politischen „Akten" drängte, so hat er mit seiner Kunst des literarischen Portraits und seiner „Universalität des Mitempfindens" doch ähnlich wie Wilhelm von Humboldt auch

objektiv gestaltende Deutung der leitenden "Ideen" des Geschehens zu geben versucht. Selbst Auguste Comte greift trotz seines Kampfs gegen jede Transzendenz weit über blosse Tatsachenermittlung hinaus mit seiner Annahme einer "loi des ~~trois~~ trois états" in der Geschichte, der "sozialen Physik".

Thomas Buckle und Hippolyte Taine bestreben sich zwar dem Programm nach ihre historische Forschung auf reine Tatsachenbeschreibung einzuengen. Aber Buckle ruft zum mindesten die Moralstatistik auf, um Tatsachen auch zu erklären und Taine entfernt sich noch ~~mehr~~ weiter von dem fragwürdigen Ideal eines Linné der Kunstgeschichte, dem er zu Bginn seiner „Philosophie de l'art" nacheifern wollte. Die Hilfsbegriffe der Rasse, des Milieu und der Eigenart eines "Jahrhunderts", die er heranzieht, stellen natürlich nicht mehr blosse Gegebenheiten und ihre „Ursachen" dar, sondern sind bereits hypothetische Deutungsversuche ebenso wie seine Wertschätzung von minuziösen, aber charakteristischen Einzelheiten ("de tout petits faits significatifs") und seine relative Indifferenz gegen die tatsächliche historische Verbürgtheit von Anekdoten, wenn diese Überlieferungen nur genügend bedeutsame Ausdruckskraft besitzen.

Dass nach Hegel die Macht des Staates die Verwirklichung der Sittlichkeit auf Erden bedeutet, oder umgekehrt nach Jacob Burckhardt (wie Lord Acton) Macht und besonders organisierte Staatsmacht „an sich böse" ist oder nach Nietzsche jenseits von gut und böse steht, kann selbstverständlich weder rein metaphysisch noch rein empirisch erhärtet werden. Alle solche Annahmen bringen Interpretationen und Wertungen der Historiker zum Ausdruck, die erst durch die philosophische Argumentation und Erprobung am historischen Quellenmaterial mehr oder minder glaubhaft gemacht oder ~~widerlegt werde~~ entkräftet werden können. Und ebensowenig lässt es sich metaphysisch oder rein empirisch erweisen, ob Ernest Renans oder David Friedrich ~~Stau~~ Strauss' Erklärung der mythischen Elemente im Leben Jesu zutreffend ist. Oder um auf das Gebiet der römischen Geschichte überzugreifen, ~~wie könnte es mit metaphysischen oder bloss tatsacher~~

weder Metaphysik noch das blosse Tatsachenmaterial konnte es veranlassen, dass Theodor Mommsen in seiner Geschichtsschreibung politische und militärische Begriffe des 19. nachchristlichen Jahrhunderts verwandte, und dass Fustel de Coulanges umgekehrt unternahm, das Römertum wesentlich in seiner Umhüllung vom archaischen Halbdunkel der vorchrislichen Jahrhunderte zur Darstellung zu bringen brachte und es in seiner „La cité antique", 1864, unternahm, die Entwicklung griechisch-römischer Staats-und Rechtsinstitutionen wie das gesamte soziale Leben der klassischen Antike in dem Dämmerlicht und unter der Inspiration von uns höchst fremdartigen religiösen Gebräuchen und Riten zu sehen zeigen. Bei Mommsen und bei Fustel de Coulanges handelt es sich so abermals um kritische Interpretationsversuche der Vergangenheit, die weder durch Metaphysik noch durch blosse Beschreibung der gegebenen Tatsachen geboten werden können.

Ganz das Gleiche aber gilt schliesslich für Karl Lamprechts kulturgeschichtliche Forschungen, die bereits auf zeitgenössische Geschichtsschreibung hinführen, auf Oswald Spengler, wie Cassirer treffend bemerkte, und wie hinzugefügt werden kann, auf Arnold J. Toynbee's erst kürzlich abgeschlossene „A Study of History", 1934-54, obwohl freilich bei Toynbee die kulturgeschichtliche Zyklenlehre Lamprechts und Spenglers veräusserlicht, kulturell unanschaulich verflacht und dogmatisiert erscheint. Aber auch Lamprechts, Spenglers und Toynbees Annahmen von „Kulturzeitaltern", die den menschlichen Lebensaltern ähneln, stehen jedenfalls jenseits reiner metaphysischer Spekulation und jenseits blosser Feststellung von empirischen Tatsachen. Sie sind methodische Postulate, oder sie wären gänzlich unhaltbar. Die klare Erfassung dieser Sachverhalte aber bedeutet in der Natur- und Geisteswelt eine dringend benötigte Befreiung von metaphysischer Gebundenheit wie von positivistischer Enge.

Diese schmale Auswahl aus Hauptmotiven von Cassirers letztem deutsch geschriebenen Werk kann kaum eine Andeutung geben von der souverainen Meisterschaft, mit der hier weitschichtiges Material aus den beiden so verschiedenartigen Hemisphären des "globus intellectualis", den

Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften zu einheitlicher Darstellung und Deutung abgerundet wurde. Aber es mag damit vielleicht besser verständlich werden, was der adäquaten Würdigung der ganz ungewöhnlichen philosophischen Gesamtleistung Cassirers wohl am meisten im Weg steht. Dies ist Cassirers Verzicht auf alles Hervorkehren von Originalität und auf blendende Prägung originell klingender Terminologie. Er hat die Gegensätze zu Vorgängern nirgends vertieft, um damit die eigene Leistung zu erhöhen, sondern hat besonders dankbar teilweise Übereinstimmung mit Anderen anerkannt, ohne damit irgendwie zum Eklektiker zu werden.

Er hat sich in tiefer, vornehmer Bescheidung nicht einmal darum bemüht, seinem grossen Gedankenwerk einen besonderen Kennamen zu geben. Obwohl seine Forschungen weit über das Feld aller anderen Mitglieder der Marburger Schule hinausführten, hat er nicht gegen den Titel eines Vertreters des Marburger Neukantianismus protestiert. Im Vergleich zu den besonders den Laien bestechenden Losunsworten „Phänomenologie", „Existenzialphilosophie" und „logischer Positivismus" klingt der Titel seines systematischen Hauptwerks „Philosophie der symbolischen Formen" erstaunlich zurückhaltend. Aber das sollte keinen Versteher echten philosophischen Werts daran hindern, in Cassirers Kraft der Zusammenschau und Neugestaltung der bleibendsten geistigen Errungenschaften der Vergangenheit jene singuläre gediegenste Eigenleistung zu erkennen, die einseitigere und kenntnisärmere philosophische Bekenntnisse auf beträchtliche Zeit hin überleben mag.

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New York/USA

CASSIRER, Ernst, -- relative of the publisher Bruno C., the art dealer Paul C. and the neurologist Richard C., -- one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century, panhistor, his contributions to the ~~kix~~ theory of science being of no less importance than those to the humanities and the history of philosophy, born July 28, 1874 in Breslau, Germany, son of a well-to-do merchant, studied at the Universities of Berlin, Leipzig and Heidelberg and took his Ph.D. at the University of Marburg as a student of Hermann Cohen with whom he remained connected in a life-long friendship. In 1906 he started his brilliant teaching career at the University of Berlin and received a full professorship at the newly founded University of Hamburg in 1919. 1929/30 he served as the Rector of this University ~~mf~~ and in 1933 he was deprived of his position by the Nazis, fled first to Oxford/England, then to the University of Göteborg/Sweden where he held a personal professorship and left on the last Swedish Second World War boat that crossed the Atlantic endangered by Nazi submarines in 1941. From 1941 to 1945 he was a visiting professor at Yale University, later at Columbia University and died from a heart attack in New York in the street near his University on April 13, 1945.

Cassirer's doctoral dissertation on "Descartes' Erkenntnistheorie" became part of his first major work on Leibniz' System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen, 1902, supplemented in 1904ff by a valuable edition of Leibniz selected works. His polemics against Leonard Nelson, founder of the once influential neo-Friesian School, appeared in 1906 under the title Der Kritische Idealismus und die Philosophie des 'gesunden Menschenverstandes'. In 1906/07 he published the first two volumes of the most learned studies in the historical development of the problem of knowledge Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft

der neueren Zeit, a work which leads from the Renaissance to the end of the nineteenth century in its fourth volume. Along with the works of well-known philosophers and scientists of these centuries, numerous rather unknown writings receive here a penetrating investigation; and a wealth of imppptant philosophical motifs has thus been unearthed in especial lucid analybes. The philosophical background of German classic and romantic poetry is the main topic of Freiheit und Form, 1916, and in Idee und ~~Ge~~ Gestalt, 1921, followed in 1918 by Kants Leben und Lehre. These three volumes are meant for the scholar as well as a wider reading public; and the later publications on the history of ideas pay, according to their enlarged topics, more regard to general historical and religious movements than the "Erkenntnisproblem". They are Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance,1927, Die platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von Cambridge, 1932, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung, 1932 (Engl. transl. in 1951) and Descartes, 1939.

Aside from this large and fruitful historical research Cassirer offers some of the most valuable constructive philosophical ideas in his systematic writings. His starting point was and remained the neo-Kantianism of Hermann Cohen. But as Cohen himself admitted, he soon outgrew the general philosophical positinn held by the Marburg School. In his Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, 1910, he showed a penetrating analysis why in mathematics, physics and chemistry the traditional preponderance of a concept of "substance" had to be replaced in these sciences by the concept of "function". In philosophy and science the commonsense view is to be abandoned that a world of substances and their movements could ever be mirrored by simple description. Instead of hoping in vain to present a faithful copy of

given existing things, the critical exploration of nature has to unveil merely precise functional relations between given phenomena on the basis of verifiable scientific hypotheses. In his Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie, 1921, and in Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik, 1937, (Engl. ed. in 19), these basic insights are extended to an analysis of the latest developments of contemporary physics and it is clarified in which sense the concept of given objects no longer precedes the concept of law but, in the inverse order, the concept of the object is dependent on the function of laws of nature. Yet, these laws and especially the law of causality refer no longer to acting forces in the universe but exclusively to functional connections between observable events. In the fourth volume of the "Erkenntnisproblem" in English, 1950 (in German in 1957) similar reflections are applied to the basic principles of biological and historical research and the concepts of "field" and "Gestalt" are given special considerations as "functional" concepts. Finally, in his Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, 1923 to 1929 (vol.I, Die Sprache, vol.II Das Mythische Denken, 1925, vol.III Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis) and in 1944 in his Essay on Man, Cassirer develops, on the basis of an overwhelmingly rich material of details, in which way language, mythology and science do not present different realms of objects of reality but vitally different symbolic expressions of understanding the world in which man lives, thinks and feels. The imposing framework of deeply original ideas offered in these principal works by C. has as yet not found sufficient recognition and adequate detailed evaluation.

Literature: Jospe, Alfred, Die Unterscheidung v.Mythos u.Religion bei Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer, 1932 - The Philos. Of E.C. (The Library of Living Philosophers, vol.VI, ed. by P.A.Schilpp, 1949 - Baumgardt, David, Introd. to 4 v. of essays by E.C. soon to appear in Agora Ved. Darmstadt, Germany

D.B.

Ernst Cassirer
zu seinem 60. Geburtstag

Unsere philosophische Gegenwart ist nicht arm an eigenwilligen Temperamenten.Mit der Erregtheit der Kriegs-und Nachkriegsjahre ist eine ältere weithin verbreitete Beschaulichkeit des Philosophierens besonders in Deutschland gründlich zerstoben. Leidenschaftliche Neigung und Empfänglichkeit für das extreme weltanschauliche Bekenntnis haben sich seitdem ausgebreitet,und erst damit hat sich die Zersplitterung des philosophischen Denkens bis ins Sektiererhafte verschärft. In solchen Zeiten wiegt die Kraft zu souveränem Ausgleich der zerrissenen Meinungen doppelt schwer.Aber die leuchtendste und die kraftvollste Gestalt unter den wenigen deutschen Denkern,die heute diesem hohen Ziel der Bändigung des philosophischen Zwistes nachgehen,ist ohne Zweifel der nun 69-sechzigjährige Ernst Cassirer.

In seinem ungemein reichen literarischen Wirken steht Ernst Cassirer jenseits fast aller Spaltungen,die sonst die philosophische Arbeit der Gegenwart durchziehen.Er ist zugleich Historiker der Philosophie und systematischer Denker.Er ist der Philosophie der Einzelwissenschaften zugewandt und zugleich der metaphysischen Problematik.Er arbeitet in engster Vertrautheit mit der beschreibenden wie der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft. Und schliesslich - was heute zum schwersten Schaden der Philosophie immer seltener zu finden ist -- er umspannt mit eigentlich gleicher Kraft die Welt der Natur-wie die der Geisteswissenschaften d.h.jener beiden Hemisphären der menschlichen Forschung,die heute einander sonst bedrohlich fremd wurden,und ohne deren Zusammenfügung doch niemals wieder ein echter geistiger Kosmos formbar werden wird.

Cassirer hat sich immer als Schüler Hermann Cohens,als Mitarbeiter der"Marburger Schule"bekannt, die um das Jahr 1900 wohl die scharfsinnigsten jüngeren Köpfe der Zeit unter der Führung Cohens und Natorps geeint hielt.An Cohen fesselte ihn gedanklich vor allem der Wille zur

Klarheit der Methode,die Energie,mit der hier in strenger begrifflicher Prägnanz nach überzeitlichen,nach exakt allgemeingültigen Grundgesetzen der Wissenschaft und der Kultur überhaupt gesucht wird. während etwa Dilthey damals die Schöpfungen der grossen Denker der Philosophiegeschichte vor allem aus ihrer einmaligen seelischen Eigenart und der Zeitsituation verstehen und interpretieren wollte,so würdigte Cohen mit seinen Mitarbeitern wesentlich nur die"goldene Kette"der grossen Ideenlinien von Plato über Descartes und Leibniz zu Kant;denn nur in ihnen wurden die Entdecker streng allgemein verbindlicher Wahrheiten gesehen, die nun allein für den Neuaufbau einer klar begrifflich fundierten philosophischen Theorie der Erfahrungswissenschaften ~~ausgewählt~~ ausgewertet werden sollten.In diesen Zusammenhängen aber hat schon der junge Cassirer mit seinem ersten Werk bahnbrechende Arbeit geleistet. Denn es war wohl kein Zufall,dass er schon 1902 wagte,gerade das System des genialsten Polyhistors der Neuzeit,das System Leibniz vom Standort der "Marburger" ~~Aus~~"in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlegen"für die damalige Wissenschaftslage nutzbar zu machen.

Und bereits 1906-07 greift er denn mit seinem nächsten zweibändigen Werk-in aller Treue zur Marburger Methode - mächtig über die innerengeren Aufgaben hinaus,die sich die Schule bis dahin gestellt hatte. Mit der umfassenden und eindringlichen Analyse,der hier"das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit"unterworfen wird, sind für die Geschichtsschreibung dieser weiten Epoche wirklich neue Wege erschlossen worden.Wohl nirgends wurde vorher und seitdem den grossen Problemen der neueren Erkenntnistheorie,den beherrschenden Fragen nach den Grenzen und nach dem Ursprung,nach der Methode und nach der Zuverlässigkeit des menschlichen Wissens mit einer solchen Umsicht bei einer solchen Fülle von kleinerem und grösserem Gestalten nachgespürt wie in diesem monumentalen Werk.Und so wurde hier von Nicolaus Cusanus und vom italienischen Humanismus an bis zu Kant ein überwältigendes Material an begrifflicher Arbeit aus buntester,verschiedenar-

tigster religionsphilosophischer und metaphysischer Einkleidung für e- historische und systematische Betrachtung freigelegt.Die Schöpfer der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft und die grossen rationalistischen und Empiristischen Erkenntniskritiker spielen dabei wohl eine überragende Rolle.Aber es bleibt doch erstaunlich,wieviel Licht von hier aus auch auf Geister wie Marsilio Ficino,auf Marius Nizolius oder auf Burthogge und Boscovich fällt;und selbst so tief irrationalistische Stimmen wie die des Paracelsus oder des Mystikers Pascal fehlen nicht in dem Chor. Wer in Cassirer nur einen gerahsam abwägenden Rationalisten vermuten sollte,der lasse sich gerade einmal von der lebendigen Einfühlungskraft, mit der hier die verzweifelte Vernunftfeindlichkeit der Pascalschen "Pensées"nachgelebt wird,eines Besseren belehren. In dieser kurzen Analyse der Religionsphilosophie Pascals verrät sich ein Geist,der bei allem Willen zur lichtesten Klarheit doch auch die Kraft der Versenkung in die dunkelsten seelischen,religiösen Verstrickungen und Leiden des menschlichen Denkens nicht entbehrt.

1920 hat dann Cassirer seine Untersuchungen über das Erkenntnisproblem in der neueren Zeit in einem dritten Band über Kant hinaus bis zu Hegel,Fries und Schopenhauer ausgeweitet. Und die Skizze zur griechischen Philosophie,die er schon 1906(in der Einleitung zur 1.Auflage des Werkes)gab,hat er 1925 in Dessoirs"Lehrbuch der Philosophie"zu einer ausserordentlich geistvollen Darstellung des voraristotelischen griechischen Denkens verbreitert. Diesen Arbeiten voran gehen halb literarhistorische Studien über die Weltanschauung der klassischen deutschen Dichtung und Philosophie um das Jahr 1800:"Freiheit und Form"1916², "Heinrich von Kleist und die Kantische Philosophie"1919;"Idee und Gestalt", 1921, Abhandlungen über Goethe,Schiller,Hölderlin und Kleist,die auch einen weiteren Leserkreis fanden,obwohl,wie mir scheint,gerade in ihnen nicht immer die eigentliche Stärke Cassirers sichtbar wird,während dies wieder 1918 in"Kants Leben und Lehre"viel greifbarer der Fall ist. In den letzten Jahren aber treten dem noch weitere anders geartete philo-

sophiehistorische Schriften zur Seite:"Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophe der Renaissance"1927;Die platonische Renaissance in England" und die Schule vos Cambridge"19 und"Philosophie der Aufklärung,",beide aus dem Jahr 1932.Während früher bewusst die erkenntniskritischen und methodologischen Fragen indenVordergrund rückten,zeigen nun diese späteren Arbeiten das neuere philosophische Denken in Querschnitten auch in breitesten geistesgeschichtlichen Verwebungen seiner Zeit. Aber nicht nur bis tief ins 19.Jahrhundert führten alle solche historischen Forschungen,auch mit gegnerischen Ansschauungen der Gegenwart ist Cassirer zeit seines Lebens niemals ausgewichen.Schon 1906 grenzte er seinen "kritischen Idealismus" von der"Philosophie des gesunden Menschenverstandes", von Nelson und der Neufriesischen Schule ab. 1920 kämpfte er darum,in einer eindringlichen Schrift"Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie"die Versöhnbarkeit der neuen Relativitätslehre mit den fundamentalsten Prinzipien seines eigenen"kritischen"Denkens darzutun. Aber auch mit einer Fülle anderer Bewegungen der Zeit liebte er,die offene Auseinandersetzung aufzunehmen bis hin zu seinen Davoser Gesprächen mit Heidegger und seiner entschlossenen Kritik der Heideggerschen Kantdeutung. So darf von Cassirer wie von kaum einem anderen Denker unserer Tage gerühmt werden,dass er seine eigenen systematischen Ueberzeigungen ständig an allen wesentlichen Mächten der abendländischen Philosophie überprüfte und mit jeder ihrer grossen Tendenzen lange und innerlich gerungen hat.

Daher aber zeigt nun auch sein eigenes Weltbild eine heute wohl einzigartige Reife und Ausgeglichenheit der denkerischen Entscheidung.1910 gab sein ausgedehntes Werk"Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff"wohl die durchdachteste philosophische Grundlegung für den damaligen Stand der Mathematik,der mathematischen Physik und der Chemie.Die ältere naive Lehr für die die wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis eine blosse Abbildung eines absoluten gegebenen Seins darstellt,wird hier ganz zurückgedrängt .Und der logische Begriff bleibt so überhaupt nicht mehr gewissermässen der"Substantielle"Träger von bestimmten festliegenden Merkmalen,eine unveränderlic

im Gegensatz hierzu,im kontrast zu solchen Auffassungen der formalen Logik(wie sie in der ganzen Tradition der älteren Metaphysik und auch im Positivismus herrschend liegen)-- hier wird der spezifische Funktionscharakter des Begriffs,die Bedeutung des Begriffs als eines gestaltenden Beziehungs-und Ordnungszeichens wohl eindrucksvoller und klarer als sonst irgendwo erhärtet.

Und in seinem letzten dreibändigen systematischen Hauptwerk,in der "Philosophie der symbolischen Formen" hat dann Cassirer abermals auch systematisch die Arbeit der Marburger Schule prinzipiell tief original aus-und umgestaltet.Von Cohen war das mythische Denken noch schroff aus aller Philosophie und Religion ausgewiesen worden.Cassirer überhat hier die gestaltende Kraft seiner Philosophie des Funktions-und Symbolbegriffs an einer Ueberfülle von Motiven in den verschiedenartigsten neuen Geistesbezirken zur Bewährung gebracht:nicht nur auf dem Boden des Aufbaus unserer Sprachwelt(1923 im ersten Bande des Werks),sondern auch im"mythischen Debken"1925 und schliesslich 1929 in einer umfassenden"Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis".Ueberall wird hier mit einer bewunderungswerten Klarheit und Durchsichtigkeit der Linienführung aus wenigen einheitlichen Grundüberzeugungen Einblick geschaffen in die kompliziertesten(nur meist übersehenen)Formmomente,aus denen sich überhaupt erst sinnvolles Gestalten und Verstehen des Mythos und der Sprache und selbst des"natürlichen Weltbilds"konstituieren kann.

Ueberblickt man heute diese intensiv und extensiv einzig bedeutungsvolle literarische Leistung ,die Ernst Cassirer aufzuweisen hat und zählt man hierzu die reichste pädagogische Wirksamkeit,die er früher an den Universitäten Berlin und Hamburg,jetzt in Oxford ausübt,so wird es verständlich,wenn nicht nur die Philosophie Deutschlands sondern auch Hollands, Englands,Frankreichs und Spaniens jetzt in ihren besten Vertretern den sechzigjährigen Denker ihren besonderen Dank abstatten will und dies jetzt in einer sehr würdigen Festschrift vollzieht.Aber auch das deutsche Judentum hat tiefen Grund zur Dankbarkeit für diesen Denker,der als ein Gelehrter vor

unbestrittenster Weltgeltung auch stets ein aufrechter Jude war und dies in seinem persönlichen wie in seinem literarischen Wirken mit Nachdruck dokumentiert hat. Die ungesuchte, aber bezwingend starke Vornehmheit seines Wesens, die tiefe Konstanz seiner geistigen Haltung, die doch nie zur Starrheit oder Heftigkeit führte, und die Lauterkeit seiner Gesinnung, die auch von seinen schärfsten geistigen Gegnern nie angezweifelt werden konnte, kennzeichnen ihn seit je als einen der edelsten und verehrungswürdigsten Repräsentanten jener besten Geistigkeit des deutschen Judentums, in der sich Treue zum Judentum und echte Hingabe an die deutsche Geisteswelt mit dem ehrlichsten Streben nach Weltbürgerlichkeit einen konnten.


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Einführung zu
4 Bänden
gesammelte Essays
von E. C. ?

AGRORA 1

ERNST CASSIRER

Die Grundlegung der kritischen Philosophie schließt nicht nur eine veränderte Bestimmung des Verhältnisses des Wissens zum Gegenstand in sich, sondern sie enthält hierin zugleich eine neue Begriffsbestimmung des Wissens selbst. Die beiden wesentlichen Momente des Wissens lassen sich in die Forderung seiner Objektivität und in die Forderung seiner durchgängigen Einheit zusammenfassen. Aber seine Einheit wie seine Objektivität wird nunmehr, gegenüber der dogmatischen Denkweise, auf einem völlig neuen Wege erreicht und begründet. Wie der Gegenstand sich jetzt nach der Erkenntnis richtet und gemäß der Mannigfaltigkeit der Erkenntnisprinzipien eine eigene innere Mannigfaltigkeit gewinnt — so fällt auch die Einheit des Wissens in keinem Sinne mehr mit seiner Einfachheit, mit seiner Ableitung aus einem einzigen Prinzip zusammen. Eine solche Ableitung hat erst die Nachkantische Philosophie wieder gefordert, während Kants Lehre schon in ihrer äußeren Gliederung, schon in der Dreiteilung ‚in die' Kritik der theoretischen Vernunft, die ‚Kritik der praktischen Vernunft' und die ‚Kritik der Urteilskraft' einen Beleg dafür gibt, wie der echte und vollständige Begriff der »Vernunft« eine Mehrheit ganz verschiedenartiger methodischer Ansätze, wie er eine Spaltung in verschiedenen Geltungsweisen und Geltungsansprüche nicht nur verträgt, sondern geradezu fordert. Auch innerhalb der rein theoretischen Sphäre wiederholt sich nun das gleiche Verhältnis. Die verschiedenen Grundfunktionen der Erkenntnis bestimmen je ein eignes Gebiet von Gegenständen und umschreiben je einen eignen Bezirk der Objektivität überhaupt. Sie richten sich nicht auf eine gemeinsame transcendente Dingwelt, um sie sodann unter verschiedenen perspektivischen Gesichtspunkten zu betrachten und abzubilden, sondern sie sind ursprüngliche Weisen, eigentümliche Gestaltungsformen des Wissens, die sich nichtsdestoweniger zu einer gemeinsamen Aufgabe der Gegenstandsbestimmung mit einander vereinen und im Hinblick auf diese Aufgabe ihren inneren Zusammenhang herstellen.

Aber dieser Gesamtaufbau des Wissens in seiner Ganzheit und in seiner Besonderheit ist freilich nur ein Ideal, das die kritische Philosophie aufstellt. Die Ausführung und Durchführung, die konkrete Erfüllung dieses Ideals kann sich nur im stetigen Fortgang der Wissenschaft selbst ergeben, nicht aber ein für alle Mal in einem abstrakten Entwurf vorweggenommen und für immer festgestellt werden. Wo dennoch eine solche Feststellung versucht wird, da trägt sie notwendig, neben ihren allgemeingültigen Bestimmungen, gewisse provisorische und hypothetische Züge. Es drückt sich in ihr auf der einen Seite die besondere geschichtliche Problemlage der einzelnen Wissenschaften, auf der anderen Seite die besondere wissenschaftliche Interessenrichtung des philosophischen Kritikers aus. Auch Kants Entwurf und Kants methodischer Aufbau des Systems der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis ist von solchen individuellen Einschränkungen nicht frei. Zwei große Problemkreise sind es hauptsächlich, auf welche die Betrachtung Kants sich bezieht und um die sie sich gruppiert. Der Begriff der Natur und der Naturerkenntnis wird durch die Mathematik, der Begriff der Geschichte und der Geisteswissenschaften wird durch die Ethik konstituiert. Der Gedanke der theoretischen Notwendigkeit, wie er durch die Mathematik und die mathematische Naturwissenschaft, und der Gedanke der Freiheit, wie er durch die Ethik aufgestellt wird, bilden die beiden unverrückbaren Pole der kritischen Philosophie. Hier entscheidet sich die Synthesis und Analysis, die Verknüpfung und Trennung, auf der Kants Welt- und Lebensansicht beruht. Der Welt des Seins tritt die Welt des Sollens — der Welt der Erscheinung tritt die intelligible Welt gegenüber. Weil Kant mit der ganzen Energie seines persönlichen und geistigen Wesens dieser großen Grundentscheidung zugewandt ist — darum können für ihn die besonderen methodischen Differenzen, die sich innerhalb der beiden Hauptgebiete und in ihren einzelnen Teilen finden, zunächst zurücktreten. Wie der Begriff des theoretischen Wissens für ihn nicht nur auf die Mathematik gegründet ist, sondern zuletzt fast gänzlich in die Mathematik aufzugehen scheint, wie er erklärt, daß in jeder Disziplin nur so viel »eigentliche« Wissenschaft liege, als Mathematik in ihr enthalten sei — so geht auf der anderen Seite sein Geschichtsbegriff und sein Entwicklungsbegriff rein in seiner ethischen Prinzipienlehre auf. Im Gedanken der Freiheit und des sittlichen Selbstbewußtseins erschließt sich erst der Sinn und der Endzweck der Geschichte, wie alles geistigen Daseins überhaupt. So begründet sich für Kant die Vernunft der Natur in der Mathematik, die Vernunft der Geschichte in der Ethik. Die Objektivität des Seins und die Objektivität der Werte wird nicht unmittelbar vorgefunden, sondern sie wird in der Bestimmung, die wir uns im Denken und im Wollen geben, und in dem theoretischen oder praktischen Gesetz, unter das wir uns stellen, erst gewonnen und gesichert. Dieser Bewegung, diesem unabschließbaren Prozeß können und dürfen wir uns überlassen, ohne befürchten zu müssen, in ihm jene Festigkeit und jene Begrenzung zu verlieren, die der dogmatische Seinsbegriff verhieß: denn sie ist von Anfang an auf die beiden festen Brennpunkte der Mathematik und der Ethik als die Mittelpunkte der theoretischen und sittlichen Gewißheit bezogen und wird durch sie innerhalb eines bestimmten Umkreises der Objektivität, d. h. der allgemeinen und notwendigen Geltung festgehalten.

Aber wenn wir von hier aus die Wissenschaften in ihrem tatsächlichen Aufbau und in ihrer systematischen Gestaltung überblicken — so macht sich sogleich eine Lücke der allgemeinen kritischen Orientierung fühlbar. Es gibt ein Gebiet des Geistes, dessen Bestimmung weder naturgesetzlich noch der Analogie des mathematischen Notwendigkeitsbegriffs, noch praktisch und teleologisch, nach dem Vorbild der ethischen Wert- und Normbegriffe zu vollziehen ist. Es gibt eine ursprüngliche geistige Energie, die der künstlerischen darin vergleichbar ist, daß in ihr die Antithese von Natur und Freiheit überwunden scheint und ein neues Verhältnis, eine neue Wechselbestimmung beider sich darstellt — und die doch andererseits auch in der Kunst und in der aesthetischen Gestaltung nicht aufgeht, sondern auf durchaus eigenen und selbständigen Prinzipien beruht. Wir scheinen, wenn wir den Phänomenen dieses Gebiets nachgehen, noch ganz innerhalb der Kette der empirischen Ursachen und Wirkungen festgehalten zu werden — und dennoch entwickelt sich aus ihnen ein Gebilde, in dem sich die Universalität und die Freiheit des Geistes erst vollkommen darstellt und bezeugt. Wir befinden uns hier einer reinen und wahrhaften geistigen Schöpfung gegenüber, die doch aller bloßen Willkür der Reflexion entzogen ist und die demgemäß selbst als ein Produkt der Natur erscheint. So scheint der Grundgegensatz, von dem die gesamte Kantische Systematik beherrscht wird, nicht auszureichen, um auch diese neue Sphäre, um das Gebiet der Sprache in seiner geistigen Eigenart zu bestimmen und abzugrenzen. Wenn der Begriff der mathematischen Naturkausalität und die Idee des Sollens und der Freiheit der beiden Zentren der kritischen Lehre darstellen — so muß jetzt die Sprache als ein exzentrisches Gebilde erscheinen. Schon in der äußeren architektonischen Gliederung der Kantischen Lehre tritt dies in der Tat deutlich hervor. Kants System schließt eine Logik, wie eine Ethik und Aesthetik in sich; es ist gleich sehr auf die »metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft« wie auf die ‚Metaphysik der Sitten', gerichtet; es begründet eine neue Form der Religionslehre und der Rechtslehre, der Geschichtsphilosophie und der Staatspilosophie — aber das Problem und Thema einer Philosophie der Sprache wird in ihm kaum jemals auch nur genannt und angedeutet. Der Kosmos der »Vernunft« wird vor uns entwickelt und dargelegt, ohne daß dieser wichtige Zeuge, ohne daß der Logos, der in der Sprache lebendig und wirksam ist, gehört wird. Hier liegt in der Tat ein Mangel vor, der schon den ersten Kritikern Kants nicht entgangen ist. Alle ‚Metakritik', die gegenüber der ‚Kritik der reinen Vernunft' versucht wurde, knüpfte immer wieder an diesen Punkt an und versuchte, von ihm aus das Kantische System aus den Angeln zu heben. Hier setzte Hamanns ‚Metakritik über den Purismus der reinen Vernunft' ein, der er eine weitere Schrift: ‚Metakritik über den Purismus der Vernunft und Sprache' folgen zu lassen gedachte. Die Vernunft kritisieren zu wollen, ohne die Sprache zu kritisieren, das erschien Hamann als das eigentliche unbegreifliche Versehen Kants: denn ihm selbst floß beides unmittelbar in eins zusammen. »Bei mir« — so schrieb er an Jacobi — »ist weder von Physik, noch Theologie die Rede, sondern Sprache, die Mutter der Vernunft und Offenbarung, ihr und — »Vernunft ist Sprache, . An diesem Markknochen nage ich und werde mich zu Tode darüber nagen. Noch bleibt es immer finster über dieser Tiefe für mich; ich warte noch immer auf einen apokalyptischen Engel mit einem Schlüssel zu diesem Abgrund«. »Was Demosthenes actio, Engel Mimik, Batteux Nachahmung der schönen Natur nennt, ist für mich Sprache, das Organon und Kriterion der Vernunft. — Hier liegt reine Vernunft und zugleich ihre Kritik«.[1]) Dieses Hamannsche Grundmotiv war es, das Herder in seinem Kampf gegen Kant aufnahm und auf das er immer von neuem zurückkam. »In Sachen der reinen und unreinen Vernunft« — so betonte auch seine »Metakritik« — ‚muß dieser alte allgemeingültige und notwendige Zeuge abgehört werden, und nie dürfen wir uns, wenn von einem Begriffe die Rede ist, jenes Heroldes und Stellvertreters, des ihn bezeichnenden Wortes schämen. Wie sollte der Vernunftrichter das Mittel übersehen, durch welches die Vernunft eben ihr Werk hervorbringt, festhält, vollendet?'[2])

Und doch hat die ‚Kritik der reinen Vernunft', obwohl sie selbst den Problemen der Sprache fernstand, durch die mittelbaren Wirkungen, die von ihr ausgegangen sind, auch die Form der Sprachphilosophie entscheidend umgestaltet. Nirgends zeigt sich vielleicht so deutlich, wie an diesem Punkt, daß ihr prinzipieller Gehalt nicht in ihrer einmaligen und individuellen geschichtlichen Gestalt aufgeht. Die Kraft und Fruchtbarkeit des neuen gedanklichen Prinzips, das in ihr wirksam ist, erwies sich jetzt darin, daß es sich, kraft der eigenen, in ihm liegenden sachlichen Konsequenz, fortschreitend immer neue geistige Gebiete anzueignen und zu erobern vermochte. Hier liegt der entscheidende Dienst, den Wilhelm von Humboldt der kritischen Philosophie geleistet hat. Indem er sie in den Kreis der Sprachwissenschaft einführte, vereinte und versöhnte er sie einem Problemgebiet, das solange es außerhalb ihrer Grenzen zu liegen schien, eine stete Gefährdung ihrer Grundgedanken bedeutete. Jetzt erschloß sich der Kantischen Lehre, kraft der Vermittlung der Sprache, ein völlig neuer Weg und Zugang zu den Geisteswissenschaften überhaupt. So erwies sich in der Tat auch in dieser Hinsicht die Sprache als Organon, als ein lebendiges Werkzeug der Vernunft wie der Vernunftkritik. Aber damit sie in diesem

Sinne wirken konnte: dazu mußte freilich die Philosophie der Sprache selbst erst durch die Methodik des kritischen Idealismus befruchtet und von innenher umgebildet sein.

Wilhelm von Humboldts Verhältnis zu Kant ist seinen Hauptzügen und seiner Entwicklung nach häufig geschildert worden: aber die Bedeutung, die Kants Lehre für die Konzeption und für die Ausgestaltung der Humboldtschen Sprachphilosophie gewonnen hat, ist hierbei selten ihrem wahren Umfang und ihrer wahren Tiefe nach gewürdigt worden. So eingehend man den Kantischen Ursprung von Humboldts ethischen, ästhetischen und geschichtsphilosophischen Ideen darlegte, so kurz pflegte man über den Zusammenhang der Humboldtschen Sprachphilosophie mit der ‚Kritik der reinen Vernunft' hinwegzugehen. Freilich hatte schon RUDOLF HAYM in seiner klassischen Humboldt-Biographie (1856) auf diesen Zusammenhang nachdrücklich verwiesen und er hatte in einem einleitenden Abschnitt über die philosophischen Voraussetzungen und Grundlagen der Humboldtschen Sprachlehre darzutun gesucht, wie der »Buchstabe und der Geist Kants« auch in Humboldts linguistischen Arbeiten überall vernehmlich sei. In voller Klarheit wird bei ihm gezeigt, wie die systematische Gliederung der Vernunftkritik es war, die die allgemeine methodische Disposition und den Aufbau der Humboldtschen Sprachphilosophie bestimmte; wie die transcendentale Formenlehre Kants, insbesondere seine Auffassung von Raum und Zeit und seine Lehre vom Schematismus, in Humboldts sprachlicher Formenlehre, in der Auffassung der grundlegenden Redeteile und ihres gegenseitigen Verhältnisses, weiter gewirkt hat. Aber noch größer — so betonte Haym — als die Abhängigkeit von Kants Buchstaben ist die Zusammenstimmung mit Kants Geist. »Die Wahrheit ist, daß selbst der Gedanke oder, richtiger zu reden, der unwiderstehliche Zug zur Ergründung der Sprache aus der Wahlverwandtschaft seiner mit der Kant'schen Denkweise herstammte. Die Wahrheit ist, daß sich das Ganze seiner Sprachphilosophie, und daß es sich gerade da am gewissesten in den Bahnen jener Denkweise bewegt, wo, nach der Natur des Gegenstandes, die Übereinstimmung mit den Formeln und Sätzen des Kantschen Systems aufhören mußte. Man kann sagen, daß Humboldt ein Kantianer gewesen sein würde, auch wenn er nie eine Zeile von Kant gelesen, auch wenn Kant nie geschrieben und nie gelebt hätte«.[3]) In diesen markanten Sätzen Hayms ist ein P r o g r a m m aufgestellt worden, das jedoch weder bei ihm selbst noch bei seinen Nachfolgern zur vollen konkreten Durchführung gelangt ist.

SPRANGER begnügt sich in seiner Monographie über Kant und Humboldt, die die Einwirkung des kritischen Idealismus auf Humboldts Gestaltung des Humanitätsgedankens allseitig darstellt, betreffs der Sprachphilosophie auf Haym zurückzuweisen, ohne das Problem nach dieser Seite hin weiter zu verfolgen.[4]) Besonders auffallend aber ist es, daß STEINTHAL, der in seiner Ausgabe und in seinem Kommentar von Humboldts sprachphilosophischen Werken dem Verhältnis Humboldts zu Kant einen eigenen Abschnitt gewidmet hat, dabei gleichfalls nur auf die allgemeinen theoretischen und ethischen Grundfragen der Kantischen Lehre eingegangen ist, die besonderen sprachwissenschaftlichen Probleme aber in der Erörterung dieses Zusammenhanges völlig außer acht gelassen hat.[5]) Der Mangel einer eignen Sprachphilosophie im kritischen System schien eine d i r e k t e Beziehung zwischen diesem System und Humboldts Grundlegung der Sprachwissenschaft auszuschließen: so konnte man daher leicht die gleichsam unterirdischen Bahnen übersehen, durch welche beide nichtsdestoweniger mit einander verbunden sind. Die folgenden Betrachtungen versuchen diese latenten gedanklichen Vermittlungen sichtbar zu machen und damit einen neuen Beweis für die Wirkung zu erbringen, die das methodische Motiv des kritischen Idealismus auch in scheinbar weit entlegenen geistigen Gebieten geübt hat.

2.

Daß das Problem der Sprache innerhalb der Kritik der reinen Vernunft keine selbständige Erörterung erfährt, erscheint um so auffallender, wenn man Kants Werk in dieser Hinsicht mit den großen Systemen des 16. und des 17. Jahrhunderts vergleicht. Alle diese Systeme, wie verschieden auch ihr Ausgangspunkt und ihre erkenntniskritische Grundrichtung sein mochte, hatten sich um das Phänomen der Sprache und um seine prinzipielle Deutung bemüht. Der Gedanke einer »lingua universalis« tritt schon in DESCARTES Briefen hervor, und in der Weiterbildung der Cartesischen Philosophie ist es besonders die Schule von Port Royal gewesen, die auf einen engeren Zusammenschluß von Logik und Grammatik hindrängte, die eine »Grammaire générale et raisonnée« zu schaffen versuchte. LEIBNIZ nimmt diesen Gedanken auf, indem er ihn ebensosehr seinem Umfang nach erweitert, wie er ihn seinem Inhalt nach vertieft. Die Wissenschaft von den sprachlichen Zeichen im weitesten Sinne, die »Characteristica generalis« wird ihm zur »Scientia generalis«, zu einer Methode und zu einem allgemeinen Mittel der Erkenntnis überhaupt. Von ihm pflanzt sich diese Betrachtungsweise und dieses Interesse auf die deutsche Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts, auf die Generation, aus der Kant hervorgegangen ist, fort. LAMBERT und PLOUCQUET, SULZER und TETENS gehen dem Zusammenhang der Vernunft mit der Sprache nach und suchen ihn auf feste Regeln zu bringen.[6]) Die Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften, der in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts noch eine führende geistige Rolle zukommt, greift zweimal in diese allgemeine gedankliche Bewegung ein, indem sie zuerst in einer Preisaufgabe des Jahres 1759 eine Untersuchung des wechsel-

seitigen Einflusses verlangt, den die Sprache auf die Entwicklung der Vorstellungen und Meinungen und den die Vorstellungen und Meinungen auf die Entwicklung der Sprache geübt haben, und sodann zehn Jahre darauf, im Jahre 1769, die Frage stellt, ob der Mensch lediglich seinen natürlichen Fähigkeiten überlassen, imstande sei, die Sprache zu erfinden und durch welche Mittel er zu dieser Erfindung gelangen könne. Diese Frage wurde wie bekannt der Ausgangspunkt von Herders Preisschrift, durch die das Problem des Sprachursprungs auf einen ganz neuen Boden gestellt wird. Die logisch-idealistische Betrachtung, die von Leibniz ihren Ausgang nahm, schloß sich hier mit den Resultaten der empirischen und psychologischen Betrachtungsweise zusammen. Denn auch die Systeme des Empirismus hatten der Sprache von Anfang an eine beherrschende Stelle in der geistigen Gesamtentwicklung, im Aufbau der Begriffs- und Vorstellungswelt zugewiesen.

Für HOBBES, der die alten nominalistischen Theorien erneuert und überbietet, wird die Sprache nicht nur zum Mittel, sondern, geradezu zum einzigen Inhalt aller logisch-rationalen Erkenntnis. Alle Allgemeinheit der B e d e u t u n g wurzelt für ihn im W o r t und ist von diesem nicht loszulösen: ein wahrhaft allgemeingültiges Wissen ist niemals von den Ideen oder Sachen selbst, sondern immer nur von den willkürlich geschaffenen Zeichen möglich, die wir an ihre Stelle setzen. Die Worte sind somit nicht nur die »Rechenpfennige des Gedankens«, sondern sie sind dasjenige Moment, durch welches überhaupt erst eine Sphäre des Denkens, eine Verknüpfung allgemeiner Begriffe, im Gegensatz zur unmittelbaren sinnlichen Empfindung und zur konkreten Einzelanschauung zustande kommt. LOCKE hat auch hierin den Radikalismus seines Vorgängers abgeschwächt ;— aber auch ihm rückt, je weiter er in seiner Analyse der Ideen fortschreitet, das Problem der Sprache mehr und mehr in den Mittelpunkt. Er selbst hat berichtet, wie sich ihm das dritte Buch des ‚Essay' concerning human understanding', das ganz der Betrachtung der Worte und der Sprache gewidmet ist, aus unscheinbaren Anfängen zu seinem schließlichen Umfang erweitert und zu seiner Bedeutung im Ganzen des Systems entwickelt hat. Endlich verschmilzt auch für BERKELEY die analytisch-psychologische Kritik, die er an der Welt der Vorstellungen und Wahrnehmungen und an der Welt der abstrakten Begriffe übt, völlig mit einer Kritik der sprachlichen Zeichen und Symbole. Um zur echten Erkenntnis vorzudringen, um den wahrhaften konkreten Inhalt des S e i n s zu gewinnen, gilt es erst den Vorhang der Worte wegzuziehen, die uns dieses Sein verhüllen.

Aber die negative Kritik, die hier an der Sprache geübt wird, schließt zugleich eine positive Bereicherung ihres Sinnes und eine Erweiterung ihres eigentümlichen Gehalts in sich. Denn der Begriff der Sprache wird nun im Ganzen von Berkeley's Lehre nicht auf die bloße Anwendung von Lautzeichen beschränkt, sondern neben diese konventionelle Sprache der Laute tritt jetzt die »natürliche« Sprache der Perzeptionen und Ideen. Im Gedanken einer »Sprache der Gesichtswahrnehmungen«, (visual Language), kraft deren die eine Wahrnehmung auf andere, mit denen sie in ständiger empirischer Verknüpfung steht, hindeutet und sie repräsentiert, erhält die Frage des Ursprungs der Raumvorstellung für Berkeley ihre Lösung. Und dieses psychologische Ergebnis wird nun, gemäß dem Doppelcharakter der Berkeleyschen Philosophie, sogleich ins Metaphysische umgewandt. Die Welt der D i n g e verliert für Berkely ihren absoluten Bestand und ihre Substantialität. Alles Sein, was ihr bleibt, geht fortan in ihrer Funktion auf: — und diese ist keine andere, als einen geistigen Zusammenhang und eine geistige Ordnung im sinnlichen Bilde darzustellen. Die gemeinsame transcendente Gegenstandswelt, auf die sich die Wahrnehmungen der einzelnen Subjekte gemäß der herkömmlichen realistischen Annahme beziehen sollen, wird nunmehr ersetzt durch den Gedanken einer spiritualistischen Gemeinschaft, in der diese Subjekte vermöge ihrer gemeinsamen Beziehung auf die eine göttliche Ursubstanz stehen. Die Welt der sinnlichen Wahrnehmungen selbst gilt jetzt als eine Sprache, deren das göttliche Wesen sich bedient, um sich den endlichen Subjekten mitzuteilen und um diese miteinander in Verknüpfung zu setzen. (Vgl. Cassin, Erkentnisproblem, S. 278 s. Anmek. 6.) So wird die anfängliche spychologische Kritik, die Berkeley an der Sprache geübt hatte, von seinem metaphysischen Standpunkt aus zugleich vertieft und berichtigt. Wenn es anfangs als Mangel der Sprache erschien, daß sie in ihren allgemeinen und abstrakten Wortbedeutungen die individuelle Fülle und Konkretion des Wahrnehmungsinhalts nicht erreicht — so gilt jetzt umgekehrt dieser Inhalt selbst als eine reichere und tiefere Sprache, als eine eigentümliche symbolische Form. —

Immerhin blieb eine solche Versetzung und Hypostasierung des Sprachbegriffs ins Metaphysische, wie sie hier von Berkeley vollzogen wurde, im Denken des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts eine vereinzelte Erscheinung. Im allgemeinen begnügte man sich mit der traditionellen Erklärung, daß die Worte willkürliche Zeichen seien, die dem Menschen zum Zweck wechselseitiger Verständigung und Mitteilung vom Schöpfer gegeben oder aber von ihm selbst kraft seiner natürlichen Fähigkeiten und seiner natürlichen Entwicklung, geschaffen worden seien. Auf die Entscheidung dieser Alternative, auf den Gegensatz zwischen der Hypothese der göttlichen Sprach-

schöpfung und der menschlichen Spracherfindung, bleibt, bis zu Herders Zeiten, das Interesse wesentlich gerichtet. Die erstere Ansicht wird insbesondere durch das Buch des Bischofs WARBURTON über Moses' göttliche Gesetzgebung und in Deutschland innerhalb der Berliner Akademie durch SÜSSMILCH vertreten; — die zweite findet ihre eingehende Darlegung und Begründung in den Kreisen der französischen Aufklärungsphilosophie, insbesondere bei CONDILLAC und MAUPERTUIS. Aber der Streit, der hier über den Ursprung der Sprache geführt wird, läßt die Anschauung über ihr Ziel und ihren Inhalt noch unberührt. Beide Parteien vereinigen sich darin, daß sie in der Sprache wesentlich ein Mittel sehen, um gegebene Erkenntnisse, um eine bestehende, innerlich in sich abgeschlossene Masse von Vorstellungen nach außen hin zu bezeichnen und zu verlautbaren. In Leibniz' Grundlegung der allgemeinen Charakteristik findet sich freilich der Gesichtspunkt, daß die Sprache nicht nur dem Ausdruck und der Darstellung einer fertigen Begriffs- und Vorstellungswelt diene, sondern daß sie eine eigentümliche Kraft und Gabe der »Erfindung« in sich schließe — daß sie nicht nur analytisch den Bewußtseinsinhalt zerlege und gliedere, sondern daß sie ihn synthetisch erweitere. Aber dieser fruchtbare Gedanke, der mit Leibniz' allgemeiner Tendenz zusammenhängt, die syllogistische Logik durch eine »Logica inventionis« zu ergänzen und zu bereichern, bleibt zunächst ohne allgemeine Wirkung. Insbesondere ist es die sensualistische Erkenntnislehre der englischen und französischen Aufklärungsphilosophie, die seine Anerkennung erschwert: denn für diese geht alle Gegebenheit, aller echter »Bestand« der Vorstellung und der Erkenntnis in den sinnlichen Elementen auf, und alles was durch irgend eine andere Funktion, was von Seiten des logischen oder sprachlichen Begriffs zu diesem Elementarbestand hinzutritt, kann ihm gegenüber nur eine sekundäre Bedeutung beanspruchen.

Das Sprachzeichen besitzt daher keine eigentlich produktive Kraft und Geltung, sondern dient nur als ein Notbehelf des Bewußtseins, das sich, da es die konkrete Gesamtheit der sinnlich-anschaulichen Inhalte nicht mit einem Male übersehen und festhalten kann, mit einer Andeutung, einer symbolischen Abkürzung von ihnen begnügen muß. Die grenzenlose Fülle und die grenzenlose Veränderlichkeit der Vorstellungsinhalte kann nur dadurch reproduziert und gedächtnismäßig aufbewahrt werden, daß wir in den Lauten bestimmte konvertionelle Merkzeichen für sie einführen. Diese Auffassung der Sprache, die schon Locke im dritten Buch des Essay vertritt, wird insbesondere von Condillac im Sinne des konsequenten psychologischen Sensualismus weitergebildet. Alles Sprechen erscheint jetzt lediglich als ein Klassifizieren und Ordnen des gegebenen Besonderen unter gewisse allgemeine Merkmale, die durch ein bestimmtes Lautzeichen fixiert und gegeneinander abgegrenzt werden. Die Arbeit und die Leistung der Wissenschaft besteht in nichts anderem als darin, dieses Verfahren, das in der Sprache natürlich und instinktiv angewandt wird, zum deutlichen Bewußtsein zu erheben und es auf bestimmte Grundsätze zu bringen. Die Wissenschaften sind lediglich methodisch aufgebaute und gegliederte Sprachen (Langues bien faites) — Sprachen, die nicht sowohl einzelne Zeichen für einzelne Gegenstände, als vielmehr ganze Systeme von Zeichen in bestimmter Verknüpfung und Ordnung erschaffen. Auf das Muster solcher Zeichensprachen wird von Condillac nicht nur die Algebra, und mit ihr die gesamte Mathematik und die mathematische Physik, sondern auch jede Form freier geistiger Betätigung, vor allem auch die künstlerische Betätigung zurückgeführt. Was wir das Genie in Wissenschaft und Kunst nennen, das beruht einzig auf der Kraft und Klarheit, mit welcher die Analyse der komplexen Vorstellungsinhalte und ihre Bestimmung durch charakteristische Zeichen durchgeführt wird. So erscheint zwar in dieser Auffassung die Sprache als eine Grundform der Produktivität des Bewußtseins — aber andererseits beschränkt sich diese Produktivität darauf, ein gegebenes Ganze fortschreitend in seine Teile zu zerlegen und es aus ihnen wieder zusammenzusetzen.

Erst mit HERDERS Schrift über den Ursprung der Sprache (1770) setzt eine tiefere Würdigung der Selbsttätigkeit und Spontaneität des Geistes ein, auf der die Sprache beruht. Die neue Wendung, die Herder herbeiführt besteht zunächst darin, daß er die Sprache nicht mehr ausschließlich, im Sinne der Aufklärungsphilosophie, als ein bloßes **Erkenntnismittel** denkt, sondern daß er ihre Bedeutung im Aufbau des **Gesamtbewußtseins** nach seiner theoretischen wie seiner praktischen Grundrichtung aufzuweisen versucht. Schon Rousseaus ‚Essai sur l'origine des langues' hatte, indem er auf den Affekt als Wurzel aller Sprachbildung hinwies und von hier aus die alte Epikureische Theorie der Entstehung der Sprachlaute aus tierischen Naturlauten zu erneuern suchte, eine derartige Wendung vorbereitet; aber eine allgemeine geschichtliche Wirkung hat diese Schrift Rousseaus, die erst nach seinem Tode, im Jahre 1782, erschienen ist, nicht geübt. Was Herder hier, in seiner Theorie vom Sprachursprung, von seiner historischen Umgebung unterscheidet und was ihn über sie hinaushebt, ist das gleiche Moment, auf dem auch die Originalität und Tiefe seiner Geschichtsansicht beruht.

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In der Geschichtsphilosophie wie in der Sprachphilosophie beruht Herders Wirkung darauf, daß es eine neue Art des Zweckbegriffs, eine neue Richtung der Teleologie ist, von der er ausgeht. Das geistige Geschehen wird nicht mehr nach seinem Nutzen befragt und bewertet, sondern es wird in ihm eine reine innere Bedeutsamkeit, eine innerlich zweckmäßige Form aufgewiesen. Nicht ein äußerliches Ziel, auf das sie auslaufen, sondern diese ihre immanente Form ist es, worin Herder den Sinn und Gehalt der Sprache, wie den Sinn und Gehalt der Geschichte oder der Kunst sieht. In dieser Auffassung erst wird die Sprache für ihn nicht zum bloßen mechanischen Abdruck gegebener Seinsbestimmtheiten oder Vorstellungsbestimmtheiten, sondern zu einer aktiven Energie und Lebensform des Geistes. Sie wiederholt nicht bloß ein totes Sein, sondern sie stellt den reinsten Ausdruck jener Dynamik des Geistes dar, in welcher für uns die Vorstellungselemente als solche erst geschaffen und ihre Grenzen gegeneinander bestimmt werden. Diese Dynamik nimmt vom Affekt, von Gefühl und Willen ihren Ausgang: nicht als Buchstaben einer toten Grammatik, sondern als »Schälle der Leidenschaft« sind die ersten Sprach- und Wortzeichen zu verstehen. Aber indem der Affekt sich in dieser Art ausdrückt, ist er freilich in diesem Ausdruck zugleich über sich selbst hinausgewachsen. Der Anfang der Benennung ist zugleich der Anfang einer neuen und tieferen Besinnung. Aus dem »Geschrei der Empfindungen« wird die Sprache geboren; aber aus ihm entwickelt sich nun jene neue Kraft der Seele, kraft deren sie die gegebenen Eindrücke nicht nur aufnimmt, sondern sie von einander unterscheidet, sie auswählt und sondert. Hierin erst gelangt sie zur Reflexion und Besonnenheit und damit erst zu ihrem wahren geistigen Begriff und Selbstbewußtsein. In der Urfunktion der Sprache liegt die Urfunktion des Urteils beschlossen, vermöge deren es für uns erst eine »Welt«, als einen Inbegriff fester gegeneinander abgegrenzter Bestimmungen und Gestalten und, dieser Welt gegenüber, ein Ich, als einheitliches Zentrum der Apperzeption und Selbstbesinnung gibt.

Herders Theorie von Wesen und Ursprung der Sprache ist in wesentlichen Punkten mit HAMANNS Grundanschauung verwandt — und im Kampf gegen die Aufklärungsphilosophie hat Herder der Theorie Hamanns manche Waffe entlehnt. Aber was ihn nichtdestoweniger von dieser Theorie scheidet, ist der Nachdruck mit dem er auf der Auffassung der Sprache als einer aktiven geistigen Energie besteht. Für Hamann stellt sich im Akt der Sprachbildung und des Sprachverständnisses eine symbolische Offenbarung des Göttlichen dar, der gegenüber sich die Seele lediglich empfangend und leidend verhält. Die Seele ist der Mutterboden und das Ackerfeld, auf dem die göttliche Saat aufkeimt und sich entfaltet. (Hamann Schriften IV. 47, s. Anm. 1; auch Unger S. 171). Wenn Herder, im vollen Gegensatz hierzu, in der Sprache den wahrhaften Zeugen und Urgrund der Selbsttätigkeit des menschlichen Geistes sieht, so hat das zweite entscheidende Bildungselement seiner Jugendjahre, so hat die Kantische Lehre hierbei unverkennbar mitgewirkt. Man könnte die Ableitung der Sprache aus Affekt und Leidenschaft das Hamannsche Moment, ihre Rückführung auf die Kraft der Reflexion und Besonnenheit das Kantische Moment in Herders Sprachtheorie nennen. Als Herder im Jahre 1770 seine Preisschrift über den Ursprung der Sprache verfaßte, da stand er daher mit Kant noch prinzipiell auf dem gleichen Boden. Von hier aus hätte sich, rein sachlich betrachtet, eine Entwicklung denken lassen, die beide, wenngleich auf verschiedenen Wegen, demselben Ziele,derselben Anschauung und Begriffsbestimmung der »Spontaneität« und Autonomie des Geistes zugeführt hätte. Aber indem sich nun statt dessen in den beiden nächsten Jahrzehnten die wachsende Entfremdung Herders und Kants und schließlich der völlige Bruch zwischen beiden vollzog, war damit auch in die Entwicklung der Sprachphilosophie ein Bruch gekommen. Daß die ‚Kritik der reinen Vernunft' das Problem der Sprache kaum erwähnt, hat zweifellos dazu beigetragen, daß Herder sich von Anfang an und von dem Werk zurückgestoßen fühlte. Was ihm als eine lebendige Quelle und als konkrete Urkraft des Geistes erschien — das sah er hier, zu Gunsten einer »abstrakten Kategorienlehre« eines logischen Schematismus verdrängt und zurückgesetzt. Und zugleich mit seiner Sprachtheorie sah er hier auch seine Theorie der Geschichte verkannt. Indem Kant den Weg zur Würdigung der Sprache verfehlte, hatt er sich damit nach Herder auch den Weg zu dem wahrhaften Begriff und dem Verständnis der lebendigen geistigen Entwicklung verschlossen. In der Tat lag hier — so viele persönliche Mißverständnisse im übrigen in Herders Kant-Kritik obwalten — ein ungelöster sachlicher Konflikt. Erst der Sprachtheorie Wilhelm von Humboldts war es vergönnt, diesen Konflikt seiner Lösung entgegenzuführen. Denn sie war ebensosehr durch die Schule Kants wie durch die Schule Herders hindurchgegangen: sie war erfüllt und beseelt von dem Gedanken der dynamischen Entwicklung, wie sie auf der anderen Seite bemüht war, sich der strengen Methodik des kritischen Idealismus einzufügen und sich ihr gewachsen zu zeigen. Indem Humboldt mit diesen beiden ideellen Voraussetzungen und Forderungen an die Mannigfaltigkeit des empirischen Materials, an die Fülle der sprachgeschichtlichen Tatsachen herantrat, erschloß sich ihm erst der innere Reichtum dieser Tatsache wie die einheitliche geistige Form, die sie zusammenhält.

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3.

Die philosophische Gesamtanschauung Humboldts wird im allgemeinen durch zwei verschiedene Gesichtspunkte und Tendenzen bestimmt. Steinthal hat sie als »Kantisierten Spinozismus« bezeichnet: aber diese bezeichnende und prägnante Formel drückt den Gegensatz, der hier zu Grunde liegt, weder nach der systematischen noch nach der geschichtlichen Seite hin vollkommen treffend aus. Denn wenn Humboldt sich Spinoza zuzuneigen scheint, so ist es doch niemals die originale Grundgestaltung der Spinozistischen Ethik, sondern immer nur der Spinoza des 18. und des beginnenden 19. Jahrhunderts; der Spinoza, der sich in Herders »Gott« darstellte, den er hierbei vor Augen hat. Humboldt sieht den menschlichen Geist und seine Entwicklung überall hineingestellt in ein dynamisches All-

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Leben der Natur: und diese Anschauung führt ihn häufig bis an die Schwelle der Alleinheitslehre, bis zu Schellings metaphysischer Fassung der Identitätsphilosophie weiter.[7]) Aber sobald er einmal bis zu diesem Punkt vorgedrungen ist, sieht er sich von ihm auch alsbald wieder zurückgetrieben. Denn nicht die Anschauung des Universums, wie sie Schelling verkündet, sondern die Anschauung der Individualität ist es doch, die seine eigentümliche Kraft und seine eigentümliche Genialität ausmacht. Und hier sucht und findet er die Hilfe Kants. Kants kritische Grenzbestimmung wie sein eigenes unvertilgbares Gefühl für Individualität bewahrt ihn davor, das Bewußtsein des Ich im Bewußtsein des Alls aufgehen zu lassen. Und jetzt sucht er nach einem Medium, in dem sich die beiden entgegengesetzten Momente, zwischen denen sich sein Denken bewegt, wechselseitig durchdringen, in dem Endliches und Unendliches, in dem die Besonderheit des geistigen Seins und die Universalität eines geistigen Lebens und einer geistigen Bedeutung ineinander übergehen. Diese seine gedankliche Forderung sieht er erst in der Sprache wahrhaft erfüllt. In ihr wird die wahrhafte Synthese und die echte Versöhnung der großen metaphysischen Grundgegensätze erreicht. In ihr stellt sich der Geist in seiner reinsten Besonderung und in seiner vollkommensten Allgemeinheit, als ein zugleich Begrenztes und Unbegrenztes, als ein zugleich Freies und Notwendiges dar. Hier erst zeigt sich daher nach Humboldt jenes Ideal eines Konkret-Allgemeinen, mit welchem die gesamte Nachkantische Spekulation ringt, wahrhaft erreicht: hier ist ein Allgemeines, das nicht willkürlich in der begrifflichen Reflexion ersonnen wird, sondern das sich in der individuellen geistigen Entwicklung selbst als ihr immanentes Ziel und zugleich als ihre treibende geistige Kraft darstellt.

»Die Sprache« — so drückt Steinthal dieses Verhältnis aus — »ist einerseits das Band der Individuen, welches sie aneinander und an die unendliche Urkraft bindet; und sie ist andrerseits das individualisierende Prinzip welches die Urkraft in die Wirklichkeit der Erscheinungen und in die geschichtliche Entwicklung versenkt.« (Steinthal - Humboldt S. 14, s. Anm. 5). Schon Humboldts erste sprachwissenschaftliche Abhandlung, seine, Ankündigung einer Schrift über die Vaskische Sprache und Nation', rückt diesen Gesichtspunkt in den Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung. »Die Sprache ist überall Vermittlerin, erst zwischen der unendlichen und endlichen Natur, dann zwischen einem und dem andren Individuum: zugleich und durch denselben Akt macht sie die Vereinigung möglich, und entsteht aus derselben Ihre Betrachtung, die jedoch, um nicht chimärisch zu werden, von der ganz trockenen, sogar mechanischen Zergliederung des Körperlichen und Konstruktierbaren in ihr anfangen muß, führt also bis in die letzten Tiefen der Menschheit. Man muß sich nur durchaus von der Idee losmachen, daß sie sich so von demjenigen, was sie bezeichnet, absondern lasse, wie z. B. der Name eines Menschen von seiner Person, und daß sie, gleich einer verabredeten Chiffre, ein Erzeugnis der Reflexion und der Übereinkunft, oder überhaupt das Werk des Menschen (wie man den Begriff in der Erfahrung nimmt) oder gar des Einzelnen sei. Als ein wahres, unerklärliches Wunder bricht sie aus dem Munde einer Nation, und als ein nicht minder staunenswertes, wenngleich täglich unter uns wiederholtes, und mit Gleichgültigkeit übersehenes, aus dem Lallen jedes Kindes hervor und ist ... die leuchtendste Spur und der sicherste Beweis, daß der Mensch nicht eine a n s i c h abgesonderte Individualität besitzt, daß I c h und D u nicht bloß sich wechselseitig fordernde, sondern, wenn man bis zu dem Punkte der Trennung zurückgehen könnte, wahrhaft identische Begriffe sind, und daß es in diesem Sinn Kreise der Individualität gibt, von dem schwachen, hilfsbedürftigen und hinfälligen Einzelnen hin bis zum uralten Stamme der Menschheit, weil sonst alles Verstehen bis in alle Ewigkeit hin unmöglich sein würde.« (Steintahl-Humboldt, S. 18).

Diese erste Bestimmung der Sprache, die Humboldt gibt, scheint freilich noch ganz der Betrachtungs- und Denkweise der dogmatischen Metaphysik anzugehören. Der Logos, der in der Sprache wirksam ist, dient als Ausgangspunkt und Mittel, um auf eine letzte transzendente Ureinheit zu schließen, die jenseits aller empirischen Trennungen liegt. Die Sprache wird als Zeuge für die pantheistische Ansicht der Welt und des Geistes aufgerufen. Aber Humboldt bleibt bei dieser ersten Anschauung nicht stehen, sondern sie gestaltet sich ihm in dem Maße um, als der neue *kritische Objektbegriff* Kants von ihm Besitz ergreift. Was diesen Objektbegriff charakterisiert, ist vor allem die Einsicht, daß von einem Objekt der Erkenntnis immer nur im Zusammenhang mit einer *Funktion* der Erkenntnis und korrelativ zu ihr gesprochen werden kann. Der Gegenstand ist als Gegenstand des Wissens, als Gegenstand der Erscheinung nicht »an sich« bestimmt, sondern seine Bestimmung erwächst ihm successiv durch die Produktivität des Geistes. Die Richtung dieser Produktivität, — die Kategorien, die in dieser Arbeit des Geistes bestimmend und wirksam sind: dies ergibt erst den neuen, den transzendentalen Begriff der Gegenständlichkeit

eigentümliche Kraft und seine eigentümliche Genialität ausmacht. Und hier sucht und findet er die Hilfe Kants. Kants kritische Grenzbestimmung wie sein eigenes unvertilgbares Gefühl für Individualität bewahrt ihn davor, das Bewußtsein des Ich im Bewußtsein des Alls aufgehen zu lassen. Und jetzt sucht er nach einem Medium, in dem sich die beiden entgegengesetzten Momente, zwischen denen sich sein Denken bewegt, wechselseitig durchdringen, in dem Endliches und Unendliches, in dem die Besonderheit des geistigen Seins und die Universalität eines geistigen Lebens und einer geistigen Bedeutung ineinander übergehen. Diese seine gedankliche Forderung sieht er erst in der Sprache wahrhaft erfüllt. In ihr wird die wahrhafte Synthese und die echte Versöhnung der großen metaphysischen Grundgegensätze erreicht. In ihr stellt sich der Geist in seiner reinsten Besonderung und in seiner vollkommensten Allgemeinheit, als ein zugleich Begrenztes und Unbegrenztes, als ein zugleich Freies und Notwendiges dar. Hier erst zeigt sich daher nach Humboldt jenes Ideal eines Konkret-Allgemeinen, mit welchem die gesamte Nachkantische Spekulation ringt, wahrhaft erreicht: hier ist ein Allgemeines, das nicht willkürlich in der begrifflichen Reflexion ersonnen wird, sondern das sich in der individuellen geistigen Entwicklung selbst als ihr immanentes Ziel und zugleich als ihre treibende geistige Kraft darstellt.

»Die Sprache« — so drückt Steinthal dieses Verhältnis aus — »ist einerseits das Band der Individuen, welches sie aneinander und an die unendliche Urkraft bindet; und sie ist andrerseits das individualisierende Prinzip welches die Urkraft in die Wirklichkeit der Erscheinungen und in die geschichtliche Entwicklung versenkt.« (Steinthal - Humboldt S. 14, s. Anm. 5). Schon Humboldts erste sprachwissenschaftliche Abhandlung, seine, Ankündigung einer Schrift über die Vaskische Sprache und Nation', rückt diesen Gesichtspunkt in den Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung. »Die Sprache ist überall Vermittlerin, erst zwischen der unendlichen und endlichen Natur, dann zwischen einem und dem andren Individuum: zugleich und durch denselben Akt macht sie die Vereinigung möglich, und entsteht aus derselben Ihre Betrachtung, die jedoch, um nicht chimärisch zu werden, von der ganz trockenen, sogar mechanischen Zergliederung des Körperlichen und Konstruktierbaren in ihr anfangen muß, führt also bis in die letzten Tiefen der Menschheit. Man muß sich nur durchaus von der Idee losmachen, daß sie sich so von demjenigen, was sie bezeichnet, absondern lasse, wie z. B. der Name eines Menschen von seiner Person, und daß sie, gleich einer verabredeten Chiffre, ein Erzeugnis der Reflexion und der Übereinkunft, oder überhaupt das Werk des Menschen (wie man den Begriff in der Erfahrung nimmt) oder gar des Einzelnen sei. Als ein wahres, unerklärliches Wunder bricht sie aus dem Munde einer Nation, und als ein nicht minder staunenswertes, wenngleich täglich unter uns wiederholtes, und mit Gleichgültigkeit übersehenes, aus dem Lallen jedes Kindes hervor und ist ... die leuchtendste Spur und der sicherste Beweis, daß der Mensch nicht eine a n s i c h abgesonderte Individualität besitzt, daß I c h und D u nicht bloß sich wechselseitig fordernde, sondern, wenn man bis zu dem Punkte der Trennung zurückgehen könnte, wahrhaft identische Begriffe sind, und daß es in diesem Sinn Kreise der Individualität gibt, von dem schwachen, hilfsbedürftigen und hinfälligen Einzelnen hin bis zum uralten Stamme der Menschheit, weil sonst alles Verstehen bis in alle Ewigkeit hin unmöglich sein würde.« (Steintahl-Humboldt, S. 18).

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»Im Grunde ist alles, was ich treibe,« — so schrieb er im Jahre 1805 an Wolf — »... Sprachstudium. Ich glaube die Kunst entdeckt zu haben, die Sprache als ein Vehikel zu gebrauchen, um das Höchste und Tiefste und die Mannigfaltigkeit der ganzen Welt zu durchfahren.« Und merkwürdig: — als ein solches Vehikel der Erkenntnis hatte auch die ‚Kritik der reinen Vernunft' an einer freilich vereinzelten, aber umso wichtigeren und bedeutsameren Stelle die Sprache gebraucht. Wo Kant von der entscheidenden Leistung des Urteils im Prozeß der Objektivierung spricht, da zieht er als Beispiel die Funktion des Satzes und der Copula im Satze heran. Durch die Copula im Satze, durch das »Verhältniswörtchen ist« sollen Subjekt und Prädikat nicht nur äußerlich verbunden, sondern in eine Beziehung objektiv notwendiger Einheit und objektiv notwendiger Verknüpfung gesetzt werden. Sage ich: der Körper ist schwer, so besteht der Inhalt dieser Aussage nicht darin, daß sich die Vorstellung des Körpers und ein bestimmtes Tast- und Muskelgefühl, das ich als Schwere bezeichne, nur subjektiv, nur in mir, und nur hier und jetzt in einem einzelnen Augenblick, zusammenfinden, sondern daß beides nach einem allgemeinen Gesetz zu einander gehört — daß die Schwere in der »Natur« des Körpers irgendwie gegründet ist.[8]) Hier wird also eine einzelne sprachliche Erscheinung, eine bestimmte sprachliche Form von Kant unmittelbar als Träger einer kategorialen Form, als Ausdruck eines logisch-sachlichen Bedeutungsverhältnisses gedacht. Humboldts Methode der Sprachphilosophie besteht darin, daß er dieses Verfahren nicht nur allseitig erweitert und vertieft, daß er es nicht nur auf das Ganze der sprachlichen Phänomene überträgt, sondern daß er sich auch von seinen Gründen und von seiner Möglichkeit erschöpfende Rechenschaft zu geben versucht. Auch für ihn, wie für Kant wird der Begriff der *Synthesis* zum eigentlichen Haupt- und Leitbegriff. Auch für ihn ist die Synthesis nicht eine Verknüpfung, die sich an fertigen und gegebenen Gegenständen vollzieht, sondern sie ist die Grundbedingung der gegenständlichen Setzung, der Setzung eines Etwas als eines Gegenstandes. Diese ihre Eigenart findet er in der Sprache mit besonderer Schärfe und Deutlichkeit ausgeprägt. Denn sie ist, im einzelnen Wort und in der verbundenen Rede, ein Akt, eine wahrhaft schöpferische Handlung des Geistes. Begriff und Laut werden als Wort und als Rede hinausgestellt und dadurch zwischen der Außenwelt und dem Geiste etwas von beiden Unterschiedenes geschaffen.[9]) Die Sprache entspringt der Subjektivität, ja der Individualität des Redenden; aber doch wird andererseits in ihr die Subjektivität der ganzen Menschheit in sich zu etwas Objektivem. »Die ursprüngliche Übereinstimmung zwischen der Welt und dem Menschen, auf welcher die Möglichkeit aller Erkenntnis der Wahrheit beruht, wird also auch auf dem Weg der Erscheinung stückweise und fortschreitens wiedergewonnen. Denn immer bleibt das Objektive das eigentlich zu Erringende.«[10])

Das ist der Gedanke, durch den Humboldt fortan dauernd mit der Grundlegung des kritischen Idealismus verknüpft bleibt: daß das Objektive nicht das Gegebene, sondern das erst zu Erringende, nicht das an sich Bestimmte, sondern das zu Bestimmende ist. Weil diese Grundbestimmung sich, sprachlich angesehen, im Satz vollzieht: darum behauptet Humboldts Sprachphilosophie ebenso den Primat des Satzes vor dem Wort, wie Kants transzendentale Logik den Primat des Urteils gegenüber dem Begriff behauptet hatte. Der Satz, nicht das Wort, ist die primäre sprachliche Äußerung, da jede noch so unvollständige Aussage in der Absicht des Sprechenden wirklich einen geschlossenen Gedanken ausmacht. Von ihm und seiner eigentümlichen Struktur ist daher in der Analyse und Charakteristik der Einzelsprachen wie der Sprache überhaupt, stets auszugehen. (Kawiwer VII, 143 s. Anm. 9). »Man kann sich unmöglich die Entstehung der Sprache als von der Bezeichnung der Gegenstände durch Wörter beginnend und von da zur Zusammenfügung übergehend denken. In der Wirklichkeit wird die Rede nicht aus ihr vorangegangenen Wörtern zusammengesetzt, sondern die Wörter gehen umgekehrt aus dem Ganzen der Rede hervor.« (Kawiwerk VII. 72). Erst die nachträgliche Reflexion ist es, die diese Einheit des Sinnes, die im Satz lebendig und unmittelbar dargestellt ist in grammatisch geschiedene Elemente und in abgesonderte Worteinheiten zerlegt.[11]) Was aber die Satzeinheit selbst betrifft, so ist sie wiederum nicht als bloßer Abdruck eines im Bewußtsein des Sprechenden bereits gegebene und feststehenden Sinnes, sondern als eine Weise und ein Vehikel der Sinngebung selbst, so ist sie als ein Prozeß zu denken, in dem die geistige Bedeutung selbst erst wird und hervorgeht. Damit haben wir Humboldts bekannteste und berühmteste, wenngleich keineswegs immer voll gewürdigte Begriffsbestimmung der Sprache erreicht. Die Sprache ist nicht sowohl wie ein totes Erzeugtes, sondern weit mehr wie eine Erzeugung anzusehen. Wir müssen weit mehr von demjenigen abstrahieren, was sie als Bezeichnung der Gegenstände und Vermittlung des Verständnisses wirkt, und dagegen sorgfältiger auf ihren gegenseitigen

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Und wie der Gesamtcharakter der Sprache im eigentlichen Sinne immer nur in dem Akt ihres wirklichen Hervorbringens liegt; — so gilt dies auch bis in ihre Besonderungen, ja bis in ihre Einzelheiten hinein. Die Sprachen sind, im Ganzen wie im Einzelnen nicht eigentlich Mittel, die schon erkannte Wahrheit darzustellen, sondern weit mehr, die vorher unerkannte zu entdecken. »Ihre Verschiedenheit ist nicht eine von Lauten und Zeichen, sondern eine Verschiedenheit der Weltansichten selbst.

Hierin ist der Grund und der letzte Zweck aller Sprachuntersuchung enthalten.« (Steinthal-Humboldt, S. 60 s. Anm. 10). Die Vorstellung hingegen, »daß die verschiedenen Sprachen nur dieselbe Masse der unabhängig von ihnen vorhandenen Gegenstände und Begriffe bezeichnen, ist die dem Sprachstudium eigentlich verderbliche, — ist diejenige, welche die Ausdehnung der Sprachkenntnis verhindert und die wirklich vorhandenen tot und unfruchtbar macht.«[12]) Jeder Sprache ist — sofern sie nicht tote Seinsform, sondern Lebensform sein will; — sofern sich in ihr nicht ein bloßer dinglicher Bestand, sondern die Tätigkeit und Energie des Geistes ausdrückt — notwendig Subjektivität beigemischt; aber diese Subjektivität steht selbst auf dem Wege, sich zum Allgemeinen zu erheben und damit ins Objektive — d. h. ins gesetzlich Bestimmte — überzugehen.

»Auch bei der Betrachtung des durch die Sprache Erzeugten« — so führt Humboldt in der Vorrede zum Kawi-Werk aus — »wird die Vorstellungsart, als bezeichne sie bloß die schon an sich wahrgenommenen Gegenstände nicht bestätigt. Man würde vielmehr niemals durch sie den vollen und tiefen Gehalt der Sprache erschöpfen. Wie, ohne diese, kein Begriff möglich ist, so kann es auch für die Seele kein Gegenstand sein, da ja selbst jeder äußere nur vermittelst des Begriffes für sie vollendete Wesenheit erhält. In die Bildung und in den Gebrauch der Sprache geht aber notwendig die ganze Art der subjektiven Wahrnehmung der Gegenstände über. Denn das Wort entsteht eben aus dieser Wahrnehmung, ist nicht ein Abdruck des Gegenstandes an sich, sondern des von diesem in der Seele erzeugten Bildes. Da aller objektiven Wahrnehmung unvermeidlich Subjektivität beigemischt ist, so kann man, schon unabhängig von der Sprache, jede menschliche Individualität als einen eigenen Standpunkt der Weltansicht betrachten. Sie wird aber noch viel mehr dazu durch die Sprache, da das Wort sich der Seele gegenüber auch wieder ... mit einem Zusatz von Selbstbedeutung zum Objekt macht und eine neue Eigentümlichkeit hinzubringt. ... Wie der einzelne Laut zwischen den Gegenstand und den Menschen, so tritt die ganze Sprache zwischen ihn und die innerlich und äußerlich auf ihn einwirkende Natur. Er umgibt sich mit einer Welt von Lauten, um die Welt von Gegenständen in sich aufzunehmen und zu bearbeiten. Diese Ausdrücke überschreiten auf keine Weise das Maß der einfachen Wahrheit. Der Mensch lebt mit den Gegenständen hauptsächlich, ja, da Empfinden und Handeln in ihm von seinen Vorstellungen abhängen, sogar ausschließlich so, wie die Sprache sie ihm zuführt.«

Dennoch wird andererseits der Gedanke, eben dadurch, daß er in Sprache aufgenommen und zur Sprache geformt wird, für die Seele wieder zum Objekt und übt auf sie eine ihr fremde Wirkung aus. Jetzt tritt demnach die entgegengesetzte Ansicht ein: die Sprache ist gerade insofern objektiv einwirkend und selbständig, als sie subjektiv gewirkt und abhängig ist. Gerade in dem Akt ihrer Erzeugung liegt es, sie ebenso wiederum zum Objekt zu machen. Die wahre Lösung dieses Gegensatzes aber liegt in der Einheit der menschlichen Natur. »Was aus dem stammt, was eigentlich mit mir Eins ist, darin gehen die Begriffe des Subjekts und Objekts, der Abhängigkeit und Unabhängigkeit ineinander über. Die Sprache gehört mir an, weil ich sie so hervorbringe, als ich tue; und da der Grund hiervon zugleich in dem Sprechen und Gesprochenhaben aller Menschengeschlechter liegt ... so ist es die Sprache selbst, von der ich dabei Einschränkung erfahre. Allein was mich in ihr beschränkt und bestimmt, ist in sie aus menschlicher, mit mir innerlich zusammenhängender Natur gekommen, und das Fremde in ihr ist daher dies nur für meine augenblicklich individuelle, nicht meine ursprünglich wahre Natur.« (Wawi-Werk, VII, 59). Wieder tritt in dieser Auffassung die volle Geltung des neuen kritischen Objektivitätsbegriffs bei Humboldt hervor. Die wahre geistige Objektivität eignet nicht einem von uns unabhängigen Seienden, oder auch nur dem von uns Erzeugten, sondern sie wurzelt in der Art und in der allgemeingültigen Gesetzlichkeit des Erzeugens selbst. In dieser Gesetzlichkeit der Synthesis, als allumfassendem Prinzip, werden mit einem Schlage die beiden Momente des Gegensatzes, wird die Welt des Subjektiven und des Objektiven geschaffen. Der Geist schafft, stellt sich aber das Geschaffene durch denselben Akt gegenüber und läßt es als Objekt auf sich zurückwirken. (Kawi-Werk, VII, 213). Jetzt ist die Sprache als Schöpfung anerkannt — aber sie ist zugleich von jeder subjektiven Willkür gelöst, wie sie ihr in den Theorien der absichtlichen Spracherfindung, die das 17.

zu entdecken. »Ihre Verschiedenheit ist nicht eine von Lauten und Zeichen, sondern eine Verschiedenheit der Weltansichten selbst.
Hierin ist der Grund und der letzte Zweck aller Sprachuntersuchung enthalten.« (Steinthal-Humboldt, S. 60 s. Anm. 10). Die Vorstellung hingegen, »daß die verschiedenen Sprachen nur dieselbe Masse der unabhängig von ihnen vorhandenen Gegenstände und Begriffe bezeichnen, ist die dem Sprachstudium eigentlich verderbliche, — ist diejenige, welche die Ausdehnung der Sprachkenntnis verhindert und die wirklich vorhandenen tot und unfruchtbar macht.«[12]) Jeder Sprache ist — sofern sie nicht tote Seinsform, sondern Lebensform sein will; — sofern sich in ihr nicht ein bloßer dinglicher Bestand, sondern die Tätigkeit und Energie des Geistes ausdrückt — notwendig Subjektivität beigemischt; aber diese Subjektivität steht selbst auf dem Wege, sich zum Allgemeinen zu erheben und damit ins Objektive — d. h. ins gesetzlich Bestimmte — überzugehen.
»Auch bei der Betrachtung des durch die Sprache Erzeugten« — so führt Humboldt in der Vorrede zum Kawi-Werk aus — »wird die Vorstellungsart, als bezeichne sie bloß die schon an sich wahrgenommenen Gegenstände nicht bestätigt. Man würde vielmehr niemals durch sie den vollen und tiefen Gehalt der Sprache erschöpfen. Wie, ohne diese, kein Begriff möglich ist, so kann es auch für die Seele kein Gegenstand sein, da ja selbst jeder äußere nur vermittelst des Begriffes für sie vollendete Wesenheit erhält. In die Bildung und in den Gebrauch der Sprache geht aber notwendig die ganze Art der subjektiven Wahrnehmung der Gegenstände über. Denn das Wort entsteht eben aus dieser Wahrnehmung, ist nicht ein Abdruck des Gegenstandes an sich, sondern des von diesem in der Seele erzeugten Bildes. Da aller objektiven Wahrnehmung unvermeidlich Subjektivität beigemischt ist, so kann man, schon unabhängig von der Sprache, jede menschliche Individualität als einen eigenen Standpunkt der Weltansicht betrachten. Sie wird aber noch viel mehr dazu durch die Sprache, da das Wort sich der Seele gegenüber auch wieder ... mit einem Zusatz von Selbstbedeutung zum Objekt macht und eine neue Eigentümlichkeit hinzubringt. ... Wie der einzelne Laut zwischen den Gegenstand und den Menschen, so tritt die ganze Sprache zwischen ihn und die innerlich und äußerlich auf ihn einwirkende Natur. Er umgibt sich mit einer Welt von Lauten, um die Welt von Gegenständen in sich aufzunehmen und zu bearbeiten. Diese Ausdrücke überschreiten auf keine Weise das Maß der einfachen Wahrheit. Der Mensch lebt mit den Gegenständen hauptsächlich, ja, da Empfinden und Handeln in ihm von seinen Vorstellungen abhängen, sogar ausschließlich so, wie die Sprache sie ihm zuführt.«
Dennoch wird andererseits der Gedanke, eben dadurch, daß er in Sprache aufgenommen und zur Sprache geformt wird, für die Seele wieder zum Objekt und übt auf sie eine ihr fremde Wirkung aus. Jetzt tritt demnach die entgegengesetzte Ansicht ein: die Sprache ist gerade insofern objektiv einwirkend und selbständig, als sie subjektiv gewirkt und abhängig ist. Gerade in dem Akt ihrer Erzeugung liegt es, sie ebenso wiederum zum Objekt zu machen. Die wahre Lösung dieses Gegensatzes aber liegt in der Einheit der menschlichen Natur. »Was aus dem stammt, was eigentlich mit mir Eins ist, darin gehen die Begriffe des Subjekts und Objekts, der Abhängigkeit und Unabhängigkeit ineinander über. Die Sprache gehört mir an, weil ich sie so hervorbringe, als ich tue; und da der Grund hiervon zugleich in dem Sprechen und Gesprochenhaben aller Menschengeschlechter liegt ... so ist es die Sprache selbst, von der ich dabei Einschränkung erfahre. Allein was mich in ihr beschränkt und bestimmt, ist in sie aus menschlicher, mit mir innerlich zusammenhängender Natur gekommen, und das Fremde in ihr ist daher dies nur für meine augenblicklich individuelle, nicht meine ursprünglich wahre Natur.« (Wawi-Werk, VII, 59). Wieder tritt in dieser Auffassung die volle Geltung des neuen kritischen Objektivitätsbegriffs bei Humboldt hervor. Die wahre geistige Objektivität eignet nicht einem von uns unabhängigen Seienden, oder auch nur dem von uns Erzeugten, sondern sie wurzelt in der Art und in der allgemeingültigen Gesetzlichkeit des Erzeugens selbst. In dieser Gesetzlichkeit der Synthesis, als allumfassendem Prinzip, werden mit einem Schlage die beiden Momente des Gegensatzes, wird die Welt des Subjektiven und des Objektiven geschaffen. Der Geist schafft, stellt sich aber das Geschaffene durch denselben Akt gegenüber und läßt es als Objekt auf sich zurückwirken. (Kawi-Werk, VII, 213). Jetzt ist die Sprache als Schöpfung anerkannt — aber sie ist zugleich von jeder subjektiven Willkür gelöst, wie sie ihr in den Theorien der absichtlichen Spracherfindung, die das 17. und 18. Jahrhundert beherrschten, zugesprochen wurde. Sie ist nicht mehr ein Erzeugnis der Reflexion und Übereinkunft, wenngleich sie ein Werk der Freiheit ist — sondern sie ist Erzeugnis einer Freiheit, die sich selbst ihr Gesetz gibt und die dadurch zugleich die Sphäre der Notwendigen, als ihr Gegenbild und Korrelat erschafft.
Alle diese Bestimmungen fassen sich schließlich für Humboldt in den komplexen und vielumstrittenen Begriff der »inneren Sprachform« zusammen. Diese Form entspricht dem neuen Begriff der Objektivität, den Humboldt errungen hat, denn sie drückt keine irgendwie dingliche, sondern eine rein funktionale Beschaffenheit und Bestimmtheit aus. Das in der *Arbeit des Geistes*, den artikulierten Laut zum Gedankenausdruck zu erheben liegende Beständige und Gleichförmige, so vollständig als möglich in seinem Zusammenhange aufgefaßt und systematisch dargestellt, macht nach Humboldt die Form der Sprachen aus. Diese offenbart sich nicht nur in der allgemeinen Struktur, in dem, was wir den grammatischen Bau der Sprachen nennen, sondern sie tritt bis in die individuellen Besonderungen der Bezeichnung,

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die als solche stets zugleich Besonderungen der Auffassung sind, hervor. Selbst bei äußeren, körperlichen, geradezu durch die Sinne wahrnehmbaren Gegenständen ist ja nach allem, was sich bisher ergeben, das Wort nicht das Aequivalent des den Sinnen vorschwebenden Gegenstandes, sondern der Auffassung desselben durch die Spracherzeugung. »Wenn z. B. im Sanskrit der Elephant bald der zweimal Trinkende, bald der Zweizahnige, bald der mit einer Hand Versehene heißt, so sind dadurch, wenn auch immer derselbe Gegenstand gemeint ist, ebenso viele verschiedene Begriffe bezeichnet. Denn die Sprache stellt niemals die Gegenstände, sondern immer die durch den Geist in der Spracherzeugung selbsttätig von ihnen gebildeten Begriffe dar; und von dieser Bildung, insofern sie als ganz innerlich, gleichsam dem Artikulationssinne vorausgehend angesehen wird, ist hier die Rede.« (Kawi-Werk, VII, 89). So leistet der *Begriff der inneren Sprachform* auf dem Gebiet der Sprachphilosophie dasselbe, was der allgemeine *Begriff der Form* für die kritische Erkenntnislehre zu leisten hat: er stellt die endgültige Abwehr der bloßen Nachahmungs- und Abbildungstheorie dar, in dem er die Bestimmung des Gegenstandes von der Art seiner gedanklichen Erfassung abhängig und in ihr gegründet sein läßt.

Und noch in einem anderen Sinne läßt sich die Analogie aufweisen, die in der Anwendung des Begriffspaares »Stoff« und »Form«, zwischen Humboldt und Kant besteht. Für Kant ist die Form ein bloßer Verhältnisausdruck, aber sie macht eben darum zugleich das eigentlich objektivierende Prinzip aus: — denn eben dies bezeichnet das Objekt im kritischen Sinne, bezeichnet den »Gegenstand in der Erscheinung«, daß er »ganz und gar aus Verhältnissen besteht. Der sinnliche Eindruck als solcher und die Summe solcher Eindrücke würde für sich nur einen unbestimmten Gegenstand ergeben: — die wahrhafte Bestimmung, die Gestaltung zum Gegenstand wird erst durch die kategoriale Formung, insbesondere durch die Kategorien der Relation als die grundlegenden Verhältnisbegriffe, die »Analogien der Erfahrung«, erreicht. Man darf erwarten, daß dieser logische Sachverhalt auch in dem Bau der Sprache seine Bestätigung und seinen korrelativen Ausdruck finden werde. Und in der Tat sehen wir, nach Humboldt, in allen wahrhaft durchgebildeten Sprachen die Trennung zwischen Stoff und Form, zwischen dem Dingbestandteil und dem Relationsbestandteil, vollzogen und doch auf der anderen Seite beide zu reiner Einheit zusammengefaßt. Zu dem Akte der Bezeichnung des Begriffs durch eine Anzahl inhaltlicher und gegenständlicher Merkmale gesellt sich in der Sprache noch eine eigene Arbeit, durch die er in eine bestimmte Kategorie des Denkens oder Redens versetzt (also z. B. als Substanz oder als Eigenschaft bestimmt) wird. Der volle Sinn des Wortes geht nur zugleich aus jenem Begriffsausdruck und dieser modifizierenden Andeutung hervor. »Diese beiden Elemente aber liegen in ganz verschiedenen Sphären. Die Bezeichnung des Begriffs gehört dem immer mehr objektiven Verfahren des Sprachsinnes an. Die Versetzung desselben in eine bestimmte Kategorie des Denkens ist ein neuer Akt des sprachlichen Selbstbewußtseins, durch welchen der einzelne Fall, das individuelle Wort, auf die Gesamtheit der möglichen Fälle in der Sprache oder Rede bezogen wird. Erst durch diese, in möglichster Reinheit und Tiefe vollendete und der Sprache selbst fest einverleibte Operation verbindet sich in derselben, in der gehörigen Verschmelzung und Unterordnung, ihre selbständige, aus dem Denken entspringende und ihre mehr den äußeren Eindrücken in reiner Empfänglichkeit folgende Tätigkeit.«[13]) Wie für Kant geht daher für Humboldt der Stoff auf die Rezeptivität der Sinne, die Form auf die reine Spontaneität des Denkens zurück. Wie für diesen ist die Form dasjenige, was nicht im Objekt (als dem »Ding an sich«) vorgefunden wird, sondern »vom Subjekt selbst verrichtet« werden muß — aber diese Verrichtung erfolgt selbst nach einer allgemein gültigen Regel und besitzt demgemäß in ihrer Idealität zugleich realisierende Bedeutung. Indem der Einzelinhalt, kraft der sprachlichen Formgebung, nicht als solcher bezeichnet, sondern auf das Ganze der möglichen Inhalte bezogen und gemäß seiner Stellung in diesem Ganzen charakterisiert wird, wird er in dieser Beziehung auf die Einheit des denkenden Selbstbewußtseins auch erst nach seinem gegenständlichen Gehalt vollständig bestimmt. Die Vollkommenheit der Bezeichnung und der Sprache überhaupt besteht nach Humboldt darin, daß beide Bestimmungen auch dem äußeren Ausdruck nach nicht getrennt werden, sondern daß sie, wie sie sachlich und gedanklich ein und denselben Akt ausmachen, auch lautlich vollkommen in eins gefaßt werden.

Dieses Sprachideal sieht er vor allem in den flektierenden Sprachen erreicht. Denn die Flexion darf mit bloß mechanischer Anfügung des Formbestandteils an den Stoffbestandteil, des des Beziehungsausdrucks an den Bedeutungsausdruck nicht verwechselt werden, sondern stellt eine reine Synthesis beider, eine wechselseitige Bestimmung zwischen ihnen dar. Die Flexion unterscheidet Bedeutung und Beziehung, indem sie beide dennoch zu einem sprachlichen Ganzen, zu einer Worteinheit verknüpft — und sie

der Elephant bald der zweimal Trinkende, bald der Zweizahnige, bald der mit einer Hand Versehene heißt, so sind dadurch, wenn auch immer derselbe Gegenstand gemeint ist, ebenso viele verschiedene Begriffe bezeichnet. Denn die Sprache stellt niemals die Gegenstände, sondern immer die durch den Geist in der Spracherzeugung selbsttätig von ihnen gebildeten Begriffe dar; und von dieser Bildung, insofern sie als ganz innerlich, gleichsam dem Artikulationssinne vorausgehend angesehen wird, ist hier die Rede.« (Kawi-Werk, VII, 89). So leistet der *Begriff der inneren Sprachform* auf dem Gebiet der Sprachphilosophie dasselbe, was der allgemeine *Begriff der Form* für die kritische Erkenntnislehre zu leisten hat: er stellt die endgültige Abwehr der bloßen Nachahmungs- und Abbildungstheorie dar, in dem er die Bestimmung des Gegenstandes von der Art seiner gedanklichen Erfassung abhängig und in ihr gegründet sein läßt.

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Aber diesen verbalen Stoffwurzeln, die gleichsam erzählender oder beschreibender Natur sind, weil sie Bewegungen, Eigenschaften und Gegenstände an sich, ohne Beziehung auf eine anzunehmende oder gefühlte Persönlichkeit bezeichnen, stehen nun andere Sprachelemente gegenüber, bei denen gerade der Ausdruck der Persönlichkeit oder die schlichte Beziehung auf dieselbe das ausschließliche Wesen der Bedeutung ausmacht. (Kawi-Werk, VII, 103). In einer eigenen Abhandlung ‚über die Verwandtschaft der Ortsadverbien mit dem Pronomen in einigen Sprachen' hat Humboldt zu zeigen versucht, daß diese subjektiven Wurzeln die ursprünglichen in jeder Sprache sein müssen und daß es eine ganz unrichtige Vorstellung sei, das Pronomen als den spätesten Redeteil in der Sprache anzusehen. Hier habe eine eng grammatische Vorstellungsart, nach welcher das Pronomen nur die Vorstellung des Nomen bedeuten soll, die tiefer aus der Sprache geschöpfte Ansicht verdrängt. »Das Erste ist natürlich die Persönlichkeit des Sprechenden selbst, der in beständiger unmittelbarer Berührung mit der Natur steht und unmöglich unterlassen kann, auch in der Sprache ihr den Ausdruck seines Ichs gegenüberzustellen. Im Ich aber ist von selbst auch das Du gegeben, und durch einen neuen Gegensatz entsteht die dritte Person, die sich aber, da nun der Kreis der Fühlenden und Sprechenden verlassen wird, auch zur toten Sache erweitert.«(Kawi-Werk, VII, 103 f, vgl. auch VI, 304 ff). Wie die kritische Erkenntnislehre das l o g i s c h e Prius der Form vor dem Stoff, der reinen Beziehung vor dem dinglich-substantiellen Sein zu begründen sucht — so sucht Humboldt zu zeigen, wie auch die Sprache diesen Weg von innen nach außen, von der Beziehung zum Sein durchläuft. Aber auch ihm handelt es sich im Grunde nur um das nicht um das — um einen sachlichen Geltungsunterschied in den einzelnen Momenten, auf denen alle Sprachbildung beruht, nicht um die Bestimmung der Reihenfolge ihres gesonderten zeitlichen Hervortretens. Denn insbesondere die objektiven Wurzeln können nicht als reale, für sich bestehende Elemente der Sprache angesehen werden, sondern sie tragen deutlich das Ansehen der Entstehung durch Analyse an sich; die wahre Sprache aber ist doch nur die in der Rede sich offenbarende und die wirkliche Spracherfindung läßt sich nicht auf demselben Wege abwärts schreitend denken, den die Analyse aufwärts verfolgt. — (Kannwerke, VII, 105)

Auch in den Einzelheiten von Humboldts Sprachtheorie macht sich die beherrschende Stellung geltend, die er einerseits dem Verbum, als dem Träger der subjektiven Beziehung zuschreibt. Im Verbum spricht sich der »Akt des der sbjektiven Beziehung zuschreibt. Im Verbum spricht sich der »Akt des synthetischen Setzens«, auf dem die geistige Eigenart der Sprache als solche beruht, am deutlichsten und kräftigsten aus. Es bezeichnet und enthält gleichsam diesen Akt selbst in seiner reinen Prägung auf von allen zufälligen Nebenumständen losgelöst. Das Verbum unterscheidet sich vom Nomen und den andern Redeteilen mit schneidender Bestimmtheit dadurch, daß ihm allein der Akt des synthetischen Setzens als grammatische Funktion beigegeben ist. Alle übrigen Wörter des Satzes sind gleichsam tot daliegender, zu verbindender Stoff; das Verbum allein ist der Leben enthaltende und Leben verbreitende Mittelpunkt. »Durch einen und ebendenselben synthetischen Akt knüpft es durch das Sein das Prädikat mit dem Subjekte zusammen, allein so, daß das Sein, welches mit einem energischen Prädikate in ein Handeln übergeht, dem Subjekte selbst beigelegt, also das bloß als verknüpfbar Gedachte zum Zustande oder Vorgange in der Wirklichkeit wird. Man denkt nicht bloß den einschlagenden Blitz, sondern der Blitz ist es selbst, der herniederfährt; man bringt nicht bloß den Geist und das Unvergängliche als verknüpfbar zusammen, sondern der Geist ist unvergänglich. Der Gedanke, wenn man sich so sinnlich ausdrücken könnte, verläßt durch das Verbum seine innere Wohnstätte und tritt in die Wirklichkeit über«. (Kaw. Werk, VII, 214). Denn im Verbum verknüpfen sich — nach einer Anschauung, die Humboldt aus der Sprachlehre BERNHARDIS und von dem Engländer HARRIS übernimmt, die er aber gemäß seiner eigentümlichen Anschauung umformt und weiterführt[19]) — zwei verschiedene Grundakte. In ihm vereint sich das rein beziehentliche Setzen mit dem existentiellen Setzen. Das Prädikat wird nicht nur dem Subjekte beigelegt, sondern dieses letztere selbst wird, durch die Form der Beilegung, in die Wirklichkeit hineingestellt, und als ein Seiendes, nicht als bloß Gedachtes oder Vorgestelltes, behauptet. Diese Grundbestimmung des Seins ist in jedem verbalen Ausdruck als solchem vorhanden. Sage ich etwa- daß der Baum blüht, so ist damit zugleich gesagt, daß er blühend i s t — daß er als bestimmter Gegenstand mit einer bestimmten Eigenschaft besteht. So ist das Verbum das Zusammenfassen eines energischen und tätigen, nicht bloß qualitativen und ruhenden Attributivum durch das Sein und vermöge der Kategorie des Seins, die sich hier in ihrer unmittelbaren nicht nur logischen, sondern auch sprachbildenden Kraft beweist und bewährt. Im Einzelnen beruft sich Humboldt hierfür auf Bopps Nachweis, daß im Sanskrit das erste Futurum und eine der Bildungen des vielförmigen Augment-Praeteritum als zusammengesetzt aus einem Stammwort und dem Verbum a s (s e i n) anzusehen ist.)[32] Von neuem knüpft hierbei Humboldts Sprachlehre an einen der bezeichnendsten Züge der Kantischen Urteilslehre an. Der Kern und die eigentliche Leistung des Urteils besteht nach Kant nicht darin, daß es lediglich gegebene Vorstellungsinhalte analytisch zergliedert, noch auch darin, daß es sie bloß psychologisch, im Sinne eines einfachen Mechanismus der Association, mit einander verbindet. Was das Urteil schafft, ist vielmehr eine ganz neue Dignität der Erkenntnis, — eine Form des Seins und

der objektiven Geltung, die dem bloßen Dasein und dem bloßen Ablauf der Vorstellungen im subjektiven Bewußtsein gegenübertritt. Diesen Akt des »selbständigen Setzens« findet Humboldt überall in der Sprache wieder und von seiner Stärke — so betont er — hänge das ganze eine bestimmte Sprache durch alle Perioden hindurch beseelende Leben ab. (Kawin Werk, WII, 213). Von neuem erweist sich darin, daß keine Gattung der Vorstellungen als ein bloß empfangendes Bewußtsein eines schon vorhandenen Gegenstandes betrachtet werden kann. »Die Tätigkeit der Sinne muß sich mit der inneren Handlung des Geistes synthetisch verbinden, und aus dieser Verbindung reißt sich die Vorstellung los, wird, der subjektiven Kraft gegenüber, zum Objekt, und kehrt, als solches auf neue wahrgenommen, in jene zurück. Hierzu aber ist die Sprache unentbehrlich. Denn indem in ihr das geistige Streben sich Bahn durch die Lippen bricht, kehrt das Erzeugnis desselben zum eignen Ohre zurück. Die Vorstellung wird also in wirkliche Objektivität hinüberversetzt, ohne darum der Subjektivität entzogen zu werden. Dies vermag nur die Sprache; und ohne diese, wo Sprache mitwirkt, auch stillschweigend immer vorgehende Versetzung in zum Subjekt zurückkehrende Objektivität ist die Bildung des Begriffs, mithin alls wahre Denken unmöglich«. (Kawin Werk, VII, 53). In diesen prägnanten Sätzen, die den Inhalt und die Tendenz der Humboldtschen Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft nach allen Seiten hin erleuchten, stellt sich uns noch einmal dar, was Humboldt im tiefsten Grunde mit Kant verbindet. Der dogmatischen Weltansicht zerfällt das Sein in zwei getrennte und einander streng entgegengesetzte Sphären: in Vorstellung und Gegenstand, in Bewußtsein und Wirklichkeit, in die Ichwelt und die dingliche Welt. Je schärfer diese Sphären sich gegen einander abtrennen, um so verwickelter und schwieriger wird das Problem, wie zwischen beiden nichtsdestoweniger ein Übergang, eine Vermittlung, ein ideeller Zusammenhang oder eine reelle Wechselwirkung möglich sein soll. Die ‚Kritik der reinen Vernunft' zeigt in methodischer Strenge und in systematischer Vollständigkeit die Unlösbarkeit dieses Problems: sie weist seine innere antinomische Beschaffenheit auf. Aber sie stellt zugleich mit dieser negativen Entscheidung einen neuen positiven Begriff der Subjektivität und der Objektivität, und in ihm eine neue Frage auf. Die Welt des Subjekts und die des Objekts stehen sich jetzt nicht mehr als zwei Hälften eines absoluten Seins gegenüber, sondern es ist ein und derselbe Kreis geistiger Funktionen, durch welchen wir den Inhalt beider, ihre Trennung und ihre wechselseitige Verknüpfung gewinnen. Dieses abstrakte Ergebnis wird durch Humboldt, durch Vermittlung der Sprache, in die konkrete Betrachtung des geistigen Lebens eingeführt. Auch die Sprache bleibt ein unbegriffenes Wunder, solange wir noch in der herkömmlichen metaphysischen Scheidung der Bewußtseins- und der Weltelemente, solange wir noch bei der Trennung des Seins in ein bloßes »Innen« und »Außen« stehen beiben. Sie wird erst erklärt, wenn wir an die Stelle des starren Seinsgegensatzes den dynamischen Gegensatz treten lassen, — wenn wir von bloß Daseienden und Gewirkten zur Grundform des Wirkens selbst, vom Ergon zur Energeia zurückdringen. Jetzt zeigt sich, daß die Subjektivität, die Freiheit und Selbständigkeit des geistigen Tuns es ist, auf welcher die Objektivität und Notwendigkeit aller geistigen Werke und auf welcher somit auch die Sprache, als ständige und unaufhebliche Einheit von Schöpfung und Werk, beruht.

Liebe Freunde, Hugo Hahn wollte mein "Kaddisch und Vaterunser" Englisch veröffentlichen. Aber er fand keinen guten Übersetzer; und ich hatte keine Zeit. So druckte er den Essay (deutsch) in der Februarnummer Bulletin Haboniim No. 2, p. 2 f. Deshalb werde ich für Robert Weltsch einen Aufsatz schicken, den ich eben schrieb: "Unverschuldete Verschollenheit und Unverdienter Ruhm". Ich hoffe das Thema wird Sie und ihn interessieren können.

Zugleich sende ich Ihnen die beigelegten Seiten über Toni Cassirer. Ich zweifle, ob sie für Ihre Pessachnummer geeignet sind. Aber ich fürchte, ich kann Ihnen bis zum 17. März nichts Anderes vorlegen, da ich im Augenblick mit zuviel anderem Dringlichen beschäftigt bin.

Mit meinen wärmsten Grüssen Ihr David Baumgardt

Könnten Sie mir freundlichst noch 5-10 Exemplare meiner "Anekdoten" und meines Aufsatzes über Goldfaden und Pinkus zukommen lassen?

N.B. S. 6 in N. B. ausgelassen

Toni Cassirer (6"k)

von David Baumgardt

Mit Toni Cassirer, geb. Bondi (nahe Verwandte des Kunsthändlers Paul Cassirer, der die grosse französiche Malerei des 19. und [redacted] frühen 20. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland einführte, eines der vornehmsten deutschen Verlegers Bruno Cassirer, des Freundes von Max Liebermann, und Richard Cassirers (eines Berliner Universitätsmedizoners), ist Anfang Januar eine eigenstarke, fesselnde Persönlichkeit ~~[redacted]~~ im 78. Lebensjahr zu Grabe getragen worden. Ich bin nicht eigentlicher Schüler ihres Gatten, des grössten Kulturhistors unserer Zeit, des Philosophen Ernst Cassirer, gewesen. Unter den bekannteren zeitgenössischen jüdischen Philosophen waren, soviel ich hörte, Hans Margolius, University of Miami, und Leo Strauss Doktoranden Cassirers zur Zeit seiner Hamburger Professur; und Margolius wie Strauss sind beide später Wege gegangen, die weit ab von denen ihres Lehrers ~~[redacted]~~ führten. Ich habe nur Vorlesungen und Seminardiskussionen ~~[redacted]~~ Cassirers aus der Zeit seiner Berliner Privatdozentur

um 1911 besucht. Aber er hat mir damals entscheidend geholfen. Als ich ihm nach einem Referat in seinem Seminar in seiner schönen Wohnung am Prager Platz heftig klagte, ich sei verzweifelt über den Mangel an Fortschritt in meinen philosophischen Studien, meinte er freundlich: "Sie müssen Geduld mit sich haben. Das 5. Semester eines Philosophiestudiums ist ~~Natur~~ man noch immer ein philosophischer Säugling."

Ich war schon in jenen Jahren überzeugt, dass der Privatdozent Cassirer als Gelehrter und an synthetischer Kraft des Denkens selbst den verdienstvollen anderen Philosophen der Berliner Universität, meinem Haubtreferenten, dem Ordinarius Alois Riehl oder Benno Erdmann, aber auch Simmel und dem oftmenschlich und geistig unterschätzten Max Dessoir weit überlegen war. Auf einer Tagung der Kantgesellschaft

~~Laaff~~ traf ich dann den Hamburger Ordinarius Cassirers wieder und war besonders erfreut, wie er sofort bei einer Portion Kaffe, Kuchen und Schlagsahne das grösste Interesse für die Grüdung einer hebräischen philosophischen Zeitschrift an der ~~tt~~ neuen Universität Jerusalem bezeigte. Mein lieber Freund Hugo S. Bergman hat mich erst kürzlich daran erinnert, wie entscheidend das Interesse Cassirers an der Begründung ~~dem Ursprung~~ der Zeitschrift Eoon geworden ist.

Bei weiteren ~~beid~~ persönlichen Begegnungen mit dem gefeierten Rektor der Universität Hamburg und bei der Lektüre seiner zahlreichen Schriften -- denen nichts an innerer Hirsau mds ~~#~~ ausgeglichenheit gegenüber den schweren Einseitigkeiten der sonstigen philosophischen Literatur unserer Zeit gleichkommt -- hat sich mein Respekt vor Ernst Cassirer ständig gesteigert. Noch in einem meiner letzten Gespräche

mit Albert Einstein bemerkte der grosse Physiker recht charakteristisch, er könne zwar nicht mit dem streitbaren Cohenschen und selbst dem viel ~~sons~~ umsichtigeren Neukantianismus Cassirers in manchen philosophischen Grundfragen der Physik übereinstimmen (meiner Meinung nach hat Einstein hier Kant und Cassirer missverstanden); aber alles, was Cassirer zu sagen habe, nähme er stets sehr ernst, und man lerne immer besonders viel von der Weite, der Reife und der allseitigen Penetration seiner Einsichten ~~gewinnen~~.

Toni Cassirer, Kousine, Gattin und 16 Jahre Witwe Ernst Cassirers war auch noch in ihrem hohen Alter eine imposante ausdrucksvolle Frauenerscheinung. Unermüdlich sorgte sie sich um das Nachlasswerk ihres 1945 verstorbenen Gatten und hat das grosse Verdienst, einen der bedeutendsten wissenschaftstheoretischen Werke des letzten Jahrhunderts, den IV. Band der "Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems" Ernst

Cassirers zum Druck verholfen zu haben mit der besonderen Hilfe des Yale Professors Charles Hendel. Ironie oder vielmehr Grausamkeit des Schicksals hat es gewollt, das diese Schrift von umfassender Kraft des Verstehens der philosophischen Grundlagen der modernen Mathematik, Physik, Biologie und Geschichte zuerst in Englischer Übersetzung ~~Jahre~~ während der ~~Er~~ ebenfalls höchst verdienstvolle Essay on Man (eine popularisierende aber nirgends versimpelnde Darstellung der Hauptprobleme seiner 3 Bände Philosophie der symbolischen Formen) ursprünglich von Cassirer englisch geschrieben war und erst kürzlich deutsch veröffentlicht werden konnte. Aber weit über diese zwei Werke hinaus sorgte Toni Cassirer für englische und andere Übersetzungen der Werke ihres Mannes und für Ersterscheinungen seiner unveröffentlichten Essays.

Sie hat über ihr Leben mit ihrem Gatten ~~ein~~ ungewöhnlich fesselndes und mit psychologischem

Eindringlichkeit geschrieben. Aber sie hat diese Biographie nur als ein mimeographiertes Buch ihren Freundin gegeben, da sie sich gern nur als das kleine s der Cassirers bezeichnete. Aber diese Cassirer Biographie sollte unbedingt gedruckt erscheinen, zum Teil auch als ein Wahrzeichen von unserer Zeiten Schande in der Würdigung eines ihrer international unbestritten grössten Denkers im Exil.

Einer der charakteristischsten Züge Toni Cassirers war, was man wohl eine Art "überlegenen Galgenhumors gegenüber dem Exil nennen könnte. Von ihren vielen Erfahrungen mit internationalen Verlegern sagte sie: "Es ist der gleiche Schwindel, nur in verschiedenen Sprachen." Aber noch, als sie mir einst bekannte, sie habe Wanzen in ihrer New Yorker Wohnung in der West End Avenue gehabt, blieb sie die Aristokratin, die lächelnd hoch über den Wanzen und allem sonstigen schmutzigen Getriebe oder den Verlegerschwierigkeiten stand.

Bei ihrer Durchfahrt von Virginia besuchte

und in 1950 in Washington, erschien an einem Stock gelehnt und erklärte: "Ein Stück in der Hand, das ist doch das einzige Mittel, mit dem man sich als älterer Mensch in diesem Lande noch ein bischen Achtung und Rücksicht erzwingen kann." Als sie uns einst – es war wohl schon in ihrer neuen viel besseren New Yorker Wohnung – zu Tisch lud, versuchte ich sanft abzuwehren: sie sei leidend genug und habe keine Hilfe, worauf sie erwiderte: Von Philosophie verstehe ich nichts – sie liebt das oft zu betonen – aber ein Kotlett kann ich noch für meine guten Freunde machen.

Noch zehn Tage vor ihrem Tode rief ich sie in New York an, ob ich sie besuchen könnte. "Natürlich," war die Antwort, "kommen Sie sobald wie möglich." Als ich erschien, gestand sie, sie hatte den ganzen Tag bis fünf Uhr nachmittags mit heftiger Migräne im Bett zugebracht. Ich wollte sofort wieder gehen. "Nein," sagte sie "nur gesunde Leute sterben doch, die langen Kranken machen immer weiter." Kurt Goldstein der grosse Neurologe, ist nicht nur mein Vetter, er ist auch der beste Arzt den man

sich wünschen kann, und er hält mich gesundheitlich so gut wie möglich zusammen."

Wir hatten, wie immer, ein sehr angeregtes Gespräch besonders über das Judentum. "Es ist entsetzlich, wie wenig ich von meine eigenen Religion weiss," bemärkte sie sichtlich deprimiert. "Wissen Sie, mein Grossvater (oder war es ein Onkel oder Grossonkel) war schon Leibarzt" -- ich habe vergessen an welchem deutschen Fürstenhof -- "und nicht von der Treue, aber vom Wissen um das Judentum waren wir viel zu weit entfernt. Was soll ich nur meinem Sohn, der zu meinem Kummer Christ in England geworden ist, und der besonders an mir hängt, was könnte ich ihm sagen, wenn er bald hier herkommt mit seinem Paulusfanatismus!" All das quälte sie offenbar; und ich suchte zugunsten des Judentums einiges zu klären so gut ich konnte. Ich hoffe, etwas erleichtert, begleitete sie mich schliesslich zum Fahrstuhl; dessen Klingel nicht funktionierte und war besorgt, dass ich drei recht schwere Folianten Thomas von Aquino von der Columbia University nach Haus trug. Sie wollte sie mir mit der Post schicken. "Aber dann mache ich doch Ihnen und Ihrer Frau Tochter unnütze Mühe." "Ja," erwiderte sie, "ich kann kaum

noch ein Pfund Kartoffeln tragen." Dann als der Fahrstuhl kam, drückte sie mir die Hand: "Sie haben nicht nur das Beste über Ernst gesagt, sie sind auch mit Hendel und James Gutmann der treuste Helfer in meiner Arbeit. Die Anderen versprechen wohl und meinen es auch gut; aber dann können sie doch aus einem oder anderen Grunde nichts tun." Dies werden für mich die letzten Worte dieser bedeutenden Frau bleiben; und kann nicht leugnen, sie taten mir wohl.

David Baumgardt

Kartoffeln tragen.

Nach Lichtal (DB im Krankenhaus)

von Rose Bydt

niedergeschrieben.

S. 6 in M.B ausgelassen

Toni Cassirer (†)
von David Baumgardt.

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Bei weiteren ~~l~~ persönlichen Begegnungen mit dem gefeierten Rektor der Universität Hamburg und bei der Lektüre seiner zahlreichen Schriften -- denen nicht zuletzt an innerer ausgeglichenheit gegenüber der schweren Exaktheit der sonstigen philosophischen Literatur unserer Zeit gleichkommt -- hat sich mein Respekt vor Ernst Cassirer ständig gesteigert. Noch in seinem neuen letzten Gespräche

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In Cassirer, Kuciera, Gattin, und 16 Jahre Mitarbeiter + Cassirer war auch weiterhin dem Alter ein imponierender Freund. Unermüdlich ergänzte sie sich um den Nachlaß ihres 1945 verstorbenen Gatten und hat das große Verdienst, einen der bedeutendsten wissenschaftstheoretischen Werke des letzten Jahrhunderts, den III. Band der "Geschichte des Erkenntnis Problems" Ernst

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Noch zehn Tage vor ihrem Tode rief ich sie in New York an, ob ich sie besuchen könnte. "Natürlich," war die Antwort, "kommen Sie sobald wie möglich. Als ich eintrat, gestand sie, sie hatte den ganzen Tag bis fünf Uhr mit heftiger Migräne im Bett zugebracht. Ich wollte sofort wieder gehen. "Nein," sagte sie "nur gesunde Leute sterben doch, die langen Kranken machen immer weiter." Kurt Goldstein der große Neurologe, ist nicht nur mein Vetter, er ist auch der beste Arzt den man-

sich wünschen kann, und er hält mich gesundheitlich so gut wie möglich zusammen."

Wir hatten, wie immer, ein sehr angeregtes Gespräch besonders über das Judentum. "Es ist entsetzlich, wie wenig ich von meiner eigenen Religion weiss," konnte sie zuletzt deprimiert. "Wenn Sie, mein Großvater (oder war es ein Onkel oder Großonkel) zum Leibarzt" -- ich habe vergessen, welchen deutschen Fürsten" -- "und nicht von der Treue, aber von Wissen um das Judentum, von ihm weit entfernt. Wenn sich bis dahin meine Religion der zu meinen Kummer Christin England geworden, und der besonders an mir hängt, was könnte ich ihm sagen, wenn er bald hier herkommt mit seinem Paulinismus!" All das quälte sie offenbar und sie suchte gegenüber dem Judentum irgend etwas zu klären so gut ich konnte. Ich hoffe, etwas erleichtert, begleitete sie mich schließlich zum Fahrstuhl, dessen Klingel nicht funktionierte und war heute, dass ich drei recht schwere Folianten Thomas von Aquino von der Columbia University nach Haus trug. Sie wollte sie mir mit der Post schicken. "Überdies mache ich doch Ihnen und Ihrer Frau Tochter unnütze Mühe." "Ja," erwiderte sie, "ich kann kaum

nicht ein Pfund Kartoffeln tragen." Dann als der Fahrstuhl kam, drückte sie mir die Hand: "Sie haben nicht nur das Brot über Crest gerettet, sondern auch mit Handel und Ihrer Geistesarbeit. Die der treue Helfer in meiner Arbeit. Die Anderen versprechen wollen wir mal sehen, es auch gut; aber dann können sie doch aus einem der anderen Gründe nicht tun." Dies werden für mich die letzten Worte dieser bedeutenden Frau bleiben; und ich kann mit Dank erfüllt, sie taten mir wohl.

David Bamgardt

Liebe Freunde, Hugo Hahn wollte mein "Kaddisch und Vaterunser" Englisch veröffentlichen. Aber er fand keinen guten Übersetzer; und ich hatte keine Zeit. So druckte er den Essay auf deutsch in der Februarnummer Bulletin Hebronim No. 2, p. 2 f. Deshalb werde ich für Robert Weltsch einen Aufsatz schicken, den ich ebenschnell "Unverschuldete Verschollenheit und Unverdienter Ruhm". Ich hoffe das Thema wird Sie und ihn interessieren können.

Zugleich sende ich Ihnen die beigelegten Seiten über Toni Cassirer. Ich zweifle, ob sie für Ihre Pessachnummer geeignet sind. Aber ich fürchte, ich kann Ihnen bis zum 17 März nichts Anderes vorlegen, da ich im Augenblick mit zuviel anderen dringlichen beschäftigt bin.

Mit meinen wärmsten Grüßen Ihr David Bamgardt

Können Sie mir freundlichst noch 5-10 Exemplare meiner "Schlacht" und meinen Aufsatz über Goldfarb und Pinthus bekommen lassen?

AR 797 12/4

DAVID BAUMGARDT: HIST OF MOD ETHICS; GERMAN ESSAYS; C1931-1947

12/4

GERMAN ESSAYS ON
HUSSERL, HARTMANN, HOBBES
HISTORY OF MODERN ETHICS

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Quotations from:

Hartmann: Ethik

3 copies @ 1 page

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Der Philosoph Nicolai Hartmann
(German)

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Noch viel schärfer und markanter aber ist die Absage,die Hartmann dann der Kantschen E t h i k erteilte.In seiner umfangreichen"Ethik"1926 hat er hier eindeutig mit aller Moral des kategorischen Imperativs gebrochen und hat aller Philosophie des rein formalen sittlichen Sollens in breitester Form eine Philosophie der inhaltlich bestimmten,der materialen,"gegebenen"Werte entgegengestellt.D.h.Das heisst;während Kant die überkühne Meinung vertrat,alle Fragen der Ethik liessen sich durch ein ganz"inhaltsloses"aber dafür streng evidentes Formalgesetz,durch seinen rein formalen kategorischen Imperativ bemeistern,so hat Hartmann hier im scharfen Kampf gegen Kant gerade die ausgedehntesten Analysen inhaltlicher Werte wie Gerechtigkeit,Liebe,Tapferkeit zum Aufbau einer neuen Ethik für unentbehrlich gehalten;und erst auf Grund solcher Analysen ist er denn zu den Fragen der Rangordnung dieser Werte vorgedrungen.

Er knüpfte hierbei vorzugsweise an Max Schelers"Materiale Wertethik"an, wie er sich überhaupt in seiner neuen Haltung gegenüber Kant vielfach mit den Anhängern der Husserlschen Phänomenologie berührte.Aber er hat dann --weit über Scheler hinausgreifend--in seiner grossen"Ethik" zweifellso eine besodners eindrucksstarke und vielschichtige,ja wohl die gegliedertste Gestaltung der materialen Wertlehre geschaffen,die bis heute existiert.

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Jan. 23, 1931

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Zur Neubesetzung des Lehrstuhls von Troeltsch.

Seit dem Jahre 1923 war das philosophische Ordinariat, das Ernst Troeltsch an der Berliner Universität innehatte, verwaist. Nachdem im vorigen Jahre der Freiburger Professor Martin Heidegger eine Berufung ausgeschlagen hatte, ist nunmehr Professor Nicolai Hartmann aus Köln für Berlin gewonnen worden.

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Als Denker wie auch als Redner ist Hartmann eine Erscheinung von bewusst schlichter und klarer Strenge, aber, damit zugleich sehr reizvoll verbunden, auch von vorbildlich hoher und feinspüriger Eindringlichkeit. ***D. B.***

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...gedruckt und werden in den Bezirk des Esoterischen und Intellektuellen abgeschoben, damit sie auf dem Markt keinen Schaden und keine Verwirrung anrichten . . . denn im Volkstümlichen herrscht der Routinier, nicht der Schöpferische, auch nicht der „Intellektuelle", d. h. der Erkennende. Die geringschätzige Bezeichnung „literarisch" für einen Roman ist so blödsinnig, als wollte man an einem Gemälde rügen, es sei gemalt, nicht geschrieben.

*

Unterhalb der naiven, unmittelbaren Gestaltung, die natürlich das Höchste ist, macht sich ihr Surrogat breit, das ihr mit illegitimen Mitteln nahekommt, indes hier ehrlicherweise nur der Verzicht auf das Schöpferische zulässig wäre, der sich seine Form zu suchen hat. Es ist nobler, sich kleiner zu machen, als sich künstlich zu strecken und sich zu übernehmen. Wie denn überhaupt die intellektuelle Ehrlichkeit und Strenge im Roman immer seltener wird. Daran könnte er zugrunde gehen.

Es wimmelt von falschen Balzacs und Dostojewskis, die kleine Welten aus dem Handgelenk schütteln. Weit weniger wäre weit zulässiger und gerade berechtigt. Sie haben die besten Stoffe, eben jene, die getragen werden, und sie reisen in ihnen. Ihre Spannungen sind die einer Uhrwerkfeder; so und so viel Drehungen, und das Ding surrt ab bis zum letzten Kapitel. Sie werden sich aber hüten, vielmehr sind sie ausserstande, ihre Technik ironisch zu enthüllen, die Illusion auf die Wirklichkeit zurück-, und umgekehrt die Fiktion bis an die Wirklichkeit heranzuführen. Niemals werden sie es riskieren, sich zu einer Erfindung zu bekennen, sich selbst zu dekuvrieren; anstatt aus dem Stoff, der trägt, aus der Sprache selbst, der für sie unsicherer Boden ist, zu komponieren. Sie haben einen viel zu grossen Respekt vor dem Publikum, um es in ein Labyrinth einzulassen, das sie übrigens gar nicht besitzen. Sie sind selbst Teil des Publikums; deshalb verstehen sie sich mit ihm so gut, und sie denken nicht daran, ihm eine geistige Anstrengung, einen Durchblick durch die Illusion zuzumuten.

Es hat für mich etwas Infernalisches, dass eben diese Autoren, die Fleisch und Blut vom Publikum sind, das sie bedienen, ihre Romane von einem gottähnlichen, wissenden, objektiven, schöpferisch unpersönlichen Standort schreiben: von oben. Sie sind nicht die armseligen Kreaturen mitten im Gewimmel, nein, sie sind hoch darüber, sie halten die Fäden, lenken alles, sind ausserhalb, sie, die Schöpfer bis zum happy end.

Kein Zweifel, diese Erhöhung und Sicherheit imponiert dem Publikum; es will eine feste Hand von oben spüren und hat nicht die Erkenntniskraft, zu merken, dass diese lenkende Hand taschenspielerhaft aus seinem eigenen Körper kommt . . . und dass also die Figuren sich bewegen, wie das Publikum es will. Nirgends lässt sich's besser verstecken, als in der Gottnähe des Schöpferischen, in dieser grossen Distanz. Aber als Fiktion ist dieser epische Standort unzulässig, gerade sie, vielleicht sie als einzige . . . Entweder man ist dort geboren und zuständig, oder man hat nicht dort zu sein. Bitte, herunter von dort oben!

*

Wo ist aber der Standort des Erzählers? Diese Frage scheint mir nicht unwichtig für die Wesens- und Formkrise des Romans, ja mich dünkt, sie wuchs aus der Unpräzisheit der Kenntnis: wo steht, soziologisch und seelisch, der Romanschriftsteller?

Zwei Antworten sind ja hier bereits gefunden: als Schöpfer ist er legitimiert zu einer erhabenen Distanz, die ihn in die Nähe Gottes und seiner überlegenen Gewissheit erhebt. Er schreibt unter Donner und Blitz, von ihm unberührt, da er ja

Jan 23, 1931

Der Philosoph Nicolai Hartmann.

Zur Neubesetzung des Lehrstuhls von Troeltsch.

Seit dem Jahre 1923 war das philosophische Ordinariat, das Ernst Troeltsch an der Berliner Universität innehatte, verwaist. Nachdem im vorigen Jahre der Freiburger Professor Martin Heidegger eine Berufung ausgeschlagen hatte, ist nunmehr Professor Nicolai Hartmann aus Köln für Berlin gewonnen worden.

Der Kölner Ordinarius der Philosophie, Nicolai Hartmann, der jetzt einem Ruf an die Berliner Universität folgt und hier den seit 1923 verwaisten Lehrstuhl Ernst Troeltschs einnehmen wird, ist 1882 in Riga geboren. In Marburg schloss er sich zunächst dem Neukantianismus Hermann Cohens und Paul Natorps an, und seine erste grosse Schrift „Platos Logik des Seins" zeugt 1909 noch nachhaltig von dem Geist jener Marburger Schulung und der vielumkämpften Marburger Plato-Deutung. Aber so gross auch Hartmanns Verehrung für die Denkererscheinung Hermann Cohens, des Schöpfers jener Marburger Schule war, so suchte er doch schon bald neue philosophische Wege und wandte sich dann besonders deutlich 1921 in seinen „Grundzügen einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis" von dem neukantischen Idealismus seiner Frühzeit ab.

Allerdings die Thesen des Apriorismus, d. h. die Behauptung von breiten, logisch ausgezeichneten Geltungszusammenhängen innerhalb unseres Wissens (von Geltungszusammenhängen, die keinerlei Bestätigung durch gehäufte Erfahrung benötigten), diese Thesen des Apriorismus, die bisher am intensivsten von der idealistischen Philosophie aufrechterhalten wurden, wollte er auch auf dem neuen Boden keineswegs preisgeben. Aber trotzdem suchte er nun auch den Feststellungen über das Irrationale, das logisch nicht restlos Durchleuchtbare in der Erkenntnistheorie einen viel breiteren Raum zu schaffen. Kant hatte es als seine „kopernikanische Tat" bezeichnet, dass er die alte Weltansicht, wonach das irrationale Sein dem Denken übergeordnet ist, in eine zusammenhängende Weltauffassung umwandelte, worin gerade die Abhängigkeit der Erfahrungswelt vom Denken aufgedeckt wurde. Hartmann aber hebt es hier mit einer neuen Pointierung gegenüber allem Kantianismus hervor, dass der Vergleich mit Kopernikus eigentlich viel besser auf die „neue ontologische Revolution" passe, die er heute als die für uns nötigste Denkbewegung ansieht. Denn Kant habe ja gerade dies mit dem naiven Denken gemein, dass er nur den „eigenen Standort als den ruhenden Pol ansehe, um den sich gas ganze Himmelsgewölbe drehen soll"; das kopernikanische Denken dagegen gliedert diesen Standpunkt in ein grösseres System von Bewegungen ausserhalb dieses Standpunkts ein, eben wie heute auch die Vernunft neu in ein grösseres Seinssystem eingespannt werden müsse, das sich nicht nach ihr richtet und bewegt, sondern in welchem sie selbst umgekehrt das „Abhängige und Sekundäre" ist.

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FILMED IN TWO SECTIONS

EDMUND HUSSERL.

Der Schöpfer der Phänomenologie in der Kant-Gesellschaft.

Von [Nachdruck verboten.]

Dr. DAVID BAUMGARDT, Privatdozent an der Universität Berlin.

Wesenberg ◆ Maschine 10

Um die grossen Denker wie um die Religionsstifter wittert ein seltsames Geheimnis: auch noch die Umdeutungen, ja selbst die Missverständnisse, die sie erfahren, können zu einer erstaunlich produktiven Kraft in der Entwicklung des menschlichen Denkens erwachsen. Das gilt in der neueren deutschen Philosophie in den frappierendsten, in gigantischen Formen von Kant, den immer wieder die heterogensten philosophischen Bewegungen zu ihrem Führer proklamiert haben. Unter den Lebenden aber gilt es wohl am tiefsten von dem Schöpfer der sogenannten modernen Phänomenologie, von Edmund Husserl.

Als Husserl 1900 mit seinem scharf geschliffenen zweibändigen Werk „Logische Untersuchungen" in die philosophische Debatte eingriff, da erschien er zunächst vor allem als der glanzvolle Befreier der reinen Logik aus den Fesseln eines älteren Positivismus, ein Empirismus, der alle Logik in ein blosses Wissen von letzthin zufälligen Fakten aufzulösen drohte. Aber schon von da an hat dieser tief besonnene, nur auf strenge Präzision bedachte Logiker merkwürdig stark auch viel ungebundenere, freier schweifende Geister in die Nähe seiner Bahn gezogen. Und gar als sich Husserls Forschung dann 1913 in seinen „Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie" bewusst breiter weltanschaulich ausdehnte, da konnte sich unmittelbar neben seinen streng kritisch „transzendentalen" Analysen in seinen „Jahrbüchern für Philosophie" auch ein so metaphysisch viel ungestümerer Kopf wie Max Scheler ansiedeln, — bis dann in der Gegenwart Metaphysik und Mystik und kaum mehr übersehbare andere vielspätige philosophische Tendenzen in buntester Fülle mehr oder minder stark gerade eine Anlehnung an die Lehre Husserls zu vollziehen suchten.

WERNER ◆ Masch. 32

Nun sprach gestern, Mittwoch, der gefeierte Philosoph der Freiburger Universität zum ersten Male in Berlin vor einem erlesenen Auditorium in Anwesenheit des preussischen Kultusministers Grimme, des spanischen Botschafters Americo Castro, des Ministerialdirektors Richter, der Rektoren aller eBrliner Hochschulen und zahlreicher Professoren, der Philosophen Dessoir, Nicolai, Hartmann, Wolfgang, Köhler, Spranger, Groethuysen, Hchstetter, Hofmann, Guttmann, der Literarhistoriker Petersen und Wechssler, der Historiker Meinecke und Breysig, der Nationalökonomen Bernhard und Sombart, der Mathematiker Ehrhard Schmidt und Schur, der Theologen Lietzmann und Sellin, des Mediziners von Bergmann wie Vertreter des ganzen geistigen Berlin — eine so grosse Hörerschaft, dass der Vorsitzende der Kant-Gesellschaft, Arthur Liebert, mit Recht bemerkte, wenn man die Scharen von Gästen mitzählen würde, die umkehren mussten, weil das Auditorium Maximum der Universität sie nicht fassen konnte, so hätte man mit diesen ausserordentlich weiten Verehrerkreisen eines Philosophen tatsächlich einmal den Sportpalast füllen können.

SCHOLZ Masch. 38

In einer ungemein schlichten, aber mitreissenden Bestimmtheit und Schärfe suchte Husserl in einer fast zweistündigen Rede den eigentlichen, originären Sinn seiner Idee einer transzendentalen Phänomenologie wenigstens in den allgemeinsten Zügen auszubreiten. Mit einer Radikalität, die den berühmten Zweifel des Descartes an der Existenz der Welt noch weit übersteigern will, erklärt es Husserl hier für die eigentliche Aufgabe einer kritischen, transzendentalen Philosophie, sich zuerst einmal alles naiven Glaubens an die bunte Welt der exitierenden Dinge und Geschehnisse völlig zu enthalten, zu entledigen. Denn strenge Gewissheit und Evidenz der Erkenntnisse kann niemal in dem Reich der ständig veränderlichen seienden Dinge gefunden werden, niemals in der Welt, die wir als naive, unkritische Wesen zunächst als bereits fest gegeben voraussetzen, sondern notwendig gültige, evidente, unanfechtbare Einsichten in bleibende Wesensverhalte können nur beschlossen

19 Zeilen!

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BACHMANN Maschine 6

Nur wer es in der echten phänomenologischen Besinnung vermag, den gesamten existierenden Kosmos (einschliesslich seines empirischen Ich), gleichsam „einzuklammern“ und den eigenen Blick gewissermassen zurückzubiegen in das weite Gebiet von Bewusstseinsgebilden, durch die alles Existierende erst sinnvoll gedacht werden kann, nur der ist nach Husserl zur wahren Philosophie, d. h. zur phänomenologischen Forschung befähigt, wie Husserl selbst bereits mit einer souveränen Meisterschaft solche phänomenologischen Analysen in einem ausserordentlichen Umfang durchgeführt hat, Untersuchungen, in denen eine divinatorischer Spürsinn und Scharfsinn selbst verwirrendste Zusammenhänge des grossen Rätsels unseres Sinn schaffenden Bewusstseins aufgeblättert hat und mit der feinsten Sonde scheinbar unlösbare Verwebungen auseinander zu trennen und wieder exakt zusammenzufügen verstand.

WÖLKE ∞ Maschine 21

So ist, wie Husserl es in seinem Vortrag und überall in seinen Schriften lebendig zu machen versteht, diese Phänomenologie ein Land der Forschung gänzlich jenseits von allem primitiven Vollzug des Lebens und Denkens in der Welt, und doch diejenige Forschung, durch die allein alles unreflektierte Leben und Denken in der Welt in den Faktoren seines Vollzugs sichtbar gemacht werden kann. In der Erregung, mit der der Denker hier in seiner Rede diese geistige Gesamthaltung des Phänomenologen nachzuzeichnen unternahm, in der Unmittelbarkeit, mit der er die wahre Einsamkeit des ganz von allem zufälligen Dasein abstrahierenden Forschers anschaulich werden liess, in der lebendigen Anspannung, mit der er die innerste geistige Umwendung des phänomenologischen Blicks heraufzubeschwören verstand — in alle dem konnte der Hörer wirklich etwas von dem Atem eines ganz an seine Aufgabe gebannten, eines ganz in ihre verspönnenen grossen Denkers verspüren.

ENGEL ◆◆ Maschine 39

Aber ob freilich (wie Husserl es gegenüber allen seinen metaphysischen Nachfolgern festhalten will), mit der Aufdeckung, mit der Blosslegung des Forschungsreichs seiner „konstitutiven Phänomenologie“ bereits das ganze Reich der Philosophie ausgemessen werden kann, ob nicht doch mindestens das Problem einer „hypothetischen Metaphysik“ und ob nicht noch neben und nach dieser phänomenologischen Anthropologie eine Art metaphysischer Lehre vom Menschen innerhalb des philosophischen Denkens immer wieder ihr Recht geltend machen wird und geltend machen sollte, das bleibt allerdings die letzte bewegende Frage, die noch über diese Rede Husserls hinausschwingend, mir nicht mit einem einfachen Nein beantwortbar zu sein scheint.

15 Zeilen!

12 Zeilen!

Feuilleton

Referat über den Begriff des
Denkens bei Husserl

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des Denkens bei Husserl

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Referat über den Begriff des Denkens bei Husserl

von D. Baumgardt

Jede Darstellung des Denkbegriffs bei Husserl muss zunächst die Tatsache berücksichtigen, dass Husserl selbst seine gesamte bisherige Forschung nicht als Psychologie, sondern als eine reine Phänomenologie angesehen wissen will.

In welchem Verhältnis steht nun die Psychologie zu jener von Husserl neu erstrebten Wissenschaft? Hierüber finden sich bei dem Forscher selbst eine grosse Anzahl nicht ohne weiteres in strengstem Einklang miteinander stehender Äusserungen.

Der wichtigste Unterschied, durch den sich die Phänomenologie von allen Erfahrungswissenschaften, also auch von der Psychologie, abheben soll, ist zunächst der: die Psychologie kann sich wie jede Tatsachenwissenschaft nur mit einem "Sein in der Welt" beschäftigen ("Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie S.7), mit individuell gegebenen psychischen Vorgängen; ihre Objekte sind daher zeitlich erfahrbar und zufällig. Die Phänomenologie dagegen soll nur von notwendig bestehenden, allgemein gültigen Wesensverhalten handeln; sie zielt daher stets auf ein zeitlich nicht Erfahrbares, auf das nur intuitiv einsichtige Eidos, auf das Wesen tatsächlicher Vorgänge. Jedoch mit Beziehung auf diese Unterscheidungspunkte hat es bereits Husserl selbst nicht entgehen können, dass sich auch innerhalb der bisherigen Psychologie weiteste Problemkreise nur mit der Beschreibung des Wesens der seelischen Vorgänge befassen. Alle diese Forschungen hat Husserl mit dem Namen der eidetischen Psychologie belegt und hat nun versucht, seine Phänomenologie auch von dieser eidetischen Psychologie noch des näheren abzugrenzen. Für die Gesichtspunkte aber, nach denen diese weitere Unterscheidung bewirkt wird, sind wesentlich erkenntnistheoretische Überlegungen bestimmend gewesen. So soll die Phänomenologie zunächst im Gegensatz zur eidetischen Psychologie abzuheben

als völlig independente, "als die einzig absolute" Wissenschaft, als die "erste" "Philosophie begründet werden" (s."Ideen" S.115 und S.121). Ihre Sätze sollen völlig unabhängig von irgend einer Voraussetzung eines Seins gelten, ja sie sollen erst nach der gedanklichen Ausschaltung alles physisch wie psychisch Existierenden zu gewinnen sein. Die eidetische Psychologie befasst sich nun mit dem Wesen der tatsächlichen psychischen Vorkommnisse, die Phänomenologie dagegen mit dem Wesen des transzendentalen Bewusstseins. Und dieses transzendentale, das immanent gegebene, das absolute Bewusstsein ist eben dasjenige, das nach "Einklammerung" der gesamten psychischen wie physischen Welt als das "phänomenologische Residuum" übrig bleibt ("Ideen" S.94ff). Das transzendentale Bewusstsein ist dasjenige, das dem in der Wirklichkeit gegebenen erst als die Voraussetzung seines Sinnes zu grunde liegt, in dem sich jedes wirkliche Erleben erst "konstituierer" muss (s.z.B. "Ideen" S.103 bis 106). Jedoch auch nach Vollziehung der phänomenologischen "Ausschaltungen", nach der Einklammerung der gesamten natürlichen Wirklichkeit, nach der Freilegung des eigentlichen phänomenologischen Feldes muss es Husserl noch zugeben, dass "jede Phänomenologische Feststellung über absolutes Bewusstsein umgedeutet werden kann in eine eidetisch-psychologische"[1]. ja die Phänomenologie soll nach S.159 von der eidetischen Psychologie trotz weitreichender vorausgegangener Analysen "noch nicht geschieden" sein und jedenfalls "immer innig mit ihr verbunden" bleiben. (vgl. z.B.auch "Logische Untersuchungen II. 1.2.Aufl.S.369). Es ist deshalb wohl berechtigt, wenn auch wir versuchen werden, den Denkbegriff Husserl's im Anschluss an genetisch psychologische Untersuchungen festzustellen, wobei freilich stets vorausgesetzt werden muss, dass das wesentliche Interesse Husserl's über die Psychologie hinweg

1) Ideen S. 143

nur der Idee einer reinen Logik oder vielmehr einer allgemeinen Phänomenologie zugekehrt ist.

"Der Problemtitel" nun, der nach Husserl die ganze Phänomenologie und damit auch die Phänomenologie des Denkens "umspannt, heisst Intentionalität." Alles Denken vollzieht sich (s."Logische Untersuchungen," II, 1, S.427 und öfter)in Akten oder intentionalen Erlebnissen. Wollen wir daher Husserl's Denkbegriff näher zu bestimmen suchen, so müssen wir uns zuerst den grundlegenden Begriff der Intentionalität verdeutlichen. Intentional ist alles Denken insofern, als es notwendig Denken von etwas, notwendig Denken eines Gedachten ist. Diese Beziehung auf das Gedachte soll aber, wie ausdrücklich betont wird, (s. Ideen S.64) nicht zu verstehen sein als die Beziehung zwischen einem psychischen Vorkommnis --genannt Erlebnis -- und einem anderen realen Dasein --genannt der Gegenstand, der gedacht ist; und ebensowenig soll die Intentionalität angesehen werden als irgend eine psyshische Verknüpfung, die in der objektiven Wirklichkei zwischen einem Denken und einem Gedachten stattfände, sondern die Intentionalität ist nur aufzufassen als eine im reinen Wesen des Denkerlebnisses selbst beschlossene notwendige Eigenart des Erlebnisses.

Im Wesen des Denkerlebnisses liegt es nicht nur, <u>dass</u> es, sondern <u>wovon</u> es Denkbewusstsein ist, und in welchem Sinne [illegible] (Ideen, S.64). -- Innerhalb dieser intentionalen Denkerlebnisse ergibt sich aber darnach als die wichtigste vorzunehmende Unterscheidung, die Scheidung des Momentes der Noesis von dem des Noema. (Moment bedeutet bei Husserl immer den unselbständigen Teil eines Ganzen, während der selbständige Teil als Bestandstück bezeichnet wird, s. "Logische Unters."II,3, S. 266). Die Noesisseite des Denkaktes enthält im weiteren Sinne

alle reellen und damit die eigentlich konstituierenden Bestandteile des Erlebnisses, das Noema aber das diesen Denkmomenten entsprechend von ihnen Gemeinte, das dem Denkbewusstsein notwendige Denkkorrelat. Des näheren zerfällt dann die Noesis noch in die sogenannten hyletischen und in die spezifisch noetischen Komponenten, wobei die ersteren die rein stofflichen Vorstellungsdaten, wie etwa die Vorstellung eines Farbentons oder dergl. bedeuten. Diesen hyletischen Momenten kann aber, obwohl sie reelle, konkrete Bestandteile eines Aktes sind, der Grundcharakter der Intentionalität selbst nicht zukommen, sondern sie können nur Träger einer Intentionalität sein, aber nicht selbst Bewusstsein von etwas (Ideen S.65); es müssen daher zu diesen hyletischen Momente noch sogen. spezifisch noetische, d.h. "Auffassungen", "Sinngebungen" (Ideen S.203) hinzutreten,, und erst die durch diese Auffassungen und Sinngebungen "beseelten" Stoffmomente können dann die volle Noesisseite eines Aktes ausmachen. Aber weiter: wie so innerhalb der Noesis die spezifisch noetischen und die hyletischen Komponenten hervorzuheben waren, so ist auch innerhalb des Noema ein Moment besonders zu nenne, nämlich "das bestimmbare im noematischen Sinn". Es ist nämlich einleuchtend, soviele Prädikate oder genauer soviele Prädikatnoemen auch dem im Noema Gedachten zukommen können, so muss doch als das notwendige Zentrum des noematischen Kerns stets ein Identisches, ein bestimmbares Subjekt der möglichen Prädikate, ein pures Gegenstandsetwas als Einheitspunkt, eine "Träger" aller Prädikate im Noema bestehen und diesen noematischen Zentralpunkt bezeichnet Husserl als das "pure bestimmbare X im noematischen Sinn".

Alle die bisher erwähnten Unterscheidungen nach Noesis und Noema sind nun solche, die Husserl erst in seinem letzten Werk, in den "Ideen" als die Fundamentalbegriffe seiner Analysen ent-

wickelt hat. Es müssen daher zu diesen Momenten noch diejenigen hinzugenommen werden, die bereits in den "Logischen Untersuchungen" genannt sind, die Husserl aber dort, wie er nachträglich betont, nur einseitig auf die Noesisseite der Akte bezogen hatte, während er sie jetzt offenbar sowohl auf die Noesis wie auf das Noema bezogen wissen will. ("Ideen" S.267).
Diese Momente sind:

1. die Qualität, auch intentionale Qualität oder in den "Ideen" Setzungscharakter oder thetischer Charakter im weitesten Sinne genannt. Diese Qualität ist der allgemeine Charakter des Aktes, durch den er je nachdem als bloss vorstellender oder als urteilende, fühlender, begehrender gekennzeichnet ist ("Log. Unters." II, 1.S.411)

2. die Materie, auch als intentionale Materie bezeichnet, der "Auffassungssinn". Diese Materie ist der Inhalt eines Aktes, durch den er als Vorstellung eben dieses Vorgestellten, als Urteil dieses Geurteilten charakterisiert wird ("Log.Untess."II, 1.S.411).

3. Der repräsentierende Inhalt ("Log. Unters." II. Band, 1. Aufl. S.562).

Suchen wir nun diese drei Momente in bezug auf die Noesis wie in bezug auf das Noema jedes Aktes an einem Beispiel zu unterscheiden, wie dies auch R. Kynast in seiner Schrift, "das Problem der Phänomenologie" getan hat, so ergeben sich etwa für den Aussageakt "dieser rote Würfel" folgende Unterscheidungen:

1. die noetische Qualität, d.i. der Setzungscharakter, wonach dieser ℰ rote Würfel nicht als gefühlt, nicht als begehrt oder bezweifelt, sondern als in der Erinnerung gleichsam gewiss seiend gedacht wird.

2. die noetische Materie d.h. das Gemeintsein eines roten nicht eines andersfarbigen Würfels, und eines Würfels, nicht eines anderen Körpers.

3. Der noetische repräsentierende Inhalt d.h.z.B. die sinnlichen Laute oder die sinnlichen Schriftzeichen, die mit dem Ausdruck "dieser rote Würfel" verbunden sind, diese Zeichen rein als visuelle oder akustische Empfindungsdaten genommen. Hierbei wird es von besonderer Bedeutung, dass der repräsentierende Inhalt eines Aktes offenbar rein signitiv sein kann, d.h. er hat wie in dem genannten Fall mit der Materie nichts zu tun; er steht mit der Materie in einem uneinsichtigen Zusammenhange, er ist nur Zeichen für das, was die Materie intendiert. Denn es ist natürlich klar, dass die Schriftzeichen oder Laute "Würfel" mit dem Gegenstand Würfel nichts zu tun haben.

4. die noematische Qualität, dies ist der Setzungscharakter, soweit er den gemeinten Würfel selbst betrifft, nicht die Art, den Würfel zu meinen, sondern die Art des Würfels selbst, ein als gewiss-seiend gemeinter zu sein im Gegensatz zu einem als gewünscht etc. gemeinten.

5. die noematische Materie, dies ist nicht die Art des So-Gemeintseins des Würfels, sondern die Art des Würfels als eines So-Gemeinten, nicht das Moment des Meinens, sondern das Moment des Rotseins des Gemeinten.

6. der noematische Inhalt, dies ist der Komplex der einzelnen Momente an den repräsentierenden Schriftzeichen etc. selbst.

Erst nach der Darstellung dieser sechs Momente, die jedem einzelnen Akte zukommen müssen, kann nun, wie ich glaube, das

nähere Kennzeichen des Husserl'schen Denkbegriffs angegeben werden. Wie nämlich in Anknüpfung an das über den repräsentierenden Inhalt Gesagte entwickelt werden muss, gehören überhaupt nach Husserl zu jedem voll realisierten Ausdruck nicht nur ein, sondern zwei Akte. (s.z.B. "Log. Unters." II, 1.Aufl. S.667) Der Ausdruck,"dieser rote Würfel"in unserem Beispiel ist daher mit dem bisher beschriebenen Akte und mit dessen nur signitiv repräsentierenden Inhalte nicht voll zu erschöpfen, sondern es muss zu dem bisher beschriebenen nur signitiven oder bedeutungverleihenden Akte zu dessen voller Realisierung noch ein zweiter Akt hinzutreten, der nach seiner Materie wie nach sin seinem Setzungscharakter mit dem ersten völlig identisch und verschmolzen sein muss, dessen Inhalt aber im Gegensatz zu dem nur signitiven, sinngebenden Inhalt des ersten Aktes sinnerfüllend ist. In unserem Beispiel enthält also erst dieser sinnerfüllende Inhalt diejenigen Momente, die noetisch und noematisch das Sichtbare eines roten Würfels geben (s. "Log. Unters." II, 1. S.37 bis 42).

Der nur significative, der bedeutungverleihende Akt wird daher von Husserl als der uneigentliche, der bedeutungerfüllende, der intuitive Akt aber als eigentlicher Denkakt bezeichnet ("Log. Unters." II, 1. Aufl. S.655).

Und entsprechend werden in den "Logischen Untersuchungen" auch sogen. uneigentliche und eigentliche a priorische Denkgesetze zu unterscheiden gesucht.

Auch die eigentlichen a priorischen Denkgesetze können natürlich nicht vorschreiben, welche Form irgend ein in einem intuitiven Denkakt gegebener Stoff annehmen kann, sondern sie lehren nur soviel, dass, wenn überhaupt ein beliebiger Stoff in einem intuitiven Denkakt eine gewisse Form anzunehmen fähig

ist, dann auch ein festumgrenzter Kreis weiterer Formen für diesen selben Stoff zu Gebote steht. ("Log. Unters." II, 1. Aufl. S.622).

In der Sphäre der uneigentlichen Denkakte, in der Sphäre der blossen ~~Bezeichnung~~ Signifikation, scheint dagegen zunächst alles und jedes als eine "Bedeutung" zur Einheit ~~kommen~~ gebracht werden zu ~~können~~ können, z.B. auch "das A, das nicht A ist". Wollen wir aber formalen und realen Widersinn fernhalten, so ergibt sich auch hier schliesslich für Husserl das Resultat, dass auch die Geltungsgesetze der Bedeutungen den Formgesetzen der Anschauungsakte "getreulich nachfolgen" müssen. (s."Log. Unters." II, 1. Aufl. S.666,667).

Der Kern der bisherigen Denklehre Husserls liegt also seiner Meinung nach ausgesprochen nur in seiner Lehre von den bedeutungverleihenden wie den bedeutungerfüllenden Akten nach deren oben angeführten verschiedenen Momenten.

Was sonst noch in anderer Literatur wesentlich als Denken bezeichnet wird, etwa der erst mittelbar oder unmittelbar auf Sinnlichkeit zurückführende Akt wird von Husserl als fundierter oder kategorialer Anschauungsakt betrachtet. Und ebenso wird das Denken im Sinne von inadäquater Vorstellung bei Husserl als inadäquate Anschauung und das Denken im Sinne von Erfassen des Allgemeinen als allgemeines Anschauen bezeichnet (s."Log.Unters." II. 1. Aufl. 674).

Wie wenig aber ~~sein~~ im allgemeinen die Phänomenologie darauf abzielt, das, was die Psychologie unter Denken versteht, definitorisch genauer zu umgrenzen, geht deutlich daraus hervor, dass Husserl einerseits unter den Denkerlebnissen offenbar alle Arten von intentionalen Akten versteht, andererseits aber gegen Ende der "Logischen Untersuchungen" (II, 1.Aufl. S.666) erklärt, man könne auch, wie es oft geschähe, Denken und Urteilen iden-

tifizieren, habe aber dann ebenfalls — im Sinne der Unterscheidung von signitivem und intuitivem Akt — zwischen eigentlichen und uneigentlichen Urteilen = Denkakten zu unterscheiden. Der Gegenstand der Untersuchung ist also für den Phänomenologen stets nur die Beschreibung von notwendigen Wesensmomenten der intentionalen Erlebnisse überhaupt, nicht eine Beschreibung der Eigentümlichkeiten der als tatsächlich verschieden gegebenen Gattungen von Bewusstseinserlebnissen.

Im übrigen aber muss auch an dieser Stelle darauf hingewiesen werden, was Husserl selbst an zahlreichen Punkten seiner Schriften hervorhebt, dass alle bisherigen Analysen der Phänomenologie nicht als abgeschlossen gelten können, wie auch die lange Verzögerung von bereits seit 1913 angekündigten Publikationen wohl manche neue Umbildung der Husserl'schen Theorien erwarten lässt.

Referat über den Begriff

des Denkens bei Husserl

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Referat über den Begriff des Denkens bei Husserl

von D. Baumgardt

Jede Darstellung des Denkbegriffs bei Husserl muss zunächst die Tatsache berücksichtigen, dass Husserl selbst seine gesamte bisherige Forschung nicht als Psychologie, sondern als eine reine Phänomenologie angesehen wissen will.

In welchem Verhältnis steht nun die Psychologie zu jener von Husserl neu erstrebten Wissenschaft? Hierüber finden sich bei dem Forscher selbst eine grosse Anzahl nicht ohne weiteres in strengstem Einklang miteinander stehender Äusserungen.

Der wichtigste Unterschied, durch den sich die Phänomenologie von allen Erfahrungswissenschaften, also auch von der Psychologie, abheben soll, ist zunächst der: die Psychologie kann sich wie jede Tatsachenwissenschaft nur mit einem "Sein in der Welt" beschäftigen ("Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie S.7), mit individuell gegebenen psychischen Vorgängen; ihre Objekte sind daher zeitlich erfahrbar und zufällig. Die Phänomenologie dagegen soll nur von notwendig bestehenden, allgemein gültigen Wesensverhalten handeln; sie zielt daher stets auf ein zeitlich nicht Erfahrbares, auf das nur intuitiv einsichtige Eidos, auf das Wesen tatsächlicher Vorgänge. Jedoch mit Beziehung auf diese Unterscheidungspunkte hat es bereits Husserl selbst nicht entgehen können, dass sich auch innerhalb der bisherigen Psychologie weiteste Problemkreise nur mit der Beschreibung des Wesens der seelischen Vorgänge befassen. Alle diese Forschungen hat Husserl mit dem Namen der eidetischen Psychologie belegt und hat nun versucht, seine Phänomenologie auch von dieser eidetischen Psychologie noch des näheren abzugrenzen. Für die Gesichtspunkte aber, nach denen diese weitere Unterscheidung bewirkt wird, sind wesentlich erkenntnistheoretische Überlegungen bestimmend gewesen. So soll die Phänomenologie zunächst im Gegensatz zur eidetischen Psychologie [redacted]

als völlig independente, "als die einzig absolute" Wissenschaft, als die "erste" "Philosophie begründet werden" (s."Ideen" S.115 und S.121). Ihre Sätze sollen völlig unabhängig von irgend einer Voraussetzung eines Seins gelten, ja sie sollen erst nach der gedanklichen Ausschaltung alles physisch wie psychisch Existierenden zu gewinnen sein. Die eidetische Psychologie befasst sich mit dem Wesen der tatsächlichen psychischen Vorkommnisse, die Phänomenologie dagegen mit dem Wesen des transzendentalen Bewusstseins. Und dieses transzendentale, das immanent gegebene, das absolute Bewusstsein ist eben dasjenige, das nach "Einklammerung" der gesamten psychischen wie physischen Welt als das "phänomenologische Residuum" übrig bleibt ("Ideen" S.94ff). Das transzendentale Bewusstsein ist dasjenige, das dem in der Wirklichkeit gegebenen erst als die Voraussetzung seines Sinnes zu grunde liegt, in dem sich jedes wirkliche Erleben erst "konstituieren" muss (s.z.B. "Ideen" S.103 bis 106). Jedoch auch nach Vollziehung der phänomenologischen "Ausschaltungen", nach der Einklammerung der gesamten natürlichen Wirklichkeit, nach der Freilegung des eigentlichen phänomenologischen Feldes muss es Husserl noch zugeben, dass "jede Phänomenologische Feststellung über absolutes Bewusstsein umgedeutet werden kann in eine eidetisch=psychologische"[1], ja die Phänomenologie soll nach S.159 von der eidetischen Psychologie trotz weitreichender vorausgegangener Analysen "noch nicht geschieden" sein und jedenfalls "immer innig mit ihr verbunden" bleiben. (vgl. z.B.auch "Logische Untersuchungen II, 1,2.Aufl.S.369). Es ist deshalb wohl berechtigt, wenn auch wir versuchen werden, den Denkbegriff Husserl's im Anschluss an sonstige psychologische Untersuchungen festzustellen, wobei freilich stets vorausgesetzt werden muss, dass das wesentliche Interesse Husserl's über die Psychologie hinweg

[1] Ideen S.143

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Alle die bisher erwähnten Unterscheidungen nach Noesis und Noema sind nun solche, die Husserl erst in seinem letzten Werk, in den "Ideen" als die <u>Fundamentalbegriffe</u> seiner Analysen ent-

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Diese Momente sind:

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2. die Materie, auch als intentionale Materie bezeichnet, der "Auffassungssinn". Diese Materie ist der Inhalt eines Aktes, durch den er als Vorstellung eben dieses Vorgestellten, als Urteil dieses Geurteilten charakterisiert wird ("Log.Unters."II, 1,S.411).

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Suchen wir nun diese drei Momente in bezug auf die Noesis wie in bezug auf das Noema jedes Aktes an einem Beispiel zu unterscheiden, wie dies auch R. Kynast in seiner Schrift, "das Problem der Phänomenologie" getan hat, so ergeben sich etwa für den Aussageakt "dieser rote Würfel" folgende Unterscheidungen:

1. die noetische Qualität, d.i. der Setzungscharakter, wonach dieser / rote Würfel nicht als gefühlt, nicht als begehrt oder bezweifelt, sondern als in der Erinnerung gleichsam gewiss seiend gedacht wird,

2. die noetische Materie d.h. das Gemeintsein eines roten nicht eines andersfarbigen Würfels, und eines Würfels, nicht eines anderen Körpers,

3. Der noetische repräsentierende Inhalt d.h.z.B. die sinnlichen Laute oder die sinnlichen Schriftzeichen, die mit dem Ausdruck "dieser rote Würfel" verbunden sind, diese Zeichen rein als visuelle oder akustische Empfindungsdaten genommen. Hierbei wird es von besonderer Bedeutung, dass der repräsentierende Inhalt eines Aktes offenbar rein signitiv sein kann, d.h. er hat wie in dem genannten Fall mit der Materie nichts zu tun; er steht mit der Materie in einem uneinsichtigen Zusammenhange, er ist nur Zeichen für das, was die Materie intendiert. Denn es ist natürlich klar, dass die Schriftzeichen oder Laute "Würfel" mit dem Gegenstand Würfel nichts zu tun haben.

4. die noematische Qualität, dies ist der Setzungscharakter, soweit er den gemeinten Würfel selbst betrifft, nicht die Art, den Würfel zu meinen, sondern die Art des Würfels selbst, ein als gewiss=seiend gemeinter zu sein im Gegensatz zu einem als gewünscht etc. gemeinten.

5. die noematische Materie, dies ist nicht die Art des So=Gemeintseins des Würfels, sondern die Art des Würfels als eines So=Gemeinten, nicht das Moment des Rdmeinens, sondern das Moment des Rotseins des Gemeinten.

6. der noematische Inhalt, dies ist der Komplex der einzelnen Momente an den repräsentierenden Schriftzeichen etc. selbst.

Erst nach der Darstellung dieser sechs Momente, die jedem einzelnen Akte zukommen müssen, kann nun, wie ich glaube, das

nähere Kennzeichen des Husserl'schen Denkbegriffs angegeben werden. Wie nämlich in Anknüpfung an das über den repräsentierenden Inhalt Gesagte entwickelt werden muss, gehören überhaupt nach Husserl zu jedem voll realisierten Ausdruck nicht nur ein, sondern zwei Akte. (s.z.B. "Log. Unters." II, 1.Aufl. S.667) Der Ausdruck,"dieser rote Würfel"in unserem Beispiel ist daher mit dem bisher beschriebenen Akte und mit dessen nur signitiv repräsentierenden Inhalte nicht voll zu erschöpfen, sondern es muss zu dem bisher beschriebenen nur signitiven oder bedeutungverleihenden Akte zu dessen voller Realisierung noch ein zweiter Akt hinzutreten, der nach seiner Materie wie nach seinem Setzungscharakter mit dem ersten völlig identisch und verschmolzen sein muss, dessen Inhalt aber im Gegensatz zu dem nur signitiven, sinngebenden Inhalt des ersten Aktes sinnerfüllend ist. In unserem Beispiel enthält also erst dieser sinnerfüllende Inhalt diejenigen Momente, die noetisch und noematisch das Sichtbare eines roten Würfels geben (s. "Log. Unters." II, 1. S.37 bis 42).

Der nur signifikative, der bedeutungverleihende Akt wird daher von Husserl als der uneigentliche, der bedeutungerfüllende, der intuitive Akt aber als eigentlicher Denkakt bezeichnet ("Log. Unters." II, 1. Aufl. S.655).

Und entsprechend werden in den "Logischen Untersuchungen" auch sogen. uneigentliche und eigentliche a priorische Denkgesetze zu unterscheiden gesucht.

Auch die eigentlichen a priorischen Denkgesetze können natürlich nicht vorschreiben, welche Form irgend ein in einem intuitiven Denkakt gegebener Stoff annehmen kann, sondern sie lehren nur soviel, dass, wenn überhaupt ein beliebiger Stoff in einem intuitiven Denkakt eine gewisse Form anzunehmen fähig

ist, dann auch ein festumgrenzter Kreis weiterer Formen für diesen selben Stoff zu Gebote steht. ("Log. Unters." II, 1. Aufl. S.622).

In der Sphäre der uneigentlichen Denkakte, in der Sphäre der blossen Signifikation, scheint dagegen zunächst alles und jedes als eine "Bedeutung" zur Einheit gebracht werden zu können, z.B. auch "das A, das nicht A ist". Wollen wir aber formalen und realen Widersinn fernhalten, so ergibt sich auch hier schliesslich für Husserl das Resultat, dass auch die Geltungsgesetze der Bedeutungen den Formgesetzen der Anschauungsakte "getreulich nachfolgen" müssen. (s."Log. Unters." II, 1. Aufl. S.666,667).

Der Kern der bisherigen Denklehre Husserls liegt also meiner Meinung nach ausgesprochen nur in seiner Lehre von den bedeutungverleihenden wie den bedeutungerfüllenden Akten nach deren oben angeführten verschiedenen Momenten.

Was sonst noch in anderer Literatur wesentlich als Denken bezeichnet wird, etwa der erst mittelbar oder unmittelbar auf Sinnlichkeit zurückführende Akt wird von Husserl als fundierter oder kategorialer Anschauungsakt betrachtet. Und ebenso wird das Denken im Sinne von inadäquater Vorstellung bei Husserl als inadäquate Anschauung und das Denken im Sinne von Erfassen des Allgemeinen als allgemeines Anschauen bezeichnet (s."Log.Unters." II, 1. Aufl. 674).

Wie wenig aber im allgemeinen die Phänomenologie darauf abzielt, das, was die Psychologie unter Denken versteht, definitorisch genauer zu umgrenzen, geht deutlich daraus hervor, dass Husserl einerseits unter den Denkerlebnissen offenbar alle Arten von intentionalen Akten versteht, andererseits aber gegen Ende der "Logischen Untersuchungen" (II, 1.Aufl. S.666) erklärt, man könne auch, wie es oft geschähe, Denken und Urteilen iden-

tifizieren, habe aber dann ebenfalls -- im Sinne der Unterscheidung von signitivem und intuitivem Akt -- zwischen eigentlichen und uneigentlichen Urteilen = Denkakten zu unterscheiden. Der Gegenstand der Untersuchung ist also für den Phänomenologen stets nur die Beschreibung von notwendigen Wesensmomenten der intentionalen Erlebnisse überhaupt, nicht eine Beschreibung der Eigentümlichkeiten der als tatsächlich verschieden gegebenen Gattungen von Bewusstseinserlebnissen.

Im übrigen aber muss auch an dieser Stelle darauf hingewiesen werden, was Husserl selbst an zahlreichen Punkten seiner Schriften hervorhebt, dass alle bisherigen Analysen der Phänomenologie nicht als abgeschlossen gelten können, wie auch die lange Verzögerung von bereits seit 1913 angekündigten Publikationen wohl manche neue Umbildung der Husserl'schen Theorien erwarten lässt.

Edmund Husserl

spricht in der Berliner Kantgesellschaft

(German) printed in Berliner Tageblatt

1 typed copy

1 galley proof copy (somewhat different)

Berliner Tageblatt

Edmund Husserl spricht in der Berliner ~~Ortsgruppe der~~ Kantgesellschaft
~~von~~

Um die grossen Denker wie um die Religionsstifter wittert ein seltsames Geheimnis: auch noch die Umdeutungen, ja selbst die Missverständnisse, die sie erfahren, können zu einer erstaunlich produktiven Kraft in der Entwicklung des menschlichen Denkens erwachsen. Das gilt in der neueren deutschen Philosophie in den frappierendsten, in gigantischen ~~Dimensionen~~ Formen von Kant, den immer wieder die heterogensten philosophischen Bewegungen zu ihrem Führer proklamiert haben. Unter den Lebenden aber gilt es wohl am tiefsten von dem Schöpfer der sogen. modernen Phänomenologie, von Edmund Husserl.

Als Husserl 1900 mit seinem scharf geschliffenen zweibändigen "logischen Untersuchungen" in die philosophische Debatte eingriff, da erschien er zunächst vor allem als der glanzvolle Befreier der reinen Logik aus den Fesseln eines älteren Positivismus, eines Empirismus, der alle Logik in ein blosses Wissen von letzthin zufälligen Fakten aufzulösen drohte. Aber schon von da an hat dieser tief besonnene, nur auf strenge Präzision bedachte Logiker merkwürdig stark auch viel ungebundenere, freier schweifende Geister in die Nähe seiner Bahn gezogen. Und gar als sich Husserls Forschung dann 1913 in seinen "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie" bewusst breiter weltanschaulich ausdehnte, da konnte sich unmittelbar neben seinen streng kritisch "transzendentalen" Analysen "in seinen "Jahrbüchern für Philosophie" auch ein so metaphysisch viel ungestümerer Kopf wie Max Scheler ansiedeln — bis dann in der Gegenwart Metaphysik und Mystik und kaum mehr übersehbare andere vielspältige philosophische Tendenzen in buntester Fülle mehr oder minder stark gerade eine Anlehnung an die Lehre Husserls zu vollziehen suchten.

Nun sprach am Mittwoch abend der gefeierte Philosoph der Freiburger Universität zum ersten Male in Berlin vor einem erlesenen Auditorium in Anwesenheit des preussischen Kultusministers Grimme, des spanischen Bot-

schafters Americo Castro, des Ministerialdirektors Richter, der Rektoren aller Berliner Hochschulen und zahlreicher Professoren, der Philosophen Dessoir, Hartmann, Nicolai, Wolfgang Köhler, Spranger, Groethuysen, Hochstetter, Hofmann, Guttmann, der Literarhistoriker Petersen und Wechssler, der Historiker Meinecke und Breysig, der Nationalökonomen Bernhard und Sombart, der Mathematiker Ehrhard Schmidt und Schur, der Theologen Lietzmann und Sellin des Mediziners von Bergmann wie Vertreter des ganzen geistigen Berlin — eine so grosse Hörerschaft, dass der Vorsitzende des Kantgesellschaft, Arthur Liebert, mit Recht es sch scherzhaft bemerken konnte, wenn man die Scharen von Gästen mitzählen würde, die umkehren mussten, weil das Auditorium Maximum der Universität sie nicht fassen konnte, so hätte man mit diesen ausserordentlich weiten Vereherrkreisen eines Philosophen tatsächlich einmal den Sportpalast füllen können. In einer ungemein schlichten aber mitreissenden Bestimmtheit und Schärfe suchte Husserl in einer fast zweistündigen Rede den eigentlichen, originären Sinn seiner Idee einer transzendentalen Phänomenologie wenigstens in den allgemeinsten Zügen auszubreiten. Mit einer Radikalität, die den berühmten Zweifel des Descartes an der Existenz der Welt noch weit übersteigern will, erklärt es Husserl hier für die eigentliche Aufgabe einer kritischen, transzendentalen Philosophie, sich zuerst einmal alles naiven Glaubens an die bunte Welt der existierenden Dinge und Geschehnisse völlig zu enthalten, zu entledigen. Denn strenge Gewissheit und Evidenz der Erkenntnisse kann niemals in dem Reich der ständig veränderlichen seienden Dinge gefunden werden, niemals in der Welt, die wir als naive, unkritische Wesen zunächst als bereits fest gegeben voraussetzen, sondern notwendig gültige, evidente, unanfechtbare Einsichten in bleibende Wesensverhalte können nur beschlossen sein in einem Bezirk, der verborgen vor dem naiven Glauben an die seiende Welt trotzdem dieser Welterkenntnis stets unbemerkt zum Grunde liegen muss. Denn aller naiven, unreflektierten Erkenntnis der faktischen Welt muss doch logisch notwendig immer ein Reich von Erkenntnismomenten vorausliegen, ohne die diese ganze faktische Welt niemals als seiend gedacht werden kann.

Nur wer es in der echten phänomenologischen Besinnung vermag, den gesamten existierenden Kosmos (einschlisslich seines empirischen Ich) glaichsam "einzuklammern" und den eigenen Blick gewissermassen zurückzubiegen in das weite Gebiet von Bewusstseinsgebilden, durch die alles Existierende erst sinnvoll gedacht werden kann, nur der ist nach Husserl zur wahren Philosophie d.h. zur phänomenologischen Forschung befähigt, wie ~~Hus~~ Husserl selbst bereits mit einer souver"nen Meisterschaft solche phänomenologischen Analysen in einem ausserordentlichen Umfang durchgeführt hat, Untersuchungen, in denen ein divinatorischer Spürsinn und Scharfsinn selbst verwirrendste Zusammenhänge des grossen Rätsels unseres ~~Sinnsche-~~ Sinnschaffenden Bewusstseins ~~entblättert hat~~ aufgeblättert hat und mit der feinsten Sonde scheinbar unlösbare Verwebungen auseinanderzutrennen und wieder exakt zusammenzufügen verstand. So ist, wie Husserl es in seinem Vortrag und überall in seinen Schriften lebendig zu machen versteht, diese Phänomenologie ein Land der Forschung gänzlich jenseits von allem primitiven Vollzug des Lebens und Denkens in der Welt, und doch diejenige Forschung, durch die allein alles unreflektierte Leben und Denken in der Welt in den Faktoren seines Vollzugs ~~#~~ sichtbar gemacht werden kann. In der Erregung, mit der der Denker hier in seiner Rede diese geistige Gesamthaltung des Phänomenologen nachzuzeichnen unternahm, in der Unmittelbarkeit, mit der er die w a h r e E i n s a m k e i t des ganz von allem zufälligen Dasein abstrahierenden Forschers anschaulich werden liess, in der lebendigen Anspannung, mit der die innerste geistige Umwendung des phänomenologischen Blicks heraufzubeschwören verstand — in alle dem konnte der Hörer wirklich etwas von dem Atem eines ganz an seine Aufgabe gebannten, eines ganz in ihr versponnenen grossen Denkers verspüren.

Aber →

~~Aber ob freilich (wie Husserl es gegenüber allen seinen metaphysischen Nachfolgern festhalten will), mit der Aufdeckung, mit der Blosslegung des Forschungsreichs seiner konstituven Phänomenologie" bereits das ganze Reich der Philosophie ausgemessen werden kann, ob nicht~~ doch mindestens das Problem einer "hypothetischen Metaphysik" und ~~ob~~ nicht noch neben und nach dieser phänomenologischen Anthropologie eine Art metaphysischer Lehre vom Menschen innerhalb des philosophischen Denkens immer wieder ~~gelten~~

~~geltend machen wird und geltend machen sollte~~, das bleibt allerdings die letzte bewegende Frage, die noch über diese Rede Husserls hinausschwingend ~~hinausgreifend~~, mir nicht mit einem einfachen Nein beantwortbar zu sein scheint.

German Ethics of the
Victorian Age 1830-1900 (?)

1) German-Jewish Ethicists
Lazarus + Steinthal

page 1-22 - 2 copies
10 printed copies

{1 copy incl. H. of M.E.
+ 2 printed copies 2/1/69

39 East Broadway
Long Beach, N.Y.

December 26,1955

Dear Dr. Shapiro:

As I do not build up any of my historical writings on a mere knowledge of literature on my topics but on the exploration of the sources, I had to go during the last three months into extended rereading of the works of Lucien Levy-Bruhl, Gerardus Heymans, Lazarus and Steinthal.

The brief chapter on Steinthal and Lazarus who are the earliest of these thinkers has just been completed; and as this chapter may convey a far more adequate idea of the character of my work than any mere description of my approach to the subject please allow me to enclose these pages.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. David Baumgardt
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HISTORY OF MODERN ETHICS

CHAPTER XI

GERMAN ETHICS OF THE VICTORIAN AGE

(1) German-Jewish Ethicists

LAZARUS and STEINTHAL

by

DAVID BAUMGARDT

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we have offprints.
Dr Baumgardt

In the Victorian Age, German Jewry produced three professional philosophers who gained international reputation and as university teachers exercized some noticeable influence on German academic youth. The youngest of them, Hermann Cohen, whose lifetime stretched out into the epoch of the First World War was the most systematic and acute mind of the three. But also the two others, (Hajim Heymann) Steinthal and Moritz Lazarus, (Moses) still deserve recognition as to their ethical teachings, though they unfold there more eclectic views than in the fields of ethnopsychology and the philosophy of language.

Lazarus and Steinthal were friends and close relatives[1]; Steinthal married a sister of Lazarus. Both taught for several decades at the University of Berlin, reached almost the age of eighty and were founders as well as, for more than thirty years, editors of one of the most valuable scholarly periodicals of Germany, the "Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft". For good reasons both are also in several regards considered adherents of one of the few German philosophers, who, during the flowering of metaphysical speculation, tried to remain, even in what he called his "metaphysics", closer to empirical thought than Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, namely, Johann Friedrich Herbart. At the unveiling of a monument of Herbart in 1876, Lazarus delivered in presence of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg[2], an oration in

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1/ See especially Nahida Ruth Lazarus, "Wie Steinthal und Lazarus Brüder wurden" in Jahrbuch für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur, 1900, e.g. p.152: as early as in a letter of 1852, Steinthal addresses Lazarus with the "trauliche, brüderliche Du".

2/ See Moritz Lazarus' Lebenserinnerungen, bearbeitet von Nahida Lazarus und Alfred Leicht, 1906, p.460: "Bei der Enthüllung" in the City of Oldenburg "war der Grossherzog .. selbstverständlich mit seiner Gemahlin und dem ganzen Hofe und dem Landtage anwesend."

In the Victorian Age

which he praised Herbart almost as an equal of Kant and Leibniz, Kepler and Copernicus.[3] Steinthal mentions Herbart in his Allgemeine Ethik only seldom (along with) the few references to other thinkers which his work contains; but his teaching on five principal moral ideas is doubtless most decisively influenced by Herbart.[4]

Finally, both Steinthal and Lazarus show a lifelong marked interest in Judaism and Jewry. In his Treu und Frei ("Faithful and Free"), Lazarus gave his well known graphic picture of life in a small Jewish congregation of Eastern Germany during the first decades of the nineteenth century[5] -- pictures later supplemented by his Lebenserinnerungen edited by his second wife, a student of his and convert to Judaism and author of several volumes on Jewish topics. Twice Lazarus was President of the Israelitische Landessynode (German Jewish Synod in Leipzig) and in his "Ethik des Judenstums" as well as in his posthumous "Die Erneuerung des Judentums", he dealt in great detail with problems of Judaism. In the same way Steinthal revealed deep scholarly connection with problems of Judaism and Jewry in his volumes "Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophy" and in his posthumous "Über Juden und Judentum".

3/ See H.Steinthal, Allgemeine Ethik, 1885, e.g. p.141 and especially p.75f where Steinthal himself stresses his dependence on Herbart.

3/ M. Lazarus, Ideale Fragen in Reden und Vorträgen, 1878, p.~~10~~ 4f.

5/ See M. Lazarus, Treu und Frei; Gesammelte Reden und Vorträge über Juden und Judentum, 1887, "Aus einer jüdischen Gemeinde vor 50 Jahren, see, for instance, the precious anecdote on Rabbi Akiba Eger, p.286: When on a journey the Rabbi passed a tavern in a village and heard the wild shouts of amusement coming out of the place, he asked in feigned or honest amazement: "Why the jubilant shouting? Have they solved a problem of the Tosafists (Commentators on the Talmud)?"

Hayim (or Heymann, also called Hermann) Steinthal (1823-1899), by one year older than Lazarus who survived him by four years, has himself called his Allgemeine Ethik ("General Ethics") "a child of pain".[6] He thus wished to indicate that, in shaping this moral philosophy, he fought "embitterment toward men and fate" and also the pain over the fact that no older principles of ethics seemed to withstand any longer the great achievements of "mechanistic science" and the slashing assaults of many "junge Weltstürmer" and that "the most beautiful stars of moral culture seem to extinguish in the heaven over our fatherland".[7] All these are certainly pains, which, in a slightly different way, are no less familiar to us than to the sensitive thinkers of a hundred years ago. And so is Steinthal's way of relieving these pains still of some interest today.

The strength of the work, however, lies mainly in its detailed ethical perceptive observations. In the choice of his ethical principles, Steinthal follows, unfortunately, rather closely Herbart's assumption of "five basic "moral ideas" or ideals.[8] Similarly to Herbart, he distinguishes between the "idea of ethical personality" ("die Idee der ethischen Persönlichkeit"[9] or "der sittlichen Persönlichkeit"[10])-- Herbart called it the idea of an inner free will, "die Idee der inneren Freiheit"[11] --,"the idea of benevolence" ("Wohlwollens"[12]), "the idea of union" ("Vereinigung") --

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6/ H.Steinthal, Allgemeine Ethik,1885,p.VI

7/ Ibid., p.VIf, 12ff.

8/ See Ibid., e.g. p.75f: "Bei der ... Bestimmung der Idee habe ich mich, wie überhaupt in den ersten und dem dritten Teil dieses Werkes, an die Herbartische Philosophie gehalten."

9/ Ibid., p.94-99

10/ Ibid., p.97, 103.

11/ J.F.Herbart, Sämtliche Werke ed. by Gustav Hartenstein,1850ff,vol.VIII p.33ff ("Allgemeine praktische Philosophie") 1808.)

12/ Steinthal, Ibid., p.108-124; Herbart, Ibid., p.41ff.

This idea, on the whole, takes the place of what Herbart called "die Idee der Billigkeit"[13] --, "the idea of law and justice" ("Idee des Rechts"[14]) and "the idea of perfection" ("Vollkommenheit"[15]). But in the clarification of the meaning of these ideas and their application to the problems of concrete life, Steinthal generally goes his own way and offers a considerable amount of valuable reflection.

Confronted with a victorious vogue of materialistic thought in science and the realistic power politics ("Realpolitik") of his day, Steinthal grants that his ethical ideas or ideals do not by any means present themselves in the way of facts of physics or zoology. These basic ideas are not given data of knowledge;[16] they are means of judging and evaluating knowledge. By praising a line of behavior as ethical, nothing is added to the mere facts of which this behavior consists or, better to say, no new "material" element is introduced; only a formal criterion and ethical standard is annexed to the facts.[17]

In a note to these observations, Steinthal rightly stresses that even in theoretical knowledge such formal ideal criteria of judging our data of the senses is needed; otherwise we would never be able to distinguish data of illusion, hallucination or dreams from data representing true facts of reality. In this way even scientific knowledge -- like

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13/ See Johann Friedrich Herbart, Sämtliche Werke ed by Gustav Hartenstein, 1850ff, vol.VIII, p.53ff; H.Steinthall, Allgemeine Ethik, 1885, p.124-134.

14/ Steinthal, ibid., p.134-155; Herbart, ibid., p.45ff.

15/ Steinthal, ibid., p.155-172; Herbart, ibid., p.37ff.

16/ Steinthal, Allgemeine Ethik, 1885, p.28ff.

17/ Ibid., p.30.

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ethics -- must contain an ideal and formal element of "Beurteilung" along with the mere givenness of the "material" experience of nature; and, in farreaching agreement with Kant, this ideal compound of the ethical and theoretical judgment is also called by Steinthal a priori. 18/

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Equally interesting, though considerably more contraversial, is a further characterization of these formal and ideal feelings of ethical standard in Steinthal. He considers them as"objective" in strict contrast to all subjective,"pathological" feelings for the useful and the pleasant in human life. 19/ Like Herbart, he believes that the fundamental ideas by which we judge beauty and morality are of objective,"universal validity and absolute value" in contradistinction to the mere feelings of hunger, or anger or others essentially concerning the individual. 20/ In our subjective feelings we are, as Steinthal points out, passive objects of suffering by external causes, therefore "pathologically" affected; and only our ego is, then, involved. 21/ In judging an object as beautiful, however, or an act as morally good, we do not refer to our mere ego and are no longer passive but actively apprehend an object as 22/

18/ Ibid., par. 18 note, p.31f. On the ideal character of ethical feelings see especially ibid., p.58, 66; on their ideal and a priori character as "Musterbilder aller sittlichen Wirklichkeit" see especially ibid.,p.84f.

19/ Ibid., p.44

20/ Ibid., p.50f

21/ Ibid., p.49f.

22/ See e.g. ibid., p.71: in the esthetic and ethical judgment we perform a "Neuschöpfung".

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esthetically or ethically valuable.

Finally, Steinthal anticipates a remark which today is generally regarded as an original idea of Max Scheler, namely, the observation that the objects of the useful and agreeable are mostly destroyed by their enjoyment while the ethical and beautiful objects remain untouched by our delight in them.[23] And, as Steinthal adds, esthetic and ethical feelings are generally capable of frequent reproduction while the experience of merely subjective, "pathological" feelings does not lend itself to any strict repetition.[24] The pain of having hurt my finger cannot be renewed as ~~pain~~ bodily pain by remembering it. But the feeling of ethical approbation of a moral act can practically always be reproduced and thus shows that it is objective, expressing an objective and abiding relation between certain phenomena while the pain caused by a hurt finger expresses only a passing subjective relation between the ego and a part of the human body. Observations of this kind are no more and no less adequate than similar much praised ones in contemporary German, English, French, Italian and Spanish ethics of value.

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The least satisfactory of Steinthal's analyses of his five fundamental ideas in ethics seems to me his characterization of what he called the ideal of ethical personality. As he emphasized, his ambition was to (place) his five ethical ideas into the center of mechanistic thinking", to maintain idealism in ethics despite a full recognition of the value of the anti-idealistic spirit in the sciences of his day.[25] But when

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23/ Max Scheller, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 1921, p.91 and H.Steinthal, Allgemeine Ethik, p.52,55.
24/ Ibid., Steinthal, p.53f.
25/ Ibid., p.18: "Wir müssen die Idee mitten in die mechanische Denkweise hineinstellen, müssen in voller Anerkennung der mechanischen Welt dennoch den Idealismus unsrer Gesinnung bestätigen."

Steinthal assures us that by stressing morality in us, man transforms his natural individuality, his being a mere product of nature into a higher ranking personality, a citizenship in a superior ~~of~~ kingdom of the pure intellect,[26] then he exposes himself to as questionable ethical metaphysics as did Kant whose teaching he and Herbart largely adopt on this point.

Steinthal stands on much firmer ground in the analysis of his second basic idea of morality, the idea of benevolence. He rightly mentions that all the splendor and vigor of ancient ~~Roman-Greec~~ Greco-Roman civilization proved to be unable to give Western morality the warmth which radiated from the preaching of love and justice by the psalmists (33:5, 101:1) and the great Jewish prophets Hosea(12:7), Michah (6:8) and Zachariah (7:9).[27] In the Greco-Roman table of virtues, love is lacking[27] (In the Pentateuch [Deuteron. 10:19; 24:14f; Levit. 24:22] and in Ezekiel [47:22f], however, the love of one's neighbor is by no means limited to the Jew but "strictly philologically" it can be proven that by mentioning the Egyptians the stranger is also fully taken into account.[28])

Steinthal tries to distinguish merely fleeting sympathy from active benevolence;[29] but he includes in benevolence all feelings and thoughts furthering the real welfare of a fellowman and aptly remarks that our thoughts and feelings can no less hurt and delight another human ~~bee~~ being than our deeds. "How deeply we are injured by any undeserved distrust and how much elevated by true confidence in us!"[30]

As to his third moral ideal, "union", Steinthal denies that to the

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26/ Ibid., p. 103.
27/ Ibid., p. 108.
28/ Ibid., p. 123.
29/ Ibid., p. 114f.
30/ Ibid., p. 112f.

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union in business partnership any specific moral value can be ascribed; If a partner cashes his profit without being active at all in the business transactions, he ranks morally even lower than any egoistic profit seeker.[31] Of ethical value is only the unselfish union of men pursuing the welfare of others outside their group or working in the service of all mankind.

The moral idea of justice and law is quite appropriately compared by Steinthal with the bank of a river being created by the stream of morality and, nevertheless, being its natural dam, ~~not as Rudolf von Ihering thought in comparing the law with the iron mounting of morality~~ and thus, in turn, influencing the continued course of the river. The law for Steinthal is not as for Rudolf von Ihering a mere"iron mounting" of morality.[32] Yet, despite his praise of the German "Rechtsstaat" and his optimistic hope that equality will never be withdrawn from German Jews, they will "never be sold again"[33], Steinthal is a sufficiently critical historian to state that ancient Rome and modern England in general far surpass Germany by the firmness of their sense of justice.[34]

Finally, Steinthal's fifth moral idea, the ideal of"perfection", mainly stresses that any retrogression or even a standstill in the strife for higher morality is ethically objectionable and reprobative.[35] But all these general comments on the five fundamental ideas in ethics by no means exhaust the wealth of valuable moral insights in Steinthal's writings. There are excellent remarks on blind obedience, ~~for instance~~ which is morally justifiable, for instance in the soldier, but only in

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31/ Ibid., p.131

32/ Ibid., p.138

33/ See H. Steinthal, "Haman, Bileam und der jüdische Nabi", an essay published in 1885 in Bericht der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums and reprinted in Steinthal's Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie

as far as the reason for and the limits of this blindness are understood and it is, thus, in fact no longer really blind.[36] As to marriage, Steinthal thinks that full harmony should not be expected or even desired beforehand but achieved by common efforts within the symbiosis.[37] As to the intellectual and artistic abilities of women, he believes that they may be equal to those of men but that it may be difficult to answer this question conclusively.[38] But as generally division of labor is recognized as the mightiest principle of progress, it seems doubtful to Steinthal whether emancipation of women mechanically carried out would be in the best interests of men and women alike.[39] And there are in this ethics many more (most) thoughtful reflections on socialism,[40] on the change of interest in ethics during various epochs of history[41] (and the like.) on mythology and morality[43] and other valuable details.

Moses or Moritz Lazarus, compared with Steinthal, was perhaps the less penetrating thinker and the greater orator.[42a] Nevertheless, he -- and not Wilhelm Wundt or Steinthal -- is the founder of modern ethnopsychology. Steinthal explicitly testified to this;[42b] and as a

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1890, p.6.

34/ H.Steinthal, Allgemeine Ethik, p.153f.

35/ Ibid., p.155f.

36/ Ibid., p.158f.

37/ Ibid., p.179.

38/ Ibid., p.289. Concerning the artistic abilities of women, Steinthal suggests that they may, perhaps, find their most adequate expression by the wife's perfect reddition of an aria composed by her husband. See ibid., p.302, note.

39/ Ibid., p. 291ff.

40/ Ibid., ~~p. 268ff~~ e.g. p.268ff, 19f.

41/ Ibid., p. 2-7

42/ Compare the obituary by the Berlin historian of literature Richard M.Meyer in Zeitschrift des Vereins für Volkskunde, 1903, vol.XIII, p. 320ff: "Die Arbeitsteilung .. stellte sich .. wohl fast wie nach den Worten der Bibel zwischen Moses und Aaron: Steinthal legte die Worte in den Mund des Bruders, der für ihn zum Volke redete." But this characterization may still be unfair to Lazarus as far as ethnopsychology and

sociologist and psychologist as well as a personality of outstanding moral nobility[44] and warmth, he and his importance should not be underrated. Unlike Steinthal however, Lazarus did not write a systematic general ethics. His principal ethical treatises are a chapter in his "Life of the Soul" (Das Leben der Seele) "On the Origen of Morals" ("Zum Ursprung der Sitten") and his two volumes on The Ethics of Judaism (volume I translated into English by Henrietta Szold, 1900f).

Lazarus essentially approached moral problems from the angle of the psychologist and sociologist but remained well aware of the "danger" of any identification of the psychology of morals with ethics.[45] "The subject matter of the psychology of morals is real life changing in various epochs and different nations; ... the task of ethics is to reveal the eternal, unchanging ideals of morality unconcerned about all aberrations in life."[46] And yet, Lazarus rightly thinks that in laying the foundations of ethics we may well do in paying far more heed to the refinement of basic psychological insights than is usually done.

~~1890, p.66~~ and (especially) as several other subject matters are concerned. 42/ See e.g. H. Steinthal, Über Juden und Judentum, 1925, p.241.

43/ H. Steinthal, Mythos und Religion, 1870, p.30; ~~Unser~~ "Ob unsere abstrakte Religion ... für die Sittlichkeit ...das leistet, was ehedem die mythische Religion geleistet hat -- wenn sie es tut, so wird sie es besser tun".

44/ See e.g. Alfred Leicht, Lazarus der Begründer der Völkerpsychologie, 1904, p.19f. Lazarus remarked on Ernest Renan's "plagiarizing" Lazarus' essay "was heisst national": "Ich freue mich so sehr, dass Renan für meine Gedanken mit seinem Namen Propaganda gemacht, dass ich auf die Nennung meines Namens gern verzichte." Compare further in Alfred Leicht, Lazarus, Gedenkschrift zum 100. Geburtstage des Begründers der Völkerpsychologie, 1924, p.53, the statement on Lazarus: "von wahrhaft vornehmem, ja fürstlichem geistigen Gepräge (war), eine ganz seltene Vereinigung von jüdischem und deutschem Wesen, von Pietät und Geistesfreiheit, von Theorie und Praxis, von religiöser Tiefe und philosophischer Weite, von Gelehrtem und Künstler, und zugleich eine Natur, die auch für die kleinen, oft äuserlichen Sorgen des Werdenden stets Ohr und Herz offen

Such a fundamental gain of modern psychology is, according to Lazarus, the emphasis placed on the original feeling of dependence of the individual on others and the much slower development of an awareness of independent selfhood[47]; and again, as Lazarus ironically adds, the enlargement of private property seems, up to the present day, to primitive man a generally far more desired characteristic of his growing selfhood than the enlarged cultivation of his individuality itself.[48] Even the great masterminds of modern ethics, Kant and Herbart, have, as Lazarus maintains, lost sight of the original human feeling of belonging to a group in favor of the human pride in individual selfhood.[49]

Although, throughout his life, Lazarus regarded himself modestly as a follower of Herbart,[50] he questions Herbart's authority on this point and may be said to be quite entitled to do so. But, despite all other justified criticism of Kantian ethics, Lazarus' objection to Kant on this score seems rather out of place. For, Kant's concept of the ego -- as well as that of Fichte whom Lazarus censures on this point even more severely[51] -- emphatically signifies not any empirical but a metaphysical all-embracing intelligence, reason itself.

45/ M.Lazarus . Das Leben der Seele in Monographien über seine Erscheinungen und Gesetze, 1882, vol.III, p.389.

46/ Ibid., p.389f. 47/ Ibid., e.g. p.402,416.

48/ Ibid., p. 403

49/ Ibid., p.401 50/ As Alfred Leicht in his Lazarus,1924,p.21 reports on the basis of personal acquaintance with the founder of ethnc psychology, Lazarus regarded himself only as a Herbartian.

51/ M. Lazarus, Das Leben der Seele, 1882, vol.III, p.401.

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Far more pertinent is Lazarus' warning against the one-sidedness of all those numerous ethicists who built up their systems by taking into account only a single one of the many moral feelings psychologically observable in human nature. Lazarus mentions as such basic ethical feelings, for instance, reverence, the sense of honor,[52] the sense of truth, the feelings of ~~pain~~ shame;[53] and he insists that no ethicist should be allowed to ignore the existence of this multitude of genuine moral feelings.

He especially turns from this point of view against the age-old "prejudice" of hedonism which tries to reduce all morally relevant feelings -- even those of praise and blame of human behavior -- to feelings of pleasure and pain.[54] Like Steinthal, Lazarus urges that the feelings of moral approbation or disapprobation may be accompanied by pleasure or pain but are not pleasure and pain themselves;[54a] and he adds that it is, unfortunately, easier to look out for "the equality of things under some abstract scheme" than to"discover their differences", though the latter should be the principal task of the psychologist and moralist.[55] Yet neither Steinthal's nor Lazarus' marked polemics against hedonism seems to me conclusive. For, no matter whether it is easier to discover ~~the~~ diversity or equality in any phenomena, even the eudaemonism of J.S.Mill -- not to mention the far more consistent one of Jeremy Bentham -- does

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52/ Ibid., p.395. 53/ Ibid., p. 399.

54/ Ibid., p. 394 and compare the extended polemics in Steinthal's Allgemeine Ethik, 1885, p.42f, 54, 60f and passim.

55/ M. Lazarus, Das Leben der Seele, 1882, vol. III, p.394f.

not deny that there are marked differences between various types of pleasure or pain, d espitetheir general identity qua pain or pleasure. Also Lazarus' reference to sacréficial death as being a counter instance to ethical eudaemonism[56] certainly cannot serve as a refutation of the validity of "universal hedonism" and its aim, the greatest happiness of all mankind.

The failure of Lazarus' and Steinthal's attacks against hedonism is, however, only part of a more general deficiency due to their uncritical and unpropitious presupposition of ready-made self-evident moral feelings and ideals. In Lazarus' Die Ethik des Judentums these shortcomings may be less manifest, as applied ethics rather than the systematic basis of all moral judgment is at issue there. Nevertheless, epistemological weaknesses are not missing in this work either. In 1895 , in an unpublished letter to Dr. Isaac M. Wise, President of Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati (I owe a copy of this letter to the kindness of Dr. Robert Weltsch) that he did not think of being an ethnopsychologist and a Jew as well but he felt that Judaism was the very root of all his principal convictions and especially his devotion to ethnopsychology; and thus the two volumes of his Ethik des Judentums[57] have to be taken into account not only as Judaica but also because of their general etical relevance.

Lazarus is, of course, aware of the fact that none of the sources of Jewish moral thought, neither the Old Testament nor the Talmud, neither the Midrashim nor even many later theoretical writings aspire to the erection of a well rounded system of a jewish philosophy of morals in the modern sense of the term. In practically all the basic religious writigs of

56/M.Lazarus: Die Ethik des Judentums, 1899, e.g., vol.I, p.140.

57/Only the first volume of this work was translated into English by Henrietta Szold in 1900 f.

not deny that there are marked differences between various types of pleasure or pain, despite their general identity qua pain or pleasure. The failure of Lazarus' and Steinthal's attacks against hedonism is, however, only part of a more general deficiency due to their uncritical and unpropitious presupposition of ready-made self-evident moral feelings and ideals. A critical analysis of Lazarus' Die Ethik des Judentums would but confirm this, without our siding up with Hermann Cohen's far too harsh censure of the work.[56] But though it may be quite legitimate to infer from this Ethics of Judaism Lazarus' own systematic points of view, a general history of modern ethics is hardly the proper place for such an undertaking.

After all, the shortcomings of Lazarus' and Steinthal's moral philosophies are also, in full measure, those of modern value ethics in André Lalande, W.M.Urban, G.E.Moore, in Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, Giulio Preti, Francisco Larroyo, Aníbal Sánchez Reulet, and, in part, even in Ortega y Gasset as well as in numerous other European, North-and South American representatives of an ethics of self-evident moral values and duties. And all these authors of the twentieth century could have had at hand to their advantage the warnings of Nietzsche's master-morality and Freud's discovery of basically (amoral) "self-evident" moral feelings -- warnings by no means at the disposal of any thinker of the Victorian Age.

Lazarus and Steinthal share with practically all their contemporaries, such as J.S.Mill or Emerson, considerable indulgence in too smooth a flow of harmonizing thought. There is often too much of a flavor of intellectual maturation and of flourishes of rather pale and abstract eloquence

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56/ See Hermann Cohens Jüdische Schriften, 1924, vol.III, p.32- p.35

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coupled with far too rosy hopes of idealistic victories in the moral life of the race man. And yet, Lazarus and Steinthal are comparatively much in the detail of their ethical observations,
freer from such deficiencies than they might appear to be to the fugitive glance of the mere observer of the façades of their thought.

Judaism,the place of absract philosophical reflection is taken by concrete moral exhortations,examples or historical reports offering ethical implications. Yet the common spirit pervading all these utterances scattered in extended documents of a long religious tradition allows us,according to Lazarus,to build out of these pieces a whole of moral Weltanschauung analogous to the classic ethical systems of ancient Greek and modern philosophy.

In the heat of his polemics against Lazarus'work,Hermann Cohen,I think,goes much too far in denying the"Ethik des Judentums" any claim to originality and in charging it with an impardonable blindness toward the merits of previous philosophies of Judaism.[58] Contrary to Cohen' s reproach, however it should be said in fairness to Lazarus that he did by no means ignored the intimate connection between religion and ethics in Jewish religious literature preceding his work.[59] But Cohen appears less mistaken in emphasizing that the systematic arrangement of Lazarus' material is comparatively lacking in precision. The headings of the various chapters on the principle of Jewish morals,on the character of Jewish morality, on sanctification as unification,on the way to morality and on the shape and on sanctification of morality to be created represent rather vague concepts under which a large heterogeneous mass of moral thought could only loosely be organised.But after all,Cohen himself attacking the "unscientific" character of Lazarus'work[60] offers us in his posthu mous Die Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums,1919,a philosophy and ethics of Judaism which,in my opinion,does not surpass Lazarus' achievement in specificly "scientific"value.

To repeat,it (seems quetionable may be questioned) whether the vast material of ethical thought in more than two thousand years of Jewish tradition is

59/See H.Cohen's Jüdische Schriften ed. by Bruno Strauss,vol.III,1924, p.3ff.

60/Lazarus,Die Ethik des Judentums,vol.I,1899,e.g.p.85f,195f.

is susceptible to any "strictly scientific" elucidation;and it appears especially dubitable whether Cohen's rigid adherence to principles of Kantian ethics as the only scientific ones is as superior to Lazarus' more flexible methods of interpretation,as Cohen himself believed. In fact,Louis Levy may have come nearer to the truth when he observed in a review of the "Ethik des Judentums" that Lazarus still was too much under the spell of Kant's ethics[61] which,at that time, held an even greater sway over German philosophy than in the days of Schelling and Hegel.

The merits of Cohen's three penetrating commentaries on the three main topics of Kant are incontestable. In contrast to the methods by which Kant's celebrated German successors,Fichte and Hegel. made use of their master's thought only in the light of their own essentially un-Kantian metaphysics,Cohen,the Jew,provided after more adequate,faithful and extremely fruitful interpretation of Germany's greatest critical philosopher. But I cannot agree with Franz Rosenzweig in ranking Cohen's Jewish thought equally high or even higher than his Kant analyses.

Cohen ridiculed Lazarus' "untenable" and narrow "Ghetto" concept of a "Gesamtgeist des Judentums" comparably independant of ancient Greek,Roman and modern Germanic civilizations.[62] In opposition to Lazarus, he insisted that "we German Jews" think and should think in "the spirit of Lessing and Herder,Leibniz and Kant,Schiller and Goethe" even in matters of our Jewish "faith".[63] Lazarus retaliated not inaptly by singling out two aggressive,harsh censors of his work,one of them an avowed German antisemite,the other"Professor Hermann Cohen.. both being my adversaries from top to bottom" and though"these two gentlemen may be very different from each other,toward my work they

61/ Louis Lévy in L'Univers Israélite, Journal des Principes Conservateurs du Judaisme, fondée par S. Bloch, 54e Année (Tome II) No. 43, 14 juillet, 1899, p. 537: "Je crains qu'il (M. Lazarus) n'ait trop vu la morale juive à travers les idées de Kant." Another point of Lévy's criticism concerning Lazarus "se complaire en des digressions" seems to me less well chosen. In any case, it is far less the "digressions", than the vagueness of the headings in Lazarus' chapters which (in my opinion) seems disturbing in the arrangement of his material. (in my opinion) jeopardizes lucidity in the table of contents will [illegible] over

62/ See H. Cohens Jüdische Schriften, vol. III, 1924, p. 8 (ibid. p. 538,)

63/ Ibid. pp. 9f, 12.

they are throughout par nobile fratrum"[64]. In fact, only a few years after Cohen's death did it become no longer difficult to realize who entertained the narrower and, at the same time, more utopian views in these respects. It is Cohen and not Lazarus.

The ethnopsychologists Lazarus and Steinthal certainly had a more appropriate insight into concrete realities of life and history than the great logician and apriorist Cohen who tried to demonstrate in his Deutschtum und Judentum, 1916, that there was a full and almost pre-established harmony between Jewish and German thought. In an oration Uber Wilhelm von Humboldt delivered at the Berlin Town Hall on the day of the unveiling of the Humboldt Monuments in May 1883, Steinthal far more tactfully and wisely restrained himself to the observation that the Jew proud of the great past of Jewry will no more be alienated from the German idea than the Catholic in his religious longing for Rome[65]. And even more markedly, Steinthal granted in a preface to his Jewish addresses and essays that "in the first instance, we represent an association built up on common blood"[66]. Lazarus took a similar stand; and it is perhaps not insignificant that -- unlike practically all the representatives of the following German generations -- both these thinkers holding professorships at Germany's leading university hesitated to use their Germanized given names and, as their Jewish given names, Moses and Hajim, seemed perhaps "too provocative" in the epoch of a rapidly progressive assimilation, they generally signed only M. Lazarus and H.Steinthal.

64/ M.Lazarus, Die Ethik des Judentums, vol.II, 1911, p.XXXIX.

65/ H.Steinthal, Über Wilhelm von Humboldt, 1883, p.25: "Wenn den Katholiken religiöse Sehnsucht gen Rom wendet, so wird ihn dies der deutschen Idee nicht entfremden, und ebensowenig wird den Juden die stolze Erinnerung an seine herrliche Vergangenheit hindern, in deutscher Freiheit zu denken, in deutscher Tiefe zu fühlen, in deutscher Kraft und Treue zu schaffen".

66/ H. Steinthal, Über Juden und Judentum, 3rd.edition, ed.byy Gustav Karpeles and N.M.Nathan, 1925, p.4: "Wir..bilden..eine zunächst auf dem Blute beruhende Genossenschaft". According to ibid., p.VII, the article in which this observation appeared was to be a preface to a book entitled "Schema Jisroel"!2 which Steinthal planned to publish about 1892 but never did.

As is the case with Steinthal,the philosopher of language,so with Lazarus,the psychologist,the value of his moral philosophy rests in the detail of his major ethical work. Out of a considerably larger knowledge of therreligious literature of Judaism than obviously was at the disposal of Cohen,Lazarus unearthed such subtle and little known ethical wisdom as that revealed in the Midrash Tanchuma of Rabbi Tanchuma bar Abba (fourth century of the Common Era,before the final codification of theTalmud):"He who is merciful even toward the cruel man will end by being forced to be cruel even toward the merciful".[67] Or out of Midrash Kohelet Rabba:"God is always with the persecuted.. even if the persecutor is a righteous man and the persecuted is an evildoer, as Rabbi Huna said on behalf of Rabbi Jose" and Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Jose ben Simra added that,~~according to Wajikra,chapter22,verse27,~~God does not desire the sacrifices of lions,panthers or wolves but only the sacrifice of the lamb,the ox and the goat,those peaceful animals which are persecuted by the beasts of prey.[68]

The relation between justice and mercy,complicated and ever fundamental in Judaism,is further referred to by Lazarus' quotation from Midrash Debarim Rabba where,according to Rabbi Eliezer,stern judgment is not used (by God)above if it is used below (by men). God replaces it in this case by mercy But if there is no strict justice below,mercy will be replaced by stern justice above.[69] Without any polemics,Lazarus also quotes sayings of old Jewish tradition which are generally attributed to the superior freedom above the "law" of Judaism and are lauded as outstanding distinctive features of Christ.

67/M.Lazarus,Die Ethik des Judentums,vol.II,1911,p.88,R.Eleazar on Sidra Mezora zora.

68/Ibid.vol.II,1911,p.215. Kohelet Rabba,parasha 3,15.In his Die Stunde und die Erkenntnis,1936,p.10, Martin Buber,too,refers to part of this statement in Midrash Kohelet Rabba 3,15.

69/Lazarus,Die Ethik des Judentums,vol.II,p.207.Midrash Deberim Rabba,parasha 5,

ian mentality,such as the observation of Rabbi Simeon ben Menasja in the Mechilta,according to which the Sabbath is handed over to you and not you to the Sabbath,[70] and the remark of Rabbi Tarphon to the effect that if one is exhorted to remove amote from one's teeth,one should not answer: You yourself take out first the beam from your eye.[71] As to the position of women in Jewish tradition,Lazarus emphasizes the sound moral esteem generally recommended and shown them. No morally questionable"romantischer Frauenkultus",no "schmachtender Frauendienst" was cultivated but the Pirkey de Rabbi Eliezer go so far in their regard for women as to report - - in an only half humorous way - - that before God gave Moses the Tora he asked him to explore whether the women would accept it,as men generally follow the example and advise of women.[72]

Finally,Lazarus was perhaps the first scholar to draw the attention of the non-Jewish world to the broad extent to which humor,wit and irony unfolded themselves in the religious tradition of Judaism. This fact was certainly not unknown to numerous generations of Talmudists. But though even Lazarus asserted this not without some timidity,(before him) it was obviously not realised before him at all in Christian theology that perhaps in thewhole of religious world literature there is no other important document (where in which) humor and even a truly gaia scienza plays such a vital role as in the Talmud and the Midrashim. Lazarus rightly referred in this respect especially to the splendid superior humor of the story told in "Baba Mezia"in which God himself laughingly confesses that "my children(Talmudic sages)have floored me"[73] in a

70/ Lazarus,vol.II,p.216and see Midrash Mechiltha(on "Exodus",chapter 21,verse 14),sidra ki thissa,parasha 1; and compare The Gospel according to St.Mark, chap.2,v.27.

71/ Lazarus,vol.II,p.247 and see Talmud Babylonicum, Arachin 16b; compare The Gospel according to St. Matthew,chap.7,v.3-5.

72/ Lazarus,vol.II,p.271 and see Pirkej de Rabbi Eliezer,chap.41

73/ Lazarus, vol.II,p.XXIf,pp.367ff and see Talmud Babyl.Baba Mezia 59b.

mighty religious dispute - a story later spiritedly evaluated also by Max Brod.[74]

Yet the determined struggle which Steinthal and Lazarus wished to carry on against the political and philosophical materialism (spreading) in Germany's public life in the later nineteenth century, the "idealism" under the banner of which they wanted to fight against the gross ~~materialistic~~ naturalistic and mechanistic thinking of philosophical popularisers suchas Büchner and Moleschott has often led them and Hermann Cohen quite unnecessarily far in their aversion to eudaemonism[75] or even self-assertion in ethics. And this repugnance for self-regarding motives drove them and Cohen to the adoption of far too unrealistic abstract fundamentals in their moral philosophies. Lazarus, Steinthal and Cohen shared a basicly unchecked trust in the strength and final victory of moral duty and of peace-loving impulses in man.

Their ethics, thus, reflects the optimistic moral sentiments and intellectual hopes of the long period of European peace after the Franco-Prussian War, the firm belief in a steady ethical progress toward Messianic perfection undisturbed by such violent outbursts of brutality, of avowed power-politics, of social and economic upheavals as occurred in the twentieth century. Even the proclamation of a radical anti-religious or a revolutionary economic ethics in Stirner or Marx was not taken into account by these late Victorian thinkers and never subjected by them to any critical scrutiny. Lazarus rejects even the possibility of a transvaluation of values and insists that "the science of morals (presents) offers in fact and in essence nothing new"; and significantly he even adds: "Woe to the nation to which scientific ethics and its contents present something new"![76]

74/ M. Brod, ~~Heidentum~~, Christentum und Judentum, 1921, vol.I, pp. 77ff.

75/ See e.g. M. Lazarus, ~~Die Ethik des Judentums~~, vol.II, 1911, p.XXXVff L.'s analysis of the motives of the Jew putting on the phylactèries: "No feeling of pleasure-like happiness is in his soul; the thing has nothing to do with his personal fate and well-being; but a feeling of inmost freedom beams forth in him such as nohappiness and no pleasure can provide".

76/ Ibid., volII, p.XI.

L Lazarus, Steinthal and still Cohen had essentially to exhaust themselves in assuring the non-Jewish world that Jewish ethics throughout the ages was notthat sinister system of rules of Shylock-like exploiting the "goy", such as Jewish morals figured ~~ithe eyes~~ in the imagination of distrusting Gentile masses and ~~ha~~ semi-learned Talmud accusers. The philosophical leaders of Jewish emancipation in the nineteenth century had, of necessity, first to cleanse the name of Judaism from the gross misinterpretation to which it had (comprehensibly) been exposed during the long centuries of Jewish ghetto-life; and these thinkers certainly were not wrong in putting first things first by claiming that allleading Jewish tradition from Moses to Isaiah and Maimonides was the equal, to moreover the forerunner of ~~the~~ Lessing's, Herder's and Humboldt's humanitarian work for a Messianic human brotherhood.

It obviously never entered the minds of either Steinthal or Lazarus that an avowed master morality could challenge the very basis of Jewish as wellas Christian and German idealistic ethics. Cohen even unswervingly refused the entrance of such radical thought to his mind. I have been told that followers of his such as the young Nicolai Hartmann used to hide their Nietzsche editions when Cohen paid them a visit.

Yet, after all, the shortcomings of Steinthalsand Lazarus' moral philosophies are also, in full measure, those of modern value ethics in Andre Lalande, W.M.Urban, G.E.Moore, in Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, Giulio Preti, Francisco Larroyo, Anibal Sanchez Reulet and, in part, even in Ortega y Gasset aswell as in numerous other European, North-and South American representatives of an ethics of "self-evident" moral values and duties. And all these authors of the twentieth century could have had at hand to their advantage the warnings of Nietzsche's master morality and Freud's discovery of the original and "self-evident" moral blindness of man --

warnings, ~~by no means at the disp~~osal, to the same extent, not at the disposal of any thinker of the Victorian age.

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Lazarus and Steinthal share with practically all their contemporaries, such as J.S.Mill or Emerson, considerable indulgence in too smooth a flow of harmonizing thought. There is often too much of a flavor of intellectual saturation and of flourishes of rather pale and abstract eloquence coupled with far too rosy hopes of placid amity in the moral wrestling of the race. And yet, in the detail of their ethical observations, Steinthal and Lazarus are freer from such deficiencies than ~~they~~ might appear to a fugitive glance at the facade of their thought.

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J. G. Herder (1744-1803)

Biography in German
Printed in the Hebrew Encyclopedia (?)

3 copies, collated pages 1-16

letters relative to Essay

incl. Hist of M.E.
2/1/69

Here as I have find enclosed my article on Heid. ~~which~~ mailed to you just as I had suggested the end of July. Unfortunately it ~~has~~ remained longer than I wanted or wished it to be. But I hope it will prove to be less troublesome than the opposite. Perhaps you may not like a number of my value judgments, & I gladly confess that I have "ein gewisse Scheuklappe für Heidegger". Please eliminate such passages which may seem to you not "value-free" enough for an encyclop. I, of course, would defend them (which I do) all the same. In my MS

Would you allow the Ld. Rektorat - Tel Aviv. P.O.B., edit Dr. H. - publish excerpts from the evaluation of H's work for the enclosed article. They originally asked me to send them a contribution of about a page of their paper; and though I have given with a copy on Tel Aviv for reasons of secrecy, I myself do not have the time to rewrite it - so for the first

time I send it to your office to
You can keep it in your office, & if you should keep it, Mr. Hedwig would gladly have it typed by a lover
Edith Hedwig
skilled of - . She can read Ger. MSS very well with difficulty & she already typed MSS of
mine years ago. Of course, please charge me for the costs.

From H. you will I received years ago the original of a letter by Heidegger. My wife has made a
unpublished brief
photostat of it which I shall send in separate cover in case you have lost - it. She has
also copied for you the following passage by Heid. on Abraham, as my Heidegger ed. is with my bulk
in the N.Y.P.L.
of my lit. still stored at the U.

bibliography I intentionally omitted Eugen Hc "schwindliger Nazi's Heidegger, 1927 which is
Eugen Kühnemann's
generally recommended. I like R. Haym. Heidegger is not only more detailed but also
I agree with
great superior literary critic though not an infallible one either. Unfortunately Adolphe Bonnet: Heidegger
sa vie et son oeuvre, 1916 and a recent work by Baeke were not accessible at Col. U. Lib., Dobbs'
compendious small book is not bad. I skipped in Ernst Cassirer
the Thieme Volksverlag in Weimar.
A remarkable blunder which the Encyc. Br. makes about H's alleged dislike of Hegel (see the 14th
ed. does) was, of course, corrected by me (see p. 11, lines 1-3)

(over)

v. 16 294 Wagenseil

Den Brief, den Erasmus an Hutten den Tag vor Ostern 1523. schrieb, kann man bei Wagenseil (Hutten. opp. Lips. 1783. S. 328 den Brief, den er an den Züricher Rath unterm 10. Aug. 1522. also wenige Tage vor Huttens Tode schrieb kann man in Schubart Ulrich von Hutten S. 146. lesen.

Nachschrift

294 Der Wunsch, den sch in diesem Andenken Huttens vor siebzehn J. geäussert hatte, seine Schriften gesammlet und sein Andenken lebend erhalten zu sehen, schien in J. 1783 sein glückliches Erfüllen zu erreichen. Der erste Band von Huttens Werken (Ulrici ab Hutten opp. T. I. ed Christ. Jac. Wagenseil, Lips. 1783) erschien; und da er sehr merkwürdige abwechselnde, schön geschriebene Briefe dieses Mannes enthielt: so war kaum zu zweifeln, dass nicht auch seine sinnreichen Gespräche, seine Poesien, endlich auch die Stücke seiner erhabnen, fortressenden Beredsamkeit folgen würden. Aber als ob der Unstern, der Hutten im Leben begleitete, ihn auch im Grab nicht verlasse, erschien folgende Anzeige des Herausgebers

v. 9-280 Auch die Berechnung der Zahl des Thiers, (Daniels. Gräuel der Verwüstung) ist nach der Gematria weiter kein Räthsel. Viele Umstände und Lobsprüche sind bekannte Schmäuche und Gebete der Juden: z. E. das siebenfache Lob des Engels die grosse Hoffnung zeigen, Wasser schöpfen aus den Heilbrunnen, und den Palmzweig (Heil) in Händen tragen.

(my)

The Fleetwood, Long Beach, Long Island, N.Y./USA June 22, 196[illegible]

Your ref.: EH/1099

Dear Dr. Feldman:

Many thanks for your friendly letter of June 17 which I answer by return mail.

I am very grateful to Prof. Netanyahu for his observations on a sentence in the 2nd paragraph of p.8 of my MS. I should like to suggest the following English rendering of my German text: The much more voluminous principal work on the philosophy of history, the "Ideen" goes into considerably more detail of this kind considering the dependence of inner peculiarities of main types of human culture on geography and climate. In this view, the "Ideen" stretch out even to a characterization of the "feine politische Moral" Chinas..

On p.3, the last word before the chapter "Leben 1769-180[illegible] should better be Moses Mendelssohn to avoid confusion with Felix Mendelssohn Barthold[illegible] born 6 years after Herder's death.

As the literature on Herder is generally not too valuabl[illegible] with the exception of the old 2 standard volumes by R. Haym, I had intentionally given only 3 titles but agree, of course, with your more detailed list .

I suggest, however, the choice of the later work by Dobbek I had mentioned, as it has the more embracing topic.

To the reference to Cassirer I should add; chapter 1, as Cassirer's brief analysis of Herder's philosophy of history consists of only 6-1/2 pages of this 3rd book, chapter 1.

Further, I suggest adding:

D. Baumgardt, Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn unter den Vorläufern der modernen Ethik, 1933, p.199-255, as these 56 pages ar generally considered the most detailed analysis of Herder's ethics.

Max Rouché, La philosophie de l'histoire de Herder, 1940,

Hans Urs von Balthasar, Prometheus, 1947, p.62-90, the best analysis of Herder's philosophical and religious lyrics,

To Alexander Gillies, Herder I should add: Oxford, 1945, a[illegible] a German translation of this work appeared in 1949.

If you wish to enlarge this list, one might add:
Benno von Wiese und Kaiserswaldau, Herder, 1939 and
Hans Georg Gadamer, Volk und Geschichte im Denken Herders, 1942.

The very well know work, Eugen Kühnemann, Herder, 3rd edition, 1927, I should not suggest adding. I never could think much o it, and the author later definitely revealed himself as a Nazi sympathizer, see his autobiography.

Hoping that this answers all your questions, with my best regards to you and Dr. Netanyahu,

Sincerely yours,

David Baumgardt

Ch. Joret, H. et la renaissance littéraire en Allemagne au XVIIIe siècle, 1875; R. Haym, H. nach seinem Leben u. seinen Werken dargestellt, 1877-85; Th. Litt, Kant u. H. als Deuter der geistigen Welt, 1930; R.H. Ergang, H. and the Foundations of German Nationalism, 1931; F. Meinecke, Die Entstehung d. Historismus, II, 1936; K. Breysig, Die Meister der entwickelnden Geschichtsforschung, 1936, 192-267; F,M. McEachran, Life and Philosophy of J.G.H., 1939; A. Gillies, H., 1945; W. Dobbek, J.G.H.s Humanitatsidee als Ausdruck seines Weltbildes u. seiner Persönlichkeit, 1949; E. Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge; Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel, 1950 (3rd "book", chapter 1 on Hist.,); R.T. Clark, H., his Life and Thought, 1955.

Rewritte

Von den vier "Klassikern" aus der Zeit de Hochblüte der neueren deutschen Dichtung, Lessing, Herder, Goethe, Schiller ist Herder innerhalb und ausserhalb Deutschlands der am wenigsten bekannte. Und doch war er vielleicht der originalste und - mindestens indirekt - einflussreichste Kopf unter diesen vier genialischen Geistern. Seine philozophische und geisteswissenschaftliche Deutung der Geschichte ist von Goethe an über Nietzsche, Spengler, Joël und Toynbee hinaus wirksam gewesen. Seine "Stimmen der Völker in Liedern" haben den modernen Sinn für volkstümlich charakteristische Lyrik geweckt ode mindestens beträchtlich vertieft. In seiner Verteidigung Spinozas hat besonders er die Bahn gebrochen

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vorbildlich [illegible] auf [illegible] Anf. statt Herder

[illegible] Bewegung [illegible] Kultur zurück

1500–2500 words
end of July

Herder

Von dem [illegible] der [illegible] der neueren deutschen Dichtung [illegible] Herder, Goethe, Schiller [illegible] Herder [illegible]

gelegen [illegible] Name. Selbst Herder [illegible]

[illegible] Philos. festgestellt, daß die führenden Geister [illegible] in der 1. Hälfte des 19. Jhdt. sich [illegible] fühlten

In der Tat [illegible] Herder

Er wurde Theologe u. verdichtete Künstler [illegible]

bedeutend [illegible] der [illegible]

Ranke, Taine

Hippolyte Taine, Philosophie de l'art 1865

[illegible] und vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft [illegible] der

vor allen [illegible] fast einzigartig

Gesindel [illegible], die den großen Juden von Amsterdam von da in [illegible] des

Scharfsinn [illegible] alle vergleichende Geister [illegible] vergleichende Literatur, vergl. Kunst [illegible] Religions-

[illegible] Schriften verdanken [illegible] u. Vielseitigkeit [illegible] Anregung, die weder [illegible]

[illegible] Schiller [illegible]

[illegible] Goethe [illegible]

[illegible] zahllose später Moralsyntaktik später Genre [illegible]

[illegible] der historischen Schule u. [illegible] d. Gestirne [illegible] in Pädagogik III S. 325

[illegible] oder [illegible] Verhältnis [illegible]

[illegible] wie [illegible] Nieder [illegible]

[illegible] Ball-Mozart

[illegible] Kälter

Reise-Tagebuch S. 86 + 156 [illegible]

[illegible] auf die des [illegible]

[illegible] Shakespeare [illegible]. Auf Coleridge + Carlyle gewirkt

N. Marselli, La scienza della storia, 1873

Giacinto Fontana, Idea per una filosofia della storia, 1873

Ausonio Franchi, [illegible] sentimento, 1854

Elizabeth Yates

6/21

Cultural Bridges for moral, historical and cultural understanding.

(6th Conf. on Science, Philosophy & Religion
Aug. 1945)

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2 typed copies, collated - pages 1 – 8
+ 3 typed copies of Abstract for the Press

22 copies of essay (marked Not for Publication)
slightly different from typed version

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1 printed copy - edited and shortened
in "Approaches to Group Understanding"
(Harper & Brothers 1947)

A note in the preface of book says that essay was edited by Harp. Bros. & there was no objection to printing of orig. essay, by author, elsewhere.

FILMED IN TWO SECTIONS

The New York Times 27th Aug. 1945 MONDAY, AUGUST 27, 1945. 21 L +

SCHOLARS SEE PERIL IN GREATEST 'CRISIS'

'Common Ground' on Which All May Achieve Happiness Is Goal at Meeting Here

SEEK 'CULTURAL BRIDGES'

But Science and Philosophy Clash Over Ways of Reaching Goal and Definitions

By MORRIS L. KAPLAN

Acknowledging that the world is facing the greatest period of "crisis" in recorded history, scientists, philosophers and theologians theorized yesterday on how to attain a "common ground," on which happiness for all people at all times might be assured.

Dr. Phillipp Frank, research associate in physics and philosophy at Harvard University, emphasized the realistic nature of the metaphysical discussions by declaring that the atomic bomb was the first real refutation of materialism. For the first time, he observed, it had been shown that matter can disappear from the world, that the mass can be converted into energy.

Attended by 130 leaders in thought and education, the third day's session of the sixth annual conference on science, philosophy and religion at the Men's Faculty Club of Columbia University, 400 West 117th Street, sought "cultural bridges" in philosophy and religion to unify divergent international groups.

Social scientists clashed with philosophers over the means to achieve these ends, but all apparently agreed that objective standards could be resolved.

Objective Standards Debated

When Robert M. Scoon, Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University, asserted that the recent United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco had bargained for cooperation without "objective standards," and suggested that individuals might do likewise to arrive at a satisfactory formula, his views were attacked by Edgar S. Brightman, Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy at Boston University.

Protesting that the conference had been guided by at least four objective standards, Professor Brightman recited them in the following quatrain:

"Discussion is better than silence,

"Reason is better than violence,

"Cooperation bett[illegible] than an-

"Reason is better than violence,
"Cooperation better than an-
[illegible]
"And democracy better than tyranny."

Professor Scoon said he agreed, but he and others asserted their disagreement over the definition of the word "happiness." They dismissed with heavy silence a suggestion by Krishnalal Shridharani, Columbia University research associate in sociology and author of "My India," that a new religion was required for the Atomic Age. They expressed greater concern for a modern application of the basic philosophies of Aristotle and Descartes.

Mr. Shridharani, appealing for a new philosophic religion, pointed out that anthropologists had found that fear was the basis for all religions, that now the fears of mankind were "horizontal," involving relations with his fellow men, not "vertical," or involving "fear of the after life."

Professor Brightman said the philosopher's task was to interpret true human welfare and values and agreed with others that there were no such things as art, philosophy or science, rather artists, philosophers and scientists — in short, human beings.

Getting what we want will not make us necessarily happy, he observed, since happiness is relative to our ideals. Hence the validity of ideals must be considered, leading to further difficulty of definition, misunderstanding and further problems. It was a grave question, he was sure, whether Congress would appropriate any funds for the continued study of philosophy.

Criteria of Happiness

David Baumgardt, consultant in philosophy of the Library of Congress, enunciated the principle of "maximization of happiness," saying that "nothing can be claimed to be moral if in the end it produces for all persons concerned more numerous, intensified, prolonged and unavoidable frustrations than satisfactions."

When Dr. Mordecai M. Kaplan of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America pleaded for an objective standard that "goes beyond the criterion of happiness," Dr. Baumgardt replied that those nations that enslave their populations violated the principle of "maximization." Moreover, he said, Nazis and Fascists actually were less happy than other peoples and required re-education.

Calling modern specialization a "blindness" to general knowledge, Dr. Frank acknowledged that science students could not get along without learning based on "philosophical concern," but challenged whether philosophy should be introduced in a "dogmatic way." The modern student, he said, would regard such teachings with scorn and contempt.

Roy W. Sellars, Professor of Botany at the University of Pennsylvania, complained that the average American regarded philosophers much as he would an appendix. He took issue with the social sciences as being interested only in a "collection of facts." The fundamental reconstruction of human life was not solved by science "with a capital S," he continued, and "facts and research won't turn aside the real issue." "I feel a little the arrogance of science," he added.

Dr. Louis Finkelstein, president of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America and president of

Continued on Page 32, Column 5

SAVANTS SEE PERIL IN GREATEST 'CRISIS'

Continued From Page 21

the conference, pointed out that people in primitive societies were relatively happy and said we should not undervaluate the function of unhappiness as "an important driving factor."

Lyman Bryson, director of education and post-war studies of the Columbia Boradcasting System, defended physical and social scientists against philosophers who, he said, pontificated that "values are not your business." Every scientist also was a philosopher and a human being and had a moral responsibility in determining what should be done with that power, he declared, while to philosophers remained "the special control" of what should be done.

Expressing uneasiness at use of the word "reason," Julius Kraft, visiting professor at the Colgate Rochester Divinity School, declared that the "reason" of the twentieth century was leading to the destruction of culture.

Respect for Persons Urged

Each person is obliged to seek happiness through rational and scientific inquiry and to establish ideals for the measurement of happiness, Professor Brightman contended. "We need more respect for each other as persons," he declared.

Rudolph Allers, Professor of Psychology at the Catholic University of America, held that human behavior was not conditioned only by the objective situation in which an individual or a people lived, but primarily by their subjective view of this situation. Naturalism, he said, was essentially anti-democratic because it was "anti-human, and science could not be made the basis of understanding because it was "un-human." Reason, he held, extends farther than science.

Harold D. Lasswell of the Library of Congress, chairman of the afternoon session, commenting on papers prepared and read in advance of the conference, emphasized that those who recommended that philosophers play a more active part in life also emphasized the contribution philosophers could make in this way to cultural understanding.

Describing as our "number one enemy" the prejudice of group against group, Robert M. MacIver, head of the Department of Sociology at Columbia University, commented that the problem was "how to destroy the barriers of misunderstanding which, in the international area, create war, and in the domestic and national area create confusion, frustration and the retardation of every social advance."

Summary
of David Baumgardt's paper
On Bridges for Moral and Cultural Understanding
(For the Press)

It has often been admitted that gangsters have their own moral codes. But the same applies to the ethics of anti-democratic governments. It is in vain to deny that the Nazis tortured their fellowmen with the best possible "moral"conscience. There are criminals and political leaders who brush aside the Ten Commandments not only for occasional practical reasons but out of permanent theoretical convictions. Only as far as we can show in detailed analyses that this type of moral philosophy violates the least capricious, the most "rational" principle of any ethics, the principle of "maximization of happiness," can we hope, in my opinion, to maintain an impartial critical standard beyond the conventional good and evil, that is, beyond a morality of sheer unselfishness and sheer self- aggrandissment. On the findings of such moral disquisitions strong ethical convictions can be sustained without prejudice to the unbiased "understanding" of different moral codes and without prejudice to all objective interpretation of different cultures and epochs of history.

Library of Congress
Washington, D. C.

~~Not for Publication~~ (#16 on Typed list) (two copies)

Cultural Bridges in Ethics and the Philosophy of History

Be sure to See → (Approaches to Group Understanding) Harper Bros. N.Y. 1949 p. 542-552 Ch. XLVI with complete notes and remarks, rejoinders of colleagues at Conference (Case B)

by

David Baumgardt, Library of Congress

(Conference of Scientific Societies 6th annual symposium Princeton, Phil. Aug. 1945)

Granted that tolerance should be combined with firm faiths, how can and should this be done? The way it is done makes all the difference on earth between a cheap and valuable tolerance as well as between a noble and valueless belief. I wish to illustrate this briefly in the two fields of moral and historical understanding.

How can and should we build there bridges which have strong foundations and yet are not breaking up in the midst of the river, as does that charming old Pont d'Avignon? These questions may seem, at first glance, entirely remote from practical, every day life; but they are in fact at the basis of it.

Roughly speaking, there are, at the present time, two main ethical schools which oppose each other. Both of their teachings are unsatisfactory. But these doctrines dominate practically all contemporary ethical discussions. There are, on the one hand, the ethical relativists and skeptics, and on the other hand the ethical dogmatists. However the consistent thinking through of a superior, critical and constructive ethics seems to me still missing.

The ethical relativists, since the days of Emile Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, have placed their main emphasis on the undeniable variety of moral customs and beliefs which exist in different countries and different epochs of history. Although representatives of these doctrines often try to temper the radicalism of their theories by minor concessions, the consequence to be drawn from this teaching is: There are no objectively valid morals. All you can do is to keep to the moral faith of your group, your age or your own individual conscience. But you cannot give any objective reason for the superiority of one moral conviction over another. It is, we are told, an antiquated and illusory task to hunt for a universally valid criterion of morality. The most radical and explicit formulation of this teaching is that of contemporary positivists such as Rudolf Carnap, A. J. Ayer or Bertrand Russell. According to them all ethical concepts are "mere pseudo-concepts." Ethical judgments express no more objective truth than a cry of pain or a laugh, a shrug of the shoulders or the word "hurrah." Ethical judgments are in no way subject to the criterion of objective truth and falschood. They pretend to have cognitive relevance, but they have merely emotive meaning.

Diametrically opposed to this ethical "nihilism" are all such influential theories of ethical dogmatism as the ethics of intrinsic values, of duties a priori and absolutely valid moral laws. Despite many minor concessions made by contemporary representatives of these teachings, their theories presuppose, without any objective

Joe - also see David's contributions in Approaches to Group Understanding

p. 34 — 379 f 577 616 | 610 f 618 f 621 f 680 f | 638 639 647 f ~~f 21~~

~~Not for Publication~~

justification, that even the clashing differences in the moral outlook of hostile economic classes and political ideologies are, in fact, non-existent, or, as Sir David Ross recently said, only the result of "different perspectives" in facing the same truth - at the worst "misstatements" of the same truth, based on "some apparently trivial logical error."[1]

1. See W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics, 1939, p. 2.

At any rate, whether one adheres to ethical skepticism or to ethical dogmatism, one will be deprived of any unprejudiced understanding as to why our Jewish-Christian morality of altruism stands objectively higher than the moral codes of ancient and modern primitives and egoists. That type of "morality" in which, truly and in the end, only power counts is certainly far more frequently practiced than even its opponents generally admit. Moreover, democratic ethics itself rightly allows for ample use of power. But why, then, do we rank democratic ethics objectively so infinitely higher than that system of morality in which "honestly" and consistently power is acknowledged as the supreme value? In none of our current ethical teachings, are we given objective reasons for these our fundamental moral convictions.

To avoid these discouraging conclusions to which ethical dogmatism and /skepticism must lead us, only one alternative has occurred to me after long years of pondering over ethical problems. I believe that, in contrast to all dogmatic or merely relativistic theories of ethics, we must not start with the discussion of any ready made moral laws or absolute, "objective" values. We must, ultimately, base all our moral judgments on the most careful understanding and analysis of "subjective" human emotions, as science ultimately verifies its objective statements by reference to merely "subjective", "unstable" data of the senses. (For even the act of consulting instruments of precision, when done by human beings, partakes of human instability.) We must not begin with any concepts of self-evident and absolute validity but, as science does, with a hypothesis - a hypothesis which gives the most coherent meaning possible to all those phenomena of reality without whose analysis value-judgments would indeed become meaningless. As such a hypothesis, in my opinion, there offers itself the new interpretation of an age old principle - the principle that, in a manner to be described with special circumspection, nothing can claim to be termed moral if, in the end, it produces for all persons concerned more numerous, intensified, prolonged and unavoidable frustrations than satisfactions. Of course, such a theory of the "maximization of happiness" should not be confused with John Stuart Mill's half-hearted and completely unsatisfactory utilitarianism. The large number of objections, however, which could be made to this theory, as well as to all older types of eudaemonism, can, I think, be fully taken care of and invalidated.

In any case, my detailed and extended studies in the history of ethics have led me to the conviction that there is no moral theory other than this which can provide a proper understanding and an impartial judgment of moral systems different from our own. It is certainly most important to have staunch convictions about one's own Jewish-Christian and democratic principles of morality. But as philosophers we must have more to offer. If the firmness of our convictions blinds us to the necessity of producing neutral, objective reasons which demonstrate the superiority of our beliefs to those of our most consistent moral opponents, then we may succeed in becoming efficient preachers and propagandists for our moral articles of faith; but we will remain poor philosophers of morals. With this attitude we would have no right to claim that our strongest moral beliefs have any better critical foundations than the opposite beliefs of Nietzschean master-moralists.

Especially now, after the military victory over Nazi Germany, it is, in my view, of the utmost educational, political and cultural value, it is a matter of life and death importance, to understand the extremely widespread anti-democratic morality of power much better than all our existing ethical systems allow us to do. It is narrow-minded to deny that the vitality even of great aggressive powers is, qua vitality, morally more valuable than the lukewarmness of unaggressive but impotent well wishers. I even agree with Bentham that the pleasure of the criminal is not evil in itself. But it can be shown that even the strongest pleasure of the real evildoer is always outweighed by the destruction of happiness which his pleasure, necessarily, brings about - a loss of happiness concerning, above all, others but often also the malefactor himself. The happiness thus destroyed includes, of course, all our strongest,"finest" feelings of trust, the unhampered peaceful promotion of free cultural activities, intense experiences of religious happiness and the like. The happiness of the real evildoer is, of necessity, to be bought at far too high a price.

If, however, the pleasure of a criminal were not to destroy more happiness than the criminal enjoys, then the so-called criminal should not even be termed a criminal. Nor should a saint be called a saint when he undergoes a suffering that, in the end, gives neither to himself nor to anyone else a stronger spiritual satisfaction than his suffering gives pain to himself and to others. And there is no doubt that the worst physical pain of a martyr can be outweighed for him by the greater satisfaction of not having deserted his cause. Only the real understanding of such (and even more) subtle complications of human emotion can form a methodically sound basis for any objective moral judgment and unbiased moral comparison.

Our moral teaching and moral understanding suffer especially from the fact that we build our moral bridges without being enough acquainted with the values prevailing on the bank of the river opposite to that of our own. Great criminals, fascists and Machiavellians have generally understood only too well how to speak the

language of our idealism and they will try again to blind people in this way and to drive into their arms hundreds of thousands of goodnatured men or even noble souls. We must learn to understand the fascists' moral language and their moral valuations quite different from our own and we must train others to see through those great fascist tricks of misusing idealistic trends of men for their dirty purposes. Only if we succeed in building for our moral bridges spans which take fully into account the terrain on the other hostile shore of the dangerously deep river of life, will we free our own democratic teachings from the dull self-assuredness or the mere rhetorical flourish with which it is, unfortunately, often, too often infested. And only in this way can we philosophically strengthen our own moral faiths.

A philosophical understanding of history is rather different from forming objective judgments on different systems of morality. And yet, there are certain similarities. I should like, therefore, to touch on those points of a philosophy of history and culture as briefly as I dealt with the ethical questions.

Giovanni Battista Vico, Herder, Leopold von Ranke and, to a certain extent, even Hegel, placed special weight on the colorful variety of expression which has manifested itself in the development of human culture. These great historians broke away from the naive belief that human nature is always exactly the same at all places of the globe and in all phases of history. They taught us that, if we look at any type of foreign civilization only from our own cultural outlook, if we are not willing to dive into another seemingly strange atmosphere and climate and culture, we shall never be able to do justice to diversities of cultural expression.

If the so-called historical facts of mediaeval or ancient history are seen only against the background of our own time, these alleged facts are, as a matter of fact, no facts at all. It is a complete illusion to believe that mere facts have any meaning when presented apart from the specific context in which these facts appear. Historical facts cannot even be described properly without an adequate understanding of their background. A human activity, for example, the building of a monastery, which once represented an intimate unity of social, economic, aesthetic and religious aspirations, would be entirely misinterpreted if it were uncritically described today as having only economic or aesthetic relevance, because it is to us of exclusively economic or aesthetic interest.

Oswald Spengler pushed these views to the extreme. According to him, the cultural patterns produced by mankind during the long course of its history are so utterly different from each other that it is impossible to understand any culture properly except the one into which we were born. The Abendland, our Western civilization, is, in Spengler's opinion, dominated by the Faustian longing for the infinite. This urge, permeating all his feelings and actions, drove Western man to build up his great cathedrals and skyscrapers pointing up to the infinite; and the very same impulses enabled him to

cultivate the modern mathematics of the infinite. Therefore, the representative of modern civilization can never understand an ancient Greek quite adequately. To the ancient Greek, the infinite remained a disvalue, it smacked of chaos. The classical culture of the Greeks wished to eliminate the idea of the infinite. Its architecture and its geometry, therefore, laid the greatest possible stress on the shaping and dealing with definitely limited, finite spatial relations. For such reasons, Spengler even went so far as to believe that no modern man could ever fully grasp what Euclidian geometry meant to the Greek.

This extremely relativistic philosophy of culture is, on the whole, rejected today as an artificial romanticism or there is no attention paid to it at all. And there are, of course, plenty of reasons for emphasizing how many impulses and needs, how many feelings and thoughts are common to all human beings. But nowadays this more popular tendency is generally carried much too far. If only those traits and ideals are stressed which are common to all epochs of history, then the cultural understanding based on such one-sided presuppositions is as unsatisfactory and even more blurred than Spengler's exaggerated relativism. It is historians of this attitude who, without the slightest inhibition, present us for instance Socrates as a very able college professor or an "Attic Moses" and Jesus as a "charmant savant", a sort of distinguished "Membre de l'Institut." With such historians the belief in historical progress may even wrap itself in that widespread but hopelessly naive and provincial self-complacency which believes that for thousands of years the human race consisted of a poor bunch of fear and superstition ridden creatures, until all of a sudden in the past few centuries - or at least in our own time and especially in our country - this very same human race has produced torch bearers of a quite unique enlightenment.

Even such outstanding contemporary historians as Charles and Mary Beard did not hesitate to compare, without qualifying their statements, the work of Andrew Carnegie with that of the Egyptian pharaohs; and they arrive at the conclusion that "four pounds of material manufactured into one pound of steel, for which the consumer pays one cent" - compared with this "complicated Pittsburgh operation the deeds of the Pyramid builders - who merely commanded under the lash armies of slaves to drag by brute force huge blocks of stone into one enormous pile - sink into banalities, inviting respect neither for the intelligence displayed nor for the object in view."[2] Such a bold value-judgment can hardly be cited as a shining

2. Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, vol. II, 1937, p. 175.

example of cultural understanding. To be sure, it seems to me a virtue for a historian not to refrain from evaluating historical facts. It seems to me meritorious not to side with the pharaohs, and, above all, to insist on an unconditional condemnation of slav-

ery or any other kind of economic exploitation. Still, despite my agreement on these points, the value-judgment of the Beards contains at least two implications of rather questionable character: first, that the building of the pyramids was nothing but an economic enterprise, and second, that the economic aims and ideals of the industrial age should also have been those of the earliest epochs of human civilization.

There can, however, be little doubt that in the flowering of ancient Egypt the pyramids, to everyone in the valley of the Nile, meant infinitely more than mere piles of stone; and doubtless they still mean much more than that to many of us in our times. On the other hand, it is certainly doubtful whether cheap steel could have possibly meant to an ancient Egyptian, 5000 years ago, as much as it means to anyone in Pittsburgh today. At any rate, the Beards would be quite inaccurate in implying that it was the brain of one man - Carnegie or anyone else - which brought about the present amazing technical mastery of nature or even the cheap manufacture of steel. It was the brains of generations of theoretical scientists and inventors who were nourished by the work of scientists preceding them. No genius living at the dawn of history could have made any of even the less significant discoveries of the modern machine age.

The value-judgment of the Beards about Carnegie and the pyramids was obviously made <u>before</u> they achieved an impartial understanding of the differences between two civilizations. What we need, however, are value-judgments, made <u>after</u> such an understanding has been reached. A cultural appraisal is of value only when made after full justice has been done to the special set-up in which the historical phenomena appear. The philosopher has to reject any naive glorification of a remote culture as well as its uncritical condemnation; he has to shun the undiscriminating praise or blame of our civilization as much as the mere abstinence from value-judgments.

If the taaching of history is expected to have any fundamental educational value, then, it is primarily that of widening our horizon without weakening our stand in our own ground. Travelling in times -- in the history of cultures -- is like travelling in space, going out to foreign countries and continents. The ideal traveller is certainly not the man who does not speak any foreign language and mingles abroad only with his own countrymen. The mentality of this type of travellers remains parochial, despite all their talk of cosmopolitanism and their trips around the globe. But historians who see all other civilizations only in the light of that culture to which they themselves belong are exactly as unseeing ss the traveller who is idling abroad only in hotels run by his compatriots. On the other hand, to assimilate oneself blindly and unconditionally to a foreign country or to imitate the cultural expression of another epoch of history, is equally undesirable. What we need most in the great art of cultural and historical understanding is to be firmly rooted in the present, but to feel free to have an eye and to

penetrate into all other quite different forms of cultural and historical life. Bridges for cultural understanding can be of value only if the pillars are strong and the arches of the bridges are wide and broad enough to reach out fully for the other bank of the river. That is to say, knowledge and long training, sensitivity, patience and insight are as much needed as good will and firmness of mind: in a word, staunch convictions coupled with true and widest tolerance.

(#16 typed last)

"Cultural Bridges..."

(Copies)

Conference on Science

Not for Publication

Cultural Bridges in Ethics and the Philosophy of History

by
David Baumgardt, Library of Congress

Granted that tolerance should be combined with firm faiths, how can and should this be done? The way it is done makes all the difference on earth between a cheap and valuable tolerance as well as between a noble and valueless belief. I wish to illustrate this briefly in the two fields of moral and historical understanding.

How can and should we build there bridges which have strong foundations and yet are not breaking up in the midst of the river, as does that charming old Pont d'Avignon? These questions may seem, at first glance, entirely remote from practical, every day life; but they are in fact at the basis of it.

Roughly speaking, there are, at the present time, two main ethical schools which oppose each other. Both of their teachings are unsatisfactory. But these doctrines dominate practically all contemporary ethical discussions. There are, on the one hand, the ethical relativists and skeptics, and on the other hand the ethical dogmatists. However the consistent thinking through of a superior, critical and constructive ethics seems to me still missing.

The ethical relativists, since the days of Emile Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, have placed their main emphasis on the undeniable variety of moral customs and beliefs which exist in different countries and different epochs of history. Although representatives of these doctrines often try to temper the radicalism of their theories by minor concessions, the consequence to be drawn from this teaching is: There are no objectively valid morals. All you can do is to keep to the moral faith of your group, your age or your own individual conscience. But you cannot give any objective reason for the superiority of one moral conviction over another. It is, we are told, an anticuated and illusory task to hunt for a universally valid criterion of morality. The most radical and explicit formulation of this teaching is that of contemporary positivists such as Rudolf Carnap, A. J. Ayer or Bertrand Russell. According to them all ethical concepts are "mere pseudo-concepts." Ethical judgments express no more objective truth than a cry of pain or a laugh, a shrug of the shoulders or the word "hurrah." Ethical judgments are in no way subject to the criterion of objective truth and falschood. They pretend to have cognitive relevance, but they have merely emotive meaning.

Diametrically opposed to this ethical "nihilism" are all such influential theories of ethical dogmatism as the ethics of intrinsic values, of duties a priori and absolutely valid moral laws. Despite many minor concessions made by contemporary representatives of these teachings, their theories presuppose, without any objective

justification, that even the clashing differences in the moral outlook of hostile economic classes and political ideologies are, in fact, non-existent, or, as Sir David Ross recently said, only the result of "different perspectives" in facing the same truth - at the worst "misstatements" of the same truth, based on "some apparently trivial logical error."[1]

1. See W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics, 1939, p. 2.

At any rate, whether one adheres to ethical skepticism or to ethical dogmatism, one will be deprived of any unprejudiced understanding as to why our Jewish-Christian morality of altruism stands objectively higher than the moral codes of ancient and modern primitives and egoists. That type of "morality" in which, truly and in the end, only power counts is certainly far more frequently practiced than even its opponents generally admit. Moreover, democratic ethics itself rightly allows for ample use of power. But why, then, do we rank democratic ethics objectively so infinitely higher than that system of morality in which "honestly" and consistently power is acknowledged as the supreme value? In none of our current ethical teachings, are we given objective reasons for these our fundamental moral convictions.

To avoid these discouraging conclusions to which ethical dogmatism and /skepticism must lead us, only one alternative has occurred to me after long years of pondering over ethical problems. I believe that, in contrast to all dogmatic or merely relativistic theories of ethics, we must not start with the discussion of any ready made moral laws or absolute, "objective" values. We must, ultimately, base all our moral judgments on the most careful understanding and analysis of "subjective" human emotions, as science ultimately verifies its objective statements by reference to merely "subjective", "unstable" data of the senses. (For even the act of consulting instruments of precision, when done by human beings, partakes of human instability.) We must not begin with any concepts of self-evident and absolute validity but, as science does, with a hypothesis - a hypothesis which gives the most coherent meaning possible to all those phenomena of reality without whose analysis value-judgments would indeed become meaningless. As such a hypothesis, in my opinion, there offers itself the new interpretation of an age old principle - the principle that, in a manner to be described with special circumspection, nothing can claim to be termed moral if, in the end, it produces for all persons concerned more numerous, intensified, prolonged and unavoidable frustrations than satisfactions. Of course, such a theory of the "maximization of happiness" should not be confused with John Stuart Mill's half-hearted and completely unsatisfactory utilitarianism. The large number of objections, however, which could be made to this theory, as well as to all older types of eudaemonism, can, I think, be fully taken care of and invalidated.

In any case, my detailed and extended studies in the history of ethics have led me to the conviction that there is no moral theory other than this which can provide a proper understanding and an impartial judgment of moral systems different from our own. It is certainly most important to have staunch convictions about one's own Jewish-Christian and democratic principles of morality. But as philosophers we must have more to offer. If the firmness of our convictions blinds us to the necessity of producing neutral, objective reasons which demonstrate the superiority of our beliefs to those of our most consistent moral opponents, then we may succeed in becoming efficient preachers and propagandists for our moral articles of faith; but we will remain poor philosophers of morals. With this attitude we would have no right to claim that our strongest moral beliefs have any better critical foundations than the opposite beliefs of Nietzschean master-moralists.

Especially now, after the military victory over Nazi Germany, it is, in my view, of the utmost educational, political and cultural value, it is a matter of life and death importance, to understand the extremely widespread anti-democratic morality of power much better than all our existing ethical systems allow us to do. It is narrow-minded to deny that the vitality even of great aggressive powers is, qua vitality, morally more valuable than the lukewarmness of unaggressive but impotent well wishers. I even agree with Bentham that the pleasure of the criminal is not evil in itself. But it can be shown that even the strongest pleasure of the real evildoer is always outweighed by the destruction of happiness which his pleasure, necessarily, brings about - a loss of happiness concerning, above all, others but often also the malefactor himself. The happiness thus destroyed includes, of course, all our strongest, "finest" feelings of trust, the unhampered peaceful promotion of free cultural activities, intense experiences of religious happiness and the like. The happiness of the real evildoer is, of necessity, to be bought at far too high a price.

If, however, the pleasure of a criminal were not to destroy more happiness than the criminal enjoys, then the so-called criminal should not even be termed a criminal. Nor should a saint be called a saint when he undergoes a suffering that, in the end, gives neither to himself nor to anyone else a stronger spiritual satisfaction than his suffering gives pain to himself and to others. And there is no doubt that the worst physical pain of a martyr can be outweighed for him by the greater satisfaction of not having deserted his cause. Only the real understanding of such (and even more) subtle complications of human emotion can form a methodically sound basis for any objective moral judgment and unbiased moral comparison.

Our moral teaching and moral understanding suffer especially from the fact that we build our moral bridges without being enough acquainted with the values prevailing on the bank of the river opposite to that of our own. Great criminals, fascists and Machiavellians have generally understood only too well how to speak the

language of our idealism and they will try again to blind people in this way and to drive into their arms hundreds of thousands of goodnatured men or even noble souls. We must learn to understand the fascists' moral language and their moral valuations quite different from our own and we must train others to see through those great fascist tricks of misusing idealistic trends of men for their dirty purposes. Only if we succeed in building for our moral bridges spans which take fully into account the terrain on the other hostile shore of the dangerously deep river of life, will we free our own democratic teachings from the dull self-assuredness or the mere rhetorical flourish with which it is, unfortunately, often, too often infested. And only in this way can we philosophically strengthen our own moral faiths.

A philosophical understanding of history is rather different from forming objective judgments on different systems of morality. And yet, there are certain similarities. I should like, therefore, to touch on those points of a philosophy of history and culture as briefly as I dealt with the ethical questions.

Giovanni Battista Vico, Herder, Leopold von Ranke and, to a certain extent, even Hegel, placed special weight on the colorful variety of expression which has manifested itself in the development of human culture. These great historians broke away from the naive belief that human nature is always exactly the same at all places of the globe and in all phases of history. They taught us that, if we look at any type of foreign civilization only from our own cultural outlook, if we are not willing to dive into another seemingly strange atmosphere and climate and culture, we shall never be able to do justice to diversities of cultural expression.

If the so-called historical facts of mediaeval or ancient history are seen only against the background of our own time, these alleged facts are, as a matter of fact, no facts at all. It is a complete illusion to believe that mere facts have any meaning when presented apart from the specific context in which these facts appear. Historical facts cannot even be described properly without an adequate understanding of their background. A human activity, for example, the building of a monastery, which once represented an intimate unity of social, economic, aesthetic and religious aspirations, would be entirely misinterpreted if it were uncritically described today as having only economic or aesthetic relevance, because it is to us of exclusively economic or aesthetic interest.

Oswald Spengler pushed these views to the extreme. According to him, the cultural patterns produced by mankind during the long course of its history are so utterly different from each other that it is impossible to understand any culture properly except the one into which we were born. The Abendland, our Western civilization, is, in Spengler's opinion, dominated by the Faustian longing for the infinite. This urge, permeating all his feelings and actions, drove Western man to build up his great cathedrals and skyscrapers pointing up to the infinite; and the very same impulses enabled him to

cultivate the modern mathematics of the infinite. Therefore, the representative of modern civilization can never understand an ancient Greek quite adequately. To the ancient Greek, the infinite remained a disvalue, it smacked of chaos. The classical culture of the Greeks wished to eliminate the idea of the infinite. Its architecture and its geometry, therefore, laid the greatest possible stress on the shaping and dealing with definitely limited, finite spatial relations. For such reasons, Spengler even went so far as to believe that no modern man could ever fully grasp what Euclidian geometry meant to the Greek.

This extremely relativistic philosophy of culture is, on the whole, rejected today as an artificial romanticism or there is no attention paid to it at all. And there are, of course, plenty of reasons for emphasizing how many impulses and needs, how many feelings and thoughts are common to all human beings. But nowadays this more popular tendency is generally carried much too far. If only those traits and ideals are stressed which are common to all epochs of history, then the cultural understanding based on such one-sided presuppositions is as unsatisfactory and even more blurred than Spengler's exaggerated relativism. It is historians of this attitude who, without the slightest inhibition, present us for instance Socrates as a very able college professor or an "Attic Moses" and Jesus as a "charmant savant", a sort of distinguished "Membre de l'Institut." With such historians the belief in historical progress may even wrap itself in that widespread but hopelessly naive and provincial self-complacency which believes that for thousands of years the human race consisted of a poor bunch of fear and superstition ridden creatures, until all of a sudden in the past few centuries - or at least in our own time and especially in our country - this very same human race has produced torch bearers of a quite unique enlightenment.

Even such outstanding contemporary historians as Charles and Mary Beard did not hesitate to compare, without qualifying their statements, the work of Andrew Carnegie with that of the Egyptian pharaohs; and they arrive at the conclusion that "four pounds of material manufactured into one pound of steel, for which the consumer pays one cent" - compared with this "complicated Pittsburgh operation the deeds of the Pyramid builders - who merely commanded under the lash armies of slaves to drag by brute force huge blocks of stone into one enormous pile - sink into banalities, inviting respect neither for the intelligence displayed nor for the object in view."[2] Such a bold value-judgment can hardly be cited as a shining

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Not for Publication

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by
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There can, however, be little doubt that in the flowering of ancient Egypt the pyramids, to everyone in the valley of the Nile, meant infinitely more than mere piles of stone; and doubtless they still mean much more than that to many of us in our times. On the other hand, it is certainly doubtful whether cheap steel could have possibly meant to an ancient Egyptian, 5000 years ago, as much as it means to anyone in Pittsburgh today. At any rate, the Beards would be quite inaccurate in implying that it was the brain of one man - Carnegie or anyone else - which brought about the present amazing technical mastery of natune or even the cheap manufacture of steel. It was the brains of generations of theoretical scientists and inventors who were nourished by the work of scientists preceding them. No genius living at the dawn of history could have made any of even the less significant discoveries of the modern machine age.

The value-judgment of the Beards about Carnegie and the pyramids was obviously made <u>before</u> they achieved an impartial understanding of the differences between two civilizations. What we need, however, are value-judgments, made <u>after</u> such an understanding has been reached. A cultural appraisal is of value only when made after full justice has been done to the special set-up in which the historical phenomena appear. The philosopher has to reject any naive glorification of a remote culture as well as its uncritical condemnation; he has to shun the undiscriminating praise or blame of our civilization as much as the mere abstinence from value-judgments.

If the taaching of history is expected to have any fundamental educational value, then, it is primarily that of widening our horizon without weakening our stand in our own ground. Travelling in times -- in the history of cultures -- is like travelling in space, going out to foreign countries and continents. The ideal traveller is certainly not the man who does not speak any foreign language and mingles abroad only with his own countrymen. The mentality of this type of travellers remains parochial, despite all their talk of cosmopolitanism and their trips around the globe. But historians who see all other civilizations only in the light of that culture to which they themselves belong are exactly as unseeing ss the traveller who is idling abroad only in hotels run by his compatriots. On the other hand, to assimilate oneself blindly and unconditionally to a foreign country or to imitate the cultural expression of another epoch of history, is equally undesirable. What we need most in the great art of cultural and historical understanding is to be firmly rooted in the present, but to feel free to have an eye and to

penetrate into all other quite different forms of cultural and historical life. Bridges for cultural understanding can be of value only if the pillars are strong and the arches of the bridges are wide and broad enough to reach out fully for the other bank of the river. That is to say, knowledge and long training, sensitivity, patience and insight are as much needed as good will and firmness of mind: in a word, staunch convictions coupled with true and widest tolerance.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Reply to Questionnaire of December 7, 1942

by

David Baumgardt, Consultant Service, Library of Congress

1. After a complete victory over the Axis I should like to see in Africa, Asia and Australia worker battalions consisting of several million militarists of the Axis countries, all engaged for life in cultivating virgin soil, under the guard of Allied troops. The remainder of the Axis nations I should like to see represented in a new, universal League of Nations in which certain sovereign state rights are limited and new wars are made impossible by the existence of an international police force, built up on a strictly democratic basis.

2. Of the evils of our world I should mention:

a) the lack of a fair distribution of goods which persists despite our most gratifying successes in their production

b) xenophobia (in the widest sense of the word) originating in a lack of understanding of other groups and cultivated by the wish to exploit others, or at least to enforce their assimilation to the dominating group

c) the lack of an original development of our religious heritage

d) the chaos of modern moral philosophies, the confusion as regards the moral apology and the moral condemnation of self-interest

e) the rapid growth of a mere city-culture with its

increasing cult of more quantity and its decreasing understanding of quality

f) the emphasis on "derniers cris" and the lack of objective historical understanding and of devotion to long-range cultural ideals

3. I published the first volume of a history of modern ethics in German in 1933, and now two other volumes of this work are ready for the printer in English. At the same time I am writing my own ethics, and have tried for two decades to train university students to think in terms of "global", "pan-historical" and "pan-cultural" consciousness and penetration.

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For essay with complete notes see - "Approaches to Group Understanding" Harper Bros N.Y. 1947. pp. 542-552 Ch. XLVI.

Not for Publication

Cultural Bridges in Ethics and the Philosophy of History

such copy plus resume put by for Frank

by
David Baumgardt, Library of Congress

Granted that tolerance should be combined with firm faiths, how can and should this be done? The way it is done makes all the difference on earth between a cheap and valuable tolerance as well as between a noble and valueless belief. I wish to illustrate this briefly in the two fields of moral and historical understanding.

How can and should we build there bridges which have strong foundations and yet are not breaking up in the midst of the river, as does that charming old Pont d'Avignon? These questions may seem, at first glance, entirely remote from practical, every day life; but they are in fact at the basis of it.

Roughly speaking, there are, at the present time, two main ethical schools which oppose each other. Both of their teachings are unsatisfactory. But these doctrines dominate practically all contemporary ethical discussions. There are, on the one hand, the ethical relativists and skeptics, and on the other hand the ethical dogmatists. However the consistent thinking through of a superior, critical and constructive ethics seems to me still missing.

The ethical relativists, since the days of Emile Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, have placed their main emphasis on the undeniable variety of moral customs and beliefs which exist in different countries and different epochs of history. Although representatives of these doctrines often try to temper the radicalism of their theories by minor concessions, the consequence to be drawn from this teaching is: There are no objectively valid morals. All you can do is to keep to the moral faith of your group, your age or your own individual conscience. But you cannot give any objective reason for the superiority of one moral conviction over another. It is, we are told, an antiquated and illusory task to hunt for a universally valid criterion of morality. The most radical and explicit formulation of this teaching is that of contemporary positivists such as Rudolf Carnap, A. J. Ayer or Bertrand Russell. According to them all ethical concepts are "mere pseudo-concepts." Ethical judgments express no more objective truth than a cry of pain or a laugh, a shrug of the shoulders or the word "hurrah." Ethical judgments are in no way subject to the criterion of objective truth and falschood. They pretend to have cognitive relevance, but they have merely emotive meaning.

Diametrically opposed to this ethical "nihilism" are all such influential theories of ethical dogmatism as the ethics of intrinsic values, of duties a priori and absolutely valid moral laws. Despite many minor concessions made by contemporary representatives of these teachings, their theories presuppose, without any objective

justification, that even the clashing differences in the moral outlook of hostile economic classes and political ideologies are, in fact, non-existent, or, as Sir David Ross recently said, only the result of "different perspectives" in facing the same truth - at the worst "misstatements" of the same truth, based on "some apparently trivial logical error."[1]

1. See W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics, 1939, p. 2.

At any rate, whether one adheres to ethical skepticism or to ethical dogmatism, one will be deprived of any unprejudiced understanding as to why our Jewish-Christian morality of altruism stands objectively higher than the moral codes of ancient and modern primitives and egoists. That type of "morality" in which, truly and in the end, only power counts is certainly far more frequently practiced than even its opponents generally admit. Moreover, democratic ethics itself rightly allows for ample use of power. But why, then, do we rank democratic ethics objectively so infinitely higher than that system of morality in which "honestly" and consistently power is acknowledged as the supreme value? In none of our current ethical teachings, are we given objective reasons for these our fundamental moral convictions.

To avoid these discouraging conclusions to which ethical dogmatism and /skepticism must lead us, only one alternative has occurred to me after long years of pondering over ethical problems. I believe that, in contrast to all dogmatic or merely relativistic theories of ethics, we must not start with the discussion of any ready made moral laws or absolute, "objective" values. We must, ultimately, base all our moral judgments on the most careful understanding and analysis of "subjective" human emotions, as science ultimately verifies its objective statements by reference to merely "subjective", "unstable" data of the senses. (For even the act of consulting instruments of precision, when done by human beings, partakes of human instability.) We must not begin with any concepts of self-evident and absolute validity but, as science does, with a hypothesis - a hypothesis which gives the most coherent meaning possible to all those phenomena of reality without whose analysis value-judgments would indeed become meaningless. As such a hypothesis, in my opinion, there offers itself the new interpretation of an age old principle - the principle that, in a manner to be described with special circumspection, nothing can claim to be termed moral if, in the end, it produces for all persons concerned more numerous, intensified, prolonged and unavoidable frustrations than satisfactions. Of course, such a theory of the "maximization of happiness" should not be confused with John Stuart Mill's half-hearted and completely unsatisfactory utilitarianism. The large number of objections, however, which could be made to this theory, as well as to all older types of eudaemonism, can, I think, be fully taken care of and invalidated.

In any case, my detailed and extended studies in the history of ethics have led me to the conviction that there is no moral theory other than this which can provide a proper understanding and an impartial judgment of moral systems different from our own. It is certainly most important to have staunch convictions about one's own Jewish-Christian and democratic principles of morality. But as philosophers we must have more to offer. If the firmness of our convictions blinds us to the necessity of producing neutral, objective reasons which demonstrate the superiority of our beliefs to those of our most consistent moral opponents, then we may succeed in becoming efficient preachers and propagandists for our moral articles of faith; but we will remain poor philosophers of morals. With this attitude we would have no right to claim that our strongest moral beliefs have any better critical foundations than the opposite beliefs of Nietzschean master-moralists.

Especially now, after the military victory over Nazi Germany, it is, in my view, of the utmost educational, political and cultural value, it is a matter of life and death importance, to understand the extremely widespread anti-democratic morality of power much better than all our existing ethical systems allow us to do. It is narrow-minded to deny that the vitality even of great aggressive powers is, qua vitality, morally more valuable than the lukewarmness of unaggressive but impotent well wishers. I even agree with Bentham that the pleasure of the criminal is not evil in itself. But it can be shown that even the strongest pleasure of the real evildoer is always outweighed by the destruction of happiness which his pleasure, necessarily, brings about - a loss of happiness concerning, above all, others but often also the malefactor himself. The happiness thus destroyed includes, of course, all our strongest, "finest" feelings of trust, the unhampered peaceful promotion of free cultural activities, intense experiences of religious happiness and the like. The happiness of the real evildoer is, of necessity, to be bought at far too high a price.

If, however, the pleasure of a criminal were not to destroy more happiness than the criminal enjoys, then the so-called criminal should not even be termed a criminal. Nor should a saint be called a saint when he undergoes a suffering that, in the end, gives neither to himself nor to anyone else a stronger spiritual satisfaction than his suffering gives pain to himself and to others. And there is no doubt that the worst physical pain of a martyr can be outweighed for him by the greater satisfaction of not having deserted his cause. Only the real understanding of such (and even more) subtle complications of human emotion can form a methodically sound basis for any objective moral judgment and unbiased moral comparison.

Our moral teaching and moral understanding suffer especially from the fact that we build our moral bridges without being enough acquainted with the values prevailing on the bank of the river opposite to that of our own. Great criminals, fascists and Machiavellians have generally understood only too well how to speak the

language of our idealism and they will try again to blind people in this way and to drive into their arms hundreds of thousands of goodnatured men or even noble souls. We must learn to understand the fascists' moral language and their moral valuations quite different from our own and we must train others to see through those great fascist tricks of misusing idealistic trends of men for their dirty purposes. Only if we succeed in building for our moral bridges spans which take fully into account the terrain on the other hostile shore of the dangerously deep river of life, will we free our own democratic teachings from the dull self-assuredness or the mere rhetorical flourish with which it is, unfortunately, often, too often infested. And only in this way can we philosophically strengthen our own moral faiths.

A philosophical understanding of history is rather different from forming objective judgments on different systems of morality. And yet, there are certain similarities. I should like, therefore, to touch on those points of a philosophy of history and culture as briefly as I dealt with the ethical questions.

Giovanni Battista Vico, Herder, Leopold von Ranke and, to a certain extent, even Hegel, placed special weight on the colorful variety of expression which has manifested itself in the development of human culture. These great historians broke away from the naive belief that human nature is always exactly the same at all places of the globe and in all phases of history. They taught us that, if we look at any type of foreign civilization only from our own cultural outlook, if we are not willing to dive into another seemingly strange atmosphere and climate and culture, we shall never be able to do justice to diversities of cultural expression.

If the so-called historical facts of mediaeval or ancient history are seen only against the background of our own time, these alleged facts are, as a matter of fact, no facts at all. It is a complete illusion to believe that mere facts have any meaning when presented apart from the specific context in which these facts appear. Historical facts cannot even be described properly without an adequate understanding of their background. A human activity, for example, the building of a monastery, which once represented an intimate unity of social, economic, aesthetic and religious aspirations, would be entirely misinterpreted if it were uncritically described today as having only economic or aesthetic relevance, because it is to us of exclusively economic or aesthetic interest.

Oswald Spengler pushed these views to the extreme. According to him, the cultural patterns produced by mankind during the long course of its history are so utterly different from each other that it is impossible to understand any culture properly except the one into which we were born. The Abendland, our Western civilization, is, in Spengler's opinion, dominated by the Faustian longing for the infinite. This urge, permeating all his feelings and actions, drove Western man to build up his great cathedrals and skyscrapers pointing up to the infinite; and the very same impulses enabled him to

cultivate the modern mathematics of the infinite. Therefore, the representative of modern civilization can never understand an ancient Greek quite adequately. To the ancient Greek, the infinite remained a disvalue, it smacked of chaos. The classical culture of the Greeks wished to eliminate the idea of the infinite. Its architecture and its geometry, therefore, laid the greatest possible stress on the shaping and dealing with definitely limited, finite spatial relations. For such reasons, Spengler even went so far as to believe that no modern man could ever fully grasp what Euclidian geometry meant to the Greek.

This extremely relativistic philosophy of culture is, on the whole, rejected today as an artificial romanticism or there is no attention paid to it at all. And there are, of course, plenty of reasons for emphasizing how many impulses and needs, how many feelings and thoughts are common to all human beings. But nowadays this more popular tendency is generally carried much too far. If only those traits and ideals are stressed which are common to all epochs of history, then the cultural understanding based on such one-sided presuppositions is as unsatisfactory and even more blurred than Spengler's exaggerated relativism. It is historians of this attitude who, without the slightest inhibition, present us for instance Socrates as a very able college professor or an "Attic Moses" and Jesus as a "charmant savant", a sort of distinguished "membre de l'Institut." With such historians the belief in historical progress may even wrap itself in that widespread but hopelessly naive and provincial self-complacency which believes that for thousands of years the human race consisted of a poor bunch of fear and superstition ridden creatures, until all of a sudden in the past few centuries - or at least in our own time and especially in our country - this very same human race has produced torch bearers of a quite unique enlightenment.

Even such outstanding contemporary historians as Charles and Mary Beard did not hesitate to compare, without qualifying their statements, the work of Andrew Carnegie with that of the Egyptian pharaohs; and they arrive at the conclusion that "four pounds of material manufactured into one pound of steel, for which the consumer pays one cent" - compared with this "complicated Pittsburgh operation the deeds of the Pyramid builders - who merely commanded under the lash armies of slaves to drag by brute force huge blocks of stone into one enormous pile - sink into banalities, inviting respect neither for the intelligence displayed nor for the object in view."[2] Such a bold value-judgment can hardly be cited as a shining

2. Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, vol. II, 1937, p. 175.

example of cultural understanding. To be sure, it seems to me a virtue for a historian not to refrain from evaluating historical facts. It seems to me meritorious not to side with the pharaohs, and, above all, to insist on an unconditional condemnation of slav-

ery or any other kind of economic exploitation. Still, despite my agreement on these points, the value-judgment of the Beards contains at least two implications of rather questionable character: first, that the building of the pyramids was nothing but an economic enterprise, and second, that the economic aims and ideals of the industrial age should also have been those of the earliest epochs of human civilization.

There can, however, be little doubt that in the flowering of ancient Egypt the pyramids, to everyone in the valley of the Nile, meant infinitely more than mere piles of stone; and doubtless they still mean much more than that to many of us in our times. On the other hand, it is certainly doubtful whether cheap steel could have possibly meant to an ancient Egyptian, 5000 years ago, as much as it means to anyone in Pittsburgh today. At any rate, the Beards would be quite inaccurate in implying that it was the brain of one man - Carnegie or anyone else - which brought about the present amazing technical mastery of nature or even the cheap manufacture of steel. It was the brains of generations of theoretical scientists and inventors who were nourished by the work of scientists preceding them. No genius living at the dawn of history could have made any of even the less significant discoveries of the modern machine age.

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jhv 5/9/47

Note on Ethics suggested by Cultural Bridges
by Dr. Baumgardt.

Is there an objective test for ethical values? One such test would be the effect on the development of the social organism. Honesty may or may not be the best policy for a particular individual at a particular time, and the criterion of best may require definition (i.e. keeping out of jail vs. having an integrated personality, vs. being able to buy a new car with the proceeds); but when it comes to social evolution there is no question that honesty of individuals is a prerequisite to advanced development. If the police are unable to keep crime under control the ultimate effect is to break the society up into fragmentary bits in which the small units protect themselves by vigilante action; there is no possibility of an industrial society without behaviour regulated by a concept of honesty.

Are we then safe in saying that anything which promotes the development or maintenance of society is good, and anything which militates against it is bad? If we knew that our present society was the perfect form, or if we knew the steps from it to the perfect form, the answer might be in the affirmative. The difficulty is that we do not know these things. The test of a perfect stste of society is not an objective test, but a subjective one . The society which satisfies the subjective needs of its members of all kinds perfectly would be the perfect society; we would reach it and then stop changing, for there would be no incentive to change. When no man can see the existing state of affairs as bad in any way, and cannot imagine any state which has a greater appeal for him, the motive power of evolution is turned off.

We can of course, look back at evolution, see the road we have travelled, and guess that a projection of that road into the immediate future will lead toward the promised land; in fact this I take ~~it~~ to be the real goal of philosophy. But the proof of the pudding, so to speak, is still in the eating. We may find that our projection of the route failed to take certain peculiarities of the past performance into consideration; it may even be that the curve will take a new turn. The past is only a guide to the probable, just as in our individual lives we choose between paths on the basis of how we fared on similar excursions in previous tries, yet can never know whether the joy will be repeated.

It comes back then to the question of fact, of frustration vs. satidfactions of individuals. But to determine that question of fact, anothee fact is important: the fact that man is a social animal,—that he has spent his life on earth building societies, in much the same way that those lower units of life the cells, have spent their time putting together the wonderful social organisms we call the higher animals and plants. For if men and cells have shown this remarkable patternin their behaviour it can have been due to but one thing,—the fact that they were driven to do so by an internal urge which they found irresistable.

We must assume that the cells found their 'happiness' in the creative work of organic evolution; it is a reasonable guess that we are finding, and will continue to find our happiness in the equally creative work of social evolution. And by social evolution is meant organic evolution into organisms as tangible and concrete as the animals and plants. True we evolve sciences and philosophy; but these are the blueprints,--steps toward the organization of the greater societies of the future. It is false to assume that our evolution is 'spiritual' as contrasted with the physical evolution of lower levels of integration. We, as they did, are working toward a tangible goal, an embodiment of our intangible world of ideas.

What then is the process of verification of a set of moral ideas? The answer is not simple. First we look back over the past to see what the creative urge has caused us and our ancestors the cells to build; then we project that curve into the future as best we can. Having done this we submit the possibilities thus suggested to ourselves for approval or rejection. We may not get a definite indication. It may be necessary to make a tentative advance and live with it for awhile to see whether it seems to meet the demands of our creative sense. If it does we go forward; if not we retreat and try over again. There is no way of achieving certainty by an examination of the past, nor by an interpretation of the momentary impulses, for that interpretation is always difficult. But by a combination of retrospect and introspection we can gradually advance toward the concrete goals of our creative impulses.

The test is always the internal one in the end, but in reaching a correct interpretation of our internal fe-lings the appeal to history, and to as long a stretch of history as possible is, I think, essential. People like Toynbee seem to me to be mistaken in two respects; they seem to believe that historical movements follow something akin to the 'laws' supposed to govern molecular actions and reactions, and equally important they seem to feel that the span of human history is a long enough backward look from which to develop a sense of direction, and that in any event no futther look is possible.

Take a specific example: Thou shalt not steal, If someone were to doubt the validity of this commandment as a moral principle, a look at the past development of society would show that abandonment of the principle would carry with it the destruction of all that we have built in the past thousands of years. The immediate conclusion would be that the doubt was based on a misinterpretation of the real impulse at work. The true impulse might prove to be one of greater brotherhood leading to a broader distribution of material welfare, instead of a denial of the property relation itself. Thus a person who feels that all men are truly brothers is shocked when he sees a mother roughly handled for trying to steal bread for her children. He might interpret his revulsion as directed against the moral code, when it actually represented a new force on a different level, tending toward a greater integration of societies rather than the dismemberment that would be occasioned, as noted above, by abandonment of the prohibition against theft. In this example I have tried to bring out the importance of the social and organic aspect of the 'objective' verification of a moral code. To determine the effect on the satisfactions of members of society it seems important to know what would be brought down at the same time if the code were abandoned or modified in some particular.

And it is important to add in this age of the emphasis on the common man, that the interests of all kinds of men must be taken into consideration in arriving at the final judgment. If we are at work on a creative enterprise, the artist, the architect, and the builder have an interest as well as the greater number who do the physical labor. It is a cooperative enterprise in which no one is dictator, and no voice is silenced altogether.

J H V

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DAVID BAUMGARDT: HIST OF MOD ETHICS. ESSAYS + DIARYS; 1939-1953

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Is Power Immoral?

Can Goodwill Supplant Force?

DAVID BAUMGARDT

I

ARE WE sentimental, are we self-pitying, if we say that we live in a particularly grim age? When we read in historical documents the comments which detached observers have made on their own time, we are surprised to see how subjective even the most objective minds have often been in this respect. Commentators have usually overrated the importance, the harshness or the glory of the age in which they live. In their judgments they often resemble those ridiculous debaters each of whom was eager to demonstrate that he had seen a taller dwarf than the other—when of course not the tallest, but the smallest dwarf is the greater rarity. I think, however, it is safe to say that in recent years we have gone through a fairly dark age. Millions of people died in the first great world war two decades ago; millions have already died in the second world war which started at the latest, in 1935, in Abyssinia.

But there has been something perhaps more alarming even than the untold tortures of fine, civilized men. This is the silent breakdown of great, old moral and religious traditions, a most malignant collapse which I saw taking place in several European countries, and particularly in Germany. I do not think that the average German, the average Italian or Russian is more cruel or more blind politically than the man in the streets of other nations. If, then, one wishes to describe what has happened during the last few years in so many European states, it can only be said that there has been a kind of moral earthquake. Is it possible outside of Germany to imagine how Hitler's laws against the Jews and Liberals have affected German life? Old ties of friendship existed between "Aryans" and Jews whose families have lived for more than 1,500 years in Germany. There had been the most friendly and intimate relations between Jewish scholars and their Christian students, between conservative Aryans and their liberal fellows. Yet suddenly, as Jews and liberal socialists were outlawed, millions of their Aryan friends stood silently aside.

No less than we ourselves they were startled to learn that friendship with us was a political crime. Many of them scarcely believed their ears when they were told that they must no longer greet on the streets people with whom they had had a lifelong friendship—in many cases people whose parents and grandparents had earlier been friends of their families. The new State, "the new order," publicly decried everyone who maintained any social contact with a

Jew. Frequently such gentile "traitors" to the great cause of the *Führer* were led by Nazis through the streets of towns and cities, with big labels round their necks pillorying them for their being shameless enough still to have Jewish friends—the whole procedure being a perfect return to the darkest practices of the darkest ages, but greatly enjoyed in its rudest boyishness by all the many feeble-minded haters among the leaders of the Nazi party.

At the "Nürnberger Parteitag" in 1935, by decree of Goering, even Aryan servants who had lived in Jewish households for decades, and had practically become members of the families, were required to leave—a method of saving their Aryan honor which often literally ruined their lives and which they felt to be revolting and a senseless tragedy. A purely Aryan lawyer, who had married a Jewess many months before this was forbidden by the State's new law was informed that he would be disbarred unless he divorced his wife. Before the court the Aryan lawyer pointed out, first, that he had married quite legally; second, that he loved his wife, and saw in her the saviour of his life—she had rescued him from drowning in the Baltic Sea. The decision of the court was this: if for you private and so-called moral feelings carry more weight than your highest political duties toward the State, you must bear the consequences. And the man lost his attorneyship.

How often has the divergence of political convictions split Aryan families apart in the last ten years! Some old and dear friends of mine, government officials, Aryans, but avowed anti-Nazis, were unable to protest against the youthful enthusiasm for Hitler which their ten year old youngsters brought home from school. In all innocence, these children who loved their parents might, nevertheless, inadvertently betray them to their Nazi teachers. Many gentiles implored their old Jewish friends under no circumstances to let it be known to the Nazi members of their families, to their sons-in-law or even their own sons, that they, the Aryans, still paid an occasional visit to Jews. I know of members of the oldest Prussian nobility who, after the Nazis came to power, no longer dared go to their Jewish doctor in the daytime, out of fear that they would be seen and denounced. But since they had far more faith in him than in the National Socialists whom, they were told, it was their new patriotic duty to consult, they went to their Jewish physician after midnight.

Of course, Aryans of this type urgently hoped that the new regime would not last for long, or that at least its appalling outrages would one day subside. But all these people were themselves politically suspected. It was, therefore, only a little while before they realised that they could in no way help us. Thus, while sincerely regretting the fate of their disfranchised friends, many Germans even took up the banner of Hitler, in the hope of slowly acquiring some influence within the party. I strictly refuse to hate Hitler, and I do not wish to accuse any former leaders of German culture who made their peace with National Socialism, for one reason or an-

other, particularly as those renegades were later, in general, bitterly disappointed. But I think we should all try to understand better how it could come about that one of the proudest and most cultured communities of human civilization submitted to the dictates of a group of men who, it is true, are first-rate organizers and courageous soldiers, but are certainly of doubtful merit as spiritual leaders either of their own nation or of other peoples.

II

One of the best known German educators wrote me in 1933 that he found himself in a mood of "abulia," a state of lack of will which he never knew before. He had only a dim hope that, from the spirit which unites him with me, better times might one day come again. In 1934 one of the finest German historians, full of shame and despair, told me that in one respect he was honestly envious of Jews. "For you," he said, "can go back with honor to the great tradition of your prophets. But the spiritual tradition of Germany is now irreparably soiled."

There can be no doubt that these and hundreds of thousands of other sensitive German conservatives suffer under National Socialism. Nevertheless they have not resisted the new regime. Thus the great question of our time is, I think, this: are the old Christian, Jewish and liberal standards no longer sufficiently valid to resist replacement by a modern master-morality? Or are we, the advocates of these old standards, too weak to understand and apply them properly? Certainly the spiritual struggle between master-morality and slave-morality did not start when Friedrich Nietzsche coined these terms. This struggle between the ethics of force and the ethics of love or justice is as old as mankind. But, evidently, never before have so many millions of men become so unbearably bewildered by these questions.

The very day I received my American visa, two years ago, the leader of one of the most powerful states on earth declared that the morality of Berlin and the morality of London have nothing in common. Indeed, international mindedness, which in the eyes of liberal Anglo-Saxons is a high virtue, is in the eyes of fascists a crime because it is to them a lack of patriotism. All these chauvinists are certain that genuine fondness for another country is of necessity high treason toward one's own people. We regard love and kindness as paramount values; the fascists see in pure love a lack of vitality and strength. We are happy whenever we can be sympathetic and helpful to our fellowmen; we are unhappy and even suffer when others have to bear pain; we are distressed if we inflict pain upon others, even by accident or because we are forced to do so. The fascists enjoy the suffering of men; they glory in the cultivation of hatred and in the tormenting of their chimeric, self-created enemies. A cousin of mine, once a lawyer of high reputation in one of the biggest industrial centers of Germany, had an accident. Though everyone knew that he was no more blame-

worthy than were the city's old synagogues which had been burnt by the Nazis, all the Aryan hospitals nearby refused to admit him for treatment and he had to be taken to a distant Jewish hospital. Similarly the Nazis are not satisfied with imprisoning their political adversaries; they delight in torturing them to death slowly in concentration camps. Even when Nazi officials express regret at having been forced to take severe measures, their voices betray jubilation, not pain. An English statesman once told me that it was Hitler's voice which had convinced him that there could be no hope of appeasing such a man.

We find the cruelty, the brutality of fascists barbaric; they find our friendliness decadent, frail and stupid. To us peace is the ideal state of community life. Yet according to a well known Prussian saying, the idea of an eternal peace is a Utopian dream, and not even a pleasant dream. Preparedness for war is in the eyes of every fascist, the prime virtue of a great state. The right of free speech is to us an indispensable condition of a life worth living; to them it is characteristic of an undisciplined and ill-organized administration. It would be unfair to underrate the sincerity and the consistency of these leading representatives of the ethics of sheer power. Is, then, any clarification of these perplexities to be hoped for?

Jeremy Bentham, the great English jurist, once suggested revising the entire terminology of human motivation; and this remark alone, in my opinion, shows that the value of Bentham's thought is, in general, considerably underestimated. Bentham warns us emphatically against the dangers of using the language of every day speech in settling difficult moral disputes. For, as he saw clearly, our common language brings an initial bias to the discussion of ethical matters. The very names we choose for motives imply uncritical judgments about the moral character of those motives. When we wish to give a name to one of the actions of our fellow men, neither modern nor ancient languages permit us to use impartial, neutral terms. Language provides us with too many ready-made moral denominations; and by these mere terms we are misled in our moral judgment without our realizing what has happened.

For instance we feel, no hesitation in praising the motive of an action as "economical" or condemning it as "avaricious." But we should ask ourselves first of all whether we are entitled to speak of economy or avarice in the case in question. Until we can decide this we should use some such perfectly neutral term as "pecuniary interest." It is ethically inappropriate either to praise a sober housekeeper as thrifty or to dispraise her as penurious, or to censure a temperamental opera singer as lavish and wasteful or to laud her generosity. Before we despise a motive as cowardice, or extol it as circumspection, we should characterize it as self-preservation, without making any moral valuation. Before we loath a man as a drunkard or commend him as a lover of the convivial cup, we should speak impartially of his love of alcohol. Before we take exception

to a motive as lust or glorify it as love, we should call it in a neutral sense a sexual desire. Rather than reproving something as superstition or approving it as piety, we should term it religiousness, without any prepossession or prejudice. Not patriotism and not chauvinism, but only attachment to one's country is a *morally* neutral appelative. Neither the disapprobation of a motive as selfishness nor its commendation as prudence is scientific, but only its unbiased description as self-interest. The motive which led the German army to the bombing of the defenceless city of Almeria in 1937 seems to us the most naked and bestial cruelty, a senseless, shameless lust for revenge; to the commander of the German army it was the noble will to repair impeached honor. So, before rejecting a motive as cruelty, a scientific moralist ought to speak only of disaffection of one person or one community toward another. I think from the scientific point of view this is most helpful advice. Moreover, if we lose sight of the consequences of human acts, if we merely evaluate men's motives without further investigation, we arrive at very dubious judgments in ethics. There is still much to be discovered and to be said concerning the intimate relations which exist between the motives, the intentions behind human acts and the effects of those actions. I hope I have succeeded in clearing up a number of difficulties of this kind in my own ethics.

Unhappily or happily, however, the man in the street is no ethical scientist. Mankind will obviously go on using its morally predetermining language as long as we speak of the rising and setting sun, although we learn in childhood that it is the earth which turns around. But I believe that something more can be done quite practically towards saving us from several great dangers in our present moral and religious life. Is it wise to turn away from what we might learn even from our ethical adversaries? Of course, we must never adopt their methods and their creeds. Yet, I think, if we have eyes in our heads, we must admit that these people have at least the courage of their convictions. And millions on the other side, on our side, have lost this courage; or they have never possessed it.

III

To follow the oldest beaten track of history and to go back to barbaric military despotism is, of course, easier than to build up a new Jerusalem. It is laughable that the fascist gospel of brutality presents itself as a new development, a new way of life. In truth it represents the most obsolete and old-fashioned program of action in human history. But its modern representatives have the great virtue of being resolute, frank, and very consistent within the limits of the world they have chosen. Among their opponents, however, among Jews, Christians, Liberals and Socialists we see far too many disunited souls, light-minded optimists or hopeless defeatists. To them it seems either that freedom is certain to survive forever in the Western democracies, or that terrorism will

inevitably and soon reign everywhere because it reigns now on the European continent. But certainly nothing is accomplished by relapsing into either hope or fear, or by making idle prophecies. True religious and moral convictions must be acquired and lived afresh each day.

Whoever confuses love with indifference, or with an indolent, friendly *laissez faire, laissez aller* is neither a good Jew, a good Christian nor a true liberal. It may sound paradoxical, but it seems evident to me that a liberal who goes so far in his liberalism as to agree to the bloody extinction of all liberty is not a proper embodiment of liberal virtues. And similar paradoxes exist in the most intricate interweavings of love and justice, tenderness and strength, self-sacrifice and self-preservation. Wherever we judge human motives, I believe we need the vision of a new line of demarcation between good and evil. This dividing line runs not between power and love, but between strong, creative love and the unfeeling craving for power. It runs between blind, useless self-sacrifice and the striving for common happiness; between weak, all pardoning passivity and constructive, active love of peace. Power is not evil in itself; only destructive power is evil. And not every type of love is morally good. There is the mother's blind love which hurts the child by spoiling him; and there is the slavish love for a chieftain, a leader, which does not dare to object any more than a dog would dare to object to the most criminal deeds of its master.

To steer the creative middle-course among all these alternatives, between the lust for power and feeble, weakish love is the great task that lies ahead. The fact that the majority of civilized Germans abhorred the atrocities of National Socialism was not enough to save democracy. Animated by the best of intentions, German democrats found themselves utterly unable to do anything from the moment they allowed the transfer of the actual power of the state from the hands of a weak good-will to the hands of ill-will, but of splendid efficiency.

Numbers of German liberals and decent conservatives once used to smile complacently and try to justify their lukewarm interest in the German Republic by quoting, with reference to Hitler, the superficial commonplace that nothing is eaten as hot as it has been cooked. I was so often bored by that quotation that I used to answer in the same tone: "But no rule without exception"; and beyond all doubt the National Socialists proved to be this exception. Up to now they have broken all their promises with a speed that is still astounding, and they have made good all their threats with several times their promised ferocity. Obviously, dictators do not mind creating exceptions to democratic rules. A well-known German scholar, of comparatively liberal views, was asked to sign a protest against Nazi brutishness in 1933; but he refused to do so with the remark that one cannot care for everything. That Nazism precisely was that which did care for everything in the world, the scholar's political lukewarmness included, was

discovered too late by that scholar to his utmost distress.

Germany's moderate socialists, who should have been warned by Mussolini's quick and definite victory over their Italian comrades, often used to scoff at any parallel between Italy's insignificant labor organizations and the glorious German workers' movement. Was not Germany's "Sozialdemokratie" the best educated socialist party of Europe, and had it not already defied far greater political menaces than the ignorant babble of an unemployed paper-hanger! As a matter of fact, up to the age of Mussolini it seemed unthinkable that labor would ever give up willingly its fight for political freedom. The cause of labor seemed to be definitely linked with left-wing, progressive, liberalism. Obviously this condition no longer exists today. For the first time in history, in the present late stage of development of capitalism, a complete split occurred among liberals and consequently an alliance between labor and political reaction became possible. What happened was exactly what liberal socialists deemed impossible and therefore could not foresee. In contrast to the whole trend of the 19th century, after the second world war, millions of workers were willing to sell their civil rights for a most modest economic security. Despite all the political freedom which modern democracy gave them many of the workers and middle classes felt so much frightened by economic insecurity that they enthusiastically embraced political serfdom in preference to liberty, when serfdom promised them a little more economic safety. Unemployment had stirred up the most desperate feelings of tedium and hopelessness particularly in those workers who had no spiritual resources to draw upon nor any special strength of character. So to the astonishment of liberal socialists a certain, though still a limited, part of German workers were indeed inclined to fight for political reaction, if reaction promised to solve their economic problems, at least temporarily by big re-armament. Such a bargain for a pottage of lentils was the great temptation to the intellectually and morally lower strata of the German worker movement in the years of the great depression from 1929-1932. Certainly to acknowledge this seemed to the politically clear-sighted worker and to the truly liberal leaders of German *Sozialdemokratie* like treason to their great old principles and tradition. So in 1932 these fine liberal socialists conceivably were unable or unwilling to make such realistic and almost cynical prognoses as to the dangers ahead and they all had then to pay for this lack of foresight not only with exile, but also in many instances with death or long, severest martyrdom.

There had been large circles of fine German intellectuals who bluntly declared their lack of interest in the survival of the German Republic. They certainly disliked the gangster following of the new Messiah wholeheartedly. But the talkative, self-assured democrats, constantly repeating their stale, empty slogans, were to them no more attractive than their noisy, boasting adversaries. They confessed that the abstract, blood-

less ideals of democracy and the concrete, primitive Nazi thirst for blood were equally foreign to their own way of life. One perfect verse of George or Rilke meant far more to them than a victory of German democracy; one dull motive in a fine metaphysics was to them more painful than the delivery of the German army into the hands of political criminals. They felt completely aloof from the low, dirty theatre of politics. They had no inclination at all to take sides. Perhaps, they thought they would even prefer the succulent vulgarity of the Nazis to the sapless friendliness of the democrats. With Bernard Shaw they felt that the eternal smile of democratic statesmen telling pleasant lies was even more annoying than the fury of Hitler's face which, at least honestly, looked just as "disgusting" as our age actually is. In truth a considerable number of Germany's literary men had but one desire in the midst of the political life-and-death-struggle of their country between 1930 and 1933: they wished to be let alone, because they did not see any point to the whole affair. What they overlooked was the simple fact that the German democracy had let them alone, but that the Nazis would not—indeed could not.

There were a number of ascetic religionists who sincerely felt that their kingdom was not of this world and that this was to them good reason for political neutrality. Alas! This profoundly honest asceticism proved to be disastrous. Ascetic Christendom has fulfilled its great task. It has taught the world that the pursuit of merely sensual pleasure can never be the ultimate aim of sensitive souls. Exclusive devotion to the joy of the day was characteristic of many of the finest personalities of ancient culture. But this "carpe diem" can no longer be our only moral ideal. Christianity has deepened and enlarged our moral horizon beyond the reach of the vision of antiquity. Even modern heathens are fond of borrowing, if nothing else from Christian ethics, its metaphors. They speak of sacrificial death on the altar of one's country, even though it be the altar of imperialistic interests; and they decorate soldiers with the symbol of the cross, though the cross is certainly the symbol of suffering love, and not the sign of successful aggression. But however loudly mankind may speak the language of renunciation, there seems to be today less room for strict asceticism than ever before. There are few monasteries left which are out of reach of modern technical comfort; and the last great Christian ascetic, Søren Kierkegaard stirs our hearts particularly, because the medieval fire of his profound ascetic suffering glowed still in the beginning of an age of industrial prosperity. However, to flee from all earthly activity and to turn to the loneliness of mere resignation is more difficult today than ever. Nazism, without inhibitions, smashed even the doors of friars' cells and tortured the most unpolitical Protestant ascetics, in order to make out of them pliable, willing adorers of the new paganism.

There had been thousands of influential businessmen and army officers in Germany who certainly were not prone

to identify their aims and ways of life with those of the Nazis. But they thought we lived in such rough times that a "tough" answer is the best reply to a rough challenge. They believed that the language which National Socialism speaks would be better understood and would lead to greater success with the Western "Plutocracies" than the polite manners of Dr. Brüning. Göring would be more able to free German big business from the fear of socialism than even General Schleicher. So they supported the Nazis most generously with money and social favors. They were even anxious to secure the explosive energy of these well tried "patriots" for their own game before the Nazi movement should lose more voters than it had already lost in the November elections of 1932.

There were millions of good German democrats who had no sympathy whatsoever with National Socialists; but, being democrats, they felt obliged to give even these fanatical opponents a chance. After all, the spirit of democracy, as they understood it, protected the rights of even a heavily armed anti-democratic demagogy. They wrongly extended the democratic right of free speech to the right of propagating party-doctrines by guns. Many of these impolitic democrats even dreamt of being able to prevent Hitler from being re-elected in 1937. It never came to their minds that free election has definitely gone, that democracy is finished as soon as you elect a dictator, though the dictator may tell you a thousand times that tyranny is the final, permanent and most splendid stage of the evolution of democracy.

The greatest tragedy, however, is, in my view, the Nazi betrayal of German youth. There were millions of young Germans, politically quite unexperienced, who blindly believed Adolf Hitler to be a unique incarnation of self-sacrifice. But the simple fact that the same applies to hundreds of national leaders and even to Attila, the king of the Huns, escaped their attention; and it will never be taught them in Nazi schools. Proudly, these German youngsters think that there is no place in the wide world where the common welfare so towers over all selfish interests as in Nazi Germany. That the welfare of all non-German nationals is excluded from the idea of the common good and that the wholesale slaughter of oldest "Nordic" peoples is included in it, does not seem to disturb their blind nationalistic idealism. They willingly adore the utter unselfishness of their leader, who even refrains from accepting part of the appanage of a German Chancellor. That his last democratic predecessor did exactly the same with far less to do; that Adolf Hitler receives the far higher appanage of President of the German Reich; and that, on the top of all this, by decree he has ingeniously forced his people to pay him royalties for millions of copies of *Mein Kampf*—all this remains obviously unknown to young Germans. They love their national savior for his symbolically modest vegetarianism. That it is cold comfort to the world of living creatures when the Führer's refusal of animal food is daily paid off with the death of thousands of human beings, is a calculation evidently

never carried out by his idealistic following. Because since 1934 no German has been allowed to leave his country with more than three dollars in his pocket (unless he was sent for a special purpose by the Nazi Government), Germany's youths are hermetically shut up from the outside world. Consequently they are able to believe all their teachers tell them about other nations. They believe that all Englishmen are servile creatures, entirely at the mercy of a few cruel Tories, who are green with envy of Germany's new moral and political achievements. There are millions of German youngsters who subscribe to Oswald Spengler's teachings that the United States of America represents no nation at all, but a band of greedy profiteers; and that all Frenchmen who are not willing to comply with Germany's new order of Europe are corrupt and degenerate arch-enemies of the world's and Germany's welfare. In Germany, however, as these people think, free men follow voluntarily the greatest man of all times setting a unique example of devotion to the public good; there is only one vice which Germans possess; too much *bonhomie;* for this reason their *Führer* must sometimes be harsh with the outside world in order to prevent the age old exploitation of Germany's sentimental good-naturedness toward foreign nations. Virtually none of the ardent believers in this nonsense can check the truth of the statements of their teachers; for the few young people whom the Nazis sent out in the last eight years are carefully selected. When they leave Germany they are not at all interested in questioning Nazi articles of faith, and they know as well as they know that clouds bear rain that if they did so they would on their return to the Reich soon find themselves in concentration camps. So millions of German youths can more sincerely believe in the moral greatness of the third Reich than any normally gifted adults.

IV

All these large groups of Germans which I have tried to characterize briefly had, in the beginning, at least one thing in common: they could not make up their minds to take the Nazi gospel for what it really is. They were not able to see that it was the revival of the cave-age. They were all preoccupied with class, or national, or youth-ideologies; and so they did not become aware of another moral menace slowly overshadowing all other dangers. This was the age-old threat of a ruthless and consistent master morality to the elementary democratic idea of the rights of the individual. Western democracy has lasted only a short time, yet long enough to let us forget that such rights are not a matter of course, but are bought at the price of most devoted moral and physical energies of many generations. Like nations behind their Maginot Line, their Channel or their oceans, many non-Nazi Germans did not notice before 1933 that in this age of confusion, apart from all national conflicts and besides

the actual class struggle, there is an "ethical" struggle of no mean importance: a real fight between strong ill-will and decent but weak good-will.

When the Germans woke up and realized that they had committed a mere sin of omission, but a very grave one in this respect, they soon found out that their new totalitarian state, with the help of modern technics of suppression, by torture and blunt lawlessness, was trampling the life out of even the most valiant citizens—constantly, by day and by night. It was soon apparent that there was no possible way to save men of good will. To try to save them endangered the bold opponent of the new master-morality and brought even more cruelty upon its victims. So at last even many of the finest Germans gave in.

That the age of the League of Nations was still filled with national rivalries and class struggle—often overlapping each other—no one could help seeing. That there is a decisive religious difference between the reign of sheer power and pure love, everyone also admits. But we are obviously not all sufficiently aware that a new ethical battle is going on now: between human decency and the "good conscience" of a technically perfect barbarism; between an elaborate glorification of efficient sadism and the plainest humanitarian feelings.

Such a statement still sounds to many ears like a hysterical exaggeration and to others like the wearisome talk of toothless old bores. It did not sound credible even a few years ago. But to overpower people by fabulous, seemingly impossible tactics, to take men by surprise—are the mightiest weapons of fascism.

Its "new" religion is in truth so antiquated that the average open-minded, progressive man of culture would never have expected to meet such a ghost from old savagery in the streets of modern cities. So he failed to recognize it at first. But Fascism is by no means a new type of organization, nor does it point to some great spiritual value of the future. Fascism shows itself more and more shamelessly as the oldest brand of military and economic despotism, now equipped with the most modern tanks and air-fleets. Modern men however, without a certain historical imagination are only with difficulty able to get it through their heads that mankind can relapse into the age of Sargon, let alone the absolute monarchism of the 17th and 18th centuries. As a matter of fact such a state as that of Frederic the Great, with its freedom of the press, was inconceivably liberal in comparison with that of Goebbels.

If we do not succeed now in depriving savagery of its overwhelming force, if we do not now make every possible effort to support moral generosity with power, we may again have to go through a completely dark age, at least during our life time. If we want to express the meaning of the new moral attitude toward life which we must, I believe, attain, we can perhaps best illustrate it by reference to the two great testaments which make up the Bible of modern mankind. It was in my view the outstanding sign of moral and religious

wisdom of early Christianity that it insisted on including the Old Testament in its holy books—in spite of all temptations to the contrary. I confess with regret that there are Jews who are either unwilling or unable to see the profound strengthening which has been given to the concept of love by the teaching of Jesus. But of course there are also Christians who are sadly wanting in the efforts to put into practice the Gospel of justice taught in the Old Testament. What our generation needs more than anything is, in my opinion, a more true and sincere union of the two Testaments, a union of powerful justice and of creative kindness, not weak and undiscriminating love. With mere love, without any strength and power, no one can lead men to happiness; no one can rule a state or even organize his domestic life. Might without right is certainly evil, but also right without strength is not desirable; it is a dangerous concession to the evil powers of aggression.

Power without love is completely immoral, but powerless love is no less objectionable. I do not think that the Jewish prophets or Christ ever preached a blind love and kindness which condones everything and agrees with all and everything. Instead they lived and worked in that unity of strength with love which is still the great, lasting example; and it is a realizable ideal; it is not an idle day-dream.

No one can doubt that there exists both latently and manifestly an overwhelming amount of native force and good will in the United States of America. Nowhere on this stricken planet do there now seem to be greater chances of building up a new realization of this ideal: the union of power and fairness. So I firmly believe we can not hope for the recovery of the suffering world of our day unless America lends her all out moral and material aid.

A war of ideas can no more be won without books than a naval war can be won without ships. Books like ships have the toughest armor, the longest cruising range, and mount the most powerful guns. I hope that all who write and publish and sell and administer books will rededicate themselves to the single task of arming the mind and spirit of the American people with the strongest and most enduring weapons.—President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

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Moral Lessons of the Day
by
David Baumgardt

Are we sentimental, are we self-pitying, if we say that we live in a particularly grim age? It might seem that we would be; when we read in historical documents the comments which detached observers have made on their own time, we are surprised to see how subjective even the most objective minds have often been in this respect. Commentators have usually overrated the importance, the harshness or the glory of the age in which they live. In their judgments, indeed representatives of different epochs often resemble those ridiculous debaters every one of whom was eager to demonstrate that he had seen a taller dwarf than the other - when of course not the tallest, but the smallest, dwarf is the greater rarity. I, think, however, it is safe to say that in recent years we have gone through a fairly dark age. Millions of people died in the first great world war, two decades ago; millions have already died in the second world war which started at the latest, in 1935, in Abyssinia. Even women, children and world-renowned scholars of eighty years of age have had to suffer, far away from the political scene.

But there has been something perhaps more alarming even than the untold tortures of fine, civilised men. This is the silent breakdown of great, old moral and religious traditions, a most malignant collapse which I saw taking place in several European countries, and particularly in Germany. I do not think that the average German, the average Italian or Russian is more cruel or more blind politically than the man in the street of other nations. If, then, one wishes to describe what has happened during the last few years in so many European states, he can say only that it has been a kind of moral earthquake.

Is it possible outside of Germany to imagine how Hitler's laws against

the Jews and Liberals have affected German life? Old ties of friendship had existed between "Aryans" and Jews whose families have lived for more than 1500 years in Germany. There had been the most friendly and intimate relations between Jewish scholars and their Christian students, between conservative Aryans and their liberal fellows. Yet suddenly, as Jews and liberal socialists were outlawed, millions of their Aryan friends stood silently aside.

No less than we ourselves they were startled to learn that friendship with us was a political crime. Many of them scarcely believed their ears when they were told that ~~from now on~~ they must no longer greet on the streets people with whom they had had a lifelong friendly intercourse — in many cases people whose parents and grandparents had earlier been friends of their families. The new State, "the new order", publicly decried everyone who maintained any social contact with a Jew. Frequently such gentile "traitors" to the great cause of the Führer were led by Nazis through the streets of towns and cities, with big labels round their necks ~~saying that they were~~ pilloried them for being shameless enough still to have Jewish friends — the whole procedure being a perfect return to the darkest practices of the darkest ages, but greatly enjoyed in its rudest boyishness by all the many feeble-minded haters among the leaders of the Nazi party.

At the "NürnbergerParteitag" in 1935, by ~~act~~ degree of Goering, even Aryan servants who had lived in Jewish households for decades, and had practically become members of the families, were required to leave — a method of saving their Aryan honor which often literally ruined their lives and which they felt to be revolting and a senseless tragedy. A purely Aryan lawyer, who had married a Jewess many months before this was forbidden by the State's new law, was informed that he would be ~~deprived of his attorneyship~~ disbarred unless he divorced his wife. Before the court the Aryan lawyer pointed out, first, that he had

married quite legally, second, that he loved his wife, and saw in her even the saviour of his life — she had rescued him from drowning in the Baltic Sea. Well, the decision of the court was this: if for you private and so called moral feelings carry more weight than your highest political duties toward the State, you must bear the consequences. And the man lost his attorneyship.

How often has the divergence of political convictions split Aryan families apart in the last ten years! Some old and dear friends of mine, government officials, Aryan, but decided anti-Nazi, were unable to protest against the youthful enthusiasm for Hitler which their ten year old youngsters — about ten years old — brought home from school. For, in all innocence, these children who loved their parents might nevertheless inadvertently betray them to their Nazi teachers. Many gentiles implored their old Jewish friends under no circumstances to let it be known to the Nazi members of their families, to their sons-in-law or even their own sons, that they, the Aryans, still payed an occasional visit to Jews. I know of members of the oldest Prussian nobility who, after the Nazis came to power no longer dared go to their Jewish doctor in the daytime, out of fear that they would be seen and denounced to Nazis. But since they had far more faith in him than in the National Socialists whom they were told, it was their new patriotic duty to consult, they went to their old physician late at night.

Of course, Aryans of this type urgently hoped that the new regime would not last for long, or that at least its appalling outrages would one day subside. But all these people were themselves politically suspected. It was, therefore, only a little while before they realised that they could in no way help us. So, while sincerely regretting the fate of their disfranchised friends, many Germans even took up the banner of Hitler, in the hope of slowly acquiring some influence within the party.

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I strictly refuse to take Books ...

of one of the most powerful states on earth declared that the morality of Berlin and the morality of London have nothing in common. Indeed, international mindedness, which ~~is~~ in the eyes of liberal Anglo-Saxons is a high virtue, is in the eyes of fascists a crime, because it ~~is~~ betrays a lack of patriotism. All these chauvinists are certain that genuine fondness for another country is of necessity high treason toward one's own people. We regard love and kindness as paramount values; the fascists see in pure love a lack of vitality and strength. We are happy whenever we can be sympathetic and helpful to our fellowmen; we are unhappy and even ~~ourselves~~ suffer when others have to bear pain; we are distressed if we inflict pain upon others, even by accident or because we are forced to do so. The fascists enjoy the suffering of men; they glory in the cultivation of hatred and in the tormenting of their chimeric, self-created enemies. A cousin of mine, once a lawyer of high reputation in one of the biggest industrial centers of Germany, had an accident. Though everyone knew that he was no more blameworthy than were the old Synagogues ~~of that city~~ which had been burnt ~~down~~ by the Nazis, ~~nevertheless~~ all the Aryan hospitals nearby refused to admit him for treatment; he had to be taken to a distant Jewish hospital ~~far away~~. Similarly the Nazis are not satisfied with imprisoning their political adversaries; they delight in torturing them to death slowly, in concentration camps. Even when Nazi officials express regret at having been forced to take severe measures, their voices betray jubilation, not pain. An English statesman once told me that it was Hitler's voice which had convinced him that there could be no hope of appeasing such a man.

We find the cruelty of fascists, ~~their brutality~~, barbaric; they find our friendliness decadent, ~~and~~ frail and stupid. To us peace is the ideal state of community life. Yet according to a well-known Prussian saying, the idea of an eternal peace is a utopian dream, and not even

Is it wise to turn away from what we might learn even from our ethical adversaries? Of course, we must never adopt their methods and their creeds. Yet, I think, if we have eyes in our heads, we must admit that these people have at least the courage of their convictions. And millions on the other side, on our side, have lost this courage; or they have never possessed it.

To follow the oldest beaten track of history and to go back to barbaric military despotism is, of course, easier than to build up a new Jerusalem. It is laughable that the fascist gospel of brutality presents itself as a new development, a new way of life. In truth it represents the most obsolete and old-fashioned program of action in human history. But its modern representatives have the great virtue of being resolute, frank, and very consistent within the limits of the world they have chosen. Among their opponents, among Jews and Christians, among Liberals and Socialists we see far too many disunited souls, lightminded optimists or hopeless defeatists. To them it seems that freedom is certain to survive forever in the Western Democracies, or that terrorism will inevitably and soon reign everywhere, because it reigns now on the European continent. But certainly nothing is accomplished by relapsing into either, hope or fear, or by making idle prophecies. True religious and moral convictions must be acquired and lived afresh each day.

Whoever confuses love with indifference, or with an indolent, friendly laissez faire, laissez aller is neither a good Jew, a good Christian nor a true liberal. It may sound paradoxical, but it seems to me evident that a liberal who goes so far in his liberalism as to agree to the bloody extinction of all liberty is not a proper embodiment of liberal virtues. And similar paradoxes exist in the most intricate interweavings of love and justice, tenderness and strength, self-sacrifice and self-preservation. Wherever we judge human motives,

a pleasant dream. Preparedness for war is in the eyes of every fascists
the prime virtue of a great state." Ther

I believe, we need the vision of a new line of demarcation between good end evil. This dividing line runs not between power and love, but between strong, creative love and the unfeeling craving for power. It runs between blind, useless self-sacrifice and the striving for common happiness; between weak, all-pardoning passivity and constructive, active love of peace. Power is not evil in itself; only destructive power is evil. And not every type of love is morally good. There is the mother's blind love which hurts the child by spoiling him; and there is the slavish love for a chieftain, a leader, which does not dare to object any more than a dog would dare to object ~~even~~ to most criminal deeds of its master.

To steer the creative middle-course among all these alternatives, between the lust for power and feeble, weakish love is the great task that lies ahead. The fact that the majority of civilized Germans abhorred the atrocities of National Socialism was not enough to save democracy. Animated by the best of intentions, German democrats found themselves utterly unable to do anything from the moment they allowed the transfer of the actual power of the state from the hands of a weak good-will to the hands of ~~ill-will, but of~~ splendid efficiency.

Numbers of German liberals amd decent conservatives once used to smile complacently ~~and tried~~ to justify their lukewarm interest in the German Republic ~~with the proverb~~, [quoting, with reference] to Hitler, ~~the superficial common-place~~ that nothing is eaten as hot as it has been cooked. I was so often bored by that quotation that I used to answer in the same ~~mood~~: "But no rule without exeption"; and beyond all doubt the National Socialists proved to be this exception. Up to now they have broken all their promises with a speed that is still astounding, and they have made good all their threats with several times their promised ferocity. Obviously, dictators do not mind creating exceptions to democratic rules. A well-known German scholar, of compara-

tively liberal views was asked to sign a protest against Nazi brutishness in 1933; but he refused to do so with the remark that one cannot care for everything. That precisely Nazism was that ~~thing~~ which cared for everything in the world, the scholars political ~~untrustiness~~ naiveté included, ~~all this~~ was he discovered regrettably too late ~~to his utmost distress~~.

Germany's moderate socialists, who should have been warned by Mussolini's quick and definite victory over their Italian comrades, often used to scoff at any parallel between Italy's insignificant labor organisations and the glorious German workers' movement. Was not Germany's "Sozialdemokratie" the best educated socialist party of Europe, and had it not already defied far greater political menaces than the ignorant babble of an unemployed paper-hanger!

There had been large circles of fine German intellectuals who bluntly declared their lack of interest in the survival of the German Republic. They certainly disliked the gangster following of the new messiah wholeheartedly. But the talkative, self-assured democrats, constantly repeating their stale, empty slogans were to them no more attractive than their noisy, boasting adversaries. They confessed that the abstract, bloodless ideals of democracy and the primitive, ~~concrete~~ Nazi thirst ~~of the Nazis~~ were equally foreign to their own way of life. One perfect verse of George or Rilke meant far more to them than a victory of German democracy; one dull motive in a fine metaphysics was to them more painful than the delivery of the German army into the hands of political criminals. They felt completely aloof from the low, dirty theatre of politics. They had no inclination at all to take sides. Perhaps, they thought they would even prefer the succulent vulgarity of the Nazis to the sapless friendliness of the democrats. With Bernard Shaw they felt that the eternal smile of democratic statesmen telling pleasant lies was even more annoying than the fury of Hitler's face which, at least honestly, looked just as disgusting as our age actually is. In truth

a considerable number of Germany's literary men had but one desire in the midst of the political life-and-death-struggle of their country ~~which took place~~ between 1930 and 1933: they wished to be let alone, because they did not see any point to the whole affair. What they overlooked was the simple fact that the German democracy had let them alone, but that the Nazis would not — indeed could not.

There ~~had been~~ a number of ~~sincerely~~ ascetic religionists who ~~strictly~~ felt that their kingdom was not of this world and ~~they felt~~ that this was ~~a~~ reason for political neutrality ~~on their part~~. Alas! This profoundly honest asceticism proved to be ~~also~~ disastrous. Ascetic ~~Christen~~ Christendom has fulfilled its great task. It has taught the world that the persuit of merely sensual pleasure can never be the ultimate aim of sensitive souls. Exclusive devotion to the joy of the day was characteristic of many of the finest personalities of ancient culture. But this "carpe diem" can no longer be our only moral ideal. Christianity has deepened and enlarged our moral horizon beyond the ~~reach~~ of the vision of antiquity. Even modern heathens are fond of borrowing, if nothing else from Christian ethics, its metaphors. They speak of sacrificial death on the altar of one's country, even though it be the altar of imperialistic interests; and they decorate soldiers with the symbol of the cross, though the cross is certainly the symbol of suffering love, and not the sign of successful aggression. But however loudly mankind may speak the language of renunciation, there seems to be to day less room for strict asceticism than ever before. There are few monasteries left which are out of reach of modern technical comfort; and the last great Christian ascetic, Søren Kierkegaard stirs our hearts particularly, because the medieval fire of his profound ascetic suffering glowed still in the beginning of an age of industrial prosperity. However, to flee from all earthly activity and to turn to the loneliness of mere resignation is more difficult today than ever. Nazism, without inhibitions,

smashed even the doors of friar's cells and tortured the most unpolitical Protestant ascetics, in order to make out of them pliable, willing adorers of the new paganism.

There ~~had been~~ were thousands of influential businessmen and army officers in Germany who certainly were not prone to identify their aims and ~~practica~~ ways of life with those of the Nazis. But they thought we live in such rough times that a "tough" answer is the best reply to a rough challenge. They believed that the language which National Socialism speaks would be better understood and would lead to greater success with the western "Plutocracies" than the polite manners of Dr. Brüning. Göring would be more able to free German big business from the fear of socialism than even General Schleicher. So they supported the Nazis most generously with money and social favors. They were even anxious to secure the explosive energy of these well tried "patriots" for their own game before the Nazi movement should loose more voters than it had already lost in the November elections of 1932.

There ~~had been~~ were millions of good German democrats who had no sympathy whatsoever with National Socialists; but being democrats they felt obliged to give even these fanatical opponents a chance. After all, the spirit of democracy, as they understood it, protected the rights of even a heavily armed anti-democratic ~~propaganda~~ demagogy. They wrongly extended the democratic right of free speech to the right of propagating party-doctrines by guns. Many of these impolitic democrats even dreamt of being able to prevent Hitler from being reelected in 1937. It never ~~came to their minds~~ occurred to them that free election ~~is~~ has definitely gone, that democracy ~~is~~ finished as soon as you ~~have~~ elected a dictator, though the dictator may tell you a thousand times that tyranny is the final, permanent and most splendid stage of the evolution of democracy.

The greatest tragedy ~~however~~ is, in my view, the Nazi betrayal of German youth. There were millions of young Germans, politically quite

unexperienced, who blindly believed Adolf Hitler to be a unique incarnation of self-sacrifice. They were firmly convinced that he gave up everything for his country. But the simple fact that the same applies to hundreds of national leaders and even to Attila, the king of the Huns, escaped their attention; and it will never be taught them in Nazi schools. Proudly, these German youngsters think that there is no place in the wide world where the common welfare so towers over all selfish intersts as in Nazi Germany. That the welfare of all non-German nationals is excluded from the idea of the common good and that the wholesale slaughter of oldest "Nordic" peoples is included in it, does not seem to disturb their blind nationalistic idealism. They willingly adore the utter unselfishness of their leader, who even refrains from accepting the appanage of a German Chancellor. That his last democratic predecessor did exactly the same ~~, but~~ with far less to-do ~~; and~~ that Adolf Hitler receives ~~, of course,~~ the far higher appanage of President of the German Reich; and that on top of all this, by ~~way of~~ decree he has ingeniously forced his people to pay him royalties for millions of copies of "Mein Kampf" — ~~all this~~ all this remains obviously unknown to young Germans. They love their national savior for his symbolicly modest vegetarianism. That it is cold comfort to the world of living creatures when the Führer's refusal of animal food is daily paid off with the death of thousands of human beings, is a calculation evidently never carried out by his idealistic following. Because since 1934 no German has been allowed to leave his country with more than three dollars in his pocket (unless he was sent for a special purpose by the Nazi Government), Germany's youth are hermetically shut up from the outside world. Consequently they are able to believe all their teachers tell them about other nations. They believe that all Englishmen are servile creatures, entirely at the mercy of a few cruel Tories, who are green with envy of Germany's new moral and political achievements. There are millions of German youngsters

who subscribe sincerely to Oswald Spengler's teachings that the United States of America represents no nation at all, but a band of greedy profiteers; and that all Frenchmen who are not willing to comply with Germany's new order of Europe are corrupt and degenerate arch-enemies of the world's and Germany's welfare. In Germany, however, as these young people think, free men follow voluntarily the greatest man of all times setting a unique example of devotion to the public good; there it is only vice which these fine Germans possess: too much bonhomie; for this reason their Führer must sometimes be harsh with the outside world in order to prevent the age old exploitation of Germany's sentimental goodnaturedness toward foreign nations. ~~Practically~~ Virtually none of the ardent believers in this nonsense can check the truth of the statements of their teachers, for the few young people whom the Nazis sent out in the last eight years ~~with Government funds~~ are carefully selected. When they leave Germany, they are not all interested in questioning Nazi articles of faith, and they know as well as that clouds bear rain that if they did so ~~after~~ on their return to the Reich ~~they would find~~ soon themselves in concentration camps. So millions of German youths can more sincerely believe in the moral greatness of the third Reich than any normally gifted adults.

All these large groups of Germans which I have ~~just~~ tried to characterize briefly had, in the beginning, at least one thing in common: they could not make up their minds to take the Nazi gospel for what it really is. They were not able to see that it was the revival of the ~~savage~~. They ~~all were~~ preoccupied by class, or national, or ~~idealistic~~ youth-ideologies; and so they did not become aware of another moral menace slowly overshadowing all other dangers. This was the age-old threat of a ruthless and consistent master morality to the elementary democratic idea of the rights of the individual. Western democracy had lasted only a short time, ~~but that was~~ long enough to let us forget that such rights

are not a matter of course, but are bought for the price of most devoted moral and physical energies of many generations. Like nations behind their Maginot Line, their Channel or their oceans, many non-Nazi Germans did not notice before 1933 that in this age of confusion, apart from all national conflicts and besides the actual class struggle, there is an "ethical" struggle of ~~no contemptible~~ great no mean import, a real fight between strong ill-will and decent but weak good-will.

When the Germans woke up and realized that they had committed a ~~mere~~ sin of omission, but a very grave one in this respect, they soon found out that their new totalitarian state, with the help of modern technics of suppression, by torture and blunt lawlessness, was trampling the life out of even the most valiant citizens -- constantly, by day and by night. It was soon aparent that there was no possible way to save men of good will. To try to save them endangered the bold opponent of the new master-morality and brought even more cruelty upon its victims. So at last even many finest Germans gave in.

That the age of the League of Nations was still filled with national rivalries and class struggle -- often overlapping each other -- no one could have seen. That there is a decisive religious difference between the reign of sheer power and pure love, everyone also admits. But we are obviously not all sufficiently aware that a new ethical battle is going on now: between human decency and the "good conscience" of a technically perfect barbarism; between an elaborate glorification of efficient sadism and the plainest humanitarian feelings.

Such a statement still sounds to many ears like a hysterical exaggeration and to others like ~~a very~~ the wearisome ~~declamation~~ talk of toothless old ~~humdrums~~ [dodards, bores]. It did not sound credible even a few years ago. But to overpower people by fabulous, seemingly ~~similing~~ impossible tactics, to take men by surprise, -- ~~just this is one of~~ the mightiest weapons of Fascism.

Its "new" religion is in truth so antiquated that the average open-

minded, progressive men of culture would never have expected to meet such a ghost from old savagery in the streets of modern cities. ~~So he did not~~ So he failed to recognize it at first. But fascism is by no means a new type of organisation, nor does it point to some great spiritual value of the future. Fascism shows itself more and more shamelessly as the oldest ~~kind~~ brand of military and economic despotism, now equipped with the most modern tanks and air-fleets. Modern men, however, without a certain historical imagination are only with difficulty able to get it through their heads that mankind can relapse into the age of Sargon, let alone the absolute monarchism of the 17th and 18th centuries. As a matter of fact such a state as that of Frederic the Great, with its freedom of the press, was inconceivably liberal in comparison with that of Goebbels.

If we do not succeed now in depriving savagery of its overwhelming force, if we do not now make every possible effort to support moral generosity with power, we may again have to go through a completely dark age, at least during our life time. If we want to express the meaning of the new moral attitude toward life which we must, I believe, attain, we can perhaps best illustrate it by reference to the two great testaments which make up the Bible of modern mankind. It was in my view the outstanding sign of moral and religious wisdom of early Christianity that it insisted on including the Old Testament in its holy books — in spite of all temptations to the contrary. I confess with regret that there are Jews who are either unwilling or unable to see the profound strengthening which has been given to the concept of love by the teaching of Jesus. But of course there are also Christians who are sadly wanting in the efforts to put into practice the Gospel of Justice taught in the Old Testament. What our generation needs more than anything is, in my opinion, a more true and sincere union of the two Testaments, a union of powerful justice and of creative kindness, not weak and undiscriminating love. With mere love, without any

strength and power, no one can lead men to happiness; no one can rule a state or even organize his domestic life. Might without right is certainly evil, but also right without strength is not desirable; it is a dangerous concession to the powers of aggression.

Power without love is completely immoral, but also powerless love must not be our aim. I do not think that the Jewish prophets or Christ ever preached a blind love and kindness which condones everything and agrees with all and everything. Instead they lived and worked in that unity of strength with love which is still the great, lasting example; and it is a realizable ideal; it is not an idle day-dream.

Every one who enters this great country must be overwhelmed by the natural power and the amount of good will which exist both latently and manifestly in the United States of America. Nowhere on this stricken planet do there seem to be greater chances of building up a new union of power and fairness. To be allowed to work for this new, old ideal in life and thought — this, I hope, will be also my salvation from the moral earthquake with I experienced in the old world.

native force and good will

No one can doubt that they exist both latently and manifestly an overwhelming amount of natural force and of good will in the United States of America. Nowhere on this stricken planet do there seem to be greater chances of building up a new realization of this old ideal: a union of power and fairness. So I am not able to hope that the suffering world of our day will recover politically and morally, unless America participates in this difficult task.

So I believe we can hardly hope for a political and moral recovery of the suffering world of our day, unless America did participate in this difficult process.

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I believe we need the vision of a new line of demarcation between good and evil. This dividing line runs not between power and love, but between strong, creative love and the unfeeling craving for power. It runs between blind, useless self-sacrifice and the striving for common happiness; between weak, allpardoning passivity and constructive, active love of peace. Power is not evil in itself; only destructive power is evil. And not every type of love is morally good. There is the mother's blind love which hurts the child by spoiling him; and there is the slavish love for a chieftain, a leader, which does not dare to object any more than a dog would dare to object to the most criminal deeds of its master.

To steer the creative middle-course among all these alternatives, between the lust for power and feeble, weakish love is the great task that lies ahead. The fact that the majority of civilized Germans abhorred the atrocities of National Socialism was not enough to save democracy. Animated by the best of intentions, German democrats found themselves utterly unable to do anything from the moment they allowed the transfer of the actual power of the state from the hands of a weak good-will to the hands of ill-will, but of splendid efficiency.

Numbers of German liberals and decent conservatives once used to smile complacent and try to justify their lukewarm interest in the German Republic by quoting with reference to Hitler, the superficial commonplace that nothing is eaten as hot as it has been cooked. I was so often bored by that quotation that I used to answer in the same tone: "But no rule without exception"; and beyond all doubt the National Socialists proved to be this exception. Up to now they have broken all their promises with a speed that is still astounding, and they have made good all their threats with several times their promised ferocity. Obviously, dictators do not mind creating exceptions to democratic rules. A well-known German scholar, of comparatively liberal views,

was asked to sign a protest against Nazi brutishness in 1933; but he refused to do so with the remark that one cannot care for everything. That Nazism precisely was that which did care for everything in the world, the scholar's political lukewarmness included, was discovered too late by that scholar to his utmost distress. Germany's moderate socialists, who should have been warned by Mussolini's quick and definite victory over their Italian comrades, often used to scoff at any parallel between Italy's insignificant labor organisations and the glorious German worker's movement. Was not Germany's "Sozialdemokratie" the best educated socialist party of Europe, and had it not already defied far greater political menaces than the ignorant babble of an unemployed paper-hanger. As a matter of fact, up to the age of Mussolini it seemed unthinkable that labor would ever give up willingly its fight for political freedom. The cause of labor seemed to be definitely linked with left-wing, progressive, liberalism. Obviously this condition no longer exists today. For the first time in history, in the present late stage of development of capitalism,a complete split occured among liberals and consequently an allience between labor and political reaction became possible. What happened was exactly what liberal socialists deemed impossible and therefore could not foresee. In contrast to the whole trend of the 19th century, after the second world war, millions of workers were willing to sell their civil rights for a most modest economic security. Despite all the pokitical freedom which modern democracy gave them many of the workers and middle classes felt so much frightened by economic insecurity that they enthusiastically embraced political serfdom in preference to liberty, when serfdom promised them a little more economic safety. Unemployment had stirred up the most desperate feelings of tedium and hopelessness particularly in those workers who had no spiritual resources to

draw upon nor any special strength of character. So to the astonishment of liberal socialists a certain, though still a limited, part of German workers were indeed inclined to fight for political reaction, if reaction promised to solve their economic problems, at least temporarily by big re-armament. Such a bargain for a pottage of lentiles was the great temptation to the intellectually and morally lower strata of the German worker movement in the years of the great depression from 1929-1932. Certainly to acknowledge this seemed to the pokitically clear-sighted worker and to the truly liberal leaders of German Sozialdemokratie like treason to their great old principles and tradition. So in 1932 these fine liberal Socialists conceivably were unable or unwi ling to make such realistic and almost cynical prognoses as to the dangers ahead and they all had then to pay for this lack of foresight not only with exile, but also in many instances with death or long , severest martyrdom.

There had been large circles of fine German intellectuals who bluntly declared their lack of interest in the survival of the German Republic. They certainly disliked the gangster following of the new messiah wholeheartedly. But the talkative, self-assured democrats, constantly repeating their stale, empty slogans, were to them no more attractive than their noisy, boasting adversaries. They confessed that the abstract, bloodless ideals of democracy and the concrete, primitive Nazi thirst for blood were equally foreign to their own way of life. One perfect verse of George or Rilke meant far more to them than a victory of German democracy; one dull motive in a fine metaphysics wa to them more painful than the delivery of the German army into the hands of political criminals. They felt completely aloof from the low, dirty theatre of politics, They had no inclination at all to take sides. Perhaps, they thought they would even prefer the succulent vulgarity of the Nazis to

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There were a number of aescetic religionists who sincerely felt that their kingdom was not of this world and that this was to them good reason for political neutrality. Alas! This profoundly honest asceticism proved to be disastrous. Ascetic Christendom has fulfilled its great task. It has taught the world that the persuit of merely sensual pleasure can never be the ultimate aim of sensitive souls. Exclusive devotion to the joy of the day was characteristic of many of the finest personalities of ancient culture. But this "carpe diem" can no longer be our only moral ideal. Christianity has deepened and enlarged our moral horizon beyond the reach of the vision of antiquity. Even modern heathens are fond of borrowing, if nothing else from Christian ethics, its metaphors. They speak of sacrificial death on the altar of one's country, even though it be the alter of imperialistic interests; and they decorate soldiers with the symbol of the cross, though the cross is certainly the symbol of suffering love, and not the sign of successful aggression. But however loudly mankind may speak the language of renunciation, there seems to be to day less room for strict ascetism than ever before. There are few monasteries left which are out of reach of modern technical comfort; and the last great Christian ascetic, Søren Kierkegaard stirs our hearts particularly, because the medieval fire of

his profound ascetic suffering glowed still in the beginning of an age of industrial prosperity. However, to flee from all earthly activity and to turn to the loneliness of mere resignation is more difficult today than ever. Nazism, without inhibitions, smashed even the doors of friar's cells and tortured the most unpolitical Protestant ascetics, in order to make out of them pliable, willing adorers of the new paganism.

There had been thousands of influential businessmen and army officers in Germany who certainly were not prone to identify their aims and ways of life with those of the Nazis. But they thought we lived in such rough times that a "tough" answer is the best reply to a rough challenge. They believed that the language which National Socialism speaks would be better understood and would lead to greater success with the western "Plutocracies" than the polite manners of Dr. Brüning. Göring would be more able to free German big business from the fear of socialism than even General Schleicher. So they supported the Nazis most generously with money and social favors. They were even anxious to secute the explosive energy of these well tried "patriots" for their own game before the Nazi movement should lose more voters than it had already lost in the November elections of 1932.

There were millions of good German democrats who had no sympathy whatsoever with National Socialists; but, being democrats, they felt obliged to give even these fanatical opponents a chance. After all, the demagogig spirit of democracy, as they understood it, protected the rights of even a heavily armed anti-democratic demagogy. They wrongly extended the democratic right of free speech to the right of propagating party-doctrines by guns. Many of these impolitic democrats even dreamt of being able to prevent Hitler from being reelected in 1937. It never came to their minds that free election has definitely gone, that democracy is finished as soon as you elect a dictator, though the dictator may tell you a thousand times that tyranny is the final, permanent and most spaendid stage

of the evolution of democracy.

The greatest tragedy, however, is, in my view, the Nazi betrayal of German youth. There were millions of young Germans, politically quite unexperienced, who blindly believed Adolf Hitler to be a unique incarnation of self-sacrifice. But the simple fact that the same applies to hundreds of national leaders and even to Attila, the king of Huns, escaped their attention; and it will never be taught them in Nazi schools. Proudly, these German youngsters think that there is no place in the wide world where the common welfare so towers over all selfish interests as in Nazi Germany. That the welfare of all non-German nationals is excluded from the idea of the common good and that the wholesale slaughter of oldest "Nordis" peoples is included in it, does not seem to disturb their blind nationalistic idealism. They willingly adore the utter unselfishness of their leader, who even refrains from accepting the appanage of a German Chancellor. That his last democratic predecessor did exactly the same with far less to-do; that Adolf Hitler receives the far higher appanage of President of the German Reich; and that, on the top of all this, by decree he has ingeniously forced his people to pay him royaltoes for millions of copies of "Mein Kampf" - all this remains obviously unknown to young Germans. They love their national savior for his symbolicly modest vegetarianism. That it is cold comfort to the world of living creatures when the Führer's refusal of animal food is daily paid off with the death of thousands of human beings, is a calculation evidently never carried out by his idealistic following. Because since 1934 no German has been allowed to leave his country with more than three dollars in his pocket(unless he was sent for a special purpose by the Nazi Government), Germany's youths are hermetically shut up from the outside world. Consequently they are able to believe all their teachers tell them about other nations. They believe that all Englishmen are servile creatures, entirely at the mercy of a few cruel Tories, who are green with envy of Germany's new moral and political achievements. There

are millions of German youngsters who subscribe to Oswald Spengler's teachings that the United States of America represents no nation at all, but a band of greedy profiteers; and that all Frenchmen who are not willing to comply with Germany's new order of Europe are corrupt and degenerate arch-enemies of the world's and Germany's welfare. In Germany, however, as these people think, free men follow voluntarily the greatest man of all times setting a unique example of devotion to the public good; there is only one vice which Germans possess; too much bonhomie; for this reason their Führer must sometimes be harsh with the outside world in order to prevent the age old exploitation of Germany's sentimental goodnaturedness toward foreign nations. Virtually none of the ardent believers in this nonsense can check the truth of the statements of their teachers, for the few young people whom the Nazis sent out in the last eight years are carefully selected. When they leave Germany they are not at all interested in questioning Nazi articles of faith, and they know as well as they know that clouds bear rain that if they did so they would on their return to the Reich soon find themselves in concentration camps. So millions of German youths can more sincerely believe in the moral greatness of the third Reich than any normally gifted adults.

All these large groups of Germans which I have tried to characterize briefly had, in the beginning, at least one thing in common: they could not make up their minds to take the Nazi gospel for what it really is. They were not able to see that it was the revival of the cave-age. They were all preoccupied with class, or national, or youth-ideologies; and so they did not become aware of another moral menace slowly overshadowing all other dangers. This was the age-old threat of a ruthless and consistent master morality to the elementary democratic idea of the rights of the individual. Western democracy has lasted only a short time, yet long enough to let us forget that such rights

are not a matter of course, but are bought at the price of most devoted moral and physical energies of many generations. Like nations behind their Maginot Line, their Channel or their oceans, many non-Nazi Germans did not notice before 1933 that in this age of confusion, apart from all national conflicts and besides the actual class struggle, there is an "ethical" struggle of no contemptible import: a real fight between strong ill-will and decent but weak good-will.

When the Germans woke up and realized that they had committed a mere sin of omission, but a very grave one in this respect, they soon found out that their new totalitarian state, with the help of modern technics of suppression, by torture and blunt lawlessness, was trampling the life out of even the most valiant citizens -- constantly, by day and by night. It was soon aparent that there was no possible way to save men of good will. To try to save them endangered the bold opponent of the new master-morality and brought even more cruelty upon its victims. So at last even many finest Germans gave in.

That the age of the League of Nations was still filled with national rivalries and class struggle -- often overlapping each other -- no one could have overseen. That there is a decisive religious difference between the reign of sheer power and pure love, everyone also admits. But we are obviously not all sufficiently aware that a new ethical battle is going on now: between human decency and the "good conscience" of a technically perfect barbarism; between an elaborate glorification of efficient sadism and the plainest humanitarian feelings.

Such a statement still sounds to many ears like a hysterical exaggeration and to others like a wearisome talk of toothless old bores. It did not sound credible even a few years ago. But to overpower people by fabulous, seemingly impossible tactics, to take men by surprise, -- just this is one of the mightiest weapons of fascism.

Its "new" religion is in truth so antiquated that the average open-

minded, progressive man of culture would never have expected to meet such aghost from old savagery in the streets of modern ~~cities.~~ cities So he failed to recognize it at first. But fascism is by no means a new type of organisation, nor does it point to some great spiritual value of the future. Fascism shows itself more and more shamelessly as the oldest brand of military and economic despotism, now equipped with the most modern tanks of air-fleets. Modern men however, without a certain historical imagination are only with difficulty able to get it through their heads that mankind can relapse into the age of Sargon, let alone the absolute monarchism of the 17th and 18th centuries. As a matter of fact such a state as that of Frederic the Great, with its freedom of the press, was inconceivably liberal in comparison with that of Goebbels.

If we do not succeed now in depriving savagery of its overwhelming force, if we do not now make verey possible effort to support moral generosity with power, we may again have to go through a completely dark age, at least during our life time. If we want to express the meaning of the new moral attitude toward life which we must, I believe, attain, we can perhaps best illustrate it by reference to the two great testaments which make up the Bible of modern mankind. It was in my view the outstanding sign of moral and religious wisdom of early Christianity that it insisted on including the Old Testament in its holy books - in spite of all temptations to the contraty. I confess with regret that there are Jews who are either unwilling or unable to see the profound strenghteneing which has been given to the concept of love by the teaching of Jesus. But of course there are also Christians who are sadly wanting in the efforts to put into practice the Gospel of Justice taught in the Old Testament. What our generation needs more than anything is, in my opinion, a more true and sincere union of the two Testaments, a union of powerful justice and of creative kindness, not weak and undiscriminating love. With mere love, without any

strength and power, no one can lead men to happiness; no one can rule a state or even organize his domestic life. Might without right is certainly evil, but also right without strength is not desirable; it is a dangerous concession to the powers of aggression.

Power without love is completely immoral, but also powerless love must not be our aim. I do not think that the Jewish prophets or Christ ever preached a blind love and kindness which condones everything and agrees with all and everything. Instead they lived and worked in that unity of strength with love which is still the great, lasting example; and it is a realizable ideal; it is not an idle day-dream.

No one can doubt that there exists both latently and manifestly an overwhelming amount of native force and good will in the United States of America. Nowhere on this stricken planet do there now seem to be greater chances of building up a new realisation of this old ideal: the union of power and fairness. So I believe we can hardly hope for the recovery of the suffering world of our day unless America lends her moral and material aid in this difficult process.

Extra pages
which have
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as in our days.

The very day I received my American Visa two years ago the leader of one of the most powerful states on earth assured us that the morality of Berlin and the morality of London have nothing in common. Indeed international mindedness which is in the eyes of liberal Anglo-Saxons a high virtue is in the eyes of fascists a crime, because it is a lack of patriotism. All these chauvinists are certain that, if you are truly fond of other nations, this is,of necessity, high treason toward your own people. We call love and kindness paramount values. They see in pure love a lack of vitality and strength. We are happy whenever we can show sympathy and helpfulness to our fellowmen; we are unhappy and we even suffer when others have to sustain pain: we are not happy,even if we feel compelled or happened to impose unwillingly any pain upon others. They enjoy the suffering of men; they glory in the cultivation of hatred and in tormenting their self-created chimeric ennemies. A cousin of mine, once a lawyer of high reputation in one of the biggest industrial centers of Germany, had an accident in that city. Though everyone knew that his record was not worse than that of the old synagogues of that place which were burnt down by the Nazis, nevertheless all the aryan hospitals nearby refused to treat him and admit him: he had to be taken to the Jewsih hospital far away. Moreover, Nazis are not satisfied with imprisoning their political adversaries; they delight in torturing them slowly to death in concentration camps; even when they express regret for having been forced to take severe measures, their voice betrays jubilee and no pain; I know of English statesmen who told me that it was the voice of Hitler which converted them from hope of appeasing him. We find the cruelty of fascists, their brutality barbaric; they find our friendliness decadent and frail and stupid.

It is silly in their eyes to release even a German gentile pacifist who is seriously ill from the concentration camp, unless his death is imminent or his conversation to the Nazi party is absolutely ge-

nuine.

selves first whether we are entitled to speak of economy or avarice in that case. Until we can decide this, we should exclusively neutral terms, such as pecuniary interest. It is ethically neither appropriate to praise a sober housekeeper as thrifty nor to condemn her as avaricious or to censure a temperamental opera singer as lavish , wasteful or to adore her as generous. Before despising a motive as cowardice or extolling it as circumspection we should characterise it first as selfpreservation without any further moral valuation. Before loathing a man as a drunkard or liking him as a lover of the convivial cup, we should impartially speak of his love of alcohol. Before taking exception to a motive as last or praise it as love we should call it in a neutral sense a sexual desire. Before dispraising something as superstition or approving of it as piety, we should term it religiousness without any preposséssion or prejudice. Not patriotism and not chauvinism, but only nationalism or love of one's country id a morally neutral appelative. Not the simple disapprovale of a motive as selfishness or ist appreciation as prudence is scientifically correct, but only its unbiased discription as self interest. The motive which led the German army to the bombing of the defenceless Almeria in 1937 is to us a senseless, animal-like and shameless will to retaliation, is naked, bestial cruelty; to the commander of the German army it was the noble will to repair its impeached honor. So before rejecting a motive as cruelty the scientific moralist ought to speak only of disaffection of one person or one community toward another. I think from the scientific point of view this is most helpful advice. Moreover if we lose sight of the consequences of human acts, if we value only motives without further investigation, we arrive at very dubious judgments in ethics. There is still much to be said and to be explored concerning the intimate relations which exist between motives, intentions and the effects of human actions. I hope I have succeeded in clearing up a number of difficulties of this kind in my own ethics.

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Unhappily or happily, however, the man in the street is no ethical scientist. Mankind will obviously go on to speak its morally preoccupied language as long as we speak of the rising and setting sun. Although we learn inchildhood that it is the earth which turns around. But I believe that something more could be done in order to free us quite practically - as far as possible - from several grave dangers in our present moral and religious life. Is it right to turn away from what we might learn even from our ethical adversaries?Of course we must never adopt their methods and their creeds. Yet I think we must, if we have eyes in our heads, admit that these people have at least the courage of their convictions. And millions on the other side, on our side, have lost this courage; or they have never possessed it.

Of course to follow the oldest beaten track of history and to go back to barbaric military despotism is easier than to build up a new Jerusalem. It is laughable that the fascist Gospel of brutality presents itself as a new development, a new way of life, In truth it is the most obsolete and oldfashioned program of action in human history. But its modern representatives have indeed the great virtue of being resolute, frank and very consistent within the limits of the world of their choice. Among their opponents, however, among Jews and Christians, among Liberals and Socialists we see infinitely more disunited souls, lightminded optimists or hopeless defeatists. Either freedom seems to them to have been secured to suffice for ever in the Western democracies; or they argue blindly that terrorism soon will necessarily reign everywhere, because it reigns now on the European continent. But whoever is so sure of victory or of failure is certainly not a little exposed to defeat. True religious and moral convictions must be acquired and lived through every day

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Ethics of Motives and Ethics of Consequences

(Read at 42nd Meeting of Eastern Division of American Philosophical Association, Sarah Lawrence College, Feb. 21, 22, 23, 1946)

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Abstract

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Therefore, the motives as a criterion of the morality or immorality of acts are fundamentally inappropriate as a standard of moral judgment. The attempts to make motives and consequences the criteria of two opposing theories of ethics are hardly satisfactory. There is no criterion that could definitely determine to what degree motives independent of consequences are of decisive ethical relevance.

Certainly, after the ethical judgment has been formed by exclusive reference to the consequences, the consideration of motives which promote such consequences is pedagogically of the greatest importance. But the theory of ethics has, of necessity, logical priority over the problems of education. Only if all this is taken into account and if thus the conventional meaning of ethics is largely abandoned, can, in my opinion, the fundamental objections raised by logical positivism and master morality be met by a modern critical theory of morals.

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"good" and duty. But in neither case cam a general principle determine the nature of good or of a sense datum. No critical justification of the validity of our ethical propositions is thought to be possible or needed. For what is good and what is evil is believed to be known already by an unfailing insight of common sense; and therefore, to Professor Moore, ethics does not seem to demand any general principle for a critical distinction between morality and immorality.

I wish to hint at leastat a few reasons why, in my view, Professor Moore's analyses lead to such embarrasing problems that perhaps, as he says himself, he has "not gone about the business of trying to solve them in the right way."[1/] Moore himself admits that "it is a just charge against me that I have been able to solve so few of the problems I wished to solve;"[1/] and I see no reason why one should take this statement as a mere flourish of modesty or irony in a thinker who often shows most definite self-assuredness. But if Professor Moore's self-criticism is not without foundation, his failure to answer fundamental questions in ethics satisfactorily is certainly not due, as he adds, "partly..to a sheer lack of ability."[1/] There is no doubt of the subtlety of Professor Moore's ethical analyses

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1/ The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. by P. A. Schilpp, 1942, p. 677.

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by
David Baumgardt

There are at least three epistemological reasons which speak in favor of basing moral judgments on consequences of acts and not on their motives. First, motives have to be inferred, while consequences of acts are, to a much larger extent, given facts. Second, grounding the ethical value of an act on its motive implies a petitio principii, as almost every term we use for a motive has already a morally praising or condemning connotation. Third, motives themselves are often tacitly valued only as indications of prevailingly good or bad consequences of acts. As long as objections such as these are not met by the ethics of motives, motives as a criterion of the morality or immorality of acts are an epistemologically unsatisfactory standard of moral judgments.

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Version

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Contemporary ethics generally assumes that the judgment on motives provides a surer criterion of morality than the judgment on consequences of acts. W.D. Ross

In contemporary ethics motives as the basis for judgment are generally regarded as far more vital than the consequences of acts. W.D. Ross says that "motive is the main factor which makes an action good or bad." Similarly in German, French, English, and American ethics of values it is at least the implicit reference to motives which essentially counts. There are many reasons given for this main emphasis on motives, and at first glance these reasons seem to be conclusive beyond question. I propose, however, to examine the extent to which they are convincing and the sense in which they are, in my opinion, definitely misleading. In the development of moral thought marked progress undoubtedly was made when crude references to merely physical consequences of acts were abandoned. It was a decided ethical advance when ancient prophets turned away from the belief in in fixed, irrational moral taboos or in the observance of dead rites, when, instead, they demanded purity of heart, searching "the hearts and reins",--that is the morality of motives.

Abailard, Kant and all the chief exponents of contemporary ethics have tried again and again to emphasize this moral conquest of our religious and ethical past, this insight into the paramount importance of human springs of action. Often, disregard for the consequences of acts has been carried to the extreme in sayings such as "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum" or in Kant's famous praise of good will as the only "jewel" which is valuable in itself, regardless of any ~~however destructive results of the acts dictated or inspired by this good will~~ effects of the acts dictated or inspired by this good will, however destructive these effects may be. Under the pressure of this radical ethical teaching, exceedingly influential ideals arose such as that of the "reine Tumbe", the "guileless fool", the utterly selfless hero who sacrifices himself and ~~his whole~~ the entire community to the forces of evil, simply because he despises worldly prudence, or the ultra-liberal who, out of zeal for fair play, is willing to help even his deadly enemies in their destruction of all liberalism. But even when the consequences

of acts are not completely ignored, when as a matter of common sense some consideration is given to the effects of our deeds, even then the moral stress laid on motives generally continues to outweigh ~~the emphasis that laid~~ placed on consequences. The reasons for this attitude are time-honored beliefs to the effect that a shift in moral accent from motives to consequences would degrade ethics to mere legalism, or lead it back either to amoral ritualism, to a morally indifferent "savoir ~~faire~~ vivre" or to mere political adroitness. Many ingenious compromises have been made in modern ethics to do justice to the intricate relations between jurisprudence, politics, religious ritualism and ethics. Hegel went so far as to sanction explicitly the regard to consequences of acts as the fundamental point of "Sittlichkeit." But he too added that real, higher "MoralitMt"starts with laying the main stress on motives, on "Vorsatz" and "Absicht", without losing sight of

"das Wohl" and "die Schuld", the beneficial or harmful effects of human deeds. I know of only one modern thinker who deliberately and with great circumspection developed a radical ethics of consequences: Jeremy Bentham. I dissociate myself completely from his most sweeping utterances as they appear in his "Deontology". In all probability not Bentham himself, but his secretary, the editor of the "Deontology", is responsible for these overstatements. In any case, I believe that a consistent ethics of consequences, though considerably divergent from that of Bentham, is superior to any of the still dominant types of ethics of motives. 4 The first set of arguments to be cited in favor of an ethics of consequences is the least conclusive. It is undeniable that ~~the motives of~~ man's motives are hidden in his breast, while the effects of his deeds become generally observable facts in the outside world. Doubtless as to our own motives, with the best intentions, we often delude ourselves; and a fortiori, all our

inferences as to the motives of others are, to say the least, even more uncertain. On the other hand, it may be said that the frequent unpredictability of future results of our actions is as disturbing as the uncertainty of our reference to motives of the past. Yet ethics cannot be restricted to establishing a moral criterion only for intended acts, excluding accomplished deeds. Therefore it has to be urged that the ethics of motives must remain vague in both fields, in the field of planned action and in that of performed action. The ethics of consequences, however, allows for far more precision when faced with the moral estimate of acts already carried out.

A Much more essential, however, it seems to me, is another line of argument in favor of the ethics of consequences. It has too often escaped the attention of moralists that any ethical reference to motives implies a far more fundamental ethical judgment without which the reference to motives is ethically valueless, and without which no

consideration of motives in a moral estimate is feasible. If we value an act as good because it is motivated by love for a certain person, we presuppose in truth the goodness of this act from the very beginning; for otherwise, we would have called the same motive not love, but, say, a criminal devotion to an outlaw, at least a foolish fondness for him, or else a lack of fairness to others. If we regard an action as moral because its motive is love of peace, our very choice of the term for the motive entails our definite ethical judgment of the whole act. In short, we do not judge the act moral because its motive is love, but, tautologically, we regard the act as moral after we have already given its motive a moral appellation. If we had wished to characterize the same act as immoral, we would have given to the same motive, not the ethical name of love of peace, but the designation of an unmanly craving for appeasement. Thus all moral judgment based on the seemingly moral or immoral qualities of

motives actually moves in a vicious circle. If nothing but motives are taken into account, we have no firm basis on which to build a moral judgment. The same motive in reality admits of quite contradictory moral characterisations. It may be described by a eulogistic or a dyslogistic term, and with this arbitrary description our final judgment on the motive, as well as on the whole act, is already fixed. There is no motive in real life which is good or bad in every respect. Even love ~~of peace~~ is not absolutely good, if it includes a craven non-resistance, a catastrophic "laissez faire"; and to exclude the valueless, immoral types of love ~~of peace~~, to exclude the spoiling of a child from true love by definition must, of necessity, lead either to absolutely vague definitions or to a consideration of the consequences of acts, not only of their motives. Even acts motivated by the sense of duty are not necessarily good. There are certainly innumerable bad acts that are motivated by

dutifulness, and I do not think that we attain an ethical insight of any relevance by calling such acts right but bad, and their opposites wrong, but good. Apart from such extremists as Kant, moralists of all times agree that, without any reference to its effects, the motive of conscientiousness alone is no sufficient guarantee of the moral goodness of an act. Even the German "Gesinnungsethik" pays its tribute to this. "Gesinnung" represents a mixture of motive and intention; and while a motive in the genuine, strictest sense of the term means nothing but the impulse, the emotion or the spring of action which impels an act, an intention also contains a reference to preconceived effects of action; and approximately the same is true of the term "value". Values as well as "Gesinnungen" represent motives combined with some reference to the consequences of acts. In this way the ethics of values also pays some regard to the

effects of our deeds, though it puts the main emphasis on motives. But wherever ethics lays the principal weight on motives such as dutifulness or on values such as love and honor, wherever only a side-glance is devoted to the results of acts, there a begging of the question occurs at the very foundations of ethics which makes an unbiased criterion of morally good and bad impossible. There is no sufficiently impartial terminology of motives in any language on which objective moral judgment could be based. My third argument in favor of an ethics of consequences concerns the fact that, even when decisive moral relevance is attributed to motives, a latent reference to the common effects of motives can be unearthed by further scrutiny. I quite admit, in contrast to certain hedonistic theories, that certain acts of mischievous consequences are nevertheless not absolutely bad, if animated by such motives as benevolence or magnanimity; and acts of beneficial consequences are not absolutely

good, if accomplished out of motives such as hatred or fury. But what is the objective reason for attributing to certain notives an influence on the goodness of an act and to other motives an influence on the badness of an action? There is, so far as I can see, no other reason than this: that certain motives are indicative of prevailingly beneficial results of acts, and other motives are indicative of prevailingly mischievous consequences. But it is the reference to usual or actual consequences which ultimately determines, or has once determined the moral quality even of motives. If powerful efficiency is held to be the truly ethical aim of our deeds, as is assumed in master morality, then every motive of aggressive vitality is comparatively good, even if it does not achieve the ultimate ethical goals of this ethical system. If the spiritual and material welfare of every individual is thought to be the ethical aim of society, as is accepted in Judeo-Christian ethics, then the

motive of benevolence is comparatively good, even if it brings about misery in certain cases. But wherever results of acts are taken into account at all, there is no type of ethics in which the goodness of motives is not at least implicitly based on some presupposition of the goodness of certain consequences of acts. I think that only by an ethics of consequences can the problem of the moral superiority of the great world religions over the ethics of sheer force be critically, undogmatically approached, and only on this basis can the fundamental objections of logical positivism be met. But these questions stand, of course, in need of further and far more detailed treatment.

Abstract of the Paper

Ethics of Motives and Ethics of Consequences

There are at least three epistemological reasons which speak in favour of basing moral judgments on consequences of acts and not on their motives. First, motives have to be inferred, while consequences of acts are, to a much larger extent, given facts. Second, grounding the ethical value of an act on its motive implies a petitio principii, as almost every term we use for a motive has already a morally appraising or condemning connotation. Third, motives themselves are often tacitly valued only as indications of prevailingly good or bad consequences of acts. As long as objections such as these are not met by the ethics of motives, motives as a criterion of the morality or immorality of acts are an epistemologically unsatisfactory standard of moral judgments.

das wie wir Erlebe, Steuer + Fanfare. Grade 11 Uhr. abgeflaut
ist wie letzt. Analyse der übersubtilen intellektuellen Verschlungenen von allen Motiven u.
Handlungsfolge. Wie unfähig ist dann der viel zu weise oder viel zu dumme
Seismograph genannt zu werden ausgelegen u. nicht auszulegen! Offenbar, dass das
ist mühig Spiel u. Intellekt bedeutet. Wer kann das wissen, was dort in uns all
notwendig. Wie viel jenseits aller Kraft ist, plötzlich wieder. U. Si-
renen vom klassischen, geistigen Kötter! Unfähig Katzenjammer! trotz alles Abgeklärtheit

2 copies
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3rd draft
(from 1st draft)

Original typing same as on 2nd draft. The changes made are different. This version (ind. changes) was used for final version (small paper)

11.6: Contraction

treatment. His tone, that on the ground of his type of epistemological reflections the concept and the aim of ethics itself must undergo an essential change. But this seems to me by no means undesirable. The parallel change of the concept and aim of natural science was of merely beneficial results.

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Ethics of Motives and Ethics of Consequences

by

David Baumgardt

In contemporary ethics motives as the basis for judgment are generally regarded as far more vital than the consequences of acts. ~~David~~ W. D. Ross says that "motive is the main factor which makes an action good or bad". Similarly ~~Also~~ in German, French, English and American ethics of values it is at least the implicit reference to motives which essentially counts. There are many reasons given for this main emphasis on motives, and at first glance these reasons seem to be conclusive beyond question. I propose, however, to examine the extent to which they are convincing and the sense in which they are, in my opinion, definitely misleading.

In the development of moral thought (undoubtedly) marked progress was undoubtedly was made when crude reference to (nothing but) merely physical consequences of acts was were abandoned. It was a decided ethical (achievement) advance when ancient prophets turned away from the belief in fixed, irrational moral taboos or in the observance of dead rites, when, (they) instead, demanded purity of heart, searching "the hearts and reins", - that is the morality of motives. Abailard, Kant and all the chief exponents of contemporary ethics have tried again and again to (fortify) emphasize this moral conquest of our religious and ethical past, this insight into the (primary) paramount importance of human springs of action (in contrast to all the effects of our deeds). (Neglect) Often disregard of the consequences of acts has (often) been carried to the extreme in sayings such as "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum" or in Kant's famous praise of good will as the only "jewel" which is valuable in itself, regardless of any, ~~fatal~~ forever destructive, results of the acts dictated or inspired by this good will. Under the pressure of this radical ethical teaching, ~~there arose~~ arose exceedingly influential ideals such as that of the "reine Tumbe", the "guileless fool", the utterly selfless hero who sacrifices himself and his whole community to the (powers) forces of evil, because he (will not take into account) simply despises

worldly prudence , or the ultra-liberal who, out of zeal for fair play, is willing to help even his deadly enemies in their destruction of all liberalism. But even where full-scale neglect of the consequences of acts is avoided, where on behalf of common sense some regard is paid to the effects of our deeds, even then the moral relevance of motives continues to overshadow the relevance of the results of acts.

The reasons for this attitude are time-honored arguments to the effect that a shifting of the moral accent from motives to consequences would degrade ethics to mere legalism, or lead it back to amoral ritualism, or to a morally indifferent doctrine of "savoir faire" or of political adroitnesss. Many ingenious compromises have been made in modern ethics in order to do justice to the intricate relations between jurisprudence, politics, religious ritualism and ethics. Hegel went so far as to sanction explicitly the regard to consequences of acts as the fundamental point of "Sittlichkeit". But he too added that real, higher "Moralität" starts with laying the main stress on motives, on "Vorsatz" and "Absicht", without losing sight of "das Wohl" and "die Schuld", the beneficial or disastrous effects of human deeds.

I know of only one modern thinker who deliberately and with great circumspection developed a radical ethics of consequences: Jeremy Bentham. I dissociate myself completely from his most sweeping utterances which are to be found in his "Deontology". In all probability not Bentham himself, but his secretary, the editor of the "Deontology", is responsible for these overstatements. In any case, I believe that a consistent ethics of consequences, though considerably divergent from that of Bentham, is superior to any of the several still dominant types of ethics of motives.

A The first set of arguments to be cited in favor of an ethics of consequences is the least conclusive. It is true that the motives of man

are hidden in his breast while the effects of his deeds become generally observable facts in the outside world. In objection to this observation, however, it may be said that the results of our actions are at least not precisely predictable and that this unpredictability of the future ~~outweighs~~ is equal to as disturbing as the uncertainty of our reference to motives of the past. But even if this be (acknowledged, taken into account) (I still think) it certainly has to be granted that as a moral criterion of acts already performed, the ethics of consequences has the advantage of being based on less vague implications than are those of the moral character of motives.

As to our ~~actual~~ own motives, even men with the best intentions men often delude themselves, ~~let alone~~ not to speak of the evil-doer with his moral self-justification; and naturally a fortiori all our inferences as to the motives of ~~our~~ others fellowmen are, to say the least, ~~far~~ even more uncertain. In contrast to the unavoidable vagueness undependability of our judgments on our own and others' motives, the reference to study of the effects of action already achieved performed provides the ground for infinitely more impartial trustworthy observation; and unquestionably ethics cannot be limited restricted to the task of establishing a moral criterion only for intended acts, excluding the accomplished deeds. The fact that the ethics of consequences does not allow for less full predictability as regards the moral character of planned action ~~does~~ should by no means ~~take~~ detract from the shine out of the more important fact that the same type of ethics is far superior as to when faced with the moral estimate of acts already carried out.

Much more essential, however, ~~is~~, it seems to me, is another line of argument in favor of the ethics of consequences. It has too often escaped the attention of moralists that any ethical reference to motives implies a far more fundamental ethical judgment without which the reference to motives is ethically valueless, and without which no employment consideration of motives in a moral estimate is feasible. If we value an act as good because it is motivated by love for a certain person,

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we presuppose in truth the goodness of this act from the very beginning; for otherwise, we would have called the same motive not love, but, say, a criminal devotion to an outlaw, ~~or~~ at least a foolish fondness for him, or else a lack of fairness to others. If we regard an action as moral because its motive is love of peace, our very choice of the term for the motive entails our definite ethical judgment of the whole act. In short, we do not judge the act moral because its motive is love, but, tautologically, we regard the act as moral after we have already given its motive a moral appellative. If we had wished to characterize the same act as immoral, we would have given to the same motive, not the ethical name of love of peace, but the designation of an unmanly craving for appeasement.

Thus all moral judgment based on the seemingly moral or immoral qualities of motives actually moves in a vicious circle. If nothing but motives are taken into account, we have no firm basis on which to build a moral judgment. The same motive in reality admits ~~of an entirely~~ quite contradictory moral characterisations. It may be described by a eulogistic or a dyslogistic term, and with this arbitrary description our final judgment on the motive, as well as on the whole act, is already fixed.

There is no motive in real life which is good or bad in every respect. Even love of peace is not absolutely good, if it includes ~~weakest~~ a craven non-resistance, a catastrophic "laissez faire"; and to exclude the valueless, immoral types of love of peace, to exclude the spoiling of a child from true love (per) definitionem must, of necessity, lead either to absolutely vague definitions or to (the taking into account a consideration) of the consequences of acts, ~~and~~ not only of their motives ~~alone.~~ (That is to say, upon the judgment of motives alone we cannot build any objective judgment of acts.) Even acts motivated by the sense of duty are not necessarily good, (- if there is ever a motive such as a pure sense of duty, untouched by any admixture of concrete materialistic or

spiritual interests.) There are certainly innumerable bad acts that are motivated by dutifulness, and I do not think that we attain an ethical insight of any relevance by calling such acts right but bad, and their opposites wrong, but good.

Apart from such extremists as Kant, moralists of all times agree that, without any reference to its effects, the motive of conscentiousness alone is not sufficient guarantee of the moral goodness of an act. Even the German "Gesinnungsethik" pays its tribute to this. "Gesinnung" represents a mixture of motive and intention; and while ~~the~~ a motive in the genuine, strictest sense of the term means nothing but the impulse, the emotion or the spring of action which impels ~~to~~ an act, ~~the~~ intention also contains (also) a reference to preconceived effects of action; and approximately the same is true of the term "value". Values as well as "Gesinnungen" represent motives combined with some reference to the consequences of acts. In this way the ethics of values also pays some regard to the effects of our deeds, though it puts the main emphasis on motives. But wherever ethics lays the principle weight on motives such as dutifulness or on values such as love, and honor, wherever only a side-glance is devoted to the results of acts, there ~~is~~ a begging of the question (in accusat) the very foundations of ethics which makes an unbiased criterion of morally good and bad impossible. There is no sufficiently impartial terminology of motives in any language on which objective moral judgment could be based. If, nevertheless, the goodness of an act is based on the goodness of its motive, then the apparent goodness of the motive presupposes the belief that the act caused by this motive is good. This proceeding represents, therefore, a perfect argument in a circle. For, from a critical viewpoint, it is questionable in every case whether a morally praising or a morally condemning term should be applied to a certain motive in reality.

My third argument in favor of an ethics of consequences concerns the

fact

fact that even when the decisive moral relevance is attributed to motives, a latent reference to the common effects of motives can be unearthed by further scrutiny. (I quite admit It seems to me,) in contrast to certain hedonistic theories, that certain acts of mischievous consequences are nevertheless not absolutely bad, if they are animated by such motives as benevolence or magnanimity; and acts of beneficial consequences are not absolutely good, if accomplished out of motives such as hatred or fury. But what is the objective reason for attributing to certain motives an influence on the goodness of an act and to other motives an influence on the badness of an action? There is, so far as I can see, from the point of a critical ethics, no other reason than this: that certain motives are indicative of prevailingly beneficial results of acts, and other motives are indicative of prevailingly mischievous consequences. But it is the reference to usual or actual consequences which ultimately determines, or has once determined the moral quality even of motives.

If powerful efficiency is held to be the truly ethical aim of our deeds, as is (assumed done) in master morality, then every motive of aggressive vitality is comparatively good, even if it does not achieve the ultimate ethical goals of this ethical system. If the spiritual and material welfare of every individual is thought to be the ethical aim of society, as is accepted in Jewish Christian ethics, then the motive of benevolence is comparatively good, even if it brings about misery in certain cases. But wherever results of acts are taken into account at all, there is no type of ethics in which the goodness of motives is not at least implicitly based on some presupposition of the goodness of certain consequences of acts.

(Finally, I think, that only from the point of view of by) an ethics of consequences can the problem of the moral superiority of the great world religions over the ethics of sheer force be critically, undogmatically approached. (and only on this basis can the fundamental objections of logical positivism be met.) But this question stands, of course, in need of ~~another~~ further and far more detailed treatment.

Continuation:

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As to our own ~~actual~~ motives, even (~~men~~) with the best intentions men often delude themselves, not to speak of let alone the evil-doer with his moral self-justification; and (a fortiori naturally all) our inferences as to the motives of ~~our~~ others ~~fellowmen~~) are, to say the least, ~~far~~ even more uncertain. In contrast to the unavoidable (undependability vagueness) of our judgments on our own and others' motives, the (study of the reference to) effects of action already (performed ~~achieved~~) provides the ground for infinitely more (trustworthy impartial) observation; and unquestionably ethics cannot be (restricted limited) to (establishing the task of finding) a moral criterion only for intended acts, excluding (the) accomplished deeds. The fact that (an the) ethics of consequences does not allows for (full less) predictability as regards the moral character of planned action should does by no means ~~take~~ detract (the shine from out of) the more important fact that the same type of ethics is far superior (when faced with as to) the moral estimate of acts already carried out.

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Thus all moral judgment based on the seemingly moral or immoral qualities of motives actually moves in a vicious circle. If nothing but motives are taken into account, we have no firm basis on which to build a moral judgment. The same motive in reality admits ~~of an entirely~~ quite contradictory moral characterisation. It may be described by a eulogistic or a dyslogistic term, and with this arbitrary description our final judgment on the motive as well as on the whole act, is already fixed.

There is no motive in real life which is good or bad in every respect. Even love of peace is not absolutely good, if it includes ~~weakest~~ a craven non-resistance, a catastrophic "laissez faire"; and to exclude the valueless, immoral types of love of peace, to exclude the spoiling of a child from true love (per) definition must, of necessity, lead either to absolutely vague definitions or to (the a consideration (taking into account) of the consequences of acts, ~~and~~ not only of their motives ~~alone~~. (That is to say, upon the judgment of motives alone we cannot build any objective judgment of acts) Even acts motivated by the sense of duty are not necessarily good, (if there is ever a motive such as a pure sense of duty, untouched by any admixture of concrete meterialistic or

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Apart from such extremists as Kant, moralists of all times agree that, without any reference to its effects, the motive of conscentiousness alone is no sufficient guarantee of the moral goodness of an act. Even the German "Gesinnungsethik" pays its tribute to this. "Gesinnung" represents a mixture of motive and intention; and while ~~the~~ a motive in the genuine, strictest sense of the term means nothing but the impulse, the emotion or the spring of action which impels ~~to~~ an act, ~~the~~ an intention also contains (also) a reference to preconceived effects of action; and approximately the same is true of the term "value". Values as well as "Gesinnungen" represent motives combined with some reference to the consequences of acts. In this way the ethics of values also pays some regard to the effects of our deeds, though it puts the main emphasis on motives. But wherever ethics lays the principal weight on motives such as dutifulness or on values such as love, and honor, wherever only a side-glance is devoted to the results of acts, there ~~is a~~ begging of the question occurs at (in) the very foundations of ethics which makes an unbiased criterion of morally good and bad impossible. There is no sufficiently impartial terminology of motives in any language on which objective moral judgment could be based. (If, nevertheless, the goodness of an act is based on the goodness of its motive, then the apparent goodness of the motive presupposes the belief that the act caused by this motive is good. This proceeding represents, therefore, a perfect argument in a circle. For, from a critical viewpoint, it is questionable in every case whether a morally praising or a morally condemning term should be applied to a certain motive in reality.)

My third argument in favor of an ethics of consequences concerns tha

fact that even when (the) decisive moral relevance is attributed to motives, a latent reference to the common effects of motives can be unearthed by further scrutiny. (It seems to me, I quite admit) in contrast to certain hedonistic theories that certain acts of mischievous consequences are nevertheless not absolutely bad, if (they are) animated by such motives as benevolence or magnanimity; and acts of beneficial consequences are not absolutely good, if accomplished out of motives such as hatred or fury. But what is the objective reason for attributing to certain motives an influence on the goodness of an act and to other motives an influence on the badness of an action? There is, so far as I can see, (from the point of a critical ethics) no other reason than this: that certain motives are indicative of prevailingly beneficial results of acts, and other motives are indicative of prevailingly mischievous consequences. But it is the reference to usual or actual consequences which ultimately determines, or has once determined the moral quality even of motives.

If powerful efficiency is held to be the truly ethical aim of our deeds, as is (done, assumed) in master morality, then every motive of aggressive vitality is comparatively good, even if it does not achieve the ultimate ethical goals of this ethical system. If the spiritual and material welfare of every individual is thought to be the ethical aim of society, as is accepted in Jewish Christian ethics, then the motive of benevolence is comparatively good, even if it brings about misery in certain cases. But wherever results of acts are taken into account at all, there is no type of ethics in which the goodness of motives is not at least implicitly based on some presupposition of the goodness of certain consequences of acts.

(Finally), I think, that only (from the, by) point of view of) an ethics of consequences can the problem of the moral superiority of the great world religions over the ethics of sheer force be critically, undogmatically approached. (and only on this basis can the fundamental objections of logical positivism be met.) But these questions stand, of course, in need of ~~another~~ further and far more detailed treatment.

Continuation:

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2nd
draft
(from 1st draft)
4 copies - collated

Many of the changes were made by someone other than D.B. They improve the english considerably.

Ethics of Motives and Ethics of Consequences

by

David Baumgardt

In contemporary ethics, motives as the basis for judgment are generally regarded far more vital than consequences of acts. ~~David~~ W. D. Ross says that "Motive is the main factor which makes an action good or bad". ~~Also~~, in German, French, English and American ethics of values, it is at least the implicit reference to motives which essentially counts. There are many reasons given for this main emphasis on motives, and at first glance these reasons seem to be conclusive beyond question. I propose to examine the extent to which they are convincing and the sense in which they are definitely misleading.

In the development of moral thought, undoubtedly ~~marked~~ progress was made when the crude reference to nothing but consequences of acts was abandoned. It was a decided ethical achievement when ancient prophets turned away from the belief in fixed irrational moral taboos or in the observance of dead rites, when they demanded purity of heart, searching "the hearts and reins" — that is, the morality of motives. ~~Abelard~~, Kant and all the chief exponents of contemporary ethics tried again and again to fortify this moral conquest of our religious and ethical past, this insight into the primary importance of human springs of action, in contrast to all the effects of our deeds. ~~Neglect of~~ the consequences of acts has often been carried to the extreme in, as in sayings such as "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum" or in Kant's famous praise of good will as the only "jewel" which is valuable in itself, regardless of any fatal results of acts dictated or inspired by this good will. Under the pressure of this radical ethical ~~t~~teaching, ~~there~~ arose exceedingly influential ideals, such as that of the

" the utterly selfless hero who sacrifices himself and his community to the powers of evil, because he will not take into account worldly prudence, or the ultra-liberal who, out of zeal for fair play, is willing to help even his deadly ennemies in their destruction of all liberalism. But, even where full-scale neglect of the consequences of acts is avoided, where on behalf of common sense, some regard is paid to the effects of our deeds -- even then the moral relevance of motives continues to overshadow the relevance of the results of acts.

The reasons for this attitude are time-honored arguments to the effect that a shifting in the moral accent from motives to consequences of acts would degrade ethics to mere legalism, or lead it back to amoral ritualism or to a morally indifferent doctrine of "savoir faire", or of political adroitness. Many ingenious compromises have been made in modern ethics in order to do justice to the intricate relations between jurisprudence, politics, religious ritualism and ethics. Hegel went so far as to sanction explicitly the regard to consequences of acts as the fundamental point of "Sittlichkeit". But he, too, added that real, higher "Moralität" starts with laying the main stress on motives, on "Vorsatz" and "Absicht", without losing sight of "das Wohl" and "die Schuld", the beneficial or disastrous effects of human deeds.

I know of only one modern thinker who deliberately and with great circumspection developped a radical ethics of consequences, Jeremy Bentham. I dissociate myself completely from his most sweeping utterances, which are to be found in his "Deontology". In all probability, not Bentham himself, but his secretary, the editor of the "Deontology", is responsible for these overstatements. In any case, I believe that a consistent ethics of consequences, though consi-

derably divergent from that of Bentham, is superior to any of the several still dominant types of ethics of motives.

The first set of arguments to be cited in favor of an ethics of consequences is the least conclusive. It is true that the motives of man are hidden in his breast, while the effects of his deeds become generally observable facts in the outside world. In objection to this observation, however, it may be said that the results of our actions are at least not precisely predictable and that this unpredictability of the future outweighs the uncertainty of our reference to motives of the past. But, even if this be acknowledged, I still think it has to be granted that, as a moral criterion of acts already performed, the ethics of consequences has the advantage of being based on less vague implications than are those of the moral character of motives.

As to our own motives, even men with the best intentions often delude themselves, let alone the evil-doer with his moral self-justification; and naturally, our inferences as to the motives of our fellowmen are, to say the least, far more uncertain. In contrast to the unavoidable vagueness of our judgments on our own and others' motives, the reference to effects of action already achieved provides the ground for infinitely more impartial observation; and unquestionably ethics cannot be limited to the task of finding a moral criterion only for intended acts, excluding the accomplished deeds. The fact that the ethics of consequences allows for less predictability as regards the moral character of planned action does by no means shine out of the more important fact that the same type of ethics is far superior as to the moral estimate of acts already carried out.

From p.3, first paragraph

(~~From this p. 3 paragraphs of~~ to p.3 last paragraph)

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Much more essential, however, is, it seems to me, another line of argument in favor of the ethics of consequences. It has too often escaped the attention of moralists that any ethical reference to motives implies a far more fundamental ethical judgment without which the reference to motives is ethically valueless, and without which no consideration of motives in a moral estimate is feasible. If we value an act as good because it is motivated by love for a certain person, we presuppose, in truth, the goodness of this act from the very beginning; for otherwise, we would not call the same motive not love, but, say, a criminal devotion to an outlaw or at least a foolish fondness for him, or else a lack of fairness to others. If we regard an action as moral because its motive is love of peace, our very choice of the term for the motive entails our definite ethical judgment of the whole act. In short, we do not judge the act moral because its motive is love, but tautologically we regard the act as moral after we have already given its motive a moral appellation. If we had wished to characterize the same act as immoral, we would have given to the same motive, not the ethical name of love of peace, but the designation of an unmanly craving for appeasement.

Thus all moral judgment based on the seemingly moral or immoral qualities of motives actually moves in a vicious circle. If nothing but motives are taken into account, we have no firm basis on which to build a moral judgment. The same motive, in reality admits of (quite entirely) contradictory moral characterisations. It may be described by a eulogistic or a dyslogistic term, and with this arbitrary description our final judgment on the motive, as well as on the whole act, is already fixed.

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My third argument in favor of an ethics of consequences concerns the fact that even when the decisive moral relevance is attributed to motives, a latent reference to the common effects of motives can be unearthed by further scrutiny. It seems to me, in contrast to certain hedonistic theories that certain acts of mischievous consequences are nevertheless not absolutely bad, if ~~they are~~ animated by such motives as benevolence or magnanimity; and acts of beneficial consequences are not absolutely good, if accomplished out of motives such as hatred or fury. But what is the objective reason for attributing to certain motives an influence on the goodness of an act and to other motives an influence on the badness of an action? There is, so far as I can see, (from the point of view of critical ethics, no other reason than this: that certain motives are indicative of (prevailingly beneficial results of acts, and other motives are indicative of) prevailingly mischievous consequences. But it is the reference to usual or actual consequences which ultimately determines, or has once determined, the moral quality even of motives.

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Continuation:

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Partial, not final

Ethics of Motives and Ethics of Consequences

by

David Baumgardt

In contemporary discussion of ethics, motives as a criterion for moral judgment are generally regarded far more vital than the consequences of the acts to be judged. D. W. Ross says that "Motive is the main factor which makes an action good or bad". Similarly in German, French, English and American ethics of values,[2] it is at least the implicit reference to motives which essentially counts. There are many reasons are given for this predominant emphasis on motives, and, at first glance, they these reasons seem to be conclusive beyond question. I propose here however, to examine the extent to which they offer a sound basis for judgment and are convincing and the sense in which, in my opinion, they are definitely irrelevant misleading.

In the development of moral thought, undoubtedly marked progress was made when consideration of the crude reference to nothing but merely physical consequences of an act was abandoned. It was a decided ethical advance when ancient prophets turned away from the belief in fixed irrational moral taboos or in the observance of traditional dead rites, when, instead they demanded purity of heart, searching "the hearts and reins" - that is, the morality of motives. Abélard, Kant and all the chief exponents of modern contemporary ethics have tried again and again to emphasize fortify this moral conquest of our religious and ethical past, this insight into the primary importance of human springs of action in contrast to all the effects of our deeds. Often disregard for Negaact of the consequences of acts has often been carried to the extreme in, as in sayings such as "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum," or in Kant's famous praise of good will as the only "jewel" which is valuable in itself, regardless of any however destructive fatal results of the acts dictated or inspired by this good will. Under the pressure of this radical ethical teaching, there arose, exceedingly influential ideals such as that of the

and his whole community to the powers of evil, because he will not take into account worldly prudence, or the ultra-liberal who, out of zeal for fair play, is willing to help even his deadly ennemies in their destruction of all liberalism. But even where full-scale neglect of the consequences of acts is avoided, where, on behalf of common sense, some regard is paid to the effects of our deeds, even then the moral relevance of motives continues to overshadow the relevance of the results of acts.

The reasons for this attitude are time-honored arguments to the effect that shifting the moral accent from motives to consequences of acts would degrade ethics to mere legalism, or lead it back to amoral ritualism, to a morally different doctrine of "savoir faire," or to mere political adroitness. Many ingenious compromises have been made in modern ethics in order to do justice to the intricate relations between jurisprudence, politics, religious ritualism and ethics. Hegel went so far as to sanction explicitly the regard to consequences of acts as the fundamental point of "Sittlichkeit". But he, too, added that real, higher "Moralität" starts with laying the main stress on motives, on "Vorsatz" and "Absicht", without loosing sight of "das Wohl" and "die Schuld", the beneficial or disastrous effects of human deeds.

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Joseph Görres: Lohengrin, Heidelberg 1813, S. VII (see auch E. Wechssler: Die Sage von heiligen Gral, 1898 p. 188) "der reine oder arme Tumbe"

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The first [set of] arguments [to be cited] in favor of an ethics of consequences is the least conclusive. It is true that the motives (of man) are hidden in his breast, while the effects of his deeds become usually generally observable facts ascertainable ~~in the outside world~~. In objection to this [observation], however, it may be said that the results of our actions are at least not precisely predictable, and that this unpredictability of the future outweighs the uncertainty of our reference to motives of the past. But, even if this be acknowledged, I still think it has to be granted that, as a moral criterion of acts already performed, the ethics of consequences has the advantage of being based on less vague implications than are those of the moral character of motives.

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Ethics of Motives and Ethics of Consequences
by
David Daumgardt

Enlarged end of the paper

In contemporary discussion of ethics, motives as (the basis) for moral judgment are generally regarded as far more vital than consequences of acts to be judged. David W. D. Ross says that "motive is the main factor which makes an action good or bad". Similarly, also in German, French, English and American (ethics of values), it is at least the implicit (reference) to motives which (essentially) counts. (There are) Many reasons are given for this (pre)dominant (main) emphasis on motives and at first glance they (these reasons) seem to be conclusive (beyond question). I here, however propose to examine the extent to which they (are convincing and) offer a sound basis for judgment and the sense in which they are definitely (misleading) irrelevant in my opinion

In the development of moral thought, undoubtedly marked progress was made when [the crude reference to nothing but consequences] consideration of the merely physical of acts was abandoned. It was a decided ethical advance achievement when ancient prophets turned away from the belief in (fixed), irrational moral taboos or in the observance of (dead) traditional rites, when instead they demanded purity of heart, searching "the hearts and reins" - that is, the morality of motives. Abailard Abélard, Kant and all the chief exponents of (contemporary) modern ethics tried again and again to [fortify] emphasize this moral conquest of our religious and ethical past, this (insight) into the primary paramount importance of human springs of action, [in contrast to (all) the effects of our deeds]. often disregard for neglect of the consequences of acts has often been carried to the extreme (in), as in sayings such as "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum" or in Kant's famous praise of good will as the only "jewel" which is valuable in itself regardless of any fatal however destructive results of acts dictated or inspired by this good will. Under the pressure of this radical ethical teaching, there arose exceedingly influential ideals arose such as that of the

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"Nine Thumbs", the "Guileless fool", the utterly selfless hero who sacrifices himself and (his whole) community to the forces of evil, because (he will not take into account worldly prudence or the ultra-liberal who, out of zeal for fair play, is willing to help even [his deadly enemies in] [their] distruction of all liberalism. But, even (where) [full-scale neglect of] the consequences of acts (is avoided), (where) on behalf of common [sense, some (regard is paid) to the effects of our deeds, even then the moral relevance of motives continues to overshadow the relevance of (the results of acts.

The reasons for this attitude are time-honored (arguments) to the effect that a shift (in) the moral accent from motives to consequences (of acts) would degrade ethics to mere legalism, or lead it (back), to amoral ritualism or to a morally indifferent ~~doctrine of~~ "savoir faire" or ~~of~~ political adroitness. Many ingenious compromises have been made in modern ethics in (order) to do justice to the intricate relations between jurisprudence, politics, religious ritualism and ethics. Hegel went so far as to sanction explicitly the (regard to) consequences (of acts) as the (fundamental) (point) of "Sittlichkeit". But he ~~too~~ added that real, higher "Moralität" (starts [with laying] the main stress on motives, on "Vorsatz" and "Absicht", without losing sight of "das Wohl" and "die Schuld", the beneficial or (disastrous) effects of human deeds.

I know of only one modern thinker who deliberately and with (great) (circumspection) developed a radical ethics of consequences: Jeremy Bentham. [I dissociate myself completely from] his most sweeping utterances, which ~~are to be found~~ in his "Deontology". In all probability, not Bentham himself, but his secretary, the editor of the "Deontology," is responsible for these overstatements. In any case, (I believe that) a (consistent) ethics of consequences, ~~though~~ consi-

derably divergent, however, from that of Bentham, is superior to any of the several still dominant system types of ethics based on motives. see attached p. 3 rewritten

The first consideration set of arguments to be cited in favor of an ethics of consequences is the least conclusive. It is undeniable true that man's the motives (of man) are hidden in his breast while the effects of his deeds are (become) usually generally factually observable ascertainable facts in the outside world. On the other hand In objection to this argument observation, however, it may be said that the frequent unpredictability of the results of our an actions are at least not surely precisely predictable and that this unpredictability (of the future) (is equal to) as disturbing as outweighs the uncertainty of our reference to motives of the past. But, even if this be admitted - conceded, acknowledged, (I still think) it still has to be granted that, as a moral criterion for of acts already performed, the ethics of consequences has the advantage of being based on less vague implications than on ethics based on are those of the moral character of motives.

Doubtless, as to our their own actual motives, even men with the best intentions often delude themselves, let alone the evil-doer with his moral self- omit justification; (and) naturally, a fortiori all our inferences as to the motives of others (our fellowmen) are, (to say the least,) still far more unreliable uncertain. In contrast to the unavoidable undependability vagueness of our judgments on our own and others' motives, [the study of the reference to] effects of an action already performed achieved provides the ground for infinitely far more trustworthy impartial observation; and unquestionably a analysis should restricted ethics cannot be limited to the task of establishing finding a moral criterion only for intended acts, excluding the accomplished deeds. Therefore The fact that the an ethics of consequences does not allow for full allows for less predictability as regards the moral character of planned action should does by no means detract take (the shine out of) from the more important fact that the same type of ethics throughout is far superior as to the moral estimation of acts already carried when faced with out. it has to be urged

that the ethics of motives must remain vague in both fields, in the field of planned and in that of performed action. The ethics of consequences, however, allows for far more precision when faced with the moral estimate of facts already carried out.

(From the last 2 paragraphs of p.2 up to p.3 last paragraph)

The first set of arguments to be cited in favor of an ethics of consequences is the least conclusive. It is undeniable that the motives of man are hidden in his breast, while the effects of his deeds become generally observable facts in the outside world. Doubtless as to our own motives, with the best intentions, we often delude ourselves; and a fortiori, all our inferences as to the motives of others, are to say the last, even more uncertain. On the other hand it may be said that the frequent unpredictability of future results of our actions is as disturbing as the uncertainty of our reference to motives of the past. Yet ethics cannot be restricted to establishing a moral criterion only for intended acts, excluding accomplished deeds. Therefore it has to be urged that the ethics of motives must remain vague in bothfields, in the field of planned action and in that of performed action. The ethics of consequences however, allows for far more precision when faced with the moral estimate of acts already carried out.

Much more essential, however, is, it seems to me, another line of argument in favor of the ethics of consequences. It has too often escaped the attention of moralists that any ethical reference to motives implies a far more fundamental ethical judgment without which the reference to motives is ethically valueless, and without which no (employment, consideration) of motives in a moral estimate is feasible. If we value an act as good because it is motivated by love for a certain person, we presuppose, in truth, the goodness of this act from the very beginning; for otherwise, we would have called the same motive not love, but, say, a criminal devotion to an outlaw, ~~or~~ at least a foolish fondness for him, or else a lack of fairness to others. If we regard an action as moral because its motive is love of peace, our very choice of the term for the motive entails our definite ethical judgment of the whole act. In short, we do not judge the act moral because its motive is love, but tautologically we regard the act as moral after we have already given its motive a moral appellation. If we had wished to characterize the same act as immoral, we would have given to the same motive, not the ethical name of love of peace, but the designation of an unmanly craving for appeasement.

Thus all moral judgment based on the seemingly moral or immoral qualities of motives actually moves in a vicious circle. If nothing but motives are taken into account, we have no firm basis on which to build a moral judgment. The same motive, in reality, admits of an (entirely, quite) contradictory moral characterisation. It may be described by a eulogistic or a dyslogistic term, and with this arbitrary description our final judgment on the motive, as well as on the whole act, is already fixed.

There is no motive in real life which is good or bad in every

respect. Even love of peace is not absolutely good, if it includes a craven ~~weakest~~ non-resistance, a catastrophic laissez faire"; and to exclude the valueless, immoral types of love of peace, to exclude the spoiling of a child from true love (per definitionem by definition) must, of necessity, lead either to absolutely vague definitions or to ~~the taking into account~~ a consideration of the consequences of acts, and not only of their motives ~~alone~~. (That is to say, upon the judgment of motives alone) we cannot build any objective judgment of acts. Even acts motivated by the sense of duty are not necessarily good, (- ~~for~~ assuming that there is ever a motive such as a pure sense of duty, untouched by any admixture of concrete materialistic or spiritual interests). There are certainly innumerable bad acts that are motivated by dutyfulness, and I do not think that we attain any (essential ethical) insight (into ethics of any relevance) by calling such acts right but bad, and their opposites wrong, but good.

Apart from such extremists as Kant, moralists of all times agree that, without any reference to its effects, the motive of conscentiousness alone is not a sufficient guarantee of the moral goodness of an act. Even the German "Gesinnungsethik" pays its tribute to this. "Gesinnung" represents a mixture of motive and intention; and while ~~the~~ a motive in the genuine, strictest sense of the term means nothing but the impulse, the emotion or the spring of action which impels ~~to~~ an act, ~~the~~ an intention (contains) also a reference to the preconceived effects of action; and approximately the same is true of the term "value". Values as well as "Gesinnungen" represent motives combined with some reference to the consequences of acts. In this way the ethics of values also pays some regard to the effects of our deeds, though it puts the main emphasis on motives. But wherever ethics lays the principal weight on motives such as dutifulness,

or on values such as love, and honor, wherever only a side-glance is devoted to the results of acts, there is a begging of the question occurs at the very foundations of ethics which makes an unbiased criterion of morally good and bad impossible. There is no sufficiently thorough impartial terminology of motives in any language on which objective moral judgment could be based. (If, neverthless, the goodness of an act is based on the goodness of its motive, then the apparent goodness of the motive presupposes the belief that the act caused by this motive is good. This proceeding represents, therefore, a perfect argument in a circle. For, from a critical viewpoint, it is questionable in every case whether a morally praising or a morally condemning term should be applied to a certain motive in reality.)

My third argument in favor of an ethics of consequences concerns the fact that, even when the decisive moral relevance is attributed to motives, a latent reference to the common effects of motives can be unearthed by further scrutiny. It seems to me, in contrast to certain hedonistic theories, that certain acts of mischievous consequences are nevertheless not absolutely bad, if they are animated by such motives as benevolence or magnanimity; and acts of beneficial consequences are not absolutely good, if accomplished out of motives such as hatred or fury. But what is the objective reason for attributing to certain motives an influence on the goodness of an act and to other motives an influence on the badness of an action? There is, so far as I can see, (from the point of view of a critical ethics) no other reason than this: that certain motives are indicative of prevailingly beneficial results of acts, and other motives are indicative of prevailingly mischievous consequences. But it is the reference to usual or actual consequences which ultimately determines, or has once determined, the moral quality even of motives.

If powerful efficiency is held to be the truly ethical aim of our deeds, as is ~~done~~ assumed in master morality, then every motive of aggressive vitality is comparatively good, even if it does not achieve the ultimate ~~ethical~~ goals of this ethical system. If the spiritual and material welfare of every individual is thought to be the ethical aim of society, as is accepted in Jewish Christian ethics, then the motive of benevolence is comparatively good, even if it brings about misery in certain cases. But wherever results of acts are taken into account at all, there is no type of ethics in which the goodness of motives is not at least implicitly based on some presupposition of the goodness of ~~certain~~ certain consequences of acts.

(Finally), I think that only (from the point by of view of) an ethics of consequences can the problem of the moral superiority of the great world religions over the ethics of sheer force be critically, un-~~dogmatically~~ approached. But this the question stands, of course, in need of ~~another~~ further and far more detailed treatment

Continuation:

.....treatment. It is true, that on the ground of this type of epistemological reflections the concept and the aim of ethics itself must undergo an essential change. But this seems to me by no means undesirable. The parallel change of the concept and aim of natural science was of merely beneficial results.

Ethics of Motives and Ethics of Consequences

by

David Baumgardt

In contemporary discussion of ethics, motives as (the basis) for a criterion moral judgment are generally regarded as far more vital than the consequences of the acts to be judged. ~~David~~ D. Ross says that "~~motive~~ motive is the main factor which makes an action good or bad". Similarly ~~Also~~, in German, French, English and American (ethics of values?) it is at least the implicit (reference) to motives which (essentially) counts. (There are) Many reasons are given for this (pre)dominant (main) emphasis on motives, and at first glance they (these reasons) seem to be conclusive (beyond question). I propose here however ~~propose~~ to examine the extent to which they (are convincing and offer a sound basis for judgment and) the sense in which in my opinion they are definitely (misleading) irrelevant.

In the development of moral thought, (undoubtedly) ~~marked progress~~ was made when [the crude reference to consideration of] nothing but the merely physical consequences of an act was abandoned. It was a decided ethical [achievement advance] when ancient prophets turned away from the belief in (fixed), irrational moral taboos or in the observance of traditional (dead) rites, when they demanded purity of heart, searching "the hearts and reins" - that is, the morality of motives. ~~Abelard~~ Abailard, Kant and all the chief exponents of (modern contemporary) ethics tried again and again to [fortify this moral conquest] of our religious and ethical post, this (insight) into the (paramount primary) importance of human springs of action [in contrast to (all) the effects of our deeds.] ~~Neglect~~ Disregard for of the consequences of acts has often been carried to the extreme (in), as in sayings such as "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum" or in Kant's famous praise of good will as the only "jewel" which is valuable in itself, regardless of any (fatal) however destructive results of acts dictated or inspired by this good will. Under the pressure of this radical ethical teaching, there arose exceedingly influential ideals, such as that of the

"guileless fool" "reine Tumbe", the utterly selfless hero who sacrifices himself and his whole community to the powers of evil, because he will not take into account worldly prudence, or the ultra-liberal who, out of zeal for fair play, is willing to help even his deadly ennemies in their destruction of all liberalism. But even where full-scale neglect of the consequences of acts is avoided, where on behalf of common sense, some regard is paid to the effects of our deeds, even then the moral relevance of motives continues to overshadow the relevance of the results of acts.

The reasons for this attitude are time-honored arguments to the effect that shifting the moral accent from motives to consequences of acts would degrade ethics to mere legalism, or lead it back to amoral ritualism or to a morally indifferent doctrine of "savoir faire", or of political adroitness. Many ingenious compromises have been made in modern ethics in order to do justice to the intricate relations between jurisprudence, politics, religious ritualism and ethics. Hegel went so far as to sanction explicitly the regard to consequences of acts as the fundamental point of "Sittlichkeit". But he too added that real, higher "Moralität" starts with laying the main stress on motives, on "Vorsatz" and "Absicht", without loosing sight of "das Wohl" and "die Schuld", the beneficial or disastrous effects of human deeds.

I know of only one modern thinker who deliberately and with great circumspection developped a radical ethics of consequences, Jeremy Bentham. I dissociate myself completely from his most sweeping utterances, which are to be found in his "Deontology". In all probability, not Bentham himself, but his secretary, the editor of the "Deontology", is responsible for these overstatements. In any case, I believe that a consistent ethics of consequences, though consi-

derably divergent, however, from that of Benthem, is superior to any of the several still dominant types of ethics based on motives. see attached p. 3 rewritten

The first consideration to be cited in favor of an ethics of consequences is the least conclusive. It is undeniable that man's motives are hidden in his breast, while the effects of his deeds are usually factually observable or ascertainable, On the other hand frequent unpredictability of the results of our actions are surely not precisely predictable and that this unpredictability of the future is equal to as disturbing as the uncertainty of our reference to motives of the past. But, even if this be admitted conceded, I still think it still has to be granted that, as a moral criterion for acts already performed, the ethics of consequences has the advantage of being based on less vague implications than are those of the moral character of motives.

Doubtless As to their own actual motives, even men with the best intentions often delude themselves, let alone the evil-doer with his moral self- omit justification; and naturally, a fortiori, as our inferences to the motives of others our fellowmen are, to say the least, still far more unreliable uncertain. In contrast to the unavoidable undependability vagueness of our judgments on our own and others' motives, the study of the reference to effects of an action already performed achieved provides the ground for infinitely far more trustworthy impartial observation; and unquestionably ethical analysis should restricted cannot be limited to the task of establishing finding a moral criterion only for intended acts, excluding the accomplished deeds. Therefore the fact that the ethics of consequences does not allow for full predictability as regards the moral character of planned action should does by no means detract takes from the shine out of the more important fact that the same type of ethics there is far superior when faced with as to the moral estimate of acts already carried out it has to be urged.

Very wrongly that the ethics of motives must remain vague in both fields, in the field of planned and in that of performed action. The ethics of consequences, however, allows for far more precision when faced with the moral estimate of facts already carried out

(~~[illegible] last 2 paragraphs of p.2 up to p.3 last paragraph~~)

The first set of arguments to be cited in favor of an ethics of consequences is the least conclusive. It is undeniable that the motives of man are hidden in his breast, while the effects of his deeds become generally observable facts in the outside world. Doubtless as to our own motives, with the best intentions, we often delude ourselves; and a fortiori, all our inferences as to the motives of others, are to say the last, even more ~~[illegible]~~ uncertain. On the other hand it may be said that the frequent unpredictability of future results of our actions is as disturbing as the uncertainty of our reference to motives of the past. Yet ethics cannot be restricted to establishing a moral criterion only for intended acts, excluding accomplished deeds. Therefore it has to be urged that the ethics of motives must remain vague in both fields, in the field of planned action and in that of performed action. The ethics of consequences however, allows for far more precision when faced with the moral estimate of acts already carried out.

And more essential, however, is, it seems to me, another line of argument in favor of the ethics of consequences. It has too often escaped the attention of moralists that any ethical reference to motives implies a far more fundamental ethical judgment without which the reference to motives is ethically valueless, and without which no (employment) consideration of motives in a moral estimate is feasible. If we value an act as good because it is motivated by love for a certain person, we presuppose, in truth, the goodness of this act from the very beginning; for otherwise, we would have called the same motive not love, but, say, a criminal devotion to an outlaw or at least a foolish fondness for him, or else a lack of fairness to others. If we regard an action as moral because its motive is love of peace, our very choice of the term for the motive entails our definite ethical judgment of the whole act. In short, we do not judge the act moral because its motive is love, but tautologically we regard the act as moral after we have already given its motive a moral ~~appellative~~ appellative. If we had wished to characterize the same act as immoral, we would have given to the same motive, not the ethical name of love of peace, but the designation of an unmanly craving for appeasement.

Thus all moral judgment based on seemingly moral or immoral qualities of motives actually moves in a vicious circle. If nothing but motives are taken into account, we have no firm basis on which to build a moral judgment. The same motive, in reality, admits ~~of~~ (an entirely) quite contradictory moral characterisations. It may be described by a eulogistic or a dyslogistic term, and with this arbitrary description our final judgment on the motive, as well as on the whole act, is already fixed.

There is no motive in real life which is good or bad in every

respect. Even love of peace is not absolutely good, if it includes a craven ~~weakest~~ non-resistance, a catastrophic "laissez faire"; and to exclude the valueless, immoral types of love of peace, to exclude the spoiling of a child from true love (per by definition definitionem) must, of necessity, lead either to absolutely vague definitions or to ~~the taking into account~~ a consideration of the consequences of acts, and not only of their motives ~~alone~~. (~~That is to say,~~ Upon the judgment of motives alone) we cannot build any objective judgment of acts.) Even acts motivated by the sense of duty are not necessarily good, (- ~~if~~ assuming that there is ever a motive such as a pure sense of duty, untouched by any admixture of concrete materialistic or spiritual interests.) There are certainly innumerable bad acts that are motivated by dutifulness, and I do not think that we attain any (~~essential~~ ethical) insight (~~into ethics~~ of any relevance) by calling such acts right but bad, and their opposites wrong, but good.

Apart from such extremists as Kant, moralists of all times agree that, without any reference to its effects, the motive of conscientiousness alone is not a sufficient guarantee of the moral goodness of an act. Even the German "Gesinnungsethik" pays its tribute to this. "Gesinnung" represents a mixture of motive and intention; and while ~~the~~ a motive in the genuine, strictest sense of the term means nothing but the impulse, the emotion or the spring of action which impels ~~to~~ an act, ~~the~~ an intention (contains also) a reference to the preconceived effects of action; and approximately the same is true of the term "value". Values as well as "Gesinnungen" represent motives combined with some reference to the consequences of acts. In this way the ethics of values also pays some regard to the effects of our deeds, though it puts the main emphasis on motives. But wherever ethics lays the principal weight on motives such as dutifulness,

or on values such as love and honor, wherever only a side-glance is devoted to the results of acts, there is a begging the question in the very foundations of ethics which makes an unbiased criterion of morally good and bad impossible. There is no ~~thoroughly~~ sufficiently impartial terminology of motives in any language on which objective moral judgment could be based. (If, nevertheless, the goodness of an act is based on the goodness of its motive, then the apparent goodness of the motive presupposes the belief that the act caused by this motive is good. This proceeding represents, therefore, a perfect argument in a circle. For, from a critical viewpoint, it is questionable in every case whether a morally praising or a morally condemning term should be applied to a certain motive in relation ~~(is to be)~~ ality.)

My third argument in favor of an ethics of consequences concerns the fact that even when the decisive moral relevance is attributed to motives, a latent reference to the common effects of motives can be unearthed by further scrutiny. It seems to me, in contrast to certain hedonistic theories that certain acts of mischievous consequences are nevertheless not absolutely bad, if ~~they are~~ animated by such motives as benevolence or magnanimity; and acts of beneficial consequences are not absolutely good, if accomplished out of motives such as hatred or fury. But what is the objective reason for attributing to certain motives an influence on the goodness of an act and to other motives an influence on the badness of an action? There is, so far as I can see, (from the point of view of critical ethics, no other reason than this: that certain motives are indicative of prevailingly beneficial results of acts, and other motives are indicative of prevailingly mischievous consequences. But it is the reference to usual or actual consequences which ultimately determines, or has once determined, the moral quality even of motives.

If powerful efficiency is held to be the truly ethical aim of our deeds, as is ~~done~~ assumed in master morality, then every motive of aggressive vitality is comparatively good, even if it does not achieve the ultimate ~~ethical~~ goals of this ethical system. If the spiritual and material welfare of every individual is thought to be the ethical aim of society, as is accepted in Jewish Christian ethics, then the motive of benevolence is comparatively good, even if it brings about misery in certain cases. But wherever results of acts are taken into account at all, there is no type of ethics in which the goodness of motives is not at least implicitly based on some presupposition of the goodness of certain consequences of acts.

Finally, I think that only from the point of view of an ethics of consequences can the problem of the moral superiority of the great world religions over the ethics of sheer force be critically, undogmatically approached. But this question stands, of course, in need of further and more detailed treatment. It is true that on the ground of this type of epistemological reflections the concept and the aim of ethics must undergo an essential change. But this seems to me by no means undesirable. The parallel change of the concept and aim of natural science was often merely beneficial results.

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Ethics of Motives and Ethics of Consequences

by

David Baumgardt

In contemporary ethics (the reference to) motives ~~of acts is~~ as the basis for judgment are regarded as generally ~~held~~ far more vital than (any reference to) consequences of actions. David W. Ross says that "motive is the main factor which makes an action good or bad". ~~Also~~ In German, French, English and American ethics of values it is also at least the implicit reference to motives which essentially counts. There are many reasons given for this main emphasis (which is commonly laid) on motives, and at first glance these reasons seem to be conclusive enough, ~~beyond questioning~~. I propose to examine (how far) the extent to which they are convincing and in which sense they are definitely misleading.

In the development of moral thought (doubtless) a marked progress, undoubtedly was made when the crude reference to ~~consequences alone~~ nothing but consequences of acts was abandoned. It was (certainly indeed) a decisive ethical achievement ded when ancient prophets turned away from the belief in fixed, irrational moral taboos, or in the observance of dead ~~rituals~~ rites, when they demanded purity of heart, the searching the heart & reins ~~into~~ hearts and reins, that is the morality of motives. Abélard, Kant and all the main trends of contemporary ethics ~~tried~~ again and again to fortify this moral conquest of our religious and ethical past, the insight into the primary importance of human springs of actions in contrast to all the effects of our deeds. Neglect of the consequences of acts has often been carried to the extreme in sayings such as "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum" or in Kant's famous praise of good will as the only "jewel" which is valuable in itself regardless of any fatal results of acts dictated, or inspired by this good will. Under the pressure of this radical ethical teaching there arose some ~~such~~ exceedingly influential ideals (took birth such) as that of the "tumbe tor" "reine Tumbe", the utterly selfless hero who sacrifices himself and his whole community to the powers of evil, because he (does will) not (want to) take into account worldly prudence, the stern judge [who takes completely sides with the legally correct mischief ~~bringer~~ maker against the whose legal conscience forces him to uphold the law abiding

reading the inmost heart ?

less (correct) benefactor of mankind; or the ultra-liberal who out of [fair-minded liberalism] is willing to help even his deadly ennemies in their destruction of all liberalism. But even where the full scale neglect of the consequences of acts is avoided (where) [on behalf of common sense and some regard is paid] to the effects of our deeds, the moral relevance of motives generally continues to overshadow the relevance of the results of ~~acts~~.

The reasons for this attitude are "time honored" arguments to the effect that shifting the moral accent from motives to consequences of acts would degrade ethics to mere legalism, or lead it back to amoral ritualism or to a morally indifferent doctrine of "savoir faire" or of political adroitness (~~craft cleverness~~). ~~Numerous~~ spirited (arrangements) have been made in modern ethics to do justice to the intricate relations between jurisprudence, politics, religious ritualism and ethics. Hegel went so far as to sanction explicitly the regard to consequences of actions as the fundamental point of the "Sittlichkeit". But he too added that real, higher developed "Moralität" starts with laying the main stress on motives, on "Vorsatz" und "Absicht" without loosing sight of "das Wohl" and "die Schuld", the beneficial or disastrous effects of human deeds.

I know of only one modern thinker who deliberately and with great circumspection (and discretion) developed a radical ethics of consequences: Jeremy Bentham. I (have to) dissociate myself completely from his most sweeping utterances which are to be found in his "Deontology" (and) In all probability Bentham himself is not responsible for these overstatements, (but only his secretary, the editor of Bentham's "Deontology"). In any case, I believe that a consistent ethics of consequences, though considerably divergent from that of Bentham, is superior to any of the (various) still [absolutely dominating] types of ethics of motives.

The first set of arguments (which have) to be (mentioned) in favor of an ethics of consequences is the least conclusive. It is true, the motives

of man are hidden in his breast, while the effects of his deeds become [on the whole] generally observable facts in the outside world. In objection to this observation it (may) (however) be said that the results of our actions are at least not precisely predictable and, that this unpredictability of the future outweighs the uncertainty of our reference to motives of the past. But even if this is acknowledged, I, still think, that it has to be granted that as a moral criterion of acts already performed, the ethics of consequences has the advantage of being based on less vague (references) implications than are those of the moral character of motives. [As to our actual motives, even men (with the) best intentions often delude themselves, let alone, the moral self-estimate (with his justification) of the evil-doers; and naturally ~~far more uncertain are~~ (are (to say the least) far more uncertain.) all our inferences to the motives of our fellowmen. In contrast to the unavoidable vagueness of our judgments on our own and other's motives the reference to (already achieved) effects of action provides the ground for infinitely more impartial observation; and unquestionably ethics cannot be limited to the task of finding a moral criterion only for intended acts, (excluding (the accomplished deeds.) and not for) already performed deeds. The fact that the ethics of consequences ~~provides a less strict moral standard as regards planned action does by no means~~ allows for less predictability as regards the moral character of planned action does by no means (baffle foil) (take the shine out) (detract from) of the more important fact that the same type of ethics is (far) much superior as to the moral estimate of acts already carried out.

Far more essential, however, (is, it) seems to me another line of argument in favor of the ethics of consequences. (Too often) it has escaped the attention of moralists that any ethical reference to motives (tacitly) implies a far more fundamental ethical judgment without which the reference to motives is ethically valueless, without which no employment of motives in a moral estimate if feasible. If we value an act as good, because it is motivated by love (for) to a certain person, we presuppose in truth the goodness

of this act (right) from the very beginning. For otherwise we would call the (same) motive not love, but, say, a criminal devotion to an outlaw or at least a foolish fondness for him, or else a lack of fairness to others. If we regard an action as moral because its motive is love of peace, our very choice of the term for the motive entails (already) our definite ethical judgment of the whole act. In short fact we do not judge the act moral because its motive is love, but tautologically we regard the act as moral after we have already given its motive a moral (name) appelation. If we had wished to characterize the same act as immoral, we would have given to the same motive not the ethical appelative of name "love of peace", but the designation of an unmanly craving for appeasement.

Thus all moral judgment based on seemingly moral or immoral qualities of motives, actually moves (in truth) in a vicious circle. If nothing but motives are taken into account, we have no firm basis on which to (build) ground a moral judgment. The same motive in reality (admits of) allows entirely contradictory moral characterisation. (The same It motive in reality) (may) can be described by a eulogistic or dyslogistic term, and with this arbitrary description our final judgment on the motive as well as on the whole act is already fixed.

There is no motive in real life which is good or bad in every respect. Even love of peace is not absolutely good, if it includes weakest non-resistance, of a catastrophic laissez faire; and to exclude the valueless, immoral types of love of peace, to exclude the spoiling of a child from true love per definitionem must, of necessity, either lead to absolutely vague definitions or (it leads) to the taking into account, the consequences of acts, and not, their motives alone. That is to say (upon) on the judgment of motives alone we cannot build (up) any objective judgment of acts. Even acts motivated by the sense of duty are not necessarily good, if there (ever) is such a motive, such as a pure sense of duty, untouched by any admixture of (other) concrete materialistic or spiritual interests. There are certainly innumerable bad acts (that which) are motivated by the motive of ~~beauti~~ duti fulness, and I do not think that we ~~win~~ can attain

any essential insight in ethics by calling such acts right, but bad, and its opposites wrong, but good.

Apart from such extremists as Kant, moralists of all times agree that, without any reference to its effects, the motive of conscientiousness alone is no sufficient guarantee for the moral goodness of an act. Even the German "Gesinnungsethik" pays its tribute to this. "Gesinnung" represents a mixture of motive and intention; "~~Gesinnung~~"-resp and while the motive, in the genuine, strictest sense of the term means nothing but the impulse, the emotion or the spring of action which impels to act, the intention contains also a reference to preconceived effects of action and about the same applies to the term "value". Values as well as "Gesinnungen" represent motives combined with some reference to consequences of acts. Therefore also the ethics of values pays some regard to the effects of our deeds, though it puts the main emphasis on motives. But wherever ethics lays the principal weight on motives such as dutyfulness or such as ~~the~~ values of love, honor, wherever only a ~~sight~~glance is ~~dee~~ devoted to the results of acts, there is a question begging in the very foundations of ethics which makes an unbiased criterion of morally good and bad impossible. There is no ~~through~~going impartial terminology of motives ~~to~~ in any language on which objective moral judgment could be based. If, nevertheless, the goodness of an act is based on the goodness of its motive, the apparent goodness of the motive presupposes in fact (in a question begging way) the belief that the act brought about by this motive is good. ~~From a~~ critical viewpoint, ~~however~~, it has to be questioned first whether a morally praising or a morally condemning term can be applied to a certain motive in reality.

My third argument in favor of an ethics of consequences deals briefly with the fact that even when the decisive moral relevance is attributed to motives, a latent reference to the common effects of motives can be unearthed by further scrutiny. In contrast to certain hedonistic theories,

6 ~~I think~~ that certain acts of mischievous consequences are nevertheless not absolutely bad, if they are animated by such motives as benevolence or magnanimity; and acts of beneficial consequences are not absolutely good, if (done) out of (such) motives as hatred or fury. But what is the objective reason for attributing to certain motives an influence on the goodness of an act and to other motives an influence ~~of~~ the badness of an act? There is, as far as I can see, from the point of a critical ethics no other reason than this that certain motives are indications of prevailingly beneficial results of acts, and other motives are indications of prevailingly mischievous consequences. But it is the reference to usual or actual consequences which ultimately determines, or once determined the moral quality even of motives.

If powerful efficiency is held to be the truly ethical aim of our deeds, as is done is mastermorality, every motive of aggressive vitality is comparatively good, even if it does not achieve the ultimate ethical goals of this ethical system. If the spiritual and material welfare of every individual is thought to be the ethical aim of society, as is done in Jewish Christian ethics, then the motive of benevolence is comparatively good even if it brings about misery in certain cases. But wherever results of acts are taken into account at all, there is no type of ethics in which the goodness of motives is not at least implicitly based on some presupposition of the goodness of certain consequences of acts.

If any ethical doctrine would try to argue the other way round and would ~~think~~ the results of acts dependent on the choice of motives, it would come into conflict with mere facts and not only with value judgments. If ~~in the~~ way of a thought experiment we assume in Jewish Christian ethics that benevolence would always lead to desastrous results for our fellowmen, while hatred would do them good, we would have to call hate a good motive ~~out~~ of the original meaning of benevolence. But we could never call benevolence good, if it would always lead, of necessity, to the misery of

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Finally I think that only from the point of view of an ethics of consequences can the problem of the moral superiority of the great world religions over the ethics of sheer force ~~can~~ be critically, undogmatically approached demonstrated. But this question ~~needs~~ is, as stands, of course, in need of another far more detailed treatment.

It is true that on the ground of this type of epistemological reflections the concept and the aim of ethics itself must undergo an essential change. But this seems to me by no means undesirable. The parallel change of the concept and aim of natural science was of merely beneficial results.

Ethics of Motives and Ethics of Consequences

by

David Baumgardt

In contemporary ethics the reference to motives of acts is generally held far more vital than any reference to consequences of actions. David W. Ross says that "motive is the main factor which makes an action good or bad". Also in German, French, English and American ethics of values it is at least the implicit reference to motives which essentially counts. There are many reasons given for this main emphasis which is commonly laid on motives, and at first glance these reasons seem to be conclusive beyond questioning. I propose to examine how far they are convincing and in which sense they are definitely misleading.

In the development of moral thought doubtless a marked progress was made when the crude reference to ~~consequences alone~~ nothing but consequences of acts was abandoned. It was certainly a decisive ethical achievement when ancient prophets turned away from the belief in fixed, irrational moral taboos or the observance of dead ~~rituals~~ rites, when they demanded purity of heart, the search ~~into~~ heart and reins, that is morality of motives. Abélard, Kant and all the main ~~trends~~ of contemporary ethics tried again and again to fortify this moral conquest of our religious and ethical past, the insight into the primary importance of human springs of actions in contrast to all the effects of our deeds. Neglect of the consequences of acts has often been carried to the extreme in sayings such as "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum", or in Kant's famous praise of good will as the only "jewel" which is valuable in itself regardless of any fatal results of acts dictated or inspired by this good will. Under the pressure of this radical ethical teaching such exceedingly influential ideals took birth as that of the "tumbe tor", the utterly selfless hero who sacrifices himself and his whole community to powers of evil, because he does not want to take into account worldly prudence, the stern judge who takes completely sides with the correct mischief ~~bringer~~ against the

less correct benefactor of mankind, the ultra-liberal who out of fair-minded liberalism is willing to help even his deadly enemies in their destruction of all liberalism. But even where the full-scale neglect of the consequences of acts is avoided where on behalf of common sense some regard is paid to the effects of our deeds, the moral relevance of motives generally continued to overshadow the relevance of the results of acts.

The reasons for this attitude are "time-honored" arguments to the effect that shifting the moral accent from motives to consequences of acts would degrade ethics to mere legalism, or lead it back to amoral ritualism or to a morally indifferent doctrine of "savoir faire" or of political adroitness craft cleverness. Numerous spirited arrangements have been made in modern ethics to do justice to the intricate relations between jurisprudence, politics, religious ritualism and ethics. Hegel went so far as to sanction explicitly the regard to consequences of actions as the fundamental point ~~der~~ of "Sittlichkeit". But he too added that real, ~~higher~~ developed "Moralität" starts with laying the main stress on motives, on "Vorsatz" und "Absicht", without losing sight of "das Wohl" and "die Schuld", the beneficious or disastrous effects of human deeds.

I know of only one modern thinker who deliberately and with great circumspection and discretion developed a radical ethics of consequences: Jeremy Bentham. I have to dissociate myself completely from his most sweeping utterances which are to be found in his "Deontology", and in all probability Bentham himself is ~~not~~ responsible for these overstatements, but ~~my~~ his secretary, the editor of Bentham's "Deontology". In any case, I believe that a consistent ethics of consequences, though considerably divergent from that of Bentham, is superior to any of the various still absolutely dominating types of ethics of motives.

The first set of arguments which have to be mentioned in favor of an ethics of consequences is the least conclusive. It is true, the motives

of man are hidden in his breast, while the effects of his deeds become on the whole generally observable facts in the outside world. In objection to this observation it can however be said that the results of our actions are at least not precisely predictable and this unpredictability of the future outweighs the uncertainty of our reference to motives of the past. But even if this is acknowledged, I think it has to be granted that as a moral criterion of acts already performed, the ethics of consequences has the advantage of being based on less vague references implications than are those of the moral character of motives. As to our actual motives, even men of best intentions often delude themselves, let alone the moral self-estimate of the evil-doers; and naturally far more uncertain are all our inferences to the motives of our fellowmen. In contrast to the unavoidable vagueness of our judgments on our own and others's motives, the reference to already achieved effects of action provides the ground for infinitely more impartial observation; and unquestionably ethics cannot be limited to the task of finding a moral criterion only for intended acts, and not for already performed deeds. The fact that the ethics of consequences ~~provides a less strict moral standard as regards planned action does by no means~~ allows less predictability as regards the moral character of planned action does by no means baffle foil take the shine out of the more important fact that the same type of ethics is much superior as to the moral estimate of acts already carried out.

Far more essential, however, seems to me another line of argument in favor of the ethics of consequences. Too often it has escaped the attention of moralists that any ethical reference to motives implies a far more fundamental ethical judgment without which the reference to motives is ethically valueless, without which no employment of motives in a moral estimate is feasible. If we value an act as good because it is motivated by love to a certain person, we presuppose in truth the goodness

of this act (right) from the beginning; for otherwise we would call the (same) motive not love, but, a criminal devotion to an outlaw or at least a foolish fondness or a lack of fairness to others. If we regard an action as moral because its motive is love of peace, our very choice of the term (for the) motive entails (already) our definite ethical judgment of the whole act. In fact we do not judge the act moral because its motive is love, but tautologically we regard the act as moral after we have already given its motive a moral (name) appelation. If we had wished to characterize the same act as immoral, we (would) have given to the same motive not the ethical appelative of name "love of peace", but the designation of an unmanly craving for appeasement.

Thus all moral judgment based on seemingly moral or immoral qualities of motives moves (in truth) in a vicious circle. If nothing but motives are taken into account, we have no firm basis on which to (ground) a moral judgment. The same motive in reality allows entirely contradictory moral characterisation. (The same motive in reality can be described by a eulogistic or dyslogistic term, and with this arbitrary description our final judgment on the motive as well as on the whole act is already fixed.

There is no motive in real life which is good or bad in every respect. Even love of peace is not absolutely good, if it includes weakest non-resistance, a catastrophic laissez faire; and to exclude the valueless, immoral types of love of peace, to exclude the spoiling of a child from true love per definitionem must, of necessity, lead to absolutely vague definitions or (it leads) to taking into account the consequences of acts, and not their motives alone. That is to say, on the judgment of motives alone we cannot build up any objective judgment of acts. Even acts motivated by the sense of duty are not necessarily good, if there ever is such a motive as a pure sense of duty, untouched by any admixture of other concrete materialistic or spiritual interests. There are certainly innumerable bad acts which are motivated by the motive of [illegible]dutifulness, and I do not think that we win

any essential insight in ethics by calling such acts right but bad, and its opposites wrong but good.

Apart from such extremists as Kant, moralists of all times agree that without any reference to its effects the motive of conscientiousness alone is no sufficient guarantee for the moral goodness of an act. Even the German "Gesinnungsethik" pays its tribute to this. "Gesinnung" represents a mixture of motive and intention; ~~"Gesinnung" rep~~ and while the motive, in the genuine, strictest sense of the term means nothing but the impulse, the emotion or the spring of action which impels to act, the intention contains also a reference to preconceived effects of action; and ~~about~~ the same applies to the term "value". Values as well as "Gesinnungen" represent motives combined with some reference to consequences of acts. Therefore also the ethics of values pays some regard to the effects of our deeds, though it puts the main emphasis on motives. But wherever ethics lays the principal weight on motives such as dutifulness or such as ~~the~~ values ~~of~~ love, honor, wherever only a ~~right~~ glance is ~~de-~~ devoted to the results of acts, there is a question-begging in the very foundations of ethics which makes an unbiased criterion of morally good and bad impossible. There is no ~~through~~ impartial terminology of motives to in any language on which objective moral judgment could be based. If, nevertheless, the goodness of an act is based on the goodness of its motive, the apparent goodness of the motive presupposes in fact (in a question-begging way) the belief that the act brought about by this motive is good, ~~From~~ critical viewpoint, however, it has to be questioned first whether a morally praising or a morally condemning term can be applied to a certain motive in reality.

My third argument in favor of an ethics of consequences deals briefly with the fact that even when the decisive moral relevance is attributed to motives, a latent reference to the common effects of motives can be unearthed by further scrutiny. ~~In~~ contrast to certain hedonistic theories

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In contemporary ethics (the reference to) motives ~~of acts is~~ (as the basis for judgment are) generally ~~held~~ (regarded as) far more vital than (any reference to) consequences of actions. David W. Ross says that "motive is the main factor which makes an action good or bad". ~~Also~~ In German, French, English and American ethics of values it is, (also) at least the implicit reference to motives which essentially counts. There are many reasons given for this main emphasis (which is commonly laid) on motives, and at first glance these reasons seem to be conclusive (beyond (enough) questioning). I propose to examine (how far) (the extent to which) they are convincing and (in which) the sense they are definitely misleading.

In the development of moral thought (doubtless) a marked progress, (undoubtedly) was made when the crude reference to ~~consequences alone~~ nothing but consequences of acts was abandoned. It was (certainly) (indeed) a deci~~sive~~ (de de) ethical achievement when ancient prophets turned away from the belief in fixed, irrational moral taboos, or (in) the observance of dead ~~rituals~~ rites, when they demanded purity of heart, ~~the~~ search (trying the hearts & reins) ~~into~~ (ing) heart (reading the inmost heart) and reins, that is (the) morality of motives. Abélard, Kant and all the main trends of contemporary ethics ~~tried~~ again and again to fortify this moral conquest of our religious and ethical past, (is) insight into the primary importance of human springs of actions in contrast to all the effects of our deeds. Neglect of the consequences of acts has often been carried to the extreme in sayings such as "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum", or in Kant's famous praise of good will as the (only "jewel" which is valuable in itself regardless of any fatal results of acts dictated, (or) inspired by this good will. Under the pressure of this radical ethical teaching (such) (there arose some) exceedingly influential ideals (took birth) (such) as that of the "tumbe tor" ("heroic tumbe"), the utterly selfless hero who sacrifices himself and his whole community to (the) powers of evil, because he (does) (will) not (want to) take into account worldly prudence, the stern judge [who takes completely sides with the (legally) correct mischief ~~bringer~~ (maker) against the

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The reasons for this attitude are "time honored" arguments to the effect that shifting the moral accent from motives to consequences of acts would degrade ethics to mere legalism, or lead it back to amoral ritualism or to a morally indifferent doctrine of "savoir faire" or of political adroitness (craft cleverness). Numerous spirited (arrangements) have been made in modern ethics, to do justice to the intricate relations between jurisprudence, politics, religious ritualism and ethics. Hegel went so far as to sanction explicitly the regard to consequences of actions as the fundamental point der "Sittlichkeit". But he too added that real, higher developed "Moralität" starts with laying the main stress on motives, on "Vorsatz" und "Absicht" without loosing sight of "das Wohl" and "die Schuld", the beneficious or disastrous effects of human deeds.

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of this nature from the beginning, for the effects or results of the same and whole tendency of observable deviation to the outside world. In objection might sound like observation of fairness we heard that the regard for action as a mere means because of the relative discovery of reasonable uncertainty of the motives and the ultimate definiteness of the final judgment of the whole act the past. But does not this already presuppose the end to be granted but teleologically with regard to the act already performed the virtues of conscientiousness as a disposition long established to characterize the same actions as those would have given to the same motives for the ethical appellative name to motives even but the designation of an unmanly craving for pleasement one the moral self-estimate of the evil-doers; and naturally far more Thus certain moral judgment based on seemingly moral or immoral qualities of motives moves in the unavoidable vagueness of our judgments on our own and taken into account the reference to already achieved effects of action ment provides the ground for infinitely more important observation, and unchangeable judgment that the motives or consequences provides a less strict moral The standard ordered planned action does by no means allow less prudence a barrier rather than to exclude the valueless, immoral types of type of person, is much superior as to the moral estimate of acts already definitely carried out, must, of necessity, lead to absolutely vague definitions or it leads to taking into account the consequences of acts and not their motives alone. That is to say on the judgment of motives alone we cannot abolish our ethical judgment that the motives or consequences provides a less strict moral judgment. Even if there were such a motive as pure sense of duty, untouched, without admixture of other concrete materialistic or spiritual interests. If we value an act as good, because it is motivated by love to a certain person, we presuppose in truth the goodness

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Continuation:

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DAVID BAUMGARDT

ETHICAL NIHILISM AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF VALUE

Like physics, psychology and other brances of science, ethics can no longer thrive in that feeling of over-confident security which was widely characteristic of the 19th century. There are still only too many believers in absolutely valid values, in self-evident ethical principles, in moral obligations a priori and in categorical imperatives. But how little is achieved by the belief in any of these absolutely binding duties or intrinsic values after it has been recognized that their strictly obligatory character melts away as soon as they are applied to any concrete problems of ethical reality!

It may be repeated again and again that the holy is a value in itself and can never be changed into a disvalue. As long as men honestly regard contradictory attitudes in life as holy, no decisive ethical insight is gained by this or similar categorical statements.

It may readily be granted that to act honorably or to be just toward everyone is undeniably a valid moral law, namely according to the definitions of honor and justice. But, unfortunately, these general laws and definitions give no information on why certain concrete acts can be called honorable or dishonorable. On behalf of justice or honor, the anti-communist may feel - and often has felt - obliged to adopt a conduct diametrically opposite to that which honor or justice demand in the eyes of a communist, although it is clear that only one type of conduct can be called moral in these instances.

The difficulty which can be overcome neither by the common ethics of values nor by modern neo-deontologism and similar absolutist ethics

may be described as follows: On the one hand the concepts of this ethical absolutism may mean no more than merely generic terms signifying by one name a multitude of concrete types of behavior, uncritically accepted as moral. In this way, these general concepts completely deceive the believer in giving him the impression that they provide the moral justification for any concrete conduct prescribed by them, while in fact these types of conduct are sanctioned beforehand without any further examination.

On the other hand, if attempts are made to deduce from the general terms of these absolute ethics only certain types of behavior and to exclude others as immoral, these attempts must inevitably fail. For, if these general concepts are examined without prejudice, they are found to be factually ambiguous and must remain so of necessity; by themselves, not supported by other preconceived evaluations, they invite entirely opposite concrete inferences to be drawn from them.

Anthropoligical relativism, logical positivism and emotive ethics reject any absolute ethics for different reasons. But thus they lead (though generally without admitting it) to a definite ethical skepticism or even to nihilism. The principal argument of these critics of absolute ethics is this: Ethics and the justification of values in general do not concern given facts or logical and mathematical relations between facts. Statements on the validity of moral values can, therefore, not be verified by any given data[1/] and thus can "not come under the category of truth and falsehood"[2/]. The "difference as to values" is only "one of tastes, not one as to any objective truth".[3/]

1/ See R.Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, 1935, p.25.
2/ A.J.Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 1938, p.161, p.152.
3/ Bertrand Russell, Religion and Science, 1935, p.250.

In short, no statement on the validity of any moral value can claim to have "cognitive", "theoretical sense"[4]. It can have only "emotive meaning"[5]; it concerns merely personal attitudes, subjective preferences or the commands of some lawgiver which - like all other commands - cannot be subject to the criterion of truth and falsehood. It is meaningless to answer to a command, "Shut the door", "Please prove that this command is true."

The outright ethical nihilism of these types of positivistic ethics is, however, generally toned down by some seemingly more constructive afterthoughts. Some hope is held out that basic agreement in morals will be reached by a free democratic exchange of moral views on the principal attitudes of man, although no attitude can be proven to be of moral validity.[6] The relativism of the anthropological school believed, as late as the beginning of the 20th century, that the mere description of the existing valuations in different epochs of mankind would point to a marked moral preferability of the standards of the later development of civilized groups. But all these are ~~rather~~ vague or even illusory hopes, especially in view of the basic moral conflicts of today.

The only choice left in contemporary ethics, therefore, appears to be the choice between either an honest ethical nihilism or an uncritical acceptance of certain valuations the validity of which can in no way be justified. However, there exists one theory of

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4/ R.Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, 1935, p.25.

5/ See Charles L.Stevenson, Ethics and Language, 1944, e.g. p.59 and G.E.Moore, "Reply to My Critics" in "The Philosophy of G.E.Moore," ed. by P.A.Schilpp(The Library of Living Philosophers, vol.IV,1942) p554f.

6/ See e.g. Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, 1951, p.296-302, and C.L.Stevenson, Ethics and Language, 1944, p.290 and passim.

morals which, if sufficiently refined, can in my opinion offer a way out of the fundamentally hopeless dilemma in which contemporary modern thought finds itself trapped. This theory is consistent hedonism, a type of moral argument which Jeremy Bentham once tried to carry through with means not sufficiently adequate, a theory which is now generally ignored or disparaged and ridiculed.

Yet only such a type of argument can, in my opinion, provide a sound secular basis for modern ethics - a goal which should be as desirable an aim today as it was to leading scholastics in the Middle Ages. 7/

Consistent hedonism expresses ethical value exclusively in terms of human happiness and disvalue in terms of human misery, as it is based on the psychologically irrefutable thesis that to understand man would be impossible if man could be imagined to aspire to any aim - even the apparently most painful one - unless this aim had a more attractive tone or color than any other he has in view. To estimate

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7/ I have tried to analyze in detail and to remove the vast amount of objections which modern ethicists have piled up against the possibility and the value of consistent hedonism in my Bentham and the Ethics of Today, Princeton University Press, 1952; in my contributions to the Third Inter-American Congress of Philosophy, see Publicaciones de la Sociedad Cubana de Filosofia, El Tercer Congreso Interamericano de Filosofia, 1950; my contributions to Approaches to Group Understanding, Harper Brothers, 1947, and to Learning and World Peace, Harper, 1948; and in my essays "Bentham's Censorial Method" in Journal of the History of Ideas, 1945; "Ethics of Motives and Ethics of Consequences", The Journal of Philosophy, 1946; "Cassirer and the Chaos in Modern Ethics", The Library of Living Philosophers ed. by P.A.Schilpp, vol.VI, 1949, p.575-603; "Gesinnungsethik und Erfolgsethik", Philosophische Studien, Berlin, 1949, p.91-110; "Toward a Copernican Turn in Ethics", Eoon. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1945.

what the maximization of happiness in a concrete case is and therefore what it is that constitutes the highest ethical value in that instance, certainly often requires extremely subtle and complicated investigation. But as to all fundamental ethical decisions between a morality of sheer power and one of generosity, between a government of permanent ruthless oppression and one of effective constitutional freedom, between a system of economic justice and one of unhampered exploitation, the estimate is feasible and gives unambiguous clear instruction.

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That, however, the consistent hedonist does not answer questions concerning values in themselves and absolutely binding duties is no greater loss to philosophy than the scientist's refusal to speak about the "essence" of matter or gravity "in itself", or e.g. about the "hot temper and fiery spirit" of sulphur, which Paracelsus[8/] once regarded as an essential characteristic of that chemical element.

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Congrès International Philosophie - Bruxelles

DAVID BAUMGARDT

ETHICAL NIHILISM AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF VALUE

Like physics, psychology and other branches of science, ethics can no longer thrive in that feeling of over-confident security which was widely characteristic of the 19th century. There are still only too many believers in absolutely valid values, in self-evident ethical principles, in moral obligations a priori and in categorical imperatives. But how little is achieved by the belief in any of these absolutely binding duties or intrinsic values after it has been recognized that their strictly obligatory character melts away as soon as they are applied to any concrete problems of ethical reality!

It may be repeated again and again that the holy is a value in itself and can never be changed into a disvalue. As long as men honestly regard contradictory attitudes in life as holy, no decisive ethical insight is gained by this or similar categorical statements.

It may readily be granted that to act honorably or to be just toward everyone is undeniably a valid moral law, namely according to the definitions of honor and justice. But, unfortunately, these general laws and definitions give no information on why certain concrete acts can be called honorable or dishonorable. On behalf of justice or honor, the anti-communist may feel - and often has felt - obliged to adopt a conduct diametrically opposite to that which honor or justice demand in the eyes of a communist, although it is clear that only one type of conduct can be called moral in these instances.

The difficulty which can be overcome neither by the common ethics of values nor by modern neo-deontologism and similar absolutist ethics

may be described as follows: On the one hand the concepts of this ethical absolutism may mean no more than merely generic terms signifying by one name a multitude of concrete types of behavior, uncritically accepted as moral. In this way, these general concepts completely deceive the believer in giving him the impression that they provide the moral justification for any concrete conduct prescribed by them, while in fact these types of conduct are sanctioned beforehand without any further examination.

On the other hand, if attempts are made to deduce from the general terms of these absolute ethics only certain types of behavior and to exclude others as immoral, these attempts must inevitably fail. For, if these general concepts are examined without prejudice, they are found to be factually ambiguous and must remain so of necessity; by themselves, not supported by other preconceived evaluations, they invite entirely opposite concrete inferences to be drawn from them.

Anthropoligical relativism, logical positivism and emotive ethics reject any absolute ethics for different reasons. But thus they lead (though generally without admitting it) to a definite ethical skepticism or even to nihilism. The principal argument of these critics of absolute ethics is this: Ethics and the justification of values in general do not concern given facts or logical and mathematical relations between facts. Statements on the validity of moral values can, therefore, not be verified by any given data[1/] and thus can "not come under the category of truth and falsehood"[2/]. The"difference as to values" is only"one of tastes, not one as to any objective truth".[3/]

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In short, no statement on the validity of any moral value can claim to have "cognitive", "theoretical sense"[4]. It can have only "emotive meaning"[5]; it concerns merely personal attitudes, subjective preferences or the commands of some lawgiver which - like all other commands - cannot be subject to the criterion of truth and falsehood. It is meaningless to answer to a command, "Shut the door", "Please prove that this command is true."

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Yet only such a type of argument can, in my opinion, provide a sound secular basis for modern ethics - a goal which should be as desirable an aim today as it was to leading scholastics in the Middle Ages. 7/

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November 15, 1952

My dear Professor Perelman:

Enclosed please find a paper on "Ethical Nihilism and the Justification of Value" which is meant to be a contribution to the Session "Morale".

With my best regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Professor David Baumgardt
Consultant of the Library
of Congress in Philosophy

XI th International Congress of Philosophy

Professor C.H.Perelman
32, rue de la Pêcherie
Uccle-Bruxelles
Belgium

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ETHICAL NIHILISM

And

THE JUSTIFICATION OF VALUE

By

DAVID BAUMGARDT

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David BAUMGARDT
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23 JAN. 1953

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[7]) I have tried to analyze in detail and to remove the vast amount of objections which modern ethicists have piled up against the possibility and the value of consistent hedonism in my *Bentham and the Ethics of today*, Princeton University Press, 1952; in my contributions to the Third Inter-American Congress of Philosophy, see *Publicaciones de la Sociedad Cubana de Filosofia, El Tercer Congreso Interamericano de Filosofia*, 1950; my contributions to *Approaches to Group Understanding*, Harper Brothers, 1947, and to *Learning and World Peace*, Harper, 1948; and in my essays "Bentham's Censorial Method" in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1945; "Ethics of Motives and Ethics of Consequences", *The Journal of Philosophy*, 1946; "Cassirer and the Chaos in Modern Ethics", *The Library of Living Philosophers* ed. by P. A. Schilpp, vol. VI, 1949, p. 575-603; "Gesinnungsethik und Erfolgsethik", *Philosophische Studien*, Berlin, 1949, p. 91-110; "Toward a Copernican Turn in Ethics", *Eoon*, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1945.

This, however, is the instruction basicly needed in the age of post-Nietzschean ethics. Machiavellianism ~~and~~ the philosophy of power politics, whether represented by fascists, by communists, or by pseudo-democrats, is now consciously or unconciously the philosophy of millions of men. The discussion of the morality of power is, thus, today hardly more out of date than in the days when Plato wrote his *Gorgias*. And even the statesman who ardently wishes to practice an ethics of generosity and love is forced to take into account the disastrous consequences to which he would expose his nation and the world if he would act according to the principle of all-forgiving Christian love and would not act exclusively according to the greatest happiness principle. By this, however, it becomes apparent that in reality not even the best motives (whose purity can always be questioned) but the results of our acts are of ultimate relevance. Even hatred is in itself by no means evil when, for instance directed against vices; and even love is in itself by no means good if it produces far more misery than justice, as occurs not unfrequently.

Along with these objections to the anti-hedonist, the hedonist must frankly admit that often life confronts especially the man of great responsibility with concrete alternatives in which neither consistent hedonism nor any other ethics can or should give simple clear-cut advice. Consistent hedonism, therefore, rightly grants that in our political and daily life there are instances in which, particularly after some original wrong-doing, there is only a choice left between two equally moral or, under certain tragic circumstances, only between two equally immoral decisions.

That, however, the consistent hedonist does not answer questions concerning values in themselves and absolutely binding duties is no greater loss to philosophy than the scientist's refusal to speak about the "essence" of matter or gravity "in itself", or e.g. about the "hot temper and fiery spirit" of sulphur, which Paracelsus [8]) once regarded as an essential characteristic of that chemical element.

However low a philosopher may estimate the achievements of modern science, he will hardly be able to deny that countless basic insights into the

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[8]) See Theophrast von Hohenheim gen. Paracelsus, Sämtliche Werke, herausg. von Karl Sudhoff, Abteilung I, Medizinische, naturwissenschaftliche und philosopische Schriften, Band XIV, 1933, Spuria 11, De Pestilitate, Cabala, S. 601: "Dan der sulphur is einer hitzigen und feurigen natur". Even more significant, however, is perhaps in this respect Paracelsus' characterization of sulphur als "materia peccans", see *ibid.*, Band VIII, 1924, Zwei Bücher von der Pestilenz und ihren Zufällen (Nördlingen 1529 oder '30), Das erst buch, das fünft capitel, S. 382: "Dan was ist materia peccans dan sulphur allein?"

it would require him to understand and weigh, with ever more subtlety and refinement,

structure of the physical universe could not have been obtained without the methodological exclusion of practically all the purely metaphysical problems of medieval and even ancient philosophy of nature. The same abandonment of an uncritical search for ethical *absoluta* would force the moralist to go into the exploration of those central and elementary phenomena of human life on which everything hinges in history, religion and in morals: ~~an increasingly and refined understanding and weighing of~~ the degrees of human joy and human suffering.

~~it would req~~ ~~in~~

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Ethical Nihilism and the Justification of value
by
David Baumgardt

1953 Printed
XI Intern'l Congress of Phil.
v. X, Brussels

Like physics, psychology and other branches of science, ethics can no longer thrive in that feeling of over-confident security which was widely characteristic of the 19th century. Yet even today there are still only too many believers in absolutely valid values, in self-evident ethical principles, in moral obligations a priori and in categorical imperatives. But how little is achieved by the belief in any of these absolutely binding duties or intrinsic values! For we must recognize that their ~~after it has been recognized that their~~ strictly obligatory character melts away as soon as they are applied to any concrete problems of ethical reality.

~~It may be repeated~~ again and again we may repeat that the holy is a value in itself and can never be changed into a disvalue. As long as men honestly regard contradictory attitudes in life as holy, no decisive ethical insight is gained by ~~this or similar~~ such categorical statements.

It may readily be ~~readily~~ granted that to act honorably or ~~to~~ be just toward everyone is undeniably a valid moral law, namely, according to the definitions of honor and justice. But, unfortunately, these general laws and definitions give us no information on why certain concrete acts can be called honorable or ~~others~~ dishonorable, unfair or fair. On behalf of justice or honor, the anti-communist may feel - and often has felt - obliged to adopt a standard of conduct diametrically opposite to that which honor or justice demand in the eyes of a communist, although ~~certainly~~ it is clear that only one type of conduct can be called moral in these instances.

The difficulty which ~~can~~ be overcome neither by the common ethics of values, nor by modern neo-deontologism and similar absolutist ethics, may be ~~therefore~~ described as follows: On the one hand, ~~Either~~ the concepts of ~~this~~ such ethical absolutism ~~are~~ may be merely generic terms signifying by one name a

multitude of concrete types of behavior uncritically accepted as moral. ~~In this way~~, these general concepts completely deceive the believer, ~~in~~ giving him the impression that they provide the moral justification for any concrete conduct prescribed by them, while in fact these types of conduct are sanctioned beforehand without any further examination.

On the other hand, if, ~~however~~, attempts are made to deduce from the general terms of these absolute ethics, only certain types of behavior and to exclude others as immoral, these attempts must inevitably fail. For, if examined without prejudice, these general concepts are ~~factually~~ ambiguous; and must remain so of necessity, ~~they~~ by themselves -- not supported by other preconceived evaluations -- (~~must~~ permit) entirely opposite concrete inferences.

Anthropological relativism, logical positivism and emotive ethics reject any absolute ethics for different reasons. But they lead, ~~therefore~~, though generally (~~without~~) admitting it, to a definite ethical skepticism or ~~even~~ nihilism. The principal argument of all these critics of absolute ethics is this: Ethics and the justification of values in general do not concern given facts or logical and mathematical relations between facts. Statements on the validity of moral values (~~can~~), therefore, cannot be verified by any given data[1] and (~~can~~) thus "not come under the category of truth and falsehood".[2] The "difference as to values" is only "one of tastes, not one as to any objective truth".[3]

In short, no statement on the validity of any moral value can claim to have "cognitive", "theoretical sense"[4]. It can have only "emotive

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1/ See R.Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, 1935, p.25

2/ A.J.Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 1938, p.161, p.152

3/ Bertrand Russell, Religion and Science, 1935, p.250

4/ R.Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, 1935, p.25

multitude of uncritically accepted

meaning;[1] it concerns merely personal attitudes, subjective preferences, or commands of some lawgiver which -- as all other commands -- cannot be subject to the criterion of truth and falsehood. It is meaningless to answer to a command "Shut the door"; "Please prove that this command is true!"

The outright ethical nihilism of these types of positivistic ethics is, however, generally toned down by some seemingly more constructive afterthought. Some hope is held out that basic agreement in morals will be reached by a free democratic exchange of moral views on the principal attitudes of man, although no attitude can be proven to be of moral validity.[2] The relativism of the anthropological school believed at the beginning of the 20th century that the mere description of the existing valuations in different epochs of mankind would point to marked moral preferability of the standards of later civilized groups. But these are vague or even illusory hopes, especially in the basic moral conflicts of today.

The only choice left in contemporary ethics seems to be between an honest ethical nihilism or an uncritical acceptance of some valuations whose validity can in no way be justified. There seems to me only one theory of morals which, if sufficiently refined, can offer a way out of the fundamental hopeless dilemma in which contemporary modern thought finds itself. This theory is consistent hedonism, a type of moral argument which Jeremy Bentham once tried to carry through with inadequate means, and which is generally ignored,

1/ See Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, 1944, e.g. p.59; and G.E. Moore, "Reply to my Critics" in THE PHILOSOPHY OF G.E.MOORE, ed. by P.A. Schilpp (THE LIBRARY OF LIVING PHILOSOPHERS, vol. IV,1942),p.554 f.

2/ See e.g.Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Science p. and C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, 1944, p.290 and passim

multitude of uncritically accepted

or disparaged and ridiculed.

Only such a type of argument can, in my opinion, provide a sound secular basis for modern ethics -- a goal which should be as desirable an aim today as it was to the leading scholastics in the middle ages.[1]

Consistent hedonism expresses ethical value exclusively in terms of human happiness and disvalue in terms of human misery, as it is based on the psychologically irrefutable thesis that it would be impossible to understand man (~~would be impossible~~) if (~~man~~ he) could be imagined to aspire to any aim -- even the apparently most painful one, (~~unless~~ without) this aim (had forming) a more attractive tone or color than ~~any~~ other ~~he has in view.~~ alternatives. To estimate what is the maximization of happiness in a concrete case, is and therefore what it is that contributes the highest ethical value in that instance, certainly often requires extremely subtle and complicated investigation. But as to all fundamental ethical decisions between a morality of sheer power and one of generosity, between a government of permanent ruthless oppression and one of (efficient effective) constitutional freedom, between a system of economic justice and one of unhampered exploitation, the estimate is feasible and gives unambiguous, ~~clear instruction~~ guidance.

This, ~~however,~~ is the ~~instruction~~ guidance basically needed in the age of post-Nietzschean ethics. Machiavellianism and the philosophy of power politics

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whether represented by fascists, by communists or by so-called democrats, is now, consciously or unconsciously, the philosophy of millions of men. The discussion of the morality of power is today hardly more out of date than in the days when Plato wrote his Gorgias. And even the statesman who ardently wishes to practise an ethics of generosity and love is forced to take into account the disasterous consequences to which he would expose his nation and the world if he acted according rather than to the principles of all-forgiving Christian love, thus exclusively according to the greatest happiness principle. This becomes apparent that, in reality, not even the best motives (whose purity can always be questioned) are of decisive importance; the results of our acts are of crucial ultimate importance. Even hatred when, for instance, directed against vices, is in itself by no means evil, nor is love causing misery in itself by no means always good.

On the other hand, moralists forget too often that life confronts men of great responsibility with concrete alternatives in which neither consistent hedonism nor any other ethics can or should give a simple, clear-cut advice. Consistent hedonism, therefore, freely admits that in our political and daily life, there are instances in which, particularly after some original wrong doing, there is only a choice left between two equally moral or, under certain tragic circumstances, only between two equally immoral decisions.

It is true that the consistent hedonist does not answer questions concerning intrinsic values (in themselves) and absolutely binding duties, but this is no greater loss to philosophy than the scientist's refusal to speak about the essence of matter or gravity "in itself" or e.g. about the hot temper and fiery spirit of sulphur which Paracelsus once regarded as an essential characteristic of that chemical element.

However low a philosopher may estimate the achievements of modern science, he will hardly be able to deny that countless basic insights into the structure of the physical universe could not have been obtained

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without the methodological exclusion of practically all the purely metaphysical problems of medieval and ~~ev~~en ancient natural philosophy. ~~of nature.~~ The same abandonment of an uncritical search for absoluta would, in consistent hedonism, force the moralist to go into the exploration of those central and elementary phenomena of human life on which everything hinges in history, religion and in morals; ~~(a more and more subtle and~~ sublimated ~~)~~ understanding and weighing of the degrees of human joy and human suffering.

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It may be repeated again and again that the holy is a value in itself and can never be changed into a disvalue. As long as men honestly regard contradictory attitudes in life as holy, no decisive ethical insight is gained by this or similar categorical statements.

It may readily be granted that to act honorably or to be just toward everyone is undeniably a valid moral law, namely according to the definitions of honor and justice. But, unfortunately, these general laws and definitions give no information on why certain concrete acts can be called honorable or dishonorable. On behalf of justice or honor, the anti-communist may feel - and often has felt - obliged to adopt a conduct diametrically opposite to that which honor or justice demand in the eyes of a communist, although certainly only one type of conduct can be called moral in these instances,

The difficulty which can be overcome neither by the common ethics of values nor by modern neo-deontologism and similar absolutist ethics may therefore be described as follows: On the one hand the concepts of this ethical absolutism may mean no more than merely generic terms signifying

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On the other hand, if attempts are made to deduce from the general terms of these absolute ethics only certain types of behavior and to exclude others as immoral, these attempts must inevitably fail. For, if these general concepts are examined without prejudice, they are found to be factually ambiguous and must remain so of necessity; by themselves, not supported by other preconceived evaluations, they invite entirely opposite concrete inferences to be drawn from them.

Anthropological relativism, logical positivism and emotive ethics reject any absolute ethics for different reasons. But thus they lead (though generally without admitting it) to a definite ethical skepticism or even to nihilism. The principal argument of all these critics of absolute ethics is this: Ethics and the justification of values in general do not concern given facts or logical and mathematical relations between facts. Statements on the validity of moral values can, therefore, not be verified by any given data [1] and thus can "not come under the category of truth and falsehood." [2] The "difference as to values" is only "one of tastes, not one as to any objective truth." [3]

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The outright ethical nihilism of these types of positivistic ethics is, however, generally toned down by some seemingly more constructive afterthought. Some hope is held out that basic agreement in morals will be reached by a free democratic exchange of moral views on the principal attitudes of man, although no attitude can be proven to be of moral validity.[2] The relativism of the anthropological school believed, as late as the beginning of the 20th century, that the mere description of the existing valuations in different epochs of mankind would point to a marked moral preferability of the standards of the later development of civilized groups. But all these are rather vague or even illusory hopes, especially in view of the basic moral conflicts of today.

The only choice left in contemporary ethics, therefore, appears to be the choice between either an honest ethical nihilism or an uncritical acceptance of certain valuations the validity of which can in no way be justified. However, there exists ~~only~~ one theory of morals which, if sufficiently refined, can in my opinion offer a way out of the fundamentally hopeless dilemma in which contemporary modern thought finds itself trapped. This theory is consistent hedonism, a type of moral argument which Jeremy Bentham once tried to carry through with means not sufficiently adequate, a theory which is now generally ignored

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Extra page

Congrès International Philosophie - Bruxelles

DAVID BAUMGARDT

ETHICAL NIHILISM AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF VALUE

Like physics, psychology and other brances of science, ethics can no longer thrive in that feeling of over-confident security which was widely characteristic of the 19th century. There are still only too many believers in absolutely valid values, in self-evident ethical principles, in moral obligations a priori and in categorical imperatives. But how little is achieved by the belief in any of these absolutely binding duties or intrinsic values after it has been recognized that their strictly obligatory character melts away as soon as they are applied to any concrete problems of ethical reality!

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It may readily be granted that to act honorably or to be just toward everyone is undeniably a valid moral law, namely according to the definitions of honor and justice. But, unfortunately, these general laws and definitions give no information on why certain concrete acts can be called honorable or dishonorable. On behalf of justice or honor, the anti-communist may feel - and often has felt - obliged to adopt a conduct diametrically opposite to that which honor or justice demand in the eyes of a communist, although it is clear that only one type of conduct can be called moral in these instances.

The difficulty which can be overcome neither by the common ethics of values nor by modern neo-deontologism and similar absolutist ethics

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The only choice left in contemporary ethics seems to be, therefore, that between an honest ethical nihilism and an uncritical acceptance of some valuations, the validity of which can in no way be justified. There seems to me only one theory of morals which, if sufficiently refined, can offer a way out of the fundamental hopeless dilemma in which contemporary modern thought finds itself caught. This theory is consistent hedonism, a type of moral argument which Jeremy Bentham once tried to carry through with means not sufficiently adequate and which is generally now ignored

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DAVID BAUMGARDT : HIST OF MOD ETHICS : BOOK REVIEWS: c1950's

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ri in "splendid isolation" von der Vermengung mit empirischen Untersuchungen über "Güter" und "Wertdinge" freizuhalten, müssen sich leider als weit weniger verdienstlich entlarven, wenn es sich zeigt, dass sie notwendiger -- nicht zufälliger -- Weise den Menschen inmitten der konkreten Wertdinge völlig im Dunkel über Gut und Böse lassen. Von der Höhe der allgemeinen Begriffe des an sich Guten und der rein idealen Werte kann kein Verständnis für konkrete Moralfragen und reale ethische Entscheidungen erhofft werden, falls nicht der recht schwierige Rückweg zur Empirie gefunden wird, durch den irgendwie der konkreten Erfahrung ein volles Recht zur Mitentscheidung gewährt werden kann, genau wie dies in der Naturwissenschaft mit dem Recht der empirischen Beobachtung neben der Aufstellung der "evidenten Allgemeingesetze" geschieht.

G.E. Moore, der Amerikaner, Wilbur M. Urban,[9] die Franzosen Gerard Petit,[10] Dominique Parodi,[11] Emanuel Leroux,[12] Andre Lalande,[13] die Engländer H.W.Joseph[14] und E.F.Carritt,[15] der Italiener Giulio Preti,[16] der Spanier Ortega y Gasset,[17] der Argentinier Anibal Sanchez Reulet,[18] der Mexikaner Francisco Larroyo,[19] setzen ihren Stolz darein, von evidenten Werten unabhängig von allen äusseren Relationen zu sprechen. Gegen diese angebliche Unabhängigkeit des moralisch Guten hat bereits der bekannteste englische Kantinterpret der Gegenwart H.A.Paton mit Recht Bedenken erhoben, indem er mit Nachdruck geltend machte: "Die moralische Güte einer Sache .. muss in notwendiger Beziehung stehen zu einem rationalen Willen .. und kann unter verschiedenen Umständen variieren."[20]

Referent Rawert Fichte

J.G.Fichte : Briefwechsel,herausgeg.von Hans Schulz,Leipzig 1925,
Verlag H. Hessel Haessel,Bd.I 619 S.,Bd. II 638 S.

Seitdem Joh.Gottl.Fichte von Nietzsche als das Muster eines "unmöglichen" Psychologen verhöhnt wurde,sollten eigentlich die Tage des alten blind pathetischen Fichte-Enthusiasmus gezählt sein. Denn dieser ältere Fichte kult war eben meist nicht nur blind,sondern auch hohl pathetisierend und er verdarb damit völlig den Blick für die echte und die viel tiefer ergreifende Problematik des Fichteschen Wesens,wie diese Problematik von feinhörigsten Zeitgenossen,von Goethe oder Jean Paul oder auch von Friedr. Heinr.Jacobi noch viel wahrer empfunden worden war.
Es ist deshalb besonders dankenswert,dass jetzt endlich zu der Erfassung der gesamten menschlichen Erscheinung Fichtes wenigstens das grundlegende Material seiner Briefe in einer wirklich textkritisch befriedigenden Form dargeboten wird in der neuen umfassenden Ausgabe von Fichtes Briefen,die Hans Schulz,der um die Fichteforschung seit langerem besonders verdiente Bibliotheksdirektor des Reichsgerichts1925 in 2 starken Bänden veranstaltet hat. Durch diese abschliessend wertvolle Edition wird zunächst einaml die Zerstückelung des Briefwechsels in die älteren Ausgaben von I.H.Fichte,Moritz Weinhold,Georg Bilow und anderen vermieden. Ausserdem aber ist hier eine wesentliche Bereicherung eingetreten durch den Abdruck von einer beträchtlichen Reihe bisher unveröffentlichter Stücke.Und schliesslich ist auch bei den schon bekannten Briefen durch möglichst allseitigen Rückgriff auf die Urhandschriften eine weit zuverlässigere textkritische Wiedergabe erreicht,was sogar bei der selbstherrlich markanten Interpunktionssetzung Fichtes nicht gleichgültig ist.
Wer sich also heute mit dem Menschen wie mit der Philosophie Fichtes befassen will,muss notwendig diese Briefausgabe(ebenso wie desgleichen Herausgebers Parallelwerk "Fichte in vertraulichen Briefen seiner Zeitgenossen",192[illegible] erschienen)zu grunde legen.

Rez. Hegel

Heinrich Levy: Die Hegel-Renaissance in der Deutschen Philosophie, Philosophische Vorträge der Kant-Gesellschaft, 1927, 94 S.

Wie ein Ungeheuer aus alten Sagen, dem man hundertfach den Kopf abhieb, und das doch in immer neuen Formen weiterlebte, so wirkt auch die hundertmal totgesagte Philosophie Hegels im heutigen Denken noch in immer neuen Wandlungen fort. In Folge ihrer Geschmeidigkeit und ihrer universalen Vieldeutigkeit sind diese Wandlungen der Hegelschen Dialektik stets besonders schwierig zu fassen. Hier aber ist mit musterhafter Gewissenhaftigkeit und mit intensiver Materialkenntnis ein besonders gediegener Ueberblick geschaffen über die sehr verschiedenartigen Rezeptionen, die Hegelsche Prinzipien in der modernen Philosophie gefunden haben. Und auf knappstem Raum ist so in der Tat eine sehr instruktive Uebersicht über die Hegelnähe Diltheys wie Simmels, Troeltschs und Sprangers, aber selbst Cohens, Cassirers, Liebermts, Kroners und Jonas Cohns erreicht worden.

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BRIEFE VON UND AN HEGEL ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. Band I [1952]. 515 pp. Band II [1953]. 508 pp. Band III [1954]. 475 pp.

Review

The stony, though imposing face of Hegel and the "bloodless dialectical abstractions" of his "panlogism" apparently hold, at first glance, little promise of sensing warm, pulsating life. Even one of Hegel's most ardent disciples could not help observe that the great thinker was far more fluent in his lectures when he spoke of of "the notion in itself, for itself, and in and for itself" than when he had to report the simplest concrete narrative. In speaking of anything in which the common talent of storytelling feels at home, he unfailingly failed almost amusingly (see Rudolf Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit, 1857, p.396). But it is too often lost sight of that, in contrast to modern graphic textbooks ,all the later principal works published by Hegel himself wish to give no more than the mere skeleton of his thought; one has to consult the "appendices" to these frighteningly abstract paragraphs (the "Zusätze" added in the later editions) to meet with at least somewhat more colorful reflections.

The great merit, however, of having definitely enriched our picture of the living thought of the great metaphysician belongs to the new and first critical edition of all his works undertaken by the publisher of the greatest "library of philosophical classics" existing in any language, Felix Meiner in Hamburg. His new Hegel edition is a work of a magnitude generally planned and executed only by heavily subsidized learned academies but in this case performed by a single idealistic publisher and by scholars devoted to his meritorious enterprise. The latest four volumes of this work, all edited by the late Johannes Hoffmeister, have again brought to light much hitherto unpublished but indispensable material for a better evaluation of the life, personality and thought of the most radical among German idealists.

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Hoffmeister

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AUS DEM WELTREICH DES ENGLISCHEN EMPIRISMUS

Daniel John O'Connor: John Locke. A critical Introduction. London, Baltimore (1952). Pelican Philosophy Series. 223 S.

John Arthur Passmore: Hume's Intentions. Cambridge. 1952. Cambridge University Press. 164 S.

R. P. Anschutz: The Philosophy of J. S. Mill. Oxford 1953. At the Clarendon Press. 184 S.

Besprochen von

DAVID BRONSTEDT

Heute ist es vor allem der englische Sprachbereich, in dem "die Sonne nie untergeht". So ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass drei führende englische Empiristen, Locke, Hume und John Stuart Mill kürzlich mit neuen Würdigungen bedacht wurden von Philosophiehistorikern, deren Geburtstätten viele Tausende von Meilen von denen ihrer Helden entfernt liggen: in Seattle, im aussersten Nordwestern der Vereinigten Staaten Amerikas, in Australien und in Neuseeland. Trotzdem und vielleicht gerade deshalb ist es wohl kaum uberflüssig, die drei Bände, um die es sich hier handelt, mit Augen zu fixieren, die auf dem europäischen Festland ausserhalb der englischen Sprachdomäne philosophisch geschult wurden.

Schelling spottete über die Anhänger Lockes, die ernstlich glaubten, hätte Plato den "Essay concerning Human Understanding" lesen können, er wäre "beschämt von dannen" gegangen. Joseph de Maistre ging in seinen "Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg" noch betrachtlich weiter; er fand: "Locke n'a jamais compris rien au fond". "Montrez moi .. le défaut .. qui ne s'y (in dem "Essay") trouve pas". Und boshaft ruft er schon in Anbetracht von Lockes Vorrede zu seinem philosophischen Hauptwerk aus: "Quelle odeur de magasin!"

V

Von solcher Kritik am englischen Empirismus ist bei unsern drei Autoren nichts zu verspüren. Wenn Schelling und de Maistre blind waren gegen alle echten Vorzüge des englischen ~~Empirismus~~ Positivismus, so haben sich diese zeitgenössischen Schriften über Locke, Hume und J.S.Mill nicht weniger abgeschlossen gegn fast alles, das ausserhalb des Bezirks einer strikt empiristischen ~~Grundhaltung~~ Denkhaltung Liegt. Aber selbst innerhalb der vielfach bedeutungsvollen Literatur über den Positivismus der Neuzeit kann den Arbeiten O'Connors, Passmores und Anschutz' schwerlich bahnbrechender Wert zugesprochen werden.

John Locke

O'Connor bietet zunächst eine kurze, verhaltnismässig farblose Biogra-

phie , in der es etwas konventionell fast mit Befremden zu buchen scheint, dass Locke sich in Holland unter einem falschen Namen vor der Verfolgung durch eine intolerante Regierung zu schutzen suchte. Sonst wird Lockes wissenschaftlicher Charakter in hohem Lob hier als umsichtig, duldsam und feind aller Bigotterie (in Religion wie Politik) bezeichnet. Aber da diese Kennzeichnung von einem anscheinend ahnlich veranlagten, etwas verstandestrockenen Autor kommt, so wird sie bei wesensverschiedenen Temperamenten kaum stark zu gunsten Lockes werben konnen.

Der Hauptteil des Buchs, das sich zwischen Ansatzen zum Volkstumlichen und zu komplizierterer Begriffskritik bewegt, ist der Analyse der Erkenntnistheorie Lockes gewidmet. Aber selbst dieser ausgedehnte Kommentar zu Lockes philosophischem Hauptwerk wird weder dem geschulten Erkenntnistheoretiker noch dem Laien Wesentliches bieten konnen, das nicht auch andeswo zu finden ware. Mir scheint, die Fruchtbarkeit der Darstellung und Kritik der Lockeschen Erkenntnislehre wurde betrachtlich erhohbar gewesen sein, wenn sich O'Connor weniger streng an die Einstellung der begriffsanalytischen und "realistischen" Common-sense-Philosophie im zeitgenossischen England gehalten hatte.

Dies fuhrt ihn z. B. dazu, in weitgehender Ubereinstimmung mit Lockeforschern wie James Gibson und Richard I. Aaron Lockes Lehre von den primaren und sekundaren Qualitaten als philosophisch durchaus gegenstandslos zu disdreditieren,vor allem deshalb weil die Empfindungen von primaren Qualitaten doch blosse Empfindungen bleiben und daher so wenig eine Burgschaft fur die Existenz von entspreschenden Eigenschaften in den Dingen selbst geben wie die Empfindungen von sekundaren Qualitaten. Man braucht aber nicht so weit wie Alois Riehl zu gehen, um Locke an diesem Punkt Hume und Berkeley uberlegen zu finden. Es genugt, die erkenntniskritische Note in Locke starker hervorzuheben und z. B. darauf hinzuweisen -- was seltsamer Weise kaum irgendwo ausreichend in der Lockeliteratur

getan wird --dass im 3. und 5.Kapitel des II.Buchs des "Essay concerning Human Understanding" nachdrucklich zwischen den "Ideen" unterschieden wird, die wir durch einen Sinn empfangen, und solchen Vorstellungen, die uns durch zwei Sinne vermittelt werden, und dass der zweiten Gruppe ~~Oo~~ offenbar wegen ihrer ausgedehnteren Verifizierbarkeit höherer Erkenntniswert zugeschrieben wird. Als diese Gruppe wird aber von Locke die Zahl derjenigen Empfindungen charakterisiert, die die primären Qualitäten darstellen d. h. Raum oder Ausdehnung, Gestalt, Ruhe und Bewegung, zu denen später ~~Gestalt~~ noch Zahl und ~~Solidität~~ Festigkeit zugefügt sind. Während Farbe, Geschmack und Geruch nur durch einen Sinn wahrnehmbar werden, sind Ausdehnung, Gestalt, Ruhe und Bewegung durch das Auge wie den Tastsinn erfassbar und bieten deshalb grössere Bürgschaft, Qualitäten der wahrgenommenen Dinge selbst zu sein. O'Connor gibt zwar selbstverständlich zu, dass sich die Unterscheidung zwischen primaren und sekundären Qualitäten für die Physik als genügend wertvoll bewahrt hat; aber im Einklang mit vorherrschenden Anschauungen in der Gegenwartsphilosophie Englands will er der Theorie der Naturwissenschaft keineswegs einen vollen ~~PP~~ Platz in der philosophischen Erkenntnislehre einräumen; und damit hat er freilich, wie mir scheint, der philosophischen Bedeutung Lockes, des Freundes Newtons und Boyles nicht den besten Dienst erwiesen.

Ebenfalls im Gleichschritt mit dominierenden Tendenzen in der ~~neu~~ zeitgenössischen englischen Erkenntnistheorie möchte O'Connor offenbar den politischen Lehren Lockes wie aller politischen Doktrin den Ehrennamen einer philosophisch relevanten Theorie absprechen. Denn es handelt sich hier dieser Meinung nach im Kern um völlig unbeweisbare Thesen, die höchstens deshalb allgmein annehmbar erscheinen, weil sie wegen der tatsächlichen Zustimmung, die sie weithin gefunden haben, keiner weiteren Rechtfertigung mehr zu bedürfen scheinen. Ausserdem seien in fast allen politischen Theorien Tatsachen-Feststellungen, blosse Definitionen und Begriffsklärung so verwirrend mit unbewisbaren Werturteilen verwoben, dass der kritische Denker sie nur wegen

ihrerhistorischen Wirksamkeit,aber nicht wegen ihres philosophischen Gehalts einer Würdigung unterziehen könne. O'Connors Skizzierung der politischen Anschauungen Lockes und der "Epistola de tolerantia" ist daher besonders knapp. Noch weniger aber als die Staatsphilosophie werden hier die "Thoughts concerning Education" beachtet und die ausgedehnten Schriften Lockes zur Interpretation des Neuen Testaments,die geistesgeschichtlich immerhin eine Art Höhepunkt an hausbackener, und gänzlich enthusiasmusfreier religiöser "Vernunftigkeit" darstellen.

Passmores Schrift über Grundtendenzen des Humeschen Denkens ist wohl das frischste,am meisten aus einem Guss geformte Werk unter den drei hier zu besprechenden Neuerscheinungen. Auch Passmore spricht freilich ähnlich wie O'Connor abfällig von dem "barbarisch"verwickelten Denkstil Kants und Hegels. Aber erfügt höchst aufschlussreich hinzu,dass zwar jeder einzelne Satz Humes als durchaus durchsichtig und klar erscheinen mag,dass aber für das Gesamtverständnis seiner Intentionen kaum weniger Schwierigkeiten bestehen als für Hegel.

Passmores Schrift unternimmt es deshalb, das scheinbar unauflösliche Knäuelvon einander widerstreitenden Tendenzen in Humes Weltbild zu entwirren; und zu diesem Zweck arbeitet er es -- in Fortführung von Norman Kemp Smith' Humeanalysen vor allem heraus,dass es für Hume einer der bestimmenden Ehrgeize w ins seinem "Treatise" war,eine Art Newton der Geisteswissenschaften zu werden(wie übrigens noch nach ihm Bentham der Newton der Ethik zu werden wunschte).Wenn bisher selbst inNorman Kemp Smith' "The Philosophy of David Hume"diesen Bestrebungen des grossen "Skeptikers" des 18.Jahrhunderts nicht zu viel Gewicht zugesprochen wurde,so wird dies nach Passmore dadurch erklärbar,dass Hume seine Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaftenn nur auf recht verdeckte Art vornahm: er versuchte (weithin) die grössere (Präzision), die den Naturwissenschaften zugesprochen wird,als illusorisch zu entlarven,

um dann auf diesem Umweg für die Zuverlässigkeit der Analysen des Geistes mindestens den gleichen oder selbst höheren Geltungswert zu beanspruchen.

Von Hier aus erhalten dann der Psychologismus, der Phänomenalismus und die Skeptik Humes eine sehr dankenswerte Durchleuchtung und zugleich werden konkretere, damit zusammenhängende Fragen anregend erörtert: die weitreichende Unabhängigkeit von Berkeley, die Differenzpunkte und die Verwandtschaft mit dem zeitgenössischen logischen Positivismus, das prinzipielle "Scheitern" am Problem der Identität der Persönlichkeit und das "Unvermögen", dem Begriff der notwendigen Verknüpfung im Kausalgesetz Genüge zu tun.

Die denkerische Leistung J.S.Mills fordert heute vielleicht noch mehr zu einer neuen Würdigung und Bewertung heraus als die Lockes und Humes. R.P.Anschutz schält in seinem Werk in der Ethik, der Staatsphilosophie, der Logik wie der Erkenntnistheorie die wohl noch mehr schweren Unausgeglichenheiten in den Gesamttendenzen des einflussreichen Denkers heraus als es schon frühere Kritiker des "unlogischen" Logikers getan haben. Aber ganz im Einklang mit der herkömmlichen herrschenden Meinung hält er Mills Umformungen der radikaleren und konsequenteren Theorien Benthams oder Comtes im Grunde für entscheidende Verfeinerungen (s.z.B.S.20). Dies aber scheint mir besonders in der Moralphilosophie eine stark anfechtbare These zu sein. wie ich dies ausführlich in meinem "Bentham and the Ethics of Today", 1952, zu erhärten suchte.

Wenn nach Mills vielzitiertem Satz selbst das Leiden des Sokrates ohne weitere Analyse unmittelbar als der höhere Wert zu gelten hat gegenüber den Freuden eines Narren, dann ist es irreführend, überhaupt noch Lust und Schmerz, wie Mill es tut, als das grundlegende Wertkriterium anzusehen. Dann sind es eben nichthedonistische Grundbegriffe, auf denen das ethische Urteil aufzubauen ist Bentham erfasste es dem gegenüber mit der grössten Klarheit, dass alle nichthedonistischen Werte wie Ehre, Gerechtigkeit und andere Grundbegriffe der idealistischen Ethik in der Anwendung auf die Wirklichkeit völlig entgegengesetzte und

doch logisch durchaus gleichberechtigte Deutungen erfahren können;und Bentham unternahm deshalb den heroischen Versuch,diese prinzipielle Vieldeutigkeit im ethischen Idealismus dadurch zu überwinden,dass er nur dasjenige angeblich ehrenvolle oder gerechte Verhalten und dergleichen als ethisch wertvoll anerkannte,das letzthin nach einer komplizierten kritischen Überprüfung als der grössere Glücksbringer gerechtfertigt werden kann.

Ein solcher Versuch,anscheinend unvergleichbare qualitative Eigenart durch quantitative Begriffsbestimmungen zu umschreiben,ist in der exakten Naturwissenschaft weithin geglückt.Aber gleichviel ob er auch in der Ethik gelingt oder nicht,Mills Festhalten am Hedonismus unter Preisgabe des wertvollsten Ziels,das diese Lehre in Benthams Handen erstrebte,scheintmmir nur einerlei Fortschritt in der Entwicklungddes modernen Utilismus zu bedeuten.Man mag Anschutz zustimmen; die Zufügung vonMills idealistischem Prinzip der Souveränität des Individuums oder der Individualität zu Benthams hedonistischem Grundprinzip verhalf den Utilitariern des 19.Jahrhunderts zu grosserem Einfluss bei den Gegnern des konsequenteren Hedonismus Benthams;aber philosophisch bleibt doch Mills zwiespältiger Eklektizismus nur mit den Mangeln der beiden Theorien behaftet,die er versöhnen wollte,ohne den Verlust an Klarheit,wie mir scheint,durch grössere "Tiefe"gegenüber den "einseitigen" Lehren Hegels oder auch Benthams ausgleichen zu können.

Und Ähnliches gilt für Haupttendenzen der Millschen Erkenntnistheorie, die Anschutz heraushebt,Anshutz räumt ein,Mills Charakterisierung der Aussenwelt als Inbegriff von dauernden Wahrnehmungsmöglichkeiten mag sowohl einer phänomenalistischen wie"mater- materialistischen" Deutung fähig sein. Und doch scheint er auch hier den Verzicht auf ein Glied dieser Alternative nicht als eine befriedigendere Theorie anzusehen ebensowenig wie eine Annahme der positivistischen These für die Erkenntnistheorie und der realistischen für die Seinslehre.

In der Frage einer Scheidung zwischen beschreibender und erklärender

Wissenschaft spricht Anschutz offenbar schliesslich mit einer gewissen Zustimmung von Mills Annahme,dass Keplers "beschreibende"Gesetze der Planetenbewegung wesentlich die phänomenale,uns tatsächlich gegebene Welt betreffen,während Newtons Gerklärende" Gravitationstheorie uns näher an die TTendenzen",die Struktur der realen und aller möglichen Welten heranführt. Die Frage bleibt hier nur,ob nicht auf diese Art den mathematisch formulierten ~~-Keplers-~~Gesetzen Keplers viel zu wenig "erklärende" Bedeutung und der Lehre Newtons zu viel solcher Erklärungsfähigkeit zugesprochen wird;und Anschutz ist offensichtlich selbst-indder umsichtigen Gesamteinstellung zu seinem Thema,die mit jedem endgültigen Werturteil oft gern zurückhält -- der Anfechtbarkeit dieser Gegenüberstellung von beschreibender und erklärender Wissenschaft gewahr gewörden. So bleibt zum mindesten seine Aufrollung all solcher ungelösten Problematik der Millschen Denkresultate ein entschiedenes Verdienst.

~~Fussend~~ Auf ausgedehnten Vorarbeiten anderer Forscher fussend können die drei besprochenen Neuerscheinungen jedenfalls als höchst instruktive zeitgenössische Einführung dienen in jenen Bereich der englischen Gedankenwelt,von dessen besonnener Nüchternheit und emotional seltsamer Unbewegtheit sie selbst ein sehr getreues Spiegelbild darstellen.

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Phil. Rundschau — 2 Korr. Abzüge auf Luftpostpapier

AUS DEM WELTREICH DES ENGLISCHEN EMPIRISMUS — Rev. phil. 2

Daniel John O'Connor: John Locke. A critical Introduction. London, Baltimore [1952]. Pelican Philosophy Series. 223 S.

John Arthur Passmore: Hume's Intentions. Cambridge. 1952. Cambridge University Press. 164 S.

R. P. Anschutz: The Philosophy of J. S. Mill. Oxford 1953. ~~At the~~ Clarendon Press. 184 S.

~~Besprochen von~~

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3 × Review

3 Rezensionen

Tsed

Heute ist es vor allem der englische Sprachbereich, in dem "die Sonne nie untergeht". So ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass drei führende englische Empiristen, Locke, Hume und John Stuart Mill kürzlich mit neuen Würdigungen bedacht wurden, von Philosophiehistorikern, deren Geburtstätten viele Tausende von Meilen von denen ihrer Helden entfernt liegen: in Seattle, im äussersten Nordwesten der Vereinigten Staaten Amerikas, in Australien und in Neuseeland. Trotzdem und vielleicht gerade deshalb ist es wohl kaum uberflüssig, die drei Bände, um die es sich hier handelt, mit Augen zu fixieren, die auf dem europäischen Festland ausserhalb der englischen Sprachdomäne philosophisch geschult wurden.

Schelling spottete über die Anhänger Lockes, die ernstlich glaubten, hätte Plato den "Essay concerning Human Understanding" lesen können, er wäre "beschämt von dannen" gegangen. Joseph de Maistre ging in seinen "Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg" noch beträchtlich weiter; er fand: "Locke n'a jamais compris rien au fond". "Montrez moi .. le défaut .. qui ne s'y (in dem "Essay") trouve pas". Und boshaft ruft er schon in Anbetracht von Lockes Vorrede zu seinem philosophischen Hauptwerk aus: "Quelle odeur de magasin!"

Von solcher Kritik am englischen Empirismus ist bei unsern drei Autoren nichts zu verspüren. Wenn Schelling und de Maistre blind waren gegen alle echten Vorzüge des englischen ~~Empirismus~~ Positivismus, so haben sich diese zeitgenössischen Schriften über Locke, Hume und J.S.Mill nicht weniger abgeschlossen gegn fast alles, das ausserhalb des Bezirks einer strikt empiristischen ~~Grundhaltung~~ Denkhaltung liegt. Aber selbst innerhalb der vielfach bedeutungsvollen Literatur über den Positivismus der Neuzeit kann den Arbeiten O'Connors, Passmores und Anschutz' schwerlich bahnbrechender Wert zugesprochen werden.

O'Connors John Locke ~~O'Connor~~ bietet zunächst eine kurze, verhältnismässig farblose Biogra-

phie , in der es etwas konventionell fast mit Befremden zu buchen scheint, dass Locke sich in Holland unter einem falschen Namen vor der Verfolgung durch eine intolerante Regierung zu schützen suchte. Sonst wird Lockes wissenschaftlicher Charakter in hohem Lob hier als umsichtig, duldsam und feind aller Bigotterie (in Religion wie Politik) bezeichnet. Aber da diese Kennzeichnung von einem anscheinend ähnlich veranlagten, etwas verstandestrockenen Autor kommt, so wird sie bei wesensverschiedenen Temperamenten kaum stark zu gunsten Lockes werben können.

Der Hauptteil des Buchs, das sich zwischen Ansätzen zum Volkstümlichen und zu komplizierterer Begriffskritik bewegt, ist der Analyse der Erkenntnistheorie Lockes gewidmet. Aber selbst dieser ausgedehnte Kommentar zu Lockes philosophischem Hauptwerk wird weder dem geschulten Erkenntnistheoretiker noch dem Laien Wesentliches bieten können, das nicht auch andeswo zu finden wäre. Mir scheint, die Fruchtbarkeit der Darstellung und Kritik der Lockeschen Erkenntnislehre würde beträchtlich erhöhbar gewesen sein, wenn sich O'Connor weniger streng an die Einstellung der begriffsanalytischen und "realistischen" Common-sense-Philosophie im zeitgenössischen England gehalten hätte.

Dies führt ihn z. B. dazu, in weitgehender Übereinstimmung mit Lockeforschern wie James Gibson und Richard I. Aaron Lockes Lehre von den primären und sekundären Qualitäten als philosophisch durchaus gegenstandslos zu diskreditieren, vor allem deshalb weil die Empfindungen von primären Qualitäten doch blosse Empfindungen bleiben und daher so wenig eine Bürgschaft für die Existenz von entsprechenden Eigenschaften in den Dingen selbst geben wie die Empfindungen von sekundären Qualitäten. Man braucht aber nicht so weit wie Alois Riehl zu gehen, um Locke an diesem Punkt Hume und Berkeley überlegen zu finden. Es genügt, die erkenntniskritische Note in Locke stärker hervorzuheben und z. B. darauf hinzuweisen -- was seltsamer Weise kaum irgendwo ausreichend in der Lockeliteratur

getan wird --dass im 3. und 5.Kapitel des II.Buchs des "Essay concerning Human Understanding" nachdrücklich zwischen den "Ideen" unterschieden wird, die wir durch einen Sinn empfangen, und solchen Vorstellungen, die uns durch zwei Sinne vermittelt werden, und dass der zweiten Gruppe ~~Oo~~ offenbar wegen ihrer ausgedehnteren Verifizierbarkeit höherer Erkenntniswert zugeschrieben wird. Als diese Gruppe wird aber von Locke die Zahl derjenigen Empfindungen charakterisiert, die die primären Qualitäten darstellen d. h. Raum oder Ausdehnung, Gestalt, Ruhe und Bewegung, zu denen später ~~Gestalt~~ noch Zahl und ~~Solidität~~ Festigkeit zugefügt sind. Während Farbe, Geschmack und Geruch nur durch einen Sinn wahrnehmbar werden, sind Ausdehnung, Gestalt, Ruhe und Bewegung durch das Auge wie den Tastsinn erfassbar und bieten deshalb grössere Bürgschaft, Qualitäten der wahrgenommenen Dinge selbst zu sein. O'~~Connor~~. gibt zwar selbstverständlich zu, dass sich die Unterscheidung zwischen primären und sekundären Qualitäten für die Physik als genügend wertvoll bewährt hat; aber im Einklang mit vorherrschenden Anschauungen in der Gegenwartsphilosophie Englands will er der Theorie der Naturwissenschaft keineswegs einen vollen ~~PP~~ Platz in der philosophischen Erkenntnislehre einräumen; und damit hat er freilich, wie mir scheint, der philosophischen Bedeutung Lockes, des Freundes Newtons und Boyles, nicht den besten Dienst erwiesen.

Ebenfalls im Gleichschritt mit dominierenden Tendenzen in der ~~heu~~ zeitgenössischen englischen Erkenntnistheorie möchte O'C~~onnor~~. offenbar den politischen Lehren Lockes wie aller politischen Doktrin den Ehrennamen einer philosophisch relevanten Theorie absprechen. Denn es handelt sich hier dieser Meinung nach im Kern um völlig unbeweisbare Thesen, die höchstens deshalb allgmein annehmbar erscheinen, weil sie wegen der tatsächlichen Zustimmung, die sie weithin gefunden haben, keiner weiteren Rechtfertigung mehr zu bedürfen scheinen. Ausserdem seien in fast allen politischen Theorien Tatsachenfeststellungen, blosse Definitionen und Begriffsklärung so verwirrend mit unbewisbaren Werturteilen verwoben, dass der kritische Denker sie nur wegen

ihrer historischen Wirksamkeit, aber nicht wegen ihres philosophischen Gehalts einer Würdigung unterziehen könne. O'Connors Skizzierung der politischen Anschauungen Lockes und der "Epistola de tolerantia" ist daher besonders knapp. Noch weniger aber als die Staatsphilosophie werden hier die "Thoughts concerning Education" beachtet und die ausgedehnten Schriften Lockes zur Interpretation des Neuen Testaments, die geistesgeschichtlich immerhin eine Art Höhepunkt und religiöser an hausbackener, gänzlich enthusiasmusfreier "Vernünftigkeit" darstellen.

Passmores Schrift über Grundtendenzen des Humeschen Denkens ist wohl das frischste, am meisten aus einem Guss geformte Werk unter den drei hier zu besprechenden Neuerscheinungen. Auch Passmore spricht freilich ähnlich wie O'Connor abfällig von dem "barbarisch" verwickelten Denkstil Kants und Hegels. Aber er fügt höchst aufschlussreich hinzu, dass zwar jeder einzelne Satz Humes als durchaus durchsichtig und klar erscheinen mag, dass aber für das Gesamtverständnis seiner Intentionen kaum weniger Schwierigkeiten bestehen als für Hegel.

Passmores Schrift unternimmt es deshalb, das scheinbar unauflösliche Knäuel von einander widerstreitenden Tendenzen in Humes Weltbild zu entwirren; und zu diesem Zweck arbeitet er ~~es~~ -- in Fortführung von Norman Kemp Smith' Humeanalysen -- vor allem heraus, dass es für Hume einer der bestimmenden Ehrgeize w in seinem "Treatise" war, eine Art Newton der Geisteswissenschaften zu werden (wie übrigens noch nach ihm Bentham der Newton der Ethik zu werden wünschte). Wenn bisher selbst in Norman Kemp Smith' "The Philosophy of David Hume" diesen Bestrebungen des grossen "Skeptikers" des 18. Jahrhunderts nicht zu viel Gewicht zugesprochen wurde, so wird dies nach Passmore dadurch erklärbar, dass Hume seine Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften nur auf recht verdeckte Art vornahm: er versuchte zuerst ~~weithin~~ die grössere Exaktheit ~~Präzision~~, die den Naturwissenschaften zugesprochen wird, als illusorisch zu entlarven,

um dann auf diesem Umweg für die Zuverlässigkeit der Analysen des Geistes mindestens den gleichen oder selbst höheren Geltungswert zu beanspruchen.

Von Hier aus erhalten dann der Psychologismus, der Phänomenalismus und die Skeptik Humes eine sehr dankenswerte Durchleuchtung und zugleich werden konkretere, damit zusammenhängende Fragen anregend erörtert: die weitreichende Unabhängigkeit von Berkeley, die Differenzpunkte und die Verwandtschaft mit dem zeitgenössischen logischen Positivismus, das prinzipielle "Scheitern" am Problem der Identität der Persönlichkeit und das "Unvermögen", dem Begriff der notwendigen Verknüpfung im Kausalgesetz Genüge zu tun.

Die denkerische Leistung J.S.Mills fordert heute vielleicht noch mehr zu einer neuen Würdigung und Bewertung heraus als die Lockes und Humes. R.P.Anschutz schält in seinem Werk in der Ethik, der ~~Staats~~-Staatsphilosophie, der Logik wie der Erkenntnistheorie ~~wohl-noch-mehr~~ die wohl noch mehr schweren Unausgeglichenheiten in den Gesamttendenzen des einflussreichen Denkers heraus als es schon frühere Kritiker des "unlogischen" Logikers getan haben. Aber ganz im Einklang mit der herkömmlichen herrschenden Meinung hält er Mills Umformungen der radikaleren und konsequenteren Theorien Benthams oder Comtes im Grunde für entscheidende Verfeinerungen (s.z.B.S.20). Dies aber scheint mir besonders in der Moralphilosophie eine stark anfechtbare These zu sein. wie ich dies ausführlich in meinem "Bentham and the Ethics of Today", ~~1952~~, zu erhärten suchte.

Wenn nach Mills vielzitiertem Satz selbst das Leiden des Sokrates ohne weitere Analyse unmittelbar als der höhere Wert zu gelten hat gegenüber den Freuden eines Narren, dann ist es irreführend, überhaupt noch Lust und Schmerz, wie Mill es tut, als das grundlegende Wertkriterium anzusehen. Dann sind es eben nichthedonistische Grundbegriffe, auf denen das ethische Urteil aufzubauen ist. Bentham erfasste es dem gegenüber mit der grössten Klarheit, dass alle nichthedonistischen Werte wie Ehre, Gerechtigkeit und andere Grundbegriffe der idealistischen Ethik in der Anwendung auf die Wirklichkeit völlig entgegengesetzte und

1) Princeton University Press 1952. 584 S. (vgl. dazu S. 111 ff. Anm. d. Redaktion.)

doch logisch durchaus gleichberechtigte Deutungen erfahren können;und Bentham unternahm deshalb den heroischen Versuch,diese prinzipielle Vieldeutigkeit im ethischen Idealismus dadurch zu überwinden,dass er nur dasjenige angeblich ehrenvolle oder gerechte Verhalten und dergleichen als ethisch wertvoll anerkannte,das letzthin nach einer komplizierten kritischen Überprüfung als der grössere Glücksbringer gerechtfertigt werden kann.

Ein solcher Versuch,anscheinend unvergleichbare qualitative Eigenart durch quantitative Begriffsbestimmungen zu umschreiben,ist in der exakten Naturwissenschaft weithin geglückt.Aber gleichviel ob er auch in der Ethik gelingt oder nicht,Mills Festhalten am Hedonismus unter Preisgabe des wertvollsten Ziels,das diese Lehre in Benthams Händen erstrebte,scheint mir keinerlei Fortschritt ~~nen Rückschritt~~ in der Entwicklung des modernen Utilitarismus zu bedeuten.Man mag ~~Ansehutz~~ zustimmen; die Zufügung vonMills idealistischem Prinzip der Souveränität des Individuums oder der Individualität zu Benthams hedonistischem Grundprinzip verhalf dem Utilitarismus des 19.Jahrhunderts zu grösserem Einfluss bei den Gegnern des konsequenteren Hedonismus Benthams;aber philosophisch bleibt doch Mills zwiespältiger Eklektizismus nur mit den Mängeln der beiden Theorien behaftet,die er versöhnen wollte,ohne den Verlust an Klarheit,wie mir scheint,durch grössere "Tiefe"gegenüber den "einseitigen" Lehren Hegels oder auch Benthams ausgleichen zu können.

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Charles A. Baylis. Ethics. Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1958, 373 pp.

Wer nach der Beschäftigung mit der Welt der bedingungslosen Heidegger-Verehrung zu einem Band wie Baylis' Ethics greift, kann das, was ihm dabei widerfährt, vielleicht am ehsten mit dem "Abenteuer" Nietzsches vergleichen, als er von Wagner zu Bizet hinüberwechselte. Aus Blitz und Donner, aus Wolkenschwere und dunkler Andeutung fühlt er sich plötzlich versetzt in die Trockenheit der Luft, die stille Ungetrübtheit des Lichts und das Ebenmass der Stunden eines Sommertags am Mittelmeer oder vielmehr in den Bergen North Carolina's.* Überdies ist es ein Übersiedeln aus Sprachpalästen eigenster Art in das Idiom einer bewusst puritanischen Siedlung. Aber trotz äusserer Anspruchslosigkeit wird meiner Meinung nach Baylis' Schrift in der inneren Ausgewogenheit ihrer Argumentation von keiner zeitgenössischen angelsächsichen Arbeit zur Ethik übertroffen.

So wird etwa hier - teilweise an Hand der amerikanischen Negerfrage - gezeigt wie sich vielleicht niemand je von den sittlichen Auschauungen seiner Umgebung gänzlich frei machen konnte, besonders wenn diese "mores" selbst von entgegen-gesetzten Parteien der räumlichen oder zeitlichen Umwelt als sittlich anerkannt werden. Gerade deshalb aber ist auch partielle stillschweigende Gleichsetzung von herrschender Sitte mit echter Sittlichkeit die elementarste Gefahr, der selbst grosse Denker zu oft und zu stark unterlagen. Dem Kult der Normalität gegenüber, der haufig in den Vereinigsten Staaten bedenkliche moralphilosophische Blüten treibt, wird entgegengehalten, wie in zahlreichen Fällen, im Erstreben von Intelligenz und anderen Werten gerade das Übernormale

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*) Baylis ist Philosophieprofessor an der Duke University in North Carolina/USA.

oder Abnormale als sittlich zu gelten hat.

Gegenüber der alleinigen Berufung auf Religion wird im Namen der Ethik darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass unmöglich eine Religion durch den Wert ihrer ethischen Prinzipien-und dieselben ethischen Prinzipien zugleich nur durch ihre religiöse Weihe beglaubigt werden können. Gerade ein solcher, wenn auch unausgesprochener Zirkelschluss aber liegt vielen hierher gehörigen Argumenten zu grunde. Für überparteiliches, unbefangenes Denken sollte daher die Religion nicht als "Wegkürzung" zu ethischer Einsicht dienen. Aber auch das Gewissen ist durchaus nicht, wie noch Kant glaubte, ein unfehlbarer Führer durch ethische Konflikte. Es ist erstaunlich, welche sinnlosen Verpflichtungen das Gewissen besonders sensitiven Menschen oft auferlegt, und welche krass unmoralischen Taten es durch die Jahrhunderte gebilligt hat.

Kants kategorischen Imperativ sieht Baylis meiner Meinung nach zu wenig in seinem Zusammenhang mit dem Aprioricharakter des Kantschen Vernunftbegriffs und dem Zentralbegriff der Kritik der reinen wie der praktischen Vernunft, der rein formalen Einheit der Apperzeption. Aber trotz Kants ausdrücklichen Hinweises hierauf werden diese Zusammenhänge ja auch sonst durchgängig in der internationalen Kantliteratur vernachlässigt. So rückt auch Baylis, wie dies meist geschieht, den Kategorischen Imperativ in die Nähe der Goldenen Regel der jüdisch-christlichen Religiosität und betrachtet beide als Formen ethischer Intuition. Aber Baylis bleibt gewiss im Recht darin, dass er beide ihrer Intuition nach gänzlich inhaltsentblösste Gebote als unhaltbar formalistisch ansieht, da sie

philosophisch kritisch geprüft, selbst dann versagen, wenn sie auf gewisse Moralsatzungen der Tradition angewandt werden, der sie selbst entstammen. Im Sinne Kants aber lässt sich wohl - über Baylis hinaus- erweisen, dass der Determinismus in der Naturtheorie, trotz Heisenbergs Einwendungen zwar nicht als ein Gesetz der Natur an sich angesprochen werden kann, trotzdem aber mehr als blosse "Hypothese", nämlich Voraussetzung aller konsequenten Erfahrung des Geschehens bleibt, auch wenn die Bedingtheit zu erforschenden aller Naturereignisse nicht in jedem einzelnen Fall beobachtbar wird.

Im Hinblick auf die Cambridger Autorität C.D.Broad weist Baylis nach, wie wenig mit Broad's hochkomplizierter Lehre getan ist, das Ethische als eine Komponente von verschiedenen Arten von Nützlichkeit und Angemessenheit an verschiedene Elemente einer Situation ("fittingness") festzulegen. Die "goldene Mitte", die Broad hier vorschwebt ist, wie meistens sonst, nach Baylis' berechtigtem Scherzwert so wenig fassbar ("elusive") wie das Gold am Ende des Regenbogens. Aber auch die in England und Amerika hochangesehene Deontologie des Oxforder Sir W.D. Ross und seiner Anhänger wird mit Recht von Baylis unzulänglich gefunden. Ross fürchtete offenbar wie einst Kant gegenüber Herder, dass Forderung menschlichen Glücks ein nicht genügend vigoroses ethisches Prinzip sei. Er besteht deshalb darauf, dass neben dem "good", der Sorge für menschliche Wohlfahrt, auch das "right", sogenannte "prima facie duties" (Pflichten, die unmittelbar, auf den ersten Blick, als Pflichten zu charakterisieren sind) wie die Pflicht des Einhaltens von Versprechen als ethische Prinzipien anzuerkennen seien. Baylis weist dem gegenüber überzeugend darauf hin, dass auch

jene Pflichten, die das "right" konstituieren, ihre Berechtigung nur aus dem überragenden Prinzip der Glücksbeförderung herleiten können.

So kommt Baylis schliesslich zu dem Ergebnis; alle die ausgedehnten Anstrengungen der gegenwärtigen englischen und amerikanischen Ethik führen nur zu dem Resultat, dass "pleasure", "happiness", "Freude" als das einzige"intrinsically good", das alleinige, seiner inneren Natur nach ethische Gut zu rechtfertigen ist. Ein Programm der Ethik aber, das auf solchem oder verwandtem Grund aufbaut, ist, wie er nur zu treffend zufügt, meistens höchst unzulänglich formuliert und fast durchgängig missdeutet worden. Es hat den logischen Positivismus Bertrand Russell's wie Rudolf Carnaps und die "emotive ethics" des Amerikaners Charles L. Stevenson dazu geführt, den Wahrheitscharakter aller ethischen Urteile überhaupt zu leugnen und ihnen nur den Wert einer unverbindlichen emotionalen Äusserung zuzubilligen, die allenfalls von wahren Aussagen über reine Tatbestände begleitet werden kann.

Baylis Werk nennt sich bescheiden nur eine Einführung in die angelsächsische Ethik. Er ist dies, aber zugleich auch erfrischend mehr.

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Exepl. für Joe Frank

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Rezension

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aus

[illegible]

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stillschweigende

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So kann Bayles scharfsinnige Zergliederung alle die ausgedehnten Meinungen der gegenwärtigen englischen und amerikanischen Ethiker für jeden Resultat, dass pleasure, happiness, Freude das einzig intrinsically good, das alleinige, seiner immanenten Natur nach ethische Gut zu rechtfertigen ist. Ein Programm der Ethik, das auf solchen oder verwandten Grundlagen baut, ist, wie es mir scheint, mehr als bisher ungenügend formuliert und fast durchgängig missdeutet worden. Es hat den logischen Positivismus, Bertrand Russell, wie Rudolf Carnap und die "emotive ethics" der Amerikaners Charles L. Stevenson dazu geführt, den Wahrheitscharakter aller ethischen Urteile überhaupt zu leugnen und ihnen nur den Wert einer subjektiven emotionalen Äusserung zuzubilligen, die allenfalls von rationalen Aussagen über reine Tatbestände begleitet werden kann.

Bayles Werk vermag solch Verhängnis nur eine Zeitlang zu hemmen, solange die rationale Ethik Bestand hat, aber zugleich auch eine sprechende Mahnung.

David Baumgardt

(Rezension) Rezens Hegel

Wenke,Hans: Hegels Theorie des objektiven Geistes,Halle-Saale 1927,Max Niemeyer,125 S.

Hans Wenke hat mit dieser Erstlingsschrift eine ausserordentlich sorgsame und sowohl historisch wie sachlich besonders begrüssenswerte Arbeit vorgelegt.Denn unsere riesenhafte Hegelliteratur schwankt ja leider noch immer weitgehend zwischen den beiden Gegensätzen,dass entweder die Sprache d er alten Hegelschen Dialektik allzu skrupellos von den Nachfolgern weitergesprochen wird,oder dass statt dessen die ganz reiche logische Arbeit des Hegelschen Panlogismus allzu beherzt als blosse Schale in absolute Missachtung gerät zu gunsten des blossen Gehaltes der verschiedenen Einzelglieder in diesem umspannendsten Pan-System. Die Schrift Wenkes aber hält sich in vorbildlicher Klarheit(wie übrigens alle von Spranger ~~inspirierten Hegel~~-Arbeiten) von diesen beiden Extremen frei. Sie sucht in ihrem ersten Teil in ~~höchst~~ feinsinniger Lebendigkeit die logischen Grundbegriffe und ~~die~~ Aufbaugesetze" des Hegelschen Systems mit modernen Darstellungsmitteln und doch wahrhaft treu zu erfassen. Und sie gibt dann im zweiten Teil ebenso knapp und plastisch die gediegenste Durchleuchtung des Hegelschen Begriffs vom objektiven Geiste, ~~die wir bisher besitzen~~. Für den Philosophen wie auch für den Geisteswissenschaftler jeder Spielart ist daher gerade diese kurze,aber ernstlich eindringliche Einführung in ein Kernstück Hegelschen Denkens von besonderem Wert.

[illegible] Intelligenz und unseren Nerven [illegible] das Übernormale als natürlich zu gelten hat.

Angesichts der allerorts Berufung auf Religion wird im Namen der Freiheit darauf insistiert, dass unmöglich eine Religion durch [illegible] Akt ihres Absolutheitsanspruchs irgendwelchen Einspruch durch ihre religiöse Praxis beglaubigt werden können. Sie sollte sich vielmehr auch verantwortlichen Fragen stellen müssen. Angesichts zu [illegible] Fundamentalismus bedarf es hier einer Klärung. Aber auch die Vernunft [illegible] Aufklärung [illegible] Kant [illegible] Aber auch die Vernunft hat ihre Grenzen, wie noch Kant glaubte, sie muss [illegible] Konflikte. Es ist erstaunlich, wie viele unlösbare Verpflichtungen [illegible] besonders von Einzelnen gefordert und vollbracht werden [illegible] Pflichten [illegible] dass sie gelebt hat.

Kants kategorischer Imperativ [illegible] Gesetzesvernunft, auch [illegible] im Zusammenhang mit dem Universalisierbarkeitsprinzip der Kantischen Ethik [illegible] kann [illegible] werden darauf, eine Zusammenhang [illegible] sonst der Gefahr, in die [illegible] Kantischen Ethik [illegible] Regel blind [illegible] Richtlinie [illegible]

Australasian Journal of Philosophy Review Cassirer

Ernst Cassirer: The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Translated by Fritz Koelln and James P. Pettegrove. (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1951, pp.366 pp. Price $6.00 (London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Price 40/-). First Beacon Paperback ed, 1955, by arrangement with Princeton U. Press, 1955

Like the entire lifework of Ernst Cassirer, the present volume ~~excels~~ shows by ~~a~~ an equal mastery ~~as great~~ in elucidating fundamental problems of science and ~~those of~~ the humanities.

In the panoramic view of the eighteenth century philosophy which is unfolded in this volume, fortunately now translated from the German edition of 1932, Cassirer removes especially two old prejudices against the thought of Europen enlightenment. He carefully tries to show why the philosophy of that epoch was not one of mere criticism, of destructive analytic dissection or of shallow"reflection", as Hegel had once indicated under the acclaim of numerous other historians. True, the leading thinkers of that century were rather critical of the "esprit de système" of their predecessors which manifested itself most strikingly in the deductive chains of argument of Spinoza's all-embracing system. But D'Alembert, Hume, Diderot and other great representatives of that time certainly did not lack a highly constructive , synthetic "esprit systématique".

Further, Cassirer vigorously defends eighteenth century thought against the frequent reproach of neglecting the colorfulness of facts in favor of far too strong a belief in abstract reason -- a belief, it is true, to be found in the aesthetics of Gottsched as well as in the political practiee of the French Revolution. Cassirer's work was thus the first of at least three great contemporary attempts at a thorough re-evaluation of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Karl Joel, too, depicted in his Wandlungen der Weltanschaung, vol.II,1934,how much "liberating and (concreticizing" power of making concrete) power lives in the philosophy of the eighteenth century, not only in minds like that of Buffon; and Paul Hazard's three volumes on La Pensée Européenne au XVIIIe siècle,1946, follow quite similar trends.

In contrast to these two later works, which offer a vast array of

graphic details, Cassirer's work concentrates on the analysis of far fewer principal ideas, such as those of Maupertuis' and D'Alembert's philosophies of nature, Condillac's, Hume's and Tetens' psychologies and epistemologies, Tindal's and Voltaire's philosophies of religion, Montesquieu's and Herder's philosophies of history, Rousseau's and Condorcet's philosophies of society, Dubos', Lessing's and Edmund Burke's aesthetics.

But despite or just because of this self-limitation to rather abstract perspectives, this work will remain of lasting value as long as the definitely secular philosophizing developed in the eighteenth century shall occupy the modern mind.

As to the English translation of Cassirer's work, it seems to me quite doubtful whether, for instance, the term "abstract sciences" can pass for an adequate rendition of the German term "Geisteswissenschaften". But, of course, not too much emphasis should be placed on this point.

David Baumgardt

Washington, D.C.
USA

Cassirer just came out in a new edition, an FSR Beacon Paperback ed. by arrangement with P.U.P., 1955. So I hope you will still be good enough to publish your review of it which I enclose. I certainly would not have offended you again in this matter save for 2 reasons. First, the aged widow of E. C. who is in a very poor state of health was truly disappointed to hear that my review was rejected by you. (2). You certainly do not remember that you had asked me to write a review of the Philosophy ed. when you declined to publish it but definitely promised me to bring out, instead, a brief review of his vol; and I feel sure you will keep a promise. From this I promise you I will not publish anything further — be it as your obvious interest in Cassirer is not in any way connected with the history of philosophy. I fully realize that you obviously have no interest in Cassirer's and my work. But I should be obliged to you if you would return the enclosed lines in the fundamental issue of this

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Ernst Cassirer: The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Translated by Fritz C. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1951, pp.366. Price $6.00. (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. Price 40/-)

Like the entire lifework of Ernst Cassirer, the present volume excels (by) will a mastery as great in elucidating fundamental problems of science as those of the humanities.

In the panoramic view of the eighteenth century philosophy which is unfolded in this volume, fortunately now translated from the German edition of 1932, Cassirer removes especially two old prejudices against the thought of Europen a enlightenment. He carefully tries to show why the philosophy of that epoch was not one of mere criticism, of destructive analytic dissection or of shallow"reflection", as Hegel had once indicated with under the acclaim of numerous other historians. Tue, the leading thinkers of that century were rather critical of the "esprit de système" of their predecessors which manifested itself most strikingly in the deductive chains of argument of Spinoza's all-embracing system. But D'Alembert, Hume, Diderot and other great representatives of that time certainly did not lack a highly constructive, synthetic "esprit systématique".

Further, Cassirer vigorously defends eighteenth century thought against the frequent reproach of neglecting the colorfulness of facts in favor of far too strong a belief in abstract reason -- a belief, it is true, to be found in the aesthetics of Gottsched as well as in the political practice of the French Revolution. Cassirer's work was thus the first of at least three great contemporary attempts at a thorough re-evaluation of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Karl Joël, too, depicted in his Wandlungen der Weltanschauung, vol.II,1934,how much "liberating and concreticizing" power lives in the philosophy of the eighteenth century, not only in minds like that of Buffon; and Paul Hazard's three volumes on La Pensée Européenn au XVIIIe siècle,1946, follow quite similar trends.

In contrast to these two later works, which offer a vast array of

graphic details, Cassirer's work concentrates on the analysis of far fewer principal ideas, such as those of Maupertuis' and D'Alembert's philosophies of nature, Condillac's, Hume's and Tetens' psychologies and epistemologies, Tindal's and Voltaire's philosophies of religion, Montesquieu's and Herder's philosophies of history, Rousseau's and Condorcet's philosophies of society, Dubos', Lessing's and Edmund Burke's aesthetics.

But despite or just because of this self-limitation to rather abstract perspectives, this work will remain of lasting value as long as the definitely secular philosophizing developed in the eighteenth century shall occupy the modern mind.

As to the English translation of Cassirer's work, it seems to me quite doubtful whether, for instance, the term "abstract sciences" can pass for an adequate rendition of the German term "Geisteswissenschaften". But, of course, not too much emphasis should be placed on this point.

David Baumgardt

Washington, D.C.
USA

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Beyond Existentialism. J. von Kintelen. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd [196] 264 pp. 30s.

It is a strange spectacle to the historian of philosophy to see how throughout the centuries generations of thinkers could believe that either metaphysics or positivism would be dead for ever after their respective death sentences had been pronounced by their opponents. Still empiricism and metaphysical speculation are both much alive with us, though severally not to the same degree in the same country and at the same time. Far more complex than the clear-cut contrast between these two markedly different attitudes of the philosophizing is the case of the so-called existentialism. The existentialist movement proclaims to present metaphysics without any positive teaching about transcendence and secular thought without any specific interest in positivistic knowledge and often with a conspicuous disesteem of it. After a renaissance of Kierkegaard's Christian existentialism, secular existentialist thought has now dominated for several decades German and to a considerable extent French and American thought, though it has hardly made itself felt in a similar way in present day Anglo-Saxon philosophy.

Von Kintelen's richly documented work has the extraordinary merit to have laid out in in penetrating detail how far and why the existentialist movement has failed to reach its ambitions aims. This extremely difficult task is performed without any bias and for a marked, constructive purpose. As existentialism is impelled by far-reaching emotional needs and strong intellectual energies of 20th century life, an English version of this work was overdue and is especially to be welcomed.

Existentialism is fond of being artistic expression as well as abstract thought. Jean Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Gabriel Marcel, Miguel de Unamuno, José Ortega de Gasset, authors of extended philosophical writings, are, at the same time, high ranking figures in contemporary literature, Rainer Maria Rilke is one of the greatest German lyricists and a philosopher as well. Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, on the other hand, have

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Von Rintelen masters this vast material in a sovereign manner; and certainly no proper approach to existentialism is feasible without a full understanding of the artistic mood (die Stimmung) which underlies practically all existentialist thought and colors its principal utterances with a special literary and even poetical vigor. The basic emotions of the movement are fundamental anxieties of our time, "fear and trembling", as Kierkegaard called them, despair, the threat of the nihil and the ever new attempts at overcoming this desperation. More than a hundred years after Kierkegaard and three hundred years after Pascal, statements of this kind about the destiny of man might be utterly unimpressive had the existentialists not made highly complicated efforts to have these feelings grounded in a metaphysics, a concept of "Being itself" "far deeper" than the realm of individual, subjective or — alas -- neurotic sentiments. Von Rintelen, however, shows with utmost assiduity why any unbiased analysis of human life and reality in general lends itself as much or more to quite opposite moods of contemplation, to a joyful, not a defiant affirmation of existence and a feeling of profound "Geborgenheit" (being sheltered) as Otto Friedrich Bollnow named this basic sentiment. Heidegger

constantly "nihilating the nihil" being and human existence can maintain themselves afloat against destruction (Heidegger in Was ist Metaphysik, 1929. pp. 20 ff). ~~Jaspers~~ According to Sartre, life is only "a flight into the desert with the furies as companions" (p. 37); and Jaspers emphasized that solely by failure (im "Scheitern") ("im Zerschellen"), by "being dashed to pieces" is man able to touch and experience something of true transcendent reality. There is no gainsaying that these and similar poetical pictures are powerful expressions of age-old tragic experiences of mankind and that their subjective honesty with which they are uttered is in the leading existentialists thoroughly convincing. But to offer this "theologia crucis" - in scorn of every "theologia gloriae et contemplationis" (128) - as the only possible interpretation and solution of the problems of "being and existence" is as pretentious as it is hopelessly one-sided and inconclusive.

Further, von Rintelen points with great circumspection to the over-emphasis which especially Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (1927) and Sartre place on dynamism under a manifest neglect of the power of stillness and of true peace of mind. Only movement, "action", "questioning", "openness", indefinite strife, project, resolve not form or measure are here the criteria of superior value (198, 182). It is a glorification of a "freedom without recognition of any binding obligations" (57), "a breathless" marching on no matter whither (~~178~~) (53). Beyond variegated types of the so-called philosophy of life, even death is seen here as "rampant in the midst of life", life as nothing but a permanent "running forward" to, "being directed toward death" (50 f), an incessant drive from a pre-natal to a post mortem nothing. So existentialism presents itself, to a large extent, as a radically dionysiac philosophy which has an undeniably strong appeal to the restlessness of our time and all times; but, unfortunately, it lacks that indispensable directive power of the ordering intellect, that Apollinic spirit which the

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In the rush of all-devouring change even the stabilising demands of ~~logical principles and~~ the laws of logic, including the principle of identity, are here rejected; and existentialism likes to revel in "la contradiction métaphysique" (Regis Jolivet). Being is here, at the same time, Nothing, "elucidating" is "concealment," is "hiding" according to Heidegger; failure is, according to Jaspers, success; and despair is to (same) also

James' Le mythe de Sisyphe the only possible type of happiness (31, 177). As ancient and appropriate this use of paradoxes is in poetry and as much as it prevailed in former mystical and metaphysical thought, the principle of identity cannot be banned (this way from philosophy altogether, as Heidegger wished to do when he insists that only the "propriety" of paradoxical and challenging "expression" (foremost counts in thought, not the rules of static logic (213).

But is there indeed much "expressed" by very many of the striking existentialist formulas? Von Rintelen rightly denies this and shows with admirable skill how little is often said and how provocatively formalistic, ~~a good~~ how merely emotionally expressive a good number of these shining pronouncements are if pressed for content of ~~thought~~ meaningful thought. All concrete content is "suspect" here (Johannes Thyssen, 199). There remains only an "undecided" existential "decision" or "decided indecision" (99, 114), a devotion to Being coupled with Being's demand "Never shalt thou ask me" (195). As (is the case) in Kant's formalistic categorical imperative (so here) all that is concretely, contentually "definable and determined," is abandoned (62). What alone matters to the existentialist, is a heroic intention without any regard to what is intended. Particularly Sartre takes free will for freedom from acknowledgment of any objectively valid values. So with the justified (style) war against "reification" of the spirit (§ 98ff), at the same time, the totally unjustified contempt of

contempt of objectively valid judgments, of objective standards and of unambiguous concepts has regrettably gone hand in hand. An "eternal "seeking" is preferred to any clarifying answer (115). The mere formalism of existentialist teaching, demanding only ~~defiance~~ a resolve defying despair must forever leave a way open to the approval commitment of even the most shameless crimes, as it did in the ~~approve~~ Heidegger's adherence to Nationalsocialism in 1933.

In his later writings Heidegger tried to overcome the philosophy of despair and his formalism, for instance, by speaking of a closer nearness to Being, to the whole and holy, at least in a distant future, by believing in "the coming of the figures of the gods" in the sense of Hölderlin (127, 189ff), and Jaspers who always was a staunch opponent to Nazism showed far more esteem for the exact sciences than Heidegger does even now. Still even (his Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte 1952) at present, von Rintelen's characterization of existentialism has, on the whole, has by no means become outdated. There is still in the movement much of a "resolved non-committal attitude an existential belief intentionally without any specific essence, an emotional confession and drive without a definite meaning and aim (189, 193), an "elevation" (196, 216) from "the guilt of existence" to a deliberately vague hope of "Advent" (139, 181), a fullness without content, an unobjective objectivity", a meaningful meaninglessness" (141), a daring pointing to transcendence which says that speaking of transcendence is impossible, an inexplicable Yes emerging by itself from a desperate No (138), an Inferno praised as the most beatifying paradise. But the mention of these few main points of von Rintelen's well founded criticism can however give only a faint idea of the work's numerous additional analyses of equal subtlety.

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developed by him in his Dämonie des Willens (1917) and Von Dionysos zu Apollon (1948). In this reply to the demands of existentialism, the author's principal postulate – fortified by his vast learning in the field of medieval philosophy – is the rational exploration of objectively valid values – values finally anchored in "a transcendent sphere" (59), in infinity and timelessness (240, 223), in "God, the highest value" (242). While the English translation of von Rintelen's work takes the author's into account also existentialist writings not published at the time of the first appearence of von Rintelen's book in German (see e.g. English text p. 173), this original German version of 1951 emphasizes by its very title the finite character of existentialist philosophizing even more visibly than the present English text. The German title of Beyond Existentialism was Philosophie der Endlichkeit. My own convictions laid down in my writings are less conservative than von Rintelen's. But this is not the place to argue about such differences of our positions, despite our common disapproval of existentialism.

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The translator of Beyond Existentialism, Miss Hilda Graef, Oxford, has carried through a heroic struggle against overwhelming odds of complex German language and has, on the whole, done very valuable work. Heinrich Heine once observed that for the understanding of Jakob Boehme not only the knowledge of German is needed but also that of Boehmian; and something similar applies to Heidegger who, too, loves to do daring violence to the common hackneyed phrasecology and shares with the theosopher of the 17th century the emphasis on "grim" in being" (192). It is, therefore, gratifying that Miss Graef sometimes gives, along with her translation, not only the original German term but also an alternative English rendering and even one suggested by the author. Still, to cite one example, Rilke's "Weltinnenraum" (38, 118, 167), unfortunately coming up several times in the book seems to me the translation of hardly satisfactory.

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Von Rintelen's answer to the basic questions raised yet not answered by any existentialist is sketched in the last chapter of *Beyond Existentialism* and even more emphatically developed in his *Dämonie des Willens,* 1947, and *Von Dionysos zu Apollon,* 1948. In this reply to the demands of existentialism, the author's prime postulate (fortified by his vast learning in medieval philosophy) is the rational exploration of objectively valid values—values finally anchored in "a transcendent sphere" (59), in infinity and timelessness (240, 223), in "God, the highest value" (242). Such "intrinsic values" are to him to be "discovered" and, contrary to Sartre's ethics, in no way to be "invented" or "posited . . . only by the subjective" human "will" (229 f). While the English translation of von Rintelen's work also takes into account existentialist writings not published at the time of the first appearance of the author's book in German (see, e.g., English text page 173), this original German version of 1951, by its very title, emphasizes the finite character of existentialist philosophy even more visibly than the present English translation. The German title of *Beyond Existentialism* was *Philosophie der Endlichkeit.* My own convictions laid down in my writings are less conservative than von Rintelen's. But this is not the place

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DAVID BAUMGARDT

Bitte senden Sie mir diese Korrektur freundlichst gelegentlich zurück. Hoffentlich passt sagt Ihnen diese Einsendung. Im Anschluss schicke ich schon und bat ihn, Ihnen und Herrn Dr. Hinner direkt wegen Der Rang des Geistes und der Übersetzung von Herrn Dr. Hinners kleinem Buch zu antworten.
Herzlichste Grüsse, bitte auch für Herrn Dr. Hinner, und auf baldiges Wiedersehen und mit den anderen schönen grüssenden Freunden
Die Festschrift soll noch diesem Herbst erscheinen.
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Von Rintelen masters this vast material in a sovereign manner; and certainly no proper approach to existentialism is feasible without a full understanding of the artistic mood (die Stimmung) which underlies practically all existentialist thought and colors its principal utterances with a special literary and even poetical vigor. The basic emotions of the movement are fundamental anxieties of our time, "fear and trembling", as Kierkegaard called them, despair, the threat of the nihil and the ever new attempts at overcoming this desperation. More than a hundred years after Kierkegaard and three hundred years after Pascal, statements of this kind about the destiny of man might be utterly unimpressive had the existentialists not made highly complicated efforts to have these feelings grounded in a metaphysics, a concept of "Being itself" "far deeper" than the realm of individual, subjective or — alas — neurotice sentiments. Von Rintelen, however, shows with utmost assiduity why any unbiased analysis of human life and reality in general lends itself as much or more to quite opposite moods of contemplation, to a joyful, not a defiant affirmation of existence and a feeling of profound "Geborgenheit" (being sheltered) as Otto Friedrich Bollnow named this basic sentiment. Heidegger

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DAVID BAUMGARDT : HIST OF MOD ETHICS : ADD'L MATERIALS; 1930 - 1940's

12/7

Comment on Professor William F. Albright's Paper
Some Functions of Organized Minorities

The last five points of Professor Albright's paper seem to me as constructive for the future as his historical review is instructive concerning the past.

Even if one takes into account cruelties of medieval German Bishops and the terror of the Spanish Inquisition it seems to me that the Christian Church was on the whole more tolerant than were the civil authorities and there was relatively little oppression of the Jews in Southern Spain and North Africa between the tenth and fifteenth centuries if one takes into account that for instance Maimonides could at least leave Cordova and successfully settle in Cairo.

The hot iron of liberal fanaticism and all-forgiving milksop liberalism can, I think, be satisfactorily handled only if as much skill is used as Professor Albright is showing and demanding. The interesting mixture of German aggressiveness with slight humanitic, international, Christian or philosophic inhibitions can indeed be best illustrated by references to such types of Germans as Lagarde, Treitschke, Stöcker and Schopenhauer.

Professor Albright's five motives for the encouragement of minorities are closely interwoven with eachother so as to form almost one whole. All the more important is, I believe, his dissecting them in several distinguishable elements. The stand which he is taking above majority- and minority-chaivinismprovides, in my view, the only basis of understanding and fertilizing group-tensions.

There are only minor points concerning facts on which I dissent. Wolfgang Köhler has so far as I know no Jewish blood. But he and Hans Driesch belong to the most internationally minded Germans. Evidence of this is a far too little known essay by Köhler, published in April 1933 in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in Berlin and Driesch's report on his travellings in China and U.S.A. as well as correspondence and talks I myself and my father had with him. Professor Albright's main thesis, therefore, stands: Breysig pointed to four German thinkers none of whom is by any means a German nationalist.

Of somewhat greater interest is perhaps my final point. Very many Zionists may agree that all baptized "assimilated" German Jews were "cowards". I myself am a Zionist. But I should not call the Mendelssohns, Heinrich Heine, Gabriel Riesser, Ferdinand Lassalle, Eduard Lasker and Walter Rathenau cowards. I believe that German Jewish assimilation was a more subtle and complicated historical phenomenon.

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Ratneaugs. Loerke, Paquet, Frobenius. ---Für die neue Edierung der Schriften W-R. gestatte ich mir, auf H. Dr. Sch. M. aufmerksam zu machen. Sch. M. hat sich bereits durch 2 gr. u. bes. schwierige Herausgeberarbeiten im Inselverl. ausgezeichnet. Sowohl seine nach völlig neuen Prinzipien angelegte Ausgabe der Schriften Meister Ekk. wie seine Sammlung mystischer Dichtungen aus sieben Jahrh. haben bei den Fachgelehrten wie in der breiten Oeffentl. eine bes. nachdrückliche Anerkennung erhalten. Ich halte ihn daher seinen Fähigkeiten u. seiner editorischen Erfahrung nach für einen Literaturhistoriker, der der Neuausgabe der Schriften W-R. in jeder Hinsicht die wertvollsten Dienste leisten könnte.

Zeitschrift f. Rechtsphilosophie
Band Heft

5 Bitten

an die Herren Mitarbeiter der

~~Annalen der Philosophie~~

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Eine der stärksten Leistungen der Nachkriegszeit aber hat hier ohne Zweifel Ottmar Dittrich mit seiner Geschichte der Ethik" vollbracht. Was in diesen bis jetzt mehr als 1000 Seiten umfassenden Bänden an Neuland für die Geschichte der Ethik aufgedeckt worden ist, ist aufs höchste bewundernswert. Von den Vorsokratikern an bis zum Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts ist hier mit einer nirgends ermüdenden Energie ein überwältigend reiches Gedankenmaterial eingefangen und zur Darstellung gebracht worden.

Das verdienstvollste Werk dieser Art vor Dittrich war bisher das von Jodl, das denselben Zeitraum der Geschichte der Ethik ~~1906~~ (in der letzten vom Verfasser selbst besorgten Auflage 1906) behandelt hat. Aber die knapp 200 Seiten, die Jodl der gleichen Zeitspanne der Entwicklung der abendländischen Ethik ~~gewidmet hat~~, wirken heute gegenüber Dittrich nicht nur wegen ihres so viel geringeren Umfanges arm und dürftig. Sie können auch ihrem Gehalt nach keine annähernde Vorstellung von dem erwecken, was Dittrich hier an Gedankenkräften längst vergangener Epochen ~~wieder zu verlebendigen~~ aufzudecken verstand. Jodl's antitheologische Gesinnung war menschlich durchaus achtenswert, weil sie aus starker und mutiger Ueberzeugung entsprang. Aber sie konnte natürlich der ganzen ethischen Gedankenarbeit des Mittelalters nicht gerecht werden. Erst bei Dittrich kommt nicht nur die Ethik der Antike, sondern auch die der Kirchenväter, der Scholastik, der Mystik und des Humanismus, erst hier kommen die Stimmen fast aller europäischen Nationen und nicht nur die der reinen Philosophen, auch die der grossen weltanschaulich bewegten Dichter, der Politiker und der Juristen wirklich zur Geltung. Und erst hier, von der Analyse seiner Ethik her, wird eben die ganze Geistesarbeit des Mittelalters (bei dem Zurücktreten seiner doch viel tiefer stehenden naturtheoretischen Thesen) in ihrer Bedeutung für die gesamten Geisteswissenschaften wie für die Rechtsphilosophie in einem ganz neuen und freieren Ausmass sichtbar.

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kennt und nennt natürlich des Pseudo-Dionysius Wort von Gott als dem "überlichten Dunkel" (von den μυστήρια θεολογίας ἐν τῷ ἀκτίστῳ τὸ ὑπερφανέστατον ὑπερλάμποντα) wobei eben nur noch entsprechende Ausserungen mit ihren Konsequenzen hervorzuheben wären.

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Berlin

Privatdozent David Baumgardt

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Grotius, Pufendorf, Thomasius, 1927
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Ottmar Dittrich; Geschichte der Ethik, 1926. I. Band: Altertum bis zum Hellenismus, 374 Seiten, II. Band vom Hellenismus bis zum Ausgang des Altertums, 311 Seiten, III. Band Mittelalter bis zur Kirchenreformation 510 Seiten, Verlag Felix Meiner Leipzig.

Die moderne Geschichtsschreibung und auch die Geschichte der Rechtsphilosophie operiert gelegentlich gern mit dem Begriff der Legende. Und sie versteht dabei unter der Legende "die Fülle der Deutungen, die geistesgeschichtliche Leistungen aller Art erfahren können oder schon erfahren haben. Aber so fruchtbar und so dringend wünschenswert auch die Aufhellung solcher höheren legendarischen "Momente und Kräfte in der Geschichte ist, so gefährlich ist auch hier bei niederer Begabung des Historikers das Herabgleiten in wirklich blosse Legenden im vulgären und subalternen Sinn, d.h. das Aufgreifen blosser Scheindeutungen der geschichtlichen Mächte aus mangelnder Deutungskraft oder — was leider besonders in der Philosophiegeschichte nicht allzu selten ist — auch aus unzureichender Kenntnis der wahren Breite und des wahren Reichtums des gegebenen Materials.

Es ist noch immer erstaunlich, welche nichtssagenden oder schiefen Thesen sich in herkömmlichen Lehrbüchern der Philosophiegeschichte fortgeerbt haben, die sich dann bei wirklich intimer Kenntnis des Stoffes einfach unhaltbar enthüllen müssen (ich könnte hier von nachdenklich stimmenden Symptomen berichten, dass z.B. Ausgaben sehr oft genannter, aber wenig gekannter englischer und deutscher Denker seit einem Jahrhundert in der Berliner Staatsbibliothek zu völlig unübersichtlichen Bandstößen zusammengeheftet waren, ohne dass irgend ein Leser anscheinend bisher daran Anstoss nahm). Gegen solches mangelnde Wissen von den Quellen kann nicht genügend angekämpft werden; und es ist sehr tröstlich, dass es doch auch dieser Hinsicht nicht an Kampfkraft im deutschen Gelehrtentum fehlt. Eine der stärksten Leistungen der Nachkriegszeit aber hat hier ohne Zweifel Ottmar Dittrich mit seiner Geschichte der Ethik" vollbracht. Was in diesen bis jetzt mehr als 1000 Seiten umfassenden Bänden an Neuland für die Geschichte der Ethik aufgedeckt worden ist, ist aufs höchste bewundernswert. Von den Vorsokratikern an bis zum Beginn des 16. Jahrhdts ist hier mit einer nirgends ermüdenden Energie ein überwältigend reiches Gedankenmaterial eingefangen und zur Darstellung gebracht worden.

Das verdienstvollste Werk dieser Art vor Dittrich war bisher das von Jodl, das denselben Zeitraum der Geschichte der Ethik ~~1906~~(in der letzten vom Verfasser selbst besorgten Auflage 1906)behandelt hat. Aber die knapp 200 Seiten die Jodl der gleichen Zeitspanne der Entwicklung der abendländischen Ethik ~~gewidmet hat~~, wirken heute gegenüber Dittrich nicht nur wegen ihres so viel geringeren Umfanges arm und dürftig. Sie können auch ihrem Gehalt nach keine annähernde Vorstellung von dem erwecken, was Dittrich hier an Gedankenkräften längst vergangener Epochen ~~wieder zu verlebendigen~~ aufzudecken gen verstand. Jodl's antitheologische Gesinnung war menschlich durchaus achtenswert, weil sie aus starker und mutiger Ueberzeugung entsprang. Aber sie konnte natürlich der ganzen ethischen Gedankenarbeit des Mittelalters nicht gerecht werden. Erst bei Dittrich kommt nicht nur die Ethik der Antik tike, sondern auch die der Kirchenväter, der Scholastik, der Mystik und des Humanismus, erst hier kommen die Stimmen fast aller europäischen Nationen und nicht nur die der reinen Philosophen, auch die der grossen weltanschaulich bewegten Dichter, der Politiker und der Juristen wirklich zur Geltung. Und erst hier, von der Analyse seiner Ethik her, wird eben die ganze Geistesarbeit des Mittelalters (bei dem Zurücktreten seiner doch viel tiefer stehenden ~~Nat~~urtheoretischen Thesen) in ihrer Bedeutung für die gesamten Geisteswissenschaften wie für die Rechtsphilosophie in einem ganz neuen und freieren Ausmass sichtbar.

Nur die grossen Zusammenhänge des christlichen mit dem arabischen und jüdischen Mittelalter sind offenbar wegen der hier entgegenstehenden philologischen Schwierigkeiten der Quellenerforschung von Dittrich zurückgestellt worden. Und es ist ausserdem selbstverständlich, dass bei einem schon stofflich so weit ausgreifenden Werk gegenüber Einzelheiten in seinen Akzentuierungen noch für Verschiedenheit der Beurteilung Raum bleiben kann. So scheint mir beispielsweise in der Ethik Philos von Alexandreia das jüdisch religiöse Moment gravierender zu sein, als Dittrich und selbst Schürer, dessen Urteil Dittrich hier besonders heranzieht, annehmen. Aber diese Frage ist ja allgemein noch sehr umstritten. Oder bei Dionysius Areopagita und in vielerlei mittelalterlicher Mystik, die ihm folgen will, möchte ich etwa den Drang zur Bewältigung des Paradoxen in Ethik und Religion für gewichtiger halten, als dies bei D. hervortritt. Aber auch D.

kennt und nennt natürlich das Pseudo-Dionysius Wort von Gott als dem über-
lichten Dunkel"[1](von den μυστήρια θεολογίας ἐν τῷ σκοτεινοτάτῳ τὸ
ὑπερφανέστατον ὑπερλάμποντα) wobei eben nur noch entsprechende
Ausserungen mit ihren Konsequenzen hervorzuheben wären.

Und so bestätigt es sich überall:in diesem umfassenden Werk Dittrichs kommen die grossen und die kleinen Dokumente des ethischen Ringens der Menschheit so reich und getreu zu Wort,dass niemand mehr,der dieses Ringen und seine Auswirkung erfassen will,die Auseinandersetzung mit dieser monumentalen Arbeit umgehen kann.

Privatdozent Dr. Bauer
Berlin

1) z.B. Erik Wolf: Grotius, Pufendorf, Thomasius, 1927 S. 28 ff

Berlin-Schmargendorf
Suarezstr. 20

tive tones" from thecharge of betrayal; and, nevertheless, by reference to merely subjective emotions of pleasure and pain, he tried to establish an objeqtive theory of morals in a great number of most acute discussions of ethical method in general. I believe that no one should write on ethics without having become familiar with these discussions.

I am well aware that even the most guarded defense of consistent hedonistic ethics sounds outrageously shallow to practically all contemporary schools of ethics and to critics of the possibility of any scientific ethics. Therefore, I wish to build up my type of "consistent hedonism entirely at my own risk. ♯

Library of Congress

David Baumgardt

♯ Editor's note: In a letter of March 15,1944, Cassirer wrote the author:"Für Ihren Aufsatz fühle ich mich Ihnen zu herzlichem Dank verpflichtet. Er hat mich besonders erfreut,weil ich aus ihm ersehen habe, wie nahe wir uns in unseren ethischen Grundanschauungen stehen. Über Ihre Kritik an G.E. Moore und anderen englischen Ethikern kann ich wenig sagen,- da Sie diese Dinge sehr viel genauer kennen als ich."

H. of M. E.

Review

Stevenson, Charles L.
Ethics and language.

The author limits his task right from the beginning to the problems of ethical method and excludes, as he admits, "the most important branch of ethics," namely conclusions about what conduct is right and wrong.

As he emphasizes himself, he finds in the extremely sceptical analyses of the logical positivists Carnap and Ayer "much more to defend" then to attack. He too thinks that value statements as such can claim no strictly scientific validity but have only emotive meaning.

Nevertheless he wishes to free these views from any seeming cynicism and to save for ethics as much of objective validity as possible. He attempts to do so by introducing distinctions between "disagreement in belief and in attitude," "focal aims and ends" etc. By stressing the complex descriptive meaning which ethical judgments can have, in addition to their emotive meaning, he hopes to temper the contention that ethical judgments are neither true nor false.

This book is addressed exclusively to the professional philosopher. It represents a considerable enlargement of somewhat similar theses developed by the author in his contribution to the volume on THE PHILOSOPHY OF G. E. MOORE in 1942.

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Short paper on epistemology of ethics
Ethics of Motives and ethics of Consequences

Das verein[illegible] Erdbeben, Sturm und Tsunami. Mit [illegible] gerade ein Manuskript abgeschlossen mit Analysen der übersubtilen, intrikaten Verwebungen von ethischen Motiven und Handlungsfolgen. Die unglückselig hat dann der weise und noch viel zu dumme Seismograph D. B. ausgeschlagen oder besser gesagt, nicht ausgeschlagen! Mich hat mir bestätigt, daß das nicht ~~unnötige~~ besondere Schmerz und Entsetzung für Kiel bedeutete.

Denn wer kann das abschätzen, sobald wir in das Reich gehen, das jenseits aller Vernunft ist, wo man plötzlich mangelnde Denkerfalten entdeckt, die vor mehr als 25 Jahren unverändert da waren, und wo ein allerletzt sitzender Hosenknopf viel schwerer wiegt als die tiefsinnigste Metaphysik! So auch der "abgeklärteste" Ethiker viel mehr bissiger, kläffender Köter ist als sein bestgeschnittener Smoking ahnen lassen kann.

Es war ein Tag vollendet verfehlter Symbole. Ich kann noch völlig rechtzeitig zum Bahnhof, schicke gestern noch Weisung die letzten Koffer zweimal ab. Aber sie weiß nicht wirklich, auch bei der Abreise des Mannes nicht. Ich wies sie noch bis Bahnhofstor wie ein gehorsamer Hund neben her gelaufen. Aber das hätte ja eine Niederlage mit in Sieg verwandelt. Wie die Dankbarkeit sogar wirke, der Kinder ist groß. Sein Kredit völlig unerschöpflich. Aber die Liebe ist nicht einzuberufen durch bestimmte Verfahren oder in der Herstellung des Verfahrens, wie sie in der Stadt

(over)

biguous, he failed in these efforts. But the core of his principal thesis considerably refined will and must survive. We need to urge the indispensableness of the highest formal unity of apperception in morals as well as in physics.

There is no other way of avoiding the fall into catastrophic relativism and nihilism in ethics, though, in contrast to Kant, the concrete multitude of given empirical data must be taken into account in ethics as fully as in exact science. All this would point to a consistent hedonism infinitely more subtle than any previous one but paying full regard even to the most complex feelings of the human heart and stressing, at the same time, that highest universal aim, the maximization and intensification of the happiness of man.

Verfasser eben so wenig Ohr wie dafür, daß man das Thema der Weltgeschichte vielleicht noch nach anderen Regeln fugieren und paraphrasieren könnte, wie nach denen der patristisch-scholastischen Harmonielehre.

Die Süddeutschen Monatshefte widmen das 9. Heft des Jahrganges der Krisis des religiösen Bewußtseins. Der Band enthält zahlreiche bedeutende Beiträge aus allen Schichten und Lagern, die aktiv oder passiv an der Auswirkung dieser Krise beteiligt sind.

R. Unger setzt in der Vjsschr. f. Litw. VI, 2 seine Problem- und Literaturschau zu Sturm und Drang und zur Romantik mit einer gehaltvollen Ab- und Auswertung der monographischen Literatur fort.

Im Logos XVII, I veröffentlicht I. Koerner Fragmente Friedrich Schlegels zur Philosophie der Philologie und bemüht sich zugleich um den literarhistorischen Nachweis, daß der Ruhm, das erste System der Hermeneutik geschaffen zu haben, nicht wie Dilthey und neuerdings noch Wach angenommen haben, Schleiermacher, sondern Friedrich Schlegel gebührt.

Dem Problem der historischen Zeit bei Wilhelm von Humboldt geht W. Schultz (Vjsschr. f. Litw. VI, 2) nach. Er sieht in Humboldt zwei große Tendenzen der Zeitauffassung ineinander geschlungen und vielfach unversöhnt miteinander ringen: die romantische, die dem Rinnen der Zeit nachhorcht und sich ihm hingibt, und die klassische, die den Kern der Ideen in eine zeittranszendente Region verlegt, und das Wesen der Dinge den Gesetzen der Zeit nicht für unterworfen erachtet.

J. G. Fichte, Briefwechsel, herausgeg. von Hans Schulz, Leipzig, Haessel, 1925, Bd. I 619 S., Bd. II 638 S. —Seitdem Fichte von Nietzsche als das Muster eines „unmöglichen" Psychologen verhöhnt wurde, sollten eigentlich die Tage des alten blind pathetischen Fichte-Enthusiasmus gezählt sein. Denn dieser ältere Fichtekult war eben meist nicht nur blind, sondern auch hohl pathetisierend, und er verdarb damit völlig den Blick für die echte und die viel tiefer ergreifende Problematik des Fichteschen Wesens, wie diese Problematik von feinhörigsten Zeitgenossen, von Goethe oder Jean Paul oder auch von Friedr. Heinr. Jacobi noch viel wahrer empfunden worden ist. Es ist deshalb besonders dankenswert, daß jetzt endlich zu der Erfassung der gesamten menschlichen Erscheinung Fichtes wenigstens das grundlegende Material seiner Briefe in einer durch möglichst allseitigen Rückgriff auf die Urhandschriften wirklich textkritisch befriedigenden Form dargeboten wird in der neuen umfassenden Ausgabe von Fichtes Briefen, die Hans Schulz, der um die Fichteforschung seit längerem besonders verdiente Bibliotheksdirektor des Reichsgerichts, 1925 in 2 starken Bänden veranstaltet hat. Durch diese abschließend wertvolle Edition wird zunächst einmal die Zerstückelung des Briefwechsels in die älteren Ausgaben von I. H. Fichte, Moritz Weinhold, Georg Bülow und anderen vermieden. Außerdem aber ist hier eine wesentliche Bereicherung eingetreten durch den Abdruck von einer beträchtlichen Reihe bisher unveröffentlichter Stücke. Wer sich also heute mit dem Menschen wie mit der Philosophie Fichtes befassen will, muß notwendig diese Briefausgabe (ebenso wie des gleichen Herausgebers Parallelwerk „Fichte in vertraulichen Briefen seiner Zeitgenossen", 1923 erschienen) zugrunde legen.

Berlin. *David Baumgardt.*

Hans Wenke, Hegels Theorie des objektiven Geistes, Halle, Niemeyer, 1927, 125 S. — W. hat mit dieser Erstlingsschrift eine außerordentlich sorgsame und sowohl historisch wie sachlich besonders begrüßenswerte Arbeit vorgelegt. Denn unsere riesenhafte Hegelliteratur schwankt ja leider noch immer weitgehend zwischen den beiden Gegensätzen, daß entweder die Sprache der alten Hegelschen Dialektik allzu skrupellos von den Nachfolgern weitergesprochen wird, oder daß statt dessen die ganze reiche logische Arbeit des Hegelschen Panlogismus allzu beherzt als bloße Schale in absolute Mißachtung gerät zugunsten des bloßen Gehaltes der verschiedenen Einzelglieder in diesem umspannendsten Pan-System. Die Schrift Wenkes aber hält sich in vorbildlicher Klarheit (wie übrigens alle verwandten von Spranger angeregten Arbeiten) von diesen beiden Extremen frei. Sie sucht in ihrem ersten Teil in sehr glücklicher Lebendigkeit die „logischen Grundbegriffe und Aufbaugesetze" des Hegelschen Systems mit modernen Darstellungsmitteln und doch wahrhaft treu zu erfassen. Und sie gibt dann im zweiten Teil ebenso knapp und plastisch eine außerordentlich gediegene Durchleuchtung des Hegelschen Begriffs vom objektiven Geiste. Für den Philosophen wie auch für den Geisteswissenschaftler jeder Spielart ist daher gerade diese kurze, aber ernstlich eindringliche Einführung in ein Kernstück Hegelschen Denkens von besonderem Wert.

Berlin. *David Baumgardt.*

Die viel berufene Hegelrenaissance, die von den geistigen Märkten heute schon wieder in den Bereich stiller aber tieferer Wirkung zurücktritt, greift nun bereits weit in die Epoche mittelbarer Auswirkung des gewaltigen Mannes hinüber. Als eine willkommene Gabe bringt sie uns jetzt den Neudruck von Rudolph Hayms, Hegel und seine Zeit (herausgeg. von H. Rosenberg, Leipzig, W. Heims. 1927. 550 S., 25 M.). Neben allem, was die sieben Jahrzehnte seit seinem Erscheinen an Gewichtigem zur Erkenntnis Hegels hervorgebracht haben, erhält sich dies Werk aus Unmut und Liebe, aus politischem Haß und Tiefe des Urteils in unverwelklicher Frische, ein biographisch-politisches Kunstwerk und ein Zeitdokument ersten Ranges. Dem Neudruck beigegeben ist das prachtvolle Fragment eines Briefes Hayms an K. Rosenkranz sowie eine Rede zu Hegels hundertstem Geburtstag. Der Herausgeber H. Rosenberg hat dem Ganzen einen Aufsatz zur Geschichte der Hegelauffassung nachgestellt, der über Haym selbst viel Neues und Treffliches enthält. Leider beschränken sich seine Ausführungen auf Deutschland. Die Geschichte der Wirkung und Auffassung Hegels in Italien und Frankreich, in Ruß-

Additional material for a History of Modern Ethics:

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ÜBER EINIGE HAUPTMETHODENFRAGEN DER MODERNEN ETHIK

(Von Kant bis zur Gegenwart).

Von

David Baumgardt
(Berlin)

Typed from only printed copy
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1930

(Ursula Franck)

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UBER EINIGE HAUPTMETHODENFRAGEN DER MODERNEN ETHIK
(Von Kant bis zur Gegenwart).

von

David Baumgardt (Berlin)

(Printed: L o g o s, Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur, Band XIX,Heft 3, 1930)

Unter bewusster Abstraktion von allem eigentlich seelischen Gehalt moderner Weltanschauung soll in dieser Skizze gegenüber der Chaotik der modernen ethischen Meinungen nur die eine Frage erhoben werden: Welche wichtigsten Pnoblemstellungen und Methoden der Ethik sind es überhaupt, die zu so verschiedenen Resultaten führen konnten. Und zwar scheint mir dann zur Entwirrung dieser starken Durcheinanderschlingung von sehr verschiedenartigen Problemen für den ersten Überblick mindestens die vorläufige Scheidung von drei grossen Fragengebieten unentbehrlich.

I.

Die Problemsphäre des konsequenten Empirismus und Positivismus ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass hier das, was wir sollen, d.h. das ethisch Gültige, nur als das, was wir tatsächlich erfahrungsgemäss wollen, angesehen wird.

Der zeitlich erste aber und wohl auch der markanteste[1] Vertreter dieser Richtung ist für das 19. Jahrhundert Jeremy Bentham; zweifellos ist die Grundeinstellung Benthams so alt wie das menschliche Denken selbst, sie ist schon vor der griechischen Sophistenbewegung im nichtgriechischen Altertum zu finden,[2] Bentham selbst gibt besonders emphatisch an, von Priestley und Helvetius beeinflusst zu sein[3], ja sein

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1/Frau von Staël soll über B. geradezu geäussert haben: "Die verhängnisvollen Zeiten, in welchen sie gelebt habe, würden von der Nachwelt nicht das Zeitalter Bonapartes,...sondern das Zeitalter Benthams genannt werden." Siehe Ed.Beneke: Grundsätze d.Civil- u. Criminal-Gesetzgebung von Bentham-Dumont, 1830, Vorrede S.III.

2/S.z.B. Deussen: Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, 1914, I.Band 3. Abt.S.78, und Ders.: Vier Philos. Texte des Mahabharatam, 1906,S.985: "jeder schätzt jedesmal dasjenige als Pflicht, woran er gerade sein Gefallen findet" (wohl um 500 a.Ch.).

3/ I.Bentham: Deontologie (deutsch), 1834,Bd.I S.421/24, und Ders.: Works, 1838/43 Bd.X S.70, 142.

greatest-happiness-Prinzip findet sich bereits wörtlich bei Hutcheson.[1] Aber die Energie, mit der Bentham seine Lehre allseitig konsequent abrundete, die drastische Kritik, die er in spezifisch englisch-empiristischem Geist an der französischen rationalistischen Erklärung der Menschenrechte übte,[2] die glückliche Schlagkraft seiner Formeln haben ihm auch in Frankreich wie in Deutschland als typischem Vertreter englischer Ethik eine starke Wirkungsmöglichkeit gegeben. Bentham lehrt es besonders instruktiv: das Sittliche ist stets nur durch Beobachtung und durch Vergleichung der tatsächlichen, der empirischen Verhaltungsweisen des Menschen bestimmbar. Diese methodische Grundüberzeugung des ethischen Positivismus ist die letzte, sie ist die oft unausgesprochene, aber ganz unentbehrliche Grundvoraussetzung Benthams, ja fast der ganzen modernen englischen Ethik.

Erst aus dieser radikal empiristischen Fragestellung erklärt sich der volle Sinn des Satzes, es bestehe eine durchgängige "Koinzidenz", ja eine Identität von Pflicht, d.h. von ethisch Gültigem und von Interesse. "Von Pflichten zu sprechen, ist verlorene Mühe...Interesse und Pflicht decken sich in allen Dingen des Lebens"[3] Das tatsächliche Interesse, das einzige und das empirisch überall feststellbare Ziel des Menschen ist nämlich nach Bentham nur die Befriedigung des Eigeninteresses. Das Interesse des Menschen besteht nach Bentham stets nur darin, dasjenige nützliche Gut zu erstreben, das ihm die grösste Lust und die kleinste Unlust verschafft. "By the principle of utility is

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1/Hutcheson: Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, 1725, II, 3, 8.
2/ Siehe Bentham: Anarchical fallacies; being an examination of the declarations of rights issued during the french revolution, Works 1838/43, Bd.II S.489 ff.
3/ Bentham: Deontologie, Bd.I S. 6ff.

meant that principle, which approves and disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have, to augment or diminish the happiness of the party, whose interest is in question"[1]. "Upon...the principle of utility... the most abominable pleasure which the vilest of malefactors ever reaped from his crime would...not...be to be reprobated, if it stood alone. The case is, that it never does stand alone, but is necessarily followed by such a quantity of pain... that the pleasure in comparison of it, is as nothing"[2]. Es lässt sich also bei jedem Verhalten des Menschen genau bestimmen, welches Quantum von Lust dieses Verhalten in seinem Ergebnis einbringt, und "ist das Endresultat gut berechnet, so ergibt es Sittlichkeit; Unsittlichkeit aber, wenn die Berechnung falsch war"[2]. Die Ethik wird also für diese Theorie zur "Moralarithmetik"[4]. Diese Moralarithmetik aber zeigt nach Bentham: es liegt im Eigeninteresse des Menschen, Sympathie und tätiges Wohlwollen fur "human kind in general", ja für "the whole sensitive creation" zu üben.[5] Jedoch fast alle die scharfe Kritik, die der Benthamismus erfuhr, richtet sich nun bezeichnenderweise nur gegen die Resultate seiner empiristischen Methode, aber nicht gegen diese Methode selbst.

So hat Robert Owen in seinem "Book of the new moral world" im wesentlichen nur eine Erweiterung der Benthamschen Formel gefordert: nicht nur für die gegenwärtige Menschheit, auch für die grösstmögliche Wohlfahrt der späteren Generationen soll gewirkt werden, nicht nur das Glück der räumlich unendlichen Schöpfung, auch das Wohl der zeitlich

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1/ Siehe Bentham: Works, Bd.I, "An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation", Chap.I, Par.2, S.1.
2/ A.a.O. Chap.II, Par.4, S.4
3/ Bentham: Deontologie II, Einleitung S.28.
4/ Bentham: Deontologie Bd.I S.223 f., II S.23. Deontology (english), 1834, Bd.II, Kap.2 S.99.
5/ Bentham: Introduction to the principles of morals, Chap.VI Par.21; Works, Bd.I S.21; vgl. Deontologie (deutsch), Bd.I S.10.

nach uns kommenden Geschlechter steht in Frage.[1] Weiter aber steht sowohl der jüngere Saint-Simon wie Fourier oder Weitling und überhaupt eine grosse Zahl aller neueren Sozialtheoretiker mehr oder minder ausdrücklich auf dem Boden eines Bentham-Owenschen Positivismus, ja selbst Marx gehört mit einem Teil seiner moraltheoretischen Voraussetzungen hierher.[2] Und ganz ebenso ist auch die assoziationspsychologische Ethik, die James Mill durchführen will, nur eine geringfügige Korrektur der Benthamschen Lehre.

Erst John Stuart Mill bedeutet in England für den ethischen Positivismus einen -- wenn auch nicht zu überschätzenden -- Fortschritt. J.St.Mill hat in seiner induktiven Beobachtung der ~~xxxxxxx~~ tatsächlichen Wertungen des Menschen den Wert des Sozialen als relativ selbstständig erkannt neben dem Wert des Ökonomischen oder des Machtpolitischen (den Bentham als den allein grundlegenden ansah). Ja J.St. Mill erkannte überhaupt, dass die verschiedenen Werte nicht rein quantitativ miteinander vergleichbar sind; die "Lüste", die die verschiedenen Werte "verursachen", sind nicht rein zahlenmässig gegeneinander abschätzbar, sie zeigen letzte qualitative Differenzen. Aber die nähere Ausführung, in der Mill diese Erkenntnisse darlegt, ist oft wenig überzeugend oder innerlich schwankend zwischen einem Rettungsversuch des konsequenten egoistischen Utilismus (wir werden im Wünschen stets nur vom Eigeninteresse bestimmt,[3] können aber im Denken ein losgelöstes, alleinstehen-

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1/ Robert Owen: The Book of new moral world, London 1836-44, VII. Teil S.69ff.; vgl.J.M. Guyau: La Morale anglaise contemporaine (deutsch herausg. v. E.Bergmann), S.88.(Owen hat in diesem Werk fälschlich den Vornamen Richard statt Robert erhalten. Richard Owen war Anatom und Zoologe).

2/ Vgl. über Marx das Urteil in W.Wundts "Ethik" 1903 S.512f. und Ed. Sprangers "Lebensformen" S.289, für W.Weitling s.z.B.seine "Garantien der Harmonie und Freiheit", ed.Mehring, 1908,S.112: "Das Ideal höchster Vollkommenheit...ist...es....an de von der Natur uns allen bestimmten Quellen der irdischen Glückseligkeit hinüberzuspringen."

3/ Siehe J.St.Mill: Gesammelte Werke (deutsch) ed.Th.Gomperz, I.Band.,1869 S.139: der letzte Endzweck, in Rücksicht auf welchen alle anderen Dinge "wünschenswert sind...ist ein Dasein, welches...so reich als möglich an Genüssen ist" ("Das Nützlichkeits-Prinzip")

des Ich gar nicht vorstellen[1] und zwischen einer Anlehnung an einen "intuitiven" Sozialeudämonismus, für den das Glück und die "Würde" des Nebenmenschen ein "intuitiv" gegebener selbständiger Wert ist.[2]

Dagegen ist John Stuart Mill sicher im Recht, wenn er dem alten Streit zwischen der "induktiven" und der "intuitiven" Schule sehr oft keine allzu zentrale Bedeutung zuspricht.[3] Es ist ein Unterschied, ob alle möglichen Wertungen des Menshhen nur als Abarten einer einzigen angesehen werden (wie dies bei Bentham geschieht) oder ob die verschiedenen Werte als selbständig nebeneinander gelten. Und es ist ebenso ein Unterschied, ob die Vorstellung des sittlich zu Erstrabenden als empirisch erworben gilt oder als angeboren, wie dies letztere die intuitive Schule, wenigstens die schottischen Intuitionisten lehren. Aber alle diese Lehren bleiben streng innerhalb des Rahmens des ethischen Positivismus. Die Ethik ist für alle diese Theorien zunächst rein auf vorgefundenen, auf gegebenen Werttatsachen aufgebaut. Auch die angeborenen Ideen der Common-Sense-Philosophie -- zum mindesten in der Darstellung jener englischen Schule -- können nur tatsächlich gegebene Wertungen bedeuten; irgendein weiterer Beweis für die Gültigkeit dieser Wertungen ist aber hier nirgends versucht und nirgends durchführbar. Selbst Dugald Stewart, ein typischer englicher Repräsentant der intuitive Schule im 19. Jahrhundert, muss zugeben, dass auch seine Lehren nur zurückführen auf "some faculty by which we are capable of bestowing approbation or blame",[4] dass aber "the power of these adventitious causes.. is so great, that there is perhaps no particular

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1/ S.a.a.O.S.162: "da Jedermann...seines Gleichen hat,...so wachsen die Menschen auf, unfähig, einen Zustand völliger Missachtung der Interessen Anderer für sich als möglich zu denken."
2/ A.a.O.S.136f.; vgl. auch J.St.Mill: Logik (deutsch)1877,Bd.II,S.597.
3/ J.St.Mill: Werke 1869, Bd.I S.160/61; "Wenn es...wirklich etwas Angeborenes gibt, so sehe ich keinen Grund, weshalb das angeborne Gefühl nicht das der Rücksicht auf die Vergnügen und Leiden Anderer sein sollte?...Wäre dem so, so würde die intuitive Moral mit der utilitaristischen zusammenfallen."
4/ Dugald Stewart: The philosophy of the active and moral powers of man, works, 1855, Bd.VI., S.229.

practice, which we may not be trained to approve of or to condemn".[1] Also auch Stewarts Theorien sind im Kern positivistisch, ja sogar den Ergebnissen der induktiven Schule sehr angenähert, wie sich Mill weitgehend mit einem gemässigten "Intuitionismus" einverstanden erklären will.[2] Ja ein Denker wie Mackintosh konnte so -- vollkommen begreiflich -- von Guyau prinzipiell der Induktiven,[3] von Jodl vorwiegend der intuitiven Schule zugeordnet werden.[4]

Die Parallelerscheinung zu J.St.Mill bildet aber in Frankreich Auguste Comte. Comte hat in seiner Soziologie -- ebenso wie Mill -- den rein egoistischen Utilismus zu überwinden gesucht. So heisst es in dem Kapitel "Soziale Statik oder Lehre von der sich selbst vollziehenden Ordnung der Gemeinschaften" sehr deutlich: "Unsere sozialen Gefühle sind nicht so aushaltend und nicht so stark als die egoistischen Gefühle; indes beruht das gemeinsame Glück hauptsächlich auf der Befriedigung der ersteren, welche allein den sozialen Zustand begründet haben und ihn trotz des Widerstrebens der mächtigsten individuellen Instinkte aufrecht erhalten"[5] Also beide "Gefühle", sowohl der "individuelle" wie der "soziale Instinkt" werden in uns empirisch vorgefunden, und sie sind deshalb in gleicher Weise ethisch wertvoll und ethisch gültig. Auch "wenn man beim Menschen das Übergewicht der eigenen Interessen unterdrücken könnte, würde man unsere moralische Natur zerstören, anstatt sie zu verbessern; denn die sozialen Gefühle wären dann ihrer Leitung beraubt und würden in eine unbestimmte und

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1/Dugald Stewart: The philosophy of the active and moral powers of man, works, 1855, Bd.VI., S.229
2/J.St.Mill: Werke ed.Th.Gomperz,Bd.I S.160f.(Das Nützlichkeits-Prinzip).
3/Siehe J.M.Guyau: La Morale anglaise contemp. (deutsch), S.93f.
4/Siehe F.Jodl: Geschichte der Ethik, II. Band, 1912, S.408f.
5/A. Comte: Die positive Philosophie im Auszuge von Jules Rig, deutsch von J.H.v.Kirchmann, II. Band, 1884, S.107.

unfruchtbare Nächstenliebe ausarten".[1]

Ja Comte geht in seinem ~~%~~ "Positivismus" so weit, dass er behauptet: erst die kraniologische Forschung Galls, erst die "Physiologie des Gehirns"[1] habe die "Ausschreitungen"[1] des egoistischen Utilismus damit "vollständig widerlegen"[1] können, dass sie sowohl den Sitz der individuellen wie den Sitz der sozialen Triebe im Hirn nachgewiesen habe -- also gewiss ein kaum mehr zu steigernder "Positivismus" in diesem Nachweis, der ~~xix~~ ethischen Gültigkeit bestimmter seelischer Triebe, ein Nachweis, der sich erst -- oder schon -- mit der Aufzeigung der physischen Lokalisationen dieser Triebe ~~xx~~ begnügen will.

Im übrigen aber steht auch in Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert eine Diskussion zwischen induktiver und intuitiver Schule oft im Verdergrund. Cousin[2] und später Renouvier[3] zeigen häufig die Tendenz, die Kantische Ethik zu einer Lehre von angeborenen Prinzipien im Sinne Reids auszudeuten, während E.Littré und die ganze Comte-Schule es scharf betonen: "A ce point, la physiologie psychique retrouve le sens moral, mais... au lieu d'être primordial et inné il est secondaire et acquis; au lieu d'être absolu il est rélatif; aussi se montre-t-il variable suivant les individus, suivant les classes, et surtout suivant les époques".[4] Aber auch noch Guyau hält in seiner Schrift: "La morale anglaise contemporaine" den Gegensatz zwischen induktiver und intuitiver Ethik für die Frage, die sich über die "Gesamtheit der Dinge" erstreckte.[5] Zugleich ist freilich die intuitive Schule in Frankreich im Durchschnitt weniger psychologistisch als in England. Es wird hier bei den idées morales

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1/A.Comte: Die positive Philosophie im Auszuge von Jules Rig, deutsch von J.H.v.Kirchmann, II. Band, 1884, S.107.

2/S.z.B. V.Cousin: Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien, 1872, S.442f.."Avec Reid et Kant nous reconnaissons la raison comme le faculté du vrai, du beau et du bien...dans notre esprit" usw.

3/S.bei Ch.Renouvier, wenigstens in dieselbe Richtung weisend, z.B."essais de critique générale, traité de psychologie",1912,S.228: "Il faut donc avouer,que le sentiment moral,la passion du bien...sont les éléments de la loi (d.h.des Kantischen kategor.Imperativs) et des conditions de sa représentation."

4/E.Littré:Des origines organiques de la morale in der Zeitschrift, 1870: La philosophie positive, Bd.VI S.9f.

5/J.M.Guyau: La morale angl. contemp. (deutsch), S.268.

weniger Gewicht auf ihr tatsächlich vorfindbares Angeborensein gelegt, der Nachdruck liegt mehr darauf, die "Axiome und Prinzipien der Moral" als evidente "Vérités éternelles" zu erweisen im Sinne eines materialen Rationalismus und im Anklang an die naturrechtliche Auffassung des droits de l'homme der französichen Revolution (vgl. hier als Belege unter anderem Jules Simon: "Le devoir", 1863, S.271,278: "L'idée de la justice...est innée,,,il faut donc" la "rapporter à la raison, dont la fonction propre est de nous fournir les axiomes et les principes éternels, sans lesquels notre pensée...et notre liberté n'auraient point de règle." Oder E.Bersot: "Essais de philosophie et de morale", 1864, Bd.I S.497f.: "Il y a du bien et du mal, il y a de l'ordre dans le monde", ce sont "de vérités premières, évidentes, universelles,,,du sens commun... qui est la seule règle de la vérité", S.251: "Cet ordre moral es nécessaire comme les vérités mathématiques; aber Ähnliches auch bei Cousin, Vacherot und bei Proudhon z.B. "De la création de l'ordre dans l'humanité", S.36: "Das Sittengesetz ist ewig und absolut", zitiert und kritisiert bei Stirner: "Der Einzige und sein Eigentum" ed. Mackey, 1911, S.52. Weiter aber gleitet die intuitive Schule in Frankreich wie z.T. in England auch leicht über in metaphysische und religiöse Begründungen der Moralideen[1] und führt natürlich damit ebenso wie mit ihren rationalistischen Argumentationen über alle bloss empirische Ethik hinaus.

In Deutschland endlich hat der englische Empirismus besonders stark auf Friedrich E. Beneke gewirkt. Beneke hat die "Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation von Bentham" 1830 bearbeitet und übersetzt und er hat danach vor allem 1837 bis 1840 in seinem "System der praktischen Philosophie" seine eigene, konsequent empiristische

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1/ Vgl. z.B.Jules Simon: Le devoir, 1854, S.286: "Nous savons, qu'il y a une justice, qu'elle est éternelle, obligatoire, universelle; que par conséquent l'homme a des droits et des devoirs;...nous savons aussi que la justice repose en Dieu comme dans sa substance éternelle." E.Bersot: Essais de philosophie et de morale, 1864, Bd.I S.7: les vérités de morale naturelle, solides sans doute, mais sans efficacité faute de s'appuyer sur l'autorité d'un Dieu."

Ethik ausgebaut. Auch Beneke sucht hier wie bereits in der "Schutzschrift für meine Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten"[1] und wie in der Vorrede zu der Bentham-Bearbeitung die Vieldeutigkeit und die Unbrauchbarkeit des Benthamschen Lustbegriffes zu überwinden. "Die Werte aller Dinge, oder aller Güter und Übel" -- so heisst es bei Beneke im Unterschied von Bentham -- "werden geschätzt durch die Steigerungen und Hemmabstimmungen, welche dieselben in dem menschlichen Sein hervorbringen".[2] Und diese oft rein geistigen oder auch nicht genügend klar bewusster "Förderungen" und "Hemmungen"[3] hat nun Beneke allerdings viel feiner differenzierend beschrieben und gegliedert, als dies nach dem alles uniformierenden Benthamschen Lustbegriff möglich war. Ja selbst das Problem einer "Rangordnung der Güter oder Werte"[4] ist hier schon mit grösster Deutlichkeit bezeichnet, wenn auch keineswegs tiefer gelöst. Beneke führt es nämlich vielfach aus: "jeder unverdorbene...Mensch...wird...die Genüsse der Anschauung durch den Gesichtssinn und der Tonempfindung mit höherer Steigerung in sich bilden, als...gleich grosse Genüsse der niederen Sinne".[5] "Jeder rein gebildete Mensch...wird die intellektuelle Ausbildung höher schätzen, als sinnliche Genüsse",[5] er wird dem Wohle einer grösseren Gemeinschaft...einen höheren Wert beilegen, als dem individuell-beschränkten Wohle".[5] "Die Allgemeingültigkeit" dieser Wertabstufung aber "bestehe darin, dass die bezeichnete Rangordnung wirklich in allen Menschen durch die Grundverhältnisse ihrer praktischen Entwickelung auf gleiche Weise angelegt ist".[6] In solchen Argumentationen wird freilich

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1/ Friedrich Eduard Beneke: Schutzschrift f.m.Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten, 1823,S.52.
2/Grundsätze der Civil-und Criminal-Gesetzgebung aus den Handschriften des englishhen Rechtsgelehrten Jeremias Bentham herausgeg.von Etienne Dumont, bearbeitet und mit Anmerkungen von Fr.Ed.Beneke,Bd.I,Vorrede S.XIX.
3/Siehe Fr.Beneke: Grundlinien desnatürlichen Systems der praktischen Philosophie, Bd.I, 1837, S.226f.
4/Fr.Ed.Beneke: Grundsätze d. Civil- u.Crim. usw.,Bd.I S.58
5/A.a.O.S.59
6/Fr.Ed.Beneke: System d. prakt. Philosophie, Bd.I S.248, 87, 88.

augenscheinlich gerade die innere Unzulänglichkeit jedes blossen ethischen Empirismus sehr sichtbar. Nahe verwandt mit Beneke sind dann weiter die moral-theoretischen Fragmente Ludwig Feuerbachs aus den Jahren 1850-1870, wenn auch Beneke oder Bentham hier nirgends als Vorgänger direkt genannt sind. Feuerbach sucht alle ethischen Werte als "Glückseligkeitswerte" zu begreifen; und seine Kampf gilt von hier aus zunächst der "Moral eines für sich allein gedachten Individuums"[1] (die ihm "eine leere Fiktion"[1] ist), dann aber auch ganz besonders allen nicht rein empirisch aufzeigbaren Moralbegriffen[2], allen "blutlosen", "hypokritischen", "Metaphysisch chimärischen Allgemeingespenstern" wie der neigungsfreien Pflicht[3], dem rein vernünftigen Gewissen[4], der glückverleugnenden Tugend[5]. Und einen ähnlichen empiristisch begründeten Eudämonismus vertritt ferner -- neben Bolzano[5a] -- auch Gustav Theodor Fechner in der feinsinnigen Schrift: "Über das höchste Gut", in der ausdrücklich auch "das Maximum der Lust schlechthin als das Anzustrebende gesetzt"[6] wird. Aber auch der ganze spätere reine Empirismus und Positivismus (wie Laas[7], Gizycki[8], Dietzgen, Schubert-Soldern[9], aber auch Dühring[10], Schuppe[11], Mach[12], H. Sidgwick[13] und später Jodl[14], Corne-

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1/ L.Feuerbach: Sämtliche Werke ed.Bolin und Jodl, 1911,Bd.X S.269: "nur der gesellschaftliche Mensch ist Mensch.Ich bin Ich nur durch Dich und mit Dir." Oder S.270/71: "die Natur selbst...hat den gegenseitigen Glückseligkeitstrieb im Geschlechtstrieb...hervorgebracht."

2/ S.besonders a.a.O.S.288:"Die Moral ist so gut eine /Erfahrungswissenschaft wie die Medicin."

3/ S.a.a.O.Bd.II S.371:"Die Pflicht gebietet den Genuss! Die Entsagung ist nur eine traurige Ausnahme von der Regel."

4/ S.a.a.O. Bd.X S.281:"das...Gewissen ist nur der in den Eingeweiden meines eigenen Glückseligkeitstriebes wühlende, verletzte Glückseligkeitstrieb des Anderen."

5/ S.a.a.O.S.287: "Die Tugend ist die eigene Glückseligkeit..im Bunde mit fremder."

5a/ Siehe B.Bolzano: Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft, 1834, I.Band S.236 (anonym erschienen).

6/ G.Th.Fechner: Über das höchste Gut, 1846,S.17,10.

7/ E.Laas: Idealismus und Positivismus,II.Teil:Idealistische und positivistische Ethik, 1882.

8/ G.v.Gizycki: Grundzüge der Moral, 1883, später umgearbeitet zur "Moralphilosophie", 1888.

9/ R.v.Schubert-Soldern: Grundlagen zu einer Ethik, 1887.

10/ E.Dühring: Der Werth des Lebens, 1902,s.z.B.S.91: "Die Naturgesetze des menschlichen Handelns entwickeln sich kulturgemäss dadurch, dass der Mensch mehr Einsicht in sein eigenes Wesen, mehr Mitgefühl im gegenseitigen Verkehr...erlangt. So bilden und wandeln sich die Sitten." S.90: "Der...Materialismus macht an dem nichts schlecht, was

lius[1], ebenso wie Meinong[2] in seiner Frühzeit, G.Heymans[3] in Holland, R. Ardigo[4] in Italien ist é in allen seinen moraltheoretischen Grundanschauungen nicht wesentlich über die bisher skizzierten englischen, französischen und deutschen Lehren hinausgegangen.

In Wahrheit kam in der zweiten Hälfte des 19.Jahrhunderts die stärkste Anregung für die empiristische Wertlehre von der -- Deszendenztheorie her. Schon Lamarck hatte in seiner "Philosophie zoologique" erklärt: "Physisches und Moralisches" (das französiche "moral" enthält ja das Ethische mindestens als Teil in sich) "sind an ihrem Ursprung ohne Zweifel ein und dasselbe...Um den gemeinsamen Ursprung dieser beiden Wirkungsreihen, welche in ihrer grössten Verschiedenheit das bilden, was man Physisches und Moralisches nennt, darzulegen", habe man es nur "bisher schlecht angegriffen und einen Weg gewählt, der dem einzuschlagenden ganz entgegengesetzt ist". Man habe fälschlich "das Studium dieser beiden Arten von scheinbar so verschiedenen Gegenständen beim Menschen selbst begonnen...wo es...am schwierigsten ist, die gemeinsame Ursache so vieler Erscheinungen zu fassen...Man hätte sich statt dessen "bemühen sollen, auch noch die Organisation der anderen Tiere kennen zu lernen"[5]. Darwin ist dann dieser Forderung Lamarcks

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in der bisherigen Moral gut war."

11/W.Schuppe: Grundzüge der Ethik und Rechtsphilosophie, ~~1881~~ 1881.

12/E.Mach: Erkenntnis und Irrtum, 1905,S.102:"Ethik und Recht gehören zur sozialen Kulturtechnik und stehen desto höher,je mehr...sie sich nur auf Tatsächliches gründen."

13/H.Sidgwick: Methods of Ethics, 1875

14/F.Jodl: Allgemeine Ethik, herausgeg. v.Börner, 1918.

1/ H.Cornelius: Psychologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft, 1897, S.375ff 409 bis 414, und Einleitung in die Philosophie, S.337/57.

2/ A.v.Meinong: Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-Theorie, 1894.

3/ G. Heymans: Einführung in die Ethik auf Grundlage der Erfahrung 1914.

4/ R.Ardigo: Opere filosofiche, 1884ff., Bd.III,bes.S.190ff.; vgl.J. Bluwstein: Die Weltanschauung Robert Ardigos, 1911, S.36,88f.

5/ J.Lamarck: Philosophie zoologique (deutsch v.H.Schmidt), 1909,S.7f.

besonders im IV. und V. Kapitel seiner "Abstammung des Menschen" nachgekommen, und er hat hier bereits auf "unseren grossen Philophen Herbert Spencer hingewiesen.[1] Und Spencer ist dann in der Tat auch der klassische Ethiker des Evolutionsgedankess geworden.[2] Aber auch noch Guyau[3] und Fouillee wie Nietzsche haben in ihren nicht rein empiristischen Theorien gewisse Lehren des Evolutionismus mitverwandt, ganz abzusehen von solchen Büchern wie P.Kropotkin: "Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt" (deutsch von Landauer), 1920. Die Entrüstung, mit der einst noch Cohen[4] und Lotze[5] den Darwinismus in der Ethik ablehnten, ist übrigens heute völlig verschwunden; eine ähnliche Ablehnung richtet sich statt dessen seit 1900 mehr gegen die Forschung der psychoanalytischen Schule.

Eine letzte entscheidende Förderung aber erfuhr die empiristische Theorie, in einigen werttheoretischen Arbeiten der Gegenwart, besonders durch Scheler, Spranger und Nicolai Hartmann. Die Hauptleistung besteht hier, wie mir scheint, in dem allseitigen Nachweis, dass die verschiedenen Wertgebiete, durch deren verschiedene Schätzung das Handeln (wie das gesamte ethische Sein der Menschen) charakterisiert ist, spezifisbh, qualitativ untereinander verschieden sind. Nicht nur die Verwirklichung oder die Bevorzugung des Eigeninteresses oder des Ökonomischen überhaupt bedeutet etwas ganz Anderes wie die Erstrebung sozialer Werte, auch eine Betonung ästhetischer Werte ist für eine umfassende Ethik von der Bevorzugung theoretischer Werte zu uhterscheiden usw. Die Hauptprobleme der Ethik beginnen dann mit den Fragen: Welche Gruppe von zunächst

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1/ Ch.Darwin: The Descent of Man (deutsch v.Carus),1902, S.136.
2/ Wie radikal empiristisch diese Ethik sein will, s.z.B. aus dem Satz: "die Tatsachen der Ethik" sind von der Biologie, Psychologie und Sociologie dargebotene Verallgemeinerungen,...die Elemente jenes Gleichgewichts zwischen Constitution und Existenzbedingungen, welches gleichzeitig das sittliche Ideal und die Grenze darstellt, nach welcher hin wir fortschreiten" (Epitome der synthetischen Philosophie H.Spencers von Collins, deutsch von Carus, 1900, S.591).
3/ J.M.Guyau: Esquisse d'uee morale sans obligation ni sanction,1885.
4/ Siehe H.Cohen: Kants Begründung der Ethik, 1877, S.173
5/ H. Lotze: System der Philosophie, II.Teil: Metaphysik, 1912, S.626.

gleichberechtigten Werten ist im Konfliktfall als die objektiv höhere anzusehen?

Der ältere Empirismus, z.B.Beneke, hatte dieses Problem der Rangordnung der Werte damit gelöst, dass er behauptete: die Erfahrung selbst zeige es, dass tatsächlich stets "die intellektuelle Ausbildung" 1/ als das höhere Gut eingeschätzt werde gegenüber dem "niederen Sinnengenuss" 1/ das soziale Wohl als der höhere Wert gegenüber dem individuellen. 1/ Und diesen Lösungsversuchen hat sich -- wie klar erkannt werden muss -- prinzipiell methodisch auch Scheler noch in seinem moralphilosophischen Hauptwerk angeschlossen, unbeschadet aller sonstigen Diskrepanz zwischen seiner "materialen Wertethik" und der Benekes. Scheler ist hier in der Tat reiner "Empirist", wie er sich selbst in dieser Beziehung einmal mit Recht charakterisieren wollte. 2/

Auch das material-apriorische Erkennen und Werten bleibt -- wie dies ausführlich belegt werden kann -- in Wahrheit nur ein empirisches Erkennen und Werten, ja auch der Unterschied zwischen "Tatsache" und "Wesen" muss für dieses materiale Apriori Schelers flüssig werden. Die materiale Wesensschau kann in der Ausdehnung, in der sie von Scheler geübt wird, keinerlei "streng allgemeingültige Wesenserkenntnis" geben, und vor allem kann dieses materiale Apriori Schelers nichts mehr gemein haben mit dem unbedingt gültigen, formalen Apriori Kants, dessen alleinige Heranziehung aber freilich auch zum Aufbau einer vollen Ethik nicht ausreicht. 3/

So erscheint es mir schon aus diesen methodischen Gründen erkennbar, warum die Lösung, die Scheler hier dem Wertrangproblem gegeben

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1/ Fr.Ed.Beneke: Bentham-Bearbeitung, I.Band S.59; vgl. System der prakt. Philosophie, I.Band S.228 ff.

2/ M. Scheler: Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, I. Teil, 1913, S.46. Nur auf dieses Hauptwerk ist in dieser Skizze Bezug genommen.

3/ S. auch diese Fragen ausführlich diskutiert in meinem demnächst erscheinenden Buch: Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn in der modernen Philosophie, Geschichte der modernen Ethik von Kant bis zur Gegenwart.

hat, nicht genügen kann. Scheler behapptet, es bestehe eine "klare Evidenz"[1], dass die Werte des Edlen und Gemeinen höher sind als die des Angenehmen und Unangenehmen, die geistigen Werte höher als die vitalen, die Werte des Heiligen höher als die geistigen Werte.[2] Aber wie kann durch eine unmittelbare Erfahrungs-Wesensschau, wie kann durch ein materiales Apriori in dem höchst weiten und vieldeutigen Sinn Schelers (der von dem Husserls sehr zu scheiden ist) eine streng allgemeingültige Evidenz gegeben werden? Die Berufung auf die jedem "Sehenden" offenstehende Wesensintuition kann hier nicht ausreichen. (Denn ist es z.B. wirklich in "klarer Evidenz"[1] gegeben, dass man stets "Lebenswerte für...geistige Werte...opfern solle"?[1] Müssen nicht z.B. -- mindestens für gewisse Verfallsepochen oder für niedergehende dekadente Völker -- die vitalen Werte als die höheren gelten gegenüber durchaus echten geistigen "Esprit-Werten"?

Demgegenüber hat das Kapital über Ethik in Sprangers "Lebensformen" mit seiner Betonung der Frage der "Wertintensität" und mit seiner Ablehnung jeder einfachen Rangordnung der Werte die hier vorliegenden methodischen und inhaltlichen Schwierigkeiten unbezweifelbar viel schärfer klargelegt.[3] Und ebenfalls einen entschiedenen Fortschritt über Scheler hinaus stellt schliesslich N. Hartmanns "Ethik" dar mit der Annahme einer viel verwickelteren Schichtung der Werte im "Wertraum", d. h. Annahme
[1] auch eines "Koordinationsverhältnisses verschiedener Werte auf gleicher Werthöhe" und überhaupt eines "mehrdimensionalen" "Systems der Werte" mit Ausdehnung nicht nur in die Höhe, sondern ebenso "in die Breite".[4] Aber prinzipiell will doch auch Hartmann in dem "Empirismus" Schelers beharren; er hält -- sehr charakteristisch, aber, wie ich glaube, mit

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1/M. Scheler: Der Formalismus in der Ethik, I. Teil, S.106.
2/a.a.O. I. Teil, S.103ff, II. Teil, 1916, S.609.
3/Siehe E. Spranger: Lebensformen, 1921, S.249ff., 284ff.
4/Siehe N. Hartmann: Ethik, 1926, z.B. S.230, 270.

Unrebht -- bestimmte "metaphysische" oder "religiöse Deutungen" des Wertreiches, die man erst "hinter" diesem Reich beginnen lässt, in der Ethik für "gleichgültig"[1], und er hält so diese Gesamtfragen der Ethik schon durch eine fortschreitend differenzierende "Erfahrung" und "Beschreibung" aller irgendwie vorfindbaren und fassbaren Wertmomente unseres Werterlebens für ausreichend beantwortbar. Jedenfalls aber ist die einfache Übereinanderordnung der Werte, die Scheler in seiner materialen Wertethik annahm, wie sich dies bei Spranger und Hartmann deutlich ergibt, unhaltbar. Und zwar scheint sie mir vor allem deshalb unhaltbar, weil der Wert des Heiligen infolge seiner besonderen methodischen Bedeutung eben nicht in eine einfache Reihe neben oder über die anderen Werte gestellt werden kann.

Auch Scheler musste es nämlich sehr bezeichnend zugeben: die Werte des Heiligen oder Unheiligen "erscheinen nur an Gegenständen, die in der Intention als absolute Gegenstände gegeben sind. Unter diesem Ausdruck verstehe ich nicht etwa eine besondere definierbare Klasse von Gegenständen, sondern (prinzipiell) jeden Gegenstand in der absoluten Sphäre"[2]. Oder wie Spranger dies viel zutreffender und brauchbarer formuliert: "Das Wesen der Religiosität" ist "die Beziehung aller Werterlebnisse auf den höchsten Wert"[3], auf den "Totalwert des Lebens"[4]. Ist dies aber der Fall, so gehört damit auch methodisch dem religiösen Wert, mit Rücksicht auf welchen die übrigen Werte erst einen "Totalsinn"[5] erhalten, unabweisbar in einer Theorie der Werte oder der Ethik eine besondere Stelle. Und diesen Besonderen Platz haben eben die reli-

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1/S.a.a.O.S.123.
2/Siehe Scheler: Der Formalism. i.d.Ethik, I.Teil, S.107.
3/Ed.Spranger: Lebensformen, 1921, 2. Aufl., S.265.
4/S.a.a.O.z.B.S.43, 81 und öfter
5/S.a.a.O.S.43, 84 oder vgl.z.B. auch die sehr schöne hierher gehörige "Definition" Jean Pauls:"Der rechte Unglaube bezieht sich auf keine einzelnen Sätze und Gegensätze, sondern auf die Erblindung gegen das Ganze" ("Levana oder Erziehungslehre", I.Bändchen, par.38)

giösen und metaphysischen Probleme der Ethik in der Tat stets -- auch im 19. Jahrhundert -- eingenommen.

II.

Wir sahen bisher: die rein "erfahrungsmässige" Beschreibung der tatsächlichen Wertungen (und der "gegebenen" "Wertwesenheiten") bildet ein höchst wertvolles und ein sehr ausgedehntes Untersuchungsgebiet der Ethik. Der ethische Positivismus in seinen verschiedenartigen Nuancen leistet mit diesen "Deskriptionen" eine -- für jede Theorie der Ethik -- unentbehrliche Arbeit. Der Empirismus irrt nur, wenn er annimmt, mit einer rinnen Beschreibung der Werte und allenfalls mit einer Beschreibung ihrer "gegebenen" Rangordnung sei bereits eine Ethik selbst gegeben. Diese Annahme des Empirismus könnte höchstens gelten in dem Sinne des tiefen Goethesehen Satzes, dass alles Faktische schon Theorie ist. Im übrigen aber zeigt es der Empirismus selbst -- besonders in seiner gegenwärtigen Entwicklung --, dass die Tafel der "gegebenen" Werte bereits zu einem obersten Wert des Religiösen, des metaphysisch Absoluten hinführt; und erst durch die Einordnung aller möglichen Werte in diesen obersten "Tatsinn" des Daseins kann, wie ich glaube, eine Theorie der Ethik möglich werden. Und diese Probleme des religiösen Totalwerts haben daher die Ethik in der Tat auch im 19. Jahrhundert -- auf sehr verschiedenartige Weise -- beschäftigt.

Für den klassischen deutschen Idealismus nach Kant lag die Totalbedeutung des Daseins mehr in seinem "Vernunftgehalt", in einer notwendig-geltenden Voraussetzung, durch die das Sein einer Welt erst denkbar werden könne, ohne die keinerlei Sein denkbar sei. Dagegen in dem späteren metaphysischen Realismus, etwa bei Schopenhauer, aber auch allgemein in der Spätromantik und noch bei Nietzsche und bei E. von Hartmann, lag die religiöse Totalbedeutung der Welt in einem irrationalen gegebenen Wesen des Seins.

Für Fichte war so die Totalbedeutung des Seins charakterisiert als die "praktische Vernunft", "die absolute Pflicht", die "Vernunftfreiheit", als das "absolute Sittengesetz", oder was alles damit identisch sein soll, als das "absolute Ich" der Wissenschaftslehre oder später in dem "System der Sittenlehre von 1812" als der "absolute, schlechthin durch sich bestimmte Begriff"[1] oder Gott. Dieses absolute Ich ist nach Fichte in Wahrheit der notwendige und der als notwendig aufzeigbare Grund jedes empirischen Ich und Nicht-Ich, da eben alles bewusste Objekt wie Subjekt bereits ein ungeschiedenes Bewusstsein überhaupt voraussetzt. Es muss also schon, damit das empirische Ich und die empirische Welt voneinander unterschieden werden können, das absolute Ich, das sie umfasst, bestehen. Und so setzt auch vor allem das "Material der Pflicht", die Welt der empirischen Werte und das empirisch wertende Ich stets ein absolutes Wert-Ich voraus, ja dieser absolute Wert, das praktische Vernunft-Ich, das Sittengesetz hat -- nach Fichte -- die empirischen Werte und die empirischen Pflichten nur darum gesetzt, um durch sie und an ihnen sich zu verwirklichen, in ihnen zu "erscheinen". Alles "Nicht-Ich...wirkt durch Widerstand, welcher nicht sein würde, wenn wir nicht zuerst darauf eingewirkt hätten. Es greift nicht uns an, sondern wir greifen es an".[2] Dies ist "das Primat der Vernunft, in-wiefern sie praktisch ist".[2]

Was aber nun das absolute Ich oder das Sittengesetz, das Gesetz der Freiheit in Wahrheit ist, dies kann nicht durch "diskursives Denken"[3] erfasst werden, sondern es ist nach Fichte rein durch eine

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1/ J.G.Fichte: Nachgelassene Werke, Bd.III (XI) S.37.
2/ J.G.Fichte: Sämtliche Werke, Bd.IV S.93 (System der Sittenlehre von 1798).
3/ J.G.Fichte: Sämtliche Werke, Bd.IV S.136 (System der Sittenlehre von 1798).

"intellektuelle Anschauung"[1], durch "Intuition"[2] gegeben. "Die Materien der sittlichen Handlung" sind aber dann dadurch bestimmt, dass die sittliche "Handlung...liegen muss...in einer Reihe, durch deren Fortsetzung ins Unendliche das Ich absolut unabhängig würde"[3]. Oder nach einer Formulierung der Sittenlehre von 1812: "Dies...müsste man den Menschen sagen: du musst scheinen an dir selbst zu arbeiten...; dann arbeitet an dir Gott und treibt in dir sein Werk...Klarheit...ist das Vehikel aller Sittlichkeit!"[4] "das Ich soll erscheinen als Leben des Begriffs...Nur diese Erscheinung ist die der Sittlichkeit, und eine andere schlechthin nicht"[5].

Bei Hegel dagegen -- dem zweiten grossen reinen Idealisten nach Kant -- ist ebenfalls durch eine "intellektuelle Anschauung" eine andere grosse Totaldeutung des Daseins gegeben. Gott, der höchste, der absolute Wert und zugleich der innerste Kern und der Sinn alles Seins, ist hier die dialektisch entwickelte Vernunft. Und hiernach ist zugleich auch der Wert aller Dinge und der Wert aller sittlichen Phänomene bestimmbar durch den Rang, durch die Stelle, die alle diese Phänomene in dem zeitlosen Selbstoffenbarungsprozess der absoluten Vernunft -- dialektisbh nachweisbar -- einnehmen. An der Hand dieses einen methodischen Grundgedankens hat Hegel sowohl in dem "System der Sittlichkeit" von 1803 wie in der "Phänomenologie", in der "Enzyklopädie" wie in der"Rechtsphilosophie" eine ausserordentlich fesselnde Rangordnung aller ihm wichtigen sittlichen Phänomene entworfen. Und diese Bar-

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1/J.G.Fichte: Sämtliche Werke, Bd.IV S.XXX 47 (System der Sittenlehre von 1798).
2/A.a.O. S.136.
3/A.a.O.S.153.
4/J.G.Fichte: Nachgelassene Werke, Bd.III S.58-59 (System der Sittenlehre von 1812)
5/A.a.O.S.53.

stellung der sittlichen Bedeutung der Familie,[1] des "menschlichen"[2] wie des "unterirdischen Gesetzes",[3] des "abstrakten Rechtes",[4] der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft,[5] des Staates,[6] der "Weltgeschichte",[7] ja des Verbrechens[8] wird zweifellos -- schon durch ihr starkes historisches Verstehen sittlicher Erscheinungen -- stets eine der tiefsinnigsten Formen systematischer Ethik bleiben.

Während aber so für Fichte und für Hegel der absolute, der religiöse Wert ein wesentlich geistiges Geltungsprinzip bleibt (das absolute Ich bzw. die dialektische Weltvernunft), beginnt nun im Zusammenhang mit der Philosophie des älteren Schelling durchaus die Wendung zu einem höchsten irrationalen (oder zum mindesten -- shhon durch die betont koordinierende Einbeziehung der "Natur" in den "Vernunftbegriff" --) überlogischen Wert[9] in der Ethik. Schelling selbst bekennt zwar noch in dem Vorbericht zu seinem "Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit", er habe sich "bisher" wenig über "Gut und Bös... erklärt",[10] und er hat auch später keinerlei eigentliche Moralphilosophie geschrieben. Aber schon die pantheistische Identitätsphilosophie seiner Jugendepoche und das religiöse, wie das mythologisierende Denken seines Alters sind gerade typischer Ausdruck für die beiden mächtigsten methodischen Einstellungen, die auch in der weiteren spekulativen Ethik seiner Zeit wirksam neben dem Hegelianismus geworden sind.

1/ Siehe Hegel: System der Sittlichkeit, aus dem Nachlasse herausgeg. von G.Molkat, 1893, S.6ff; Werke 1832/45, Bd.VII, 2.Abt. S.393ff; Band VIII S.221-246; S.334ff.
2/ Siehe Hegel: Werke, 1832, Bd.II S.333,339ff..346.
3/ Siehe Hegel Werke, 1832, Bd.II S.333,339ff..346.
4/ S.a.a.O.Bd.VII,2.Abt.,S.379ff.; Bd.VIII S.72/147
5/ S.a.a.O.Bd.VII,2.Abt. S.394ff.; Bd.VIII S.246/312.
6/ S.a.a.O.Bd.VII, 2.Abt.S.403ff.; Bd.VIII S.312ff.
7/ S.a.a.O.Bd.VII, 2.Abt.S.420ff.; Bd.VIII S.430.
8/ Hegel:System der Sittlichkeit,Werke ed.G.Lasson,1913,Bd.7,S.450ff.
9/ S.z.B.Schelling: Sämtl.Werke, I.Abt.Bd.VII S.395/96: "Der...Verstand muss...das irrationale Verhältnis der Natur zu sich täglich mehr erkennen." Hier unterscheidet auch Schelling seine Lehre ausdrücklich von der eines "reinen Idealismus" (a.a.O.S.395).Vgl.auch Fichte: Nachgel.Werke, Bd.III S.32: "so hat Schelling mich bedauert; ich habe keine Natur. Ich gebe ihm sein Bedauern zurück, es ihm als Unglück zurechnend, dass er Natur hat, ein blindes Ungefähr."
10/ Schelling: Sämtl. Werke I, VII S.334.

So hat etwa K.Chr.Fr.Krause -- in einer inneren Verwandtschaft zu Schellings identitätsphilosophischem Pantheismus -- "das Gute für den Menschen"[1] rein durch "das Eine Gute"[2], welches "ist die Wesenheit Wesens, sofern Gott selbige in sich darlebt"[1], bestimmen wollen. Und die Wesenheit Wesens, ~~xxxxx~~ "das Eine Gute" ist auch hier -- in Anlehnung an die Identitätsphilosophie -- als "Natur und Vernunft in Vereinheit, als die höchste Vereinsphäre in Gott"[2] zu charakterisieren gesucht.

Weiter aber schliessen sich auch -- wie schon Jodl[3] dies richtig sah -- alle die späteren ethischen Fragmente Schleiermachers noch ganz nahe an den Gedankenkreis der Schellingschen Identitätsphilosophie an. Auch für Schleiermacher ist das "höchste Gut", der absolute Wert, "die Identität von Vernunft und Natur"[4], ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ oder genauer: "ein Minimum von Auseinandersein der Vernunft und Natur".[5] "Die Frage aber, ob diese und jene Gestaltung der Dinge ein Element des höchsten Gutes sein könne,...kann..niemand...abweisen"[6]. Und zwar soll nun eben diese ethische Gestaltung der Dinge, die Verwirklichung des höchsten Gutes, nach Schleiermacher auf sehr verschiedenartige Weise erfolgen, sowohl durch ein "organisierendes Verfahren"[6], d.h. durch eine "fortschreitende Einigung der Natur mit der Vernunft..., insofern sich die Vernunft im ethischen Verfahren dasjenige weiter bereitet, womit sie ins Unendliche fort auf das Übrige Handelt"[7].

1/ K.Chr.F.Krause: Vorlesungen über die Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaft, 1829, S.536.

2/ Krause: System der Sittenlehre, ed. Hohlfeld und Wünsche, 1888, S.217. - S.ferner a.a.O.S.291: "Es ist für den Menschen als sittliches Wesen erforderlich, dass er den Urbegriff des Einen Guten und des Gliedbaues desselben...erkenne;...dass er den Urbegriff und das Urbild des Guten stetig zu seinem eigenen, eigenleblichen oder individuellen Musterbegriffe und Musterbilde weiterbestimme."

3/ F. Jodl: Geschichte der Ethik, Bd.II, 1912,S.131.

4/ Siehe Schleiermacher: Werke ed. Braun, Bd.II, z.B.S.254.

5/ Schleiermacher: Werke ed. Braun, Bd.II S.254 (Ethik 1812/13).Vgl. a.a.O. S.561 (Güterlehre.Letzte Bearbeitung); ferner a.a.O.Bd.I S.475ff.: "das höchste Gut ist ein...Geeinigtsein...von Vernunft und allem irdischen Sein" (Begriff des höchsten Gutes, 2.Abhandlung). Vgl.ferner a.a.O. Bd.II S.36ff. (Tugendlehre 1804/05;a.a.O. S.200ff.: das höchste Gut ist Identität "des Productes und Producirens" (Brouillon zur Ethik 1805); a.a.O. S.423,425,426: das

wie zugleich durch ein "symbolisierendes" Verfahren[1], d.h. durch eine "sittliche Tätigkeit,...durch die die Vernunft ins Unendliche sich dasjenige ausbildet, worin sie erkannt werden kann"[1]. Ist das Organisieren ein "allgemein gleiches" oder "identisches", so ergibt sich der ethische Wert des Verkehrs, des Rechtes, des Staates; ist es ein "individuelles" -- Schleiermacher hat bekanntlich mit Recht den Wert des Individuellen in der Ethik besonders unterstrichen --, so ergibt sich der Wert des Eigentums, der Gesellschaft. Ist das Symbolisieren ein "allgemein gleiches" oder "identisches", so zeigt dies nach Schleiermacher den Wert des wissenschaftlichen Denkens, des Glaubens, der Schule; ist das Symbolisieren ein "individuelles", so sollen sich nach Schleiermacher die Werte des Gefühls, der Offenbarung, der Kirche ergeben. So erstrebt auch Schleiermacher überall in seinem unvollendeten System eine Ableitung, Einordnung, Bestimmung aller möglichen empirischen Werte durch einen höchsten absoluten, metaphysischen.[2]

Aber während in dieser ganzen identitätsphilosophischen Ethik sich ein starker metaphysischer Optimismus ausgelebt hat in dem festen Glauben an eine absolute höhere Einheit von Vernunft und Natur, von geltendem Wert und bloss natürlichem Sein, so weist im Gegensatz hierzu -- schon vom Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts an und bisher viel zu wenig beachtet -- noch eine völlig andersartige metaphysische Ethik gerade in die entgegengesetzte Richtung. Offenbar von Baader am Frühesten und am markantesten verfochten[3], aber auch von Geistern wie dem älteren Steffens[4], G.H. Schubert[3] (oder gelegentlich auch von Solger[5]) und anderen spekulativen Spätromantikern und schliesslich noch in

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höchste Gut ist die "Einigung der Vernunft mit der irdischen Natur überhaupt" (Ethik 1814/16).

6/ Schleiermacher: Werke ed. Braun, Bd.I S.467 (Begriff des höchsten Gutes, I.Abhandlung).

7/ A.a.O.Bd.II S.425. Vgl.S.93ff.,Bd.I S.475ff.

1/ A.a.O.Bd.II S.425. Vgl.S.93ff.,Bd.I S.475ff.

2/ S.z.B.Schleiermacher: Werke, Bd.II S.252: "Die Ethik" ist ein "speculatives,...aber doch...reales Wissen."

3/ Der spätere Schelling ist hier offenbar mehr von Baader abhängig als Baader von Schelling, s.hierzu und über G.H.Schubert mein

mddifizierten Formen von Kierkegaard übernommen, bricht hier in Anlehnung an den Mythos vom Sündenfall die schwerblütigste Metaphysik der Verzweiflung über die Schuld- und Schmerzbeladenheit der Sinnennatur hervor. Und in diese Entwicklung der metaphysischen Ethik gehört auch noch Schopenhauer hinein. Nicht nur der Pantheismus, sondern auch jede einfache metaphysische Deckung von geltendem Wert und Natur ist hier (bei diesen wesentlich theistischen oder atheistischen Denkern) geleugnet. Aber jedenfalls werden hier überall bei Baader wie dem älteren Steffens, bei Schopenhauer wie bei Kierkegaard alle einzelnen empirischenWertsetzungen aus der allgemeinen metaphysischen Verneinung mindestens des gegenwärtigen "natürlichen" Lebens gewonnen.[1] Und ähnlich besteht noch bei Ed.v.Hartmann der höchste Sinn des Daseins und damit der höchste ethische Wert in der "Erlösung" des Urwillens,[2] in der "bewussten" "Überwindung des ganzen Welt-und Gottes-Schmerzes";[3] und erst aus diesem "absoluten Zweck" der Weltverneinung werden für Hartmann alle sonstigen empirisch-sittlichen Zwecke und seltsamerweise dann auch wieder die "sittliche Mitarbeit an der Kulturentwicklung"[4] erschliessbar.

Buch: Baader und die philosophische Romantik, 1927.

4/ S.z.B. Steffens: Caricaturen des Heiligsten, 1819ff., Bd.I S.44, 41f.: "In aller Erscheinung verbirgt...sich...die Hölle." "Das Böse...ist ursprünglich wie die Natur, wie die Geschichte, wie die Seele selbst." "Fragt Euch...selbst, ob Ihr nicht Euch...einer Schuld bewusst seid, die...mit eurer Natur so innig verwebt ist, dass ihr beide, diese Natur und diese Schuld, nicht zu trennen vermögt."

5/ S.z.B. Solger: Nachgel. Schriften, Philos. des Rechts und Staats, Bd.II S.279f.: "Das Böse...wird...durch die Natur in der Existenz erhalten"; vgl. J.Heller: Solgers Philosophie der ironischen Dialektik, 1928, S.107.

1/ Siehe Schopenhauer: Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Bd.I, Buch 4, z.B. par.60: die moralischen Handlungsweisen sind solche, in welchen die Verneinung des Lebens "ihren Ausdruck findet".

2/ Ed.v.Hartmann: System der Philos.im Grundriss Bd.VI:Grundriss der ethischen Prinzipienlehre, 1909,S.211f.,204.

3/ S.a.a.O.S.214.

4/ A.a.O.S.213.

Innerhalb des russischen Denkens haben Bulgakow und Berdjajew besonders entscheidend auf Baader zurückgreifen wollen.[1] aber auch schon Solovojeff (der übrigens in seiner Frühzeit stark von Schopenhauer beeinflusst wurde)[2] besitzt Verwandtschaft mit Baaders deutscher metaphysischen Ethik.[3]

Dagegen in Frankreich ist auch die Annahme und Bejahung der stark irrationalen "idées forces" bei A.Fouillée oder des "principe de la vie" bei J.M.Guyau noch mehrfach als metaphysische Gesamtdeutung alles Daseins gedacht,[4] aus der heraus erst alle besonderen empirischen sittlichen Bewertungen gefolgert werden können. Und endlich bedarf es wohl kaum noch näherer Ausführung, dass auch der spätere Nietzsche alle Ziele des Übermenschen durch eine metaphysische Grunddeutung des

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1/ Siehe N. Berdiajew: Das Problem der Anthropodizee in H.Ehrenberg: Dokumente des östlichen Christentums, 1925,S.251; S.Bulgakow: Aus "Das Tageslicht", ebenda.

2/ Siehe W. Solovjeff: Ausgewählte Werke (deutsch), I.Band, 1914, Vorrede S.VII. Über die besondere Annäherung S.s an Baader a.a.O.S.IXf.

3/ Zur näheren Charakterisierung der Ethik Solovjeffs, s.z.B.Ausgew. Werke Bd.1 S.61,58: "das Dasein der Geschöpfe in Sinnlosigkeit, Trennung,...feindseligem Widerstreit...ist nur begründet in ihrer falschen Beziehung zueinander, die schattenhaft und vergänglich ist, ihr wahres Sein wurzelt in der Einheit mit allem. Die Krone des Seins gebührt nicht dem einzelnen, sondern dem Ganzen. Der Urbeginn und Quelle alles Seins ist...die absolute Einheit alles Seienden...Gott." --Gott ist also auch, "wie uns unser inneres Bewusstsein bezeugt,... das absolute Gute, d.h. Gott und ebenso alles, was sich mit Ihm schon vollkommen vereinigt hat." Aus diesem Grunde muss auch dieses "umfassende", dieses absolute Gute, die Einheit alles Seienden "die Norm unserer moralischen Beziehung zu allem enthalten". -- "Alles was ist, und alles was sein kann, wird nun in moralischer Beziehung durch drei Kategorien seines Wertes erschöpft; denn wir haben es entweder mit dem zu tun, was höher ist als wir, oder mit einem uns Gleichwertigen oder mit dem, was unter uns steht. Es ist logisch unmöglich, noch eine vierte zu finden." Deshalb soll also "das Prinzip der moralischen Vervollkommnung in drei Grundgefühlen enthalten, die die...natürliche Tugend ausmachen: im Schamgefühle, das unsere höhere Würde vor den Angriffen tierischer Begierden schützt, im...Mitleid, das uns mit allen...gleich macht, im religiösen Gefühle, in dem sich unsere Erkenntnis des höchsten Guten ausspricht" usw. (Die ersten Sätze stammen aus: "Die geistigen Grundlagen des Lebens", die letzten Sätze aus Bd.II, 1916 S.517/18, "Die Rechtfertigung des Guten, eine Moralphilosophie").

4/ S. zur Beurteilung dieser metaphysischen bzw. empiristischen Tendenzen bes. Ch.Christophe: Revue de metaphys. et de morale, 1901,S. 522ff., und H.Pfeil: J.M.Guyau und die Philosophie des Lebens, 1928, S.112ff.

gesamten Seins, durch den einen obersten Wert der Bejahung des irrationalen, metahpysischen Willens zur Macht zu begründen suchte.[1] Selbst die Theorien Stirners, die Nietzsche nach der Meinung Jodls nur weiter gedacht und bereichert haben soll, sind kaum als ein blosser Positivismus anzusehen. Nietzsche aber war höchstens in der Zeit des "Menschlichen, Allzumenschlichen" überwiegend Empirist. Dagegen in der "Geburt der Tragödie" wie in dem "Willen zur Macht" herrscht überall -- neben allem Reichtum an empirischer Seelenforschung -- eine letzte metaphysische Intuition, aus der heraus erst alle Einzelwerte herausgelesen werden, hier ist Nietzsche überall doch wesentlich metaphysischer Ethiker gewesen, so sehr er sich auch gegen alle Transzendenzgesinnung herkömmlicher Metaphysik gewehrt hat.

III.

Wie aber ist nun das Verhältnis zwischen empiristischer und metaphysischer Problemstellung im einzelnen näher zu bestimmen? Oder die Frage verallgemeinert: Müssen sich diese beiden und eventuell noch sonstige Fragestellungen in der Ethik weitgehend gegenseitig ausschliessen? Oder gibt es einen übergeordneten methodischen Gesichtspunkt, von dem aus alle diese verschiedenen Fragen als unentbehrliche und sich gegenseitig ergänzende Momente einer gegliederten Gesamtfrage erkannt werden können und müssen? Auch dieses umfassendste Methodenproblem ist zweifellos in der Geschichte der Ethik schon öfters berührt oder, besser gesagt, gelegentlich gestreift worden.

So hat Fries die "praktische Philosophie"[2] zerlegt in "I. Ethik, praktische Naturlehre, Lehre...vom Werth und Zweck menschlicher Handlungen und 2. in Religionslehre, praktische Ideenlehre, Lehre vom

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1/ Siehe Nietzsche: Werke (Taschenausg.), z.B. Bd.IX, 1906, S.448: Unsere Werte sind in die Dinge hineininterpretiert...Aller Sinn ist "Wille zur Macht" (alle Beziehungssinne lassen sich in ihn auflösen), vgl. ferner a.a.O.S.471, 18,520f.

2/ Jakob Friedr. Fries: Handbuch der praktischen Philosophie, I. Band, 1818, S.12.

Zweck der Welt"[1]. Und Fries hat sich auch bemühen wollen, das "gegenseitige Verhältnis"[2] zwischen dieser metaphysisch religiösen Wertlehre und der wesentlich empirischen Wertbeschreibung klarzustellen. Aber diese Klarstellung bleibt doch im allgemeinen vollkommen auf folgende Sätze beschränkt: "Wir sehen nun leicht, dass in der That die religiöse Frage die höhere sey, denn dem Zweck der Welt sich unterordnend wird der Mensch erst die Zwecke seines Lebens ansetzen können. Aber über den Zweck der Welt gibt es keine wissenschaftliche Lehre; die Ideen desselben können Menschen nur im Gefühl fassen, welches die Schönheit und Erhabenheit des Lebens in der Natur anerkennt. Wissenschaftliche ist daher nothwendig die Lehre der Ethik das erste, sie ist die begreifliche, von dem wir uns erst zu dem höheren unbegreiflichen können hinüber leiten lassen"[3]. Und besonders in der Durchführung seiner Ethik bleibt Fries lediglich bei der Behauptung: das, "was gut und recht"[4] ist für den Menschen, werde bereits stets durch einen "rein vernünftigen Ausspruch unserer Überzeugungen rein apriori entschieden."[4] Während er in der "Religionsphilosophie oder der Weltzwecklehre" nur zu dem Ergebnis kommt: "Das höchste Gut...ist für den einzelnen Menschen subjective Seelenruhe aus Selbstzufriedenheit"...[5] "Für die Welt aber ist das ewige Gut: jedes Leben trägt in der eigenen Schönheit seinen Werth!"[6]

Dagegen das methodische Verfahren in Herbarts Ethik erinnert auffallend mehr an methodische Grundeinstellungen des 17. und 18. als des 19. Jahrhunderts. Wie es im Zeitalter Descartes' oder Christian Wolffs versucht wurde, alle Erkenntnis auf einer Reihe von völlig in

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1/ J.Fr.Fries: Handbuch der praktischen Philosophie, Bd.I, 1818,S.12.
2/ A.a.O.S. 14.
3/ J.Fr.Fries: Handbuch der praktischen Philosophie, Bd.I, 1818, S.14/
4/ A.a.O.S. 112ff., 116.
5/ J.Fr.Fries: Handbuch der praktischen Philosophie, Bd.II, Die Religionsphilosophie oder die Weltzwecklehre, 1832, S.150.
6/ A.a.O. S.151.

sich evidenten, rationalen Vorstellungen und Vorstellungsbeziehungen aufzubauen, so lehrt auch Herbart für die Ethik: "das Löbliche und Schändliche besitzt eine ursprüngliche Evidenz, durch vermöge deren es klar ist, ohne gelernt und bewiesen zu sein. Allein die Evidenz durchdringt nicht immer die Nebenvorstellungen, welche theils begleitend, theils von jenem selbst verursacht, sich einmischen. Daher bleibt es oftmals unbemerkt; oft wird es gefühlt, aber nicht unterschieden; oft durch Verwechselungen und falsche Erklärungen entstellt. Es bedarf also, herausgehoben, und in ursprünglicher Reinheit und Bestimmtheit gezeigt zu werden. Dieses vollständig zu leisten, und die theils unmittelbar gefallenden, theils durch die Aufgabe, das Missfallende zu meiden, herbeigeführten Musterbegriffe (Ideen) geordnet zusammenzustellen, ist die Sache der allgemeinen Ästhetik"[1], von der die Ethik nur ein Untertail ist. Diese "ursprünglichen" Musterbegriffe (Ideen), die die praktische Philosophie aufstellen kann und muss, sind nach Herbart bekanntlich die "Idee der inneren Freiheit"[2], "der Vollkommenheit"[3], "des Wohlwollens"[4], "des Rechts"[5], "der Billigkeit"[6] (von ihnen "abgeleitet" die Ideen der beseelten Gesellschaft"[7], des "Kultursystems"[8], des "Verwaltungssystems"[9], "Lohnsystems"[10], der "Rechtsgesellschaft"[11]). Und diese fünf "ursprünglichen Ideen" sollen nun keineswegs durch eine bestimmte menschlich-seelische Veranlagung gegeben sein ("das moralische Gefühl ist verwiesen aus den Grundlegungen der Sittenlehre"[12]) der praktischen Philosophie kann es "nicht darauf ankommen, den Geschmack"[13], der uns die Urteile über die "ursprünglich gefallenden

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1/ I. Fr.Herbarts Sämtl.Werke ed. Hartenstein, 1850, Bd.I S.124 (Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie).
2/ S.a.a.O. Bd.VIII (Allgemeine praktische Philosophie) S.33ff.
3/ S.a.a.O.S.37ff. 4/ S.a.a.O.S.41ff. 5/ S.a.a.O.S.45ff.
6/ S.a.a.O.S.53ff. 7/ S.a.a.O.S.101ff. 8/ S.a.a.O.S.96ff.
9/ S.a.a.O.S.90ff. 10/ S.a.a.O.S.83ff. 11/ S.a.a.O.S.78ff.
12/Herbart: Sämtl. Werke ed. Hartenstein, Bd.VIII S.12 (Allgemeine Praktische Philosophie).
13/A.a.O. S.13.

sittlichen Verhältnisse" gibt, "psychologisch zu erklären"[1]), und ebensowenig können und sollen diese "Ideen" durch eine rein metaphysische Intuition, durch eine "intellektuelle Anschauung" erschlossen werden,[2] sondern sie sollen ein rein Geltendes bedeuten (im Sinne eines materialen Rationalismus, wie ihr Herbart stets vertrat. Wei aber dieses Geltende in den verschiedenen "Fällen"[3] des "Lebens"[3] anzuwenden sei, hierauf antwortet Herbart nur, sei keinerlei "vollständige Auskunft"[3] zu geben. Es sei hier vielmehr jeder "--nicht...nur zuweilen, sondern auf immer -- an sein Herz...zu verweisen; an jenes Zartgefühl, welchem die Schätzung der Annäherung des Wirlichen an die Ideen ist zugeschrieben worden. Nicht als ob in den einzelnen Fällen Elemente von sittlicher Bedeutung vorkommen könnten, deren Vorbild nicht in den Ideen enthalten wäre. Sondern weil die Ausmittelung des Factischen, die bestimmte Nachweisung dessen, was den Ideen in dem Wirklichen entspricht, Schwierigkeiten findet, die sich durch Begriffe nicht heben lassen, da sie nicht im Reich der Begriffe, sondern in den Dunkelheiten und Vieldeutigkeiten der Empirie selbst ihren Sitz haben".[4]

Dagegen wirkenimmerhin die wenigen kurzen Skizzen, die Lotze für den Aufriss einer Ethik hinterlassen hat, in einigen Punkten wenigstens klärender als Herbart. Lotze greift wohl noch sehr häufig zurück auf eine Art "latent...eingeborener sittlicher Ideen",[5] die sich an der Hand sittlicher Erfahrung entwickeln sollen.[5] "Ganz einfach ausgedrückt, kommen wir daher darauf zurück, dass wir nur von unserem (sc. eingeborenen) Gewissen die Aussprüche erwarten, welche uns die allgemeinsten

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1/ A.a.O. S.13.
2/ Jeden Versuch, seine "ursprünglichen" 5 Ideen wieder einem "höheren", einem eigentlich metaphysischen Princip unterordnen zu wollen hat Herbart "mit aller Strenge" abgelehnt, z.z.B. a.a.O.S.27.
3/ A.a.O.S.31 (Allgemeine praktische Philosophie).
4/ A.a.O.S.31/32.
5/ Siehe H.Lotze: Die Prinzipien der Ethik, 1882 (wieder abgedruckt in H.Lotze: Metaphysik ed. G. Misch, 1912, S.610, 611f.).

sittlichen Grundsätzen festsetzen. Es wird auch niemand bezweifeln, dass keine Theorie uns jemals von anderen Verpflichtungen überzeugen wird, denen diese Zustimmung des Gewissens fehlt"[1]. Und weiter wird einfach behauptet, es gibt eben "mancherlei Verhältnisse der Dinge und der Ereignisse, denen ein eigener Wert und Unwert insofern zukommt, als sie zwar überhaupt bloss in unserem Gefühl beide erlangen, dann aber unabhängig von unserer Willkür, so dass auf einige ein unmittelbares, nicht abzuänderndes Urteil des Wohlgefallens oder der Billigung, auf andere eins des Missfallens oder der Missbillingung fällt, und dass endlich auch nach einem gleich unmittelbaren Anspruch unseres Gefühls bestimmte Gradunterschiede dieser Werte feststehen".[2]

Aber abgesehen hiervon findet sich dann doch bei Lotze ein sehr interessanter -- wenn auch ganz unzureichender -- Versuch, die methodischen Grundprobleme der Ethik durch einen Parallelisierung mit denen der Naturtheorie weiter zu fördern. "Keine Erkenntniss des Wirklichen" -- so heisst es nämlich z.B. -- "entstand ohne die Erfahrungen, welche"[3] den Grundsätzen alles Erfahrens "den Inhalt ihrer Beurtheilung lieferten; umgekehrt konnte nie die Erfahrung allein die höchsten Grundsätze erzeugen, nach denen sie beurtheilt zu werden verlangt. Die praktische Philosophie bietet eine vollständige Analogie".[4] Auch in der praktischen Philosophie soll also nach Lotze auf die gleiche Art eine Verbindung des Geltenden mit dem Tatsächlichen gesucht werden, wie dies bereits in der Naturerkenntnis geglückt ist.

Ähnliche Anregung aber für solche umfassendsten Methodenprobleme der Ethik findet sich ferner auch bei Sigwart. Auch Sigwart vertritt noch ausführlich die Theorie von einer im Menschen "angelegten...Empfänglichkeit für "sittliche Gefühle"[5]. Aber neben diesen empiristisch

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1/ H.Lotze: Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie, Diktate aus den Vorlesungen Lotzes, 1899, S.13.
2/ A.a.O.S. 12/13.
3/ H.Lotze: Metaphysik ed. Misch, S.625.
4/ H.Lotze: Metaphysik ed. Misch, S.625.
5/ Chr. Sigwart: Vorfragen der Ethik, 2. Aufl. Ed.H.Maier, 1907, S.63.

psychologischen Lehren betont er zugleich: "in dem Gedanken also eines einheitlichen und höchsten Zwecks, zu dem sich alle einzelnen Zwecke der bestimmten Handlungen wie Teile oder Mittel verhalten, kann sich erst mein Selbstbewusstsein nach der praktischen Seite vollenden. Erst dann weiss ich zu sagen, warum ich das einzelne will, wenn die einzelne Handlung durch einen einheitliche, letzten Zweck begründet ist...Die Aufgabe der Ethik enthält also die Aufstellung dines letzten, alle menschlichen Willenstätigkeiten umfassenden und in sich schliessenden Zwecks"[1], eines "Menschheits- und Weltzwecks"[2], "und zwar so, dass daraus die einzelnen konkreten Handlungen als Mittel, diesen Zweck zu verwirklichen, sicher und unzweideutig deduziert werden können"[1]. Eben aus diesem Grunde aber hält Sigwart auch -- wie er wenigstens andeutet -- eine "Begegnung"[2] von Metaphysik und von empirisch fundierter Ethik für unbedingt wünschenswert.[2]

Entsprechende Gedanken finden sich ferner bei Paulsen udd bei Wundt. Dagegen ist nun, wie ich glaube, die noch immer tiefste Lösung aller dieser Probleme angebahnt in der methodischen Grundanlage der Kantschen "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft"; nur allerdings in keiner Weise in der Ausführung, die Kant seiner Ethik gegeben hat, und die naturgemäss bisher das allein wesentlich Beachtete geblieben ist.

Von dieser Kantschen Lösung der ethischen Probleme ist, wie ich glaube, der rein transzendentale Problemansatz (wie er z.B. in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft ed. KKK Kehrbach S.109, eine volle Analogie zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft erstrebt) völlig zu scheiden. Kant selbst ist in den Antworten, die er auf alle ethischen Fragen gab (wie schon oft genügend gesagt, wenn auch nicht genügend im einzelnen gezeigt wurde) in einen unhaltbaren -- weil vorkritischen -- Rationalismus verfallen. Demm entgegen aber ist es eine unentbehrlich wichtige Aufgabe, den echten kritische, transzendentalen Problemansatz -- wenn

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1/ A.a.O.S. 15/16
2/ S.a.a.O.S.70.

auch zum grössten Teil im Gegensatz zu der Ausführung der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft --zu verdeutlichen.

Es ist eben deshalb bei der Erörterung der eigentlich transzendental ethischen Probleme völlig abzusehen von fast allen mehr oder minder orthodoxen Kantianern (die höchstens einige Korrekturen an den Kantschen Resultaten versuchten, aber den unmöglichen materialen Rationalismus der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft in keiner Weise methodisch zu überwinden vermochten), z.B. Von Julius Bergmann[1], Hägerstrom[2] oder B. Erdmann, aber auch von Cohen oder von Nelson, der nicht nur methodisch, sondern auch in allen Resultaten nicht über den sehr engen Kreis der Inhalte der Kantschen Ethik hinauskam.[3] Im Gegensatz zu fast allen diesen Forsbhern muss es besonders -- mit Rickert wie mit Troeltsch und Spranger -- festgehalten werden, dass die Ethik sich nicht "auf das Prinzip der Autonomie in seiner umfassendsten Bedeutung beschränken kann. In der Logik ist ja ebenfalls nicht nur von der Wahrheit im allgemeinen, sondern...von ihrer bsonderen Ausgestaltung in der Wissenschaft zu handeln"; und "für die wissenschaftliche Erforschung des autonomen Lebens gilt nicht minder, dass sie eine inhaltliche Erfüllung braucht, die aus den formalen Grundwerten nicht zu deduzieren ist".[4]

Des näheren aber ergibt sich nun für die Ethik, wie ich glaube, aus einer wesentlich transzendentalen Problemauffassung in der betonten Analogie zur Naturtheorie folgendes: der Begriff der Autonomie kann nur aufrecht erhalten und begründet werden im Sinn einer notwendigen Einheit der Apperzeption im Ethischen, d.h. als der oberste Grundsatz

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1/ Siehe Julius Bergmann: Über das Richtige.Eine Erörterung der ethischen Grundfragen, 1883, besonders S.11ff.
2/ A.Hägerström: Kants Ethik im Verhältnis zu seinen erkenntnistheoretischen Grundgedanken systematisch dargestellt,1902,s.z.B.S.256f.
3/ Siehe L.Nelson: Vorlesungen über die Grundlagen der Ethik, Bd.I: Kritik der pratischen Vernunft, 1917.
4/ H.Rickert: Über logische und ethische Geltung, 1914, in Kant-Studien, Bd.XIX S.221.

der Ethik kann nur dies rein apriori aufgezeigt werden, dass alle möglichen sittlichen Werte stets notwendig einer obersten umfassendsten Einheit unterstehen müssen. (Selbst da, wo ein blosses Chaos der sittlichen Inhälte zu setzen versucht würde, würde doch dies Chaos notwendig noch in der Form der Einheit eines Apperzipierenden Ich überhaupt angenommen werden müssen.) Wie aber nun weiter in einer Theorie der Naturerkenntnis zwischen dem Moment der Einheit der Apperzeption auf der einen Seite un dem empirisch gegebenen Inhalten auf der anderen Seite mindestens noch ein spezifisch eigenartiges Moment für einen "Schematismus" des Erkennens unentbehrlich ist, nämlich das Moment einer universalen, nichtempirischen Anschauung, so gilt dies relativ korrespondierend auch für die Ethik. Und zwar ist nun für die Ethik diese alles umfassende Anschauung -- wie dies ausführlich zu zeigen wäre -- stets notwendig eine metaphysisch-religiöse Grundintuition, eine "intellektuelle Anschauung" von einem umspannenden Totalsinn des Daseins. Ein solcher Totalwert wird stets schon mit in alle empirischen Werte hineingesehen und hineingelebt, auch bei den flachsten Totaldeutungen, die etwa alle Werte nur als selbstverständlich roh hedonisch oder ökonomisch deuten wollen.

Um also den gegliederten Stufenbau derjenigen Momente zu bestimmen, die zu einer Theorie des Ethischen unentbehrlich sind, ja die bereits jeder Satz über Ethisches (korrespondierend allen Sätzen der Naturerkenntnis) enthält, ist ausser dem Moment der Einheit der Apperzeption und dem Moment der empirisch gegebenen Wertungen mindestens noch das Moment einer ethischen Totalanschauung nötig, wie sie bei jeder Erfassung emprisischer Werte stets mitgegeben ist und mitgegeben sein muss. Die Probleme dieser stets vorhandenen und notwendig vorhandenen Gesamtintuition sind es, die Kant in seiner Typik der reinen praktischen Vernunft methodisch beschäftigt haben. Es Erst nach der Anerkennung dieser Universalanschauung kann der Kantishhe Begriff einer vorausgesetzten "Ordnung der Dinge", d.h. der Werte (ein Begriff, der für

die Kantische Typik, für alle Urteilsentscheidung auf Grund dieser Typik entscheidend ist, s.z.B. den Satz: "die Regel der Urtheilskraft unter Gesetzen der reinen praktischen Vernunft ist diese: frage dich selbst, wenn die Handlung, die du vor hast, nach einem Gesetze der Natur...geschehen sollte..., und du gehörtest mit zu einer solchen Ordnung der Dinge, würdest du darin wohl mit Einstimmung deines Willens sein? "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft S.84/85) einen Sinn gewinnen. Jede solche allgemeinste "Ordnung" der Werte -- in der Ethik kann es sich natürlich nicht um physische "Dinge" handeln, die ja auch an jener Stelle bei Kant nicht gemeint sind -- setzt eben jene ordnende metaphysische Universalanschauung schon voraus, wie sie die spekulative Ethik, ohne sich voll methodisch Rechenschaft zu geben, in einer intellektuellen Anschauung des höchsten Gutes (d.h. Güterzusammenhangs) stets geübt ht. Oder wie schon Franz von Baader diese Problemlage in diesem Zusammenhang gut andeutet: "Was...der Schematism dem Verstande, dasselbe leistet die Simbolik der Vernunft".[1] Erst im Rahmen einer sälchen "universalen Anschauung" des Sittlichen, einer "Simbolik der Vernunft", erst durch sie und aus ihr heraus gewinnen dann alle die verschiedenen einzelnen empirischen Werte einen Ordnungszusammenhang.

Nun kann selbstverständlich in der Geschichte der Ethik diese Ordnung der Werte, es kann das höhhste Gut oder der wahre Zusammenhang der Werte in jener Totalanschauung oft oder dauerns irrig bestimmt sein. Dies ist so wenig zu vermeiden, wie man in der Geschichte der Naturerkenntnis etwa falsche naturwissenschaftliche Hypothesen unmöglich machen kann.[2] Die Korrektur solcher falschen Einordnungszusammen-

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1/ Fr.v.Baader: Uber d. Begr.d.Ethik durch d. Physik, 1813, S.7

2/ Vgl. hiermit H. Maier: Psychologie des emotionalen Denkens, S.775: "Das sittliche Bewusstsein lässt sich durch...die Verschiedenheit der sittlichen Anschauungen...so wenig beirren, wie das Wahrheitsbewusstsein durch die Tatsache des Irrtums."

hänge wird für die "theoretische" wie für die "praktische Vernunft" immer nur durch das Gewicht von "Tatsachen" erfolgen, durch das Gewicht von empirischen Wahrnehmungen bzw. von empirischen Wertungen.

Sobald einige Reihen des tatsächlichen Wertens gar nicht mehr eingegliedert werden können in den bestimmten Wertezusammenhang, den irgendeine inhaltlich bestimmte metaphysische Anschauung aufstellt, sobald muss eben ein anderer neuer Anschauungszusammenhang gewonnen werden, der diese Aufgabe leisten kann. Niemals aber wird und braucht deshalb die Menschheit an der Möglichkeit einer immer weiter fortschreitenden, an der Möglichkeit einer immer mehr wahren (weil mehr Tatsachen umfassenden) Erkenntnis der Natur und des Sittlichen zu verzweifeln. Auch unsere höchst entwickelte Erkenntnis der Naturgesetze setzt uns noch nicht in den Stand irgendwelche komplizierten organischen Prozesse zu erklären. Und doch wird deshalb niemand den Wert der naturwissenschaftlichen Gesetzesforschung in Frage ziehen können. Ganz ebenso ist es, glaube ich, gewiss nicht möglich, den unersetzlichen Wert einer philosophisch exakten theoretischen Ethik deshalb zu leugnen, weil es in bestimmten individuell verwickelten Fällen nicht immer gelingt, das Ganze aller hier in Frage kommenden Wertverhältnisse aufzudecken.

Nur dann, wenn von uns überhaupt keinerlei wahrhafte, sich entwickelnde Theorie des Sittlichen angebahnt werden könnte, nur dann müsste jede philosophische Ethik einer letztlich subjektiven Lebensauffassung weichen, ebenso wie jede Naturtheorie einer bloss subjektiven Natureinfühlung. Eine solche Theorie der Ethik ist aber nun, wie ich bisher im Ansatz zu entwickeln suchte, in einem wesentlich transzendentalen Sinne -- wenn auch durchaus nicht in der Formung des historischen Kant -- möglich. Dagegen ohne eine solche umfassende Theorie würde, wie ich eben zeigen wollte, auch ein tieferes Verstehen und ein tieferes Eindringen in die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Moralphilosophie nicht möglich werden.

Es darf in einer umfassenden Geschichte der Ethik gewiss nicht geschehen, dass die "begrifflichen Mittel" der Methoden allein "für den Kern" geonommen werden und dass die "Struktur der Seelen" der Denker wie die gesamte geistesgeschichtliche Denkatmosphäre unverstanden bleibt. Es wäre das Gegenteil von dem, was auch in dieser Skizze erstrebt wurde, wenn eine Geschichte der philosophie zu einer rohen Rubrizierung der allgemeinsten philosophischen Standpunkte, zu einer Art "Ketzerhistorie von allgemeinen Ansichten" [1/] herabsinken würde.

Aber neben der treuesten Einfühlung in die menschliche Eigenart der grossen wie der kleineren Denker, neben einer klaren Erfassung der gesamten zeitgeschichtlichen Hintergründe darf doch auch die Darstellung des objektiven Lehrgehaltes und der Methoden der Systeme nicht leiden. Zu einer Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Ethik gehört durchaus auch eine exakte Vergleichung des oft mühsam und tief durchdachten begrifflichen, des methodischen Apparates, den die verschiedenen Denker ausgebildet haben, nicht nur einer Vergleichung der Resultate der Forschung.

Diesen Anforderungen kann, wie ich glaube, die Geschichte der modernen Ethik von Jodl, das einzige grössere Werk, das bisher auf diesem Gebiete existiert, nicht genügen. Jodl ist im wesentlichen nur der empiristischen Ethik gerecht geworden; dagegen die ganze Darstellung der "spekulativen", der kritischen, der rein rationalen wie der religiösen Problematik ist meist sehr stark positivistisch verzeichnet, trotz des weit ausgedehnten und des dauernd verdienstvollen Quellenstudiums, das dies Werk aufweist. Und so ist für die Geschichte der modernen Moralphilosophie gegenwärtig noch ein reiches Material zur Darstellung zu bringen; oder es würde sonst ein oft ergreifend starkes Ringen um inhaltvolles und exaktes Denken -- wie es das 19. Jahrhundert erfüllt -- unbeachtet bleiben, und es würde das Wort Schleiermachers: "die Sittenlehre als

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1/ Siehe Schelling: Werke, I. Abt., VII., Band, S.338 und 344.

Wissenschaft...befindet sich in einem unerfreulichen Zustande"[1] -- mindestens für die Geschichte der Ethik, schon wegen der "geringen Produktivität auf diesem Gebiete"[2] -- auch heute noch aufrecht erhalten werden müssen.

1/ Siehe Schleiermacher: Werke ed. Braun, Bd.I S.445.
2/ Siehe Schelling: Werke, I. Abt., VII.Band, S.338 und 344.

ÜBER EINIGE HAUPTMETHODENFRAGEN DER MODERNEN ETHIK

(Von Kant bis zur Gegenwart).

Von

David Baumgardt
(Berlin)

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(Ursula Franck)

UBER EINIGE HAUPTMETHODENFRAGEN DER MODERNEN ETHIK
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Unter bewusster Abstraktion von allem eigentlich seelischen Gehalt moderner Weltanschauung soll in dieser Skizze gegenüber der Chaotik der modernen ethischen Meinungen nur die eine Frage erhoben werden: Welche wichtigsten Pzoblemstellungen und Methoden der Ethik sind es überhaupt, die zu so verschiedenen Resultaten führen konnten. Und zwar scheint mir dann zur Entwirrung dieser starken Durcheinanderschlingung von sehr verschiedenartigen Problemen für den ersten Überblick mindestens die vorläufige Scheidung von drei grossen Fragengebieten unentbehrlich.

I.

Die Problemsphäre des konsequenten Empirismus und Positivismus ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass hier das, was wir sollen, d.h. das ethisch Gültige, nur als das, was wir tatsächlich erfahrungsgemäss wollen, angesehen wird.

Der zeitlich erste aber und wohl auch der markanteste[1] Vertreter dieser Richtung ist für das 19. Jahrhundert Jeremy Bentham; zweifellos ist die Grundeinstellung Benthams so alt wie das menschliche Denken selbst, sie ist schon vor der griechischen Sophistenbewegung im nichtgriechischen Altertum zu finden.[2] Bentham selbst gibt besonders emphatisch an, von Priestley und Helvetius beeinflusst zu sein[3], ja sein

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1/Frau von Staël soll über B. geradezu geäussert haben: "Die verhängnisvollen Zeiten, in welchen sie gelebt habe, würden von der Nachwelt nicht das Zeitalter Bonapartes....sondern das Zeitalter Benthams genannt werden." Siehe Ed.Beneke: Grundsätze d.Civil- u. Criminal-Gesetzgebung von Bentham-Dumont, 1830, Vorrede S.III.

2/S.z.B. Deussen: Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, 1914, I.Band 3. Abt.S.78, und Ders.: Vier Philos. Texte des Mahabharatam, 1906,S.985: "jeder schätzt jedesmal dasjenige als Pflicht, woran er gerade sein Gefallen findet" (wohl um 500 a.Ch.).

3/ I.Bentham: Deontologie (deutsch), 1834.Bd.I S.421/24, und Ders.: Works, 1838/43 Bd.X S.70, 142.

greatest-happiness-Prinzip findet sich bereits wörtlich bei Hutcheson.[1] Aber die Energie, mit der Bentham seine Lehre allseitig konsequent abrundete, die drastische Kritik, die er in spezifisch englisch-empiristischem Geist an der französischen rationalistischen Erklärung der Menschenrechte übte,[2] die glückliche Schlagkraft seiner Formeln haben ihm auch in Frankreich wie in Deutschland als typischem Vertreter englischer Ethik eine starke Wirkungsmöglichkeit gegeben. Bentham lehrt es besonders instruktiv: das Sittliche ist stets nur durch Beobachtung und durch Vergleichung der tatsächlichen, der empirischen Verhaltungsweisen des Menschen bestimmbar. Diese methodische Grundüberzeugung des ethischen Positivismus ist die letzte, sie ist die oft unausgesprochene, aber ganz unentbehrliche Grundvoraussetzung Benthams, ja fast der ganzen modernen englischen Ethik.

Erst aus dieser radikal empiristischen Fragestellung erklärt sich der volle Sinn des Satzes, es bestehe eine durchgängige "Koinzidenz", ja eine Identität von Pflicht, d.h. von ethisch Gültigem und von Interesse. "Von Pflichten zu sprechen, ist verlorene Mühe...Interesse und Pflicht decken sich in allen Dingen des Lebens"[3] Das tatsächliche Interesse, das einzige und das empirisch überall feststellbare Ziel des Menschen ist nämlich nach Bentham nur die Befriedigung des Eigeninteresses. Das Interesse des Menschen besteht nach Bentham stets nur darin, dasjenige nützliche Gut zu erstreben, das ihm die grösste Lust und die kleinste Unlust verschafft. "By the principle of utility is

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1/Hutcheson: Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue. 1725. II. 3. 8.
2/ Siehe Bentham: Anarchical fallacies; being an examination of the declarations of rights issued during the french revolution. Works 1838/43. Bd.II s.489 ff.
3/ Bentham: Deontologie. Bd.I S. 6ff.

meant that principle, which approves and disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have, to augment or diminish the happiness of the party, whose interest is in question"[1]. "Upon...the principle of utility... the most abominable pleasure which the vilest of malefactors ever reaped from his crime would...not...be to be reprobated, if it stood alone. The case is, that it never does stand alone, but is necessarily followed by such a quantity of pain... that the pleasure in comparison of it, is as nothing"[2]. Es lässt sich also bei jedem Verhalten des Menschen genau bestimmen, welches Quantum von Lust dieses Verhalten in seinem Ergebnis einbringt, und "ist das Endresultat gut berechnet, so ergibt es Sittlichkeit; Unsittlichkeit aber, wenn die Berechnung falsch war"[3]. Die Ethik wird also für diese Theorie zur "Moralarithmetik"[4]. Diese Moralarithmetik aber zeigt nach Bentham: es liegt im Eigeninteresse des Menschen, Sympathie und tätiges Wohlwollen fur "human kind in general", ja für "the whole sensitive creation" zu üben.[5] Jedoch fast alle die scharfe Kritik, die der Benthamismus erfuhr, richtet sich nun bezeichnenderweise nur gegen die Resultate seiner empiristischen Methode, aber nicht gegen diese Methode selbst.

So hat Robert Owen in seinem "Book of the new moral world" im wesentlichen nur eine Erweiterung der Benthamschen Formel gefordert: nicht nur für die gegenwärtige Menschheit, auch für die grösstmögliche Wohlfahrt der späteren Generationen soll gewirkt werden, nicht nur das Glück der räumlich unendlichen Schöpfung, auch das Wohl der zeitlich

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1/ Siehe Bentham: Works, Bd.I, "An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation", Chap.I, Par.2, S.1.
2/ A.a.O. Chap.II, Par.4, S.4
3/ Bentham: Deontologie II, Einleitung S.28.
4/ Bentham: Deontologie Bd.I S.223 f., II S.23. Deontology (english), 1834, Bd.II, Kap.2 S.99.
5/ Bentham: Introduction to the principles of morals, Chap.VI Par.21; Works, Bd.I S.21; vgl. Deontologie (deutsch), Bd.I S.10.

nach uns kommenden Geschlechter steht in Frage.[1] Weiter aber steht sowohl der jüngere Saint-Simon wie Fourier oder Weitling und überhaupt eine grosse Zahl aller neueren Sozialtheoretiker mehr oder minder ausdrücklich auf dem Boden eines Bentham-Owenschen Positivismus, ja selbst Marx gehört mit einem Teil seiner moraltheoretischen Voraussetzungen hierher.[2] Und ganz ebenso ist auch die assoziationspsychologische Ethik, die James Mill durchführen will, nur eine geringfügige Korrektur der Benthamschen Lehre.

Erst John Stuart Mill bedeutet in England für den ethischen Positivismus einen -- wenn auch nicht zu überschätzenden -- Fortschritt. J.St.Mill hat in seiner induktiven Beobachtung der ~~[illegible]~~ tatsächlichen Wertungen des Menschen den Wert des Sozialen als relativ selbstständig erkannt neben dem Wert des Ökonomischen oder des Machtpolitischen (den Bentham als den allein grundlegenden ansah). Ja J.St. Mill erkannte überhaupt, dass die verschiedenen Werte nicht rein quantitativ miteinander vergleichbar sind; die "Lüste", die die verschiedenen Werte "verursachen", sind nicht rein zahlenmässig gegeneinander abschätzbar, sie zeigen letzte qualitative Differenzen. Aber die nähere Ausführung, in der Mill diese Erkenntnisse darlegt, ist oft wenig überzeugend oder innerlich schwankend zwischen einem Rettungsversuch des konsequenten egoistischen Utilismus (wir werden im Wünschen stets nur vom Eigeninteresse bestimmt,[3] können aber im Denken ein losgelöstes, alleinstehen-

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1/Robert Owen: The Book of new moral world, London 1836-44, VII. Teil S.69ff.; vgl.J.M. Guyau: La Morale anglaise contemporaine (deutsch herausg. v. E.Bergmann), S.88.(Owen hat in diesem Werk fälschlich den Vornamen Richard statt Robert erhalten. Richard Owen war Anatom und Zoologe).

2/Vgl. über Marx das Urteil in W.Wundts "Ethik" 1903 S.512f. und Ed. Sprangers "Lebensformen" S.289, für W.Weitling s.z.B.seine "Garantien der Harmonie und Freiheit", ed.Mehring, 1908,S.112: "Das Ideal höchster Vollkommenheit...ist...es...,an die von der Natur uns allen bestimmten Quellen der irdischen Glückseligkeit hinüberzuspringen."

3/Siehe J.St.Mill: Gesammelte Werke (deutsch) ed.Th.Gomperz, I.Band..1869 S.139: der letzte Endzweck, in Rücksicht auf welchen alle anderen Dinge "wünschenswert sind...ist ein Dasein, welches...so reich als möglich an Genüssen ist" ("Das Nützlichkeits-Prinzip")

des Ich gar nicht vorstellen[1] und zwischen einer Anlehnung an einen "intuitiven" Sozialeudämonismus, für den das Glück und die "Würde" des Nebenmenschen ein "intuitiv" gegebener selbständiger Wert ist.[2]

Dagegen ist John Stuart Mill sicher im Recht, wenn er dem alten Streit zwischen der "induktiven" und der "intuitiven" Schule sehr oft keine allzu zentrale Bedeutung zuspricht.[3] Es ist ein Unterschied, ob alle möglichen Wertungen des Mensbhen nur als Abarten einer einzigen angesehen werden (wie dies bei Bentham geschieht) oder ob die verschiedenen Werte als selbständig nebeneinander gelten. Und es ist ebenso ein Unterschied, ob die Vorstellung des sittlich zu Erstrebenden als empirisch erworben gilt oder als angeboren, wie dies letztere die intuitive Schule, wenigstens die schottischen Intuitionisten lehren. Aber alle diese Lehren bleiben streng innerhalb des Rahmens des ethischen Positivismus. Die Ethik ist für alle diese Theorien zunächst rein auf vorgefundenen, auf gegebenen Werttatsachen aufgebaut. Auch die angeborenen Ideen der Common-Sense-Philosophie -- zum mindesten in der Darstellung jener englischen Schule -- können nur tatsächlich gegebene Wertungen bedeuten; irgendein weiterer Beweis für die Gültigkeit dieser Wertungen ist aber hier nirgends versucht und nirgends durchführbar. Selbst Dugald Stewart, ein typischer englicher Repräsentant der intuitive Schule im 19. Jahrhundert, muss zugeben, dass auch seine Lehren nur zurückführen auf "some faculty by which we are capable of bestowing approbation or blame",[4] dass aber "the power of these adventitious causes.. is so great, that there is perhaps no particular

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1/ S.a.a.O.S.162: "da Jedermann...seines Gleichen hat....so wachsen die Menschen auf, unfähig, einen Zustand völliger Missachtung der Interessen Anderer für sich als möglich zu denken."

2/ A.a.O.S.136f.; vgl. auch J.St.Mill: Logik (deutsch)1877,Bd.II,S.597.

3/ J.St.Mill: Werke 1869, Bd.I S.160/61: "Wenn es...wirklich etwas Angeborenes gibt, so sehe ich keinen Grund, weshalb das angeborne Gefühl nicht das der Rücksicht auf die Vergnügen und Leiden Anderer sein sollte?...Wäre dem so, so würde die intuitive Moral mit der utilitaristischen zusammenfallen."

4/ Dugald Stewart: The philosophy of the active and moral powers of man, works, 1855, Bd.VI., S.229.

practice, which we may not be trained to approve of or to condemn".[1] Also auch Stewarts Theorien sind im Kern positivistisch, ja sogar den Ergebnissen der induktiven Schule sehr angenähert, wie sich Mill weitgehend mit einem gemässigten "Intuitionismus" einverstanden erklären will.[2] Ja ein Denker wie Mackintosh konnte so -- vollkommen begreiflich -- von Guyau prinzipiell der Induktiven,[3] von Jodl vorwiegend der intuitiven Schule zugeordnet werden.[4]

Die Parallelerscheinung zu J.St.Mill bildet aber in Frankreich Auguste Comte. Comte hat in seiner Soziologie -- ebenso wie Mill -- den rein egoistischen Utilismus zu überwinden gesucht. So heisst es in dem Kapitel "Soziale Statik oder Lehre von der sich selbst vollziehenden Ordnung der Gemeinschaften" sehr deutlich: "Unsere sozialen Gefühle sind nicht so aushaltend und nicht so stark als die egoistischen Gefühle; indes beruht das gemeinsame Glück hauptsächlich auf der Befriedigung der ersteren, welche allein den sozialen Zustand begründet haben und ihn trotz des Widerstrebens der mächtigsten individuellen Instinkte aufrecht erhalten"[5] Also beide "Gefühle", sowohl der "individuelle" wie der "soziale Instinkt" werden in uns empirisch vorgefunden, und sie sind deshalb in gleicher Weise ethisch wertvoll und ethisch gültig. Auch "wenn man beim Menschen das Übergewicht der eigenen Interessen unterdrücken könnte, würde man unsere moralische Natur zerstören, anstatt sie zu verbessern; denn die sozialen Gefühle wären dann ihrer Leitung beraubt und würden in eine unbestimmte und

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1/Dugald Stewart: The philosophy of the active and moral powers of man, works, 1855, Bd.VI., S.229
2/J.St.Mill: Werke ed.Th.Gomperz,Bd.I S.160f.(Das Nützlichkeits-Prinzip).
3/Siehe J.M.Guyau: La Morale anglaise contemp. (deutsch), S.93f.
4/Siehe F.Jodl: Geschichte der Ethik, II. Band, 1912, S.408f.
5/A. Comte: Die positive Philosophie im Auszuge von Jules Rig. deutsch von J.H.v.Kirchmann, II. Band, 1884, S.107.

unfruchtbare Nächstenliebe ausarten".[1]

Ja Comte geht in seinem "Positivismus" so weit, dass er behauptet: erst die kraniologische Forschung Galls, erst die "Physiologie des Gehirns"[1] habe die "Ausschreitungen"[1] des egoistischen Utilismus damit "vollständig widerlegen"[1] können, dass sie sowohl den Sitz der individuellen wie den Sitz der sozialen Triebe im Hirn nachgewiesen habe -- also gewiss ein kaum mehr zu steigernder "Positivismus" in diesem Nachweis, der für die ethischen Gültigkeit bestimmter seelischer Triebe, ein Nachweis, der sich erst -- oder schon -- mit der Aufzeigung der physischen Lokalisationen dieser Triebe zu begnügen will.

Im übrigen aber steht auch in Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert eine Diskussion zwischen induktiver und intuitiver Schule oft im Vordergrund. Cousin[2] und später Renouvier[3] zeigen häufig die Tendenz, die Kantische Ethik zu einer Lehre von angeborenen Prinzipien im Sinne Reids auszudeuten, während E.Littré und die ganze Comte-Schule es scharf betonen: "A ce point, la physiologie psychique retrouve le sens moral, mais... au lieu d'être primordial et inné il est secondaire et acquis; au lieu d'être absolu il est rélatif; aussi se montre-t-il variable suivant les individus, suivant les classes, et surtout suivant les époques".[4] Aber auch noch Guyau hält in seiner Schrift: "La morale anglaise contemporaine" den Gegensatz zwischen induktiver und intuitiver Ethik für die Frage, die sich über die "Gesamtheit der Dinge" erstreckte.[5] Zugleich ist freilich die intuitive Schule in Frankreich im Durchschnitt weniger psychologistisch als in England. Es wird hier bei den idées morales

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1/A.Comte: Die positive Philosophie im Auszuge von Jules Rig, deutsch von J.H.v.Kirchmann, II. Band, 1884, S.107.

2/S.z.B. V.Cousin: Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien, 1872, S.442f.."Avec Reid et Kant nous reconnaissons la raison comme le faculté du vrai, du beau et du bien...dans notre esprit" usw.

3/S.bei Ch.Renouvier, wenigstens in dieselbe Richtung weisend, z.B."essais de critique générale, traité de psychologie",1912,S.228: "Il faut donc avouer,que le sentiment moral,la passion dubien...sont les éléments de la loi (d.h.des Kantischen kategor.Imperativs) et des conditions de sa représentation."

4/E.Littré:Des origines organiques de la morale in der Zeitschrift, 1870: La philosophie positive, Bd.VI S.9f.

5/J.M.Guyau: la morale angl. contemp. (deutsch), S.268.

weniger Gewicht auf ihr tatsächlich vorfindbares Angeborensein gelegt, der Nachdruck liegt mehr darauf, die "Axiome und Prinzipien der Moral" als evidente "Vérités éternelles" zu erweisen im Sinne eines materialen Rationalismus und im Anklang an die naturrechtliche Auffassung der droits de l'homme der französischen Revolution (vgl. hier als Belege unter anderem Jules Simon: "Le devoir", 1863, S.271,278: "L'idee de la justice...est innée...il faut donc" la "rapporter a la raison, dont la fonction propre est de nous fournir les axiomes et les principes eternels, sans lesquels notre pensée...et notre liberte n'auraient point de règle." Oder E.Bersot: "Essais de philosophie et de morale", 1864, Bd.I S.497f.: "Il y a du bien et du mal, il y a de l'ordre dans le monde", ce sont "de vérités premières, evidentes, universelles...du sens commun... qui est la seule règle de la vérité", S.251: "Cet ordre moral es necessaire comme les vérités mathematiques; aber Ähnliches auch bei Cousin, Vacherot und bei Proudhon z.B. "De la création de l'ordre dans l'humanité" S.36: "Das Sittengesetz ist ewig und absolut", zitiert und kritisiert bei Stirner: "Der Einzige und sein Eigentum" ed. Mackey, 1911, S.52. Weiter aber gleitet die intuitive Schule in Frankreich wie z.T. in England auch leicht über in metaphysische und religiöse Begründungen der Moralideen[1] und führt natürlich damit ebenso wie mit ihren rationalistischen Argumentationen über alle bloss empirische Ethik hinaus.

In Deutschland endlich hat der englische Empirismus besonders stark auf Friedrich E. Beneke gewirkt. Beneke hat die "Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation von Bentham" 1830 bearbeitet und übersetzt und er hat danach vor allem 1837 bis 1840 in seinem "System der praktischen Philosophie" seine eigene, konsequent empiristische

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1/ Vgl. z.B.Jules Simon: Le devoir, 1854, S.286: "Nous savons, qu'il y a une justice, qu'elle est éternelle, obligatoire, universelle; que par conséquent l'homme a des droits et des devoirs;...nous savons aussi que la justice repose en Dieu comme dans sa substance éternelle." E.Bersot: Essais de philosophie et de morale, 1864, Bd.I S.7: les vérités de morale naturelle, solides sans doute, mais sans efficacité faute de s'appuyer sur l'autorité d'un Dieu."

Ethik ausgebaut. Auch Beneke sucht hier wie bereits in der "Schutzschrift für meine Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten"[1] und wie in der Vorrede zu der Bentham-Bearbeitung die Vieldeutigkeit d und die Unbrauchbarkeit des Benthamschen Lustbegriffes zu überwinden. "Die Werte aller Dinge, oder aller Güter und Übel" -- so heisst es bei Beneke im Unterschied von Bentham -- "werden geschätzt durch die Steigerungen und Hemmbestimmungen, welche dieselben in dem menschlichen Sein hervorbringen".[2] Und diese oft rein geistigen oder auch nicht genügend klar bewussten "Förderungen" und "Hemmungen"[3] hat nun Beneke allerdings viel feiner differenzierend beschrieben und gegliedert, als dies nach dem alles uniformierenden Benthamschen Lustbegriff möglich war. Ja selbst das Problem einer "Rangordnung der Güter oder Werte"[4] ist hier schon mit grösster Deutlichkeit bezeichnet, wenn auch keineswegs tiefer gelöst. Beneke führt es nämlich vielfach aus: "jeder unverdorbene...Mensch...wird...die Genüsse der Anschauung durch den Gesichtssinn d und der Tonempfindung mit höherer Steigerung in sich bilden, als...gleich grosse Genüsse der niederen Sinne".[5] "Jeder rein gebildete Mensch...wird die intellektuelle Ausbildung höher schätzen, als sinnliche Genüsse",[5] er wird dem Wohle einer grösseren Gemeinschaft...einen höheren Wert beilegen, als dem individuell-beschränkten Wohle".[5] "Die Allgemeingültigkeit" dieser Wertabstufung aber "bestehe darin, dass die bezeichnete Rangordnung wirklich in allen Menschen durch die Grundverhältnisse ihrer praktischen Entwickelung auf gleiche Weise angelegt ist".[6] In solchen Argumentationen wird freilich

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1/ Friedrich Eduard Beneke: Schutzschrift f.m.Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten, 1823,S.52.
2/Grundsätze der Civil-und Criminal-Gesetzgebung aus den Handschriften des englishhen Rechtsgelehrten Jeremias Bentham herausgeg.von Etienne Dumont, bearbeitet und mit Anmerkungen von Fr.Ed.Beneke,Bd.I,Vorrede S.XIX.
3/Siehe Fr.Beneke: Grundlinien desnatürlichen Systems der praktischen Philosophie, Bd.I, 1837, S.226f.
4/Fr.Ed.Beneke: Grundsätze d. Civil- u.Crim. usw.,Bd.I S.58
5/A.a.O.S.59
6/Fr.Ed.Beneke: System d. prakt. Philosophie, Bd.I S.248, 87, 88.

augenscheinlich gerade die innere Unzulänglichkeit jedes blossen ethischen Empirismus sehr sichtbar. Nahe verwandt mit Beneke sind dann weiter die moral-theoretischen Fragmente Ludwig Feuerbachs aus den Jahren 1850-1870, wenn auch Beneke oder Bentham hier nirgends als Vorgänger direkt genannt sind. Feuerbach sucht alle ethischen Werte als "Glückseligkeitswerte" zu begreifen; und seine Kampf gilt von hier aus zunächst der "Moral eines für sich allein gedachten Individuums"[1] (die ihm "eine leere Fiktion"[1] ist), dann aber auch ganz besonders allen nicht rein empirisch aufzeigbaren Moralbegriffen[2], allen "blutlosen", "hypokritischen", "Metaphysisch chimärischen Allgemeingespenstern" wie der neigungsfreien Pflicht[3], dem rein vernünftigen Gewissen[4], der glückverleugnenden Tugend[5]. Und einen ähnlichen empiristisch begründeten Eudämonismus vertritt z ferner -- neben Bolzano[5a] -- auch Gustav Theodor Fechner in der feinsinnigen Schrift: "Über das höchste Gut", in der ausdrücklich auch "das Maximum der Lust schlechthin als das Anzustrebende gesetzt" wird[6]. Aber auch der ganze spätere reine Empirismus und Positivismus (wie Lass[7], Gizycki[8], Dietzgen, Schubert-Soldern[9], aber auch Dühring[10], Schuppe[11], Mach[12], H. Sidgwick[13] und später Jodl[14], Corne-

1/L.Feuerbach: Sämtliche Werke ed.Bolin und Jodl, 1911,Bd.X S.269: "nur der gesellschaftliche Mensch ist Mensch.Ich bin Ich nur durch Dich und mit Dir." Oder S.270/71: "die Natur selbst...hat den gegenseitigen Glückseligkeitstrieb im Geschlechtstrieb...hervorgebracht."

2/S.besonders a.a.O.S.288:"Die Moral ist so gut eine /Erfahrungswissenschaft wie die Medicin."

3/S.a.a.O.Bd.II S.371:"Die Pflicht gebietet den Genuss! Die Entsagung ist nur eine traurige Ausnahme von der Regel."

4/S.a.a.O.~~Sx28Sx~~ Bd.X S.281:"das...Gewissen ist nur der in den Eingeweiden meines eigenen Glückseligkeitstriebes wühlende, verletzte Glückseligkeitstrieb des Anderen."

5/S.a.a.O.S.287: "Die Tugend ist die eigene Glückseligkeit..im Bunde mit fremder."

5a/Siehe B.Bolzano: Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft, 1834, I.Band S.236 (anonym erschienen).

6/G.Th.Fechner: Über das höchste Gut, 1846,S.17,10.

7/E.Lass: Idealismus und Positivismus,II.Teil:Idealistische und positivistische Ethik, 1882.

8/G.v.Gizycki: Grundzüge der Moral, 1883, später umgearbeitet zur "Moralphilosophie", 1888.

9/R.v.Schubert-Soldern: Grundlagen zu einer Ethik, 1887.

10/E.Dühring: Der Werth des Lebens, 1902,s.z.B.S.91: "Die Naturgesetze des menschlichen Handelns entwickeln sich kulturgemäss dadurch, dass der Mensch mehr Einsicht in sein eigenes Wesen, mehr Mitgefühl im gegenseitigen Verkehr...erlangt. So bilden und wandeln sich die Sitten." S.90: "Der...Materialismus macht an dem nichts schlecht, was

lius[1], ebenso wie Meinong[2] in seiner Frühzeit, G.Heymans[3] in Holland, R. Ardigo[4] in Italien ist / in allen seinen moraltheoretischen Grundanschauungen nicht wesentlich über die bisher skizzierten englischen, französischen und deutschen Lehren hinausgegangen.

In Wahrheit kam in der zweiten Hälfte des 19.Jahrhunderts die stärkste Anregung für die empiristische Wertlehre von der -- Deszendenztheorie her. Schon Lamarck hatte in seiner "Philosophie zoologique" erklärt: "Physisches und Moralisches" (das französiche "moral" enthält ja das Ethische mindestens als Teil in sich) "sind an ihrem Ursprung ohne Zweifel ein und dasselbe...Um den gemeinsamen Ursprung dieser beiden Wirkungsreihen, welche in ihrer grössten Verschiedenheit das bilden, was man Physisches und Moralisches nennt, darzulegen", habe man es nur "bisher schlecht angegriffen und einen Weg gewählt, der dem einzuschlagenden ganz entgegengesetzt ist". Man habe fälschlich "das Studium dieser beiden Arten von scheinbar so verschiedenen Gegenständen beim Menschen selbst begonnen...wo es...am schwierigsten ist, die gemeinsame Ursache so vieler Erscheinungen zu fassen...Man hätte sich statt dessen "bemühen sollen, auch noch die Organisation der anderen Tiere kennen zu lernen"[5]. Darwin ist dann dieser Forderung Lamarcks

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in der bisherigen Moral gut war."

11/W.Schuppe: Grundzüge der Ethik und Rechtsphilosophie, 1881.

12/E.Mach: Erkenntnis und Irrtum, 1905,S.102:"Ethik und Recht gehören zur sozialen Kulturtechnik und stehen desto höher,je mehr...sie sich nur auf Tatsächliches gründen."

13/H.Sidgwick: Methods of Ethics, 1875

14/F.Jodl: Allgemeine Ethik, herausgeg. v.Börner, 1918.

1/ H.Cornelius: Psychologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft, 1897. S.375ff 409 bis 414, und Einleitung in die Philosophie, S.337/57.

2/ A.v.Meinong: Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-Theorie, 1894.

3/ G. Heymans: Einführung in die Ethik auf Grundlage der Erfahrung 1914.

4/ R.Ardigo: Opere filosofiche, 1884ff., Bd.III,bes.S.190ff.: vgl.J. Bluwstein: Die Weltanschauung Robert Ardigos, 1911, S.36,88f.

5/ J.Lamarck: Philosophie zoologique (deutsch v.H.Schmidt), 1909,S.7f.

besonders im IV. und V. Kapitel seiner "Abstammung des Menschen" nachgekommen, und er hat hier bereits auf "unseren grossen Philophen Herbert Spencer hingewiesen.[1] Und Spencer ist dann in der Tat auch der klassische Ethiker des Evolutionsgedankens geworden.[2] Aber auch noch Guyau[3] und Fouillee wie Nietzsche haben in ihren nicht rein empiristischen Theorien gewisse Lehren des Evolutionismus mitverwandt, ganz abzusehen von solchen Büchern wie P.Kropotkin: "Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt" (deutsch von Landauer), 1920. Die Entrüstung, mit der einst noch Cohen[4] und Lotze[5] den Darwinismus in der Ethik ablehnten, ist übrigens heute völlig verschwunden; eine ähnliche Ablehnung richtet sich statt dessen seit 1900 mehr gegen die Forschung der psychoanalytischen Schule.

Eine letzte entscheidende Förderung aber erfuhr die empiristische Theorie, in einigen werttheoretischen Arbeiten der Gegenwart, besonders durch Scheler, Spranger und Nicolai Hartmann. Die Hauptleistung besteht hier, wie mir scheint, in dem allseitigen Nachweis, dass die verschiedenen Wertgebiete, durch deren verschiedene Schätzung das Handeln (wie das gesamte ethische Sein der Menschen) charakterisiert ist, spezifisbh, qualitativ untereinander verschieden sind. Nicht nur die Verwirklichung oder dbe Bevorzugung des Eigeninteresses oder des ökonomischen überhaupt bedeutet etwas ganz Anderes wie die Erstrebung sozialer Werte, auch eine Betonung ästhetischer Werte ist für eine umfassende Ethik von der Bevorzugung theoretischer Werte zu unterscheiden usw. Die Hauptprobleme der Ethik beginnen dann mit den Fragen: Welche Gruppe von zunächst

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1/ Ch.Darwin: The Descent of Man (deutsch v.Carus),1902, S.136.
2/ Wie radikal empiristisch diese Ethik sein will, s.z.B. aus dem Satz: "die Tatsachen der Ethik" sind von der Biologie, Psychologie und Sociologie dargebotene Verallgemeinerungen....die Elemente jenes Gleichgewichts zwischen Constitution und Existenzbedingungen, welches gleichzeitig das sittliche Ideal und die Grenze darstellt, nach welcher hin wir fortschreiten" (Epitome der synthetischen Philosophie H.Spencers von Collins, deutsch von Carus, 1900, S.591).
3/ J.M.Guyau: Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction,1885.
4/ Siehe H.Cohen: Kants Begründung der Ethik, 1877, S.173
5/ H. Lotze: System der Philosophie, II.Teil: Metaphysik, 1912, S.626.

gleichberechtigten Werten ist im Konfliktfall als die objektiv höhere anzusehen?

Der ältere Empirismus, z.B.Beneke, hatte dieses Problem der Rangordnung der Werte damit gelöst, dass er behauptete: die Erfahrung selbst zeige es, dass tatsächlich stets "die intellektuelle Ausbildung" 1/ als das höhere Gut eingeschätzt werde gegenüber dem "niederen Sinnengenuss" 1/ das soziale Wohl als der höhere Wert gegenüber dem individuellen. 1/ Und diesen Lösungsversuchen hat sich -- wie klar erkannt werden muss -- prinzipiell methodisch auch Scheler noch in seinem moralphilosophischen Hauptwerk angeschlossen, unbeschadet aller sonstigen Diskrepanz zwischen seiner "materialen Wertethik" und der Benekes. Scheler ist hier in der Tat reiner "Empirist", wie er sich selbst in dieser Beziehung einmal mit Recht charakterisieren wollte. 2/

Auch das material-apriorische Erkennen und Werten bleibt -- wie dies ausführlich belegt werden kann -- in Wahrheit nur ein empirisches Erkennen und Werten, ja auch der Unterschied zwischen "Tatsache" und "Wesen" muss für dieses materiale Apriori Schelers flüssig werden. Die materiale Wesensschau kann in der Ausdehnung, in der sie von Scheler geübt wird, keinerlei "streng allgemeingültige Wesenserkenntnis" geben, und vor allem kann dieses materiale Apriori Schelers nichts mehr gemein haben mit dem unbedingt gültigen, formalen Apriori Kants, dessen alleinige Heranziehung aber freilich auch zum Aufbau einer vollen Ethik nicht ausreicht. 3/

So erscheint es mir schon aus diesen methodischen Gründen erkennbar, warum die Lösung, die Scheler hier dem Wertrangproblem gegeben

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1/ Fr.M.Beneke: Bentham-Bearbeitung, I.Band S.59; vgl. System der prakt. Philosophie, I.Band S.228 ff.

2/ M. Scheler: Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, I. Teil, 1913, S.46. Nur auf dieses Hauptwerk ist in dieser Skizze Bezug genommen.

3/ S. auch diese Fragen ausführlich diskutiert in meinem demnächst erscheinenden Buch: Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn in der modernen Philosophie, Geschichte der modernen Ethik von Kant bis zur Gegenwart.

hat, nicht genügen kann. Scheler behapptet, es bestehe eine "klare Evidenz"[1], dass die Werte des Edlen und Gemeinen höher sind als die des Angenehmen und Unangenehmen, die geistigen Werte höher als die vitalen, die Werte des Heiligen höher als die geistigen Werte.[2] Aber wie kann durch eine unmittelbare Erfahrungs-Wesensschau, wie kann durch ein materiales Apriori in dem höchst weiten und vieldeutigen Sinn Schelers (der von dem Husserls sehr zu scheiden ist) eine streng allgemeingültige Evidenz gegeben werden? Die Berufung auf die jedem "Sehenden" offenstehende Wesensintuition kann hier nicht ausreichen. (Denn ist es z.B. wirklich in "klarer Evidenz"[1] gegeben, dass man stets "Lebenswerte für...geistige Werte...opfern solle"[1]? Müssen nicht z.B. -- mindestens für gewisse Verfallsepochen oder für niedergehende dekadente Völker -- die vitalen Werte als die höheren gelten gegenüber durchaus echten geistigen "Esprit-Werten"?

Demgegenüber hat das Kapital über Ethik in Sprangers "Lebensformen" mit seiner Betonung der Frage der "Wertintensität" und mit seiner Ablehnung jeder einfachen Rangordnung der Werte die hier vorliegenden methodischen und inhaltlichen Schwierigkeiten unbezweifelbar viel schärfer klargelegt.[3] Und ebenfalls einen entschiedenen Fortschritt über Scheler hinaus stellt schliesslich N. Hartmanns "Ethik" dar mit der Annahme einer viel verwickelteren Schichtung der Werte im "Wertraum", d. h. Annahme auch eines "Koordinationsverhältnisses verschiedener Werte auf gleicher Werthöhe" und überhaupt eines "mehrdimensionalen" "Systems der Werte" mit Ausdehnung nicht nur in die Höhe, sondern ebenso "in die Breite".[4] Aber prinzipiell will doch auch Hartmann in dem "Empirismus" Schelers beharren; er hält -- sehr charakteristisch, aber, wie ich glaube, mit

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1/M. Scheler: Der Formalismus in der Ethik, I. Teil, S.106.
2/a.a.O. I. Teil, S.103ff, II. Teil, 1916, S.609.
3/Siehe E. Spranger: Lebensformen, 1921, S.249ff., 284ff.
4/Siehe N. Hartmann: Ethik, 1926, z.B. S.230, 270.

Unrehht -- bestimmte "metaphysische" oder "religiöse Deutungen" des Wertreiches, die man erst "hinter" diesem Reich beginnen lässt, in der Ethik für "gleichgültig"[1], und er hält so diese Gesamtfragen der Ethik schon durch eine fortschreitend differenzierende "Erfahrung" und "Beschreibung" aller irgendwie vorfindbaren und fassbaren Wertmomente unseres Werterlebens für ausreichend beantwortbar. Jedenfalls aber ist die einfache Übereinanderordnung der Werte, die Scheler in seiner materialen Wertethik annahm, wie sich dies bei Spranger und Hartmann deutlich ergibt, unhaltbar. Und zwar scheint sie mir vor allem deshalb unhaltbar, weil der Wert des Heiligen infolge seiner besonderen methodischen Bedeutung eben nicht in eine einfache Reihe neben oder über die anderen Werte gestellt werden kann.

Auch Scheler musste es nämlich sehr bezeichnend zugeben: die Werte des Heiligen oder Unheiligen "erscheinen nur an Gegenständen, die in der Intention als absolute Gegenstände gegeben sind. Unter diesem Ausdruck verstehe ich nicht etwa eine besondere definierbare Klasse von Gegenständen, sondern (prinzipiell) jeden Gegenstand in der absoluten Sphäre"[2]. Dier wie Spranger dies viel zutreffender und brauchbarer formuliert: "Das Wesen der Religiosität" ist "die Beziehung aller Werterlebnisse auf den höchsten Wert"[3], auf den "Totalwert des Lebens"[4]. Ist dies aber der Fall, so gehört damit auch methodisch dem religiösen Wert, mit Rücksicht auf welchen die übrigen Werte erst einen "Totalsinn"[5] erhalten, unabweisbar in einer Theorie der Werte oder der Ethik eine besondere Stelle. Und diesen Besonderen Platz haben eben die reli-

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1/S.a.a.O.S.123.
2/Siehe Scheler: Der Formalism. i.d.Ethik, I.Teil, S.107.
3/Ed.Spranger: Lebensformen, 1921, 2. Aufl., S.265.
4/S.a.a.O.z.B.S.43, 81 und öfter
5/S.a.a.O.S.43, 84 oder vgl.z.B. auch die sehr schöne hierher gehörige "Definition" Jean Pauls:"Der rechte Unglaube bezieht sich auf keine einzelnen Sätze und Gegensätze, sondern auf die Erblindung gegen das Ganze" ("Levana oder Erziehungslehre", I.Bändchen, par.38)

giösen und metaphysischen Prcbleme der Ethik in der Tat stets -- auch im 19. Jahrhundert -- eingenommen.

II.

Wir sahen bisher: die rein "erfahrungsmässige" Beschreibung der tatsächlichen Wertungen (und der "gegebenen" "Wertwesenheiten") bildet ein höchst wertbolles und ein sehr ausgedehntes Untersuchungsgebiet der Ethik. Der ethische Positivismus in seinen verschiedenartigen Nuancen leistet mit diesen "Deskriptionen" eine -- für jede Theorie der Ethik -- unentbehrliche Arbeit. Der Empirismus irrt nur, wenn er annimmt, mit einer rinnen Beschreibung der Werte und allenfalls mit einer Beschreibung ihrer "gegebenen" Rangordnung sei bereits eine Ethik selbst gegeben. Diese Annahme des Empirismus könnte höchstens gelten in dem Sinne des tiefen Goethesehen Satzes, dass alles Faktische schon Theorie ist. Im übrigen aber zeigt es der Empirismus selbst -- besonders in seiner gegenwärtigen Entwicklung --, dass die Tafel der "gegebenen" Werte bereits zu einem obersten Wert des Religiösen, des metaphysisch Absoluten hinführt; und erst durch die Einordnung aller möglichen Werte in diesen obersten "Tatsinn" des Daseins kann, wie ich glaube, eine Theorie der Ethik möglich werden. Und diese Probleme des religiösen Totalwerts haben daher die Ethik in der Tat auch im 19. Jahrhundert -- auf sehr verschiedenartige Weise -- beschäftigt.

Für den klassischen deutschen Idealismus nach Kant lag die Totalbedeutung des Daseins mehr in seinem "Vernunftgehalt", in einer notwendig-geltenden Voraussetzung, durch die das Sein einer Welt erst denkbar werden könne, ohne die keinerlei Sein denkbar sei. Dagegen in dem späteren metaphysischen Realismus, etwa bei Schopenhauer, aber auch allgemein in der Spätromantik und noch bei Nietzsche und bei E. von Hartmann, lag die religiöse Totalbedeutung der Welt in einem irrationalen gegebenen Wesen des Seins.

Für Fichte war so die Totalbedeutung des Seins charakterisiert als die "praktische Vernunft", "die absolute Pflicht", die "Vernunftfreiheit", als das "absolute Sittengesetz", oder was alles damit identisch sein soll, als das "absolute Ich" der Wissenschaftslehre oder später in dem "System der Sittenlehre von 1812" als der "absolute, schlechthin durch sich bestimmte Begriff"[1] oder Gott. Dieses absolute Ich ist nach Fichte in Wahrheit der notwendige und der als notwendig aufzeigbare Grund jedes empirischen Ich und Nicht-Ich, da eben alles bewusste Objekt wie Subjekt bereits ein ungeschiedenes Bewusstsein überhaupt voraussetzt. Es muss also schon, damit das empirische Ich und die empirische Welt voneinander unterschieden werden können, das absolute Ich, das sie umfasst, bestehen. Und so setzt auch vor allem das "Material der Pflicht", die Welt der empirischen Werte und das empirisch wertende Ich stets ein absolutes Wert-Ich voraus, ja dieser absolute Wert, das praktische Vernunft-Ich, das Sittengesetz hat -- nach Fichte -- die empirischen Werte und die empirischen Pflichten nur darum gesetzt, um durch sie und an ihnen sich zu verwirklichen, in ihnen zu "erscheinen". Alles "Nicht-Ich...wirkt durch Widerstand, welcher nicht sein würde, wenn wir nicht zuerst darauf eingewirkt hätten. Es greift nicht uns an, sondern wir greifen es an"[2]. Dies ist "das Primat der Vernunft, in-wiefern sie praktisch ist"[2].

Was aber nun das absolute Ich oder das Sittengesetz, das Gesetz der Freiheit in Wahrheit ist, dies kann nicht durch "diskursives Denken"[3] erfasst werden, sondern es ist nach Fichte rein durch eine

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1/ J.G.Fichte: Nachgelassene Werke, Bd.III (XI) S.37.
2/ J.G.Fichte: Sämtliche Werke, Bd.IV S.93 (System der Sittenlehre von 1798).
3/ J.G.Fichte: Sämtliche Werke, Bd.IV S.136 (System der Sittenlehre von 1798).

"intellektuelle Anschauung"[1]. durch "Intuition"[2] gegeben. "Die Materien der sittlichen Handlung" sind aber dann dadurch bestimmt, dass die sittliche "Handlung...liegen muss...in einer Reihe, durch deren Fortsetzung ins Unendliche das Ich absolut unabhängig würde"[3]. Oder nach einer Formulierung der Sittenlehre von 1812: "Dies...müsste man den Menschen sagen: du musst scheinen an dir selbst zu arbeiten...; dann arbeitet an dir Gott und treibt in dir sein Werk...Klarheit...ist das Vehikel aller Sittlichkeit"[4] "das Ich soll erscheinen als Leben des Begriffs...Nur diese Erscheinung ist die der Sittlichkeit, und eine andere schlechthin nicht"[5].

Bei Hegel dagegen -- dem zweiten grossen reinen Idealisten nach Kant -- ist ebenfalls durch eine "intellektuelle Anschauung" eine andere grosse Totaldeutung des Daseins gegeben. Gott, der höchste, der absolute Wert und zugleich der innerste Kern und der Sinn alles Seins, ist hier die dialektisch entwickelte Vernunft. Und hiernach ist zugleich auch der Wert aller Dinge und der Wert aller sittlichen Phänomene bestimmbar durch den Rang, durch die Stelle, die alle diese Phänomene in dem zeitlosen Selbstoffenbarungsprozess der absoluten Vernunft -- dialektisbh nachweisbar -- einnehmen. An der Hand dieses einen methodischen Grundgedankens hat Hegel sowohl in dem "System der Sittlichkeit" von 1803 wie in der "Phänomenologie", in der "Enzyklopädie" wie in der"Rechtsphilosophie" eine ausserordentlich fesselnde Rangordnung aller ihm wichtigen sittlichen Phänomene entworfen. Und diese Ran-

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1/J.G.Fichte: Sämtliche Werke. Bd.IV S.XXX 47 (System der Sittenlehre von 1798).
2/A.a.O. S.136.
3/A.a.O.S.153.
4/J.G.Fichte: Nachgelassene Werke. Bd.III S.58-59 (System der Sittenlehre von 1812)
5/A.a.O.S.53.

stellung der sittlichen Bedeutung der Familie,[1] des "menschlichen"[2] wie des "unterirdischen Gesetzes",[3] des "abstrakten Rechtes",[4] der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft,[5] des Staates,[6] der "Weltgeschichte",[7] ja des Verbrechens[8] wird zweifellos -- schon durch ihr starkes historisches Verstehen sittlicher Erscheinungen -- stets eine der tiefsinnigsten Formen systematischer Ethik bleiben.

Während aber so für Fichte und für Hegel der absolute, der religiöse Wert ein wesentlich geistiges Geltungsprinzip bleibt (das absolute Ich bzw. die X dialektische Weltvernunft), beginnt nun im Zusammenhang mit der Philosophie des älteren Schelling durchaus die Wendung zu einem höchsten irrationalen (oder zum mindesten -- schon durch die betont koordinierende Einbeziehung der "Natur" in den "Vernunftbegriff" --) überlogischen Wert[9] in der Ethik. Schelling selbst bekennt zwar noch in dem Vorbericht zu seinem "Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit", er habe sich "bisher" wenig über "Gut und Bös... erklärt",[10] und er hat auch später keinerlei eigentliche Moralphilosophie geschrieben. Aber schon die pantheistische Identitätsphilosophie seiner Jugendepoche und das religiöse, wie das mythologisierende Denken seines Alters sind gerade typischer Ausdruck für die beiden mächtigsten methodischen Einstellungen, die auch in der weiteren spekulativen Ethik seiner Zeit wirksam neben dem Hegelianismus geworden sind.

1/ Siehe Hegel: System der Sittlichkeit, aus dem Nachlasse herausgeg. von G.Molkat, 1893, S.6ff; Werke 1832/45, Bd.VII, 2.Abt. S.393ff; Band VIII S.221-246; S.334ff.
2/ Siehe Hegel: Werke, 1832, Bd.II s.333.339ff..346.
3/ Siehe Hegel Werke, 1832, Bd.II S.333.339ff..346.
4/ S.a.a.O.Bd.VII.2.Abt..S.379ff.; Bd.VIII S.72/147
5/ S.a.a.O.Bd.VII.2.Abt. S.394ff.; Bd.VIII S.246/312.
6/ S.a.a.O.Bd.VII, 2.Abt.S.403ff.; Bd.VIII S.312ff.
7/ S.a.a.O.Bd.VII, 2.Abt.S.420ff.; Bd.VIII S.430.
8/ Hegel:System der Sittlichkeit,Werke ed.G.Lasson.1913.Bd.7,S.450ff.
9/ S.z.B.Schelling: Sämtl.Werke, I.Abt.Bd.VII S.395/96: "Der...Verstand muss...das irrationale Verhältnis der Natur zu sich täglich mehr erkennen." Hier unterscheidet auch Schelling seine Lehre ausdrücklich von der eines "reinen Idealismus" (a.a.O.S.395).Vgl.auch Fichte: Nachgel.Werke, Bd.III S.32: "so hat Schelling mich bedauert; ich habe keine Natur. Ich gebe ihm sein Bedauern zurück, es ihm als Unglück zurechnend, dass er Natur hat, ein blindes Ungefähr."
10/ Schelling: Sämtl. Werke I, VII S.334.

So hat etwa K.Chr.Fr.Krause -- in einer inneren Verwandtschaft zu Schellings identitätsphilosophischem Pantheismus -- "das Gute für den Menschen"[1] rein durch "das Eine Gute"[2], welches "ist die Wesenheit Wesens, sofern Gott selbige in sich darlebt"[1], bestimmen wollen. Und die Wesenheit Wesens, ~~xxxxx~~ "das Eine Gute" ist auch hier -- in Anlehnung an die Identitätsphilosophie -- als "Natur und Vernunft in Vereinheit, als die höchste Vereinsphäre in Gott"[2] zu charakterisieren gesucht.

Weiter aber schliessen sich auch -- wie schon Jodél[3] dies richtig sah -- alle die späteren ethischen Fragmente Schleiermachers noch ganz nahe an den Gedankenkreis der Schellingschen Identitätsphilosophie an. Auch für Schleiermacher ist das "höchste Gut", der absolute Wert, "die Identität von Vernunft und Natur"[4], ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ oder genauer: "ein Minimum von Auseinandersein der Vernunft und Natur".[5] "Die Frage aber, ob diese und jene Gestaltung der Dinge ein Element des höchsten Gutes sein könne,...kann..niemand...abweisen"[6]. Und zwar soll nun eben diese ethische Gestaltung der Dinge, die Verwirklichung des höchsten Gutes, nach Schleiermacher auf sehr verschiedenartige Weise erfolgen, sowohl durch ein "organisierendes Verfahren"[6], d.h. durch eine "fortschreitende Einigung der Natur mit der Vernunft.... insofern sich die Vernunft im ethischen Verfahren dasjenige weiter bereitet, womit sie ins Unendliche fort auf das Übrige Handelt".[7]

1/ K.Chr.F.Krause: Vorlesungen über die Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaft, 1829, S.536.

2/ Krause: System der Sittenlehre, ed. Hohlfeld und Wünsche, 1888, S.217. - S.ferner a.a.O.S.291: "Es ist für den Menschen als sittliches Wesen erforderlich, dass er den Urbegriff des Einen Guten und des Gliedbaues desselben...erkenne;...dass er den Urbegriff und das Urbild des Guten stetig zu seinem eigenen, eigenleblichen oder individuellen Musterbegriffe und Musterbilde weiterbestimme."

3/ F. Jodl: Geschichte der Ethik, Bd.II, 1912,S.131.

4/ Siehe Schleiermacher: Werke ed. Braun, Bd.II, z.B.S.254.

5/ Schleiermacher: Werke ed. Braun, Bd.II S.254 (Ethik 1812/13).Vgl. a.a.O. S.561 (Güterlehre.Letzte Bearbeitung); ferner a.a.O.Bd.I S.475ff.: "das höchste Gut ist ein...Geeinigtsein...von Vernunft und allem irdischen Sein" (Begriff des höchsten Gutes, 2.Abhandlung). Vgl.ferner a.a.O. Bd.II S.36ff. (Tugendlehre 1804/05;a.a.O. S.200ff.: das höchste Gut ist Identität "des Productes und Producirens" (Brouillon zur Ethik 1805); a.a.O. S.423,425,426: das

wie zugleich durch ein "symbolisierendes" Verfahren[1], d.h. durch eine sittliche Tätigkeit,...durch die die Vernunft ins Unendliche sich dasjenige ausbildet, worin sie erkannt werden kann"[1]. Ist das Organisieren ein "allgemein gleiches" oder "identisches", so ergibt sich der ethische Wert des Verkehrs, des Rechtes, des Staates; ist es ein "individuelles" -- Schleiermacher hat bekanntlich mit Recht den Wert des Individuellen in der Ethik besonders unterstrichen --, so ergibt sich der Wert des Eigentums, der Gesellschaft. Ist das Symbolisieren ein "allgemein gleiches" oder "identisches", so zeigt dies nach Schleiermacher den Wert des wissenschaftlichen Denkens, des Glaubens, der Schule; ist das Symbolisieren ein "individuelles", so sollen sich nach Schleiermacher die Werte des Gefühls, der Offenbarugg, der Kirche ergeben. So erstrebt auch Schleiermacher überall in seinem unvollendeten System eine Ableitung, Einordnung, Bestimmung aller möglichen empirischen Werte durch einen höchsten absoluten, metaphysischen.[2]

Aber während in dieser ganzen identitätsphilosophischen Ethik sich ein starker metaphysischer Optimismus ausgelebt hat in dem festen Glauben an eine absolute höhere Einheit von Vernunft und Natur, von geltendem Wert und bloss natürlichem Sein, so weist im Gegensatz hierzu -- schon vom Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts an und bisher viel zu wenig beachtet -- noch eine völlig andersartige metaphysische Ethik gerade in die entgegengesetzte Richtung. Offenbar von Baader am frühesten und markantesten verfochten[3], aber auch von Geistern wie dem älteren Steffens[4], G.H. Schubert[3] (oder gelegentlich auch von Solger[5]) und anderen spekulativen Spätromantikern und schliesslich noch in

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höchste Gut ist die "Einigung der Vernunft mit der irdischen Natur überhaupt" (Ethik 1814/16).

6/ Schleiermacher: Werke ed. Braun, Bd.I S.467 (Begriff des höchsten Gutes, I.Abhandlung).

7/ A.a.O.Bd.II S.425. Vgl.S.93ff.,Bd.I S.475ff.

1/ A.a.O.Bd.II S.425. Vgl.S.93ff.,Bd.I S.475ff.

2/ S.z.B.Schleiermacher: Werke, Bd.II S.252: "Die Ethik" ist ein "speculatives,...aber doch...reales Wissen."

3/ Der spätere Schelling ist hier offenbar mehr von Baader abhängig als Baader von Schelling, s.hierzu und über G.H.Schubert mein

mädifizierten Formen von Kierkegaard übernommen, bricht hier in Anlehnung an den Mythos vom Sündenfall die schwerblütigste Metaphysik der Verzweiflung über die Schuld- und Schmerzbeladenheit der Sinnennatur hervor. Und in diese Entwicklung der metaphysischen Ethik gehört auch noch Schopenhauer hinein. Nicht nur der Pantheismus, sondern auch jede einfache metaphysische Deckung von geltendem Wert und Natur ist hier (bei diesen wesentlich theistischen oder atheistischen Denkern) geleugnet. Aber jedenfalls werden hier überall bei Baader wie dem älteren Steffens, bei Schopenhauer wie bei Kierkegaard alle einzelnen empirischenWertsetzungen aus der allgemeinen metaphysischen Verneinung mindestens des gegenwärtigen "natürlichen" Lebens gewonnen.[1] Und ähnlich besteht noch bei Ed.v.Hartmann der höchste Sinn des Daseins und damit der höchste ethische Wert in der "Erlösung" des Urwillens,[2] in der "bewussten" "Überwindung des ganzen Welt-und Gottes-Schmerzes";[3] und erst aus diesem "absoluten Zweck" der Weltverneinung werden für Hartmann alle sonstigen empirisch-sittlichen Zwecke und seltsamerweise dann auch wieder die "sittliche Mitarbeit an der Kulturentwicklung"[4] erschliessbar.

Buch: Baader und die philosophische Romantik, 1927.

4/ S.z.B. Steffens: Caricaturen des Heiligsten, 1819ff., Bd.I S.44, 41f.: "In aller Erscheinung verbirgt...sich...die Hölle." "Das Böse...ist ursprünglich wie die Natur, wie die Geschichte, wie die Seele selbst." "Fragt Euch...selbst, ob Ihr nicht Euch...einer Schuld bewusst seid, die...mit eurer Natur so innig verwebt ist, dass ihr beide, diese Natur und diese Schuld, nicht zu trennen vermögt."

5/ S.z.B. Solger: Nachgel. Schriften, Philos. des Rechts und Staats, Bd.II S.279f.: "Das Böse...wird...durch die Natur in der Existenz erhalten"; vgl. J.Heller: Solgers Philosophie der ironischen Dialektik, 1928, S.107.

1/ Siehe Schopenhauer: Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Bd.I, Buch 4, z.B. par.60: die moralischen Handlungsweisen sind solche, in welchen die Verneinung des Lebens "ihren Ausdruck findet".

2/ Ed.v.Hartmann: System der Philos.im Grundriss Bd.VI:Grundriss der ethischen Prinzipienlehre, 1909,S.211f..204.

3/ S.a.a.O.S.214.

4/ A.a.O.S.213.

Innerhalb des russischen Denkens haben Bulgakow und Berdjajew besonders entscheidend auf Baader zurückgreifen wollen.[1] aber auch schon Solovojeff (der übrigens in seiner Frühzeit stark von Schopenhauer beeinflusst wurde)[2] besitzt Verwandtschaft mit Baaders deutscher metaphysischen Ethik.[3]

Dagegen in Frankreich ist auch die Annahme und Bejahung der stark irrationalen "idées forces" bei A.Fouillée oder des ℔ "principe de la vie" bei J.M.Guyau noch mehrfach als metaphysische Gesamtdeutung alles Daseins gedacht,[4] aus der heraus erst alle besonderen empirischen sittlichen Bewertungen gefolgert werden können. Und endlich bedarf es wohl kaum noch näherer Ausführung, dass auch der spätere Nietzsche alle Ziele des Übermenschen durch eine metaphysische Grunddeutung des

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1/ Siehe N. Berdiajew: Das Problem der Anthropodizee in H.Ehrenberg: Dokumente des östlichen Christentums, 1925,S.251; S.Bulgakow: Aus "Das Tageslicht", ebenda.

2/ Siehe W. Solovjeff: Ausgewählte Werke (deutsch), I.Band, 1914, Vorrede S.VII. Über die besondere Annäherung S.s an Baader a.a.O.S.IXf.

3/ Zur näheren Charakterisierung der Ethik Solovjeffs, s.z.B.Ausgew. Werke Bd.1 S.61,58: "das Dasein der Geschöpfe in Sinnlosigkeit, Trennung,...feindseligem Widerstreit...ist nur begründet in ihrer falschen Beziehung zueinander, die schattenhaft und vergänglich ist, ihr wahres Sein wurzelt in der Einheit mit allem. Die Krone des Seins gebührt nicht dem einzelnen, sondern dem Ganzen. Der Urbeginn und Quellé alles Seins ist...die absolute Einheit alles Seienden...Gott." --Gott ist also auch, "wie uns unser inneres Bewusstsein bezeugt,... das absolute Gute, d.h. Gott und ebenso alles, was sich mit Ihm schon vollkommen vereinigt hat." Aus diesem Grunde muss auch dieses "umfassende", dieses absolute Gute, die Einheit alles Seienden "die Norm unserer moralischen Beziehung zu allem enthalten". -- "Alles was ist, und alles was sein kann, wird nun in moralischer Beziehung durch drei Kategorien seines Wertes erschöpft; denn wir haben es entweder mit dem zu tun, was höher ist als wir, oder mit einem uns Gleichwertigen oder mit dem, was unter uns steht. Es ist logisch unmöglich, noch eine vierte zu finden." Deshalb soll also "das Prinzip der moralischen Vervollkommung in drei Grundgefühlen enthalten, die die...natürliche Tugend ausmachen: im Schamgefühle, das unsere höhere Würde vor den Angriffen tierischer Begierden schützt, im...Mitleid, das uns mit allen...gleich macht, im religiösen Gefühle, in dem sich unsere Erkenntnis des höchsten Guten ausspricht" usw. (Die ersten Sätze stammen aus: "Die geistigen Grundlagen des Lebens", die letzten Sätze aus Bd.II, 1916 S.517/18, "Die Rechtfertigung des Guten, eine Moralphilosophie").

4/ S. zur Beurteilung dieser metaphysischen bzw. empiristischen Tendenzen bes. Ch.Christophe: Revue de metaphys. et de morale, 1901,S. 522ff., und H.Pfeil: J.M.Guyau und die Philosophie des Lebens, 1928, S.112ff.

gesamten Seins, durch den einen obersten Wert der Bejahung des irrationalen, metahpysischen Willens zur Macht zu begründen suchte.[1] Selbst die Theorien Stirners, die Nietzsche nach der Meinung Jodls nur weiter gedacht und bereichert haben soll, sind kaum als ein blosser Positivismus anzusehen. Nietzsche aber war höchstens in der Zeit des "Menschlichen, Allzumenschlichen" überwiegend Empirist. Dagegen in der "Geburt der Tragödie" wie in dem "Willen zur Macht" herrscht überall -- neben allem Reichtum an empirischer Seelenforschung -- eine letzte metaphysische Intuition, aus der heraus erst alle Einzelwerte herausgelesen werden, hier ist Nietzsche überall doch wesentlich metaphysischer Ethiker gewesen, so sehr er sich auch gegen alle Transzendenzgesinnung herkömmlicher Metaphysik gewehrt hat.

III.

Wie aber ist nun das Verhältnis zwischen empiristischer und metaphysischer Problemstellung im einzelnen näher zu bestimmen? Oder die Frage verallgemeinert: Müssen sich diese beiden und eventuell noch sonstige Fragestellungen in der Ethik weitgehend gegenseitig ausschliessen? Oder gibt es einen übergeordneten methodischen Gesichtspunkt, von dem aus alle diese verschiedenen Fragen als unentbehrliche und sich gegenseitig ergänzende Momente einer gegliederten Gesamtfrage erkannt werden können und müssen? Auch dieses umfassendste Methodenproblem ist zweifellos in der Geschichte der Ethik schon öfters berührt oder, besser gesagt, gelegentlich gestreift worden.

So hat Fries die "praktische Philosophie"[2] zerlegt in "I. Ethik, praktische Naturlehre, Lehre...vom Werth und Zweck menschlicher Handlungen und 2. in Religionslehre, praktische Ideenlehre, Lehre vom

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1/ Siehe Nietzsche: Werke (Taschenausg.), z.B. Bd.IX, 1906, S.448: Unsere Werte sind in die Dinge hineininterpretiert...Aller Sinn ist "Wille zur Macht" (alle Beziehungssinne lassen sich in ihn auflösen), vgl. ferner a.a.O.S.471, 18,520f.

2/ Jakob Friedr. Fries: Handbuch der praktischen Philosophie, I. Band, 1818, S.12.

Zweck der Welt"[1]. Und Fries hat sich auch bemühen wollen, das "gegenseitige Verhältnis"[2] zwischen dieser metaphysisch religiösen Wertlehre und der wesentlich empirischen Wertbeschreibung klarzustellen. Aber diese Klarstellung bleibt doch im allgemeinen vollkommen auf folgende Sätze beschränkt: "Wir sehen nun leicht, dass in der That die religiöse Frage die höhere sey, denn dem Zweck der Welt sich unterordnend wird der Mensch erst die Zwecke seines Lebens ansetzen können. Aber über den Zweck der Welt gibt eskeine wissenschaftliche Lehre; die Ideen desselben können Menschen nur im Gefühl fassen, welches die Schönheit und Erhabenheit des Lebens in der Natur anerkennt. Wissenschaftliché ist daher nothwendig die Lehre der Ethik das erste, sie ist die begreifliche, von dem wir uns erst zu dem höheren unbegreiflichen können hinüber leiten lassen"[3]. Und besonders in der Durchführung seiner Ethik bleibt Fries lediglich bei der Behauptung: das, "was gut und recht"[4] ist für den Menschen, werde bereits stets durch einen "rein vernünftigen Ausspruch unserer Überzeugungen rein apriori entschieden."[4] Während er in der "Religionsphilosophie oder der Weltzwecklehre" nur zu dem Ergebnis kommt: "Das höchste Gut...ist für den einzelnen Menschen subjective Seelenruhe aus Selbstzufriedenheit"...[5] "Für die Welt aber ist das ewige Gut: jedes Leben trägt in der eigenen Schönheit seinen Werth!"[6]

Dagegen das methodische Verfahren in Herbarts Ethik erinnert auffallend mehr an methodische Grundeinstellungen des 17. und 18. als des 19. Jahrhunderts. Wie es im Zeitalter Descartes' oder Christian Wolffs versucht wurde, alle Erkenntnis auf einer Reihe von völlig in

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1/ J.Fr.Fries: Handbuch der praktischen Philosophie, Bd.I, 1818,S.12.
2/ A.a.O.S. 14.
3/ J.Fr.Fries: Handbuch der praktischen Philosophie, Bd.I, 1818, S.14/
4/ A.a.O.S. 112ff., 116.
5/ J.Fr.Fries: Handbuch der praktischen Philosophie, Bd.II, Die Religionsphilosophie oder die Weltzwecklehre, 1832, S.150.
6/ A.a.O. S.151.

sich evidenten, rationalen Vorstellungen und Vorstellungsbeziehungen aufzubauen, so lehrt auch Herbart für die Ethik: "das Löbliche und Schändliche besitzt eine ursprüngliche Evidenz, durch vermöge deren es klar ist, ohne gelernt und bewiesen zu sein. Allein die Evidenz durchdringt nicht immer die Nebenvorstellungen, welche theils begleitend, theils von jenem selbst verursacht, sich einmischen. Daher bleibt es oftmals unbemerkt; oft wird es gefühlt, aber nicht unterschieden; oft durch Verwechselungen und falsche Erklärungen entstellt. Es bedarf also, herausgehoben, und in ursprünglicher Reinheit und Bestimmtheit gezeigt zu werden. Dieses vollständig zu leisten, und die theils unmittelbar gefallenden, theils durch die Aufgabe, das Missfallende zu meiden, herbeigeführten Musterbegriffe (Ideen) geordnet zusammenzustellen, ist die Sache der allgemeinen Ästhetik"[1], von der die Ethik nur ein Untertheil ist. Diese "ursprünglichen" Musterbegriffe (Ideen), die die praktische Philosophie aufstellen kann und muss, sind nach Herbart bekanntlich die "Idee der inneren Freiheit"[2], "der Vollkommenheit"[3], "des Wohlwollens"[4], "des Rechts"[5], "der Billigkeit"[6] (von ihnen "abgeleitet" die Ideen der beseelten Gesellschaft"[7], des "Kultursystems"[8], des "Verwaltungssystems"[9], "Lohnsystems"[10], der "Rechtsgesellschaft"[11]). Und diese fünf "ursprünglichen Ideen" sollen nun keineswegs durch eine bestimmte menschlich-seelische Veranlagung gegeben sein ("das moralische Gefühl ist verwiesen aus den Grundlegungen der Sittenlehre"[12]) der praktischen Philosophie kann es "nicht darauf ankommen, den Geschmack"[13], der uns die Urteile über die "ursprünglich gefallenden

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1/ I. Fr.Herbarts Sämtl.Werke ed. Hartenstein, 1850. Bd.I S.124 (Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie).
2/ S.a.a.O. Bd.VIII (Allgemeine praktische Philosophie) S.33ff.
3/ S.a.a.O.S.37ff. 4/ S.a.a.O.S.41ff. 5/ S.a.a.O.S.45ff.
6/ S.a.a.O.S.53ff. 7/ S.a.a.O.S.101ff. 8/ S.a.a.O.S.96ff.
9/ S.a.a.O.S.90ff. 10/ S.a.a.O.S.83ff. 11/ S.a.a.O.S.78ff.
12/Herbart: Sämtl. Werke ed. Hartenstein, Bd.VIII S.12 (Allgemeine Praktische Philosophie).
13/A.a.O. S.13.

sittlichen Verhältnisse" gibt, "psychologisch zu erklären"[1]), und ebensowenig können und sollen diese "Ideen" durch eine rein metaphysische Intuition, durch eine "intellektuelle Anschauung" erschlossen werden,[2] sondern sie sollen ein rein Geltendes bedeuten (im Sinne eines materialen Rationalismus, wie ihn Herbart stets vertrat. Wei aber dieses Geltende in den verschiedenen "Fällen"[3] des "Lebens"[3] anzuwenden sei, hierauf antwortet Herbart nur, sei keinerlei "vollständige Auskunft"[3] zu geben. Es sei hier vielmehr jeder "--nicht...nur zuweilen, sondern auf immer -- an sein Herz...zu verweisen; an jenes Zartgefühl, welchem die Schätzung der Annäherung des Wirlichen an die Ideen ist zugeschrieben worden. Nicht als ob in den einzelnen Fällen Elemente von sittlicher Bedeutung vorkommen könnten, deren Vorbild nicht in den Ideen enthalten wäre. Sondern weil die Ausmittelung des Factischen, die bestimmte Nachweisung dessen, was den Ideen in dem Wirklichen entspricht, Schwierigkeiten findet, die sich durch Begriffe nicht heben lassen, da sie nicht im Reich der Begriffe, sondern in den Dunkelheiten und Vieldeutigkeiten der Empirie selbst ihren Sitz haben".[4]

Dagegen wirken immerhin die wenigen kurzen Skizzen, die Lotze für den Aufriss einer Ethik hinterlassen hat, in einigen Punkten wenigstens klärender als Herbart. Lotze greift wohl noch sehr häufig zurück auf eine Art "latent...eingeborener sittlicher Ideen"[5], die sich an der Hand sittlicher Erfahrung entwickeln sollen.[5] "Ganz einfach ausgedrückt, kommen wir daher darauf zurück, dass wir nur von unserem (sc. eingeborenen) Gewissen die Aussprüche erwarten, welche uns die allgemeinsten

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1/ A.a.O. S.13.
2/ Jeden Versuch, seine "ursprünglichen" 5 Ideen wieder einem "höheren", einem eigentlich metaphysischen Princip unterordnen zu wollen hat Herbart "mit aller Strenge" abgelehnt, s.z.B. a.a.O.S.27.
3/ A.a.O.S.31 (Allgemeine praktische Philosophie).
4/ A.a.O.S.31/32.
5/ Siehe H.Lotze: Die Prinzipien der Ethik, 1882 (wieder abgedruckt in H.Lotze: Metaphysik ed. G. Misch, 1912, S.610, 611f.).

sittlichen Grundsätzen festsetzen. Es wird auch niemand bezweifeln, dass keine Theorie uns jemals von anderen Verpflichtungen überzeugen wird, denen diese Zustimmung des Gewissens fehlt". 1/ Und weiter wird einfach behauptet, es gibt eben "mancherlei Verhältnisse der Dinge und der Ereignisse, denen ein eigener Wert und Unwert insofern zukommt, als sie zwar überhaupt bloss in unserem Gefühl beide erlangen, dann aber unabhängig von unserer Willkür, so dass auf einige ein unmittelbares, nicht abzuänderndes Urteil des Wohlgefallens oder der Billigung, auf andere eins des Missfallens oder der Missbillingung fällt, und dass endlich auch nach einem gleich unmittelbaren Anspruch unseres Gefühls bestimmte Gradunterschiede dieser Werte feststehen". 2/

Aber abgesehen hiervon findet sich dann doch bei Lotze ein sehr interessanter -- wenn auch ganz unzureichender -- Versuch, die methodischen Grundprobleme der Ethik durch einen Parallelisierung mit denen der Naturtheorie weiter zu fördern. "Keine Erkenntniss des Wirklichen" -- so heisst es nämlich z.B. -- "entstand ohne die Erfahrungen, welche" 3/ den Grundsätzen alles Erfahrens "den Inhalt ihrer Beurtheilung lieferten; umgekehrt konnte nie die Erfahrung allein die höchsten Grundsätze erzeugen, nach denen sie beurtheilt zu werden verlangt. Die praktische Philosophie bietet eine vollständige Analogie". 4/ Auch in der praktischen Philosophie soll also nach Lotze auf die gleiche Art eine Verbindung des Geltenden mit dem Tatsächlichen gesucht werden, wie dies bereits in der Naturerkenntnis geglückt ist.

Ähnliche Anregung aber für solche umfassendsten Methodenprobleme der Ethik findet sich ferner auch bei Sigwart. Auch Sigwart vertritt noch ausführlich die Theorie von einer im Menschen "angelegten...Empfänglichkeit für "sittliche Gefühle". 5/ Aber neben diesen empiristisch

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1/ H.Lotze: Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie. Diktate aus den Vorlesungen Lotzes. 1899. S.13.
2/ A.a.O.S. 12/13.
3/ H.Lotze: Metaphysik ed. Misch. S.625.
4/ H.Lotze: Metaphysik ed. Misch. S.625.
5/ Chr. Sigwart: Vorfragen der Ethik. 2. Aufl. Ed.H.Maier. 1907. S.63.

psychologischen Lehren betont er zugleich: "in dem Gedanken also eines einheitlichen und höchsten Zwecks, zu dem sich alle einzelnen Zwecke der bestimmten Handlungen wie Teile zu oder Mittel verhalten, kann sich erst mein Selbstbewusstsein nach der praktischen Seite vollenden. Erst dann weiss ich zu sagen, warum ich das einzelne will, wenn die einzelne Handlung durch einen einheitliche, letzten Zweck begründet ist...Die Aufgabe der Ethik enthält also die Aufstellung dines letzten, alle menschlichen Willenstätigkeiten umfassenden und in sich schliessenden Zwecks"[1], eines "Menschheits- und Weltzwecks"[2], "und zwar so, dass daraus die einzelnen konkreten Handlungen als Mittel, diesen Zweck zu verwirklichen, sicher und unzweideutig deduziert werden können"[1]. Eben aus diesem Grunde aber hält Sigwart auch -- wie er wenigstens andeutet -- eine "Begegnung"[2] von Metaphysik und von empirisch fundierter Ethik für unbedingt wünschenswert.[2]

Entsprechende Gedanken finden sich ferner bei Paulsen udd bei Wundt. Dagegen ist nun, wie ich glaube, die noch immer tiefste Lösung aller dieser Probleme angebahnt in der methodischen Grundanlage der Kantschen "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft"; nur allerdings in keiner Weise in der Ausführung, die Kant seiner Ethik gegeben hat, und die naturgemäss bisher das allein wesentlich Beachtete geblieben ist.

Von dieser Kantschen Lösung der ethischen Probleme ist, wie ich glaube, der rein transzendentale Problemansatz (wie er z.B. in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft ed. KKK Kehrbach S.109, eine volle Analogie zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft erstrebt) völlig zu scheiden. Kant selbst ist in den Antworten, die er auf alle ethischen Fragen gab (wie schon oft genügend gesagt, wenn auch nicht genügend im einzelnen gezeigt wurde) in einen unhaltbaren -- weil vorkritischen -- Rationalismus verfallen. Demgegenüber aber ist es eine unentbehrlich wichtige Aufgabe, den echten kritische, transzendentalen Problemansatz -- wenn

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1/ A.a.O.S. 15/16
2/ S.a.a.O.S.70.

auch zum grössten Teil im Gegensatz zu der Ausführung der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft --zu verdeutlichen.

Es ist eben deshalb bei der Erörterung der eigentlich transzendental ethischen Probleme völlig abzusehen von fast allen mehr oder minder orthodoxen Kantianern (die höchstens einige Korrekturen an den Kantschen Resultaten versuchten, aber den unmöglichen materialen Rationalismus der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft in keiner Weise methodisch zu überwinden vermochten), z.B. Von Julius Bergmann,[1] Hägerstrom[2] oder B. Erdmann, aber auch von Cohen oder von Nelson, der nicht nur methodisch, sondern auch in allen Resultaten nicht über den sehr engen Kreis der Inhalte der Kantschen Ethik hinauskam.[3] Im Gegensatz zu fast allen diesen Forshhern muss es besonders -- mit Rickert wie mit Troeltsch und Spranger -- festgehalten werden, dass die Ethik sich nicht "auf das Prinzip der Autonomie in seiner umfassendsten Bedeutung beschränken kann. In der Logik ist ja ebenfalls nicht nur von der Wahrheit im allgemeinen, sondern...von ihrer bsonderen Ausgestaltung in der Wissenschaft zu handeln"; und "für die wissenschaftliche Erforschung des autonomen Lebens gilt nicht minder, dass sie eine inhaltliche Erfüllung braucht, die aus den formalen Grundwerten nicht zu deduzieren ist".[4]

Des näheren aber ergibt sich nun für die Ethik, wie ich glaube, aus einer wesentlich transzendentalen Problemauffassung in der betonten Analogie zur Naturtheorie folgendes: der Begriff der Autonomie kann nur aufrecht erhalten und begründet werden im Sinn einer notwendigen Einheit der Apperzeption im Ethischen, d.h. als der oberste Grundsatz

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1/ Siehe Julius Bergmann: Über das Richtige.Eine Erörterung der ethischen Grundfragen, 1883, besonders S.11äff.
2/ A.Hägerström: Kants Ethik im Verhältnis zu seinen erkenntnistheoretischen Grundgedanken systematisch dargestellt,1902,s.z.B.S.256f.
3/ Siehe L.Nelson: Vorlesungen über die Grundlagen der Ethik, Bd.I: Kritik der pratischen Vernunft, 1917.
4/ H.Rickert: Über logische und ethische Geltung, 1914, in Kant-Studien, Bd.XIX S.221.

der Ethik kann nur dies rein apriori aufgezeigt werden, dass alle möglichen sittlichen Werte stets notwendig einer obersten umfassendsten Einheit unterstehen müssen. (Selbst da, wo ein blosses Chaos der sittlichen Inhälte zu setzen versucht würde, würde doch dies Chaos notwendig noch in der Form der Einheit eines Apperzipierenden Ich überhaupt angenommen werden müssen.) Wie aber nun weiter in einer Theorie der Naturerkenntnis zwischen dem Moment der Einheit der Apperzeption auf der einen Seite un dem empirisch gegebenen Inhalten auf der anderen Seite mindestens noch ein spezifisch eigenartiges Moment für einen "Schematismus" des Erkennens unentbehrlich ist, nämlich das Moment einer universalen, nichtemprischen Anschauung, so gilt dies relativ korrespondierend auch für die Ethik. Und zwar ist nun für die Ethik diese alles umfassende Anschauung -- wie dies ausführlich zu zeigen wäre -- stets notwendig eine metaphysisch-religiöse Grundintuition, eine "intellektuelle Anschauung" von einem umspannenden Totalsinn des Daseins. Ein solcher Totalwert wird stets schon mit in alle empirischen Werte hineingesehen und hineingelebt, auch bei den flachsten Totaldeutungen, die etwa alle Werte nur als selbstverständlich roh hedonisch oder ökonomisch deuten wollen.

Um also den gegliederten Stufenbau derjenigen Momente zu bestimmen, die zu einer Theorie des Ethischen unentbehrlich sind, ja die bereits jeder Satz über Ethisches (korrespondierend allen Sätzen der Naturerkenntnis) enthält, ist ausser dem Moment der Einheit der Apperzeption und dem Moment der empirisch gegebenen Wertungen mindestens noch das Moment einer ethischen Totalanschauung nötig, wie sie bei jeder Erfassung emprisischer Werte stets mitgegeben ist und mitgegeben sein muss. Die Probleme dieser stets vorhandenen und notwendig vorhandenen Gesamtintuition sind es, die Kant in seiner Typik der reinen praktischen Vernunft methodisch beschäftigt haben. Es Erst nach der Anerkennung dieser Universalanschauung kann der Kantische Begriff einer vorausgesetzten "Ordnung der Dinge", d.h. der Werte (ein Begriff, der für

die Kantische Typik, für alle Urteilsentscheidung auf Grund dieser Typik entscheidend ist, s.z.B. den Satz: "die Regel der Urtheilskraft unter Gesetzen der reinen praktischen Vernunft ist diese: frage dich selbst, wenn die Handlung, die du vor hast, nach einem Gesetze der Natur...geschehen sollte..., und du gehörtest mit zu einer solchen Ordnung der Dinge, würdest du darin wohl mit Einstimmung deines Willens sein? "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft S.84/85) einen Sinn gewinnen. Jede solche allgemeinste "Ordnung" der Werte -- in der Ethik kann es sich natürlich nicht um physische "Dinge" handeln, die ja auch an jener Stelle bei Kant nicht gemeint sind -- setzt eben jene ordnende metaphysische Universalanschauung schon voraus, wie sie die spekulative Ethik, ohne sich voll methodisch Rechenschaft zu geben, in einer intellektuellen Anschauung des höchsten Gutes (d.h. Güterzusammenhangs) stets geübt ht. Oder wie schon Franz von Baader diese Problemlage in diesem Zusammenhang gut andeutet: "Was...der Schematism dem Verstande, dasselbe leistet die Simbolik der Vernunft".[1] Erst im Rahmen einer solchen "universalen Anschauung" des Sittlichen, einer "Simbolik der Vernunft", erst durch sie und aus ihr heraus gewinnen dann alle die verschiedenen einzelnen empirischen Werte einen Ordnungszusammenhang.

Nun kann selbstverständlich in der Geschichte der Ethik diese Ordnung der Werte, es kann das höhhste Gut oder der wahre Zusammenhang der Werte in jener Totalanschauung oft oder dauerns irrig bestimmt sein. Dies ist so wenig zu vermeiden, wie man in der Geschichte der Naturerkenntnis etwa falsche naturwissenschaftliche Hypothesen unmöglich machen kann.[2] Die Korrektur solcher falschen Einordnungszusammen-

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1/ Fr.v.Baader: Über d. Begr.d.Ethik durch d. Physik, 1813, S.7

2/ Vgl. hiermit H. Maier: Psychologie des emotionalen Denkens, S.775: "Das sittliche Bewusstsein lässt sich durch...die Verschiedenheit der sittlichen Anschauungen...sowenig beirren, wie das Wahrheitsbewusstsein durch die Tatsache des Irrtums."

hänge wird für die "theoretische" wie für die "praktische Vernunft" immer nur durch das Gewicht von "Tatsachen" erfolgen, durch das Gewicht von empirischen Wahrnehmungen bzw. von empirischen Wertungen.

Sobald einige Reihen des tatsächlichen Wertens gar nicht mehr eingegliedert werden können in den bestimmten Wertezusammenhang, den irgendeine inhaltlich bestimmte metaphysische Anschauung aufstellt, sobald muss eben ein anderer neuer Anschauungszusammenhang gewonnen werden, der diese Aufgabe leisten kann. Niemals aber wird und braucht deshalb die Menschheit an der Möglichkeit einer immer weiter fortschreitenden, an der Möglichkeit einer immer mehr wahren (weil mehr Tatsachen umfassenden) Erkenntnis der Natur und des Sittlichen zu verzweifeln. Auch unsere höchst entwickelte Kenntnis der Naturgesetze setzt uns noch nicht in den Stand irgendwelche komplizierten organischen Prozesse zu erklären. Und doch wird deshalb niemand den Wert der naturwissenschaftlichen Gesetzesforschung in Frage ziehen können. Ganz ebenso ist es, glaube ich, gewiss nicht möglich, den unersetzlichen Wert einer philosophisch exakten theoretischen Ethik deshalb zu leugnen, weil es in bestimmten individuell verwickelten Fällen nicht immer gelingt, das Ganze aller hier in Frage kommenden Wertverhältnisse aufzudecken.

Nur dann, wenn von uns überhaupt keinerlei wahrhafte, sich entwickelnde Theorie des Sittlichen angebahnt werden könnte, nur dann müsste jede philosophische Ethik einer letztlich subjektiven Lebensauffassung weichen, ebenso wie jede Naturtheorie einer bloss subjektiven Natureinfühlung. Eine solche Theorie der Ethik ist aber nun, wie ich bisher im Ansatz zu entwickeln suchte, in einem wesentlich transzendentalen Sinne -- wenn auch durchaus nicht in der Fassung des historischen Kant -- möglich. Dagegen ohne eine solche umfassende Theorie würde, wie ich eben zeigen wollte, auch ein tieferes Verstehen und ein tieferes Eindringen in die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Moralphilosophie nicht möglich werden.

Es darf in einer umfassenden Geschichte der Ethik gewiss nicht geschehen, dass die "begrifflichen Mittel" der Methoden allein "für den Kern" genommen werden und dass die "Struktur der Seelen" der Denker wie die gesamte geistesgeschichtliche Denkatmosphäre unverstanden bleibt. Es wäre das Gegenteil von dem, was auch in dieser Skizze erstrebt wurde, wenn eine Geschichte der philosophie zu einer rohen Rubrizierung der allgemeinsten philosophischen Standpunkte, zu einer Art "Ketzerhistorie von allgemeinen Ansichten" 1/ herabsinken würde.

Aber neben der treuesten Einfühlung in die menschliche Eigenart der grossen wie der kleineren Denker, neben einer klaren Erfassung der gesamten zeitgeschichtlichen Hintergründe darf doch auch die Darstellung des objektiven Lehrgehaltes und der Methoden der Systeme nicht leiden. Zu einer Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Ethik gehört durchaus auch eine exakte Vergleichung des oft mühsam und tief durchdachten begrifflichen, des methodischen Apparates, den die verschiedenen Denker ausgebildet haben, nicht nur einer Vergleichung der Resultate der Forschung.

Diesen Anforderungen kann, wie ich glaube, die Geschichte der modernen Ethik von Jodl, das einzige grössere Werk, das bisher auf diesem Gebiete existiert, nicht genügen. Jodl ist im wesentlichen nur der empiristischen Ethik gerecht geworden; dagegen die ganze Darstellung der "spekulativen", der kritischen, der rein rationalen wie der religiösen Problematik ist meist sehr stark positivistisch verzeichnet, trotz des weit ausgedehnten und des dauernd verdienstvollen Quellenstudiums, das dies Werk aufweist. Und so ist für die Geschichte der modernen Moralphilosophie gegenwärtig noch ein reiches Material zur Darstellung zu bringen; oder es würde sonst ein oft ergreifend starkes Ringen um inhaltvolles und exaktes Denken -- wie es das 19. Jahrhundert erfüllt -- unbeachtet bleiben, und es würde das Wort Schleiermachers: "die Sittenlehre als

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1/ Siehe Schelling: Werke, I. Abt., VII., Band, S.338 und 344.

Wissenschaft...befindet sich in einem unerfreulichen Zustande"[1] -- mindestens für die Geschichte der Ethik, schon wegen der "geringen Produktivität auf diesem Gebiete"[2] -- auch heute noch aufrecht erhalten werden müssen.

1/ Siehe Schleiermacher: Werke ed. Braun, Bd.I S.445.
2/ Siehe Schelling: Werke, I. Abt., VII.Band, S.338 und 344.

Hauptmethodenfragen moderner Ethik ..." D's Essay copy 1 of 2

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LOGOS

INTERNATIONALE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE DER KULTUR

★

UNTER MITWIRKUNG VON

BRUNO BAUCH · JULIUS BINDER · ERNST CASSIRER
EDMUND HUSSERL · FRIEDRICH MEINECKE · RUDOLF OTTO
HEINRICH RICKERT · EDUARD SPRANGER · KARL VOSSLER
UND HEINRICH WÖLFFLIN

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des XIX. Bandes

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Mit einer Beilage der Firmen Quelle & Meyer in Leipzig, der Neue Geist-Verlag in Berlin, Felix Meiner in Leipzig, Fr. Frommann in Stuttgart, Junker & Dünnhaupt in Berlin, des Hegelbundes und 4 Beilagen der Verlagsbuchhandlung.

ÜBER EINIGE HAUPTMETHODENFRAGEN DER MODERNEN ETHIK ‹VON KANT BIS ZUR GEGENWART›.

VON

DAVID BAUMGARDT (BERLIN) [1]).

Unter bewußter Abstraktion von allem eigentlich seelischen Gehalt moderner Weltanschauung soll in dieser Skizze gegenüber der Chaotik der modernen ethischen Meinungen nur die eine Frage erhoben werden: Welche wichtigsten Problemstellungen und Methoden der Ethik sind es überhaupt, die zu so verschiedenen Resultaten führen konnten. Und zwar scheint mir dann zur Entwirrung dieser starken Durcheinanderschlingung von sehr verschiedenartigen Problemen für den ersten Überblick mindestens die vorläufige Scheidung von drei großen Fragengebieten unentbehrlich.

I.

Die Problemsphäre des konsequenten Empirismus und Positivismus ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß hier das, was wir sollen, d. h. das ethisch Gültige, nur als das, was wir tatsächlich erfahrungsgemäß wollen, angesehen wird.

Der zeitlich erste aber und wohl auch der markanteste [2]) Vertreter dieser Richtung ist für das 19. Jahrhundert Jeremy Bentham; zweifellos ist die Grundeinstellung Benthams so alt wie das menschliche Denken selbst, sie ist schon vor der griechischen Sophistenbewegung im nicht-

1) Dieser Aufsatz ist bereits seit längerem abgeschlossen und war für die Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag Eduard Wechßlers im Oktober 1929 bestimmt. Wegen des Raummangels der Festschrift erscheint er nun an dieser Stelle.

2) Frau von Staël soll über B. geradezu geäußert haben: »Die verhängnisvollen Zeiten, in welchen sie gelebt habe, würden von der Nachwelt nicht das Zeitalter Bonapartes, . . . sondern das Zeitalter Benthams genannt werden.« Siehe Ed. Beneke: Grundsätze d. Civil- u. Criminal-Gesetzgebung von Bentham-Dumont, 1830, Vorrede S. III.

griechischen Altertum zu finden [1]), Bentham selbst gibt besonders emphatisch an, von Priestley und Helvetius beeinflußt zu sein [2]), ja sein greatest-happiness-Prinzip findet sich bereits wörtlich bei Hutcheson [3]). Aber die Energie, mit der Bentham seine Lehre allseitig konsequent abrundete, die drastische Kritik, die er in spezifisch englisch-empiristischem Geist an der französischen rationalistischen Erklärung der Menschenrechte übte [4]), die glückliche Schlagkraft seiner Formeln haben ihm auch in Frankreich wie in Deutschland als typischem Vertreter englischer Ethik eine starke Wirkungsmöglichkeit gegeben. Bentham lehrt es besonders instruktiv: das Sittliche ist stets nur durch Beobachtung und durch Vergleichung der tatsächlichen, der empirischen Verhaltungsweisen des Menschen bestimmbar. Diese methodische Grundüberzeugung des ethischen Positivismus ist die letzte, sie ist die oft unausgesprochene, aber ganz unentbehrliche Grundvoraussetzung Benthams, ja fast der ganzen modernen englischen Ethik.

Erst aus dieser radikal empiristischen Fragestellung erklärt sich der volle Sinn des Satzes, es bestehe eine durchgängige »Koinzidenz«, ja eine Identität von Pflicht, d. h. von ethisch Gültigem und von Interesse. »Von Pflichten zu sprechen, ist verlorene Mühe . . . Interesse und Pflicht decken sich in allen Dingen des Lebens« [5]). Das tatsächliche Interesse, das einzige und das empirisch überall feststellbare Ziel des Menschen ist nämlich nach Bentham nur die Befriedigung des Eigeninteresses. Das Interesse des Menschen besteht nach Bentham stets nur darin, dasjenige nützliche Gut zu erstreben, das ihm die größte Lust und die kleinste Unlust verschafft. "By the principle of utility is meant that principle, which approves and disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have, to augment or diminish the happiness of the party, whose interest is in question" [6]). "Upon . . . the

1) S. z. B. Deussen: Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, 1914, I. Band 3. Abt. S. 78, und Ders.: Vier Philos. Texte des Mahâbhâratam, 1906, S. 985: »jeder schätzt jedesmal dasjenige als Pflicht, woran er gerade sein Gefallen findet« (wohl um 500 a. Ch.).

2) I. Bentham: Deontologie (deutsch), 1834, Bd. I S. 421/24, und Ders.: Works, 1838/43 Bd. X S. 70, 142.

3) Hutcheson: Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, 1725, II, 3, 8.

4) Siehe Bentham: Anarchical fallacies; being an examination of the declarations of rights issued during the french revolution, Works 1838/43, Bd. II S. 489 ff.

5) Bentham: Deontologie, Bd. I S. 6 ff.

6) Siehe Bentham: Works, Bd. I, »An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation«, Chap. I § 2, S. 1.

principle of utility . . . the most abominable pleasure which the vilest of malefactors ever reaped from his crime would . . . not . . . be to be reprobated, if it stood alone. The case is, that it never does stand alone, but is necessarily followed by such a quantity of pain . . . that the pleasure in comparison of it, is as nothing" [1]). Es läßt sich also bei jedem Verhalten des Menschen genau bestimmen, welches Quantum von Lust dieses Verhalten in seinem Ergebnis einbringt, und »ist das Endresultat gut berechnet, so ergibt es Sittlichkeit; Unsittlichkeit aber, wenn die Berechnung falsch war« [2]). Die Ethik wird also für diese Theorie zur »Moralarithmetik« [3]). Diese Moralarithmetik aber zeigt nach Bentham: es liegt im Eigeninteresse des Menschen, Sympathie und tätiges Wohlwollen für »human kind in general«, ja für »the whole sensitive creation« zu üben [4]). Jedoch fast alle die scharfe Kritik, die der Benthamismus erfuhr, richtet sich nun bezeichnenderweise nur gegen die Resultate seiner empiristischen Methode, aber nicht gegen diese Methode selbst.

So hat Robert Owen in seinem »Book of the new moral world« im wesentlichen nur eine Erweiterung der Benthamschen Formel gefordert: nicht nur für die gegenwärtige Menschheit, auch für die größtmögliche Wohlfahrt der späteren Generationen soll gewirkt werden, nicht nur das Glück der räumlich unendlichen Schöpfung, auch das Wohl der zeitlich nach uns kommenden Geschlechter steht in Frage [5]). Weiter aber steht sowohl der jüngere Saint-Simon wie Fourier oder Weitling und überhaupt eine große Zahl aller neueren Sozialtheoretiker mehr oder minder ausdrücklich auf dem Boden eines Bentham-Owenschen Positivismus, ja selbst Marx gehört mit einem Teil seiner moraltheoretischen Voraussetzungen hierher [6]). Und ganz ebenso ist auch

1) A. a. O. Chap. II § 4, S. 4.

2) Bentham: Deontologie II, Einleitung S. 28.

3) Bentham: Deontologie Bd. I S. 223 f., II S. 23. Deontology (englisch), 1834, Bd. II Kap. 2 S. 99.

4) Bentham: Introduction to the principles of morals, Chap. VI § 21; Works, Bd. I S. 21; vgl. Deontologie (deutsch), Bd. I S. 10.

5) Robert Owen: The Book of new moral world, London 1836—44, VII. Teil S. 69 ff.; vgl. J. M. Guyau: La Morale anglaise contemporaine (deutsch herausg. v. E. Bergmann), S. 88. (Owen hat in diesem Werk fälschlich den Vornamen Richard statt Robert erhalten. Richard Owen war Anatom und Zoologe.)

6) Vgl. über Marx das Urteil in W. Wundts »Ethik« 1903 S. 512 f. und E. Spangers »Lebensformen« S. 289, für W. Weitling s. z. B. seine »Garantien der Harmonie und Freiheit«, ed. Mehring, 1908, S. 112: »Das Ideal höchster Vollkommenheit . . . ist . . . es . . ., an die von der Natur uns allen bestimmten Quellen der irdischen Glückseligkeit hinüberzuspringen.«

die assoziationspsychologische Ethik, die James Mill durchführen will, nur eine geringfügige Korrektur der Benthamschen Lehre.

Erst John Stuart Mill bedeutet in England für den ethischen Positivismus einen — wenn auch nicht zu überschätzenden — Fortschritt. J. St. Mill hat in seiner induktiven Beobachtung der tatsächlichen Wertungen des Menschen den Wert des Sozialen als relativ selbständig erkannt neben dem Wert des Ökonomischen oder des Machtpolitischen (den Bentham als den allein grundlegenden ansah). Ja J. St. Mill erkannte überhaupt, daß die verschiedenen Werte nicht rein quantitativ miteinander vergleichbar sind; die »Lüste«, die die verschiedenen Werte »verursachen«, sind nicht rein zahlenmäßig gegeneinander abschätzbar, sie zeigen letzte qualitative Differenzen. Aber die nähere Ausführung, in der Mill diese Erkenntnisse darlegt, ist oft wenig überzeugend oder innerlich schwankend zwischen einem Rettungsversuch des konsequenten egoistischen Utilismus (wir werden im Wünschen stets nur vom Eigeninteresse bestimmt [1]), können aber im Denken ein losgelöstes, alleinstehendes Ich gar nicht vorstellen [2]) und zwischen einer Anlehnung an einen »intuitiven« Sozialeudämonismus, für den das Glück und die »Würde« des Nebenmenschen ein »intuitiv« gegebener selbständiger Wert ist [3]).

Dagegen ist John Stuart Mill sicher im Recht, wenn er dem alten Streit zwischen der »induktiven« und der »intuitiven« Schule sehr oft keine allzu zentrale Bedeutung zuspricht [4]). Es ist ein Unterschied, ob alle möglichen Wertungen des Menschen nur als Abarten einer einzigen angesehen werden (wie dies bei Bentham geschieht) oder ob die verschiedenen Werte als selbständig nebeneinander gelten. Und es ist ebenso ein Unterschied, ob die Vorstellung des sittlich zu Erstrebenden als empirisch erworben gilt oder als angeboren, wie dies letztere die intuitive

1) Siehe J. St. Mill: Gesammelte Werke (deutsch) ed. Th. Gomperz, I. Bd., 1869 S. 139: der letzte Endzweck, in Rücksicht auf welchen alle anderen Dinge »wünschenswert sind . . . ist ein Dasein, welches . . . so reich als möglich an Genüssen ist« (»Das Nützlichkeits-Prinzip«).

2) S. a. a. O. S. 162: »da Jedermann . . . seines Gleichen hat, . . . so wachsen die Menschen auf, unfähig, einen Zustand völliger Mißachtung der Interessen Anderer für sich als möglich zu denken.«

3) A. a. O. S. 136 f.; vgl. auch J. St. Mill: Logik (deutsch) 1877, Bd. II, S. 597.

4) J. St. Mill: Werke 1869, Bd. I S. 160/61: »wenn es . . . wirklich etwas Angeborenes gibt, so sehe ich keinen Grund, weshalb das angeborne Gefühl nicht das der Rücksicht auf die Vergnügen und Leiden Anderer sein sollte? . . . Wäre dem so, so würde die intuitive Moral mit der utilitaristischen zusammenfallen.«

Schule, wenigstens die schottischen Intuitionisten lehren. Aber alle diese Lehren bleiben streng innerhalb des Rahmens des ethischen Positivismus. Die Ethik ist für alle diese Theorien zunächst rein auf vorgefundenen, auf gegebenen Werttatsachen aufgebaut. Auch die angeborenen Ideen der Common-Sense-Philosophie — zum mindesten in der Darstellung jener englischen Schule — können nur tatsächlich gegebene Wertungen bedeuten; irgendein weiterer Beweis für die Gültigkeit dieser Wertungen ist aber hier nirgends versucht und nirgends durchführbar. Selbst Dugald Stewart, ein typischer englischer Repräsentant der intuitiven Schule im 19. Jahrhundert, muß zugeben, daß auch seine Lehren nur zurückführen auf »some faculty by which we are capable of bestowing approbation or blame« [1]), daß aber »the power of these adventitious causes . . . is so great, that there is perhaps no particular practice, which we may not be trained to approve of or to condemn« [1]). Also auch Stewarts Theorien sind im Kern positivistisch, ja sogar den Ergebnissen der induktiven Schule sehr angenähert, wie sich Mill weitgehend mit einem gemäßigten »Intuitionismus« einverstanden erklären will [2]). Ja ein Denker wie Mackintosh konnte so — vollkommen begreiflich — von Guyau prinzipiell der induktiven [3]), von Jodl vorwiegend der intuitiven Schule zugeordnet werden [4]).

Die Parallelerscheinung zu J. St. Mill bildet aber in Frankreich Auguste Comte. Comte hat in seiner Soziologie — ebenso wie Mill — den rein egoistischen Utilismus zu überwinden gesucht. So heißt es in dem Kapitel »Soziale Statik oder Lehre von der sich selbst vollziehenden Ordnung der Gemeinschaften« sehr deutlich: »Unsere sozialen Gefühle sind nicht so aushaltend und nicht so stark als die egoistischen Gefühle; indes beruht das gemeinsame Glück hauptsächlich auf der Befriedigung der ersteren, welche allein den sozialen Zustand begründet haben und ihn trotz des Widerstrebens der mächtigsten individuellen Instinkte aufrecht erhalten« [5]). Also beide »Gefühle«, sowohl der »individuelle« wie der »soziale Instinkt« werden in uns empirisch vorgefunden, und sie sind deshalb in gleicher Weise ethisch wertvoll

1) Dugald Stewart: The philosophy of the active and moral powers of man, works, 1855, Bd. VI., S. 229.

2) J. St. Mill: Werke ed. Th. Gomperz, Bd. I S. 160 f. (Das Nützlichkeits-Prinzip).

3) Siehe J. M. Guyau: La Morale anglaise contemp. (deutsch), S. 93 f.

4) Siehe F. Jodl: Geschichte der Ethik, II. Band, 1912, S. 408 f.

5) A. Comte: Die positive Philosophie im Auszuge von Jules Rig, deutsch von J. H. v. Kirchmann, II. Band, 1884, S. 107.

und ethisch gültig. Auch »wenn man beim Menschen das Übergewicht der eigenen Interessen unterdrücken könnte, würde man unsere moralische Natur zerstören, anstatt sie zu verbessern; denn die sozialen Gefühle wären dann ihrer Leitung beraubt und würden in eine unbestimmte und unfruchtbare Nächstenliebe ausarten« [1]).

Ja Comte geht in seinem »Positivismus« so weit, daß er behauptet: erst die kraniologische Forschung Galls, erst die »Physiologie des Gehirns« [1]) habe die »Ausschreitungen« [1]) des egoistischen Utilismus damit »vollständig widerlegen« [1]) können, daß sie sowohl den Sitz der individuellen wie den Sitz der sozialen Triebe im Hirn nachgewiesen habe — also gewiß ein kaum mehr zu steigernder »Positivismus« in diesem Nachweis der ethischen Gültigkeit bestimmter seelischer Triebe, ein Nachweis, der sich erst — oder schon — mit der Aufzeigung der physischen Lokalisationen dieser Triebe begnügen will.

Im übrigen aber steht auch in Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert eine Diskussion zwischen induktiver und intuitiver Schule oft im Vordergrund. Cousin [2]) und später Renouvier [3]) zeigen häufig die Tendenz, die Kantische Ethik zu einer Lehre von angeborenen Prinzipien im Sinne Reids auszudeuten, während E. Littré und die ganze Comte-Schule es scharf betonen: »A ce point, la physiologie psychique retrouve le sens moral, mais . . . au lieu d'être primordial et inné il est sécondaire et acquis; au lieu d'être absolu il est rélatif; aussi se montre-t-il variable suivant les individus, suivant les classes, et surtout suivant les époques« [4]). Aber auch noch Guyau hält in seiner Schrift: »La morale anglaise contemporaine« den Gegensatz zwischen induktiver und intuitiver Ethik für die Frage, die sich über die »Gesamtheit der Dinge« erstrecke [5]). Zugleich ist freilich die intuitive Schule in Frankreich im Durchschnitt weniger psychologistisch als in England. Es wird hier bei den idées morales weniger Gewicht auf ihr tatsächlich vorfindbares

1) A. Comte: Die positive Philosophie im Auszuge von Jules Rig, deutsch von J. H. v. Kirchmann, II. Band, 1884, S. 107.

2) S. z. B. V. Cousin: Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien, 1872, S. 442 f.. »Avec Reid et Kant nous reconnaissons la raison comme le faculté du vrai, du beau et du bien . . . dans notre esprit« usw.

3) S. bei Ch. Renouvier, wenigstens in dieselbe Richtung weisend, z. B. »essais de critique générale, traité de psychologie«, 1912, S. 228: »il faut donc avouer, que le sentiment moral, la passion du bien . . . sont des éléments de la loi (d. h. des Kantischen kategor. Imperativs) et des conditions de sa représentation.«

4) E. Littré: Des origines organiques de la morale in der Zeitschrift, 1870: La philosophie positive, Bd. VI S. 9 f.

5) J. M. Guyau: La morale angl. contemp. (deutsch), S. 268.

Angeborensein gelegt, der Nachdruck liegt mehr darauf, die »Axiome und Prinzipien der Moral« als evidente »vérités éternelles« zu erweisen im Sinne eines materialen Rationalismus und im Anklang an die naturrechtliche Auffassung der droits de l'homme der französischen Revolution (vgl. hier als Belege unter anderem Jules Simon: »Le devoir«, 1863, S. 271, 278: »L'idée de la justice . . . est innée . . . il faut donc« la »rapporter à la raison, dont la fonction propre est de nous fournir les axiomes et les principes éternels, sans lesquels notre pensée . . . et notre liberté n'auraient point de règle.« Oder E. Bersot: »Essais de philosophie et de morale«, 1864, Bd. I S. 497 f.: »Il y a du bien et du mal, il y a de l'ordre dans le monde«, ce sont »de vérités premières, évidentes, universelles . . . du sens commun . . . qui est la seule règle de la vérité«, S. 251: »Cet ordre moral est nécessaire comme les vérités mathématiques; aber Ähnliches auch bei Cousin, Vacherot und bei Proudhon z. B. »De la création de l'ordre dans l'humanité«, S. 36: »das Sittengesetz ist ewig und absolut«, zitiert und kritisiert bei Stirner: »Der Einzige und sein Eigentum« ed. Mackey, 1911, S. 52. Weiter aber gleitet die intuitive Schule in Frankreich wie z. T. in England auch leicht über in metaphysische und religiöse Begründungen der Moralideen [1]) und führt natürlich damit ebenso wie mit ihren rationalistischen Argumentationen über alle bloß empirische Ethik hinaus.

In Deutschland endlich hat der englische Empirismus besonders stark auf Friedrich E. Beneke gewirkt. Beneke hat die »Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation von Bentham« 1830 bearbeitet und übersetzt und er hat danach vor allem 1837 bis 1840 in seinem »System der praktischen Philosophie« seine eigene, konsequent empiristische Ethik ausgebaut. Auch Beneke sucht hier wie bereits in der »Schutzschrift für meine Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten« [2]) und wie in der Vorrede zu der Bentham-Bearbeitung die Vieldeutigkeit und die Unbrauchbarkeit des Benthamschen Lustbegriffes zu überwinden. »Die Werte aller Dinge, oder aller Güter und Übel« — so heißt es bei Beneke im Unterschied von Bentham — »werden geschätzt durch die Steigerungen und Herabstimmungen, welche die-

1) Vgl. z. B. Jules Simon: Le devoir, 1854, S. 286: »Nous savons, qu'il y a une justice, qu'elle est éternelle, obligatoire, universelle; que par conséquent l'homme a des droits et des devoirs; . . . nous savons aussi que la justice repose en Dieu comme dans sa substance éternelle.« E. Bersot: Essais de philosophie et de morale, 1864, Bd. I S. 7: les vérités de morale naturelle, solides sans doute, mais sans efficacité faute de s'appuyer sur l'autorité d'un Dieu.«

2) Friedrich Eduard Beneke: Schutzschrift f. m. Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten, 1823, S. 52.

selben in dem menschlichen Sein hervorbringen« [1]). Und diese oft rein geistigen oder auch nicht genügend klar bewußten »Förderungen« und »Hemmungen« [2]) hat nun Beneke allerdings viel feiner differenzierend beschrieben und gegliedert, als dies nach dem alles uniformierenden Benthamschen Lustbegriff möglich war. Ja selbst das Problem einer »Rangordnung der Güter oder Werte« [3]) ist hier schon mit größter Deutlichkeit bezeichnet, wenn auch keineswegs tiefer gelöst. Beneke führt es nämlich vielfach aus: »jeder unverdorbene . . . Mensch . . . wird . . . die Genüsse der Anschauung durch den Gesichtssinn und der Tonempfindung mit höherer Steigerung in sich bilden, als . . . gleich große Genüsse der niederen Sinne« [4]). »Jeder rein gebildete Mensch . . . wird die intellektuelle Ausbildung höher schätzen, als sinnliche Genüsse« [4]), er wird dem Wohle einer größeren Gemeinschaft . . . einen höheren Wert beilegen, als dem individuell-beschränkten Wohle« [4]). »Die Allgemeingültigkeit« dieser Wertabstufung aber »bestehe darin, daß die bezeichnete Rangordnung wirklich in allen Menschen durch die Grundverhältnisse ihrer praktischen Entwickelung auf gleiche Weise angelegt ist« [5]). In solchen Argumentationen wird freilich augenscheinlich gerade die innere Unzulänglichkeit jedes bloßen ethischen Empirismus sehr sichtbar. Nahe verwandt mit Beneke sind dann weiter die moral-theoretischen Fragmente Ludwig Feuerbachs aus den Jahren 1850—1870, wenn auch Beneke oder Bentham hier nirgends als Vorgänger direkt genannt sind. Feuerbach sucht alle ethischen Werte als »Glückseligkeitswerte« zu begreifen; und sein Kampf gilt von hier aus zunächst der »Moral eines für sich allein gedachten Individuums« [6]) (die ihm »eine leere Fiktion« [6]) ist), dann aber auch ganz besonders allen nicht rein empirisch aufzeigbaren Moralbegriffen [7]), allen »blutlosen«, »hypokritischen«, »metaphysisch chimärischen Allgemein-

1) Grundsätze der Civil- und Criminal-Gesetzgebung aus den Handschriften des englischen Rechtsgelehrten Jeremias Bentham herausgeg. von Etienne Dumont, bearbeitet und mit Anmerkungen von Fr. Ed. Beneke, Bd. I, Vorrede S. XIX.

2) Siehe Fr. Beneke: Grundlinien des natürlichen Systems der praktischen Philosophie, Bd. I, 1837, S. 226 f.

3) Fr. Ed. Beneke: Grundsätze d. Civil- u. Crim. usw., Bd. I S. 58.

4) A. a. O. S. 59.

5) Fr. Ed. Beneke: System d. prakt. Philosophie, Bd. I S. 248, 87, 88.

6) L. Feuerbach: Sämtliche Werke ed. Bolin und Jodl, 1911, Bd. X S. 269: »nur der gesellschaftliche Mensch ist Mensch. Ich bin Ich nur durch Dich und mit Dir.« Oder S. 270/71: »die Natur selbst . . . hat den gegenseitigen Glückseligkeitstrieb im Geschlechtstrieb . . . hervorgebracht.«

7) S. besonders a. a. O. S. 288: »die Moral ist so gut eine Erfahrungswissenschaft wie die Medicin.«

gespenstern« wie der neigungsfreien Pflicht [1]), dem rein vernünftigen Gewissen [2]), der glückverleugnenden Tugend [3]). Und einen ähnlichen empiristisch begründeten Eudämonismus vertritt ferner — neben Bolzano [4]) — auch Gustav Theodor Fechner in der feinsinnigen Schrift: »Über das höchste Gut«, in der ausdrücklich auch »das Maximum der Lust schlechthin als das Anzustrebende gesetzt« wird [5]). Aber auch der ganze spätere reine Empirismus und Positivismus (wie Laas [6]), Gizycki [7]), Dietzgen, Schubert-Soldern [8]), aber auch Dühring [9]), Schuppe [10]), Mach [11]), H. Sidgwick [12]) und später Jodl [13]), Cornelius [14]), ebenso wie Meinong [15]) in seiner Frühzeit, G. Heymans [16]) in Holland, R. Ardigo [17]) in Italien ist in allen seinen moraltheoretischen Grundanschauungen nicht wesentlich über die bisher skizzierten englischen, französischen und deutschen Lehren hinausgegangen.

1) S. a. a. O. Bd. II S. 371: »Die Pflicht gebietet den Genuß! Die Entsagung ist nur eine traurige Ausnahme von der Regel.«

2) S. a. a. O. Bd. X S. 281: »das ... Gewissen ist nur der in den Eingeweiden meines eigenen Glückseligkeitstriebes wühlende, verletzte Glückseligkeitstrieb des Anderen.«

3) S. a. a. O. S. 287: »Die Tugend ist die eigene Glückseligkeit ... im Bunde mit fremder.«

4) Siehe B. Bolzano: Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft, 1834, I. Band S. 236 (anonym erschienen).

5) G. Th. Fechner: Über das höchste Gut, 1846, S. 17, 10.

6) E. Laas: Idealismus und Positivismus, II. Teil: Idealistische und positivistische Ethik, 1882.

7) G. v. Gizycki: Grundzüge der Moral, 1883, später umgearbeitet zur »Moralphilosophie«, 1888.

8) R. v. Schubert-Soldern: Grundlagen zu einer Ethik, 1887.

9) E. Dühring: Der Werth des Lebens, 1902, s. z. B. S. 91: »Die Naturgesetze des menschlichen Handelns entwickeln sich kulturgemäß dadurch, daß der Mensch mehr Einsicht in sein eigenes Wesen, mehr Mitgefühl im gegenseitigen Verkehr ... erlangt. So bilden und wandeln sich die Sitten.« S. 90: »Der ... Materialismus macht an dem nichts schlecht, was in der bisherigen Moral gut war.«

10) W. Schuppe: Grundzüge der Ethik und Rechtsphilosophie, 1881.

11) E. Mach: Erkenntnis und Irrtum, 1905, S. 102: »Ethik und Recht gehören zur sozialen Kulturtechnik und stehen desto höher, je mehr ... sie sich nur auf Tatsächliches gründen.«

12) H. Sidgwick: Methods of Ethics, 1875.

13) F. Jodl: Allgemeine Ethik, herausgeg. v. Börner, 1918.

14) H. Cornelius: Psychologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft, 1897, S. 375 ff., 409 bis 414, und Einleitung in die Philosophie, S. 337/57.

15) A. v. Meinong: Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-Theorie, 1894.

16) G. Heymans: Einführung in die Ethik auf Grundlage der Erfahrung 1914.

17) R. Ardigo: Opere filosofiche, 1884 ff., Bd. III, bes. S. 190 ff.; vgl. J. Bluwstein: Die Weltanschauung Robert Ardigos, 1911, S. 36, 88 f.

In Wahrheit kam in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts die stärkste Anregung für die empiristische Wertlehre von der — Deszendenztheorie her. Schon Lamarck hatte in seiner »Philosophie zoologique« erklärt: »Physisches und Moralisches« (das französische »moral« enthält ja das Ethische mindestens als Teil in sich) »sind an ihrem Ursprung ohne Zweifel ein und dasselbe... Um den gemeinsamen Ursprung dieser beiden Wirkungsreihen, welche in ihrer größten Verschiedenheit das bilden, was man Physisches und Moralisches nennt, darzulegen«, habe man es nur »bisher schlecht angegriffen und einen Weg gewählt, der dem einzuschlagenden ganz entgegengesetzt ist«. Man habe fälschlich »das Studium dieser beiden Arten von scheinbar so verschiedenen Gegenständen beim Menschen selbst begonnen ... wo es ... am schwierigsten ist, die gemeinsame Ursache so vieler Erscheinungen zu fassen.... Man hätte sich statt dessen »bemühen sollen, auch noch die Organisation der anderen Tiere kennen zu lernen« [1]). Darwin ist dann dieser Forderung Lamarcks besonders im IV. und V. Kapitel seiner »Abstammung des Menschen« nachgekommen, und er hat hier bereits auf »unseren großen Philosophen Herbert Spencer« hingewiesen [2]). Und Spencer ist dann in der Tat auch der klassische Ethiker des Evolutionsgedankens geworden [3]). Aber auch noch Guyau [4]) und Fouillée wie Nietzsche haben in ihren nicht rein empiristischen Theorien gewisse Lehren des Evolutionismus mitverwandt, ganz abzusehen von solchen Büchern wie P. Kropotkin: »Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Tier- und Menschenwelt« (deutsch von Landauer), 1920. Die Entrüstung, mit der einst noch Cohen [5]) und Lotze [6]) den Darwinismus in der Ethik ablehnten, ist übrigens heute völlig verschwunden; eine ähnliche Ablehnung richtet sich statt dessen seit 1900 mehr gegen die Forschung der psychoanalytischen Schule.

Eine letzte entscheidende Förderung aber erfuhr die empiristische Theorie, in einigen werttheoretischen Arbeiten der Gegenwart, besonders

1) J. Lamarck: Philosophie zoologique (deutsch v. H. Schmidt), 1909, S. 7 f.

2) Ch. Darwin: The Descent of Man (deutsch v. Carus), 1902, S. 136.

3) Wie radikal empiristisch diese Ethik sein will, s. z. B. aus dem Satz: »die Tatsachen der Ethik« sind von der Biologie, Psychologie und Sociologie dargebotene Verallgemeinerungen, ... die Elemente jenes Gleichgewichts zwischen Constitution und Existenzbedingungen, welches gleichzeitig das sittliche Ideal und die Grenze darstellt, nach welcher hin wir fortschreiten« (Epitome der synthetischen Philosophie H. Spencers von Collins, deutsch von Carus, 1900, S. 591).

4) J. M. Guyau: Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction, 1885.

5) Siehe H. Cohen: Kants Begründung der Ethik, 1877, S. 173.

6) H. Lotze: System der Philosophie, II. Teil: Metaphysik, 1912, S. 626.

durch Scheler, Spranger und Nicolai Hartmann. Die Hauptleistung besteht hier, wie mir scheint, in dem allseitigen Nachweis, daß die verschiedenen Wertgebiete, durch deren verschiedene Schätzung das Handeln (wie das gesamte ethische Sein der Menschen) charakterisiert ist, spezifisch, qualitativ untereinander verschieden sind. Nicht nur die Verwirklichung oder die Bevorzugung des Eigeninteresses oder des Ökonomischen überhaupt bedeutet etwas ganz Anderes wie die Erstrebung sozialer Werte, auch eine Betonung ästhetischer Werte ist für eine umfassende Ethik von der Bevorzugung theoretischer Werte zu unterscheiden usw. Die Hauptprobleme der Ethik beginnen dann mit den Fragen: Welche Gruppe von zunächst gleichberechtigten Werten ist im Konfliktfall als die objektiv höhere anzusehen?

Der ältere Empirismus, z. B. Beneke, hatte dieses Problem der Rangordnung der Werte damit gelöst, daß er behauptete: die Erfahrung selbst zeige es, daß tatsächlich stets »die intellektuelle Ausbildung«[1]) als das höhere Gut eingeschätzt werde gegenüber dem »niederen Sinnengenuß«[1]), das soziale Wohl als der höhere Wert gegenüber dem individuellen[1]). Und diesen Lösungsversuchen hat sich — wie klar erkannt werden muß — prinzipiell methodisch auch Scheler noch in seinem moralphilosophischen Hauptwerk angeschlossen, unbeschadet aller sonstigen Diskrepanz zwischen seiner »materialen Wertethik« und der Benekes. Scheler ist hier in der Tat reiner »Empirist«, wie er sich selbst in dieser Beziehung einmal mit Recht charakterisieren wollte[2]).

Auch das material-apriorische Erkennen und Werten bleibt — wie dies ausführlich belegt werden kann — in Wahrheit nur ein empirisches Erkennen und Werten, ja auch der Unterschied zwischen »Tatsache« und »Wesen« muß für dieses materiale Apriori Schelers flüssig werden. Die materiale Wesensschau kann in der Ausdehnung, in der sie von Scheler geübt wird, keinerlei »streng allgemeingültige Wesenserkenntnis« geben, und vor allem kann dieses materiale Apriori Schelers nichts mehr gemein haben mit dem unbedingt gültigen, formalen Apriori Kants, dessen alleinige Heranziehung aber freilich auch zum Aufbau einer vollen Ethik nicht ausreicht[3]).

1) Fr. Ed. Beneke: Bentham-Bearbeitung, I. Band S. 59; vgl. System der prakt. Philosophie, I. Band S. 228 ff.

2) M. Scheler: Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, I. Teil, 1913, S. 46. Nur auf dieses Hauptwerk ist in dieser Skizze Bezug genommen.

3) S. auch diese Fragen ausführlich diskutiert in meinem demnächst erscheinenden Buch: Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn in der modernen Philosophie, Geschichte der modernen Ethik von Kant bis zur Gegenwart.

So erscheint es mir schon aus diesen methodischen Gründen erkennbar, warum die Lösung, die Scheler hier dem Wertrang-Problem gegeben hat, nicht genügen kann. Scheler behauptet, es bestehe eine »klare Evidenz«[1]), daß die Werte des Edlen und Gemeinen höher sind als die des Angenehmen und Unangenehmen, die geistigen Werte höher als die vitalen, die Werte des Heiligen höher als die geistigen Werte[2]). Aber wie kann durch eine unmittelbare Erfahrungs-Wesensschau, wie kann durch ein materiales Apriori in dem höchst weiten und vieldeutigen Sinn Schelers (der von dem Husserls sehr zu scheiden ist) eine streng allgemeingültige Evidenz gegeben werden? Die Berufung auf die jedem »Sehenden« offenstehende Wesensintuition kann hier nicht ausreichen. (Denn ist es z. B. wirklich in »klarer Evidenz«[1]) gegeben, daß man stets »Lebenswerte für . . . geistige Werte . . . opfern solle«[1])? Müssen nicht z. B. — mindestens für gewisse Verfallsepochen oder für niedergehende dekadente Völker — die vitalen Werte als die höheren gelten gegenüber durchaus echten geistigen »Esprit-Werten«?

Demgegenüber hat das Kapitel über Ethik in Sprangers »Lebensformen« mit seiner Betonung der Frage der »Wertintensität« und mit seiner Ablehnung jeder einfachen Rangordnung der Werte die hier vorliegenden methodischen und inhaltlichen Schwierigkeiten unbezweifelbar viel schärfer klargelegt[3]). Und ebenfalls einen entschiedenen Fortschritt über Scheler hinaus stellt schließlich N. Hartmanns »Ethik« dar mit der Annahme einer viel verwickelteren Schichtung der Werte im »Wertraum«, d. h. Annahme auch eines »Koordinationsverhältnisses verschiedener Werte auf gleicher Werthöhe« und überhaupt eines »mehrdimensionalen« »Systems der Werte« mit Ausdehnung nicht nur in die Höhe, sondern ebenso »in die Breite«[4]). Aber prinzipiell will doch auch Hartmann in dem »Empirismus« Schelers beharren; er hält — sehr charakteristisch, aber, wie ich glaube, mit Unrecht — bestimmte »metaphysische« oder »religiöse Deutungen« des Wertreiches, die man erst »hinter« diesem Reich beginnen läßt, in der Ethik für »gleichgültig«[5]), und er hält so diese Gesamtfragen der Ethik schon durch eine fortschreitend differenzierende »Erfahrung« und »Beschreibung« aller irgendwie vorfindbaren und faßbaren Wertmomente unseres Werterlebens für ausreichend

1) M. Scheler: Der Formalismus in der Ethik, I. Teil, S. 106.

2) a. a. O. I. Teil, S. 103 ff., II. Teil, 1916, S. 609.

3) Siehe E. Spranger: Lebensformen, 1921, S. 249 ff., 284 ff.

4) Siehe N. Hartmann: Ethik, 1926, z. B. S. 230, 270.

5) S. a. a. O. S. 123.

beantwortbar. Jedenfalls aber ist die einfache Übereinanderordnung der Werte, die Scheler in seiner materialen Wertethik annahm, wie sich dies bei Spranger und Hartmann deutlich ergibt, unhaltbar. Und zwar scheint sie mir vor allem deshalb unhaltbar, weil der Wert des Heiligen infolge seiner besonderen methodischen Bedeutung eben nicht in eine einfache Reihe neben oder über die anderen Werte gestellt werden kann.

Auch Scheler mußte es nämlich sehr bezeichnend zugeben: die Werte des Heiligen oder Unheiligen »erscheinen nur an Gegenständen, die in der Intention als absolute Gegenstände gegeben sind. Unter diesem Ausdruck verstehe ich nicht etwa eine besondere definierbare Klasse von Gegenständen, sondern (prinzipiell) jeden Gegenstand in der absoluten Sphäre«[1]). Oder wie Spranger dies viel zutreffender und brauchbarer formuliert: »Das Wesen der Religiosität« ist »die Beziehung aller Werterlebnisse auf den höchsten Wert«[2]), auf den »Totalwert des Lebens«[3]). Ist dies aber der Fall, so gehört damit auch methodisch dem religiösen Wert, mit Rücksicht auf welchen die übrigen Werte erst einen »Totalsinn«[4]) erhalten, unabweisbar in einer Theorie der Werte oder der Ethik eine besondere Stelle. Und diesen besonderen Platz haben eben die religiösen und metaphysischen Probleme der Ethik in der Tat stets — auch im 19. Jahrhundert — eingenommen.

II.

Wir sahen bisher: die rein »erfahrungsmäßige« Beschreibung der tatsächlichen Wertungen (und der »gegebenen« »Wertwesenheiten«) bildet ein höchst wertvolles und ein sehr ausgedehntes Untersuchungsgebiet der Ethik. Der ethische Positivismus in seinen verschiedenartigen Nuancen leistet mit diesen »Deskriptionen« eine — für jede Theorie der Ethik — unentbehrliche Arbeit. Der Empirismus irrt nur, wenn er annimmt, mit einer reinen Beschreibung der Werte und allenfalls mit einer Beschreibung ihrer »gegebenen« Rangordnung sei bereits eine Ethik selbst gegeben. Diese Annahme des Empirismus könnte höchstens gelten in dem Sinne des tiefen Goetheschen Satzes, daß alles Faktische

1) Siehe Scheler: Der Formalism. i. d. Ethik, I. Teil, S. 107.

2) Ed. Spranger: Lebensformen, 1921, 2. Aufl., S. 265.

3) S. a. a. O. z. B. S. 43, 81 und öfter.

4) S. a. a. O. S. 43, 84 oder vgl. z. B. auch die sehr schöne hierher gehörige »Definition« Jean Pauls: »Der rechte Unglaube bezieht sich auf keine einzelnen Sätze und Gegensätze, sondern auf die Erblindung gegen das Ganze« (»Levana oder Erziehungslehre«, I. Bändchen, § 38).

schon Theorie ist. Im übrigen aber zeigt es der Empirismus selbst — besonders in seiner gegenwärtigen Entwicklung —, daß die Tafel der »gegebenen« Werte bereits zu einem obersten Wert des Religiösen, des metaphysisch Absoluten hinführt; und erst durch die Einordnung aller möglichen Werte in diesen obersten »Totalsinn« des Daseins kann, wie ich glaube, eine Theorie der Ethik möglich werden. Und diese Probleme des religiösen Totalwerts haben daher die Ethik in der Tat auch im 19. Jahrhundert — auf sehr verschiedenartige Weise — beschäftigt.

Für den klassischen deutschen Idealismus nach Kant lag die Totalbedeutung des Daseins mehr in seinem »Vernunftgehalt«, in einer notwendig-geltenden Voraussetzung, durch die das Sein einer Welt erst denkbar werden könne, ohne die keinerlei Sein denkbar sei. Dagegen in dem späteren metaphysischen Realismus, etwa bei Schopenhauer, aber auch allgemein in der Spätromantik und noch bei Nietzsche und bei E. von Hartmann, lag die religiöse Totalbedeutung der Welt in einem irrationalen gegebenen Wesen des Seins.

Für Fichte war so die Totalbedeutung des Seins charakterisiert als die »praktische Vernunft«, »die absolute Pflicht«, die »Vernunftfreiheit«, als das »absolute Sittengesetz«, oder was alles damit identisch sein soll, als das »absolute Ich« der Wissenschaftslehre oder später in dem »System der Sittenlehre von 1812« als der »absolute, schlechthin durch sich bestimmte Begriff«[1]) oder Gott. Dieses absolute Ich ist nach Fichte in Wahrheit der notwendige und der als notwendig aufzeigbare Grund jedes empirischen Ich und Nicht-Ich, da eben alles bewußte Objekt wie Subjekt bereits ein ungeschiedenes Bewußtsein überhaupt voraussetzt. Es muß also schon, damit das empirische Ich und die empirische Welt voneinander unterschieden werden können, das absolute Ich, das sie umfaßt, bestehen. Und so setzt auch vor allem das »Material der Pflicht«, die Welt der empirischen Werte und das empirisch wertende Ich stets ein absolutes Wert-Ich voraus, ja dieser absolute Wert, das praktische Vernunft-Ich, das Sittengesetz hat — nach Fichte — die empirischen Werte und die empirischen Pflichten nur darum gesetzt, um durch sie und an ihnen sich zu verwirklichen, in ihnen zu »erscheinen«. Alles »Nicht-Ich ... wirkt durch Widerstand, welcher nicht sein würde, wenn wir nicht zuerst darauf eingewirkt hätten. Es greift nicht uns an, sondern wir greifen es an«[2]). Dies ist »das Primat der Vernunft, in-wiefern sie praktisch ist«[2]).

Was aber nun das absolute Ich oder das Sittengesetz, das Gesetz der

1) J. G. Fichte: Nachgelassene Werke, Bd. III (XI) S. 37.

2) J. G. Fichte: Sämtliche Werke, Bd. IV S. 93 (System der Sittenlehre von 1798).

Freiheit in Wahrheit ist, dies kann nicht durch »diskursives Denken«[1]) erfaßt werden, sondern es ist nach Fichte rein durch eine »intellektuelle Anschauung«[2]), durch »Intuition«[1]) gegeben. »Die Materien der sittlichen Handlung« sind aber dann dadurch bestimmt, daß die sittliche »Handlung ... liegen muß ... in einer Reihe, durch deren Fortsetzung ins Unendliche das Ich absolut unabhängig würde«[3]). Oder nach einer Formulierung der Sittenlehre von 1812: »Dies ... müßte man den Menschen sagen: du mußt scheinen an dir selbst zu arbeiten ...; dann arbeitet an dir Gott und treibt in dir sein Werk. ... Klarheit ... ist das Vehikel aller Sittlichkeit«[4]). »Das Ich soll erscheinen als Leben des Begriffs. ... Nur diese Erscheinung ist die der Sittlichkeit, und eine andere schlechthin nicht«[5]).

Bei Hegel dagegen — dem zweiten großen reinen Idealisten nach Kant — ist ebenfalls durch eine »intellektuelle Anschauung« eine andere große Totaldeutung des Daseins gegeben. Gott, der höchste, der absolute Wert und zugleich der innerste Kern und der Sinn alles Seins, ist hier die dialektisch entwickelte Vernunft. Und hiernach ist zugleich auch der Wert aller Dinge und der Wert aller sittlichen Phänomene bestimmbar durch den Rang, durch die Stelle, die alle diese Phänomene in dem zeitlosen Selbstoffenbarungsprozeß der absoluten Vernunft — dialektisch nachweisbar — einnehmen. An der Hand dieses einen methodischen Grundgedankens hat Hegel sowohl in dem »System der Sittlichkeit« von 1803 wie in der »Phänomenologie«, in der »Enzyklopädie« wie in der »Rechtsphilosophie« eine außerordentlich fesselnde Rangordnung aller ihm wichtigen sittlichen Phänomene entworfen. Und diese Darstellung der sittlichen Bedeutung der Familie[6]), des »menschlichen«[7]) wie des »unterirdischen Gesetzes«[8]), des »abstrakten Rechtes«[9]), der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft[10]), des Staates[11]), der »Weltgeschichte«[12]), ja des Ver-

1) J. G. Fichte: Sämtliche Werke, Bd. IV S. 136 (System der Sittenlehre von 1798).
2) A. a. O. S. 47. 3) A. a. O. S. 153.
4) J. G. Fichte: Nachgelassene Werke, Bd. III S. 58—59 (System der Sittenlehre von 1812).
5) A. a. O. S. 53.
6) Siehe Hegel: System der Sittlichkeit, aus dem Nachlasse herausgeg. v. G. Mollat, 1893, S. 6 ff.; Werke 1832/45, Bd. VII, 2. Abt. S. 393 ff.; Bd. VIII S. 221—246; S. 334 ff.
7) Siehe Hegel: Werke, 1832, Bd. II S. 333, 339 ff., 346.
8) Siehe Hegel Werke, 1832, Bd. II S. 333, 339 ff., 346.
9) S. a. a. O. Bd. VII, 2. Abt., S. 379 ff.; Bd. VIII S. 72/147.
10) S. a. a. O. Bd. VII, 2. Abt. S. 394 ff.; Bd. VIII S. 246/312.
11) S. a. a. O. Bd. VII, 2. Abt. S. 403 ff.; Bd. VIII S. 312 ff.
12) S. a. a. O. Bd. VII, 2. Abt. S. 420 ff.; Bd. VIII S. 430 ff.

brechens[1]) wird zweifellos — schon durch ihr starkes historisches Verstehen sittlicher Erscheinungen — stets eine der tiefsinnigsten Formen systematischer Ethik bleiben.

Während aber so für Fichte und für Hegel der absolute, der religiöse Wert ein wesentlich geistiges Geltungsprinzip bleibt (das absolute Ich bzw. die dialektische Weltvernunft), beginnt nun im Zusammenhang mit der Philosophie des älteren Schelling durchaus die Wendung zu einem höchsten irrationalen (oder zum mindesten — schon durch die betont koordinierende Einbeziehung der »Natur« in den »Vernunftbegriff« —) überlogischen Wert[2]) in der Ethik. Schelling selbst bekennt zwar noch in dem Vorbericht zu seinem »Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit«, er habe sich »bisher« wenig über »Gut und Bös ... erklärt«[3]), und er hat auch später keinerlei eigentliche Moralphilosophie geschrieben. Aber schon die pantheistische Identitätsphilosophie seiner Jugendepoche und das religiöse, wie das mythologisierende Denken seines Alters sind gerade typischer Ausdruck für die beiden mächtigsten methodischen Einstellungen, die auch in der weiteren spekulativen Ethik seiner Zeit wirksam neben dem Hegelianismus geworden sind.

So hat etwa K. Chr. Fr. Krause — in einer inneren Verwandtschaft zu Schellings identitätsphilosophischem Pantheismus — »das Gute für den Menschen«[4]) rein durch »das Eine Gute«[4]), welches »ist die Wesenheit Wesens, sofern Gott selbige in sich darlebt«[4]), bestimmen wollen. Und die Wesenheit Wesens, »das Eine Gute« ist auch hier — in Anlehnung an die Identitätsphilosophie — als »Natur und Vernunft in Vereinheit, als die höchste Vereinsphäre in Gott«[5]) zu charakterisieren gesucht.

Weiter aber schließen sich auch — wie schon Jodl[6]) dies richtig sah —

1) Hegel: System der Sittlichkeit, Werke ed. G. Lasson, 1913, Bd. 7, S. 450 ff.
2) S. z. B. Schelling: Sämtl. Werke, I. Abt. Bd. VII S. 395/96: »der ... Verstand muß ... das irrationale Verhältnis der Natur zu sich täglich mehr erkennen.« Hier unterscheidet auch Schelling seine Lehre ausdrücklich von der eines »reinen Idealismus« (a. a. O. S. 395). Vgl. auch Fichte: Nachgel. Werke, Bd. III S. 32: »so hat Schelling mich bedauert; ich habe keine Natur. Ich gebe ihm sein Bedauern zurück, es ihm als Unglück zurechnend, daß er Natur hat, ein blindes Ungefähr.«
3) Schelling: Sämtl. Werke I, VII S. 334.
4) K. Chr. F. Krause: Vorlesungen über die Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaft, 1829, S. 536.
5) Krause: System der Sittenlehre, ed. Hohlfeld und Wünsche, 1888, S. 217. — S. ferner a. a. O. S. 291: »Es ist für den Menschen als sittliches Wesen erforderlich, daß er den Urbegriff des Einen Guten und des Gliedbaues desselben ... erkenne; ... daß er den Urbegriff und das Urbild des Guten stetig zu seinem eigenen, eigenleblichen oder individuellen Musterbegriffe und Musterbilde weiterbestimme.«
6) F. Jodl: Geschichte der Ethik, Bd. II, 1912, S. 131.

alle die späteren ethischen Fragmente Schleiermachers noch ganz nahe an den Gedankenkreis der Schellingschen Identitätsphilosophie an. Auch für Schleiermacher ist das »höchste Gut«, der absolute Wert, »die Identität von Vernunft und Natur«[1]), oder genauer: »ein Minimum von Auseinandersein der Vernunft und Natur«[2]). »Die Frage aber, ob diese und jene Gestaltung der Dinge ein Element des höchsten Gutes sein könne, ... kann ... niemand ... abweisen«[3]). Und zwar soll nun eben diese ethische Gestaltung der Dinge, die Verwirklichung des höchsten Gutes, nach Schleiermacher auf sehr verschiedenartige Weise erfolgen, sowohl durch ein »organisierendes Verfahren«[3]), d. h. durch eine »fortschreitende Einigung der Natur mit der Vernunft ..., insofern sich die Vernunft im ethischen Verfahren dasjenige weiter bereitet, womit sie ins Unendliche fort auf das Übrige handelt«[4]), wie zugleich durch ein »symbolisierendes« Verfahren[4]), d. h. durch eine »sittliche Tätigkeit, ... durch die die Vernunft ins Unendliche sich dasjenige ausbildet, worin sie erkannt werden kann«[4]). Ist das Organisieren ein »allgemein gleiches« oder »identisches«, so ergibt sich der ethische Wert des Verkehrs, des Rechtes, des Staates; ist es ein »individuelles« — Schleiermacher hat bekanntlich mit Recht den Wert des Individuellen in der Ethik besonders unterstrichen —, so ergibt sich der Wert des Eigentums, der Gesellschaft. Ist das Symbolisieren ein »allgemein gleiches« oder »identisches«, so zeigt dies nach Schleiermacher den Wert des wissenschaftlichen Denkens, des Glaubens, der Schule; ist das Symbolisieren ein »individuelles«, so sollen sich nach Schleiermacher die Werte des Gefühls, der Offenbarung, der Kirche ergeben. So erstrebt auch Schleiermacher überall in seinem unvollendeten System eine Ableitung, Einordnung, Bestimmung aller möglichen empirischen Werte durch einen höchsten absoluten, metaphysischen[5]).

1) Siehe Schleiermacher: Werke ed. Braun, Bd. II, z. B. S. 254.

2) Schleiermacher: Werke ed. Braun, Bd. II S. 254 (Ethik 1812/13). Vgl. a. a. O. S. 561 (Güterlehre. Letzte Bearbeitung); ferner a. a. O. Bd. I S. 475 ff.: »das höchste Gut ist ein ... Geeinigtsein ... von Vernunft und allem irdischen Sein« (Begriff des höchsten Gutes, 2. Abhandlung). Vgl. ferner a. a. O. Bd. II S. 36 ff. (Tugendlehre 1804/05); a. a. O. S. 200 ff.: das höchste Gut ist Identität »des Productes und Producirens« (Brouillon zur Ethik 1805); a. a. O. S. 423. 425, 426: das höchste Gut ist die »Einigung der Vernunft mit der irdischen Natur überhaupt« (Ethik 1814/16).

3) Schleiermacher: Werke ed. Braun, Bd. I S. 467 (Begriff des höchsten Gutes, 1. Abhandlung).

4) A. a. O. Bd. II S. 425. Vgl. S. 93 ff., Bd. I S. 475 ff.

5) S. z. B. Schleiermacher: Werke, Bd. II S. 252: »Die Ethik« ist ein »speculatives, ... aber doch ... reales Wissen«.

Aber während in dieser ganzen identitätsphilosophischen Ethik sich ein starker metaphysischer Optimismus ausgelebt hat in dem festen Glauben an eine absolute höhere Einheit von Vernunft und Natur, von geltendem Wert und bloß natürlichem Sein, so weist im Gegensatz hierzu — schon vom Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts an und bisher viel zu wenig beachtet — noch eine völlig andersartige metaphysische Ethik gerade in die entgegengesetzte Richtung. Offenbar von Baader am frühesten und am markantesten verfochten[1]), aber auch von Geistern wie dem älteren Steffens[2]), G. H. Schubert[1]) (oder gelegentlich auch von Solger[3]) und anderen spekulativen Spätromantikern und schließlich noch in modifizierten Formen von Kierkegaard übernommen, bricht hier in Anlehnung an den Mythos vom Sündenfall die schwerblütigste Metaphysik der Verzweiflung über die Schuld- und Schmerzbeladenheit der Sinnennatur hervor. Und in diese Entwicklung der metaphysischen Ethik gehört auch noch Schopenhauer hinein. Nicht nur der Pantheismus, sondern auch jede einfache metaphysische Deckung von geltendem Wert und Natur ist hier (bei diesen wesentlich theistischen oder atheistischen Denkern) geleugnet. Aber jedenfalls werden hier überall bei Baader wie dem älteren Steffens, bei Schopenhauer wie bei Kierkegaard alle einzelnen empirischen Wertsetzungen aus der allgemeinen metaphysischen Verneinung mindestens des gegenwärtigen »natürlichen« Lebens gewonnen[4]). Und ähnlich besteht noch bei Ed. v. Hartmann der höchste Sinn des Daseins und damit der höchste ethische Wert in der »Erlösung« des Urwillens[5]), in der »bewußten« »Überwindung des ganzen Welt- und Gottes-Schmerzes«[6]); und erst aus die-

1) Der spätere Schelling ist hier offenbar mehr von Baader abhängig als Baader von Schelling, s. hierzu und über G. H. Schubert mein Buch: Baader und die philosophische Romantik, 1927.

2) S. z. B. Steffens: Caricaturen des Heiligsten, 1819 ff., Bd. I S. 44, 41 f.: »In aller Erscheinung verbirgt ... sich ... die Hölle.« »Das Böse« ... ist ursprünglich wie die Natur, wie die Geschichte, wie die Seele selbst.« »Fragt Euch ... selbst, ob Ihr nicht Euch ... einer Schuld bewußt seid, die ... mit eurer Natur so innig verwebt ist, daß ihr beide, diese Natur und diese Schuld, nicht zu trennen vermögt.«

3) S. z. B. Solger: Nachgel. Schriften, Philos. des Rechts und Staats, Bd. II S. 279 f.: »Das Böse ... wird ... durch die Natur in der Existenz erhalten«; vgl. J. Heller: Solgers Philosophie der ironischen Dialektik, 1928, S. 107.

4) Siehe Schopenhauer: Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Bd. I, Buch 4, z. B. § 60: die moralischen Handlungsweisen sind solche, in welchen die Verneinung des Lebens »ihren Ausdruck findet«.

5) Ed. v. Hartmann: System der Philos. im Grundriß Bd. VI: Grundriß der ethischen Prinzipienlehre, 1909, S. 211 f., 204.

6) S. a. a. O. S. 214.

sem »absoluten Zweck« der Weltverneinung werden für Hartmann alle sonstigen empirisch-sittlichen Zwecke und seltsamerweise dann auch wieder die »sittliche Mitarbeit an der Kulturentwicklung« [1]) (!) erschließbar.

Innerhalb des russischen Denkens haben Bulgakow und Berdjajew besonders entscheidend auf Baader zurückgreifen wollen [2]); aber auch schon Solovojeff (der übrigens in seiner Frühzeit stark von Schopenhauer beeinflußt wurde) [3]) besitzt Verwandtschaft mit Baaders deutscher metaphysischen Ethik [4]).

Dagegen in Frankreich ist auch die Annahme und Bejahung der stark irrationalen »idées forces« bei A. Fouillée oder des »principe de la vie« bei J. M. Guyau noch mehrfach als metaphysische Gesamtdeutung alles Daseins gedacht [5]), aus der heraus erst alle besonderen empirischen sittlichen Bewertungen gefolgert werden können. Und endlich bedarf es wohl kaum noch näherer Ausführung, daß auch der spätere Nietzsche alle Ziele des Übermenschen durch eine metaphysische Grunddeutung des gesamten Seins, durch den einen obersten Wert der Bejahung des irrationalen, metaphysischen Willens zur Macht zu begründen suchte [1]). Selbst die Theorien Stirners, die Nietzsche nach der Meinung Jodls nur weiter gedacht und bereichert haben soll, sind kaum als ein bloßer Positivismus anzusehen. Nietzsche aber war höchstens in der Zeit des »Menschlichen, Allzumenschlichen« überwiegend Empirist. Dagegen in der »Geburt der Tragödie« wie in dem »Willen zur Macht« herrscht überall — neben allem Reichtum an empirischer Seelenforschung — eine letzte metaphysische Intuition, aus der heraus erst alle Einzelwerte herausgelesen werden, hier ist Nietzsche überall doch wesentlich metaphysischer Ethiker gewesen, so sehr er sich auch gegen alle Transzendenzgesinnung herkömmlicher Metaphysik gewehrt hat.

1) A. a. O. S. 213.

2) Siehe N. Berdiajew: Das Problem der Anthropodizee in H. Ehrenberg: Dokumente des östlichen Christentums, 1925, S. 251; S. Bulgakow: Aus »Das Tageslicht«, ebenda.

3) Siehe W. Solovjeff: Ausgewählte Werke (deutsch), I. Band, 1914, Vorrede S. VII. Über die besondere Annäherung S.s an Baader a. a. O. S. IX f.

4) Zur näheren Charakterisierung der Ethik Solovjeffs s. z. B. Ausgew. Werke Bd. 1 S. 61, 58: »das Dasein der Geschöpfe in Sinnlosigkeit, Trennung, . . . feindseligem Widerstreit . . . ist nur begründet in ihrer falschen Beziehung zueinander, die schattenhaft und vergänglich ist, ihr wahres Sein wurzelt in der Einheit mit allem. Die Krone des Seins gebührt nicht dem einzelnen, sondern dem Ganzen. Der Urbeginn und Quell alles Seins ist . . . die absolute Einheit alles Seienden . . . Gott.« — Gott ist also auch, »wie uns unser inneres Bewußtsein bezeugt, . . . das absolute Gute, d. h. Gott und ebenso alles, was sich mit Ihm schon vollkommen vereinigt hat«. Aus diesem Grunde muß auch dieses »umfassende«, dieses absolute Gute, die Einheit alles Seienden »die Norm unserer moralischen Beziehung zu allem enthalten«. — »Alles was ist, und alles was sein kann, wird nun in moralischer Beziehung durch drei Kategorien seines Wertes erschöpft; denn wir haben es entweder mit dem zu tun, was höher ist als wir, oder mit einem uns Gleichwertigen oder mit dem, was unter uns steht. Es ist logisch unmöglich, noch eine vierte zu finden.« Deshalb soll also »das Prinzip der moralischen Vervollkommnung in drei Grundgefühlen enthalten, die die . . . natürliche Tugend ausmachen: im Schamgefühle, das unsere höhere Würde vor den Angriffen tierischer Begierden schützt, im . . . Mitleid, das uns mit allen . . . gleich macht, im religiösen Gefühle, in dem sich unsere Erkenntnis des höchsten Guten ausspricht« usw. (Die ersten Sätze stammen aus: »Die geistigen Grundlagen des Lebens«, die letzten Sätze aus Bd. II, 1916 S. 517/18, »Die Rechtfertigung des Guten, eine Moralphilosophie«).

5) S. zur Beurteilung dieser metaphysischen bzw. empiristischen Tendenzen bes. Ch. Christophe: Revue de métaphys. et de morale, 1901, S. 522 ff., und H. Pfeil: J. M. Guyau und die Philosophie des Lebens, 1928, S. 112 ff.

III.

Wie aber ist nun das Verhältnis zwischen empiristischer und metaphysischer Problemstellung im einzelnen näher zu bestimmen? Oder die Frage verallgemeinert: Müssen sich diese beiden und eventuell noch sonstige Fragestellungen in der Ethik weitgehend gegenseitig ausschließen? Oder gibt es einen übergeordneten methodischen Gesichtspunkt, von dem aus alle diese verschiedenen Fragen als unentbehrliche und sich gegenseitig ergänzende Momente einer gegliederten Gesamtfrage erkannt werden können und müssen? Auch dieses umfassendste Methodenproblem ist zweifellos in der Geschichte der Ethik schon öfters berührt oder, besser gesagt, gelegentlich gestreift worden.

So hat schon Fries die »praktische Philosophie« [2]) zerlegt in »1. Ethik, praktische Naturlehre, Lehre . . . vom Werth und Zweck menschlicher Handlungen und 2. in Religionslehre, praktische Ideenlehre, Lehre vom Zweck der Welt« [3]). Und Fries hat sich auch bemühen wollen, das »gegenseitige Verhältnis« [4]) zwischen dieser metaphysisch religiösen Wertlehre und der wesentlich empirischen Wertbeschreibung klarzustellen. Aber diese Klarstellung bleibt doch im allgemeinen vollkommen auf folgende Sätze beschränkt: »Wir sehen nun leicht, daß in der That die religiöse Frage die höhere sey, denn dem Zweck der Welt sich unterordnend

1) Siehe Nietzsche: Werke (Taschenausg.), z. B. Bd. IX, 1906, S. 448: Unsere Werte sind in die Dinge hineininterpretiert. . . . Aller Sinn ist »Wille zur Macht« (alle Beziehungssinne lassen sich in ihn auflösen), vgl. ferner a. a. O. S. 471, 18, 520 f.

2) Jakob Friedr. Fries: Handbuch der praktischen Philosophie, I. Band, 1818, S. 12.

3) J. Fr. Fries: Handbuch der praktischen Philosophie, Bd. I, 1818, S. 12.

4) A. a. O. S. 14.

wird der Mensch erst die Zwecke seines Lebens ansetzen können. Aber über den Zweck der Welt gibt es keine wissenschaftliche Lehre; die Ideen desselben können Menschen nur im Gefühl fassen, welches die Schönheit und Erhabenheit des Lebens in der Natur anerkennt. Wissenschaftlich ist daher nothwendig die Lehre der Ethik das erste, sie ist die begreifliche, von dem wir uns erst zu dem höheren unbegreiflichen können hinüber leiten lassen«[1]). Und besonders in der Durchführung seiner Ethik bleibt Fries lediglich bei der Behauptung: das, »was gut und recht«[2]) ist für den Menschen, werde bereits stets durch einen »rein vernünftigen Ausspruch unserer Überzeugungen rein apriori entschieden«[2]). Während er in der »Religionsphilosophie oder der Weltzwecklehre« nur zu dem Ergebnis kommt: »das höchste Gut ... ist für den einzelnen Menschen subjective Seelenruhe aus Selbstzufriedenheit« ...[3]). »Für die Welt aber ist das ewige Gut: jedes Leben trägt in der eigenen Schönheit seinen Werth!«[4])

Dagegen das methodische Verfahren in Herbarts Ethik erinnert auffallend mehr an methodische Grundeinstellungen des 17. und 18. als des 19. Jahrhunderts. Wie es im Zeitalter Descartes' oder Christian Wolffs versucht wurde, alle Erkenntnis auf einer Reihe von völlig in sich evidenten, rationalen Vorstellungen und Vorstellungsbeziehungen aufzubauen, so lehrt auch Herbart für die Ethik: »das Löbliche und Schändliche besitzt eine ursprüngliche Evidenz, vermöge deren es klar ist, ohne gelernt und bewiesen zu sein. Allein die Evidenz durchdringt nicht immer die Nebenvorstellungen, welche theils begleitend, theils von jenem selbst verursacht, sich einmischen. Daher bleibt es oftmals unbemerkt; oft wird es gefühlt, aber nicht unterschieden; oft durch Verwechselungen und falsche Erklärungen entstellt. Es bedarf also, herausgehoben, und in ursprünglicher Reinheit und Bestimmtheit gezeigt zu werden. Dieses vollständig zu leisten, und die theils unmittelbar gefallenden, theils durch die Aufgabe, das Mißfallende zu meiden, herbeigeführten Musterbegriffe (Ideen) geordnet zusammenzustellen, ist die Sache der allgemeinen Ästhetik«[5]), von der die Ethik nur ein Unterteil ist. Diese »ursprünglichen« Musterbegriffe (Ideen), die die praktische Philosophie aufstellen kann und muß,

1) J. Fr. Fries: Handbuch der praktischen Philosophie, Bd. I, 1818, S. 14.
2) A. a. O. S. 112 ff., 116.
3) J. Fr. Fries: Handbuch der praktischen Philosophie, Bd. II, Die Religionsphilosophie oder die Weltzwecklehre, 1832, S. 150.
4) A. a. O. S. 151.
5) I. Fr. Herbarts Sämtl. Werke ed. Hartenstein, 1850, Bd. I S. 124 (Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie).

sind nach Herbart bekanntlich die »Idee der inneren Freiheit«[1]), »der Vollkommenheit«[2]), »des Wohlwollens«[3]), »des Rechts«[4]), »der Billigkeit«[5]) (von ihnen »abgeleitet« die Ideen der beseelten Gesellschaft«[6]), des »Kultursystems«[7]), des »Verwaltungssystems«[8]), »Lohnsystems«[9]), der »Rechtsgesellschaft«)[10]). Und diese fünf »ursprünglichen Ideen« sollen nun keineswegs durch eine bestimmte menschlich-seelische Veranlagung gegeben sein (»das moralische Gefühl ist verwiesen aus den Grundlegungen der Sittenlehre«[11]); der praktischen Philosophie kann es »nicht darauf ankommen, den Geschmack«[12]), der uns die Urteile über die »ursprünglich gefallenden sittlichen Verhältnisse« gibt, »psychologisch zu erklären«)[12]), und ebensowenig können und sollen diese »Ideen« durch eine rein metaphysische Intuition, durch eine »intellektuelle Anschauung« erschlossen werden[13]), sondern sie sollen ein rein Geltendes bedeuten (im Sinne eines materialen Rationalismus, wie ihn Herbart stets vertrat. Wie aber dieses Geltende in den verschiedenen »Fällen«[14]) des »Lebens«[14]) anzuwenden sei, hierauf antwortet Herbart nur, sei keinerlei »vollständige Auskunft«[14]) zu geben. Es sei hier vielmehr jeder »— nicht ... nur zuweilen, sondern auf immer — an sein Herz ... zu verweisen; an jenes Zartgefühl, welchem die Schätzung der Annäherung des Wirklichen an die Ideen ist zugeschrieben worden. Nicht als ob in den einzelnen Fällen Elemente von sittlicher Bedeutung vorkommen könnten, deren Vorbild nicht in den Ideen enthalten wäre. Sondern weil die Ausmittelung des Factischen, die bestimmte Nachweisung dessen, was den Ideen in dem Wirklichen entspricht, Schwierigkeiten findet, die sich durch Begriffe nicht heben lassen, da sie nicht im Reich der Begriffe, sondern in den Dunkelheiten und Vieldeutigkeiten der Empirie selbst ihren Sitz haben«[15]).

Dagegen wirken immerhin die wenigen kurzen Skizzen, die Lotze für den Aufriß einer Ethik hinterlassen hat, in einigen Punkten wenigstens klärender als Herbart. Lotze greift wohl noch sehr häufig zurück auf

1) S. a. a. O. Bd. VIII (Allgemeine praktische Philosophie) S. 33 ff.
2) S. a. a. O. S. 37 ff. 3) S. a. a. O. S. 41 ff. 4) S. a. a. O. S. 45 ff.
5) S. a. a. O. S. 53 ff. 6) S. a. a. O. S. 101 ff. 7) S. a. a. O. S. 96 ff.
8) S. a. a. O. S. 90 ff. 9) S. a. a. O. S. 83 ff. 10) S. a. a. O. S. 78 ff.
11) Herbart: Sämtl. Werke ed. Hartenstein, Bd. VIII S. 12 (Allgemeine praktische Philosophie).
12) A. a. O. S. 13.
13) Jeden Versuch, seine »ursprünglichen« 5 Ideen wieder einem »höheren«, einem eigentlich metaphysischen Princip unterordnen zu wollen, hat Herbart »mit aller Strenge« abgelehnt, s. z. B. a. a. O. S. 27.
14) A. a. O. S. 31 (Allgemeine praktische Philosophie).
15) A. a. O. S. 31/32.

eine Art »latent . . . eingeborener sittlicher Ideen« [1]), die sich an der Hand sittlicher Erfahrung entwickeln sollen [1]). »Ganz einfach ausgedrückt, kommen wir daher darauf zurück, daß wir nur von unserem (sc. eingeborenen) Gewissen die Aussprüche erwarten, welche uns die allgemeinsten sittlichen Grundsätze festsetzen. Es wird auch niemand bezweifeln, daß keine Theorie uns jemals von anderen Verpflichtungen überzeugen wird, denen diese Zustimmung des Gewissens fehlt« [2]). Und weiter wird einfach behauptet, es gibt eben »mancherlei Verhältnisse der Dinge und der Ereignisse, denen ein eigener Wert und Unwert insofern zukommt, als sie zwar überhaupt bloß in unserem Gefühl beide erlangen, dann aber unabhängig von unserer Willkür, so daß auf einige ein unmittelbares, nicht abzuänderndes Urteil des Wohlgefallens oder der Billigung, auf andere eins des Mißfallens oder der Mißbilligung fällt, und daß endlich auch nach einem gleich unmittelbaren Anspruch unseres Gefühls bestimmte Gradunterschiede dieser Werte feststehen« [3]).

Aber abgesehen hiervon findet sich dann doch bei Lotze ein sehr interessanter — wenn auch ganz unzureichender — Versuch, die methodischen Grundprobleme der Ethik durch eine Parallelisierung mit denen der Naturtheorie weiter zu fördern. »Keine Erkenntniss des Wirklichen« — so heißt es nämlich hier z. B. — »entstand ohne die Erfahrungen, welche« [4]) den Grundsätzen alles Erfahrens »den Inhalt ihrer Beurtheilung lieferten; umgekehrt konnte nie die Erfahrung allein die höchsten Grundsätze erzeugen, nach denen sie beurtheilt zu werden verlangt. Die praktische Philosophie bietet eine vollständige Analogie« [5]). Auch in der praktischen Philosophie soll also nach Lotze auf die gleiche Art eine Verbindung des Geltenden mit dem Tatsächlichen gesucht werden, wie dies bereits in der Naturerkenntnis geglückt ist.

Ähnliche Anregung aber für solche umfassendsten Methodenprobleme der Ethik findet sich ferner auch bei Sigwart. Auch Sigwart vertritt noch ausführlich die Theorie von einer im Menschen »angelegten . . . Empfänglichkeit für« sittliche »Gefühle« [6]). Aber neben diesen empiristisch psychologischen Lehren betont er zugleich: »in dem

1) Siehe H. Lotze: Die Prinzipien der Ethik, 1882 (wieder abgedruckt in H. Lotze: Metaphysik ed. G. Misch, 1912, S. 610, 611 f.).

2) H. Lotze: Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie, Diktate aus den Vorlesungen Lotzes, 1899, S. 13.

3) A. a. O. S. 12/13.

4) H. Lotze: Metaphysik ed. Misch, S. 625.

5) H. Lotze: Metaphysik ed. Misch, S. 625.

6) Chr. Sigwart: Vorfragen der Ethik, 2. Aufl. ed. H. Maier, 1907, S. 63.

Gedanken also eines einheitlichen und höchsten Zwecks, zu dem sich alle einzelnen Zwecke der bestimmten Handlungen wie Teile oder Mittel verhalten, kann sich erst mein Selbstbewußtsein nach der praktischen Seite vollenden. Erst dann weiß ich zu sagen, warum ich das einzelne will, wenn die einzelne Handlung durch einen einheitlichen, letzten Zweck begründet ist. . . . Die Aufgabe der Ethik enthält also die Aufstellung eines letzten, alle menschlichen Willenstätigkeiten umfassenden und in sich schließenden Zwecks« [1]), eines »Menschheits- und Weltzwecks« [2]), »und zwar so, daß daraus die einzelnen konkreten Handlungen als Mittel, diesen Zweck zu verwirklichen, sicher und unzweideutig deduziert werden können« [1]). Eben aus diesem Grunde aber hält Sigwart auch — wie er wenigstens andeutet — eine »Begegnung« [2]) von Metaphysik und von empirisch fundierter Ethik für unbedingt wünschenswert [2]).

Entsprechende Gedanken finden sich ferner bei Paulsen und bei Wundt. Dagegen ist nun, wie ich glaube, die noch immer tiefste Lösung aller dieser Probleme angebahnt in der methodischen Grundanlage der Kantschen »Kritik der praktischen Vernunft«; nur allerdings in keiner Weise in der Ausführung, die Kant seiner Ethik gegeben hat, und die naturgemäß bisher das allein wesentlich Beachtete geblieben ist.

Von dieser Kantschen Lösung der ethischen Probleme ist, wie ich glaube, der rein transzendentale Problemansatz (wie er z. B. in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft ed. Kehrbach S. 109, eine volle Analogie zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft erstrebt) völlig zu scheiden. Kant selbst ist in den Antworten, die er auf alle ethischen Fragen gab (wie schon oft genügend gesagt, wenn auch nicht genügend im einzelnen gezeigt wurde) in einen unhaltbaren — weil vorkritischen — Rationalismus verfallen. Dem entgegen aber ist es eine unentbehrlich wichtige Aufgabe, den echten kritischen, transzendentalen Problemansatz — wenn auch zum größten Teil im Gegensatz zu der Ausführung der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft — zu verdeutlichen.

Es ist eben deshalb bei der Erörterung der eigentlich transzendental ethischen Probleme völlig abzusehen von fast allen mehr oder minder orthodoxen Kantianern (die höchstens einige Korrekturen an den Kantschen Resultaten versuchten, aber den unmöglichen materialen Rationalismus der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft in keiner Weise methodisch zu überwinden vermochten), z. B. von Julius Bergmann [3]), Häger-

1) A. a. O. S. 15/16. 2) S. a. a. O. S. 70.

3) Siehe Julius Bergmann: Über das Richtige. Eine Erörterung der ethischen Grundfragen, 1883, besonders S. 114 ff.

ström[1]) oder B. Erdmann, aber auch von Cohen oder von Nelson, der nicht nur methodisch, sondern auch in allen Resultaten nicht über den sehr engen Kreis der Inhalte der Kantschen Ethik hinauskam[2]). Im Gegensatz zu fast allen diesen Forschern muß es besonders — mit Rickert wie mit Troeltsch und Spranger — festgehalten werden, daß die Ethik sich nicht »auf das Prinzip der Autonomie in seiner umfassendsten Bedeutung beschränken kann. In der Logik ist ja ebenfalls nicht nur von der Wahrheit im allgemeinen, sondern . . . von ihrer besonderen Ausgestaltung in der Wissenschaft zu handeln«; und »für die wissenschaftliche Erforschung des autonomen Lebens gilt nicht minder, daß sie eine inhaltliche Erfüllung braucht, die aus den formalen Grundwerten nicht zu deduzieren ist«[3]).

Des näheren aber ergibt sich nun für die Ethik, wie ich glaube, aus einer wesentlich transzendentalen Problemauffassung in der betonten Analogie zur Naturtheorie folgendes: der Begriff der Autonomie kann nur aufrecht erhalten und begründet werden im Sinn einer notwendigen Einheit der Apperzeption im Ethischen, d. h. als der oberste Grundsatz der Ethik kann nur dies rein apriori aufgezeigt werden, daß alle möglichen sittlichen Werte stets notwendig einer obersten umfassendsten Einheit unterstehen müssen. (Selbst da, wo ein bloßes Chaos der sittlichen Inhalte zu setzen versucht würde, würde doch dies Chaos notwendig noch in der Form der Einheit eines apperzipierenden Ich überhaupt angenommen werden müssen.) Wie aber nun weiter in einer Theorie der Naturerkenntnis zwischen dem Moment der Einheit der Apperzeption auf der einen Seite und den empirisch gegebenen Inhalten auf der anderen Seite mindestens noch ein spezifisch eigenartiges Moment für einen »Schematismus« des Erkennens unentbehrlich ist, nämlich das Moment einer universalen, nichtempirischen Anschauung, so gilt dies relativ korrespondierend auch für die Ethik. Und zwar ist nun für die Ethik diese alles umfassende Anschauung — wie dies ausführlich zu zeigen wäre — stets notwendig eine metaphysisch-religiöse Grundintuition, eine »intellektuelle Anschauung« von einem umspannenden Totalsinn des Daseins. Ein solcher Totalwert wird stets schon mit in alle empirischen Werte

1) A. Hägerström: Kants Ethik im Verhältnis zu seinen erkenntnistheoretischen Grundgedanken systematisch dargestellt, 1902, s. z. B. S. 256 f.

2) Siehe L. Nelson: Vorlesungen über die Grundlagen der Ethik, Bd. I: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1917.

3) H. Rickert: Über logische und ethische Geltung, 1914, in Kant-Studien, Bd. XIX S. 221.

hineingesehen und hineingelebt, auch bei den flachsten Totaldeutungen, die etwa alle Werte nur als selbstverständlich roh hedonisch oder ökonomisch deuten wollen.

Um also den gegliederten Stufenbau derjenigen Momente zu bestimmen, die zu einer Theorie des Ethischen unentbehrlich sind, ja die bereits jeder Satz über Ethisches (korrespondierend allen Sätzen der Naturerkenntnis) enthält, ist außer dem Moment der Einheit der Apperzeption und dem Moment der empirisch gegebenen Wertungen mindestens noch das Moment einer ethischen Totalanschauung nötig, wie sie bei jeder Erfassung empirischer Werte stets mitgegeben ist und mitgegeben sein muß. Die Probleme dieser stets vorhandenen und notwendig vorhandenen Gesamtintuition sind es, die Kant in seiner Typik der reinen praktischen Vernunft methodisch beschäftigt haben. Erst nach der Anerkennung dieser Universalanschauung kann der Kantische Begriff einer vorausgesetzten »Ordnung der Dinge«, d. h. der Werte (ein Begriff, der für die Kantische Typik, für alle Urteilsentscheidung auf Grund dieser Typik entscheidend ist, s. z. B. den Satz: »die Regel der Urtheilskraft unter Gesetzen der reinen praktischen Vernunft ist diese: frage dich selbst, wenn die Handlung, die du vor hast, nach einem Gesetze der Natur . . . geschehen sollte . . ., und du gehörtest mit zu einer solchen Ordnung der Dinge, würdest du darin wohl mit Einstimmung deines Willens sein?« Kritik der praktischen Vernunft S. 84/85) einen Sinn gewinnen. Jede solche allgemeinste »Ordnung« der Werte — in der Ethik kann es sich natürlich nicht um physische »Dinge« handeln, die ja auch an jener Stelle bei Kant nicht gemeint sind — setzt eben jene ordnende metaphysische Universalanschauung schon voraus, wie sie die spekulative Ethik, ohne sich voll methodisch Rechenschaft zu geben, in einer intellektuellen Anschauung des höchsten Gutes (d. h. Güterzusammenhangs) stets geübt hat. Oder wie schon Franz von Baader diese Problemlage in diesem Zusammenhang gut andeutet: »Was . . . der Schematism dem Verstande, dasselbe leistet die Simbolik der Vernunft«[1]). Erst im Rahmen einer solchen »universalen Anschauung« des Sittlichen, einer »Simbolik der Vernunft«, erst durch sie und aus ihr heraus gewinnen dann alle die verschiedenen einzelnen empirischen Werte einen Ordnungszusammenhang.

Nun kann selbstverständlich in der Geschichte der Ethik diese Ordnung der Werte, es kann das höchste Gut oder der wahre Zusammenhang der Werte in jener Totalanschauung oft oder dauernd irrig bestimmt sein.

1) Fr. v. Baader: Über d. Begr. d. Ethik durch d. Physik, 1813, S. 7.

Dies ist so wenig zu vermeiden, wie man in der Geschichte der Naturerkenntnis etwa falsche naturwissenschaftliche Hypothesen unmöglich machen kann [1]). Die Korrektur solcher falschen Einordnungszusammenhänge wird für die »theoretische« wie für die »praktische Vernunft« immer nur durch das Gewicht von »Tatsachen« erfolgen, durch das Gewicht von empirischen Wahrnehmungen bzw. von empirischen Wertungen.

Sobald einige Reihen des tatsächlichen Wertens gar nicht mehr eingegliedert werden können in den bestimmten Wertezusammenhang, den irgendeine inhaltlich bestimmte metaphysische Anschauung aufstellt, sobald muß eben ein anderer neuer Anschauungszusammenhang gewonnen werden, der diese Aufgabe leisten kann. Niemals aber wird und braucht deshalb die Menschheit an der Möglichkeit einer immer weiter fortschreitenden, an der Möglichkeit einer immer mehr wahren (weil mehr Tatsachen umfassenden) Erkenntnis der Natur und des Sittlichen zu verzweifeln. Auch unsere höchst entwickelte Kenntnis der Naturgesetze setzt uns noch nicht in den Stand, irgendwelche komplizierten organischen Prozesse zu erklären. Und doch wird deshalb niemand den Wert der naturwissenschaftlichen Gesetzesforschung in Frage ziehen können. Ganz ebenso ist es, glaube ich, gewiß nicht möglich, den unersetzlichen Wert einer philosophisch exakten theoretischen Ethik deshalb zu leugnen, weil es in bestimmten individuell verwickelten Fällen nicht immer gelingt, das Ganze aller hier in Frage kommenden Wertverhältnisse aufzudecken.

Nur dann, wenn von uns überhaupt keinerlei wahrhafte, sich entwickelnde Theorie des Sittlichen angebahnt werden könnte, nur dann müßte jede philosophische Ethik einer letztlich subjektiven Lebensauffassung weichen, ebenso wie jede Naturtheorie einer bloß subjektiven Natureinfühlung. Eine solche Theorie der Ethik ist aber nun, wie ich bisher im Ansatz zu entwickeln suchte, in einem wesentlich transzendentalen Sinne — wenn auch durchaus nicht in der Formung des historischen Kant — möglich. Dagegen ohne eine solche umfassende Theorie würde, wie ich eben zeigen wollte, auch ein tieferes Verstehen und ein tieferes Eindringen in die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Moralphilosophie nicht möglich werden.

Es darf in einer umfassenden Geschichte der Ethik gewiß nicht geschehen, daß die »begrifflichen Mittel« der Methoden allein »für den

1) Vgl. hiermit H. Maier: Psychologie des emotionalen Denkens, S. 775: »Das sittliche Bewußtsein läßt sich durch ... die Verschiedenheit der sittlichen Anschauungen ... so wenig beirren, wie das Wahrheitsbewußtsein durch die Tatsache des Irrtums.«

Kern« genommen werden und daß die »Struktur der Seelen« der Denker wie die gesamte geistesgeschichtliche Denkatmosphäre unverstanden bleibt. Es wäre das Gegenteil von dem, was auch in dieser Skizze erstrebt wurde, wenn eine Geschichte der Philosophie zu einer rohen Rubrizierung der allgemeinsten philosophischen Standpunkte, zu einer Art »Ketzerhistorie von allgemeinen Ansichten« [1]) herabsinken würde.

Aber neben der treuesten Einfühlung in die menschliche Eigenart der großen wie der kleineren Denker, neben einer klaren Erfassung der gesamten zeitgeschichtlichen Hintergründe darf doch auch die Darstellung des objektiven Lehrgehaltes und der Methoden der Systeme nicht leiden. Zu einer Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Ethik gehört durchaus auch eine exakte Vergleichung des oft mühsam und tief durchdachten begrifflichen, des methodischen Apparates, den die verschiedenen Denker ausgebildet haben, nicht nur eine Vergleichung der Resultate der Forschung.

Diesen Anforderungen kann, wie ich glaube, die Geschichte der modernen Ethik von Jodl, das einzige größere Werk, das bisher auf diesem Gebiete existiert, nicht genügen. Jodl ist im wesentlichen nur der empiristischen Ethik gerecht geworden; dagegen die ganze Darstellung der »spekulativen«, der kritischen, der rein rationalen wie der religiösen Problematik ist meist sehr stark positivistisch verzeichnet, trotz des weit ausgedehnten und des dauernd verdienstvollen Quellenstudiums, das dies Werk aufweist. Und so ist für die Geschichte der modernen Moralphilosophie gegenwärtig noch ein reiches Material zur Darstellung zu bringen; oder es würde sonst ein oft ergreifend starkes Ringen um inhaltvolles und exaktes Denken — wie es das 19. Jahrhundert erfüllt — unbeachtet bleiben, und es würde das Wort Schleiermachers: »die Sittenlehre als Wissenschaft ... befindet sich in einem unerfreulichen Zustande« [2]) — mindestens für die Geschichte der Ethik, schon wegen der »geringen Produktivität auf diesem Gebiete« [1]) — auch heute noch aufrecht erhalten werden müssen.

1) Siehe Schelling: Werke, I. Abt., VII. Band, S. 338 und 344.
2) Siehe Schleiermacher: Werke ed. Braun, Bd. I S. 445.

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