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John Clarke John M. Yelton
Feb 1978
(Little River, Va.)

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Dr. *Clarke's* DEMONSTRATION

O F T H E

Being and Attributes of God, &c.

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D E F E N C E
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Dr. *Clarke's* DEMONSTRATION

O F T H E

Being and Attributes of GOD.

Wherein is particularly consider'd

The Nature of SPACE, DURATION,
and NECESSARY EXISTENCE.

B E I N G A N

A N S W E R

To a late Book entitul'd,

A Translation of Dr. King's *Origin of Evil,*
and some other OBJECTIONS.

Together with a

COMPENDIUM of a DEMONSTRATION
of the *Being and Attributes of* GOD.

L O N D O N :

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T H E

P R E F A C E.



THE great Design Dr. *Clarke* had in publishing his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, was to establish the Foundation of our Religion upon such a strong and immoveable Basis as strict and undeniable Demonstration: Which Design, no less commendable than the Strength of Arguments, with

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which he has pursued it, has very deservedly had a great Share in gaining him that Reputation, which he has had and always will have, amongst both the learned and religious Part of the World. Yet as this noble Design of the Doctor's has not so fully taken Effect, as one could have wished, but there are many learned and ingenious Men, that are not convinced of the Force of his Arguments, nor think all of them conclusive; I was induced to offer this Defence of him to the Consideration of the Publick, which was chiefly occasioned by an ingenious Gentleman's translating Dr. *King's Origin of Evil*, and making Notes upon it, where he has treated of divers Subjects, and has particularly many Arguments against Dr. *Clarke's* Demonstration. All which I have considered in the following Treatises, not meddling with any but what relate

The P R E F A C E. iij

relate to Dr. *Clarke* in the fore-mentioned Notes, and some other Objections that I have met with elsewhere. There was a Book published in the Doctor's Life-time, where there are some ingenious Objections, which I have passed by, because all that are of any Force are drawn up, though not in the same Manner, by the ingenious Translator. I have endeavoured to make the following Treatises as plain and clear as I could, yet as *Metaphysicks* is a Subject of so abstract a Nature, to be understood clearly by none but close attentive Minds, I must desire the Candid Reader to consider all the Arguments as calmly and impartially as he can, and before he enters upon them to lay aside all Prejudices, which are too apt in such abstract Reasoning to lead Men into Mistakes and false Consequences, and to hinder them from seeing the

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the Force of some Arguments, because contrary to their own Opinions. And as the Abstractness of the Subject may as easily have such an Effect upon me, if I should be found to have erred in any or all of the following Particulars, I shall be very willing to acknowledge it, hoping the Candid Reader will not condemn the whole, if he has only a few Exceptions against some of the Particulars.





O F T H E

N A T U R E

O F

SPACE and DURATION.



IN a late Translation of Dr. *King's Origin of Evil*, there are many Objections brought by the Translator against Dr. *Clarke's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, and against the real Existence of Space *distinct* and *separate* from Body; as therefore our present Subject is upon the Nature of *Space* and *Duration*, I shall consider first what he says concerning *them*. “ Though so much Noise has been
 “ made about *Space*, which *Leibnits* justly
 “ calls an Idol of some modern *English* Men;
 “ and so great Use has been made of it in
 B “ demon-

“ demonstrating the Divine Attributes, in a
 “ way which some stile *a priori*; Yet I
 “ am forced to confess, that I cannot possi-
 “ bly frame any other Notion of it, than
 “ either, first, as the mere *Negation* or *Ab-*
 “ *sence* of *Matter*, or secondly, as the *Ex-*
 “ *tension* of *Body*, considered abstractly, or
 “ separate from any particular *Body*, as
 “ *Whiteness* without a *white Body*; or third-
 “ ly, as a *Subject* or *Substratum* of that same
 “ *Extension in abstracto, &c.*” Here he re-
 fers us to the Sixteenth Note, which shall
 be considered in its proper Place. Let us now
 examine his first and second Supposition: he
 says first, he conceives Space to be nothing
 but the *Negation* or *Absence* of *Matter*; the
 Absurdity of which may appear very plain,
 from a familiar Instance; which is this,
 Suppose two Walls to touch one another, it
 is evident, that there is then nothing between
 them. If we suppose two Walls not to touch
 one another, there must necessarily be some-
 thing between *them*, otherwise there would
 be no Difference between touching and not
 touching, which is a Contradiction in Terms.
 Now if we suppose this Matter which was
 between the two Walls that did not touch,
 to be taken away, there must either remain
 something between them, or they must touch.
 If there remains nothing between them, and
 yet they do not touch, then is there no Dif-
 ference between touching and not touching,
 but

but in the mere Words. If then there is any Thing between them after the Matter is taken away, that is, what I call Space, and is not, as the Translator asserts, the mere Negation or Absence of Matter. As to his second Supposition, I think that is no less absurd, it being as clear as it is possible, that *Whiteness* considered abstractly without a white Body is not the same, but widely different from *Space* considered abstractly without *Body* or *Matter*. For first, all *Bodies* are not *White*, but all *Matter* does and cannot but exist in *Space*. Secondly, *Whiteness* is only owing to a particular Texture of Parts upon the Surface of the *white Body*, by which it reflects all or almost all the Rays that fall upon it, and from thence arises an Idea in us which we call *White*; but the Extension of, or the Space in which any Body exists, neither is nor can possibly be, owing to any Texture of Parts or Difference of Surface, since were Matter either Square or Round, or any other Shape whatever, it must necessarily be extended, that is, must exist in some Part of Space.

“ Now according to the first Supposition, says he, we may indeed have a *positive Idea* of it, (of *Space*) as well as of *Silence*, *Darkness*, and many other Privations, &c. But to argue from such an Idea of Space, that Space is itself, something external, and has a real Existence,

“ seems altogether as good Sense, as to say,
 “ that because we have a different Idea of
 “ *Darkness* from that of *Light*, of *Silence*
 “ from that of *Sound*, of *Absence* from that
 “ of *Presence* ; therefore *Darkness*, &c. must
 “ have as real an Existence as *Light* has.”
 Afterwards says he, “ To say that *Space*
 “ must have Existence because it has some
 “ *Properties*, for Instance, *Penetrability*, or
 “ a Capacity of receiving *Body*, seems to me
 “ the same as to urge, that *Darkness* must be
 “ *Something*, because it has the Power of re-
 “ ceiving *Light* ; *Silence* the Property of
 “ admitting *Sound* , and *Absence* the Proper-
 “ ty of being supplied by *Presence* ; i. e. to
 “ assign absolute Negations, and such as by
 “ the same way of Reasoning may be ap-
 “ plied to *Nothing*, and then call them po-
 “ sitive Properties, and so infer, that the
 “ *Chimera* thus cloathed with them, must
 “ needs be *Something*.”

W H A T E V E R is indued with Proper-
 ties, must actually exist ; that *Space* has the
Property or the *Capacity* of receiving all
Body, or *Matter*, or any *Thing* that exists,
 no Person was ever so absurd as to deny.
 But, that *Nothing* should have a *Property* or
 be a *Capacity* of receiving *Something*, is
 impossible, and contradictory : Because it
 would then be *Nothing* and *Something* at
 the same *Time*, that is, *exist* and *not exist*
 at the same *Time*, which is a flat Contra-
 diction.

diction. Now indeed I grant as the Translator says, that had *Darkness*, abstractly considered, a Property or Capacity of receiving *Light*, and *Silence* the Property of admitting *Sound*, and *Absence* the Property of being supplied by *Presence*, it would unavoidably follow, that *Darkness*, *Silence* and *Absence* did actually Exist of Themselves, independent of *Light*, *Sound* and *Presence*. But these three Instances are not at all parallel to the present Case; for *Darkness* is not a Capacity of receiving *Light*, at least not in the same Sense that *Space* is, or has a Capacity of receiving Body; for if there is any *Darkness* which is incapable of receiving Light at all, it evidently follows, that *Darkness* cannot be a Capacity of receiving *Light*. The Translator's Definition therefore of *Darkness* does not seem to be a true One. I should rather take this to be the true Definition of it, that it is (when we consider it only particularly, that is, with regard only to some particular Place) that part of *Space*, in which we consider it, void or free from those very small Particles, which flow from luminous Bodies, and move only in straight Lines, unless altered by Refraction or Reflection, and which entering our Eyes and striking upon the *Retina*, raise in us the Idea we have of *Light*: When therefore there are none of these Particles to strike upon our *Retinas*, we have the Idea of *Darkness*, that

is of their Absence, or of that Part of Space being Dark, in which we before perceived them ; consequently, it is the Space is the Capacity of receiving the *Light*, and not the Darknefs the Capacity. But to return to the Proof. Matter is infinitely, at least indefinitely Divisible ; nay is composed, if not of infinitely, yet of Particles so very small, that were we to suppose them never so small we may yet suppose them, (and they may be actually) smaller. The smallest Particle therefore that we can suppose must have Pores in it, and consequently the Particles of Light must also have Pores, which Pores must certainly be less than the Particles of Light which contain them, and therefore no Light can enter them ; *Ergo*, the Darknefs that is in those Pores is incapable of receiving Light. *Secondly*, lest any Person should think that the Particles of Light are of themselves Atoms, and not composed of yet smaller Particles, and from thence conclude, they having no Pores, that there is no Darknefs which is not capable of receiving Light, upon the Supposition of their being Globular, though they were Atoms, it may be proved that there is Darknefs incapable of receiving Light ; for as Globes can touch one another but in one Point, there must necessarily be in a Number of those Globes a great many Cavities, which being less than those Globes, would be incapable of receiving

ving them; which if we apply to Light, supposing the Particles of Light to be Globular, the Case is the same; for the Darknes that was in those Cavities, would be incapable of receiving Light. *Thirdly* and *Lastly*; Whatever Shapes we suppose them of, there must be Cavities between them, which Cavities being less than the Particles of Light, must be incapable of receiving Light. Cubes and Parallelopipeds are the only Shapes, which can be so placed together as not to have Cavities between them; but as the Rays of Light come all the way from the Sun in a Curve, at least through our Atmosphere in a Curve, if we suppose them of either of those Shapes, there must be Cavities between them.

A G A I N, When *Light* comes into the place of *Darkness*, the *Darkness* ceases; whereas when *Body* comes into any part of *Space*, the *Space* in which the *Body* is, does not cease to exist, or to be *Space*, but is distinguished by calling one *Space* void of Matter, or empty *Space*, and the other *Space* full of *Matter*. But how absurd would it be to say, *Darkness* void of *Light*, and *Darkness* full of *Light*? which certainly would not be an absurd Expression, if *Darkness* was a Capacity of receiving *Light*, in the Manner that *Space* is a Capacity of receiving *Body*. *Silence* and *Absence*, I think, ought not to be considered in our present

Question, as being very different and wide of it, neither of them being Capacities of receiving any Thing in any Sense at all: for *Silence* is only a Cessation of the tremulous Motion of the Air; which, by striking upon the *Tympanum* of our Ears, raises in us the Idea of *Sound*. And *Absence* is only any determinate Part of *Space* void of any particular Person, or Thing.

AGAINST the *positive Infinity* of *Space* the Translator quotes this Passage out of Dr. Cudworth. “ If *Space*, says the *Doctor*, “ be concluded to be nothing else but the *Ex-* “ *tension* and *Distance* of *Body* or *Matter* “ considered in *general* (without Respect to “ this or that particular *Body*) and *abstract-* “ *ly* in order to the Conception of *Motion*, “ and the *Mensuration* of Things, then do “ we say that there appeareth no sufficient “ Grounds for this *positive Infinity* of *Space*, “ we being certain of no more than this, “ that be the *World*, or any figurative *Body*, “ never so great, it is not impossible but that it “ might still be greater and greater without “ End. Which *indefinite Increaseableness* of “ *Body* and *Space* seems to be mistaken for a “ *positive Infinity* thereof. Whereas for this “ very Reason, because it can never be so *great*, “ but that more *Magnitude* may still be added “ to it, therefore it can never be positively “ *Infinite*.

“ TO conclude therefore, by Space with-
 “ out the finite World is to be understood,
 “ nothing but the Possibility of Body, farther
 “ and farther without End, yet so as never to
 “ reach to Infinity. *Intellect. System.* Hence,
 “ says the Translator, appears the Weakness
 “ of that common Argument urged by *Gas-*
 “ *sendus*, *Dr. Clarke*, and *Raphson*, for the
 “ *Absolute Infinity* of *Space*, viz. from the
 “ Impossibility of setting *Bounds* or *Limits*
 “ to it; Since that, say they, would be to
 “ suppose *Space* bounded by *something*, which
 “ *Itself* occupies *Space*, or else by *Nothing*;
 “ both which are Contradictions.

“ WHICH Argument either first of all
 “ supposes that *Space* is really *Something*, or
 “ some positive *Quality*, which wants to be
 “ proved: Or else improperly applies *Bounds*
 “ and *Bounders* to mere *Non-entity* or bare
 “ Possibility, which has nothing to do with
 “ the *Idea* of *Bounds*.”

THE Quotation from *Dr. Cudworth* seems
 only to prove against our *Idea* of *Infinity*;
 but our not being able to have a positive *Idea*
 of *Infinity* does not at all prove that *Infinity*
 does not exist; for *Infinity* is not itself an
 actual *Addition* of finite *Spaces*; though all
 the *Idea* we can get concerning it arises from
 an endless *Addition* of finite *Spaces*, without
 ever being able to reach to any *End*; there-
 fore I think, as *Mr. Locke* very justly ob-
 serves, “ That we are carefully to distinguish
 “ between

“ between the *Idea* of the Infinity of Space,
 “ and the *Idea* of a Space infinite: The first
 “ is nothing but a supposed endless Progref-
 “ sion of the Mind, over what repeated *Ideas*
 “ of Space it pleases; But to have actually
 “ in the Mind the *Idea* of a Space infinite, is
 “ to suppose the Mind already passed over,
 “ and actually to have a View of all those
 “ repeated *Ideas* of Space, which an endless
 “ Repetition can never totally represent to it,
 “ which carries in it a plain Contradiction.”

Human Understanding. That we have an Idea of the *Infinity* of *Space* seems very plain, but an Idea of a Space infinite we neither have nor possibly can have any Idea at all. For it is no more possible that a finite Mind should be able in the least to comprehend, or have any *adæquate* Idea of *Positive Infinity*; than that a Created Being should in Wisdom, Goodness, Justice, and all other Divine Attributes, equal his Creator. Than which Supposition nothing can be more absurd. A Possibility of increasing *Body*, is a Possibility of extending its Extremities into more distant Parts of Space. But if there were no Parts of Space into which these Extremities of the Body are to be extended, as there certainly would not without the Pre-existence of Space; it evidently follows, that the increasing the Bigness of the Body; cannot make that *something* which was really *nothing* before, but the Space must be something actually pre-exist-
 ing,

ing, must be pre-supposed to the Existence of every Thing, which is to exist in it. For *Space* is the Thing *containing*, and *Body* is that which is *contained* in it, (I would not be understood by *Thing* to mean a *Substance*, which seems to be the Meaning of all those, if they have any Meaning at all, who call *Space nothing*; Or they may easily be driven to that Shift at last, as the Translator himself is forced to say, in the same Note, *Prove it to be a Thing, and then we will enquire whether it has Bounds or not.*)

IT is very plain therefore that the *Container* must be supposed to exist, before we can possibly suppose any thing at all about the Existence of That which is to be *contained* in it.

How absurd, then, is it to say, that because our Idea of the *Infinity* of *Space* arises only from our Power of either adding or multiplying any known Distances or determinate parts of *Space*, without ever being able to come to any End, and that if we go on adding and multiplying to all Eternity, we shall still be as far off, as if we had never tried at all; How absurd, I say, is it to conclude from thence, that *Space* is really not Infinite: Whereas for this very Reason it must necessarily follow that it is Infinite, or else we could not have a Power of adding to all Eternity without reaching to an End some time or other, if there really was any End; and if there

there is none, it is very evident, that Space must be *positively Infinite*. Were the latter part of the Quotation true, it would indeed from thence follow, that *Space* was not actually *Infinite*. Though I think it rather seems to tend against the Infinity of Body, which is quite wide of the Question, *which Indefinite Increasableness of Body and Space, seems to be mistaken for a Positive Infinity thereof; Whereas for this very Reason, Because it can never be so great, but that more Magnitude might still be added to it, therefore it can never be positively infinite.* Were it true, as I said, that *Space* could never be so *big* but that *more* Magnitude might be added to it, it would then follow that it could not be positively *Infinite*. But how does the Truth of this appear? we can never have an Idea of it so large, but that we may still add more to it; But our Idea of it is not the Thing itself. Besides with relation to *Body*, how do we know that *Body* or *Matter* cannot be created so large, as that there should be no Possibility of adding more to it? *i. e.* Where is the Contradiction in supposing *Matter* to have been created *Infinite*? There certainly appears no Contradiction in the Supposition; and if *Matter* had been *Infinite*, it would be impossible to add any more to it, and therefore it would be positively infinite in the strictest Sense of the Word *Infinite*. He first supposes the Extension of *Body* to constitute

tute Space, whereas it is very clear, that the Extension of Body is only that by which we get the Idea of Space; for in the forecited Passage, *Because*, says he, *It can never be so great, but that more Magnitude might be still added to it, therefore it can never be positively Infinite.* Now this can never be applied to *Space* in any Sense at all, nay not even to *Matter*; for that may be capable of being increased on *in infinitum*, and also of being made Infinite, as I said before; not that it is infinite, for it certainly is not: There is without doubt many hundred times as much void Space in the whole Universe, as there is Space filled with Matter. Yet this is no Reason why God cannot now create, or could not in Times past have created Matter infinite, so that it should possess as much Space as He himself does. At least there appears no Contradiction in the Supposition, and therefore it is certainly possible. *Infinity* is indeed an *individual Attribute* of the Deity, so that it is impossible that *Infinity* can be an *Attribute* of any thing else; yet were Matter infinite, it would not follow from thence that *Infinity* was an *Attribute* of this *infinite Matter*; any more than that *Extension* is an *Attribute* of all Finite Beings throughout the whole Universe. An *Attribute* is what depends upon its *Substratum*, and cannot possibly exist without it: If *Extension* therefore was an *Attribute* of finite Beings,

Beings, if we suppose all finite Beings away, then both the Idea of Extension and Extension it self ought to cease; whereas we find that it necessarily will remain, after we have done all we possibly can to suppose it away. *e.g.* *Figure* or *Shape* is an Attribute of all finite Beings; now it is very plain, that were there no finite things existing, there could not possibly be any such thing as *Figure*; for *Figure* is a certain Modification of the external Parts or Bounds of some *Thing*, so that if there was nothing that had any Bounds, there could be no Modification of Bounds, and consequently no such thing as *Figure*. From hence perhaps we may understand the Meaning of *Dr. Waterland's Ninth Query, i. e. Whether the Divine Attributes, Omniscience, Ubiquity, &c. those individual Attributes can be communicated without the Divine Essence, to which they are inseparable.* Which seems to me to be this, whether God can create an *Omniscient Being*, or an *Infinite Being*. As for *Omniscience*, that I cannot tell whether he can or no, it may perhaps be a Contradiction to suppose two *Omniscient Beings*, for all that I know. So that this I must leave undetermined, and to be judged of by the Learned: only taking Notice of this one thing, that if there can be two *Omniscient Beings*, *Omniscience* will be the Attribute properly but of One of them, in the same manner as *Knowledge* is a Property only of the Deity, and not
of

of every finite Being that possesses it. As for an Infinite Being, that I think is in the Power of God to create; for that does not make the created Being either necessarily existent or powerful, or even give to him Freedom of Will, because He must nevertheless depend upon and owe his Existence to his Creator, and must receive all Faculties and Powers from Him, and without Him must cease to exist, and can be able to do nothing contrary to *his* Will. There appears to me no Contradiction in this Supposition at all, and if there is no Contradiction in it, it is evident that the thing is not impossible. For, as I before said, *Infinity* would not therefore be an *Attribute* of such a Being; both *Eternity* and *Immensity*, are *individual Attributes* of the Deity; it is impossible, that an Attribute can belong to more than one Substance, as in the forementioned Instance, Figure is a Property of all Finite Beings, yet really it is the Property only of one Thing, that is, it is a Property only of *Finiteness*, because it is the destroying *Finiteness* which makes Figure cease. If therefore God was to create an Infinite Being, we might for the same Reason, say that, Time was an Attribute of that infinite Being, as well as Infinity; so we might go on and say that Time was also an Attribute of all Beings that exist, since, no Being can exist but in Time. It is a plain Consequence

quence of the Definition of an Attribute, that nothing can possibly be an Attribute of that which does not constitute its Existence. And that Infinity cannot be applied to any created Being in that Sense, is very certain. In the last Paragraph, the Translator says; *Or else improperly applies bounds and bounders to mere Non-entity or bare Possibility.* In this I think he is entirely wrong; for *Non-entity* in that Sense is a direct Contradiction; Because *Non-entity* can only be applied to particular Things; as for Instance, when any Being is created, it is a mutation from *Non-entity* to *Entity*, so if he is annihilated, he is changed from *Entity* to *Non-entity*. But to say *Non-entity* in general is a direct Contradiction. For, could we suppose Nothing to exist, (not that *Nothing* should become *Something*, as a late absurd and childish Pamphlet-Writer against Dr. Clarke's Argument *a priori*, would have understood him, when he only meant, that if it was any way possible not to suppose *Something* to exist;) then the Existence of the Supreme Being could not be *Necessary*; nay, there could not possibly be any thing at all *Necessary*; it would then be as much a Contradiction to suppose a *Necessarily* or *Self-Existent Being*, as it is now not to suppose *One*. To suppose nothing in any Part of the Universe, is a flat Contradiction, because it is supposing Nothing where we
cannot

cannot help at the Time supposing Something. It is plain therefore that we cannot suppose nothing in the Universe ; for could we suppose nothing in any one Part, we might for the same Reason, suppose nothing in another Part, and so in all Parts. The Objection usually urged against Dr. *Clarke's* Sixth Proposition, can have no Force against this, because here is no Pre-supposition of *Any thing necessarily existent*. But from our not being able, or our finding that it is a Contradiction to suppose *nothing* in any Part of the Universe, arises the *Necessity* of the Existence of *something* : Which *Thing* must therefore be necessarily existing. This perhaps, if considered, might show the *Infinity* of the *Self-existent Being*. For since we cannot but suppose *something* in every Part of the Universe, All that *something* must be the *Self-existent Being*, and as the Universe must be *infinite*, consequently the *Self-existent Being* must be so also ; but more of this in another Place. The Translator, by his Quotation from Dr. *Cudworth*, seems to confound the Idea of Space with that of Number, as if they were the same Thing. For, says the Doctor, “ When I consider the Number of
 “ the Stars, I can go numbering on in my
 “ Thoughts still more and more Stars *in infi-*
 “ *nitum* : But I can also set Bounds to them,
 “ can suppose their Numbers finite ; but to
 “ Number itself I can set no Bounds. Yet

“ what is Number ? nothing but an abstract
 “ Idea ; nothing *ad extra*. And to say that
 “ Number is infinite, comes only to this,
 “ That we can set no Bounds to our Faculty
 “ of Numbering, it being always as easy to
 “ add to a Thousand, or a Million, one
 “ more, &c. as to one, &c.” Now all this
 cannot be applied to Space, because the whole
 of Space actually exists all in one and the
 same Instant : But as for *Number*, that is
 widely different. For it is the Things which
 exist that constitute *Number*, and without
 which *Number* is only an *abstract Term*, and
 can only be applied to mental Things. As
 for instance, we may suppose a *Number* of
 Yards, Feet or Inches, without any real
 Bounds to them. So that *Number* always re-
 quires something to be applied to. The Case
 is quite different with regard to *Space* ; for
 the Things which exist cannot in any Sense
 at all constitute Space. Besides infinite Num-
 ber, in the true Meaning of the Word *Num-
 ber*, is certainly a Contradiction, at least it is
 not very far from it. For in an infinite Line,
 suppose there is an infinite Number of Yards,
 and also an infinite Number of Inches, yet
 there is thirty six times as many Inches as
 Yards, and there will be seventeen hundred and
 sixty times as many Yards as Inches, though
 there is an infinite Number of Miles. Again,
 suppose the whole Universe full of Globes of
 Matter, so full, that all of them should be
 contigu-

contiguous : Then there would be an infinite Number ; and though every one of them had a hundred thousand Millions of Grains of Dust in them, there would still be only an infinite Number of those Grains of Dust, though there was a hundred thousand Million of times as many as there were Globes. From hence it appears, that Infinite cannot be, without a manifest Absurdity, made up of any thing finite, it is evidently absurd to say there is an infinite Number of Yards, or any other known Measure, in an infinite Line, when the Length of it is beyond the Reach of all Number whatever. But this, as Dr. *Clarke* says, is no Argument against the real Existence of Infinity. For, says he, “ It is *Demonstrable* that *something must be* “ *actually Infinite*. All the metaphysical Difficulties therefore, which arise usually from “ applying the Measures and Relations of “ Things finite, to what is infinite ; and from “ supposing *Finites* to be (Aliquot) *Parts* “ *of Infinite*, when indeed they are not properly so, but only as mathematical Points “ to Quantity, which have no Proportion at “ all : (and from imagining All *Infinites* to “ be *Equal*, when in things *disparate* they “ manifestly are *not* so ; an *infinite Line*, being not only *not equal to*, but *infinitely less* “ than an *infinite Surface*, and an *infinite Surface* than Space *infinite in all Dimensions* :) “ All metaphysical Difficulties, I say, arising

“ from false Suppositions of this kind, ought
 “ to be esteemed vain, and of no Force.”
Demon. of Being and Attrib. of God.

THE Translator proceeds with some Arguments against the *Positive Infinity* also of *Duration*. “ We shall only add a Word or
 “ two to shew that *Duration*, as well as
 “ *Space, Number*, and all *Quantity*; any
 “ Thing which can be considered only by
 “ way of Parts, or in Succession; is abso-
 “ lutely repugnant to, or incapable of, true
 “ positive Infinity in any Respect. Now by a
 “ positive or *metaphysical Infinite*, we always
 “ mean that which is absolutely *perfect* in
 “ its Kind, which cannot admit of *Addition*
 “ or *Increase, &c.*” And in the next Para-
 graph, says he, “ If then a metaphysical
 “ Infinite means *perfect*, or *that to which no-*
 “ *thing can be added*, it is plain that *Dura-*
 “ *tion, Number*, and all *Quantity*, the very
 “ Nature and Idea of which includes per-
 “ petual *Increaseableness* or *Addibility*, must
 “ be essentially incapable of this Absolute or
 “ Positive Infinity, &c.” A *Positive* or *Meta-*
physical Infinite, as the Translator says, cer-
 tainly means what is absolutely *Perfect*, that
 to which nothing can be added: But then
 this must always mean in the particular *Way*
 that it is infinite; for instance, an infinite
 Line cannot be made either longer or shorter,
 but it may be made broader, because it is not
 infinite in Breadth, but finite, yet it will still
 be

be an infinite Line, whatever Breadth you suppose it. So also an infinite Superficies can neither be made longer or wider; yet it may be made thicker, because its Thickness is finite, and may be therefore increased at Pleasure; still it would nevertheless be an infinite Superficies. Again, suppose a Line from any given Point to be continued in Length infinitely; this Line has an End, or is finite one Way; and has no End, or is infinite the other Way. At the given Point, we may either add to it, or take from it, yet it will necessarily remain a Line infinite one Way, though we either add to, or take away never so much the other Way. *Duration*, says the Translator, *includes in it a perpetual Increaseableness or Addibility.* How this can be made appear, I know not; it is true indeed that Duration is a perpetual Flux, yet it neither is, nor can possibly be in the Power of any Being whatsoever to add to it, or take from it, to make it move slower or faster, or to stand still. I grant indeed that God has the Power of making our Ideas pass twice as fast or twice as slow in our Minds; so that the Length of one Hour would appear to be the Length of two, or the Length of two but one, (because the Idea of Duration arises from the Succession of Ideas in our Minds) but *Duration* would not be quicker, nor the two Hours one, though they appeared so; any more than the Time, when a Man sleeps so sound,

as to perceive none or very little Distance between his falling asleep and waking, is no real Length of Time, because it appears to be none; yet all this is neither adding to or taking away from Duration. I grant that *Duration* cannot be *infinite* in the Manner that a Line is, because there is one *infinite Duration* past, that is, a *Duration* terminated at the *present Instant*; and an *infinite Duration* to come, terminated also at the *present Instant*. We may make the clearest Representation of it by a Line; for suppose a Line infinite each Way, and a mental Termination in some Part of it, which may stand for the present Instant, we may suppose that mental Bound to move forward, and to have moved from Infinity to where it is, and that it will move on uniformly to Infinity. This I think is a true Representation of Duration, and the most parallel that we can apply to it; for the Motion of that mental Termination alters not the Infinity of the Line, which is the Case of Duration, for the present Instant hinders not the uniform flowing of it.

“ FARTHER, says the Translator, if we
 “ attend to the Notion of an *Infinite Series*,
 “ and the manifold Absurdities which accom-
 “ pany it, in any manner of Conception,
 “ (from which Absurdities we draw our only
 “ Proof of a *First Cause*, or *God*) we shall
 “ be necessarily led to exclude from Infinity
 “ all such Things as exist *seriatim*, or must
 “ be

“ be conceived as consisting in or composed
“ of *successive Parts*, *i. e.* such as *Duration*,
“ *Number, Space, Motion, Magnitude, &c.*”
“ All which, when said to be infinite, are
“ nothing but so many *infinite Series*, and
“ therefore liable to the same Absurdities.
“ The same is shewn of Duration or Time
“ by Dr. *Bentley*, *Boyle's Lect.* where speak-
“ ing of *infinite Generations* of Men sup-
“ posed to be *already past* (and the Argu-
“ ment is the very same in Years or Ages ;)
“ Whatsoever, says the Doctor, is now past, was
“ once actually present ; so that each of those
“ infinite Generations, was once in its Turn
“ actually present ; therefore all, except one
“ Generation, were once future, and not in
“ Being, which destroys the very Supposi-
“ tion : For either that one Generation must
“ itself have been infinite, which is Nonsense,
“ or it was the finite Beginning of infinite
“ Generations, between itself and us ; that is,
“ Infinity terminated at both Ends, which is
“ Nonsense, as before. Again, infinite past
“ Generations of Men have been once actually
“ present ; there may be some one Man,
“ suppose then, that was at infinite Distance
“ from us now ; therefore that Man's Son
“ likewise forty Years younger, suppose than
“ his Father, was either at infinite Distance
“ from us, or at finite ; if that Son too was
“ at infinite Distance from us, then one Infi-
“ nite is longer by forty Years than another ;
“ which

“ which is absurd. If at finite, then forty
 “ Years added to finite, makes it infinite ;
 “ which is as absurd as the other.”

THAT there are Difficulties, in the Supposition of infinite past Generations of Men, which are almost insuperable, is very true. But the Supposition of the Impossibility of the Existence of such Generations, that is, that there could not possibly have been Men existing in a Series from all Eternity to this present Time, is a direct Contradiction. For since God existed himself from all Eternity, he could act from all Eternity ; but Creation is an Action, therefore he could create from all Eternity ; and if he could create from all Eternity, it must necessarily follow, that created Beings might have existed from all Eternity. Because if created Beings could not have existed from all Eternity, it would have been impossible for him to have created from all Eternity. If God could not create from all Eternity, then whenever, or at whatever Time it was that he had the first Power of Creating, that Power had a Beginning, because whatever was not from Eternity, certainly had a Beginning ; now whatever began to exist, there was an Eternity *a parte ante*, before it did begin to exist ; for, whatever had a Beginning, bears no Proportion to that which was from Eternity. So that God existed a whole Eternity *a parte ante*, before he had the Power of Creating ; that is, he was
 an

an impotent Being, a whole Eternity. To suppose which, *i. e.* to suppose him not to have had the same Faculties and Powers from all Eternity, which he now has, is at once overturning all that can be proved of him, all his Attributes, both natural and moral; and even the very Foundation of all his Necessity of Existence; since whatever exists by any Necessity, always was, is, and always will necessarily be unalterably the same individual identical Being. The Absurdity of the contrary Supposition I leave others to make their Judgment of. Hence it appears, that the Material World might have been Eternal, since the Supposition implies no Contradiction. Not that it would therefore be *necessary* or *self-existent*, as several have imagined, especially of the ancient Philosophers, mentioned by Dr. Clarke, in his *Attributes*, it is very evident, that were the World eternal, still it would be nevertheless dependent upon its Creator. For having existed from Eternity to this present Time cannot make *it* be Self-existent, any more, than existing from this present Time *to* all Eternity. Necessity of Existence can be only where the Supposition of the Non-existence of that Thing is a Contradiction; which every one sees is not the Case of the material World. For, whether it did exist from all Eternity or no, we can never be certain of: yet as the Nature of it is plainly Contingent, it might have existed and it might

might not ; as it depended alone upon the Will and Pleasure of him who made it, whether he should have created it from all Eternity or no, it follows very clearly that it cannot be Self-existent, not even upon the Supposition of its being Eternal. How God could create from Eternity appears to us very absurd, and almost impossible ; Nor have we a clearer Notion how he has existed from all Eternity, yet Reason shews that it is a Contradiction not to suppose him Eternal. The Reason, I think, arises from our not being able in the least to comprehend how an Eternity can be now actually past, when there are so many seeming Absurdities springing from such a Supposition.

Let us now return and consider the Learned Dr. Bentley's Arguments. First then, *Whatsoever*, says he, *is now past was once actually present ; so that each Generation in its Turn was once present, Therefore all except one were once future.* All these Propositions plainly imply a Beginning, whereas whatever was from Eternity could have no Beginning ; they are therefore grounded upon a wrong Basis, and must therefore fall, when the Foundation is overturned. *Therefore all except one were once Future*, says he, that is, all of them were once to come except the *First* ; But it is manifest that there was no *First*, for upon the very Supposition of a First, the supposed Eternity of them is destroyed.

stroyed. In the second Argument, he in the same Manner supposes a Beginning, *There was some one Man*, says he, *at infinite Distance from us now* ; who can be possibly meant by *that same one Man*, but the *First*? when it is very evident, that there could not possibly have been any *First* in Generations which were from Eternity. By these two Arguments of the Doctor's, we may see plainly that the whole Difficulty arises from our not being able to have any Idea of an infinite Duration already past.

As for the strength of Them, I think if they prove any Thing they will prove too much. For they will equally prove against the Existence of the *Deity* from all Eternity. Because if there is not a Time or a Part of Duration past which never was present, then there was a Beginning of the Existence of God, the Thing is much plainer in Eternity to come, (for of that our Idea is much clearer than in Eternity past.) There is a Time to come which never will be present ; for if all Time that was to come would be once present, then there would be an End, which is a Contradiction : for the same Reason therefore, there is a Time now actually past which never was present. The difference of Eternity past and future is only that one is *Beginningless* and the other *Endless*. If therefore we revert the Doctor's Arguments, we may the better see the Defect

fect of them. He supposes, in his first Argument *an infinite Number of Generations now past*; let us then suppose an Infinite Number of Generations of Men to come; that is, Men to exist in a *Series* from this present Time to all Eternity: now as *all his were once present*, so all ours *will be once present*, and, as *all his except one were once future*, so all ours except *one will be past*; that is, all of them except the *last*, which plainly implies an *End*, when it is supposed that there is no *End*: in the same Manner *his* necessarily implies a *Beginning*, when there really never was a *Beginning*. Again, according to his second Argument, *Infinite past Generations of Men*, says he, *were once actually present*, so we may suppose, Infinite future Generations of Men *will be once present*. *There is some one Man*, suppose, says the Doctor, *that was at infinite Distance from us now*: so, there will be some one Man that *will be at infinite Distance from us now*. *That Man's Son likewise forty Years younger than his Father*, was either at *infinite Distance from us*, or at *finite*, &c. In our way, That Man's Father, who dies forty Years before his Son, *will be either at finite Distance from us or at Infinite*; if at finite, then the Addition of the forty Years longer Life of the Son makes it Infinite; if at Infinite then one Infinite is longer than the other by the forty Years. From hence

appears very plain the Absurdity of both the foregoing Arguments, and that both, suppose a Beginning and no Beginning in the same Thing, which is a flat Contradiction. In the latter Part of this Note, the Translator seems to turn wholly upon *that* making or constituting Infinity, which is only *that* by which we get the Idea of Infinity, *i. e.* by a perpetual Addition or Multiplication of finite Parts of Space, we find, that were we to add to Eternity even the Diameter of the *Orbis Magnus*, or the Distance from us to the most remote fixt Star, yet we should not find any Hindrance to our supposing the Distance still more. But it is impossible that this Addition should be that which makes the Space exist. For upon the Supposition of these Parts being added together, making the whole, we immediately destroy the Infinity of it. “ But, says “ the Translator in the latter Part of the “ same Note, should not the Argument rather be reversed, and the Consequence of “ it stand thus? This is the only way of “ conceiving any Infinite applicable to these “ Things; but this way we cannot conceive these to be positively Infinite (or “ positive Infinity cannot be applied to these) “ without a Contradiction, therefore we cannot at all conceive these to be positively “ infinite without a Contradiction, therefore these are not positively Infinite.”

It

It seems a very absurd Notion, that there cannot be such a Thing as positive Infinity, without we had an Idea of it, which is impossible. The whole, I think is against the positive Infinity of Space, which I shall endeavour to shew may be positively Infinite. Let us suppose a Being to move from a given Point any determinate way with a very swift Motion, it is very plain, that if he moves never so swift or never so long, he will never come to any End, and if he cannot come to any End, it must certainly be because there is no End to come at ; for were there any End, he must necessarily arrive thither, one time or other. If therefore, which way soever he moves, it is impossible to come to an End, or there is no End to come to, it is evident, that the Space he moves in must be positively Infinite, independant of his Motion, since it cannot be *his Motion* which makes it so.

In Note the Eleventh the Translator, speaking of Mathematical Points, Lines and Solids, quotes this Passage from Dr. *Green*.
 “ But it is owned, says he, that there is no
 “ such real Point, and consequently, no such
 “ Line in being, therefore no such Surface ;
 “ and what Reason can there be Assigned
 “ why we may not go one Step farther, and
 “ from the same Principles conclude there is
 “ no such Solid.” That a Mathematical
 Point is not any Thing really existing is
 true,

true, it is only a mental Thing, but then it is supposed in a real Part of Space; so also a Line is not any Thing existing in Nature, but is only a mental bounded Distance, the Distance is real, but the Bounds of it do not exist actually without us, they are rather mental Assignations of such and such proportionate Parts of Space; so that the Distance is only mental with Respect to its being either of a greater or a less Distance, because if it is of no Distance, it is not a Line; wherever we fix Bounds to it, we do it mentally, and do not apply any solid Substance to it. The same may be said of a Superficies, for that is only mental with Respect to its Bigness, there must really be Distance two ways in it. For suppose a Square Piece of Matter to exist in any Part of Space, that may not improperly be called a Surface, not considering its Thickness; now this being taken away the Space in which it existed still remains, consequently the Surface still remains, though now there is no real Bounds to it marked out, because we can now only suppose Bounds in the Place, where the real Bounds were when the Body existed in that Part of Space; yet though the Bounds are mental it does not follow that the Space to which we assign these Bounds is mental and consequently Nothing. All this and more may be said of a Solid, for in that there is real Length,
Breadth,

Breadth, and Depth, without any Bounds marked out, the Bounds being only supposed by us at a certain Distance from one another. In the next Paragraph says the Translator, *We have said that Length, Breadth, and Thickness, is the Definition of imaginary Space.* This I think is false, for it rather appears to me to be a mental Consideration of *Real Space.* For were there no Distance existing really, it would unavoidably follow, that the Sun and Moon existed both in the same individual Place, though we may imagine them to Exist in different Places. I think we might with as much Reason conclude, that they did not exist at all, (as some have been so absurd as to think that there was not any Thing really existing without us,) but were only *Chimæra's* of the Brain. Let every Person judge the Absurdity of this for himself.

I SHALL only take Notice of part of another Quotation from the *Critical Dictionary*, in this Note: The Words of the Quotation are these. “ Is this *Vacuum*, or
 “ immoveable, indivisible, and penetrable Ex-
 “ tension, a Substance or a Mode? It must
 “ be one of the two, for the adequate Divi-
 “ sion of Being comprehends but these two
 “ Members. If it be a Mode, they must
 “ then define its Substance; but that is what
 “ they can never do.” There is no need of proceeding any farther in this Quotation; for
 all

all the remaining Part is only to prove that it is not a Substance, which Nobody now I think contends. As for its not being a Mode, the Quotation falls very short in the Proof of. For first, there is no Reason why the *Substance* of it should necessarily be defined, before we can tell whether it is a *Mode* or no. Secondly, it proves too much, because we are not in the least able to define the *Substance* of any *Mode* whatsoever, it would therefore inevitably follow, according to that Way of arguing, that no *Modes* at all existed. Have we not an Idea of particular Modes, as of Spirits, of our own Souls, and of Matter? But who can define the Substance of separate Spirits, of our own Souls, or even of the most minute Particle of Matter which we are most conversant with? How absurd therefore is it to conclude, from our not being able to define the Substance of a Mode, that therefore *that Mode* does not exist. If Space be infinite; (and that it is certainly and must be infinite, has been proved before;) and if it be a Mode, as it plainly is, if it is any thing at all, which shall be shown afterward; and if there be any infinite Substance, then that Substance is the *Substratum* of Space.

IN his thirteenth Note, the Translator endeavours to prove that Space is not necessarily existing. For, says he, " If we
 " can consider our own Souls as existing
 D " alone,

“ alone, and without this Space, without
 “ considering it as a *Causa sine qua non*, or
 “ in any other *Respect*, without *pre-supposing*,
 “ or any ways *including* it : (This, accord-
 “ ing to the Doctor, (Dr. Clarke) himself,)
 “ will prove demonstrably, that Space is not
 “ necessarily existent.” Here seems to be a
 kind of Ambiguity in the Expression, whe-
 ther we can suppose a Spirit to exist without
 the real *Existence* of Space, or whether, we
 can suppose a Spirit to exist, without *con-*
sidering the Existence of Space. The for-
 mer we cannot possibly do, though perhaps
 the latter we may, but not very properly. For
 if we endeavour all that we can to suppose
 Space away, yet we find that it will necessa-
 rily remain, even after it is supposed to be
 taken away ; because to suppose it removed, is
 the same as to suppose a Thing removed from
 itself ; if then Space cannot possibly be suppo-
 sed away, we cannot suppose any Thing inde-
 pendent, and not requiring the Existence of
 Space. For as there can be no Pores in Space,
 no Being can be so small, but that he must
 take up some part of Space to exist in ; be-
 cause there will be parts of Space as small,
 and even smaller than any Being can possibly
 be, were he never so small. To suppose a
 Being existing without considering or think-
 ing about Space, perhaps may be, (though
 this I think is, because the Idea of the Ne-
 cessity of Space to the Existence of all other
 Things,

Things, is so common to us, that we do not take any Notice of it in our natural Thoughts about the Existence of other Things.) But as we cannot suppose any Being without Space, that is, without his existing in Space; the Supposition of a Being's Existence without the Consideration of, or the not thinking about Space, does not prove that Space is not necessarily existing. For we know not the Manner of a Spirit's Existence, yet we find that to suppose any Thing existing, we are necessarily led to suppose somewhere for it to exist in. For whether Thinking requires Extension, or not, yet as Thinking is only an Action of an immaterial Being, that does not prove that the *Being* does not exist in Space; for, as Dr. *Clarke* says, speaking about the Needfulness of what is necessarily existing, to the Existence of all other Things: "As *Space* is necessary to every Thing, and " nothing can possibly be conceived to exist, " without thereby pre-supposing *Space*: which " therefore I apprehend to be a *Property* " or *Mode* of the self-existent Substance; " and that, by being evidently necessary *itself*, " it proves that the *Substance*, of which it " is a *Mode*, must also be *necessary*; *necessary* " both in *itself*, and needful to the Exist- " tence of *any Thing else* whatsoever. Ex- " tension indeed does not belong to *Thought*, " because *Thought* is not a Being; but there " is Need of Extension to the Existence of

“ every *Being*, to a Being which has, or has
 “ not Thought, or any other Quality what-
 “ soever.” *Answ. to 2d Letter.*

IF a Spirit is unextended, it must exist in no Place, and is therefore incapable of Motion. For if it can move, it must either move, or go out of one Place into another, or out of no Place into some Place, or *lastly*, out of no Place into no Place. It is plain that it cannot go out of one Place into another, for that would be to exist in no Place, and in some Place at the same Time, which is a flat Contradiction. *Secondly*, it cannot go from no Place into some Place, because that is sometimes to be in no Place, and sometimes in some Place, no less absurd than the former. *Lastly*, it is as evident, that it cannot go from no Place into no Place, for that would be not moving at all at the same Time that it does move, because the Definition of Motion is a changing of the Place it existed in before; but if it exists in no Place, it cannot change any Place. That a Spirit has the Power of moving, is very manifest. Or else the Soul of a Man would be very often a hundred Miles distant from his Body, which is the most absurd Supposition possible. Since then what is not extended, is incapable of Motion, and the Soul is capable of Motion, it evidently follows, that the Soul must be extended. I would not mean that the Soul is extended in the same Manner as Matter is; it may be, nay it
 demonstrably

demonstrably is a *Continuum*, or an inseparable Substance, and that to divide it, is to destroy its Essence, and I take Thinking to be only the Action of such an indivisible Being.

“ THOUGH Thought is not a Being, where’s the Difference in this Respect! says the Translator, Do not we frame our Idea of the *Being*, from its essential *Properties*? And if these have no manner of Relation to Extension, why should the *Being* to which these Properties belong have any? &c.” Though we frame our Idea of a Being from the essential Properties of it, yet this is no Reason why the Being should not require something to its Existence, which the essential Property does not, only by the Being’s requiring it. A Property is something belonging to a Substance, and is dependent upon it, so that upon the Annihilation of the Substance, the Property must necessarily cease, but though the Property were to be taken away from the Substance, still the Substance would remain. This is the Definition of a Property. Now when we come to join Essential to Property, it alters the Case, with respect to the Substance; for the essential Property cannot exist without its Substance, no more than a Property which is not essential can. But then the Substance cannot exist without that neither, *i. g.* Space is the essential Property of the self-existent Being,

therefore Space cannot exist without the self-existent Being, nor the self-existent Being without Space. From hence it will appear, that a *Substance* may require that to its Existence, which the *essential Property* does not (but by the *Medium* of the Substance.) For if a Substance has more than one essential Property, it is plain, that the Substance cannot exist without them all; now none of the essential Properties require the Existence of any other essential Properties, but by Means of the Substance: Therefore the Substance requires what the essential Property does not. As for instance; A *Capacity of Motion* is an essential Property of Finiteness, or of all finite Beings. That a finite Being should not be capable of Motion, that is, of being moved, (it may not indeed have a Power of Self-Motion) yet to suppose it not in the Power of some one Being to move it, is the most absurd Thing that can be supposed. *Figure* or *Shape* is also an essential Property of all finite Beings. It is very clear then that no finite Being can exist without these two essential Properties, because without those Properties, the Essence of the Beings to which they belong would be destroyed. Now *Shape*, one of these essential Properties, does not require a Capacity of Motion, or of being moved, but only because the Being (without which it cannot exist) does. Consequently a Substance may require something to its Existence,
which

which its essential Property does not. The contrary is indeed true, that the essential Property requires that to its Existence, which is needful to the Existence of its *Substratum*; so that the Translator's Argument should have been reversed, and stood thus: The essential Property cannot exist without that which is needful to the Existence of its Substance.

AGAINST the Extension of the Soul, the Translator quotes this Passage from Dr. *Cudworth*, amongst whose various Arguments, this is one: "If the Soul be an *extended Substance*, then it must be of Necessity either a *physical Point*, (for a *mathematical Point* has no Extension) or *Minimum*, the least Extension that can possibly be; or else it must consist of *more* such *physical Points* joined together. As for the former of these, it is impossible that one *single Atom*, or *smallest Point* of Extension, should be able to perceive distinctly all the *Variety* of Things, *i. e.* take Notice of all the *distinct* and *different* Parts of an *extended Object*, and have a *Description* or *Delineation* of the whole of them at once upon it self, (for that would be to make it *divisible* and *indivisible* at the same time.) As for the latter, if the Soul be an *extended Substance* consisting of *more Points*, one without another, all concurring in every *Sensation*, then must every one of those

“ *Points* either perceive a *Point* and *Part*
 “ of the *Object* only, or else the *whole* *Ob-*
 “ *ject*: Now if every *Point* of the *extended*
 “ *Soul* perceives only a *Point* of the *Object*,
 “ then is there no one *Thing* in us that per-
 “ ceives the *whole*; or which can compare
 “ one *Part* with another. But if every *Point*
 “ of the *extended* *Soul* perceives the *whole*
 “ *Object* at once, consisting of many *Parts*,
 “ then will the former *Absurdity* return:
 “ And also there will be innumerable *Per-*
 “ *ceptants* of the same *Object* in every *Sen-*
 “ *sation*, as many as there are *Points* in
 “ the *extended* *Soul*: And from both these
 “ *Suppositions* it would alike follow, that
 “ no *Man* is one single *Percipient* or *Per-*
 “ *son*, but there are innumerable distinct
 “ *Percipients* or *Persons* in every *Man*. Nei-
 “ ther can there be any other *Supposition*
 “ made besides those three forementioned:
 “ As that the *whole* *extended* *Soul* should per-
 “ ceive *both* the *whole* *sensible* *Object*, and all
 “ its several *Parts*, no *Part* of this *Soul* in
 “ the mean time having any *Perception* at all
 “ by itself; because the *whole* of an *extend-*
 “ *ed* *Being* is nothing but *all the* *Parts* taken
 “ together; and if none of those *Parts* have
 “ any *Life*, *Sense*, or *Perception* in them,
 “ it is impossible that there should be any in
 “ the *whole*. But in very *Truth*, to say that
 “ the *whole* *Soul* perceiveth all, and no *Part*
 “ of any thing, is to acknowledge it not
 “ to

“ to be *extended*, but to be *indivisible*, which
 “ is the Thing we contend for.”

NONE of these Suppositions of the learned Doctor's either are, or can by any Means, I think, prove inconsistent with the Nature of the Soul of Man, or of separate Spirits. For, *first*, supposing the Soul to be, as the Doctor calls it, a *physical Point* or *Minimum*, the smallest Part of Extension, How does it from thence appear that so small a Being cannot be able to perceive distinctly the Variety of external Objects? I think it rather proves against himself. For if it is absurd to suppose such a Being capable of perceiving Objects distinctly, or perhaps of perceiving them at all, because he is so very small; it will be, sure, much more absurd to suppose that a Being infinitely less, (as an unextended Substance must be, were the Supposition of such Substances possible, which seems to me very absurd and contradictory) should be able to receive all kinds of Ideas, and perceiving all external Objects as distinctly and clearly as they really are in themselves. And how a Being that was *Minimum*, or the smallest Part of Extension, (which to me is inconceivable, for how can it be possible, that there should be any Part of Extension so small, but that there might be a Part still smaller, since Extension is in its Nature infinitely small, as well as infinitely great?) should therefore be both *divisible* and *indivisible* at the same Time, I cannot

not imagine: For if we could mentally divide it, still the actual Separation of it would certainly destroy its Essence. *Secondly*, according to the Supposition of the Soul's being so extended, as to consist of more than one Point, yet these Points would be a *Continuum*, they could not be separable, any more than every Point of the Deity is. It is therefore very absurd to talk of every Point's perceiving either all, or only a part of the Object, when it is the whole that perceives it, and certainly perceives it exactly the same, as if it had no Parts at all, even in his own Sense. For, where is the Difference between having no Parts, and inseparable Parts, between an uniform *Continuum*, and an unextended Substance? It is as much one simple Substance, as if it were never so small. Besides, this very Argument would equally prove, that there was an infinite Number of Percipients in the Deity; since it is demonstrable that he is, and must necessarily be, infinitely extended. The Doctor seems to confound the two Ideas of *Indivisibility* and *Non-extension* together, as if they were the same Thing, when they are certainly as wide and distinct from one another, as any two Ideas possibly can be. That they are so is very plain, from the Consideration of the Nature of Space, which nobody can be so absurd, as to say is not extended, and yet must allow, that it is indivisible and inseparable. I suppose he meant, that if
a Spi-

a Spirit was extended, it must be extended in the same Manner as Matter is, which is certainly not the Case. For, as Dr. Clarke says, “supposing Extension not excluded out of the Idea of Immateriality, it is answered, that the Case is very different: Because some of the first, and most obvious Properties which we certainly know of Matter, as its having *Partes extra partes*, strictly and properly speaking, that is, its consisting of such Parts as are *actually unconnected*, and are *truly distinct Beings*, and *can* (as we see by Experience) *exist separately*, and have *no Dependence one upon another*, do necessarily and confessedly imply *Discerpibility*: But in *immaterial Beings* we do *not know* of any such Properties, as any wise imply *Discerpibility*. It cannot be collected from any Property we know of *Them*, but that they *may* be such Beings as can no more be divided than annihilated, that is, whose whole Essence may be necessarily One, and their Substance essentially indivisible, upon the same Ground as their Existence continues: Nay, the *only* Properties we *certainly and indisputably* know of them, namely, *Consciousness*, and its Modes, do prove that they *must necessarily* be such indiscerpible Beings. As evidently as the known *Properties* of *Matter* prove it to be certainly a *discerpible* Substance, whatever *unknown Properties* it may be endued with; so evidently the *known*

“ and

“ and confessed Properties of immaterial Be-
 “ ings prove them to be indiscerpible, what-
 “ ever unknown Properties they likewise may
 “ be endued with. How far such Indiscer-
 “ pibility can be reconciled, and be consistent
 “ with some kind of *Expansion*; that is, what
 “ unknown Properties are joined together with
 “ these known ones of Consciousness and In-
 “ discernpibility; is another Question of con-
 “ siderable Difficulty, but of no Necessity to
 “ be resolved in the present Argument. Only
 “ this: As the Parts of *Space* or *Expansion*
 “ itself, can demonstrably be proved to be
 “ absolutely indiscerpible; so it ought not to be
 “ reckoned an insuperable Difficulty, to ima-
 “ gine that all immaterial thinking Substances
 “ (upon Supposition that *Expansion* is not
 “ excluded out of their Idea) may be so like-
 “ wise.” The whole Difficulty whether a
 thinking Being is extended or no, seems to
 arise from our Inability in conceiving what
 Thinking is, and wherein it consists. That
 it is an Operation of the Soul, and not its
 Essence, I think is pretty certain, though it
 does not appear to be as Motion is to the Body,
 as Mr. *Locke* supposes. For it may be an
 Operation which cannot cease, and will ap-
 pear to be very likely so upon Consideration.
 As Thinking is that Operation of the Soul by
 which it determines to act or not act in any
 Case, it is impossible that there should be any
 thing to determine, when it should cease to
 think,

think, and when begin to think, because in a thinking Being, it must be Thinking that determines him whether he will think or no; which is supposing him to think at the same Time that he does not think, and is consequently absurd. Whether the Soul always thinks, is a very disputable Question, and perhaps incapable of being determined; and as it is out of the Limits of our Question, I shall pass it by, and say no more of it. We shall return therefore to the Consideration of the Soul's Extension. "Nay the Soul, (says "Dr. Cudworth) conceives *extended Things* "themselves *unextendedly* and *indivisibly* ; "for as the Difference of the whole *Hemis-* " *phere* is contracted into a narrow Compass "in the Pupil of the Eye, so are all Distances "yet more contracted in the Soul itself, "and there understood *indistantly* : For the "Thought of a Mile *Distance*, or Ten thou- "sand Miles, or Semi-diameters of the Earth, "takes up no more *Room* in the Soul, nor "stretches it any more than does the Thought "of a *Foot* or *Inch*, or indeed of a *mathe-* " *matical Point*." Were all this true, it would unavoidably follow, that a finite thinking Being could at one finite View take in the whole Idea of Immensity. For if every Distance, be it never so small, or never so great, is equally perceived by the Soul, no Distance whatever, not even Infinity itself, could possibly escape such an inconceivable

Percep-

Perception. But we are by Experience evidently convinced of the contrary. For let us try whatever we possibly can, we can take in no more than such a stated Length, and if we endeavour to take in any more, we are compelled to lay aside part of what we before took in; and can perceive a very large Distance, only by the Addition of such Distances as are perceptible at one View. Let any Person try whether he can, at one View, perceive the Distance from us to any one of the fixt Stars in its full Length, let him try whether he is not forced to consider such a particular stated Length, and as he adds more to that Length at one End, is forced to diminish and take away from the other, all the Way from hence to the fixt Star. This seems so very plain and evident, that I need not insist any more upon it. And from hence it necessarily follows that the Soul is extended. Because were it not, it would, as *Dr. Cudworth* says, perceive all Distances indistantly, and consequently would have an Idea of Infinity, which is a flat Contradiction.

WE shall return to consider the Nature of *Space* again. In Note the Fifteenth, the Translator says, “ For to suppose it (*Space*) “ at all once away, seems so far from amount- “ ing to that *absurd Supposition*, mentioned “ by *Dr. Clarke*, (*that it remains even after “ it is taken away*) that it is no more than “ what must be conceived in every *Annihila- “ tion*

“*lation* of any Thing, which is the total
“ Destruction, or *taking away* of its Existence, the Removal of it, as we may say,
“ *from itself*, or from Being, which is a
“ Supposition generally thought to carry no
“ Absurdity along with it.” To suppose
Space away, certainly amounts to the fore-
mentioned Absurdity, for the Idea of it necessarily rushes into our Minds, and we cannot but suppose it to exist even after we have tried to suppose it annihilated. But to suppose any Substance or Property which is not necessarily existing, away, or to be annihilated, is far from the same Absurdity. The supposing any Thing to be *annihilated*, is not, as he says, supposing it to be taken away *from itself*, for that is a Contradiction, and is the same Thing as to say, that a Man may exist after he is annihilated. To suppose any Thing to be annihilated, therefore, is not to suppose it to be taken away *from itself*, or *from Being*, or *from Existence*, but more properly Existence taken from that, *i. g.* suppose any particular Man to be annihilated, would therefore that Man be taken away from himself? That is, would he exist after he ceases to exist? which is the Case in *Space*; for whoever supposes that to be annihilated, supposes it to be annihilated even whilst it necessarily remains, which is the greatest Absurdity possible. “ That to suppose Immensity, says Dr. *Clarke*, out of the Universe,
“ or

“ or not necessarily *Eternal*, is an *express Con-*
 “ *tradiction*, is *intuitively* evident to every one
 “ who attends to his own Ideas, and considers
 “ the essential Nature of Things. To sup-
 “ pose *any part* of Space *removed*, is to sup-
 “ pose it removed *from and out of* itself :
 “ And to suppose the *whole* to be *taken away*,
 “ is supposing it to be *taken away from it-*
 “ *self*, that is, to be *taken away while it still*
 “ *remains* : Which is a *Contradiction in*
 “ *Terms.* ” Again, in the Answer to the
 sixth Letter. “ They who *remove* the Idea
 “ of *Infinity* (or of a *Being* whose Attribute
 “ *Infinity* is) by supposing *Space* to be no-
 “ thing, but a *relation between two Bodies* ;
 “ are guilty of supposing that to be *nothing*,
 “ which has *real Qualities*. For *the Space*
 “ *which is between two Bodies* is always un-
 “ alterably just what it was ; and has the
 “ very same *Dimensions, Quantity, and Figure* ;
 “ whether *These or any other Bodies* be *there*,
 “ or *any where else*, or *not at all* : Just as
 “ *Time or Duration* is the same, whether
 “ you turn your *Hour-glass* or no ; or whe-
 “ ther the *Sun* moves or stands still ; or whe-
 “ ther there *was*, or *was not any Sun*, or any
 “ *material World* at all.” In Note the six-
 teenth, the Translator proceeds after this
 manner : “ Dr. *Clarke*, says he, affirms,
 “ that *Space* is not a *Substance*, and yet de-
 “ clares that it has *real Qualities* ; is *not this*
 “ either to suppose *Qualities or Properties*
 inherent

“inherent in one another? Or else with *Gas-*
 “*sendus* to imagine some middle Thing be-
 “tween *Substance* and *Accident*, which is
 “neither of them but partakes of Both?”
 That Dr. *Clarke* asserts *Space* to have real
 Qualities, is true. But *then* he does not con-
 sider it strictly as a *Property*, but as its own
Substratum; that is, considering these Pro-
 perties, which he applies to *Space*, as
 being truly, and really inherent in that
 which is the *Substratum* of *Space*; as for
 Instance, *Penetrability*, *Immobility*, *Indiscer-*
pibility, and *Infinity*, are strictly Properties
 of the infinite Being, to whom *Space* belongs.
 But then they are such Properties as could
 not pertain at all to that infinite Being, with-
 out *Space* was a Property of him also; (since
Space is the Cause of the Existence of all
 such Properties, though they may not per-
 haps be so properly stiled *Properties*, or *At-*
tributes of *Space*, as a *Property* of the in-
 finite Being, to whom *Space* belongs.) *Space*
 is the *Extension* or *Expansion* of that infinite
 Being; it is *Extension* in its general Meaning,
 in the same Manner as *Figure* is the *Gene-*
ral of all Shape; as *Squares*, *Cubes*, *Globes*,
Parallelograms, *Spheroids*, &c. are all diffe-
 rent Shapes; yet they are all but *Figure*: So
Miles in Length, *square Miles*, *Yards*, *Feet*,
square Inches, *cube Inches*, &c. are all *Extensions*
 in different Ways and Lengths; yet they may
 be all comprehended under the general Name,

Spaces, or Parts of Space. Besides, I do not see so much Absurdity, in supposing Qualities inherent in one another, as the Translator would make it; at least not in the Instance of Space: For why cannot *Penetrability, Immobility, Indiscerpibility, and Infinity,* be said to be Modes of Space? as well I think as all Kinds of Shapes are different Modes or Modifications of Figure, and it is very plain that Figure is no Substance, but only a Property of Finiteness.

THE same may be said of *Time* as was of *Space*; it is not *Time* or *Duration* that endures, but the *Substratum* of *Duration*; for *Duration* is only *Enduring*, and what can *Enduring* be without something to endure? For as *Duration* is no Substance, there must therefore necessarily be some Substance to which it belongs. As for Instance, *Existence* is not a Substance, for there could not possibly be *Existence* without Something or Being existing. How absurd therefore would it be to ask whether *Existence* existed, or whether *Duration* endured, or *Space* was extended? The Case in all three seems to be the same; *Duration* is, as I said before, a continual Flux, which was and always is the same; it is the uniform perpetual Flowing of the *Existence* of the Deity. It neither does nor can possibly depend at all upon the Succession of Ideas in any Person's Mind whatever. For had a Man one invariable Perception, still he

he could not but have the Idea of Duration. If a Being was to be created, who should have but one Idea imprinted on his Mind, and never was to have any more, such a Being indeed would have no Idea of Duration. But where would be the Difference between that Being, and a Being who had no Ideas at all? For he could not contemplate the Idea he had, nor so much as know that he had such an Idea, any more than a Statue could know that it was the Shape of a Man. Without a Succession of Ideas, there cannot be any Idea of Duration; so on the contrary, where-ever there are any Number of Ideas, there must be the Idea of Duration. There cannot possibly be any Reasoning or Thinking at all, but must give us the Idea of Duration. It is very plain then that Duration is a continual regular Flowing of itself, independant of all created Beings, and is not, as Mr. *Leibnitz* styles it, *the Order of Succession of created Beings*. Neither can it, as applied to the Deity, be a *Punctum Stans*, or instantaneous, as the Schoolmen imagine; for were all Things past, present and future, actually present to *Him*, it would necessarily follow, that a Thing was and was not at the same Time; for Instance, suppose one Man to be killing another, then the One would appear to be killing the Other from Eternity to Eternity: And as Justice requires a Punishment for the Murderer, we may

suppose him to be punished for his Crime ; then will he appear to be punished from Eternity to Eternity, that is, he will appear to be killing the Man and not killing him at the same Time, which is a Contradiction in Terms. It is true indeed, that they appear to him the same as if they were present, that is, he can be no more deceived in his Judgement concerning them, than if they actually were present all at once. Hence perhaps may appear the Fallacy of the long Remark of the Translator under Xc.

“ Now, says he, if we attentively examine our Idea of Eternity, I believe we shall find that it amounts to thus much ; *viz. uniform, invariable Existence ; or simple Existence* joined with *Necessity* : By which last Words, we only understand an *Impossibility of ever having begun, or of ever ceasing*. This I apprehend to be all that can consistently be affirmed of the Divine Existence in this Respect, and perhaps we may more easily and safely determine what the Manner of it is *not*, than what it is, *v. g.* that it continues not by *Time*, or in *Place* : Indeed *local Extension* and *successive Duration*, are Modes of the Existence of most Beings, and therefore we find it very difficult to consider any Existence without them, &c.”

Eternity does not belong to any Being, but the supreme. It is also true, that were there

no such Thing as Eternity or Duration, no Beings could possibly exist; yet Eternity or Duration does not therefore depend upon the Existence of the Beings, but is a *sine qua non* of the Existence of all Beings whatever. “Space, “ says Dr. Clarke, in his *Answer to the Third Letter*, is a Property (or *Mode*) of the “ self-existent Substance; but not of any “ other Substances. All other *Substances* are “ IN *Space*, and are *penetrated by it*: But “ the self-existent Substance is not IN *Space*, “ nor *penetrated by it*, but is itself (if I may “ so speak) the *Substratum* of *Space*, the “ *Ground* of the Existence of *Space* and “ *Duration it self*.” It is very evident, that neither *Extension* nor *Duration* can be Modes of the Existence of any created Beings; how therefore putting the Words *local* to one, and *successive* to the other, can make them so, I cannot perceive; for as every Place or Part of Space, (which is what I take *local Extension* to mean,) is the same, whether any created Beings exist there or no, so also Duration is a regular Flowing of Existence, whether there be any created Beings that exist in that Duration. *Local Extension* and *successive Duration*, are those by which we determine and judge of the Existence of all created Beings; but they are not therefore Modes of their Existence; for Modes cannot exist without the Substances to which they belong, whereas both *local Extension* and *successive*

Duration do exist independant of any created Being. Though the Extension is not marked out into such a Shape or Size, yet the Place is really the same. Neither perhaps is Duration of the same Length to us as to other created Beings, because the apparent Length of Duration arises from the swift or slow Succession of Ideas; but that Succession is not Duration, for *that* is necessarily what it is, whether there were any Succession of Ideas, or no. *Eternity*, says the Translator, is *uniform invariable Existence*; what Meaning can possibly be applied to that Expression, but this, a *regular Flowing* or *enduring* of *that Existence*? Or what can be understood by *simple Existence joined with Necessity*, except, a *necessary simple æquable uniform Flowing* of the *same Existence*? Or what can be more absurd and contradictory, than saying, *that it continues not by Time or Place*? That is, it continues at the same Time that it does not continue. And afterwards, in the same Remark, "Succession therefore, says he, does
 " not appear to be necessarily joined with
 " the Idea of absolute Existence, since we
 " can consider *one* (for how small a Time
 " soever) *without* and *independent* of the
 " *other*. Nay, lastly, there is a certain
 " Existence to which it cannot possibly be
 " applied in any Sense, and that is a *perfect*
 " one. Suppose this perfect Being *alone* in
 " Nature, as we must believe him once
 " to

“ to have been, and then what *Change* of
 “ Nature, or *Succeſſion* of Ideas to be found?
 “ What *Flux* of *Moments*, what *Alteration*
 “ or *Increase* can we imagine in his own uni-
 “ form invariable Eſſence? What Idea have
 “ we of *Duration*, as applied to his Exiſ-
 “ tence, antecedent to his *willing* and *crea-*
 “ *ting* external Things? Such Duration then
 “ as we are acquainted with, can, I humbly
 “ apprehend, have no Manner of Relation
 “ to this immutable Being, while he is ſup-
 “ poſed to exiſt alone, &c.” Succeſſion is
 not, he ſays, neceſſarily joined with Exiſ-
 tence. Perhaps not, that is, not ſuch a Suc-
 ceſſion as ours; but ſuppoſe no Sort of Suc-
 ceſſion is, does it thence follow that Dura-
 tion is not neceſſarily joined with Exiſtence?
 He firſt of all ſuppoſes Succeſſion to be Du-
 ration, when it certainly is only, as I ſaid
 before, that by which we get the Idea of
 Duration. For it is neither Succeſſion of
 Ideas, nor Change of Nature, neither Alte-
 ration, Increase, nor Diminution, that can
 in any Senſe at all conſtitute the Nature of
 Duration, which is the enduring of, or not
 ceasing from Exiſtence (if I may ſo ſay) of
 that infinite Being, whoſe Attribute it is.
 How abſurd then are thoſe Expreſſions about
 the Alteration or Increase of his invariable
 Eſſence? ſince they manifeſtly ſuppoſe that
Alteration, *Increase*, *Diminution*, and the
 like, are actual Duration itſelf, or that there

can be no Duration without them ; whereas were there no created Beings at all in the Universe, yet there would necessarily remain that uniform invariable Flux of the Existence of the self-existent Being. Besides, what Necessity is there to suppose the supreme Being ever to have been alone in Nature? It was before proved, that he might not have been alone, that is, that there was a Possibility of his having created from all Eternity, and there appears some Probability, at least, that he did ; for since he always acts upon some Ground or Reason, and from thence it follows that he had some Reason for Creation, otherwise he never would have created at all. If then he had any Reason, that Reason certainly was the same from all Eternity that it was at any particular Time: For instance, suppose Goodness was the Ground of his Creation, it follows, that if it was good at any particular Time, it was equally so from all Eternity. For as he himself is, and always was immutable and invariable, every Thing must be the same with respect to him from Eternity, and before the Existence of any Thing but himself, there can be no external Cause, to determine it either ways. It is therefore very probable, that as it was always good in him to create, that he always did create, and did therefore never exist alone, at least there is more Probability

bability on this Side, than Necessity on the other. I think we have considered this Remark enough, we shall now come to that upon Space ($\times h$) relating to the Deity. "We cannot, says he, include any such Notion in *Omnipresence* as makes the Deity *present in his simple Essence* to (or co-extended with) *every Point of the boundless Immensity*; since this Idea of *Extension* seems plainly inconsistent with that *simple Essence*."

WHAT the Meaning of *present in his simple Essence* to is, I confess I do not understand; as for the *Omnipresence* of God, I think that is fully demonstrated by *Dr. Clarke*, as shall be shown in its proper Place, and the Objections against it answered; however, it may not appear so proper to say that he is *co-extended* or *co-expanded* with *every Point of the boundless Immensity*. For it is *He, his Existence*, that constitutes every Point of this *Immensity*, it is he alone that is immense, and even *Space itself* is not *infinite* independent of him. "Dr. Clarke's Query, says the Translator, *How it can be shown upon any other Principle than that of necessary Existence, that his governing Wisdom and Power in those boundless Spaces where we know of no Phænomena or Effects to prove its Existence*, is well answered by *Episcopius*." I shall put down the Words of *Episcopius*, as far as they relate

late to the fore-mentioned Query. “ *Hoc*
 “ (*nempe Deum esse extra Mundum*) *non*
 “ *modo prorsus est ἀκατάληπτον, sed etiam*
 “ *valde absurdum, quia totum atque omne*
 “ *illud spatium, quod extra hunc mundum*
 “ *esse dicitur, nihil omnino reale est, sed pure*
 “ *pute imaginarium, & prorsus nihilum; ut*
 “ *autem Deus esse dicatur in pure pure*
 “ *imaginario, & prorsus nihilo, per se absur-*
 “ *dum est, &c.*

THIS seems to be all that has any Relation to Dr. Clarke's Query. But how this is any Answer to it I cannot see: For *Episcopius* supposes that all the supposed extramundane Space is nothing but *pure pure imaginarium & prorsus nihilum*, which is what is to be proved, nay, is what cannot be proved possibly, because the Truth is on the other Side. Having thus considered all the Objections against Space and Duration, their positive Infinity, and their necessary Existence, which seem to have any Force in them; and as my whole Design was only to defend Dr. Clarke in his Notions concerning them, I have not taken any Notice of any other Part of the fore-mentioned Translation, than what has some Relation to Dr. Clarke's Works. I shall now therefore endeavour to prove the Existence of both Space and Duration separated from and independent of Matter, and that they are only Properties of some Being,

ing, which Dr. *Clarke* has fully demonstrated in his Letters to *Leibnitz*, I shall here give it the Reader in his own Words. All
“ the Conceptions (I think) that ever could
“ be framed concerning Space, are these
“ that follow: That it is either *absolutely no-*
“ *thing*, or a *mere Idea*, or *only a Relation*
“ *between one Thing and another*, or that it
“ is *Body*, or some *Substance*, or the *Pro-*
“ *perty of some Substance*.

“ Now that it is not *absolutely nothing*,
“ is most evident: For of nothing there is
“ no *Quantity*, no *Dimensions*, no *Prop-*
“ *ties*; this Axiom is the first Foundation
“ of all Science whatsoever, alone showing
“ the Difference between what exists, and
“ what does not.

“ THAT it is not a *mere Idea*, is not less
“ clear; for no *Idea* of Space can possibly be
“ framed greater than *finite*, yet Reason
“ shows that it must be *infinite*.

“ THAT it is not only a Relation be-
“ tween one Thing and another, arising
“ from the Position and Order of Things
“ amongst themselves, is plain to every Per-
“ son; for Space is Quantity, which Re-
“ lations (Situation and Order) are not; be-
“ sides if the material Universe either is,
“ or possibly can be finite, there must be
“ either actual or possible extramundane
“ Space.

“ THAT

“ THAT it is not Body, is also manifest;
 “ for then Body would be necessarily infi-
 “ nite, and no Space void of Resistance
 “ to Motion, which is contrary to Expe-
 “ rience.

“ THAT it is not any kind of Substance,
 “ is equally evident; because infinite Space
 “ is *Immensitas*, not *Immensum*; whereas an
 “ infinite Substance is *Immensum*, not *Immen-*
 “ *sitas*, the same as Duration is no Substance,
 “ because infinite Duration is *Æternitas*, not
 “ *Æternum*; but an infinite Substance is
 “ not *Æternitas*, but *Æternum*.

“ THERE remains therefore the neces-
 “ sary Consequence that Space is a Pro-
 “ perty in the same manner as Duration is;
 “ Immensity is τ̃ *immensi*, Eternity is τ̃
 “ *æterni*.

THIS I think is a sufficient Proof that Space really exists, and that it cannot be any Thing but a Property; yet lest it should not appear satisfactory to every Person, I shall endeavour to prove every Proposition by some other *Medium*; because some who cannot see the Force of an Argument by one Medium, may yet be convinced by another, though that other may not appear so clear to those who were able to see the Force of the former.

First, then, that Space is not nothing, evidently follows from hence; that if Space is nothing, for the very same Reason we may
 conclude

conclude that Duration is also nothing, then there are two Nothings; and these two Nothings having something to distinguish them by, (as for Instance, every Part of Space exists at once, and no two Parts of Duration can be said to exist at once: and again, the bigger any Body is, the greater Part of Space it requires for its Existence, whereas in Duration it takes up the same Part of it, whether it be great or small) immediately become something, it being impossible that there should be any Distinction between *No-thing* and *Nothing*.

Secondly, THAT it is not a mere Idea, is as evident as any Thing can possibly be. The Idea we have of Space is a simple Idea: See *Locke's Essay, Book II. chap. 13. Sect. 2.* That we have some sort of Idea of it, is very clear, because we cannot reason nor so much as think about that of whose Existence we have no Idea, (not of its Manner of Existence, for of that perhaps we can have no Idea, but whether it does, or ever did exist or no) we certainly then have some Idea of Space, and that Idea must be a simple one; now to have a simple Idea from nothing, or that nothing should be the Cause of a simple Idea in us, is impossible and contradictory. We cannot by any Means have a simple Idea but from something actually existing in Nature; it is not in ours, nor any such Being's Power, to frame a simple
Idea;

Idea ; for then we might have an Idea of a sixth Sense, or of the Taste or Smell of what we never heard of. We may, and certainly can make a complex Idea ; because nothing more is required there than a joining together simple Ideas which existed in our Minds before : As for instance, we may frame to our selves the Idea of a Centaur, an enchanted Castle, and such like, which Things may not really exist in Nature ; yet as the Parts or Ideas of which they are composed do really exist, we join them together according to our own Fancy. But when we have a simple Idea, it necessarily follows that the Thing, from whence we had the Idea, does either actually exist now, or since we were capable of receiving such Ideas ; because had it never existed, we could never have had any Idea of it, *e. g.* Light is a simple Idea, no Person could ever have had an Idea of Light, had Light never existed. This is very clear from the Case of a Man born blind, for it is the same to him as if there never had been any Light ; we see that such a Man has no more an Idea of Light than we have of a sixth Sense. If therefore we have any Idea of Light, it plainly follows, that Light does exist actually without us. This may be applied in the same manner to Space, which we have a simple Idea of, and consequently it must exist really in
Nature

Nature independent of us, and cannot be a mere Idea.

Thirdly, FROM hence it also follows, that it cannot be a Relation arising from the Situation and Order of created Beings, since Relations (Situation and Order) are not simple Ideas, as Space is. Besides, were Space only a Relation of Bodies one to another, or of the Parts of the same Body, it would follow that a Mile Cube, was no bigger than a Cube of an Inch, because the Sides of each bear the same Relation to one another.

Fourthly, THAT it is not Body, may be proved by the same Argument. For Body is a complex Idea, which Space is not. It is also *discerpible*, *full of Pores*, *moveable*, *impenetrable* to Matter; all which Ideas are quite contrary to those of Space, which is *simple*, *indiscerpible*, *free from Pores*, *immoveable*, and *penetrable*, which cannot be applied to any kind of Matter.

Fifthly, THAT it cannot be any kind of Substance, is no less evident than any of the former. For *Space* is infinite, and necessarily existing; *Duration* is also necessarily existing, and there is the same Reason to conclude *one* to be a Substance as the *other*. But as it is demonstrable, that there cannot be two necessarily existing Substances, and one may as well be a Substance as the other, it follows, that neither of them can be Substances.

T H E R E

T H E R E remains therefore the necessary Consequence, as *Dr. Clarke* says, that it must be a Property, and is the Property of Him, *in whom we live, and move, and have our Being.*





O F

NECESSARY EXISTENCE.



THE Dispute about Necessary Existence has almost always been attended with very great Confusion and Jangling, has caused many different Opinions, for which Reason, and as it is the chief Point upon which most of Dr. Clarke's Demonstration turns, it may not be amiss to premise a few Things, before I proceed to consider what the Translator says concerning it, which I shall endeavour to do in as clear and plain a Manner as I possibly can.

First, then, What *Necessity of Existence* is, wherein the Nature of it consists, is impossible for *us* to know, it is infinitely beyond all our Comprehensions, far removed from the Reach of any *finite* Beings; for it would be to search into the very *Essence*, the very *Nature* and *Ground* of all Things, the very *Cause* and *Foundation* of the Existence of that supreme, infinite, in-

F

compre-

66 *Of Necessary Existence.*

comprehensible Being ; which is impossible and contradictory. Yet though the *Nature* of it is so far out of our Reach, so far beyond all that we can ever hope to attain to, we may nevertheless be able to know and perceive in what Beings *this Necessity of Nature* inheres ; because we may know this without knowing either the *Nature* of *this Necessity*, or the *Nature* of the *Beings* and *Substances* in which it inheres.

THUS we can see that two and two are necessarily equal to four, that is, by a Necessity of Nature, by a Necessity in the very Nature and Constitution of those Numbers themselves, independent of, and antecedent to, the Will of any Being or Beings whatsoever ; and are so, because to suppose them equal to five, or any other Number, implies a Contradiction. The implying which Contradiction is the sole Ground or Foundation upon which we build all our Knowledge and Certainty of the Necessity of Existence of any Thing at all. For if the *Non-existence* of that *Thing* of which we affirm *Necessity of Existence*, implies a Contradiction, (not because we affirm *such a Necessity* to be in *that Being*, but the Non-existence of a Being, in whom a *Necessity of Existence* inheres, antecedent to all our Knowledge of, or Apprehensions about it.) The contrary must be true also, that is, where there is a Contradiction in the Supposition of the *Non-existence*

existence of any Being, that Being must exist by a Necessity in its own Nature. Where therefore there is no Contradiction in the Negative, the Affirmative cannot be necessary in any Sense at all. This shall be farther explained.

Secondly, WE should make a Distinction in the Word *Necessity*, and divide it into two Parts, *Necessity of Existence*, and *Necessity of Relation* upon the Supposition of Existence. Thus the Necessity of Equality between the three Angles of a Triangle and two right ones, is a Necessity of Relation, that is, that particular Relation, called Equality, is necessary. So the Necessity of One Infinite Being, Creator and Governour of all Things, is a Necessity of Existence. Necessity of Equality may be numberless, of various Kinds and Degrees; as we see in Mathematicks, that the Number of Relations and Proportions are almost infinite, all which are necessarily what they are, upon the Supposition of the Figures or Qualities existing, of which these Relations are affirmed. But Necessity of Existence can be but one, one only uniform invariable Necessity. This must certainly be true, because it is no Contradiction not to suppose more; and will appear plainer from the fore-mentioned Instance. If there are various and different Figures and Quantities existing, there must necessarily be various Relations and Propor-

tions between those Figures and Quantities ; all which Relations (when they cannot be supposed not to be, or to be altered, without either destroying the Figures or Quantities themselves, or changing the Natures of them) are necessary. It is therefore a Contradiction not to suppose more than one Relation, where there are such various Figures and Quantities, to constitute such various Relations. The contrary of which must also be true, that where there is a Contradiction in not supposing more than one Relation, there is necessarily more than one, or there are several necessary Relations. Let us then put Existence in the Room of Relation, and the Case must be the same. If it is a Contradiction not to suppose more than one Existence, there is necessarily more than one, that is, there are several necessary Existences : But if there is no Contradiction in not supposing more than one necessary Existence, the contrary is most true. But more of this in another Place.

Thirdly, Necessity (whether of Existence or Relation) must be *uniform* and *invariable*, neither to be altered by *Time* nor *Place*. For Variation is a Capacity of being changed, or of not being the same, and consequently of not being at all; which is totally contradictory to the Idea of *Necessity*. For if it is no Contradiction to suppose any Being to be changed, or not to be the same ; it will be no Contradiction to suppose such a Being not
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to be at all. Since if a Being can be so altered at any one Time, that it shall not be exactly the *same*, it may at another Time be so altered again, as not to be the *same* that it was after the first Alteration, and so on, till it shall not have one Property the same, or any Thing else, that it had at first before it was altered at all; and consequently, we may with as much Reason suppose it not to exist at all; since with respect to its Identity, it is the same as if it really had never existed at all. No such Being therefore can possibly be necessary. To instance in Necessity of Equality; the Equality of twice Three to Six is necessary, and therefore immutable, and consequently must be so, in all Times and all Places, upon the Supposition of the Existence of those Numbers; for could we suppose the Relation to be altered by either Time or Place, or any other Means; we might also suppose them to have no Relation at all, (since with respect to the former Relation it is the same as if there were none) which is a direct Contradiction.

Fourthly, Necessity, either of Existence or Relation, can be only where the contrary is a Contradiction. Thus if it is no Contradiction not to suppose *any* Existence at all, then *no* Existence is necessary: But if it is a Contradiction not to suppose *some* Existence, *so much* of Existence therefore as implies a Contradiction not to suppose, is necessary,

and no more. Of which Supposition, Unity is the necessary Consequence. We may see this much clearer in Necessity of Equality or Proportion. The Equality of twice Two to Four is necessary, and is so, because to suppose them equal to any other Number, is a flat Contradiction. But were it no Contradiction to suppose them equal to some other Number, the Equality of them could in no wise be necessary; because a Possibility of not being so, and a Necessity of being so, are contradictory. Here perhaps it will be objected, that the Case is widely different in these two, *Necessity of Relation*, and *Necessity of Existence*; and that it may be so in one Case, but not in the other. To which I answer, That we know not the Nature of *one*, any more than of the *other*; we know not the Nature of Necessity at all in either Case, nor can we tell any Thing more, about Existence or Proportion; their Natures are equally hid from us. It may indeed be farther objected, that as *Necessity of Existence* is beyond our Comprehension, and the *Being* or *Beings* to whom we apply this *Necessity*, are also beyond our Comprehension; therefore it is impossible for us to know to how many Beings this Necessity, or different Necessities, may be applied, and that therefore there may be a Number of *necessary existent Beings*, all which may be out of our Knowledge. I answer again, that a Possibility of not existing, and
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a Necessity of existing, are absurd and contradictory Ideas ; and that if any Being whatever exists necessarily, by a Necessity of Nature, it must be both impossible and contradictory in it self, (independent of, and antecedent to all our Suppositions about it) that *that Being* should not exist. Whatever Number therefore of necessary Beings there is, there is necessarily such a Number, and neither more or less is possible. For Instance, let us suppose some certain Number of necessary self-existent Beings ; now there cannot possibly be any more, (supposing *that* to be the true Number that there really is in Nature) because the Addition of one or more, makes one or more to become necessary, when they were not so before : which is a flat Contradiction. Neither can there be any less or fewer, because to suppose a less Number, is to suppose one or more to cease to be necessarily existent : which is no less absurd and contradictory. It is very clear then that whatever Number of Necessities of Existence there is, there is necessarily such a Number ; so that any Number but that which is, is a Contradiction. The Objection therefore in its full Force, cannot be urged any farther than this ; That a Thing may in itself be a Contradiction, without appearing to us to be any Contradiction at all, but rather the quite contrary. In answer to this, I must beg Leave to say, that then all our Understanding

is useless, all our Knowledge and Reason vain and uncertain, since we may be so easily deceived in so plain and self-evident a Thing as this is; we may with no less Reason conclude all external Objects that continually affect our Senses, not to exist; when at the same Time we cannot but perceive their Existence. We may equally conclude, that a Thing may be and not be at the same Time; that a Part may be equal to its Whole, or whatever Absurdity we please; since it may in it self be no Contradiction to suppose them all so, though it appears to us to be a Contradiction, or is a Contradiction in our Ideas: Than which I cannot frame to myself a greater Absurdity. If any Person should still farther object, and say These Cases which I bring are not at all parallel, for these (external Objects, such as the Material, and its constituent Parts) are not above our Comprehension, but fall within the Reach of our Understanding; whereas in Necessity of Existence we are quite lost, it is infinitely beyond the Reach of our narrow-bounded Capacities, and far surpasses the Conception of the most wise. But here I answer, that there is no Difference at all in his Case and ours, with respect to that which I affirm to come within the Reach of our Understanding; it is neither requisite that we should know the *Nature* of Necessity of Existence, nor the *Nature* or *Essence* of the Being to which it belongs, we are
very

very certain that there must be some one necessarily existing Being at least, though we know neither the Substance nor Essence of that Being; for we may have a much clearer Idea of the *Relation* there is between *Necessity* and *the Existence* of that Being, than we have either of *Necessity*, or of *that Being* to which it belongs. This Mr. *Locke* asserts in his Chapter about Relation, where he says that we have often clearer Ideas of Relations than of the Things related. This Objection therefore, if it proves any Thing at all, will prove too much; since if we can judge of nothing but those Things, whose Nature and Essence come within our Reach, it will inevitably follow, that as we know not the Nature or Essence of any Thing, we cannot be able to judge either of the Existence, or Manner of Existence or Relation of Beings amongst one another, which plainly contradicts our daily Experience. From hence I think I may very justly infer, that all Persons who cannot get over such Objections as these, are only prejudiced and bigotted to their own Opinions; and taking for granted that those Opinions are right, will hear no Reasoning that strikes at the Foundation of them, and yet will allow the same Way of Arguing with respect to one Thing, which they will hear nothing of with respect to another. An Instance will show that this is but too true. Thus every one
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of those Persons will readily grant that the material World, or any Part belonging to it, cannot be necessary or self-existent ; and that the Reason why it cannot be so is, because the Nature and Constitution of its Parts are plainly contingent, since we can, without any Contradiction, suppose it either not to exist at all, or to exist otherwise than it now does. The very same Person, who upon the foregoing Principles, concluded the material World could not be necessary, shall now assert, that though it does imply a Contradiction in our Ideas to suppose more than one necessary self-existent Being, there may nevertheless be more than one ; which is the absurdest Thing in the World. For the Way of Reasoning in both Cases is exactly the same, I can with as much Reason assert, that the material World is necessary and self-existent, since it only implies a Contradiction to suppose it so, which may not be a Contradiction really in the Nature of the Thing itself, but only in my Idea of it. Why therefore cannot I assert the material World to be necessary ? I am sure I may as justly as any Person can affirm, that there may be more than one necessary self-existent Being, though it implies a Contradiction to suppose more than one. This evidently shows the Force of Prejudice and Partiality in those Persons, and how much they debase the Understanding and Reason, the
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only sure Guides we have to lead us through the dark and mazy Ways of Ignorance and Errour, and to conduct us safely to the brighter Paths of Light and Truth.

Fifthly, and *lastly*, *Necessity* of Existence, or of Relation, can be only where there is no other Cause or Foundation of that Existence or Relation. Thus in *Necessity* of Equality it is very clear, as in the Equality of twice Two to Four, there cannot possibly be any other Ground or Reason of their Equality, but the fore-mentioned *Necessity*; for, *First*, there could be no efficient Cause of such an Equality, because then there might have been some other *Ratio* or Proportion between them; that is, they might have been equal to five, or some other Number: which is a flat Contradiction. *Secondly*, The Existence of those Numbers cannot be the Cause of the Equality, because the Existence of them is only the *sine qua non* of there being any Relation at all, because without the Existence of the Numbers, the Equality could not be; nevertheless the Equality does not depend upon the Existence of the Numbers, because the Equality might exist in the divine Mind, antecedent to the Existence of any Thing which was to constitute Number. *Thirdly*, If there is any Cause at all of their Equality, and that Cause is not an Efficient one, it must be a Cause or Ground necessarily inherent in the Nature
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of those Numbers themselves. The Case is exactly the same in Necessity of Existence ; for if the Cause, Ground, or Foundation of the Existence of a necessarily existing Being is not an efficient Cause, and if there can be no other than either efficient, or some sort of Ground or Foundation of Existence in the Nature of the Being itself, this is very evident ; such a Ground or Foundation then of Existence is what I call Necessity of Existence ; the Nature of which I do not pretend to determine, it being so far out of our Reach, that we may perhaps be utterly incapable of ever knowing it. An Objector may indeed say, that a Being can exist without any Cause, any Ground or Foundation at all. To which I must desire to answer, that nothing can be more absurd and contradictory, and that it is, as in the Case foregoing, all owing merely to Prejudice and Partiality ; since, to instance in Things which affect our Senses daily, they will all allow, that, if there is no Reason why a Thing (the World suppose) is of this or that particular Shape, it might have been of some other Shape than what it now is : But could the Case be put so strong, that it could not be of any other Shape, ought not the Conclusion to be still stronger, that there must be some Ground or Foundation of its Shape ? Most certainly, otherwise the contrary could not be true,
which

which every one must grant. It is the same in Existence ; if there is no Reason why such a Being exists, that Being certainly might not exist ; nay, even where there is a Reason for the Existence of such and such a Being, still that Being may not exist ; which is the Case in all created Beings. The Argument therefore holds much stronger, as before, with respect to a Being that cannot but exist. A Being then that has no Reason for its Existence, might not exist, therefore a Being that cannot but exist, must necessarily have some Ground or Foundation of its Existence. These two Propositions are necessarily connected. But this will be more fully considered in the following Pages, where I shall consider what the Translator says upon this Head.

HE divides *Necessity* into four Kinds, all which I shall here take Notice of, and endeavour to reduce them into the two before-mentioned ; *Necessity of Existence*, and *Necessity of Relation*. “ Necessity, says he, is “ primarily applied to *Means*, and then it “ has *Relation* to some *End* to be attained “ by those *Means* of which it is affirmed.” This we see is plainly reducible to *Relation*, that is, when *Necessity* is applied to *Means*, it denotes, the *Relation* between those *Means*, and the *End* to be attained by those *Means*, is necessary. The *End* therefore which is to be attained, must be incapable
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of being attained by any *other Means*, and impossible to be attained without them; otherwise the supposed *Necessity* of those *Means* ceases; Necessity being, as I before defined it, only where the contrary is impossible and contradictory. Thus Religion, (to use the Translator's own Instance) is necessary to the Happiness of a Rational Creature; but then we must suppose it impossible for this rational Creature to be happy without Religion, else it is not necessary. "Farther, says he, Means being
 " a relative Idea, whatever is affirmed of
 " Means as *Means*, must be relative also;
 " or, which is much the same, must be an
 " Affection of a relative Idea." From whence he would infer, that there can be no such Thing, as *good, fit, right, reasonable in itself*, because he says, it would be the same as *relative in itself*, which is Nonsense. Here I must desire the Reader to take Notice, that when any Thing is said to be *fit, right, reasonable in itself*, it is only meant, that the Fitness of it does not depend upon the Will of any Being, but is a necessary Consequence of the Existence of that Thing, of which it is affirmed. Thus it is absolutely right, right and fit in itself, antecedent to any Command, that a Creature should reverence his Creator; where can be any Absurdity in this Proposition? Is not the Relation between a Creature, and Reverence of his Creator,

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agreeable to the Natures of each of them? To say a Thing is right and fit in itself, is not affirming it to be relative in itself, but only affirming it to be so, from the very Nature of the Thing or Action itself, and that *that Fitness, Rightness, Agreeableness* of the Thing or Action cannot be destroyed or altered, without destroying the very Nature of the Things themselves, from whence that Rightness or Agreeableness arises.

Secondly, HE applies "Necessity to *Truth*,
" and then it has Relation to some other
" Truths, either antecedent or consequential,
" according to the different Manner in which
" the Truth is proved to be *necessarily true*."
This is also reducible to Necessity of Relation. For Truth is nothing but the real Relation between either Things themselves, or Propositions concerning Things, or Words, and Falsehood the contrary; so that where this Relation is not necessary, the Truth is not necessary; there may indeed be Truth, but not necessary Truth; so in a Falsehood, if a Proposition is necessarily true, the contrary must be necessarily false; but if the Proposition be true, and not necessarily so, the contrary will be false, but not necessarily false; for as the Proposition which was true, might have been false, so the contrary, which was false, might have been true. *v. g.* It is true, that the Sun bears some certain Proportion to the Earth, but as that certain Proportion between them

is not necessary, but might have been either greater or less, the Truth of that certain Proportion is not a *necessary Truth*, consequently to suppose any other Proportion between them, is only false in Fact, and not necessarily so. But that the Square of the Hypothenuse of a right-angled Triangle is equal to the Squares of the other two Sides, or that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right ones, these are Propositions that are true, and necessarily true; because to suppose them not so, is impossible and contradictory; the contrary therefore, that is, to suppose them unequal, is false, and necessarily false, because it is a flat Contradiction. Under this Head, he ranks Necessity as applied to Axioms, and then he says, *it has Relation to the Terms themselves*; but this is exactly the same as Certainty and Clearness of Truth. Then *Truth*, he says, *being relative also, the same may be affirmed of it as of Means*; and from thence he concludes, as before, *that these Phrases, true, or false in itself, a Contradiction in itself, or absolute such, are very absurd ones*. But here, as before, we must consider what is meant by *true in itself, absolutely true*, and the like. When a Thing is said to be true in itself, I apprehend it only means, that the Certainty or Reality of the Things being so, is independent of the Will or Power of any Being, and that it cannot possibly be altered; thus
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the Certainty or Reality of the Equality of twice Two to Four, is independent of the Will of any Being whatever, and cannot be made unequal by any Power whatever; and consequently the Truth, the Reality of that Equality must be so in itself, in its own Nature, and incapable of being made otherwise. The same may be affirmed of the Falsity of supposing them unequal. But this may appear too great a Digression from our present Question, which more particularly relates to Necessity of Existence; I shall therefore proceed to consider his two next Divisions, and that there may be no Misrepresentation of him, shall give them the Reader in the Translator's own Words.

“ Necessity, says he, is also applied to
“ Existence; and then it ariseth either from
“ the Relation, which the Existence of that
“ Thing has to the Existence of *Other Things*;
“ or it ariseth from the Relation, which the
“ Existence of that Thing of which it is
“ affirmed has to the *Manner of its own*
“ Existence. In the former Signification,
“ when Necessity of Existence has Relation
“ to the Existence of other Things; it denotes that the Supposition of the Non-
“ existence of that Thing, of which Necessity is affirmed, implies the Non-existence
“ of Things which we know to exist. Thus
“ some independent Being does *necessarily*
“ *exist*, because to suppose no independent
“ Being,

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“ Being, implies *that there are no dependent*
 “ *Beings* ; the contrary of which we know
 “ to be true, so that Necessity of Existence
 “ in this Sense, is nothing else but Necessity
 “ of Truth, as related to consequential Truth ;
 “ and this sort of Proof is called *Demonstra-*
 “ *tio à posteriori.*

“ W H E N the Necessity of Existence
 “ arises from the Relation which the Exis-
 “ tence of any Thing has to the *Manner* of
 “ its own Existence ; then Necessity means
 “ that That Thing, of which it is affirm-
 “ ed, exists after such a Manner, that it ne-
 “ ver could have not existed : Thus every
 “ *Independent Being*, or every Being existing
 “ without a Cause, is *necessarily* existing ;
 “ because such a Being, from the *very Man-*
 “ *ner* of its existing could not begin to exist ;
 “ therefore must always have existed, *i. e.*
 “ does necessarily exist. For to suppose a Being
 “ to *begin* to exist, is to suppose a *Mutation*,
 “ *viz.* from Non-Entity to Entity ; and to
 “ suppose a *Mutation*, is to suppose a *Cause* ;
 “ for if there is no Cause, every Thing must
 “ continue as it was : Therefore every Being
 “ which had no *Cause* of Existence, *i. e.* which
 “ is independent, cannot begin to exist, con-
 “ sequently cannot be supposed not to exist,
 “ *i. e.* is necessarily existent, &c.” These
 are his two Divisions, the First of which I
 agree with him in, that Necessity, as applied
 to the Existence of Other Beings, is only a conse-

consequential Necessity, a Necessity consequent to the Supposition of other Beings existing; and were there no such Beings, perhaps we should see no Necessity for such a necessarily existing Being. But as to the Second, I must beg Leave to dissent from him, for when Necessity is applied to the Existence of the Being itself, then it means, that such a Being exists necessarily, whose Absence cannot be supposed without a Contradiction. An independent Being is necessarily existing, is independent, because he is self-existent; yet there must be some Cause, some Ground or Reason for his Existence, whether he be independent, self-existent, or no. "Whatever," says Dr. Clarke, "exists, has a Cause, a Reason, a Ground of its Existence, (a Foundation on which its Existence relies, a Ground or Reason why it doth exist, rather than *not exist*,) either in the Necessity of its own Nature, and then it must have been *of itself Eternal*, or in the Will of some other Being; and then that other Being must, at least in the Order and Nature of Causality, have existed before it." And in his Answer to the sixth Letter. "Of every Thing That *Is*, there is a Reason which now does, or Once or Always did, *determine* the Existence rather than the Non-existence of that Thing. Of That which derives not its Being from Any Other Thing, this Reason or Ground of

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"Existence,

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“ Existence, (whether we can attain to any
 “ *Idea* of it, or no,) *must* be *In* the Thing
 “ itself. For though the bare Proof by Ra-
 “ tiocination, that *there cannot but exist such*
 “ *a Being*; does *not* indeed give us any di-
 “ stinct *Notion* of *Self-existence*, but only
 “ shows the *Certainty* of the Thing: Yet
 “ when once a Thing is known, by reason-
 “ ing *a posteriori*, to be *Certain*; it *un-*
 “ *avoidably follows*, that there *Is in Nature*
 “ a Reason *a priori*, (whether we can dis-
 “ cover it or no,) of the Existence of That
 “ which we know cannot but exist. Since
 “ therefore in that which derives not its Being
 “ from any Other Thing, the *Ground* or *Rea-*
 “ *son why* it *exists* rather than *not exists*, must
 “ be *in* the Thing itself; and it is a plain
 “ Contradiction to suppose its own *Will*, by
 “ way of *efficient Cause*, to be the Reason of
 “ its Existence; it remains, that *absolute Ne-*
 “ *cessity*, (the same Necessity that is the
 “ Cause of the unalterable *Proportion* be-
 “ tween Two and Four) be by way of *For-*
 “ *mal Cause*, the *Ground* of that Existence.
 “ And this Necessity is indeed *antecedent*,
 “ though not in *Time*, yet in the *Order of*
 “ *Nature*, to the *Existence* of the Being it-
 “ self: Whereas on the contrary, its own
 “ *Will*, is, in the *Order of Nature*, *subse-*
 “ *quent* to the Supposition of the Existence
 “ of the Being; and therefore cannot be the
 “ *formal Cause* of that Existence.

“ NOTHING

“ NOTHING can be more *absurd*, than
“ to suppose that any Thing, (or any Cir-
“ cumstance of any Thing) *is*; and yet
“ that there is absolutely *no Reason why* it
“ *Is*, rather than *not*. It is easy to conceive,
“ that *We* may indeed be utterly ignorant of
“ the *Reasons*, or *Grounds*, or *Causes* of
“ many Things. But, that any Thing *is*;
“ and that there is a *real Reason* in Nature
“ *why* it *is*, rather than *is not*; these two
“ are as necessarily and essentially connected,
“ as any two *Correlates* whatever, as *Height*,
“ and *Depth*, &c.

NOR having had a Beginning, or having
existed from all Eternity, neither does nor
possibly can make a Being necessarily exist-
ing; for there must have been some Reason
to have determined its Existence, even from
Eternity, as well as from any determinate
particular Time. For should we suppose an
uneven Ballance, that is, whose one Side is
lower than the other; would it be a satisfac-
tory Answer to a Person who should enquire
Why one Side was lower than the other, to
say that it was so from all Eternity? If there
was no other Reason, how could it have kept
in that State from all Eternity? If there ne-
ver had been any Thing to over-ballance one
Side, they must most certainly have been
equal, and have kept equal from all Eternity,
upon the Supposition of there being nothing
now, nor there ever having been any Thing

more in the one Side than the other, to overballance that Side which was the lowest. Besides, as has been fully shown before, there is no Impossibility in supposing created Beings to have existed from Eternity, provided they have some original Cause; which Beings, by that Way of Arguing, ought also to be independent self-existent Beings; which, I am sure, every Body will readily acknowledge, is a Contradiction in Terms. The Word *Cause* therefore, as he uses it, cannot possibly mean any Thing, but an *Efficient Cause*; and if so, I readily grant his Consequence to be true, That a Being, which never was created, or which depended not upon any Efficient Cause, must be self-existent; not because he had no *Cause*, for he must necessarily have some *Cause*, some *Reason* or *Ground* of his Existence; but because there was no *Efficient Cause*, no *Cause* that had any *positive Effect*, that brought him out of Non-existence into Existence. To say that, because such a Being *could not begin to exist*, He *must therefore always have existed*, *i. e.* *does necessarily exist*, is as absurd as one can imagine; where is the Connexion of the Propositions? No more I think than if a Person should tell me, that because a Being will certainly exist, (I would not be understood a Being that cannot but exist from now to all Eternity, for such a Being would be self-existent, but only such a Being as certainly will,

will, such a Being as we call naturally Immortal, whose Existence is not necessary, but depends upon the Will and Pleasure of its Creator) from this present Time to all Eternity, that such a Being is therefore self-existent; which is exactly the same Argument reversed, which every Person will plainly see, if they consider to what sort of Being he applied the fore-cited Propositions. Farther, *For if there is no Cause*, says He, *every Thing must continue as it was.* This I allow to be true; but then if there never had been any *Cause*, any *Reason* or *Foundation* why the Thing was what it was, I should be glad to know, how it came to be what it was, and why it was not something else; I am sure the Translator can give no Reason why it was not something else, for by his own Argument, it might have been something else without any Reason.

THE Absurdity of this appears very plain from the Supposition of an eternal Motion, (which the Translator says is a Contradiction; but the sole Ground he has for this Assertion, is the same with that against Created Beings existing from Eternity, so that it necessarily falls with his Notion of that, which was before shown to be false.) Let us then suppose a Globe to have moved, or kept moving from all Eternity; could any one say, that there was no *Cause* or *Ground* of that Motion, because it was eternal; no Body,

sure? An *eternal Motion* could no more have been without some *eternal Cause*, than a *Temporal Motion* without a *Proportionable Cause*. To affirm then That the supreme Being has no Ground or Foundation for his Existence, is the most absurd Thing in the World; for if he has no *Reason* for his Existence really in Nature, it is impossible that it should imply any Contradiction not to suppose him ever to have existed. If it does imply a Contradiction not to suppose some one necessary self-existent Being, then is the Ground or Cause of its being a Contradiction not to suppose such a one, the Reason why he *does exist* rather than *not exist*. It is impossible that a Thing should be a Contradiction, if there is no Reason for its Opposite; for instance, if there is no Reason why Two and Two are equal to Four; then every Person must allow that it ought to be no Contradiction to suppose them equal to Five, or any other Number; because if there is no Reason why a Thing should be after such or such a particular Manner; there not being a Reason for it, is itself a plain Reason that it might have been the contrary: So that if there is no Reason why a self-existent Being should *exist*, rather than *not exist*, that is itself a Reason why it may be possible that he should not exist. To say that *he necessarily exists, because he always did exist*, is the same as to say, that *he necessarily exists, because he does*

does exist ; from whence it will also follow, that every Being whatever is necessarily existing, than which nothing can be more absurd. The Consequence ought to have been the Reverse. He always did exist, because he is *self-existent*, or *exists necessarily* ; and then the next Consequence is also true, that he exists now, because he *exists necessarily*, or because he cannot *but exist* : We are therefore first to prove that he *exists necessarily*, (which we find arises from the Supposition of his Non-existence implying a Contradiction,) and then the necessary Consequence is, that he always did exist, that he exists now, and that he always will exist. Again, *Therefore every Being*, says the Translator, *which had no Cause of Existence, i. e. which is independent, cannot begin to exist, consequently cannot be supposed not to exist, i. e. is necessarily existent.* But where is the Connection of these Propositions ? I own, I cannot see any. For, *never having begun to exist*, cannot make a Being incapable of ceasing to exist. It is no Consequence at all to say, because a Being never began to exist, that for that Reason he cannot be supposed not to exist ; that is, if I take him right, he cannot be supposed to cease from Existence. But why not ? Not because such a Being always did exist, for then whatever existed from Eternity, cannot be supposed not to exist, or to cease to exist any Time hereafter ; and that Created Beings
might

might have existed from all Eternity, was proved before ; yet it is plain that *they* may be supposed either not to exist now, or to cease to exist at any Time, whenever their Creator pleases. It is true indeed that such a Being, who never did begin to exist, cannot be supposed, now at this present Time, not to have always existed ; because whatever is once done, and actually past, is beyond the Power of Omnipotence itself (which cannot extend to Contradictions) to make undone or recall. But though it is a Contradiction in Fact to suppose a Being, who actually has existed from all Eternity, not to have existed from all Eternity ; yet it is no Contradiction to suppose that such a Being might not have existed from all Eternity, though he really did. Nor can his Existence from all Eternity be any Reason why he cannot be supposed to cease to exist. To say that to cease to exist, is to suppose a Mutation from *Entity* to *Non-entity*, and therefore requires a *Cause* : but to keep in the State it always was in, requires no Cause, is saying nothing ; for though it is true that it requires no *efficient* Cause to keep in the State it is, yet if there is no Ground or Reason why it should go on to exist, that is itself a Reason why it may cease to exist. In the next Paragraph. “ Necessity,” says he “ as applied to Existence “ in these two Ways, must carefully be distinguished ; for though an independent “ Being

“ Being cannot be necessarily existing, in the
 “ former Sense, without being so in the lat-
 “ ter also; (*See the two fore-cited Passages,*)
 “ yet it may be necessarily existent in the lat-
 “ ter Sense, without being so in the former.
 “ There may be two or more necessarily exist-
 “ tent Beings in the latter Sense, though in
 “ the former there can be but one necessarily
 “ existent Being, which shews the Inconclu-
 “ siveness of *Dr. Clarke’s seventh Proposition.*
 “ And upon the whole, I think, we may be
 “ convinced that no Ideas can possibly be
 “ fixed to this Proposition, *Necessity absolute*
 “ *in itself.*”

NECESSITY of Existence is, and can only
 be where the Supposition of the Non-existence
 of that Thing, of which we affirm this Ne-
 cessity, is a Contradiction; for if it was no
 Contradiction to suppose nothing to exist, that
 is, not to suppose something to exist, then the
 Existence of the Supreme Being could not
 be necessary, because he might be supposed
 not to exist without a Contradiction. “ If
 “ the Idea,” says *Dr. Clarke*, in his Answer
 to the seventh Letter, “ of an *Eternal* and
 “ *Infinite Nothing*, were a *possible Idea*, and
 “ not *contradictory in itself*; the Existence
 “ of the *first Cause* would not be *necessary* :
 “ (*For Necessity of being, and Possibility of*
 “ *not being, are contradictory Ideas.*) And
 “ if the *Existence* of the *First Cause* was not
 “ *necessary*; it would be no *Contradiction*, to
 “ sup-

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“ suppose it either *not to have existed* in Time
 “ past, or *to cease to exist* in any Time to
 “ come. The *Existence* therefore of the *First*
 “ *Cause*, is *Necessary*; *Necessary absolutely*,
 “ and *in itself*. And therefore *That Necessity*
 “ is, *a priori*, and in the *Order of Nature*,
 “ the *Ground* or *Reason* of its *Existence*.
 “ For *That* which *exists Necessarily*; or in
 “ the *Idea* of which, *Existence* and *Necessity*
 “ are *inseparably* and *necessarily connected*;
 “ must either *therefore* be *necessary*, because
 “ it *exists*; or else it must *therefore* exist,
 “ because its *Existence* is *Necessary*. If it
 “ was *therefore* necessary, *because* it existed;
 “ then, for the same *Reason*, *every thing* that
 “ *exists*, would *exist necessarily*; and either
 “ *every thing*, or *nothing*, would be the *First*
 “ *Cause*. On the contrary; If the *First*
 “ *Cause* does *therefore* exist, *because* its *Exis-*
 “ *tence* is *Necessary*; then *Necessity* is the
 “ *Ground*, or *Reason*, or *Foundation* of that
 “ *Existence*: And the *Existence* does not *in-*
 “ *fer* (that is, *a priori*, or in the *Order of*
 “ *Nature* and *Consequence*, antecede) the *Ne-*
 “ *cessity of existing*; but the *Necessity of existing*
 “ does on the contrary *infer*, (that is, *a priori*,
 “ or in the *Order of Nature*, antecede) the
 “ *Supposition* of the *Existence*,” Hence it very
 plainly appears, that there can be but *One ne-*
cessarily existing Being, but *One*, even in the
 Translator’s latter Sense. For should we sup-
 pose all *Beings* out of the *Universe*, or not
 existing,

existing, save One ; to suppose that *One Being* away, implies a Contradiction : But why ? Because to suppose that *One* away, is to suppose an Infinite Nothing, which is a plain Contradiction. *That One Being* then, which necessarily remains, and cannot be supposed away, without the absurd and contradictory Supposition of an Infinite Nothing, must be Self-existent. But should we suppose two such Beings, we may, without any Contradiction, suppose one of them away ; because the Supposition of the Non-existence of one of them, does not infer that Contradiction which arises from supposing an Infinite Nothing to exist, (which is the Reason from which we get the Idea of the absolute necessary Existence of any Being) for there still remains One Being to hinder that contradictory Supposition ; and from hence it is very evident, that there cannot possibly be any more than one necessarily existing Being, either absolute or relative. I think therefore the Translator should not have been so free in condemning Dr. *Clarke's* seventh Proposition, at least not till he saw the full Force of it. If indeed he will suppose that a *Being* may exist necessarily, and yet that it shall be no Contradiction to suppose *that Being* not to exist ; then I must unavoidably grant, that there may be more than One in his latter Sense. But is this the True Way of concluding ? Is not a Being necessarily or self-existent, because it is a Contradiction

diction to suppose him not to exist ; and not that he cannot be supposed not to exist, because he is first supposed necessarily existing without any Reason or Foundation ? For if to suppose him not to exist, contradicts only the bare Name of his being Self-existent ; he is very improperly stiled a *self-existent Being*, since, if you do not call him a self-existent Being, you may, without any Contradiction at all, suppose him not to exist. If then it is a Contradiction not to suppose some one Being to exist, that Being exists by some Necessity in its own Nature, which Necessity having no Respect or Relation to any Thing external, must be a *Necessity absolute in itself* ; That is, a Necessity which has no Dependance upon any Thing whatever, but is in itself absolutely that which it is, the Expression does not seem therefore so unintelligible as the Translator would make it.

“ It is not then apparent yet (says he,
 “ Note the Fourteenth, speaking of neces-
 “ sary Existence) that there needs any *Physi-*
 “ *cal Reason* at all for the *Existence* of the
 “ *Eternal Independent Being* ; nor, *Secondly*,
 “ if there did, would this *Necessity of Nature*,
 “ usually assigned as such, serve for that Pur-
 “ pose ; for, *First*, It is not the *Substance* it-
 “ self, that would be to make the same Thing
 “ the Ground of itself ; which is Nonsense.
 “ It is therefore a *Perfection, Property, or At-*
 “ *tribute* of that Substance, (we know no
 “ other

“ other Distinction) and as such must, in the
“ Order of our Ideas, be consequent upon
“ the Existence of that Substance in which
“ it inheres. Whatever it is, it has in some
“ Respect or other a *Relation* to the Subject
“ to which it belongs ; let it then be an *At-*
“ *tribute, sui generis cujuscunque Generis*, (if
“ we mean any Thing at all by this Word) it
“ must be *predicated of*, and *præsuppose* its
“ Subject ; and consequently cannot, accord-
“ ing to our Ideas, be the antecedent *Ground*
“ or *Foundation* of it. And to endeavour
“ to clear (as some do) by making it not an
“ Attribute of the *Substance*, but of the
“ *Attribute* of the Substance ; or, as they
“ phrase it, a *Property of a Property* ; is only
“ thrusting it still farther back, and making
“ it posterior in Conception to both the Sub-
“ stance and its Attribute or Property.”

That Nothing, or No Being whatever, can possibly exist without some *Reason*, or *Ground*, or *Foundation* of its Existence, seems one of the most obvious Things in Nature, even what every Person, if he will impartially consider with himself, cannot but agree to. But as this has been before considered, I shall not so much insist upon it here. *This Necessity of Nature would not serve for that Purpose*, says he ; why not ? The Thing seems to be so very clear and evident, that no Body can, with any Reason, deny it. For if a Being cannot possibly exist without some
Ground

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Ground or *Foundation* of that Existence, and if there can be no external Cause, it necessarily follows then that there must be an internal one, which can be nothing else, but an utter Impossibility in the very Nature of the Being itself, of not having existed in any Time past, or of ever being able to cease to exist at any Time to come; which Impossibility of ever being able not to exist, differs not at all in any Respect from a Necessity of Existence in the Nature of the Being itself; a Necessity that it always should have existed, that it should exist now, and from this present Time to all Eternity; or its implying a Contradiction to suppose the contrary. That this *Ground* of Existence should be the *Substance itself*, no Body was ever so weak as to imagine: But that therefore the Existence of the Being must be pre-supposed to the Existence of the *Attribute*, and that therefore it cannot be pre-supposed to the Existence of the *Substance*, is one of the greatest Difficulties our present Question labours under, though I hope it will not be accounted insuperable, at least not to those that will impartially consider How many and how great Absurdities, and palpable Contradictions, are the necessary Consequences of the contrary Opinion. Necessity of Existence I take to be an *Attribute* or *Property* of the *self-existent Being*, and as it is the *Ground* or *Foundation* of the Existence of *that Being*, it must for that Reason

Reason be an *essential Attribute*. Now an *essential Attribute* is as necessary to be pre-supposed to the Existence of the *Substance*, as the *Substance* is to be pre-supposed to the Existence of the *Essential Attribute*; because the *Substance* can no more exist without *all its essential Attributes or Properties*, than any *one of the Essential Properties* can without the *Substance*; they mutually depend upon each other, and the destroying the *one* necessarily implies the Destruction of the *other*. When therefore a Substance is pre-supposed to the Existence of the essential Attribute, or when one of the essential Attributes is pre-supposed to the Existence of the Substance, the Word *Before* is only meant in the Order of our Ideas, and not in the Order of the Things themselves. Here therefore I think lies the Difficulty, that we suppose this essential Attribute (*Necessity of Existence*) to be actually *before* (to be really antecedent to the Existence of) the Being. Or when we pre-suppose the Existence of the self-existent Being to the Existence of any of its essential Attributes, we suppose it (*the self-existent Being*) to be actually (to begin to exist) *before* them, which is impossible, because they are coæval, and from Eternity. So that when we suppose this *Necessity* to be the Ground or Foundation of the Existence of the self-existent Being, we do indeed pre-suppose it to that Existence, when in Reality

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it is *coæval*. So also when we consider it as an Attribute, we pre-suppose the Existence of the self-existent Being to the Existence of that; there is no Absurdity therefore on either Side, provided the Pre-supposition is only in the Order of our Ideas, and not in Nature. Besides, necessary Existence is not an Attribute in the Sense that other Divine Attributes are. "In Strictness of Speech," says Dr. Clarke, "Necessity of Existence is not an Attribute in the Sense that Attributes are properly so styled: But it is (*sui Generis*) the Ground or Foundation of Existence both of the Substance and all the Attributes. Thus in other Instances: Immensity is not an Attribute in the Sense that Wisdom, Power, and the like, are strictly so called; but it is (*sui Generis*) a Mode of Existence both of the Substance, and all the Attributes; in like manner Eternity is not an Attribute or Property, in the Sense that other Attributes, inhering in the Substance, and supported by it, are properly so called, but it is (*sui Generis*) the Duration of Existence, both of the Substance and all the Attributes. Attributes or Properties, strictly so called, cannot be predicated one of another, Wisdom cannot properly be said to be powerful, or Power to be wise. But Immensity is a MODE of Existence, both of the Divine Substance, and of all the Attributes; and Eternity is the DURATION

" of

“ of *Existence*, both of the *Divine Substance*,
“ and of *all the Attributes* ; and Necessity is
“ the *GROUND*, or *Reason*, or *Foundation*
“ of *Existence*, both of the *Divine Substance*,
“ and *all the Attributes*.” *Answer to the Se-*
venth Letter.

THERE is a great deal of Distinction to be made with Regard to the Attributes of God. For *necessary Existence*, *Duration*, and *Space*, are necessarily existing Properties, necessarily so in themselves ; whereas all the other Divine Attributes, such as *Wisdom*, *Justice*, *Power*, *Mercy*, *Goodness*, and the like, are all necessarily existing Properties, but not of themselves ; they are necessary, because they are Properties of a necessary Being. But without either considering the Deity, or *them*, as relating to him, we find, that both *Space* and *Duration* are necessarily existing ; and that they require as much to be pre-supposed to the Existence of the Deity, as he does to the Existence of them. For let any one try, whether he can possibly suppose any Thing to exist, without pre-supposing *Space* and *Duration*. I believe at least, he will find it very absurd, if not impossible ; and that it is much easier to suppose *them* existing without any Thing else ; yet when he comes to perceive, that even both these are not Substances, but Properties, he will be necessarily led to suppose some Substance of which they are Properties ; which Substance ; as the Proper-

ties are necessarily existing, must be necessarily existing also.

“BUT, *Thirdly*,” says the Translator, “supposing this *Necessity*, this *Ground*, or *Reason*, could be considered as *antecedent* to the Divine Nature, and inferring its actual *Existence*; we are got but one Step farther yet: for will there not be the same *Necessity*, for demanding a *Reason* for that *Reason*, a *Ground* for that *Ground*, and so on *in infinitum*? And what shall we get by such an endless Progression? &c.” The Translator seems to me, throughout his whole Book, to make no Distinction between an *efficient* Cause, and a *Ground* or *Reason*. Were there indeed an efficient Cause of the Existence of the Supreme Being, then we might ask upon what *Ground* or *Foundation* that Cause acted, so as to produce such an Effect. But the mere Reason why a Thing is what it is, rather than not, can have no Reason antecedent to that Reason; the Supposition of any such Thing is absurd; as for instance, the three Angles of a Triangle are and must be equal to two right ones, and there must be necessarily some Reason why they are so, rather than equal to two and a half, or any other Number: But can any Person be so absurd as to ask the Reason, or *Ground* of that Reason of the Equality of the three Angles of a Triangle to two Right ones? One might as well ask what is the Reason of the Reason of
its

its being a Contradiction to be and not to be at the same Time. That he always confounds, as I said before, the Ideas of *Ground* or *Foundation*, with *efficient Causality*, appears very plain from his own Words; *Either some one Thing must be without a Cause, or every Thing.* The next Paragraph can mean nothing else possibly than *efficient Causality*, which is continued throughout this whole Note: I shall therefore pass it by, as being wide of, and not at all relating to our present Question. To say, *that this Necessity must be by way of Causality, or we fix no manner of Idea to the Words*, is mere trifling; as if there could be no Ground or Reason of Existence in any Being, unless that Ground or Reason were the actual Producers of the Being, which is as absurd as is possible. And if a Being is not the Effect of some other Being, or of some efficient Cause, then there is no Reason why such a Being exists: If this be the Case, I ask, why does he then exist? Their Answer is, because he always did exist. I ask then again, why did he always exist? Their Answer again is, because he could not but always have existed. I have the same Reason still to go on, and ask, why he could not but always have existed; (but by the way this shows, that it is not his having always existed, which makes him necessarily existing, but its being a Contradiction to suppose him not to have existed always.) The Answer therefore should be, that it is, and always was

a Contradiction to suppose him either not to exist now, or from Eternity, or to Eternity. I ask therefore once more, why it is, and always was a Contradiction to suppose him not to exist? No Person sure will say that there is no Reason why it is a Contradiction; since if there is no Reason why a Thing is so, it is plain that it might not have been so; but it could not have been no Contradiction; that is, it must always have been a Contradiction to suppose him not to exist, there must therefore have been some Reason for it.

“ On the one hand,” says he, “ here is a
 “ Certain *Alteration* made, a Positive *Effect*
 “ produced, without a *Cause*, which is a clear
 “ Contradiction. On the other hand, there
 “ is a *Difficulty*, but not an apparent *Con-*
 “ *tradiction*: There is somewhat existing,
 “ of which we can give no *Account*, (the
 “ Manner of whose *Existence* is quite diffe-
 “ rent from that of any thing else,) which
 “ will admit of no *Cause*, the Idea of
 “ which is entirely repugnant to that of
 “ *Causality*.”

HERE we may plainly see that the sole Thing that the Translator can possibly mean, is an *efficient Cause*; nay, even more than *that*, a Cause that must be actually and really in Nature *before* the Existence of the self-existent Being, and that must take up some Time to produce that Being, which is the Effect of it. Whatever Reason or Ground
 of

of Existence we pre-suppose, for there must be some Reason, otherwise it could not have been Impossible and Contradictory to suppose no such Being; there is no Necessity that that Ground or Reason should actually exist before the Being, whose Existence it infers, not as a Cause does an Effect, though even in that there appears no Contradiction, that they should be *Coæval* one with another; and for that Reason, it must be much farther from a Contradiction to suppose the self-existent Being, and the Ground or Reason of its Existence *coæval*, and consequently both of them Eternal. But this Phrase, *That it is sufficient to say, there can be no Reason why he exists*, seems to me one of the greatest Absurdities in the World; for if I ask the Reason why such a Being does exist, the Answer must necessarily turn upon his own fore-mentioned Absurdities, *That he exists because he does exist, That he always did exist because he always did exist*. Nor does the Learned Dr. Cudworth's Answer, which the Translator quotes, seem at all satisfactory, *That he exists and always did exist, because he is and always was infinitely able to exist*, which is the same as to say, that he always had a *Power or Capacity* of Existence. And so for the same Reason as before I may ask, how he came by that *Power or Capacity*? what is the Ground or Reason of his having it? the same Absurdity will follow from hence, *That he is infinitely able to exist,*

or has an infinite Capacity of existing, because he is infinitely able to exist, or because he has an infinite Capacity of existing, than which nothing can possibly be more absurd. “ But “ if we grant,” says the Translator, “ the “ first Being to be now existing, there will “ be a Reason (contrary to what Dr. *Clarke* “ asserts in his last Letter) why he should “ exist To-morrow, and to all Eternity, “ since ceasing to be is an *Alteration* from “ Existence to Non-existence, *i. e.* a *positive* “ *Effect*, and consequently requires a *Cause*, “ unless it can be effected and not effected at “ the same Time.” All this must again necessarily run into the same Absurdity as the former. For suppose I put this Question to them, Why cannot he cease to exist? They answer, Because there can be no Cause superior to him, to make him cease to exist; then I say, that he must be a Being greater than, and superior to all other Beings whatever. I therefore ask again, Why he is that greatest or most superior Being which they suppose him? What Answer can they make to that? If they are consistent with themselves, they must say, that he is the Greatest Being, because he existed from all Eternity. But then again, Why did he exist from all Eternity? They can only reply, That there is no Reason for it, that no Reason is at all required, why he should have existed from all Eternity. Then I say that it
must

must necessarily follow, that there is no Reason why he is superiour to all other Beings, no Reason why there should not have been a Cause superiour to him, to make him cease to exist; since, according to the Translator's own Way of Reasoning, there might have been such a Cause without any Ground or Reason. And farther, there can be no Reason, why there should not be a hundred Beings equal to him, since there might exist so many Beings without any Reason, Beings that are incapable of ceasing to exist; and are so, because there is no Reason why they should, or why they should not exist. Besides, how he can prove upon the foregoing Principles, that ceasing to exist must be a Positive Effect, an Effect which is the Consequence of some efficient Cause, I must confess I am not able to see; for if the First Cause and Supreme Author of all Things can exist without any Ground, or Reason, or Foundation at all, we may with equal Certainty suppose him either corruptible or incorruptible, since, according to him, there can be no Reason why he should be one more than the other: For which-ever he is, he is such without any Reason, there can therefore be no Reason why he was not the other. Can any Thing possibly appear more absurd, than all this which we see, is a necessary Conclusion from his Principles. "For," as Dr. *Clarke* says, "If the first Cause exists *absolutely without any Ground*

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“ or Reason of Existence, it may as possibly
 “ be *finite* as *infinite*, it may as possibly be
 “ *limited* as *immense*. It may as possibly, in
 “ *other Places*, without any Reason, not exist;
 “ as it does, without any Reason, exist in those
 “ Places, where the *Phænomena of Nature*
 “ prove that it does exist.” Again, “ If the
 “ *First Cause* exists *absolutely without any*
 “ *Ground or Reason of Existence*, it is altoge-
 “ ther as possible and as probable, and as *rea-*
 “ *sonable* to suppose, that there may, without
 “ any Reason, exist *numberless, finite, inde-*
 “ *pendent, co-existent First Causes*, (either of
 “ *like Nature and Substance* to each other, or
 “ of *different Nature and Substance* from each
 “ other) in *different Parts* of the immense
 “ Universe, as that there should, without any
 “ Reason, exist, One only, *Infinite, Immense,*
 “ *Omnipresent First Cause*, Author and Go-
 “ vernour of the whole.” What the Transla-
 tor says concerning the Will of God being
 determined by nothing, with Respect to crea-
 ting the World at such a particular Time, is
 no Proof, that there can be any Thing with-
 out a Ground or Reason, which is what he
 intended to prove by it. For, *First*, It is
 impossible to tell from mere Reason, without
 Revelation, whether the World was created
 from Eternity or no; but if it was not, the
 Will of God is a sufficient Reason, in Actions
 that are indifferent in their own Nature,
 (though I very much question whether Crea-
 tion

tion was in its own Nature indifferent, or whether it was not Goodness in God to create; if it was, it is very probable at least, that he did;) which to be done, or not done, depends alone upon the Will of the Being who is to do, or not to do so. His Will, in Actions not indifferent, is, and must always be determined by that which is most right; by that, which is, upon the whole, most for the Benefit and Happiness of his Creatures. “For being,” as *Dr. Clarke* says, “Himself necessarily *Happy* in the Enjoyment of his own infinite Perfections; he cannot possibly have any other Motives to make any Creatures at all, but only that he may communicate to them his own Perfections, according to their different *Capacities* arising from that *Variety of Natures* which it was fit for *infinite Wisdom* to produce.





T H E
 T R A N S L A T O R ' S
 D E M O N S T R A T I O N
 E X A M I N E D.



I N the forementioned Translation, there is a short kind of a Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, which is wholly founded upon the Supposition of the Supreme Being's existing without any *Cause, Ground or Foundation*, and that his Necessity of Existence is a natural Consequence of his Eternity, or his having existed from all Eternity. As to his Existence without any Cause or Foundation, we have before treated of it; and as to his Eternity, constituting his necessary

fary Existence, though we have elsewhere considered it, yet as it is directly repugnant to, and what would, upon the Supposition of its being true, overturn Dr. Clarke's Demonstration, I shall now examine the Translator's Demonstration in particular. *First*, then, He begins with the Proof of our own Existence, as *I exist, therefore something exists, therefore something has always existed, therefore there must always have been some original first Cause, or an infinite Series of caused or successive Beings without any Eternal or first Cause.* Thus far he argues very clearly and demonstrably: but when he comes to give us a Reason why an infinite Series of successive Beings, existing from Eternity to this present Time, could not be the Original of all Things, he falls very short of what he intends to prove; for he concludes it from a supposed Impossibility in the Nature of successive Beings of existing from Eternity, and not from the Absurdity of their existing without any Foundation. "For," says he, "either
 " *some one* Part of this infinite Series has not
 " been *successive* to any other, or else all the
 " several Parts of it have been successive: If
 " *some one* Part of it has not, then there was
 " a *first*, which destroys the Supposition; if
 " *all* the several Parts of it have been succes-
 " sive to each other, then they have all been
 " once *future*, and if they have been once
 " all future, then there was a Time when
 " none

“ none of them existed, then all the *Parts*
 “ of this *infinite Series*, and consequently the
 “ *whole*, must have arisen from *Nothing* ;
 “ which is absurd ; or else there must be
 “ something in the *whole* beside what is con-
 “ tained in all the *Parts* ; which is also ab-
 “ surd. This *infinite Series* therefore is in
 “ the whole, and in every *Part*, an express
 “ Contradiction.”

THAT an infinite Series (supposing some original Cause of its Existence) might have existed from all Eternity, has been proved in the first Part ; all the Difficulties therefore that may appear in this Argument, ought to be rejected, because it arises only from our Inability of Comprehending, how an infinite Series of Beings can possibly have existed from Eternity. But then our not being able to conceive how the Thing can be, is no Proof that it cannot, at least when it is demonstrable that it may be. Let us now come to the Argument, and see where the Fallacy lies. He supposes that either *some one* Part of this infinite Series has not been successive, that is, that there was a *First*, which, as he says, destroys the Supposition ; or else, that the whole was successive, by which he means, that there was a Time when none of them existed, which also destroys the Supposition ; and therefore they are neither of them any thing to the Purpose. For in a Series of Beings that existed from Eternity down to this present

present Time, there could be no First, nor could there be a Time when none of them did exist, for then they would not have existed from Eternity. If we consider the Argument in future Generations, as we did Dr. Bentley's in the first Part, we shall see the Absurdity of it much plainer. Let us then suppose a Series of Beings to begin to exist now, and that they will exist on to all Eternity, would any Person be so absurd as to affirm, that there must be *some one* not *previous* to any other, that is, that there must be a *Last*? Or would it be less absurd to say, that there would be a Time after all of them had existed, or when all of them shall have been past, and consequently there will be an End of the Existence of those Beings which are to exist to all Eternity, which is an express Contradiction. But as we find that we can suppose a Series of Beings that shall exist to all Eternity, and that we are not compelled to suppose *some one* not *previous* to any other, or a *Last*; or to suppose a Time when the Existence of them all shall be past. So neither is it necessary, in Generations that have existed from Eternity, to suppose *some one* not *successive* to any other, that is, a *first*, nor to suppose a Time when none of them did exist, or before *those Beings* began to exist, *which* had no Beginning; a Contradiction in Terms. Nor is the Second Argument more conclusive, for there,

as in the former, he supposes *that they were all successive, or that some one was not; which one, he says, either makes the Number infinite, or it was infinite before, and then it makes one more than infinite.* Here He refers us to a Quotation from *a Philosophical Essay towards the Eviction of the Being and Attributes of God*, by S. W. wherein is more particularly considered the Addition of one or more to Infinity. The Quotation is very long, I shall therefore only take Notice of that Part which appears contrary to the Hypothesis here laid down, with Relation to the Possibility of created Beings having existed from Eternity. “That the World
 “ was not Eternal, but Created, is demon-
 “ strable from Things that are visible.” Here is a plain *Petitio Principii*; for from the World's being created, he infers that it was not from Eternity: But unless he had proved that Creation could not have been from Eternity, to say *that the World was not Eternal, but Created*, is plainly taking for granted what required Proof. He proves indeed that the World was created, and draws his Argument from Generation, for, says he, “If it was
 “ begotten, either we must follow up the
 “ Course of successive Generation to some
 “ first Production from a Cause Eternal, or
 “ else we must necessarily say, that the Course
 “ of Generations had no Beginning, and
 “ consequently, that infinite Successions are

“ already past, which is as much as to ac-
 “ knowledge, that an infinite Number of
 “ Successions are already past; and if past,
 “ then they are at an End; so we have found
 “ an infinite Number, which hath had an
 “ End, that is another Contradiction.” In-
 finite Generations, that have existed from
 Eternity, could have no Beginning, though
 they really have an End; but then this End
 does not amount to a Contradiction, nor
 make the Generations not infinite, for they
 are supposed to be infinite but one Way.
 This therefore is only Quibbling upon the
 Word *Infinite*, by which he means what can
 admit of no Addition, which is not the Case
 here; for here is what we may call infinite in
 one Direction, and finite in the opposite; where
 it is infinite, there it is incapable of any Ad-
 dition; and where it is finite, there it may
 be increased without any Respect had to the
 Infinity of it; but this was more fully treat-
 ed of in the first Part. “ Again: If any
 “ shall affirm, that the Course of Generation
 “ had no Beginning, but that the Number
 “ of them hath been infinite: Let us put a
 “ Case, and reason with them. We will
 “ imagine the Generations of *Abraham*, for
 “ Example, and *Joseph* the Son of *Isaac*,
 “ the Son of *Abraham*. I demand there-
 “ fore, whether before the Birth of *Abra-*
 “ *ham*, there had past an infinite Series of
 “ Generations, or not? If the Series was
 I “ finite,

“ finite, the Work of Generation had Be-
 “ ginning; which is the Conclusion I con-
 “ tend for: If the Series past was infinite; then
 “ at the Birth of *Joseph*, it is evident that
 “ more Generations were past; so we have
 “ found a Number greater than that which
 “ was supposed to be infinite: and conse-
 “ quently that was not infinite; so it was
 “ both infinite and not infinite, a manifest
 “ Contradiction.” All this necessarily runs
 into the same Absurdity as the former, of
 supposing all Infinites to be equal, *when, as*
Dr. Clarke says, in Disparates they manifestly
are not so. For in the Case before us, the In-
 finity of these Generations that are supposed
 to be past, and to have been from Eternity to
 the Birth of *Abraham*, are not strictly infinite
 in the Sense that the Author of the Essay
 supposes; because such Generations as he
 would call infinite, must not only have existed
 from all Eternity, but to all Eternity, and
 then they would be so in the strictest Sense.
 But in the present Instance, we suppose Ge-
 nerations of Men to have existed from Eter-
 nity down to the Birth of *Abraham*. As
 these Generations had no Beginning, there
 can be no finite Number of them, they are
 infinite therefore, because they had no Be-
 ginning. Now the Addition of *Isaac*, or of
Joseph, or of a Thousand Generations, or
 the Subtraction of a Thousand Generations,
 cannot

cannot make the Number more or less infinite, because they have nothing to do with the Infinity of them, for they are nevertheless without a Beginning (which is the Reason of their Infinity) whether we add to them, or subtract from them. For our Addition or Subtraction is at the wrong Place, we add to it where it is finite, and then suppose that that should increase the Infinity of it; and we subtract where it is finite also, and then suppose the contrary Effect should follow. Let us put a parallel Case, suppose a Line drawn from Infinity to us, which may be compared to infinite Duration past; now it is very plain, that the Addition of a Yard or more to the finite Part of this infinite Line, cannot make the Line more than infinite, because its Infinity is the other Way; so neither can the Addition of the Life of *Isaac* or *Joseph*, make the Duration or the Number of those Generations more than infinite, for the same Reason. Nor does the Subtraction of a Yard or more from this Line, make it less than infinite, so neither can the Subtraction of the Life of *Abraham* possibly make the Series less than infinite. But if we suppose a Line to be drawn from Infinity to us, and continued on from us to Infinity, that Line would be really and metaphysically infinite, that is, what could neither admit of Addition or Subtraction; so if we suppose Generations to have existed always, and to

exist on always, those would then be metaphysically infinite in the same Sense as the Line. Therefore to add one or more to it, would make it one more than infinite, and to take away one from it, would make it one less than infinite, both which are absurd; because there is no finite Place to add to in this Case, but in the former, that is, in Generations from Eternity to this present Time, there is a finite Part to add to or subtract from, and therefore the Case is quite different. Had the Author of the Essay considered this Difference, I believe he would not have argued in the Manner he does. I made the latter Supposition only to show that the Author's Idea of an infinite Series of Beings, was of such a Series as that would be. But, though it is possible that a Series of Beings might have existed from all Eternity, and might go on existing to all Eternity, yet such an infinite Series as that could never be, because it supposes future Eternity to be past, otherwise we shall have more of these Generations that are still to come, which is a Contradiction. "But," says the Author of the Essay, "if we say that *Abraham's* was infinite, and that so was *Joseph's* also, then it will follow that the Number of *Abraham's* was equal with the Number of *Joseph's*, but *Abraham's* was but a part of *Joseph's*, wherefore the Part is equal to the whole. Else admit that *Abraham's* was finite, but when it came to *Joseph*, that then the

Number

“ Number was infinite, it follows then, that
 “ a finite Number added to a finite, shall
 “ make an infinite, which also is against
 “ the common Light of Reason.” Hence
 it plainly appears, that the whole Difficulty
 arises from not considering the Difference
 of Infinites, when it is evident, that they
 are not only not equal, but bear divers Pro-
 portions to one another, a Line that is in-
 finite but one Way, being equal to but half
 a Line that is infinite both Ways. The Ge-
 nerations at *Abraham* are infinite, and they
 are also infinite when they come to *Joseph*,
 yet it does not thence follow that they are
 equal; for as a Line drawn from a given
 Point to Infinity one Way, receives no Al-
 teration of its Infinity from a finite Line drawn
 from the same Point the opposite Way, so
 if we suppose the Birth of *Abraham* to be a
 given Point, down to which from Eternity
 the Generations existed, the Addition of the
 new Generations from thence to the Birth of
Joseph, being the opposite Way, cannot alter
 the Infinity of the foregoing Generations,
 any more than the Addition of a mathe-
 matical Point to a finite Line can increase
 the Length of that Line. As for the Second
 Case, that can by no Means be admitted,
 because we suppose the Generations to be in-
 finite at the Birth of *Abraham* as well as at
Joseph. This is all that appears to me any
 Thing to our present Question, we will there-

fore return to the Translator's Demonstration.

“ HENCE, says he, we gather the *Eternity* of *some one Thing* or *Being*. That *every one* is not in like manner eternal, *a parte ante* (as the Schoolmen improperly speak) or never had a Beginning: Particularly that no *Body* or *material System* can be so (and the same Reasons hold equally against any finite immaterial Substance) is sufficiently proved, in the *Enquiry into the Evidence of the Christian Religion.*” That other Beings besides the self-existent Being might have been eternal, has been before proved, though they would not be in the same manner as He, because they would equally be dependent, as if they had not existed from Eternity. From the Absurdities of Beings having existed in an endless Series without any Ground or Foundation, without any original Cause at all, we gather the Existence of some one unchangeable independent self-existent Being, because the Supposition of there ever having been nothing, or of such a Succession of Beings without any original Cause, is absurd and contradictory; and not as the Translator says, from the Impossibility of such Beings having existed in an endless Series from Eternity, for there is no Impossibility in that, provided there is some original Cause of their Existence. (It is indeed very inconceivable how such Beings could exist, but

but it is a flat Contradiction to suppose they could not ;) “ For,” as Dr. *Clarke* says, “ If
 “ we consider such an infinite Progression, as
 “ one entire endless Series of *dependent* Be-
 “ ings ; it is plain this *whole Series of Beings*
 “ can have no Cause *from without* for its Exis-
 “ tence ; because in it are supposed to be in-
 “ cluded *all Things*, that are or ever were in
 “ the Universe : And it is plain it can have
 “ no Reason *within itself* of its Existence,
 “ because no one Being in this infinite Suc-
 “ cession, is supposed to be self-existent or
 “ *necessary*, but every one dependent on the
 “ foregoing : and where *no Part* is necessary,
 “ it is manifest the whole cannot be necessary.”
 This is a true, if not the only Reason, that
 we are able to come at, why it is impossible
 that there should have existed from Eternity
 such an infinite independent Series, whether
 a Dependent Series of Created Beings might
 have existed from Eternity, which, he says,
 is sufficiently confuted in the *Enquiry into the*
Evidence of the Christian Religion, we have
 so often spoke of, that we may, without say-
 ing any more of it, proceed to the Quotation
 from *this Enquiry*, &c. “ A material Sy-
 “ stem, composed of Parts that are *change-*
 “ *able*, cannot exist without a Cause *distinct*
 “ from and *prior* to such a System ; for
 “ where-ever there is a Change, there must
 “ be a *Cause* of that Change, otherwise there
 “ would be a *Beginning* without a *Cause*.

“ The Cause of this Change cannot be in the
 “ *Materials* of this System, for the very same
 “ Reason : therefore it must be in something
 “ *distinct* from and *prior* to the System itself.”

It is very true, as he says, that no material, (nor any other dependent) System, can exist (whether it began or not began) without some *Cause distinct* from and *prior* to *It* : But then that Priority needs only to be so in the Order of our Ideas, and not in Nature ; for, as Dr. *Clarke* says, Light would eternally proceed from the Sun, or an Impression from an imposed Seal, were their Causes Eternal. In the same manner created Beings might eternally spring from the Workmanship of the Almighty, as the Light from the Sun. For to suppose the Deity *necessarily* to require some Space of Time to create in, seems to me very absurd, because were the Time required to that Action never so small, still it must certainly be better in itself, and show a greater Power in the great Maker and Governour of all Things, to be able to *act* in that very Instant he *wills* any Thing, so that the *finishing* any Action should have no Distance of Time from the first *willing* it. Let us then return to the fore-cited Quotation. “ The same
 “ will be the Case as to *Motion* in a material
 “ System ; there is no Motion but what is the
 “ Effect of a *former* Motion, consequently
 “ there is no Motion in such a System, which
 “ has been from *Eternity*, or which has not
 “ been

“ been caused.” Why Motion might not have been from Eternity, I cannot conceive; for since God had a Power to act from Eternity, (or else there was a Mutation in him, which every Person must allow to be absurd) he certainly could put a Globe of Matter, or any other Thing that he had created, into Motion, so as to move in a streight Line suppose. If it could have been put in Motion from Eternity, it would, provided there was nothing to hinder or stop its Motion, have moved from Eternity to this present Time, and on from this Time to all Eternity; for as Space is infinite, it would never come to any End, even though it moved never so swift and never so long. Again, Could he not have created a System like ours, that is, a Sun and several Planets to move round their common Center of Gravity from all Eternity? The Sun indeed would have wasted, so as long before this Time to have been reduced to a Point. But then there might have been continual fresh Supplies, either from Comets falling into it, or some other Ways, unknown to us, it is therefore impossible to prove that the Sun did not exist from Eternity, since there appears no Contradiction in the Supposition. From hence it appears not true, *that there is no Motion but what is the Effect of a former one*; for was it true, it would follow, that no Being could possibly begin Motion, which is plainly contrary to our daily Experience. The Ideas of Motion’s

tion's being Eternal, and of not being caused, seem to be confounded together in the Quotation, when they are certainly very distinct from one another. As if that could not be caused, or must be necessarily existing and independent which was from Eternity, which is absurd; for had Motion been from Eternity, still it is no Contradiction to suppose it otherwise, or to suppose it to cease; but were it necessary, or without any external Cause, it would then be a Contradiction to suppose it not to have been from Eternity, or to cease to be hereafter.

“FROM Eternity,” says the Translator, “comes *Independence* or *Self-existence*; for “that which never had a Beginning of Existence, could not possibly have any *Cause* of “that Existence, (for then it would not be “the *first Cause*, contrary to what we have “proved above) or could depend upon no “other Thing for it, *i. e.* must be *independent* of all others; or, which is the same “Thing, must exist of itself, *i. e.* be *self-existent*.” This Argument of the Translator's, I think, labours under the same Difficulty as the last; for it has been shown before, that the first Proposition cannot be true; it is impossible that what has existed from Eternity, should for that very Reason be independent and self-existent; from Independence and Self-existence Eternity both *a parte ante* and *a parte post* necessarily follows, but they
cannot

cannot be reciprocal. The next Proposition depends upon the same false Foundation, That nothing created, or which had any Cause of its Existence, could have existed from Eternity, which has been before proved possible. "From Independence comes also Omnipotence." This Proposition, I think, cannot possibly be proved upon his Principles. For *Omnipotence* can be a Consequence of nothing but *Unity*, and as the Translator seems to think that there may be more than one independent Being, his Argument is not conclusive. If there are more than one, the very Supposition shows that they can have no Power over one another, and consequently cannot have all Power; because a Power over all other Beings except the independent Ones, is not all Power, for a Power over them, is a Power which they have not. Besides, we may go still farther, such Beings have a Power over what each other do, or they have not, in each Case they must be very far from Omnipotency. For, *First*, if they have a Power to hinder what one another do, then no one has a Power in himself of preserving his own Workmanship. *Secondly*, If they have no such Power, then none of them will have any Power over half the Beings of the Universe, which I am sure falls very short of Omnipotency. *Liberty* depends on the foregoing Proposition, and consequently must fall with it. Whether Omniscience is a Consequence

quence of Unity, I leave to be determined by the Learned. We come now to his Proposition concerning the Unity. “ The *Phæ-*
 “ *nomena of Nature* also lead us up to *One*,
 “ such first Cause, which is sufficient for
 “ their Production, and therefore none else
 “ are *necessary* ; and though *several more in-*
 “ *dependent* Beings might possibly exist, yet
 “ would they be no Gods to us ; for they
 “ would have no manner of Relation to us,
 “ nor we any Thing to do with them.” The
 first Part of this Proposition is true, That
 there can be but *One relative necessary Being*.
 But the second Part depends wholly upon
 eternal unbeginning Existence constituting
 Independence, which was before proved other-
 wise ; because created Beings might have exis-
 ted from Eternity, which would be, accord-
 ing to him, independent Beings, that is, in-
 dependent and dependent at the same Time,
 which is a direct Contradiction.

Lastly, WHAT the Translator says about
Necessity of Existence, is mere Trifling, and
 ought not to be considered at all. As if Uni-
 formity excluded Attributes of different Kinds.
 It excludes indeed all Variety of the same
 Kind, as, there can be but *One Being*, *One*
Immensity, *One Eternity*, *One Omniscience*,
One Omnipotence, *One Will*, &c. Properties
 of the one independent self-existent Being.

ARGU-



ARGUMENTS

AGAINST

Dr. *Clarke's* DEMONSTRATION

OF THE

Being and Attributes of God,

AND THEIR

A N S W E R S.



ANY Objections have of late been made against Dr. *Clarke's* Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, and particularly these against the Three following Propositions, which are supposed to be wrote by a very learned Man, and in which I think

I think are contained the chief of all the Objections that have any Force in them. I shall therefore give them the Reader in the Objector's own Words.

PROP. IV. *That the Essence of the self-existent Being is not known to us, and that it is impossible it ever should.*

“ THIS Proposition, (though in fact true
 “ and almost an Axiom) the Doctor endeavours
 “ to *prove*; but as I am apt to think falls
 “ short of *it*. I apprehend it to be divided
 “ into Two Parts. *First*, That we have no
 “ Idea of the *Essence* of the *Being*. (and in-
 “ deed we have none.) *Secondly*, That it is
 “ impossible we ever should have *any*; since
 “ the Doctor has undertaken, one would ex-
 “ pect a Reason in Proof. But not a Word,
 “ except the bare Assertion of the Proposition
 “ be *one*. But he proceeds to shew the Un-
 “ reasonableness of the *Atheists*, who disbe-
 “ lieve the *Being*, because the *Essence* is in-
 “ comprehensible. This indeed he proves:
 “ but that is far wide and different from the
 “ Question.”

THE foregoing Objection I think is very trifling, and too mean for so learned a Man. For if, as the Objector says, *it is in Fact true, and almost an Axiom*, there was no Reason at all why the Doctor should endeavour to prove that, which would appear evident to every
 Man

Man at first Sight. The Design of the Proposition was, as it appears to me, to shew that though the *Essence* of the supreme Being was *incomprehensible*, yet many of his Attributes were strictly demonstrable. And also to show the Unreasonableness of All *Atheists*, who disbelieve the Being and Attributes of God upon that Account. That we can never be able to comprehend the *Essence* of the supreme Being, is as clear and evident as possible. For as he is a Being infinitely above, and superiour to us, he must for that Reason be infinitely above our narrow Comprehension; consequently we can never be able in the least to comprehend his *Essence*. *As to its Substance and Essence*, says Dr. Clarke, *this we are infinitely unable to comprehend*. And again, *The one may be capable of the strictest Demonstration, when the other is absolutely beyond the Reach of all our Faculties to understand*. How a finite Being should ever be able in the least to comprehend, or have any Idea at all of an infinite Being, is as inconceivable as it is possible, when even we see that the most Learned are not able to comprehend their own *Essence*, nor so much as the *Essence* of the meanest Thing in the World, much less, nay infinitely less able are they to comprehend the *Essence* of him, *who is above all, and through all, and in us all*.

Objection

Objection against Proposition VI. The Infinity.

“ AS to this Attribute, I, in no wise, think
 “ it to be proved from Necessary Existence,
 “ because they would be reciprocal, so that
 “ whatever is infinite would be necessarily
 “ existent ; which I am sure the Doctor will
 “ not grant (for a very good Reason.) And
 “ indeed he seems to be aware of this, since
 “ he guards it by adding *Independency*, so that
 “ *Immensity* does not infer Necessary Existence,
 “ according to the Doctor, but only
 “ *per accidens*, when it is independent and of
 “ itself.

“ WELL then he must allow that *Infinity*
 “ is a communicable Attribute, and not a *proprium*
 “ of the Deity. It cannot therefore according
 “ to his Concessions (though I do not believe
 “ them) follow immediately from necessary
 “ Existence. I believe that Infinity implies
 “ necessary Existence. But that necessary
 “ Existence immediately and of it self implies
 “ Infinity, I do not ; since the Denial of
 “ Infinity does not destroy the Necessity of
 “ Existence, or make it (what the Doctor calls)
 “ a consequential Necessity.

“ HERE we deny that the Absence of a
 “ single self-existent Being can be conceived
 “ without a Contradiction, because he then
 “ would not be necessarily existent.

“ H E

“ HE goes on to prove it after this Man-
 “ ner. *If a Being can without a Contra-*
 “ *dition be absent from one Place, then he*
 “ *may be absent from all Places without a Con-*
 “ *tradiction.* But where is the Connection?
 “ To be absent from all Places would actu-
 “ ally destroy his necessary Existence; be-
 “ cause whatever exists, exists somewhere:
 “ but to suppose him absent from one Place,
 “ is not to suppose him not to exist at all,
 “ but only not there.

“ THIS Argument would make Infinity
 “ to constitute the necessary Existence, where-
 “ as we are perfectly ignorant wherein its
 “ Nature consists, and can discourse nothing
 “ *à priori.*

“ WHERE-EVER God exists, he exists ab-
 “ solutely by the Necessity of his own Na-
 “ ture; and therefore whatever Space his
 “ Extension fills, since he is immutable, it is
 “ impossible to suppose that he can fill less.
 “ How much Space he may take up, I know
 “ not, and therefore I may suppose him to
 “ take up any Quantity, and to be removed
 “ from all other Space. But some he must
 “ be supposed to be extended in, otherwise he
 “ could not be necessarily existent, which is
 “ contrary to the Supposition.”

IF *Infinity*, says the Objector, can be
 proved from *necessary Existence*, then they
 would be *reciprocal*, *i. e.* whatever is *infinite*,
 would therefore be *necessarily existing*. This

is certainly not true, because there is no Contradiction in supposing God to create an infinite Being, and it is very plain that no created Being can possibly be self-existent. It evidently follows therefore, that *Infinity* cannot possibly *of itself* imply *necessary Existence*, though *necessary Existence* does *immediately* and *of itself* imply *Infinity*. Besides, Matter might have been infinite, at least there appears no Contradiction in the Supposition. And therefore according to him, Matter would then have been necessarily existing, which is a plain Absurdity.

LET us put a parallel Case, and then see how strong the Objection will be. A Triangle cannot exist without (or must have) three Lines, therefore three Lines must make a Triangle; but how absurd is this Way of Arguing, yet I believe whoever considers it, will find it exactly the same as the learned Objector's. But to apply it to the present Case: As a Triangle not only requires three Lines, but also a particular Situation of those Lines, before the two Propositions can be reciprocal, so a necessarily existing Being not only may be infinite, but must of Necessity be infinite. If therefore a Being is infinite, and not necessarily so, his Infinity can by no Means imply Necessity of Existence. Yet if a Being is necessarily infinite, it would then unavoidably follow that that Being was necessarily existent.

IN the next Section, *he must allow then that Infinity is a communicable Attribute, and not a Proprium of the Deity*, says the Objector. But here, with Submission, I do not apprehend that there is any need of such an Allowance or Concession. For *Infinity* is certainly a *Proprium* of the Deity. But how does it from thence follow, that no Being can be infinite except the Deity alone? For a Being's being *infinite* does not make *Infinity* an *Attribute* of that Being; because the destroying the Existence of that Being does not infer the destroying of *Infinity*, which certainly would be the Case, were *Infinity* the Attribute of that Being; because when the *Substance* is destroyed, the *Attribute* must necessarily be destroyed also. See Page 113.

THAT Necessary Existence immediately and of itself implies *Infinity*, and that the Denial of *Infinity* destroys necessary Existence. See Prop. 6. in the following Compendium.

HERE we deny, says he, *that the Absence of a single self-existent Being can be conceived without a Contradiction, because he then would not be necessarily existent*. Now this plainly first supposes a Being to be a necessarily existing Being, and then that you cannot suppose him away, because he then would not be *necessarily existent*. What can be more absurd? Are we not first to try whether we can suppose him away, before we can tell whether he is *self-existent* or no? And if we find that we

cannot suppose him *not to exist* without a Contradiction, then it follows that he is *necessarily existing*. But if it is no Contradiction to suppose him *not to exist*, then he neither is nor can be *necessarily existing*. For the bare calling or supposing him *necessarily existent*, cannot make him *really so*.

As to the next Section, concerning the Connection of his being supposed absent from one Place and from all Places. *See Prop. 6. in the following Compendium*. But that this would therefore make Infinity constitute the Necessary Existence, I cannot perceive: Infinity will indeed be a necessary Consequence of Self-existence, though the contrary cannot possibly be true.

As to the last Section, *See Prop. 6. ibid.* wherein is shown that if he takes up any Space, he must take up all.

Objection against Prop. VII. The Unity.

“ Neither are the Doctor’s Arguments produced in Proof of this Proposition convincing or conclusive, where he says there can be but One self-existent Being, because *Necessity absolute in itself* is simple and uniform, without any possible Variation or Difference, which must always arise from some *external Cause*. Here I cannot see the Consequence. The just Inference from hence seems to be this. Therefore the self-existent

“ existent Being is *Quid unum & simplex* : but
 “ not *Unicum*. It proves that whatever exists
 “ necessarily, is a Being of the most pure Sim-
 “ plicity, but not that there may not be many
 “ Beings of such a Nature. The Reason he
 “ assigns to reduce the Supposition of Two
 “ or more Gods to a Contradiction, seems
 “ to have this Failing, that there is a *Petitio*
 “ *Principii*. For he first bids us suppose
 “ two necessarily existent Beings, and then
 “ asks if we can suppose one not to exist.
 “ No surely, if they are both necessarily ex-
 “ isting. All that I can do here is this: I
 “ find I have no Occasion to suppose above
 “ One God, which is a sufficient Reason for
 “ my not worshipping above One ; but it
 “ does not therefore follow, that there are
 “ no more, because I know of no more.
 “ Many Things exist which I do not know
 “ of, and till I know them, I may suppose
 “ them not to be,---but this is no Argument
 “ that they are not. So, many Things may
 “ exist necessarily, but having no Relation to
 “ me that I know of, I may think it possible
 “ that there may not be such Things ; for
 “ there is no Consequence in the Nature of
 “ the Thing, that whatever exists necessarily
 “ by its own Nature, should be known so to
 “ exist, God’s *absolute* necessary Existence
 “ would not be known to us, were it not for
 “ his *relative* necessary Existence, to account
 “ for the *Phænomena* of Nature. My sup-

“ posing two Gods, would destroy the Ne-
“ cessity of either of them separately as to
“ me, *i. e.* their *relative* necessary Existence.
“ But still they might both enjoy a Necessity
“ *absolutely* in their own Nature. Two Gods
“ may exist *necessarily*, though it is not *ne-*
“ *cessary* two Gods should exist. The whole
“ of the Matter seems to be this. My Possi-
“ bility of supposing two Gods not to exist,
“ does not arise from the apparently preca-
“ rious Existence in the Nature of either ;
“ but from my own want of Arguments to
“ prove, that there are two such Natures.
“ Whereas in other Things, as in Matters
“ of this World, (on which Account the
“ Doctor’s Second Proposition is certainly de-
“ monstrated) which are supposed not ne-
“ cessary, because they can be supposed not
“ to be ; the Non-necessity of their Being
“ arises from our perceiving them to be of
“ such a Nature as is plainly contingent. But
“ I do not say that two Gods may not ne-
“ cessarily exist, because we can prove the
“ Nature of them would therefore be *conting-*
“ *gent* : But because we are ignorant whe-
“ ther there are two such Natures at all, since
“ one will solve the *Phænomena* of Nature,
“ without the Help of which Argument, I
“ could not prove that one did necessarily
“ exist, though he would nevertheless do so.
“ Hence we may conclude, that our supposing
“ a Thing possible not to be, never infers that it
“ is

“ is therefore impossible it should be. But
 “ when the Supposition arises from the known
 “ Nature of the Thing, and not from our
 “ bare Ignorance of its Existence, therefore
 “ a Thing may be necessary *per se* and *absolutely*,
 “ and not *relatively quoad nostrum intellectum*,
 “ *i. e.* we may not perceive the Necessity
 “ of it.”

The Objector says, that the Consequence of *Necessity's* being simple and uniform is, that therefore the *self-existent Being* is *Quid unum & simplex*, and not *Unicum*; It proves that whatever exists necessarily is a Being of the most pure Simplicity, but not that there may not be many Beings of such a Nature. Were the Supposition of *two Necessities* possible, then indeed there might be *two necessarily existing Beings*. But from *one Necessity* there cannot possibly be but *one self-existent Being*; for two Beings are not *simple* and *uniform*, because there might as well be any other Number; for, as Dr. Clarke says, *even Number it self is a manifest Difformity*. Let us suppose *two* such *self-existent Beings*, One of them exists by the Necessity of *its own Nature*, and, for the same Reason, the other must exist by the Necessity of *its own Nature*: Now these *two Necessities* of Nature cannot possibly be *one* and *the same*, it plainly follows therefore, that upon the Supposition of there being *but one Necessity*, there can be *but one* necessary *self-existent Being*, and that there

can be *but one* Necessity of Existence, is very manifest, because we are compelled to suppose some one Necessity at least, to hinder that Contradiction, which necessarily forces it self upon us in the Supposition of the contrary. As for Instance, the Supposition of an infinite Nothing is a Contradiction. It is plain then, that the Necessity of some one Thing only is sufficient to hinder that Contradiction; but if after we have hindered one Contradiction in the Supposition of an infinite Nothing, there still should remain the contradictory Supposition of another infinite Nothing, then we might reasonably conclude that there was two Necessities of Existence, but it is impossible upon any other Supposition whatever, it evidently follows from hence that there can be *but one Necessity*. The next Section of the Objector's, seems indeed very trifling, and unworthy any Man of Learning and good Sense, much more unworthy so great a Man as the supposed Author of these Objections is, to say that it is a *Petitio Principii*, first to bid us suppose *two* self-existent Beings, and then to try whether we can suppose *one* of them *away*. Are not a Multitude of mathematical Propositions demonstrated in the same manner, where we are first bid to suppose the Thing to be so, and then we are shown the Absurdities and Contradictions arising from such a Supposition? *Euclid's* Elements will easily convince

us of the Truth of what I affirm. Besides, in this very Proposition, if we suppose *two* such Beings, where is the Contradiction in supposing *one* of them away? It is only contrary to our first Supposition of their being necessarily existing, it contradicts nothing in the Nature of the Being itself: For Necessity of Existence can only arise from the Supposition of the Non-existence of that Thing, to which we apply this Necessity, being a Contradiction, and not that such a Being cannot be supposed not to exist, because we, without any Reason, call him before-hand necessarily existing. Suppose *only two Beings*, of any Kind whatever, existing in the whole Universe, (not considering at all whether they are necessarily existing or not) to suppose *one* of these Beings away, implies no Contradiction, but to suppose *both* of them away, does imply a Contradiction, because it is a direct Contradiction not to suppose *some one Being*. *One* of these Beings then is and must be necessarily existing, and *only One*. This is the same as Dr. Clarke's Demonstration, except in this, that he calls them *both* necessarily existing, which seems to be the Reason why so many have mistaken his Meaning, and have not seen the Force of his Argument. *Many Things*, says the Objector, *exist, which I do not know of, and till I know, I may suppose them not to exist.* All this is very true, but then it is not a parallel Case, because

cause it is no Contradiction to suppose many created Beings existing or not existing, either here or in any other distant Part of the whole Universe. But when the Beings are necessary or self-existent, the Case is quite different. For since it implies a Contradiction to suppose a Being, which exists necessarily, not to exist, that is, whatever is necessary, the contrary, or any other Supposition but that, is a Contradiction; so that if there are *more* self-existent Beings than *one*, it must follow, that the Supposition of *one only* is a Contradiction, because no Being can be self-existent, unless the Supposition of his Non-existence was a Contradiction. From hence it follows, that *whatever* exists necessarily in its own Nature must be *known* so to exist, contrary to what the Objector asserts; and also that the *absolute Necessity* of God's Existence is known without considering his *relative Necessity*; because if there never had been any created Beings at all, yet it is a Contradiction not to suppose *some one Being*, and from thence arises the necessary Existence of *such a Being*. The Objector need not have said so much about relative Necessity, for it is very clear to every Person, that there can be but one relative necessary Being. *Two Gods*, says he, *may exist necessarily, though it is not necessary that there should be Two*. It is certainly not necessary that *Two* such Beings should exist, that is, not to the *Phænomena* of Nature. But if there are *Two* such Beings, it is absolutely necessary

necessary there should be *Two* such Beings, and therefore it is a direct Contradiction not to suppose *Two*, and yet there is no Difficulty in making such a Supposition. *My Possibility*, says he, *of supposing two Gods not to exist does not arise from the apparently precarious Existence in the Nature of either, but from my own want of Arguments to prove there are two such Natures.* Let any Person consider this, and see whether it will not hold good of any created Being. How do we know that the *Sun* is not *self-existent*, since we only want Arguments to prove that *it is?* for the Possibility of supposing it *not to exist*, will not, according to him, make it *not necessarily existing*. Again, *Hence*, says he, *we may conclude, that our supposing a Thing possible not to be, never infers that it is impossible it should be.* This is no more a parallel Case than the former. Because necessary Existence always infers a Contradiction in the contrary Supposition, it cannot be possible that there should be either *One, Two, Three,* or any other Number, of self-existent Beings, because whatever Number there is of them, the Supposition of any other Number must imply a Contradiction; for if it is possible that there should be *Only one*, it necessarily follows that there is *but One*; because were there more, it could not be possible that there should be *but One*, it would be a Contradiction to suppose *but One*, and that which is a Contradiction,

diction, cannot be a Thing that is possible. *A Being*, says he, *may be necessarily existing, yet its necessary Existence not perceived by us*, which is the same as to say, a *Being* may exist necessarily, and yet it shall be no Contradiction to suppose *such a Being* not to exist, than which nothing was ever more absurd and childish. See *Prop. 7. in the following Compendium.*





A

COMPENDIUM

O F A

DEMONSTRATION

O F T H E

Being and Attributes of GOD.



HERE have been many Learned Men, who have lately endeavoured to demonstrate the Being and Attributes of God, and as none of them have done it more clearly and strictly than the late Learned Dr. *Clarke*, All whose Arguments are built upon so strong and plain a Foundation, and all the Propositions so closely connected, that no real Fault can be found by any Person ;
yet

yet as there are some Persons very sagacious in other Things, who have not seen, or at least have pretended not to see the Connection of some of the principal Arguments; particularly that between necessary Existence and Infinity, and necessary Existence and Unity: I have therefore, with Regard to those two Propositions, in the following Compendium, endeavoured more particularly to shew the strict and necessary Connection between them. For though I think *Dr. Clarke* has thoroughly demonstrated what he undertook, yet as the Manner in which an Argument is put together, may make it clear to some, and obscure to others; so by changing the Order of it, or shewing the Connection of the several Steps, it may appear plain to those to whom it was before obscure. And since Necessity of Existence is the sole Ground upon which both *Dr. Clarke's* Demonstration, and this Compendium depend; it may not be amiss, though it has been very fully explained before, to define the Meaning that I would have applied to the Term Necessity of Existence; which is this, That a Being exists necessarily, the Supposition of whose Non-existence is a direct Contradiction, that is, if there is any one Being in the whole Universe, which cannot be supposed not to exist without a Contradiction, that Being must be necessarily existing; not that we are first to suppose a certain Being necessary or self-existent,

tent, and then say, that it is a Contradiction to suppose that Being not to exist, because we before-hand give him the Name of a necessarily existing Being. But we are first to consider what Modes of Existence there are, and we shall find, that if we try to suppose all the Beings that now are or ever were out of the Universe, or not to exist, yet some one Being will necessarily remain even after he is supposed away; because it is a flat Contradiction not to suppose some one Being. That Being therefore that necessarily remains even after he is supposed away is the self-existent Being, and is so, because he cannot be supposed not to exist without a Contradiction, and not the contrary Way, that he cannot be supposed not to exist; because he is first supposed necessary or self-existent without any Ground at all. This is what I would be understood to mean by the Word Necessary Existence. Let us therefore now proceed to the Demonstration.

I. *First* then, *That something has existed from all Eternity.* This seems the most plain and evident Thing that is possible, for as *something* exists now, it is manifest that something always did exist; or else that which now is, was either produced by nothing, or by it self; now to be produced by nothing, is to be produced and not produced at the same time, which is a Contradiction in
 Terms;

Terms; and for any Thing to produce it self, is for that Thing to exist before it did exist, that is, to exist and not to exist at the same Time, which is also a Contradiction in Terms. That something does now exist, is one of the plainest Things in the World: No Man could ever doubt of his own Existence; for the very doubting of or questioning his own Existence, proves demonstrably that he does exist; it being impossible that *Nothing* or *Non-entity* should be able to doubt whether it existed or not. If therefore something now is, it evidently follows that something always was, *viz.* that something has existed from all Eternity.

II. *There has existed from all Eternity, some one Unchangeable and independent Being.* This follows directly from the former; for either there has always existed *some one unchangeable independent Being*, or else there has been an *infinite Series of dependent Beings* existing one after another in an endless Succession without any original Cause at all: Now this is plainly absurd and contradictory; for these Beings could have no *Cause* from *without*, because it is supposed that there never were any Beings at all besides themselves. Neither could there be any Ground of Existence *within* themselves; because no one of them is supposed necessary, but each of them depends on the preceding one: If therefore there is no external Cause, nor internal Reason for
the

the Existence of any one of them, it is plain that the whole Series cannot have any Ground or Reason at all for their Existence, and without any *Cause* or *Reason* it is impossible that any such Series of Beings should exist.

III. *That Unchangeable and Independent Being which has existed from all Eternity, must be self-existent, that is, necessarily existing.* It is manifest, that this unchangeable Being must either have arisen from nothing, or from something external, or must be self-existent; To arise from *nothing* is a direct Contradiction, for if it did arise from nothing, it was once equally possible, that it should not have existed at all: If then it did exist, there must of Necessity be *something* which determined its Existence rather than not; now that must be either something *external*, or something *internal*: If it is something external, then this Being is not the independent Being which we before supposed; because there must be some one Being that has no *external Cause*, and since such a Being could not arise from nothing, nor have any *external Cause*, he must therefore have an *internal one*, and this can be nothing but a *Necessity* of Existence in the Nature of the Being *it self*; were there no such Necessity in the Nature of the Being, it would then be no Contradiction to suppose that no such Being *exists*. We see indeed demonstrably that such a Being exists at this present Time, but if there is no Reason

son for his Existence, it cannot imply a Contradiction to suppose him not to have existed, that is, to suppose it possible that he might never have existed at all. But we cannot now suppose him really not to have existed, because we find that he has always existed. It is impossible and contradictory to suppose nothing existing. But this Supposition could not be contradictory, if there were no Reason why it is so; and since it is so, it follows that we are necessarily led to suppose something existing; which *something*, as it *necessarily* crowds *it self* into our Ideas, must be necessarily existing. Necessity of Existence must be the Ground of Existence of something *Incorruptible, Immaterial, and Immutable*; for whatever is *necessary*, is *necessarily* that which it is, consequently cannot be *otherwise*, and is therefore *immutable and incorruptible*. If then we could suppose a necessary Being *variable*, we might for the same Reason suppose him *not to exist* at all. Hence it appears that the *material World* cannot be the self-existent Being; for as the material World does not continue the same an Hour together, we cannot suppose it self-existent, (whether we suppose it Eternal or not) because Eternity cannot make it necessary; for were it so, it would then be a Contradiction to suppose it not to have been Eternal, or to suppose it otherwise than it is, than which nothing can be more easy. That immutable

Being

Being therefore which has existed from Eternity must be self-existent; not because he has existed from all Eternity, but because it is a Contradiction not to suppose him to have existed from Eternity, or not to exist now, or to all Eternity.

IV. *What the Substance or Essence of that Being, which is necessary, or self-existent, is, we have no Idea, neither is it at all possible for us to comprehend it.* That we have no Idea of the *Substance* or *Essence* of such a Being, nothing can be more evident; for we have no Idea at all of the Substances we are most conversant with: Who is it that can tell wherein consists the *Essence* of *Matter*, of our own *Souls*, or of *separate Spirits*, much less of the *supreme Being*? such a Being must infinitely surpass all our finite and narrow Understandings, he must be infinitely beyond the Reach of our weak Comprehensions, we might as well be able at one finite View to take in the whole Idea of the *Boundless Immensity*, as to perceive wherein the *Essence* of a Being so infinitely superiour to us consists, when we are not able even to perceive the *Essence* of our own selves. Our Understanding is to his, as a Point to Infinity: To comprehend his *Essence* therefore must be infinitely out of the Reach of our narrow Capacities. Yet though his *Essence* is *incomprehensible*, his *Being* and *Attributes* may be nevertheless strictly *demonstrable*; for could we

demonstrate the *Existence* of nothing, but of those Things whose *Essence* we could comprehend, we should not be able to demonstrate the Existence of any Thing, and consequently no Being could know that he existed, which evidently contradicts Experience. We are not therefore to conclude that the Being and Attributes of God, are not demonstrable, because we have no Idea of his *Essence*, which we find is impossible for us to have at all, though we were never so certain of his actual Existence.

V. *The self-existent Being must of Necessity be Eternal.* Since something must of Necessity be eternal, which was proved in the First and Second Propositions, that Thing must of Necessity be self-existent, because whatever is necessary as to the Manner of its Existence, must be necessary as to the Existence also; so likewise whatever exists necessarily, must be necessary as to the Manner of its Existence, otherwise we might suppose him just now or a few Ages ago to have begun to exist, both which are absurd and contradictory. Now if we suppose the self-existent Being ever to have begun to exist, it is very evident that then He would not be necessary as to the Manner of his Existence, because we might have supposed him to have begun to exist either sooner or later, consequently He cannot be supposed to have begun to exist, therefore He has existed from all Eternity.

Eternity. That He must also exist from this Time to all Eternity, may be proved by the same Argument: For if there ever is to be a Time when He shall cease to exist, He cannot be necessary as to the Manner of his Existence, because I can suppose him then to cease to exist either before or after that Time, consequently He can never cease to exist; therefore He must exist to all Eternity. Again, As it is a Contradiction not to suppose something existing, therefore there is a Being self-existent; but if we can suppose the self-existent Being either not to have always existed, or not to exist now, or any Time hereafter, then is it no Contradiction to suppose him not to exist, and consequently no Contradiction to suppose nothing existing, that is a Contradiction and not a Contradiction at the same Time, which is Nonsense.

VI. *The self-existent Being must of Necessity be Infinite and Omnipresent.* There is as strict a Connexion between Necessary Existence and Infinity, as there is between Necessary Existence and Eternity. For since *something* must be *necessarily infinite*, therefore it must be *necessarily existent*. To be *infinite*, and not *necessarily so*, will not include necessary Existence: But if a Being is *necessarily Infinite*, that Being is *necessarily existent*; it being impossible that a Being should be necessary as to the *Manner* of its Existence, and not necessary as to the *Existence itself*. Whatever

exists necessarily, is necessarily that which it is; so that it is a Contradiction either to suppose it not to exist, or to suppose it to exist after another Manner than what it does exist in. If then the self-existent Being is a *finite Being*, he is necessarily *finite*, and consequently it is a Contradiction to suppose him *infinite*; so likewise if he is *infinite*, he must be necessarily *infinite*, and then it is a Contradiction to suppose him *finite*: One of these therefore is a Contradiction. Now Infinity implies neither Contradiction, Absurdity, nor even any Improbability. But Finiteness implies Limitation without a Limiter, or by its own Nature, or by nothing, or at least many Absurdities, which must appear to every Person, if it does not appear a Contradiction, though if any one would examine Dr. Clarke's Sixth Proposition, he may plainly see the Contradiction of supposing the self-existent Being finite. Again, suppose the self-existent Being to be *finite*, He must then have a Power to move himself out of one Place into another; for if he cannot move himself, he can give a *Power* to other Beings which he has not himself. As for instance, suppose this finite self-existent Being to create a *Globe of Matter*, and to give it a *Velocity*, so that it would, without any thing to stop it, move on in *infinitum*, when it is got beyond the *Limits* of this self-existent Being, he cannot possibly stop it, (because nothing can act where it is not)

not) but he can create a Being that may go after it and stop it. It is plain then that *such a Being* must have a Power of *moving himself*. Let us then see how a *finite moveable Being* agrees with a *necessary self-existent Being*. Whatsoever exists *necessarily*, must exist *necessarily* in *some Place*, for to exist necessarily and not necessarily in *some Place*, is to exist necessarily and not necessarily at the same Time, a Contradiction in Terms. In this alone is the Difference between what *exists necessarily*, and what *does not*; for whatever *exists*, must exist *somewhere or other*, so whatever *exists necessarily*, must exist *necessarily somewhere or other*; I do not mean in any particular Place, but only in *some Place or other*. Whatever *Place* then a necessary Being *exists in*, he must at that Time *exist necessarily in that Place*. Because as he exists necessarily *somewhere*, and as he cannot exist, (either necessarily or not necessarily) where he *is not*, therefore he must at *that Time* exist necessarily in *that Place* where he is. Now as he has a Power of moving himself from one Place to another, it is manifest, that he might not have existed in *that Place* at *that Time*, consequently he cannot be necessarily existing in *that Place* at *any Time*, and therefore he cannot be necessarily existing at all. The same will hold in supposing any finite Part of Space whatever. He must therefore be either an infinite Being,

or a finite immoveable Being ; a Being bounded by Nobody can tell what, a Being that must reach as far as there are any created Things, and no farther, the Absurdity of which has been shown before. Again, It is a Contradiction not to suppose *something* to exist. Now if we can suppose *nothing existing* in any one Part of the Universe, we may for the same Reason suppose *all the whole Universe* to be *nothing*, we are necessarily led to suppose *something actually existing*. This therefore which necessarily crowds itself into our Minds, and *which* must be every where for the same Reason that *it* is any where, is *something* which fills the whole Universe, and is consequently *an infinite Being*, and as *it* exists necessarily, must be a *necessary self-existent infinite Being*. Hence appears the strict Connexion between necessary Existence and Infinity ; for had it been no Contradiction to suppose this Being not to exist, it would not have been necessarily infinite, and therefore the self-existent Being must be infinite.

VII. *The self-existent Being must of Necessity be but One*. This is no less evident than the former ; for, as I said before, whatever is necessarily existing, is necessarily that which it is, so that it is a Contradiction to suppose it otherwise. If then there is *only One self-existent Being*, there is necessarily *but One*, so that it is a Contradiction to suppose *Two*, or *any other Number*. But if there are
Two,

Two, then for the same Reason there are necessarily Two, so that to suppose One must then be a Contradiction. Now it is absurd and contradictory to suppose that both Sides can be reduced to a Contradiction. But the Supposition of *One only* implies no Contradiction. If then there are more than *One self-existent Being*, it is plain, that that which appears to us no Contradiction, is a direct Contradiction, and that is no Contradiction which appears to be a direct Contradiction. If this is the Case, which it must be, upon the Supposition of there being *more than One*, then is all our Understanding vain, our Reason useles, and we have no Ground or Foundation to go upon. But every one must follow his own empty Imaginations. Again, It is a direct Contradiction to suppose *nothing*, or not to suppose *something* existing. This is the sole Reason by which we judge of the absolute Necessity of the Existence of a Being. For could we suppose *nothing* to exist, then it would be no Contradiction to suppose *all Beings non-existent*, so that there could be no self-existent Being at all upon that Supposition. If we suppose *One Being only* in the Universe, (whether we call *him* necessary or not necessary) to suppose *that One Being* away, reduces us to the contradictory Supposition of there being *nothing existing*. Therefore it implies a Contradiction to suppose *that Being* not to exist, *such a Being* then is necessarily existing,

existing, because *he* cannot be supposed *not to exist* without a Contradiction. But if we suppose *Two such Beings*, we may suppose *one away*, because the supposing *only one* of them away, does not reduce us to the absurd and contradictory Supposition of there *being nothing existing*, (which is the Reason by which we judge whether a Being is necessarily existing or not so) because there still remains *one Being* to hinder that Contradiction. From hence it is very clear that there can be *but One self-existent Being*. We are not first to suppose *some One Being self-existent*, and then say that *he* cannot be supposed *not to exist*, but it is the Impossibility of supposing a *Being away*, that must make *him necessarily existing*. Again, *Space* is an *Essential Property* of the *self-existent Being*; this has been proved in the First Part, and it is evident that it is *necessarily existing*. Now since no Substance can exist without its essential Property, it is plain that the *self-existent Being* cannot exist without *Space*, and *vice versa*, because no Property, (either essential or not essential) can exist without its Substance. Let us then suppose *Two necessary self-existent Beings independent of each other*. *Space* will be an *essential Property* of them *both*, which is a flat Contradiction, and it will follow likewise that they depend upon one another, which is another Contradiction. For suppose A one self-existent Being, and suppose

B the

B the other, and C Space, it is plain that A cannot exist without C, nor C without A; because A is the Substance, and C the essential Property, which mutually depend upon each other. B also cannot exist without C, nor C without B, for the same Reason as the former. As A therefore depends upon C, and C depends upon B, A must also depend upon B; so on the other hand, B depends upon C, and C depends upon A, therefore B must depend upon A. They are then two *Dependent Beings* at the same Time that they are supposed *Independent Ones*, which is a Contradiction in Terms; they can neither of them therefore be self-existent, because Self-existence necessarily includes Independence. From hence it follows, that no two Beings can have the same *essential Property*: Space then can be the *essential Property* but of *one self-existent Being*. And if there could possibly be more than one, Space would be only a *sine qua non* of their Existence.

VIII. *The self-existent and original Cause of all Things must be an intelligent Being.* This, as Dr. Clarke says, seems not demonstrable *à priori*, because we know not wherein *Intelligence* consists, that is, we cannot at all tell what it is which makes a Being capable of Understanding. It is therefore impossible for us to see the Connection between *necessary Existence* and *Intelligence*, (though there certainly is a strict and necessary one) till we can
thoroughly

thoroughly apprehend the Nature of and see wherein Intelligence consists. But though *à priori*, we cannot demonstrate the Intelligence of the Deity, yet we have sufficient Proofs of it *à posteriori*. For as we experience in our selves, and observe in other created Beings existing without us, *Thought, Reason, and Intelligence*; and as these have been no longer than since we were created, and the Creation of all those Beings who are possessed of them, they must certainly arise from some Cause; and as there can be nothing in the Effect, which is not in the Cause in a more perfect Manner, there must be Intelligence in the self-existent Being. To suppose Intelligence or any other Perfection in the *Creature*, and not in the *Creator*, is the most absurd Thing in the World. We might as well suppose a Globe of Matter, which is at Rest, to put another Globe in Motion which is also at Rest. But this is not the only Argument that can be brought; for the Beauty and Harmony, the Variety and exact Proportion of all created Beings, proves demonstrably that they could not be created by an unintelligent Being, but must on the contrary be no less than the Workmanship of an infinitely wise Being.

IX. *The self-existent and original Cause of all Things is not a necessary Agent, but a Being endued with Liberty and Choice.* From Intelligence Liberty plainly follows, for without Liberty Intelligence is nothing; it is, as

Dr.

Dr. *Clarke* says, only a Consciouſness of being acted upon, and not of acting itself. Besides, if there is no Liberty in the supreme Being, then every Thing is necessarily what it is, so that it is a Contradiction to suppose them otherwise, the contrary of which is most true; for we find that we can without any Difficulty suppose the World originally to have been, or that it may be hereafter of any other Form quite different from what it now is, which is an undeniable Proof of the Freedom of the Being which created it. A moral Necessity there is that Things should be as they are; because a wise Being *cannot*, that is, *never will* act or do any Thing but what is upon the whole best; but then this is not from any Necessity of Nature, but as Dr. *Clarke* says, is from the unalterable Rectitude of his Will, which is consistent with the most perfect Freedom and Choice. If there is any Freedom in any Beings at all, there must be in the supreme, because he cannot give to any of his Creatures what he has not himself. That there is Liberty in some Beings, is very plain, because we can suppose them to act either one Way, or the direct contrary: They have indeed some Motive, some moral Inducement to determine their Actions; but this does not act upon them necessarily, as a Cause produces its Effect. All Actions instantaneously follow the last Judgment of the Understanding, but
not

not necessarily, because there is a Possibility of acting contrary to it. There are so many Proofs of Liberty both in Created Beings and in the Supreme Being, that I shall not insist any more upon it here.

X. *The self-existent and original Cause of all Things must of Necessity have infinite Power.* This Proposition is a plain Consequence of the Seventh, for since there can be but *One such Being*, all other Beings must derive their *Power* from *him*, consequently he has a Power over all other Beings in the whole Universe: Therefore he has *infinite Power*. But though He has this infinite Power, yet it cannot be extended to Things contradictory, which is the same as no Power at all; neither can it relate to Imperfections, as destroying its own Existence, or the like. But where there is no Contradictions, so far his Power extends, as Creating all Kinds of Beings, as *immaterial cogitative Beings*, *material incogitative Beings*; *material cogitative Beings* seem not to be *Objects* of his Power, because there are *essential Properties* of Matter *contradictory* to a Power of Thinking, as *Divisibility in infinitum*, *consisting of actual distinct separate Parts*, &c. I shall not consider any more of this, but refer the Reader to Dr. Clarke.

XI. *The Supreme Cause and Author of all Things must of Necessity be infinitely wise.* Since God is an infinite omnipresent and intelligent

telligent Being, it necessarily follows, that he must know every Thing that is; because as they all depend upon and arose from him, he must be able to perceive every thing that belongs to them in the most minute Manner possible. Besides, as he is a Being that is *omnipotent* and *superiour* to all other Beings whatever, he cannot possibly be *limited*, but must have *all the Perfections* that other Beings have in an *unlimited Degree*. And for that Reason his Wisdom must be unlimited, and consequently infinite, since there neither is nor can possibly be any Being in the whole Universe, that can be able to limit or bound either him or any of his Divine Attributes; so that if he can be proved to have any Wisdom at all, it must be in an infinite Degree.

XII. *The supreme Cause and Author of all Things, must of Necessity be a Being of infinite Goodness, Justice and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections, such as become the supreme Governour and Judge of the World.* That there is a natural *Fitness* and *Unfitness* in Things, when applied to each other. A Fitness founded in the *Nature* of the *Things themselves*, which is *eternal* and *immutable*, is very manifest. Thus for instance, it is an eternal immutable Unfitness or Disagreeableness to the Nature of any Being to be punished for a Crime that he never committed; for it is impossible, that it could ever have been
good,

good, just or agreeable to the Nature of a rational Being to punish another in that Manner without any Fault of his. Again, To be created miserable for any Term of *Years*, and after the Time is expired to be annihilated, without ever having had during his whole Existence the least Respite from his Misery ; than which nothing can appear more unfit and unreasonable. It is also a natural Fitness or Agreeableness to the Nature of a *Rational Being*, to have Enjoyment or Pleasure during his Existence, and to be punished for nothing but what he merits ; for it is plainly impossible that it could ever have been unjust in itself, or disagreeable to the Nature of such a Being, to have Enjoyment or Pleasure whilst he existed. It is very plain then that there certainly is a natural Fitness and Unfitness in the Things themselves and their Relations. Since therefore the supreme Being has infinite Knowledge and Wisdom, it is impossible for him to be ignorant of or mistake any of these Relations ; and being also independent and omnipotent, his Will can in no wise be influenced by any false Motive or Interest, and it is impossible that he should be limited by any superiour Strength. He must therefore, by the unalterable Rectitude of his Will, always do that which is fittest and best to be done, that is, as *Dr. Clarke* say, He must always act according to the strictest Rules of infinite

finite Goodness, Justice and Truth, and all other moral Perfections. For, *First*, He must be infinitely Good, because to do Evil can arise from nothing but a Faultiness of Will, or from Want, or from some other Depravation; but these cannot be in any kind whatever in the supreme Being: He must therefore have an immutable Disposition and Desire to communicate Enjoyment and Happiness to his Creatures. For the same Reason, He must also be infinitely just, because the Rule of Equity, as *Dr. Clarke* says, being nothing else but the very Nature of Things, and their necessary Relations one to another, and Justice being only a suiting the Things and their Relations to the Qualifications of Beings; and as the supreme Being can in no wise be ignorant of this Rule, and has no Temptation or Desire to deviate at all from it. He must always do that which is just and right. That he must also be faithful and true in all his Promises, is as evident as the former. For there cannot possibly be any Reason to make him break his Word or Promise; because the sole Ground or Foundation of any such Thing arises from some sort of Depravation, either from Fear, or some Hope of Gain or Happiness, or from want of Power, and the like, none of which can any ways be in the least Degree possible

ble in the independent infinitely wise and All-seeing Being.

FROM what has been said, I think, it sufficiently appears that the Being and Attributes of God are strictly and undeniably demonstrable. I have considered them but shortly, as I designed, except in the Sixth and Seventh Propositions, which are the only ones in *Dr. Clarke's Demonstration*, that have any Objections of Weight against them; for all the others are allowed by almost every Person to be demonstrated by him, yet even those I think he has sufficiently demonstrated. For if we allow Necessity of Existence in his Sense of the Words (which is this, that that alone is necessarily existing, whose Absence, or Non-existence cannot be supposed without a Contradiction) the Demonstration of those Two Propositions is unexceptionable, But upon this Supposition, that we may suppose a Being necessarily existing, whose Non-existence we can conceive without a Contradiction, or at least, if it only contradicts our having before supposed him self-existent, upon this Supposition, I say, He has not, nor can they possibly be demonstrated. But those who cannot see the Absurdity of such Suppositions, are Persons that cannot be argued with, but must be left to their own absurd

furd prejudiced Notions, and to feel the Consequences of them. Such Demonstrations as Dr. *Clarke's* should be considered only by unprejudiced Persons, such as will be convinced by true Reasoning and strict Demonstration.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Read</i>
8	8	any,	some.
10	18	Inches,	Miles.
40	32	of,	of it.
72	19	Material,	Material World.
95	13	clear,	clear it.
98	30	Immenty,	Immensty.
99	14	Necessairy,	Necessarily.



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