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A  
**DEFENCE**

OF

SOME PASSAGES IN DR. COPLESTON'S

*Enquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and  
Predestination,*

IN

**REPLY TO A LETTER**

Addressed to that Author,

BY THE REV. E. W. GRINFIELD, M. A.  
MINISTER OF LAURA CHAPEL, BATH.

WITH

**AN ABSTRACT**

OF

THE LEADING ARGUMENT OF THE "ENQUIRY."



BY THE

**REV. W. DALBY, M. A.**

FELLOW AND TUTOR OF EXETER COLLEGE, OXFORD



But what doth your arguing reprove!

*Job vi. 29.*



**OXFORD,**

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A

## LETTER,

&c.



REV. SIR,

**I** HAVE to thank you for the courtesy of presenting me with a copy of your "Letter to Dr. Copleston." It has been read by me with lively interest. Your objections to those passages of his "Enquiry," on which *alone* your remarks bear, were already known to me, generally. My curiosity has been gratified by perusing them in detail. **But I** cannot rejoice, as a friendly acquaintance, (if you will permit me so to style myself,) in your having given publicity to them. They appear to me such as, on revision of the text in question, your own convictions will incline you to withdraw: they have a

B

tendency, too, (*contrarily to your express intent and inclination,*) to cast a slur on a valuable service, rendered to wandering minds, and souls that vex themselves with cravings for forbidden knowledge.

The civility, which I have just acknowledged, partly indicates, I conceive, your remembrance of a conversation in which you engaged me, at intervals, when we met, last month. It turned on the very points involved, in what I must now call, your meditated censure of Dr. C.'s view of them. My share in it was of a *negative* character. I protested against the justice of your strictures, confessing, at the same time, my deficiency in readiness with the only facts by which they could effectually be combated. You persevered, however, notwithstanding the vagueness of my opposition, in patiently stating to me your opinions, or, at least, the substance of them.

I have, since, renewed my acquaintance with the "Enquiry," and especially with the Note to Discourse III, (having recourse to no other illustrative authorities, than those



which its Author has quoted, or embodied in it.) The result is, that my original impressions, then less lively than they ought to have been, have now revived, and are confirmed; neither am I afraid to engage in the defence of the Christian truth, and Christian prudence, of those positions, of which you controvert some as they stand, and (*undesignedly*, I need scarcely add, yet materially) misrepresent others.

My purpose, however, is purely *refutative*. I oppose your objections to a certain logical doctrine of the "Enquirer," and (I must add) your representation of the precepts, which he has connected with it. You differ from him, principally, you say, in his "account of analogy, and of the attributes of God, in relation to our moral faculties<sup>a</sup>." I shall not attempt to prove that "analogy" is what he has asserted, and what I believe it to be. This were an officious labour. Much less am I about to argue in exculpation of "allegory and mysticism<sup>b</sup>," ingrafted on Scrip-

<sup>a</sup> Letter, p. 2.

<sup>b</sup> Letter, p. 45.

ture. This is in the present case wholly unnecessary. I shall simply endeavour to remove the exceptions which you take at Dr. C.'s view of the *first* point, and to shew that you have reported inaccurately the bearing which it has, and which he assigns to it on the *second*, that higher and holier matter.

Nevertheless, I intend to premise a brief abstract of the *main argument* of the whole work;—for this reason. You have, I fear, incurred the hazard of deterring some, at least, of your readers, from resorting to it for admonition with the confidence it deserves. You have called upon the Author, in the hearing of the multitude, to “consider, before he lends the weight of his name and character to those delusive speculations,” (which you imagine yourself to have detected in the course of a perusal of what he has published,) “that they must inevitably lead to the increase of atheism and infidelity<sup>c</sup>.” A startling appeal! As one of that multi-

<sup>b</sup> Letter, p. 14.

tude, then, as a plain and ordinary reader, not capable of finding in any such performance more than is written in it, I offer, in the first place, (without the slightest fear of offending you, nay, rather with the belief that I shall give pleasure to you,) to assure those of like capacity with my own, that, whatever be the soundness of your partial objections, they do not in the slightest degree obstruct the main current of the “Enquirer’s” reasonings, but glance off to topics altogether incidental.

The doctrine of Fatalism confined to this life, originally professed by a few Pagan philosophers, has been extended, unhappily, to the life to come, by too large a class of believers in Christianity, (not to speak of false pretenders to Revelation.) In the former shape, it is complimented with the title of Philosophical Necessity; in the latter, it constitutes Calvinistic Predestination.

“Dissatisfied often with the attempts made to refute the Calvinistic opinions— attempts which seemed to” him “often to retain as much error on their own side as

“ they exposed on the opposite, and to de-  
 “ prive Christianity of much of that spiritual  
 “ and vital force, which is its main charac-  
 “ teristic, and essential property,” Dr. C.  
 “ thought it would be a plainer and safer  
 “ way to demonstrate” this “ identity of  
 “ those opinions with that philosophical  
 “ creed denominated Necessity or Fatalism;  
 “ to exhibit this creed in its exact form and  
 “ dimensions, and to refute it by that pro-  
 “ cess of reasoning, which is called reductio  
 “ ad absurdum, namely, by shewing how  
 “ *it contradicts the first principles* of man,  
 “ as a being furnished with active powers,  
 “ and with a sense of right and wrong<sup>d</sup>.”

This leading argument of the Enquirer is  
 comprised in the *three* first of his four  
 Discourses.

The last of the four “ enters on the main  
 “ subject of the Calvinistic controversy, and  
 “ shews the doctrine of the Church of Eng-  
 “ land, on the points involved in it, to be  
 “ agreeable to Scripture, and to be delivered

<sup>d</sup> Enquiry, p. 168.

“ in a manner *conformable to the principles*  
 “ maintained in this Enquiry<sup>e</sup>.”

Now, I pause to observe, that you have not given the slightest reason to suppose that you dislike the *shape*, which the result of the whole “ Enquiry ” assumes : viz. that “ in respect to the declarations of Scripture “ on Predestination and Free-will, each of “ these points is distinctly expressed in it ; “ so that though their union be not explained, the one is not to be permitted to “ obliterate the other<sup>f</sup>.” You object nothing to the Scriptural soundness and sufficiency of this caution. In fact, you “ *approve of* “ *the general train of the argument,*” and are a *hearty well-wisher to its intention*. Yet your remarks, wherever they circulate, will carry with them a tendency to create prejudice against the former. They intimate, that certain “ important particulars ” discussed by the Author, principally in a Note, arising out of his text, are resolved by him into positions highly “ injurious to Christian theology<sup>g</sup> ” in

<sup>e</sup> Pref. to Enquiry, p. xi.

<sup>f</sup> Ibid. p. xii.

<sup>g</sup> Letter, p. 1, 49.

their consequences. Now, in such a case, a question naturally arises, whether these particulars are integral members of the body of proofs *directly* alleged, or introduced exclusively for the collateral purpose of reasonable expostulation with those who are antecedently disposed to shut their minds against it. To me, and, I firmly believe, to you also, they are evidently of the latter description. But the cursory notice, by which you have implied this admission, (in a phrase already quoted from the first page of your publication,) may not prove, I apprehend, a sufficient warning either to those who may read the animated sentences of condemnation which occur in it, or to those who may hear of their tone by report. For *their farther* admonition then, not for impertinent suggestion to you, I shall proceed; and I would thus address them, secure of your concurrence.

Most certainly, the application of the principles maintained in the early and theoretical part of the "Enquiry," is exemplified in the

consideration given to the text of Scripture, in the concluding Discourse of the series. Yet exemplification is not deduction; neither has the Author used it as such; wherefore he has not hazarded the credit of his practical admonition, on the accuracy of his prefatory doctrine. "On the contrary he subjects, in the eye of the public, the inference arising from his own meditations on "the book of God's works," to rigid comparison with that of the book of God's "words."

Again, what are these "principles?" Not any one of the positions attacked by Mr. G. or understood by him to occur, in the work and its notes. Not any "account of analogy, or of the attributes of God, in relation "to our moral faculties," but, probable expectations, deduced after Bp. Butler's manner, that, correspondently to the "confessed "difficulties" and "apparent incongruities" which have occurred in the course of man's unassisted contemplation of powers invisible, impediments will be found to check presumptuous vanity, and remind human intel-

lect of its assigned limits, in a revelation which teaches us that “to know even as we “are known” is reserved for a future state of our being. Also, on like grounds, a cheering anticipation of the certainty which shall derive itself from the lips of the Spirit, to those *separate* notions, which, on separate evidence, we imbibe and closely embrace, of Divine Providence, and human liberty. And the practical inference to be deduced from the verification of these expectations, is promised, and afterward proved (*historically*, in the Appendix) to be the very same as that which is virtually contained in the seventeenth Article of our Church, and dictates the “pious “and salutary” lesson of modesty of speculation derivable from it<sup>b</sup>.

It is, therefore, an essential article of that fairness of construction, which Dr. C. so eminently merits, and which Mr. G. anxiously wishes for him, that his endeavour to make plain to the Calvinist some of the temptations which are least suspected by him, and yet contribute powerfully to seduce him from an

<sup>b</sup> See Enquiry, p. 170, 171. “Instead—condition.”



orthodox and reverent interpretation of Scripture, should not be confounded with the direct argument above stated, which he urges to strengthen the hands of the faithful, and to encourage those who, when challenged to admit that human liberty is inconsistent with Divine Providence because they cannot discover how the two consist with each other, prefer adhering in humble confidence, to the separate declarations of holy writ, that man is free, and God supreme. You will perceive this to have the effect of confining my debate with Mr. G. to its proper limits, if I first indicate the occasions on which Dr. C. introduces and employs the above-mentioned remarks on "analogy," and the salutary restrictions, which he suggests for adoption, in our attempts to conceive "the attributes of God, in relation to our moral faculties."

The opening Discourse seems to divide itself into three principal parts. *First*, it is maintained that the notion of God's foreknowledge, which we get by ascribing to him in an unlimited degree, our own capa-

bility of arriving at some certainty concerning future events “ought not to interfere in “the slightest degree with our belief in the “contingency of events, and the freedom of “human action<sup>i</sup>.” *Secondly*, it is considered whether the opinion of the Fatalist (even when unincumbered by the fallacy thus exposed) “is reconcilable with other positions, “which we can prove undeniably true<sup>k</sup>.” These positions are, that the intellectual and moral energies of men are increased by a persuasion that they have it in their power to attain certain ends, and decreased, even to inactivity, by their discovering that “some “superior influence entirely frustrates, or entirely supersedes, all their efforts.” Wherefore, on the hypothesis that Fatalism is truth, every step we advance in discovering the true relations of things, (which is allowed to be one of our proper employments,) we become less fit and less disposed to fulfil all the other purposes of our being. So that we should come to the

<sup>i</sup> Enquiry, p. 1—7.      <sup>k</sup> Ibid. p. 10—25.

impious and absurd conclusion, that “ the  
 “ Creator has formed us full of *active powers*  
 “ and principles, and yet with a capacity  
 “ and a disposition to draw nearer and  
 “ nearer to that state, which if we could ever  
 “ actually reach it, would make all these  
 “ faculties and principles implanted in us  
 “ useless, and would reduce us to absolute  
 “ inactivity.” Farther<sup>1</sup>, since “ man is not  
 “ only an active being but also a *moral*  
 “ *agent*,” and his own moral judgment, and  
 that of his fellow-creatures, spontaneously  
 conform to “ this rule, that in proportion as  
 “ the case” of any action “ approaches to  
 “ absolute necessity,” in the same degree is  
 the praise or blame due to it to be abated,  
 its credit to be lowered, or its guilt ex-  
 tenuated; therefore, “ the knowledge, or the  
 “ belief, of such a system tends to loosen all  
 “ moral restraint, to confound all duties, to  
 “ deaden moral feeling, and to silence the

<sup>1</sup> See Pref. to Enquiry, p. vi, vii. where the separate originality of each of the main portions of this argument is with great candour defined.

“ voice of conscience?”—and thus, again, “ man is formed by his Maker, a prepos-  
 “ terous compound, with a conscience that  
 “ informs him of his duty, and an under-  
 “ standing which tells him, in proportion as  
 “ it is cultivated and improved, that his con-  
 “ science is a mistaken guide.”

This, you must already perceive, is the *reductio ad absurdum* which was intended; a demonstration that the opinions professed by the Fatalist are “ contradictory and  
 “ inconsistent with themselves,” no less than with “ the consciousness, the moral feeling  
 “ and judgment, and all the real principles  
 “ of action,” which inhabit the minds of all  
 “ human creatures.” It is founded on “ ad-  
 “ mitted facts,” on “ human nature as it is,” and as it is confessed to be by Necessarians no less than others.

After pointing out by a partial anticipation of the argument presently to be abridged, how close a connection subsists between the whole question of Fatalism and that of Calvinistic Predestination, both in theory and in practice, Dr. C. goes on, in the *third*

place, to state<sup>m</sup>, that he would *account for the ascendancy acquired over the human mind by opinions so unreasonable and extravagant*, partly from the pride of intellect, but “still  
 “more from the thralldom in which men’s  
 “judgments are held by *the inaccurate use of*  
 “*language*, and from an ignorance of some  
 “of the first principles on which language is  
 “constructed<sup>n</sup>.” Here then is the origin (though the digression itself does not fully begin here) of a patient tracking of errors, superficial yet widely delusive, which Dr. C. has subsequently practised, for the purpose, collateral only to his chief intent, of leading back the Fatalist, who calls himself Christian, through his own unsuspected deviation from simple fact, and plain truth, natural and revealed. If the primary object of his “Enquiry” be the more comprehensive, the more promising, this secondary aim yields not to it in fervent zeal, and “charity un-  
 “feigned.” Still it *is secondary* to it, as you see.

<sup>m</sup> Enquiry, p. 34.      <sup>n</sup> Enquiry, p. 25.

Dr. C. notices, as specimens, one of these errors, which helped as he shews to keep Fatalism alive in the Stoical school, and another or two still prevalent and indirectly influential on similar opinions. He then takes occasion to establish a position, of which he afterward avails himself materially: viz. that “ if the subjects and predicates of “ two propositions are not precisely identical, if there be any shadow of difference “ perceptible, or even possible, in their “ meaning—although we may be *incapable of* “ *reconciling their apparent incongruity*, or “ of conceiving in what manner the things “ denoted by them can co-exist, yet is palpably absurd, for those who admit the “ being of a God, to *deny the possibility of* “ *their co-existence*°.”

Here we enter on ground which Mr. G. does not immediately dispute with him, but in traversing which, he has employed the term “ analogy,” which the former charges him with having wrongly defined. I do not

° Enquiry, p. 41.

observe, however, that Mr. G. has quoted any erroneous inference from this part of his work, arising from the misapplication of it. We may let the question, therefore, whether he has used it consistently with his own limitation, or not, be deferred till we have argued the propriety of the definition itself. It shall then be respectfully, and (I hope) satisfactorily considered. The other and graver matter, on which Mr. G. impugns sentiments which I do not find him to have professed, does not yet present itself to us, although we are indeed admirably prepared for its introduction by the concluding remarks of the discourse.

“There yet remain,” he says, “some  
 “points to be examined in the argument  
 “concerning God’s dealings with man, and  
 “the freedom and responsibility of man,  
 “regarding only the present life, before we  
 “shall be prepared to transfer the same  
 “method of reasoning to those analogous  
 “difficulties which have been started from  
 “the language of Scripture, and the removal

“ of which is the ultimate aim of the enquiry  
 “ thus begun<sup>p</sup>.”

Accordingly, in the *second* Discourse, after brief recapitulation and enforcement of the refutative argument maintained in the *first*, a reference to the endeavour made therein “ to prove the absurdity of calling “ that *impossible* with God, which appeared “ irreconcilable to ourselves,” and a summary conclusion that “ with regard to all “ questions in which the infinite power of “ God is represented as irreconcilable with “ something that either is, or is alleged to “ be, unless an *actual* contradiction can be “ pointed out in the terms of the proposition, “ no difficulties can justify a denial of its “ possibility”—the question is at once met<sup>q</sup>, “ whether by attributing to men the power “ of choice, and regarding them as in a great “ measure working out their own happiness “ or misery, we do at all derogate from the “ sovereignty and active providence of God,

<sup>p</sup> Enquiry, p. 44.      <sup>q</sup> P. 58.



“ or say any thing inconsistent with the first  
 “ principles of religion—that he knows all  
 “ things—that he made all things—that he  
 “ governs all things—that he wills the happi-  
 “ ness of his creatures, and that for his  
 “ glory they are, and were created.”

The result obtained is, (fair consideration being given to the ancient difficulty of the existence of evil,) that “ each of these posi-  
 “ tions must be separately admitted, although  
 “ their union is mysterious and unaccount-  
 “ able,” that “ though we cannot compre-  
 “ hend how *both* these things should be true  
 “ *together*, we can yet believe them both *to*  
 “ *be* true”—that they are “ not contradic-  
 “ tions, but only apparent incongruities,”  
 and that therefore we have no right to pro-  
 nounce the one fact impossible, because our  
 limited faculties fail in the endeavour to  
 shape it into a form, in which it will combine  
 with that other, which has taken such strong  
 hold on our apprehensions<sup>r</sup>.

In other words, (if I may venture the pa-

<sup>r</sup> See Enquiry, p. 69.

raphrase,) we cannot bring heaven down to earth, for our nearer contemplation ; but let us not, for that reason, discard that evidence which, springing from our own consciousness, is the more immediate gift of God, to make room for an over-strained ambition of conceiving his attributes in their mysterious infinity. We *feel* that we are free, (the “ current unreflecting testimony of mankind ” confirms the fact;) we *know* that he foresees, disposes, and governs all things. Let us be content to strengthen ourselves in a sense of our moral responsibility by bearing in mind the one fact, and of his gracious protection by reliance on the other. Or, if we must, by our inherited wilfulness, still long for knowledge benevolently, no doubt, withheld from us, let us pray that, at least, we may be enabled to temper that vain desire with a thankful carefulness of the measure already vouchsafed unto us, and let the clearness of our conviction of *each* of these truths be *treasured* by us as an earnest of that glorious illumination of the soul, which the heathen panted for, in darkness and in

doubt, but which is assured in the Covenant of Grace to the Christian who shall have “walked humbly with his God,” on earth. But—I forget myself, and am indulging in amplification of my teacher’s lessons, when I ought to be preparing for vindication of his authority.

“From this point,” he proceeds, “the transition is easy to the *analogous difficulties in the doctrine of Revelation*, which have so often divided the Christian world.”

Here is, I conceive, the key-stone of his work. For the main argument henceforth is this. Since the scheme of God’s natural government of the world, and the scheme of revelation, have in him, one and the same great Author, “the characteristics of the “one” will correspond in all leading points with the system of the other, and “the difficulties of the one be no greater than the “other,” (*except* to those who superadd to them others of their own creation, by *blind*

\* Enquiry, p. 71.

*perversion of the words of life.*) So that if our natural reason has attained to a firm conviction both of God's foreknowledge, and of man's free agency, by meditation on all that we feel within us, and see without us; but has also exhibited to us the insurmountable difficulty of reconciling these facts—we shall in no wise be surprised to find a like difficulty attendant on like separate enunciations of them in Scripture, when taken in contrast. Nay, this very circumstance will confirm our conviction of the common origin of the created universe and our revealed religion. We shall *expect*, therefore, this "absolute sovereignty, absolute knowledge, and unbounded power, extending to all that we now do, or shall do hereafter," to be frequently asserted; and, as frequently, that binding truth, that "the more he has done for us, the more we should be called upon to do for ourselves," and the necessary exhortation, that we be, *first*, earnest in prayer for his gracious aid, preventing and assisting us; *secondly*, on active guard against negligence or presump-

tion, striving daily to lay aside sin, and do, to our utmost, our duty towards God and our neighbour<sup>1</sup>. Now, it is not denied that to adapt these representations to each other with exact symmetry, will prove too hard a task for us, but it is denied that we shall be therefore warranted in declaring their plain and literal meanings incompatible; for it “has never yet *been shewn* that the two “opinions are *contradictory* to each other. “That they are contradictory has been “*tacitly assumed*, because to us their union “is inexplicable; and hence the most pernicious errors of different kinds have at “times prevailed—some denying or doubting the agency of Providence—others the “freedom of the human will<sup>2</sup>.”

Now, the *state of fact* thus anticipated, in respect to the Scriptures, proves at first sight to be actually this. “*There is* an abundant “supply of texts, which unquestionably contain *each doctrine*.” And, *the application of the conclusion* drawn in the two first Dis-

<sup>1</sup> Enquiry, p. 73—75.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 79.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p. 87.

courses to this state of fact is, that the advocate for Predestination has no more right to object to the belief of the asserter of human freedom in this one of the fundamental truths, which the Spirit has expressly recognized, than the latter has to impugn the adherence of the former to that other “godly consideration” of the “everlasting purpose of God.” The fault is not common among reasoners *against* the Calvinistic doctrines, in our church, at least. It is on the Predestinarian then, by reason of his too frequent intolerance, that the edge of the reproof falls—on him who unwarrantably “interprets those passages of Scripture which declare that things happen from the appointment and the ordinance of God, from his *purpose*, his *counsel*, his *will*, as if mankind were not at liberty to do otherwise than they have done—and as if he punished them for those acts which he designed they should commit, and the commission of which it was not in their power to avoid.”

<sup>v</sup> Enquiry, p. 89.

Shall I pursue the detail of this application, at the risk of doing farther injustice to its copiousness? I will not. Enough has been extracted to shew you what the *whole* purpose of the "Enquiry" is, and on what grounds the peculiar cogency of its conclusion properly rests. May it go forth among us and prosper, daily increasing in the "well-earned reputation," which Mr. G. avowedly and cheerfully imputes to it.

This pleasing task discharged, (whether officiously, or not, others must judge,) I return, Sir, to amicable conference with yourself, individually. My first business is to resume, from the abstract just sketched, the thread of that incidental discussion, on a branch of which your censure has fallen.

It has been already intimated, that, beside the difficulties inherent in the subject itself, which the considerations just now abridged mildly and effectually remove from troubling us, men superadd others of their own creation, arising, it is believed by the Enquirer, from "latent ambiguities in the language

“employed.” Now if such a cause of error does exist, (and he has proved that it does, by an ample induction of cases<sup>2</sup>;) in what degree soever it may have perplexed the over-curious in disputes on matters of natural religion, in a much greater ratio must it have proved dangerous to those, who may have had a leaning toward “heady and “high-minded” dogmatism in Scriptural authorities. Not that the word of God contains in itself one jot of ambiguity. God forbid that we should think so! But that positive tempers too readily deceive themselves into a persuasion that their own bold fancies are the only true faith, whenever they can dress them up to their own satisfaction in Scriptural language. Hence a pernicious abuse of that benevolent adaptation to man’s capacity, which is so striking a feature of the style of the holy volume. God is therein “revealed to us not as he is *absolutely* in “himself, but *relatively* to ourselves; and the “terms concerning him are such as clearly “to indicate not his nature and essence, but

<sup>2</sup> See Enquiry, p. 36—43, 80—85.



“ the duties which belong to us arising out  
 “ of that *relation*<sup>a</sup>.” It is to teach *us* how to  
 feel and act toward God, not to explain *his*  
 nature, that such words are chosen as pity,  
 anger, jealousy, repentance, &c. and applied  
 to his dealings with mankind. “ When he  
 “ punishes men for sin, he is said to be  
 “ angry;—when he punishes for idolatry, or  
 “ any dishonour done to himself, he is said  
 “ to be jealous;—when he changes the course  
 “ of his proceedings, he is said to repent<sup>b</sup>.”  
 So that, again, “ if he is said to be angry, it  
 “ is that we may feel it our interest to en-  
 “ deavour to please him. If he is said to  
 “ *pity* and *repent*, it is that we may neglect  
 “ nothing which we should do in a case of  
 “ distress to make a man *pity* and *repent*<sup>c</sup>.”  
 And since “ we make no scruple to acknow-  
 “ ledge that love and hatred, mercy and

<sup>a</sup> Enquiry, p. 102.

<sup>b</sup> Bp. Burnet's Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles,  
 Art. I. See also Bp. Tomline's Elements of Christian  
 Theology, vol. ii. (Exposition of the Articles,) Art. I.  
 p. 66, eighth edition of vol. ii.

<sup>c</sup> Enquiry, p. 97.

“ anger, with other passions, are ascribed  
 “ to God; not that they are in him, *as we*  
 “ *conceive them*, but to teach us how we are  
 “ to behave ourselves toward him, and what  
 “ treatment we are to expect at his hands—  
 “ why should we make any difficulty to think  
 “ that *foreknowledge, purposes, elections, and*  
 “ *decrees*, are attributed to him, after the same  
 “ way, and to the same intent<sup>d</sup>?” Why should  
 we not bear in mind, that terms such as these  
 “ are applied to the Almighty only in an  
 “ *analogical* sense---that they are borrowed  
 “ from human affairs, and employed when  
 “ speaking of divine things as imperfect ex-  
 “ pressions—as suitable only in the way of  
 “ comparison or resemblance—as helping us  
 “ to form some conceptions, however inade-  
 “ quate, of God’s adorable perfections—yet  
 “ as fully sufficient to instruct us how we  
 “ ought to think and act toward him, which  
 “ is their principal end and meaning.” Are  
 any tempted to slight this caution, as if it

<sup>d</sup> Abp. King’s Sermon on Predestination, quoted by  
 Dr. C. Enquiry, p. 88.

were too nice, and superficial? Let them give thought to the blasphemous familiarity with which the enthusiast has too often polluted the most condescending expressions of the first kind quoted—and, if his seem too coarse an example, for a lesson to cultivated minds, let them turn to the pages of philosophising champions of the doctrine of absolute decrees, and behold them peremptorily deciding on the nature of the knowledge, the will, and happiness, of the Creator, and reasoning from them “with the same boldness and confidence” that they do when applying these terms to a creature<sup>e</sup>.

Yet this is the object of your attack, the occasion of your alarm. You apprehend its import to be, that “all the language of holy writ, all our moral sentiments, all our interpretations of nature, respecting the goodness and wisdom of the Deity, are to be considered merely as *hieroglyphical representations*”<sup>f</sup>. Against this fearful interpretation of it I shall merely quote to you, from

<sup>e</sup> Enquiry, p. 98, 99, 137, 139.

<sup>f</sup> Letter, p. 14.

its context, another passage or two, of like tenour with those which have already been produced to illustrate it. This done, I shall have extracted from the body of the Enquiry almost all that it contains on this topic. The subject is afterward pursued to much greater length, in a note, (Enquiry, p. 115—141,) which, as is evident, you have had almost exclusively, in your eye, while writing your remarks. That note I reserve therefore, for distinct consideration, only while I cite the quotation last promised. It is this. Dr. C. declares that the sentiment which he advocates, concerning the *right analogical interpretation* of certain Scriptural terms, “*cannot be conveyed in* “*plainer or better* words than in those of “Luther; ‘To know,’ says he, ‘any thing of “God otherwise than as revealed in Scrip- “ture—what his nature is, what he does, or “what he wills—belongs not to me: my “business is to know what are his precepts, “his promises, and his threatenings.’ To “which he adds, with a simplicity and “energy of language hardly attainable in

“ translation, ‘ *Hæc cum meditaris studiose,*  
 “ *Invenis Deum.*’ Nor can we,” Dr. C.  
 proceeds to observe, “ adopt a better prac-  
 “ tical rule to prevent the application of  
 “ these *relative* terms from being pushed too  
 “ far, than *to check it, the moment we perceive*  
 “ *that it begins to trench upon any of the re-*  
 “ *vealed attributes of God*—such as his jus-  
 “ tice, his goodness, his mercy—or to con-  
 “ tradict any positive declaration of his will.  
 “ No man knoweth the Father, but the  
 “ Son, and he to whomsoever *the Son will*  
 “ *reveal him*<sup>g</sup>.”

Now, Sir, is not this caution, which Dr. C. deduces immediately from the views which he has adopted and recommended, the very same in substance with that which, in such very warm terms, you accuse him of subverting<sup>h</sup>? And, I ask, can you possibly maintain, on re-consideration of the pages referred to, that any “ academical prelec-  
 “ tions,” delivered in a style conformable to their contents, would describe the rela-

<sup>g</sup> Enquiry, p. 102, 103.

<sup>h</sup> Letter, p. 41, 47, &c.

tions implied in such precepts as this, “ Be ye merciful, as your Father who is in heaven is merciful, as a kind of moral phantasmagoria, which, however useful, had no real existence<sup>h</sup>?” If there be any one feature of anxiety more prominent than another in this portion, as in the rest of Dr. C.’s work—if there be a *peculiarly strong* characteristic of his sentiments—it is the desire which he evinces to defend every text of Scripture in the possession of the plainness and fulness of its meaning. Have we not had ample occasion to observe this, during our cursory review of his main argument?

But your observations refer to the *note*<sup>i</sup> subjoined. Sir, I do no rash thing, I trust, in involving the character of those passages in the text which that note amplifies and

<sup>i</sup> Letter, p. 49,

<sup>h</sup> Letter, p. 33. l. last. If it had occurred to you to specify this reference in your titlepage, would you not have thus done more exact justice to your own intention of disclaiming any unfavourable imputation on the work at large?

corroborates, with that of the Note itself. I have no wish, as you perceive, to overstate the operative force of your objections, but, if they have any weight at all, they must strike as heavily at that text, as at any comment, or analytical illustration of it which may be connected with it.

The question to be argued between us, then, is, in the *first* place, whether Dr. C.'s "account of analogy," implied by him in some sentences of an incidental portion of his "Enquiry," and set forth more largely (for general purposes) in a subsequent Note, be satisfactorily refuted by the considerations which you have alleged against it. In the *second* place, whether you have used sufficient circumspection in imputing to him certain obnoxious consequences, which in part you represent him to have drawn from it, but which in greater part you derive yourself, (without suspecting that you do him injustice.)

I have already said that my "defence" will be *purely refutative*. I have only one more prefatory remark to offer. It is this.

I hold that (independently of your rejection of what seems to me a sound logical doctrine) you have erred in your representation of one material feature of Dr. C.'s propositions, in each case. In the first you have assumed, that he denies the existence of a fact, where he only contends against its being necessary to the existence of a certain other fact. In the second—(that awful topic)—you have, in like manner, remonstrated with him for teaching men absolutely to deny, what he only cautions them against asserting arrogantly. This I am bound to make appear; together with the result of the discussion which I now commence with you.

You and I both write for the public as well as for each other. We will, for convenience and courteousness sake, supply such chasms as the absence of the book to which we refer might otherwise create in our several comments on it. With this view, I remind our readers that Dr. C. has called that acceptance of certain Scriptural terms, which seems to him both rational and reve-



rent, an “*analogical* interpretation” of them. They will hence perceive that an “account of *analogy*” is aptly appended to the rule which he has praised, and exemplified in his practice.

Concerning *analogy* then, what do we read in the Note alluded to, and what opposite statement in your own Letter?

The Enquirer has defined “analogy” to consist in a “similarity, or sameness, of relations,” denying that it results from any likeness which may, how frequently soever, be observed to exist between the correspondent subjects of these relations. So that, in his opinion, “things the most unlike and discordant in their nature, may be strictly *analogous* to each other<sup>1</sup>.”

You assert, that in all cases the statement of an analogy “*implies* the latter, while it “*expresses* the former,” and indeed that “this doctrine of relations, without any re-

<sup>1</sup> Enquiry, (Note to Disc. III.) p. 122, 123. Letter, p. 3, 10.

“gard to the subject-matter<sup>m</sup> of the things  
 “which are compared, has no solid founda-  
 “tion in the nature of things<sup>n</sup>.”

There certainly appears to be, here, a wide difference of opinion between the Enquirer and yourself. You seem to me to have substituted an occasional accompaniment of analogy for its essential characteristic. You have been induced to do so (if I may hazard the conjecture) by these causes—the not distinguishing between an *actual likeness* of things, and their clear correspondence in place, use, manifest design, and other such circumstances—the confining your attention too closely to the *two* terms of an analogy which are *alone*, usually, exhibited in comparison—and, the inferring too much from the practice of good authors, who have suffered themselves occasionally to use the words “similitude,” “similar,” instead of “analogy,” “analogous,” when in fact they

<sup>m</sup> i. e. as appears, to [the likeness of congeniality, in] “the subject matter.”

<sup>n</sup> Letter, p. 14.

meant still to designate a likeness *of relations*, and a *correspondence*, not a *likeness of terms*. This is the sum of my view of your objections.

Before any endeavour is made to reconcile you to his opinions concerning the specific nature of analogy, let us see to what department of logic the employment of analogies belongs. It falls, I think, under the head of Comparison.

Every one knows how valuable an instrument of teaching comparison is. By its help, what was obscure becomes clear, what was unknown, known. It is the juxtaposition of things, and notions, like to like; and thus the introduction of the mind, by an easy step, to fresh conceptions, and, generally to fresh acquisitions of knowledge. Some comparisons, however, are trifling and erroneous, while others are important and legitimate. In matters of theology, they have been, we will hope, for the most part, reverently adopted from holy writ; but we know also, that there have been profane inventions of this kind, verging even on

blasphemy. Hence springs, I may justly presume, the care bestowed both by yourself and the Enquirer on the determination of the legitimate character of one of its two branches: viz. Analogy.

It has but two, surely. The likeness of *things* (which is similitude, or resemblance) must furnish one of these;—the likeness of their *relations* (which I must not yet call analogy) supplies the other, I should assert, but that you disallow the *independent* existence of the latter, in morals, which is confessedly the widest field of exercise for the human judgment. In morals, I say, for you admit that there may be, elsewhere, “ a comparison of bare proportions,” founded on “ a mere likeness of relations<sup>o</sup>.” I should have conjectured, that you meant here to except the case of Mathematics, (Euclid having defined mathematical analogy to consist in “ the similitude *of ratios*,”) but that you have formally argued against such exception<sup>p</sup>. In fact, this argument is the princi-

<sup>o</sup> Letter, p. 33.

<sup>p</sup> Ibid, p. 3—8.

pal weapon with which you combat the propriety of Dr. C.'s definition;—a circumstance which surprised me at first, because *he* has not used one “inference arising from “mathematical investigations” in support of it. But I perceive<sup>q</sup> that you have inadvertently restricted the import of the symbols A, B, C, D, employed by him, to *mathematical* quantities, whereas they are (as you will acknowledge, on re-consideration) intended to designate *any* four things capable of constituting an analogy. With this observation, I, who confine myself to the task of replying to your objections, might wave all farther comment on what you have alleged, on the assumption of his having been swayed in framing his account of the nature of analogy, by a regard to “the ordinary use of “the word” *by geometers*”<sup>r</sup>. But since you have, on this occasion, exhibited in detail the principle, to which, without much farther demonstration, you afterwards refer invariably for confutation of Dr. C.'s position—

<sup>q</sup> See Letter, p. 4. l. 19—23.

<sup>r</sup> Ibid. p. 3.

I should do you wrong, were I not to consider what you have thus urged, attentively. To save time, I will borrow the term which you have adopted, in stating this principle; viz. *congeniality*. From your context I gather that you mean by it—sameness of kind, indicated by the possession of common properties<sup>•</sup>. And I conjecture that you have preferred it to *homogeneity*, because the latter is, in general, *strictly* construed, and you have need of a term which shall apply both to *perfect* and *imperfect* sameness of kind<sup>†</sup>. This is fair and convenient.

Now the principle itself is, that “it is this “*very congeniality* pervading the subjects “of every definite science, *which furnishes* “*the substratum of analogy*”.” And herein resides the *likeness*, which you afterward declare essential to “any two or more *moral* “subjects<sup>‡</sup>,” in order that they should enter into an analogy, and which you instance

<sup>•</sup> Letter, p. 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 17, 20, &c.

<sup>†</sup> Ibid. p. 6. (and Note,) p. 9, 24, &c.

<sup>‡</sup> Ibid. p. 7.

<sup>§</sup> Ibid. p. 24.

forthwith in the case of those which are *geometrical*: viz. lines, surfaces, and solids. These are, I understand you to say, *alike*, inasmuch as they are congenial; and congenial, inasmuch as they are magnitudes. There is, you allow, a subordinate distinction between perfectly homogeneous magnitudes, (as line to line,) and partly heterogeneous magnitudes, (as line to solid.) Still, you contend, that both these classes are ultimately congenial. And so they are, by your own definition of the word. And so are, by parity of reasoning in morals, judgment and imagination, for they are both *mental faculties*, or revenge and mercy, for they are both *passions*, or, to go one step farther, bodily strength and cunning, for they are both *human* qualities. The very same process of abstraction, by which the common notion of *magnitude* is elicited from line, surface, and solid, presents us with the genus *passion*, when it is applied to revenge and mercy, and so on with the rest. Are they therefore *like* each other, in any recognized sense of the word? Surely not.

But, to confine ourselves a little while longer to the mathematician's province, does *he* ever admit that a line is *like* a surface, or talk of the *resemblance* of either of these to a solid? I may venture to say that he does not, scanty as my knowledge is of his operations. Suppose, however, that he did. This would not establish your position at all. For, would he, or *could* he, employ this fact, in any shape, to demonstrate an analogy to subsist among any of them? If so, Euclid has forgotten himself, in having made no mention of the likeness of congeniality, in his somewhat prolix enunciation of a test for the ascertaining *geometrical* analogies. Should you urge that the definition referred to implies the "common quality of extension" in the subjects of these analogies; I grant the fact as readily as I have granted that they are "magnitudes," and have still to ask whether mathematicians call lines and surfaces *like*, (or similar,) because they are extended, or even whether they ever infer such *likeness* or similarity from that fact. On the contrary, it is well



known that they would *uno ore*, pronounce any such fashion a solecism in language, and a fundamental error of conception.

If these observations are just, they invalidate (I conceive) your assertion of a similarity of subjects necessarily implied in the expression of a similarity of geometrical ratios. For you will readily allow the geometer to have a better right than any one else to determine where any proposed term, as “similarity,” or “likeness,” can, or cannot, be applied with propriety to the things which fall within his province.

Still, we are bound to discuss this question—with reference to its *practical value*. I am ready to concede, that if there was the slightest probability of any increase of real knowledge, or even of clearness of description, sure to result from the assumption that things *congenial* (in your sense of that word) are in all cases things *similar*; we might disregard the mathematician’s protest, and adopt it, for our own use, in his affairs, and in any others, where it might avail. But this is not the case. The *likeness* for which you

contend is purely ideal, the creature of abstraction. Its guidance is not safe conduct.

Undoubtedly it has been in the power of any man, since the days of Aristotle, to educe by continued abstraction, from almost *any* two given notions, (say those of a line, and of a solid; or, of bodily strength, and cunning,) some common nature (congeniality, if you will) designated by one or other of these ten words, substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, time, place, situation, habit. Nay, these may be comprehended under substance and accident; and these again, finally, under being<sup>y</sup>. Also, if the proposed notions be already of a highly abstracted character, as geometrical magnitudes are, the process of generalization will be obvious and rapid. There is but one step (magnitude) between line, surface, solid, and quantity<sup>z</sup>. Hence, in many theoretical treat-

<sup>y</sup> Later writers have added to the ten, as you know, but this is not to our purpose.

<sup>z</sup> There is that one step to be trodden, else we confound continuous with discrete quantity.

tises on moral subjects, (take for instance “Ferguson’s Elements of Moral Philosophy,”) there is an attractive shew of simplicity, precision, and uniformity of doctrine; great perspicuity of division; faculties, habits, conditions, classed in large masses, with broad lights upon them. But, for practical instruction, how deplorably dry such compositions are, in comparison with the teaching of your admired Paley! Not that any writer ever understood sound *logic* better, or practised it more sedulously, than he has; but that few have adhered so unaffectedly to that “plainness of speech,” which comes home to every man’s bosom, because it gives fresh moral force to ordinary matters of fact, without altering their familiar aspect. Not to digress farther, I will here summarily avow my belief to be, that you have supposed a logical denomination capable of producing a practical conviction, in morals, as well as in mathematics. For instance, you have called a line and a solid, “reason” and “instinct,” *congenial*<sup>a</sup>; you have justified

<sup>a</sup> I adopt this term in the wish to combine brevity with fairness.

the propriety of this appellation, by your circumstantial definition of the term; and, then, have required us to admit, on the strength of it, that a line is *like* a solid, reason *like* instinct; and, afterward, by extension of the same principle, that human wisdom is *like* that ineffable attribute of God, by which he hath “made the heavens<sup>b</sup>,” and “founded the earth<sup>c</sup>.” Whereas the writer whom you criticise has not attempted to refine on the vulgar notion of likeness, or to demand that it be invariably attached to any abstract idea, (as that of congeniality,) but has merely admonished men not to confound it, especially in their aspirations after the knowledge of “things above,” with another notion, of distinct character and different application, viz. that of correspondence, (or homology.) He has reminded us, that we have no reason, *a priori*, to predicate *likeness* of the correspondent *terms* of an *analogy*, moral or mathematical. He *does not deny* that they *may be* like; he only contends that they are not so necessarily<sup>d</sup>. This is no

<sup>b</sup> Ps. cxxxvi. 5.

<sup>c</sup> Prov. iii. 19.

<sup>d</sup> See p. 34.

absolute innovation on our established practice. It is a rule to which, in strongly marked cases, falling obviously within the limits of our apprehensions, we already conform spontaneously. For instance, in the physiology of plants, if we hear it remarked that the sap of a tree is *analogous* to blood in the human body, do we understand it to be implied that sap is *like* blood, in the plain and obvious meaning of the phrase? Or, if we are told that instinct is to brutes, what reason is to man, do we forthwith infer that the faculty of instinct is in its nature and internal constitution, like reason? Do we not rather conceive a *dissimilarity* between the two, at least as great as the dissimilarity of man to brute? Is it not rather implied in the analogy thus stated, that reason is one thing, and instinct another; that each has its separate province, but that each discharges in that province, an office like to that of the other? The expression is sometimes thrown into this form—instinct in brutes supplies the place of reason. This is to speak loosely, and the first sound of the phrase would seem

to convey a notion, that instinct acts as a representative of reason. But I appeal to every one, whether we do not, as instantaneously discard the thought thus arising from an ambiguity of language? And why? Because we apply, of our own accord, in such clear cases, the corrective which Dr. C. is recommending throughout his Note; viz. our knowledge of the fact, that, similarity of things does not follow from the similarity of their relation to other things, wherefore instinct may *operate similarly*, in many respects, to reason, and yet be very unlike reason. It is not, I repeat, in these cases, in which the subjects contemplated are not altogether disproportionate to the range of our intellects, that we are so much in danger of neglecting thus to guard ourselves against confusion, as when we strive to comprehend the sublime, the mysterious, the infinite. Then, as long as we “keep to our Bibles<sup>e</sup>” with a “single eye” and a humble mind, we are safe; when we quit them, and trust to the wings

<sup>e</sup> Enquiry, p. 8.

of our own speech, we are in jeopardy. What terms soever are therein employed, in condescension to our limited perceptions, whether “anger,” “repentance,” “gladness;” or, “counsel,” “decree,” “predestinate;” or, “wisdom,” “justice,” “power,” &c. there is, throughout the tone of inspiration, so awful and peculiar a majesty diffused, that it must be by the agency of “the tempter” himself, if ever we incline to conceive therefrom irreverently, or audaciously, of God and his attributes. The Word speaketh as man never yet spake. But, on the other hand, in the urging of those same terms, with obstinate vehemence, by the devotees, chiefly, of “one of the most melancholy corruptions of our faith to which a Christian is liable<sup>f</sup>,” how offensively have proud lips profaned the language of the Spirit, how fearfully have they dared to sit in debate on the purposes of the Almighty, and pretend to demonstrate what his revealed will is, and what his future judgments will be! Oh that they had hearkened

<sup>f</sup> Enquiry, p. 123—130. Note.

to the warning voice that denounces the self-deceiving tongue! But they will not believe that their own tongues *are* such “unruly “evils<sup>g</sup>;” and yet, it is written, “the tongue “can no man tame.” Be they sure, that “little member” is too capable of “boasting “great things<sup>h</sup>” against God unwarily, even when it is reciting most confidently, and with fancied piety, from the divine oracles.

If then—(to redescend from Scripture to the lesson delivered by a brother Christian)—if, I say, one of our brethren, of “well-earned “reputation” and “pre-eminent authority<sup>i</sup>,” has laboured to frame for our use CAUTIONS<sup>k</sup> as sound as they are needful, against presumptuously speculating on the divine nature, as it is “intrinsicly and in itself,” on the strength of our acquaintance with the more familiar acceptation of those terms in which the Godhead is condescendingly revealed, so far only as it behoves us to know it, and with reference only to our *relations* to it, shall we not gratefully accept this service

<sup>g</sup> St. James iii. 8.    <sup>h</sup> Ibid. ver. 8, 5.    <sup>i</sup> Letter, p. 1.

<sup>k</sup> Ibid. p. 53.



at his hands, and rejoice with him in his good use of the good gifts which he has received. Now, the soundness of *the grounds on which* two such cautions have been offered to us from such a quarter, you have, with zealous sincerity, impugned by a train of objections. Those objections I have endeavoured to refute. I am sure, Sir, that you had rather see them fairly subverted, than fully confirmed, or even admitted without examination.

[I wish to combat you in principle, not in detail of reasoning. Special demurrage to every proposition which you may have involved in the exposition of your main views, is not my intention. Some few points, however, still require notice, before I proceed briefly (and, I trust, with due courtesy) to correct the involuntary misrepresentation which you have made of some sentences of the Enquirer's doctrine concerning the analogical expression in Scripture of the nature and attributes of God.

Do not let me seem to have laid too much stress on the word "congeniality" as em-

ployed by you. It is essential to the exposition of your views of analogy, and indicates indeed the very conception which gives them their individual character. But let our readers take it in the widest extent of signification imputed to it by your context; let “common relationship”<sup>l</sup>—“liability to general affections”<sup>m</sup>—“possession, or participation, of some common properties”<sup>n</sup>—“kindred nature”<sup>o</sup>—or any other equivalent phrase by which you have varied your style, be substituted every where for that word, as it has been adopted from you by me. This is but fair dealing. Only let it be remembered, that every such phrase denotes, according to your scheme, *the ground on which* you claim to prove a likeness of things, and not that likeness itself. When you use “resemblance” and “affinity” as synonymous in your definition of Moral Analogy<sup>p</sup>, it must be borne in mind that you have before assigned<sup>q</sup> to “affinity” the same meaning with “similitude”<sup>r</sup>,

<sup>l</sup> Letter, p. 6.    <sup>m</sup> Ibid.    <sup>n</sup> Ibid. p. 10.    <sup>o</sup> Ibid. p. 19.

<sup>p</sup> Ibid. p. 24.    <sup>q</sup> Ibid. p. 16.    <sup>r</sup> See also p. 50.

else you will appear to be chargeable with a *petitio principii*.

You have supposed the question to be put, “How do we discover any such common possession of properties in two subjects?” And you answer, “By judging from the similarity of their effects<sup>s</sup>.” You must mean here in morals, for in mathematics you have not, surely, discovered lines, surfaces, and solids, to be magnitudes, by the similarity of their effects. In morals, then. All that I shall remark is, that judgment formed on *such* observed similarity of two effects not altogether identical, (suppose the hut of the beaver, and the dwelling-house of man,) be they ever so much alike, presupposes the exercise of *abstraction*, (i. e. the collecting their features of agreement, exclusively of the points in which they differ.) And this process (abstraction) was the way in which, as I endeavoured to shew, you *must* proceed in all cases to arrive at congeniality, or community of properties, simply because they are

<sup>s</sup> Letter, p. 10.

*abstract* ideas. Wherefore I object to your *theory* of analogy, which rests *exclusively* on this basis, that it will often require long conduct of an operation hard to pursue far, and in the course of which thousands lose their way every day. [Dr. C. shews a less hazardous, a broader road, without absolutely shutting up this.] To your *theory*, I say, for the *practice* which you should institute on it is as much too narrow, (as it appears to me,) as the theory itself is too operose. Many of the most sublime discoveries in natural philosophy, (for example,) even of an identity of causes, have been derived from the observation of effects *prima facie*, altogether dissimilar, nay, directly opposed to each other. Besides, similarity of *effect* does not always accompany, and thus indicate, similarity of *rank* among things related to each other; (e. g. revenge occupies a place in the bad man's heart similar to that of forgiveness in the good Christian's; yet their effects are opposite.) Now you would not *exclude* similarity of rank from furnishing a basis of analogy, I am sure. Do we not frequently speak

of titles and offices, in ancient governments, “*analogous*” to those which exist in modern constitutions? Yet the effects of the former and of the latter could not strike us as similar, if they presented themselves to us fully. The materials on which they wrought were very different; the circumstances under which, equally so. To take one example in illustration of what has been suggested in these few last sentences. The sense of honour, according to Montesquieu<sup>†</sup>, is the chief motive of personal feeling by which a monarchical government is upheld; and the fear of violent death, &c. serves the same office in a despot’s state. Here is an analogy, if anywhere; sense of honour is to the monarchy what fear is to the despotism—where is the observable similarity of effects between sense of honour and fear, or between monarchy and despotism?

<sup>†</sup> *Esprit des Loix*, b. i. c. 6, 9. I quote this sentiment of his for illustration’s sake only, of course. Like many others of his ingenious positions, it exhibits a materially defective view of the subject which he is handling. Still it is an analogical view of two relations.

In fine, analogy does not imply (any more than it excludes) resemblance of its subjects, but it does imply, and is suggested by, correspondence in rank, of the first with the third, the second with the fourth, numbered according to the order in which we think of them. Mathematicians call this correspondence, homology, and regulate all their statements of proportions by it.

But I hasten to conclude this branch of my rejoinder to you. Indeed I should not have pretended to discuss the subject with so much prolixity, if you had not taken Dr. C.'s attachment to this theory of analogy as the ground on which you erect an apparently logical deduction of a most harsh conclusion against him. I trust that I may in some measure have disproved, by anticipation, what you would infer as the necessary consequence of his views of this subject. It remains that I should restore to the passages alluded to in his own application of it to the interpretation of Scripture, what I conceive to be their only true meaning.

I shall not even delay encountering the

charge which you have thus alleged (in mistake, as I think) for the purpose of enquiring with you, whether figurative language may be called “analogical,” or not. You maintain strenuously<sup>u</sup> that it should be degraded to the appellation “metaphorical.” I differ from you, but am not inclined to argue a verbal question, (which the enquiry concerning analogy was not.) I avoid it; taking, in lieu of it, this opportunity of suggesting to you, that the frequent, nay<sup>x</sup>, prevalent use of analogy as synonymous with “similitude,” and of “analogous” as with “similar,” is not a fact which can avail you against Dr. C.’s account of the *notion* of analogy. He admits the fact, nay, points it out, and comments on its inconvenience. But he does not assert, that every writer who speaks<sup>y</sup> of “analogy, or similitude,” (as Bp. Butler,

<sup>u</sup> Letter, p. 17, &c.

<sup>x</sup> Analogy of Nat. and Rev. Religion, Introd. p. 6.

<sup>y</sup> I wish Dr. C. would say something on the gradual abbreviations of language. Horne Tooke caught up its theory in English grammar with avidity, and made it popular, nay, to a certain degree useful, by his ingenuity. But yielding to that affectation of originality, (which so

for instance,) leads his readers astray whenever he uses the word "analogy." Such assertion would be absolute pedantry. In fact, we have seen that Bp. Butler's *use* of the word, and Dr. C.'s, are, in sense and effect, precisely the same. For the truth is, the *context* of a clear-headed writer will almost always hinder the confusion which might in weaker hands result from the indiscriminate employment of two terms, not absolutely synonymous, (i. e. to which there answer respectively, two notions, not altogether the same, and which have no other specific names in use beside these very terms<sup>2</sup>.) But I am rambling from my busi-

fatally misguided him,) he hunted it into a mass of absurdities, an irrational confusion of the *etymological* with the *present* import of words. Professor D. Stewart has well exposed his leading fallacy, but has not even pretended to unfold the whole importance of this subject, to the philosophy of language.

<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, when the clearest writer describes only *two* terms of an analogy, and applies the words "similitude," "similar," immediately to them, readers are naturally tempted to forget that he is merely likening them to each other, *in respect of their relations* to two



ness. I return to say, that I decline combating your reprehension of Dr. C.'s classification of metaphors, under the head of analogies; for *two* reasons. *First*, I perceive that we differ very widely in our manners of considering the subject-matter of metaphor. You take much pains<sup>a</sup> to establish an *absolute* distinction, where I should contend for the importance of a *relative* one—relative to the circumstances under which any given analogical expression, in morals, is used. It is in this spirit that you tax Dr. C. with having “confounded together the “provinces of reason and imagination<sup>b</sup>.” I apprehend that you have narrowed the range of reason too much. She has a large share in the control of the boldest figurative expressions. *Secondly*, I think that you have

other terms. This liberty of style has apparently influenced your conceptions of analogy materially. Had it not, you would rather have held that in all analogical expressions, where the similarity of *two things* is expressed, the similarity of *two relations* is implied, than the converse of this proposition. See Letter, p. 7.

<sup>a</sup> Letter, p. 11, 13, 23, &c.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* p. 22.

not deliberately weighed the fact, that holy Scripture abounds in forms of speech highly metaphorical. Benevolently suited in all things to our wants and weaknesses, it addresses us in the language of our own heads and hearts, and, indulging our fancy in the excursions which it loves, makes it cheerfully to aid our feeble judgments. For there exists in the mind of man a proneness to *metaphorise*, that is, to strike out resemblances between the relations of things and thoughts very remote from each other, and to delight itself<sup>c</sup> in drawing instruction from them. Prophecy, type, precept, and parable combine in directing to the “one needful” purpose, this fondness for figurative representations. Would it not be (if I may borrow your words) “highly injurious to “Christian theology,” if it could be supposed that the language of the Bible was in great part that of “merely fanciful illustration,” abounding with “ornaments of “rhetoric,” which “cannot become instru-

<sup>c</sup> Arist. Rhet. b. iii. c. 10.

“ments of logic?” It did not occur to you that all readers would find bolder imagery, and more imaginative metaphors, in almost every book of Scripture, than this—the calling “a certain proposition the basis of a “system<sup>d</sup>.” Your judgment being against allowing the example adduced by Dr. C. of an analogy, evidently independent of any likeness of terms, you have argued somewhat hastily against the dignity and value of the whole class to which it belongs.]

In taking leave of the subject<sup>e</sup>, I will avow, that one principal excellence of analogy as an instrument of the extension of knowledge, appears to me to be derived from the wonderful aptness with which the human mind discovers *correspondence* in rank, situation, &c. between two objects of different classes, long before it detects any real *likeness*, should such exist, between them. The former is much the more *external* feature of their character, and therefore a more obvious and ready guide to the understanding, which

<sup>d</sup> Enquiry, p. 123.      <sup>e</sup> See Note (A.)

is ever grasping at such helps to its progress. And, not to be always arguing against *you*, I will avow that I cannot bring myself to think, with Dr. C. that “the transfer of “name from one of the terms in the relation “best known to its correspondent term “in the other, causes no confusion.” At least, I imagine that this is not so universally.

And now to defend the “Enquirer” from a much more serious imputation than that of error in an “account of analogy”—I shall do no more than contrast the passages on which you raise so lively an alarm, with that representation of their import, in which (most unwillingly I repeat this) you have inadvertently exposed him to misinterpretation.

You combat views no where to be found in Dr. C.’s book, nor deducible, by sound inference, from any thing which is found there, when you say to him<sup>c</sup>,

“Sir, if your interpretations were adopted,

<sup>c</sup> Letter, p. 25.

“ the whole language of Scripture would be-  
 “ come allegory and mysticism, and you would  
 “ unintentionally effect on moral and doctrinal  
 “ subjects the same kind of revolution which  
 “ Hutchinson and the Cabbalists, by their in-  
 “ terpretations, formerly attempted to produce  
 “ in philosophy.”

I do not offer to accompany you, Sir, through your amplification of this mistaken comment on his text, nor your enumeration of four kinds of mischief consequent on the admitting his opinions. I shall strictly confine myself to shewing that it *is* a mistaken comment.

In the first place, (generally,) you have led yourself and your readers to suppose, that what he offers as *a caution against peremptory assertion* of the close resemblance of the attributes of God to the qualities of man, and presumptuous reasoning thereon, extends to *an absolute and universal denial* of the existence of any fact, *equivalent in moral effect to it*. Let them now arbitrate, between your impression, derived from his text, and mine.

He says<sup>f</sup>, “ in the first place, when we  
 “ speak of the *eye*, the *arm*, the *hand* of God,  
 “ all are agreed in regarding these as purely  
 “ analogical expressions—not indicating any  
 “ resemblance in the things spoken, but  
 “ simply denoting that we recognize in God  
 “ faculties analogous to those signified by  
 “ these words, but of a nature wholly dif-  
 “ ferent.”

Now the phrase “ of a nature wholly dif-  
 “ ferent,” (to which you object,) my first and  
 last impressions prompt me thus to com-  
 plete—“ of a nature wholly different from”  
 man’s faculties *of seeing with the eye of his  
 body, striking with the arm of his body, or  
 handling with the hand of his body.* Com-  
 pare Dr. C.’s allusion to the anthropomor-  
 phites in the next page, (where he refers to  
 this very passage,) and also Abp. King’s  
 language with this phrase which I have sup-  
 plied. He speaks the sentiments of Dr. C.  
 you know. He says, “ when the holy Scrip-  
 “ tures speak of God, they ascribe eyes,

<sup>f</sup> Enquiry, p. 131.

“ and hands, and feet to him; not that  
 “ it is designed that we should believe that  
 “ he has any of these members according  
 “ to the *literal* signification; but the mean-  
 “ ing is, that he has a power to execute all  
 “ those acts, to the effecting of which in us  
 “ these parts are instrumental; that is, he  
 “ can converse with men as well as if he had  
 “ a tongue and a mouth, he can discern all  
 “ that we say or do as perfectly as if he had  
 “ eyes and ears, &c.\*” I could not, if I  
 were to labour with all the force of imagina-  
 tion, attach any other sense to Dr. C.’s  
 words. Yet you have implied him to mean  
 faculties “ of a nature” “ wholly different”  
 from those which are *metaphorically* de-  
 signated by eye, &c. such as “ perceiving  
 “ understanding,” &c. See Isaiah vi. 9.  
 Matthew xiii. 14. where these faculties are  
 expressly opposed to seeing with the eye,  
 &c. in the *literal* sense. You cannot mean  
 to assert that “ *omnipresence*” denotes a di-  
 vine faculty *like* to man’s seeing with the eye

\* Abp. King’s Sermon on Predestination, with notes by Whately, p. 9.

of his body. This was surely an oversight, and hence a misrepresentation.

I have dwelt on this passage, because the words "wholly different" are put forward prominently by you, and in fact are the strongest terms which you quote. Let them be rightly applied, and then duly weighed.

He proceeds, "in the second place when  
 " we ascribe anger, jealousy, repentance, re-  
 " venge, to God, we are never supposed to  
 " mean more than that his dealings will be  
 " to us such as proceed from these passions  
 " in men. It is not even pretended that  
 " there are qualities in his nature similar to  
 " these qualities in us, but the analogy is  
 " founded only on the relation of *cause* to  
 " effect. The analogy is not indeed alto-  
 " gether fanciful. God is still regarded as  
 " an *agent*: but having no word to denote  
 " the *active cause in him*, we borrow the  
 " word which belongs to the cause of these  
 " effects in men."

Here it is important to observe, that Dr. C. recognizes the *existence of active causes* in God, correspondent, *in relation to their effect*,



to these *emotions* in men. (Could the atheist<sup>h</sup>, or pantheist, make even a fair *verbal* advantage of this language?) But he refuses to liken their *essence* to that of “passions “and affections belonging to ourselves,” fearful lest he do dishonour to God. You hold, that we can conceive of anger, jealousy, &c. notions “divested of *all* the imperfections “which are inherent in them as belonging “to ourselves,” and are not afraid to impute them, thus purified by abstraction, to the Deity. This is simply a question, whether he is over-cautious, or you too venturous. This falls without the province I have entered upon, and it would be, moreover, very arrogant on my part to discuss it. But I subjoin below an opinion on the matter, which you will respect, I am sure, as deeply as I do<sup>i</sup>.

<sup>h</sup> Letter, p. 27, 38.

<sup>i</sup> When, therefore, the Scriptures speak of the face, eyes, ears, and hands of God, or his grief, jealousy, anger, and other mental emotions, we are to consider that such language is only accommodated to the understandings of men, and that those properties and qualities do in fact by no

Thirdly, Dr. C. concludes, when we speak of the wisdom and knowledge “ of God, his “ justice, mercy, love, long-suffering, the “ process is precisely similar to that before “ described. These are effects continually “ coming under our notice, which indicate “ these qualities in men, and from a view of “ effects similar to these in the system of “ the universe we suppose corresponding “ qualities in the author of that system, “ and accordingly bestow on them the same “ name.”

Here then, again, “ since the process is “ precisely similar,” is to be understood an acknowledgment of certain powers in God, correspondent, in relation to their effect, to these faculties in man<sup>k</sup>.

This is Dr. C.’s own application of *his* own account of analogy, to terms which you means belong to the Supreme Being. *We can form no conception of the agency of a pure spiritual substance, and therefore, in speaking of God, we are under the necessity of using terms derived from ourselves, and which we cannot but know to be in reality inapplicable to him.* Bp. Tomline, ubi supra.

<sup>k</sup> See note (B.)

admit to be applied to the Almighty in an analogical sense: "Being borrowed from " other objects," he argues, " they cannot " adequately describe his nature and pro- " ceedings. They are the *best* means, in- " deed the only means, *we* have of expressing " our thoughts upon this subject at all, but " they ought never to be used without a " reverential sense of their imperfection; and " the rule of interpreting them as *relative* " to ourselves is an admirable preservative " against many mistakes and perplexities, " into which men are led by a critical ana- " lysis of scriptural terms." The rest of the note bearing on this application is of course to be interpreted by this its principal member, in what terms soever it may express indignation at the reproach of atheism and infidelity, cast on those who have denied the certainty of a resemblance between God's attributes and man's faculties.

Now let us once more consider what it is that you object to this modest and reasonable rule of interpreting Scripture. Wherein do you differ from the Enquirer? Simply

on this point, that, whereas he finds in holy writ, a revelation of *active causes* in the *Deity, correspondent*, in relation to their effect, to certain passions, faculties, &c. in man, and called by the names of those passions, faculties, &c. in benevolent accommodation to the narrowness of our comprehensions; but draws back from reasoning therefore, on the former, as if they were *really like in their nature* to the latter; you, on the contrary, insist on concluding on the same scriptural grounds that they are in “some real sense, “though *in an infinitely small degree*, similar “and congenial.”

Sir, I firmly believe, that no two sincere Christians, who are both earnestly seeking the truth, with prayer to God for grace to aid them, and with unfeigned respect for the authority of those “burning and shining “lights” with whom he hath, from time to time, blessed his Church, are ever far asunder from each other in their convictions respecting things spiritual. Only let each refrain from charging the other with promulgating opinions perilous to the souls of his

brethren, until he has fully ascertained that he differs *essentially* from him in an article of faith. Impute it to the hearty desire which I feel to reconcile your views with those of the Enquirer, which have been so satisfactory to my own mind, that I take the liberty of intreating you to re-examine the grounds of your opposition to him, and see whether they be not much too narrow and unsubstantial, to justify the continuance of your hostility to his positions.

I will not advert to those holy mysteries of our faith, those certain, yet inscrutable, doctrines, in which is contained our whole hope of mercy, and of heaven, on which, at the close of your Letter, you anticipate the fall of much evil, resulting from the opinions which you condemn. If the foregoing considerations are just, they suffice to preclude the possibility of any apparent contradiction being imputed, as a consequence of those opinions, to any passage of Scripture in which the agency of one of the divine Persons is expressed even of him, in whom "the God-head and manhood were joined together

“ never to be divided.” And, if the task of replying to this part of your argument be unnecessary, I conceive myself bound to decline commenting on it at all, lest I involve awful matters more deeply in a mixed debate, and be found without the excuse of compulsion.

Neither will I make any other remark on the apprehensions which you entertain, lest the force of scriptural precepts of imitation of “ our Father which is in heaven” should be impaired by “ this kind of interpretation,” than that you must not say that “ by the “ same mode of it, any one text of Scripture “ may be brought to bear on *any* one moral “ duty<sup>k</sup>.” If you will but cast your eye once more over the whole passage from which you quote, you will, I trust, perceive, that the Enquirer supposes us to have *separately* before our mind’s eye in each case the notions we have of God’s holiness, mercy, and perfection, derived from his dealings with us, and “ not to be satisfied with our

<sup>k</sup> Letter, p. 45.

“ own limited attainments,” in *each* of them, respectively; but, by fixing that heavenly pattern before our eyes, strive daily to convince ourselves of our own unholy, our unforgiving, and our imperfect dispositions, and seek chastening grace to descend on each, in the spirit of that humility, which such contemplation cannot but beget.

And in these our permitted aspirations, let us grasp most thankfully at *all* the help which Scripture yields them; still watching as sedulously, that we do not presume too far on the condescension of Almighty God in pouring to us those elementary conceptions, which are to give birth to dutiful affection toward him. Let us beware of halting at any limited notions, how exalted soever, of his being and attributes. Scripture incites us to be ever urging upward this arduous flight of thought, yet admonishes us that the finite mind must ever be infinitely distant from comprehension of Him, the Infinite. His ways are not our ways, it is written.

I have no desire to oppose conjecture to

conjecture, on the question whether “the nature of many a living creature approaches nearer to ours, than that of ours to the eternal and invisible God<sup>1</sup>.” We both believe, I am sure, that ever since man’s wilful defacement of the “image of God,” impressed on him, he must, in his earthly state, be “compared to the beasts that perish,” rather than to the Lord, holy and perfect.

Much less would I parade in detail any inaccuracy, which you have probably ere this observed in your account of mathematical analogy, or any unimportant misconstruction or misquotation in your Letter<sup>m</sup>. As a reader, it is fair to indicate them to you; as your answerer, I acknowledge them to be the veriest trifles.

No, Sir; you write (permit me to say) with so much frankness of temper, that it would be worse than illiberal to harass you with petty and scattered exceptions. On the whole, you have argued for a more *familiar*, as Dr. C. has for a more *reflective*,

<sup>1</sup> Enquiry, p. 135.

<sup>m</sup> Letter, p. 8, 15, 19.



view of a Scriptural topic. But as you are able, so you will be well-inclined, to cherish the union of the two, if you see cause to doubt the soundness of your objections to the latter. That they admit of union, nay, that the one resolves itself naturally into the other, when released from the embarrassment in which the rejection of correct notions of analogy involves it, I have already taken on myself to suggest. I would not call the one “the creed of the learned<sup>n</sup>,” the other, “the creed of the vulgar<sup>o</sup>,” but both together different expressions of the common creed of orthodox Christians.

At parting let me say, that if in my haste (for I have written at short and stolen snatches of leisure) any expression has fallen from me capable of being thought at all disrespectful to your seniority in the Church, or the general superiority (which I freely confess) of your talents and acquirements to mine, I beg leave distinctly to apologize for it. And, if it be not an imperti-

<sup>n</sup> Letter, p. 15. l. 23.

<sup>o</sup> Ibid. p. 19. l. 3.

nent testimony, suffer me to avow to you my lively conviction of your having been immediately actuated, in all that you have written, by the desire of confirming men in the giving of glory to God.

I remain, Rev. Sir,

With sincere respect,

Your's, &c.

WILLIAM DALBY.

EXETER COLLEGE,  
Oxford, Feb. 24, 1822.

P. S. I have not thought it my business to defend Abp. King's Sermon. Mr. Whately, with his well-known acuteness and perspicuity, has summed up and enforced Dr. C.'s vindication of its tendency from the objections now revived. He has, of course, in so doing, maintained also the legitimacy of Dr. C.'s views of its subject; and thus anticipated the intent of my clumsy endeavours. But I have not been deterred by this consideration from reporting the impression left on the mind of an ordinary student of divinity and

logic, *by a bare reperusal of the "Enquiry."* Dr. C. is not answerable (I must observe) for any erroneous conception of his meaning which I may have formed, or, indeed, for any one expression contained in these pages.



## NOTES.

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Note (A.) p. 61.

YOU propose (p. 32.) an *experimentum crucis* of the controversy on Analogy. It cannot be accepted. "Death" is not related to "life" as "white" to "black," nor "light" to "darkness," as "youth" to "age;" for "death" is *mere privation* of "life," and "darkness" *mere privation* of "light;" but "black" is not privation of "white," but the *contrary* to white, as youth is to age. Wherefore the ratios proposed are not the same. Whence also, no such analogy as is defended on our side—no *reductio ad absurdum* therefore, on your part. Your good humour will not be discomposed, I am sure, if my logic thus opposes your array of "absurd comparisons" with the small arms of its ancient discipline. Had you proposed *this* case, "life is to death, as light to darkness," the offer could not have been, in honour, declined. But enough of this trifling.

Note (B.) p. 68.

Mr. Hume's argument (as quoted by Dr. Reid, to whom you refer) is this, "The universe is a *singular* effect, and therefore we can draw no conclusion

“ from it, whether it may have been made by wisdom “ or not.” Now “ singular” is here used in the sense of *having no other observed effect* (as of *human wisdom*) *correspondent to it*. Which is an assumption denied in limine by the Enquirer, who obtains the indication of an *active cause* in the Deity, correspondent to *wisdom* in man from the correspondence of observed effects in the system of the world, with other observed effects indicating wisdom in man<sup>a</sup>. So far, then, from arguing “ in the very manner in which Mr. Hume “ has,” he has (if I see the case rightly) taken the very opposite ground, and come (I need hardly add) to the very opposite conclusion.

Addition to note, p. 55.

To prevent mistake, I should have added, There is a perceivable similarity between the effects of *the relations* of the sense of honour to monarchy, and of fear to despotism, respectively;—none between the sense of honour and fear, or their effects, *absolutely* considered.

<sup>a</sup> See Enquiry, p. 131.

THE END.









