DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL GROWTH IN AMERICA

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FOUR LECTURES

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CONTENTS.

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LECTURE I.

A FUNDAMENTAL TENDENCY.

THE occupation of the American continent by Europeans has part of its significance in the fact that it provided conditions for an unprecedented extension of democracy. In the presence of the wilderness and uncultivated tribes, the conventionalities of an old and complex society were wanting, and a new social growth began, with few of the hampering influences of artificial restrictions and distinctions. Never before, within historic times, had there been offered to man such an ample field of escape from the conventional forms

of established society, by which individuals are kept bound in their places of inferiority and superiority. In the unsettled regions of America there was the widest freedom from the restraints of civilization. There was ample room for millions to take essentially similar places. Under these circumstances, men necessarily and inevitably drifted towards the enjoyment of common rights and privileges, and the law in the course of time recognized and confirmed the fact.

Through the discovery of America and its subsequent occupation by Europeans, large scope was given to a modified form of political practice; and the new phenomena of political life have given a new basis for scientific inductions. The idea of equality under the law, which we recognize as one of the results of the new social conditions, has entered as a conspicuous feature into recent political discussion. In fact, all the important inductions drawn from the phenomena of colonial life on this continent, constituting, as they do, a noteworthy addition to our general knowledge of politics,

must be set down among the consequences of westward migration. The discovery and settlement of America have, moreover, enabled us to study society in the actual process of formation. We have seen men build communities, and by slow degrees organize a body politic. First, in this process, came the creation of an agency or institution to do certain work which the society wished done; then the union of these several agencies or institutions into a system, and this system we have seen fit to call a state.

This point of view has been of vast importance in revealing the state as an organized part of the nation; or as an instrument of human creation designed to accomplish the common work of society. Seeing the state grow up, little by little, as one institution after another was organized to perform some part of the increasing social work, there has been derived the well-founded conclusion that the origin of the state and the source of political authority are not to be looked for in the inscrutable mind of Providence, but in the instincts

and intelligence of the nation itself. We have seen the state develop in this new world without an external initiative. We have consequently been led to set aside the vague mediæval idea of a Divine origin of political authority, and have emphasized the truth which has been made clear by American experience, that the state is a body of institutions, not only of human origin, but also of worldly purposes.

The subjection of America to civilized peoples has contributed to some phases of general popular advancement. This is suggested by the fact that the course of progress is along the geographical course of migration; and the reason of this is not far to seek. The men who move on over the frontier, who give their lives to building a new society in a new field, are not the drones, the ineffectives, or those who feel that their work is finished. Such as these are left behind. The new community, therefore, begins its career with the minimum of conservatism and the maximum of force; and, except as it becomes entangled in the qualities of the barbarians, it is in a

better condition to run the course of civilization than was its antecedent society.

Our English ancestors generally kept themselves in this condition. In colonizing America they were uncompromising. They moved steadily and irresistibly forward, and their advance was marked by the disappearance of the uncultivated aborigines. The Spaniards, on the other hand, wherever they met the Indians of America, were willing to descend from their European standard of civilization and affiliate with them on a lower plane. They compromised with them both physically and spiritually. The English policy has tended to the ultimate extermination of the barbarians; but the Indians who have survived contact with the Spaniards have become constituent parts of the new nations. The important question involved in these facts is not the question of the preservation or disappearance of a people, but the progress of civilization. It is, therefore, a matter of grave concern whether a nation in colonizing preserves its stock unmixed with lower elements, or, becoming united

with barbarians, leaves a posterity less effective than would have been descendants of unadulterated blood. In the one case, the colony is able to take up the work of civilization at the point to which it had been advanced by the parent nation. In the other case, the colony finds itself endowed with more or less of the taint and bias of barbarism, and is thus outranked by colonies of the higher race, which have remained true to themselves. The community which is descended from a union of Europeans and Indians has naturally more or less of an inclination towards the thoughts and life of its Indian ancestors, and is thus compelled to go over a certain part of the path of progress which the European has already trod, and which has led him to his present position of enlightenment. It is obliged, by a slow and laborious process of cultivation, to eliminate or overcome the influence of the element that makes for degeneracy; and, until this is accomplished, its facility of movement along the way of civilization is impeded, and it is consequently outrun by com-

munities that have been careful to withhold themselves from barbarian contamination.

The English were induced to hold aloof from the barbarian by that quality in them which we may call their race-respect; and through this it has been possible for them to spread their colonies to the four quarters of the world, with no departure anywhere from the social standard of the parent stock. And the preservation of this standard was rendered easy by keeping the way to the colonies constantly open to the emigration of both men and women from the mother country. The Spaniards, on the other hand, by the provisions of law, prohibited unmarried women from emigrating to their colonies, and thus made inevitable the rise of a mixed race, whose strain of barbarism rendered it incompetent to participate in the leadership of the world's civilization. For the advantage possessed by the people of the United States, in being able to start on a course of national progress without a handicap, they are indebted largely to the wise discretion of their colonial ancestors,

who were enabled to preserve the purity of the blood of their descendants.

Whether the determinations of these ancestors were consciously taken or were the result of a strong national instinct, in either case the important aspect of their action was its relation to the future; in fact, the questions which demand the most profound and careful consideration of any generation are not questions concerning the past, but questions whose significance is only seen by reference to the future. And in contemplating our national future we are not disposed to set for ourselves limits. As a nation we have attained rank and power and some measure of self-confidence; the blood of youthful health flows in our veins, and under the spell of our own imposing nationality we sometimes think that we have solved the secret of national immortality. And this thought is more than a passing fancy; it is woven into the texture of our being. It abides in our national life and character as an ever-present instinct. For, as it is difficult for the individual man to live constantly in the

presence of the idea of his dissolution and the extinction of his personality, so is it difficult for a nation to hold in perpetual contemplation the thought that its national life and formal organization are doomed to perish. The impression of the multitude is that the law of national life, to which there has been no exception, is not to apply to this nation, but is to be set aside in our behalf. But intelligence, enlightened by the records of the past, traverses instinctive impressions, and leads to the conclusion that while this nation continues to be progressive, it will be subject to the common fate of organized humanity, as revealed in the institutional transformations of earlier nations.

The rise of the English colonies in America to the position of an independent nation and the subsequent development and conduct of this nation constitute an important part of the history of democracy. The establishment of this republic was an emphatic announcement of certain principles which appear destined to abide, although in the process of social growth the forms

of political organization may change. In view of the necessary relation between a certain form of society and its proper form of government, a modification of the political organization may be expected as an inevitable accompaniment of the changes which society undergoes in passing from the simple to the complex form. Under this principle, which, since Montesquieu, has been one of the axioms of political science, we expect a democratic government wherever we find a democratic form of society, or wherever there is a near approach to equality of material conditions. Under this principle, on the other hand, we expect that, in a society where great inequality of material conditions prevails, the government maintained will be neither democratic in form nor democratic in spirit. In Switzerland, some cantons, on account of their natural circumstances, have been unfavorable to the development of great wealth, and the inhabitants have, therefore, remained in essentially similar conditions; they have touched neither the extreme of poverty nor the extreme of riches. Such

cantons have continued to be democratic cantons. They have produced no large cities, but have continued to be peopled by small farmers or peasant proprietors. They have retained the democratic spirit and the democratic form of political organization. In other cantons of more abundant natural resources large cities have arisen, and society has passed to an advanced stage of differentiation. Marked inequalities of material conditions have appeared, and these cantons have not grown to be democracies, but have become aristocracies, both as to the forms of the society and the forms of government.

The more or less extensive manifestation of the democratic spirit in the institutions of every political society existing on this side of the Atlantic is the distinguishing characteristic of the history of this continent. In searching for the causes of this appearance we cannot satisfactorily attribute it to national peculiarities that have been passed on to the colonies, for the members of the colonies were derived from many nations; and whether coming from

liberal England or absolutist Spain, they have shown a decided preference for the principles and practices of democracy. We cannot attribute it to a conscious determination, for over the vast area of the continent, with nations of unlike inheritance, we cannot reasonably presume uniformity of conscious purpose. We cannot, moreover, attribute it to any intelligent force, for the general features of national and continental life are not determined consciously, but by the action of forces which lie outside of the human will. The universal prevalence of democracy in America must, therefore, be referred in large measure to that equality of material conditions into which men are forced by the circumstances of frontier life. In an old society persons are maintained in relations of inequality as a consequence of social differentiation, supported by the direct provisions of law and the decrees of custom. But under the conditions which prevail where a wilderness is taken for civilization, and where the cultivation of the soil is the almost universal occupation, law is in its incipient stages, custom is silent,

and the restraining influence of social conventionalities is wanting. Under these conditions pretensions to superiority are seldom made, and if made would find little recognition.

The universal presence of the democratic spirit in American society finds an explanation in the suggestions already made concerning the conditions under which democracy appears, and in the further fact that these conditions are the inevitable accompaniment of certain stages of colonial life. If these conditions and their influence are more marked in the English than in the Spanish colonies, the difference is due to the greater freedom from external governmental control which the English colonies enjoyed. These colonies were practically free, and took character from their environment. The English colonists generally acquired whatever amounts of land they could cultivate, and each in the cultivation of his land found himself essentially in the same position with respect to wealth, and living essentially the same kind of life, as his neighbor. When the necessity of organizing and

carrying on a local government presented itself, the obligation fell equally upon all members of the colony, and the government which arose was a democracy by virtue of the material equality in which the colonists lived. The forces which made the English colonies in America democratic were thus the same forces that developed and have maintained democracy in the forest cantons of Switzerland.

If the Spanish colonists have had a somewhat different history in this regard, it is because of the close relation that was maintained between them and the authorities of the mother country. From the foundation of the first Spanish settlements on this continent till the beginning of their struggle for independence, the king of Spain held a strong hand over his American subjects. Every important feature of their life was prescribed by authority emanating from him. The movements of goods and the movements of persons were subject to a most arbitrary and far-reaching restriction. The political organization, from the lowest municipal corporation to the vice-

royalty, was planned and constructed in Europe in accordance with European ideas, and the higher offices, almost without exception, were filled with persons of European birth and European education. To furnish an additional force to counteract the natural tendencies to democracy in Spanish America, the privileges and prestige of nobility were extended to conspicuous colonists. In view of these artificial restrictions and imported conventionalities, the native forces of colonial life worked slowly and against great odds. But when the war for the emancipation of Spanish America was ended, it was clearly seen that the forces which make for democracy had not been subdued, but that even during the domination of the Spanish king they had so far moulded the life of the Spanish colonists that after emancipation had been achieved no independent government was possible which did not rest on, and give ample recognition to, the democratic principle. Even the strong anti-democratic preferences of the great leaders, who had enjoyed a most extraordinary

popularity during the war, were inadequate to check or turn aside the current of democratic sentiment.

The English colonies furnished the best example of democracy in America, largely because they were to a greater extent than any other colonies moulded by local influences. The English government made little or no effort to restrain them by imposing upon them the legal and conventional forms and relations that had come into existence in an old and complex society. And they found themselves, moreover, under circumstances that favored the ownership and cultivation of land on a small scale, thus permitting each settler to become a proprietor and the peer of his neighbor; while in the Spanish settlements the system of *encomiendas* provided for inequality from the beginning, and thus set up a barrier that had to be broken down to make way for democratic progress.

The equality of material conditions presented by the colonial life of America has not only given a democratic basis to the republics of this continent, but it has

indirectly moved parts of other nations to undertake to establish democratic institutions; and this attempt has sometimes been made where the conditions did not favor the maintenance of such institutions. France may maintain a republic, or a government in which the highest offices are filled by election, but in the presence of existing inequalities of material conditions it is not to be expected that the government will exhibit many characteristics of democracy. If a democratic government were set up in a nation as far advanced in social development as France, it would indicate that the nation as a whole had fallen under the dominion of a class, that the large unprivileged body of the inhabitants whose individual possessions are essentially equal had assumed control. It would not, however, mean the establishment of a permanent national government. The movement in favor of democracy in the last two hundred and fifty years is to be regarded as a movement primarily American. The great European nations have felt its influence, but their social con-

ditions have prevented them from realizing its ideal. An illustration of one of the phases of the influence which the conditions of this continent have exerted upon European nations may be seen when we consider the movement for political emancipation which filled the last quarter of the eighteenth and the first quarter of the nineteenth century. It was a movement of three episodes. It began with the steps that led the English colonies to assert their freedom from a non-resident government, it was continued in the French Revolution, and ended with the achievement of Spanish-American independence. Its French phase was an attempt to realize in an old and highly differentiated society the democratic ideas that were born of colonial conditions. So completely was France dependent upon America in this matter that Professor Ritchie has felt justified in affirming that "every article of the French revolutionary creed had been already formulated—and often in less carefully guarded phraseology—by the emancipated 'Anglo-Saxons' on the American

side of the Atlantic." To realize the borrowed ideas of this creed and make them permanently applicable required that the society of France should be turned back from its natural drift, and by artificial means made to assume the characteristics of a simpler form. And herein lay the insurmountable difficulty of establishing democracy in France.

In proceeding to take account of the prospects of democracy, we find a reasonable starting-point in the acceptance of the propositions already considered: (1) That a given form of society tends to secure for itself a certain proper form of government; (2) That the circumstances which produce an essential equality of material conditions tend also to produce, among the inhabitants, equality of political rights and power, and thus a democratic form of government. From this point of view light is thrown on the problem in hand by the facts of normal social growth. If we find in a certain early stage of civilization an essential equality of material conditions, we do not find either similarity

of tastes or equality of mental endowments; and because of the inequality of intellectual power, the diversity of aims, and the desire of the majority of men to improve their circumstances, society, under favorable opportunities, moves away from its condition of democratic equality. With no restrictions placed on the movements of the individual members of such a society, the fittest in the several lines of activity acquire positions of advantage, and the less fit fall behind or are crowded to the wall. Thus every step forward from the simplicity and equality of the early agricultural stage towards the complexity of highly developed society is marked by an increasing inequality of material conditions. In some cases this result is furthered by the action of the government, either directly by grants of property or privileges, or indirectly by such legislation as tends to produce among the persons affected diversity of advantage. But this discriminating activity of government is not necessary to the end; essentially the same result will be achieved by the forces inherent in

an individualistic society. In a word, the natural growth of society under the forces resident in the unlike powers of the individual members is towards various kinds of inequality, and especially towards inequality of material possessions. If in some regions this end has not been reached, if a given society has retained its primitive simplicity and equality, explanation of the permanence of this equality will be found in the lack of social progress due to isolation, or to a lack of those natural resources which permit social differentiation. Perhaps in those parts of the United States where the conditions of the frontier have been left behind, society has had as nearly a normal growth as in any country. There have been abundant natural resources, a rapidly increasing population, favoring the widest division of employments, and comparatively little direct governmental interference in behalf of inequality. In these places the result of social growth has been to increase the inequality of material conditions, and this is clearly the normal result of social growth under the influence

of merely inherent forces. Whenever the government or any external force interferes to give an artificial advantage to certain persons, the effect will be only to accelerate this movement. But in the presence of this tendency there arises from time to time a strong protest which takes the form of a proposal to return to earlier equality; yet all conscious attempts to accomplish this have hitherto been without important results. We are led, therefore, to regard the movement from equality of material conditions to inequality of material conditions as a characteristic feature of progress under freedom, particularly as it appears in industrial society.

Under the earlier characteristic social order of monarchy, inequality of possessions was sometimes directly furthered by extensive grants of property from the crown, and by special exemptions from pecuniary burdens which fell upon the bulk of the citizens. But in the characteristic life of the modern industrial nations this means of promoting inequality of material conditions has been almost entirely

discarded; yet unrestricted competition in the presence of all the modern artificial appliances for production is producing a similar result. The opportunity here offered to a person of extraordinary energy and foresight to combine in behalf of his private interests the modern means of production, gives to superior ability an advantage not enjoyed under any other form of society. Unequal powers in the presence of common opportunities for gaining wealth give as a result unequal possessions. Thus, whether the government interferes in behalf of individuals, or simply stands for order, the outcome of industrial development, with respect to possessions or material conditions, will be essentially the same in both cases, and that an increasing inequality.

Under this movement, and by the very nature of their differentiating affairs, and the varying magnitudes of their industrial and commercial interests, men are drawn towards different forms of life and activity; and thus, as a result of free social progress, society, in the course of time, inevitably

becomes marked by classes, becomes undemocratic, and this in spite of the non-recognition of these classes by law.

If, as here indicated, the democratic form of society disappears under normal social development, we have only to apply the already accepted principle concerning the relation of the form of society to the form of government, in order to make clear the proposition that the passing of democratic society means the passing of the democratic element in government. The process, however, is neither rapid nor uniform in all parts of a given country. Every stage in the progress already made in the United States is represented in the present by some part of our society. The two extremes, the beginning and the present culmination of the movement, are represented by the agricultural frontier and by the large cities. This frontier is not merely the region where the wave of westward migration breaks on the shore of barbarism, but it is also found in the interior of older states; the isolated rural parishes of Missouri or Indiana have to-day the essen-

tial qualities of frontier life. The influences that made for democracy in the colonial days survive here, and here lie the basis and hope for the continuance of democracy in America. In the cities, however, which stand for an advanced stage of social development, there is the widest departure from the condition of material equality. The gulf which separates social classes becomes wider, and the undemocratic spirit of the great city becomes every year intensified. Every year, moreover, its domination of the rural districts becomes more complete. With the relative fall of rural independence, and the growing subjection of the country population to the ideals and purposes of the city, we behold the decline of the conditions and the forces that have given to this nation its democratic character, and thus furnished the basis of its institutions.

In this view the present flight from the country to the city appears of vast importance. For the individual, it means the gratification of new wants, but it does not mean that in the gratification of these

wants a higher life is necessarily realized, or a clearer prospect opened to posterity. It means a renunciation of the dignified independence of one who tills his own soil; and indicates a willingness on the part of an increasing number of persons to be dependent on undertakings initiated by others. It means, for the strong few, wealth, power, and a fuller experience; it means, for the weak many, lives burned out by an electric current they are unable to bear.

With respect to the nation, it means a more than proportionate growth of that part whose circumstances are unfavorable to the development or maintenance of the democratic spirit. This movement is significant, moreover, on account of the fact that this popular tide has hitherto been seen to run in only one direction. There is nowhere a record of a popular migration from the great city to the country, in which is revealed a disposition, on the part of the persons migrating, to take up the genuine life of the country. When it is remembered, therefore, that not many gen-

erations may be maintained in high efficiency under continuous life in the great city, it will be seen that any change in the population which builds up the city and depletes the country not only makes the continued reign of democracy impossible, but even threatens the existence of civilization itself. And so far as may be seen from our present point of view the principal forces that have produced the recent striking growth of large cities are permanent forces. One of these is found in the growing sensitiveness of the whole body of the people under the influences that are inducing a higher degree of popular enlightenment. Through this, the loneliness of existence in the country is made to appear oppressive, and the gregarious and exciting life of the city extremely desirable. As it is impossible for the ordinary man, who has been bred under the pleasurable irritations of the city, to go with satisfaction to the silent and dull life of the country, so is it impossible for the countryman to remain contented after his imagination has been awakened by frequent communi-

cation with the city. This attitude of the dwellers in the country towards the city is not likely to pass away in a society growing from simplicity to complexity, but is likely to be confirmed and emphasized by the further development of rapid transportation. As soon as the dwellers in the country have been made to feel the intellectual wants of the age, they are bound to become conscious that these wants can be satisfied only at the great centres of population. In the same direction operates the force of material interests. The extension of the means of rapid and cheap transportation has tended to make the cities distributing points for the products of the country, and thus the cheapest place for the retailed purchase of such products. By this the cost of food, the great obstacle to living in large cities, has been reduced, making way for the attractions of city life to become effective. It may thus be seen that the influences which contribute to the enlightenment and elevation of the country people, and lead them to seek their temporal advantage, at the same

time tend to induce them to desert their ancient conditions, and to cause the rural districts to lose that character which has made them the promoters of democracy.

Although the recent extension of the power exercised by the people in some of the European nations, appears to be a movement towards democracy, it is nevertheless not to be regarded as a counter movement to the tendency already observed; it is only the result of the abolition of privileges previously granted and upheld by the government. As long as these privileges are maintained, social growth proceeds along artificial lines, and the forces of free competition are more or less checked by hereditary advantages or disadvantages. The maintenance of legal privileges has, therefore, preserved an artificial inequality, which, in so far as it has been supported by these privileges, tends to disappear when they are removed. As soon as the arbitrary interference of government ceases, the nations concerned become subject to the forces of free industrial life. The apparent drift towards

equality and democracy, on the removal of governmental privileges, is, therefore, only a temporary movement. That no real democracy is about to be attained in these nations becomes evident when it is remembered that they have entered the industrial stage of civilization, and are, therefore, subject to the forces already considered, which make for inequality, and lead away from democracy. European society, therefore, presents two phases of the transition movement. It is slowly setting aside legal privileges, and is already far on the course of economic differentiation. The English colonists in America stood in contrast with existing European society in that they were rid of legal distinctions before they had made any important industrial progress, when, in fact, their equality of material conditions made democracy possible. It is not possible for these conditions to appear in Europe, and there is consequently no ground for the expectation that the great nations of Europe will become democratic.

Under the forces of normal develop-

ment, society grows away from the democratic ideal, and consequently away from that condition in which the democratic element appears as a conspicuous and effective power in the government. This conclusion appears true in its application although the nation in question may have accepted the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man, or although the individual members of the nation may seem to have found in the existing government the realization of their political ideals. Devotion to these ideals has been manifested in many ages and in many countries, yet stability of forms is not a striking feature of general political history. Change has been the rule, except in isolation, or when the physical means of social development have been wanting. In this respect, democratic states have shared the common destiny. Our belief that for our country we have reached a final form of political organization, is no more significant than similar beliefs entertained by other nations. Other nations have hoped for the perpetual preservation of their social forms

with hopes as well grounded as those entertained by Americans; yet they have seen the spirit of their institutions depart, and the historian has finally noted the fact that the ancient institutions have been superseded by others.

In view of the dependence of democracy on transitory material conditions, and the absence here of conspicuous obstacles to change, America appears to be drifting towards a state of society less democratic than that of the present. In cases of such a transition the departure of the democratic spirit is not immediately followed by the overthrow of democratic institutions. This is abundantly illustrated in political history. While Mexico, in her actual administration, is as completely a monarchy as Spain, she retains all the constitutional forms that were created to give expression to the spirit of democracy. Rosas, of the Argentine Republic, found it unnecessary to change the law, or to modify the conditions of universal suffrage, in order to maintain absolute rule. Whenever, in the normal growth of society, it becomes neces-

sary for the government to adapt itself to the modified character of the nation, this is not necessarily accomplished by a sudden revolution, or by any process attracting popular attention. Gradually, and by an almost imperceptible movement, one department or element in a government assumes functions not originally accorded to it by law, but which are later confirmed by law; and thus while the governmental form changes, the ideas of the people change also. The Roman Republic grew into the Empire, in spite of the strong devotion to republicanism which the people had previously manifested; and because they had gradually accepted new ideals, there was no more popular dissatisfaction with authority under the later than under the earlier form. Such a transition is in some sense characteristic of the change through which a growing society passes in developing along the line of least resistance.

In so far, therefore, as the extreme democratic form of administration involves the maximum of governmental friction, will there appear a tendency to depart from it

as the business of government becomes difficult, by reason of the great variety and technical character of the practical problems, or as the need for prompt and decisive action becomes imperative. The proper conduct of military affairs, whether under republican or monarchical rule, demands such action; consequently the army of a democratic state has essentially the same organization as the army of a monarchical state; and this organization is determined by the conditions and purposes of military life, by the social disposition to proceed by the course of greatest institutional efficiency. Furthermore, in its essential nature a great city in America does not differ materially from a great city in Europe. There may be certain artificial or accidental differences, but as a social product one is like the other. They stand for the same things in the history of progress; and if one form of administration is found to be better than all others in one country, it is to be expected that rational progress will lead to the acceptance of this form in other countries. If the method of municipal administration

by a strong centralization of power is found to be most effective in England, France, and Germany, there is no reason for supposing that a different method for a similar body will be most effective in America.

LECTURE II.

CONFLICT AND SOCIALISM.

PROMINENT accompaniments of the fundamental tendency in the growth of our society are the discontent of laborers, the conflicts with their employers, and the extravagant expectations which many persons entertain concerning socialism. This discontent is not, however, an indication that the lot of the people is exceptionally hard. In the United States there is no want of unrest and agitation, but, taking everything into consideration, the bulk of this nation enjoys a degree of material well-being not attained elsewhere. No other land furnishes the laborers more nearly an adequate reward for their efforts than this. The persistent complaints and even the reports of serious strife, which are heard here, are not evidence of an op-

pressed or degraded condition of the laborers; they point rather to the fact that the laborers have become so far emancipated from their earlier lot as to be able to direct their attention to a better state, and struggle for its attainment. The workman in Mexico or Egypt, on the other hand, who dares not look up from his task lest he miss his scanty daily sustenance, makes little noise or contention in the world. He is absorbed in his immediate work, and his actual plans do not reach much beyond his meagre supper and the following rest of the night. In general, it may be said that the sounds of discontent come not from those countries where the laborers are still least prosperous and feel most the heavy hand of their employers, but from the countries of the most advanced civilization, where the industrial classes have attained the most favorable standing. Under the hard conditions of the least favored nations, with few rewards and no prospects, the laborer sees nothing before him to stimulate him to revolt against his fate. But when in the course of time his circum-

stances have become more favorable and he is able to look about him and before him, he catches glimpses of a condition which he would strive to attain. Then it is that discontent with his lot appears; and this discontent will last as long as he sees before him some better state yet unattained but attainable. From this point of view the progress of the bulk of a nation illustrates the general progress of social enlightenment. With every step forward, whether in the case of an individual, or of a class, or of society at large, there are revealed attractive positions still further on; and it is the view of these that arouses discontent with the present; it is the view of these more attractive positions yet unattained that makes the world move. The upward movement in the progress of society is not towards completer contentment, but towards more perfect activity.

If one would know the condition of the majority of the people of the progressive nations at the close of this restless century, he must cast a glance over their history; and when he does this he will find that

they have risen from dependent and servile positions to be both independent and free. In the very early phases of society they were essentially slaves, and in all respects were subject to the will of masters. Here the clearly recognized relation was that of inferior and superior. The first step which the workman took upward from this lowest position was to the status of a mediæval serf. Yet even after this change one industrial class held a position of recognized superiority over the other, and felt itself charged with the protection of the persons below it; while these, in turn, acknowledged their subordination and dependence. From this position the laborer in modern times has moved forward over two important stages. By the first advance he became a free man under an individual personal employer; by the second he became the subject of an industrial or commercial corporation.

At first, under the complete superiority of the master, the slave was immediately dependent on his superior, not only for his daily food and clothing, but also for the

privilege of life. Later the master's power to impose the extreme penalty on his slaves fell away, and was taken up in the power of the political sovereign; and thus, one by one, the acknowledged prerogatives of the master or employer were cut off, until in the beginning of this century, in the more enlightened states of the world, the workman stood as a free man in relation to the employer for whom he worked. But the relation between them still continued to be a personal one. The workmen relied somewhat on the good-will of their superior, and the employer acknowledged still a certain moral obligation to hold towards his workmen a kind of paternal attitude, an attitude implying something more than merely the pecuniary obligation of a specific contract.

The second stage in the modern progress of the working classes carries us over important phases of the great industrial and commercial revolution of our times. The most significant feature of this revolution, with reference to the relation of employee to employer, is the transition from personal

to corporate industry. The introduction of the machinery which followed the idea of using steam as a motor, gave beginning to this transition. It produced important new industries, and also made it profitable to aggregate existing industries into large establishments; in other words, it gave a decided advantage to production on a large scale. But this involved greater risks than any individual person was willing to assume; it involved, moreover, greater accumulations of capital than single private persons could furnish. Commercial and industrial corporations became, therefore, in one sense necessary. They became necessary as a means, where the end was the greatest possible economic advantage in production. The superior profits of business on a large scale was the force which called them into existence; and they have already in large measure occupied the field. The old industrial and commercial organization is giving way to a new organization, in which the personal employer disappears and the laborers find themselves in new and strange relations. They find themselves

under an employer whose personality is unknown, and with whom it is impossible for them to establish relations of personal sympathy.

With every year, in the course of this revolution, the individual owner and employer of capital is becoming relatively a less important factor in the industrial world. He is supplanted by corporations. But the change is in no sense the result of a conspiracy of the few against the welfare of the many. The corporation has come into prominence in obedience to an economic law. It has come into prominence in accordance with the law that capital will seek that form of investment under which it will encounter a minimum of resistance and a maximum of gain. In view of the inability of individual capitalists to undertake single-handed many of the great industrial enterprises demanded by the conditions of modern life, and carry them on on the most economical scale, the corporation has risen as an economic expedient, and it is supported by the most permanent forces recognized in the economic activity of soci-

ety. And it is noticeable that whenever a hitherto stagnant nation, like Mexico or Japan, enters into the list of industrially progressive nations, the first conspicuous sign of the change is the formation of commercial and industrial corporations. It becomes clear to such a nation very early that the means and methods here involved are necessary to enable it to maintain successful rivalry with other nations. And the other side of the proposition is equally clear: that no nation can abandon corporations as a part of its commercial and industrial organization without losing its rank among the nations. A government might, indeed, withdraw its support from corporations, and exert its influence directly to discourage their formation, but such action would not bring back the reign of individualism. It would simply help to turn the affairs of that nation over to the control of foreign corporations. Spain has done less than most other Western nations to encourage the formation of industrial and commercial corporations, and, as a consequence, her railways, her mines, her street-car lines,

and her municipal water-works are largely in the hands of French and English corporations, and through these interests the Spanish nation has become hopelessly tributary to the foreigner.

But the transition from individual industry to the dominance of the ordinary corporation is only one phase of the economic progress in which we are involved. Another phase is seen in the movement through which the earlier corporations are becoming absorbed in the larger organizations or trusts. The forces that have made the corporations supplant the individual employers are the same forces that are carrying us from the dominance of the ordinary corporation to the dominance of the trust. They are the essentially constant forces of economic development. All the new institutions that arise in the course of social growth are not the result of new social forces, but of old forces finding, through new circumstances, new expressions. The economic motive that underlies individual industry is the same motive that has led to the formation and maintenance of indus-

trial and commercial corporations. By this, corporations have come into existence, and, in large measure, superseded individual enterprise; and the same motive is operating through the changed circumstances of the present to make the trusts supersede the ordinary corporation. The forces that have produced the trust are thus among the constant economic forces of society; and the trust, or a corporation occupying the field which the trust proposed to occupy, will, therefore, abide till the changed social circumstances make some other organization more profitable for the holders of capital.

But it is urged, in objection, that under the influence of the comprehensive corporation, or trust, the small corporation goes to the wall. This fact is too evident to be denied; but it is like other familiar facts to which we have long since ceased to object. The introduction of the labor-saving method or machine drives many individual laborers to the wall; but we consider the millions who are benefited by the cheapened products as contrasted with the com-

paratively few who are thrown out of employment, and we refuse to go back to the old method or to destroy our new machines. The corporation, or the trust, is a new device; it is a capital-saving device; it sets aside the small individual capitalist, but it gives the consumer the possibility of cheaper wares, and the interests of the consumer constitute the proper end of economic activity. The trust, moreover, often sets aside both the individual capitalist and the small corporation; and it does this because it is an economical device; because it is able to supply the consumers at less expense than was possible under the old order of things. Because it is economical we refuse to seek to abolish it; and we refuse to abolish it on the same grounds that we refuse to abolish the power-loom and a thousand other devices whose practical introduction has, from time to time, set aside large numbers of laborers and small employers.

But the objection to corporations, or trusts, although entertained by a different class of persons, is not greatly unlike the objections that at various times have given

rise to machine-breaking mobs. These objections have been intensified by the stubborn and defiant attitude which the trust and corporations have assumed towards the government. But this is not to be charged against the trusts or the corporations, but against the government. We hold the government to account for its failure to govern. The significant fact of this great social transformation is, that a new kind of person has appeared on the scene—a powerful, corporate person, not contemplated in our early social organization. States are organized in the expectation that certain individual persons will resist the government as long as they are persuaded they can do it with impunity; and there is no reason for a different presumption with respect to trusts or corporations. The main difference, as it appears in this country, is, that the individual, in his opposition, has encountered a government able to subdue him; but, on the other hand, the government which has been able to control the individual person has shown itself, in a large measure, incompetent to

compel obedience on the part of the great corporation.

At every turn, certain individual citizens appear resisting the authority of the state, yet this fact does not provoke a general denunciation of citizens as such, or cause a demand that they be abolished. What we request in case of the disobedience of the individual citizen is, that the power of the government shall be magnified and asserted till the citizen shall be subdued. What we have reason to request, in case corporations or trusts refuse to comply with the laws, is, not the abolition of all trusts and corporations, but that the power of the government be magnified and asserted till all corporations and trusts shall yield obedience to both the letter and the spirit of the law. If it is affirmed that this cannot be done without bringing about a centralization of power that will do violence to our institutions, by this affirmation is proclaimed the incompetency of our government to perform the work required of it under the conditions of modern life.

The trusts have come into existence through the operation of permanent economic forces, and, therefore, appear to be permanently established, or at least established till some other great social revolution shall provide conditions in which the economic forces of society shall work out a new economic organization. But this state of things is so remote that it may be left out of the calculation; and our present problem concerning trusts and corporations becomes simply a political problem. It is not an economical, but a governmental question that faces us. It is a question of so increasing our national administrative power that the government under which we live may be competent to control effectively the powerful artificial persons whose recent rise has transformed modern society. We stand, therefore, where we are apparently obliged to choose between a government largely influenced by trusts and corporations and a government strong enough to hold individual and corporate interests in a just and even balance.

In the light of recent experience, we

seem to be brought face to face with two alternative propositions. The first is, that if corporations and trusts control the government, there will necessarily arise a modification of our present political system. The second is, that if the government becomes sufficiently strong and its power sufficiently centralized to control the corporations, we shall also have departed from our ancient ideal. If, therefore, the problem of the trusts has any serious aspect, it is its political aspect. For economically they fulfil the conditions sought in economic progress. They work in the line of new inventions and increased efficiency of labor. They tend to reduce the cost of production, and thus make it easier for the millions to satisfy their ever-recurring and increasing wants. If, therefore, some of our fellow-citizens offer vigorous objections to corporations or trusts, their objections must rest on other than economic grounds. It may, perhaps, be objected to trusts either that they are sometimes in the position to apply the principle of monopoly, or that

they are supposed to involve a class of persons whom it is thought politically expedient to oppose. If opposition is based on their exercise of certain powers given by monopoly, this opposition should reach all cases of such exercise. It should reach the unions of laborers as well as the unions of capitalists; for when a union of laborers refuses to allow laborers to work for certain specially designated persons, the action is not greatly different in principle from the refusal of a corporation of coal dealers to sell coal to certain designated retailers. If, on the other hand, the opposition is raised as a demagogical appeal to one class against another class, it should be borne in mind that he who makes such an appeal, is undermining the foundation on which this government rests, and thus, as a conspirator against the common weal, is deserving of the denunciations of his fellow-citizens and the brand of public infamy.

The consequences of the loss of the ancient personal relation with their employers were in the first place, to remove from the

laborers the sense of a somewhat humiliating subjection to a personal superior, which had hitherto existed and which still survives in the case of menial servants. The employees of corporations have become more widely distinguished from the menial servants of individual masters than were the workmen under the old order of things. They have become parts of important social organizations.

A second consequence of the change from individual to corporate industry is the development of combination and organization in each of the two parties involved in production, namely, those who furnish the capital, and those who furnish the labor. The fact of combination among laborers indicates that they have at last come to understand that they must look to themselves for the maintenance of their cause, and not to the good intentions of a superior. The combination of laborers attains a certain purpose in preparing them to stand as a unit over against their united employers, and thus to bring the questions at issue between the parties to a settlement

by conflict, as at present all the more important social questions are settled.

The immediate end of the agitation in which the laborers of to-day are engaged, is the preparation of the laborers as a class for conflict with employers as a class, in order that through this struggle there may result a satisfactory division of the products of industry. How large the portion of either party should be may not be determined independently, under the present industrial order, by either the laborers or the employers. And herein lies the principal unsolved problem of economics, which is, to find some formula and some practical means for distributing the results of production in a manner satisfactory to all the agents concerned. At present, we know no method but that of conflict by which the gross product may be properly distributed among the agents co-operating in production. As we already know, the good-will of employers is no longer considered adequate to this end, and no third party has the knowledge necessary to draw the line of distribution. We are, therefore,

driven to rely upon a free and independent contest between the parties concerned; and in this we adopt a method that has been conspicuously employed in determining also political questions.

Our present method of determining important social relations by conflict, represents the widest possible departure from mediæval practice, and stands as the latest achievement which has been made in this direction by enlightened nations. But it cannot be regarded as necessarily the ultimate method of determining private relations, any more than the holding of vast armies, as in modern Europe, is the ultimate method of maintaining proper international relations. Within the field of industry, however, the application of the principle of conflict is practically universal; and in politics, the advance from absolutism to democracy shows a movement towards a condition in which political determinations are reached by a similar resort to conflict.

If, now, we compare a society, in which conclusions are reached through conflict,

with one in which all social relations were determined by the independent decision of a permanent superior, we shall find that a new feature of social organization has appeared in the world. Under this later order, persons seeking what they feel to be their due, refuse to trust their affairs in the hands of a superior. They decline to accept a superior's sense of duty, as it has hitherto appeared, as a sufficient guarantee. On the contrary, they hold that the history of trusts betrayed, of class oppressed by class, warrants the conclusion that the unaided sense of duty has been inadequate to determine and preserve among them their proper relations. Laborers do not believe that their employers will accord to them their deserts, unless some other force than the sense of duty is made to operate on the minds of the employers. The members of a body politic, by centuries of painful experience, have come to the conclusion, that a personal political superior, independent of those in subjection to him, needs some other guiding force than duty to keep his action consistently advantageous to the

subjects. In the field of economical and political relations, we see the inadequacy of the sense of duty to produce results sometimes expected of it; and thus while generations have been dreaming of an age of peace, when the lion would unselfishly look out for the interests of the lamb, the actual progress of society has been marked by a more and more extensive application of some form of conflict.

And here we reach a critical point. If the division of the total product of industry between the laborers and the owners of capital must be determined by some form of conflict, it is of the highest importance for the laborers to know what form is the most expedient. Speaking very generally, recent economic history shows us two forms. Under the first there is the completest combination of laborers possible, followed by attempts to persuade the employers, and finally withdrawal from work. The effectiveness of this method clearly depends upon the comprehensiveness of the combination, the binding force of the agreement, and the prevention of the importation of workmen.

The other method of engaging in the conflict is to form somewhat exclusive associations, no special effort being made to make the organizations comprehensive of all the laborers in the field, and then to rely upon force to prevent persons not in these associations from taking positions abandoned by laborers on strike. No one in sympathy with the great body of workers, who has followed the history of antagonisms that have resulted in class wars, can but feel grave anxiety in view of the growing disposition to let physical force play a part in the conflict between laborers and their employers. They are solicitous not because they see, in existing forms of society, any other means than conflict for settling these questions, nor because they allow the consideration of the few lives that may be lost to overbalance a great good, but because they are convinced that by the use of illegal force the desired end cannot be reached. The great achievements in behalf of the working classes, in behalf of the great body of the people, are likely to be won in the future, as they have been

won in the past, through bloodless conflict. Through a long course of centuries, the common people of England struggled for economical advantages and for positions of power against an arbitrary king and an overbearing aristocracy, and yet their effective weapons, the weapons by which their victory was won, were never the weapons of death. The armed efforts of Wat Tyler and Jack Cade hindered rather than helped the political and social amelioration of the people.

The common people of England have won their cause by closing the conflict before it reached the phase of military force. And in the French Revolution, practically all that was gained for the people was gained before a drop of blood had been spilt. The history of the world brings us this conclusion, that whenever one class in society raises its arm to strike down another class, by that very act it casts away its liberties. In the Roman republic there were grave social questions on which the classes were divided, and when finally they grew impatient and attempted to reach a

solution by force, or to settle their differences under arms, the fact of victory was of no importance to either party; the liberties of both parties disappeared in the social war. It was, in fact, the leader of the triumphant popular party, the friend of the people, who laid the foundations of the Roman Empire, in which popular rights were lost, and the ancient valor and virtue of the Roman citizen disappeared from the state. Thus it might be in the American republic; and it is for this reason that every lover of his country and its liberties, is filled with apprehension at any sign of an approaching war of classes. In a country where one part is closely bound to other parts by important economic interests there is no ground of fear that in class contentions order may permanently disappear; for this will be maintained, though liberty perish. By magnifying class antagonism, we prepare the way for the domination of a few; by carrying this antagonism to an extreme, we prepare for the domination of one.

This does not mean, however, that we look

to a condition of social rest and quiet as the ideal of society. On the contrary, we hold that strong internal movement, the vigorous action and counteraction of elements, the rivalry of classes, and the determined ambition of individuals are characteristic of healthy social life. It is not enough that an individual or a class is conscious of his rights; it is not enough that the various social elements have once rested in equilibrium; it is not enough that the laborers to-day are satisfied with their hire, or the employers with their profits; every revolving year brings new conditions and the possible necessity of a new adjustment. With no all-wise and all-powerful social arbiter possible, who may fix by decree the relations of persons and classes, there has appeared, down to the present, no way to the solution we seek, except through the action and counteraction of clashing elements. There may result turmoil and confusion, the uproar of social rivalry and conflict, and yet, even under the dominance of this principle, we may expect a better order and a more exalted social life.

Yet now and then in the history of the world—and often when progress is most rapid—men become impatient and distrustful of the means by which advances have hitherto been made. Something of this is manifest in the socialistic demands made by certain groups of laborers. They consider that the competitive order, with its varying appeals to conflict, has been tried and found wanting. They look with marvellous optimism to a centralization of industrial activity under socialistic control. It may be true that as society grows more and more complex, its drift is inevitably towards such centralization; yet it does not necessarily follow that such a drift carries it on to positions more and more desirable for the individual workers. To determine some of the characteristic features of a society growing towards more complete socialistic centralization, and the position of the laborer as a member of this society, we start from the familiar fact of the separation of employments. The multiplication of employments is to such an extent a characteristic feature of developing so-

ciety that it becomes in some sense a means of measuring social progress. In the advance of civilization in the past, there has been a movement from general to special work, and there is no indication in the present that this tendency has reached its possible limit. On the other hand, there is abundant ground for the expectation that the separation of trades will be carried in the future very far beyond its present condition. The forces which have produced results already observed are as powerful now as they ever were. If the makers of machines have been supplanted by the makers of parts of machines, it is clearly because there is an economic advantage in the latter method ; and as long as this advantage may be had by this means, we may expect that this process of separating trades into minor trades will continue.

Perhaps the most important consequence of this movement is the fact that by this increasing division of labor, and the necessary co-operation among the separate producers, there is brought about a more complete unity of society, a more per-

fect harmony and consolidation of interests. For the great body of the producers of a community or a nation work in vain unless each finds his surplus product demanded by others. In other words, a community, or a nation, in which there is a distribution of many trades among many persons, appears from one point of view as a great co-operative association, the end of its activity being the greatest possible accumulation of the means of satisfaction. Every step forward in the division of employments is necessarily followed by a closer union and completer co-operation of the members of the community in which this division is made. With the extension of this separation of trades, the individual worker becomes more and more interested in the ability and success of the workers in other special lines, for without their product his product is useless. This is true not merely of the narrow special trades, but applies also to the great departments of human effort. The growth of society is simply another name for increasing interdependence among the persons

who compose it. In very low stages of civilization, the individual man may be taken as the unit, for with his hunting weapons he is practically self-sufficing. But in the highest stages, the individual or the group of individuals engaged in a single industry cannot be regarded as a self-sufficing unit, for each is an element in a great scheme of co-operation. Therefore, through specialization of work, and the division of employments into separate trades, communities and nations grow into more and more perfectly organized bodies, and the economic interests of the individuals come to be more and more bound up in the economic welfare of the whole.

If we turn to the facts and tendencies of government we shall find another illustration of increasing specialization and co-operation. Properly conceived, the government of a state is a great co-operative association in which the citizens are members. One of its simplest forms may be found in an ancient canton of Switzerland or a mining camp of California. Governmental action appeared in these cases when

there arose some task to be performed, in which all, or a large part of the members of the canton or the camp, were either equally or in some measure interested. If a road was needed, some person was authorized by the camp or the canton to have it built, and to collect money to pay for the work done. After the completion of the undertaking, the person who had been charged with it, resumed his place in the ranks of the community, and returned to his private affairs. This person while acting for the community was the government. The difference between this government and that of a modern state is that the one is exceedingly simple, while the other is complex. In one, the public business is not sufficient to keep the agent of the community constantly employed, while in the other, not only one but many are kept in constant service. The progress from the simple government with few officers and little public work, to the government with many officers and much public work is by a process of division of labor, on the one hand, and on the other hand, by the

encroachment of the government upon fields earlier regarded as the sphere of individual activity. This encroachment indicates two things: 1. That men have an increasing faith in the efficiency of the government as an agent. 2. That they are finding more and more things which they can do advantageously through co-operation.

Whether we consider the extension of the division of employments on the economic or the political side of society, in either case it is attended by an enlargement of the field of co-operation, and the motive is always the desire for advantage.

This indicates that in the normally developing society there is a movement towards a condition akin to that contemplated in the socialistic ideal. The separation of trades and the co-operation of workers give a community a compact economic organization and unity; and the multiplication of political offices, in the course of development from the simple to the complex state, points to the enlargement of governmental functions, and a consequent larger control of economic interests, thus realizing,

at least in some measure, the fundamental expectation of the great body of the nation, that in progressive society the government is to have an increasing part in conducting practical affairs.

The error in calculation begins when those who have become dissatisfied with the determinations of a personal superior, and the outcome of competitive conflict, expect that governmental control will render them the peculiar satisfactions which they seek, with no possibility of failure. This expectation is in no sense a logical conclusion from the data in hand. It is a case of interpreting a social movement according to desires and not according to reason. It is attaching consequences to an observed social change without taking account of the possibilities and impossibilities of the case, or without checking expectations respecting the immediate future by the known tendencies of the past and the present. Those who entertain these expectations derive them from a picture of life which has been impressed upon their minds by the fancy, and

has been accepted without an attempt to confirm it by the facts of such socialistic progress as has already been made in certain departments of public activity. With respect to the immediate future, conclusions drawn from the facts and tendencies of socialistic centralization, where this has been realized, are likely to be reliable for the following reasons. In the first place, certain departments which are now organized on a socialistic basis in certain existing states, are so independent, so completely non-competing with respect to other departments that their organization would not be greatly changed if the socialistic form of management were extended to all departments. In the second place, if there are forces in society as at present constituted which are making its organization socialistic, in other words, bringing it to a more complete solidarity, and subjecting all its interests to a more perfect control through a central authority, it does not appear reasonable that society is to be carried on towards this ideal by these forces, and then at some undetermined point sud-

denly be turned over to the operation of other and different forces. This is not the manner in which society grows. The forces which carry a social policy on to victory are the same forces that will be operative in upholding and directing this policy after its victory has been won; they are the forces on which it must rely in the period of its domination. Therefore, in so far as there are actual socialistic tendencies observable in existing society, they furnish our best intimations of the characteristics of a society extensively realizing socialistic principles. And already in certain places the movement has gone far enough to enable us to estimate some of the results. In some European states, the army, the schools, the post and the telegraph, certain railroads, the manufacture and distribution of tobacco and spirituous liquors are subject to the socialistic form of management, but in these instances there is not revealed a wide departure from the principles and practices involved in the management of the affairs of great corporations. In fact, the methods of the successful management of a depart-

ment of business are prescribed by the nature of the business itself. If we may judge from the socialistic practice as exemplified in the German army, or in the German educational system, or in the state railroads in Germany, socialism is not likely to gratify any expectations of those who are looking for an easy way up to important places. The nature of the place fixes the conditions of holding it, which must be met; and whether the filling of it is in the hands of the centralized authority of the state, or in the hands of a corporation, or in the hands of a private person, the essential features of these conditions must be complied with. Even under a socialistic state organized by universal suffrage, the care and the use of the locomotives employed by the state could not be turned over to persons whose previous experience with railroads had been confined to grading the track. The nature of places fixes the qualifications which must be met by those who would fill them; and this applies to all the occupations to which men aspire, and it is more emphatically true where the

separation of trades and professions has been carried to a great length, as in the more advanced phases of society.

It may be affirmed, moreover, that the expectation that social equality will be realized under socialism is likely to prove a delusive hope; for, down to the present, among all the instances of socialistic organization there is no prominent indication that the forces which are making for socialism are at the same time making for equality of social condition. Germany has more conspicuous socialistic features than most of the other nations, yet thus far the practical socialism of Germany has not been attended by any marked progress towards this form of equality. There are, indeed, certain considerations which indicate that under socialism differences of rank and standing would be emphasized. When, as in existing society, men are free to own and manage private capital, or to take place under the government, or to serve private corporations, there are many ways open to them to secure social recognition. One expects it on account of

his official position, another for his achievements as a captain of industry, another for his inherited fortune which permits him to live without engaging in business; but under socialism, with no private capital, there would still remain the desire for distinction, and nearly all persons would be driven to claim recognition on account of the positions held by them under the authority of the state. The number of these positions would, of course, be greatly increased, but practically the whole population would become competitors for them. The whole population would become competitors for office; and it goes without saying that nowhere else are the lines of social precedence so strictly drawn as in official life.

Moreover, in the progress already made towards socialism there is revealed no tendency to make authority less exacting, or discipline, under this authority, less rigid than at present. The large increase of public departments, and the multiplication of public duties, would bring the economico-political body into such a condition that it

could be maintained only through the most thorough organization and the most rigid discipline; and this would be true whether the authority was of a democratic or a monarchical origin; for it is of the nature of such a body, once constituted, to exercise those powers which are necessary for its preservation, provided they are within its reach. Confirmation of this is found in every line of our socialistic experience. Who would have freedom from discipline, and the easy condition which arises from lax social organization, should look away from socialism. The promised land for such persons as these lies not at the culmination of socialistic tendencies, but in the individualistic past, when the bonds of social organization were not closely drawn, and when the individual had to consult little else than his personal caprice. Under socialism, in which would be realized the completest division of employments and the most perfect co-operation of the members of society, each person would be obliged to keep pace with those of his own rank. Even now, while yet far

from the socialistic ideal, any man who takes and holds a place in the present compact industrial organization is obliged to time his movements with the general movement. This condition of things finds an illustration in three men swinging their hammers at the same time to forge a single bar of iron. The rapidity of each man's stroke must keep time with the blows of the others. Under the complete co-operation of socialism, each man would be expected to swing his hammer in time with his fellows. But, under existing circumstances, there are those who fail to keep up their parts, and are obliged to yield their places to the merciless strength of youth; and if tendencies thus far observed furnish a reliable basis for a conclusion, the conditions of completed socialism would not be greatly different.

The tendencies manifest in social development and the conduct of existing society, with respect to those who fall by the way, or whose defective powers are inadequate to their proper support and guidance, indicate that the public organization, under

whatever change the future may bring to it, will continue to recognize, as it recognizes now, the necessity of furnishing maintenance in certain cases without expecting return service. And in existing conditions, or in the conditions of the past, there is no indication that such support will be rendered without arranging the claimants into classes, as they are arranged now—as the paupers, the adult and helpless blind, the idiots, and the insane. But there is no tendency yet observable in the advance towards socialism to break down the distinction between those who contribute to the national wealth and those who would merely draw from it.

The considerations here advanced only furnish hints as to what might be reasonably expected in case social development should proceed along lines hitherto followed, but they are sufficient to indicate that by reason of the increasing complexity of society, the various elements are becoming more and more interdependent; that the principle of co-operation is becoming more and more extensively realized; and that as

a necessary consequence of the extension of co-operation the functions of the social organization are becoming enlarged. These considerations indicate, moreover, that under a new social order, even if it shall be socialistic, those who expect a kind of material millenium, in which will be provided an easy way to positions of power and abundant means of personal satisfaction, are doomed to be disappointed. There is no evidence that their expectations will be realized. Even should it be true that we are drifting towards a condition of society in which something answering to the socialistic ideal will be attained, it, nevertheless, does not appear that under that order the sharp rivalry for position will be avoided, or that equality of conditions will be achieved and maintained; and there is no indication in the history of the past that society will ever establish itself permanently in such a form that the struggle for life will cease, and that it will not discriminate against the vicious, the defective, and the indolent, and in favor of the virtuous, the industrious, and the efficient.

From the nature and movement of society in the past, it may be reasonably concluded that whatever wishes are entertained respecting socialism, however strong may be the desires of individuals to see the democratic body of the people control the economic and political affairs of the nation, with an authority in which all shall have equal shares, there still remains the stubborn and unavoidable fact that public management which will be effective in maintaining order and the conditions of social progress, will presume the concentration of administrative power and the necessary surrender of certain individual desires to the common interest, and that, too, whether the ultimate authority is conceived of as residing in the whole body of the people or in a small number.

LECTURE III.

EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY.

IN the process of organizing laborers and setting them in opposition to employers, the fundamental tendency towards inequality already considered is strengthened and confirmed; and the growth towards unity and compactness of organization, which points towards the realization of some phases of the socialistic ideal, does not appear to set aside this tendency. There are, however, forces in progressive society, which seem to counteract the movement towards inequality, and in some measure help to preserve the basis of democracy. These forces do not tend to put down persons who have become prominent, but contribute opportunities for all to rise. To put down the conspicuous has never been a prominent aim of

democracy as it has appeared in this country. The spirit of our society has not demanded that the successful shall be overthrown: rather that the accumulated wealth and the accumulated wisdom of the nation shall be so used as to provide opportunities for the advancement of the worthy of whatever origin. As democratic government is the outgrowth of equality, so in its enlightened activity it seeks to preserve equality. In the pursuit of this purpose the public schools furnish its most effective agency. They act as a levelling force, not by pulling down, but by lifting up. In some countries, where the aristocratic spirit is still strong, the richest members of society, who are able now to pay the expenses of educating their sons, object to the introduction of free public instruction, because it would give the sons of the poor opportunities to prepare themselves to compete with the rich, in the professions and in all callings requiring education, and thus rob wealth of one of its advantages; because it would throw down the barrier of inequality, and

clear the way for the ambitious poor to advance. Free public instruction opens to the great mass of the people, to the persons of small fortunes or limited incomes, the opportunity of placing their sons in successful rivalry with those who have the support of great wealth. It is particularly important from this point of view that under democracy all instruction, the highest as well as the lowest, should be free, since the highest form of instruction is of all the most costly and the most difficult for individual effort to furnish. If all the lower schools were free, and university instruction were supported by the fees of students, this order of things would constitute an insurmountable obstacle to the poor and to all persons of inferior incomes; it would give us that condition of affairs which makes the member of the aristocracy rejoice that his sons are released from the necessity of competing with the poor. A free university is, therefore, the best expression of the democratic spirit in an enlightened society. In obedience to the demands of true democracy, the high-

est instruction must not only be free, but it must also be equal to the best. The university of a democratic commonwealth must, therefore, be a great university, in order that those who are unable to go to the conspicuous centres of learning in foreign countries, may be as well equipped in knowledge and training as their rivals, who have been able to avail themselves of all the advantages the world has to offer. Thus the great and free university stands as the most efficient contributor to equality on the higher planes of existence.

A monarchy may exist in stability, even though the great body of the people is corrupt; but the continuance of democratic institutions, with whatever advantages they possess, requires not only the preservation of equality, but also the the maintenance of a high standard of public morals and private virtue. To every lover of the liberty of his country therefore, it is of the first importance that all the forces which tend to enlighten and clarify the mind should be upheld and magnified. It is sometimes affirmed that there is a complete

separation of moral and intellectual culture; but the moral condition of those countries where this doctrine is assumed and carried out furnishes its sufficient refutation. You may make the human being dependent, and by superior authority force him to obey specific positive injunctions, but by that process you may not give him a high moral character, which, under conditions of independence, will furnish worthy guidance for his life, and make him a fit counsellor for his fellows. The moral and intellectual life are but different phases of the manifestation of the human spirit, and in the normal man the higher moral life attends the fuller development and education of this spirit. As a representative republic, resting on democracy, this nation has not less need than other communities for the elevation of its moral status, and consequently not less need for the broadest and completest education, an education that will give sanity of understanding and clearness of moral discrimination. Such an education can be attained only under the directing care and stimulating influence of a great university.

In the extension of democratic institutions over the present territory of the United States, we may see illustrated the influence of rapidly developing democracy on the educational system, and also the influence of popular education on the conduct of democratic government. The movement of civilization, from the east to the west, made the West a colony of the East. After the isolated settlements of the Mississippi valley had been founded, they suffered the ordinary fate of colonies ; they entered upon a period of social stagnation. In spite of the growth of population through the attractive power of great material resources, they remained, with reference to many features of civilization, in a condition of arrested development. Speaking generally, when in a colony the period of stagnation is passed, when the new commonwealth has taken possession of the resources of the country and developed among the inhabitants a sense of common interests and common patriotic aspirations, the colony begins to make its positive contributions to the advancement of civilization. Unhampered

by venerable traditions, not too careful in observing the accumulated conventionalities of older communities, yet gathering what appears worthy from their experience, it enters upon the race of progress with the freshness and vigor of youth. Its course is free from antiquated and impeding social growths, and its development is correspondingly rapid.

In the West, after the period of stagnation, society passed in two decades over stages of development corresponding essentially with those covered in New England in two centuries. In New England an institution needed, at any given time, only small additions of funds to keep it abreast of a slowly advancing society. Gradually, in the progress of time, it grew strong through the loyal support of generation after generation of its students; with little risk of being outrun by other social institutions, it had the good fortune to be able to wait for constituents to rise from those who had experienced its beneficent influence. In the West, however, an institution of learning could not afford to wait for a generation of supporters to grow up from its alumni.

In order to continue to hold the same relative position to society which the New England college had held, it had to mature as the society matured, to make the growth of two centuries in two decades.

Moreover, while the population of New England in the early days was homogeneous, with certain ideas and sentiments and purposes in common, that of the West comprised the heterogeneous gleanings of the four quarters of the earth. The settlers of New England were zealous in seeking to realize ideas that concerned their spiritual well-being; the settlers of the West were zealous in seeking to realize ideas that concerned their material well-being. The ties of blood and a common religion bound the New Englanders into a well-ordered community; but in the West the ties of blood were in large measure wanting, and religion had no specially binding force. There was little zeal in common efforts that looked beyond the personal gain of the individual members of the community. In view of the imperative need of rapid development, the lack of public interest in anything so intangible as human

cultivation, and the failure of the ecclesiastical sects to co-operate and to furnish the required support in the undertaking, the organization for the promotion of higher education very early reached the point where it had to face these alternatives; either to hold to its primitive and inadequate form, borrowed from New England, or to seek some other form and some more efficient means of making the institutional development keep pace with the almost unprecedented growth of the society.

These alternatives presented themselves throughout the western part of this country, wherever the growth of population was especially rapid. The movement of inhabitants into these regions from Europe and the Atlantic States was a process of colonization, and in the results of the movement we observe the ordinary effects of colonization. Conspicuous among these effects was a tendency to equality of condition, a tendency to a social state in which no one was held to have extraordinary or superior obligations concerning the public weal. The fact of equality suggested and justified

the policy of contributions to the higher aims of society proportionate to the amounts of individual property. This policy determined with respect to education, was an important step towards the support and control of instruction by the state. The development of this policy, as manifest in the system of public schools of all grades, belongs to the time of the most rapid growth of population in the West, and, in some sense, has its cause in the social conditions established by the westward movement of colonization. Already in the early part of this century, New England appeared to have solved the practical problem of education, without relying on the state as a permanent fact or in the support and control of the higher grades. But in the West, during the formative period of its society, there appeared no agency, except the government, which was adequate to the undertaking, and at the same time competent to act with sufficient promptness to secure for the means of higher instruction their proper place among the institutions of the commonwealth. From many points of view, the

foundation and growth of colleges in the West have followed the laws of colonial development. These colleges have had their periods of arrested growth, but some have acquired forces which make for independent progress. Like vigorous colonies, these institutions find themselves less hampered in initiating reforms than their antecedent organizations. They have no shackling traditions, no long and respectable history, with which they are morally bound to be consistent. The future for them is an open field for experiments; and out of these experiments there will undoubtedly come important achievements in behalf of educational advancement.

In providing for the co-education of young men and young women in the highest grades of instruction, the newer colleges of this country have moved independently, and taken a position to which they confidently expect the rest of the world will ultimately come. For the West the general policy of educating young women with young men is no longer in debate. The advocates of this policy may not have fully

comprehended all the remote consequences of their decision, but they seem to know that what they seek, namely, a broader intellectual horizon for women and a truer view of life, lies in this direction. The difficulty in this matter is not in establishing the principle, but in so far breaking the social traditions as to secure its application.

The history of woman from her oriental bondage to her completest freedom under democracy is spanned by the single expression, from the harem to the university. But this transition has been long and difficult, and checked at every turn by doubts as to social proprieties. In free and cultivated Greece, it was not compatible with good form for a woman to appear in a public place, even with her husband. In gratifying her ambition to be something more than an untaught child, she lost the esteem of other women. But this spirit did not pass away with the decline of the ancient world. What kept the Grecian woman shut up in her house with slaves, keeps many of the young women of the present from acquiring that cultivation which would enable them

to have an intelligent part in the life of the century to which they belong. But under the influence of the spirit of democracy, this tradition is passing, making the thought and activity of women a more and more important factor in the conduct of society.

The spread of education, made free and public under democracy, removes the dangers arising from great masses of the illiterate, but at the same time it subjects the state to the equally important danger of falling under the control of the half-educated. In spite of the most ample provisions for popular education, society under a democratic organization is obliged to face the evils of bold and self-confident half-knowledge, which are not less than those proceeding, under other forms of rule, from illiteracy or malicious intentions. That the terrorists of the French Revolution were saint-like, except for lack of knowledge, is hardly to be believed, yet it may be affirmed that in this and in all other similar outbreaks, the dominant desire is not to inflict injury, but to attain what to the imperfectly instructed mind of the revolutionist appears

as a good. If evil has followed such outbreaks, it is not because it has been the ultimate purpose of that part of the community which has dominated and controlled the action, but because, through lack of knowledge, means have been employed which could not possibly lead to a good result. That the bulk of a nation should will and consciously pursue any other end than its own advantage is inconceivable. It is one of the fundamental ideas of modern radicalism that every group of human beings naturally seeks its own happiness, or advantage, and that when clothed with legislative power, it will legislate for the attainment of this happiness, or advantage. It is clear, however, that success in this design will depend less on the disposition to seek social well-being, than on the ability to discern and employ the means by which it may be attained. However much, therefore, modern society has to fear from malicious intention and crass ignorance, it has a far more threatening source of danger in that widely diffused half-knowledge which marks this age of expanding democracy.

The social and political unrest which has threatened to plunge Russia into anarchy, which is raising up for the German government an ever increasing socialistic opposition, and which finds expression in the United States in noisy declamation against grievances that are only dimly apprehended, is not the product of downright ignorance and brutish stupidity, but, on the other hand, is the result of knowledge which is sufficient to discern the existence of the problem, but not sufficient to hinder the advocacy of irrational and inefficient means for its solution. As long as the Russian serf remained in bondage, a mere clod of the soil, with no hopes or prospects to stimulate ambition, he remained a manageable element of the nation. But when his bonds were broken, and he was ushered into the freedom of an independent citizen, there dawned on his awakening mind the prospect of a condition, to even the conception of which he had hitherto not been able to attain. The new prospects roused his sluggish intellect, and he was enabled to perceive the hindrances in the way of realizing

his hopes. He saw the existence of a great social problem, in the solution of which his own well-being was involved; and in the confidence which half-knowledge inspires, he undertook the solution; he undertook to break down the barrier that excluded him from the promised land. From this endeavor have come the woes of Russia. Considerably less knowledge on the part of the common people, and Russia would have remained undisturbed in the repose of dumb indifference. Considerably more knowledge, and the futility of Nihilism as a method of reform would have become distinctly apparent.

The case of Russia is in one sense the case of the whole Western world. In Germany, in the United States, or wherever the plan of universal education prevails, there is, and will always remain, a half-ripe element in the population, an element whose unblushing confidence, born of half-knowledge, urges the full exercise of the vast power with which it is clothed. This is the class at present contributing most to disturb the social order of civilized

nations. Its growth, activity, and vigorous pursuit of Utopian ends, constitute a perpetual menace to peaceful progress. Its force is not in the utterly ignorant, but in those who see somewhat of the ills by which they are surrounded, yet whose untrained minds fall short of grasping the proper remedy. The plan which seeks to raise everybody to a certain medium level, and offers little or no encouragement to rise above this level, can have no other ultimate outcome than to deliver the affairs of civilization, material and spiritual, into the hands of mediocrity.

Much of the special agitation of the last hundred years may be set down to the credit of half-knowledge. It is the work of reformers who undertake to solve intricate social problems, with an understanding of only a limited part of the essential data. The extreme socialism of to-day is a short-sighted effort to realize the conditions of Utopia, while the essential qualities of men remain unchanged. It aims at the simultaneous attainment of liberty and social equality. Liberty is clearly attainable, but

as long as men differently endowed enjoy it, there can be no social equality. But social equality may be attained under certain circumstances; yet the means necessary to its attainment involve the suppression of liberty. More knowledge of the principles which underly the social fabric would show the advocates of social reform the utter incompatibility of these aims, and the consequent futility of all efforts in this direction. Through the presence of leaders who are without such knowledge, and who have never experienced the sobering force of fundamental instruction on any subject, society is compelled periodically to undergo the terrors of the socialistic nightmare.

This illustration presents only one of a long list of evils that may be ascribed to the guidance of half-knowledge. But it shows how far-reaching are the consequences, going even to the destruction of the basis on which alone it is possible to build free human society. Other illustrations might be drawn from foolish legislation which debauches the public mind and entails expensive consequences; from the

bungling of scientific quacks, through whose guidance property and life are dissipated; and from the work of half-educated teachers and the use of imperfect text-books which lead to error and stupidity rather than to true knowledge and intellectual power. Not only do evils of this character exist, but at the same time there are powerful forces operating to perpetuate the conditions out of which they spring. Many of the smaller colleges of this country are chartered opponents of true education. They are established in the interest of personal pride, local prejudice, or denominational zeal, and whatever influence they exert is in favor of making superficial knowledge general. They contribute, moreover, to make the half-knowledge which they encourage more noxious than it otherwise would be, since they endorse it with an academic degree, which is the last assurance necessary to convince the holder that he has swept the whole intellectual horizon, and is consequently fitted for the performance of any task within the realm of intellectual effort.

Scattered over the land, they enlist and doom to inferiority young men who, through the better opportunities of the great centres of thorough knowledge, would easily rise out of the realm of mediocrity, and become safe guides in the affairs of society.

This policy of encouraging the diffusion of half-knowledge rests in part on the false notion, that if in proportion to the population the United States has fewer real scholars than any other civilized nation, the lack is more than made up by our large number of possessors of superficial knowledge. It is true, in the matter of physical power, ten weak men may be equal to five strong men; but, in the matter of intellectual power, ten weak men are only equal to one weak man. The plan of co-operation by which astounding results have been produced in the material world, fails utterly in its application to the intellectual world. Five hundred lawyers, each of whom has mastered only the elements of his subject, are no match for him whose strong judgment is supported by the vast knowledge

it is possible for one to obtain. All the poetasters of the ages are not equal to one Shakespeare.

The theory of universal education involves the idea of bringing the bulk of the population to such a degree of intellectual independence that public opinion and public action will be the result of concurrent independent individual judgments. This, however, is a purely ideal end, that never was and never will be reached in any human society. In the most advanced stage of enlightenment, as well as in the rudest condition of barbarism, men follow leaders: and not infrequently, as in the United States, bewail the degeneracy of the times, when there are no great leaders to whom they can look with confidence for guidance. As society becomes more complex, and its practical problems more difficult, the need of leaders of extraordinary power and attainments will become more and more imperative. But the wide diffusion of the means for spreading half-knowledge will tend to make mediocre attainments the ideal, and society will be compelled to rely

upon inferior men as leaders, when strong men are demanded. In this it is not affirmed that the intellectual pursuits of a nation are manned solely from the highest schools, still it is the standard of these schools that sets the intellectual standard of the nation. Men may and do rise without the aid of the schools, yet the schools determine the extent to which they must push their unaided achievements. The degradation of the intellectual standard of a nation is by no means the least of the many evils resulting from that diffusive policy which dissipates the educational funds and force, without at any point extending the bounds of knowledge.

Still, because there are serious evils arising from that state of half-knowledge into which men are plunged with the first spring from ignorance, it does not follow that, for the sake of avoiding these evils, we should attempt to set aside the forces that are lifting men from barbarism. Though there is social peace in the state of Arcadian ignorance, we are not able to turn back and seek it, and thus shun the infelicities of the en-

lightening process. The doom of onward change is upon us. Within each progressive nation, there is an unceasing movement from ignorance towards intelligence, with the inevitable result, that at any given time, the majority of the population are only midway in the transition. The evils of half-knowledge are, therefore, not simply of this generation or this century; they are an unavoidable feature of the life of every nation that seeks to rise from barbarism to civilization. But they are not equally formidable in all nations. In a nation which emphasizes the plan of making its education universal, and which has no ideal higher than mediocrity, these infelicities are without any important antidote. They must be met stoically, as part of the great sacrifice entailed by the peculiar line of progress which that nation has chosen. There is no escape by way of a return to primitive ignorance, nor does the plan itself promise the desired salvation. What is especially wanted as a remedy for this condition conspicuously illustrated in the affairs of the United States, is not less in-

struction for the great body of the people, but a new ideal that shall be in harmony with the fundamental principle of a representative republic. This principle is that all the citizens are not, and cannot become, competent to pronounce an intelligent judgment on all the diversified details of state action; but that they may be safely relied upon to point out and elect the men best fitted to perform the business of government. The principle of pure democracy, on the other hand, is that every citizen may be, and should be, fitted to perform the functions of any office in the state. It is desirable, therefore, in a pure democracy, that its education should be both uniform and universal. But this nation is not, and never can be, a pure democracy; hence no such educational requirement is demanded, in order to secure harmony in the elements of the state. A presupposition of representative government is that some citizens are well-fitted and others ill-fitted for the conduct of public affairs. The universal and uniform education demanded by a democracy is, therefore, not an imperative

necessity under the representative system. But it is demanded under this system that there shall be men of extraordinary learning and wisdom, who, as leaders in the commonwealth, shall be worthy of confidence. Thus, in so far as our plan of universal education draws attention and support away from, and prevents the development of, means for the highest instruction, degrading the intellectual standard and leaving us to the guidance of the blind, in so far it is in conflict with the fundamental idea on which every complex society is organized. The preliminary educational need of this great representative republic, as it appears from this point of view, is not the further multiplication of institutions for superficial instruction, but the establishment of a new and higher ideal of intellectual life, which shall silence and put to shame the noisy pretensions of half-knowledge, and, through the realization of this ideal in higher wisdom, relieve the nation from the dangers of uninstructed counsel.

LECTURE IV.

PRESERVATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC SPIRIT.

ALTHOUGH the forms of our society may change in the course of our social growth, yet at the same time we feel the rightness of our instinct to preserve the democratic life. We know that in a community growing from simplicity to complexity, equality tends to disappear, and with equality also the conditions favorable to democratic rule. Yet as a nation we stand committed to a representative republic based on democracy. For us there is no alternative but an oligarchy or a military dictatorship, and to neither of these can we look with any degree of hope. A throne upheld by great achievements and the traditions of glorious centuries is impossible on this continent. We are compelled, therefore, to stand for

what we have, for the fundamental ideas and institutions under which we live, and to attempt to counteract those social forces that tend to make them impossible. We stand for these institutions, although we recognize that their establishment was in some sense an experiment. In fact, we recognize the establishment of every government as an experiment. Moreover, the whole governmental history of the world is only one long series of more or less successful attempts to find some means for wisely organizing and controlling men in communities and nations. It is true, the individual men who lay the plans and set in operation the forces of the experiment seldom live to see the outcome; but the nation or the race stands by and waits calmly for the result. And all this must be because no two governmental problems, either in the same age or in different ages, involve the same factors, and therefore the history of the past furnishes only hints, but no solutions, for the future. In making the experiment, the government must be framed on the basis of the circumstances

and conditions which we know from an observation of the present; but it goes into force to apply to circumstances and conditions which we cannot know, because they are in the undeveloped future.

After only one hundred years it may be too early to pronounce on the success or failure of this experiment. When the Roman empire had lasted an hundred years, it was still in its infancy. The close of the second century saw it in increased renown and undiminished vigor. As it passed the end of the third century, it was guided by one whose acts reveal the true prophetic insight of a statesman. And not until after four hundred years was its existence seriously threatened by external shock. To have said during the first three hundred years of its existence that the Roman empire was a failure, as some have said of this American republic in its first hundred years, or to have said that it was established to last forever, as our patriotism prompts us to say of our government, would clearly have been a false judgment. The Roman empire may not have had all

the qualities of our ideal of a wise and efficient government, but at the same time, in the second or third century, it had by no means failed. Still it was not immortal, and finally passed away with the development of Christian society.

In view of the Empire's long unrivalled dominion and final extinction, in view of the perishableness of all human institutions, which is emphasized on every page of history, it is not to be supposed that as a nation we have reached a point in the development of social and political forms beyond which we shall not advance; to suppose this is to presume that the active practical intelligence which this nation has displayed for an hundred years will suddenly become paralyzed, and social stagnation settle over the land. As long as the nation moves with the current of progress, our institutions will continue to change to meet the demands of the developing spirit.

If, then, the establishment of our government is one of a long line of experiments which the race has made, why celebrate its beginnings or take delight in its con-

tinuance? The reason lies not in the wish that the form may remain unchanged, for the necessary condition of such a result is a state of society entirely repugnant to our strongest social instinct—the instinct of progress. We regard with patriotic pride the beginnings of our government, not because we believe its institutions destined to perpetual survival, but because we hold that its establishment represents a step forward, and because it has emphatically announced certain principles which we believe will abide, however the forms may change. As long as the nation moves forward in the line of true progress, we may look with gratification to the necessary changes in the form of the state. There is reason for anxiety only in the indications of a return to rejected principles and antiquated conditions.

Some phases of an important movement are seen in our wide departure from simple living, and in the prodigious attempts that are making throughout the Union to draw strong lines of class separation. Fifty years ago the general equality of conditions

among the people appeared to De Tocqueville as the fundamental fact and central point of American life. But to-day we are conspicuous among the nations for our lack of simplicity of living, and for our wide variations of conditions. This lack of simplicity arises from the desire for social distinction taken with the fact that as a nation we especially emphasize wealth as the measure of the distinction to be accorded. The ambitious German or Englishman dares to live simply, because his society lays stress on other criteria of distinction than the display of wealth. In some countries intellectual cultivation and achievement balance nobility in giving social distinction, but in the great society of America there is little to balance the possession of wealth. There is, therefore, a powerful stimulus to action in only one direction. The highest, the non-commercial pursuits, consequently appear unattractive, and comparative neglect attends these phases of life on which alone rests a nation's glory.

Yet one may easily underestimate the

beneficent influence of wealth even on the higher phases of national progress. To avoid this liability, one may recall the fact that the glorious period of art and learning among the Dutch followed their commercial supremacy in Europe, and that the unrivalled brilliancy of Grecian civilization in the age of Pericles followed a period of remarkable commercial and industrial activity. But in both of these nations personal living retained much of its primitive simplicity. In the conspicuous qualities of American life, however, there is no evidence that the civilization of either Holland or Greece is our model; rather that we are returning to the social condition of the Roman empire, in which vast accumulations of wealth were used to promote rivalries in the magnificence of personal luxury.

The political significance of these changes in the structure of American society has already been made apparent in pointing to the fact that certain forms of government grow naturally, as a plant out of its proper soil, from certain appropriate forms of society.

Among the forces which lead away from democracy, and against which all champions of democracy are obliged to contend, are those which arise from the spirit of war; for, however persistently the Utopists and sentimentalists may affirm that the day of universal peace is about to dawn, the solemn fact remains that military ambition and the war spirit are as vigorous to-day as ever. For the monarchical governments of Europe, the military spirit and the military habit are sources of strength. They make the people accustomed to absolute authority, and prevent the administration from becoming weakened by decentralization. The military organization is the monarchical organization, and the monarch is the military head of the nation. The military spirit confirms the ruler in his position, and gives vigor and compactness of organization to his kingdom. But the army of a republic is not essentially different in its constitution and methods and influence from the army of a monarchy. If, therefore, it is maintained in strength and employed in frequent wars, it will tend to

develop in a republic the monarchical spirit and a monarchical form of rule. Our policy is thus a policy of peace; for the hope of staying the monarchical or oligarchical tendency in a republic hangs on the possibility of finding some other means for settling controversies than an appeal to arms. It is for this reason that the people of the United States are interested in the plan of international arbitration; and for the same reason every association of persons seeking the preservation of American democracy must have as one of its practical purposes the advocacy of peace.

It is not, however, that war in all its forms is to be repudiated. When it comes to resist foreign encroachment, to defend the rights of our citizens abroad, or to preserve the integrity of the nation, even though it come with all its attendant misery and sacrifice, it may bring incidental blessings. It may strengthen the bonds of national unity; it may deepen the sentiment of patriotism; it may give to the pulse of every citizen a firmer and truer and steadier beat. National independence

and national honor we hold not dear, even if they must be purchased and maintained at the cost of human life. Moreover, in war our sense of social duty is magnified, and we become willing even to give our lives to insure the welfare of the nation. But war may not be employed with design in a republic based on democracy as a means of awakening a sense of social duty; for the good which may attend it is only incidental, while the evils are far-reaching and fundamental.

Another force tending to the dissolution of the democratic community is the strong advocacy of individual rights, which marks society under republican liberty. While the oppressive hand of their superiors rested on the common people of the several civilized nations, they sought relief, and demanded the satisfaction of their desires under the guise of a recognition of rights. But the identification of desires and rights, followed by a strong and unwavering insistence on their realization, tends to destroy the bonds which hold society together, places the individual in antagonism to his

fellows, and brings about that condition of affairs where each is for himself and none is for the state. It is a drift towards this state of things that has conspicuously marked the movement of society during the last two hundred years, or even since the rise of the individualism of the Protestant Revolution. And as a consequence of the general striving to realize individual rights, we behold the diversity and antagonisms of modern life, and private judgment, in both religious and political affairs, unrestrained by authority, running into the wildest vagaries of individual opinion. From this chaos of individualism, which manifests itself in the assertion of rights, the republic has need to be redeemed, and the redemption may come only through a revival of the sense of social duty.

In political as well as in religious affairs there is need of revival. The history of every successful system of religion shows either a continuous effort, or occasional extraordinary efforts, to maintain in influence, or restore to effective power, the principles of the founders. Frequent recurrence to

the simple doctrines and zealous lives of the early Mohammedans has kept Mohammedanism a force in the world. The strong traditions of the Hebrews, binding the later generations to the principles and lives of the early heroes, have preserved that people true to itself, and given it a consistent development through centuries of trial. Christianity might have drifted into lifeless formalism, but that ever and anon the Christian world has been aroused to lift its eyes from the material interests of the day, and contemplate the sublime spiritualism of the early Christian teachers. What has been found needful to keep a religious community in healthful life, is equally needful for the broader life of a political community. If the nation would be true to itself throughout its changes of governmental forms, growth must continue on the basis of its essential and fundamental ideas. Like a religious system, it must seek to keep its primitive principles conspicuous, and if at any time they are lost to sight, the nation must be awakened by the preaching of a revival. The world

grown indifferent to primitive Christianity was awakened by the preaching of Saint Bernard, which was echoed from hill-top to valley and from valley to hill-top throughout Southern Europe. Again, absorbed in the delights of ancient learning and the external glories of artistic creations, there was needed the sublime faith and heroic devotion of Luther and Loyola to recall primitive Christian teachings to the hearts and minds of a worldly generation. Politically we have fallen on barren times like these. Our generation is either indifferent to the political doctrines which underlie our social organism as formed by the founders of this republic, or it is absorbed in the wonders of our own physical creations. We have need of a political revival, a revival of democratic simplicity, and an awakening of genuine patriotism.

Not only does this American generation need to be recalled to the simplicity of the fathers, but also to their more complete conception of life. The youth of the present are moved to criticise every plan of education or pursuit in life with reference

to its power to contribute material advantages, without regard to the nature of the character that will result. Moreover, many persons instead of viewing the state as a beneficent organization whose effective existence is secured only by the devotion of citizens, regard it as something to be plundered for immediate, individual profit. Wherever we direct our view, we discern the imperative need of a reviving voice that shall awaken the nation to look once more on its ancient and lofty ideals; and in the attainment of this end the conserving forces of religion are of great importance.

Under democratic rule, as well as under other forms of government, social growth is dependent in a large measure upon religion. Yet it is not the the function of religion to initiate new features of organization, or to urge important social changes; it the rather represents the principle of conservatism; it stands for the forces of instinct and tradition, and not for the forces of intelligence. Under the domination of freely acting intelligence, man appears as a

radical, and seeks better conditions through changes which he consciously proposes. Under the domination of the religious instinct, he appears as a conservative, and holds to principles and forces which he conceives to be a part of an everlasting order. Pure intelligence in social progress is revolutionary: in the creation and pursuit of its ideals it is self-sufficient and neglectful of tradition. The religious instinct, on the other hand, adores that which was from the beginning, and, in its influence on progress, tends to bind the present to the past, and allow the forces of the past to help determine the affairs of the present. And through its conservative force it helps to make effective the social ideals of the past.

Because religion is conservative, it is sometimes claimed that it hinders rather than helps the onward movement, that it chains the wheel of progress. Take an illustration from two drivers on one of our long, steep mountain roads. The one chains a wheel of his wagon, and is thus enabled to carry his load steadily and

safely along the narrow decline to its destination. The other will have nothing of such hindrances, and, with all wheels free, enters upon what he regards as his career of rapid and uninterrupted progress. But soon his load is beyond control, the leaders are in wild flight, and, at a dangerous turn, horses, driver, and all they carry, are plunged over the precipice in one promiscuous ruin. If the American people, with all the momentum of the ages, have thus far been able to keep to the road of genuine progress, and have at different times safely rounded the sharp curve which looks into the abyss of national dishonor, it is because there exists in us still some inheritance of the things our fathers lived for, some unconscious memory, it may be, of the principles which their religious consciousness approved.

The efficacy of religion in relation to social evolution is, furthermore, illustrated by its power in strengthening the sense of duty. As already suggested, this sense is weakened in proportion as emphasis is laid on individual rights. Since the loud proc-

lamation of the rights of man in the last century, the doctrine there involved has operated on society as a disintegrating force. It has tended to make the individual man forgetful of everything but his claims. It has encouraged his natural selfishness, and made his relation to organized society conspicuously a relation of personal material profit. In itself, it points only to anti-social consequences. In order, therefore, that through its influence the development of society may not be prevented, or the bonds of social intercourse be dissolved, the recognition of rights must be supplemented by the recognition of duties. It is only with the recognition of duties that social evolution begins; and, in the whole course of social growth, no agency has been more powerful than religion in enforcing and keeping alive the sense of duty, and thus implanting in men the qualities under which society proceeds by evolution to a higher standard.

It may not be maintained that religion helps directly to build means of communication, to establish and operate factories, or

in any other way to bring the forces of nature into subjection to man. But doing these things is only one phase of progress. In the course of national evolution, there are ages of action and ages of ideas; and the achievements of both are essential to true social development. Neither the heroic undertaking of the Athenians against the Persians, nor the events of the period of material prosperity which followed, give us a full view of Athenian civilization. The development was not complete till the spirit of the nation had unfolded itself in the creation of religious and artistic ideals, and realized through these the higher manifestations of social existence. What is true of the Athenians is true of every nation. However great its power and economic achievements, its evolution is incomplete till it has acquired clear religious ideals that have found expression in life. And it is to religion, moreover, that society must look for the transmission of its highest conceptions from generation to generation. What religion teaches about God and moral con-

duct has taken form through human thought; and this doctrine, gathered into one body and accepted as part of a system of religion, goes everywhere, bearing the stamp of divine authority. And throughout the ages the religious system is destined to be the means through which the highest thoughts of the race concerning human life are preserved and made a portion of our common inheritance. It maintains the continuity of our highest conceptions, and carries them on, with all their uplifting force, from age to age and from nation to nation.

But there is a still more important service which religion renders to social evolution. By emphasizing the spiritual as contrasted with the physical side of man's being, a basis has been laid for a new and higher estimate of the worth of human life; and this new conception of the dignity and worth of man has given rise to many of the characteristic qualities of the world's ripest civilization. It underlies the movement in behalf of universal education. It has called into existence the whole scheme of modern

charity, from the care and training of waifs to the efforts to protect and redeem the idiotic and the insane. It has tended to deprive the penalties of the law of their former barbarity, without diminishing their efficiency in defending the peaceful and the virtuous. In a word, it has given to the civilization of this age a rank not attained by that of any other age, although other ages may have transcended us in the excellence of their literature and the perfection of their art.

The social problems which a nation in any generation has to face cannot be solved by the pure intelligence of that nation as manifest in that generation. The knowledge of the bulk of any community is only half-knowledge, and is inadequate to social control. France, in the Revolution, cut loose from religion, rejected her national tradition, and relied on the immediate intelligence of her people. The outcome was a fiasco; and after the Revolution had dealt its first blow at the past, there was no hope of progress for the nation till tradition, with its halo of religion, had been rehabilitated. The tem-

porary failure here observed was such a failure as is bound to appear whenever reform proceeds solely on the conclusions of intelligence. We are not determined in the larger part of our action or non-action by the investigations and decisions of our intelligence, but by tradition which operates through our instincts, and brings already formed a solution for most of the cases on which we are called to act. If we work not all the evil we might do, it is not because our intelligences sit in judgment on every proposed act, but because we are moved in our conduct by tradition, by an inheritance of impulses which are able to make themselves effective in our lives by the fact that they were involved in the religion of our ancestors. It is this sanctified inheritance which maintains society, in its evolution, true to itself, and enables it to preserve what is best in its experience and the nobler features of its ancient ideals. It is this which enables a nation to carry itself steadily forward, in spite of the vagaries of immature thought and the aberrations of temporary passion.

INDEX.

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