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DEMOCRATIC
FRANCE

THE THIRD REPUBLIC
FROM SEDAN TO VICHY

BY

RICHARD WALDEN HALE, JR.

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To My Wife



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INTRODUCTION

USUALLY A description of how a book was written is of interest only to the author, but in this case the reader may care to know that not only is this the first complete history of the Third French Republic, but that, since the draft of this was completed in June 1940, it may claim to provide an interpretation of the Third Republic that did not have to be changed because of the Fall of France and of the Republic. The text was changed somewhat, since the Fall of France made it seem a wider audience would be interested in the subject, but essentials have not been changed. Indeed, because the last scene of the Republic, at the Casino in Vichy, has fitted so neatly into the interpretation already given, the author has reason to hope that that interpretation may be worth putting before the general public.

The aim of this book is to show the average American what France was like during the seventy years she was a democracy. The means used is to try to see the French as they saw themselves, by looking at the workings of the collective mind of the Nation, the French Parliament. Each of the four parts of the book attempts to use that means to that end. Part I, the Foundation of the Republic, has as its purpose to show how France found herself a republic in fact as well as in name, when the National Assembly took over, after the collapse of the Second Empire and the end of the Republican "Dictatorship at Tours." Part II, the Constitutional Stage, has as its purpose to show how the temporary republic became permanent, and found methods for estab-

lishing democratic control over the machinery of potential dictatorship inherent in the vast French bureaucracy. Part III, the Institutional Stage, has as its purpose to show how France used this Parliamentary democracy to meet the problems of an independent Army and an independent Church. Part IV, the Industrial Stage, has as its purpose to show how France tried to use the same Parliamentary democracy to meet the new problems of an industrialized society, till in 1940 she was overwhelmed by an industrialized war. Since French life was, and is, highly centralized, the story of the decisions the French Parliament took, and of the reasons for them, should add up into a whole, the story of the nation, making this not only a political and institutional history of the Third Republic, but to a certain degree a survey of the trends in French life. As a successful democracy must be a way of life as well as a form of government, such a treatment of the history of the Third Republic should enable the reader to judge for himself how successful French democracy was in its seventy years of existence.

Because this is an interpretative history, attention has been given to three especial difficulties that beset the presentation of the history of the Third Republic to the general reader. The first is the multiplicity of characters who appear for a moment, without explanation, then to disappear. This has been met by trying to refer to a man twice or not at all, and to refer by name only to those men who symbolize movements. As an example of this policy, see the omission of the Viscount Henri de Rochefort, even though he was a Republican under the Empire, a Communard, a Boulangist, and had a dramatic escape from New Caledonia. It cost a pang at the loss of good stories to leave him out, but it was found that references to him served to confuse and complicate the story rather than clarify it, whereas references to Paul Déroulède, not much more prominent a man, served to demonstrate the meaning of French Nationalism. So, if a character appears at all, he should appear often enough for the reader to have some idea what he was like.

A second difficulty is the basis of past history on which the history of the Third Republic rests, a basis not known to the American reader. Here are to be avoided the Scylla of going so far back in the history of France that little is said of the Third Republic and the Charybdis of failing to explain essential characteristics in which the Third Republic differed from other governments of France and the world. It is hoped that the Scylla has been avoided by starting at the beginning of the Republic, not the beginning of France; and that the Charybdis has been avoided by a careful selection of illustrative references showing the background of the various events chronicled. An example of this might be the problem of keeping in the reader's mind the importance of Adolphe Thiers in the winter of 1870-1871. It is far too easy to make it appear he sprang into importance overnight, as the National Assembly met, for Thiers at a cursory view seems to sweep Gambetta suddenly from the stage. But, as to weight down the story with the full account of all Thiers had done in his seventy years' life would prevent ever coming to the point, the solution seemed to be to make such incidental references to him as to suggest his career without detailing it at length, and use those references to lead up to the commanding position Thiers assumed when the National Assembly met at Bordeaux. Throughout this book there has been an endeavor to make explanations of background in terms of the events of the time, rather than in terms of the history of France before the Republic.

A third difficulty has been the emotional character of the history of the Third Republic, especially the Separation of Church and State, and the Fall of France. That emotional character pervades the source material, and the interpretations of it, and reaches into the act of writing. There the answer has been to try to take incontestable facts, illuminate them in the terms of the situation as men then saw it, and then draw only those conclusions that could readily be drawn without long processes of reasoning. Rather than take sides, the author has had steadily before his mind the

aim of trying to put himself into the events he is describing, and to report the situation as it appeared at the time.

In so attempting to show France as the French saw it, the author has tried to show the probable motives behind each action, rather than to explain all actions by one formula. To cite what may seem an outstanding example of this, he has not, as have many historians, assumed that the Count of Chambord prevented his being brought back as King Henry V by a foolish punctilio about replacing the tricolor with the White Flag and sticking to the letter of his prerogative, as did his grandfather, King Charles X. On the contrary, the author, while not neglecting that interpretation, puts forward the version of the Count's own supporters, that because the Count's great-uncle, Louis XVIII, had wisely used his prerogative as a check on Parliaments that were going too far, the Count felt he could not give up what he alone could bring to France—a claim to authority that was based, not on universal suffrage, but on God's grace. Many conservative Frenchmen wished for such a balance of powers; is it not possible that the Count meant what he said about the terms on which he would take the throne? That may serve as an example of the point of view from which this book is written: of considering what the actors on the stage of French history thought of themselves, as well as what others thought of them.

Besides considering the aim of this book, its means of interpretation, and the point of view, this introduction should mention the scholarly apparatus. Footnotes have not been used since the general events with which the book deals do not need single documents for verification, but are matters of general knowledge that can be checked in many ways. A bibliography has been provided in which scholars can find the most accessible checks, and the general reader can find suggestions for going on with the subject. One class of statement, those variously recorded anecdotes of the Third Republic that are almost certainly not true to fact but have real truth to character, have been labeled as

“legends” in the text to show that scholars have either disproved them or decided no proof can be shown. As for translation, since this is written for the average American, no French phrases have been put in the text, and only those French names have been left untranslated whose translation would serve to confuse instead of to enlighten. For example, the Marshal MacMahon has been called the Duke of Magenta since his title refers to the battle he won in Italy in 1859; but the Duke *de Broglie* has not had part of his name translated because to do so would both be to deprive him of his surname and to suggest a connection that no longer existed with an Italian town his ancestors had left centuries before. That general rule has been the guide in other cases too numerous to mention.

But the aim has also been to preserve accuracy and use it to give clarity to the story that is presented to the American reader. Because French aristocrats of the time were very aristocratic, their titles have been given in due form and sonorousness. Because the difference between the French and English Executives is paralleled by the French use of “Premier” and “President of the Council of Ministers” instead of “Prime Minister,” that word has not been used, nor has Cabinet been used, except for meetings of the Council of Ministers away from the President of the Republic. For the French word Commission, the word Committee has been used, except when the French body was like an American or English Commission. And for the convenience of scholars there is appended the French Constitution in full, and a table not only of Presidents of the Republic and Presidents of the Council of Ministers, but also of Presidents of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies.

PART I
*THE FOUNDATION OF
THE REPUBLIC*



Chapter One

SEDAN AND THE FOURTH OF SEPTEMBER

THOUGH PRAISE is often given for seeing ourselves as others see us, it is not given often enough for seeing others as they see themselves. The latter virtue should be encouraged among historians, for it can clear up a good many puzzles, among them the Third French Republic. If that Republic is judged by English or American standards, it has had unstable Executives, riotous state trials, and a willful Parliament that alternated between fears of the mob and fears of a dictator. It seems amazing that such a government should last seventy years, and only fall under tremendous pressure. But those years do not appear the same to the French. When considering their Republic, why not try to see it as they saw it? Perhaps it will make better sense that way.

When a Frenchman thinks of how the Third Republic began, two names probably come to his mind, Sedan and the Fourth of September, each bringing pictures with it. Sedan will evoke pictures of a trapped army, of veterans fighting desperately to cut a way out by hand-to-hand fighting and furious cavalry charges, while untrained recruits stand immobile and suffering under a rain of shells; of incompetent generals wrangling in front of a sick Emperor; it will evoke emotions of desertion, of desperation, and of anger at the men governing the Second Empire who had brought France to such a pass. The Fourth of September will evoke

pictures of a Council of Ministers sitting with full power to act but no will; of mobs roaming the streets in a night of late summer; of a midnight session of Parliament, at which an amazing proposition is brought to the Tribune for discussion, while a mob hammers at the gate of the Palace Bourbon; of a noon session the next day, during which the mob breaks in and chooses new rulers for France from the opposition in Parliament, while the Empress flees by back streets; of the mob bringing its new rulers from Palace Bourbon to City Hall to prove by proclaiming them there that this Republic is in the tradition of its two predecessors, though this time not a drop of blood was shed; and finally of a new Council of Ministers sitting faced with the task of fighting a lost war. What those two significant days pointed out to France then can be seen now, if looked at rightly.

Since two Americans watched those events, perhaps it would be possible to borrow their eyes. At Sedan, Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan, U. S. A., saw the Empire collapse from a perfect vantage point; seeing what he saw may make the words conscription and isolation, which are the keys to France's then relations with Europe, stop being mere print and become things that mold men's lives. In Paris, four days later, Minister Elihu Washburne saw Parliament and mob, saw the proclamation of the Republic from the City Hall; seeing what he saw may give life to the struggle France has had between three forces: a centralized bureaucracy that might mean dictatorship, mobs in the streets, and a Parliament balancing between; and may show why Frenchmen wanted one form or another of government. Sedan and the Fourth of September can serve to explain the whole Third Republic, for they are days that sum up eras.

As the dawn of Thursday, September 1, 1870, broke through the white mists that overlay the Meuse Valley and the town of Sedan, a picture was uncovered that would haunt the imagination of France for many a year. The best point from which to view the final trapping of the last Army of the Second French Empire was the heights of Wadelin-

court, just to the south of the Meuse, because they stood across the base of the sharp bend in the river, against which Marshal MacMahon's retreating army was backed up. From those heights could be seen how one German army was pushing into Bazeilles, to the east and the watcher's right, and crowding the French into Sedan, while another German army which had audaciously passed south of the French had gotten behind them, captured the bridge at Donchery as French Engineers were on the point of blowing it up, and was closing the jaws of the trap. On the top of the hill, with all this unfolding below him, was one of the best-qualified observers then alive, Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan, of the United States Army, who was enjoying a European vacation from chasing Indians across the Great Plains in the "Department of the Missouri" by watching Germans chase Frenchmen across Alsace-Lorraine. He had arrived with the Germans just in time to see them pin Marshal Bazaine up in the fortress of Metz, had hurried with them from Metz to the Belgian border to meet the strange march of Marshal MacMahon to Bazaine's aid, and was now watching with critical interest to compare von Moltke's generalship with that which he had seen in the Civil War.

Sheridan saw the right-hand jaw of the German trap close, grinding hard on the little village of Bazeilles, and stand firm from the river to the Belgian border. He saw the steady flow of the gray-clad men who made up the left-hand jaw of the trap cross the Meuse and stream up behind the bend to the village of Floing, while the French did nothing. He saw the first German skirmishers reach Floing, when, as if from nowhere, lancers and Chasseurs d'Afrique poured out, dashed at the skirmishers, and, driven off once, tried again and again to smash into the solid lines of infantry in the face of repeating rifles spitting a hail of bullets, crashing to the ground as they galloped downhill in the graveyard of Illy. Sheridan counted four such charges, though actually there were more. Then the cavalry withdrew to the protection of the French infantry, whom Sheridan saw waiting

there doing nothing. At this point Sheridan stopped watching and enjoyed a good lunch with the King of Prussia, for the battle seemed over, and an aide was sent to ask MacMahon to surrender. Sheridan suggested that the Emperor Napoleon III might be there, but was told the "Old Fox" was too wise to be caught in such a trap. After lunch, with a reply from a French general asking for terms, came a personal letter of surrender from the Emperor of the French, who had been caught, after all. With that as a battle, Sedan ended, though such was the state of nerves of the French generals that the negotiations took till noon of Friday the second, which is the usual date given for the surrender.

Such was the picture that stood out in all men's minds of the defeat that smashed the Second French Empire. As the years went on, four men who had been there began to stand out, three for some sort of qualified praise, one for great blame. At Bazeilles had been a young poet, Paul Déroulède, recently and violently converted from pacifism. He had given up a reserve officer's commission to fight in a front-line regiment as a private, he was captured rescuing a wounded comrade under fire, and only surrendered under direct orders from a French officer. Had the French Army had in its ranks more valiant willing recruits like Déroulède, instead of the men who had rested immobile when the cavalry charged at Floing, then the few superb veteran professional soldiers could have absorbed and given training to man power nearly equal to the German man power, thus multiplying their own effectiveness. But neither the valor of enthusiasm nor the valor of discipline could be expected of the mass of newly called up, undrilled conscripts who had been huddled in Sedan, many of whom had never fired the rifles they carried on their shoulders. Déroulède, realizing this, made himself the poet of the Army, sang of its life, beginning with the brave Rector of Bazeilles who had carried water and munitions to the Zouaves, and set himself to build up the popular support for spirit of the French Army

in order to gain revenge for Sedan. The Republic was to see much of him, and the ideas he represented.

Another man who gained credit of sorts was General the Marquis de Gallifet, later to be known for other reasons as the Red Marquis. It was he who had led the charges at Floing, when his commander, General de Marguerite, was shot through the face as he rode out to reconnoiter. Marguerite, unable to speak, gave his last order by pointing with his sword to the charge, and was led off to die. Gallifet carried out that order, riding with suicidal bravery downhill through gravestones, where horses and men fell and broke their necks even before they could be shot down by the German fire, Gallifet himself escaping by a miracle. It was magnificent; it was obedience to orders; but, like the Charge of the Light Brigade, it was questionable whether or not it was war. Gallifet had proved that the French Army held heroic men whom nothing but death or direct orders could stop from fighting, leaving it to others to find a better use for them. Gallifet, too, had a future before him.

It almost at once appeared that Marshal MacMahon was not to blame for the defeat of the French Army. He was a brave soldier, who in 1859 had been made Duke of Magenta for winning that battle, who carried out unwise orders to the best of his ability. He had tried to withdraw from the trap while yet there was time, but a shell splinter had struck him in the thigh as he was riding out to find a way. Because he had uncomplainingly done his best under difficult circumstances, MacMahon earned respect from most Frenchmen that would bring him high office later on. It was others who deserved blame. It was General Ducrot, to whom MacMahon had handed over, who had ordered Marguerite's and Gallifet's charges, in the hope of breaking out upriver. As those charges took place, suddenly the self-assured General de Wimpffen drew from his pocket instructions from the Empress in Paris authorizing him to take over command if he felt it necessary, and, changing plan, he ineffectually

tried to break out downriver. In front of the Emperor Napoleon III, who was suffering tortures from gallstones, these two men squabbled at first over who should have the glory of the command; and then, when they realized the completeness of the defeat, they reversed their positions and tried to foist on each other the ignominy of signing terms of surrender, until at last the Emperor turned from begging them to surrender to ordering them to do so.

This should have been done long before. It had been criminal to subject to the heavy German shelling the majority of the Army, who were raw recruits. But such behavior was part and parcel of the collapse of the Second Empire. There were brave men in the Army, none better; the professional private soldier of the Second Empire was probably the best fighting man in the world. There were many good officers, as has been said; MacMahon, Gallifet, and Déroulède would later play great parts on the stage of French life. The Army had some very good equipment, the only machine guns in the world and the best rifles. However, it did not have leadership, for the rulers of the Empire had lost their nerve, and with it the grasp of the situation. Because they lost their heads, they made sure defeat all the more crushing. Just as at the two ends of the battlefield there had been signs that France could be a great power, in the center, at headquarters, could be found the responsibility for her failure.

At Sedan Napoleon was paying for a decade of failure. He had stood aside while Count von Bismarck had built Prussia up into a great power, assembled the North German Confederation around Prussia, and then launched his Confederation and South Germany, too, against France, as a means of uniting the thirty-nine German states into one Empire. Bismarck had used Napoleon's own difficulties to gain time in which to do this. In 1862 Napoleon had been busy in Mexico and Syria when Bismarck was telling the Prussian Parliament that Prussia's boundaries, with three empires around her, precluded a healthy state life, and that

not liberalism but "blood and iron" would settle the questions of the day, and by that justifying the reintroduction of full conscription. In 1864 he was busy in Mexico, having misjudged a Polish revolt that might have given him strength in eastern Europe if properly helped, when Bismarck took over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. In 1866 Napoleon was again caught napping when Bismarck crushed Austria in a seven weeks' war, and was ready to turn German man power against the French professional army before it could get home from Mexico. From then for four years opposition at home and inefficiency among his assistants prevented Napoleon from building up the Army and the alliances that would have checked Bismarck. Napoleon had become so weak at home he had had to set up a bogus Parliament, the Legislative Body, and pretend to accept its control. In 1869 the Legislative Body started to make that control real. Men died at Sedan because no Austrians and Italians were marching to their aid, and it was Napoleon's fault that they were not so marching. Sedan graved on the heart of France temporary distrust of a single person as ruler, especially if he be Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, and a permanent determination to start as Bismarck had done, by building up an army that used all the nation's man power and continue as he did by gaining all possible allies. The lessons of Sedan run through all the history of the Third Republic. Preoccupation with the needs of a conscript army, and the officers and equipment it needed, and with the needs of diplomacy explain much of the aims of French democracy, and the special forms it took. For example, had it not been for Sedan, and the desire to revenge military disaster, the trial of an artillery captain, Dreyfus, might not have been the crucial event in French life that it was.

If lessons on what should have been done were needed at Sedan, there was not far to go for teachers. On the heights of Wadelincourt, where Sheridan was lunching with the King and watching the last closing of the trap, were the men who could give the lessons. There was War Minister Count

Albrecht von Roon, who had provided Germany with man power by making conscription a real thing, not the farce Napoleon III had intentionally made it in France. There was the King of Prussia, who had provided the loyalty that made the officer corps hang together and train the man power, inspiring the ordinary German with devotion to his rulers. There was Chief of Staff Count Helmuth von Moltke, who in two previous wars, the Danish one of 1864 and the Austrian one of 1866, had used the weapon von Roon had forged for him. Above all, there was Count Otto Eduard von Bismarck-Schönhausen, the master statesman, who had used the machinery of man power, loyalty, and military brains. If France was to be great again, Frenchmen must rebuild her on the lines those men had pointed out, must have real conscription, loyalty, generalship, and diplomatic success.

But if responsibility is to be pinned on Napoleon III, it must be pinned intelligently on him, for Napoleon III was in many ways a great man. For twenty-two years, ever since he was elected President of the Second French Republic in 1848, he had managed to stay at the forefront, not only of France, but of Europe. He had combined seemingly contradictory roles, being the man elected by universal suffrage who drove in 1851 the National Assembly from the Parliament chamber in the Palace Bourbon in the name of law and order on the pretext of preventing a future revolt that did not happen, appealing as pretext to bloody Republican revolts, two of them in 1848, one each in 1849 and 1850, to stop a threatened one in 1852. He had also combined the contradiction of proclaiming himself, in 1852, the Emperor of Peace, and of fighting and defeating Russia in the Crimean War of 1855 and Austria in the Italian War of 1859. He had kept order with a stern hand at home, and yet encouraged revolts abroad; had favored the Catholic Church at home and its enemies in Italy, while at the same time lending the Pope troops to protect himself from the Italians. To have seen the possibilities of such inconsistencies and

used them is a mark of great ability, and most of what he had done he had done by himself, without help.

When, in December 1848, the French people had elected Louis Napoleon Bonaparte President of the Second French Republic, he had seen to it that he was President in fact, and took no orders from the Assembly. It was he, acting alone and against advice, who had sent the Army of the French Republic to drive the Roman Republic out of Rome and restored the sway of the Pope. It was he, with a group of army officers, headed by General St. Arnaud, who had locked up the Assembly at 2 A.M. on the morning of December 2, the lucky day of the Bonapartes. It was he, with the aid of Rouher, whom men later called the Vice-Emperor, who had engineered the wave of enthusiasm that swamped the plebiscite proclaiming the Prince President the Emperor of Peace under the title of Napoleon III. It was he who deviously enticed France and England into a war with Russia that, if it had no other results, had brought back to French arms the glory the First Napoleon had given them. It was he who had searched out and married the Spanish Countess Eugénie de Montijo, to show the dynasties of Europe that the peoples' dynasty could find a mate not connected with a throne. It was he, fascinated by the assassin Orsini who had bombed him to remind him of a youthful promise to free Italy, who had caused Count Emilio di Cavour to meet him secretly at Plombières. It was he who out of that meeting engineered the sudden break of relations with Austria, the first railway transportation of an army, the battles of Solferino and Magenta, and the freeing of Italy from Austria, even if he had to draw back when his original feat, the restoring of Pope Pius IX to Rome, was threatened. It was he to whom the English statesman Richard Cobden had come, to negotiate, in a few days, a treaty of Free Trade, upsetting the whole tradition of French economic policy, by the ability to convince, not a nation, but one man. It was he who, struck by the hope of making a Mexican Empire, had brought Archduke Maximilian of Aus-

tria to the New World. It was he with whom Mr. Slidell of Louisiana had dealt in his almost successful attempt to get outside aid for the Confederacy. It was he who had to rebuff the Archduchess Carlotta, when her husband, Maximilian, vainly attempted to hold out in Mexico after Marshal Bazaine's French troops had been taken away. And, incidentally, it was he whom Count von Bismarck had had to hoodwink at two crucial moments in his career, just before the Danish and Austrian wars, when French intervention might have thrown out of kilter deep-laid plans for building up German unity.

Because Napoleon III had been the mainspring of France during those twenty-two years, the history of those years was largely court history. While Napoleon would never have lasted had he not well known what the French people wanted, yet, since every decision was taken by him, much history was made by influencing him. That made the French Court's glitter and intrigue a matter of history as well as legend, and Paris a haven of adventurers, and has thrown a haze of romance over all that went on under the Second Empire. It is worth setting aside that glamour, as the people of France did when Sedan forced them to wake up, and reflecting a moment on just what it was that enabled the President of the Second Republic to slip into a personal dictatorship that lasted for twenty years. The potentialities of the great French bureaucracy are something not always fully realized, and they explain not only the career of Louis Napoleon and his crew of adventurers, but also the rise, continuance, and fall of the Third Republic.

For, when Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's uncle, the great Napoleon, seized power in 1799 and put an end to the First Republic, he made France into an extremely good dictatorship, bringing all the threads to one point at the top. Each Ministry controlled some aspect of French life, and he controlled the actions of all the ministers. This centralization was often inveighed against by those in opposition to whatever government might be in power; but, when the opposi-

Main

tion changed hands with the government, temptation to exercise power was always too great, and reformers in office forgot most of the reforms they had clamored for. Fundamentally the machinery set up by the great Napoleon is that which Marshal Pétain has in his hands at the moment of writing, and Adolf Hitler is trying to wrest from him by installing at its head his tool, Pierre Laval. The point at which these threads join is the Council of Ministers, where policy-making actions and important decisions are made, not on the order of individual ministers, but by decree of the whole Council. That, again to refer to contemporary events, is why Pétain has held the office of President of the Council in his hands, and why the Vice-Presidency is such a prize.

Of all the Ministries, that of the Interior is the most important. To it are responsible all the Prefects at the heads of the Departments, all policemen in France, and especially the Paris police force, who are utterly independent of the City Council. The Minister of the Interior can give orders to every mayor in France, and if those orders are disobeyed he can dismiss the mayor and replace him. Possibly the next most important Ministry is that of War, for France has had conscription since 1793, and the command of all healthy Frenchmen between the ages of 18 and 45 is no trifle. In dignity the most important Ministry is that of Justice, whose holder is often called Keeper of the Seals. Though judges have life tenure, it is he who promotes them, and every court has in it a state prosecutor at his orders. When there was a Ministry of Public Worship, it had great importance, for from 1801 to 1905 the state paid the salaries of every clergyman in France, of whatever denomination, with a special arrangement with the Pope, called the Concordat, by which it appointed all bishops of the Roman Catholic Church, subject to the Pope's veto. Of this arrangement Napoleon used to say, "A Priest is worth more than a policeman." Napoleon well knew that indirect methods were better for dictators to employ. His Minister of the Interior used to bribe newspapers, a custom that has held to the present. This indirect

pressure existed in economic life too. Napoleon established an excellent Bank of France, requiring it to serve even the smallest shopkeeper's needs for credit, and put the appointment of the Governor of the Bank in the hands of the Minister of Finance. Later on, when railways came to France, to this control of economic life was added government ownership of the road-bed, leasing to capitalists the right to lay rails and run trains. In every way French life was tied to Paris, and the cluster of Ministries near the Elysée Palace, where lived Napoleon I and his successors, Kings Louis XVIII, Charles X, and Louis Philippe, and his nephew the Prince President and later the Emperor Napoleon III. Whatever the ordinary French citizen did, he had to keep his eye on the local officials in a way no Anglo-Saxon does. Of course, the French, being a practical people, soon evolved several ways of handling officials, in slang called the "System D" because most of the French verbs meaning "fix" begin with a d, but that does not change the essentials of the situation. If the government acted, a Frenchman's first impulse was to follow. Such was the situation when Prince President Louis Napoleon Bonaparte locked up the Assembly, on December 2, 1851; such was the situation when the Emperor Napoleon III was captured at Sedan, September 2, 1871. Each time, the French people looked to see what the government would do before they acted.

As has been said, Sedan is not enough to explain the Third Republic. All Sedan did was to eliminate Napoleon III from French history. At noon, on Friday the second of September, there was a last meeting between Bismarck and the man he had hunted down from first place in Europe, because in that way alone could Germany be united. It took place at a weaver's cottage, outside Sedan, in the garden. Sheridan watched it, saw the two men take chairs and sit in front of the cottage, talk and gesticulate. He wondered at what they were saying, and may have compared this with another meeting of victor and vanquished in which he had taken part, at McClean's farmhouse near Appo-

mattox. Bismarck was a king among men, just as his master, William of Prussia, was a gentleman among kings, and gave a great adversary not only due politeness but cordiality. But the importance of Napoleon was measured by the treatment meted out to him; he was hustled off to exile with his son, not even being allowed to go back to Sedan. He stayed in Germany till the war ended, then went to England, there to die during an operation for gallstones, in January 1873. But, though Sedan eliminated Napoleon III, it did not replace him at the head of the vast French administrative structure.

Though Sheridan has provided American eyes with which to look at France as she was at the moment the Second Empire fell, other eyes are needed to see how the Third Republic was born, for Sheridan knew nothing of the foundation of the Third Republic till five days afterwards. During that time he was with Bismarck while German leaders debated whether to make peace with France or go on to Paris. Bismarck, who knew when enough was enough, was overruled by the enthusiastic army that wanted its fill of victory, and turned to making the most of the enthusiasm he could not control in persuading the still-independent southern states to give up their independence and thus finish his task of uniting Germany. He told Sheridan how long it would take to capture Paris, and sent Sheridan off for a European tour, to make the most of his leave from Indian chasing. But another American and friend of Grant's can show the picture, in this case Elihu Washburne, the Galena lawyer whom Grant had made Minister to France. Washburne was honorable heir to the great tradition of American Ministers to France, that whoever else leaves their post, they will not. Just as Jefferson and Morris stayed through the Revolution, as Herrick stayed through the Great War, as Bullitt did recently, so Washburne stayed through the Franco-Prussian War. He saw four things: a quiet evening before the revolt, a heated midnight session of the Legislative Body, the storming of the Legislative Body the next

day by the mob, and the bringing of the new government to the City Hall.

Quiet that evening was, because few knew of Sedan, for French censorship can be effective. The Minister of War and President of the Council of Ministers, Count de Palikao, did get the news almost immediately on September 1; but, though he had been so strong-willed as to force General de Wimpffen on the Army at Sedan from a distance and to have put down a revolt in Paris a fortnight before, he kept the news wholly to himself for forty-eight hours, neither acting himself nor giving the information to others until the spread of rumor forced him to tell the Council of Ministers. The news seeped into Paris through other channels. Washburne got it as a rumor at six on Saturday the third, and was hauled out of bed at one in the morning by his military attaché to have it confirmed, so little information did get through. The Empress herself did not hear till six Saturday evening. She immediately telegraphed the news and told the Prefects in charge of the eighty-six departments, with strict instructions to keep it a secret, and then called the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers met at once, but broke up at eight, having in two hours decided only to do nothing. The truth of the matter was that, though the remaining Imperialist leaders in Paris had the machinery of government in their hands, they had not, any more than the men captured in Sedan, the will power to use it. As a result, though the streets were filled with discontented men, the discontent was over the general conduct of the Empire and the lack of news from the Army, not over Sedan. Ten years of mounting opposition had provided the material for a conflagration, right enough; but no one wanted to take chances with the French government, without a good specific reason. The French, as has been explained, have to respect the powers of their government, whatever they may think of their governors.

But, once telegrams from Belgium started the rumor of Sedan, matters were different. The crowds in the street

swelled in numbers, and the opponents of the Empire in the Legislative Body, that bogus Parliament of Napoleon III's that had just taken life, called a session at midnight. De Palikao, the President of the Council of Ministers, was late in coming. When he reached the Palace Bourbon he found it was not enough to suggest that the Legislative Body meet next day at noon, he had to give consideration to an amazing motion for a body to consider that had sworn allegiance to an Empire, a motion made by the Republican leader Jules Favre that the Imperial House had ceased to reign and should be replaced by a nonpartisan Government of National Defense. That, too, he succeeded in deferring, but it was clear that time was short. The man in the street had heard of Sedan, and was about to act; and when Paris "goes into the street," history is often made. The natural focus for action was the Palace Bourbon where the Legislative Body had its sitting. While deliberations were going on inside, more and more men gathered outside, pounded at the railings, and clamored to be let in to make sure that the Bonaparte Dynasty was deposed. Through the dark of the night, down to the grille where the courtyard was separated from the street, came Léon Gambetta, the burly, one-eyed lawyer who was the most outspoken of the Republicans. He addressed the crowd, telling them that they would get their Republic. He gave the crowd the standard answer that from sad experience Republican leaders had learned to give to crowds, that the people's representatives must not be interfered with, except at an election. The past eighty years had taught them that if a mob gave power a mob could take it away. But keeping a clear record by talking against mob action was one thing; letting a mob do one's dirty work for one was another; and, when Gambetta wanted to go out into the crowd, the gatekeeper, loyal to the Empire, would not let him go for fear that the gate would be rushed as it opened.

When Parliament faced mob through the iron grillwork on the outside of the Palace Bourbon early that morning of

September 4, two great forces that have faced each other throughout French history met again. Since the Revolution broke out in 1789 France had seen many a mob. It was a mob which had stormed the Bastille that celebrated July 14, 1789; which in October, 1789, had taken Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette from Versailles to Paris; which on August 10, 1792, had stormed the Tuileries and massacred the Swiss Guards; which in the succeeding years had again and again threatened the Convention of the First Republic till a young general named Bonaparte had dispersed a mob with a "whiff of grapeshot," after which time a countermob had arisen—the "men with the gold-headed canes," of whom Carlyle writes, who saw to it, as best they could (also by mob action), that no return to Jacobinism came about. It was only when General Bonaparte had become, first of all First Consul, then Emperor, that mob and countermob stopped pouring down the streets of Paris. After that, for nearly thirty years mobs stayed off the streets; but in 1827 they reappeared with a new way of fighting which was also an old one—namely, barricades to block the streets, a device Paris had last seen three hundred years before in the "Fronde" of 1652. From 1827 to 1851 mobs and barricades were a constant part of French political life, overthrowing two Kingdoms directly, in 1830 and 1848, and one Republic indirectly, in 1851. Then, for the last time, barricades came up in the streets, and the Republican deputy Baudin died resisting the *coup d'état* without help from the citizens of Paris, who had been so shocked by the two tremendous revolts of 1848 and the abortive ones of 1849 and 1850, that they hardly felt political principles worth dying for any more. Indirectly, too, the mobs had changed the construction of Paris, for one of Napoleon III's reforms was to have Baron Haussmann rebuild the avenues of Paris so wide as to make it difficult to block them in a moment by throwing furniture out of the windows and tearing up paving stones. Mobs were nothing new in French political life, and they remain part of it today. Any Frenchman who

"Bourgeois Program" which the workingman's Popular Front had tried to enact. It was above all Herriot's France that was going down that day, the anti-clerical Jacobin France of the small businessman who ardently believed in free enterprise. Already the Jacobin slogan of *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, had been supplanted by *Labor, Family, Fatherland*. He symbolized what was going.

It was fitting, then, that he should lead its last sally. When Édouard Daladier, who represented the insufficient preparation of France, was accused of cowardice, Herriot sprang to his feet to his defense, pointing out that the Germans were keeping Daladier away. It was fitting that the last National Assembly should stand by its old ways. It saw to it that its meeting was public, and duly recorded. It used for the last time the committee, the device of De Broglie, Gambetta, Jaurès, and the Popular Front, to amend the proposals of the Executive. That committee kept at least the name of democracy by insisting that Pétain's new constitution be referred to the people and to his new corporative bodies for ratification. It was little to turn to the plebiscite so favored of dictators or to their controlled advisory bodies to limit dictatorship, but it was a last blow.

On its deathbed, French democracy showed how ingrained were its ways of making the Executive feel its responsibility to the Nation. Likewise, by making its debates public, it till the last saw to it that when the Nation made up its mind, it had the opportunity of knowing the truth, and had not been deluded. In its death, it proved itself a democracy still; for a democracy, in which the people (or *demos*) may rule (or *kratein*) as they will, two things are obviously essential. One is that the rule is effective, not blocked by individual wills. The other is that the will is honestly that of the people, not foisted upon them. Without responsibility of the government to the people, and free choice of action by the people, no democracy can exist.

That was proved the next day. Albert Lebrun, unlucky like the other re-elected President of France, Jules Grévy,

elected; and discipline is maintained by a sergeant-at-arms who is not a member. But by European custom, following France, the provisional organization is under the control of the oldest member acting as temporary president till a permanent one is elected; and records are kept by secretaries, discipline by quaestors, who are both members of the body. These details, in themselves trivial, show how important Parliament had become in the life of France. A further sign is the fact that Napoleon III felt that he had to keep one, even though, like Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini, who also have bogus Parliaments, he saw to it that his Parliament was a rubber stamp until 1869. One more sign may be quoted: that the bogus Parliament came to life in 1869 and began to make Napoleon III obey. With that much tradition behind it, Parliament was on more or less even terms with the mob.

The question remained, however, as to which would win the next day—Parliament, which was still, if not Imperialist, at least extremely conservative, or the mob, which was at that particular moment (for mobs have varied widely from time to time) emphatically and violently Republican. Could the Republican leaders combine mob and Parliament, or were these mutually antagonistic? Some leaders thought that they were, some thought not.

In Paris were all sorts of Republicans, differing from one another. Certain Republicans who were in the tradition of the turbulent First Republic were willing to take mob action, and were almost professional revolutionaries. They were plotters and mob leaders who had conducted the street fighting of the Liberal Monarchy of 1830 and 1848. Fear of them had excused Napoleon III's coup in 1851. They dreamed of the people really ruling at last and were willing to die for their dream. One of their leaders, the archplotter Blanqui, whom they called "the Old One," was in jail for his attempted revolt of two weeks before, but others of the rank and file were out of jail and ready for action. Most of these had as ideals the First Republic and the Jacobins who

dominated it. Allied with these were Socialists, many of them loosely organized into a new workingman's organization, the International, that Karl Marx had recently founded in London, but had not as yet succeeded in dominating. By necessity, because they were so often suppressed, these professional revolutionaries had underworld contacts and a very bad reputation.

Then there were other and very different Republicans, mostly lawyers and writers, who had been left over from the idealistic Second Republic of twenty years before—men who abhorred revolution and disorder and hoped for the rule of the people by the people coming because it was so manifestly right. These upright men of 1848 hated the Emperor Napoleon III for having broken the oath he had sworn, as President of that Republic, to uphold its constitution; and they clung very literally to their democratic theories. They all would rather be right than President, and were called Forty-eighters from the memory of the idealistic Republic they had set up but could not keep going. Like the professional revolutionaries, they were curiously conventional in their insistence on doing as their predecessors of the First and Second Republics had done.

Lastly, there were younger men, also mostly writers and lawyers, who, like the men of 1848, believed in law and order; but who, like the professional revolutionaries, wanted to get results. They were not bound by convention; on the contrary, they were willing to act with the Imperial authorities if those authorities set up institutions that might lead to a Republic and help the people rule themselves, fiercely announcing their intention of preventing such institutions from being shams. Sometimes these men were called "Opportunists," especially by their opponents.

For all Republicans were idealists, but the Opportunists did what the men of 1848 did not do, and what only the Socialists among the revolutionaries did: they brought down their ideals to a practical world. They not only wanted the people to rule, they wanted certain measures to be

carried out when the people did rule, and were willing to get support for Republicans from those the measures would benefit. Some among them had the usual program of middle-class politicians all over the world at that time; others of them, especially Léon Gambetta, the deputy from Belleville and Marseilles, realized that there were, under universal suffrage, voters not in the middle class, men who would like free schools, the elimination of the alliance between state and Church that brought the Roman Catholic Church so much into French life, cheap justice, less taxation of the necessities of life, and in place of it an income tax on those able to bear it—all of which measures would enable such voters to raise themselves to a higher layer of society. Because Gambetta's election program covered those very points, he was able to defeat a Forty-eighter at Belleville even though he chose to relinquish his Belleville seat and to sit for Marseilles. That is a sign of the effectiveness of his program.

But this should be marked: that, though the Republic and the middle classes had much in common, there were Republicans out of the middle classes, and men in the middle classes who were not Republican. Republicanism was not a class program, even if it did draw much support from the class that it would most benefit. Republicanism was more than that, it was an ideal which could hope for universal support throughout the Nation. In that sense most Republicans were Jacobin. The name Jacobin is often given to any intense Republican, such as was Georges Clemenceau.

In this moment when the control of the dictatorial machinery of France was his who could seize and hold it among the Republicans, the best chances lay with the Opportunists. The revolutionaries could seize power—seizing was their forte; but they would not for a moment have been let hold power. The Nation still distrusted them, and even in wartime would have turned on them. The Forty-eighters would have been able to hold power had they had it, but

as they declined to seize it, it would not be theirs, until it was handed to them at the millennium or by a freak of fate, such as 1848. The Opportunists alone could both seize and hold.

For seizing power, a simple Opportunist device was used. The Republican papers the morning of September 4 carried the suggestion that the National Guards—that is, all citizens who just recently had been conscripted and given arms for home defense—should come unarmed but in uniform to the Palace Bourbon. That would both increase the pressure on the Legislative Body to get rid of the remains of the Empire and would not let anyone say it was an armed revolt. Meanwhile deputies flew about, bargaining as to who should be on the proposed nonpartisan Government of National Defense and form the new Council of Ministers. The trouble was that the new Council could succeed only if the most respected and wisest deputies joined it; and the most respected and wisest of them all, the seventy-three-year-old Adolphe Thiers, an independent non-Republican member from Paris, was wise enough to see that that Council of Ministers would have to endure defeat and then sign a humiliating peace, and to prefer someone else to have the job.

Time was pressing. Telegrams reported that the industrial city of Lyons had proclaimed a Republic. From that day to this Lyons has been called the "First City of the Republic." The Empress took fright, despite the promises of General Trochu, the Governor of Paris, and hurried away from the Tuileries. She fled to her American dentist, Dr. Evans, who took her to the seacoast at Dieppe, found a yacht there, and got her across to England.

The excitement grew greater. Around the Palace Bourbon more and more men in the uniform of the National Guard gathered, as the Republican papers had advised. All sorts of men had put on that uniform—men as varied as a young and violently Republican doctor, Georges Clemenceau, and the mildly Royalist Duke Descazes, but united in enmity to

the Empire. At noon the members of the Legislative Body pushed through the mob and debated how to set up a non-partisan Government of National Defense. They debated too long. While a committee was deciding whether to depose the Bonapartes formally or just to leave the question in the air, the mob rushed the railings; and this time they got through.

Minister Washburne saw it all happen. He saw Gambetta again address the crowd, in much the same terms as the night before; he saw deputies ask to have their friends let through the gates, thus getting them opened. He saw the mob push across the square and into the galleries and the actual chamber itself. Just at that moment the committee came out to present its report, too late. The mob would have none of it. In vain the President of the Legislative Body rang his bell for silence. In vain Favre spoke. He was heard for a moment, and then he was shouted down. Only Gambetta of the impressive presence and bull-like voice could gain a hearing. All that the crowd would hear, even from him, was the proclamation of a Republic. A true Opportunist, Gambetta made the best of this. He promised them a Republican Government of National Defense, of all the deputies elected from Paris; all of whom, except Thiers, were Republican. This forestalled the revolutionaries, because the Paris mob could not be incited against its own representatives; and at the same time it provided France with a government that had some sort of legal title. That Washburne saw Gambetta do; and he saw him and the mob leave the Palace Bourbon while a few members of the Legislative Body stayed behind.

Next, the crowd, Gambetta, and with them Washburne, went to the City Hall. The conventionality of Republicans and revolutionaries being what it was, it would not have been possible to get them to accept the Third Republic unless it had been proclaimed where the First and Second Republics had been proclaimed. Gambetta and his men reached the City Hall just in time to forestall the revolu-

tionaries in another way. For the revolutionaries were already there, but were squabbling over who should be on the new Council of Ministers. From the balcony of the City Hall Gambetta once more shouted out to the people that the Empire had ended, and that the deputies of Paris would take over the government. That they then did, except for Thiers, who first tried to revive the Legislative Body, then went off on his own. But, though that was the vivid dramatic announcement of the Republic to satisfy the citizens of Paris, the effective announcement of the Republic to the Nation was something else.

Gambetta and a man named Ernest Picard, the mildest of the Republicans from Paris, jumped into the same cab and dashed to the Ministry of the Interior, the brain-center of the Nation. There Gambetta outfaced Picard; and at six, just twenty-four hours after the Empress had telegraphed warnings of the news of Sedan, he sent out telegrams to all the Prefects to say that there was a Republic and a Government of National Defense. In that telegram were two bluffs by the young Opportunist: one, that General Trochu, the Military Governor of Paris, was its President; the other, that he was its Minister of the Interior. That was the announcement to all France outside of Paris, in itself a proof of how Paris can rule France, through Napoleon I's dictatorial machinery.

Then Gambetta went back to the City Hall to help the Government of National Defense apportion posts, and to see what could be done about his bluffs. Trochu was there already. Legend has it that, crossing the Solferino Bridge on his way to the City Hall, Favre had met Trochu, seated on his horse, undecided whether to enforce the rule of the Empress or to join the Republic; and that Favre had seized the horse's bridle and led the animal with its rider on to the City Hall. That still-circulated legend unfortunately is not true. Favre did speak to the reconnoitering Trochu then, but Trochu waited till the Government of National Defense asked him, the commander of the largest free body

of troops, to join them. The conditions he made were no attempts at reform during the war, and no limitation on his military powers. Correctly speaking, therefore, he is the first President of the Third French Republic, though lists often omit his name. As for the second bluff, by five votes to three Gambetta was confirmed in office—the office where most could be done to make France a Republic.

Thus it was that in three ways the new Republic was announced to the people of France. First, as was right, it was announced to their representatives in Parliament, even though those representatives were scuttling out back doors at the time. Then it was announced to that other force in French political life, the mob. But, though those announcements at Palace Bourbon and City Hall were to those who had or claimed to have governing will, what made those announcements effective was their going through the machinery of dictatorship. Just as the question of national security has underlain the success or failure of any French government since 1500, so has the existence of dictatorial machinery in good working order underlain the methods used by any French government since 1800.

From that day to July 9, 1940, as witnessed countless streets of the Fourth of September, in cities, towns, and villages, France has been a Republic, but she has been a Republic that clung to Napoleon the Great's dictatorial machinery of government, and has been governed by Parliamentarians who have held a balance, sometimes by sheer opportunism, other times by ability, between a mob on one hand and a dictator on the other.



Chapter Two

THE DICTATORSHIP AT TOURS

WHEN, ON September 5, the new Council of Ministers of France met around the green baize table at the Paris City Hall, they were faced with severe problems. In order to survive as a government of France they must so administer their departments and coordinate their actions that France could fight, even though only four of her 120 regiments of regular infantry were still in the field. Likewise, in order to survive as a government of France, they must gain and keep popular support for their seizure of power. The fact that no reputable statesman wanted to take on the task of fighting Germany did not preclude disreputable men from attacking them or secure them support. Above all, in whatever they did the new Council of Ministers must keep ahead of Count von Bismarck, and Count von Bismarck had an uncanny ability of seeing deep into a situation, seeing all the possibilities in it, never striving for an impossibility, such as stopping the war after Sedan, and turning all the possibilities to his advantage. At the moment what Count von Bismarck wanted was to unite the North German Confederation and the five South German states into a German Empire, and he was using to that end the war enthusiasm he could not control. With those difficulties the ten opposition members of the Legislative Body and three military men had to deal, jointly taking the respon-

sibility for the important actions in the field of each minister.

In the Council of Ministers were two men, Jules Favre and Jules Simon, who would for a time matter greatly, and two others, Jules Ferry and Léon Gambetta, who were really great. Favre was an earnest, oversolemn lawyer who made a habit of defending political prisoners. He had a lurid private life that accorded little with his public dignity. At one time the woman novelist George Sand had been his mistress. A perjury about the woman he married, another mistress, would in almost exactly a year destroy him as a figure. But for the moment he was the head of the Republicans in the eyes of France and the world; and, being such, he took the portfolio of Foreign Affairs to speak for the Nation. Jules Simon, also a lawyer, ingratiating, tactful, was one of those adaptable men who can survive and keep a certain independence of the powers that be, who stay afloat on the sea of boisterous circumstance when better but more vigorous men are overwhelmed. He held the difficult position of Minister of Public Worship and Education, where the Republicans would have the most administrative difficulty, there running up against the Roman Catholic Church, which heartily distrusted Republicanism and the bishops Republicans would appoint, and state interference in education. For the administration of such a post Simon was the best choice the Republicans could have made.

But neither of these men could compare to the Lorrainer, Ferry, or the Gascon, Gambetta. Ferry, a young lawyer dour but highly respected, had gained fame as a Republican by a pamphlet the punning title of which suggested that Baron Haussmann, the Mayor of Paris under the Empire, had turned in false accounts. In the sweep of Republican enthusiasm a Paris district had elected him to the Legislative Body, almost sight unseen, on the strength of the pun. The natural post to give him was Prefect of the Department of the Seine, to manage the finances better; but he was too

stern and matter-of-fact to win permanent favor of the Parisians. Only his native Lorraine, of serious men, would provide him a constituency in the future, after his actions in the war. As for Léon Gambetta, the member for Belleville and Marseilles, who ranked, for the purposes of making a government, as a Parisian member, even if he had chosen the Marseilles seat, he was the leader of the younger Republicans. He had sprung to fame in a political case, in which his client, a revolutionary Republican named Delescluze, had given the amazing instructions not to try to prove him innocent, but to use every moment in the courtroom damaging the Empire. Gambetta had followed his instructions to the full. Delescluze was accused, with complete justice, of forming an illegal procession and collecting money illegally. But the procession was to the grave of Baudin, one Republican deputy who in 1851 had died rather than accept Napoleon III's *coup d'état*; the collection was for money to decorate the grave in the Père-Lachaise cemetery. In the courtroom not only did Gambetta repeat Baudin's almost forgotten rejoinder to the mob's sneer that deputies wanted only their salary of 25 francs a day, "See how a man can die for 25 francs a day," he went further. He made the rafters ring, asserting that no legislation in France from the day of Baudin's death had any validity, since on that day Louis Napoleon Bonaparte broke his oath of office as President, that the Second Republic was still the legal government of France, and that the judge, as an Imperial appointee, had no jurisdiction. In making that claim he poured accusations on the Empire, making extremely clever use of Imperial Court proceedings to broadcast all the great flaws in the Empire's legality. That combination of daring and cleverness set him at the head of the younger Republicans, just as similar quickness of decision in the cab race with Picard had gained him the Ministry of the Interior. He had a flaming patriotism that was not shared by all Republicans, and alone of them had declined to oppose the Imperial Government when in July

1870 it called for more money for arms. These two men, Ferry and Gambetta, were fighters.

Two actions were quickly taken. That day Jules Favre announced to the world that France was ready to treat for peace, but that she would surrender "not an inch of her territory, not a stone of her fortresses." This bombastic statement was assented to by the Council of Ministers. The next day Etienne Arago, the Mayor of Paris, announced that he had appointed mayors for the various sections into which Paris was divided. This was un-Republican, since it denied the people's right of election, but was a highly practical way of preventing professional revolutionaries from using legally acquired office to foment revolt. This, too, the Council of Ministers accepted. Then Gambetta set to work replacing the Prefects who were tools of Napoleon III by men he believed capable of holding the post, and true supporters of the Republic—not always compatible qualifications. This, too, was largely accepted by the Council of Ministers, and created a national administration very different from what Picard would have provided.

Then the Council of Ministers settled down to a debate, whether or not to hold an election for a National Assembly. Theoretically, being Republicans and believing in the people, that was their duty; practically, the question was whether it could be done in the face of German troops all over the northeast of France and marching on Paris. Could a government that had just ordered an election that might well force itself out of office gain the support needed to fight effectively? Could any election take place in occupied territory during a war? This the Council debated at its meetings. Its real decisions were made for it, however, by Counts von Bismarck and von Moltke. Von Moltke marched on Paris and surrounded it on September 18; von Bismarck met Favre on September 19 at Ferrières, and demanded the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine as the price of peace. Von Moltke's actions, von Bismarck's words, ended any chance of an Assembly being elected.

This group of men who were trying to shape a policy for France were largely men of Paris who knew no other life. They saw about them the swarms of men of military age who already had arms in their hands, the men who had by their mere existence in the courtyard of the Palace Bourbon frightened the Empire out of existence. They saw the enthusiasm of those men which in a few days would lead them to contribute out of what little they had to buy artillery; they saw the democratic spirit of those men which in a few days more would lead certain private soldiers to form a Federation of the National Guard; and they saw the strong forts around Paris, built thirty years before in the great war scare of 1840, when Adolphe Thiers had been President of the Council of Ministers. The conclusions they drew were that so great a city as Paris could not really be besieged; and that, if the Germans were foolish enough to surround it, the armed populace would burst forth and smash the thin ribbon of Germans. Had not the armies of the First Republic won victories by their enthusiasm, at far greater odds? So, when von Moltke besieged them and, with Bismarck and the King of Prussia, settled down in comfort at Versailles, ten miles southwest of Paris, to supervise the siege, the Government of National Defense stayed in Paris, sending out only three of its members, Minister of Justice Crémieux, Minister of State Glais-Bizon, Minister of Marine Admiral Fourichon, as a "delegation," to carry on the duties of all the ministers at Tours, until the Parisians should break out and regain contact with the outside world. Fourichon, for instance, took over the duties of Minister of War in addition to conducting what naval operations took place.

Two men, however, had the heartiest doubts of the abilities of the Parisians to break out. One of them was General Trochu, the Governor of Paris. Under the Empire he had been popular among Republicans just because he had opposed the Emperor, but not because he was a Republican. His ground of opposition was that the Empire had not suffi-

ciently trained its reserve troops, as he had shown in a blistering book, *The French Army in 1870*. That being his feeling about the reserves, who were at least organized on paper, his opinion of the National Guard, which had organized itself, can be imagined. His officers shared his contempt. Some were heard to say that the National Guard needed shooting over, and then it would be interesting to see how they ran. Trochu, when pressed to set a date for the "torrential sortie" that the National Guard dreamed of, answered that his plan was so secret he kept it with other private papers at his notary's office. Pretty soon there were street ballads about that, it was such an evasion of the people's demands for action.

As for distrusting the defenders of Paris, that was done also by the man who had built the forts, Adolphe Thiers. Thiers, who had been a rising young man when the First Napoleon was Emperor, a historian under the rule of the restored Bourbons, Louis XVIII and Charles X, a politician and minister under the Orléans King, Louis Philippe, an important and effective opposition deputy under the Second Republic, and after jail and seclusion, an important and effective opposition deputy under the Empire, was too old and had experienced too much to want to tell Bismarck and Moltke they couldn't have an inch of France or a stone of her fortresses. He was willing to help France, but not to help rashness. A task was found for him. As von Moltke closed in on Paris, one last train left the city, and from its rear platform Thiers watched the railway bridge being blown up behind him. He was traveling as the impartial friend of France, almost an independent state in himself. In London he saw whom he could and arranged the Ferrières meeting between Bismarck and Favre which had ended all talk of an election when Bismarck had demanded land and fortresses. Thereafter Bismarck embarrassed Favre, who had no legal title to his office as Foreign Minister, by negotiations with Napoleon III, legally the ruler of France if the Empire still existed, and the Count of

Chambord, legally the ruler of France as grandson of King Charles X, the last "legitimate" king, who had been overthrown in 1830. Then Thiers passed back from England, where Mr. Gladstone was not doing too much to help, through France to see what Austria and Russia could do. At Orléans he found Léon Gambetta, who had left Paris. Here, as in the Baudin trial, Gambetta had combined the dramatic and the practical. In Paris Gambetta found that he was useless. With Paris under siege, with two colleagues, Ferry and Arago, running respectively the unoccupied parts of the Department of the Seine and Paris, there was no Interior for him to be Minister of. Outside, where the three old men of the Delegation were running France, they were running her badly. The new Republican leaders in the South of France were so critical of the Delegation they had set up two leagues, of the South and the Southwest, to ginger it up, and if necessary supersede it. To settle the question of authority, instead of being firm the Delegation weakly ordered elections, notifying the remainder of the Council of Ministers by a message sent by carrier pigeon. Such an election, ordered immediately after the general election had been canceled, would destroy the whole support of the new Republic. It had to be stopped, and the Minister of the Interior, with nothing to do in Paris, was the man to do it if he could get out.

There came the drama. In those days balloons were sometimes sent up, to be blown with the wind, a chancy way of getting anywhere. One such balloon from Paris landed in Norway. Gambetta took the chance, and though the wind changed, and he was fired at as he landed, he got safely to Tours. There he pulled out of his pocket two decrees, one canceling the election, another making him chairman of the Delegation with a casting vote in case of a tie. Finding a quarrel going on between Admiral Fourichon and the two others, he persuaded Admiral Fourichon not only to vote with him on crucial matters, so as to create a tie Gambetta would naturally break in his own favor, but also

to resign the conduct of the Ministry of War, which Gambetta then took over, by a vote naturally enough of Gambetta and Fourichon against Crémieux and Glais-Bizon. With the two central offices of the Interior and War in his hands, and a casting vote in a split Delegation, Gambetta needed no more to be virtual dictator.

It was as such that the hard-working old Thiers found him when he returned to France. By then Gambetta had practically brought the rebellious Leagues to order. To the separate cities that gave trouble he sent very different men. To Lyons he sent the editor Challemel-Lacour, who by constant temporizing prevented the red-hot Republican city from exploding, even though the red flag of revolt flew from the City Hall. To Toulouse he sent one Duportal, whom he had defended in a semipolitical, semicriminal trial. Duportal seemed so tough himself that later Gambetta tried to supplant him, only to find that, in the first place, Duportal would not be supplanted by a law professor; in the second place, there was no need, for Toulouse stayed orderly and gave the help Gambetta needed to fight the war. Only in Marseilles, where the journalist Esquiros was too lenient, was it necessary to try again, and Gambetta sent in the more vigorous Gent, a local politician of whom he had heard. The upshot of all this was that fourteen days after Gambetta had been sent out of Paris to restore order in a disorganized nation a pigeon flew back into Paris announcing that order had been restored.

Just the same, Thiers thought that the war was foolishness. He arranged a truce with Bismarck, and terms—the cession of much of Alsace-Lorraine—and indemnity, and the end of fighting. If Paris would only surrender and be sensible, the deal could be put through. This truce was cutting into Gambetta's plans of relieving Paris by the armies he had raised. Though the Germans had driven the French out of Orléans, Gambetta put an admiral in charge of one army corps, found a general who was a strong Royalist to drill and command the whole, and was preparing

to push the Germans out again. Now, instead of going on to break a path back into Paris, and gain touch with the mass of men and guns cooped up there, he must wait while Bismarck juggled; and in Metz the supplies of the besieged French veterans dwindled.

With the truce peace nearly came. Thiers had Bismarck so compromised that, even though Marshal Bazaine did surrender in Metz, freeing sorely needed troops to go to Paris and Orléans to fight Gambetta, yet the war could not have gone on. Bismarck could only keep German troops in France as long as the other countries of Europe let him and Thiers was getting diplomatic opinion on France's side. But Bismarck knew a trick or two. Curiously enough, though much news failed to get through the siege lines, the news of Bazaine's surrender got through at once. It was coupled with a particularly ignominious defeat of a sortie to join hands with Gambetta. The general result was much what Bismarck had expected, though he could not have foreseen its truly French details. For on October 31, as many of the Council of Ministers were seated around the green baize table in the City Hall, in burst a mob, headed, as might have been expected, by old Blanqui. For over an hour the Council room was in tumult. Many an observer remembered how Gustave Flourens strode up and down the table-top, dragging his spurs in the green baize cloth. In the midst of the shouting, just as the Council of Ministers was at its wits' end how to escape without compromising its authority, a sudden interruption came. Charles Ferry, the brother of Jules, had brought in some more disciplined National Guards, and broke through the mob long enough to rescue his brother and General Trochu. In going out, they brought one of the instigators of the mob with them, who turned out to be Blanqui. Trochu and Ferry then organized a real rescue party, came in through the sewers when the rebels barricaded the City Hall, and restored order. But after that it could be argued that the Government of National Defense could not even speak for Paris,

let alone France, and Bismarck could refuse to treat. Thiers' work was undone. All he could do was go to Russia and try to find some assistance. Russia was engaged in tearing up the Black Sea treaty of 1856 that Napoleon III had enforced by the Crimean War, and was embarrassing Bismarck with it. There were troubled waters in which Thiers might catch a useful fish for France, and he resumed his duties as a roving ambassador-at-large.

As for Paris, there the Government of National Defense found itself, not a government of France, but the commanders of a siege who were not too sure of the trust of the garrison. The Government of National Defense tried to consolidate its position. It held a plebiscite on November 3, at which it obtained 557,966 votes to an opposition of 62,638. Then Ferry was made Mayor in place of Arago, and the Parisians settled down to more waiting. The citizens of Paris subscribed for cannon to help a sortie. There was a sortie in December that failed. Ferry asked to be allowed to put the city on rations, but he was not allowed to do so. That meant that food went to very high prices, rats being quoted in the markets and the elephants in the Zoo being eaten; and it also meant, illogically, that Ferry got the blame for what he had tried to avoid and was given the nickname of "the starver." In January, when things were at their worst, another sortie failed on the nineteenth; and on the twenty-second a second revolt, again raised by Blanqui, was put down by Ferry, this time with bloodshed. After that Trochu resigned as Governor of the City, but kept his title of President to keep continuity in the government. In short, the besieged city carried on as besieged cities do when starved rather than shelled.

However, after the revolt of October 31, if not before, no matter though the Government of National Defense in Paris claimed to have all power, it was Tours which was the seat of Government, almost of dictatorship. For that was where Gambetta was, with his unusual powers, and Gambetta thought of as an asset what the men in Paris con-

sidered a liability—the tradition of the famous First French Republic. Even to this day mention of it, and of the Jacobins who directed it, brings to mind the Terror, beheadings at the guillotine, hasty trials of unhappy and guiltless prisoners. Mindful of that, the Second Republic had tried to be very meek and mild, and had died of that meekness. The men of the Third Republic, in Paris, were still trying to avoid the appearance of being dictatorial.

Gambetta would have none of that. He ordered no executions, but tolerated no weakness. There was another side to the tradition of the First French Republic less well known outside of France which Gambetta re-emphasized, in deeds as well as words—the victorious way in which, on one and the same year, it had faced the Empires of Austria and Russia, the Kingdoms of Prussia, Spain, and England, and defeated them all. If the Jacobin Republicans did cut off the head of the King, their leader, the lawyer Danton, said after that execution, “The Kings of Europe threaten us; we throw them the head of a king.” He had also given a recipe for victory: “Courage, Courage, and more Courage,” and then had shown it. Associated with him was an engineer, Carnot, who had earned the name of the “Organizer of Victory” by the way he called conscripted men to the colors and turned them into victorious soldiers. To the wars Carnot’s men went, to the tune Roget de Lisle had written for volunteers from Marseilles, who had answered a previous call for men who knew how to die; and in the great year 1793 that saw the execution of Louis XVI, they defeated the armies of Spain, England, Prussia, and Austria. In this war of 1870 the lawyer Gambetta called to his side, as chief of staff, an engineer, Charles de Freycinet, and roused the men of France, without distinction of political creed, to fight, to whatever tunes they wanted, whether of the old kings, the Bonapartes, or the Marseillaise of the Republic; but in the spirit of the Republic. Men might sing how M. Charette had sent to M. Rochejaquelin to rise once more for the old kings, or Queen Hortense’s song her son Napo-

leon III liked so well, how brave young Dunois went off to Syria, as well as how the brave Republicans camped on the Sambre and the Meuse had started off to invade Germany, or how the men of Marseilles had rallied against tyrants; but all obeyed the Republican Léon Gambetta.

Courage Gambetta had, and he could recognize it in others. Paul Déroulède, the poet who had joined the Zouaves just before Sedan, and who had boiled with rage at being ordered to surrender, escaped from his prison camp in East Prussia and worked his way back to France to fight once more. He went at once to see Gambetta, offering his services as an officer, and showing Gambetta a reserve commission as second lieutenant that had been given him just after his conversion from pacifism. He had given that up to serve as a private in the line, but in the crisis he felt that, as he had battle experience, he should use it. When their talk had ended, Gambetta had given him, not a lieutenant's, but a captain's commission, sending him off to join Bourbaki's army and to be captured once more; and Déroulède had obtained a hero to worship for the rest of his life, together with a lifelong belief that a true Republic consisted of finding the right man and having that man serve the people as Gambetta was serving them—serving and ruling at the same time. Such was the impression that Gambetta made, not on one man, but on many. No wonder his heart was preserved in the Pantheon, among the other relics of the Nation, as one of France's greatest treasures; and no wonder that it, which saved France in 1871, was brought out in solemn procession in 1921, at the burial of the unknown soldier who represents the men who saved France in 1914-18.

There are two sides to what Gambetta did as Minister of War at Tours. He demanded the impossible of the people of France; but, on the other hand, he came very close to getting it. He raised scratch armies, of which one military historian has this to say: that, as no one, including their commanders, knew in the least what they would do, they

at least had the advantage of surprise among their multitudinous faults. A study of the dispatches of the bewildered German commanders will bear this out. It is more than a jest; it is the serious conclusion of a serious thinker that hastily raised armies do have this one advantage of surprise to outweigh their other disadvantages. Gambetta suspended the seniority law in the Army, appointing officers at will, and disrupting the officer corps. But he appointed many good ones. The hastily raised armies were disorganized. It was with them that a young volunteer who had run away from the Royal Engineers' School at Woolwich for the experience learned his detestation of disorganization, that was to make him one of the finest organizers the English Army ever had, and rise to be Earl Kitchener. But at least Gambetta raised the armies.

The orders given were at times wild, to put it mildly, particularly the one that caused Bourbaki's flank march of the Army of the Loire, which ended up on the Swiss frontier, a hundred miles from the headwaters of that river. However, in a desperate situation Gambetta did not do badly. It is also alleged that some of the contractors from whom Gambetta got supplies were not above suspicion; but, if an investigation committee of his enemies had to say he was blameless, he must have been so. Added up, the balance is heavily in Gambetta's favor.

Considering what he had to work with, Gambetta accomplished something approaching a miracle. All the trained men he had numbered at most 40,000; a very large proportion of them were sailors or marines. He had to mix at least one admiral in among his generals—indeed, it was Admiral Jauréguiberry who won his real victory. His "deputy" at the War Ministry, in effect his Chief of Staff, Charles de Freycinet, was a railway engineer who had had some early training in a military academy. He was in constant need of supplies; and at the end he had to borrow money from America, from J. P. Morgan and Company, at a high rate of interest because no one in Europe thought he had a chance.

Here Crémieux did much. Against Gambetta was a victorious army blooded in the Seven Weeks' War of 1866 and in the Danish War of 1864 before that, and led by the finest generals in Europe. What help he did get from Bazaine holding out in Metz ended with the end of October, and for some time before that was nullified by the truce Thiers had negotiated. Yet the record shows that Napoleon's superb professional army, man for man the best in the world, fought five battles with the Germans and lost them all. Gambetta's mixed mobs fought six; and, though they lost four, drew one, and even won one.

Gambetta did recapture Orléans in November, and held it for a month. General Faidherbe, who came back from Africa to supply the lack of generals in the homeland, did have a seeming success in Normandy in January. Then, of course, German might proved too great; and, as has been told, France's armies were shattered. Even in December the Delegation had had to leave Tours for Bordeaux when the Germans recaptured Orléans.

The details of the fighting are such that they should be gone into heavily or not at all. To the professional soldier and to those interested in military science, they throw much light on the problems of guerrilla warfare and fighting with hastily raised armies. Surprise was the one advantage the French had. The victory at Orléans was won by General d'Aurelle de Paladines and Admiral Jauréguiberry in December, when they simply went ahead, happened to coincide with Trochu's sortie, and hit the Germans before Prince Frederick Charles had gotten his men across from Metz. They would have had more success if the ambassador-at-large, Thiers, had not secured an armistice just as they were ready to strike earlier. After that victory, which failed to get peace terms from Bismarck, all that the French could do was to make the war costly for the Germans. Failure came when Gambetta's men were ordered to try to do too much, and at the end that was almost inevitable. That explains the sad march east of General Bourbaki, that ended

with his army's internment and his suicide; and the defeat of Chanzy's army in western France after its initial success, which impressed Kitchener with its chaotic disorganization and rout. But these details are too complex to go into further, and the lesson of the "People's War" was simply that in war courage is a great thing, especially if welded to organization.

For all Gambetta's courage, for all the burden on Germany, the war had to end. It was doing what Bismarck had intended it should, ever since he had altered the famous Ems telegram to provoke France into war. At last the mad King of Bavaria was persuaded to invite the King of Prussia to become Emperor of Germany, and the King of Prussia accepted. The details of beer taxes and the way the army was to be left for von Moltke to have it as he wanted it were arranged; and on January 18, 1871, the same day that the first King of Prussia had been crowned, in 1701, the King of Prussia—so angry at submerging his Prussian title in the German Empire that he would not speak to Count von Bismarck—stopped being "Praesidium of the North German Confederation" and was proclaimed Emperor of Germany. He was proclaimed as such at Versailles in the golden hall of the great King Louis XIV of France, with the trophies of a victorious war about him, with battle flags borne by specially picked officers, among them being Paul von Hindenburg.

Paris then surrendered, Jules Favre making the terms with Bismarck—or rather, taking them from him. They were so strict that Favre wept. Favre being Favre, he told the people of Paris about his weeping and getting them softened; and he has had Bismarck's contempt and that of many another for it ever since. The final terms were the surrender of all Alsace and most of Lorraine, 6,000,000,000 francs indemnity (\$1,250,000,000, roughly, at the then existing *gold* rate of exchange), to be secured by the occupation of French territory, including some forts of Paris, till payment was made. Thiers might have gotten better

terms at the end of October. This was to be accepted or rejected by a freely elected National Assembly.

At the signing Favre sealed the document with his signet ring, a figure of a woman in antique dress, just such a figure as is usually used to represent a Republic. In his agitation he put the seal sideways, at which Bismarck smilingly said, "Ah, M. Jules Favre, you are upsetting your Republic." At that time, it looked as if Bismarck was only too likely to be speaking the truth, that the armistice would be the end of the Republic.

However, the surrender of Paris did not mean that Gambetta had surrendered. On the contrary, he thought that it meant just not tying his troops down to an attempt at relieving Paris; and he refused to give up. Facts beat him, and he had to admit defeat in war; but, if there was to be a National Assembly, he would have nothing Imperial about it and would stand no defeat in Republicanism. He sent out orders to France, the Minister of the Interior having control of elections, barring all candidates who had held Imperial office or who had been official candidates for the Imperial Parliament. This was protested against by Bismarck, and rightly, as unfair.

A protest by Bismarck meant nothing to Gambetta. The Government of National Defense tried its next trick—that of sending a messenger; but, when Jules Simon, Minister of Education, reached Bordeaux, he found that he could not do to Gambetta in January what Gambetta had done to Crémieux at Tours in October. It was necessary to send for Etienne Arago, who was a great deal more of a man than Simon, and to threaten to bring the whole Government of National Defense to Bordeaux before the rest gave in and outvoted Gambetta. Gambetta then resigned, and Arago became Minister of the Interior.

That was the end of the Dictatorship at Tours, the great inspiration of the French people by Gambetta that took away some of the sting of Sedan. Because France was and is such a centralized country, one man, if he mastered the

Council of Ministers, could inspire the whole Nation. While to Frenchmen the Dictatorship at Tours has the one lesson that courage can pay, for those not French it can also serve as a reminder that France can be a dictatorship.

From the election decree of January 28, as had been realized when the first election decree was canceled, the Government of National Defense became a mere holdover, carrying on routine. Then another man began to loom up in place of Gambetta—Adolphe Thiers. Here are the reasons, officially stated by the National Assembly, for his importance. "The inspiration that made him, thirty years ago, fortify Paris so well that only hunger could capture it, the foresight that made him, several months ago, combat the war when there was still a chance of avoiding it, the devotion that led him to go to all the peoples of Europe, to defend together with the interests of France the rights of civilization, and the homage that is rendered him, at this moment by election by so many departments at once—all of these make him our choice." That motion has no recorded vote against it. It shows that France's mood had changed from applauding Favre's rhetoric, "Not an inch of our land, not a stone of our fortresses," to practical common sense, of which Thiers was the incarnation.

But the fact that France's mood had changed did not mean that the Delegation at Tours had not "deserved well of the Republic." The very actions of Thiers before the National Assembly met, and at its first meeting, were an eloquent proof that the man who best represented the temper of the French at that moment realized that the Republic had struck root in France. Just what the Republic of the Fourth of September was, was as yet not clear; nor was it clear whether it could survive Favre's sealing of the armistice terms; but it was clear that it existed.



Chapter Three

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

ON SUNDAY, February 8, 1871, all the men in France over the age of twenty-one gathered to choose themselves new masters by electing a National Assembly to replace the Government of National Defense. In every commune or *arrondissement* into which the departments and cities of France were divided, they trooped up to the voting urn, over which the Mayor held guard (for the smallest commune in France has its mayor), and dropped in the list of names of those they wanted to represent their district. At the end of the day the contents of the urns were sent to the chief town of the department, for the lists to be counted. That took but little time, for in many departments there was no serious opposition to an agreed list of candidates for the task of making peace. Only in a few places, notably Paris, were two sets of lists passed around, one for war and one for peace. Most voters accepted the printed lists handed out. As soon as each assemblyman knew he was elected, he made the best of his way to Bordeaux, the early arrivals at Bordeaux beginning the task of organization even before a quorum was collected, in order to bring back peace as soon as possible.

This election, by manhood suffrage, was as free as circumstances could permit. Not only had Count von Bismarck prevented Gambetta from keeping former Imperial office

holders off the lists, he had kept his own hands off too. In Alsace and Lorraine, under German occupation, war lists were passed around, one candidate on them being Colonel Denfert, who was still holding out in Belfort after the rest of France had accepted an armistice; and that list carried the election. Bismarck knew he did not need to influence the voting; he knew that most of France wanted peace, and that the best way of creating a French Government which would enforce the peace terms he would dictate would be to have an utterly free election. But, though this was a free election, it was the most hurried France had ever seen. Only eleven days elapsed between the election decree of January 28 and the voting of February 8, and no runoff elections were to be held. This was not done for speed alone, but also to help the Republicans. Going back to the election law of the Second Republic was a way of asserting that that Republic still existed, legally, and using a law that had favored Republicans. As a result, in many a department political opponents found themselves put on the same lists to save splitting votes, and on the successful lists of many departments were found the same man, nine departments choosing Gambetta, nine Trochu, twenty-six Thiers. Above all, this election, besides being free though hurried, was a special election, for peace or war. Consequently it sent up men of trusted judgment, likely to be conservative. It has been said that the French may vote Radical but like conservative lawyers and agents; and the Assembly was to be lawyer and agent with Count von Bismarck. That to some extent nullified the usual effect of universal-suffrage voting.

Naturally all sorts and conditions of men were chosen to go to Bordeaux. Among them was General Giuseppe Garibaldi, who had come to do what he could for a French Republic—he who so long ago had fought for a Roman Republic against President Bonaparte of a French Republic, and then had fought side by side with the same man, now Emperor, for Italy. He never reached Bordeaux, but resigned

before the Assembly met. There was Louis Blanc, the old Socialist, whose "National Workshops," intended as a cure for unemployment, had caused the bloody "Days of June" in 1848. There, too, were all the members of the Government of National Defense—Picard, Ferry, Simon, Favre, Gambetta, and the rest. There were such men as Jules Du-faure, who had been a minister both under King Louis Philippe and under the Second Republic. Such was the spread among known or suspected Republicans in the Assembly. But, as well as Republicans, this free election under a Republic brought up many men who desired no Republic. There was Monseigneur Dupanloup, Bishop of Orléans, known and beloved all over France. There was the Duke Albert de Broglie, son of a distinguished father, the Duke Decazes, whom we saw outside the Palace Bourbon on the Fourth of September. There was the brave soldier, General Changarnier, a famous fighter on the Algerian frontier. There was the cloth manufacturer Henri Chesnelong, a strong Catholic from Navarre, who later would carry a famous but unsuccessful message. These men were businessmen, professional men, and a remarkably large number of them noblemen. For it is a mistake to think that the French Revolution killed off the French nobility. It did not. Some nobles were executed; others were forced to emigrate, or thought they were; practically all of them lost property; but after the Revolution the nobility as a class still existed, and till 1848 still formed a House of Peers in Parliament. That class still held the respect of the French people. And the general sort of man—businessman, professional man, nobleman—made up a working majority in the Assembly, as was realized as the assemblymen gathered at Bordeaux. One angry young man, Gaston Crémieux, realized this as he was watching a session of the Assembly and yelled out from the gallery: "Bumpkins." The name the majority gave to itself was "Conservatives," "Monarchists," or "Royalists."

Now, hindsight being easier than either foresight or seeing things as they looked at the time, it has been the custom

among historians to divide the assemblymen into four or more parties, depending on how many kinds of Republicans they distinguish, and say that the Conservatives consisted of two kinds of Royalists: Legitimists, who wanted the Divine Right Legitimate King, the exiled Count of Chambord; and the Orléanists, who wanted the other or Constitutional branch of the family, headed by the exiled Count of Paris, plus a very few Bonapartists; and that these made a majority of 400 among the 759 assemblymen. These are the figures M. Gabriel Hanotaux gives in his classic *History of Contemporary France*. They have been copied ever since. But as far as foresight went, the assemblymen were not elected on any party platform, but as representatives to make peace or war. Frequently lists were intentionally drawn up with representatives of all shades of opinion, except Bonapartism. The issue of peace or war was the basic one, cutting across all others. Alsace, for instance, sent up the Catholic and Royalist Emanuel Keller, and the Agnostic and Republican Léon Gambetta, both determined to fight to the end.—

And as for how things really were and whether Hanotaux's figures were accurate, the investigations of such scholars as Professor Rudolph Winnacker have shown that there were more Republicans, fewer Conservatives than is usually thought. But even there it is possible to be misled, to forget that many men came to the Assembly with an open mind, ready to change their opinions if the general opinion in the Assembly changed. It was of such waverings that the Duke Albert de Broglie was to say, "Every victory brings in its prisoners." Generally speaking, in the back of every man's mind lay the possibility of three organizations of the government of France. One, the Bonapartist ideal, would be hardly worth mentioning for the moment, for when a motion was made whether Napoleon III still reigned, only four men stood up, and no ballot was taken, was it not that Paul Déroulède was to revive it, one day. It was an ideal of a leader directly elected by the people, using the vast bureaucracy of the nation as the people wanted, and referring

to the people by a plebiscite at any time he wished. It was an answer to the problem of the vast centralization of the nation, though it was one then disliked by all statesmen because it enabled the elected leader to call trick plebiscites, and nullified any real control of the Executive. It was the other two choices that really lay before the Assembly, if it should go on from making peace with Germany to providing France with a government that was more than a makeshift negotiator. One choice was the ideal of many Republicans, a National Assembly of some sort, a single Chamber elected by universal suffrage, with absolute power between elections, serving for a fixed term to prevent either trick elections or a perpetual tenure of power after the Nation had changed its mind, with the whole machinery of the Executive under the control of the Assembly. Jules Grévy had made himself famous by proposing such a constitution for the Second Republic. How and why this became the doctrine of many Republicans of France takes too long to tell in detail. In large part it comes from the First Republic of 1793-1799, which was most effective when its constitutional convention took full power into its hands, and least effective after a constitution had been drawn up. Republicanism in France was always closely linked with the memory of that Republic, and with that Republic's bitter struggle with the Roman Catholic Church, which Napoleon ended by the Concordat of 1801.

Because Republicanism was so linked with the violent memories of the Convention and the bellicose, anti-clerical Jacobins, who had dominated the Convention, was one reason staid people preferred some other form of government on monarchical lines. The Conservatives had different forms of monarchy in mind, but were in general agreement. Of course, one cannot read into the minds of men who are dead and gone, even less so than into the minds of men who are now alive; but it is possible to figure out their thoughts. An elder statesman, in the year 1861, wrote down his per-

sonal opinions about government so effectively that Napoleon III's police confiscated almost every copy of the book on the presses, before they found it was not for public circulation anyway. In May 1870, a sign of the relaxing strength of the Empire, the Duke Victor de Broglie's *Reflections on the Government of France* was published by his son and successor, the Duke Albert de Broglie. From it can be learned more, in a short time, of what the typical Conservative wanted, than from any other source.

In his preface the Duke showed that the governments of France from the fall of the Divine Right Monarchy of 1789 to the Second Empire had followed a regular sequence: Divine Right Monarchy, Constitutional Monarchy, Republic, Empire, that had repeated itself again in 1815, with a second Divine Right Monarchy, second Constitutional Monarchy, Second Republic, and Second Empire. However, to the Duke Victor there had been a significant distinction between the first and second sets of monarchies. The first Divine Right monarchy had been an autocracy, the first Constitutional Monarchy a battlefield between king and the representatives of the people. The latter set had both had a House of Peers that held a balance between the king and the representatives of the people, and had combined the liberty and vigor of the Republic and the order and stability of the Empire. They alone had fallen, he thought, not from inevitable faults, but from avoidable mistakes by their rulers. To the existence of a second chamber, the Duke ascribed this avoidance of turmoil and of repression. As a Catholic and a nobleman, he spoke in terms his fellows would best understand; but he ended his preface with an appeal to Republicans who, like himself, saw the dangers of the Empire, to agree on the basic principle of an independent Executive and a second chamber to moderate the tendencies of a House of Parliament elected by universal suffrage.

There is no use in following the old Duke's analysis of

French administration from the ground up, from commune to canton, from canton to *arrondissement*, from *arrondissement* to department, from department to region in discussing the appropriate areas for various forms of control or representation. What matters are his chapters on the Legislative Body and the Prince. His chapter on the National Legislative Body concerns itself solely with the need of a second chamber, showing his opinion of its vast importance. As for his chapter on the prince, the first part is worth quoting verbatim. It sums up so well what did happen in 1871 and on, that it almost seems like a prophecy. Certainly it is a complete description of those who wanted a Divine Right King and those who wanted a Constitutional Monarch.

Chapter VI

Of the Prince

In the language of public law, this name is given to the executive power, whatever form it may take, whatever its sort, nature or duration, whether it be in a single person or in many, elective or hereditary.

The term is so used here, in order to preserve at whatever price a neutral position between the various fortunes that the future is holding in reserve for this land. While persisting in regarding Monarchy as the noblest form of government, and that which best falls in with God's wishes and with the needs of civilization, the only one worthy of great states that promises France both greatness and peace, it cannot be asserted that she will not be once more reduced to the perilous experience of rule by a Republic.

In order for a Monarchy to be established, or re-established in effect, at the end of long series of civil disorders, it is not enough that a Monarchy should be preferred to all other forms of government; at that moment a man must be found without a peer, whom the force of circumstances calls to the throne, and who is worthy of the throne through his inheritance or his personality; a man who may be, as has been said by one of rustic vigor of speech, "of the clay of which kings are made."

If such a man is not in existence, *time must be given a chance.*

If, on the contrary, which may easily be the case, there are several claimants, unequal in the eyes of history or reason, but equal more or less in actual chances, it would be wise to prefer a Republic to a civil war. In that case again, it would be the "Government that divides the least," and which best permits the popular opinion to form itself, and the legitimate ruler to grow strong and finally to triumph.

In either case, the course of wisdom would be to accept a Republic, but to accept it only as a choice of evils, as a state of transition, and not to sacrifice to the jealousy and turbulence of a Republic, above all not to its perpetuation, any of the guarantees of internal order, or exterior safety and position.

A chief executive is needed—in a single person, not in a committee—irremovable, even if that costs him effective responsibility—with all the powers of royalty: initiative and veto, the execution of the laws, the direction of all branches of the administration; the nomination, under the law, to all offices, command of army and navy—in short, a chief who is a king, save in name and tenure of office.

If this chief executive is to become actual king, it is important that the transition come about naturally, easily, by the development of public opinion, with the consent of the organs of government; if he undertakes to usurp the throne it is important to leave him no excuse or pretext that would turn him to violence, and justify resistance to the law. By mutilating the powers of the chief executive less is gained in the form of guarantees than is lost in giving subjects of complaint and recrimination, and motives to risk all.

Possibly if the negotiations between the two branches of the Royal Family had progressed further there would have been a "man without a peer, whom the force of circumstances called to the throne," in the person of Henry Count of Chambord, of whom many thought as King Henry V of France. For, though the Count of Paris's grandfather, King Louis Philippe, had accepted the throne after the revolt of 1830 had driven the Count of Chambord's grandfather, King Charles X, off it, with consequent family hatreds, yet the two branches of the family had agreed to agree when the way to the throne had begun to open, with the signs of weakness in the Empire. There was complete agreement

between the Count of Chambord and the Count of Paris (or rather, the Count of Paris's uncles) that France would have much such a government as just described, of an independent Executive and a second chamber to restrain and guide a chamber containing the representatives of the people. As the Count of Chambord was childless, and the Count of Paris was his heir, in the interests of unity the Count of Paris could let his aged cousin take the throne for a few years. There was no necessity either for thinking that a Divine Right monarchy was incompatible with Parliament. Even if the Count of Chambord's grandfather, Charles X, had made a mess of his five-years' reign, 1824-1830, by asserting his powers, the Count's great uncle, Louis XVIII, had made a real success by his tactful use of them. (These men may be known better to many readers as the two brothers of Louis XVI, the Counts respectively of Artois and Provence.) But to reach a full working agreement between a man, the Count of Paris, who had campaigned, though in comfort, for the North in the American Civil War to show his interest in the common people, and a man, the Count of Chambord, who kept a royal court in his exile in Austria because he believed God had chosen him to be King of France, was difficult, especially under the suspicions both inherited from 1830. The followers of each had ideas about the duties and powers of a king hard to reconcile, too.

Such being the case, there being "claimants, unequal in the eyes of history or reason, but equal more or less in actual chances," and there being, with Paris, Lyons, Toulouse, Marseilles, and Bordeaux so full of potential Republican mobs, danger of trouble if a monarchy were re-established, Conservative assemblymen bethought themselves whether or not "it would be wise to prefer a Republic to civil war." As they were inexperienced in government, for under the Empire only those subservient to the Emperor had had experience in government, they had to turn to someone for advice. Perhaps if the Count de Falloux, the leader of the Conservatives under the Second Republic, had been in good

health and a member of the Assembly, they might have followed him; for he was a strong Catholic who, under the Second Republic, had gained special freedom from state control for Church schools, and had put the Church in a position of inspecting state schools by the famous Falloux Law of 1850. But the Count de Falloux was an aged, tired man, and the members of the Assembly turned to M. Thiers, who was aged, experienced, and energetic. He had been in every free legislative body since 1830, had had more administrative experience than any man in the Assembly, and a real gift of exposition. Though he was known to have led the revolt against Charles X in July 1830, the two branches of the Conservatives had to trust him; there was no one else. He recommended accepting the Republic as "dividing us least," as preventing civil war, and as a scapegoat to blame for the treaty that was sure to be hated. There was a danger that an unknown king would be driven off the throne. This was happening at that moment to the unfortunate Italian who was trying to be king of Spain. And, as someone was needed "of the clay of which kings are made," it was almost inevitable that the members of the Assembly should turn to Thiers to be "Prince" or Chief Executive. Such was the agreement, made informally in private meetings in hotel rooms and such gathering places, and finally driven home in a caucus the night of February 15 at which certain Conservative leaders made known their decisions to their followers. The agreement is commonly known as the Pact of Bordeaux, and was that an avowedly temporary Republic should be kept till peace was made, when the Assembly would turn to giving France a new government and picking up the mess after the war.

But it was one thing to decide how the Assembly should vote, another thing, too, for that aggregation of six hundred and fifty from all over France to vote that way. French Parliamentary tradition has always been of independence, of the body (whatever its name) making its own decisions; and the Assembly at Bordeaux was naturally preparing to

follow all the Parliamentary traditions of France, even to the building it was to use. A theater was being made over; most French Parliaments have sat in made-over theaters, just as English and Hungarian Parliaments have sat in made-over chapels and churches. The orchestra seats were floored over, benches placed on the new flooring to crowd in more than the usual audience, and seats set in the first gallery and boxes. On the stage was erected that dais that is peculiar to European Parliaments, the Tribune, with the President's Chair above it. The Tribune is the heart of any French Parliamentary body, whatever its name, Legislative Body, National Assembly, or Parliament. In this particular body, as the *London Times* pointed out, the Tribune was just above the prompter's box, which suggests that one prompter, Thiers, gave the words for the whole play. But before considering what was done in Bordeaux, it is worth remembering, once and for all, that what was done was done by Frenchmen in a French way. Failure to remember that has caused many misconceptions about the Third Republic, and complicated what is simple.

Possibly the shape of the room in which French Parliamentary bodies meet has caused the peculiar methods those bodies have employed; certainly the shape of the room exemplifies them. It may not be that, because English members of the English Parliament sit on benches facing each other, they almost automatically split into two definite parties, one of which governs, the other of which opposes; whereas the French, sitting like the audience in a theater, form no definite parties and all share in governing; but if this is not so, the accidents of architecture confirm the truths of politics. It may not be that the English Speaker, because his chair is secluded under a canopy, acts as umpire and leaves the guidance of the House of Commons to the "Leader of the House," who speaks from the front bench, in contrast to the French President, who, because his chair faces the whole body, acts as both umpire and guide; but here again architecture reminds one of the facts of politics.

Again, the fact that the ministers of the English Crown sit on the same bench as the Leader of the House, who is one of their number dominating the House of Commons, whereas the French ministers sit apart as privileged servants, a third party in the by-play between President and those presided over, on a side bench, may be a reminder of the truth that the English Cabinet has a power over Parliament the French Council of Ministers has rarely had. Above all, the differences in speaking to the two bodies and of casting votes drive home the differences between English and French Parliamentary bodies. English members speak from the benches on which they sit, addressing the Speaker in words that are intended more as an appeal to public opinion than to the opposite benches, whose votes there is little hope of changing. The English voted, until recently, by filing out of the House of Commons by two doors, pretty much in the order in which they sat. It is news when an English M.P. makes up his own mind, instead of having his party making it up for him. But in France, speaking and voting was done facing the whole body, from the Tribune underneath the President's Chair, that Tribune which the late Louis Barthou called "both Capitol and Tarpeian Rock," for from it the governments of France ruled, as from the Roman Capitol, till they were thrown down after others, speaking from the Tribune, had persuaded votes to change. Often between debating and voting, members of a French Parliamentary body go out into the lobby, which in France is called "the Hall of Wasted Steps" and continue their discussions informally. Sometimes a French Parliamentary body will split up into special committees called bureaux to encourage such discussions. For the French voted as they saw fit; it was news not when there was independence in a French Parliament but when there was dependence, this even going so far that the French Parliament could change its mind on the motion on which it was voting, select among choices of motions (twenty is believed to be the record), and generally register at the ballots cast at the Tribune, either solemnly in person or in

baskets sent up to be counted by the four secretaries who sit behind the President's Chair, the will of the body as a whole, not of any party machine.

Now, an architectural theory of Parliaments can be broken down pretty quickly, pointing to Hungary, with an English House and French customs; America, with Houses like the French, except for the all-important Tribune, and English customs. But if an architectural theory of Parliaments serves as a reminder that French Parliaments must be thought of as French, and as doing French things for French reasons, not as a faulty copy of English Parliaments, that theory has served its purpose.

Seeing just what happened at the Bordeaux meetings of the National Assembly may serve to show how a French Parliament works, and what are the signs by which such a body's actions can be interpreted.

On February 12, Sunday, the National Assembly met just long enough to decide on a preliminary organization. Monday the thirteenth, still without a quorum, five days after the election, it met to start organization by appointing committees on credentials. As was the custom, Count Benoit d'Azy, a devoted follower of the Count of Chambord, as the oldest present, presided, and the four youngest members acted as secretaries sitting behind him. On "the third bench on the left" sat those members of the Government of National Defense, treating it as if it were a full-fledged "ministerial bench" in a properly built Parliament House. From among them rose Jules Favre, the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of the Government of National Defense, to tell the Assembly that he resigned its powers to the Assembly, but would carry on administration till a new Council of Ministers was formed. Then the committees on credentials got to work, to save time.

It was not until Thursday the sixteenth that all was ready with a quorum of the 759 members present, and more pouring in, and it was possible to elect a permanent President, in place of the President *pro tem*. With the election of a

President, the Assembly could act. The characteristics of any French Parliamentary body can be told by the sort of man it chooses to guide its work. It was known that Thiers wanted the Moderate Republican, Jules Grévy, as President of the Assembly, and there was no surprise when he obtained 519 of the 536 votes cast. Republicans would vote for Grévy because he was a Republican who had been a member of the Assembly of the Second Republic; Conservatives would vote for him because he had objected to Gambetta's strenuous methods during the war, and because Thiers had vouched for him. The National Assembly was at that moment mildly Republican, but only because Thiers had told it to be.

During the further election of officers, between the election of four vice-presidents and that of three quaestors, assigners of seats and keepers of order, Benoist d'Azy read out a motion, which, if any document was to be it, was to become the Pact of Bordeaux: "M. Thiers is named Chief of the Executive Power of the French Republic. He will exercise his functions under the control of the Assembly, with the assistance of ministers whom he will have chosen, and over whom he will preside." Among the nine signatories of this motion were the names of Jules Grévy, President of the Assembly, Jules Dufaure, to become Thiers's Minister of Justice, and M. Rivet, who had proposed adding the words "of the French Republic" to the motion, and was to make a similar far-reaching proposal later on. This motion was referred to the Assembly, to deliberate upon, to have transferred to a committee the next morning, and to be voted upon at one the next day. Here again the Assembly was asserting its French powers of revision.

At half-past one the next day the session opened, with a secretary reading the journal of the last session, and a newly arrived member complaining at the foot of the Tribune that he had no seat, and being told to apply to the quaestors. Then, even before the committee could bring in its report, Keller, the oldest member from Alsace, asked the Assembly

to "declare urgency," depart from its prearranged "order of the day," and announce to the world that it would not give up Alsace-Lorraine. Such a motion is typical of the flexibility of French Parliament procedure. Without even going to the Tribune, in a few words from his seat on the front bench, Thiers, that bespectacled, benign-looking old man, rather resembling a little white cockatoo, showed that, deeply as he regretted it, it was impossible to make such a declaration and so blocked any change of mind. The Assembly separated into small groups, as has been the ancient French custom, came back, and agreed to a committee report that it sympathized with Keller, but must not tie the hands of those negotiating the peace.

Then the committee which that morning had been chosen to report on the Pact of Bordeaux brought in its report. The National Assembly had jibbed at the words "French Republic" and wanted to guard itself. It exercised its powers of control. A preamble was added to the motion, which now ran: "The National Assembly, the depositary of the sovereign power, in consideration of the fact that, while waiting to pass a basic law on the government of France, it is necessary to provide for the necessities of government and the conduct of negotiations, decrees as follows: M. Thiers is named Chief of the Executive Power of the French Republic. He will exercise his functions under the authority of the National Assembly, with the assistance of ministers whom he will have chosen and over whom he will preside." From then on, Thiers signed himself Chief of the Executive Power and President of the Council of Ministers. As all three parties to the Bordeaux Pact—the Royalists, who shoved the discredit of the treaty off on the Republicans; the Republicans, who kept the Republic going, even though they formed a minority; and Thiers, who got a free hand—agreed to it, there was not even the formality of a vote.

Two days later Thiers sat on what passed for a Ministerial Bench with his government. The intervening day he had

sent a written message to the Assembly, apologizing for not appearing before it with a declaration of policy, because he could not get his Ministry together. As it was, when he did appear, his Minister of Finances was still wandering about France on his way to Bordeaux. But Thiers did tell the Assembly what had to be done to end the war footing France was on, make peace, and reconstruct the nation. Then, just as he had persuaded a Conservative Assembly to accept a Republican President, he also persuaded it to accept a Council of Ministers that, though nonpartisan, contained many of the milder members of the Government of National Defense. It contained as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jules Favre; as Minister of Education, Jules Simon, who had failed to handle Gambetta; as Minister of the Interior, that Ernest Picard who had lost the race for that Ministry on September 4 to Gambetta; and as Minister of War kept on the professional soldier, General Le Flô. But it also contained as Minister of Justice, which is sometimes called "Keeper of the Seals," Dufaure, who had been a minister both under the constitutional monarchy of Louis Philippe and under the Second Republic; and besides him a Legitimist follower of the Count of Chambord. For all his personal sway over the Assembly from being the one man in France who knew the ropes, Thiers knew that a French Legislature wants to see any Ministry that is to be responsible to it, and to be given an explicit statement of the policy that that Ministry will follow. Parliamentary procedure having been re-established in France, Thiers then went off to Versailles to negotiate with Bismarck.

Paradoxically, it was Bismarck, not Gambetta, who founded the Third Republic. True, on the Fourth of September Gambetta proclaimed to Parliament, mob, and Nation that Republicans had taken over the Council of Ministers from the men who had lost power at Sedan. But that was only a change in the Council of Ministers from two great men and a clique of courtiers to a group of Opposition depu-

ties. It is not promise but performance that matters, and if the Government of National Defense had promised France a Republic and a freely elected National Assembly, it had canceled the election and given France the dictatorship at Tours. But when that same test of performance applied to the National Assembly, whose election Bismarck had ordered, its intentions, too, were belied by its performance. Generally speaking, the Assembly wanted to set up a monarchy with a Parliament of two chambers, and above all to avoid the Republican ideal of an Assembly that was checked by no one but the voters, and could dismiss the Chief Executive at will. Yet by the Pact of Bordeaux the Assembly had set up just such a government. The Assembly was the product of universal suffrage. That reform had been brought in in 1848 to stay. Being a French Parliamentary body and not an English or American one, the Assembly was capable of throwing off control of any party machinery, and enforcing its own will. That meant that the Assembly could control, through the dismissible Executive, the whole vast monarchy of the French bureaucracy. The universal suffrage, exercised at the voting urns the twelfth of February for the first time in French history, unless one excepts the constitutional convention of the Second Republic, had a direct control of the governmental machinery that affected the lives of the voters. For that reason it can be said that the Third Republic was founded in fact at the meeting of the Assembly, even if it was founded in name on the Fourth of September.

If looking at Sedan and the Fourth of September can make clear what France was like when the Third Republic was founded, looking at the National Assembly can make clear what France was like during the whole Third Republic. The French have applied to that Republic three appellations: universal suffrage, centralized, and Parliamentary; and the key one is Parliamentary. If one wants to see the French as they saw themselves, their National Assembly or

their Parliament is the place at which to look. There one can see the French, perhaps, better than they could see themselves. Individual Frenchmen have their individual ideas about France; and, as Frenchmen are individualists, their individual ideas about France vary greatly. But because French Parliamentary procedure is so much more out in the open than ours, so much less under the control of party managers, the motions Parliament makes, the votes it casts, are an averaging out of the opinions of many representative Frenchmen into the opinions of France. Watching a French Parliament work is watching a collective mind work. From the first meeting of the first National Assembly in Bordeaux to the last meeting of the last National Assembly in Vichy, the thoughts of the rulers of France have been laid bare. At many times their collective mind has halted, has wavered, has turned one way or another because a small fraction of it has been moved by ignoble motives. But at other times their collective mind has shown great courage, great determination, and great patience. And whatever emotions that collective mind has shown, it is surprising how closely it has moved with the mind of the Nation. A close examination of Parliamentary actions has been a good index of national thought. It has almost been as if a great surgeon had replaced the top of a thinker's skull by glass, allowing the world to see thoughts chasing about in his head. Even the National Assembly, unrepresentatively as it had been chosen, showed itself by the speeches and votes at the Tribune to be a cross-section of the Nation. Subsequent Parliaments have shown themselves even more a little piece of France thinking out loud. Because of this, the Parliamentary history of the Third Republic has been truly the history of France under the Third Republic, and if one wants to see the French as they really saw themselves, Parliament is the place to look.

Thiers, the agent the Assembly and France had both chosen to represent the Nation, went off to negotiations the

results of which were a foregone conclusion. Thiers did get better terms than Jules Favre had gotten. He did cut the indemnity from six billion francs to five; he did get back the heroic city of Belfort, that had been still holding out when the National Assembly met, in exchange for permitting the German Army to make a triumphant entrance into Paris, under the very Arch of Triumph that had celebrated the victories of the past, so many of them over Germans. By dint of rushing through a first installment of the indemnity, that triumphant march was hurried through at once, before the National Assembly could reach Paris or Versailles and be insulted by it. But the main terms remained. Alsace-Lorraine was lost to Germany, except for a little of Lorraine; and a German Army occupied French forts and cities until the indemnity was paid. Among those forts were the forts of Paris north of the Seine River. The real duty of Thiers was to sign the treaty, and make the best of it.

The ratification of the treaty on the first of March by the National Assembly was also a foregone conclusion. Those who protested were told by Thiers how weak France was, how utterly impossible it was to go on fighting. There were some bitter-enders—Gambetta and, to his lasting pride, Clemenceau among them—but the treaty was carried, 546 to 107. Then a moving scene took place. The members from the "lost provinces" took their farewell to France. At their head was Grosjean, who had been besieged with Colonel Denfert in Belfort when the National Assembly was meeting. Among them was Léon Gambetta, who had chosen to sit for the department of Bas-Rhin, as well as Keller. The only absentee was Colonel Denfert, who later wrote in to say that, while marching the garrison of Belfort home with the honors of war, he had not heard of the resignations in which he wished to join. Their declaration was never to accept the ravishing of the "lost provinces." Then Gambetta went off to Spain to forget, which he did so thoroughly and so pleasantly that some compromising letters had to be bought back later in life by his political associates.

Little more remained for the Assembly to do at Bordeaux, since Paris, where the administrative offices were, was no longer besieged. But the Assembly would not move there. It remembered the Paris mob too well, and how the Legislative Body had been treated on the Fourth of September, not to mention other legislatures in the past, or its fears of the Bordeaux mob. Instead, the Assembly went to the suburb of Versailles, which had just been vacated by the newly crowned German Emperor, setting March 20 as the date for its next meeting. The Assembly did one more thing. Because of the war, many debts and many rents had not been paid, especially in besieged Paris, where debtors and creditors, tenants and landlords, had been separated by German soldiers. It ordered their payments, including the immediate payment of all debts over four months old. These laws of maturities and of rent were to have world-wide effect. Then it packed up and went.

The moving of the Assembly from Bordeaux to Versailles is a moving from one stage of the Third Republic's history to another. In those months of September to February the Republic was founded. Now it had to find itself a constitution, for this Republic was temporary, and accidental; the Assembly itself would end the Republic in a moment if it dared. During the next fifteen years it might be said the Third Republic passed through its Constitutional stage, making the temporary permanent, the Conservatives trying to transform the Republic into the government they wanted by adding an independent Executive and a second chamber; the Republicans trying to hold on to what accident had given them. If one looks ahead in the history of the Republic, after the constitutional battles had been fought other battles would come, in what might be called the Institutional stage of French History, the twenty years from 1885 to 1905, when the Republic battled with the Army and the Church, the strongholds of conservatism. After that the Third Republic might be said to have moved into yet another stage of its history, the Industrial stage, in which it was confronted

with the problems of an industrialized society, problems democracies were facing the world over: of the rights of labor, social security, a new form of finance. This stage lasted thirty-five years, from 1905 to 1940, ending when industrialized war swept over the Republic and forced the tearing up by the last National Assembly of the Republic's constitution and the surrender by a new Chief of the Executive of the name Republic. What, however, links these three subsequent stages together, is that they all can best be interpreted through the French Parliamentary machinery. At the Tribune of the Assembly and of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate that succeeded it, all problems finally appeared, to be discussed or passed on or accepted without discussion. The centralization of French bureaucracy saw to the bringing of all important matters to the Council of Ministers; the methods of French Parliamentary life saw to the Council of Ministers' reporting all important matters to Assembly or Parliament. From the first National Assembly to the last, through all the intervening Parliaments and National Assemblies, men who really understood Parliament could really understand France. To share that understanding it is not necessary to understand each set of Parliamentary maneuvers; the historian need not again go into the detail of this chapter. It is necessary to remember that each decision of Assembly or Parliament was reached by some such averaging process, and that it was the opinion of Parliament, not an opinion forced on Parliament from outside by party leaders or others. To say in English history that Parliament did such and such, in American history that Congress did such and such, is rarely strictly true. Parliament and Congress usually have obeyed leaders. To say in French history that Assembly or Parliament did such and such usually is strictly true.

But instead of philosophizing further on this, and telling how many French Parliaments had names and personalities of their own, it is time to show how this came about, and

how an Assembly that did not want a Republic, but wanted a monarch and a second chamber, came to draw up a Republican constitution.

PART II

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STAGE



Chapter Four

THE COMMUNE

THE FIRST task of the temporary Republic was to make sure of its own authority. When the Assembly, however, reached Versailles on March 20, ready to occupy another made-over theater, it found M. Thiers there too, living in the Préfecture that Emperor William of Germany had just left, not in Paris, as it had expected. M. Thiers was there because Paris was in the hands of the Commune. Both he and the Assembly then spent much time trying to find out what the Commune was, a task that to this day may be considered unaccomplished, since it is still a matter of debate, and to do something about the Commune, a task they most emphatically and bloodily accomplished. But because since 1871 the Commune has been so much used in Socialist and anti-Socialist propaganda, legend and twisting of argument has sometimes obscured the rest of the story. What Thiers and the Assembly had to deal with, in a hurry, was a city that had suddenly exploded, not with a planned revolt. In making any attempt to understand the Commune, the details of the explosion are just as important as the economic and social theories that have been dragged in afterwards.

In March 1871 Paris was a far from normal city. First of all, its inhabitants had been starved by the siege and had not recovered from their starvation. Then the inhabitants had been humiliated. During the siege they had clamored to be

led out in sorties against the Germans and had contributed their own money to buying artillery, but their generals had despised them and shown open contempt for them. After the siege the German Army had triumphantly marched under the Arch that the Great Napoleon had erected to France's triumphs. That had been such a bitter blow that a rising had occurred, the Marines had been prevailed upon to join in resisting the entrance of the Germans, and only the persuasions of the Committee of the National Guard Federation had prevented foolish and pointless slaughter. The Germans were still in possession of the forts on the north of the Seine River, still reminding the Parisians that they had surrendered without having had a chance to fight.

In March 1871 Paris was abnormal in another way. Temporarily it was a working-class city. Many of the richer classes had left for the country and the good food to be found there. The working-class men who had been enrolled in the National Guard and still had their rifles had special grievances against the Assembly. The Law of Maturities just passed by the National Assembly required the payment of all bills seven months old on March 13. While it is true that business cannot be done unless debts are paid, yet the suddenness of the demand for payment was quite unreasonable. Between March 13 and March 17, 150,000 bills were protested, facing their givers with court proceedings and possible ruin. The Law of Rents, allowing landlords who in many cases had run away from the siege to collect from tenants who had stayed and tried to fight made matters worse. A slogan went around: "It is the capitalists who capitulated." These impositions from without rubbed in the constant grievance; on top of all this was the fact that a Republic, supposedly a government by the people, had not let Paris govern herself. There were Republican mayors, but they had not been elected—they were the men Arago had appointed on the fifth of September.

Thiers was well aware of the state Paris was in, and at once began taking measures, planning to forestall trouble

rather than wait for it. The obvious first move was to put the chief troublemaker, Blanqui, in jail, which was done, even though it made Paris angry, because an amnesty had been proclaimed for the events of January 22, which had provided the pretext for the arrest. Then Thiers, wanting to remove the material for trouble as well as the troublemakers, and remembering that Paris was full, not only of rifles but of cannon, summoned the police authorities to him the night of Friday, March 17, to discuss how to get the cannon away. Thiers's new Governor of Paris, General Vinoy, his new Commander of the National Guard, D'Aurelle de Palladines, felt the police, the regulars, and the dependable National Guards were not strong enough. But Ferry, still Mayor of Paris, believed in firmness; and Thiers at last ordered Vinoy to send in his regulars and get the guns. The vital matter was the guns on Montmartre, the hilltop in the center of the city, the toughest section of Paris, where the most guns were and the most trouble was to be expected. A Socialist historian has given this reason why overpowering the sentry at 4 A.M. was not noticed: "The natives, accustomed to nocturnal shooting, had not roused." But seizing the cannon was one thing; taking them away was another. There were 171 guns and no horses to drag them. For four hours the soldiers of the 88th of the Line stood about in the cold, without breakfast, waiting for horses, during which time "the natives" did rouse. More and more of a crowd collected, to see what was going on. Since the wounded National Guard sentry, Turpin, lay on the ground, unattended, the famous woman Socialist, Louise Michel, began taking care of him. The Mayor of Montmartre, Dr. Georges Clemenceau, offered his services, too; but General Lecomte sent him away, saying he knew too well what happened when a wounded man was carried through a crowd. He was right; that particular crowd was beginning to get nasty.

Then the situation changed. National Guardsmen came up the hill, armed. Some of the regular infantry, the 88th of the Line, a newly raised regiment, left their ranks and joined

them. Lecomte promptly arrested others who were wavering, and jailed them in the Mayor's office. Then, seeing a rush developing, he ordered his men to aim and fire. Instead, they disobeyed orders, turned their rifles butt upward, and joined the mob. The mob surged up, seized Lecomte and his officers, and put them in the basement of a music hall at the foot of the hill. What had been a regiment of the French Army became indistinguishable from a mob. Matters got worse. A Montmartre Vigilance Committee carried off General Lecomte, though the restaurant keeper who had him as prisoner had given his word as a National Guard officer that Lecomte was safe. Then, picking up on the way General Clement Thomas, who had preceded D'Aurelle as Commander of the National Guard of Paris, the Vigilance Committee had them shot in the garden of a house in the Rue des Rosiers. Almost all historians, no matter what their prejudices, admit that this was a brutal and unjustified murder of officers of the French Army who were obeying their lawful superiors. Clemenceau, who had been trying to keep the mob from the prisoners in his office, got to the Rue des Rosiers too late to stop this, and just in time to be in terrible danger himself. It took him an hour to make his way back a few hundred yards through the mob to safety.

The news of these happenings on the heights reached Thiers at the Foreign Office, where he took his decision. He had been in this same fix once before, in February 1848, when he had informally acted as the last Premier of King Louis Philippe. Then the King had tried to stay in Paris, and he had been forced to persuade the King to abdicate to avoid slaughter. But for all that abdication, it had been necessary to slaughter that June, after all, when Paris broke into open revolt. On the other hand, during that same Revolution of 1848, which had spread all through Europe, in Bohemia Prince Windischgräts had withdrawn his troops from Prague and fought his way in again with far less trouble. In the long run the Prince had killed fewer people and settled the matter better. Therefore Thiers adopted the Prince's

method of evacuating the city post haste, and sent direct orders to that effect to the troops in other parts of the city.

Thiers represented an old-fashioned idea of government, of not trusting the governed. But there was a man who shared the ideals that led Clemenceau to spend his day pleading on the hilltop of Montmartre. That was Jules Ferry. He stayed in the City Hall till driven out, disregarding Thiers's distrust. Then he picked up his umbrella, strolled over to the Mayor's office in the highly respectable First Arrondissement, told the assembled Mayors of all twenty *arrondissements* that there were no more police in Paris, and went home to bed, strolling out of Paris, unmolested, the next day.

Such was the situation that met the members of the National Assembly as they gathered in Versailles for their first meeting in the Palace Theater, on March 20. It was one that might drive men to despair or frenzy. Engaged in the tremendous task of trying to restore a shattered nation and obtain terms from their conquerors, they now found they could not even keep order in their capital. At the very moment at which they were receiving reports from the Chief of the Executive Power of how powerless he was, the Republican mayors of Paris were negotiating with the ringleaders of this outbreak. And in the *Journal Officiel*, which the Communards had seized, was printed an acceptance of responsibility for the murder of the two generals. To the Assembly the words of Jules Favre seemed the only answer, "We will have no dealings with murderers." No wonder the Assembly appointed a Committee of Fifteen to watch over Thiers; no wonder many of them trembled for their safety, fearing that the Paris mob would come out to Versailles. Only one brigade of regulars was still loyal, and it did not look too dependable as it slouched disconsolately about the streets of Versailles. That Fort Mont Valerian was held was more luck than intention. It was not Paris alone that was scorning the Assembly. Two days later, Lyons, the First City of the Republic, broke into revolt, and other cities were seething.

With the Conservatives in the Assembly in such a mood, when on the twenty-third the mayors of Paris came out and begged the Assembly to grant terms, there was such excitement the session was broken up. Those mayors, such as Clemenceau, who were members of the Assembly were allowed to speak, but when the other mayors were cheered as they stood watching in the galleries, with cries of hurrah for the Republic, that was too much. Certain heated Royalists burst out in shouts and prevented anyone's hearing himself think.

This was the end of the attempt by the Republican mayors, the men Arago had appointed to restrain their wilder comrades, to settle the quarrel. The mayors saw a different picture from that which the Assembly saw. They saw a capital city which felt that it had been betrayed, that, while it had held out to the last, the country had failed to come to its aid, and that the cowardly Royalists who were in office to make peace were trying to betray the Republic, too. On the twentieth the mayors had dealt with embittered envoys of the National Guard Federation, and had only been able to get one envoy to accept the terms they had brought to Versailles. The mayors knew the justice of Paris's demands that she govern herself and that the Law of Maturities be suspended. They also knew that there was no hope for Paris once the country was roused, that the June Days of 1848 would come again, and angry troops, supported by an angry Nation, would sooner or later smash their way in. And in that anger they saw the two dangers to the Republic. Paris was denying the sovereignty of the people by attacking their duly chosen representatives. That would weaken the respect for a future Republic. Outside of Paris a wave of anger might grow against the idea of a Republic. In combination, these might make possible a monarchy independent of the people. Louis Blanc, the old Socialist leader of 1848, a hater of Royalists if ever there was one, came to plead with the revolters and beg them to be good Republicans and accept the decision of the majority. He,

Clemenceau, the lawyer Charles Floquet, resigned their seats in the Assembly in order to make their appeal more effective, but to no avail. Paris was determined.

For in Paris men saw another picture still. Blinded by the mood they were in and the possession of actual power, the working-class leaders saw dimly ahead of themselves the chance of putting their ideals into practice. They clearly saw a new city government in their hands—technical illegalities seemed to them no bar to the moral justice of letting Paris at last choose her own rulers. When Admiral Saisset, appointed Mayor of Paris by Thiers, led a procession of protest, National Guards dispersed the procession, and with a wave of enthusiasm the working class of Paris went to the polls and elected its heroes to the Commune, the new body that would truly represent the people. That this was a fervor that struck deep, apologists for the Commune can prove now by the diary left by the later rather conservative future President of the Council, Jules Méline. He was then Mayor of the respectable First Arrondissement, was chosen to the Commune, and in his diary on the night of his election recorded his feelings that a new world was coming.

But later on Méline's friends spent much time denying for him that he had ever taken his seat on the Commune, because of the way in which that new world did not come. The Commune was not only attempting to be a morally justifiable Paris City Council; it was born of utter distrust of the Versailles Assembly and challenged the Assembly's powers not only to control Paris city elections but also to control the whole nation. Memories of the past and hopes for the future welled up in Paris and confused men's minds. Because the hard-fighting Jacobins of the First Republic had written a constitution never enforced in which France would be a federation of communes, because many of the leaders knew Prince Kropotkin, the anarchist leader, and were influenced by his ideas of communal independence, as well as personal independence, the Commune talked, in its meetings, of a new government for France to supplant the Versailles As-

sembly by a loose federation of communes. Because the Roman Catholic Church had been an ally of the state and of the police forces that had beaten down all attempts by workers to organize and better themselves; because the teachings of the Church had gone counter to that Republicanism to which the working classes looked for a better world, when Monseignor Darboy, the Archbishop of Paris, came into the city to see what he could do for his flock, they clapped him into jail, and discussed whether to shoot him, or to trade him with Thiers for Blanqui, whom they needed as an organizer and leader, in the course of the discussion relieving their minds of their highly unfavorable opinions of the Catholic Church.

For others, a new set of vistas opened. These were not the revolutionaries pure and simple, the men who had passed on the traditions of the First Republic till at times they almost lived then instead of in the world of the present; these were not the friends of Prince Kropotkin and other independent thinkers on anarchical lines; these were the new Socialists, organized from London by a German named Karl Marx, partly imbued with his ideas of a new economic order in which the workers should own the plants and factories in which they worked, and thoroughly imbued with the general idea that a new kind of government was necessary. It was the sight of a strong majority of this kind of man that made the few more ordinary Republican members of the Commune withdraw hurriedly. The result was to leave the capital of France, thought by many to be the most beautiful city in the world, and its leader in the arts and fashions, under the guns of a conquering invader in the forts on the north, while inside a group of men ruled who had wild incoherent ideas and no experience of government except plotting.

In handling the situation of a frenzied capital and a frenzied Assembly outside of it, Thiers was propped up by pressure from other directions. In those weird days at the end of March 1871, telegraphic reports did come in of still more

revolts, reports which encouraged the Commune in its recalcitrance. But those reports of revolts in the steel town of Creusot on the twenty-sixth, in Toulouse, where Duportal had just been ejected, on the twenty-seventh, in Marseilles, where the inspiriter was that same Gaston Crémieux who had given the Assembly its nickname, on the twenty-eighth—all turned into reports of order being restored, though at Marseilles it took a week. And with those reports came delegations from other great towns asking Thiers if the Republic was safe. Assurances that it was, the delegations said, would prevent revolt. Thiers gave those assurances, guarded, since he was the Executive of the Assembly, but full. Those assurances kept France quiet.

And as for Prince Bismarck, as he had now become, having been given the title on March 21, he saw his need of supporting Thiers. Should Paris burst into disorder, his master, William I, would probably send German troops in; and the results of a German storm of Paris, both of destruction at once and of hatred in the long run, Bismarck did not like to contemplate. When Thiers told him he had to have an army, not to fight Germany again, but to keep France in order, and that the only dependable French troops were German prisoners, Bismarck sent him men faster than he had planned. The men were rushed to Versailles from the transports that carried them by sea, the trains that carried them by land. Thiers may have wanted General Chanzy to command them; the Assembly wanted no Republican, and Thiers sent for Marshal MacMahon. MacMahon demurred, saying he was a beaten man and his appointment would bring criticism; but Thiers answered that there was no one in France who was not beaten, and that he would answer criticism. MacMahon came, took command, and drilled the troops, the Marquis de Gallifet taking command of his cavalry, trying to make them dependable, as the 88th had not been. In fact, it was war between Paris and Versailles.

On Palm Sunday, April 2, the outbreak came. The Communards came out of Paris to show what a *sortie en masse*

could be if led by real Republicans, not by Trochu. The Fortress of Mont Valerian fired on them, routing one column. Gallifet went out to meet them, and sent forward a non-combatant medical officer to treat with them. As he was waving his arm band that proved he was not a fighter, the Communards shot him. After that, to soldiers like Gallifet, it was a struggle to the death. Men in the uniform of the French National Guard had fired on the French Army, not only in hot blood when the two generals were murdered, but now of set purpose. That was not war, under the laws of war, but mutiny. Yet, though the scene was laid for a bloody siege of Paris, for six weeks a curious truce lasted, with Frenchmen in Versailles facing Frenchmen in Paris under the eyes of Germans on the north bank of the Seine. During that time matters shook down, and it became somewhat clearer what the fighting was about. From the side of Versailles the matter at issue was clear. Two generals had been shot, an Archbishop was held prisoner under bad conditions in his own diocese, and the city government of Paris had been overthrown, the national government driven from its capital, its authority denied, and attacked where it had taken refuge. The degree of iniquity of the Parisians might be a matter of debate. Some might hold that they were misguided; others told fantastic tales of their plans and considered them devils in human form, adducing true evidence and adding exaggerations. On April 14 the Assembly declared its stand in two laws. One was a local government act that was meant with real liberality for the rest of France, but took away from Paris even the office of mayor, let alone electing him, and the powers of deciding on the costs of police and sanitation. The Minister of the Interior would nominate a Prefect of the Seine and a Prefect of Police who would be Paris's executives, and the Council would just find the money they wanted and pass by-laws. However, Thiers limited the law, against the wishes of Albert, the new Duke de Broglie, by having the Minister of the Interior appoint mayors in all towns of over 20,000 population. That was a

law giving liberty to France. The other was a law giving order, and enabling the taking away of liberty. It allowed the President of the Council of Ministers to proclaim martial law in any department it wanted to, not only in Paris, where it already existed. That was typical of the Assembly—to it liberty was valuable only in order. And as the amazement at the Commune grew, the support of the Assembly grew stronger. Thiers was working at fever heat. He really understood administration of France from twenty-one years of connection with it. He rearranged all of France's administration, for he thought he could do anything, which was nearly true, as proved by his accomplishment of the titanic task of appointing, inspiring, and guiding new officials all over France. With a different aim—peace, not war—he was using the vast machinery of French administration as Gambetta had when at Tours.

For the mood of Paris was changing, the first flush of enthusiasm wearing off. The men who suspected that the Commune would fail were deserting it, first its few respectable members, then the rank-and-file ordinary citizen who could make his way out of Paris. Administrative difficulties grew. Money the Commune had; for Jourde, its "financial delegate," made an arrangement by which he could draw on the balance of the City of Paris at the Bank of France. To this Thiers and the Governor of the Bank assented; it was a way of avoiding the sack of the Bank and cheap at the price. But every National Guardsman had to draw his pay, and was not very much inclined to go out of his home district. A succession of "military delegates," among them Charles Delescluze, told the Commune how well they could fight, and then squabbled with their masters, and finally left dramatically. As many of the members of the Commune were Republicans of the old school, the ways of the First Republic were restored. The curious calendar with a ten-day week and dating from September 20, 1792, the first day of the First Republic, was momentarily restored. As the Vendôme Column, with a statue of Napoleon I on it, commemorated both the man

who had erected it and had destroyed the First Republic, and his nephew, who had re-erected it and destroyed the Second Republic, the Commune solemnly pulled it down. Ropes were attached, and on Tuesday, May 16, the people of Paris tugged and down it crashed, to the joy of the Communards and the ridicule of the outside world. As for Thiers, they burned his house to show him how they felt.

Some of the legislation of the Commune was social, but even all of that must not be considered socialistic. For example, fixing the price of bread was a legacy from the First Republic. Only when the ground is cleared that way can it be said, without misunderstanding, that the Commune had its Socialist side. For in these six weeks of waiting was born a great Socialist legend. Men began to stand out in the Commune, exponents of ideas, sturdy fighters who blundered ahead, eccentrics whose eccentricity may have seemed grim then but has a charm now. Paris has always been a great stage, and on it these men stood out, floodlit. And they were honest men. The Bank of France can testify to that, because, although National Guards tramped the streets enforcing strange regulations, there was a meticulous honesty that shines out, and was to have a dramatic demonstration when the end came. Despite the fact that there were followers of Marx among them, it is incorrect to call the Communards, as many do, Communists. That is part of the Socialist and anti-Socialist propaganda connected with the Commune and obscuring actual events. The other name for the Communards is the Federals, since the fighting men belonged to the Federation of National Guard Battalions. What the Communards really were was angry, bewildered Parisian workingmen, with some rather freakish leaders who suddenly found themselves in power and, being in power, tried to work out a program for a government that would be a real government for the people.

But for six weeks more, in spite of desultory fighting, the queer truce seemed to continue. At last, in May, the time seemed to have come to force the surrender of Paris. Paris

seemed to think so, too. There were elections held to fill the vacancies of Méline's and other resignations. Under the French law, one-quarter of the registered voters must vote to make an election valid. The Commune dropped this to one-eighth, and at that did not get the required number, only 53,680 voting. For the 31 seats to be filled, only 12 got an eighth of their district; only 20 were elected. The twenty-third of May was the day set for the storm, and the Versailles troops massed outside the walls of Paris.

But at three on the afternoon of the twenty-first, a white flag was seen waving from the wall of the St. Cloud gate. A civil engineer came out and reported the whole section of the walls undefended. In marched MacMahon's men, opened other gates, and had cause to bless Napoleon III. For Napoleon III had had Paris rebuilt with wide avenues, having had enough of the professional revolutionary tactics of throwing furniture out of windows, and then pulling up paving stones to make a barricade in no time. Down those wide and indefensible streets came the Versaillaise, steadily and scientifically. Whenever possible they outflanked barricades instead of storming them. In all, they suffered only 800 casualties, of which 600 were in the street fighting of the "Bloody Week." Among the few to storm barricades was Paul Déroulède, once again back from captivity to serve in his beloved Army. For his gallantry he was given the Legion of Honor.

A note of tragi-comedy, it was found that the guns of Montmartre, the cause of it all, were incapable of being fired.

By the night of the twenty-second, despite the attempts of some like Déroulède to temper justice with mercy, the horrors had begun. The Versaillaise continued to shoot as mutineers all in National Guard uniform, and as rebels all not in uniform. From the houses hidden men and women shot at the men they considered murderers of their nearest and dearest. Constant shots would carry off one or two soldiers at a time. Grimly the now extremely angry soldiers

took to examining all passers-by, making them show their hands, especially after outflanking a barricade and finding all peaceful when there had been shooting. If there were powder marks on the hands, that was a sentence of death; white hands might go free. As a result of this policy National Guardsmen with tricolor arm bands to show their sympathy with the Versaillaise came out to help in the restoration of order.

In return the Communards took to desperate means, only the desperate being still on their feet. The last that was seen of Delescluze, he was walking down a broad avenue, looking for death by bullets, and obviously about to die of illness any moment. Louise Michel, the woman Socialist, raised a battalion of women. Somebody had an inspiration that burning houses might prolong the defense. The order went out to burn the Treasury. A whole series of buildings was destroyed. The Rue de Rivoli, with its famous luxury shops, was completely gutted. The Tuileries Palace and the City Hall went, too. In the Treasury was the entire list of pensioners in France and of bondholders. Fortunately duplicates existed elsewhere. The Bank of France was saved by Beslay, who for that was given safe conduct out to Switzerland. Jourde, the financial delegate, was arrested and found carrying the balance of the Paris city cash on his person, anxiously looking for someone to give it to to keep his books straight.

Rigault, who must have been partly mad, got his warrant at last and dragged out the Archbishop and eleven others from the prison at Mazas and shot them without trial. Then the prisoners realized that help was near; and, though another batch surrendered and were butchered, the rest, aided by a few warders, fought off Rigault and his men and were saved by the troops coming in.

In this mad city, smoldering and stinking to high heaven, the Versaillaise did horrible justice. In the streets men who had resisted were lined up—Gallifet was in charge of this—were quickly examined to see if they should be summarily

executed, and were shot. Socialist legends tell how Gallifet, his mistress on his arm, twirling his mustachios, pointed out who should die, who should live, making caustic jests as he did so. Gallifet used to enjoy those legends. The last fighters were cornered at the Père Lachaise cemetery near Montmartre, where one wall, the Wall of the Federals, served to stand them up against for shooting. This form of execution was almost a ritual on both sides, strange as it may seem. There is the famous tale of the boy who told a Versaillaise officer, after the barricade from which he had been shooting was taken, that he must take his silver watch back to his mother. Thanking God for that excuse, the officer sent him off, hoping never to see him again. But the boy came back to be shot. Some special cases the Versaillaise took up to the Rue des Rosiers, to be shot in revenge in the garden where Lecomte and Clement Thomas had been murdered.

After this was over, court-martials sat even into the winter, till the Assembly Committee on Pardons terminated them. There were, after these unnumbered shootings, 270 executions ordered by court-martial, and 7,000 transportations to New Caledonia. It is from these doings that Gallifet got his nicknames of the Red Marquis and the Butcher of the Commune. It is hard to reconstruct the emotions of this time. The horrors on both sides seem so unjustified—the shootings of the generals, the imprisonment and shooting of the Archbishop, and the deliberate gutting of a great city by the Commune, and on the other hand the logical but murderous application of the laws of war, with such a dreadful toll of lives. Even if Paris had been asking for something drastic, she had no reason to deserve such treatment. But in fairness to the Versaillaise it should be remembered that eyewitnesses, among them Washburne, who daily went into Paris, even during the Bloody Week, and who had professional dealings with the Communard authorities, testify how horrible the Commune was. Washburne especially deserves credence, because he admits that the Communards treated his German protégés well. The scum of Paris had had its

chance during the Commune, and in some cases had taken it. Both sides had temporarily gone mad.

To judge what the Commune meant when all was over and some sanity returned, there are four signs. First, there is high above Montmartre the Basilica of the Sacred Heart, paid for by a national subscription, to expiate a great horror. It covers the spot where the generals were murdered. Secondly, there is the Wall of the Federals, where until this war usually one would find a wreath put by some sympathizer with the downtrodden. Every May Day, the Labor Day of the continent, great processions went there to honor those who, so it is said, died for the workingman. Thirdly, there is a book, *The Civil War in France*, written in the heat of the moment by Karl Marx in London, explaining what he thought the Commune meant. He pointed out the two sorts of Communards, the old-fashioned Jacobin revolutionaries, like Duval, who bared his breast to be shot, like Jourde who paid in the petty cash of the city to keep its accounts straight, and his New International, devoted to a new idea, to the workers' taking over property rather than the people's taking over the government. He asserted that his friends acted wisely, the old-fashioned revolutionaries foolishly. He asserted that the Bank of France should have been destroyed to destroy the capitalists and employers who used it, that full use should have been made of all the Government offices, instead of only the Government printing office and the *Journal Officiel*. And, using Marx's book, Lenin, sent into exile in Finland in July 1917 by the Russian Republic, came back in October and overthrew it, supplanting it by the present Soviet regime. That use of the Commune is one-sided, denying the importance of the victory march and the Parisians' love for the guns that they had bought for themselves, but it has stimulated many, besides Lenin.

But in some ways, more than lasting emotions on each side, more than a theory of revolt, one other thing symbolizes the Commune's results. On the nineteenth of June an

army now of 140,000 men led by Marshal MacMahon was reviewed by M. Thiers. That review showed the Germans still in the forts that France had a government that could act, something far different from the frightened Assembly that had met in the Versailles Theater on March 20. It could put down rebellion; it had better be treated with consideration, even if France had been defeated. What that government was, no one at that time knew, other than that M. Thiers was for a while at its head. But that it had power, after the Commune, all had to admit. In some strange way the Commune had rebuilt France. If constitutional government had been restored to life by the meeting of the Bordeaux Assembly, it had been restored to vigor by the suppression of the Commune. Since then no one has ever felt that the French Executive was incapable of keeping order if it put its mind to it.



Chapter Five

THE REIGN OF ADOLPHE I

WHEN THE Commune had ended, the members of the National Assembly at Versailles found themselves face to face with the problems it had overshadowed. Formally they met to deliberate in the theater at Versailles; and many an open-minded man, of all parties, made up his mind as the debates went on, gaining enlightenment from them. Somewhat less formally, all the Conservatives, whether they wanted a Divine Right king or a Constitutional one, met at the Hôtel des Reservoirs, there to decide on policy and concert Parliamentary measures. Likewise, the many committees worked on their reports, and wherever men met they were likely to thrash things out. Every day a special train came out from Paris for the use of members of the Assembly, who had moved in there; every day knots of arguing men would meet on the platform, and, still arguing, get into the train, to be found still arguing as they got out at the Versailles station. As for the fountain-head of knowledge, it was at the Préfecture at Versailles, where M. Thiers would hold receptions and where he would talk long and emphatically on almost any subject. It was a national joke that he thought he knew everything, and in fact came as close to it as could possibly be expected.

Just what the Government of France was, in those days, no one knew, except that there was a National Assembly, a Chief of the Executive Power, and an agreement, half-

written, half-unwritten, called the Pact of Bordeaux, not to push anything too far till the urgent problems of reconstruction were over. But the essence of the Government of France was the garrulous, wise old man who in some almost incredible way was getting things done, such as building a modern army out of prisoners in three months. And for a while it would be wise not to disturb him at his task.

Even before the June 17 review, Thiers had given the Assembly a talking-to on the question of not interfering with the man at the wheel. The pretext for it was the question whether the Count of Paris's uncles, the Dukes d'Aumale and de Joinville, were duly elected members of the National Assembly. Legally, they had been banished from France by Napoleon III, but just the same they tried to fight in the war and had been elected by the departments of Oise and Haute-Marne. Was there any reason why the Assembly should not end Napoleon III's expulsion? This was a move decided upon by the meeting at the Hôtel des Reservoirs as an opening wedge for the return of a royal family. It had effect, all right. After the proposition had been read from the Tribune and explained by its proposer, Thiers clambered up, faced the Assembly, and told them deftly, amusingly, but very firmly just what he thought. Thiers was to give the Assembly many such a talking-to. This particular one, however, contained the gist of all he had to say on the question of organizing a constitution, and was much quoted. In practical fact, it summed things up; it settled the question for almost two years.

Thiers told the Assembly that if he had not assured deputations from various cities that he would protect the Republic, revolts as bad as the Commune would have broken out all over the country, and then he went on to explain why he thought they should accept the Republic willingly. He said: "Two governments cannot exist side by side in the same country."—"We must make a loyal trial of the Republic." Then he reassured the Assembly about the kind of Republic it would get. He said: "Monarchy is a Republic

with an hereditary president." And, amid laughter: "The Republic has never succeeded—in the hands of Republicans." And he recommended letting the two princes sit, it having been privately agreed that they would resign their seats at once. The sum of Thiers's remarks were contained in his avowal that he preferred a constitutional monarchy like England, but that if he was not let cross the Channel he would cross the Atlantic to Republican America. For the time being he thought things were good enough as they were, and as long as the Government of France had a representative form and a stable Executive he did not wish to enter into quarrels over what were really details. His stand was, really: "Time must be given a chance."

As for the Republicans, it was possible to gather together 166 to vote against the readmission of the princes, but they had no leader, and many dared not vote against Thiers. That was their stand: that they needed organization and leadership.

As for the Monarchists, when Republicans began to speak against the readmission of the princes, they shouted for cloture of debate, got it, shouted for a vote, and carried it. They knew that on their side was a situation that did not bear talking about—the mutual and justified distrust of the two branches of the House of Bourbon for each other. They, too, needed organization and leadership.

As for the princes, the law referred to them as "the House of France," by that admitting that they had a serious claim to the throne. In that they scored a point.

The reasons for that distrust showed themselves at once after this debate. The followers of the Divine Right Count of Chambord had always considered that the younger branch, the House of Orléans, was untrustworthy. The two princes showed their untrustworthiness by failing to carry out their part of the bargain, and resigned from the Assembly. That made it seem too likely that they had inherited the characteristics of their grandfather, Duke Philippe of Orléans, who during the Revolution had voted for the death

of his cousin, Louis XVI, and their father, Duke Louis Philippe of Orléans, who in 1830 had accepted the lieutenancy general of the kingdom, and by doing so had driven the Count of Chambord from the throne for which his grandfather, Charles X, had abdicated in his favor, and taken it himself. Was it likely that the Count of Paris, the nephew of these deceitful princes, would prove more trustworthy? There was already talk of making D'Aumale President in place of Thiers; later on it was to be hinted that in that case D'Aumale would not even have given over to his nephew but would have taken the throne for himself. When the Monarchists met at the Hôtel des Reservoirs, such suspicions weakened their union.

A test was coming soon of the feeling toward these questions in the country at large. There were 111 seats to be filled in the National Assembly, to bring it up to full strength. The elections for them would not, like those of February, be on a peace or war basis, but one of Monarchy and Republic. If the Republicans could pull themselves together and find a leader, they might strengthen that group that the Monarchists were shouting down at Versailles, and take full advantage of the "loyal experiment" of the Republic for which Thiers was pleading. A leader did come—Léon Gambetta returned from his self-imposed exile in Spain, and in a speech at Bordeaux, on June 26, made a quotation from Thiers. Thiers had once said: "Power should go to the wisest and worthiest." That, Gambetta said, was his ideal of a Republic; and he was willing, by Parliamentary means, to make a "loyal experiment" of the Republic, following Thiers as his leader. That was a new sort of thing to hear from one whom Thiers himself, in that epigrammatic speech of June 8, had hinted at when he spoke of "wild madmen" who had wanted to go on fighting after France had been crushed. The Republic might be turning respectable after all. Gambetta, having proved himself a fighter during the winter, was now proving himself an opportunist.

So France seemed to think, for the elections of July 2 gave 100 of the 111 vacant seats to Republicans, including the election of Gambetta in three departments. The importance of this can be overemphasized. Paris, for instance, elected five Republicans, six who merely announced they followed Thiers, and five Monarchists. But it was a great blow to the Monarchists' hopes, a great advance for the Republicans in the Assembly, a great change in the behavior of the Assembly.

Another blow fell upon the Monarchists. Just as the Orléanists were justifiably distrusted by the Legitimists for their disloyalty, so the Legitimists were justifiably distrusted by the Orléanists for their stubbornness. On July 5, three days after this election, the Count of Chambord issued a manifesto. The first part of the manifesto was all that any Orléanist could desire. It declared that the Count of Chambord stood for home rule for the cities, real Parliamentary government, by two chambers and a ministry, and universal suffrage. It was a clear statement, with a clear recognition of the fact that it was the present, not the past, that had to be lived in. But the Count added a second part. This was fully in line with a saying of his, "Either I am King by Right Divine or a lame old man with no business in politics." Having said that he would give up anything for France except his honor, he added that he had something to give France that no one else could give her, and illustrated his point by referring to the White Flag of the House of Bourbon. He said that Henry V, by which he meant himself, could never reign under any flag but the white one of Henry IV, who had founded the house. That was far too reminiscent of his grandfather, Charles X's, attempt to suppress Parliament in 1829 and 1830.

The Orléanists had been waiting for something like that. The tricolor flag was a sore point in the relationship between the two branches of the Royal Family, and had caused much trouble in the negotiations that had intermittently gone on between them since 1854 to reunite the

two branches. The tricolor, which is the red and blue of Paris, added to the white of Bourbon, had been the flag of the First Republic and Napoleon, had been given up when Louis XVIII and Charles X came back as Divine Right monarchs, and had been returned to by the Orléanists after 1830. That the Count of Chambord, for all his having once told his followers that he was more liberal than they, should want to go back to the symbol of 1829, confirmed all the suspicions that the first part of the Manifesto might have allayed. No longer did those men who sat at Jules Grévy's right, as he looked down on them from the President's Chair, meet at the Hôtel des Reservoirs. They met as separate groups.

With the disbandment of the Monarchists' meetings at the Hôtel des Reservoirs, came a year when the Assembly learned its business, not so much as a unit as separate committees. In all, fifty-two committees were set up. These dealt with all the great problems before the country, and in them men learned to recognize who were natural leaders. That Albert, the new Duke de Broglie, as "reporter" for the committee, put through a remarkable press law in the midst of the Commune, marked him out. That Henry Waddington, an English-educated French Protestant, was "reporter" for the law which on August 10, 1871, gave real power to departmental councils, made him a man politicians would in future trust, especially those in all parties who had lamented the weakness of the department councils. But, though the members of the Assembly were learning how to behave in a Parliamentary body, they still could be goaded and have their passions touched off. The time was far in the future of the typical French Parliamentarian, the experienced politician who knew the ropes and could not be handled by a master of procedure. Thiers could, and did, mold the committees and the Assembly to his will, just because he was the most experienced man in the room, one who had handled Parliaments when many assemblymen were still in the nursery.

However, Thiers was not alone in this ability. When the Department of Var sent Léon Gambetta to the Assembly, it sent there a master of men. In less than a month Gambetta had made his mark by a deft move that changed the Parliamentary chessboard.

It was on July 23 that a Royalist moved an order of the day sympathizing with the Pope in his struggles with the King of Italy. Until after Sedan the French Empire had supported the temporal power of the Pope over the city of Rome and a district around it by giving him a garrison. But when every man was needed the garrison had been withdrawn; and the Italians, who had for ten years chafed at French interference, marched in and put the question to a vote of the Romans, to be Italian or independent, knowing in advance that the vote would be overwhelmingly for independence. The order of the day on the petition was a neutral one, expressing confidence in the Government's patriotism. Gambetta, the Republican who would not enter a church, merely came to the Tribune and announced that he, too, would vote for the motion. At that old M. Keller, the Royalist member from Alsace, who, like Gambetta, had been re-elected, dashed to the Tribune and announced that he could not vote on the same side. Another motion was passed, ordering Jules Favre, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to consider the subject carefully. That the Minister of Foreign Affairs could not do; he was a pronounced supporter of the Italian occupation of Rome, and he resigned, to disappear from history in a few months in a personal scandal. Thiers replaced him with a close friend, Charles de Rémusat, not a member of the Assembly, who thus had a voice in virtue of his office, but no vote.

There was more to this incident than just a clever goading of Monarchists. It was a fundamental clash in France between many Republicans and many Catholics. It is hard to reconcile a divinely inspired church which guides and gives authority in all matters, and a form of government which recognizes no authority but that given by the people.

A great many Frenchmen on both sides of the fence did not even try. The split must be remembered if one is to understand France. Almost every atheist was a Republican, almost every Monarchist was a Catholic.

There was another issue, too—that of the responsibility of ministers. Thiers wanted to keep Jules Favre—the whole purpose of the motion Gambetta supported to its downfall was to save him. But the Assembly by its vote had asserted and proved its power to dismiss ministers. This was part of Gambetta's voicing the Republican demand for the election of a real National Assembly to make a constitution unconfused by the issues of peace and war and in the meantime making the Republic as Republican as possible. Thiers now wanted the situation straightened out.

M. Rivet, who had already written the words "French Republic" into the Pact of Bordeaux, moved again. The Rivet Law of August 31, 1871, was an amplification of that Pact and a further recognition of the stand taken by Thiers, the Republicans, and the Monarchists. It formed, till the end of the Republic, the basis of Parliamentary government in France.

First of all, the law declared that the Assembly had "constituent power"—that is, could make a constitution. This was an answer to the Republican demand that the Assembly dissolve and let a new Assembly give France a constitution, it having been elected only to make peace. The law then went on to say that Thiers held office for the duration of the Assembly, but was responsible to it. Here the Conservative majority confirmed the power it had taken by driving Favre from office, and made all ministers responsible to it, as well as to Thiers, which would allow removals of particular men. Then, as Thiers had been using his oratorical power to persuade the Assembly to do things that in cold, sober second thought it had wished it had not done, the Rivet Law therefore forbade his speaking without warning. However, the Republicans got their sop. Thiers was now to be, not Chief of the Executive Power

of the French Republic, but President of the French Republic. The same law that said that the Assembly could destroy the French Republic by a single vote also said that the French Republic existed.

A decree of the Council of Ministers of September 12 crowned the Rivet Law by creating a new office—that of Vice-President of the Council—to be held by M. Jules Dufaure, who also held the Ministry of Justice, or, as it was sometimes put, was “Keeper of the Seals.” He was to preside over the Council when it met away from Thiers, deciding—free from Thiers’s influence—how to meet its own responsibility to the Assembly.

From that day on, when the Ministry met with the President of the Republic, ready to countersign his actions, as the Rivet Law required, it was the Council of Ministers; when it met away from him to discuss policy, it was the Cabinet. Furthermore, until 1925, with rare exceptions the Keeper of the Seals was Vice-President of the Council.

But after the clarification of the nation’s stand on monarchy by the election of July 2, there was no desire on the part of the Assembly to do any but the most rudimentary constitution-making, such as was the Rivet Law. Its aim, indeed its duty, was to follow the Duke de Broglie’s advice, and start not with politics but with institutions. France had to be rebuilt, and as the purpose of having a monarchy was to rebuild her on Conservative lines, there was no reason for not rebuilding her on Conservative lines before founding the monarchy. To that tremendous task of rebuilding a bankrupt and defeated nation, the National Assembly now addressed itself, a task surpassed in recent times only by Napoleon I, when he reorganized France during the Consulate of 1799-1801.

There was much to do, and much solid work done. A Budget Committee met the great problem of paying interest on the loans for the indemnity to Germany, and of cutting down the burden of debt that the Empire had run up. This it did nobly. The problem of the swollen civil service was

taken up by another committee that proposed to save 21,000,000 francs a year, and actually saved 12,000,000. A Local Government Act gave real power to the departmental councils, which for the first time had the right of making their proceedings public and were freed from fear of suppression by the Minister of the Interior, which had been done by the Empire, and by Gambetta at Tours. A committee sat on the Commune, another investigated the conduct of the war. At the same time, other questions, of major or minor importance, were handled by other committees; there were fifty-three in all, hard at work at the same time. A great work of reconstruction was done.

One task in particular had to be handled, the Army. The Assembly and Thiers both wanted two things at once: an army of veterans to put down any revolt, and an army of trained reserves with which to meet German man power. It had been all very well to review 140,000 ex-prisoners of war after the Commune, but the lesson of the war had been that it was not the regulars, but the trained reserves, that had turned the day at Sedan. On the other hand, it had not been the newly raised 88th of the Line, but the veterans, who had put down the Commune. The committee that had to find a working compromise between man power and discipline took fourteen months over it, wavering between three and five years with the colors, finally accepting five-year service under pressure from Thiers, who feared repetition of the Commune. The law of 1872, as passed, required of every man five years' service with the colors, and four with the reserve, in the first line in war, then eleven with the Territorials. But if one was lucky in drawing lots, one escaped the five years' service, and stayed at home till war came. If one was educated, and paid a fixed sum, one could serve one year instead of five, and be practically guaranteed a commission in the Territorials. That made a curious army, in which the lower classes had to serve five years to get up enough *esprit de corps* to shoot their fellow Frenchmen in case of trouble, while the upper classes served

only one year, the woes of the lower classes being sweetened with the hope of exemption if one drew a lucky number. But it did provide a combination of the valor and training that had been manifest at Sedan with the man power which had so markedly not been used there.

Besides men, an army needs officers; and the changes and sudden commissionings, first by Gambetta at Tours, then by Thiers at Versailles, had thrown the officer corps into confusion. This was straightened out by the famous "Commission of the Marquises." There were real wrongs to be righted. Under the law of 1832, which is sometimes referred to as the "Charter of the Army," promotions were alternately by seniority and by merit; and an officer's commission could not be taken from him till retirement unless for misbehavior. Seniority and the guarantee of tenure gave a secure career to the officer; alternate promotions by merit encouraged ability. That ladder of promotion had been broken, as it had to be when most regular officers were in captivity. But the good men who had been taken prisoner at Metz and Sedan through no fault of their own ought to be put back in their places on that ladder. Yet the ability of the good men, such as Déroulède, who had officered Gambetta's armies, deserved recognition. And there was not room for them all. As the commission reported, it had had an invidious and yet a vital task. It had to choose among good men with the greatest care, since these men would, under universal service, mold a whole generation of Frenchmen who would spend five years under their orders. In a sense the Army would be as important as the school system in making the Republic work.

That was what made the membership of the commission important—the effect its decisions would have on the Frenchmen of the future. Now, the chairman of the commission was the Royalist leader, General Changarnier; the commission of fourteen other members contained five marquises, who gave it its nickname, a count, and six other

members with the particule "de" before their names, signifying noble birth and probable Royalist sympathies. Honest as those men were, the weight they gave to each officer's record must have been Royalist. Certainly after that the officer corps was Royalist and, being Royalist right through to the office of the Chief of Staff, where recommendations for merit promotion were made, would become increasingly Royalist as time went on. In founding institutions for a potential monarchy, the Assembly had built strongly in combining five-year service with a Royalist officer corps, that would be helped in its influence by the national desire for revenge on Germany.

This added the Army to the Church as a monarchical institution. The Judiciary, being left over from the Empire, was monarchical. The school system was partially so. Monseigneur Dupanloup, the great and beloved Bishop of Orléans, however, wanted to make it more so, as the Emperor had been moving from clerical to lay control of the schools. In a year and a half much was done to make a monarchy, but even the best legislators cannot do everything they want to in a year and a half.

As has been said, the Army was only one of fifty-odd problems that the Assembly turned its hand to. In doing its work, it found it necessary to develop some sort of informal groupings to exchange opinions. As will be remembered, until the Count of Chambord's manifesto, the whole Right used to meet at the Hôtel des Reservoirs. Then it split into a Right Center, of Orléanists, and the Extreme Right, or Light Cavalry, so called first because they met in the "Street of the Light Horsemen"; but later, because they rushed at their decisions like light cavalry, the original reason for the name was forgotten in its appropriateness. In February 1872 a Moderate Right organized itself to try to bridge the gap. Some members of the Assembly attended two sets of gatherings. M. de Marcère organized the friends of M. Thiers into a Left Center. These groups elected

spokesmen who would draw up programs; but the individual members, after talking things over, would sometimes vote against their groups.

Among Republicans the organization was the same. There were Moderate Republicans, who liked to follow Jules Ferry, and the Republican Union—that called itself Radical every now and then—that followed Gambetta. All these groups were more social gatherings and habits of working together than parties in the English and American sense. But they were a sign that the Assembly which at Bordeaux had treated the Tribune over the prompter's box from which Thiers had spoken as if Thiers had been its prompter, that during the Commune, for all its suspicions of Thiers, had followed where he led, had developed a mind of its own and a way of making it up.

The Assembly had need of its new-found knowledge of Parliamentary procedure. Its relations with Thiers were becoming strained. In December 1871, when the Orléans princes had broken their promise, and not only not resigned but taken their seats in the Assembly, Thiers had flamed out, telling the Assembly not to count on any sentimental attachment he may have had for the Count of Paris's grandfather to make the Count of Paris king. That removed the point of the Pact of Bordeaux, which was to have the Republic make the peace and pay the indemnity, then have the monarchy come in free from blame. But the corollary to that was that, till the last installment was paid, Thiers was indispensable, and the Assembly dared not get rid of him. Bismarck made a jest of this, saying that France had no need of another monarch, that King Adolphe I was doing well enough. The jest was too true to be palatable.

King Adolphe I enjoyed his reign. He enjoyed holding court in the Préfecture at Versailles or in the Elysée Palace in Paris. He enjoyed hearing himself talk, one of his foibles being to think he knew everything. Another foible was making epigrams, one of which was to cause his fall. Resentment began to grow at the way he ordered the Assembly

around and favored Republicans. When, in July 1872, he spoke to the Assembly of the "Conservative Republic you have made," a Committee of Nine waited upon him to rub in the point that the Conservatism was more important than the Republicanism. The time was ripe for a leader to use the powers the Assembly had assumed under the Rivet Law to show Thiers that "power to the wisest and worthiest" did not necessarily mean all power to him. Such a leader did appear. On September 12, 1872, Albert, Duke de Broglie, presented his letters of recall as Ambassador to Queen Victoria, and returned to France to take over the leadership of the Monarchists in the Assembly.

Albert de Broglie found himself the leader in his camp by sheer force of merit, and that not without competition, either. His merit was such as to secure him election to the French Academy, though he was not a professional writer. His immediate following was a group of noblemen, many of them his relatives, who, like their English counterparts of this time, were engaged in taking their money out of the land and investing it in industry. Mingled ties of family and finance connected him with the Duke d'Audiffret-Pasquier, the Duke Decazes, and Marshal MacMahon, the Duke of Magenta. Perhaps the best way of describing these men is to use the English word Whig. For Whigs believed in a government that combined King, Lords, and Commons in balance, and if the earlier Whigs had supported Commons against King, and in 1688 had chosen a Constitutional monarch, William III, in place of a Divine Right one, James II, the later ones, the Duke de Broglie's contemporaries, were supporters of Lords against Commons, of just such a second chamber as the Conservatives wanted. The English Whigs also had certain characteristics shared by the Duke de Broglie, of real brains and extremely haughty, not to say bad, manners. The Duke de Broglie could make epigrams as good as Thiers's. He could also make enemies. Once he came hurrying into the Assembly Hall in Versailles, and, seeing a man in the correct frock

coat and white tie of the day, assumed he was an attendant. To the supposed attendant he handed his wet umbrella, telling him to put it away, be quick about it, and not let it drip. Ever after that M. Senard, who till then had been a follower of the Duke de Broglie, voted against him.

The followers that the Duke de Broglie might be able to rally were not only his relatives and business associates with whom he consorted on equal terms. There were also the Legitimist "Light Cavalry" country gentlemen who were loyal to the death to him whom they called King Henry V. They would give their fellow aristocrat their votes, but not their sympathy. They were country squires, usually either with minor titles or the aristocratic particule "de" in front of their names, who accepted the economic changes of the French Revolution because they had to, and had given up feudal ways of cultivating their land, but kept on with the old feelings, including violent loyalty to the Catholic Church as well as to the King. Besides these Legitimists there were businessmen, resembling the above-mentioned dukes in their investment policy, who had liked the Empire for its security, and thought a monarchy might give them the same security with more freedom. If De Broglie's brains could outweigh his manners, there was the material to make a monarchy out of, on the lines of the first half of the Count of Chambord's manifesto, adding the prestige of a Divine Right monarch to the balancing effect of a second chamber in checking the exuberance of the representatives of the people.

But the Duke de Broglie was not the only leader, nor his camp the only camp in the Assembly. Opposite him was Léon Gambetta, now the editor of a newspaper, the *République Française*, and as such drawing a comfortable income from the spreading of his doctrines. When not at the Assembly Hall in Versailles, he could always be found at the office of the *République*. The young Republicans fell over one another to contribute to his paper. Running the office and Gambetta's many errands were seen to by his

loyal friends—Ranc, who had been elected as a Moderate to the Commune, and had helped him at Tours; Challemel-Lacour, who had kept Lyons in order for him during the war; and above all Eugene Spuller, the managing editor, who had shared Gambetta's balloon flight from Paris. Gambetta was too busy elsewhere to attend to the work of the paper. In society, though to the end of his life his waistcoat and trousers never really met, he learned manners and made useful acquaintances at the house of Madame Juliette Adam, who had a salon for Republicans modeled on that of Madame Roland in the French Revolution.

Gambetta had another inspiration. Even in the days of the Empire a woman used to look down on the debates when he spoke, but sent back all his notes. At last he met her by chance, at a friend's house, and found that she, Léonie Léon, admired him devotedly, but felt that a slip in her past and her fervent Catholicism prevented their ever being anything to each other. Gambetta would have none of it, and though she refused civil marriage as irreligious and he Church marriage as a matter of Republican principle, their secret relation seems to have been really noble. (It is pleasant to be able to record that finally a way out of the dilemma was found and that they were to have been married when Gambetta suddenly died.) From "Madame Léon," as she was called by the few of Gambetta's circle who knew her, Gambetta learned what Catholics thought. Just as Madame Adam brought him, the Radical lawyer and editor, into touch with businessmen whom he might, not knowing them, have antagonized, so Léonie Léon made him understand how to handle the susceptibilities of Catholics.

Gambetta had need of such training. Just as De Broglie had to keep together his mixed team of Legitimist Light Cavalry and businessmen who admired Thiers, and add their votes to those of his little coterie of ducal friends, so Gambetta had to add very varied votes to those of the men of the *République Française*. On one side were the bit-

ter Republicans. The bitterest were, of course, most of them either in New Caledonia or French Guiana or under the soil in Père Lachaise. But there were those who thought Gambetta too weak. However, they would vote with him as better than De Broglie. The men he had to reach were much the same men De Broglie had to reach, the Center, those who sat on each side of the middle aisle of the Assembly.

Gambetta reached them with his speeches and his paper. He went back of the Assembly, whose constituent power he steadily denied, to the people. There lay the difference between him and De Broglie. He believed in democracy and practiced it. He tried to persuade the voters of France to fill all vacancies in the Assembly with Republicans, in doing which he traveled all over France; and when they called him a commercial traveler, turned the phrase back upon his attackers, calling himself the commercial traveler of Republicanism. He was really selling the Republic to France. He had to live down his fiery patriotism enough to make sure he could not be called a war monger, and yet keep his loyalty to his vote against giving up Alsace-Lorraine. This he did with a slogan, "Think of it ever, speak of it never." That made his very silence a promise of peace now, and a promise of revenge after France had been rebuilt as a Republic. He had to rally workingmen to his kind of Republic. He did that with a slogan that "a new layer of society would take over," that he enunciated at a series of "private" meetings in Dauphiny, so called to evade the restrictions that Thiers was still keeping up even in the autumn of 1872. But with all this, under the advice of Madame Adam, Léonie Léon, and of his own quick wits, he made sure that his "opportunism," his willingness to go step by step, was known to all. That was the assurance that the businessman who was looking for security could get as good a brand from the Republic as from De Broglie.

This struggle in the Assembly was part of a greater struggle in the Nation, which, through universal suffrage, the

Assembly represented. At the time it was often put that the Old France was struggling against a New France. The Duke de Broglie was heir to a great tradition. Ever since Counts de Broglie had come from Italy to serve France, there had been Counts and Dukes de Broglie in the armies of France and her diplomatic service, under Louis XIV and his great marshals, Condé and Turenne, under Louis XV and his great marshal, Marshal Saxe. That great tradition to which the De Broglies had joined themselves appealed to the memory of the King of Navarre, Henry of Bourbon, who had become King of France, reunited a divided nation, and seen to it, as best he could, that "every peasant had a chicken in his pot"; to the memory of Joan of Arc, who fought and died for France and received guidance, so she said, from God; to the memory of the Crusades, which medieval chroniclers had spoken of as the "Deeds God did through His Frenchmen"; and to that King of France, Louis IX, who was also a saint. The tradition of Old France, so closely bound up with the Church that the King of France took the title, the "Eldest Son of the Church," was a literary and cultural tradition as well. Molière's plays, Bossuet's sermons, Cardinal Richelieu's Academy, to which Albert de Broglie belonged, were all part of it. Its finest flowers of thought were the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and Pascal; and in De Broglie's day and today the representatives of that tradition were and are spoken of as "sound thinkers." For the tradition of Old France is a living tradition..

But the tradition of Gambetta's New France was, and is, also a living tradition, with a past to appeal to. When Baptista Gambetta left Italy to come to France in 1818, to settle in Cahors, where his grandson would be born, there was already a tradition opposed to that of Old France. It appealed to the memory of the lawyer Danton who had dared, and dared, and dared again; to the memory of the engineer Carnot, the organizer of victory, whose Republican troops sang, as French Republican troops do today, of

their march into Germany along the Sambre and the Meuse; and to the memory of the great organization of the Nation, when General Bonaparte was First Consul, and the Code Napoléon was enacted. It, too, has a literary and cultural tradition—of Jean Jacques Rousseau, who glorified the people; of Arouet de Voltaire, who sneered at the clericals; of the many practical thinkers of the eighteenth century who thought out piecemeal the many reforms that were united in the work of the Consulate. Today the representatives of that tradition are spoken of as “intellectuals.” The question the Assembly had to meet was how to choose—whether to plump for one tradition or the other, or to try to fuse them.

On the side of the old were, of course, the Church and he whom many spoke of as the King, Henry, Count of Chambord. So were also most of the nobility, most of the army officers, most of the civil service officials, and many of the educators, especially those whom the Falloux Law had made more or less independent of state control. On the side of the old were many peasants, especially in the Loire Valley, and La Vendée. On the side of the old were the wealthy businessmen. In short, the secure were on the side of the old. They made up De Broglie’s followers.

On the side of the new were the workers who were politically conscious, the bourgeois shopkeepers, and, in increasing numbers, peasants and businessmen. On the side of the new were many of the professional and literary classes, and all who, for intellectual reasons, distrusted the Roman Catholic Church. The name for these, in contrast to the “sound thinkers” was “intellectuals.” All these made up Gambetta’s followers.

But there was not a clear-cut division of France into two parties. Just as the Assembly had in-between groups and men of changing opinions, so had the Nation. It was because there were mergings of opinion and changings that it was possible to make peaceful changes, in Assembly and in Nation. It has been said that France is both Catholic

and anti-clerical; the truth that lies behind this remark is that there is sufficient tolerance of others' opinions in France to make it possible to settle matters "by counting heads instead of breaking them," as both sides hope to win the next election by argument and are willing to accept a check at this election. There seems always to be a middle group, if possible.

So it was that the balance of power in Assembly and Nation rested with a middle group, wooed by both De Broglie and Gambetta. Thiers had performed his function of giving France a breathing spell, had given her new life; and now, being a Republic, which is proverbially ungrateful, France was on the way to dismiss her savior. But perhaps it is wise for a Republic to be ungrateful, for that ensures its obtaining the servants it needs at the moment, not those whom it once needed but needs no more. As it was, the Assembly, the agency by which the Republic reached its decisions, was aware of its powers and of what it wanted done.

From June 1871 to October 1872 the National Assembly had gone a long way. From being a body uncertain of its powers and because of that uncertainty subject to the compelling powers of Thiers's mind, it had become a body in which two forces were struggling for leadership, with the purpose, once that leadership had been obtained, of overthrowing Thiers and setting up the kind of constitution, monarchy or republic, that it respectively wanted; in doing that representing a success in a greater struggle within the Nation. Parliamentary control of the Executive was about to come in, and the reign of Adolphe I was about to end. The informal dictatorship of a clear mind and a strong will that had established itself during the Commune was about to be subjected to the Assembly. While the Assembly followed the Nation in being slow to make up its mind, the strengthened Parliamentary machinery of the Republic was finding out how to deal with the Executive, and a step was unconsciously being taken toward democracy.



Chapter Six

THE KING DOES NOT COME BACK

WHEN THE National Assembly met for its winter session in 1872, the honeymoon year of reconstruction, in which members had buried themselves in committees, was over. Now that the Royalist members had a leader, they were coming out of their holes and facing the President of the Republic. Naturally President Thiers knew that something was up. He had not led one revolution (1830), taken key parts, either as victim or agent, in three more (1848, 1851, and 1870), and in between belonged to every freely elected Parliamentary body, without knowing his way about in French politics. He knew that the Parliamentary machinery that had been restored to France by the setting up of the Assembly would be used by an intelligent man, though not one drilled in dealing with men; but that behind him would be pretty much the men who used to meet in the Hôtel des Reservoirs before the break-up of July 1871. Thiers also knew that the best defense under those circumstances was an offense, and the place to make an attack was the regular declaration of policy at the beginning of the session.

At once a full-dress Parliamentary battle broke out, worthy of the days of Thiers's youth in the 1830's when the Palace Bourbon saw battles of giants. In it were used once again the weapons of those struggles. Thiers bid high for the votes of the Left Center, those men who, grouped

around M. de Marcère, had declared themselves either conservatively Republican, or republicanly Conservative; they were not sure which. He told the Assembly plainly, "The Republic is in existence," and added, "The Republic will be Conservative, or it will not exist at all." Then he forestalled the device he was sure the Duke de Broglie would use, and asked for a constitution. Promptly the Monarchists set up a committee to reply to Thiers's message. It got no answer, and De Broglie dropped argument and took to votes. There was a skirmish on phrases, for when the committee offered a constitution Thiers replied that he would be delighted with a second chamber, by that forcing the Assembly, which liked its power now and wanted a senate for the future, to redraft its proposal. Then it was moved that the responsibility of the ministers to the Assembly be "organized," a defeat on which would have forced Thiers out. Thiers had to threaten to resign, through Dufaure, his "watchdog" as he called him, to get a 37-vote majority, and only then by consenting to a Committee of Thirty, most of them Royalists, that would draft a constitution. And the next day the Duke de Broglie was back again, this time with another Parliamentary weapon known only to Europe, the interpellation. An interpellation is a question, on the answer to which will be a vote of confidence, naturally as embarrassing a question as can be found. The particular one was an accusation by a Bonapartist, that M. Thiers's Minister of the Interior was letting mayors whom M. Thiers had insisted on appointing enter politics, instead of remaining civil servants. The Republican, Lefranc, who happened to be Minister of the Interior, had to leave; and the Duke de Broglie could say, with a chuckle, that he had plucked a leaf off the artichoke, meaning that if he could not get rid of Thiers and his Council of Ministers in a lump, he could get rid of the Council one by one, as a diner strips the leaves off an artichoke on his plate.

The significant thing about this struggle was not the skirmishing over words or the signs of hatred that were

developing. Nor was it the growth of a Bonapartist party, led by the famous "Vice Emperor," M. Rouher, newly elected a member of the Assembly from Corsica, the home of the Bonapartes, and that party's willingness to ally itself with the Monarchists. That had its importance, for the Emperor Napoleon III was wondering if a return was possible, was trying the experiment of riding a horse once more, had learned the agonies of his gallstones were worse, and had decided to undergo a dangerous operation. He had plans for a sudden stroke, a dash to Switzerland, an appeal to the Army, and a trapping of the Parliamentary train in a tunnel, imprisoning the Assembly and making the road clear for him to ride into Paris. It was a daring scheme, it had its possibilities, for after the Commune France wanted a strong government and was not getting it from the Assembly. But, though this was a real danger to the Republic, it was momentary and was cut off by the death of Napoleon, January 9, 1873, under the surgeon's knife. These Parliamentary battles meant something much more lasting than personal spites or an opportunity for a coup; they meant that the Assembly was finding ways of expressing its full opinion. In this give and take, this sparring about for statements of policy, this sniping at ministers one by one instead of as a Council, ways were being found again—they had been known to French Parliaments of the past—of giving expression to the wishes of the real majority, the men who did the voting. Members of the Assembly were not faced with take it or leave it propositions; they were able to settle on more exact answers to statements of policy, and were able in interpellations to ask a question of the Executive, get an answer, and show at once whether or not they liked that answer. The men who for a year had been working silently in committees, rebuilding France, were coming into their own.

As for the work of rebuilding France, the great struggle over power and constitution did not stop it. The members of the Assembly kept on with that work, which they kept

in their own hands, through their committees and their reconsiderations, as an Assembly, of the work the committees had done. Whether or not the majority of the assemblymen wanted a monarchy, they certainly wanted monarchical institutions. They did as Monseigneur Dupanloup suggested and made the Education Council more Conservative by letting the Church and industrial members be chosen by the interests they represented, instead of being hand-picked by the Minister of Education. Just as the army officers would give the effects of monarchy to men of military age, so the change in the Education Council would give them to a younger generation. And, believing in property and its sanctity, the Assembly gave \$8,000,000 worth of property back to the Orléans princes from whom Napoleon III had confiscated it. It must not be forgotten that the French Parliamentary system allows legislation to go on while there is a struggle over the Executive power, such as cannot happen in England, where such a majority of bills are government measures that when A. P. Herbert got an important private bill through he wrote a book about it. The work of legislation of the winter session was going on during the struggle between the Duke de Broglie and M. Thiers, with M. Gambetta as a third party dangerous to both.

In preparing for that struggle, the Assembly gave thought to the accusations of the Republicans that the people of France were Republican and would return an overwhelmingly Republican Assembly at a free election. The election law was changed. On February 18, 1873, the Assembly added to the natural requirement for election—getting more votes than any other candidate—that of getting more than half the votes cast. Otherwise the voters would try again, this time success coming to the man who got more votes than any competitor. This return to the old runoff system was thought to help the Conservatives, since Legitimists, Orléanists, and their new allies, the Bonapartists, could vote for separate candidates at the first election, knowing that

as long as the Republicans did not get more than half the votes cast, they were safe in trying out their relative strength, which could be united at the second ballot. The Right pushed this through against the will of the Republicans.

With this help in keeping up Conservative membership in the Assembly, the Committee of Thirty, with some bargaining with Thiers, got a new set of rules governing their relationship of Assembly and President of the Republic. By the Vitet Law, so called after the name of its proposer, no longer could Thiers come down and answer interpellations himself, bolstering up his ministers by his prestige; his ministers must stand or fall by their own answers. As for the messages he still gave to the Assembly, they must be at a separate session devoted to his speech and that alone. Then the Vitet Law went on to promise that the Assembly would not separate without drawing up a constitution in which there would be a second chamber. This was an indirect declaration that a monarchy would come; for, though some Republicans wanted a second chamber and were willing to use Monarchist votes to force one on the rest of the Republicans, all Monarchists, generally speaking, wanted a second chamber. This was a well-timed measure. It was passed on March 13, 1873. On March 15 Thiers signed his last agreement with Germany about details of the indemnity and the evacuation of the territory, and on the seventeenth the National Assembly voted that M. Thiers had deserved well of the Nation. As Thiers had always said, cynically, that if ever that was voted of him he knew he was sure to be voted out of office almost at once, the Vitet Law should have been a sign the Republic was doomed and France was about to become a monarchy.

His prophecy was delayed, however; for an election came up at Paris, which so often had chosen assemblymen favorable to him. This seemed an opportunity for his favorite friend and foreign minister, Charles de Rémusat, to enter the Assembly. But the more extreme Republicans

put up a M. Barodet, to whom Gambetta was induced to give his backing. That made the vote Gambetta against Thiers, not De Rémusat against Barodet, and Gambetta won. The other leader besides De Broglie was entering the fray; and he, the democratic leader, was getting on his side, not the Assembly alone, but the people, and intended to replace the Assembly if he could not convert it.

All sorts of things went against Thiers. Jules Grévy, whom he had placed in the Presidential chair of the Assembly, was caught napping, for when a fist fight broke out in the floor, he was winking at a lady in the galleries, and guessed wrong whom to call to order. He was forced to resign, and a Royalist, Buffet, was elected in his place. Jules Simon, the Republican Minister of Education, was plucked as another artichoke leaf, on the pretext that he had praised Thiers, and Thiers alone, not the Assembly, for "liberating the territory." That inspired De Broglie to one more step. The government would be interpellated on its policy, and asked if it was being truly Conservative. Thiers answered by dismissing all the non-Republicans but one from his Cabinet.

The formula which De Broglie had invented for such an interpellation was gone through. The interpellation was made. Grimly Thiers came down to hear it. Grimly Dufaure, the Vice-President of his Council of Ministers, announced that the President of the Republic demanded the right to speak, and grimly he defended his master. Thiers rose to speak at that session, and was called to order by Buffet, equally grimly, who gave him his special session at nine that morning, for there was much to do that day. Then, May 24, 1872, Thiers spoke eloquently, but no one marked him; for M. Target, head of a group of thirteen "Conservative Republicans," had called his followers together and agreed to vote against Thiers. At the next session, held at two, the second of those held that day, Target announced how he would vote, and it was voted, 362 to 344, by those very votes of M. Target's, that "the Republic was not sufficiently Conservative." At nine that night a third session was held,

at which Thiers's resignation was read, and amid such shouting that one cynical deputy was heard to remark, "And this is the Conservative Republic." Marshal MacMahon was elected President of the Republic, by 390 votes to one, all the Republicans having left the hall.

On Monday, May 26, not Jules Dufaure, but Albert de Broglie sat on the ministerial bench as Vice-President of the Council, and ascended the Tribune to read a message from the new President of the Republic, Marshal MacMahon, the Duke of Magenta. Though it might seem as if the monarchy was sure to come, a price had been paid for this success. The message De Broglie read contained these words: "The rule of the majority is the rule in all Parliamentary governments, but . . . especially in this one . . . in which the . . . Executive power is solely the delegate of the Assembly." It is true that Marshal MacMahon, Duke of Magenta, speaking by the mouth of the Duke de Broglie, promised to be "resolutely Conservative"; but the Dukes of Magenta and de Broglie could be no more Conservative than the Republican, M. Target.

"Power to the wisest and worthiest" now meant power to him who could most wisely and worthily bring together a majority in the Assembly and keep it together.

The Duke de Broglie became Vice-President of the Council as the representative of a narrow majority in the National Assembly, the 360 who, though 14 of them were Republicans, thought the Republic insufficiently Conservative, the 390 who felt that if M. Thiers was not President, Marshal MacMahon was the best substitute. Though "every victory would bring its prisoners," De Broglie's task was to create a monarchy that would be acceptable to all the 360 or all the 390. He had to consider the foibles of the Legitimists, who did not trust the House of Orléans, of his own Right Center that did not trust the judgment of any Bourbon. He had to build a golden bridge for new Royalists to come over to him on, from the Left Center.

Paradoxically, the establishment of a Royalist ministry

for the purpose of putting on the throne a man who believed in the divine right of kings, also established the rule of Parliamentary control over the Executive, whoever he might be. De Broglie's methods, the many votes of policy, the interpellations, the committees, would live after him when his particular policy had long since been discarded. Those methods were not peculiar to him, but they were first used to destroy a ministry by him, and they were the way by which the Republic controlled its ministries. Duke Albert de Broglie had gone against his father's advice not to mutilate the powers of the Executive.

But the Duke de Broglie had advantages on his own side to counterbalance his difficulties. As has been said, the Emperor was dead, which meant that the old Imperialists would work for him. M. Thiers was out of the way, though still a member of the Assembly, and as such a danger in debate, for all his seventy-five years. That left the feud in the Royal Family the next to last stumbling block. If that could be surmounted, France might be made a monarchy despite the last stumbling block, Gambetta and the Republicans. De Broglie had captured the Executive power; it remained to see if, using it, he could strengthen his control over the Assembly and make sure of the Nation. Could a Royalist Executive make an uncertain Assembly and an uncertain Nation definitely Royalist?

The Duke showed his colors in the way he used the Executive powers against the Republicans. He remembered that Gambetta's collaborator, Ranc, had been a member of the Commune, and asked the suspension of his Parliamentary immunity to prosecute him, which he got with ease. Ranc left hurriedly for Switzerland, and was condemned to death *in absentia*. Gambetta sniped back by using De Broglie's old Parliamentary weapons against him. He revealed instructions to the Prefects to find how much it would cost to buy up local newspapers and "plucked off an artichoke leaf" in the person of an under-secretary of the Interior. But this seemed only a last skirmish; the

Monarchists' battle seemed won. The firm hand having been shown, the ever-useful Parliamentary vacation was utilized and the Assembly suspended till November. During that time matters might be arranged within the Royal Family.

The majority in the Assembly had acted without consulting the Count of Chambord. He lived on quietly at Frohsdorf, in the dignified position of waiting for the Assembly or the Orléans princes to make an offer to him. King in many mens' minds, he behaved as if he were king. Suddenly a telegram arrived at Frohsdorf, saying that the Count of Paris was in Vienna, and wanted to see his cousin, the Count of Chambord. The Count of Paris came, on August 5, and the interview was a great success, all discord seeming to vanish into thin air. The young Count of Paris reported to his uncles that he was thoroughly willing to accept the Count of Chambord as king. Then the question was raised again, what about the flag? That was the symbol of the type of kingdom France would get with the Count of Chambord, Divine Right or Constitutional; and De Broglie was fearful of the reception the White Flag would get because of what it symbolized.

On the one hand, the Legitimate cause had a great asset that, through its ally, the Church, was gaining it support in the Nation. A religious movement was sweeping through Catholic France. The seventeenth-century visions of the Blessed Marguerite Marie Alacoque, in which the Heart of Our Saviour appeared to her, had been recognized by the popes. Miracles were reported from the convent where she had lived and died. The great popular Catholic paper *L'Univers* spread the movement. The Assumptionist monks added to it. Their paper, *Le Pelerin*, increased in circulation by leaps and bounds. They organized pilgrimages to such shrines as Lourdes, tens of thousands going. The National Assembly had felt this movement, when subscriptions were raised to build on the top of the heights of wicked Montmartre a Basilica to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, as expiation for the murders of the generals and the Archbishop. The

National Assembly voted to make the church a "building affected with the public interest." At this time, too, Count Albert de Mun was founding his Catholic workers' clubs, and making a success of the first, which was in the heart of Gambetta's own constituency, Belleville.

Such a movement played right into the hands of the Count of Chambord. The very faith in God as a guide which was thus being spread would bring with it a faith in the especial servant of God who ought to reign over France. Royalism of the strong kind was on the upswing in France in those days.

But it was not the only movement on the upswing. The men of the *République Française* were also to be heard from. The exiled Ranc had published his famous analysis of the by-elections. In 48 departments there had been department-wide votes after the original vote of February 8, 1871. Ranc asserted that the supplanting at them of 35 Royalists by Republicans would mean that at a real election 82 more Republicans in addition to the 35 would be chosen. And De Broglie's majority was 14! Did De Broglie dare act?

After the Frohsdorf meeting rumors ran each way. Some said that the Marshal would immediately summon the Assembly and proclaim the Count king; some said that a pledge on the flag was needed. The Republican and Orléanist press discussed this heatedly. It was decided not to summon the Assembly, and instead the Right waited, taunted by the papers and speakers of the Left. Finally the nerve of the Right broke, in October, over the question whether the Army, that in the last resort would have to keep order, would fight under any flag other than the tricolor. It was under the tricolor that the Commune had been put down. The Minister of War said the Army would, but he was not believed. The Duke d'Audriffret-Pasquier was sent to the Marshal and came back with this quotation: "If the White flag came back the army rifles would go off by themselves." It was felt that the Count of Chambord must give a pledge beforehand that the White Flag would not

come back. A businessman named Chesnelong, a cloth manufacturer from the Pyrenees, the very home of Henry IV, of whose flag there was so much talk, worked out a formula that seemed both reassuring and such as the Count of Chambord might accept. He was sent off with it to try to get the Count's acceptance.

Otherwise, this was an open secret commented on in the press: De Broglie and his friends were determined, rather than to take the Count of Chambord without his giving them binding promises of getting the sort of government they really wanted, to keep on with the Marshal as the safer way, making him a sort of long-term semi-dictator. The *République Française* put it bitterly, faced as it was with the imminent death of the Republic for which Gambetta had fought and for which Ranc at that moment was in exile: "The Center Right has no faith in the monarchy. The truth is that since August 5 they have been busy with everything but the monarchy's interests. To them all the king is is a means of keeping power and place."

Chesnelong was well received at Salzburg, where the Count of Chambord had moved for the hunting. The two agreed on everything except the flag. On that the Count was adamant—so adamant that Chesnelong did not read him the draft declaration. But the Count did say that, once king in fact, he would *present a solution* compatible with his honor, which he was sure would smooth things out. His point, as he explained to Chesnelong, was that he represented a principle, and that, most unfortunately, the tricolor represented an opposing principle. However, he agreed that he would give Chesnelong a definite message to bring back; and, sending his wife back to Frohsdorf by an earlier train, he met Chesnelong at the railway station at midnight, just before both their trains went. When Chesnelong read him the exact words at last that he had been too shy of royalty to spit out before—the words the Committee of Dukes, for that was what it amounted to, had wanted to dictate to him whom so many called their king, and asked

the king "if he would let his followers vote for them," "the king" answered that they might vote as they pleased. Then in the murky dark of the railway station, they parted.

At first this reassured the De Broglie Cabinet. Forms of words for the royal proclamation were drafted, beginning "The National Monarchy, which is hereditary and constitutional, is the Government of France, and Henry Charles, Gift-of-God, head of the House of France, is called to the throne." Then the next clauses kept the tricolor. These leaked out, for "the king" so nearly came back that the carriages made ready for his entry may be seen to this day at the Chateau Chambord. The party groups, whose deliberations had caused, in part, the sending of Chesnelong, now met and talked the situation over again. France was in ferment. The rumors of the drafts reached the Count of Chambord through the French press. He wrote Chesnelong a letter in which he said that, like Henry IV, he would never abandon his flag. "My person is nothing, my principle all. . . . If it is lessened today, I am powerless tomorrow. . . . I am the pilot France must have, the only one who can bring the ship to port. It is my mission, I have the authority for it." He ordered this published, and it was.

That clarified the situation with such a vengeance that to De Broglie there seemed only one way out—giving the Marshal a permanent tenure of office that would remove him from the danger of overthrow that hung over Thiers, and thus get security. De Broglie did not feel safe with the Count. The second of November this was agreed to.

"The king" made one last effort. In his manifesto of July 1871, he had told France that he would sacrifice everything for her but his honor. He came to see what he could do in person, in accordance with his willingness to do anything. He went to Versailles secretly, talked with his supporters, and tried a last stroke for his principle. They say that those days were, however, strangely happy ones, in which he saw Paris, which he had last seen, save for one fleeting moment, as a boy of nine. His secretary came to the Marshal, told him

“the king” was at Versailles, left a key on his desk, the key to the king’s lodgings, and said he would know what he would find if he used it. The hope was that the Marshal, on his own responsibility, would proclaim him king. But the Marshal sadly shook his head, being first of all a soldier who had sworn an oath to obey the Assembly, which Assembly had voted to remain Republic and keep him as its head. When the attendant came back the key was still on the desk, the room unentered.

Meanwhile the Assembly debated what sort of power it would give the Marshal. Excited rumors ran among the Legitimists, for one of their number had recognized the king’s valet in the streets of Versailles. But no more was heard, and the final vote came. The Marshal was to be given seven years’ powers, it being assumed that by that time the Count of Chambord would be dead and off the field, leaving the way clear for the Count of Paris. Of the Legitimists, 80 voted for the Marshal’s powers, 9 abstained, and only one loyal peasant voted against cheating his king out of his throne. By that vote monarchy was, in fact, ended in France, though hopes of it were not.

Now, was this all mere obscurantism, a romantic novel foolishly brought into real life, by which a punctilio kept a man from a throne that was waiting for him? Maybe. The Count of Chambord had lived long in exile and was married to a romantically religious princess of the line of Bourbon Parma. But the Count’s own statements afford a clue to another answer. If he was king by Right Divine, could he become king by accepting the terms of an Assembly? He might be willing to accept full Parliamentary control; he hinted to Chesnelong that he might even, if he could have done it as an act of free will, have accepted the tricolor as a national flag, keeping the white flag of his house only as a royal standard. Even then he would be ruling by Right Divine; his other great uncle, Louis XVIII, had reigned most successfully from 1815 to 1823 on that basis, by making similar concessions, as acts of free will, not in obedience to any

Parliament or Assembly but in anticipation of its desires. Might not Henry V have done the same, the moment *after* he ascended the throne? He had once told his supporters that he was more liberal than they thought he was, possibly more liberal than they themselves were. This can only be answered in the next world, for the Count of Chambord knew how to keep a secret; but the interpretation is plausible. How could a king by Right Divine become a king by right of promise? It would destroy his only justification for being king.

The Count of Chambord may have been over-punctilious, but at any rate he was kingly. One bitter phrase did escape him. He said of the Marshal: "I had thought to have dealt with the Lord High Constable of the Kingdom; I found I was dealing with a police captain." Otherwise he behaved with the greatest dignity and went off to exile in a way that makes one wish he had sat on the throne of France. Beside him the dukes who then ruled France, the Duke of Magenta as President of the Republic and of the Council, and the Duke de Broglie as Vice-President of the Council, shrivel up. He had "dared put it to the touch, to win or lose it all"; they had not.

But, as time would show, in not daring to put it to the touch, the dukes, too, had lost it all. Without a king, their laboriously acquired control of the Assembly went for nothing. From them the Assembly had learned how to assert itself against any ruler, and would use their own methods against themselves. The moment during which the Assembly might have ruled the Nation against its will had passed. Now the Assembly would find it had to obey the Nation it was supposed to represent.



Chapter Seven

M. WALLON'S CONSTITUTION

SINCE THE king could not be brought back, the monarchical majority in the National Assembly found itself in an unusual situation. It had wanted to found a kingdom and found it had given independent power, not forever to a king by Right Divine but for seven years to a slow-thinking, honest old general. Now it had to go on to keep its promise of giving France a constitution that contained a senate, and in doing so would have to face a dilemma. One word its majority hated, Republic; yet, if it dared not give France a monarchy, it had to give her a Republic. This was not a palatable task; it was one the Assembly wanted to put off; but outside the Assembly Hall there was a nation demanding action and growing restless. Some men would have to make up their minds to do what had to be done, to swallow the inevitable, and give France as monarchical a form of government as she would take.

The men who would do this would not be the determined Monarchists or the determined Republicans, who would vote till doomsday without changing their minds. At this moment the men who had the power in France were the men capable of changing their minds; the question was just how those men would change their minds, and to what effect. The Assembly, that collective mind of 759 men, showed as soon as it had voted the Septanate that it had begun the task of thinking out a new answer to the problem

of a government for France, once the preferred solution of proclaiming the Count of Chambord King Henry V was impossible. The sign of this was the refusing to vote the Duke de Broglie's chosen order of the day, but voting general confidence in him. The Duke de Broglie took the hint, and remade his Cabinet, taking in the Duke Decazes. From then on the work of thrashing out a new solution went forward.

There is one peculiarity of a democracy at work that is misleading, the fact that it changes its mind in public. That somehow seems an ugly process, usually because the final cells in a collective mind that change and throw the mind's balance the other way are likely to change for ugly reasons. Attention is focused on the petty reason that leads so and so to switch his vote and accept the inevitable, and turns from what made the decision inevitable and the fact that the decision is usually accepted in good grace by the defeated party. The way the members of the National Assembly who made up the majorities in each vote twisted and turned is less inspiring than the courage and dignity with which the Count of Chambord met failure, the zest and adroitness with which Léon Gambetta went forward to success. Yet to understand a democracy it is not enough to understand the great issues that faced it and the great figures that stood for one side or another in those issues. More than that is necessary; one must understand how the collective mind of the Parliamentary body that had to consider those issues considered them, how the collective mind of the Nation worked with the collective mind of Parliament or Assembly. In the framing of the Constitution of the Third Republic the vital point is the reaching of agreement by men who had been at first apart. Inconsistency can be a virtue as well as consistency; each has its time and place. The story of how the Third Republic got a constitution is not without interest.

The philosophy of government that had inspired the Duke de Broglie with a desire to bring the king back still inspired

him and the majority in the Assembly on which his government was based. They believed in limits on freedom. Free speech, free press, free elections, local self-government might be all very well in their way; but at the same time the central government should be able to use a strong hand. Much the same majority that forced De Broglie to modify his Cabinet now allowed the Minister of the Interior to remove elected mayors and replace them with their own appointees. As De Broglie had forced the right to elect mayors upon a reluctant Thiers in 1871, he was here eating his own words. But then De Broglie had not been responsible for policy and could live up to principles; now he was the servant of a majority that wanted to steer a middle course between Divine Right monarchy and complete democracy.

There was general agreement throughout the Assembly on the main elements of a constitution. Even the Count of Chambord had wanted universal suffrage of a sort, and two chambers, to which the Ministry would be responsible. There were, it was true, Republicans—Jules Grévy at their head—who wanted only one chamber and no independent Executive. Gambetta himself would have preferred that. But a majority could probably be obtained in the Assembly to vote an independent Executive, with safeguards; and a larger majority could certainly be found to accept it, once voted. The questions to be settled were how independent an Executive, what safeguards against the abuse of its independence, and two corollaries: whether or not there should be a loophole left for bringing in the monarchy, and what sort of second chamber there should be.

The real answer to these questions was that the Assembly did not know what it wanted, and was making up its mind, by the use of Parliamentary methods. Having gotten security for the present from revolt and from a Divine Right king—that is, from the usual fears of a French Parliament, the mob, and a dictator—what it wanted seems to have been, after that, time to think. Devices for procrastination

existed in the winter session just as much as over the summer holidays. There was always the budget to discuss. It was discussed at length. Then a committee could be asked to report. Another Committee of Thirty was set up, elected by public ballot in the Assembly. It took ten ballots to whip the Right and Left Centers and their allies into line to make a committee pretty much loaded in favor of the Center—that is, of procrastination. The Legitimists held De Broglie in the hollow of their hand, for on certain issues he could not get the votes of the Left Center and had to rely upon them. On the Mayor's Bill they held up all proceedings a day, just to show their power and force the Marshal to intervene by calling a conference between their leaders and the Duke. Possibly urged on by this, the Duke "revoked" some very distinguished mayors. The Duke was thus setting up a queer dictatorship of mild Conservatives whose watchword was "moral order," whose strength would be the personal authority of a not-too-victorious Marshal of France, and whose weakness would be that its fifty most Conservative supporters might desert it. Any quarrel might upset it.

A quarrel did, over how to make France Conservative. It was agreed that the senate would have to act as a check on the lower house. It would have to represent something other than universal suffrage, yet it could not be entirely appointive. Now if the communal councils were in the hands of the Conservatives, especially the smaller ones, might not a senate elected by the councils on some principle of one council, one vote, have the needful effect, and yet not look too much like cheating universal suffrage? To do this properly, however, some device like that used in Bismarck's Prussia, by which those who paid the heaviest taxes had extra votes or even sat on the councils, might be a help. The Committee of Thirty reported two bills instead of one, because of an internal squabble that could not be ironed out, and, although the bills were almost identical, the Legitimists in confusion voted down the Duke's proposal and put him out

of office. But it was generally agreed that the Septanate, the Vitet Law, and the Rivet Law should make the basis of the constitution.

Here, after an attempt of De Broglie's at reforming the Ministry had failed, the Marshal stepped in and ordered his Minister of War to carry on. General de Cissey did, and the Marshal's stock went up, as a useful sort of constitutional monarch who could make a recalcitrant Assembly get to work.

Work the Assembly must, for the Imperialists had suddenly reappeared. When the Emperor had died, they had seemed to fade away, but that was only because there was such a good chance that the Count of Chambord would become king. Now that the restoration had failed and the Prince Imperial was nineteen, not eighteen, men's minds began to turn once more to the Empire. It had worked in the past. If the Republic could not work and the Monarch would not work, then the Empire might settle things. Furthermore, the Prince Imperial, a teachable young man, would be better than a dying old one had been.

Under the impulse of this fear, decisions came. On June 13 Gambetta, at a meeting of the Republican Union, persuaded it to vote that it would accept the claim of the Assembly to make a valid constitution. That did not mean the end of the Republicans' clamor for electing a new Assembly specifically chosen to make a constitution, but it did mean that they would co-operate with those in the Center who wanted to set up a Republic. Two days later the Casimir-Perier motion to declare France a Republic and make a constitution later, with a clause allowing amendment, was granted urgency. Such a constitution would be admittedly a makeshift that would allow the Count of Paris to become king later on, but it at least would get the government in working order. As M. Casimir-Perier was a leader in the Left Center and a brother-in-law of the Duke d'Audiffret-Pasquier, who was a leader in the Right Center, it meant that minds were being made up. An obscure deputy of the Left Center, M. Wallon,

deposited at the Tribune an amendment to the Casimir-Perier proposal, which he thought would accomplish what his leaders wanted done, in a more acceptable manner.

On July 2 the Count of Chambord reminded everyone that a constitution must be made by issuing a last despairing Manifesto. The Government then used its powers to suppress *L'Univers*, on the grounds that publishing the Manifesto was an insult to the head of the state, the Marshal, and thus showed it could use the semidictatorial powers it had against Right as well as against Left. A Royalist read the Manifesto to the Assembly and got only 79 votes on his motion for a monarchy. During the general uncertainty General de Cissey was beaten on his chosen order of the day, but given leave to stay on by the voting of an "unmotivated" one. The Marshal intervened again, kept him on, and sent a message to the Assembly, telling it he wanted a senate, the power of dissolving Parliament and forcing an election, whether or not in consultation with the senate, and the power of appointing some of the senators. For a quiet general, the Marshal was taking a good firm hand. The next question was how to get him what he wanted.

The Casimir-Perier proposal was debated heatedly during July. Then, at the end of the debate, M. Wallon climbed up on the Tribune and explained in his bleating voice the virtues of his bill, which would not proclaim the Republic but would create it. The Assembly only too obviously felt that the amendment was out of place, and stood about in the open space below the Tribune, chatting away, until M. Wallon took the hint and climbed down again, permitting the vote to take place and the Assembly to go on to something that mattered. His immediate associates voted with him—30 of them—and 633 voted against him.

Then the Assembly got down to work and defeated the Casimir-Perier motion, 374 to 333.

At the end of the summer session the Assembly refused to hand the job over to a newly elected body, by a vote of 375 to 332, and decided instead to adjourn and do nothing about

it. By 366 to 296, it resolved, just before adjournment, to go on with martial law and govern France with a strong hand. Then it adjourned for four months, until November 30, as if to let the Marshal rule the country as he liked while it tried to make up its mind.

This was a time of perplexity. Cardinal Lavigerie, as he later became, the famous missionary Bishop of Algeria, wrote to the Count of Chambord that he felt sure that the Assembly would break up, and that it would be possible for the Army to proclaim him king as an answer to disorder. On the other hand, when the Assembly met again, there had been by-elections, all Republican. The city council elections of the autumn had gone Republican, and De Broglie's appointees as mayor had not been confirmed. Even at that the Assembly kept procrastinating, postponing the constitution till the New Year. The Marshal intervened again, pointing out that he wanted a senate he could work with, when a Committee of the Right came to talk to him. Gambetta found a name for what the Marshal was trying to make of himself, comparing him to the Dutch Stadtholder who had acted as King of Holland, though without the title. His war cry became "a real Republic—not a Stadtholderate!"

Discussion of the constitution was renewed on January 21, the anniversary of the execution of Louis XVI in 1793 by the Republicans with whom had voted the then head of the Orléans family. A M. Ventabon had a bill that contained the agreed elements: the presidency, two chambers, ministerial responsibility, and the rest. But it did not have a clause either establishing a republic or definitely arranging for revision later, if a monarchy should be wanted. One such clause was voted down, after a fearsome scene in which the wildest of the extreme Left Republicans had been dragged to the voting urn by Gambetta's pleas, and after they and the consistent Jules Grévy had spoken against any president at all as monarchical, they in public, he in private.

Then on January 30 (and that, if it interests anybody, is the day Charles I of England was executed) M. Wallon

again climbed up the Tribune and again bleated out his plan, praising it as not proclaiming a Republic but constituting what existed, an "organization of the provisional." As before, he was listened to from time to time. While he was speaking, one man was heard to say, "If only we could wake up and find the Republic founded without our having done anything about it." To make confusion worse confounded, the Legitimists tried to kill the motion by adding a rider that President Buffet of the Assembly had to rule out of the vote. When that had been straightened out, Dufaure, acting as Thiers's spokesman, said that he understood that the Wallon amendment, such as it was, meant that the constitution could be revised. Puzzled, the Assembly voted. During the voting men were still uncertain what it was all about. One member, General de Chabron, was persuaded to vote only as the counting of the ballots in the urn was going on. Buffet let him deposit his ballot, since the piles were so even that no immediate declaration could be made. After careful checking, the vote turned out to be 353 to 352. By that vote of General de Chabron's the Republic was founded. For those who enjoy dime-novel contrasts, a Royalist, M. Charreyon, had in his pocket a proxy from M. Mallevergne, but did not cast it against the Wallon amendment because he was not sure enough as to what the Wallon amendment was to cast another man's vote on the subject.

Getting the word "Republic" into the constitution cleared the air. The next stumbling block was the question of dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, as the lower house was to be called. M. Wallon, emboldened, moved that the President and Senate do it jointly. This was carried, 425 to 243. Then things went with a rush. The log jam was broken. The individual and collective responsibility of ministers to the Chamber were carried by a show of hands and no vote, together with the irresponsibility of the President and provisions for electing a new one by joint ballot of Senate and Chamber of Deputies, sitting together under the name of a National Assembly.

All these things had been in M. Wallon's draft that in July had been voted down, 633 to 31.

Then came a clause providing for revising the constitution by a similar National Assembly of Senate and Chamber, sitting together. Gambetta got up, walked to the Tribune to explain himself, started to speak, then thought better of it and came back. He knew that he had better not slow things up by trying to explain why the great Republican voted for making the Republic a makeshift. That, too, went without a vote. It was voted to make Versailles, not mob-ridden Paris, the capital. Then there was a procrastinating vote to make the whole law wait till a law establishing the Senate had been passed. The final vote on the whole bill was 508 to 174. If only one vote majority could be found to carry a Republic, there were 334 ready to uphold what one vote had made. De Broglie himself was the prisoner of the victory against him and put his ballot in the urn.

In a similar rush a Senate bill was carried. There was a clause in it making the same electorate choose both senators and deputies. That was carried by the angry Legitimists as revenge on De Broglie. The Marshal again behaved as Stadtholder, called in certain leaders, and told them that that would not do. He had, under the terms of the presidency drawn up to throw Thiers out, a right to send a bill back to be voted on again. He did that, and the Legitimists repented. The two brothers-in-law of the two Centers again consulted, M. Wallon having sunk back into the second rank, from which he had temporarily emerged to leadership, and the Assembly accepted the Marshal's revision. It was the indirect election by the councils again, designed to hamper the urban voter, to the benefit of the "bumpkins." The Marseilles that provided Gaston Crémieux to hurl that jest also provided a classic example of the way city voters were hampered. Even since the reform of 1884 seventeen rural communes around the city balanced the city's representatives in the electoral College of Deputies, departmental councilors, and representatives of communal councils.

As with the revision article, so with the Senate bill, the burden was upon Gambetta. If he persuaded his friends in the Republican Union to vote for the Senate, he got a Republic that was far from his ideals. If he did not, by throwing out the Senate bill he threw out the Wallon amendment that was linked to it. Gambetta knew, however, how to deal with that. He accepted the Senate as it was, because it would provide an education to the voter. He called the Senate not a Senate but a "Grand Council of the Communes of France." He painted a picture of the peasant returning home from his council election and realizing that he had by that vote taken his share in settling the fate of France. He painted a further picture of the senator realizing that he represented the simple interests of the ordinary people. For such a senate he said that he would vote.

Events have proved Gambetta right. It did turn out that the connection of the councils with Parliament through the senatorial elections has lifted local politics up out of the parochial, and has at the same time reminded the Senate that it is just as responsible to the people as the Chamber. Fittingly enough, recently the Senate has been more than half composed of Gambetta's own party, the Radicals. But that was in the future. It took daring to vote for a Senate that would certainly at first be Conservative, if not Monarchist. Gambetta carried the day, and the Republicans put through the Senate.

The Senate, as then it was planned, had, besides a forty-year-age requirement, another anti-Republican feature—namely, 75 life members in the 300, who were to be elected in the first place by the Conservative Assembly, and, the Senate having thus been made Conservative, were to be replaced by vote of the Senate when vacancies occurred. But, since half a Republic was better than none and there were the Prince Imperial and the Count of Paris to look out for, the Republicans mostly voted for the Senate.

By this time General de Cissey had outworn his usefulness, having been defeated on January 6, and just staying in

office till the constitution voting was done. Then (power was passing into the hands of the Center) Buffet, the President of the Assembly, was made President of the Council, as the man most respected and available, and the Assembly's Vice-President, the Duke d'Audiffret-Pasquier, was made its President.

There was still much to do, but the Assembly was in no mood to move fast. It took two more rushes of voting—in July and in December—to finish the constitution and the laws that would put it into force. The Assembly had to be screwed up to the pitch of giving up its ideals and accepting what it could get. Then, too, a crisis occurred with Bismarck. His mouthpiece, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, began to discuss the fact that France was getting very strong and might attack Germany to get Alsace-Lorraine back again. There was truth in that. The French Army had more officers than the German, although as yet not more men. So strong was France becoming, the paper went on, that Germany might be compelled to attack France first. To meet this crisis the almost permanent Foreign Minister, the Duke Decazes, cleverly did nothing, but hinted at a need for help in such a way that the English and Russian governments warned Bismarck to refrain from a war that he probably had no intentions of declaring. When he did fight a war he used to ease William I's tender conscience first, and in this case he did nothing of the sort. That leads modern historians to think that he had no intention of fighting. But, whatever Bismarck's intentions, the war scare did afford an opportunity of procrastination to the Assembly. Prophetically, General Séré de Rivière was instructed to build a series of strong forts on the German border, then considered the best in the world.

In July the Assembly ratified the draft of a newly elected and more Republican Committee of Thirty on the "Relations of the Public Powers." This contained certain safeguards against the Executive—that is, against the President and the Council of Ministers—that experience had shown neces-

sary. Parliament had to meet five months in every year, no matter what the Executive thought, the first meeting taking place on the second Tuesday in January. If the Executive wanted to be free of the chambers within those five months, it could send them home for a month, but would still have to face Parliament five months each year. If the Executive wanted an election, it could, with the consent of the Senate, dissolve the Chamber, but must have an election within three months; there was to be no long period of personal rule. Not only was the Executive, in the persons of the members of the Council of Ministers, responsible to the chambers (this ambiguity has never been cleared up as to whether it means either chamber or just the Chamber of Deputies and not the Senate), but also money bills must originate in the Chamber of Deputies (expressly so stated), giving the deputies the power of the purse. On the other hand, after the five months are up, the Executive can call and dismiss the chambers at will. Impeachment, as in England and America, was by the lower house before the upper; but, added to that, the Council of Ministers might order a "High Court Trial" before the Senate, for endangering the state.

The Executive is the President, who is irresponsible and can only be called to account by impeachment. But his acts must be countersigned by a minister who is definitely responsible. The President has the powers MacMahon exercised of sending messages, though not of speaking to Parliament, and of asking the reconsideration of a measure, which can, however, be passed by a simple majority. That leaves, as the ingenious M. Wallon intended, the question of Republic or Stadtholderate up in the air, to be fought out later.

The rest of the constitution is remarkable by its omissions. There is no bill of rights. As far as the constitution goes, Frenchmen may be shot, jailed, have their papers suppressed, without any redress. Parliament can give and can take away, as long as the Chamber of Deputies is elected by universal (manhood) suffrage. That means that the rights

which are usually called democratic (the rights that the English think they have from immemorial custom, and we do have from our written constitution) the French have—if they have them—only from universal suffrage and the determination of Parliament to use its safeguards against the Executive. In effect, the Constitution of 1875 is a deal by which Gambetta said to the Right, "Give us a universal suffrage Parliament, and you can have your potential dictatorship. Through the Parliament we will get our rights."

The July vote of the "Relations of the Public Powers" was not enough. The machinery of getting it into effect had to be set up. There were laws for senatorial elections, for the elections to the Chamber, that ended department-wide votes and substituted single-member districts as more likely to be Conservative. The term of the Chamber of Deputies was set at four years, but might be changed. It has been changed three times. The date of the first meeting of Parliament was set as March 8, 1876. Then, that November, byelections to the Assembly were called off as foolish, and the Assembly's last duty was performed, that of electing life senators. The two Centers combined, as usual, to elect the President and Vice-President of the Assembly, one from each—D'Audiffret-Pasquier and Martel. Then in a rage the Legitimists voted De Broglie's choices down. The man of bad temper had ruled them long enough, and tricked them enough. One M. de la Rochette came to Gambetta with an idea. He preferred honest men of the Left, especially of M. de Marcère's Left Center, to Monarchists who were not loyal. He and a few friends, if some of their number were elected, would throw their votes to Gambetta's choices. The deed was done. De Broglie and his friends tried to protest, but under the rules no speeches could be made during voting. "We can hiss," De Broglie said, and through a constant hissing the voting went on. A mildly Republican set of life senators was elected, and with them M. de la Rochette and a very few ardent Legitimists. Shortly after, De la Rochette

died, it was said of a broken heart, even before the new Parliament met.

The Assembly left as a legacy to the Republic it had been so reluctant to found its philosophy of monarchical institutions without a monarchy. There was a Conservative officer corps in the Army, a Conservative education council, and by virtue of a law passed at Monseigneur Dupanloup's wishes that July, "free universities" that, like the schools under the Falloux Law, were free in the sense of being Catholic and free from state supervision. The way the concordat linked Church and State was recognized by a clause in the constitution that required prayers in every church in France the Sunday after Parliament met. The semirepression that Thiers had set up was intensified by a stringent Press Law passed in December, allowing the control of the papers by the Ministry, and by keeping martial law in force in twenty-seven departments. It was under such conditions that the Nation went to the voting urns for the first general election since the Assembly had been chosen to vote for peace or war, in February 1871.

In the election itself the Conservatives took no chance. The first electoral colleges for the Senate contained not the deputies of the new Chamber of Deputies, but the assemblymen of the old Assembly. The senators they elected on January 27 were naturally Conservative. As for the elections to the Chamber, the whole machinery of the French Government was used by M. de Fourtou, the Minister of the Interior, to aid Conservative candidates. Gambetta had determined to stand at four great cities: Paris, Lille, Marseilles, Bordeaux, to prove he was the leader of the Republicans. To prove that improper pressure was being used, he stood at Avignon, too, making his defeat there such an example of defeat by improper means that the Chamber would have to investigate. And that was how 225 senators and 233 deputies were chosen for the first Parliament of the Third Republic.

On Wednesday, March 8, 1876, the officials of the National Assembly handed over to the provisional officials, the oldest member acting as President, the six youngest as secretaries, of the new Senate and the new Chamber of Deputies. The first meeting of the Parliament of the French Republic took place, and the Constitution of 1875 was at work.

But the National Assembly gave the Republic more than just the Constitution of 1875 and its un-Republican philosophy of government superimposed on universal suffrage. Had it not, Gambetta never would have accepted the Constituent Powers of the Assembly. It gave the Republic men experienced in Parliamentary procedure, and the proof that by Parliamentary procedure men can make decisions that all will accept, and can change their minds and those of the Nation. Now it remained to be seen if giving Parliament the rights it needed would mean, in the long run, through the workings of universal suffrage, giving the whole of France the rights the Nation needed.



Chapter Eight

THE SIXTEENTH OF MAY

M WALLON'S constitution, which organized the provisional, was almost designed to cause friction between Parliament and President, and between the two houses of Parliament. At the very start, with the news that at the first election to the Chamber, before the runoffs, the Republicans had won some 300 seats and secured a majority, the Marshal summoned to him, to consider the situation, not his Council of Ministers, in which there were Republicans, but the heads of his supporters, the Conservative party. When the argument grew warm between Buffet, the Vice-President of the Council, who wanted to act at once and dissolve the Chamber, and De Broglie, who was for waiting till the Republican Chamber had had "time to betray itself, and lose credit through its own excesses," the Marshal took them into his study. When they came out, Buffet told his fellow bitter-ender, the Viscount de Meaux, who tells this story, that they two must resign. In Buffet's place the Marshal made Jules Dufaure, Thiers's "watchdog," Vice-President of the Council, as one known to be a Republican, but known to be conciliatory in a gruff way. "Time was being given a chance," but by those against whom time was running.

In the runoff things went more in favor of the Conservatives, as might be expected—that was what the runoffs were for. But as things were, even though the Republicans had

elected a remarkable number of life senators, the Conservatives had carried the senatorial elections and the Senate. Here was just the constitution the Conservatives had wanted, in so far as they followed the ideas of the old Duke de Broglie; for there was a Senate to mediate between Chief Executive and the representatives of the people. The Marshal was "resolutely Conservative" and, though he had to appoint a Ministry that could get votes of confidence from the Chamber, could choose men who favored his policies, and could, if he played his cards well, create a situation in which France would go back to the mood in which she elected the National Assembly. So again the game of Parliamentary maneuver began, with monarchy or democracy still as its stake.

The first move was by Dufaure, the watchdog, and made in the Council of Ministers. On March 9 he laid before the Marshal a set of decrees to sign, now that the Republic existed, to be then countersigned by a responsible minister. The first decree appointed Jules Dufaure not Vice-President of the Council, but President of it, divorcing the headship of the state from responsibility for actions of the Council of Ministers, as the new constitution ordained. That was countersigned, for want of any other minister, by the Duke Decazes, the Foreign Minister. But the next decree appointed the Duke Decazes Foreign Minister, not under the old laws of the Assembly, but under the new constitution, and was countersigned by Jules Dufaure, President of the Council of Ministers. Other decrees reappointed the rest of the Council, all countersigned by Dufaure. Ever since, with one famous exception, all ministers have been appointed by the President of the Council, even to the outgoing President of the Council's taking technical responsibility for the appointment of his successor.

The publication of these decrees in the *Journal Officiel* of March 10 was a publication to all France that at least the President of the Council of Ministers intended to live up to

the letter and spirit of the clause in the constitution that made all ministers "collectively and individually responsible to the chambers." It was now up to Parliament to make full use of the willingness of Dufaure to work with it.

But at the moment Parliament was too busy getting organized to be able to do anything else. The Senate, almost entirely composed of members of the National Assembly, and meeting in the Versailles Opera Hall which the Assembly had used, with a nucleus of 74 life members who had already been elected,¹ could organize itself quickly enough, and could elect the Duke d'Audiffret-Pasquier to preside over it. But it took more time for the Chamber, sitting in the newly built Congress Hall, to verify the elections of its new and inexperienced members, elect Jules Grévy its President, and prepare for work. It was only on March 14 that Parliament was ready to hear from the Council of Ministers a declaration of its policy, a declaration that began with the ominous words: "Chosen by the President of the Republic to exercise in his name the powers the constitution confers on him." That meant that the Marshal thought of himself as an active Executive, not a passive constitutional monarch.

No comment was made on this in the Chamber, for in the Chamber a struggle for leadership was already started. Twice already had Gambetta summoned all the Republicans to meet at the famous Hôtel des Reservoirs. Once they had disobeyed his summons. The second time 300 deputies and senators did meet, did listen to his complaint "not of the incoming ministers but of those who should go out and do not," but did not organize into one homogeneous Republican party. On the contrary, just as in the National Assembly, though some 75 stuck by him, an extreme Left on one side of him, a Left Center on the other side of him, and, under Jules Ferry, a Republican Left formed themselves, elected

¹ M. de la Rochette had already died suddenly, as has just been narrated; and M. Ricard, the Minister of the Interior, who had no seat in either chamber, had not yet been elected in his stead.

chairmen, and prepared to go on as had such organizations in the National Assembly, acting as small groups with a will of their own, not as a united party.

By this division of the Republicans into separate groups, and by the choice the Marshal had made of ministers, the direct road to power by party organization and party control of Parliament seemed blocked to the Republicans. But at the moment the direct road was blocked, indirect roads opened. One was through hope of capturing the Senate. On March 29 the Senate solemnly divided the list of 83 departments into three parts, A, B, and C, containing equal numbers of senators, and then drew lots to see which group would have a three-year term, which a six-year, which a nine-year. As B, the group that contained the most Conservatives, drew the three-year term, there was hope that in the next senatorial elections the Senate might be made definitely Republican. Then, on April 3, in the Chamber, the Budget Committee was elected, of 30 Republicans and 3 from the Right, which in turn elected Gambetta as its chairman. A committee was the device De Broglie had used against Thiers in the autumn of 1872, when his frontal attack had been foiled; here Gambetta was using it against the Marshal when his frontal attack had been foiled. Soon he was delighted to find his committee spending so much more on the Army than the Minister of War that General de Cissey had to retire, proving by that the individual responsibility of ministers to the Chamber; and more than the Minister of Education had proposed on Education, in that way attacking clericalism, that great ally of the monarchy. The Left Center Minister of Finance, Léon Say, might propose, but by the device of the Committee the Republican majority in the Chamber disposed.

Just the same, as long as the Dufaure Ministry remained in power, the Executive remained, though not anti-Republican, un-Republican, not being completely under the control of Parliament. Likewise, inside Parliament the Conservative

Senate remained as a block on the Chamber that truly represented the Nation.

When Dufaure tried to carry a law suspending the prosecutions of the Communards, such as the still-exiled Ranc, Senate and Chamber disagreed on the terms; and Dufaure, refusing to resign when beaten in the Senate, did resign when the Chamber refused to accept the Senate's amendment. This, like his assumption of the style of President of the Council, set a precedent in favor of Republicanism, if only the successor the Marshal appointed to him would keep up the good work. Now was the chance for the Marshal to give France a real Parliamentary government, with the leader of the majority as President of the Council. Gambetta was so willing to gain the substance, if giving up the name, that even though MacMahon had always refused to meet him, he sent the Marshal a list of those whom the Republicans would support as President of the Council. On that list was the name of Jules Simon. But Gambetta wanted a truly Republican Ministry; as he had previously said of the Dufaure Ministry as a reconstruction of the Buffet one, he did not mind the men who had been taken in; the ones he minded were those who had not been put out; and now the same thing happened again. Jules Simon came in, but many Conservatives failed to go out.

For a while the agile Jules Simon succeeded in balancing between the Republican majority in the Chamber and the MacMahonist majority in the Council of Ministers. But the eternal clerical question came up. The Pope was still complaining that the Italian Government had taken Rome from him by force, as it had, the force being ratified by a vote of the Roman people later. There were clerical demonstrations which Simon told the Chamber would be put down. The day after that statement Gambetta went to the Tribune. When he had finished listing the ills that clericalism had done France, he wound up with a remark he had already made in his Dauphiny speeches of 1872: "Clericalism is the

enemy!" By then the Chamber had become so disorderly that the heads of the various parties had had to meet in a hurry to draft new rules to keep better order. The Marshal grew angry, and so worked on Simon that Simon promised not to relax the Press Law of 1875, but to tighten it up. Stadtholder and Parliament were about to quarrel.

Simon, worn out, went that night to the theater. Next morning, May 16, he saw upon his desk a letter, unstamped and obviously left by a messenger, in a handwriting unknown to him. He opened it. It was from the Marshal, and told him that he had not been sufficiently forceful in his duty of leading the Chamber in the way it should go. Simon went to the Elysée at once and poured out his feelings to the Marshal, who listened to him in silence. At the end he offered to resign. The Marshal accepted Simon's resignation, then sent for the Duke de Broglie and appointed him President of the Council. As that action—an official and not a personal one—had to be countersigned by a minister, it was countersigned, not by Jules Simon as the last act of the outgoing Premier appointing his successor, but by the Duke Decazes, the perennial holdover Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was a personal friend of the Marshal's.

The meaning of this appeared at once. In the first place, there was no need for Simon to resign if he did not want to. The constitution expressly stated that the President appointed but the Chambers removed ministers. Simon, if he had had courage, could have stayed in office as long as the Chamber supported him. However, he had not been picked for courage, but for being the most pliable of the Republicans. Although it was bad enough for Simon to have let himself be forced out, worse had happened. MacMahon had continued to dictate not only who should head the Cabinet, but who should compose it. He was doing something to Parliament that the Assembly had never let Thiers do to it, and was ending the collective responsibility of ministers. It was by steps such as that that Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, as President of the Second Republic, had secured to himself

all the Executive power, after which he jailed the members of Parliament and set himself up as a dictator.

This all was happening at a serious moment in Europe's history. Russia had just declared war on Turkey, to protect the Christians in Bulgaria against the Turks, risking trouble with England and Austria in doing so. It was possible that a general European war would break out. Was that the moment to have France's foreign policy tied to some special set of religious principles? Such questions were asked in the Chamber of Deputies on the seventeenth, before the De Broglie Ministry was formed, and obtained the answer that there was no such danger. But the suspicion remained. A strictly party vote, 347 to 149, took place on the adoption of the order of the day. Then the Republicans, realizing what the next move would be, met at the ever-useful Hôtel des Reservoirs as a united party, not separate groups. To his great surprise, M. de Marcère of the Left Center found himself, the mildest of men, presiding over a meeting with the Radical Floquet on one side of him and the veteran Socialist and revolutionary, Louis Blanc, on the other. It was agreed to form a joint electoral organization, and to issue a joint manifesto. This was a very short one, ending: "The Republic will arise stronger than ever from the ballot boxes of the electors." This manifesto was signed not only by the 347, but also by certain ones who had been absent, notably Thiers. They numbered 363 in all.

On the eighteenth the Duke de Broglie brought his Cabinet to face the Chamber, seating it on the ministerial benches. Then M. de Fourtou exercised his power as a minister to intervene in the speaking at any time and read a decree from the President, suspending the session for a month, or until June 16. This automatically prevented speaking or voting against the government, for, when Gambetta rose to speak, Grévy stopped him, as in duty bound as presiding officer. Then the Chamber emptied, the Left cheering for the Republic, the Right shouting back, "Hurrah for France!"

For a month then the Duke de Broglie ruled France without any Chamber to call him to account. He shifted Prefects and sub-Prefects, in one extreme case appointing six sub-Prefects in rapid succession to each other. But Gambetta was not muzzled yet. He, speaking as editor of the *République Française*, told some students who called on him that there were Republicans who would make perfectly good Presidents of France, that one had. And as chairman of the Budget Committee he announced that it would refuse to discuss financial measures with the Cabinet until it was reassured about the Cabinet's policy. The election policies of both sides were thus made clear at the start. De Broglie intended to use the whole machinery of government to secure the election of a Chamber of Deputies favorable to his views and those of the Marshal. Gambetta intended to make an issue of the attempt to make the President a Stadtholder, and to use the powers that the Constitution had given Parliament to defend itself against usurpation by the Executive, even to replacing MacMahon by Thiers. On June 16 the Chamber met to hear what the program of the Ministry would be, knowing full well that the Senate would fall into line and order a dissolution and election. De Fourtou, the Minister of the Interior, who would be primarily responsible for "managing the elections," delivered his statement as to why a strong government by the Marshal was necessary to keep order and give France safety, and hinting the Chamber should be dissolved. He made the mistake, however, of adding that the Marshal had liberated France from the Germans, which was technically correct, as under his presidency the last Germans had marched off. That was too much for a war veteran from Lorraine, who, bursting with indignation, arose and shouted out, as he pointed at Thiers, "There is the Liberator of the Territory!" Taking their time from Gambetta, all the Republicans stood up, pointed at Thiers in his seat high in the back of the Congress Hall, and cheered themselves hoarse, while the old man turned crimson with pride and pleasure. After that,

M. de Fourtou was less positive in his statements. In reply to him Gambetta went to the Tribune and for three hours strove to make himself heard against heckling, while Grévy ineffectually tinkled his bell for silence. At the end Gambetta said, "We leave 363. We shall come back 400."

In the Senate the Duke de Broglie replied to this, saying, "He who bears the name of Marshal MacMahon cannot become the ally and hireling of the honorable M. Gambetta—such is the bare truth." Then he gave his slogan, "A government of *moral order*," the slogan with which he had driven Thiers from office. Since then the nickname for his rule has been the "Moral Order."

There was an answering slogan in the Chamber. Jules Ferry put the point that the Marshal had no power of dismissal with brutal frankness, saying, "Shall France be ruled by law or by the sword of a Marshal?" It must be remembered that such actions as MacMahon's had been in the past the inevitable preludes to *coups d'état*. That is why outside students of French history are sometimes puzzled to find that the French speak of the *coup d'état* of the sixteenth of May; for a *coup* it was, in spirit if not in letter. Then the Senate voted 149 to 130 to dissolve the Chamber, and the vote in the Chamber of no confidence, for which all the 363 voted, was carried to the French people.

On the Duke de Broglie's side was all the power given him by the potentially dictatorial administration of France. Within the period of three months he could have the elections when he pleased, by the simple issuing of a decree. His Minister of the Interior supervised the conduct of those elections when he did finally decide to have them. If he wanted to, he might (and did) use the official white paper which may be used in France only for official notices and orders to announce who were the official candidates of the government of the Marshal. As the Marshal was personally liked, he might be sent around France. That was the way Louis Napoleon Bonaparte had gained popularity before his *coup d'état*. The poor Marshal did not do so well, though.

In country districts he was received well enough, but in Bordeaux he went through tribulations, with street boys hanging on to his very carriage and shouting, "Hurrah for the Republic!" while he tried to smile and look pleasant.

Those somewhat obvious methods were not the only ones used. The workers on government public works were given to understand how they should vote. The Press Law of 1875 was vigorously used. Public meetings were, of course, hindered. Many fines and imprisonments were given after prosecutions at the order of the Minister of Justice. The Church did its part. The Conservatives also attempted, without complete success, to pool Legitimist, Orléanist, and Bonapartist votes, and thus to prevent splitting the vote and forcing runoff elections.

On the other side the Republicans had to use only the standard methods of democracy and party government. The 363 were made the candidates of all Republicans, even though one of them was a Bonaparte prince—Prince Jerome Napoleon. At the head of the Republican party, following the perfectly frank hint that Gambetta had given in the office of the *République*, was set Thiers, as the man to be President if Marshal MacMahon did not obey the law and tried to go on ruling with the sword. As time went on, this was made clearer and clearer. On August 25, at Lille, Gambetta attended a "private dinner" for one hundred twenty-five people. To them he made a speech that legally was not at a public meeting, in which he said, "The Marshal must knuckle under or go out." For that statement, as an attack on the head of the state, Gambetta was foolishly enough tried, and condemned to pay a fine and go to jail; but he appealed, and before they got around to trying the appeal Parliament had met and, as a deputy, he was immune from arrest. This very action, though, showed what "Moral Order" would come to.

In the midst of this campaign Thiers died, on September 23. On his desk was found the draft of an election address, guardedly but firmly repudiating the methods of "Moral

Order" that he had really taught De Broglie to use. A government funeral was offered, but his family refused it unless they could conduct it as they wished. As a result, Thiers had a funeral unmarked by the attention of the very government he had headed. It was at Père Lachaise, where so many who might be called his victims had also been buried—victims whose associates had finally united with Thiers to save the Republic. The official circular announced laconically to the Prefects of France, "Funeral without incident. Perfect order maintained." This in itself was a further commentary on "Moral Order." And Gambetta struck another blow for the Republic by bringing Jules Grévy to Thiers's old constituency and introducing him as the man to succeed Thiers as President of the Republic.

So badly off did the Marshal's Ministry think its cause, that it stretched its powers by postponing the elections beyond the three months' delay that alone was permitted, although the "electoral period" came within that time limit. But the elections had to come and had to be held in October. The 363 did not come back 400. They did not even come back 363; but 315 Republicans were elected, with 15 runoffs and doubtful seats, as against only 199 Conservatives. Through universal suffrage the people of France had given the Marshal his answer. This news came first to the Ministry of the Interior; and De Fourtou, bringing it over to De Broglie, announced that with the news he was bringing the Marshal his resignation. All De Broglie said to that was, "Others, too, have need of rest, but we must not evade responsibility." Then at De Broglie's orders telegrams were sent back to the Prefects, announcing that the Marshal's government remained Conservative. De Broglie was still willing to fight it out for "Moral Order."

When the new Chamber met, it elected Jules Grévy to preside over it, as a sign of how it felt. At that meeting De Broglie and his colleagues sat on the ministerial bench, to Grévy's right. But the next day they received a hint in the election of a committee to investigate the conduct of the

election, and the day after that the chairman of the Budget Commission, again Gambetta, told them that the budget was ready to be presented to a Cabinet that the Chamber trusted. As Gambetta had promised, the machinery of Parliament would be used to the full. The united Republican party held together. De Broglie saw he was beaten, and resigned.

The Marshal still showed fight. He telegraphed for General de Rochebouet, who accepted the presidency of the Council, in what was called a "fighting ministry," and for one day sat in front of the Chamber. The Chamber voted emphatically its opinion of its intention not to have any relations with that Cabinet. There were rumors that the Marshal intended now to go all the way, to dissolve again, get fifty more votes by official pressure, or even turn to naked force. It looked for a moment as if all the compromise of the Constitution of 1875 had gone into thin air; and there was talk of bitter resistance and the Commune again. The Committee of Eighteen that had guided Republican efforts at the election prepared to guide those efforts at a more severe contest of wills. But the Duke d'Audiffret-Pasquier told the Marshal that the Senate would vote no second dissolution, the Senate thus functioning as mediator between President and people. General Rouchebouet returned to his army corps, and Dufaure was appointed President of the Council.

Dufaure's first official act was to see the Marshal for a moment, speak a few friendly words, explain what he intended to do, and then bring in his Cabinet. It had been agreed that the Marshal should no longer hold on to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, War, and Marine. But, more than that, a presidential message was brought to the Marshal to sign, containing these words: "The Constitution of 1875 has founded a Parliamentary Republic in establishing my irresponsibility while affirming the responsibility, general and individual, of the Ministry. Our respective rights and duties are thus determined; the independence of the

Ministry is the condition of their responsibility." The Marshal came into the room where the rest of the Cabinet was, told them that he stayed in office only from a sense of responsibility, considering the foreign situation, and then sat down, very red in the face, at the desk on which this message lay. M. de Marcère, the new Minister of the Interior, said that the Marshal's eyes filled with tears as he signed, and he exclaimed, "There, then, if it must be so!" Then he stood up at once, and escaped from the hall as if he could bear no more. This was the end of the Marshal's intervention by messages giving his personal opinion. Now his messages would be the responsibility of his ministers.

To confirm the end of "Moral Order" and personal government, the Chamber, shortly after this message had been read to it, passed without the formality of a vote a law ending the use of martial law unless with the consent of Parliament, or—if during the recess of Parliament—allowing it by decree of the Council of Ministers, which would automatically summon Parliament. (In order to prevent using martial law as a trick in an election, during dissolution, it was prohibited except in invaded areas.) By a similar uncontested passage the Press Law was repealed. Then M. de Marcère, the Minister of the Interior, got to work. He dismissed only 46 of De Fourtoul's Prefects because he was kind enough only to suspend 7 of them; and because 27 more beat him to it by resigning. This made nearly a clean sweep of the 86 departments. An amnesty for all the 845 sentences and 321,000 francs of fines during the elections was voted. The Senate passed all these, and people turned their minds to the Exposition of 1878, a most useful device for putting things off.

Just to make sure, for a while the Budget Committee voted only one month's money at a time; but in the spring the feeling was that the Marshal had really knuckled under and would behave for a vote of the Chamber, without the stronger measures that had been used. Because it had had this success in ending "Moral Order" and the personal gov-

ernment, the Chamber elected in the autumn of 1877 has been called the "Liberating Chamber" and spoken of as if it had a personality of its own, as, indeed, it had.

In 1879 the elections to the Senate took place, to the seats that had drawn a short term. In these 82 seats there had been 47 Conservatives before the election, only 16 after, and 66 Republicans. This meant a victory for the Republic, as the Senate pointed out by replacing the Duke d'Audiffret-Pasquier by M. Martel as its President, and the Chamber by carrying an order of the day, proposed by Jules Ferry, expressing confidence in the Cabinet that was "henceforth in possession of full liberty of action." The work of liberation was almost over.

On January 28, 1879, to the Marshal were brought for signature the routine retirements of old friends from army commands. He exclaimed at that that he had had "enough toads to swallow." For two days he held off. Then, instead of signing the decrees, he brought to Dufaure and the Council of Ministers the message he planned to send to the Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, announcing his resignation. He asked Dufaure to countersign it, but Dufaure told him that it was a personal action, not one requiring a constitutional countersignature, and undertook himself to transmit to Parliament the last personal action of the President. That afternoon it was read to both Houses, who immediately suspended their sittings. The Republican senators then announced to their colleagues in the Chamber that their candidate for the presidency of the Republic would be the President of the Chamber, Jules Grévy.

For the first time the National Assembly, as it was formed under the Wallon Constitution, met in the Congress Hall; and, as that constitution provided, was presided over by M. Martel, the President of the Senate. Lots were drawn, and, since the letter "T" came first, M. Tailhaud mounted the Tribune and cast the first ballot. At eight that night the election of Jules Grévy was announced, by 563 votes to 99 thrown away on the Republican General Chanzy (who him-

self had voted for Grévy), five for Gambetta, and one for Gallifet.

By that election, four years to the day after its passage, the ambiguity of the Wallon amendment was cleared up, and it was decided for once and for all that the official acts of the President must be acceptable to ministers responsible to the Chamber, which in turn is responsible to the Nation. The last vestiges of the Stadtholderate were over, and it was the Marshal himself who, wearing civilian clothes, was the first to congratulate Grévy.

Later the Marshal said that he had seen the fall of many governments in France, and had regretted each fall except one—that of his own government. And, now that the impediments to the People of France's ruling themselves by their own representatives had been removed, the question was: Could Parliament succeed, not in the negative task of destroying governments, but in the positive task of governing?



Chapter Nine

THE REPUBLICANS IN POWER

THE FATES must have been amused at seeing Jules Grévy, the man who in 1848 tried to abolish the presidency of the Second Republic, in 1879 become President of the Third Republic. Maybe they amused themselves by testing him out to see if he would hold to his other principles, for, a few days after Grévy's election, Dufaure, the President of the Council, decided he was too old for his office, and resigned. Here was the chance to put the Republican leader in Parliament at the actual head of the government, just as Grévy had suggested should have been done in 1848. It was true that Gambetta, at Grévy's suggestion, had allowed himself to be elected President of the Chamber; but, just as Buffet had moved on to being President of the Council, so could have Gambetta. Instead, Grévy appointed as President of the Council Waddington, the Foreign Minister of the Dufaure Cabinet. This was the sort of thing MacMahon had been doing. Grévy seemed to be following in his footsteps as far as blocking the desires of Parliament went. But then Grévy's distinguishing characteristic, which had made him Thiers's choice as President of the Assembly, was disliking Gambetta; that was also why he was made President of the Republic.

It is not true that for the two years and a half left of the life of the Liberating Chamber nothing was done. As a matter of fact, a great deal was done, more than is generally

realized. But only two important things were done by ministers: the De Freycinet public works program and the Ferry school reforms, and even those two were carried out as much by the Chamber as by the ministers. The united Republican party somehow vanished into thin air, leaving everyone, including its leaders and members, very puzzled. What was done seemed to have been done backhandedly and by accident, not by Government leadership. The failure to find any explanation of what did happen worried everyone, Republican and anti-Republican alike.

The work of Liberation went on. A committee of the Chamber, whose "reporter" was Jules Méline, recommended that the constitution be changed to allow Parliament to sit in Paris, near the office of government. That was done, and the Chamber now sat in the Palace Bourbon, the Senate in the Luxembourg, where their counterparts had been under the Empire. But the fear of Paris "going into the street" remained, and when the two houses met as one, in a National Assembly to elect a President or change the constitution, they had to "make the trip to Versailles" and meet there. There, and there alone, free from the fear of the Paris mob, might such great decisions be taken.

As Liberation was going on, the workers' movement, crushed by the crushing of the Commune and the semi-repression of the "Moral Order," started up again. There was a congress that autumn of 1879 at Marseilles, at which working-class leaders decided to pluck up courage once more and be willing to stand up against repression. The rejuvenated French Socialist movement really dates from the Marseilles Congress.

But the real event of this period was the De Freycinet public works program. There was a vast amount of railway mileage to be built. As in France the Government owns the roadbed, and usually gives franchises subject to a power of repurchase, railway building is right in the thick of politics. Since a depression seemed to be coming on, Government expenditures were popular, and De Freycinet, "the white

mouse," won the Republic many businessmen friends. He also won another type of friend, the intellectual, by spending some of his money, which had been raised by loans, not taxation, on building schools. At that time there were no normal or girls' schools in France, and the answer to any proposal for public education was that there was no equipment for it.

The question of education was closely linked with that of Liberation and the further question of whether Liberation was enough or whether it would not be necessary to go on to Reform. In the struggle between the Old France and the New a great weapon in the hands of the Old France was the great Teaching Congregations that turned their energies to bringing up the younger generation as "sound thinkers" and not as "intellectuals." Though Napoleon I had tamed the secular parish priests and their superiors by the Concordat of 1801, and made them allies instead of enemies of the French state, his central control of all education by inspection had been ended by the Falloux Law of 1850. The regular clergy, the congregations of the monks and nuns, who spread the Catholic Church by preaching or teaching, were not paid by the state, and under no control by the state. What to do with them was a question. Conservatives liked this arrangement, Republicans did not. Some Republicans thought a concordat should be drawn up to make a truce between congregations and the state similar to that which had made a truce between the ordinary priesthood and the state. Others wanted to subject the congregations to state control. Once raised as a political question, education brought with it manifold difficulties.

This problem was not attacked right away. It was thorny, except for the pleasant side of building schools and spending money that had been saved by the firm economy of the National Assembly. Instead, Liberation was carried out by celebration. The Marseillaise was made the national song; the Fourteenth of July, the day the Bastille was stormed in 1789, considered the start of the French Revolution, was

made the national holiday. On it the President of the Republic and the President of the Chamber made speeches, that of the latter being embarrassingly better than that of the former. During the summer recess the Waddington Ministry held on; in the autumn session it got into trouble with Clemenceau, who pulled off an artichoke leaf in the person of the Minister of the Interior. That Christmas Waddington resigned, since the question of an amnesty to the Communards—Ranc was still abroad—seemed too difficult. In his place, with practically the same Cabinet, De Freycinet took over.

It was in 1880 that Jules Ferry as Minister of Education and Paul Bert as reporter of the Chamber Committee took over the education question. It was proposed to make education free of expense, compulsory, and lay, or nonreligious. It was proposed also to make education state controlled. If education were free of cost, the poorest could have it, and could have a good brand, instead of getting it at Church-supported schools, that would, in effect, make "sound thinkers" and anti-Republicans of the common man. If education were compulsory, such a shocking situation as the 60 per cent illiteracy among French women would no longer exist. If it were lay, without clerical teachers, there would be no attacks on the Republic.

The first step was a law to make all education state supervised and end Monseigneur Dupanloup's "free universities" and Count de Falloux's uninspected schools. There were objections either way. If the state supervised only part of French education, there would be a temptation to lower standards in the unsupervised part, since certain diplomas granted entrance to trades and professions. For example, there might be a temptation to give a medical degree to a man who was believed to be of sound character, even if he was not quite up to the mark. That this was a real and not an imaginary danger may be seen from the fact that, of the 37,000 clerical teachers, only 6,000 had a state diploma; the rest had merely a certificate of character from the bishop of

the diocese, a so-called "letter of obedience." The bill that contained this reform of state supervision, however, might lead to the other danger, political supervision. It had the especial danger of Article VII, that forbade the teaching in state schools or heading of other schools by members of "unauthorized congregations." That meant in effect that all Jesuit-run schools were prohibited, as under a law that had not been enforced for fifty years, no Jesuit might remain in France.

To Jules Simon, now a senator, this clause seemed an atrocious attack on liberty. He held the idea that the best way of securing liberty would be to let the Catholics teach out in the open, and have a fair field and no favors. His powerful speeches defeated Article VII in the Senate. There was an answer to that. Jules Ferry and Paul Bert proposed to go one step more, and not only purge the education council of noneducators and set up nation-wide standards, but really make education free, compulsory, and lay. Having introduced such bills, Ferry then used his power as Minister of Education. The fact that Jesuits had taught for some fifty years illegally was no reason that they should continue to do so. Early one July morning, M. Andrieux, the Prefect of Police, wearing at that early hour, so the reporters noted, pearl-gray gloves, supervised the police expulsion of the Jesuit teachers in Paris. There was a chance that the Chamber might object, but Gambetta himself came down from the president's desk to the Tribune to support Ferry, and a vote of confidence was obtained.

Later on, De Freycinet, who liked to compromise, was trapped by his Minister of the Interior, Constans. Because of a Cabinet split which forced De Freycinet to resign, Ferry took over, with about the same Ministry. Clemenceau's comment was: "The Waddington Ministry was the Dufaure Ministry without Dufaure; the De Freycinet Ministry was the Waddington Ministry without Waddington; the Ferry Ministry was the De Freycinet Ministry without

De Freycinet. That is the plastering over of something that has been replastered."

In the autumn of 1880, with the election a year or less off, this then was the situation: One man, De Freycinet, now run out of office, had proved himself a conciliatory and able administrator. Two men, the Moderate Ferry, the Radical Paul Bert, had a law on education that they could not pass as a whole, but were trying to get through bit by bit. The head of the Republican party, as far as any French party had a head, was in the anomalous position of trying to be the impartial supervisor of the debates of the Chamber, while in fact he was just not the sort of man who could ever be impartial. He was put in this position because the President of the Republic, a man who did not believe, if he was consistent, in the office he held, was in fact making very clever use of the fact that he attended every meeting of the Council of Ministers, and saw, as a matter of course, all the Parliamentary leaders, in or out of office. Obviously a crisis was coming, in which Gambetta would either get done somehow the things that were waiting to be done, but that the Liberating Chamber was procrastinating about, or would fall in the attempt.

In the meantime, if Gambetta could not get what he wanted at once, he could get it bit by bit, and take glory in the effectiveness of his opportunist tactics. Since the Executive was not to his liking, he taught the Chamber how to do without it. He taught all the committees in general, and the Budget Committee in particular, how to see to it that the Ministry did their will. Gambetta ruled the Chamber, and under his teaching the Chamber ruled the Ministry.

For Gambetta still stood out, even in an anomalous position. He still rallied his party at the office of the *République Française*, and still met its leaders at Madame Adam's. Léonie Léon still showed him what the Catholic mind really felt, and in 1879 he went to Rome and exchanged opinions with the new Pope, Leo XIII. An attempt to get in touch

with Bismarck failed, and after that Bismarck hounded him with insinuations. At Cherbourg, when the Navy, in August 1880, got the new Republican flags that the Army had been given on July 14, Gambetta again, though the lesser functionary, stole the show from Grévy. There Gambetta said a few words—that he thought well-chosen, but Bismarck ill-chosen—about when the “day comes and the hour strikes.” Young men who had been inspired in the election campaign of 1877, but had had to support Moderates because they were the 363, now could turn to bringing in Gambettist Republicans. And Gambetta was going further, and making new friends, on the ground that he was a patriot. Gallifet and he established a curious jovial friendship of two honest and hard-hitting men. Déroulède, forced by an injury to leave the Army and be nothing more than a poet, saw all he could of his leader. Forces in the Nation were building up behind Gambetta to put him in power, even if Grévy, at De Freycinet’s replacement by Ferry, had said, “I am holding M. Gambetta in reserve.”

The immediate thing to do would be to make Gambetta President of the Council. This was the program for the election of 1881. After that would come finishing the task that the Liberating Chamber had started on, keeping up its good work on the questions of education, civil service, and freedom of the press, and going on to make the Army and the Civil Service less of Marquises and more Republican. To remedy certain failures of Republican party discipline, there was a scheme to give up single-member districts and go back to department-wide voting, the idea being that that would restrict log-rolling and strengthen party cohesion. Then perhaps Gambetta could come out in the open and show France what he had been doing, instead of using the methods inherited from De Broglie of working through committees against an unfriendly Executive.

At the election of 1881 there was pressure to bring in a Chamber that would support Gambetta. At the same time there were those, Clemenceau more or less at their head,

who thought that Gambetta had taken to compromise and "opportunism," and would never get the needed reforms enacted. Radicals therefore ran against Gambetta in his own Belleville district, and at election meetings Gambetta was shouted down. Belleville had been divided into two parts, only one of which Gambetta carried. In itself that showed how the Republicans had split into Radicals, Opportunists, and Moderates. But just the same, split or not, the Chamber that was elected was a more Republican one, ready to be the "Reforming Chamber" and not merely a Liberating one.

Even before the Chamber met, Ferry, who shared Gambetta's wish for a united Republican party, let him know that he intended to resign and give over the presidency of the Council. When the Chamber met, Gambetta therefore did not stand for election as its President, though he was chosen "Provisional President," but allowed the election of the Radical Henri Brisson. He set to work to bring together a Ministry when Grévy should call him to office to replace Ferry.

Then Gambetta had to face a most serious situation. During the election period, and summer vacation, Ferry had found it necessary, so he said, to preserve order in Algeria and prevent raids by Tunisians, by invading and conquering Tunis. As such raids had gone on constantly without counterattack till then, as the conquest—technically merely the "protection"—of Tunis, took place when the Chamber could not call Ferry to account; and as the Chamber, full of patriotic Radicals, was suspicious of any arrangement that took French strength away from getting Alsace-Lorraine back, it went wild. Some twenty orders of the day in favor of the action were voted down, and it seemed as if the troops would have to be withdrawn just because the Chamber was in a bad mood. At first Gambetta stayed outside in the lobbies during this, to prevent his future Ministry's being mixed up in it, but finally decided that the disorder was too disgraceful, marched into the Chamber, climbed up into the Tribune, and told the Chamber that, as Ferry was going out

of office anyway, a vote of confidence expressed confidence not in Ferry, but in the brave men who had done the fighting and should not be let down. By that speech he made Tunis a French protectorate, to the annoyance of the Italians. Then he set about forming the Ministry that at last would really represent the Republican party.

Gambetta had planned to gather together the great men of the party in his Cabinet. Léon Say would be Minister of Finance; Ferry, of Education; De Freycinet, of Public works. But none of them would join him. In hopes, before its formation, his Ministry had been spoken of as the "Great Ministry." Now it was spoken of by the same name in disdain, and by that name has gone down into history. Curiously enough, it deserves it, for it contained Paul Bert, the great educator, physiologist, and Governor of Indo-China as Minister of Education; Waldeck-Rousseau, later the leader of the Paris bar, and the Premier who saved the Republic at the time of the Dreyfus Case as Minister of Interior. Among the under-secretaries were Félix Faure, later President of the Republic and Maurice Rouvier, who piloted France through the Boulanger and Algeciras crises. But the powers of all were unknown except those of Paul Bert, which were distrusted.

However, if the Great Ministry seemed composed of unknown men, it had a known program, which it intended to achieve by Executive leadership. That was Gambetta's Radical program that he had expounded at Belleville in 1869, and in the Dauphiny in 1872. The Ministry started out by creating, legally enough, but by decree, two new ministries, Agriculture and Fine Arts. It survived the vote on that; but never again, legal though it is, has any new Ministry been created by decree without the Chamber's being consulted. Then the Budget Committee showed that it had learned the tricks Gambetta had taught it when he was a President of the Chamber rebelling against the Executive. Now that he was the Executive, he was in turn rebelled against. The English found themselves about to get into

the same kind of trouble in Egypt that France had been in in Tunis, and asked the French, who also held the bonds on which the Egyptian Government was defaulting, if they would join in too. Gambetta accepted the invitation, and there was an outcry. He had taught the Chamber all the lessons that De Broglie had taught the National Assembly about the restraint of the Executive, and the Chamber taught him in turn, just as the National Assembly had De Broglie, that it had to be consulted, too, even if the teacher headed the Executive.

In January Gambetta turned to what seemed the first part of his program, finishing the work of making France a Republic by removing those two stumbling blocks: the semi-Conservative Senate and the district instead of department-wide elections. His plan was to "make a trip to Versailles," give the larger communes more votes in the electoral colleges, and stop electing life senators, in their place electing 75 by vote of the National Assembly, for nine years. That would give the good effects of nationally chosen senators, and not the bad ones. As for the department-wide election, he intended to write that into the constitution too. But, not trusting the Chamber or the Senate once they got to Versailles, he moved that the very bill that ordered the constitutional vote would limit what could be voted on at Versailles to those two measures. The committee to which this was referred reported against it, saying that the National Assembly could not be bound. Gambetta stood out against this, thinking he could carry the Chamber when it was in Paris, but not at Versailles, and was beaten. The Great Ministry had lasted six weeks. Parliament, having refused to be led by the President of the Republic, now refused to be led by the President of the Council, even if Gambetta were he.

But that did not mean that Parliament would not carry out its pledges. It was one thing for the Chamber to refuse to be under the thumb of any man; it was another thing not to keep faith with the voters. With Paul Bert and Ferry act-

ing together, there was no more nonsense, and education became free, obligatory (in that one had to pass Government examinations, though one might be taught where one chose), and lay. That set up an army of teachers who, though underpaid, were the loyal servants of the Republic that paid them, unlike the clerics who had partially preceded them. There are still Church schools in France, but only in the Catholic West are they common. It is hard to ask a Frenchman to pay twice, once in taxes and once in fees, for one education. "Freedom" of education is a great weapon for the Republic.

There was another pledge to be carried out. The Army bill of 1872 had made a middle- and lower-class Army to fight for the upper and upper middle classes. The law of 1882 saw to it that all Frenchmen served, with no more lucky numbers, and that those who escaped with only one year of service because they were receiving higher education put in a real year of service and got real higher education. Scholars and priests entered the ranks and no longer were accused of slinking off to universities and seminaries. These were parts of Gambetta's Belleville and Dauphiny programs.

The Chamber could do things, even if the ministers could not. Still, good ministers would be an addition. The conciliatory De Freycinet declined an English invitation to occupy Egypt jointly, and France saw Egypt become an English protectorate because their Chamber had not had courage. In six months De Freycinet's government faded away, and a M. Duclerc took his place, to fade away in another six months. It did seem as if something was seriously wrong with the kind of Republic France had.

Déroulède was worried over this, and felt it showed moral fault in France. He founded a League of Patriots, of which his admired Gambetta was a patron, and Paul Bert and Félix Faure were early members. This attempted, by meetings, pamphlets, and speeches, to arouse Frenchmen to taking their country seriously before it was too late.

It did seem to be getting late. In November, Gambetta,

now on the Army Committee of the Chamber, was experimenting with a new pattern of revolver. He was wounded in the hand, with some blood poisoning. As he was recovering, an "internal inflammation," as it was then called, set in, and he died a few moments after the new year of 1883 had come in. There were, of course, rumors about his death, and that Léonie Léon, whose relationship to him was not understood till after her death, had shot him. The fact was that he died of appendicitis, possibly brought on or aggravated by the blood poisoning. But the legend that was preferred at the time was that he had died as he had lived—trying to do something, no matter how little it was, for France, if not ruling her, then seeing that her soldiers had the best possible weapons.

Legend or no legend, France recognized that she had lost a great leader, and gave him a funeral worthy of a man who had served her wholeheartedly. Delegations from all the cities of France came. At their head were put delegations from the lost cities of Metz and Strasbourg that Gambetta, at least, had never deserted. His body was taken to that Père Lachaise that holds such strange bedfellows—Baudin, for whom Gambetta spoke, Thiers, and the last of the Communards. But he was not buried there. His father said that no Republic that had treated his son so ill could have his son's body, and Gambetta was buried in his father's home, Nice.

Later, his father relented; and, though Gambetta's body still lies in Nice, his heart, which really belongs to France, is among the other treasures in the Pantheon.

Gambetta gone, there seemed only one leader left in France, Ferry; and when the Duclerc Ministry fell and a Fallières Ministry lasted only three weeks, Grévy had to call him to office. This second Ferry Ministry was a truly great one, with Waldeck-Rousseau as Minister of the Interior, and Jules Méline as Minister of Agriculture. It finished redeeming the election pledges. Waldeck-Rousseau carried through a Law of Associations that at the same time

legalized trade-unions and social clubs, subject to police permit, and set corporation law right. Méline encouraged agriculture and built up tariffs and organizations to help it. The department-wide elections were at last put through by a simple law. The law giving life tenure to judges was suspended long enough to remove certain notorious anti-Republicans, then reimposed to protect good judges.

More than that, the constitution was straightened out and certain vestiges of the "Moral Order" removed. As if to celebrate the death of the Count of Chambord and consequent combination of the Royalist parties, a trip to Versailles was made in August 1884. The life senators were abolished, the vacancies at the death of each being given to the under-represented urban districts. The last life senator was M. de Marciere, who died in 1917. The composition of the Senate was taken out of the constitution and left to Parliament's discretion, the Senate being perfectly able to protect itself. Two symbolic clauses were passed. The January prayers for the Parliament, so ostentatiously put in to show that France had a clerical government, were as ostentatiously taken out to show that France had an anti-clerical government. A clause forbidding proposing any form of government other than a Republican was put in. That is meaningless, for all that a National Assembly need do to found a kingdom would be, first, to delete that clause, and then to found a kingdom; it would, under the Republic's own constitution, only prolong the Republic an hour or so. But as a symbol it was a clear demonstration of what the Reforming Chamber thought it stood for.

Typically, the National Assembly preferred to accept leadership from within, not without. It shouted Ferry out of the Tribune without a hearing, and added to his text of amendments one its committee preferred, prohibiting any member of a family that had ruled over France becoming President.

Ferry did still another thing for France. Before his day, Indo-China had been a faraway drain on the French

treasury. When in 1874 Captain Francis Garnier with one gunboat and 200 men had forced the Emperor of Annam to accept a protectorate, De Broglie had at once weakened that protectorate. But when Captain de Rivière was killed, in 1883, enforcing France's rights, Ferry acted. He asserted the rule of France over Tonkin, to the north of Annam, over which the Annamese were trying, and failing, to rule.

The Chinese claimed that, as they had a shadowy suzerainty over Annam, they were suzerain over Tonkin. "Black Flags," Chinese guerrillas, drifted into Tonkin, and were driven out by French troops. This cost money, won by dribbets from the Chamber against the protests of Clemenceau. Clemenceau had gained the name of the Tiger from his habit of clawing at Ministries to make them behave and clawing them down out of office if they did not. If he were contradicted he would fight duels, and, having a name for being a dead shot with a pistol, he was listened to with respect, in Parliament and out. But the Ferry Ministry would not fall, and would not be Radical enough for him, would not show him respect. So, day in, day out, he dueled with it, vituperating it from the Tribune. Meanwhile in Tonkin the fighting went on, turned into a full-dress war with China, and became less popular. When De Rivière had been killed in an ambush, many Parisians had gone into mourning, but the mood of the city had changed. Paris had called Ferry "Ferry the Starver" when he had been Mayor of Paris, and "Ferry the Tunisian" when he was first Premier. Now they called him "the Tonkinese," and added to that a worse name, "the Prussian," saying that he was wasting France's strength and her soldiers' lives half a world away, instead of preparing to get Alsace-Lorraine back. When in 1885 the news came that at Laong-son, close by where De Rivière and Garnier had died, the French had been beaten again, Ferry's request for still more money was howled down. The Tiger struck. In his pocket Ferry had a dispatch saying that the Chinese were about to sign peace, and that Laong-son did not matter. But to reveal

that dispatch would be to reveal that Sir Robert Hart, the English supervisor of the Chinese customs, was acting as go-between, and would be a breach of faith that might prevent the Chinese from signing. Ferry made no such breach. The Chamber howled, the mob "out in the street" howled too, and for safety Ferry had to be taken out a back door, badly defeated in a Chamber he had ruled for two years. Henri Brisson, the President of the Chamber, formed a government to carry on till the elections were over, Charles Floquet becoming President of the Chamber. At those elections it would be decided what the country felt about the work of the Reforming Chamber.

That October the Nation gave its opinion, in no uncertain terms. As the Republic rested on the will of the people, to be a true democracy that will had to be free, even to the extent of allowing the people to vote the Republic out of existence. They nearly did. At the first balloting, on Sunday, October 4, 177 Conservatives were elected and only 129 Republicans. This was the worst setback the Republic had had since its founding. Had the trend continued at the second balloting, the Republic would have foundered then and there; but in the runoff election of Sunday, October 18, only 25 Conservatives and 243 Republicans were elected. At first sight it might seem as if the law of 1873 for double elections, designed to give the divided Conservatives a chance to unite against the united Republicans, had now spoiled the chances of the united Conservatives to defeat the divided Republicans. But there was more to it than that. The law allowed testing out how each district felt on great questions more accurately than a plain yes or no would. This election illustrated very well the uncanny ability of the French election system to obtain a representative Parliament.

At the first ballot, the Conservatives showed that, with the deaths of the Prince Imperial in Zululand in 1879 and of the Count of Chambord in Austria in 1883, leaving the Count of Paris the only real candidate for the throne, there

was no need to carry their divisions to a second ballot. They could unite to protect what they thought valuable in French life. It had been alarming to see judges dismissed from life-tenure posts when life tenure had been the guarantee of their integrity. It had been alarming to see age-old schools run by famous teachers closed by the enforcement of an obsolete law to secure aims Parliament would not enact. It had been alarming to see the financial surpluses of the National Assembly turned into deficits by expenditures that were of doubtful benefit to the public, even if of real benefit to politicians and their friends. It had been alarming to see the educated classes shoved into the barracks with doubtful benefit either to the Army or the newly conscripted educated classes. The measure of these alarms was the addition of 1,000,000 votes to the Conservatives.

But, just as the first ballot had allowed a dramatic presentation of the union of the Conservatives under the Count de Mackau, and of popular alarm over an upheaval in French society, it also allowed the dominant Republicans to air their differences. The Moderates felt that Liberation and such Reform as had been achieved were enough. But the Radicals felt that opportunism meant procrastination and stopping too soon, and that deputies who had been good enough to beat the Marshal with in 1877, now needed gingering up or replacing. As Paul Bert had answered an appeal for Republican Union, there were Republicans for whom one would work hard in districts where the point was to defeat a Conservative, whom one would oppose in departments where Radicalism had a chance. Throughout the Nation, the first ballot in 1885 was a great test of the strength of Radicalism, to find out how various departments stood on the issues of the day. That explained why in 28 departments, including Paris, no deputies were elected at the first ballot, and why in 21 more there were vacancies to be filled. What happened in Paris exemplifies what went on. That city, which in July 1871 had elected Monarchists and followers of Thiers, which in 1876 had chosen Clemen-

ceau to be chairman of its City Council, in 1885 could not make up its mind, but clearly did not have a plurality of Radicals. To run Radicals at the second ballot would be dangerous, as Conservatives rather than Moderates might get in. In Paris the Radicals withdrew; it was the Var that elected Clemenceau. Though there had been union at the second ballot, the differences in the Republican party had been brought out, and aired democratically, not smothered in party loyalty.

The result of this election of October 4 and October 18 was to send to the Chamber from each department, deputies who represented that department's ideas on what the Reforming Chamber had done to the Institutions of France. Now it remained for that Parliament and its successors to decide whether to go on with Reform, to stop as things were with Liberation, or to go back to "Moral Order." If the Republic was to survive, the "democratic process" would have to be applied, the Nation making up its mind by Parliamentary and national discussion whether the Institutions of France, particularly the Army and the Church, could exist alongside the new democratic Republic, without change either in the institutions or in the Republic. Force might be a weapon of the Conservatives; it could not for the Republicans.

Thus it was that the election of 1885 set the stage for a fifteen-year struggle in which France had to apply her new democracy she had just created.



Chapter Ten

WHAT WAS FRENCH DEMOCRACY?

AT THIS stage in France's history it is worth while to pause and re-examine the structure that had been built up from the chaos of the Government of National Defense and Gambetta's Dictatorship at Tours to the completed machine that in 1885 was engaged in registering the will of the French people. What was French democracy? How did it work?

The short answer would be that France had the machinery of a most efficient dictatorship, one that Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini would envy, on top of which dictatorship sat a manhood-suffrage Parliament that was very efficient at seeing to it that the potential dictatorship did not get above itself. As the average opinion in the manhood-suffrage Parliament came close to being the average opinion of the French people, French democracy approached the paradox of a nation's not minding a dictatorship because the whole nation dictated to itself only what it really wanted to do anyway. But an explanation of the workings of French democracy that consists of a picture of a cross-section of France, in the persons of 600-odd deputies at the Palace Bourbon, and exactly 300 senators (314 when Alsace-Lorraine came back) at the Luxembourg making sure that a potential dictatorship seated at the Elysée Palace did nothing that it was not wanted to do is so different from usual notions that it needs expansion and defense.

First of all for the potential dictatorship seated at the Elysée Palace. Under the Constitution of 1875 and the laws of France, all executive power was vested in the President of the French Republic. That executive power was no idle thing. The President had at his orders every policeman in France, from the smallest hamlet to the great Parisian police force. Almost every court had its public prosecutor, or state solicitor, and the President also appointed magistrates and judges. Besides having under him the normal and multifarious services of the Ministry of Finance and other such central ministries, the President made treaties and could call to the colors, on land and on sea, all Frenchmen between the ages of 18 and 45, which last power he could use, and did use, in time of peace as well as in time of war. A glance at the decrees daily published in the *Journal Officiel* will show the wide scope of the executive powers in France. It was this vast range of powers that President Thiers used to pull France together so miraculously in 1871. The existence of these powers made dictatorship an immediate possibility at any moment. That is why the sixteenth of May, 1877, when President MacMahon tried to gather those powers into his hands, was considered an attempted *coup d'état*.

However, there was a catch to all this. No action of the President was legal unless countersigned by a minister. If the President could command his ministers, as did Thiers, then he had, in fact, all the powers he certainly had in theory. But if the ministers commanded the President, then it was they who had the power. The dictatorship was still seated at the Elysée Palace, because it was there that the Council of Ministers met to issue decrees; but the dictator was not the President of the Republic, but the President of the Council of Ministers, if he was a strong man, or the Council of Ministers collectively, if he was not. This contest between the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers for the actual executive power was reflected in the ambiguities of the Wallon Constitution, and in the impor-

tance of the Sixteenth of May as an interpretation of those ambiguities.

The Wallon Constitution, as M. Wallon so carefully pointed out, was "the organization of the provisional," and did not proclaim the Republic, but merely constituted it. On the one hand it left the President the possibility of actually commanding the Army, on which he insisted; the power of making treaties and keeping them secret; the power of appointing ministers and all other officials; the power of sending written messages to Parliament; the power of suspending the sessions of Parliament, and with the Senate, of dissolving the Chamber of Deputies; and in two ways recognized that all these actions might be personal decisions of the President. It was left open, as M. Wallon explicitly stated, to revise the constitution, which until 1880 only the President could suggest, and by so revising it, as M. Wallon did not state, to transform the Republic into a monarchy, in which a king would naturally have such powers. Furthermore, the President could be impeached by the Chamber before the Senate for high treason, a further recognition of his personal responsibility. But, on the other hand, not only had all the actions of the President to be countersigned by a minister; but the President, except for impeachment for high treason, was made legally irresponsible. As can be seen, that left open the question whether the President was the driving force of the Executive, or a figurehead who did no more than keep a meeting place for the Council of Ministers, and act as clerk to attest to the documents they issued.

In actual practice, however, the question was settled very definitely. Vestiges remained to the President of the powers that Thiers and MacMahon had wielded, and a deft President could make use of them if he did not overstep the bounds set up to limit Thiers and MacMahon. But those limiting devices almost completely transferred the dictatorial powers that existed in France from the President of the Republic to the Council of Ministers. When France was

transformed into a dictatorship in 1940, the dictator was not President Lebrun, but President of the Council Pétain.

The President sat with the Council of Ministers because that is what Thiers did. But because Thiers could talk the National Assembly into doing things which on sober second thought it felt it had not wanted to do, the President was not allowed to address the Parliament. Because MacMahon, on the other hand, could recall the Assembly to its senses by a written message, the President was allowed to send written messages, but no President used that power except once, in June 1924, because ever since the Marshal with tears in his eyes had to sign the message that Dufaure put before him, the ministers took responsibility for every message from the President except that of resignation—and what is the use of ministers' putting words in the President's mouth that they can speak themselves? The treaty-making power remained, and that was not used except for gaining secrecy, because Parliament was perfectly ready to go back on treaties of which it did not know. During the Great War some vestiges of the command of the Army on which Marshal MacMahon had so insisted did reappear, but were not important.

Under the constitution the President did appoint Ministers. But ever since the famous Sixteenth of May that brought into the open the conflict between President and Parliament, that power, too, was circumscribed. From then on, as every action of the President, except resignation, had to be countersigned, the appointment of the next President of the Council had to be countersigned by the outgoing one, who by that took technical responsibility to Parliament. It was the appointment of De Broglie by the countersignature by the Duke Decazes, the Foreign Minister, as much as the self-dismissal of Jules Simon, that had unleashed the storm in 1877. That implied that the President could pick and choose who would be in his Council of Ministers, could hold over certain men from Cabinet to Cabinet, and could create a personal and almost irremovable Cabinet as against

the one responsible to Parliament. Since then the rule has rigorously been followed that the outgoing President of the Council goes through the formality of commissioning the incoming one, and that the new President of the Council commissions the rest of the Council. The President of the Republic might, and often did, see to it that men stayed in office, but such holdovers had to be ratified by Parliament.

That left to the President of the Republic, for all the structure set up by the Constitution of 1875, only the powers of advice and resignation. All the other independent powers it was thought he might have, had disappeared. France could not be ruled without a President, because without him power could not be transferred from Ministry to Ministry. But that, except again for the advice he might give during the meetings of the Council of Ministers, was all he was good for. The presidency was not a job for any man who wanted to be a driving force. It was a respected job—far more so than those not in France realized; it had possibilities, as Poincaré and Millerand were to show when they became President; but Clemenceau really almost added a clause to the constitution by his phrase about Carnot: "Vote for the most stupid."

As the President was essential, there were clauses in the constitution for making sure France had a President, prescribing his election by joint ballot of Senate and Chamber sitting as a National Assembly in the safety of Versailles, lest a directly elected President behave as did Napoleon III and seize power; and lest, as did happen at Carnot's election, with the threat of revolt if Ferry were chosen, Paris mobs affect the election. Since 1884, it was forbidden to revise the constitution to make the Republic a monarchy, nor could a member of a family that had ruled over France be elected President, as the Duke d'Aumale might have been. If the President served out his full term, a new President had to be chosen in the month before the term ended. If a President resigned or died, the Council of Ministers collectively exercised the presidential powers till there was a new President.

That last clause seemed almost to assert that in truth the Council of Ministers was the true executive power.

Legally, the Council of Ministers was co-ordinate with the President; actually it was almost supreme as far as the two parts of the executive went. When Parliament was out of session during the summer, the Council was supreme under the laws, and if Parliament allowed it could be supreme during the session. French laws were drawn in general terms, to leave the minister discretion, which he was expected to use. By combining Ministries in one man's hands, semidictatorial powers might be set up. When Gambetta was at Tours, and at the same time was Minister of War and Minister of the Interior, he hardly needed to consult his colleagues. But that was during the Government of National Defense, and once the emergency was over his election decree got short shrift from the rest of the Government in Paris. Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes both combined the Interior and Public Worship when the laws of Association and Separation were matter for Executive handling; but the former had a great personal ascendancy over the Chamber, the latter co-operated with the Delegation of the Left. This is the lesson of Gambetta's "Great Ministry"—that the Chamber would work with a President of the Council, but it would not be driven by him no matter if he was Gambetta himself. The words in the constitution, "responsible before the Chambers," Parliament took very seriously and enforced to the utmost. In the constitutional evolution of the Third Republic power did not merely pass from the President of the Republic to the Council of Ministers; it went further and passed from the Council of Ministers to Parliament whenever Parliament chose to ask for it. In France Parliament was effectively sovereign and Ministers its servants, sometimes privileged ones, sometimes not.

Traditionally, in the books on political science, the means by which any Parliament controls the Executive is the power of the purse. That did lie in the background in France; but only once in French history was it nakedly used. That was

when Gambetta, as chairman of the Budget Committee, refused to discuss any budget with De Broglie or with Rochebouet, and granted Dufaure only monthly installments till he had proved his good behavior. It was often, however, used for bargaining purposes. The Budget Committee, ever since Gambetta first took its chairmanship and fought the Marshal that way, fought ding-dong battles with the Finance Minister.

The real means of day-to-day control, which proved sufficient since 1878, came from French Parliamentary methods, inherited from the monarchies of 1815 to 1830 and 1830 to 1848, if not far earlier. From start to finish a Ministry was made to remember its responsibility. The means by which Parliament so exercised its control were: requiring a declaration of policy at the outset of a Ministry or at the beginning of each session of Parliament; the removal of functions from the Ministry to a committee; and constant votes on policy, either in the almost daily voting of "orders of the day," or after "interpellations," at both of which times precise formulations of intention could be demanded and secured. All these methods have proved themselves effective in controlling Ministries from the days of the National Assembly to the present.

When a Ministry first presented itself to Parliament, it had to declare what its policy was. In history five Ministries failed to meet that test and dissolved at their first meeting with the Chamber: the famous "fighting" Rochebouet Ministry of 1877, the Ribot Ministry of 1914, the Marsal Ministry of 1924, the Herriot Ministry of 1926, and the Buisson Ministry of 1935. Other Ministries have come close enough to failure to be forced to walk warily, notably Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau's in 1899.

Being in office did not mean being in power. Ministries might propose, but the Chamber disposed, either through committees or by itself. When Grévy "replastered" the Dufaure Ministry, the subsequent Ministries may have administered, but the Committees of the Chamber legislated. Then

when the chosen of the Chamber, Gambetta, became President of the Council at last, it was a committee, the one to which his bill on the amendment of the constitution was referred, that brought him down. De Broglie first used this weapon in pulling Thiers down out of power with his Committee of Thirty. Much of the unwritten French constitution is his work. It was the committees from within the Chamber, just as much as the Ministries superimposed on it, that guided the Chamber. The same was true of the Senate.

After that, however, it was not only committees that pulled Ministries down. The Chamber itself could, too. Every day the Chamber, after debate or without debate, decided whether or not it would go on with the "order of the day" as it had planned. If it wanted to, it could "declare urgency" and take up something else or pass a measure with one reading instead of three. In the process of passing on to the order of the day, Chamber and Senate might simply go on with it, or might, and often did, give reasons "motivating" the order of the day. The Ministry was sometimes asked whether or not it wished the vote to be one of confidence, sometimes the order of the day was so phrased that it had to stand or fall by the vote. Sometimes a choice was made among orders of the day—when the first Ferry Ministry fell there was some twenty orders of the day proposed. In a month a French Ministry might have to face as many votes of confidence as an English government would in a year.

On orders of the day the Ministry might on the whole pick its ground. But there were also questions. The ordinary question simply called for an answer from the minister concerned. When written questions were allowed, no minister failed to have forced in upon him the fact that he was "individually" responsible to the Chambers. But it was possible either to "interpellate"—that is, ask a question that was followed by a debate—or to transform, with the Chambers' consent, a question into an interpellation. That power of the Chamber to intervene kept ministers on their toes. It was at

the first session of the National Assembly, in the full tide of adulation of Thiers, that the Assembly "motivated" the resolution of appointment of Thiers as President, by the words that, if any, summed up the Bordeaux Compact, giving the conditions on which Thiers became President. De Broglie used interpellations and motivated orders of the day to get rid of "artichoke leaves," just as, in July 1871, Jules Favre was ushered out of political life by an order of the day. As for the Tiger, interpellations were his favorite means of clawing Ministries down out of office.

Yet, though the Chamber, by plucking off ministers from a Cabinet the way diners take leaves off the artichokes on their plates, might dismember Ministries before it destroyed them, it had another habit, of allowing holdovers. Delcassé held the Foreign Ministry for more than six consecutive years; André was Minister of War for five, as was De Freycinet. Along with constant control the Chamber allowed consistent policy in various departments. It was then the true sovereign in France. What the Chamber voted was done.

There was, of course, the Senate. With its forty-year age requirement and nine-year term, it was a house for elder statesmen, or aged politicians, and was intended as a balance between President and Chamber. It also had its functions as a high court. It had legislative powers, too, and because its electoral colleges were loaded in favor of the country districts, it had a restraining effect on the Chamber. It held up Article VII of Ferry's education law for three years; it held up an income tax for nearly twenty years. It threw out the Bourgeois Ministry in 1896. But the Senate never succeeded in defeating any important measure that the Chamber really wanted passed, or in acting as the National Assembly intended it should. It chiefly acted as an excuse when the Chamber felt it had to pass something, but also did not want it enacted. When M. de la Rochette elected the Republican life senators, he ended the hope of a Conservative Senate. In the first place, the Senate had no

power of initiation of financial legislation, though it sometimes got away with amendments if the Chamber was in a hurry. Then at the very start even Dufaure refused to resign after a defeat by the Senate. No Ministry has dared stay in office after a defeat by the Chamber since De Broglie was defeated in the election of 1877. For the power of dissolution enjoyed jointly by Senate and President was exercised only that once, and was hardly thought of. Until it itself dissolved for its four-year elections, the Chamber was safe from all attacks. That was the Chamber's real strength; that in a contest with it the most a Ministry could hope for was a draw; the Chamber could not be defeated.

That is what made so important the guarantees of Parliament in the Constitution. Since the Sixteenth of May the Chamber did not need to fear dissolution. Parliament—that is, both Senate and Chamber—had to sit for five months every year and within one month after a general election. No adjournment did more than change the time at which Parliament sat; by the constitution Parliament had to sit for five months every year. If Parliament wanted to avoid a decision, it could allow its session to be suspended after that five months' period. More usually, there was an autumn session as well as a spring one. Martial law automatically called Parliament into session. With the immunities of Parliament, the freedom of speech on the floor and freedom from arrest during session, unless by vote of the Chamber of which the offender was a member, it was impossible to muzzle Parliament. If any subject reached Parliament, it had to be attended to.

But the protection of Parliament from the Executive was only part of its safeguards. Parliament was also protected from the people. True, one protection, an automatically Conservative Senate, was removed by the constitutional amendment of 1884, and even before that was limited by the determination to have the Chamber of Deputies supreme, as shown by Dufaure's refusal to resign after an adverse vote in the Senate. But another protection, the

staggered system of elections, still remained. The Senate, which still acted as a brake though not as a block, had its membership renewed every three years, but only by one-third, the voting in the electoral colleges taking place in January. The Chamber renewed itself every four years, the voting taking place usually in the spring to allow farmers to vote at a time when they were not too much occupied, though, thanks to the Sixteenth of May and World War I and World War II, there have been elections postponed to the autumn and alterations in the election law in 1898, 1919, and 1940. That averaging out the results of several elections to Senate and Chamber made, in effect, the decisions of the French Parliament a sort of appeal from Peter drunk—to Peter sober, the combination of the conclusions of the voters at four elections.

More than that, Parliament had other protections against hasty decisions of the people. These are all not written into the Constitution of 1875, but if one should ever speak of an "unwritten" French Constitution, they would form part of it. Throughout the history of the Third Republic there has been fear of the Executive on one side of Parliament, of the mob on the other. At one time a detective and twelve plain-clothes policemen were the only barriers between Boulanger and the Elysée; that and the time Roget steered Déroulède away from the head of his mob into the barrack yard were narrow enough squeaks for the Republic. There was a strong force of troops, the Republican Guard, of tough old noncommissioned officers, that usually spent its time wearing cock's-feather hats and escorting the President of the Republic as he went to and from functions. It was independent of the Prefect of Police, who, the head of the forces usually keeping order in Paris, is in turn independent of the Paris City Council, that body that once revolted in the Commune, and once, at the Sadi-Carnot election, vetoed the choice of a President of the Republic. But once people "went into the streets," and the mob was out, these hard-boiled ex-noncom-

missioned officers showed their mettle, that had been used on countless young recruits, and the mob was likely to think twice and go home. And if the inciter of the mob, some Déroulède, was so popular no Paris jury would convict, there was always the Senate sitting as a high court, with the latitude of judgment allowed bodies that hear impeachments to decide, not on the law, but on the merits of the case. Between Senate, Republican Guard, and the habit of going to Versailles to elect a President of the Republic, between elections Parliament was safe from hasty judgments by the people of France, for which they might be sorry later.

In fact, the only thing the Chamber of Deputies was not protected from seems to be itself. That is more significant, as there was no Bill of Rights at all in the Constitution of the Third Republic. However, the substitute for this, the guarantee of French democracy, the whole which made Gambetta accept the Constitution of 1875, was the direction that the Chamber must be elected by universal suffrage. That made the Chamber representative of the whole nation, and in fact, the Senate became the same, more or less, after the abolition of the life senators, except that senatorial elections were loaded against the big cities, which made each Chamber merely a brake on the other by preventing the swamping of one by a sudden wave of emotion swamping all of Parliament. That, the representative Parliament dictating to the bureaucratic machine that in turn dictated to the people, would, if true, obviate the need of any Bill of Rights. What could possibly go wrong if all the dictatorship in France was the people dictating to themselves?

Here is ground on which it is dangerous to tread. The assertion that the French Parliament perfectly represented the French nation cannot be made. No political scientist would accept it for a moment; there are too many doubtful points about any election machinery. No French politician would accept it for a moment. He knows of too much, or thinks he knows of too much, that the people wanted but that Parliament did not give them. However, it may be sug-

gested that the French Parliament, if not ideally, at least for practical purposes, did represent the French nation as no other body could. The argument for that is an argument by elimination. France tolerated constant checking on her government's actions, even constant overthrowing of Ministries. She would only tolerate this if the body that did the overthrowing truly represented her. Therefore, for practical purposes, that body, which was Parliament, may be assumed truly to have represented her.

That assumption would then suggest that each vote of the Chamber as a whole was a referendum taken by a cross-section of the French nation, and that the constant votes of confidence and votes on policy in the Chamber were really miniature referenda. If this picture were completely true, France would represent the fulfillment of a democrat's dream—a Republic in which every question was decided by referendum and in which a dictatorship at once enforced the will of the people as soon as it had been declared.

Such a sweeping assumption requires an immediate check on it to see how true it can be. Such a check, it happens, can be provided, because the election system in France was different from that in England and America, to which most Americans are accustomed, and because in those very differences in electoral methods can be found reasons for thinking the French Parliament more truly representative than the English, or than our Congress.

The law of February 18, 1873, that restored the traditional second elections whenever there was no absolute majority at a first election, altered the French deputy's relation to his constituents from that of the English M.P. to his, or of our Congressman to his. In England and America, with only one ballot and a two-party system, the voter dares not vote for a third party, but must vote for one of the two candidates of the two major parties. That being so, the party machine may force its candidates on the constituency. All the voters can do is plump for the lesser of two evils. Doing anything else is throwing a vote away. This is true

in America, as has been shown by the failure of third-party movements, and is even more true in England. Consequently, an election is a referendum between two party machines. But in France there is no need for choosing between two evils. At the first ballot the voter can safely vote for the candidate he likes best, no matter what his chances are. If either the preferred candidate or someone else gets a majority anyway, it does not matter how the voter voted. If no one will get one, the whole district will know how many voters prefer which candidates, and the second ballot will take place, at which it will be possible for the constituency to make a choice, not between the two candidates imposed upon it by two major parties, but between those candidates who show that they have the most support.

Consequently, it may happen, for example, that two Radicals may sit side by side in Parliament, each elected by a second ballot, one because the Moderates in his district preferred him to a Socialist, the other because the Socialists in his district preferred him to a Moderate. As each will want to be re-elected, on certain issues they will vote differently, or if they do not, one will not be returned to the next Parliament. Average that sort of thing out, and the average of 600 or so men, each chosen not because he was of a particular party but because, of all the candidates in his constituency, he could amass the most support, should come close to being the average of France. It may be suggested that French democracy is mathematically certain to work, and provides a good approximation to a referendum or a public-opinion poll.

So far the theory of the Chamber as a cross-section seems to fit the facts of French politics by fitting in with the peculiarly French (actually peculiarly European) election methods.¹ If this theory has validity, it also should be able to

¹ The word "ballotage" is often used in political science textbooks to describe such election methods. Technically that is incorrect. Ballotage is a runoff between those two candidates at the top of the list. The French system permits as many candidates as want to run at the

furnish an explanation of the French party system, which is so different from the Anglo-Saxon one. The explanation it suggests is not altogether to the credit of Anglo-Saxon parties, as tested by the opinion of the great Anglo-Saxon apostle of the party system, Edmund Burke. In his "Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents," Burke said, "Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed," and has pointed out that, with the attainment of the principle, the cause for the party's existence has ended. To party, in that sense, Burke opposed "faction" or "connexion," "the mean and interested struggle for place and emoluments." A French party is a true party by Burke's definition, because it is a common agreement to vote together in Parliament as long as one can agree upon a spokesman and a policy, and a common agreement to electioneer together during the election and pool votes. It is not an agreement to get office, because accepting office outside of the Cabinet (and ambassadorships) put a deputy out of Parliament. As individuals, French deputies wielded much patronage in their districts, but party patronage was at a minimum, thus differing widely from England and America. As a result of this situation there were three sets of parties: one in the Senate, one in the Chamber, and one at the elections. There were, it is true, overlappings. There were Socialists and radicals in Senate, Chamber, and elections. But the Democratic Alliance in the elections fed into different parties in Senate and Chamber, some of whose members had not had the support of the Democratic Alliance.

The doctrinaire parties, Socialists and then Communists, kept party discipline in Parliament because the party machine could take votes away from deputies by reading them out of the party. At that, there were now and then parties

second election; it sometimes happens that votes are pooled on a man who runs third or lower, or that a new compromise candidate is put up, and wins.

split off from Socialism and Communism. It also lost votes, though not so many, to go against the Radical machine. But the rest of the deputies formed groups at will and when they had been beaten, were likely to form almost the same group but use a different name, just to avoid the stigma of the previous defeat. The Progressives called themselves the Republic Union and the Republican Federation, after bad defeats. The parties in Senate and Chamber behaved as the parties did in the National Assembly. They met, decided what to do, as did the Target Republicans before the fall of Thiers, the De Marcère Left Center during the making of the Constitution, and voted accordingly. The party might split up, as did the Monarchist Reunion des Reservoirs, over some new policy of their leaders. The parties might work together, as did the Left and Right Centers during the making of the constitution; and now and then, the committee that won an election might, like the Delegation of the Left, last on till it had ensured the legislation it won the election to get. But the party system, in France, seemed to be part of the machinery of the Chamber, by which the Chamber reached a collective decision, not a form of control over the Chamber.

It was the Chamber as a whole that made up its mind. Any analysis of votes shows that deputies of every party voted against their party. It was the Chamber as a whole that, at a secret ballot, at each session elected its President. It was the Chamber as a whole that the President of the Chamber "consulted," as the official records put it, whether or not to put a question of urgency ahead of the normal order of the day, whether or not to transform a question into an interpellation, whether to "give priority" to such and such an order of the day over such and such another one in the voting. The Chamber and the Senate, which worked much the same way, could not act as a whole in this efficient way if they had not had flexible Parliamentary methods, that were applied in such a way as to enable those bodies to make

up their collective minds both rapidly and yet genuinely, and free from outside pressure or "railroading" tactics.

Because France had a Parliament like this, dependent on all sorts of winds and currents of public opinion, in the Third Republic a curious Parliamentary world sprang up. If a political scientist described its actions, he would write much as a psychiatrist would when describing the workings of a mind, telling how and why many petty details fused into one decision. Any who are interested in such things and want to see how France's Parliament made up its mind may read André Siegfried's *Tableau de l'Ouest*, and see how the varied constituencies throughout Normandy, Brittany, Touraine, and Gascony chose men to do their will at Paris, and why those constituencies chose as they did. But there is little need for the ordinary person to speak of parts of a single person's mind, or parts of a French Parliament. A human's mind is one personality; the same was true of French Parliaments, which had names, indeed. The Chamber of 1877 was the Liberating Chamber; of 1881 the Reforming Chamber; that of 1919 the Horizon Blue one; one Chamber, that of 1885, was named from the strong and well-disciplined minority of Conservatives that gave it a special character. Others have been known from the majorities that saw to it that the general course of action was followed: the famous Bloc of the Left of 1902, the National Bloc of 1919, the First Cartel of 1924, the National Union of 1928, the Second Cartel of 1932, the Popular Front of 1936.

The separate men who made up these Parliamentary personalities naturally were professionals or semiprofessionals at following the people, and at doing and receiving favors. They had their special press almost—many a paper thrived because it influenced a few Parliamentarians; many an editor played a leading part, not because the people read what he had to say, but because the people's representatives took his hints. And, naturally, many professionals at the political game made their living by it. Editors frankly sold their pens;

politicians less frankly sold their votes. Certain social gatherings, from time to time, such as those at the house of Madame Adam, molded events in those details about which the people of France concerned themselves little. But for all the curses that anti-Parliamentarians have hurled against these Parliamentary cliques, it must be remembered that every four years every deputy had to be re-elected and had to represent his constituency. A senator was safer in going against the people's will, but then the Senate did not dare fight the Chamber—the Chamber was the true seat of power. Of course, the accusation is true that Parliament was corrupt. Corruption has existed in every form of government known. But even if Parliament may have represented the French People imperfectly in some ways, it did so about as adequately as any governing body has in the history of man. It should be judged by how well it carried out its task.

Leaving aside questions of how much better or worse other representative bodies have represented their constituents, and whether or not representative government is the best form of government, one matter of interest is the important part Presidents of the Chamber and Senate played in French life. Those two men, elected at the beginning of each session for the whole of it, were essential to the proper functioning of the French Parliamentary system. When Gambetta sat facing the Liberating Chamber, when Henri Brisson faced the Reforming Chamber, President combined with Chamber, in some ways being more important than the ministers who sat on the bench to the side, ready to intervene in debates but also to take their orders from their master. Something of a Chamber's spirit may be gauged by its choice of a leader. The dynamic Gambetta inspirited the easy-going Liberating Chamber; the kindly, lovable Henri Brisson saw to it that the Reforming Chamber kept within bounds. Sarcastic Charles Floquet commanded the battles of the Chamber of the Conservatives; serene Charles Dupuy more fitted the halcyon days of the 1890's. And when charm-

ing Paul Deschanel came on the scene, he brought a mellowness to Parliamentary life that fitted the days of his rule, but justified his supersession by Léon Bourgeois and Brisson when Church and state came to blows. As for Édouard Herriot, the schoolmaster and scholar who ruled the First Cartel and the Popular Front—he embodied those two popular movements far more truly than any President of the Council. Normally the President of the Chamber, and this is also true of the President of the Senate, stayed in the background. But the two Presidents were pillars of the state, advisers of the President of the Republic when there was need of wise, impartial advice on appointments, emergency Presidents of the Council when a man whom all trusted was needed, and frequent successors to the President of the Republic. But if not great leaders, they were great institutions. A bitter word from Floquet, a hint from Deschanel, might turn events, and their decisions frequently did. Presidents of the Chamber ruled over no awed House of Commons that fears the Speaker and his great wig. At times even Gambetta would ring his bell in vain for order, and be forced to put on his hat, rise, and suspend the sitting till men's tempers would cool. But the Presidents, facing the rough-and-tumble of Parliament, performed a great task in enabling the will of 600 to become one will and let a cross-section of the Nation speak for the Nation.

For French democracy was a perpetual averaging process. Ideas were thrashed out in the press, the freest in the world—too free, according to the much-maligned Casimir-Perier—in which libel suits were a joke. Ideas were thrashed out in the party machines of the Socialists, the Radicals, and the Democratic Alliance. Finally, ideas were brought to the Tribune of the Senate, and especially of the Chamber, and presented to a cross-section of France to vote on. Just as the ministers were collectively and individually responsible to Parliament, so were the members of Parliament individually responsible to their constituencies. As the sum of their constituencies is France, they were collectively responsible

to France. The wheel swung full circle—the dictatorship at the Elysée was responsible to the Luxembourg and especially to the Palace Bourbon, and Luxembourg and especially the Palace Bourbon were responsible to just the men over whom the dictatorship at the Elysée held sway. French democracy could be slow, because it takes time to educate a whole nation to a new idea, but then the Nation stayed educated. If it took nine years to separate Church and state, they stayed separated without bloodshed. The dictatorship was kept from being dictatorial. Yet in an emergency the dictatorship could act, and act hard, as it has often shown.

It is worth noting that this democratic control of dictatorship seemed able to exist in wartime. In the 1900's, when war with Germany began to loom up again, this was not believed possible. Amendments to the constitution were suggested, giving the Executive more power, and a decree of the Minister of War, Messimy, fused the functions in wartime of Chief of Staff and Generalissimo to centralize military authority and remove checks from it. This was found to be harmful, though fortunately partially remedied by the latent powers of the President as commander in chief, and was done away with. President Poincaré found that, though he of course did not actually command, as MacMahon had intended to, he could rouse Joffre to realizing the consequences of his actions by asking for explanations. Later on Poincaré, as the one fixed point in changes of Ministry and High Command, found also that he was able to pass on useful experience, and during the mutinies of 1917 probably saved the day. Parliament also took a hand. Committees forced ministers to be aware of their responsibility, and later went to the front and the industrial centers to see that underlings were also aware of their responsibilities. Only one war clause existed in the constitution, the one permitting secret sessions of either Chamber. Despite a belief that extra powers for the Executive would be needed, that clause alone seemed sufficient. The mishandling of the defense of Verdun in 1916 caused the invoking of that power; after that

Parliamentary control proved effective in instilling ardor in the Council of Ministers and the generals. In World War II it was also Parliamentary control that invigorated France's war effort.

Indeed, except for the need of keeping military secrets, there may have been no reason for this clause. In 1918 Clemenceau used to scorn secret sessions and speak directly to the Nation through the Chamber. Public triumphs over defeatism restored morale as no secret discussion could. In World War II, Reynaud at times tried this device, making use of the democratic control of a potential dictatorship to inspirit all of the democracy.

It is in its machinery, not its ends, that French democracy differed from ours. We have our Bill of Rights and local self-government. As Americans we make up our own minds and are on the whole independent of the state. A Frenchman, on the contrary, went as a child to a state school, used to worship in a church the state paid for, and later had his church kept out of his life by the state. Willy-nilly, he served in the National Army. As a citizen he was subject to summary arrest and a quick judicial procedure that would turn an American's hair. His life was of constant state interference, even though he learned how to handle government officials. But on the other hand he was free as no American was. His press could, in peace, tell him almost anything, the courts not seeming even to care if it was true or not. On full information the French could make up their mind, and to all the dictatorship exercised over them they had an answer: they were voters, and would see their deputies. That was the paradox of French democracy—it was the democratic control of a dictatorship.

PART III

THE INSTITUTIONAL STAGE



Chapter Eleven

THE REPUBLIC IN DANGER

IF HISTORIANS used a spotlight to illuminate those on the stage of history who most deserved notice, when 1885 came around they would shift its beam from statesmen to soldiers. Till then the light would have been on an old man with spectacles who from the Tribune ruled a motley collection of nobles, lawyers, authors, doctors, and businessmen, running a sort of unintentional school for statesmen, with extra tuition for those who came to his house, the Préfecture at Versailles, after school hours. It would have been on a haughty duke, who from the Tribune tried to bring home a bearded exile; it would have been on a burly, commanding figure, an orator and an editor, who had once been a lawyer, then a dictator, on his way to being a leader of men, either from the Tribune or the presidential chair above the Tribune. In the next twenty years of the Republic, the light would be on three soldiers, a general who used to ride a coal-black charger at reviews, a spade-bearded poet and ex-officer who led mobs and belonged to the French Academy, and an artillery captain who would swelter in a tropical jail unjustly accused of treason.

However, though it would be tantalizing to turn from writing history to acting it on a marionette stage, that has not yet become practical. Put in terms of simple history, at about 1885 the Third Republic passed from the Constitu-

"Bourgeois Program" which the workingman's Popular Front had tried to enact. It was above all Herriot's France that was going down that day, the anti-clerical Jacobin France of the small businessman who ardently believed in free enterprise. Already the Jacobin slogan of *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, had been supplanted by *Labor, Family, Fatherland*. He symbolized what was going.

It was fitting, then, that he should lead its last sally. When Édouard Daladier, who represented the insufficient preparation of France, was accused of cowardice, Herriot sprang to his feet to his defense, pointing out that the Germans were keeping Daladier away. It was fitting that the last National Assembly should stand by its old ways. It saw to it that its meeting was public, and duly recorded. It used for the last time the committee, the device of De Broglie, Gambetta, Jaurès, and the Popular Front, to amend the proposals of the Executive. That committee kept at least the name of democracy by insisting that Pétain's new constitution be referred to the people and to his new corporative bodies for ratification. It was little to turn to the plebiscite so favored of dictators or to their controlled advisory bodies to limit dictatorship, but it was a last blow.

On its deathbed, French democracy showed how ingrained were its ways of making the Executive feel its responsibility to the Nation. Likewise, by making its debates public, it till the last saw to it that when the Nation made up its mind, it had the opportunity of knowing the truth, and had not been deluded. In its death, it proved itself a democracy still; for a democracy, in which the people (or *demos*) may rule (or *kratein*) as they will, two things are obviously essential. One is that the rule is effective, not blocked by individual wills. The other is that the will is honestly that of the people, not foisted upon them. Without responsibility of the government to the people, and free choice of action by the people, no democracy can exist.

That was proved the next day. Albert Lebrun, unlucky like the other re-elected President of France, Jules Grévy,

the globe. But the army officer of the revision by the Commission of Marquises was a man with a definite political creed and a higher average social position than his predecessor, and the private of the law of 1872, and especially of the stiffened law of 1882, was every healthy Frenchman. When a new generation of young men began coming out of the Army back into civil life, two things were clear about them: they were less Republican than when they went in, and they had had a tough time. When soldiers were put into the guardhouse for reading a Republican paper but not for reading a Royalist one, and when the Royalist vote rose by a million, it is hard to believe that the Republican paper was barred merely because it was a bad influence in discipline or that the army officers were out of politics. When men came to their homes with stories of no sanitation, bad food, and treatment such as one reads of in P. C. Wren's novels as meted out to the Foreign Legion, it is no wonder that deputies, who had to be sensitive to what the people wanted, began to take up army reform. This would be especially true of radical deputies.

Now, the direct road of legislating reform in the Army was difficult. It would be impossible to set up a commission of commoners to rectify the revisions made by the Commission of Marquises, for that commission had done an honest job by its lights, and where would the Army be if the promotion ladder were shaken? Just as it was being gotten ready for eventualities, just as France was ready to take her place again among the nations of the world was not the time for the successors of Gambetta to weaken the Army that might regain Alsace-Lorraine. As for detailed legislation about the treatment of private soldiers, that, too, was impossible. Legislation about sanitation or feeding that might be advanced could in a very short time become a clog on improvements and, worse, a clog on military action.

Such special legislation was not according to the French custom anyway. It was usually handled by an order by the

Minister of War if it were a matter of detail, or by a decree issued in the Council of Ministers if it were more important. The Minister of War was always a soldier—that, too, was a matter of custom. The result was that anyone who wanted to stop Royalism in the Army and introduce reforms had to find a general to do it.

One man in particular had both these aims, Georges Clemenceau. In the hectic political life after the election of 1885, he held a peculiar position. It was impossible, as long as Jules Grévy appointed to ministerial positions, for a Radical to gain office as long as anyone else could get a vote of confidence from the Chamber. And if a Radical did gain office, as Henri Brisson had, he could not be sure of holding it. Sooner or later the Royalists, now organized under the Count de Mackau, would cast all their 202 ballots against him, and be joined by a hundred or more Moderate Republicans; and out he would go. But likewise the 200 Radical votes could do the same. Clemenceau could promise not so much support as the refraining from pulling down. Though not in office, he, as the spokesman for most of the Radicals, could bargain for measures. One measure he did bargain for—a general as Minister of War who was not one of the regular conservatively inclined gang. He got his bargain in the person of General Boulanger, who had been demoted by the Commission of Marquises but promoted again for gallantry in the field in the Algerian revolt that occurred just after the Franco-Prussian War. Clemenceau's price was paid, and Boulanger became Minister of War.

Boulanger at once made a name for himself as a true Republican. In the Chamber, when asked what the troops would do at the strike in the Decazeville mine field, he answered: "Today the Army is the Nation. The workers, who were soldiers yesterday, need not fear the soldiers today, if they respect their duties to society while enforcing their rights. . . . The Army takes no sides." That was a new

sort of talk to hear from a general, so many of whom had made their names by shooting Frenchmen.

Not only would Boulanger protect the common man; he would not tolerate privilege. When, in May 1886, the daughter of the Count of Paris married the Crown Prince of Portugal, the wedding was used as a Royalist demonstration. Royalist papers were at pains to point out that diplomats had attended the wedding, as if it were one of reigning royalty, and suggested that what France really needed was there, waiting for it. As this coincided with other Royalist propaganda in the form of maps showing how her kings had built France up, piece by piece, whereas the Republic had not gained land but lost Alsace-Lorraine, De Freycinet had to answer questions in the Chamber and take action. The action taken was to pass a law exiling all pretenders to the throne at once, enabling the exile of other members of royal families by decree, and dismissing members of such families from the armed forces. This meant the dismissal of six officers, with Major-General the Duke d'Aumale at their head. D'Aumale wrote an intemperate public letter to the President of the Republic, claiming that the sacred law of 1832 that protected officers' commissions had been violated, for which he was at once exiled. It fell to Boulanger to answer the inevitable Royalist interpellation. He pointed out that as D'Aumale had entered the Army at fifteen, when the second son of the reigning king, it was not to his credit that he had become a general at twenty-one. According to Boulanger, it was D'Aumale who had violated the spirit of the law, for "one cannot be an officer unless after military training or winning the rank, knapsack on back." Again, that was the sort of thing the common people wanted to hear.

No wonder that, when the General attended the Fourteenth of July review, where all Paris was out for the fun, all Paris acclaimed him. They wrote a song hit about it, "Coming Back from the Review," which told how the girls fell for the bright uniforms, the older women for the gay young

officers; but that father told them "*our* brave General Boulanger" was the man for him. So great was Boulanger's popularity that the publication of letters in which he had thanked D'Aumale for getting him promoted had no effect.

Boulanger had a more solid claim to respect. A crying need in France, now that the law of 1883 brought everyone into the Army, was for a decent life for the private soldier. Conditions that might have been justified when the Army consisted of toughs from the streets of Paris, who were accustomed to nothing better, were not good enough for the people of France as a whole. Those who read P. C. Wren's stories of the Foreign Legion, with their descriptions of an almost utter lack of sanitation, of no contact between officer and man, and of bestial brutality on the part of the noncommissioned officers, may well wonder if they can possibly be true. Of the French Army in the early 1880's there is far too much documentary evidence that they were true.

Boulanger, using the executive power of the Ministry of War, began to remedy things. He had already served as "Director of Infantry" and done much then. Now he cut down the penalties that noncommissioned officers could inflict, and put their power of punishment under more effective supervision. He put washhouses in at least some of the barracks, and gave soldiers (remember that these were the whole male population of France between the ages of twenty and twenty-four) the privilege of eating their meals at table instead of astride their beds. It can easily be imagined that he became the Radicals' ideal, and that he seemed to suggest that the Republic could be strengthened, if by "revision" of the constitution the Executive could be strengthened to go on in all matters as Boulanger had been going. He also brought in a new rifle, the Lebel rifle, that was so good it was still in use at the start of the Great War.

After a year of De Freycinet, his Ministry was "re-plastered" into a Goblet Ministry; but Boulanger, during all changes, all "plucking of artichoke leaves," remained in

office. Then Bismarck, who had had so much to do with France in one way or another, took a hand. In Germany he had started a custom of the Reichstag's giving him control of the army expenditures, except for voting a budget at fixed periods. Sometimes the Reichstag would not vote him money unless there was a severe international crisis. By a curious accident, there always seemed to be a severe crisis whenever the Reichstag got stubborn. This time, in the spring of 1887, an almost perfect international question came up. A French customs officer, who was in his spare time a French spy, was arrested in German territory, but while clinging to a French boundary post. With both sides in the right, leaders could fulminate away to their hearts' content, and the army budgets in both countries went through well. After it was all over, it turned out that Schnaebeler, the customs official, had had a safe-conduct to cross the border to talk over customs enforcement. Out of this trumped-up affair Boulanger got a nickname—"the Man Whom Bismarck Fears"—and pictures of Boulanger with this heading circulated widely.

A man who can rally to follow him workers, patriots, and soldiers, at the same time persuading both the common people and the rich that he is better than those holding office in a democratic Republic, is in a fair way to destroy that democratic Republic. Hitler's career has proved that. Boulanger could get followers; if the Republic was to be saved, he must be prevented from using them. Count de Mackau, the head of the "Union of the Right," now took a hand. He called on Grévy on April 24 and informed him that the Right would guarantee to support any Ministry that got rid of the Radical Minister of War.

His hint was acted upon. In May the chairman of the Budget Committee, Maurice Rouvier, brought in a report that the Goblet Ministry did not economize enough, and it fell crashing, 133 to 306. For a fortnight Grévy tried to find a Ministry that dared meet the Chamber; for Ferry brought him word that he and his friends, too, would sup-

port no Ministry that held Boulanger. On the other hand, there were hints in the opposite direction. Boulanger's name was written in at the Paris election. The ballot was reported at 40,000 votes thrown away on Boulanger, who, as a serving soldier, was ineligible, and it is estimated that some 60,000 more may have written in Boulanger's name in addition to the name they voted for. Either way a Ministry was damned; if it took Boulanger, it fell; if it did not take him, it fell with a mob after it. Finally Rouvier took on the task, formed a Ministry without Boulanger, and the not too edifying sight was seen of a Republican Ministry staying in office because it was sure of 200 anti-Republican votes.

In July the Minister of War sent Boulanger off to command the 13th Army Corps at Clermont-Ferrand. A great crowd went to the station and prevented the train from starting by lying down en masse on the tracks. Boulanger had to be hustled to a single engine that sputtered out of the station shedding enthusiastic admirers as it gathered speed. Probably the reason Boulanger did not use this mob to seize power was that he was already entangled in a love affair with the Viscountess de Bonnemain, the wife of one of his subordinates at Clermont.

The summer vacation saved the Rouvier Ministry; but when Parliament met for its autumn session the famous Wilson scandal broke. It appeared that if one wanted a red Legion of Honor ribbon to wear in one's buttonhole, all that was necessary was to see the right man and the matter could be arranged. The Order of Agricultural Merit, with a green ribbon, was cheaper. In the file of police documents dealing with the subject was a letter from Daniel Wilson, President Grévy's son-in-law, supposedly dated one year, but written on paper whose watermark showed it had not been made till two years later. The obvious conclusions were that Wilson was guilty and had tried to substitute documents to cover himself up. The investigation led to a vote of the Chamber exempting from immunity Wilson, who was a member, and forced the Rouvier Cabinet, which

had tried to protect Wilson and Grévy, to resign. Grévy wildly offered the presidency of the Council to almost any Republican who would take it, for fear he would be forced to resign, as MacMahon had been.

This seemed beyond the utmost hopes of the Radicals. The man who had been blocking them now offered them power. For two nights they sat up at the Restaurant Durand, in the Rue Royal—Clemenceau, Déroulède, and with them Boulanger—talking it over and sending off messages. They could do nothing with De Freycinet and Floquet, as both returned identical replies, saying that if the crisis lasted long enough Grévy would have to resign, and they would be President of the Republic. No man capable of holding together a majority seemed willing to take on the presidency of the Council. Late in the second night's session of these "historic nights" a message came for Boulanger. He went out, stayed out for an hour, and when he returned did not mention what had happened. What had happened was that the Count de Mackau, who had run him out of office, and Boulanger, who had dismissed the Orléans princes from the Army, had agreed to buy the latter's support for the House of Orléans. Two nights were all that Grévy dared hold out, hawking around the Premiership; then he gave in and resigned. Paris was "in the streets" again, this time endangering not an Empire, but the Republic.

The National Assembly met at Versailles in the great Congress Hall to elect a successor to Grévy. There was one great man who would make a great President—Jules Ferry; but Paris had other ideas. The Paris City Council had its officers sit day and night, waiting for eventualities. It was announced that if Ferry the Starver, Ferry the Tonkinese, Ferry the Prussian should be elected President, the Commune would break out again. To guard against what Ferry the Prefect of the Seine had once done, the sewers of the new City Hall were barred off, lest troops come in as they had on October 31, 1870. Besides Paris, Clemenceau, too, had other ideas. He and his followers would have nothing

of Ferry. It was obviously necessary to have the Republicans vote together in this crisis, when the official vote for President came. A trial ballot, for Republicans only, was held, with Ferry far in the lead. Then the real ballot came. Ferry was still ahead, but could not get the majority. Through the corridors Clemenceau hurried, saying, "Vote for Sadi-Carnot. He is the stupidest." Ferry and De Freycinet, the other contender, agreed that the more ballots were taken, the worse things would look, and that Clemenceau had them in his hands. They withdrew, and at the second official ballot Sadi-Carnot, thanks to his being the grandson of the "Organizer of Victory" and Minister of War of the First Republic, and thanks to Clemenceau's not too flattering opinion, became President of the French Republic. A wicked jest has put it that Clemenceau that day added an unwritten clause to the constitution. And even as far away as Versailles the Paris mob had dictated to Parliament.

A week later, as Ferry was walking in the outer hall of the Chamber of Deputies (which is called the Hall of Wasted Steps because of the hopeless requests made there), a man who claimed to be a fellow Lorrainer asked to speak to him. Ferry let him come up, and was shot just below the heart. Ironically, it was Dr. Georges Clemenceau who administered first aid. Ferry lived, but this was the end of him in politics. It seemed as if all the great of the Republic were being stricken down. But there were other signs of the times, too. When the Tirard Ministry fell, and Charles Floquet moved on from the presidency of the Chamber to that of the Council, a surprising thing happened at the election of his successor. For two ballots the post was disputed by Brisson, Clemenceau, and Andrieux, as if the presidency of the Chamber were a perquisite of the Radicals. But at the third and final vote Ferry's former Minister of Agriculture, Jules Méline, was put up against Clemenceau. Each man got 168 votes, and, following the French custom for such a tie, Méline, the older man, got the post. Legend

has it that had not Clemenceau playfully put a ham sandwich in a colleague's pocket, one vote at least would have been different. But this showed that if old men were falling away, new men were arising.

At the moment, though, Boulanger had a pretty clear field. His name was presented at by-elections, despite the rule that an officer on active service cannot stand for election. He was put on half-pay for disobedience, and was immediately and now legally elected in the South of France. A master stroke, he said he would not sit there; he wanted to sit for the miners of Decazeville. He was elected by 172,000 votes in the large Department of Nord. His program was simple: The Republic will not work; get rid of Parliament, and get a Republic that will work. It was summed up in two words, "Dissolution and Revision." When he entered the Chamber he made his demand. Floquet, who on the fall of the Tirard Ministry had left the presidency of the Chamber for that of the Council, to tide things over, answered him that he was too old to be a dictator. "Sir, at your age Napoleon was dead." The next morning they fought a duel with sabers, and the sixty-year-old politician wounded the brave cavalry general, then went to a July 14 celebration, where he was roundly cheered. But it seemed as if nothing, not even ridicule, could stop the General. In three departments there were by-elections at once, and Boulanger carried all three. Democracy seemed to want to vote itself to death.

The Parliamentary vacation intervened. Then, on the twenty-seventh of January, 1889, a by-election throughout the Department of the Seine, which contains Paris, took place. Two hundred twenty-four thousand votes were cast for Boulanger. That night, as he sat at the Durand Restaurant again, the crowds cheered him, and cried out, "On to the Elysée Palace!" Paris had gone into the streets again. Déroulède and his League of Patriots were linked with Boulanger, and could supply organization for the mob. It is true that troops were ready, but one who was a one-

year soldier tells how his regiment was given its first repeating rifles, those Lebel rifles that Boulanger himself had introduced, and stood under arms, waiting, while the officers themselves spoke of their preference for Boulanger. Between the Durand Restaurant and the Elysée was an agent of the police with a warrant he was begged not to use, and twelve plain-clothes men. But Madame de Bonnemain was not at the Elysée, and Boulanger went to her instead of to dictatorship. The next morning, when Constans, the Minister of the Interior, was told of all this, he said: "The comedy is over."

At last the Republic acted to defend itself. It passed a law against the department-wide elections that Gambetta and Ferry had so trusted, in order that never again might one man inflame all Paris or all the mining region. Then it searched for some way of getting rid of Boulanger. Putting him in front of a Paris jury would just guarantee an acquittal and a riot. But the Senate could sit as a high court, if only someone would act as Government Prosecutor. It took some dismissing and promoting, but finally a young man named Quesnay de Beaurepaire took the chance of what would happen to him if the trial went wrong. However, Constans really did not want a trial, even in front of the Senate, for fear of what might happen. He tried a trick. First, he frightened Madame de Bonnemain out of the country, and then let it be known to her that a warrant was out for the General. The "brave" General cut and ran to Brussels, and the Chamber of Deputies could face the election of the autumn with more confidence.

But it was believed that even in exile Boulanger was a danger. It leaked out that he had a plan for bringing in the Count of Paris. He would stand in all districts that were Republican, carrying them, while the Conservatives would carry the rest. Then the purely Conservative Chamber from which Boulanger would have eliminated the Republicans would bring in the Count of Paris. That had an obvious answer. A law was passed, and from that day on it was il-

legal to run in more than one district. Before the election, the Senate, sitting as a high court, condemned Boulanger *in absentia*. The results of the election were that Ferry was beaten in his own home, but otherwise the situation of the Republic was much the same. Instead of 202 Conservatives against it, there were 165 and 45 Boulangists. Déroulède went to the island of Jersey and pleaded with the General to come back and act. He would not. Madame de Bonne-main was all in all to him. He lived with her at Brussels until she wasted away and died of tuberculosis; and then, in July 1891, he shot himself on her grave. From that particular danger the Republic was free.

While the Republic was protecting itself from Boulanger, it was strengthening itself in another way. The war scare of 1887 had been a wider-spread thing than just a quarrel between France and Germany. It was tied up in the kidnaping of the Prince of Bulgaria by Russian officers, and a falling-out between Germany and Russia. The Russians began to borrow money from France and in 1889 adopted the Lebel rifle, giving a promise that their Lebel's would not be used against France. At last France had come out of her diplomatic isolation. At the Ministry of War was De Freycinet, who held office for five years (1888-1893), and with him, as Chief of Staff, was General Miribel, for six years, who by a decree of De Freycinet's was given wide powers. Negotiations went on with Russia, as much through military channels as through diplomatic—so much so that when an agreement was finally signed in 1893 it was signed by the semi-independent Chief of Staff as well as by the diplomats. The "Alliance" was a vague connection at first, with conditions attached, such as its not being valid until ratified, which only took place in 1895. But behind the scenes it was a sign that France was strong once more. However, in the early 1890's, the common opinion was that the Republic had survived Boulanger, not because it was strong, but because Boulanger had been weak. People considered, with a measure of justice, that the average

deputy was a crook, for since the De Freycinet Public Works Policy of 1879 there had been much log-rolling and getting of favors for constituents. Déroulède and his League of Patriots became a real danger to the Republic, because of his honesty and virulence, and the fact that the League would furnish a striking force for a riot, as had the National Guard on the Fourth of September. Edmond Drumont was violently attacking Jews in his paper, *Le Libre Parole*. The governments of France rose and fell with the same speed, and the standing jokes about the length of time one lasted kept circulating. One young Boulangist deputy, the writer Maurice Barrès, who had joined the movement more as a lark than anything else, showed his opinion. He solemnly moved that the ashes of Jules Simon be transferred to the Pantheon. It took people, who had forgotten Simon, a moment to realize that he was still doddering about the Senate, and then draw Barrès's implication about the proper place for Republican leaders in general.

A great scandal might shake the Republic still. A great scandal did come. In 1891 the Panama Canal Company went broke. In the not so far distant past the Panama Canal Company, whose chief asset was that its head, old Ferdinand de Lesseps, had built the Suez Canal, needed money badly. Its costs were higher than had been expected. Stock would not sell. Bonds were then issued. These sold badly, and an inspiration came, to sell bonds with a lucky lottery number attached to some. To make this legal, a bill was introduced in the Chamber, referred to a committee, and voted down 6 to 4. But then an absent member returned, it was intimated to one member that some of the luck might fall on him, and the measure went through. Till the final bankruptcy came, the lottery side of the Panama Canal was a success, though for some foolish reason the deputies accepted pay in checks which could be traced.

When the bankruptcy came, the receiver was curiously slow in liquidating the Company's assets. Déroulède smelled a rat and had a friend make an interpellation in

the Chamber, at which lists were read out of those who had taken checks. The reading of a supplementary list of 104 names was just stopped. Floquet himself, at that moment President of the Chamber, admitted to having accepted a check, after having denied it at first. Rouvier also admitted, in front of the Chamber, that he had accepted one. He went on to say that he had done so because the Government needed money to fight Boulanger. He was not prosecuted. To the anger of Déroulède, who resigned from the Chamber because his friend bungled the interpellation, the whole scandal passed off. Casimir-Perier succeeded Floquet as President of the Chamber; and the courage of a newcomer in politics, Louis Barthou, then Minister of Justice, in pushing forward the investigation, and the probity with which Henry Brisson presided over the special investigating committee, showed that it was certain politicians who were corrupt, not the whole political system. The Republic might have been shaken at the height of the excitement, but it had new strength.

Déroulède left Parliament, as a last gesture challenging Clemenceau to a duel. That took courage, for Clemenceau was a dead shot, and in no mood to be lenient. Fortunately it was a friend of Déroulède's who gave the count for the firing, and he counted slow. That put Clemenceau off, he missed, and Déroulède came back alive from the Bois de Boulogne.

The fact that the Republic had lasted impressed people. Pope Leo XIII noticed this, and took to reconsidering the ancient alliance between the monarchy and the Church. A dramatic announcement of the change took place. In 1890 Cardinal Lavignerie, the missionary Bishop of Algeria, attended a banquet in Algiers. It was he who, in 1874, had suggested to the Count of Chambord seizing the throne by force, under certain circumstances; it was also he whose successes as a missionary had been so great as to cause Gambetta to say, "Anti-clericalism is not an article for export." At the dinner the usual platitudes were expected of

him. Instead he said: "If the form of government has nothing in it contrary to the principles that alone can make the proper life for Christian people . . . then the time has come to call the experiment a success, and put an end to our divisions." The Cardinal then added these important words: "I am certain I shall not be disavowed by an authorized voice." This was stupefying. It meant peace between the Republic and the Church. The Admiral who had to answer the toast did not know what to say, and merely answered, "I drink to the Cardinal and the clergy of Algeria," and sat down.

On the basis of this, Albert de Mun founded a political party of the "Rallied," who, though clericals still, accepted the Republic. In 1892 the Papal Encyclical, *Inter Innumeras*, coming as it did just after the defeat by the Chamber of an attack on those unauthorized associations that Ferry had had trouble with, was very effective. It summoned all to a union in politics and broke up the support that still surrounded the Count of Paris. Just what the other causes were is not known, but at the election of 1893 the Royalists lost heavily, as did certain Radicals, Clemenceau being beaten out of his district on the basis that he had been closely connected with the Panama Company; and one party, calling itself "Republicans of the Government," held more than half the seats of the Chamber. At last it seemed as if the French had learned their lesson, and something might be made out of the Republic without losing national security or the Old France as Army and Church knew it. For a few days the Republic gave its second highest honor to its first citizen. In January 1893 Jules Ferry became senator from Lorraine, and in February he was elected President of the Senate. But it was a dying man whose presidential address was ordered printed by Parliament and circulated through the Nation, and in March Challemeil-Lacour, Gambetta's intimate, presided over the Senate in Ferry's stead. Perhaps this belated recognition of a great man was symptomatic of what was happening in France in 1893.



Chapter Twelve

APPEASEMENT FAILS

WHEN THE Chamber of 1893 met, it seemed as if at last Thiers's dream of a Conservative Republic had come true. No longer would it be necessary to rely on Radical support to keep the Republic going. There were three hundred eleven deputies who listed themselves as Republicans of the Government, needing only a leader to form a compact party that could rule without support from Left or Right. There was even a leader. Casimir-Perier (the son of the Casimir-Perier, who, as the Duke d'Audiffret-Pasquier's brother-in-law and leader of the Left Center, had had so much to do with the passage of the constitution), who had been chosen as President of the Chamber in place of the discredited Floquet, was widely considered to be the future President of the Council. When Charles Dupuy's government was defeated as the result of an interpellation by the Socialist deputies Millerand and Jaurès, which withdrew from it Radical support, such pressure was put on Casimir-Perier that he was compelled to take office. Together with this leader there was a new policy, proclaimed by Spuller (Gambetta and Ferry's old associate, now a member of the Perier Cabinet), of the "New Spirit" which would tolerate clericals now that they were no longer dangerous. Added to all this, a new dignity seemed to be showing itself in French political life. When Perier became President of the Council, Dupuy replaced him as President

of the Chamber, handsomely defeating the Radical Brisson for that office. A few days after he took the chair, in the midst of a technical debate on a disputed election, a bomb thrown by an anarchist exploded in the Chamber. With complete calm Dupuy rose to his feet, spread out his hands, said, "The sitting continues," added a few words of reassurance, and directed the debate to go on. With a majority, a leader, a policy, and a spirit of dignity, the accusation of the 1880's seemed answered. It seemed as if the Republic was at last on firm ground.

In these days France had so recovered her confidence that over the Siamese crisis of 1894 she stood up to England to the point of war, and secured what she wanted.

Since French literature, like most of the rest of French life, was centralized in Paris, the new confidence in the nation was reflected in a new outpouring of writings. In the 1870's and 1880's Frenchmen had alternated between two moods, revenge and despondency. Revengeful Frenchmen had mostly written political speeches, despondent ones novels. Suddenly one young writer after another shook off the shackles of despair and took to a renewed interest in life and hope for the future. Possibly the best example of this is the career of Maurice Barrès, who started in life as believing in art for art's sake, and that outside of a few of his friends, who represented civilization, all France was barbarous. More for a lark than anything else, he ran as a Boulangist candidate near Marseilles, had a most amusing time, which he promptly turned into a novel, and to his surprise got into Parliament. When, though Boulanger faded away, Barrès's enthusiasm remained, he made friends with the revengeful Déroulède and took to castigating his former associates, the men who thought all civilization embodied in themselves, for not realizing the glories of France. A similar cure for despondency took place with Paul Bourget. These two were men of the Right, but the same revived interest in life was affecting men of the Left, such as the gloomy Zola, the gaily satirical Anatole France.

It looked as if France in every way was really awakening, for her iron mines began to expand, as her colonies were doing. The attitude of France was that, though much was wrong with France, something could and should be done about it.

Yet for all these hopeful signs in the Nation, in Parliament the majority did not seem to coalesce behind the leader. In anger at this bomb outrage, Parliament voted that the publication of anarchist propaganda should cause the suppression of a paper, and forbade the old trick of using trial evidence as propaganda, which Gambetta had used in the Baudin trial. The Radicals and Socialists, Brisson and Millerand at their head, did all they could to defeat this law and defend the freedom of the press, since almost any paper could be suppressed under this law, without any real chance of getting at the evidence, with the trial in a closed court, not an open one. This was reminiscent of De Broglie's Conservative Republic of fact, not dream, and was too close to its attacks on democracy. A group of Radicals, calling themselves "Socialist Radicals," had combined with some Socialists in a "Union of the Left" to pool votes at the second ballot of the election. They wanted to make sure that "the new layers of society" were represented in Parliament. Some fifty members in all, they were a new portent in French politics. Their attacks on the Ministry in Parliament and in the press were vigorous, and the Ministry was not composed of men like Floquet and Clemenceau, who would have given back as good as they got, but of quieter, more serious men, unaccustomed to the rough-and-tumble of political life. The Perier Ministry fell and was replaced by a Dupuy one, containing new men—Poincaré, Barthou, Delcassé, Hanotaux—with the same policy and the same support. Casimir-Perier was re-elected President of the Chamber.

On June 24, 1894, when President Carnot was driving in his open landau to the theater in Lyons, an anarchist named Caserio leaped up on its side and struck him to the

heart with a dagger. This was one of many anarchist assassinations of the time, among the other victims being Empress Elizabeth of Austria and King Humbert of Italy. In spite of Clemenceau's advice, "Vote for the stupidest," Casimir-Perier was elected President of the Republic to succeed Carnot. Casimir-Perier proved not the man for the job. He was unable to tone down his abilities, and he was also unable to stand up under public attack. When he presided over the Council of Ministers he irritated it by taking too large a part in the discussion; when the Socialist and Radical press attacked him, he encouraged the attacks by resenting them. Subject in this way to open attack in the press and to veiled attack from men who were at best piqued at his interference, at worst jealous and angry at the same time, Perier stood this less than a year. Then he resigned with an angry letter, the one "personal action" open to him.

When the National Assembly met in the spring of 1895 to elect a President of the Republic, there were two candidates before it, both men of the Great Ministry—Félix Faure and Waldeck-Rousseau. Obeying Clemenceau's rule this time, Waldeck-Rousseau let the better-qualified Faure take the post. The Radicals in Parliament were by now so influential that, not only was Henri Brisson elected President of the Chamber, but after a Ribot Ministry lasting nine months, Faure tried a Radical one, with Léon Bourgeois as Premier. That Ministry lasted six months, but collapsed when it tried to put an income tax across. The Chamber voted the tax, secure in the knowledge that the Senate would defeat it. Léon Bourgeois then realized that he could not persuade the Chamber to quarrel with the Senate, and got out while the getting was good. Faure then appointed Jules Ferry's old friend, Jules Méline, as President of the Council, and at last secured a Council of Ministers that lived up to the high promise of the election.

The Méline Cabinet was a real one. It had a majority, a leader, a policy, dignity. Méline's followers, who called

themselves "Progressives," had absorbed the former "Republicans of the Government." Méline's Ministry put the tariffs in working order, and at the same time got on good relations with Italy by ending a tariff war there. It paid real attention to Méline's great interest, agriculture; and (of this it was very proud) it put through a bond issue for a secret military use. The Parliament trusted Méline with the bonds, and wisely, for out of that trust France obtained the famous 75-millimeter cannon that did so well in the World War. The history of the Méline Ministry is short, though its term was long, because it was an effective Ministry. Happy is the French Ministry that has no history.

But the Méline Ministry had its troubles, for all its placid rule and successes. First of all, a new layer of society, the proletariat, below Gambetta's "new layer" of the lower middle classes, was demanding attention. Socialist and Socialist Radical strength in the country was growing. In May 1896 there was a sign of this, a dinner held in Paris to celebrate Socialist successes in municipal elections, and called the St. Mandé Dinner because it particularly celebrated an election victory at St. Mandé. There Alexander Millerand, the great Socialist lawyer, stated what the Socialists would demand to have done if ever they shared power and office. This was a danger to Méline from the Left. Secondly, the Méline Ministry, being a Progressive one, had a policy of appeasement with the clericals. That policy such of the "Constitutional Right" as the Count de Mun accepted loyally enough. But in return for fair play to them and from them, they insisted on fair play to other clericals who were not playing fair. The organ of the Assumptionist Fathers, *La Croix*, which had a very wide circulation indeed, was enough to make one's hair stand on end, outdoing some of the Socialist attacks on Perier. Déroulède, by now a member of the French Academy for his military poetry, Drumont, Barrès, and the other ex-Boulangists who now called themselves Nationalists were as hard-hitting. They wanted some leader to take over directly,

elected by the people—in other words, a dictatorship which they hoped would be popular. These men, in one way or another, were more willing than ever De Broglie had been to trample on the liberties that ensured the Republic against another dictatorship. A feeling grew up, particularly in the Provinces, that Méline was not being firm enough with danger from the Right, despite his answer that he stood in the middle of the road, between Socialists and clericals, standing for “neither Revolution nor Reaction.”

At the election of 1898, despite the careful “management” of the Progressive Minister of the Interior, Louis Barthou, this feeling showed itself in votes. Barthou’s explanation was that the Radical teachers had out-electioneered the Conservative priests. In those simple words are summed up worlds of French provincial life, the themes of many novels of social struggle. Though the Union of the Left was less well organized at this election, fifty more Radical seats were secured in the Chamber, which was a closely balanced one. In the contest for its presidency, the Progressive Deschanel defeated Brisson by one vote. The Méline Ministry determined to meet the Chamber to see if it could handle the new Parliamentary situation. In a sense it could. There were two votes, one a blanket approval of the Ministry’s work, that was carried; and another that reproved the Ministry for relying at certain times on anti-Republican votes. This was defeated, but only by relying on anti-Republican votes. Méline therefore resigned. In his place Faure put Brisson, the well-loved Radical.

About this time the famous Dreyfus Case began to make a difference in politics. Méline had had trouble with it, but had been able to set it to one side. Brisson was put out of office by it. In the fall of 1894 a French spy, the cleaning woman in the German Embassy, had taken out of the wastepaper basket a letter giving a list of documents that would be sent to the German Military Attaché before the officer went off on maneuvers. Its writer was referred to by the letter D. Among them was a very secret artillery manual.

A quick search of the list of artillery officers who had access to the manual and went to maneuvers pointed overwhelmingly to a Captain Dreyfus, who happened also to be a Jew. He was promptly arrested, in the bosom of his family, and most touchingly denied everything. Drumont's *La Libre Parole* got hold of this story and was delighted to publish abroad the news of a Jewish traitor.

A certain difficulty was found in actually pinning the guilt on Dreyfus, obvious man though he seemed to be. He was a slippery customer, as to dates and just when he had gone off to maneuvers. It began to look as if a very dangerous spy might get off on technicalities. Colonel Henry of the Second, or Counter-Espionage, Section of the General Staff dealt with that. He handed up to the court-martial a document to prove Dreyfus guilty, and then refused to show it to Dreyfus's lawyer, on the ground that it was a military secret. For not showing it there was the good reason that it was a forgery. The court-martial, moved by the fact that five out of seven handwriting experts declared that the original document (the *bordereau*) was in Dreyfus's handwriting, and by Henry's document which he asserted was far too secret to let out, condemned Dreyfus to degradation from his military rank and perpetual imprisonment in French Guiana, on Devil's Island. With great gusto there was a scene in the spring of 1895 of tearing all Dreyfus's insignia off him, while he loudly cried out, "I am innocent!" Then they shipped him off to Devil's Island.

His wife, who had plenty of money, protested that he was innocent, and tried to have something done; but that was generally felt to be about the only privilege she had, and left at that. But the fact was that there was a movement roused the General Staff to order further investigations. The investigator, Colonel Piquart, told his superiors that not Dreyfus but a Major Esterházy in the Infantry was the guilty man. For that he was sent to a post in Algeria so quickly, and to such a dangerous one, that he suspected it was purposeful and left behind sealed testimony in case he

should be killed. To block Piquart and his inquiry Henry forged a second letter from the Italian to the German Military Attaché.

The lawyer with whom Piquart left his testimony disobeyed his orders of secrecy and carried it to Senator Scheurer-Kestner, an Alsatian, who had been approached by Madame Dreyfus. The case got out into the press, and Émile Zola wrote fiery articles in *Le Figaro* until one editor was fired for letting him do that, and Esterházy was put before a court-martial. The trial was simple. All inquiry was still blocked. To all questions by Dreyfus's friends the answer was: "Dreyfus is guilty; Esterházy must be innocent." There was no chance of going back of the verdict in the Dreyfus Case.

This was so infamous that Clemenceau was approached, and begged to put his newspaper, *L'Aurore*, at the service of justice. A strong patriot, he was indignant at the treason of which, to him as to the rest of the outside world, Dreyfus seemed guilty; but, an even stronger Democrat, he felt that to condemn on a document which the defendant could not see was worse. He wanted Dreyfus properly tried, and gave Zola space in his paper. In an open letter to the President of the Republic Zola said what he thought of all those who had kept Dreyfus from justice. He wound up with a list of them, accusing each of various crimes. Clemenceau headed the letter "I Accuse." When it came out Zola got what he wanted, a libel suit. With more embarrassing questions that raised the danger of interpellation in a Chamber full of Radicals to vote against a Ministry, witness after witness let out hint after hint that there were other documents. Though Piquart, slandered by a prosecution lawyer, lost his temper and dared tell all he knew, Zola was condemned. At Clemenceau's advice he skipped the country to keep the case open, as the best way of bringing about ultimate justice.

All this happened when Méline was Premier.

After the election of 1898, with Brisson trying to hold

a Radical Cabinet in office, politics entered. To gain support, Brisson had put into the Ministry of War a Nationalist, Godefroy Cavaignac, which got him some highly essential votes not usually thrown to Radicals, since the aims of the Nationalists were close to the Radicals, though they wanted an elective president to carry them out. Cavaignac was sure that Dreyfus was guilty, for an army officer must tell the truth, and army officers said so. He was not afraid of consequences and published the documents. When photographic copies got loose, and Esterházy's guilt was obvious to any who could get a copy of anything he wrote, the cat was out of the bag. Henry confessed his forgeries, was arrested, and at the end of August committed suicide.

Until then the Dreyfus Case had not really been politics. It is true that Clemenceau, urged by a love of justice and a desire to fish in troubled waters, had taken up the case, even though then convinced on the assertions of presumably honorable army officers that Dreyfus was guilty. It is true that deputies had asked embarrassing questions, but that was a habit of deputies. It is true that at the Zola trial army officers had taken a very high stand, from which it was hard to withdraw, that they should be implicitly trusted. But as far as the Zola trial went they were safe, for the central point on which they rested was the assumption that Dreyfus was guilty, his guilt buttressed with secret documents that utterly trustworthy men had said it would endanger the country to reveal.

But now the whole support of the case against Dreyfus broke down just at the moment when French democracy began to do its work in cleaning up the mess by Parliamentary procedure and by going back of Parliament to the Nation. Here was a scandal that almost automatically divided the believers in democracy from the authoritarians, and begged to have sides taken. Those who believed in authority were sure that Dreyfus was guilty, or else army officers would not have said so. Those who believed in arguing things out felt that the refusal of army officers to testify

was a sign of something very rotten. The line-up was curious. Urbain Gohier, a rabid anti-Semite, was a leading defender of Dreyfus; and Pope Leo XIII took an impartial stand, both proving themselves on the side of the Republic, while Déroulède, whose sincerity could not be doubted, nor his theoretical devotion to the Republic, was the leader on the other side. But generally the same forces were opposed as usual. Back of the Army lay the Church, *La Croix* especially. The Radicals gave the greatest support to Dreyfus, along with Jaurès's speeches and his *Petite République*, which, for the Radicals and Socialists, was taking the place Gambetta's *République Française* had taken for the original Republicans. The Dreyfus Case was being thrashed out in front of the whole country by democratic methods; but more than the Dreyfus Case was being thrashed out. It was really no longer a question whether or not an artillery officer accused of espionage had been fairly tried. What was on trial now was the privileged position of Army and Church in the state.

At this moment, August 1898, England and France suddenly came near to war in the Fashoda crisis when two colonial expeditions clashed on the Nile. That strengthened the hands of the Army. The Army defended itself by attacking. Cavaignac had resigned when the Brisson Cabinet voted to have the Court of Cassation look into the whole evidence and straighten it out. General Zurlinden took his place as Minister of War. He suddenly announced to the Chamber that Dreyfus was guilty, and resigned. General Chanoine took Zurlinden's place in October. The Court of Cassation announced that, as far as it could tell, the case ought to be looked into, and that it was waiting for a motion from the Solicitor General to that effect. Quesnay de Beaurepaire, who had dared indict Boulanger, was now a judge and vociferously sure Dreyfus was guilty, which complicated matters. But when Brisson got up to announce the court's opinion, Déroulède rose to his feet with a question, Chanoine rushed to the Tribune and said that the Army had let

him be Minister of War, that he agreed with it that Dreyfus was guilty, and therefore, out of loyalty, could no longer hold office. Outside the Chamber, just as when Ferry fell, men were yelling, many of them members of Déroulède's League of Patriots. It is said that the soldiers there, infected by the enthusiasm, asked their officers why they were not led forward to seize the Chamber and take over, in the name of the slandered Army. Paris was in the street again, again threatening the Republic.

With the mob outside, a vote was taken, and Brisson fell. The imperturbable Dupuy was again made Premier, and found himself in the same cleft stick Brisson had been in. He could move for an investigation. If he had eyes in his head, he would see that he would be a fool not to. But if he had eyes in his head he could equally see that he would be lynched or otherwise driven out of office if he did. Either way he was lost; he had to temporize. Being a good politician, he did so. His Minister of Justice introduced a bill to have the Dreyfus Case investigated by the whole Court of Cassation instead of by one division of it, which was a way of delaying and "giving time a chance." In making the motion, the Minister of Justice cynically remarked that deputies had better look home to their constituencies. The motion was carried; and for a time, as far as politics went, the Dreyfus Case was shelved.

But in January, six days after the bill had been passed through the Senate, the case was dramatically taken off the shelf. The news came that President Félix Faure, himself a patron of the League of Patriots in the old days, and a personal friend of Déroulède's, had died suddenly. The generally accepted story of his death, from debauchery for which he was too old, is not for ears polite. The fact that it was—to put it mildly—unusual, led to suspicion. Drumont and Déroulède trumpeted their suspicions to high heaven that the Jews had done it.

The next question was who should be President. Two choices stood out—Jules Méline, the leader in the pre-

vious Parliament, and President of the Chamber, earlier still; and Émile Loubet, the President of the Senate. In *L'Aurore* appeared a leading article, entitled, even though Clemenceau was no longer in Parliament, "I Vote for Loubet," pointing out that such a vote would be a declaration of policy in favor of the Liberal side. Brisson, whom the Radicals usually put up, withdrew, many Senators voted for Loubet, and by 483 to 279 he was elected.

But in Paris Déroulède's friends did not like this, any more than the Paris City Council had cared for having Ferry President. Legend has it that as Loubet drove in from Versailles a woman street-cleaner got into his carriage with a full pail and got out with an empty one and that nothing was done about this, in order not to advertise it further. That night Déroulède addressed shouting mobs at the Arc de Triomphe near the Elysée Palace, but did no more than tell them to meet at his friend Félix Faure's funeral. Charles Maurras, who made a study of possible *coups* against the Republic, considered that Déroulède had the best chance then of any, and that his scruples about seeing his friend buried before he overthrew Parliament were overdone.

For the funeral, however, Déroulède was ready. There are posters in existence (Maurice Barrès later published one) explaining how a new government, resting directly on the people and not on a corrupt Chamber, would be a true Republic, with a directly chosen President able to act. It is said that in further preparation the colonels in charge of the regiments escorting the funeral had been bribed. Déroulède has his own story of his failure. He said that the day before a stranger approached him, asking what he would do if "Philip of Orléans" (the Count of Paris's son, and the then Pretender) should appear. Déroulède stoutly said, "I should be the first to arrest him!" Of Déroulède's Republicanism there can be no doubt, nor of his hatred of Parliament.

The custom is that when a funeral takes place, the general in charge of the escort rides out and enjoys the fun, but

that only the colonels have the bother of taking the troops back to barracks. When Déroulède, after his friend's funeral, met the returning troops, he was surprised to see General Roget still at their head. General Florentin, the Military Governor of Paris, had quietly sent General de Pellieux off, supplanting him by General Roget. Nothing daunted, he seized Roget's bridle, just as legend states Jules Favre had seized Trochu's, with that strange French conventionality in revolt, and, marshaling his disciplined mob behind him, cried, "To the Elysée!" Roget went along quietly till the column passed the barracks. Then, with a rattling order, the column swept into the barrack square, and at another sharp order the gates to the street were closed, with Déroulède inside and the mob out. Barrès and Jules Guérin always asserted that with better management this need never have happened. Within the barrack yard Déroulède went about from soldier to soldier, asking each to follow him in an attack on the presidential palace. Then, having as publicly as possible incited to mutiny, he demanded to be arrested and tried.

He was arrested, the Chamber lifted his immunity, and on May 31 a Paris jury, in the face of the evidence, acquitted him unanimously. Such was the apparent opinion of Paris about the Republic.

On June 3 the Court of Cassation ordered a retrial of the Dreyfus Case. June 4, at the Saturday races at Auteuil, where all the swells went, Loubet was hissed, with cries of "Hurrah for Déroulède!" "Resign!" and "Hurrah for the King!" One man, Baron de Christiani, climbed into the President's box and smashed him over the head with an umbrella, driving Loubet's top hat over his ears. In the Socialist and Radical press it was announced that the next week a deputation would go to the Longchamps races to honor the President and show that the common people could behave better than the swells. Fearing trouble, the once imperturbable Dupuy sent more than a brigade of troops to Longchamps, there having been no protection of the Presi-

dent at Auteuil. The workers of Paris marched out in perfect order, singing the Marseillaise and the International. There was some trouble in Paris because it had been denuded of police, but none at Longchamps this time. French democracy showed dignity; the Government of France did not.

The next day an interpellation ended Dupuy's Cabinet, and the post of being mobbed by Déroulède or voted out by the Chamber was open to any who wanted it. Twice the Chamber adjourned, hoping that a Cabinet would be formed in a few days. Twice there was no Cabinet to meet it. A young Lorrainer, Raymond Poincaré, tried to get pledges of support, but could obtain none. Léon Bourgeois, who was at the Hague Peace Conference, was sent for, but went back to it, saying with unconscious humor that he could do more good there; and he had once held together a purely Radical Cabinet in the face of a Progressive Chamber.

Meanwhile, Jules Guérin, a Royalist leader, summoned to his flat in the Rue de Chabrol some of his followers, some of Déroulède's followers, though Déroulède was not there, and some Bonapartists, to concert measures for seizing power when the crisis should be still worse. It looked as if French democracy could raise the storm but could not ride it, could bring such matters as the Dreyfus Case out into the open, but could not solve them. Perhaps Déroulède was right, in that what the Republic needed was leaders, and that her institutions needed some change to let leaders come to the front.



Chapter Thirteen

FRENCH DEMOCRACY FINDS A LEADER

ON JUNE 26 a government at last took its seats on the ministerial bench and prepared to face the Chamber. It had no assurance that it would not receive just the treatment General Rochebouet's "fighting Ministry" had received, and be sent to the rightabout at once. It did have pledges of support, but not enough to cover a majority of the votes in the Chamber, and needed to persuade by public argument some men of uncertain mind. If the Government failed to gather in those extra unpledged votes, the future of its members was gone, and the chance of forming any government at all was that much less, with Déroulède in the streets, and behind him and using him a king hoping to return. The treatment of the ministers as they entered the Chamber showed how matters stood.

The tall, somber, eloquent President of the Council, Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau, was greeted well enough, in a Chamber ready to attack anyone. The burly, mustachioed Minister of Commerce, Alexandre Millerand, the first Socialist ever to hold office, was booed from the Right. The worst reception was reserved for the Minister of War. From Socialists on the extreme Left came cries of "Hurrah for the Commune, assassin, murderer." Gaily the Red Marquis de Gallifet, the "Butcher of the Commune," drew himself up, saluted, and as if at a military roll call answered, "Murderer, present." Then Waldeck-Rousseau climbed up into the

Tribune to read the Ministry's declaration of policy. It took him an hour. The text of it, as printed today in the *Parliamentary Debates*, shows that almost every single one of his sentences was broken into by an interruption that the stenographer could take down, not to mention the miscellaneous shoutings that are merely recorded as "divers remarks." But Waldeck-Rousseau saw to it that the Chamber heard the one phrase that summed up what he stood for: "a Government of Republican Defense." Then, in the midst of more shouting, he came down from the Tribune, leaving it empty for attacks on him. Men of the Right and of the Left poured out their opinion of a government that held Millerand and Gallifet; a man of the Center explained why he could not vote for Waldeck either; and then a Radical, Gaston Doumergue, got up and stated he had given his turn at the Tribune to another. Old Henri Brisson, with his long white beard, mounted the Tribune and wasted no words. He merely said that it was not a question of voting for the government, but of voting for the Republic, and he begged his friends to vote with him for Waldeck. Then Doumergue took his turn at the Tribune and asked other Republicans to follow the lead of a man all Republicans loved and admired.

After that last appeal, the deputies went out into the "Hall of Wasted Steps" to think things over. A Progressive named Aynard buttonholed a small group of friends and pleaded with them. Brisson, so the story goes, gave a Masonic sign of distress to wavering friends. The fact struck home to many Socialists that they must vote for the first Cabinet to hold a Socialist, even if the great shooter of Socialists were in it, too; and to many anti-Socialists that no government that had in it the Red Marquis would let the Socialists go too far. When the deputies came back to put their ballots in the urn, Waldeck-Rousseau had a scant majority of 25.

The "Government of Republican Defense" having been confirmed in power, the next thing was to make sure it would not be thrown out. Only the essential Parliamentary

business was transacted, such as could not be put off; and then the Chambers separated for the summer, before Waldeck-Rousseau could be voted out of office. Even at that, when, under the powers by which a minister may intervene at any time, the decree suspending the session was read in the midst of a debate, there were howls of indignation at the Government's being unwilling to stand another test vote. Then Parliament went off, leaving all problems to the Council of Ministers. Ministers might worry about Dreyfus and Déroulède during the summer vacation, and do what they could, while deputies and senators would have none of the responsibilities, and might come back in the autumn after it was all over and say how much better they would have done it.

If French democracy was to preserve itself, it would have to do two things: First it would have to restore order. Then it would have to get at the roots of the disorder, the special position of the Army and the Church in the state. The first problem might be handled brusquely, but the second would have to be done by persuasion. The Chamber of Deputies would accept no new status for Army and Church till it was convinced, and till it was convinced the country was convinced, that the change was for the better.

Waldeck-Rousseau was fully prepared for what he would have to do. He had gathered together a truly "Great Ministry." Not only had he the Red Marquis as Minister of War, and Alexandre Millerand as Minister of Commerce, as well as himself in the key positions of the Interior and Cults; he had at the Ministry of Marine, De Lannessan, who had been an excellent Governor General of Indo-China; at Justice, Monis, a future Premier; at the Finances, Joseph Caillaux, one of the greatest financiers of the Third Republic; and at the Foreign Ministry, Theophile Delcassé, who had so ably handled the Fashoda crisis. Waldeck had taken the further precaution of making sure of the safety of Paris by bringing back as Prefect of Police, Lépine, who had done so well in that post in the 1890's. Generals Roget and De Pellieux, who

were suspected of being too close to Déroulède, were sent away from Paris. If ever a Council of Ministers was ready to take full advantage of a summer vacation and the semi-dictatorship it brought, this was it.

The Ministry needed all the advantages it could get. Dreyfus, the pretext of all the troubles of the past year, was back in France, pale and shattered after five years on Devil's Island in the tropics, and about to be retried, as the Court of Cassation had ordered. The retrial was to be at the Norman market town of Rennes; it would have been madness to have had the trial in Paris in its turbulent state. At that, when the court-martial opened its hearings on August 7, Rennes was swarming with excited onlookers and participants. All the testimony was gone through again; again General Mercier and other army officers tried to assert that the Army must be trusted blindly; and Labori, Dreyfus's new lawyer, who had also defended Zola, again involved them in their own statements. Feeling ran high, assertions grew wilder, and the day before Labori's final speech some unknown person came up to him in the street, shot him—fortunately it was not a serious wound—and dashed off, escaping successfully. At length, September 9, the court-martial, after an hour and a half's deliberation, gave its verdict, "*Guilty of treason with extenuating circumstances*"—this by a vote of 5 to 2. The sentence was to ten years in Devil's Island, of which Dreyfus had already served nearly five.

After this preposterous sentence, Waldeck-Rousseau persuaded Dreyfus, who at first wanted to have another retrial ordered, to accept a pardon. Either Jaurès or Clemenceau, the stories differ, helped him draft a very dignified protest, and the Dreyfus Case was out of politics for the time being. Gallifet issued an order to the Army that began, "The incident is closed," and was read to all the troops. But at that feeling remained so strong that all the officers of the court-martial were cut by their fellow officers at mess on suspicion of having voted for innocence, till the two who had so voted

revealed who they were to make things easier for the others.

Furthermore, the Council of Ministers saw to it that there were no longer Nationalists to take advantage of this feeling. It is said that the secret service "broke" Déroulède's cypher. On August 12 Waldeck-Rousseau, the Minister of the Interior, and Lépine, the Prefect of Police, struck. Warrants were issued for thirty-seven men, for trial before the Senate, sitting as a high court, for endangering the state. All were rounded up except two who fled abroad, and Jules Guérin, who barricaded himself in his flat in the Rue de Chabrol, and announced he would hold out till the last. A comic siege lasted six weeks, till September 20. In front of the flat sat a "Republican Guard," who, as far as Lépine could see, spent most of his plentiful leisure reading the *Libre Parole*, of which Guérin was editor. But no one molested the watchers, after the first days of the siege of "Fort Chabrol," when one mob had had to be prevented from breaking through. All that was done was to rout traffic around that particular block. Occasionally Lépine would go by to see what was happening, and would be honored by having a few shots fired in his general direction. Finally Lépine succeeded in assuring Waldeck-Rousseau that there was no danger of bloodshed, told Guérin something really would happen soon, and waltzed Guérin off to jail.

On November 9 the Senate started sitting as a high court, and continued to do so for 47 sessions, till January 4. Déroulède, the fanatical Republican, orated away to his heart's content. At the end he and two Royalists, Buffet and the Marquis de Lur-Saluces, were condemned to ten years' exile, Guérin to ten years in jail. Déroulède, the love of France his great passion, went into exile at San Sebastian, just over the Spanish border, where his friend Gambetta had gone into his voluntary exile, and where he could look every day at his homeland. From then on fear of a *coup d'état* was needless.

While Waldeck kept order in the civil population, Gallifet was doing the same in the Army. Generals who were not

too favorable to the Republic found themselves transferred. The one hero of Sedan was known not to like politicians overmuch, and the Army could take from him what it might not take from another. It was piecemeal work, personally distasteful to Gallifet, who had to be kept up to the mark by Waldeck, as it meant treating friends with severity; but Gallifet did his duty.

Other ministers were doing their share. Caillaux, who had been an Inspector General of the Treasury, introduced new methods; Millerand, who had explained at St. Mandé what a Socialist minister could do in a non-Socialist Cabinet, proceeded to put teeth into the factory act of 1892, and to call workingmen's representatives to the Superior Works Council. Later on before he went out of office he was to make the state a model employer, with an eight-hour day. At the Foreign Office, in the Quai D'Orsay, Delcassé went on with his work of obtaining a neutrality agreement with Italy, and settling outstanding questions with England, making her a friend, not an enemy. Waldeck showed, too, that he really was Premier. When Millerand tried to speak for the Cabinet, he tried it only once.

When the chambers met on November 14, Waldeck-Rousseau told them what had been done to defend the Republic and what he planned to go on to do, and obtained a vote of confidence, 317 to 212. If only 25 had put him into power, 40 more had changed their minds and were willing to keep him in power. The moment for strong Executive action had passed. What remained was to go on with the work of education, within Parliament and without, till the relationship of Army and Church on one side, state on the other, would be such as to prevent future crises such as had just been passed through.

For, though much had been done in the summer vacation of 1899, the victory of the Republic was only temporary, and enough to gain a breathing spell. The Republic still remained in danger, the same danger the Spanish Republic was in in 1936. In both countries some sort of appeasement

of Church and Army had been tried by men who believed in Parliamentary methods, in both countries men who believed that the relations between Church and Army on the one side, state on the other, must be changed reached power by legal means; and in both countries the new Republican government made immediate use of its executive powers. There the similarity ends, and a contrast begins that shows how French democracy worked. In Spain the new Executive acted quickly. The killing of Calvo Sotelo by the Assault Guards may or may not have been, like the arrest of Déroulède, the forestalling of a *coup d'état*. At any rate it, measures of stringent and unexpected discipline in the Army, and measures of removing the Church from political life seemed to Army, Church, and a very large proportion of the population a terrible threat to all that made life worth living. The valor with which the boys of the Military Academy barricaded themselves into the Alcazar, the horrors of the Barcelona executions, the efficiency with which General Franco marched upon Madrid, the appeal of the spirit of the Navarrese volunteers, the personality of General Quiépo de Liano, who with 27 men and bluff took Seville and marched on Malaga—all made a barrier of public opinion that the Loyalists had difficulty in overcoming. Similarly, Communist and Anarchist support was a detriment to the Loyalists, as was their utter lack of organization. As a result, at the end of three years the Republic was destroyed, a million lives were lost, hundreds of thousands were exiled, and enduring hatreds were sown. In France, where the situation, though not completely parallel, was strikingly similar, action, though firm, was not as drastic; the remedy was more slowly applied, and the million lives that were not lost, the hatreds that were soothed rather than raised, form a testimonial to the efficacy of French democracy in solving the problems of Church and Army. For this slowness took away from the opponents of the Republic those assets that they might have used at a crucial moment to rouse public opinion in their favor.

It is not in the least fair to the Spanish Loyalists to suggest that France had as difficult a problem in 1899 as they had in 1936; or that they had in 1936 as much experience in the workings of democracy as the French had in 1899. There is no intention of suggesting that. But it is fair to quote Ortega, in his book, *Invertebrate Spain*, who asserts that a union of center parties, just the union of Moderates with the Left that Waldeck-Rousseau made, might have solved the problem; and to quote ex-President Azana, who asserted that a senate that would have delayed action would have allowed wiser counsels to prevail on both sides. In the light of such expressions of opinion by men who were in the thick of the Spanish Civil War, the facts of the French controversy over Church and Army can speak for themselves. They suggest that the slowness and uncertainty of democracy is part of the process of changing the minds of a whole nation so decisively that they need never be changed back.

Waldeck-Rousseau, in his ministerial declaration in November 1899, proposed three measures for getting at the root of the troubles brought to a head by the Dreyfus Case. One, to make the training of teachers practically a Government monopoly, was so manifestly impossible at the moment as to be discounted by all. A second, to reduce service with the colors from three years to two, was practical politics; but the Senate might be trusted to delay it. This was finally enacted into law in 1905. The third, an amendment to the Law of Associations that Waldeck-Rousseau himself had had passed in 1884, was immediately practical and went to the heart of the matter. It would clear up the position of clubs and trade-unions, that still suffered from petty restrictions. The description that Waldeck gave of his proposal was to allow free formation of all associations that did not attack the Government or deny the rights of citizens. That qualification meant anarchists' clubs and religious congregations that exacted a stringent oath of obedience from their members. In practical effect Waldeck's plan would keep

many congregations in France because the Minister of Interior would issue licenses to congregations that complied with the requirements. That would, therefore, exile some dangerous opponents of the Republic, and remove from decent congregations the fear that some morning at six, another M. Andrieux with his pearl-gray gloves would supervise their ejection, and from decent political organizations the fear that some informer would hale them before a closed police court where they would get the same injustice Dreyfus had had, without Dreyfus's chance of redress through publicity. Waldeck-Rousseau had an ideal, to make of this a "Statute of Congregations" and as permanent a settlement for them as the Concordat had been for the secular or parish clergy. Having made this proposal, he then let it lie, in order that it might be fully discussed, and his good faith in making it might be realized.

The pretext for taking time to mull things over was the Paris Exposition of 1900. As ever, "time must be given a chance." The Chamber that had been elected in 1898 still, in 1900, elected Paul Deschanel to preside over it, showing it still had the sentiments that had induced it to vote confidence in Jules Méline's Ministry, though not in his use of Conservative support. The majority that kept Waldeck-Rousseau in office consisted, in the last analysis, of some 25 or more Progressives who, like himself, felt that Méline was wrong in thinking that at that moment Socialism was a more dangerous ally than clericalism. Only if those men could be kept persuaded would it be possible to enact the Law of Associations, and those men could be persuaded only if Waldeck showed himself firm about keeping order in strikes and resolute to keep the Army up to strength as well as loyal.

When Waldeck so stated his policy and then left men to discuss it, he started the greatest piece of work that French democracy ever handled. In a sense it might be likened to a jujitsu match. He stood in one place, his opponents attacked him the wrong way, tumbled, fell, and enabled him to take

a new stance, on which again attacks made improperly failed. At each stand he took, French democracy had a chance to follow his maneuvers, to discuss them, to attack and defend his position, and to see, when discussion was over, the results of that position, those attacks, and those defenses. Not only did the Parliamentary machinery start work with discussions in the Hall of Wasted Steps between motion and vote, with innumerable informal gatherings; but discussions went on in the Nation. Matters were thrashed out in the press. In every café where men read political papers, and over their beer or their cup of coffee talked about the arguments of the favorite editors, public opinion was forming. More organized groups went to work to spread arguments. The Group of Liberal and Social Action, and League of the French Fatherland, the latter headed by the sound thinker, François Coppée, and subventioned by the rich congregations that stood to lose so badly by the Law of Associations, put the Conservative view in speeches and pamphlets, coming to the aid of *La Croix*, and those monks whose enemies compared them to the League that in old days had split France in civil war over religion. On the other side was, of course, the Socialist Jean Jaurès, using all his influence to persuade the Socialists who wanted much more done to support Waldeck in going part of their way, and to persuade the rest of the world Waldeck was right. As for the Socialist Radicals, they called a party congress in 1900 which was so envied by the straight Radicals that in 1901 they copied it, and made it an institution that lasted till 1940, a channel for the sharing of the opinions held by perhaps more Frenchmen than have any other opinions. Those who agreed not so much with Gambetta's economics as with Ferry's, who wanted to fight the Church but not to turn France over to the new social levels, organized a Democratic Alliance that spread similar argument. In these days the French Nation organized to give practical effect to the theories of democracy that it followed.

It was at this time that men of very determined mind gave

up their belief on the democratic system. For one side stood a believer in the Divine Right of kings, Charles Maurras, whose newspaper, *L'Action Française*, was dedicated to the belief that Parliamentarianism was rotten and that the cure was not an elective President, but a frank return to the king of France. Those disgusted with defeat of the Conservative cause joined him, giving him an audience, one that often relished his extremism while not sharing it. Maurras and his coadjutor, Léon Daudet, were masters of the French language, if not of the minds of Frenchmen. And on the other side, Jules Guesde rallied those disgusted with the failure of the French Parliament to go as far as it might for the newly enfranchised and awakened workingmen, and began to split the newly united Socialists into one party that would not co-operate with Waldeck and one that would. Guesde believed in Parliament about as much as did Maurras, thinking of it as a means of attacking Parliamentarianism. Among the extreme Socialists were men who went further, and felt that Parliamentarianism was a failure even as a means of attacking itself. Like Maurras, they talked of frankly seizing power. And so it was that, just at this time when the democratic Republic was perfecting its informal machinery, new enemies rose to the Right and the Left who denied democracy, insignificant in numbers, but listened to as thinkers.

In February there was a great strike, lasting a month, in the West Indian island of Martinique, during which rioters were shot down. Here, by postponing the interpellation a month, it was possible to secure enough votes of Radicals who at least preferred Waldeck to any alternative and of Progressives who felt he was right in the particular case to balance Socialist defections, no Socialist wanting to approve the shooting of workers. The Ministry survived by 5 votes. In May, in an unguarded moment, Waldeck characterized the action of an army officer in letting a deputy see army documents as rascality. Sixteen times already had Gallifet resigned, and been talked out of it by Waldeck-Rousseau. For a seventeenth and last time he now resigned, swearing,

as had MacMahon, that he could "swallow no more vipers and toads." On his desk was found a scapulary, left there by Gallifet to show that he, at least, was a good Catholic. This also Waldeck managed to survive, and to draw benefit from.

For he asked Gallifet whom to appoint as his successor, and Gallifet told him that the most Republican major general in the Army was General André. André, by assiduous attention to duty and by minding his own business, had risen past Royalist promotion boards to commanding a corps, and had no great desire to end his military career in a quarrel with the larger part of the officer corps, when he might serve a few years more and retire in quiet and dignity. But it was hard not to be persuaded by Waldeck, and he took the post, which he held for five years. André would do willingly what Gallifet had done unwillingly—force officers to be loyal to the Republic. He came to grips with the General Staff at once, and by forcing the obedience or resignation of all, obtained only three resignations and the obedience of the other 79 in the office. After that, as the General Staff was the center of the merit promotion that leavened the slowness of seniority promotion, the officer corps became subordinate to the Republic in order to rise professionally instead of being Royalist for the same reason. Later on, André had the secret promotion boards abolished and ended that method of favoring Royalists. On this, as well as on the great Chalons strike of June, Waldeck-Rousseau had to survive interpellations. By his actions Waldeck-Rousseau was gaining the confidence of Moderates in and out of Parliament that he was right and Méline wrong on the degree of appeasement required.

If anything, he may have overdone it, for a deputation of the spokesmen of the parties that supported him—Socialists, Socialist Radicals, Radicals, and Moderates—came to him and pointed out that any Law of Associations must end teaching by unauthorized congregations, to which he agreed. That showed he was in the position Benjamin Franklin thought proved a man in the right—of being thought

by each side to favor the other. The Socialists certainly thought him not one of them. In September they held their annual congress, at which was discussed the question whether Millerand was justified in holding office in a non-Socialist government, or was betraying the cause of Socialism. It was voted that he should not hold office, and some twenty Socialists left the party and became independents, moving over toward the Socialist Radicals. This did not mean, however, that Waldeck-Rousseau could not count on the votes of the Reformists on almost every issue. Now, secure of the confidence of the Moderates, he could go ahead.

In September, at a great dinner of 22,000 to the mayors of France, an official declaration of governmental policy was made, and a promise that it would not go too far. In October, at Toulouse, Waldeck stated his desire, almost in Gambetta's words, to treat the congregations as the ordinary priests were treated and regularize their relation with the state. This must have had an effect, for during the autumn session a committee, elected by the parties that supported him—Socialists, Social Radicals, Radicals, and Moderates—waited upon him and pointed out that, much as they liked his idea of a Law of Associations licensing decent congregations, they thought it might be better if Parliament voted the licenses, rather than have him, as minister, grant them. He was now in the strong position of being pushed ahead by a majority in Parliament, and therefore of being sure the country was behind him.

The work went on. During the spring session the usual committee of the Chamber considered the bill. Some changes were made. The prohibition against international associations was removed, as that meant that any Socialist who felt in sympathy with international Socialist doctrines—that is, the great majority of the Socialists—*ipso facto* committed a crime if he voiced his perfectly reasonable opinions. Some of the congregations were overwealthy. Their extra money might well go to the workers' pension funds that Millerand

was setting up. At the end of March the bill went up to the Senate; on July 1 it was promulgated by the President of the Republic as a law. In its final form it required only a simple notification for forming most associations. But it required a vote by Parliament on religious congregations to authorize their existence in France, and a decree by the Council of State to let any such congregation open a school. Under the interpretation of the measure given the Vatican in February 1902 by Waldeck-Rousseau, that would apply only to new teaching institutions. But at that, the law in its final form was no longer an equal blow at anarchists and clericals, with a guarantee to the clericals that their teaching institutions would be safe once they passed the approval of Waldeck-Rousseau. The law of July 1 was almost solely directed at religious congregations, and ordered them to run the more risky gantlet of the majority in the Chamber, a majority now aroused.

For Parliament well understood the advice the Minister of Justice had given it over the Dreyfus Case: "Watch your constituencies." By now all France was thrashing out the arguments pro and con, and all their implications. From July 1901, when the law was promulgated, to the April and May elections, the French people were deciding whether they meant the Law of Associations to have any real meaning; and the majority in Parliament, as well as the minority, joined in the discussion with the rest of the Nation.

However, more than mere propaganda bodies were needed to handle the election of 1902, and meet the full strength of the Church. The supporters of Waldeck could, however, capitalize on one weakness that the opposition had, that the Progressives, who were loyal Republicans, would not pool votes with the anti-Republicans. A vote-pooling agreement on the left was needed, similar to the Union of the Left that had created the Socialist and Socialist Radical group in the Chamber of 1893. This was established, with a central committee to handle agreements throughout France, and was called the "Bloc of the Left." It contained not only

Socialist Radicals and Reformist Socialists (the followers of Jaurès), but also straight Radicals and Moderates. A slogan of "no enemies on the Left," and an agreement that on the "second turn" votes would be pooled for the highest on the first turn, whoever he was, were adopted to obtain the largest possible number of deputies for the Bloc. It succeeded. There were some twenty more pledged supporters of Waldeck-Rousseau, a sign that, no matter how hard the clericals tried, the tide had turned against them. The Chamber that would vote on the specific application of the Law of Associations was more anti-clerical than the Chamber that had voted that law, and correspondingly further from the Progressive President of the Council who had held the Chamber of 1898 together so that it could vote that law.

At this stage, after the elections and before the meeting of the new Parliament, Waldeck-Rousseau, to the surprise of the general public, announced that he would resign office, giving as a reason ill-health, which was not an excuse—he was to die of cancer in two years. He had held office longer than any President of the Council in the history of the Third Republic, before or since. As matters turned out, had he lived and stayed in office, he might well have outlasted his successor, had he wanted to and been in health, and held office for more than six years, for he would never have made the mistakes that defeated his successor. His was, if ever there was such, the "Great Ministry" of which Gambetta had dreamed, full of able men, who accomplished much in the Council of Ministers, as well as passing much legislation. In a sense it was a greater Ministry than Gambetta's "Great Ministry" could have been, because Waldeck-Rousseau never, like Gambetta, tried to drive any measure through the Parliament; he always worked with it, educated it, and was willing to learn from it in turn. Even the most partisan historians, and France can provide heartily partisan ones, admit that Waldeck-Rousseau was both great and wise. Monarchists say of him that for such a powerful Republican he did remarkably little damage; Socialists say of

him that he did wise things, though, being Conservative-minded, he did them for the wrong reason of trying to patch up a bad world rather than the right one of trying to make a new one. The facts show that he could combine Millerand and Gallifet in one Cabinet, and win devotion from André.

But, being such a great man, he may have known when his time was up. He wanted a "Statute of Congregations," a settlement that would keep many congregations in France and provide the genuine appeasement that his party had hoped for in the 1890's, and that he had left his party to try to create with the aid of Radicals. But the new Chamber brought into being by the Bloc of the Left would show no leniency, and in France the Chamber must be obeyed. Barthou, Méline's Minister of the Interior, had already announced that he would support the Ministry and shown by that what the election meant. Waldeck-Rousseau seems not to have liked the task before the Ministry that must obey that Chamber. Like Gallifet, he retired. But, unlike Gallifet, he shouted out no oaths, but merely saw the President, spoke, truly, of his bad health, and returned from his seat on the ministerial benches to his seat in the Senate. Only speeches and revelations by his friends two years later showed another reason for his retirement.

This was his second retirement from politics. In 1889, he had left them once before, saying that they were no place for a decent man.



Chapter Fourteen

FRENCH DEMOCRACY TRIUMPHS

IT is a shame that some of the best legends of the Third Republic turn out to be apocryphal, such as Jules Favré's seizing the bridle of Trochu's horse on the Fourth of September, and those variants of Gambetta's death that omit appendicitis. There is a delightful one, equally apocryphal, about the choice of Waldeck-Rousseau's successor. It goes that when President Loubet asked him to suggest someone to take his place, many names were discussed, but that of Émile Combes was mentioned only by accident as Waldeck-Rousseau was going out of the door. The truth of the matter is that Combes, as chairman of the Senate Committee on Associations, was the only possible choice as President of the Council that would enforce the Law of Associations, since the Senate would provide the stumbling block to its application, with one-third of its members holdovers from the election of 1894, and Combes would be best fitted to deal with senators.

But the legend, like those about Trochu and Gambetta, is true to character if not to fact. Till he became Premier no one not in Parliament had heard of Combes; when he became Premier it was a constant wonder that anyone so seemingly ineffective could do so well. The clericals clung delightedly to the fact that Combes was what the Irish call a "spoiled priest"—one whose early education had been for the priesthood, but who had given it up, or had it given up

for him. That seemed gratifyingly to explain in their favor both his abilities and his bitter anti-clericalism. About his Cabinet, too, there was an air of being above its station and abilities. Compared with Waldeck-Rousseau's, it stood on much the same footing as did the two Premiers. The War Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were deftly enough managed, because André and Delcassé were kept on from the previous Cabinet. At the Finance Ministry, Rouvier, the man who had dared dismiss Boulanger in 1887, though not as good as Caillaux, was on the same level. But a nobody replaced Millerand, and the substitution for De Lannessan at the Ministry of Marine of Camille Pelletan, who did not believe in battleships and did in helping his friends, turned out almost ruinous for the French Navy. The Ministry Combes assembled to put the Law of Associations into effect was indeed such that the committee that had managed the elections for the Bloc of the Left decided not to disband, as had been the custom of such committees previously, but to reorganize and carry on steadily the type of control over the Ministry that had twice been exercised over Waldeck-Rousseau, when his supporters thought he was too mild. This was an advance on and inheritance from previous methods of watching the Executive, which go back to the Royalist Committee of Fifteen that watched Thiers during the Commune.

The first matter that worried the committee was the constitutionally required meeting of Parliament immediately after the election, at which a President of the Chamber would have to be elected. That would be a test vote of the feelings of the Chamber, and if Paul Deschanel were chosen again it would mean that the Chamber would be of a temperament that would require the maneuvering, twisting, and turning that had been gone through under the Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry to get any effective anti-clerical action. But the vote for President was by secret ballot, at which Deschanel's personal popularity with many Moderates would enable him to defeat Henri Brisson, the usual Radical

candidate, but would not enable him to defeat Léon Bourgeois. Brisson was persuaded to retire, pressure was put on all members of the Bloc, and Bourgeois was elected. With that notice served of what this particular Chamber had better be like, a short summer session began.

Combes soon showed the kind of man he was, and the difference in his attitude from Waldeck-Rousseau's. Under the Law of Associations, July 1, 1902, was the deadline for applications to the Council of State for permission for teaching bodies that were subsidiaries of congregations. All such bodies that had not applied were then closed. To the surprise of those which had existed before July 1, 1901, they, too, were closed. Combes took a different view of the law from that Waldeck-Rousseau had taken in February; and the Council of State, when appealed to, agreed with the President of the Council, a habit it has in crucial cases.

The Bloc, too, showed what it was. On the initiative of the Socialist Radicals, a "Delegation of the Left" was formed, consisting of 7 Moderates, 8 pure Radicals, 6 Socialist Radicals, and 5 Reformist Socialists, to concert measures. As chairman the Radical Sarrien was chosen. Jaurès, re-elected to the Chamber, led the Socialists. These twenty-six waited upon Combes and informed him they wanted full details of his policy in advance, not merely the day-by-day information that Parliament usually gets of decisions already made for it to approve or not. In particular, they wanted him to realize that they would stand for no more Catholic education than they could help. After a long interview they went away satisfied; and from then on, for some time, France had two Cabinets: Combes's Council of Ministers, which administered, and the Delegation of the Left, which, under the leadership of Sarrien and Jaurès, afforded Moderates, both brands of Radicals, and the conciliatory brand of Socialists a chance to find a common policy that they could then force through Parliament. The Bloc of the Left was in a stern mood and would not be put off.

The Bloc of the Left was in a stern mood because the

anticlerical majority in the country was also in a stern mood. It was felt that clericalism had been tolerated long enough, and must be shorn of its ability to do harm. Here are some of the accusations made against clericalism: It had been clericalism that after 1870 had insisted on a foreign policy that lost France allies. It had been clericalism that had nearly destroyed the Republic by bringing back the king. It had been clericalism in the time of Ferry's and Paul Bert's educational reforms that had blocked the chances of many a poor man to rise by putting off universal education, and by trying to restrict it. It had been clericalism that had afforded the election agents for rounding up popular support for the Conservatives among the ignorant. In particular it had been clericalism that had furnished the press and the writers who raised such a storm when the wrongs of Dreyfus were being righted. An example of the extremes to which clericalism went was the supposed revelations of the iniquities of Freemasonry by an Englishwoman named Diana Vaughan, who claimed she had shared in the debauches. It was sheer pornography, of a very low sort, and turned out to be an utter fraud. Yet the Assumptionist Fathers, who edited *La Croix*, widely urged the purchase of the book, obscene as it was, before the fraud was discovered, and continued to afterwards, for some little time. Bearing such accusations in mind, the actions of the Bloc of the Left are understandable.

When Parliament met in October, the Bloc acted. The personnel of committees has been vital, ever since De Broglie took to using them against Thiers, and Gambetta against Grévy. The Delegation left nothing to chance, especially with the essential Committee on the Law of Associations. Under the Parliamentary procedure then used for electing committees, the Chamber was divided by lot into eleven sections, or bureaux, which elected one, two, or three members to each committee, as the case might be. This system ensured an almost automatic proportional representation on each committee if it was allowed to work itself out. But

the Bloc of the Left did not let the system work itself out. The Delegation so organized the voting that, though it represented little more than half the Chamber, it held three-quarters of the seats, not only on the Committee on Associations, but also on the other committees. So contrary was this to the usual ideas of Parliamentary procedure that the Parliament of 1910 changed its rules to ensure that such a treatment of a minority would never recur, and that all groups would have equal representation on committees by directly choosing representatives.

The Bloc also made a clean sweep of the vice-presidencies of the Chamber, violating the usual custom of allowing minority representation there; and in January, at the reorganization of that session, elected Jaurès a vice-president to show exactly where it stood. A little less than thirty-two years from the "Bloody Week" of the Commune, with the shooting of Socialists, the wheel of politics had so turned that a Socialist was helping preside over the successor of the body that ordered the shooting.

It was this sort of symbolic thing that made angry Conservatives speak of a "Dreyfusian Revolution" even before the Chamber took up the application of the Law of Associations to particular Associations. Though it had been agreed that acceptance of a congregation by either Chamber would be sufficient, which enabled the sending of applications to the more favorable Senate, no Ministry would last in the Chamber that sent many to the Senate. Six applications of the sixty were therefore sent to the Luxembourg, five to be accepted, one of a congregation so notorious that even the Senate could not fail to reject it. The remaining fifty-four were laid before the Chamber. At the thought of debating fifty-four separate motions and listening to angry speeches on each one, the Chamber shuddered, and decided to vote the fifty-four in one motion. That was an automatic defeat for them all. To this Waldeck-Rousseau objected, and as his prestige was such that he still had to be listened to, a compromise was reached. The teaching congregations, the

preaching congregations, and Chartreux, the business one, would be voted on in separate groups. The test vote on the teaching congregations went 300 to 268, and the other two votes really did not matter, just being for the record. The Law of Associations turned out to be no Statute of Associations, leaving as it did only five in existence. It removed from France 15,964 teaching monks, 3,040 preaching monks, and spoiled the taste of the Chartreuse cordial for all time, for the cordial depends on combining the secret which the Chartreuse monks took away to Spain with the grapes which grow only in France. (Of the two, the secret seems the more important, according to connoisseurs.) For a shocking moment it seemed as if the famous missionary branches of the now-expelled congregations were also expelled from the colonies, but Combes assured the Chamber that would not be so.

Voting to expel the monks was one thing; expelling them, as Jules Ferry had found, was another. Waldeck-Rousseau, now weak and ill, told his followers in the Senate that the Law of Associations would be either a permanent statute or a temporary expedient, depending on whether it was used, as he had intended, as a law to control the congregations, or as a law of punishment to expel them. The actions of the congregations seemed to confirm his ideas. The Law of Associations was resisted, not accepted. "Secularized" monks tried to enter parish churches and preach there, that being what they had consecrated their lives to. At times religious mobs protected them, at other times anti-clerical mobs attacked them. A school of thought that wanted to mend this sort of disorder by ending the connection of Church and state strengthened. In May 1903 a motion was made in the Chamber to separate the Roman Catholic and all other churches in France from the state, but there the Bloc of the Left split. The Moderates in the Delegation did not want that, and the motion was defeated, the unusual sight being seen of most of the Bloc voting against the Ministry, and the entire Opposition for it. The Nation, on the whole, still

wanted forbearance; and Parliament, sensitive to what the Nation wanted, was giving it forbearance.

But its patience was wearing thin. Further steps were taken. Nunneries were treated just as monasteries had been—that is, only the Missions were left. Expelled monks, who said that they were laymen, were not allowed to teach, whatever they said they were, in the same Commune in which they had been monks, or the next one to it. The famous Falloux Law of 1850, making some secondary schools independent of Government supervision, was whittled away to almost nothing. A fairly elected committee was set up to receive and consider the many petitions for separation that poured in. So evenly divided was the committee that it was only by a vote of 17 to 16 that Brisson was elected its chairman, Aristide Briand, an independent Socialist, its “reporter.” This Committee would be ready to act when the time came.

Thus, for the two years from the regular spring session of 1903 to the regular spring session of 1905, the Bloc tried what it considered forbearance, while its opponents fretted at the strange way France was being ruled. With Dreyfus being granted a retrial by Executive action, at which his name was finally cleared, this seemed even more to be a “Dreyfusian Revolution.” The Cabinet seemed the agent merely of a malevolent dwarf, who, combining as he did the Interior and Cults, held in his hands all the administrative threads that concerned the religious struggle. The real Cabinet seemed the Delegation, over which, in a dim way, Sarrien presided, but whose leading spirit seemed to be Jean Jaurès. In the Chamber attack after attack was made, and it was always repulsed the same way. Some obvious member of the Bloc would propose an Order of the Day, the little Premier would accept it, and, after many speeches against it, one man in particular, the bearded, compelling Jean Jaurès, would mount the Tribune in defense of the accepted Order of the Day, and present reasons that any Moderate could quote for voting for Combes. The next day

it would be realized that somehow the Government had triumphed again, and that Jaurès again had been in the thick of it. The natural accusation was that the Government was "the prisoner of the Socialists," and that Jaurès—though, following the Socialist rule, he had accepted no office—was really the "Minister of Speeches" of the Combes Ministry, instead of being what he was—the most eloquent, moving, and persuasive defender of a policy that the four parties making up the Bloc had agreed upon in common, or rather, had had their governing body, the Delegation, agree to for them. For, as had happened at the attempt to separate Church and state, no policy not acceptable to all of the parties could be put through by the machinery of the Delegation. However, it was true that Jaurès, by his determination and will, held the Bloc together and gave it impulse.

On the other side, the clerical forces acted as do beaten men who will not give up the fight, but take great chances. They saw taken away from them their most effective institutions: the means of educating the next generation, of preaching to the current generation, and of subsidizing an effective press. They hunted for and found loopholes in the law, and the Bloc closed the loopholes they had found. Though no Delegation could be established in the Senate, which was jealous of its independence, the Senate would not go against the Chamber. Almost in desperation, the Vatican took a hand, the Pope no longer being Leo XIII, who believed in accepting the Republic and had encouraged the small group of pro-Dreyfus Catholics, but Pius X, who was trying to strengthen the discipline in the Catholic Church. The Vatican jumped at a pretext for explaining its opinions.

In 1903 the King of Italy had paid a visit to France, a sign of the more friendly relations that Delcassé had established between the two countries. In common decency the President of the Republic had to return the visit. Doing that was something very different from the days when the French Republic so strongly supported the Papal claim that

the King of Italy was oppressing the Pope as to keep a cruiser waiting night and day at the port of Ostia in case the Pope wanted to flee from the Vatican. This being a case of the President of France visiting the King of Italy and the Pope liking it, or of the President of France visiting the King of Italy and the Pope not liking it, the Pope decided not to like it. A note was sent by the Papal Secretary of State, Cardinal Merry del Val, to Delcassé, couched in such terms that the French Cabinet notified the Vatican it could not be accepted, hoping by ignoring it to keep the peace and its dignity at the same time.

But Jaurès got hold of a copy of an almost identical note, varying only in being more severe, that the Vatican had sent to every other capital in Europe. This he published in his new paper, *L'Humanité*. The fat was in the fire. No government could stand being told that it had "special duties" to another government, and that the movements of its Chief Executive were "offensive," or that that second government had "accorded" the first the right of protecting its interests, or that only "special reasons" prevented the second government's breaking off diplomatic relations. Indeed, only "special reasons"—a threat of resignation from Loubet, whose wife was an earnest Catholic—prevented Combes and Delcassé from breaking off relations with the Vatican, and forced them to take the milder step of withdrawing the French ambassador, leaving only a chargé d'affairs. Only 95 could be found to vote against Combes on an interpellation on this subject.

The Church continued to struggle, despite the warning it should have had from the way separation was almost put through in May 1903, when the Concordat was saved only by the intervention of its enemy, Combes. Another warning came in a law prohibiting any member of any congregation from teaching in France, ending the licenses issued by the Senate. That law, in theory, is still in force. The Church took exceptional action, and itself broke the Concordat. Two bishops, in the heat of the controversy going on throughout

the Nation, were accused of vulgar crimes, the Bishop of Dijon of being a Freemason, the Bishop of Laval of seducing an abbess. Instead of allowing the French courts to handle the cases, as legally they should, and either punish the guilty or free the innocent from disgraceful and unwarranted imputations, the bishops were summoned to Rome, questioned in secret, and then transferred to posts outside of France without its ever having been explained whether or not they were guilty. Nor would the Pope confirm the new appointments that Combes made in their places, and for other vacancies. With the Concordat no longer functioning, the Moderates began to waver and agree that separation might be necessary.

At the same time the cohesion of the Delegation was ending. It had been a feat to persuade even Reformist Socialists to support a government that contained the friend of the bankers, Maurice Rouvier. That feat had been accomplished by the personal sway of Jaurès, and the fact that no International Congress of the Socialist party had definitely pronounced against supporting a bourgeois government under exceptional circumstances. In August 1904 such a congress was held, the Congress of Amsterdam. There Jaurès defended himself as best he could, but was told that he would be run out of the party if he did not mend his ways. Not being like Millerand, Briand, and René Viviani—more interested in specific Socialist aims than the general Socialist doctrine and Socialist party regularity—he could not, like them, withdraw and call himself an independent Socialist, gradually merging with the Socialist Radicals. He had to obey, but because of his obedience separation no longer seemed so tied to Socialism.

In these circumstances the opposition to separation began to weaken. When Combes definitely and flat-footedly came out for separation in his Auxerre speech in September, even the Progressives came over. In October Paul Deschanel announced that the group for which he spoke would accept separation from any government other than Combes's. Cle-

menceau, in *L'Aurore*, remarked that, if even Deschanel had agreed to separation, that made it practically unanimous.

The purpose of the Delegation was over. It had existed to dragoon Moderates to voting for a Radical program and to dragoon Socialists to waiting till the Moderates had made up their mind. Now the Moderates, and even the Progressives, had agreed to the Radical program; and the Socialists had not even waited to be told they could go hang, but had broken off beforehand. By one of those curious accidents that so often happen in French politics as to make some suspect intention behind them, at this very moment a storm broke over the Combes Ministry, over the famous "Delations" (*Les Fiches*).

In the process of Republicanizing the Army that André had carried out, it had been necessary to find out what officers were for the Republic, what ones were hampering the advancement of Republicans. The obvious channels of information by officers' superiors were blocked in this case, because so many of the higher officers were anti-Republican, André being himself War Minister because he was an outstanding exception to this rule. The Freemasons had always been anti-clerical and secretive, as well as pledged to help fellow Masons. In France the Grand Orient, rather than the Scotch Rite, is the prevailing type of Masonry. Men subscribing to its doctrines, which are very hard to reconcile with orthodox Catholicism, were spread all over France, and in correspondence with the central office of the Grand Orient in Paris. The simple thought came to someone to have secret information sent by Masons to the Grand Orient, and thence to Captain Mollin, on the Staff, to check on the official reports. At the Grand Orient were lists of officers, with little notes (or labels, hence the use of the word *Fiche* in speaking of them) telling what sort of a man each was. The crucial test of opinion being Catholicism, many labels merely read, "Goes to Mass," or "Wife goes to Mass." A secretary at the Grand Orient sold to the Nationalist deputy, Guyot de Ville-neuve, a great many of these, which in collaboration with

Le Figaro he published in the press, and read from the Tribune when making an interpellation. It was only by the personal intervention of Jaurès and the slim margin of four votes that the Combes Ministry survived. André had to go for making use of such methods, but, there being no other general to take his place, the Radical deputy Berteaux took over the Ministry of War, ending the custom of giving that office only to generals or Charles de Freycinet.

This was not the end of the rout of the Delegation. Fearing for its influence, it called for an open ballot on the election of the President of the Chamber at the January 1905 session, but it was defeated; and under the protection of the secret ballot, its candidate, Sarrien, was beaten by Doumer, who had been chairman of the Budget Committee, and was known, though a Radical, to be turning against Combes. Further narrow squeaks kept Combes on the narrow edge, when more "Delations" were brought up; and at last, in January 1905, he resigned office. In his place came Maurice Rouvier, with a Cabinet so full of company directors that it was called the "Directors' Meeting"—hardly a Radical body. Rouvier himself told the Socialist Bourson that if he wanted separation he should think of it ten years from then.

That attitude brought the Delegation to life once more. When its purpose had apparently been accomplished it had faded away. Now that its purpose seemed snatched away, it revived, and forced Rouvier to send a Government bill to the Separation Committee to discuss. The Separation Committee, under the leadership of Briand, then worked out a bill that was presented to the Chamber at the end of March. It took all of April, May, and June to bring the measure to a final vote. One reason was the attempt to work out arrangements that would be acceptable to the Church. Here it was that Briand may have learned the diplomacy that, in the years after the first World War, made him an almost perpetual Foreign Minister.

When worked out, with concessions to make the transition easier, the Law of Separation stated that, in place of

paying salaries to clergymen, those salaries would be reduced by one-tenth a year, and ended at the end of ten years. All Church property, of whatever sect, which had until then been state property, would be handed over to the sect that used it, which would set up "Cultural Associations" to hold it. For Protestants and Jews that would be enough, but for Roman Catholics another provision was added. Any Cultural Association for the whole of the Roman Catholic Church would be a super-congregation, to which the Assumptionists and Jesuits would seem as nothing. Abolishing the Concordat would mean abolishing the hold the state had over the Church to make it behave. Not daring to give too much power to a nation-wide Cultural Association for the Catholics, the Law ordered that separate Cultural Associations also be set up for each parish to act under the control of a central assembly. All parish property after an inventory would be transferred to each such Association. A corollary was giving up the Vatican Embassy.

However, at the very start of the debates, the higher clergy of France, having consulted the Pope, looked at this another way, as their manifesto of March 28 showed. In their eyes this would make each parish independent of its bishop, a suggestion utterly repugnant to Catholicism, and would snatch the sacred objects of Christian worship from the churches. Their recalcitrant attitude was natural, and taxed Briand's powers to their limit. When Briand at the end of June had finished his work, the measure in its final form was put to a vote. It was carried at midnight on July 3, the result of the vote, 341 to 233, being announced from the Tribune as the clock struck twelve from the belfry of the Palace Bourbon.

Observers noted that in the afternoon the Chamber had been rocked with recriminations over the voting of the brandy tax, but that the separation was voted with perfect quiet and decorum. Recriminations might avail in changing the distilling laws; the time for them was well over as far as affecting separation went.

What held separation up, besides Briand's policy of tact, was a series of outside events. On March 31, 1905, just a week and a day after the first discussion of the law, Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany landed at Tangier, and hinted that he would protect the rights of the Sultan of Morocco. Delcassé, who had just signed an "entente" with England, wanted to call the German bluff and fight, asserting that the King of England had promised him the aid of an army of 100,000 men. Rouvier had no such foolish desire, and on June 17 Delcassé was forced to resign, and Rouvier moved over to the Foreign Office from the Ministry of Finance. The Germans insisted on a conference at Algeciras on the Moroccan question, and got it, and nothing more. That, however, is another story to be told later. What matters is that the Rouvier Cabinet, having undergone the humiliation of having had to dismiss the Foreign Minister at the orders of Germany, had to be supported in office for a while out of national self-respect.

Other matters connected with the career of the Bloc were cleared up, too. Guyot de Villeneuve was persuaded not to publish any more of the "Delations" by an assurance that that policy would be given up. Most important, Jaurès was brought to heel by the Amsterdam Congress, and the bringing to heel announced to the world by the founding of the United Socialist Party, on April 25. No longer would there be a French Socialist Party that tried to settle French questions in a French way, and a Socialist Party of France that applied universal rules of Socialism to France. Just at the moment that Jaurès's work was done, the Socialists stopped doing any such work.

The story of separation was not over with the passing of the bill through the Chamber. It was only after the summer vacation that the Senate took it up, only after more discussion that it was promulgated as law by the President, on December 9, 1905. Then it had to be enforced in an atmosphere of relaxation. The election of Doumer to the presidency of the Chamber had shown the leaders of the Delega-

tion that the Delegation no longer held its supporters together. When Loubet's term came to an end, the old method of ensuring an election of a Republican President was resorted to—the method that had elected the so-well-qualified Sadi-Carnot; and a preliminary ballot was held, for Republicans only, which selected Armand Fallières, the President of the Senate. Almost immediately after that, the Rouvier Cabinet fell.

The cause of the Rouvier Cabinet's fall was the inventories. The Pope, Pius X, had, in the Bull *Vehementer Nos*, forbidden the clergy of France to accept either local Cultural Associations or the seizure of sacred objects. Resistance was offered to the authorities; there was a cartoon of a prefect lying on the ground, a bulky priest treading on him, saying, "M. le Préfect, we beg you to listen to our feeble protest," while the unfortunate prefect looks up at him in bewilderment and fear. All over France parishioners protected their churches. Soldiers were sent in to make sure that inventories were made. The feelings can be imagined of a soldier who was also a devout Catholic in the dilemma of being ordered by his officer to march into a church, ordered by his priest, in full vestments, not to enter. If he did not go in he broke his soldier's faith; if he did he insulted his Mother Church and imperiled his immortal soul. No wonder that in one celebrated case soldiers wept as they entered a church with bayonets fixed.

Parliament, sensitive to the Nation's feelings, could not tolerate this. Rouvier resigned. In his place was put an obvious man to superintend separation, Sarrien, who had headed the Delegation of the Left. He gathered together a Cabinet of able men, Poincaré, Barthou, Briand, and even got the Tiger himself to break his self-imposed rule of never taking office. They met at Sarrien's to talk things over. Clemenceau came in late, as drinks were being passed. Sarrien asked him what he would take and got the firm answer, "The Interior," instead of his choice of a drink. The Tiger being the Tiger, Sarrien silently gave up his own

plans of taking the key position of the Interior. As Minister of the Interior, Clemenceau had an answer to the inventory question: "No list of chandeliers is worth a soldier's life." That cause of discord was ended, at once.

Discord, however, automatically existed in any Cabinet Clemenceau and other strong men were in at the same time. Sarrien resigned, taking with him, when the Cabinet was reconstituted, Barthou and Poincaré, and a Clemenceau Cabinet had a sweeping success at the elections. Technically, a majority of the Chamber were Radicals, but that just meant that everyone who could had availed himself of the excellent Radical election machinery in the Rue de Valois.

Then, with Briand as Minister of Education, the nearest post to the now-ended Ministry of Cults, to negotiate with the Church, Clemenceau tried to settle the details of separation. An ingenious idea of Briand's, to let priests hold public meetings in churches without forming Cultural Associations, was destroyed by the Pope's forbidding the requesting of police permission for such meetings, and made it necessary to permit public meetings without police permission in a hurry, to forestall other scenes like those of the inventories. As Clemenceau said once, "The Law of Separation took care of all eventualities except those that occurred."

Clemenceau himself had his troubles, aside from the Church. The Grenoble strike, the Fougères lockout, the Paris electricians' strike, the Nantes dockers' strike, the near-revolt of the wine growers in the Midi, in which the 17th Regiment of the Line mutinied, the formation of the C.G.T., the General Confederation of Workers, all taxed his efforts in keeping order. It was not till 1908 that a solution was found.

That solution was simple. In 1908, when a Cultural Association set up against the order of the Catholic Church tried to take possession of a parish church, suit was brought in the Council of State to prevent the non-Catholic Cultural Association from using a building that was, under the Law of Separation, to go to the Catholic Church. This decision

in effect said that, though the Catholic Church had not taken possession of the buildings the state was transferring to it, it could use those buildings, and prevent others from using them. Both sides got what they wanted, and all was well. With that decision the very problem that brought Spain to a murderous civil war was brought in France, through and because of the complications of the democratic process, to a humorous close.

It is a far cry to that friendly decision in the Council of State from Déroulède and Guérin planning a coup nine years before. At first sight, in those years, little that was heroic occurred. A great man came to save the Republic in its hour of danger, and retired three years later, to watch his legislation be put to uses he had not intended—that being his second retirement from political life. In his place was put an obscure man who had to have a special committee watch him, a committee that rode roughshod over the amenities and minority rights of Parliamentary life. When the obscure man had been caught using Masonic lodges to spy on army officers, he was with difficulty removed and replaced by a banker, who also had to be watched. The banker crawled at Germany's feet, and was succeeded by the chairman of the watching committee, who in turn was quickly followed by an anti-clerical Radical who until then had asserted he would never hold office, and whose claim to fame while President of the Council was that he betrayed his principles a second time by giving in to the Church he hated, his hatred having gained him the nickname of "Priest-Eater."

Such is a view that is frequently expressed of the "Dreyfusian Revolution" and the separation of Church and state; but it leaves out the magnitude of the problem to be solved. Looked at another way, in a severe crisis an undecided nation found itself leaders, but never surrendered its judgment to those leaders. Instead, by open discussion that never was curtailed, it thrashed out the problem, put the tentative solutions to the people at not one but two elections to the

Chamber, not to mention three senatorial elections, and reached a solution. Part of that solution, the Cultural Associations and the inventories, proved unacceptable. A way was found to get around the letter of the law. Part of that solution, the abolition of the congregations and the withdrawal of the Vatican Embassy, was found, in the 1920's, no longer needful, and was also tacitly or explicitly changed. But the great purpose of ending the pressure of Army and Church on the Nation was achieved. Furthermore, it was achieved without bloodshed or increased hatred, and at the same time a truculent Army was made subservient to the civil authorities. Was that not a success to be put to the credit of French democracy, rather than to its discredit?



Chapter Fifteen

NEW FORCES IN FRENCH DEMOCRACY

AFTER 1905, French democracy, which until then had had to face problems largely constitutional and institutional, struggling first with the monarchy, then with the Church and the Army, found itself confronting problems of a different sort. If the struggles between 1870 and 1905 had been between an Old France and a New, there was now a struggle between that New France and a Newer.

The Rouvier Ministry was delayed in separating Church and state because it suddenly came up against the Morocco crisis. The Clemenceau Ministry was delayed in making the separation effective by having to handle an epidemic of strikes at the same time. If the actions of French democracy after 1905 are to be made intelligible, it must be considered why France was in difficulties with other nations, why she was in Morocco anyway, what made "new layers of society" demand more. Looking at diplomacy, colonial expansion, Nationalism, and the workers' movement, and trying to see them as the French saw them should show how much the problems of 1905 had changed from those of Sedan and the Fourth of September, what was merely a new form of an old problem, what was essentially new and meant a change in France and France's history.

As far as diplomacy goes, the period between the War of 1870 and the Great War may be divided into three parts. In the first period, up to the Franco-Russian Alliance of

1894, Germany held France isolated by means of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, coupled with a working agreement with Russia and England. Then there was a period of three-sided rivalry, among the Triple Alliance, the Franco-Russian Alliance, and England, up to 1904. Then the last two combined into the Triple Entente, to which, in fact though not in theory, Italy acceded, and turned the tables on Germany. The struggle between the two systems of alliances led to the Great War, at the end of which France found herself the dominant nation on the Continent. But the historian of France does not need to keep so clear the interaction of many nations on each other. He can simply hold fast to the one fact that the stronger a nation is, the more it will be sought as an ally. It was the growing strength of France that enabled her diplomats to end the isolation she had been in since 1871.

The truth of that comes out at every crisis in the diplomatic relations of France. When, in 1875, the French Army, as reconstituted under the presidency of Marshal MacMahon, was stronger in officers than the German, though not yet so in men, it was natural for Bismarck to take fright, and for other nations to protect France as a useful counterpoise to Bismarck. That, from the Frenchman's point of view, is the war scare of 1875 in a nutshell. In 1878, when the Marshal had knuckled under but had not yet gone out, France, still divided against herself, played a small role in the Congress of Berlin, not daring to take Tunis when it was offered her. It was only the first strong President of the Council, Ferry, who dared take Tunis; and, though Gambetta tried to enter Egypt along with England, he fell; and De Freycinet did not feel strong enough to keep up his policy and face the Chamber of Deputies.

Similarly, the first feelers of the Franco-Russian Alliance took place when, with Boulanger as Minister of War, France was standing up to Bismarck in a remarkable way; but the military "conversations" became a military agreement only in 1891, when Boulanger had been safely exiled; and they

were ratified only after the "rallying" had greatly strengthened the Republic. It is worth noting, in that era of rampant Nationalism, with the Army existing as a semi-independent body, that the Russians insisted on the semi-independent Chief of Staff signing, as well as the diplomatic authorities, as if to bind future dictators as well as the Republic. In this period France came to the verge of war with England—in 1894 over Siam, in 1898 over Fashoda—but had to back down each time. It was in this time of growing strength that she detached Italy from the Triple Alliance.

When the Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry had survived its initial dangers and given long tenure of power to its great Foreign Minister, Delcassé, it was possible for him to make terms with England. It was overconfidence on Delcassé's part to think that England would fight on the Continent; but Rouvier, who had to jettison Delcassé for thinking so, knew that up to war, as far as diplomatic action went, England and France could defeat Germany at the Algeciras Conference. Once the conference had been called, France was able to gain her ends, this despite the collapse of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. In 1909, over the Capablanca Affair of a German deserter from the French Foreign Legion, and in 1911, over the Agadir Affair of the German gun-boat *Panther's* protecting almost imaginary Germans on the Atlantic coast of Morocco because the French had occupied the capital, Fez, France stood up to Germany remarkably. So remarkable was the bravery in 1911 that Caillaux, the Premier, had to negotiate behind the Foreign Office's back for fear it was being too brave. By then England was becoming ready to fight on the Continent.

These are not the only facts in the complicated diplomatic history of Europe before the Great War; but details have been spared the reader because these are the facts on which the French based their decisions, and on which other nations based their decisions about France. Looked at thus, the diplomatic history of France resolves itself into the truism that the stronger you are, the stronger you are; and that

when you are strong again you find you have friends again; and leaves unexplained the new strength and the causes of struggle, which may be explained elsewhere. The diplomatic problem in 1905 was just a new version of the old problem that had stood out at Sedan.

Since France beyond the seas and its phenomenal growth from 1880 on have not been dealt with, they may provide the new factor with which to explain a "Newer France" than that of Gambetta. The France beyond the seas that the National Assembly had to administer in 1871 consisted of Algeria (which, it was hoped, would become a slightly separated part of the homeland, although it was perversely refusing to do so) and a series of isolated outposts scattered all over the world. The France beyond the seas of June 1940 consisted of an Algeria that was fast becoming assimilated to France, a Tunis and a Morocco that did not, as they did then, hamper the assimilation, but rather shared in it, and not only the larger part of the Continent of Africa, but also Madagascar and Indo-China, as well as all the old scattered outposts. What happened is that, while some of the outposts stayed outposts, others suddenly developed, and in their development found the solution to the Algerian difficulty. Here details have interest because they both show the extent of the French Colonial Empire and introduce some important figures in French history.

Of course, some of the outposts could not be developed at all. St. Pierre and Miquelon, off the coast of Newfoundland, the last vestiges of the French ownership of Canada, could never be more than stores where fishermen might buy goods tax free. French Guiana, where was the Devil's Island, was a hell-hole, best suited to keeping convicts, for any attempt to escape almost certainly ended in the convict's returning from the jungles to the comparative comfort of jail. New Caledonia, on the opposite side of the world, was hardly more pleasant as a residence, and was—if anything—harder to escape from. The New Hebrides, which were almost uninhabitable, and Tahiti, which was

highly pleasant, merely prove that there have been French as well as English explorers in the South Seas. Then there are French West India Islands and two French Forts in India—Pondicherry and Chandernagor—to prove that when the English founded their colonial empire in the eighteenth century they had to fight the French for it. The most serious effect of these outposts on the Third Republic comes from their sense of gratitude. The Second Republic gave the natives voting rights, and steadily their deputies voted Republican in the Third Republic, helping to make up the slim majorities by which the Republic at times survived.

Other outposts have been far different. At the mouths of distant rivers in Asia and Africa there were in the 1870's little settlements of French officials, French missionaries, French traders, and French explorers, the last of whom took to going up the rivers and coming back to inspire others to follow in their footsteps. Beyond French India, that ran itself so quietly, were the mouths of two curious unexplored rivers, the Mekong and the Red, either of which might give a back road into the riches of China. At the mouth of the Mekong had been the Empire of Cambodia and the Kingdom of Cochin-China, both of which had been conquered by Napoleon III because missionaries had been ill-treated; and then had been left alone. Up the Mekong, with ill-defined boundaries that nearly caused war with England in 1894, was Siam; beyond was, in fact, Burma, and it was hoped China, if only the Mekong could be explored. Between the mouths of the Mekong and the Red rivers was the Empire of Annam, a curious parody of China, even to having a ruling caste of Mandarins selected by literary examinations. In some shadowy way Annam was supposed to be under the suzerainty of China. In no shadowy way, but in actual fact, the Annamese ruled the Tonkinese in the Red River Valley, and controlled any attempt to get into China that way, which is the way munitions got in until July 1940.

Similarly, at the north end of the curious island of Mada-

gascar was a French mission station and trading post, in competition with an English mission station and trading post in trying to convert and trade with the Malay race of Hovas that inhabited the highlands and lorded it over the Negro tribes. At Obock and Djibouti on the Red Sea coast there were missionaries and traders in connection with Abyssinia. At the mouths of the Congo and the Senegal in West Africa, and at the Ivory Coast, where was the native kingdom of Dahomey, there were more officials, more missionaries, more traders—all rather uninterested in the question of where the Congo came from, what was above the falls of the Senegal, and where the water rose that flowed out of the many mouths of the Niger River. An exception to this was the remarkable development of the Senegal by that General Faidherbe who came back from Africa to help Gambetta in Normandy.

In the 1870's the explorers got no encouragement. When Captain Francis Garnier, in trying to go up the Red River, had to contend with the Annamese rulers of Tonkin, and wound up by storming the Emperor's capital of Hué with only two hundred men, his treaty was disavowed by De Broglie and a milder one substituted. When De Brazza went up the Congo and its northern branch, the Ubangi, finding a hidden world of rolling plains and Mohammedan kingdoms, he got no encouragement. The first forward step came in Algeria and Tunis.

In Algeria there had been various policies. In the 1830's and 40's the great Marshal Bugeaud had occupied the valleys behind the seacoast, and left behind him a legend of fighting spirit combined with a flair for getting on with Arabs and junior officers, together with the positive fact that it was possible to rule Algeria, despite the pressure of Arabs from the mountains. The Arabs, however, gave plenty of practice in warfare to his successors, the Duke d'Aumale and Marshal MacMahon; and in 1871 and thereafter to General Chanzy, the Republican governor general, who had a war of some duration on his hands. It was there

that General Boulanger got promotion on the field of battle, outside of the usual Royalist-controlled boards. In 1881, on less provocation by raids than usual, but with a stronger President of the Council than usual, Tunis was finally occupied. After that, under the fiction that the Dey of Tunis was advised by a French Resident, Paul Cambon, the Resident, later a great diplomat, managed Tunis so well in his few years that there the forms of a native government were fitted admirably into the facts of a French administration which all races seem to accept, with the possible exception of the Italians, who have come over from Sicily. The success of the Tunisian venture, and possibly the bitter regret that Egypt was not shared with England, as might have been done for the asking, in 1881 may have made it easier for the man with forward ideas to get help elsewhere. At any rate, in the 1880's the attitude to forward movements was different.

In 1883, when De Rivière had trouble like Garnier's on the Red River, he got support Garnier had never had.¹ Admiral Courbet was sent out from France, and when the war, first with the Annamese overlords, then with unofficial "Black Flags" sent down from China, and then with the official Chinese Army, had ended, Indo-China, despite the clawing-down of Ferry by Clemenceau, was French.

The story of Madagascar, except for dates, is much the same. It was in 1894 that Queen Ranavaloa and the French had their final falling-out over the terms of the treaty of 1885. General Duchesne spent a great deal of time actually getting to the plateau, and no time at all in capturing Tananarive, the capital. Then came the task of administration. In West Africa the story was the same again. The railway was built around the falls of Senegal, and the ground-nut industry made French West Africa a paying proposition. The King of Dahomey, with his fighting women, was brought to order, ending shocking practices. De Brazza not only

¹ Both De Rivière and Garnier were killed in action, defending their conquests.

made the north bank of the Congo French and organized it, but also put the Ubangi Sultans under proper control. From the headwaters of the Senegal, men went across to the headwaters of the mighty Niger, the river that for a thousand years no white man had been able to find. On those headwaters stood the holy city of the Touaregs, Timbuctoo, legendary for its inaccessibility and for what the Touaregs did to their captives. In 1894 Colonel Bonnier took Timbuctoo, but he and his men were massacred shortly afterward. However, the major of engineers in command of his supply train, a man named Joffre, gathered up the fugitives, calmly went ahead, and with fugitives and supply train took Timbuctoo so that it stayed taken. The crowning attempt of all was to cross from the Ubangi to the little French settlement of Djibouti and make all Africa north of the Congo French. Major Marchand, in command of this mission, was blocked by Lord Kitchener at Fashoda, though he made the actual journey to Djibouti, a matter of four years of struggling. Thus the map of Africa was colored French.

Conquest was one thing, administration another. Just as Algeria without Bugeaud was hard to rule, so were Indo-China and Madagascar without men of Bugeaud's stamp.

It might be thought that Cambon's example would be followed, but he was considered a diplomat who was forced by the status of Tunis in international law to use exceptional methods, and the administration of the French colonies remained brusque and military. The impulse to better administration, on the level of the English administration that writings of the time show the French envied, came elsewhere. Of course, each colony had its own development, complicated by the way administrators were transferred from colony to colony; but probably the real inspirer of the new French Colonial Policy, as opposed to the habit of treating everyone as rather a poor class of Frenchmen, unless it was Faidherbe in Senegal, was Paul Bert, the radical professor of physiology, who had been Committee Re-

porter on the Ferry education laws. In 1887 he was sent out to Indo-China, which seems to be used as a refuge for radical politicians, to succeed the radical Constans. In less than a year, by sheer personality, he had set Indo-China on its feet. He had the idea that the Indo-Chinese probably knew more about their own business than Frenchmen, and that the way for the French to run Indo-China would be through the Indo-Chinese.

Bert governed Annam as it had been governed in the past—through Mandarins. In Tonkin there were also Anamese Mandarins, but these he drove out, as ignorant of Tonkin, and in their stead he called an assembly of Tonkinese to confer with him. However, Bert died in 1888, just having started things; his successor had no imagination, and matters relapsed to the unimaginative repression that had caused the previous revolts. Then, in 1894, De Lannessan, also a Radical of sorts, came out, and tried either to take on after Bert or to work out his own scheme. He found a Republican Colonel, Gallieni, an engineer officer with Senegalese experience, spectacles, dry ways, and a mind of his own. Gallieni he put in the disturbed districts of Tonkin. To Gallieni as chief of staff was sent a young Royalist officer with whom Gallieni made great friends despite their difference in character and outlook. To Lyautey, in their campaigns, he taught his policy of the "oil-stain" of orderly government, that spreads by itself and stops revolt, once applied; and is applied by ruling with and through natives. It consists, too, of showing so much force when force is shown that force never has to be used. When Gallieni had ended, Tonkin was peaceful, and on the whole it has remained so.

Then, since it was found that the Hova kingdom was not all Madagascar, and that Hovas and Negroes both needed ruling, Gallieni was sent there and promptly asked for his apt pupil, Lyautey. His request was granted, and the Hova chieftains, who were also being kept in order by Joffre, now a colonel, found that their conquerors treated

them well and that it was easier to rule for France than to fight against France. When Lyautey returned to France from the happy comradeship of the Colonial Army, where Royalist and Republican worked together for the nation, to the unhappy clash of Nationalist and Republican in the homeland, he had left a going colonial system. Whether it started with Faidherbe in Senegal and was passed on through Gallieni, or with Bert or with De Lannessan in Indo-China does not really matter. What matters is that the outer Empire was at a good working pitch.

But Algeria still gave trouble. The constant border patrol against Moroccans and the desert tribes made it impossible to create a really settled Algeria, except just at the sea-coast. There was a civil governor, not a military one. But ever since Jules Grévy's brother Albert was made Governor in 1879, anxious generals still had much to say, which was not conducive to a calm life for civilians. In 1904, after a border post had been shot up, it had been felt that a man of colonial experience should be sent to try his hand.

Lyautey came to Algeria, not like a gust of fresh air, but a gale of it. Algeria was being run by red tape and regulations, somewhat modified by having a governor, Jonnart, of De Lannessan's type. Lyautey took revolutionary measures, from the point of view of hidebound administrators, reducing the weight carried by infantry soldiers in a light column so that they would have a chance of catching Arabs, obtaining the right to appeal to headquarters, and when ordered to abandon a fort, excused his disobedience of orders by renaming it. He seemed Bugeaud come back to earth, and more. He established an "oil-stain" of confidence in himself from the Arabs and from his officers, which made it possible to think of doing the like in Morocco. Then he went back to France to command an army corps.

That was how it was possible for France to intervene in Morocco. The rest of the story is that, after the diplomatic intervention of 1905, there was a military one in 1911. Here again Lyautey was sent for from his army corps in France,

and again the "oil-stain" of confidence worked a miracle. It was a miracle, because the Great War broke out, and Lyautey again disobeyed orders. Told to stop his conquest of Morocco, he went on with it, knowing that to retreat would be to raise revolt; to advance would take fewer troops.

There are, of course, greater forces behind imperialism than the personalities of generals and governors. There must be a strong colonial office at home to back them up. Étienne, the perpetual Colonial Minister of the 1890's, did much to support the men on the spot. Back of the colonial office must be public opinion, in a democracy, and the forces creating public opinion. In most nations those forces—it is true of France—have been the industrial growth of the nations and the search for markets for surplus goods. That explains more. But, as colonies more often than not do not pay, and yet are persisted with, there must be an emotional side to imperialism that is more than an automatic reflex to industrialism—an "admiration for brave men doing brave deeds." For example, France took over Syria in 1920, not merely because French economic interests there were great, but also because of the tradition of the Crusades. That Napoleon III's mother wrote a song, "On the Way to Syria," has an importance in explaining why Frenchmen went there that must be weighed in the balance with the amount of currants sold in the Marseilles market in deciding just what reasons brought General Weygand there. Fortunately, it is not the task of this account to explain imperialism, but merely to demonstrate its existence, and leave judgments to others. It is both economic and emotional, but into the relative proportions it is not necessary to go. It certainly is a factor in the Newer France with which French democracy had to deal after 1905.

However, one point might be taken up. There is much talk of French Nationalism as a great motivating force. Now, it is true that French Nationalism is a very strong emotion, and that much has been written about it. The

great prophet of the movement was Maurice Barrès, a supporter of Boulanger and Déroulède; and it has attracted and still attracts many who were and are tired of the cut-and-dried liberalism that often went with the Republic. For the theories on which the Republic was based go back to the rationalism of the eighteenth century and the French Revolution, and Nationalism substituted for that action and energy. But, though Nationalism has its importance in explaining Democratic France, it is possible to take it too seriously.

The fact is that Nationalism, like Regionalism, that also sprang up at this time, was chiefly a literary movement. The "sound thinkers" who admired and devoted their lives to the older French culture that had been the especial fruit of clerical education, felt that they represented something precious that had to be protected from the common horde that was elbowing them out. A very good expression of that feeling can be found in Abbé Dimnet's *France Herself Again*, published in 1914. It contains those appeals for the protection of the old culture, those fervid hopes that the spirit of France is rising to save it, despite the wickednesses, in this case of Combes, and those desires for a man or a symbol to stand between the mob and the precious things of life (in this case Poincaré) that have been characteristic of Conservative thinking throughout the Republic. Now, it so happens that in France the Ins have been too busy running the country to have time for anything but official speeches and writings in the course of duty, and the Outs have had all the time they wanted to write. The clever young men who are in favor of the Government become statesmen; the clever young men who are against it take up writing. In the *Ancien Régime*, before the Revolution, it was Voltaire and Rousseau who wrote against the monarchy to make a living; and it was Bossuet, the great preacher, who, in the course of his duties, gave the best exposition of what the monarchy stood for. So it was under the Republic. In Gambetta's and Ferry's speeches, or Waldeck-

Rousseau's, could be found the exposition of what the Republic stood for; in the writings of Barrès can be found the attacks on it. Now Barrès's books, like those of Voltaire and Rousseau, are exported; the preachings of Bossuet and the speeches of Gambetta are not. That is why the foreign reader can make such mistakes about the Republic and the *Ancien Régime*.

Furthermore, it may be true that recrudescent Nationalism can explain how united France entered the diplomatic struggles of the 1900's; and how, again and again, after 1906, internal questions were shelved in order to pursue a vigorous foreign policy. But that leaves those very internal questions to be explained, and why politicians wanted to shelve them. The International Socialist movement and the wave of strikes, even within Government services, certainly were not Nationalism. They were something that grew out of the Commune, in a way, but were very different. Nationalism does not explain what new things entered French life around 1905; it is still one of the old continuing things.

Perhaps the change in the underlying factors of the workingman's movement, trying to see what the workingman saw between the years from 1871 to 1906, may explain most of the new phenomena. In 1871 what the worker, as a worker, was struggling against was police control. He and the Republican wanted much the same thing, but he wanted more of it. The workers' leader, Blanqui, "the Old One," was a bitter revolutionary in the Republican tradition. But even then, as Marx pointed out in his *Civil War in France*, there were leaders of the workers who realized that there was more in France in the way of the workers than the police system. About half the members of the Commune were connected with Marx's First International, and agreed with him that the economic institutions of the present world had something to do with the position of the worker.

When the "Moral Order" was over, and the Liberating Chamber allowed, by its change in police laws, the meeting of the Marseilles Congress in 1879, the Marxians largely ob-

tained control of the intellectual and political side of the workers' movement. By then Marx's ideas had defeated the ideas of other thinkers, and Marxianism had become a doctrine with Marx's book, *Das Kapital*, a sort of bible to which one appealed. However, in the 1880's it was found that workers could gain seats on the Paris Municipal Council. Marx's doctrine urged going to the elections to make trouble for the capitalists, but ordered doing nothing in Parliament or city councils if elections were won, on the grounds that co-operation with the bourgeois corrupted, and that, anyway, things would have to be worse for the worker before they could become better. "Marxian thought," based on Hegel's philosophy, works out that way. However, some of the workers' members of the Municipal Council thought it was possible to do something, from which they got the name of Possibilists. Later, because they split under the original leader, Brousse, and another, Alleman, they were called Broussists and Allemanists. There were also independents, like Jean Jaurès, who wanted to help the workers but disagreed with the usual doctrines.

In the 1890's politics gave the workers more benefits: Waldeck-Rousseau's Law of Associations in 1884, which allowed trade-unions to form, the Factory Act of 1892, that—with the right Minister of Commerce—would be just what laborers wanted, and the abolition of the yellow book that previously had to be shown to employers, thus encouraging "black-listing." These successes led to a fusion of the five Socialist groups into two main groups—the Reformists, who thought reform possible, and the strict Marxians, led by Jules Guesde and Lafargue, Marx's son-in-law, who thought with Marx that reform was a delusion. The Reformists were willing for the price of reforms (Alexandre Millerand listed them in his St. Mandé speech) to co-operate with the Radicals or anyone else. Both factions were willing to co-operate at the second election. It has already been told how the united party split, first over Millerand's joining the Waldeck-Rousseau Cabinet, then over Jaurès's supporting

it, even as far as voting for it on the Chalons strike, and how the Amsterdam Congress, the repository of the Socialist faith, brought the errant Jaurès back into the fold, just as if he had been an Early Christian bishop reprimanded by the Council of Nicea.

All these men had still the political idea, because it seemed as if politics were the only means for advancing what workers wanted. By 1890, with relaxed legislation, formerly prohibited methods became feasible. Strikes could be more vigorous before the police intervened. What the workers needed seemed to those in the thick of the fray, not intellectuals to squabble over advice, but organization and action. Unions sprang up; but in France, curiously enough, it was not a federation of trade-unions that centralized the movement, but a federation of labor exchanges. These were naturally, in each district, the meeting place of all laborers of all trades, and it was natural for them, since they were largely self-governed, to federate and mean much more than a federation of unions. Therefore, the central organ of French labor, as opposed to the Socialist party, is the C.G.T., those initials standing for the *Confédération Générale du Travail*, which originally contained the labor exchanges, but absorbed the federation of unions.

Now, for all the despising of intellectuals by the workingman, an intellectual captured the C.G.T. The philosopher Georges Sorel adapted, from Bergson's theory that the present is something separate from the past, an answer to the determinism that Marx had gotten from Hegel. Bergson called for action; Sorel invented an idea called Syndicalism, which gave, in the workers' world, all the action that could be desired. The new weapons were at hand, with the relaxed laws, and the Syndicalists had a creed that went so far as to say that striking for the sake of striking was good, so far had it brought Bergson's doctrines of the human will to justify willful actions.

This sort of thing gives a new color to French history, unknown in the days of Gambetta, Ferry, and Waldeck-

Rousseau. Events in the period after 1906 have much more in common with events after the war than they have with the events before 1906. If one takes as a starting point the discovery of iron in French Lorraine, close to coal, and of the Thomas process of smelting phosphorus ore, that allowed using it, and the change wrought in French life by the consequent large-scale industrialization of the metal industry—a change that began to have results about 1906—then the strikes of the prewar period, the currency difficulties of the 20's, and the industrial difficulties and strikes of the 30's all hang together. The problems of the Newer France all seem part of one big problem, one not met before in France's history.

The thread on which they hang is the usual course of events when a country controlled by a so-called nineteenth-century Liberal party, such as were the French Republicans, meets the problems of large-scale industry, and more and more sets the powers of the state at the service of the common people. At first the National Assembly and, even more, the early Republicans, had as their aim reducing the powers of the state that they so feared. But such parties have always found it possible and politically profitable to set up institutions which, like savings banks and bureaux of information, can afford more opportunities to the "new levels of society" without being interference. Imperceptibly the schemes expand and draw more and more on the treasury—a drawing aided by the willingness to have the state pay for education. That was a large part of De Freycinet's public works program, it will be remembered. For practical reasons many public utilities become government-operated, such as lighting and tramways. Tariffs, which are anathema in strict Liberal doctrine, get voted just the same. This reduces the practical fear of the state, though not the theoretical.

At about this stage of the game the nineteenth-century Liberal party is having a very hard time defining its theoretical doctrine, because its new measures do not in the

least jibe with its old slogans of *laissez-faire*, and much talk has to float about, concerning a new definition of Liberalism. But the party has no trouble getting votes because it is giving the nation just what it wants. In Anglo-Saxon countries the word "opportunity" has been found very useful for politicians making explanations of inconsistencies between doctrine and action; in France "solidarity" is the word. At about this stage it is even possible to advocate old-age pensions and support by the state in the same breath as old-fashioned doctrines of personal liberty and self-support.

As examples are better than random discussions, the career of Joseph Chamberlain, the father of Neville, is an excellent case in point of the evolution of a Liberal. He began, as did so many French Liberals, by fighting the established church for the freedom of education. He gave, when in Parliament, some of the best theoretical speeches ever heard in favor of free trade. However, being a practical businessman of Nettlefold and Chamberlain, screw makers, he was not bound by theory. The term "gas and water socialism" was coined for his term as Mayor of Birmingham, when he persuaded the city to take over those services. He wound up by being read out of not the Liberal but the Conservative party for trying to bring in a tariff and old-age pensions, which England now has.

In France when "Liberalism" reached this stage, around 1905, "Liberals" made a discovery not unknown in this country—namely, that under some circumstances short-term loans can be made at such low rates as to make it seem almost cheaper to borrow than to tax. A consequent willingness to unbalance the budget arose, which was also politically profitable.

All this seems to correspond with a stage in the economic development of the country when more of the population are on salaries and wages, fewer own property, and therefore a larger number want social security, usually old-age pensions and sickness insurance first of all, since they no

longer can rely on the security of property that can be sold or mortgaged to tide over catastrophes. Modern industry that has created the new salaried and wage-earning classes has also raised the standards of living in comfort and in medical care, so that the average man expects more than did the previous generation. It is at this time that Socialist parties increase rapidly, and Liberals find themselves surprisingly often in practical agreement with them, considering their violent divergence on points of theory.

Explaining how these new factors enter into the events of French politics would be difficult, but stating that they do, without any attempt at being dogmatic about how, is merely stating the obvious. That obvious, however, should be stated, because so often politicians—who, after all, are the practical agents through whom democracy works—are misjudged for being inconsistent with theories that no longer fit the facts, rather than being criticized for how well or ill they deal with the facts that have escaped from the limits of the old theories. These facts here listed of French diplomacy, French colonial expansion, French Nationalism, and, above all, of French Socialism—the French workers' movement—should be kept in mind, if the progress of French democracy since 1906 is to be clear.

Just as it may be possible to call the period 1870-1884 the Constitutional stage in the history of the Third Republic, and that from 1884 to 1905 the Institutional stage, so the period from 1905 on might well be called the Industrial stage. If the struggles of the first two stages were between an Old France and a New, the struggles of this stage are between that France and a Newer still. From the isolation of 1871 and the comparatively halcyon days of Bismarck's "Armed Peace," France stepped on the stage of European diplomacy once more, and at the same time was forced to seek ways of reorganizing her society in the face of changes in French life. From 1905 to 1940 the question has been whether French democracy, which did meet the older problems, could meet the newer ones.

PART IV
THE INDUSTRIAL STAGE



Chapter Sixteen

DODGING ISSUES

IN THE Industrial stage of the Third Republic, in which the new problems of an industrialized world were dealt with, all decisions, as in the Institutional stage, were still made or registered at the Tribune of the Chamber of Deputies. The same Parliamentary signs still measured the importance of a subject, the vote on it in the Chamber, the difficulty of enforcing decisions in fact, the occasional emergence of wills able to stand against the will of the Nation for a while, as a sign of perplexity within the Nation. As ever, the problems of national security, especially man power and its corollary, allies, recurred. So did the old questions of Army and Church. But the new problems remained the chief ones, and brought with them a new difficulty for French democracy to surmount. These were not problems that had been mulled over for some hundred and fifty years, as had been the problems hitherto met by the Republic. Representative government, education, the relations of Church and Army to the state, had all of them been considered by the men of the eighteenth century and codified by Napoleon during the Consulate. In dealing with such problems all that French democracy had to do was to choose between solutions that had long been under discussion, many of which had undergone practical tests. But with these new problems of workers' rights, of social security, of national finance to secure these ends,

there were no codified solutions or past experience to serve as a guide. Before French democracy could canvass and discuss policies, those policies had to be invented and formulated. Thus, after 1905, a new element increasingly enters French democracy—the element of forming new policies as well as of choosing between already formulated ones. The new element complicated the workings of the Parliamentary machine, and more and more led to using delay as a way of giving time a chance to bring a solution from someone's brain. In recording these events, too, there is the difficulty that historians, economists, and political scientists have not sifted them as they have the events before 1905. The facts that can be set down cannot be given as thorough or as detailed an interpretation as previously. Perforce the reader must content him or herself with more tendencies, less analysis and illustration; for analysis not based on detailed knowledge is likely to be misleading, and such knowledge does not yet exist. Such a warning is necessary before embarking on the history of the Industrial stage of the Third French Republic.

The particular politician who had to face a new world in which Church and Army were no longer the Republic's chief problems was Georges Clemenceau. Clemenceau showed, when he met the newly elected Chamber of 1906, that autumn, that he recognized that it was a new world. In his ministerial statement he listed the eleven measures he hoped to pass, including income tax, the establishment of a Ministry of Labor, which he gave to the independent Socialist René Viviani, and the taking over of the Western Railway by the state. In the debate on this statement, Jaurès and Clemenceau thoroughly thrashed out the issue of socialism against free capitalism. It was as able, as dramatic, as philosophical, and as pointless a debate as has ever been heard in the Chamber of Deputies. The only thing that was settled was the new political line-up—that the Socialists were united among themselves and the Reformist Socialists were thoroughly disunited from the Radicals. That in itself

was a declaration that old issues had been dropped, new ones taken up.

Out in the country at large, at the very time that this debate was going on, the Grenoble strike was testing in practice what a Radical President of the Council would do, and whether or not Georges Sorel was right and all of the Socialists wrong in saying that the workers should act and strike, not talk and vote. Then Clemenceau showed that he meant what he had said in his editorials in *L'Aurore*. He had written that a minister ought to go to a strike with his hands in his pockets and keep them there, give responsibilities to both sides, telling the workers to keep the order they so often broke, employers either to keep for themselves or give up advantages they so often got the government to keep for them, and make clear to both sides that he was there only to keep the peace and mediate, but that at a pinch he would keep the peace with a genial vengeance. For nearly three years he tried this. They were disturbed years in which public opinion was uncertain how it felt about strikes, whether it was for them or against them; and the Chamber was only too delighted to watch someone else experiment and bear the brunt of unpopularity. What happened was that men's minds were slowly being made up on the new social and economic issues, in just the way they had been on the old issues of Church and Army. Meanwhile, men's minds not being made up, the Chamber did not legislate on Clemenceau's eleven points.

There was a touch of Calvin Coolidge in what Clemenceau did about strikes. The old Jacobin would tolerate no striking against the public safety. He proposed legislation in the spring of 1907 against Government employees striking. He told the postmen, when they struck in 1907, that it was wrong to strike against the public and ran postal service with policemen. He told the electricians of Paris in March 1907 that if they shut off the lights, thieves could break in and steal; and when they struck, substituted an engineer regiment for them. In 1907 the wine growers of

the South of France, injured by competition by weaker wines from Algeria, demanded a fixing of standards for strength, as otherwise ruin stared them in the face. There was such a tremendous popular movement back of this that 300 mayors resigned, rather than obey Clemenceau's orders. When the 17th Regiment of the Line was sent down to put down disturbances, it was agreed officially to accept the story that it marched down a road, that angry peasants marched up the same road, and that somehow each reached the other end without meeting the other, since the truth, that the 17th had disobeyed orders, was not pleasant. In a sense this problem settled itself, as the disorder became too great to be tolerated, and the wine business picked up. This was the same sort of problem as the vote on the brandy law that caused such excitement in the Chamber of Deputies the day Church and state were separated.

No one could deny Clemenceau's firmness in the foreign field, as well as at home. In 1908, when Russia and Austria nearly fell out over the Austrian annexation of Bosnia, Clemenceau gave all the support he could to his ally. In 1909, when there was a disturbance over a German who ran away from the Foreign Legion and hid in the Consul's office in Capablanca, Clemenceau, so the story runs, terminated one interview with Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador, by telling him that the train for Berlin went so soon he might miss it and called Radolin's bluff of breaking off diplomatic relations.

But the rule of Clemenceau may be summed up in a retort Lyautey made to him. Lyautey had explained, with a single dramatic gesture, a military situation in Morocco that lengthy reports had served only to confuse. Clemenceau was delighted with such a man, asked why no one had put it that way before, and went all over Paris praising Lyautey. He told Lyautey so, joshingly, then asked him why he showed no more pleasure when the President of the Council told him he was praising him everywhere. Lyautey answered, "It is all right as long as it lasts." Clemenceau was more

delighted, and told that everywhere, too. That was the very tone of Clemenceau's own Ministry. As an administration it was most successful, but it could not get its eleven points into law. It did get the Chamber to vote income tax, but lost the measure in the Senate. All and more of Caillaux's and Rouvier's savings, much of them made by skimping the Army, were lost in buying back the Western Railway, though the usual short-term bonds and confused accounts covered this up. But the strength of the Ministry was the absence of anyone else wanting power.

Clemenceau himself did not last. The Navy had not recovered from Pelletan's mismanagement, and Clemenceau fell resisting the acceptance of the report of Delcassé's Committee of Inquiry, out of loyalty to Pelletan, his old colleague on the paper *La Justice*, and hatred for Delcassé, who had once injured a friend. As Clemenceau need not have made that particular order of the day a matter of confidence, he was able to go about Paris and claim his reputation as a puller-down of Ministries had extended to pulling down his own. His thirty-three months in office might otherwise have stretched out longer.

In his place Briand carried on with much the same Cabinet, held office for a year and a quarter, bore the burden of keeping order in disturbed times, and took the country through elections. Those elections ended a political truce. Since 1906 the Ministry had run the country while Parliament did nothing, passing out of Clemenceau's eleven-point program only one measure, and that a financial failure, the "repurchase" of the Western Railway. Consequently, dissatisfaction had grown up in the country with the Radical preponderance in Chamber and Senate, and had led to dissatisfaction with the election machinery by which the Radical party in the middle on runoffs gained votes from each side. There was much talk of proportional representation—so much talk that the initials R. P. were used instead of the full words to save time. Just before the election of 1910 Briand declared against the "stagnant swampy pools"

of single-district elections, and for a "strong, purifying current" to be brought into Parliament by R. P. That put Briand in the excellent position of having taken a popular stand that would have no practical results for four years. In reply to this the Radicals and the Socialist Radicals organized their now famous offices in the Rue de Valois to unite their efforts at the elections. But as yet that did not mean union in Parliament.

The Chamber elected in 1910 was a peculiar body, full of new members, that did not know its own mind. There was nothing to turn Briand out for, and every reason to want not to take his place. Briand, like Clemenceau, was bearing the brunt of Syndicalism, that was now spreading from France into England with Welsh colliery strikes, and to Ireland, where Jim Larkin and his tramway workers were disrupting Dublin. Briand had the strike of the Eastern Railway to handle, and handled it by the simple method of pointing out that the Eastern Railway was of national importance, as leading to the German border. Therefore he called out the reserve regiments of that region, who happened to be the strikers, and gave them the military order to run the railway. On the interpellation on this, the Socialist shouting was so deafening that Briand, in the Tribune, himself had to shout his speech into the stenographer's ear to get it heard. But he knew the Chamber, and the Chamber knew him. That type of difficulty he could surmount, but he had no answer to the big economic problems that lay back of the strikes. He survived a few months, but in February saw his time was up, and resigned before he was beaten. He was followed by the Monis Ministry, with Caillaux at the Ministry of Finance.

Caillaux might have been the man who could have solved the problems of the age. For a Radical leader he had a curious record, and a curious personality. He was the son of the Finance Minister of the Sixteenth of May; he was closely connected with banking interests; and, like many young financiers, he had served in the Treasury. Then, at

the start of his political career, he had taken the risk of joining the Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry, and had begun a movement to the Left that wound up in a unique position. His tremendous abilities gained him respect from everyone, but allowed him an independence of behavior that he pushed too far. The Norman peasants of Mamers would re-elect him without question for his financial abilities, which they, some of the shrewdest men in France, so admired. But accusations of personal infidelity could shake their trust, and he had a stormy divorce from his first wife, who used the exigencies of elections as a sort of blackmail before he married his mistress. Accusations of treason could destroy their trust, and he first was accused of selling out to Germany in 1911, and then was jailed for contact with the enemy during the war. Likewise, in the political world, he could make all sorts of combinations, and for a time could even impose on others a genial but haughty manner. His famous big cigars, which he rarely shared with others, his gleaming white waistcoats, marked him out as a banker, a being very different from the school teachers, doctors, editors, lawyers who made up the usual run of Radical politician, and yet Radicals followed his leadership. But sooner or later resentment would suddenly break out, allied with distrust of his combinations of opposites, and sound, well-laid plans would be thrown aside because to accept them would be to accept Caillaux. Those plans might be put into effect as quickly as a fortnight later, for Caillaux had an irritating habit of being right; but Caillaux would be thrown into the outer darkness to reassemble his forces, and, eventually, to get his revenge. Foreign affairs, especially, would cause his defeat. He would be trusted with the Nation's money, but not with its honor.

An example of the sensible things that happened when Caillaux was in charge, though in this case not directly traceable to him, was the way Briand's trouble with wine growers was handled. This time the trouble was in Champagne, over what sparkling wines might bear that name.

Here the violence did not go as far as in the South, because the matter was solved by handing the whole question to the wine growers to solve for themselves, an early form of "self-government in industry." This was worked out by M. Pams, the Minister of Agriculture. Monis never got a real chance to show his abilities, being hurt in an airplane accident that killed Berteaux, the Minister of War; and Caillaux became President of the Council in June 1911.

Foreign Affairs proved Caillaux's bane. The Algerian Government had decided it was necessary to send troops to Fez, the capital of Morocco. Suddenly the German gunboat *Panther* appeared at the port of Agadir to protect German interests. By the time that everyone had become so excited that even the then-pacifist English Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, announced that England might fight, Caillaux took a hand to prevent war. Since from his business connections he knew all sorts of people, he got a French business friend of his to get into touch with the German Emperor direct and get away from professional jealousies of diplomats and foreign offices. By going to the top this way, he solved the problem and prevented war. It was agreed that Germany clear out of Morocco, taking some of French Congo instead.

But the professionals at the War, Marine, and Foreign offices had their innings, too, getting ready for the war that Caillaux was preventing. Vestiges of the independence of the Army remained. A Colonel Grandmaison, on the staff, thinking little of the ideas of the Commander in Chief, General Michel, secured the appointment of Joffre, the conqueror of Timbuctoo, as both Chief of Staff and Generalissimo, thus combining all military authority in one point where a man of strong will could act decisively. Grandmaison could charm even the dour Gallieni with his doctrine of the will—it was of him that Gallieni said, "He is a Royalist, a Catholic, and was educated by Jesuits, and yet he is intelligent." The French Navy was concentrated in the Mediterranean, the British agreeing to protect the

Channel for France. And, on being told that English troops would be worth three divisions to France by their mere presence, a British Expeditionary Force of 100,000 was arranged for to take the left flank if England helped France fight Germany.

Then Clemenceau, who was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the winter of 1911, ferreted out what Caillaux had done. Selves, the Foreign Minister who had been set to one side, helped let the cat out of the bag, and Caillaux, attacked bitterly in the press, fell.

Another great lawyer, Raymond Poincaré, reappeared in political life, just as had Waldeck-Rousseau, to take Caillaux's place, formed a strong government, and himself took over the key ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. M. Pams was Minister of Agriculture. The Minister of War was Millerand; of Marine, Delcassé. Poincaré announced that he would bring in R. P. and get France on a sound basis, with Army and finances in order. Lyautey was sent to command in Morocco when the tribesmen besieged Fez, and by the luck of getting a clear field for his artillery raised the siege, and by his genius at handling native populations created an "oil-stain" of orderly government and trust in the French that spread out from Fez into the wilds.

Though the Poincaré Cabinet was an able one, of all parties, that could keep administration in its hands, it could not change the nature of the Chamber of 1910. That Chamber was certain of only one thing, its uncertainty. Though almost half of its membership owed their election to the Committee of the Rue de Valois, the Chamber as a whole represented the Nation, not the Committee, in leaning away from Radicalism. It supported an ex-Progressive as President of the Council; when Henri Brisson died, in April 1912, it elected Paul Deschanel to succeed him as President of the Chamber. It would be finally induced to vote R. P., though Clemenceau, as the chairman of a Senate Committee, buried R. P. by an adverse report of 18 to 3.

But, on the other hand, the Chamber would not go too far from Radicalism. Besides voting R. P., which was directed against the Radicals, it finally voted the Radicals' favorite tax, the income tax, which also was killed by the Senate.

The Chamber showed its uncertainty by the way it helped elect a President of the Republic. As Fallières's term drew to an end, Poincaré announced his candidacy. Clemenceau, who had in Parliament chosen Carnot, and out of Parliament chosen Loubet, intervened once more, by supporting Pams, the Minister of Agriculture. At the usual trial ballot of Republicans, it took three votes before Pams got a slim majority. Then four former Presidents of the Council called on Poincaré to ask him not to stand at the National Assembly. Poincaré replied that it was not a matter of principle, but personalities, since Pams and he were members of the same Cabinet. He remained a candidate and was elected by the National Assembly at a second ballot, obviously by the votes of those 80 or so who had been barred from the trial ballot as not Republicans.

It was clear that the election of Poincaré would alter the relations of the President of the Republic to Parliament and the Ministry. Poincaré, a strong and a persuasive man, constantly presiding over the work of the Council of Ministers, would certainly guide and influence Executive action. Whether or not Parliament would tolerate this remained to be seen. If anyone could, however, revive the powers of the presidency in a way acceptable to Parliament, it was probably Poincaré. As President of the Council he had successfully guided the difficult Chamber of 1910; the question was whether he could successfully guide the men who would guide that Chamber, the first of whom was Briand, appointed by Fallières just before he went out of office.

By this time the European situation had become tense, and took the Chamber's attention away from home affairs.

To the Italo-Turk War that had begun in the spring of 1911 had succeeded the First Balkan War of 1912, in which all the Balkan countries except Rumania had attacked Turkey, and to that had succeeded the Second Balkan war that was still going on, in which all the Balkan countries, including Rumania and defeated Turkey, would have attacked Bulgaria if Bulgaria had not herself attacked first. This mess, in some ways worse than the Agadir crisis, might well have led to war between Austria and Russia, and therefore between France and Germany. Consequently, the two years' service so blithely voted in the good days of the Bloc of the Left, when only the Pope was quarreling with France, had to be changed back to three years' service, to the distress of those 250 Radicals without some of whom no government could be formed. Briand could not carry this, and Poincaré called in his old friend and colleague of the Méline Cabinet, Louis Barthou, who could. For, when the Chamber would not legislate, Barthou simply used the executive power that existed under the law of 1905 to keep the outgoing men one year longer. There were scenes that resembled mutiny, but the men stayed, and the Chamber had to vote three years' service.

That autumn Caillaux had his revenge. He appeared at the annual Congress of the Radical Party at Pau, carried the resolutions he wanted against the three years' service, was elected President of the party, and led a united party in the Chamber. Barthou was promptly put out of office for spending too much on the Army, and Doumergue was in, with Caillaux at the Finances again. However, with Caillaux rising this way from his fall, another attack came. This time it was his marital difficulties that trapped him. *Le Figaro* published some letters to his former wife that angered his then wife. She entered the editor's office and shot him. Naturally, M. Caillaux had to resign. In the Ministerial reshuffling, a M. Malvy, who previously had been Minister of Justice in the Monis Ministry, and was Minister of Com-

merce, became Minister of the Interior. The usual April and May elections took place, with a swing of thirty seats to the left, though Deschanel was still elected President of the Chamber. Doumergue fell, Poincaré asked Ribot to make a Ministry founded on the center, but this was beaten the day it faced the Chamber. The Chamber felt that the Ministry was too far to the Right and said so in its vote of no confidence. Viviani (an independent Socialist) did make a Ministry in which Malvy held the Interior, and the trial of Madame Caillaux, as old newspapers of the day show by their headlines, held general attention no matter what the Balkans did. This was July 1914.

In these eight years, 1906 to 1914, Parliament had seemed very ineffective. The Chamber of 1906, except for trying to wind up the Law of Separation and buying the Western Railway, had done nothing, Clemenceau everything. The Chamber of 1910 had not even let the ministers do anything. Caillaux had had to resort to trickery to come to terms with Germany, and after great popular pressure R. P. and the income tax had passed only in principle and not in effect. Barthou had had to get the three years' service through by forcing the hand of the Chamber, and had been defeated for it. Yet that Radical Chamber had elected a Progressive to preside over it, and helped elect a Progressive to preside over the Republic. As for the Chamber of 1914, it seemed as if it would, if given a chance, surpass the feats of indecision of its predecessors. Certainly it had got rid of Ribot in remarkably short order.

However, before the Chambers of 1906 and 1910 are judged too severely, it should be remembered that under their sway Syndicalism was so treated that it was quenched *without* the passage of anti-labor laws covering state industries, and the serious wine-growing problem was settled once and for all, though it had come twice to the verge of open revolt. The delays of French democracy may have had their virtues. If the people want to do nothing, is it not democratic, if not right, for nothing to be done?

This is not academic discussion of the effectiveness of French democracy, for the Chamber of 1914, that was so like its predecessor, was about to be faced with the question whether or not a democracy could fight a great war and remain a democracy.



Chapter Seventeen

THE GREAT WAR

IT is hard to get at the facts of the Great War of 1914-18 because in a way the censorship of the war has lasted on. It is not that what is now told is not true—to a large extent the lies have been combed out of histories of the war; but that those histories are true as far as they go, and no farther. Each nation has its own “authorized version” of what happened, which goes to prove either that that nation won against great odds in fighting a dastardly foe with little help from its allies, or that that nation was beaten by treachery. It is not important to go into the particular reason, war debts or desire to recreate confidence in Germany’s fighting power, that causes each particular “authorized version.” What is important is to recognize that “authorized versions” must be guarded against by adding together all the accounts of the war, from all sides. Then they melt into one straightforward account of human beings caught up in a tremendous whirlpool and trying desperately to swim out of it. The interesting thing about the rectified account of France in the Great War is that France started the war as almost a dictatorship and wound up more democratic than when she started.

France’s actual entry into the war was democratic, not dictatorial, if those adjectives can be stretched so far. It was the complicated alliance system that brought France to the verge of war. The Russian Alliance, the English En-

tente, the neutrality agreement with Italy did give France national security; but they also made sure that France would have an excellent opportunity of fighting against a larger and better-industrialized country, Germany, because an Austrian archduke was shot at Sarajevo when France was mildly interested in whether M. Viviani would make a good President of the Council, and very interested in the exact excuses Madame Caillaux would give for shooting Gustave Calmette, and not in the least interested in Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Under the Russian Alliance, once Austria had mobilized to punish Serbia, and Russia to protect Serbia, France would have to consult with Russia; and a German mobilization to protect Austria increased the obligation to concert measures and to fight if Russia fought. But a written agreement between diplomats is one thing, a motive that will make the ordinary citizen drop his work and go off to get killed is another. As the French Army was a universal-service army, the only way the written agreement could be lived up to would be by making the ordinary Frenchman feel that France was fighting for something worth fighting for.

It so happened that the facts of the case persuaded the ordinary Frenchman that he ought to be called to the colors, alliance or no alliance. Those facts are worth setting out in some detail, because they are often neglected in histories of the war, and yet are the basis on which it was fought for three years. Germany felt she had to attack, because she was so badly outnumbered by France and Russia. To roughly 2,500,000 mobilizable Germans and nearly 2,000,000 mobilizable Austrians, the French could oppose about 2,000,000; the Russians 3,000,000. Germany's one hope was that she could mobilize quicker than anyone else, while the Russians would take up to eight months to get their full strength into the field.¹ The German war plan, as drawn up by Count von Schlieffen, was to capitalize on the temporary advantage given by quicker mobilization, and

¹ It took the Siberian Corps longer to get to the Front.

throw all Germany's strength into attacking France, while Austria held Russia off. As a direct advance into France would bring the Germans up against Séré de Rivière's forts in the Vosges, Count von Schlieffen's plan was to go around those forts through Belgium. He was obsessed by the importance of a crushing blow by the German right wing before Russian manpower overwhelmed Germany. Legend says that his dying words were: "Strengthen the right wing." His plan he left as a legacy to the German High Command. He had drafted it in the 1890's when first Germany had to face the threat of a Franco-Russian alliance; they held to it so strongly that they refused to consider attacking Russia first.

This reply of Germany's to the superiority of Allied man power had an immediate effect in bringing France into the war. Though Poincaré and Viviani had been in Russia after the assassination of the Archduke and before the declaration of war, and had certainly made arrangements for action, France did not stand on the letter of the Alliance. Instead, troops were ostentatiously withdrawn from the border, to the horror of the Commander in Chief, Joffre, who was afraid that the Germans would break in and break up French mobilization as it was going on. Indeed, the Germans saw fit to ask the French for guarantees that this neutral gesture was genuine, going so far as to demand that certain of Séré de Rivière's forts be handed over to Germany as a real protection against attack on her rear while she was fighting Russia. This ultimatum the French Government could not accept. Mobilization was ordered the first of August, and took place the second. By then war was merely the recognition of the existing state of things. German advanced troops had already occupied Luxembourg.

Consequently, when, on Tuesday, August 3, Viviani went down to the Chamber of Deputies to ask permission for the declaration of war, he found a cordial reception. In case of need he had brought with him the text of the alliance with Russia, that had hitherto been secret. He saw he need not

read it out, since the Chamber thought France was fighting in self-defense, and carried it away unread, for it contained some clauses that would require a great deal of explaining away. Those clauses were only revealed in 1917 by the Bolsheviki. France had changed greatly from the mutinies of 1913, when the troops were kept an extra year with the colors by Barthou. Now most were enthusiastic for war. Count Albert de Mun, who had led the rallying of the 1890's, now wore himself out rallying the opponents of the Republic to its support in war, and died of his fatigue.

One man alone might have led a resistance to war, Jean Jaurès. In the days before the war, true to his Socialist belief that the workers of the world should unite rather than fight, Jaurès had planned to do what he could to stop any war breaking out. At the International Congress of Basel in 1913 he had made very specific suggestions about a general strike. On July 29, 1914, he had gone to a meeting in Brussels to confer with Socialists from other nations about this, and had found them reluctant. But on July 31, as he was sitting in the Restaurant du Croissant in Montmartre, looking at the photograph of a baby that an admirer was showing him, he was shot in the back of the head. To the disgrace of French justice, the murderer was never tried till 1919, and then a Paris jury let him off.

It was surprising the unanimity with which the French went off to war. The Ministry of the Interior had a special list, *Carnet B*, of those who should be jailed when war broke out. The anarchist leader Almyreda told Malvy, the Minister of the Interior, that he need lock up only the foreigners; that such men as Marcel Habert, who had been with Déroulède in his attempted *coup*, and a young Socialist named Pierre Laval (the two deputies on the list) would be loyal. Clemenceau advised against this leniency, but Malvy carried it in the Council of Ministers. The trust seemed justified, that the people of France wanted to fight. The War Ministry had expected a 5 per cent absence of reservists at mobilization, but only $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1 per cent of those called failed to appear. It is

worth contrasting this with the Austrian figures to see with what enthusiasm France went to war.

Parliament went to war with enthusiasm, too. August 2, mobilization day, saw a state of siege ordered in every department in France. August 4 saw a Press Law allowing the Government to suppress any paper it thought had misbehaved, and credits voted for any expenditures needed when Parliament was not in session. On August 5 the state of siege law was put back to the days of the Commune, allowing it to be declared by decree without any vote of Parliament. A further decree set up summary procedure in court-martials, ending appeals and the twenty-four hours' delay between arrest and trial. Pardons might only be asked for by the permission of the court. Parliament then shut up shop, being officially prorogued September 3, and went to war itself, 220 deputies and senators serving in one way or another. The belief was that the war would be short, and won or lost by the Army in one supreme effort. Though no formal dictatorship was set up, the Government was given all the powers it was then believed were needed for war, and set them at the service of the Commander in Chief, Joffre, who had only to ask to get what he wanted.

France also could feel that she had behind her the resources of England. For a moment it looked as if England would not fight, and the French Ambassador in London went to the Foreign Office with "his little piece of paper," the Naval Agreement of 1911, to use his own words: "To see if the word honor should be erased from the English language." But when the Germans violated the neutrality, not only of Luxembourg but of Belgium, a neutrality they themselves had suggested in 1839, the English went to war as unanimously almost as the French. An English Expeditionary Force, under Field Marshal Sir John French, landed to protect Belgium and take station on the left wing of the French Army. Joffre had at his complete disposal the enthusiastic and trained man power of France. It now remained to be seen if Colonel Grandmaison had been right in

securing Joffre's appointment in 1911, and if the French General Staff and the Commander in Chief knew how to handle modern warfare, for which they had been given such sweeping powers.

The General Staff—G.Q.G., to use the French initials—started out with complete confidence; indeed, they had made a philosophy of confidence, that they had taught to Joffre. Their plan of operations, Plan XVII, assumed that, as a war can only be won by a successful attack on the enemy, the vital thing was to attack. The place for that attack would be Alsace, where it would pin the German Army down and smash it. To military historians there is much interest in the history of this doctrine, how it came from the philosopher Bergson, as had Syndicalism in the Labor movement, and how, developed at the School of War by Ferdinand Foch, it was taken over in an exaggerated form by the "Young Turks" of the General Staff. But to the ordinary Frenchman serving with the colors, what was important was not who thought up the idea, but that he was sent forward to fight his way into Alsace, to start the war by an attack.

Plan XVII, however, never went into full effect. There was a moment of jubilation at the invasion of Alsace, the crepe that covered the statue of the lost city of Strasbourg was taken off, and then things began to happen not at all the way G.Q.G. had expected. General Lanrezac, in command of the 5th Army, on the extreme left flank, began sending in complaints to Joffre that there were not one but three German armies in front of him, and got his position changed to 75 miles west of where Plan XVII had put him. But at the same time as that change was sanctioned, he was told that his function was to attack, and not argue about it. General Lanrezac tried to explain his disquietude to Sir John French, but when the dapper Englishman and the heavy-set, casually dressed Frenchman met, they discovered that neither could understand what the other said, and parted distrusting each other.

Most unfortunately General Lanrezac was right in his

fears. The Germans were coming through Belgium in great force, having, by a prodigious feat of organization and the clever use of second-line troops where most would have used first-line ones, massed a real preponderance of men on that right wing that had been Count von Schlieffen's obsession. Still more unfortunately, the fighting instructions of the French Army were wrong. Having made the first mistake by putting the bulk of the Army in the wrong place, the General Staff then made the second mistake of its doctrine of constant attack, sending forward the comparative few who were opposing the tremendous sweep of the German right wing in charge after charge. Like Sedan and Gallifet's charges, it was magnificent but it was not war. The Germans had marched far, were tired by their rapid advance, and might have been thrown back if the French had stood on the defensive. At Sedan magazine rifles had for one side crushed Gallifet, and for the other held Bazeilles for a day, and the more modern ones of 1914, as the English were showing at Mons, might well have checked the German advance a little beyond the Belgian border. Instead, these foolish attacks at Charleroi and other "Battles of the Frontier" gave the Germans a chance to use their magazine rifles and to mow down the valuable trained men of the Army, just the men who could best whip into shape the new recruits who did not know how to be soldiers and the reservists who had forgotten. After this series of defeats, the German right wing pressed on so hard that all that the French could do was to retreat as fast as possible, get far enough ahead of the German advance to be able to turn around and counterattack. At the Battles of the Frontier were left the cream of the French Army, as brave men sacrificed themselves to cover the retreat of their comrades and prevent its turning into a rout. In these battles died the poet Charles Péguy and the soldier-novelist Ernest Psichari.

In front of the retreating French Army streamed refugees—men, women, and children—from the northern part of France. The blow of the Battles of the Frontier was so over-

whelming that the French soldiers hardly had time to lose heart as they trudged wearily southwards, trying to get far enough ahead to turn around and attack. Their generals, used to thinking in terms of great army movements, still had hopes. Plan XVII had gone by the board, but Joffre, imperturbable in the midst of disaster, went to commander after commander, and by the great power of his personality, that same courage that had taken Timbuctoo after a disaster, gave them new heart. Or if new heart was not to be given to a general, a new general would be given to the army or army corps that needed it. Lanrezac, among others, was thus "sent to Limoges." The English soldiers, so those who praise them say, on occasions like this do not think, and consequently do not lose heart. But Sir John French had to think, and was very conscious that, as the Duke of Wellington had once said, England had but one army, which must not be thrown away. He began planning how to withdraw his troops to the seacoast and get them back to England. Fortunately, the English War Minister, Lord Kitchener, himself a veteran of French retreats, peremptorily ordered him not even to talk of desertion till absolutely necessary.

In circumstances and under emotions like these, the French Government, appalled at the way three German armies were sweeping on Paris, and remembering what a mistake the Government of National Defense had made when it let itself be besieged in Paris, wisely left for Bordeaux at once. Somewhat less wisely, it started to treat Paris as an "open town," not to be defended, as the Belgians had Brussels. It is pleasing to record that Myron Herrick, the American Ambassador, in this time of fear upheld the tradition of Gouverneur Morris and Elihu Washburne and did not abandon his post when America's sister Republic was in danger, but stuck it out, like Brand Whitlock in Brussels.

On August 26 the Viviani Ministry was reconstituted into a "Ministry of Sacred Union" that took in representatives of all sections of Parliament, even the strict Socialist, Jules Guesde. The Ministry of Sacred Union dared hold Paris, and

gave the post of Military Governor to the old colonial fighter, Gallieni. Gallieni brought a brave and independent way of thinking into the situation. He issued a proclamation to the citizens of Paris that did not conceal his contempt for the Government's going to Bordeaux, and spoke his resolve to fight to the last. He secured a reserve army under General Manoury for the defense of Paris, and then pleaded with his old subordinate of Madagascar days, Joffre, to let him attack the flank of the German right wing, that had, so reports came, swung to the north of Paris in the pursuit of the Fifth Army and the English. At this time the French armies all along the line had begun to stiffen. At Verdun General Sarrail refused to obey an order to abandon the fortress, and held it against heavy attack. To the east of him General de Castelnau likewise stood firm. In the center Ferdinand Foch, a former writer on strategy, in command of the newly formed Ninth Army, turned his troops about regardless. Legend, unfortunately not verified, says that he knew propitious moments and sent this message to Joffre: "My center yields, my right wing is falling back; situation excellent, will attack," did so, and won a victory.

It was when this was happening that, under Gallieni's orders, Manoury led his men out of Paris. The 7th Division went in those famous taxicabs that have been magnified into carrying all his army. Caught in disorder, the Germans were forced to retreat just as the French had after the Battles of the Frontier. Their retreat was more orderly, and at the Aisne River they were able to stop, dig trenches, and hold the heights north of the river. Valiant attacks were made; one of many instances of valor was the way Colonel Nivelle took the 5th Artillery Regiment into the midst of an infantry attack that was falling back, opened fire in the open field, and thus encouraged the attackers to try again and succeed. But the trenches north of the Aisne remained the limit of the swing back from the victory of the Marne.

There is much truth in what Gallieni said about the Marne. "There has not been a Battle of the Marne. Joffre's

instructions ordained a retreat on the Seine and the evacuation of Verdun and Nancy. Sarrail did not obey; he saved Verdun. De Castelnau held on the Grand Couronne; he saved Nancy. I have taken the offensive." But then Gallieni never did like staff officers anyway, and Joffre had given the Army one great thing—faith. He had held it together till the counterblow could be struck, and when the blow became possible, sanctioned it. It is interesting to note that one officer on his staff who persuaded him to take Gallieni's suggestion was Major Gamelin.

With a deadlock from the Swiss frontier to the Aisne, the only remaining hope for a quick decision, such as all experts then expected for a war, was to rush troops west and outflank the enemy. In this "race to the sea" it was sometimes bitterly said that the Allies were three days and an army corps behind; but it is equally true that had the Germans backed up their cavalry patrols they might easily have taken the Channel ports. The race was a deadlock again, thanks to General Foch, who was sent into the west as Joffre's deputy, to co-ordinate the efforts of the English, Belgians, and French. With amazing confidence he ordered constant attacks that enabled reserve French troops, the remaining uncaptured Belgians, and the transferred and reinforced English Army to hold a line from the Aisne to the Channel that even saved a tiny corner of Belgium. At the Yser Canal the race reached the sea, where Marines, who seem to have a habit of coming to the rescue, and Belgians held the last German army corps that was rushed over.

At the end of 1914 the war turned into a curious stalemate. Across France ran a line of trenches that seemed impregnable. On the other side of Germany, Russian man power, that was expected to crush resistance unless France was crushed first, was held off by a victory, Tannenburg, even more dramatic and unexpected than that of the Marne. The two Russian armies, each larger than the one German army that was opposed to them, were really smashed. The official

credit went to a retired general, Paul von Hindenburg, who had been a lieutenant in the war of 1870; the true credit was given by the rulers of Germany to a brigadier named Ludendorff, who had achieved the remarkable feat of running trains through the fortified Belgian town of Liège while Belgian troops still held most of the forts around it. As the war was a stalemate of an unexpected kind, it became necessary to find some new way to fight this new war.

There seemed no reason not to keep on with Joffre. On the contrary there grew up a faith in him, as the man who never lost hope but achieved the "miracle of the Marne." Joffre still was the practical dictator of France, getting what he asked for. The problem was to give him it, and help him meet the new conditions. Trenches had either to be got around, which seemed impossible, or gone through; in which case new and vast supplies of artillery must be gotten. Here it was that Parliament reappeared. For to get artillery, there must be money spent, and a reorganization of French industry to make the artillery. On December 22 Parliament came back to life to vote a budget for 1915, such as it could. Then, as the Constitution ordained, on the second Tuesday in January Parliament met, not to separate till the war was over.

If the fighting was to be siege and storm, if, in Joffre's words, the Germans were to be "nibbled at" until they were worn down while the Allies benefited from their superiority in man power, England throwing her population into the scale, the first thing to do was to get the equipment for siege warfare. Men skilled in certain essential trades were taken out of the Army and sent back where they would be more useful. Lieutenant Louis Loucheur pointed out that in America bullets were made by machine, not by hand, and was set to supervising the setting up of such factories, in which women would work, liberating men for the front. In May 1915 a special under-secretaryship of state for artillery was set up in the War Ministry, under the Socialist Albert Thomas. That was the beginning of a great re-organization

of France, in agriculture as well as in industry, which developed into an economic as well as a military co-operation with England. Later France helped England in the problem of keeping supplies from Germany by blockade.

As all this entailed legislation, the committees of Parliament began asking questions. They ran up against the stiff Alexandre Millerand, the Minister of War of the "Sacred Union." Here Charles de Freycinet, who long ago had been Gambetta's deputy, did excellent work in keeping military authorities up to the mark; and, when age let him do no more, another aged man, Clemenceau, took his place. Later on Clemenceau, as chairman of both the Senate Foreign Affairs and the Senate War committees was a one-man Opposition in himself. The attitude that the Army would not answer questions led to a desire to see for oneself and get behind the Commander in Chief's power to withhold information whether directly or by punishing informative officers. Therefore the Army committees forced Millerand to give them passes to the Front.

Attempts were being made to go around the trench line on the Western Front, and to get supplies to Russia, which was blocked off by the German control of the Baltic and the Turkish control of the Dardanelles. Italy was induced to declare war on Austria; but, as the Alps were almost impassable, what that really did was act as a drain on Austrian man power. An attack was made on the Dardanelles that failed, but formed for France a useful way out of a political dilemma. For General Sarrail, who had held Verdun, was a strong politician. Caillaux had had himself attached to Sarrail's army, for that reason. Sarrail, extremely able, was that rare thing in an army officer, a strong Republican. So when Joffre, who had been changing generals about mercilessly if he thought it was needed, sent him from the Front, he could not be dismissed, as other generals could; and the Dardanelles and an attempt to land at Salonica in neutral Greece and push help through to Serbia, the cause of the war, provided posts to which Sarrail could be sent.

The relations with Greece were, to put it mildly, delicate after this use of Salonica. Delcassé, who was acting again as Minister of Foreign Affairs, got into squabbles in the Cabinet over the matter. The Chamber of Deputies, that was in constant session, took note of this. It felt that it had been subject to Executive control too long, and showed its feelings by ending the strict state of siege. It also asked questions about the way press censorship was being run. First Delcassé left the Ministry; then, preparing to meet trouble before it came, the Viviani Ministry, that had Briand as Minister of Justice and Vice-President, was reconstituted into a Briand Ministry that had as Vice-President and Minister of Justice Viviani. Millerand and Delcassé were jettisoned as unpopular, and an experiment was made of adding "ministers of state" to represent all sides. These were Combes, De Freycinet, Léon Bourgeois, and the Socialist Guesde, and the last remaining Royalist leader, the Count Denys Cochin. Even more than Viviani's, this was a Ministry of "Sacred Union."

It was about time that something was done to satisfy public opinion. A whole series of assaults on the German lines had opened with high hopes, General Pétain actually breaking through all the trenches in front of him but being unable to widen the gap—all of which had ended with the capture of a few yards of land and many deaths. The last attacks, by Foch, in September in Champagne had forced some sort of a change. In particular some Minister of War was wanted who could keep the Cabinet informed. Joffre was asked if he would mind Gallieni's having the job, and said he would not.

Gallieni started out to differ from Millerand, and take his own line. He wanted to appoint generals to command the various armies, the result of which contest was that Joffre demanded and got control over Sarrail in faraway Salonica. A Colonel Driant, Deputy from Nancy, in command of the 59th Chasseurs at Verdun, came back to the Army Committee of the Chamber, of which he was a member, complain-

ing that the fortress was not properly equipped with cannon. Gallieni forwarded the complaint to Joffre. Joffre replied that all was well at Verdun, and wanted to know who was going over his head. For five months, October to March, this sort of thing went on. Finally Gallieni appeared in the Council of Ministers with a draft decree putting the Commander in Chief in his place. Only one minister voted with him to issue it, Paul Painlevé, the Minister of Education and Wartime Inventions, a distinguished scientist who had been much in the front line seeing for himself what needed inventing. Gallieni needed an operation seriously, and gave that as his excuse for resigning. In his place was put a General Roques, whom Joffre had said he would accept. Joffre still remained virtual dictator, still gave faith to the Allied cause, and still demanded, as a dictator, that he be implicitly trusted. He still went on with his "nibbling," too, that cost men's lives.

In 1916 a test came of Joffre as a commander. During 1915 the Germans had stood on the defensive on the Western Front because they were polishing Poland off, and driving the Russians back to the Pripet Marshes. But, that having been done, von Falkenhayn, who had taken the place of the younger von Moltke (the nephew of the great man of 1870) after the Marne, came back to see what could be done to France. His idea was that, if Germany had the best artillery, as she had, that artillery could shell the life and courage out of the French at some fortified place they would have to hold. The place he chose was Verdun, where Driant died rifle in hand, covering the retreat of his Chasseurs, in proof that he had been right and Joffre wrong. But Pétain, hurried to the command in Verdun, passed divisions through the hellish fire in rapid succession, so that none were broken; the English attacked on the Somme and drew off the Germans, using their new invention, tanks; and, after Pétain had been promoted from the command of an Army to that of an Army Group, Nivelle, his successor, counterattacked, and with remarkably few casualties took back the forts the

Germans had captured, including the famous Douaumont. Verdun, at first a German success, became a triumph of French morale, and in the slaughter of Germans, a weakening of their morale. But it also caused a serious questioning of the blind faith in Joffre.

There was in the French Constitution a power of either Chamber to hold secret session. In June 1916 the first secret session was held, from June 16 to June 22. Driant was not there to have his say, being dead at Verdun; but there were men there who had fought, and had something to say on how the war was being carried on. Out of the Secret Committee came the formation of a special committee on the control of the war, whose Reporter, André Tardieu, had commanded a company at Verdun. Tardieu's recommendation for a permanent committee to supervise the Front was voted down, but the War and Budget committees were given full powers to see things for themselves.

During the summer of 1916 that sufficed Parliament. But that winter questions arose once more. French marines had been shot down in Athens by the orders of the King of Greece. Something had to be done about it, and about the complaints that Sarraill was doing nothing at Salonica. Another secret session was held, after which Briand remade his Ministry. As even Roques, hand-picked though he had been by Joffre, had wanted to discipline Joffre, Briand got rid of Roques and of Painlevé, who had supported him, and at the same time got rid of Joffre by making him such an exalted Commander in Chief and Marshal of France, the first of the Republic, that he had no one to command. Joffre took the hint and resigned. Briand also threw off the lumber of ministers of state and brought into his Cabinet the able Mayor of Lyons, Édouard Herriot, as Minister of Public Works, and the miracle-worker of Morocco, Lyautey, as Minister of War. Being in a hurry for a commander in chief, he picked Nivelle, without waiting for Lyautey to agree to the appointment. Then he went to Parliament, told the Chamber that the emergency was so great that certain eco-

conomic legislation could not be enacted in time by normal means, and asked for power to issue decrees having the force of law. Parliament would not let him have this. It was one thing to strengthen the Executive, utterly another to make it irresponsible, as would be the case if it was allowed to legislate and get its decrees confirmed by the plea of emergency. Parliament instead speeded up its work and passed all Briand wanted done, winnowing out in debate some impracticable proposals.

From this account it may seem as if there was little fighting. On the contrary, there was all that could be wished; the reason it is not recorded is that it was all the same sort of thing, living in trenches, suffering under artillery fire, sometimes coming out to try to take enemy trenches if one could struggle through barbed wire and a hail of bullets. The enthusiasm of 1914 had long since gone. Voices in favor of peace began to be heard. In 1915, at Zimmerwald, in Switzerland, a shadow of an International Congress of Socialists had met, at which there was a French representative; and Lenin, in exile from Russia, had written a manifesto that said: "This war is not our war." In April 1916, at Kienthal, there were three French signatories to a similar manifesto. Back in France, that same month, a strong minority movement in the Socialist party wanted to re-establish relations with the Second International. This movement for stopping fighting corresponded to a movement for negotiating peace that came close to success in December 1916, pushed on by the new Emperor Charles of Austria. In every country there was a struggle between those willing to negotiate and the bitter-enders at this time. Such a struggle caused the fall of the Asquith Government in England. If the war were to be carried to a successful close, morale was a new problem.

In a sense Parliament could hardly have awakened to its functions of control at a more difficult moment. Command had changed from the true and tried Joffre to a man who, no matter how able he was, had started the war as a colonel.

The Minister of War, who in his younger days had been a devoted follower of the Count of Chambord, and in his prime, in which he still was, "had been too busy to have time for modesty," was about to take more powers into his hands, which might win the war, but might also be bad for the Republic. Russia, whose man power had been counted on to overwhelm Germany, who in 1914 had held off the Germans at the cost of the loss of Tannenberg, who in 1915 had held off the Germans when there was one rifle to every five Russian soldiers at the Front, who in 1916 had held off the Germans when, without any artillery, Brussiloff's men attacked and won a victory through sheer surprise, was at last on the way to collapse because, though the Russian private soldier was heroic, and Russian officers good enough, Russian rulers were contemptible. A similar weakening of morale was to be feared in France.

This was a splendid time for Parliament to let the Executive run the war and take the blame for failures; it was at this very time that Parliament took to standing on its dignity. When Lyautey, on whose personal prestige Briand had relied, told the Chamber, quite rightly, that even in secret session there were certain military secrets he would not give out, he was howled from the Tribune, despite the protest of Deschanel, the President of the Chamber. As Lyautey said to Briand going out, "We could last in office about a fortnight more, but why drag it out?" A new Ministry was formed by Ribot, the man the Chamber had not tolerated in 1914. In it, however, there was one man who towered over the rest, Paul Painlevé, who had been right about the way to handle Joffre—so right that the Chamber had cheered him when he walked down the aisles to his seat during Briand's declaration of policy of the December Briand Cabinet that did not contain Painlevé. Painlevé was made Minister of War and had to deal with Nivelle's plan for a great attack in Champagne. Events seemed to conspire to make that attack a failure. It was delayed by rain, it was delayed by a sudden withdrawal of the German armies, it was so

debated that rumors of it ran all over Paris and reached the German High Command. And all the time it was being delayed Painlevé would send for Nivelle and have it explained all over again, till Nivelle himself lost faith. At that, compared to other attacks, except for Nivelle's own successes at Verdun, it was a success—that is, a certain amount of German trench line was carried with fewer killed than usual.

But only an unqualified success would have been enough to meet the needs of French morale. The very rumor that the attack would be renewed sent a staff officer and deputy named Ybarnégaray posthaste to Poincaré at the Elysée to say that neither officers nor men could stand another attack. Poincaré, who throughout the war acted more as a Minister of State or, as he constitutionally was, as commander in chief, than as a figurehead, in the absence of Painlevé sent to Nivelle for explanations. The battle was called off, and Nivelle was kicked out, gradually, being first given Pétain, who had also started the war as a colonel, as Chief of Staff, then supplanted by Pétain, Foch being made Chief of Staff, which was professional adviser to a civilian Minister of War. This separated the offices of Generalissimo and Chief of Staff.

Possibly if Nivelle had either been thrown out neck and heels or backed up, instead of being eased out, things would have gone on all right. Instead, mutinies broke out. Troops would refuse to go to the Front from reserve. Antiwar propaganda was openly spread among the troops; one regiment even threatened to march on Paris; another locked itself into barracks and elected leaders. There was not very much that officers could do, being, even such tried and valiant ones as Ybarnégaray, in sympathy with the men; but they did get the men to take up arms again. Sixteen army corps were affected. It was said that there were only two sound divisions between the Germans and Paris.

Here Painlevé dared act. He gave Pétain what Pétain wanted—a promise that all pardons would be given by him, and not, as in the recent and notorious pardon of two trade-

union leaders, by Poincaré. He restored summary court-martials, by decree, without asking the Chamber. He brought Pétain to the Council of Ministers to discuss the morale of the Army. When it was suggested that it might be wise to let delegates go to a Socialist Congress in Stockholm, Pétain barked out one word, "no"; and that was that. Then, assured that he really was commander, Pétain righted what was wrong. He visited every division, brigade, and regiment on the Aisne Front that he could, talked not only with officers, but with men, and saw to it—he who himself had been a regimental commander at the beginning of the war—that regimental difficulties were smoothed over. The ordinary soldier was assured that he would not be kept in the trenches too long, or longer than the next man; that his food would be good; that his life would not be sacrificed in vain. Painlevé in the Chamber made too much of this, which showed the Germans they need fear no French attack and enabled them to divert troops to crush Russia, now a Republic under Kerensky, but with an Army that was dissolving as the French Army might have dissolved had it not been for Pétain, largely from Socialist propaganda. But when Pétain had finished persuading, France had an Army again.

Painlevé had other difficulties to face. Malvy may have been right in 1914 not to jail those on *Carnet B*, but they should have been jailed later on. Almyreda, who edited a paper called *Le Bonnet Rouge*, that in May 1917 was openly suggesting mutiny, was no longer the patriot he had been in 1914. Mata Hari, a famous courtesan, tried to be a spy and was caught with letters in her possession from a former Minister of War, though they were not military in nature. There was disloyalty and treachery to meet behind the lines. A firm hand was necessary. Painlevé gave it, though he did not go so far as to believe the attacks the Royalist editor Léon Daudet made on Malvy, accusing him of being in German pay on the strength of what a baker had been told by a priest he had met in the street. The accusations against

Malvy pulled the Ribot Cabinet down, though it was not beaten in the Chamber, and for a month Painlevé headed another Ministry that contained Ribot but not Malvy, who was demanding that he be cleared by an impeachment, which, to his later regret, he got.

As for the military situation, it was going from bad to worse. Russia was utterly smashed, and in the winter of 1917 would finally sign the dictated peace of Brest-Litovsk that made her the cat's-paw of Germany. Germany thus had a chance of avoiding the English blockade by getting food from the Ukraine and oil and food from conquered Rumania. The descendants of the princes who had squabbled at Versailles over the union of Germany into an Empire were able to squabble over carving Russia up into kingdoms and duchies for themselves, so completely had Russia gone down. Italy seemed about to follow. Some of her troops turned war-weary, and at Caporetto she received such a beating that France and England had to hurry help to her across the Alps. Foch and Painlevé went to Italy to supervise this, Painlevé making the sensible suggestion that one commander for all the Allied armies and a pooling of resources would be wise. It was not taken up, but Foch won golden opinions as a co-ordinator.

The political situation was as bad as the military. The people were losing confidence in the deputies, far too many of whom seemed to feel that their duties in Parliament prevented their being at the Front, far too few being like Driant, or the Minister of the Colonies, Maginot, who was in Paris busy raising African troops to supplement France's man power, after having been badly wounded in the fighting. Caillaux, an excellent judge of what was going on in Parliament, assumed that, after Painlevé, Briand would be tried again, since Clemenceau was so hated by Poincaré that he could not get office; and that then he, Caillaux, would be called in. He was so indiscreet as to say this when traveling in Italy. He had also been so indiscreet as to have embarrassing friends whom he had met in South America,

who were in touch with Germany. He committed the further indiscretion of committing to paper, in a packet inscribed *Rubicon*, how he would seize power if he were given office, how he would summon two regiments of Norman peasants, his own constituents, to Paris to act as a striking force, and how he would bring in peace, after enacting a law giving him the decree powers of legislation that had been denied Briand. A packet similarly marked *Rubicon* had contained Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's plans for overthrowing the Second Republic. It was in an atmosphere like this that the Painlevé Ministry met an adverse vote in the Chamber. Painlevé had done many wise things, and tried to do more. He had picked Pétain and Foch, that alone a claim to fame; he had ordered the right supplies—if ideas alone could win, he had had all the right ideas—but he could not clothe his thoughts with the will power that brings successful action.

Caillaux was wrong. Poincaré may have hated Clemenceau; he did consider a suggestion of making himself President of the Council, as Thiers had been, while President of the Republic; but he loved France, and tried Clemenceau in office, as the best hope after Painlevé. Almost the first thing Clemenceau did was to secure a waiver of Parliamentary immunity for Malvy and Caillaux, and put them securely in jail, with no nonsense about not hitting hard and not hitting those high up. When it was protested that Briand, who had been in contact with the enemy, and then Clemenceau himself might be the next, Clemenceau said he would take his chance. That was the spirit Clemenceau brought to the war. When he was having trouble making his Cabinet, he said if no politician dared join it he would face the Chamber with a Ministry composed of four front-line soldiers. Caillaux and Briand may have had the common sense that told Thiers when to admit defeat, but Clemenceau had Gambetta and Danton's courage to dare all.

From then on Clemenceau was a revival of Gambetta, a combination of the Great Ministry and the Delegation at Tours. He had as colleagues unknown men, such as Tardieu,

who later turned out very able, just as Gambetta had had De Freycinet and Waldeck-Rousseau. He had a supreme control by personality over those who should have controlled him, his colleagues in the Council of Ministers, his fellow Parliamentarians of Senate and Chamber, just as Gambetta had had over his colleagues at Tours. He who used to believe, as a one-man Opposition, that Parliament should control the President of the Council even in war, now as President of the Council controlled Parliament. The former chairman of the Senate Army Committee, who kept in touch with matters despite the Army's desire to run itself, now protected the Army from any interference but his own. The spare, tall, angry young man with the black mustaches, who had been Mayor of Montmartre, who had pulled down Ministries from the Tribune and shot down opponents at dawn in the Bois de Boulogne, changed into the gaunt white-mustached old man who wore a black skullcap when in the office of the Ministry of War and a green "deerstalker" when hurrying about France or into the trenches. His nickname remained the same, the Tiger; but its old meaning was forgotten, for now he was tigerish to all who would not fight as of old Danton had fought when the First Republic dared all the crowned heads of Europe. His actual ministerial declaration was longer, but it was all summed up in his one phrase, "I make war."

France had need of him. America, it was true, had come in, and might eventually balance the loss of Russia; but France could be saved only if Clemenceau could give her heart to hold out till American help came. In February 1918, Clemenceau was given those decree powers that had been refused to Briand, in a somewhat less sweeping form. These powers Clemenceau used or had Louis Loucheur use for him. With Clemenceau was Foch, the man whose distorted doctrine of the attack had been so fatal at the first, but whose doctrine of will had saved so much in the "race to the sea" that another man might have lost. Against them was a great general, Ludendorff, who launched an attack in March

that nearly split the English from the French. Pétain and Haig tried to work together; but again, as in 1914, the English began to consider a separate retreat. At the worst of it, Foch, Pétain, Clemenceau, Haig, and Lord Milner, the English War Minister, met on March 26 at Doullens. Even Clemenceau was in despair, which meant that things were very bad. But Foch, who believed in will, told them he would fight in front of Amiens, and refused to hear of anything but victory. Earlier a Supreme War Council had been set up, one of Painlevé's ideas. Now another of Painlevé's ideas was tried: Foch was made first co-ordinator, then a genuine commander in chief, over Pétain's head, of the English, French, Americans, and Belgians. Helping Foch was a tactful cavalry colonel he had had given him as a staff officer, when in 1914 he organized the Ninth Army—a man named Maxime Weygand.

German blows came fast. Another blow at the Marne that the Americans helped parry came close to Paris, but was countered as Pétain had long wanted to see it done; and the Chemin des Dames, of evil fame for Nivelle's disaster, was the scene of the first forward movement. If Ludendorff had evolved a new system of tactics, "infiltration," and had used it to get through trench lines in Russia, in Italy, and in Flanders, the French had learned it; and, again thanks to Painlevé, they had plenty of that excellent English invention, tanks, which so help infiltration. As for defeatism in Parliament and the general public, Clemenceau brought it out into the open in debates in Parliament, and defeated it, promising to fight in front of Paris, in Paris, behind Paris, and on every river of France till he had to fight on the sea; but never to surrender. Such speeches, backed by action, rallied the Nation.

At this point, as one reads the detailed history of the war, the scale of measurement changes. No longer are there gains of a few yards, or at most two or three miles. Great sweeps are taken. The trenches exist still; but tanks, plenty of munitions—much of them paid for or made in America—and at

last such a knowledge of trench fighting as the troops that put down the Commune had of street fighting, make it possible, not to break through—the discipline of the Germans is too good for that—but to press forward faster and faster. The English fight a battle that is no longer given the name of a town, preceded by the number of times they have fought there, but the grandiloquent name, “the Battle of the Rivers,” so many rivers do they cross in one battle. The French advance steadily in the center. Near Verdun the Americans first practice taking the St. Mihiel salient, then swarm into the Argonne Forest and along the Meuse River. Finally they come up those heights of Wadelincourt on which their General Philip Sheridan had watched Sedan as the French come around the bend around which the Crown Prince’s Army had come to surround MacMahon and take Sedan.

During all this, Clemenceau has done his share. When the Chamber, in the dark days of June, wants to get rid of Foch, he tells it that it can get rid of him, too. He and Foch cannot talk together about anything but war; they have no other common interest; but they understand each other. There is none of the secretiveness about Foch that there was about Joffre, nor does Clemenceau hide things in the haughty way that Millerand used to conceal them from the Chamber. In victory the French democratic system is working with the chain of responsibility in full order. It gives Clemenceau one day pleasure to bring Foch a document he says Foch will find particularly interesting, a decree that orders the Minister of War to make Major General Ferdinand Foch a Marshal of France.

Germany is losing her allies; they drop away; there are no more men to go to the Front; and on November 8, in a railway car in the Forest of Compiègne, a German general hears from Foch what the terms of an armistice must be. They are not disguised, except for the absence of the word, from being unconditional surrender. From such an armistice, no more than from the one Jules Favre had to accept

in 1871, can the defeated hope to rise and fight again. At eleven o'clock, November 11, firing ceases, and Germany can fight no more.

Parliament votes its thanks for the leaders who have carried it through to victory. In every school in France children read the names of two men, who are singled out in the general expression of gratitude to the Government and the Army and the Navy: first Citizen Clemenceau, then Marshal Foch. As for Pétain, they made him a Marshal too, giving him his baton when Metz opened its gates to victorious French troops.

These three men had by their leadership enabled a democracy to win a war. Fundamentally each had persuaded and inspired, not commanded. Pétain had inspired the privates; Clemenceau, Parliament; Foch, the generals. From an almost pure dictatorship at the start of the war, France, to win, had had to infuse the dictatorship with democratic methods in order to obtain her glorious victory.



Chapter Eighteen

THE HORIZON-BLUE MOOD

FOR ALL the democracy in the methods that were used to win the war, all the persuasion and inspiration (and it is important to remember that these methods proved themselves better than dictatorial ones), it is equally true that France ended the war in no democratic mood. For when it is said that France became more democratic at the end of the war than she had been the day of mobilization, that truth must not obscure the facts that war powers must be dictatorial, and that the mood in which France ended the war was carried on into the peace. There had been for a time a mood of respect for the idealist who had given heart to the Allies and taken heart from the Germans. Leaflets of Woodrow Wilson's speeches dropped behind the German lines had been most effective in destroying the will of the German people to fight against democracy, just as similar Wilson speeches had strengthened the will of the Allies to fight for democracy. "If 'Ifs' and 'An's' were pots and pans," perhaps Wilson might have had a peace to his liking—had he struck while the iron was hot, in December 1918, before the "coupon election" in England. So Harold Nicholson thinks, and he was on the spot at the making of peace.

But that is a matter of conjecture. Certainly by the spring of 1919 France had one desire, a peace that would let 50,000,000 Frenchmen live without fear of having all northern

France occupied and ravaged for another four years by 80,000,000 Germans. It has been widely held that in making the peace the Tiger was too vengeful. That may be so; such a picture of the black-skullcapped, white-haired Tiger has often been painted; but in France at the time he was thought to be too lenient. The Chamber of 1914 had gone far from its few June days of peace in 1914, when it had driven out Ribot and put in his place the Socialist Viviani. Now that Chamber of the Left, having fought a war with a President and Army of the Right, was itself in a mood of the Right, a mood that might well go back to the days of Albert de Broglie.

It may seem strange to speak of democratic and undemocratic moods, but as thinking about democracy has progressed it has been realized that democracy is not only the literal translation of the Greek words, *demos*, "the people," and *kratein*, "ruling"; there is more to it than that. The people cannot rule, really, unless they can change their ruler. No dictator, however much he may represent the will of the people at the moment, is really democratic, because the people cannot change their will as long as he is dictator. Going a step further, even if there is machinery by which a people can change its will, that is not enough. Democracy can fail to exist where all the machinery of democracy is in existence—that has happened time and time again. As Lord Balfour once said: "The essence of Parliamentary government is the desire to make it work." Consequently, for democracy to inspire the efforts of the French Government in the period after the war, it was necessary not only to have the machinery of democracy, which France had, but also the will to use it as it was meant to be used. It is rather doubtful if such a will then existed.

In Paris at this time there was pageantry of victory that showed what was the mood of France. On July 14, through the Arch of Triumph through which in 1871 von Moltke had marched to the tune of Schubert's *Marche Militaire*, Foch led his victorious men to the same tune. At Versailles, too,

there was pageantry when the treaty of peace with Germany was signed, in the very Hall of Mirrors where the fallen German Empire had been proclaimed. Spectators packed it to watch the representatives of the new German Republic sign, two humiliated men, a professor and a merchant. Fittingly, among those spectators was Déroulède's daughter. It must have given the Tiger pleasure to see his revenge.

But when the crowds of onlookers squeezed their way out of that packed hall into the open sunlight, they had to face the dread that victory had been won too late, and that their world, for want of a firm hand at its head, would go down to ruin. The news from eastern Europe showed that only if France put life into them could the provisions of the Versailles treaties and the subsidiary alliance with newly made client states have meaning. For the bitter mood that in the spring of 1919 had replaced the gladness of victory had ensured the setting up of a new Europe over which France would have to preside. Germany had been disarmed, made to confess she had been guilty of the war, hampered by inspections to see that she was disarmed, had the Saar coal district cut off from her for fifteen years; she been made to promise to pay for all the damage she had done, an astronomical sum. Germany having been weakened, a system of client states had been set up to the east of her, with Poland and Czechoslovakia the chief, but also an enlarged Rumania and a Serbia transformed into Yugoslavia. These were to be armed by France, and to serve as guards to watch over Germany and what remained of Austria and Hungary, lest they try for revenge. That set France at the headship of Europe once more, a position she had held and lost under the Second Empire.

Being at the head of Europe, France had to take the lead in facing the sudden spread of Communism after the war. For a moment it looked as if Western civilization might be engulfed by a unknown and murderous horror called Bolshevism. The stories that came west about it were exaggerated, but the grim truth of mass murders and mass starva-

tion was horrible enough without exaggeration, no matter what noble ideals might inspire some Bolshevik leaders. Russia, which in 1917 the German princelings were sharing out among themselves, had gone under, save for the Baltic coast and a lingering garrison in the Crimea; Hungary was filled with Bolshevism; it spread into Bavaria, and was on the verge of breaking out in Berlin and Hamburg. France herself was not immune. In the Black Sea, French sailors who had been sent to retrieve the situation in the Crimea caught the infection, and mutinied under the leadership of a man named Marty. Before France could control Europe she must save Europe; before she could save Europe she must save herself. Those were the three tasks before France. How she solved them depended on the mood she was in, whether democratic or dictatorial.

When the definitive peace treaty replaced the prolonged armistice, it was necessary to hold elections at which would be chosen a Parliament that would decide how France would meet her new responsibilities. During the war it had been impossible to do this. Legally, soldiers could not vote, and a very large proportion of the voting population was in the front line. Also a large proportion of the constituencies was in enemy hands. To meet this situation the term of the Chamber had been lengthened a year. But on July 2, 1919, an election law was passed, establishing Proportional Representation of a sort, providing for autumn elections to give Parliament an immediate mandate, and in 1924 returning to spring elections and the idea of not voting during harvest. In preparing for the election the fervor of wartime and of Cabinets of "Sacred Union" was still evident, and, of all seemingly antagonistic characters, Alexandre Millerand of St. Mandé and Maurice Barrès, the Boulangist and Nationalist, issued a call for a union, the National Bloc, of parties opposed to revolution and reaction. The Democratic Alliance joined it, the Republican Federation joined it, the Republican Committee for Commerce and Industry joined it, and the Catholic Liberal Action joined it. The Radical

party joined it, then saw the company it was in and withdrew its signature, making instead a "cartel" with the Socialists at the second ballot. But the tide of voting was with the National Bloc and its able little manager, M. Mandel, who had been Clemenceau's secretary. The R. P. law was so complex, compared to the old, simple single-district and a runoff method, that, so the jest ran, candidates spent most of their time telling voters how to vote and not whom to vote for. Just the same, the National Bloc swept the boards. Four priests sat in the Chamber, as many as had sat in the National Assembly. General de Castelnau, the great soldier the Republicans had distrusted for his clericalism, was elected, as were many ex-officers. Promptly the Chamber got a nickname, "Horizon-Blue," from the color of the army uniform, because it had so much the army spirit.

In effect, the decision of the Nation was that it wanted the spirit in which Pétain put down the mutinies of 1917 with a firm hand, with which Clemenceau put Malvy and Caillaux in jail, and was not so much interested in the way in which Pétain had coaxed soldiers back to loyal service, and Clemenceau had put his determination to fight to the end to a vote, not once but many times. If democratic methods in foreign affairs meant listening to German persuasions, the democratically elected French Parliament intended to shut its ears; or, if it was undemocratic not to use sharp methods to get results, then the Horizon-Blue Chamber intended to be undemocratic. This mood was not confined to the French; it existed in England, where the Parliament elected in 1919 was called "the Parliament of Hard-Faced Men." But this mood would inspirit the carrying out of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, as well as of the rebuilding of Europe and of France, the three simultaneous tasks that lay before the Horizon-Blue Chamber.

Of course, France was still France. Almost the first thing Parliament had to do was to elect a successor to Poincaré as President of the Republic. In December Clemenceau gave out the hint that he meant to retire from the presidency of

the Council in January. However, Briand went about pointing out that if Clemenceau became President of the Republic, soon the Elysée would see a fine civil funeral to go with the many military ones, so old had Clemenceau become. Deschanel, always a symbol of Parliament's moods, was overwhelmingly elected President of the Chamber two days before Parliament sat at Versailles as a National Assembly to elect a President of the Republic; and, though at the trial ballot of Republicans Clemenceau rallied some 389 votes, Deschanel had 408, and the election was a foregone conclusion. Clemenceau went off to spend the winter in Egypt, and Raoul Péret succeeded Deschanel in guiding and representing the Horizon-Blue Chamber as its President.

However, he must have had a double laugh over it all. He lived out the full seven years that Briand denied he could, receiving his friends and dictating memoirs, and died only in 1929. Then he, the devoted Republican, was buried on his country estate, paradoxically in the very heart of the one Royalist district left in France, La Vendée. But, as for Deschanel, he, a younger man, showed signs of trouble, and of living up to the qualification Clemenceau had once set for the presidency of the Republic—plenty of stupidity. If the President of the Republic climbs the trees in the Rambouillet Park or bathes in fountains, people ask questions. If the President of the Republic steps out of a night train that is, fortunately, going slowly, and is found walking the ties in his pajamas, people don't even stop to ask questions, they just laugh. On September 21 Deschanel resigned and underwent medical treatment; and on the twenty-third Alexandre Millerand, a man who believed in using a strong hand, became President of the French Republic.

However, in the summer of 1920, all this was just a diversion from the important thing, the way the Horizon-Blue Chamber was carrying out its mandate. It had to make the Treaty of Versailles work, and find the material with which to make it work. It had to hold off Germany, hold off Communism, and rebuild both France and Europe.

A first step in this was the high court trials of Malvy and Caillaux in the spring of 1920. The specific accusations against each could not be proved, but their "defeatism" had been obvious, and they were sentenced for crimes for which they had not been indicted—Malvy for not restricting the press and not jailing agitators at the start of the war, Caillaux for having been in contact with suspicious characters.

Naturally enough, the Horizon-Blue Chamber showed one affinity to the National Assembly, which had had to meet in its day similar problems. This was its attitude toward Catholicism. It winked at the presence of monks and nuns in France, refugees from Belgium during the war who had not gone back afterward but had opened teaching establishments. It voted to send an ambassador to the Vatican again. Fittingly enough, Combes died the very day this Ambassador, Jonnart, set out for Rome. France was officially represented at the canonization of Joan of Arc as a saint. It may not have been a coincidence that the Basilica of the Sacred Heart, on the heights of Montmartre, raised in expiation for the Commune, was at last sufficiently finished to be dedicated on October 16, 1919, exactly a month and a day before the election that went against the heirs of the Commune. Catholicism was at least something solid to rely upon in a shifting world, where allies were badly needed.

Two sections of France had to be rebuilt, in different ways: Alsace-Lorraine and the devastated regions of the North. In Alsace the problem was that, though the Lost Provinces were delighted to be back, they had grown accustomed, under Germany, to ruling themselves, and did not like the French way of ruling the whole Nation from Paris. First a High Commission was tried, that took orders from the Ministry of the Interior; then, when that failed, Millerand was sent to act as governor general, with more independence. But when, in February 1920, he became President of the Council, his successor did not do so well. An especial problem was that, in Alsace-Lorraine, the Concordat, abolished in France in 1905, was still in effect, and

Church and state were still linked. That left vestiges of the old struggle of the Old France against the New to disturb the Parliament that was striving to reconcile that New France with a Newer.

In the devastated regions the problem was clear. Government assistance was essential. The former inhabitants had not begun to return to the homes from which they had fled. At the election absentee ballots had had to be used. When the former inhabitants returned they had to rebuild their homes, their factories, their places of employment. It was hoped that eventually the Germans would pay for the damage done. But in the meantime, though there were some payments in kind and not in money from Germany, the Government had to raise money by short-term bond issues secured against the promise of German repayment, and lend it to those in need. This was Government expenditure on a scale far above Charles de Freycinet's in the 1870's. With a supply of money to hand out, the rest of the reconstruction could be left to the owners of the homes and farms and factories that were being reconstructed. That work was done generously and well by Jonnart and Louis Loucheur, among other "Ministers of the Liberated Regions."

In 1920, too, a wartime pledge was carried out, and the machinery for enforcing an eight-hour day set up and put into partial operation.

Naturally, reconstruction went with the problem of holding off Communism, without and within. In the beginning of 1920 it looked as if the Poles would do their duty by France, for they were in possession of Kieff, right in the heart of South Russia, and pushing the Bolsheviki hard; but in July matters were very different, and the Bolsheviki were hammering at the gates of Warsaw. Foch had a cure for all military difficulties, "Send Maxime." He called to his side his old Chief of Staff, Maxime Weygand, explained to him the maneuver that might work, and with a handshake parted with him at the Paris railway station. That was all the help France could send Poland, but it was enough. War-

saw, sometimes called the twentieth decisive battle of the world, ended to well into the 1930's any fear that Russia would intervene in the diplomacy of Europe by force of arms.

In France, too, Communism was met. When, in December 1920, the Socialist party met at Tours, the question before it was different from that before the Congress of 1905. Then the Socialist party united itself by submitting to the International Congress at Amsterdam. This time the socialist party divided itself, there being two Internationals for it to submit to: the old Second International, to which it belonged, and the new Third International which the Bolsheviki had set up. There was a severe struggle, but the victory was assured to the Third International. Marcel Cachin, who had seen Russia as the guest of the Bolsheviki, was all for joining forces with them, though he had stuck with Renaudel during the war and had not made overtures for peace. But Renaudel and old Jules Guesde distrusted the men of the Third International and the terrible strictness of their party discipline. A member of the Council of State, Léon Blum, till then, though a friend of Jaurès, rather an academic member of the Socialist party, also put, at the congress, Jaurès's case—that the Socialist party in France should be interested in France. These men split the party, saved enough support to found the paper, *Le Populaire*, and make an alliance with the unions, in the C.G.T. The men of the Third International, now called Communists, took *L'Humanité*, Jaurès's old paper, and split off from the C.G.T. a new Federation of Labor, the C.G.T.U. Then Blum resigned from the Council of State and set himself the task of making his minority of the Socialist party the majority, by democratic methods of persuasion, and of sticking to Jaurès's ideals of a French Socialist party, rather than an International Communist party.

But, though France could take care of herself, by means of treason trials, reconstruction, and democratic discussion of party aims, it was hard for her to take care of others, and

the reconstruction of the devastated regions depended on Germany. For reconstruction depended on those short-term bonds, and those short-term bonds depended on Reparations. As the Treaty of Versailles had not fixed the amount of Reparations, endless squabbles went on over how much to expect, while a Reparations Commission collected goods and minerals on account, to be reckoned in at the final settlement. Also, the enforcement of the treaty depended on the way France's partner, England, behaved; and England and France disagreed over the policy to adopt in the Mediterranean. In Palestine England was trying to be pro-Jew and pro-Arab at the same time, which complicated matters in Syria, where France was trying to get a form of government set up first, and then hand it over later. It is true that again "Maxime was sent," and Weygand went out to do what he could; but his task was hard, and he made slow headway. Wherever one looked at the problems before France, whether at home or abroad, the answer might well seem to be a firm hand.

When Millerand replaced Deschanel as President of the Republic, it was thought that Briand would be called to the presidency of the Council. At the meeting of the National Assembly at Versailles it was openly spoken of, and he was congratulated in advance. But Millerand summoned instead Georges Leygues, who had been a colleague of his in the Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry. Millerand, as President of the Republic, was determined to have as President of the Council some Jules Simon he could overawe, not a skillful diplomat. Millerand frankly believed that France needed a strong President who could influence decisions even more than Poincaré had during the war. During the year 1920 Leygues wrestled with the endless conferences over details of Reparations, and with the problems of the Silesian Plebiscite that was to give Silesia to France's ally, Poland, but did not completely succeed. The eastern Mediterranean formed a further problem because the French Mandate for Syria needed a treaty with Turkey to make it effective, and it was

hard to find any Turkish government to make a treaty with; and if it were found, the Greeks were determined to pay off old scores and attack it, backed by England. Then Leygues's Minister of Finance, François Marsal, got into trouble, and in January 1921 Briand at last became President of the Council.

Briand took his turn of a year trying to make bricks without straw. He did set up a Ministry of Reconstruction and Reparations. He did get a treaty drawn up with Turkey, the Treaty of Sèvres, with a son of the ex-Sultan. He did go to Washington to a disarmament conference, and cut down the French Navy and some expenses with it. But he did not get any settlement of how much Reparations could be expected to pay off those short-term bonds without which the rebuilding of the devastated regions might crash into bankruptcy. He also seemed infected with the idea that if Germany and Russia, the roots of evil, were treated kindly, the one might pay up, the other stop plotting. In short, he seemed to rely on deftness rather than strength. He went to Genoa for a last conference. There he played golf with Lloyd George. The press printed a lovely picture of them playing together, and the German and Russian delegates to the conference went out to a small near-by town named Rappallo and signed an agreement. Then the President of the Republic, on his own authority, with no nonsense about any minister countersigning the action, persuaded some ministers to send Briand an imperative telegram of recall; and Briand hurried back to take the hint and resign without any vote of nonconfidence. This was rather like the famous note Jules Simon got from Marshal MacMahon on May 16, 1877. In Briand's place Millerand put a man who would be firm, and had strong ideas about what the President of the Republic should do—ex-President Raymond Poincaré.

Poincaré formed the sort of Cabinet that might be expected, with General Manoury of taxicab fame as Minister of the Interior; Maginot as Minister of War; and his old friend Louis Barthou as Minister of Justice. In January 1923,

in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs, he notified the Reparations Commission that Germany had defaulted in the payment of certain carloads of wood, part of the payment of Reparations in kind, and asked to occupy the Ruhr to enforce proper payment. By a vote of three (France, Belgium, and Italy) to one (England), that was agreed to, and French soldiers marched in. The German answer was to do nothing. From a slight trickle of payments that gave hope that some day the reconstruction bonds might be met, the flow from Germany dropped to just what the French could make themselves and carry off—less than the cost of the occupation. The French, not the Germans, paid for the troops in the Ruhr. From England, France got no sympathy; for shortly before, in Turkey, England had tried to back the nonexistent Sultan against Mustapha Kemal, who had turned out to be the real government. With French backing, Kemal had beaten the Greeks, and had marched into Constantinople so fast that only the blessing that the English commander there was an Irishman named Harrington with a gift of blarney got the English out of the mess without a fight.

But, despite the difficulties France was getting into, her rulers stuck by the philosophy of the strong hand. At Évreux, in October 1923, Millerand made a speech on his own, stressing the importance of the presidency, and proposing a line of policy, thereby assuming he had a responsibility for policy.

However, since France had no big ally, and no cash, embarrassing questions began to be asked about the value of the franc. After a year in the Ruhr, in the spring of 1924, some Americans, headed by Charles Gates Dawes, were called upon, as representatives of the only financially sound big country, to suggest how Reparations could be handled in such a way as to make war debts payable. They suggested, in effect, the plan that had cost Briand the Premiership—namely that of treating the Germans decently, letting them get on their feet, and then collecting from them when

they had gathered together something to collect. As it was, the German Government had taken to printing marks in such a way that prices doubled in one day, and the mark was finally stabilized by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht on the value of the German railways, at 1,000,000 old marks to one new one. The French franc showed embarrassing signs of going the same way, and Poincaré reconstituted his Cabinet entirely, with Maginot and the Minister of Reconstruction alone left, and Marsal at the Finances again. The Horizon-Blue Chamber took that exceptional step, that had been voted down in the winter of 1916, of granting Poincaré the right to legislate by decree in the financial field to protect the franc. The existence of that power, without its use, was enough to stop the fall of the franc and raise it to a normal value. That saved the franc for the time being, but elections were close.

At those elections a rejuvenated Opposition appeared. The Radicals still had their strong old organization and the program they inherited from Gambetta. Léon Blum was daily increasing the strength of the Socialists as against the Communists, and under Paul Painlevé another Left Wing group had formed, called Republican Socialists. These three parties formed a "cartel" and by drawing up common lists saw to it that the parties of the Right did not gain advantage from the Proportional Representation law to pick up odd deputies here and there. The Cartel had a real set of grievances to right. Punishing Germany was building no houses and factories in the devastated regions. Caillaux was still in jail for having had suspicious friends, not a serious crime in politics, and his book, *My Prisons*, was being widely read. While it was all right to be kind to refugees, there were limits to the extent to which clericals might be allowed to drive a coach and four through the Law of Separation. This business of assuming that Alexander Kerenski, in exile in America, was the only President of the Russian Republic, had gone on long enough; and a realistic recognition that Bolshevist Russia existed might be wiser. Above all,

the idea that Millerand had that the President could dismiss ministers and influence policy, especially such an un-Republican policy as that of the Horizon-Blue Chamber, was a reminder of MacMahon, De Broglie, and "Moral Order," and must be checked.

At the elections the Cartel made perfectly clear what it stood for, and said it expected Édouard Herriot, the head of the Radical party and war mayor of Lyons, to be the next Premier. It had hoped to gain only enough seats to bargain about Ministries, but in the Chamber, which had been reduced to 584 seats, it carried 310. The days of the Liberating Chamber seemed back again, for again the reactionary Minister of the Interior waited in his Ministry to receive the election returns and carry the news of the tidal wave to the President of the Republic and the President of the Council, just as De Fourtou had done for MacMahon and De Broglie. This time it was the President of the Republic who held firm; the President of the Council, for Poincaré was a strong constitutionalist, who gave in. Poincaré resigned, but Millerand tried to carry on. He appointed Marsal President of the Council, not so much to rule as to countersign a message he wanted read to the Chamber. For 300 deputies had signed a pledge to support no Ministry appointed by Millerand, not giving him the option Gambetta had given to MacMahon of knuckling under or going out, but ordering him out. Marsal's Ministry was beaten in the Chamber, 310 to 214, in the Senate 154 to 144; and Millerand resigned, too. In his place was elected, not Painlevé, the Cartel candidate, who had been elected President of the Chamber against the symbolic candidacy of Maginot, but Doumergue, the President of the Senate. Unlike the Bloc of the Left in 1902, the Cartel had no means of enforcing discipline at such a vote. But Doumergue, of course, called Herriot to the presidency of the Council, and the Cartel Chamber set to work to undo what the Horizon-Blue Chamber had done.

The embassy to the Vatican was not withdrawn, because General de Castelnau and his National Catholic Federation

got together a million signatures of protest in a month; but an embassy was sent to Russia. An amnesty was voted that brought Caillaux out of jail and kept the re-elected Malvy from fear. The Dawes Plan was accepted. Herriot, as his own Foreign Minister, arranged a withdrawal from the Ruhr. Briand, who succeeded him as Foreign Minister in a Painlevé Cabinet, signed a treaty with the English Baldwin Government, also newly in office, at Locarno, which guaranteed the Rhine to both France and Germany, a hoped-for pledge of perpetual peace that had the signatures of Republican Germany, of England, and of Italy, that was now under Mussolini. In Syria, Weygand was recalled; and the Republican General Sarrail was sent out, which later proved a bad mistake, but showed good intentions.

In place of the philosophy of the strong hand, democracy had come back to France, both at home and abroad, in a change of mood, and had brought success with it. It remained to be seen if democracy could handle the problems of an industrialized world better than the men it had supplanted; if it could succeed, not in the negative task of destroying governments, but in the positive task of governing.



Chapter Nineteen

THE BATTLE OF THE FRANC

THE CARTEL, with Herriot as Premier, showed that democracy could solve diplomatic problems that the Horizon-Blue Chamber and Nationalism could not. But then democracy, having shown the advantage of having a changeable mind when it was time to change it, showed that a firm mind sometimes matters, too. The Cartel had solved every problem but one, that difficulty of those short-term bonds that were not being redeemed as fast as it might be hoped they would be. France, as a country of individuals and corporations doing business, was rich; France, as a government that had debts to pay and credit to keep up, was approaching bankruptcy.

It is a peculiar thing about those who live in an industrial liberal state, such as the great nations of Europe and America are now, that they do not recognize what national bankruptcy is until it is upon them. Symptoms of bankruptcy, that in an individual's accounts would make him sit up and take notice lest the sheriff come in with warrants, have no effect when they appear on the national accounts. Instead, theories of money—many of them apparently sound, as far as they go—such as that a national debt is not like a private debt, are pushed out of their limits and, politically, are very successful. These theories seem to make unnecessary the unpleasant economies of reducing salaries and other expenditures. Then come the further signs of bankruptcy, which

cannot be denied—the fact that foreign business goes to someone else because you cannot deliver money or goods as you promised; the fact that somehow there is a slackening of production and an increase in prices, so that everyone seems to be getting less and less; and these facts force home truths on the ordinary man, driving him and his representatives to panic measures and making them both wish that taxes had been raised earlier.

That was how matters went with the Cartel. One reason France was prosperous was that taxes were low. Taxes were low and the rate of exchange favorable because the French raised money by short-term bonds and not by taxes. On the other hand, practically every Frenchman who saved (and France is a thrifty nation) put his money in long-term Government bonds which would go down in value and in return if the national credit fell. What would a deputy naturally do about such a situation, when faced with the alternatives of annoying his supporters, whatever he did? Just what Parliament did do—nothing.

At first, indeed, it seemed as if nothing need be done. Clémentel, the Minister of Finance in Herriot's Cabinet, announced for the first time since the war a balanced budget. But the budget was balanced by a hair, on the assumption that when short-term bonds fell due, as shortly they would, it would be possible to pay them off with more short-term bonds. Shortly after that, when Clémentel tried to get in some money by long-term bonds to protect against recurrent crises, the bond issue failed, and he went out of office in December 1924. At this time heavy sales of francs in foreign markets occurred, and the rout was on. Something had to be done because the franc was falling; but Parliament, the Chamber Budget Committee headed by Malvy being the ringleader, saw to it that each specific proposal was voted down. In the year 1925 the score was the fall of six Ministers of Finance and three Ministries. The proposals of each minister were chiefly one form or another of disguised borrowing. It was the details that varied.

What defeated Herriot and his second Finance Minister, De Monzie, was that Herriot was too honest. He actually told the Senate he couldn't explain the terms of the budget, was defeated in consequence, and resigned. He was borrowing money from the Bank of France in return for allowing it to increase its note issue, which made the budget most complicated.

After Herriot, came, logically enough, the other leader of the Cartel, Painlevé. Painlevé turned to the men best equipped to help—Caillaux, to whom civil rights had been given back on the first of the year, and Briand, whose feats at Locarno have already been told. The only trouble with Caillaux was his accommodating way of getting allies. When the Cartel seemed unwilling to vote him his measures in July, he turned to the Right, got the support of Louis Marin, whose economies he was trying to enact, and split the Cartel the day Parliament adjourned. During the summer, when his hands were free, Caillaux made a deal with the English over the war debts, came to America, made another deal, and worked out a plan for doing what Clémentel had failed to do, set up an amortization fund. But, with his treachery to the Cartel and his unpopular measures, Caillaux could not be kept in the Cabinet once it had to meet Parliament. Painlevé met Parliament without him, transferring himself from the War Ministry to the Finance Ministry, which, by a curious experiment, he divided into halves, taking the treasury functions himself and giving the budget ones to Georges Bonnet, telling Parliament the leader's place was the post of danger.

Bonnet could not get amortization through, either. It took barely a month to get him and the whole Painlevé Cabinet out. Briand reconstructed the Cabinet, Painlevé going back to the War Ministry; and Louis Loucheur, who had made such a success of munitions during the war and of reconstruction after it, trying his hand at finance. He could not make a success of the Finance Committee. He was followed by Paul Doumer, the sixth minister of the year, who fell in

March 1926 over a sales tax. Péret, whose articles on finance were widely read, followed him, and did get a budget voted and did get new taxes; but it was such a lame, halting, incomplete budget that he appointed a committee to make further suggestions, and then resigned before hearing, officially, that they wanted the base of taxation broadened. No politician, except perhaps Louis Marin, head of the Republican Federation, the Right Wing organization, wanted to hear that.

Herriot, now President of the Chamber, gathered together, on the night of June 19, the leaders of the Cartel. They sat together, argued, telephoned wildly about Paris, in the hopes of making a national Ministry—what the English in the eighteenth century would have called a broad-bottomed Ministry because it rested on support from all parts of Parliament. At last, near dawn, exhausted, they gave up the attempt. Briand again reconstituted his Ministry, turning to the only hope, Caillaux, now a senator. Caillaux made strict terms. He would be not only Minister of Finance, but also Vice-President of the Council, which office would be divorced from the Ministry of Justice. It would not be a Briand Ministry but a Briand-Caillaux Ministry. Then, since he felt that the Bank of France was using its powers of refusing to lend to the Government too much, he dismissed the Governor of the Bank his first day in office, using a power that had almost been forgotten.

Caillaux worked out a plan. If Germany had been put on her feet and restored to the gold standard by English and American gold, coupled with conditions of how it should be used and long-term repayments, why could not France be put on her feet in the same way? To Caillaux's mind there seems to have been nothing wrong with that, though it was a surrender of national sovereignty. To make sure of the economy needed, though, strong measures would have to be taken; laws would have to be changed. The blessed summer vacation, used for turning troubles over to the Ministry, was coming. Caillaux asked for the powers of legislation by de-

cree, subject to future ratification by Parliament, that had been refused to Briand in 1916, but granted to Clemenceau in 1918, and to Poincaré in 1924. This was the obvious way out, even if it ran against the control of the Executive by Parliament.

There was a tremendous scene in the Chamber when it was debated. It was clear that men were undecided, and that a narrow majority would carry it one way or another. A thing happened that had hardly happened since the days when Gambetta ruled in De Freycinet's Ministry—the President of the Chamber, Édouard Herriot, came down from the chair to the Tribune and appealed to the Chamber as its President not to abdicate its powers. He told the Chamber that the strongest governments in France had been those that had trusted their Assemblies, not distrusted them. When Briand spoke in defense of Caillaux's plan, Herriot interrupted him to remind him that they both had asked for such powers in 1916, had been denied them, and had succeeded in passing through Parliament all the measures they wanted, as quickly as they had wanted. Louis Marin arose, who the year before had kept Caillaux in office for the summer vacation. He spoke of the *Rubicon*. He said, "There are men to whom one would give full powers. . . . At this moment I wish to say only what is amiable to the Minister of Finance." A moment later André Tardieu interrupted him, to read from the *Rubicon* the exact text Caillaux would have had enacted had he seized power, surprisingly like the one he was at that moment proposing. Then the Chamber clotured the debate, listened to Caillaux defend himself, and voted his plan down and the Briand-Caillaux Ministry out of office, 288 to 243.

With that fall the franc crashed further, to two cents. Herriot tried his hand, met Parliament with a Ministry, and in four days was defeated, too, at his first meeting with the Chamber, with the franc falling still further. One man alone was left—Poincaré. Poincaré formed the sort of Cabinet Herriot had tried to form in June. It had in it Briand, Pain-

levé, Marin, Tardieu, and Herriot. Poincaré came in with a very definite proposal. It was almost the same as Caillaux's—of legislation by decree and restoration of the national credit. But Poincaré, a fighting patriot, not an international financier, wanted to have France save herself, not be saved by the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. He would have Péret's taxes and Clémentel's amortization fund, and no outside help. It was agreed that Parliament had had its try and had failed, sign of this being the election of Péret to succeed Herriot as President of the Chamber. Herriot himself voted for the somewhat narrower decree powers. On August 7 Poincaré set up the "Autonomous Fund" that would take over all the 47,000 billion francs of floating debt, and see to it that they were paid off soundly. To the Autonomous Fund were given the proceeds of the tobacco monopoly, and of any reparations that could be collected from Germany. The Autonomous Fund would be managed by a committee, a President elected by the Senate, a Vice-President elected by the Chamber, and would be out of politics. Albert Lebrun was elected its President, and the National Assembly met at Versailles to vote solemnly into the constitution that the Autonomous Fund would be independent. (Most versions of the French constitution in print in English omit this new clause.)

Having by this defended the budget and the value of the short-term bonds, Poincaré turned to the problem of defending the franc. He allowed the Bank of France, that until then had been an almost automatic central bank of discount and rediscount, with the unusual custom of directly discounting small bills, to buy and sell foreign securities as part of its other hitherto also automatic function of issuing and redeeming the paper currency. The Bank pitched in and the franc rose spectacularly in value to four cents; so that speculators, instead of driving the franc down, now drove it up, hastening the recovery that was needed.

Parliament, having handed the problem to Poincaré, went home for the summer, leaving him the power of legislation.

He took it. French government needed reorganizing. The many districts that had been set up in the past, with individual courts and councils, made a hodgepodge in a time when an industrialized nation needed larger units than those that had been satisfactory in the year 1791. By decree 90 departments were, for most judicial and administrative purposes, reduced to 22 regions. Parliament met that fall to find France a far more solid nation than she had been before in those hectic early August days, and a far more efficient nation than she had ever been; and by accepting these changes admitted it had not dared face facts.

Poincaré stayed in power, even in a Cartel Chamber, with an increased majority. But the presidency of the Chamber, that sign of men's moods, changed hands. Péret did not run again, and after some balloting the office fell to a man of the Center, Fernand Buisson. Meanwhile, during 1927 Poincaré went on with his task. The Bank was ordered to redeem currency at fixed rates in relation with the English pound, and given discretion in the selling and buying of foreign securities. The Autonomous Fund put the short-term bonds on two-, three-, and four-year bases, preventing sudden maturities from bringing on crises. Poincaré also distrusted the confiding way in which the Cartel had put its trust in Germany. His Minister of War, Painlevé, worked out plans for putting the Army on a sound basis, with a special "covering force" to protect mobilization and make the best use of French man power, so dangerously low compared to German, but at least blessed with training. Then at the end of 1927 the period of the elections was on. In July 1927 the Cartel had raised its head, and ended Proportional Representation, going back to district voting and a Chamber of more than 600.

The elections brought in, with a "Republican Union" and much ballotage, an evenly divided Chamber that, however, promptly backed Poincaré in voting a gold bullion standard by which one could certainly get gold for francs if one were fool enough to want to carry vast amounts away; in other

words, a gold standard for central banks only. There was a promise of getting around to coining gold some day, to give the ordinary man the benefit of the gold standard, too.

Then, with the fruits of the election gathered, politics raised its head once more. In Alsace the clerical movement, that feared an attack on the Concordat, as it still existed there, roused the old anti-clerical feelings of the past. Cail- laux had had to wait for his revenge, but he got it. In De- cember 1928, under Caillaux's presidency, the Radical Con- gress of Angers voted its disapproval of the clemency to clericalism and the expenses on military precautions. That caused the Radicals in the Poincaré Cabinet to withdraw, and made André Tardieu Minister of the Interior.

In July 1929, with the Young Plan seeming to assure the Autonomous Fund of some real receipts from Germany at last, Poincaré retired, his duty apparently done; and Briand, as ever, took the presidency of the Council.

The year 1929 was a year when all looked well, all over the world. France seemed herself again, politically, because Briand was thrown out of office promptly on the meeting of the Chamber, on the ground that he had let Philip Snow- den, the English negotiator at The Hague, get too much of the benefit of the Young Plan money, and France too little. A Radical Ministry under Daladier, President of the Socialist Radical party, almost was created, but the balance of the Chamber was against it, and Tardieu tried his hand. He lasted three months, was succeeded by a Radical, Chau- temps, for nine days, and came in again. The majorities were narrow; any issues that might change votes would make the National Union Chamber a Cartelist one. The tendency was toward Ministries of the Center, supported from the outside by the Right under Louis Marin. A man named Paul Reynaud, in the Center, began making a name for himself as an administrator and a critic. At this time new economic ideas began to reach France. The Battle of the Franc had made France, which had saved herself by it, seem very strong, but new ideas were coming in just the

same. As far as social security then went, France had promises but no performances. The old-age pensions—for all the money taken from the congregations by Combes to spend on them—were a joke, fifty depreciated francs a month. Workmen's compensation schemes were on too small a scale. Pressure began for real schemes, and Tardieu realized what he was up against. In 1930 the contributions to a real old-age pension scheme were started, which, being based purely on contributions, will be effective about 1970, in that resembling the original American scheme instead of the state-subsidized English and German ones that paid full benefits when they started. A health-insurance scheme started up, too. At first it was for service by doctors, as most are; but the doctors themselves put a stop to that, and made it a scheme in which the bills were underwritten and there was no spy ordering a professional man how to practice his profession. Tardieu also had a grandiose scheme for "National Re-equipment" that was always being talked about but somehow never got through. These were amazing things to come from Tardieu, the man of the National Bloc and the National Union, whose exclusion from the Chamber in 1924 had been considered one of the triumphs of the election. But Tardieu, because of his interest in large-scale industry, had an insight into the world that was coming, and wanted to forestall it, and there was that slim majority to consider, of sometimes only ten votes, that at times changed and would hold a Radical Ministry in for a moment. Some embarrassing discoveries were made about the Oustric Bank failure and the way in which Raoul Péret, the Minister of Justice and exemplification of all the Right stood for, had been induced not to prosecute. That caused a four-day Radical Ministry to which Laval succeeded. He ruled for some eleven months, managing to hold together the slim majority of the National Union.

During his premiership the National Union spirit prevented a customs union between Germany and Austria. The evacuation of the Rhineland seemed to the French enough

kindness to Germany. In balance for that, and the way the Cartel had cut the Army down, André Maginot, who had during the war supplied France with her colonial troops, now gave her the famous forts on the frontier that bear his name, that carry out Painlevé's idea of covering mobilization, and resemble in their military function the forts Séré de Rivière built in the 1870's. At this time, too (June 1931), Doumergue's term of office as President was up, and he firmly announced that he would not be a candidate for re-election. The memory of fifteen successful formations of Ministries and ten still-born ones was too much for him. Briand, who had objected to Clemenceau as too aged, now stood himself. The National Union's candidate was Paul Doumer, who had been the candidate against Faillières in 1906. This time he defeated Briand at the second ballot and took over from Doumergue the task of finding Presidents of the Council who would do what Parliament wanted done but dared not do itself.

In 1931, in September, despite help from the Bank of France, and from the Federal Reserve of New York, England went off the gold standard, it being impossible to patch up for England even the kind of agreement that Caillaux had devised for propping up France. That caused a greater flow of gold into France.

In the spring of 1932 the elections took place again, and this time there was no balanced Parliament in which the National Union and the Cartel glared at each other. The Cartel came back with the inevitable Herriot; but it was not Doumer who appointed Herriot President of the Council. An insane Russian, Gorguloff, shot Doumer at a charity fair; and in between the two "turns" of the spring election the outgoing Parliament quickly met at Versailles and elected the President of the Senate, Albert LeBrun, who had been President of the Autonomous Fund, President of the Republic.

Then Herriot came into power again as the head of the largest party in the Cartel and tried to keep France on an

even keel. For the Autonomous Fund was reducing the old debt only about as fast as the Government, what with the Maginot Line and other plans, was building up new debt. America tottered off the gold standard, but France solidly kept on redeeming its currency, through the special functions of the Bank of France, keeping, if not the promises of 1914, at least those of 1927. With Tardieu's new social legislation and Poincaré's steadfast holding to the honesty that is the best business policy; with Briand's good treatment of Germany and Maginot's strong line of forts against Germany, France seemed to be the central power in Europe, ready to conciliate and ready to act—the one strong point which depression and the failures of the Treaty of Versailles elsewhere could not touch. Struggles were building up in the Nation between employers and employed; the big industrialists and the labor unions both had histories of organizing and influencing Parliament that changed the political picture from that of the 1900's. But details of the Committee of Ironmasters and the General Confederation of Labor in the first place have not been revealed, and in the second and more important place were not so much matters of present importance as signs of the future. What mattered was that French democracy seemed again to have triumphed. As it had in the past met accusations of not being able to keep order, the charge of the 70's, of not understanding the requirements of war or men's religious consciences, the charges from 1885 to 1906, of not being able to fight, the charge of the First World War, so now it seemed to give the answer of success to the charge it could not keep its finances straight and meet an industrialized world.



Chapter Twenty

FACING FASCISM

HERE WAS a great difference between the sturdy Republic that in 1932, a success and a leader in a peaceful Europe, was making light of depression and the rising tide against the Treaty of Versailles, and the crushed Republic that on July 10, 1940, in a war-torn Europe, voted away its constitution at the behest of a conqueror. That difference has changed people's opinions of the Republic. In 1932 many said that in some queer way, because of "National Characteristics," it was the best form of government for France; in 1940 many said that France's fall was an inevitable result of its form of government. Such differences in the position of this subject matter and the opinions expressed on it, seem to make it hard for a historian to interpret a history that was making as he wrote. To use his usual methods of interpretation may be risky in the light of insufficient evidence; to fail to use them is to admit his interpretation was not sound. There is the dilemma that faces the historian of the Third Republic.

From that dilemma, however, there is a way out. In the matter of details, naturally, he must walk warily, for facts are not available. There may be characters like Léonie Léon behind the scenes, of whom no one knows or will know for twenty years. Time has not yet sorted out the Boulangers of today, who look great, and are not, from the Combeses, who look small and are great, though the process is going on.

Was Gamelin a great general, as was said before Second Sedan, or an incompetent, as at the time of writing he is hinted to be? That question may not be answered till long after the Riom trials are over, even if those trials bring out evidence. Much analyzing, much sifting, must be done before a complete detailed account of the last eight years can be written.

But true as that restriction is on any detailed account, it does not affect a general account. The historian can quote André Tardieu's remark: "The French problem is complex in its manifestations, simple in its elements." He can set manifestations to one side and apply the interpretation he has already tested on the more distant past to recent events, to see if it fits. If known Parliamentary events have reflected those big facts that stand out already as incontrovertible, he can trust his general picture, even though a better knowledge of details may sharpen it. Parliamentary events do so reflect the big facts. In those eight years French democracy was functioning under great strain, and the same danger signs reappeared that were significant in the Constitutional and Institutional stages of the Republic's history; the same devices were used to meet threats. In particular there were failures of thinking in Nation or Government, and resultant temptation to use the dictatorial machinery that lay at hand, and military and diplomatic needs affected the domestic history of France, all repetitions of past experience.

The first thing to be interpreted, the early history of the Cartel of 1932, looks very familiar. Again a pooling of votes on the second ballot by Radicals and Socialists, accompanied by a moral fervor against anyone, even Raymond Poincaré's, imposing his will on Parliament, sweeps the elections. Again a new President of the Republic shows less desire than his predecessor to have a will of his own, such as Thiers and MacMahon had had, Millerand had tried to have, Doumergue had wished he could have had. All this seemed a parody of the Cartel of 1924, speeded up. Though Briand was

out of public life, though the German Republic was not allowed a customs union with Austria, yet a policy of friendliness with a now democratic Germany was kept up. Ministries fell, finances were conducted with probity, in so far as the name of balance was preserved for the budget, and with ostrichlike disregard for the future. And the length of military service was brought down to one year.

In its failures, especially, the Cartel of 1932 parodied that of 1924. It did not bother to have a successful Herriot Ministry before a series of collapses from bad finance; it had the collapses right away. It did not wait for two years before calling in a committee of experts to write its budget for it; it called one in in six months. That committee report, too, it rejected, this time perhaps because it was pointed out that, despite a supposed cutting-down, the civil service had increased by 113,000 since 1925.

Here the speeded-up parody ends. In 1926 France was alone among the nations of the earth in suffering economic ills, and in 1928, when Tardieu brought in social-security legislation, did not consider unemployment among the ills a Frenchman would have to insure against. By 1933 the depression was world-wide, and mounting relief rolls were making mock of the pride with which unemployment insurance had been kept out of the social insurance law. In 1926 France proudly refused to send for outside help; in 1933 Herriot went to America to help to stay on the gold standard and found that America had gone off gold when he was on the water, and that France would have to stand alone not because she wanted to but because she had to. In 1926 France was faced by a peaceful Germany; in 1933 Hitler came into office and was on his way, by a fire, an hysterical election, and the "Blood Purge," to absolute power. What remained to the Cartel of 1932 of the foreign policy of the Cartel of 1924 was the idea that Germany might deserve better treatment than she had had, and its converse, the idea that the client states to the east, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, might behave

better. This attitude, excellent for winning German friendship when it was to be won, now merely tempted to dangerous savings in the military budget and in diplomatic support of the client states.

In such a new situation new ideas evolved. The France of 1933 was a changed France. Her people no longer consisted of a majority that had grown up in an unindustrialized world, but now of a majority that had been accustomed to a partly industrialized world and thinking in its terms. At the same time industrialization was proceeding apace, and intensifying its problems, as was marked by the enactment of social-security legislation in 1929. Parliament, in its defeating of Ministries, was reflecting the chopping and changing of the national mind. It too was giving up old habits reluctantly. It too was being puzzled by new problems, was now trying to evade them and disliking men who demanded that they be faced; was now going to the other extreme and demanding that some new thought, some new plan, some new leader, bring France out of the morass. From the Socialists there split off a Neo-Socialist group that wanted to combine the vigor and ruthlessness of the Communists with the national loyalty of the Socialists. André Tardieu left Parliament and went on a one-man crusade for "revision" of the constitution, that perennial cry in crisis. The tiny but vocal Royalist minority, led by the editor Charles Maurras and his paper, *Action Française*, began to be listened to; the Royalist rioting organization, the King's Servitors, that much resembled Déroulède's League of Patriots, began to grow. So did many youth movements. The man in the street was losing faith in democracy, and might become a mob, believing in a dictator or serving as a pretext for one.

In France, as elsewhere, the depression was bringing Fascism nearer. Standard economic ideas of tightening one's belt, paying as one went, and staying on the gold standard were being given up by many who wanted "re-flation," various forms of bringing potential production of wealth into

the present by monetary or organizational changes or both. One man, Paul Reynaud, got disliked by both sides by suggesting going off gold but keeping to the old economics. Even the Radical party was infected by such thinking, and at its annual congresses drafted plans for a new organization of France which it did not introduce into Parliament. The Cartel victory of 1932 had pushed to one side men such as Marin, Laval, Tardieu, Reynaud, leaving the Radicals to meet the new problems; now the Radicals, by their inaction and their petty political ways, were discrediting themselves at a time when the discrediting of all of Parliament might be dangerous to democracy.

This feeling came to focus over the pawnbroker Stavisky, just as an earlier feeling had come to a focus over the Jewish artillery officer Dreyfus. Stavisky had dabbled in Bordeaux municipal bonds, and had had his own stock issue given Government certification. But his issue had not deserved this; his methods of obtaining it had been shady, and so had his relations with the police, there having been one alias in his past. He was arrested, disappeared after arrest, and when searched for was found shot to death. Whether this was suicide or a murder by the police was hotly debated, as was the probity of the Minister of Justice, who had to resign, of the Chautemps Cabinet, which had to follow its Minister of Justice out of office, and of all Parliament. All this ferment went on during December 1933 and January 1934, and was reminiscent of the ferment in the days of Boulanger.

The man who had to deal with this in February 1934 was Édouard Daladier. He was a former schoolmaster of whom history may say that he always knew the right lesson of history to apply, but somehow he just failed to apply it; that he was always on the right spot, talking of doing the right thing. This time he behaved much as had Waldeck-Rousseau thirty-five years before, in the face of a threatened revolt, but not as well. He did replace the Prefect of Police, but not with a firm hand. Instead, he tried to kick him up-

stairs to the Residency General at Fez, and squabbled with him over the telephone about a preposition, whether he had threatened to go "into the streets" to raise a mob, or had mourned being "in the streets" and out of a job. Similarly, in firing the Chief of the Secret Police, Daladier made him head of the Comédie Française. Such a government seemed to afford an example of the lack of leadership of which there was so much complaint.

Such a government, however, did obtain a vote of confidence in Parliament, 360 to 220. The trust of the people was another matter, at least, the trust of the people of Paris. On February 6, 1934, there was a veterans' parade. The riots that had been increasing during the past two months broke out worse than ever. The King's Servitors, especially, went into action to prove that they were not boasters, as many had charged, but would fight the police as the Socialists and Communists would. They tried to storm the Concorde Bridge, and cross the Seine to the Palace Bourbon, to "drive the thieves away." All sorts and conditions of people, just as on the Fourth of September, joined in, in this case not to upset an unpopular Empire but to purify Parliament life by un-Parliamentary means. The newly installed Prefect of Police had his hands so full that he had to call on the Republican Guard, cock-feather hats and all, to protect Parliament from the mob. Late in the evening the veterans marched right through all the tumult with perfect discipline. That only postponed the rioting for a moment; the brawlers returned to their attack immediately afterward. One particular group, the Croix de Feu, marched up and down in back of the Palace Bourbon, as if to hint that it could have broken in had it wanted to. All this time deputies melted out of the back doors of the Palace Bourbon as if it had been the Fourth of September all over again. Only at midnight were the brawlers tired enough for the new Prefect of Police to be able to push them away from the Concorde Bridge by a charge of mounted men. Such was the famous Sixth of February, which at once took its place with the

Fourth of September and the Sixteenth of May in the history of the Third Republic, almost with the Fourteenth of July and the Second of December in the history of France.

Like those days, it had results. The next morning the Daladier Government found that its Parliamentary vote of confidence had done it no good; for Police, Republican Guard, and Army—none of them wanted to face another such day, and the crowds were gathering. Daladier resigned, and the mob had defeated Parliament, dismissing a President of the Council Parliament had supported. In a sense, the mob also appointed the new President of the Council, Gaston Doumergue, the ex-President of the Republic, who was called out of his retirement in his country house of Tournefeuille near Toulouse. Of the three living ex-Presidents he alone was not hopelessly ill, like Poincaré, nor hopelessly discredited, like Millerand. He announced that the needed cleaning-up of Parliamentary life would be done by a National Ministry, such as Poincaré had made in 1926. Such a one he made, including in it the Radicals Herriot and Daladier, Louis Marin, Louis Barthou, Pierre Laval, and Marshal Pétain. But in one important point Doumergue's Government differed from Poincaré's. Poincaré had belonged to Parliament, being a senator; Doumergue was the first non-Parliamentary President of the Council since General Rochebouet and MacMahon's attempt to assert a will independent of Parliament. Doumergue, like Thiers, could threaten to resign and bring France to heel; his remarks about going back to Tournefeuille kept Parliament in subjection from the fear of another Sixth of February.

To Socialists and Communists, accustomed to monopolize mob action, this successful countermob of the Right seemed to demand an answer. In the tradition by which the Royalist mob at the Auteuil races in 1899 had been met by the Socialist mob of the Longchamps races, with the resultant founding of the great Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry, they tried to meet the Royalist-led mob of the sixth of February with one of their own on the thirteenth. This did unite the parties

that had split at the Congress of Tours, but it did not disturb Doumergue's hold on power. On the contrary, it cemented it the more. Doumergue suppressed the riots in a way Daladier had not, and went to work to tell Parliament what to do.

He took the power of the purse away, getting a vote of expenditures through and leaving to Parliament the levying of taxes later. He took the power of legislation away, securing the right to issue decree laws. Like Thiers, he pressed his will against that of Parliament and won. France had a strong government, though not a government strong in Parliament, like those of Ferry, Méline, Waldeck-Rousseau, Clemenceau, and Poincaré; but strong outside of Parliament. Being a strong government, it could have a strong foreign policy. This was the year of the Blood Purge and the seizure of absolute power by Hitler. Clear-sighted old Louis Barthou saw what others would not see—that Germany had stopped being a democratic nation whose friendship could be won; that she was rearming; and that, rearmed, she might crush the client states one by one. He made a circuit of eastern Europe, talking with the Poles, the Czechs, the Rumanians, the Yugo-Slavs, breathing new life into the treaties that were designed to hold Germany in check. The achievements of Doumergue and Barthou put France once more at the headship of Europe.

What Barthou might have gone on to do will never be known. King Alexander of Yugoslavia returned Barthou's visit—and was shot in Marseilles, Barthou dying too because a spouting artery wound was neglected. In his place was put Pierre Laval, who had other ideas. And a week after Barthou died, Doumergue fell, his support in the Nation having gone. What had held Doumergue in power had been the contrast between the discipline of the veterans who had marched through the riot of the Sixth of February and the indiscipline of the deputies who had faded out of the back doors of the Palace Bourbon. That contrast now appeared in a new light. At first, "Victory had brought

in its prisoners," and many veterans had joined the Croix de Feu, who had so demonstrated their strength and their self-restraint on that day. The Croix de Feu, "Those Who Had Been Under Fire," had in their leader, Colonel de la Rocque, a man whose simplicity and soldierlike qualities had the same attraction as had Déroulède's, even if De la Rocque had no eloquence. They held orderly meetings that held off attack by Communists, but rarely did they counter-attack, as did Hitler's Brownshirts. De la Rocque, who forewent his title of Marquis, unlike his Royalist brother, the Count, seemed only to want to give the support of the altruism and devotion that seemed to inspire his followers, to any who would rule France well. He seemed not a Hitler who would overthrow a Republic, but a Déroulède who wanted to breathe new life into it.

But as the summer went on suspicion grew. Doumergue had used the radio to explain the crisis France was in to the Nation, speaking directly to the people over the heads of Parliament. He began to suggest, not new laws for Parliament to enact, but a change in Parliament. De la Rocque drew nearer to him, seeming to want, not spiritual revival, but actual power. Indeed, one day when Doumergue was addressing a crowd from a balcony, De la Rocque was seen in the room behind. Then Doumergue, who had already had his expenditures voted him, was heard to say that MacMahon's one mistake was not to have taken that precaution. In his next broadcast Doumergue then suggested that the President of the Council be given the power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, without recourse to a vote in the Senate. That was too much; it was asking for snap elections to hold a government in power, such an election as had taken place in Germany. By that time, too, the Nation had become a little tired of Doumergue's speeches and references to his home at Tournefeuille. The Radicals withdrew from his Cabinet, and he went home to Tournefeuille.

In his place was Flandin, the head of the Democratic

Alliance. A curious phenomenon was taking place—a phenomenon which had taken place before was to do so again: Parliament, as in 1926, was diverging from the Nation that had elected it. Power was going into the hands of men who had been repudiated in the election, but not this time with the approbation of the Nation. After the imposed rule of Doumergue, Parliament was in power again, but uneasy about it. It was a time of making up of minds, whether to stick to old economic policies or listen to new ones. There was talk of “re-flation,” of so adjusting currency that prosperity would return. Against the pressure for that was an outside pressure for sticking to the old ways. The Bank of France, under Poincaré’s reforms of 1926, had been changed from an automatic currency-issuing body to the guardian of the exchange rate. It was impossible to keep a budget near balance unless the Government’s credit at the Bank was good; and the Bank saw as its duty telling the Minister of Finance what to do, and, if need be, making him do it by refusing a loan. The Bank took the same political position the Army had had before André’s reforms. The Army used, feeling itself in duty bound to protect France, to tell Parliament it knew best, and thus dictated through the Nation’s representatives to the Nation, to Parliament’s disgust. Now the Bank, also in duty bound to protect France, dictated to the Nation’s representatives, and disgusted them.

To the Socialists and the Communists, this seemed natural. Already in July they had continued their co-operation, that had begun in February, by a parade to the Wall of the Federals, in the Père Lachaise Cemetery, where the last fighters of the Commune lay buried, this occurring on July 14, when the Government and De la Rocque were celebrating the national holiday on the Champs Élysée. But to succeed, the Socialists must find other allies against the “Wall of Silver,” by which, as they saw it, the rich, in the person of the Bank of France, foiled the desires of the Nation. And if they were not joined to the Radicals in economic policy, for the Radicals were still supporting Flandin

and his pale copy of Poincaré's policy, yet they were joined to the Radicals in hatred of what the Sixth of February stood for. On the Sixth of February, 1935, in one Popular Front, Communists, Socialists, and Radicals jointly demonstrated against what had happened a year before. With this curious division in Parliament and Nation, the Radicals siding with the Socialists and Communists on the questions of personal and constitutional liberty, with the Flandin Government on economic questions, Flandin stayed in power, neither fully trusted nor fully checked. In uncertainty of mind over the new problems of an industrialized nation, France and her representatives were weak of will. Yet it was a time to be strong. Dwindling population, especially among those of military age, was weakening France's man power. A sign of the times abroad was the overwhelming vote in the Saar Plebiscite, January 18, 1935, to join Germany, despite Hitler's persecutions and threats. The one year's military service, so blithely voted in 1932, had that April to be extended to eighteen months for those entering the Army in 1935, for two years for those entering the Army for the next four years. Supposedly this was an answer to the rise of German power, but the German answer was swift: to give up the pretense of restricting her army to 100,000, as the Versailles Treaty ordered, and to reintroduce conscription, as that treaty forbade. At this time, Belgium, till then an integral part of the French defense system, under treaties of 1919, resumed her traditional neutrality. This forced the French to give up hopes of using the Belgian forts on the German frontier and plan to extend the Maginot Line in behind Belgium, in case of a German attack. Uncertainty in face of a rising Germany was costing France man power and military position.

By the end of May a new financial crisis faced France, which Parliament would not face. Flandin asked for decree-law powers over the summer vacation, and was refused them. The President of the Chamber being the obvious man to form a neutral Ministry of all parties, Buisson

made one, with Caillaux as Minister of Finance, to ask such powers. Possibly because of Caillaux's presence in the Ministry, it fell at its first meeting with the Chamber. Then Laval, the Foreign Minister, took office, and got decree powers. He, no longer a dangerous young Socialist but rich by marriage and a senator, was prodigal of his decree-law powers, pouring out 549 of them, paring here, saving there, loosening at that place. And still the Nation was divided. Again there were two processions on Bastille Day—the Government one and the Popular Front one—and this time the Radicals, including Daladier, went to the Wall of the Federals with the Socialists and the Communists. Mobs took to organizing—the Croix de Feu, the Communists, and, to make confusion worse, Jacques Doriot, an ex-Communist, formed his own mob, independent of both sides, claiming he alone could save France. But the Radicals who sympathized with the Socialists and Communists would not yet put Laval out of office. Even when Parliament met that autumn, Laval stayed in.

Two special problems faced Laval. One was that Mussolini, who had prevented Hitler from seizing Austria at the time of the murder of Dollfuss, now wanted payment, and announced that Abyssinia needed to be civilized. The Axis was being born. There was a Popular Front outcry to use the powers of "sanctions" of the League of Nations to bring Mussolini to heel by a boycott. In England, where a Conservative government had been returned to power after a "peace ballot," there was equal pressure for "sanctions." But privately Laval and Sir Samuel Hoare told Mussolini to go ahead and take most of what he wanted, if only he took it nicely. The news of the offer came out, and drove Sir Samuel from office and weakened Laval. Then, as will be remembered, "sanctions" were not enforced, and Mussolini got all he wanted and did not take it nicely, amid much blame of international munitions makers.

In the meantime Parliament pulled itself together. A committee forced upon Laval a bill disarming private or-

ganizations at the order of the Minister of the Interior. This passed in a sudden whirl of emotion, for Ybarnégaray, that same Ybarnégaray who had stopped the Nivelles offensive and so saved men's lives, now, as the Parliamentary spokesman for De la Rocque, put the bill through and saved more Frenchmen's lives. At last, too, the Radicals made up their minds, and by leaving Laval's Cabinet forced him out of office. The new President of the Council, Albert Sarraut, was a Radical again.

At this moment French diplomacy acted again. A client state to the east being needed, and international but Russian-based Communism being then, with the formation of the Popular Front in France and in Spain against Fascism, a defensive alliance was signed with her. Almost before the ink was dry on it its efficacy was called in question, for the Germans re-occupied the supposedly demilitarized Rhineland the French had evacuated in 1930. Now was the moment for France's increased Army to strike from the strong Maginot Line into defenseless Germany. Troops went into the Maginot Line, but did not strike. It is said that Poland offered to attack, too; it is said that the French General Staff thought the French private soldier would not fight. The truths of that are not known. It is certain that France let Germany militarize her Rhine frontier, the same frontier France had crossed in peacetime in 1923, just to get money. Those were proofs of a different Germany and a different France.

A very different France it was. By this time the Popular Front had worked out a program all three of its members could support. Édouard Herriot characterized it, quoting a sign he had once seen, as "Worker's Restaurant, Middle-Class Cooking." It was the program the Radical congresses had discussed, but had never put into legislation. The bill of fare was triple: the Defense of Liberty, the Defense of Peace, Economic Demands. The first two were merely going on with policies already discussed. De la Rocque was to be disarmed, and the purchase of papers to influence public

opinion brought into the open. The ideas expressed during the Italian crisis—that it was armament manufacturers who caused wars and the League of Nations that could stop them—would be tried out by nationalizing the manufacture of arms and trying to co-operate with the League. The Economic Demands were to use reflation in place of deflation. Instead of waiting for prosperity to bring higher wages and shorter hours for workingmen, the example of the American New Deal would be followed, and prosperity would be brought by giving higher wages and shorter hours. Farmers would share with laborers, for a Wheat Office would stabilize the price of grain. As the powers of the Bank of France would block this, the “Wall of Silver” would be melted by taking those powers away, and using similar powers to protect the new purchasing power to be created by higher wages and fixed prices of wheat. As all this was sure to be successful, the gold standard, for which France had suffered so much, would be maintained. On this last point the three parties did disagree, only the Communists holding out for it strongly, the Socialists wanting to “devalue,” the Radicals being uncertain.

With the arrival of an idea and a cause, a feeling of leadership and unity came, too. The Communists, in particular, waged a most effective electoral battle, claiming their cause was of a France “free, strong, and happy.” The feeling of unity went into the divided labor movement. The C.G.T. and the Communist C.G.T.U., which had split in 1920, like the Socialists and Communists, rejoined, to put the full force of the workers before the Popular Front. The enthusiasm, devotion, and drawing of people out of themselves for a cause in this election can only be compared, much as it would displease both sides, to the enthusiasm, devotion, and drawing out of oneself that characterized the Croix de Feu in its days of growth. Coming to a certainty of mind gave a new confidence to the French people, such as voted in the vote-pooling agreement for the Popular Front candidates. The Parliament that resulted

from this election was greatly changed. Now the Socialists, not the Radicals, were the largest party, and the Communists rose spectacularly from 26 to 72. So pleased were the Socialists with the Popular Front that they gave up their self-denying ordinance and let Léon Blum, their leader, at that moment most popular in revulsion from an attack on him by the King's Servitors, take office. He, as the head of the largest party, would be President of the Council, with the Radical, Camille Chautemps, its Vice-President, and Édouard Daladier, Minister of National Defense. The Cabinet, the largest in history, would be organized into sub-committees, with the President and Vice-President independent of the cares of administration, the President in special offices in the Hôtel Matignon. This was to be the most scientifically organized government France had ever had, even to having Mademoiselle Curie as under-secretary of science. And once again Édouard Herriot would preside over the debates of the Chamber.

However, not everyone was sure that the Radicals would swallow the bill of fare that had been laid out from their own recipes. In Parliament the Committee of the Popular Front that had won the election and directed the vote-pooling stayed on watch, giving the Communists, who still refused to take office, their share in the control of legislation. This was the device, it will be remembered, that in 1902 the Bloc of the Left used to keep Combes in order, and Rouvier after him. Out of Parliament even more important action was taken. The workers had heard Radical promises before, and wanted hostages for performance. They took them by taking in the factories themselves, in which, in the period between the election and the meeting of the new Parliament, the workers camped in a series of sit-down strikes. It was by negotiations with the new President of the Council, not by legislation, that the Matignon agreements, called after Blum's office, set up a wages-and-hours bill and a machinery for arbitration to enforce the scales decided upon. Forty hours a week, with a whole

holiday on Saturdays, called the "Week of two Sundays," gave the shorter hours, and were intended to reabsorb the unemployed; while higher wages and a fortnight's paid vacation prevented the individual worker from losing.

A supermob having dictated to Parliament in a way beyond the Sixth of February, and a watching committee having been set up, the Blum Government then turned to putting the Popular Front program into law. The "Wall of Silver" was melted by taking the choice of directors of the Bank of France from its stockholders, voting each share separately, and giving it to stockholders as individuals and the employees of the Bank. The manufacture of munitions was partially nationalized. A Wheat Office was set up. The pledges of the election were put into law in short time. But it was another matter to enforce them, for two obstacles came in the way. One was that the sister Popular Front in Spain, which had much the same program as the French one, but in addition was not only struggling with the Spanish Army and the Spanish Church, but also with the owners of big estates, was faced by a revolt. To that revolt came support from Fascist Italy and Fascist Germany; to the Spanish Popular Front came embarrassing support from Communist Russia. If the French Popular Front was to rely on international co-operation to straighten this out, the Foreign Minister, Delbos, was going to have a hard time; and if M. Auriol, the Finance Minister, was going to finance the Popular Front, he was going to have a hard time borrowing money from men who did not believe in his plans. Delbos worked out a plan in co-operation with the English, whereby England, France, Germany, and Italy prevented anyone not a Spaniard from fighting in Spain. This was called Non-Intervention, and succeeded only in preventing aid to the Spanish Popular Front, but not in keeping German and Italian "volunteers" from fighting for General Franco, the leader of the Spanish Rebellion. Auriol tried means of exchange control to prevent capital from leaving France,

as it had in 1925 and 1926, but failed; and had, that October, to devalue the franc.

The Senate, not elected in the Popular Front wave of enthusiasm, was suspicious, but gave in, even to giving Blum decree-law powers over the summer vacation. Gradually the administrative difficulties of the Popular Front clogged its support. For a moment, when a plot of "the Hooded Ones" to seize power was discovered, reminding France of the dangers at home of Fascism, the Popular Front revived. But when Auriol admitted that the increased revenue from the expected boom had not come, and that to make the budget balance he must devalue once more, the Senate took stock of whether Jouhaux of the C.G.T. would call a general strike, or whether the Senate could come to life. It took four separate meetings of the Senate in one day for Caillaux to screw up the courage of his colleagues; but he succeeded, and after twelve months and a few days of rule Léon Blum left office as President of the Council, to take it as Vice-President under his former Vice-President, Camille Chautemps. Auriol, the Finance Minister, went into outer darkness, to be replaced by the Ambassador to the United States, Georges Bonnet, a man from outside the Popular Front, yet one who had sided with the Cartel in 1925, under Painlevé. If the Socialists could not guide the Popular Front program to success, perhaps the Radicals could, if they took in a professional financier. Bonnet got decree-law powers, and did devalue; but, though the C.G.T. called no general strike, many particular ones were called—in the Marseilles docks, the textile industry, the Paris electric light. In Spain, General Franco could fight and had brave and trained supporters; the Spanish Popular Front had bravery but no training. Air superiority and tanks were cutting through the man power of Republican Spain.

When, under the Constitution, Parliament met the second Tuesday in January, 1938, Chautemps appeared at the Tribune to make his ministerial declaration. He told the Cham-

ber that he made his speech unprepared, saying what he felt. Those feelings were clear: that the strikes were the fault of his Communist supporters. Then he left the Tribune. After him, no one spoke. The members of the Right had nothing to say; they hoped the Popular Front was breaking up and did not want to revive it by an attack. And, as the Popular Front was breaking up, it took from half-past six in the afternoon till four in the morning, with repeated adjournments, even to agree to disagree. Attempts to make a National Ministry failed, even with a slogan, Blum to Reynaud, and Chautemps took office without any Socialists in his Cabinet, but with the fiction that the Popular Front had not been voted out of existence. This Ministry lasted a month, a very critical month. In Austria Hitler suddenly struck. He ordered the appointment of a Nazi as Minister of Interior, and when Schussnigg, the Austrian Chancellor, called for a plebiscite to restore his authority, marched on Austria. The attack was perfectly timed. The march was on March 12, and on the eighth, unable to go on, yet not wanting to be voted out, Chautemps had walked out of the Chamber of Deputies as a gesture of voluntary resignation. By the time, March 13, that Blum had formed a last Popular Front Cabinet, Austria was Hitler's. A month of makeshifts saw the end of Blum's last government, that fell before the Senate when it tried to get decree-law powers. In that month already Hitler had begun to discover injustices in the German-populated regions of Czechoslovakia, now that by the conquest of Austria he had outflanked it. The Czechs took a firm stand, encouraged by England and France.

In place of Blum, Daladier took office. He had been in the Government steadily, as Minister of National Defense, and yet apart, as concerned with a national problem. His Cabinet held Bonnet, not as Minister of Finance—Marchandeau was that—but as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and, as Keeper of the Seals, Paul Reynaud, the constant critic of all that had gone on since 1932. Even though Chautemps was Vice-President of the Council, this taking in of Rey-

naud meant the end of the Popular Front, both of its enthusiasm and of its program. Daladier was given decree-law powers, another of the confessions of Parliament that it could not reach a conclusion, and Parliament went home. Then a strange summer was spent. The Germans built forts, the Siegfried Line, along the Rhine, to match the Maginot Line and prevent invasion; they built airplanes and tanks night and day, and harrassed the Czechs. Frenchmen continued to enjoy the "Week of Two Sundays," and took their August paid vacations so thoroughly that from the first to the twenty-fifth of that month no airplanes were delivered. Even with decree-law powers, Daladier did not act. The English declared their determination to stand by France by sending their King and Queen to visit France, and be met by a Bastille Day celebration that showed France's Army, not her affection for the Commune. They also tried to find out who was in the right in Czechoslovakia, sending Lord Runciman to mediate between the Czechs and their German subjects, which turned into mediation between the Czechs and Hitler.

The climax of that summer was Munich. The whole world knows the story of Hitler's ultimatum, of its acceptance by Czechoslovakia after two airplane flights by Chamberlain, of the second ultimatum that was answered by the mobilization of the British Fleet and the French Army, and not only Chamberlain but also Mussolini and Daladier taking to the air. The result, at the time, was thought by many to give peace and justice, even if it stripped the Czechs of their forts and laid them open to German invasion. At least certain injustices of the Treaty of Versailles had been remedied, and if they were a cause of war, war was to that extent made less likely. At the cost of having the English urge an ally of France's to give in, France had peace and could turn home.

Turn home France needed to. The Popular Front had not done what it had been hoped it would do; it had not made France free, strong, and happy. To make France strong a

new policy was needed. The Popular Front had failed, just as Doumergue had. France seemed bankrupt of ideas, and without ideas no government can live. One man, one set of ideas alone remained—Paul Reynaud and his idea of going back to old economic ways with a new monetary basis. To do that meant striking at the great force that had pushed on the Popular Front, the workingmen as organized in the C.G.T. Only by decree-law powers could anything be done. Daladier had those powers till the end of November, granted him in a short session of Parliament in October. Dared he give Reynaud control?

In the first week of November Daladier took the plunge. He made Marchandeu Keeper of the Seals, Reynaud Finance Minister; and on November 12 the *Journal Officiel* came out with a great report by Reynaud explaining his new policy and his decree laws. The report pointed out that more than half the national income, 137 billion francs out of an estimated 250 billion, was going into Government expenditure; that this must stop; that the cure for the monetary crisis, since money is the means of exchange, was to produce more in order to have more to exchange, and that what was needed was no more forty-hour-week maximum of production, and no more exchange control. But this was not a negative policy, like so many retrenchment policies of the past. The Matignon Agreements would remain, affording means for labor to be protected, and would give overtime for work beyond forty hours, while drastic devaluation would end the overvaluation of the franc that had made exchange control necessary.

This was answered, on November 30, by a one-day general strike. It was always possible to end a general strike in France by calling out the strikers as reserves, and after such mobilization ordering them to do their work, or face the military courts. This either ended the strike or the Government that mobilized, depending on public opinion, whether the orders were obeyed or the strikers mutinied beyond control. Reynaud was right; it ended the strike. After six

years of hesitation and uncertainty and two false starts with their moments of certainty, Doumergue and the Popular Front, France had found a way to make her industrial life go on. It had been a great strain on the democratic process, and on the Nation that had undergone those years of education by trial and error. There was much to be remedied, many bleeding wounds to be bound up, much hard feeling to assuage. But when Parliament met and voted confidence in what the Government had done, it registered a feeling in the Nation that a turning point had been passed. In so far as Reynaud's policy should prove successful the political structure that had given him the chance to gain final acceptance for his ideas justified itself. In so far as the situation was not met, the political structure of France had not justified itself. On the first of December, 1938, with the end of the general strike, France moved on to what proved to be the final test of French democracy.



Chapter Twenty-one

THE FINAL TEST OF FRENCH DEMOCRACY

PROBABLY IT will be hard for historians of the future to realize how Munich and the settling of the general strike seemed turning points toward peace and a better France, for in retrospect faith in Munich looks so foolish. But with the threat of war with Germany replaced by a treaty of amity, all other foreign problems seemed soluble. At Christmas a "spontaneous demonstration" by Italian students was treated with contempt. The problem of Spain was faced squarely by realizing that Franco would win, and sending the universally respected old Marshal Pétain as ambassador to him, on March 2, 1939—an act that was to have far-reaching results. And, however false was the satisfaction with the foreign situation, the pride in the way Paul Reynaud had restored France was justified. The *London Economist* published figures showing that he had done more than Poincaré had in 1926, in less time. The upturn in national life was reflected by an upturn in Parliamentary life. French democracy seemed to have come to itself again, through the breathing spell of Munich. It looked as if M. Reynaud might fulfill his promise of complete recovery by 1942, and France would then be "free, strong, and happy."

From this short dream there was a rude awakening. After a sudden artificial crisis, on March 18 German troops marched into Czechoslovakia. At once Parliament surrendered responsibility again, giving decree-law powers to

Daladier. The shock was confirmed by the Italian invasion of Albania on Good Friday. These two blows showed that war was inevitable, and forced France and England to realize where they stood. Compared to Germany and Italy, they had neither the trained men, the equipment, nor the airplanes they once had. Their assets were a supposedly impregnable line of forts and a great navy. They could not strike, but they could blockade and prepare to strike by bridging the gap between them and the dictatorships.

At home, as far as producing missing equipment went, Reynaud's liberating measures were still having effect, despite the slowing rate of improvement caused by the international situation. On April 21, 1939, M. Reynaud issued a new set of decrees, returning to such restrictive devices as exchange control and allocation of raw materials with priorities for armaments, including control over imports; but now that these things were done for defense—not, as with the Popular Front, to reconstruct society—they were readily accepted. If, as against Germany's enormous war production, France was still losing ground, at least she was losing less fast, and might hope soon to hold her place by transferring to purposes of defense all the new production, all the new national income, that had been acquired by the liberating measures of November 1938. Reynaud still was sure free enterprise was the best means for getting things made, but he had no intention of taking risks with misdirection of production for what seemed an inevitable war. With increased production at home and help from abroad, the gap might be bridged; and all eyes were turned on the struggle to get ready, so much so that the re-election of Albert Lebrun as President of the Republic went almost unnoticed. After all, the office no longer meant even what it had in the days of Poincaré and Millerand.

The summer of 1939 consisted of a scrabble to find in a few weeks the aid it had taken France many years to find between 1870 and 1914. The details of that scrabble have not yet been completely revealed, but its main outlines are

painfully clear. Three obstacles had to be surmounted: a belief that France and especially England would not fight; a distrust, usually justified, on the part of each possible ally of almost every other possible ally; and a dread of the new "total war," with which the Germans threatened their enemies. Only one of these obstacles was overcome: the belief that England would not fight. That was done by having England offer protection if Germany attacked, without any return whatsoever. But even such an offer was accepted only by Poland, the most threatened state, Greece, and Rumania. Russia, the former ally of France, bargained hard, and wanted such promises of a free hand with the Baltic states as would lose the support of every other small state in Europe, and especially of Poland, who hated and feared Russia almost as much as she hated and feared Germany. To gain such support in the east, an Anglo-French army was built up in Syria, under General Weygand, and eventually Turkey was brought into the fragile alliance system. Most states clung to a precarious neutrality, hoping that strictness in not defending oneself would prevent attack. Even Italy clung to a variant of this, "nonbelligerency."

The pretext of the inevitable war was the status of the Free City of Danzig, in which Poland had rights; but even before the Germans had fully developed their complaints they and the Russians had signed a "nonaggression pact" that fully justified the Poles' fears of the Russians, and of the meaning of which there could be no doubt. Then the war broke out. Its manner of breaking mattered for the building up of morale in the democracies, at the time, and there was diplomatic maneuvering that delayed Polish mobilization, but that vanished into limbo with the unleashing of the new "total war," of which so much had been heard. That was to add a new word, *Blitzkrieg*, to the English language, and to be the most important thing in the remaining history of the Third Republic.

When analyzed, the total war was nothing new, merely the logical development of the tactics and strategy of the

previous war that had been based on the new weapons created by industrialization. In strategy the Blitzkrieg went back to Hannibal and the Battle of Cannae, being the pincers tactics that von Schlieffen had taught: of striking at two flanks at once and encircling the stricken enemy. In tactics it was more recent, being von Hutier's infiltration, striking deep into the enemy defense line, surrounding his strong points, and cutting his communications, instead of trying to shatter him by frontal blows. In weapons it was hardly new either, the important ones being the airplanes and tanks which had won the previous war for the Allies, and applied much as the Allies had applied them. Gunning troops from the air was a method of Allenby's in Palestine; pushing tanks ahead was Byng's device at Cambrai—spies, it is true, not soldiers, had been dropped by parachutes behind the lines—railways had been bombed. Defeatism and treason had brought Austria down. Dive bombing alone might be considered new. But such thoughts as this did nothing to assuage the Polish victims of the Blitzkrieg. What was new, and terrible, was the intensity with which these tactical weapons were used. Hosts of dive bombers to blast open the way, dropping not a spy, but companies of men by parachute, to be followed by airplane-loads as soon as a landing field had been captured; the surprise of being so cut off without notice—all these, added to an intensification of the known horrors of heavy artillery bombardment and heavy tank attacks, made the new war of 1939 far worse than the old one of 1918. Defeatism and treason embittered the Polish defeat. Poland, which was still so unindustrialized as to rely on cavalry as a fighting arm, sank at once under this assault. Warsaw, whose building gave some protection from tanks and bombings, held out for a few days. The rest of Poland fell to the Germans and the Russians, who came in at the last moment in little more than a fortnight. By the end of September France and England found themselves without an eastern ally and reduced to a war of blockade, the same sort of war they had had to fight in 1917.

But if the eastern war was a bitter parody of 1917, events in France seemed a somewhat better parody. There was none of the gay dashing to war of 1914, but the stern measures of 1917 were repeated. A state of siege was immediately proclaimed all over France, and the Communist members of the Chamber were forced to take an iron-clad oath or lose their seats, there being none of the hesitation that spared Pierre Laval in 1914, but rather the firmness that met Cailiaux in 1917. Censorship was strong, military trials were swift. As international Communism, with its headquarters in Russia, seemed an agent of the Germans, Communist mayors were driven from office in a way reminiscent of Thiers and De Broglie, even before most of the 72 Communist deputies were driven from Parliament and its privileges. The machinery of command of 1917 was brought back and improved on. To Painlevé's Supreme War Council of the Premiers of both nations and their High Command and to the unification of command on land, under Général Gamelin, who had been the trusted Chief of Staff for five years, and unified command at sea, under the English Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, was added an inter-Parliamentary Committee that combined the efforts of the English and French Parliaments. In London, under the chairmanship of a Frenchman, Jean Monet, was set up a Supreme Economic Council, to unify war effort even more than had the Transportation Board of the last war. Purchases abroad were again unified. These were actions of a France that knew how to fight a war of blockade, and was determined to save man power, save money, and let the besieged Germans face starvation.

One sign, however, pointed to something wrong in France—that was the composition of the Cabinet. Neither Blum nor Marin would join the narrow Daladier Cabinet of Radicals plus Bonnet and Reynaud; there was no Cabinet of National Union. But the narrow Daladier Cabinet was not like that with which Clemenceau fought opposition in public and by his speeches beat down defeatism; it was a silent,

uncriticized Cabinet that had the faults both of the uncriticized "Sacred Union" Cabinets and of Clemenceau's unrepresentative Cabinet, and kept on with the bitternesses of the collapse of the Popular Front that had better been forgotten. Doubts of whether Daladier was fighting hard enough mingled with doubts of whether the war was worth fighting at all during that quiet winter of watching across the Rhine from the Maginot Line to the Siegfried Line, and waiting on the Italian border to see if Mussolini's non-belligerency meant anything.

After the fall of Poland, which was officially discounted because of the bad state of Polish preparations, the war seemed one of siege rather than movement, of blockade rather than siege. The forts of the Maginot Line faced the forts of the Siegfried Line. There was some shelling, but there was also talking across the Rhine by loud-speakers to propagandize the troops of the other side, so little fighting was done, alarms of German offensives proving false. To the north of that line of little fighting were neutral Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland, theoretically ready to resist aggression; to the south was neutral Switzerland, also prepared. Elsewhere, to the south through impoverished "nonbelligerent" Italy; to the southeast through the Balkans, which had never been rich, back of which lay the ally Turkey and the Army of Syria, 500,000 men under Weygand; to the east through ravaged Poland to impecunious Russia; to the north, to Scandinavia that must get its goods through the watchful eyes of British sea power, Germany, though not at war, seemed effectively blockaded. Either Germany must starve or break out, or the war must take a new form.

One French officer saw this, a man like Nivelle and Pétain in the last war in being a senior colonel on the verge of promotion, Charles de Gaulle, whose book on mechanized warfare had served as a guide to the Germans in Poland. On January 28, 1940, he was to submit a memorandum to his superiors prophesying how the war might change. But it was not the Allies but the Germans who would see war as he

saw it, and choose to bring a new form to the war. The first sign of this rubbed in the apparent connection between Russia and Germany. Russia took payment for her aid in Poland by occupying the four Baltic states whose freedom England and France had refused to sign away. The others gave in; Finland alone fought. That gallant struggle in the North will always remain an epic of free men doing their utmost. For three months Finland held off what was considered one of the world's greatest military powers, despite its use of total war, bombings of supply lines, parachute troops, heavy artillery. There was discussion of aid from England and France, but before it started Finland had to surrender.

This news, on March 11, brought the last flowering of French democracy. There had been a feeling that, though Daladier was going through the motions that history had shown to be correct, he was not going through them effectively. Communist propaganda was spreading too openly; the censorship was being too arbitrary. The fall of Finland brought criticism to a head. At Pierre Laval's demand, on March 13 the Senate went into secret session and came out the next day with a vote of praise for Finland and "confidence in the increasing energy of the Cabinet." On the nineteenth the Chamber stopped discussing the agricultural policy of the Government and went into its secret session. It came out the same day, to have 239 vote they believed the Government would act, and to have 283 present markedly abstain from voting, while one man voted no. At that blow Daladier resigned, and in a reshuffled Cabinet, noticeably without Bonnet, Reynaud became President of the Council.

Now the wartime chain of responsibility was at work. In public Reynaud fought for the life of his narrow Cabinet as Clemenceau had in his day, thus defending himself before the Nation and inspiriting it. Opposition he had, white-haired Louis Marin saying that the list of ministers in what should be a Cabinet of action was longer than the declaration of policy, that the Cabinet was no better than a blown-

up cream puff. But by 268 votes in its favor, as against a negative total of 156 opponents, including Blum and Marin, and 129 abstainers, Reynaud secured the right to stay in power over the Easter vacation and took it, with the warning that he must show ability or fall by the next session. If France had not a National Cabinet as yet, she had a President of the Council who was worthy of representing the Nation.

During that Easter vacation the Blitzkrieg came to the west. Suddenly, by airplane and treachery, Denmark and Norway were invaded, the German troops that followed the seizure of key points meeting with resistance only in the middle and north of Norway. The story of the campaign is confused, but at least the French share was creditable. French troops and French ships were dispatched to give the English aid. When Parliament met in its secret sessions after Easter, the Senate from April 16 to April 19, the Chamber on the sole day, April 19, Reynaud obtained a unanimous vote of confidence. France had at last given recognition, through the democratic process, to a leader.

But that was the last chance Parliament would have to guide policy and choose a Ministry. On May 10 the Blitzkrieg struck Holland and Belgium, again with treachery and parachute troops opening the way for infiltration that should honeycomb the defense lines. English and French troops were at once dispatched north to aid neutrals who had so clung to neutrality as to make no arrangements for sending for aid. For a moment the Dutch held behind their dykes, the Belgians on the Albert Canal. At the neutrals' appeal for help a combined Franco-British force entered the Low Countries, and in default of holding the frontier, which had been breached by parachute troops and tanks, tried to hold the line of the Meuse, for which reason this encounter was first called the Battle of the Meuse. Holland had succumbed to terrific aerial bombardment, the Queen fleeing to England. In this battle the machine of loyalty to Hitler, brains of a skilled General Staff, and trained man power of con-

scripts and Reichswehr combined swept over France just as had in 1870 the machine of loyalty to William I, brains of von Moltke, and man power raised by von Roon. The German commander, von Reichenau, proved that, like von Moltke at Sedan, he knew how to take a wise risk. A tremendous assault by armored troops was hurled at the junction of the new line of the Meuse and the Maginot Line, coming by surprise through the Ardennes, which General Gamelin had stripped of troops to aid Belgium, and striking at the ill-omened town of Sedan. The faith of those who believed in the Maginot Line was shaken, for the armored troops broke through, smashed General Corap's Ninth Army into rout, and dashed up the Meuse and down the Somme to the Channel.

On May 16 Reynaud told the Chamber that Hitler was risking all to win or lose in two months, and that France must try her utmost. This was a sign that the time for action for Parliament was over. France had chosen her President of the Council, given him what she could; now it was to be seen if the man who had found an answer for the problems of industrialized peace could find an answer for the problems of industrialized war, and hold the Germans off for those two months. Three days later the Council of Ministers was broadened at last, Marshal Pétain coming back from Spain, where he had been making friends with General Franco, to supplant Camille Chautemps as Vice-President of the Council. The task of holding out those two months depended on how wisely von Reichenau was taking his risk.

For, pouring through the gap made by Second Sedan, armored troops rushed to the coast, then turned north along it to Boulogne and Calais. This took the chance that the bottleneck between Lille and Rethel would not be cut, choking off the flow of supplies and gasoline on which the armored spearhead depended. To save France now a miracle was needed, for her industrial North was being shattered, and refugees were clogging the roads to the utter dislocation of military transport. Though there was good equipment as

in 1870, as in 1870 there was not enough of it, nor enough men to use it. As in 1870, too, the trained men were immobilized in a fortress, this time not Metz alone but the whole Maginot Line, of which Metz was a part. If a miracle could be done, a miracle worker was needed, and, remembering Foch's way out of difficulties, "Send for Maxime," Reynaud sent for Weygand, the seventy-three-year-old commander in Syria, to cut that bottleneck. But it was not to be done. In Belgium the king surrendered his army, leaving the British alone, and General Prioux's Twentieth Corps, to resist that great feat of infiltration, the sending of an armored spearhead of tanks from Sedan to the Channel, doing what Ludendorff had dreamed of—cutting the English and the French apart. Then, as all know, the spearhead went up the Channel, to cut off the re-embarkation of the British and such French and Belgians as were still with them.

The epic of Dunkirk, how the British and some French got back to England, is only indirectly a part of the story of French democracy. It showed that some French, for all the tales of defeatism and treachery, had valor. The brave men in Lille who first tried to cut off the German spearhead, then, cut off themselves, fought their way out to Dunkirk to cover the English retreat—a retreat not all could share in—will bear comparison with any valiant men in history. Dunkirk, too, showed in the way the Royal Air Force, equal in quality to the Germans if not in numbers, covered the British, what France so pitiably lacked in her air force. But for French democracy Dunkirk meant a final breathing spell. Could Reynaud, now with a Cabinet of National Union, from which Daladier had been excluded, in which Laval sat, save the day?

As all know, he could not. The fog of war covers and will cover for some time the events. Again there were tales of weakness and tales of heroism. Bridges were not blown up, supplies did not come, treachery and defeatism played into each other's hands. Yet there was bravery, too. The "Wey-

gand Line," the extemporized defenses along the Somme, were held as best they might be when the pincers struck again, on each side of Paris. Reynaud spoke to Parliament the brave words Clemenceau spoke in June 1918, of how he would fight in Paris till it fell, then on every river of France till he was forced out of France, there to fight on. But then the decision of 1914 was repeated, and Paris was left open, the Government fleeing under a rain of bombs to Tours; then, bombed out of Tours, to Bordeaux. In two weeks it took the road Gambetta had taken in three months. Those weeks were weeks of collapse. No one can yet tell just what the English offers of union with France were, or why the last meeting between Reynaud and Churchill never took place. How Pétain replaced Reynaud is still a matter of dissension. For France was smashed as she had never been before. Defense of a flank that the Maginot Line proved to be, it was now not a Verdun at which to crush the Germans but a Metz in which to trap Frenchmen. It was held as long as possible, in the hopes that holding it would enable a pivot and counterattack, as had Sarrail's holding of Verdun. But the strength of France was not enough, and the only question was whether, as Mandel, Daladier, and Reynaud wanted, Frenchmen would leave France and fight on, or, as seemed best to Laval and Pétain, France would admit defeat. Defeat was admitted, and an attempt by General de Gaulle to carry on the fight with the troops in Morocco and Syria failed. France beyond the seas joined in the surrender, a surrender made more bitter by the last-moment intervention of the Italians.

At the moment of smashing, the machinery of French democracy was still functioning. The Presidents of the two Chambers, Jeanney and Herriot, came to the President of the Republic, Lebrun, and begged him to do as Reynaud had promised, go to Africa. And to Africa went a shipload of men, Daladier and Mandel among them, to prepare the way. But with those men away, the surrender followed the collapse. Reynaud turned over the powers of the presidency

of the Council to Pétain, and took the ambassadorship to America. On the road toward Lisbon his motor crashed, his arm was shattered, and the Countess Helen de Portés, who was with him, was killed. The men with the will to fight were dispersed; those with the will to surrender remained at the center of things, ready to seize power.

In Africa the last blow at the Republic was struck, for there, at Oran, were the main body of the French Fleet and Daladier. To Oran went two Englishmen, Alfred Duff Cooper and General the Viscount Gort, to beg the army in Morocco and the fleet to fight on. Their mission failed. To the last the schoolteacher had known the right lesson but failed to apply it. Daladier was held from the English, and when the English demanded the surrender of the French Fleet, lest it fall into German hands, it was denied them. Then, a bitterer blow even than surrendering to Italians, English ships sank their former allies in port. Of all the men with the will to fight, alone De Gaulle, the man who understood modern industrialized war, held out in London, but at the head not of a Republic, as Daladier might have been, but of an army and navy of "Free Frenchmen."

Many explanations of the Fall of France have been given. Besides plain treason it has been blamed on the Freemasons, whom the army officers hated; the army officers, whom the Freemasons hated; the employers; the workers; the politicians. In all these accusations there are kernels of truth; all had their share. Perhaps a later historian, in possession of all the facts, will be able to use illustrative detail. Perhaps he will recapitulate all he has to say about the mishandling of the Army, the suspicions of unjust treatment on the part of the army officers, the suspicions of disloyalty on the part of such men as are usually both politicians and Freemasons, by showing how Corap and the Ninth Army broke at Sedan. Perhaps he will recapitulate all he has to say about Parliamentary weakness by describing the hectic re-formations of the Reynaud Cabinet. Perhaps he will recapitulate all he has to say about the collapse of French industry in terms of the

last shattering German advance to the west of Paris. Perhaps he will recapitulate the strains of preaching the truth to a France that would not hear in terms of Paul Reynaud's last weeks of power, and the tales of his infatuation with the Countess Helen de Portés. But when the historian of the future does this, he will marshal proofs of what is already known: that France fell because of the tanks and airplanes that were made in Germany and not in France; that France was not ready for industrialized war and Germany was.

Till too late, France forgot the lesson Louis Loucheur had taught her: that modern war depends on equipment. Other lessons of the past she had forgotten, too. Perhaps it is not the fault of the rulers of the Third Republic that there was not enough man power, though they are often accused of indirectly discouraging breeding. The accusations against the Maginot Line seem unjust. In so far as it tempted France to do without allies, it was dangerous; in so far as it supplemented France's man power and gave her a chance for a second Verdun, it was wise. The failure to follow Barthou's line after his murder, and supplement Frenchmen who had not been born by Poles and Czechs who had, was a greater fault. Man power, too, could have been replaced by disarming German hatred, which was not done effectively enough. But all these faults pale behind the fact that in 1932 France had the better equipment, and let herself fall behind. The last days of democratic France, when all that was left to do was to ratify the inevitable, afford a sad confirmation of those words, "too late." Perhaps democratic France had found a solution to the problems of industrialization in Reynaud's decrees. If so, the democratic process partly justified itself. Perhaps not; but there one is dealing with the question of the advantages of the corporative state in an industrialized age, not with the history of French democracy.

For with the surrender, some of the fog of war disappears. Pétain told the world why he gave up. His speech from Clermont-Ferrand, that little hill town that for a few days

held all that was left of an organized French Government, was bitterly reminiscent of Thiers's of February 1871. But when Thiers spoke to the National Assembly he spoke of missing regiments; when Pétain spoke he spoke of missing divisions and missing allies. When Thiers spoke, he spoke to the representatives of the Nation, with hope in what they might do. When Pétain spoke, and spoke of spiritual ills as well as physical ones, he spoke of the need of a rejuvenation of France from an outside source. That denial of democracy did pay a tribute, a back-handed one, to French democracy, by suggesting that a bad nation had been truly represented by bad rulers; but the man who had rejuvenated the armies of France in 1917 evidently felt that what had been then possible under Parliamentary rule now needed a new form of government. What the Republic had had to face in May and June was far greater than what it had had to face in March 1918 when a German break-through threatened but was staved off; or in February 1871, when surrender was forced upon France. New measures seemed in order, and a breaking away from the past.

Pétain's first Council of Ministers exemplified this, containing mostly enemies of the Republic. It held men who stood for the France that had preceded the Republic. As France needed an attorney to represent her with Germany, she had accepted a Conservative one, the aged soldier all France should be able to trust, the man who, after the mutinies of 1917, had interviewed nearly every regiment in the Army to redress its wrongs and who had not relaxed discipline, and put him at her head, with Albert Lebrun for a time to countersign his orders, as under the still-existing Wallon Constitution he must. To his side he called, as Minister of the Family, that fine old Catholic gentleman, Ybarnégaray, who had prevented a second Nivelle Offensive in 1917, and who stood for the old France of the priest and the soldier, lineal successor of the men who had wanted to bring back the Count of Chambord. But to his side Pétain also called men who represented a newer France that the

Third Republic had not been able to cope with, not the lower middle classes of an unindustrialized France but the proletariat who lived among factories. Such were Adrian Marquet, the "neo-Socialist" Mayor of Bordeaux, and above all the squat, swart Auvergnat, Pierre Laval, men of the new large-scale industry, that may turn to Socialism and the workers' rule, or to a "corporative state," and the organization of life under industrial discipline. None of these men represented the fallen Republic, or cared for its ways of ruling.

Yet still they were bound by the letter of the Wallon Constitution, and would prefer to be loosed from it and freed to struggle among themselves whether to lead France back to trust the Army and the Church as she used to, or forward to a wave of the future. France was now, as far as those leaders went who had stayed in France, no longer in the mood of Gambetta, Clemenceau, and Mandel, for fighting to the end, but in the common-sense mood of Thiers and Caillaux, a common sense at times a close neighbor of defeatism, if not the same, and at the moment advised making the best of a bad job. So at Vichy was summoned the French Parliament, that had faded away at Paris, Tours, and Bordeaux before the Council of Ministers. There the forces of the Republic, the idealism of the Left and the organized workers, the independence of the Center and the petty bourgeoisie, the practicality of the Right and the rich, all met for the last time, to confess by their votes that they had left their allies in the lurch, had failed to prepare themselves till too late, and had fallen into the very pit they had dugged for others. It was not a palatable dose to swallow, as witnessed the gagings, excuses, and recriminations that poured out over the radio; but it had to be swallowed, to finish the surrender of France and end the Republic.

When at Vichy, in the Casino, was set up the last makeshift Parliament House of a Republic that had had many such, the Council of Ministers showed by the absence of its President that no longer was the Executive responsible to

Parliament. On the ninth of July, after Édouard Herriot, the last President of the Chamber of Deputies, had mounted the chair above the Tribune, this time not "the Capitol from which France is ruled," but a "Tarpeian Rock" from which the Republic would be flung, it was Pierre Laval who mounted the Tribune to move that all powers be given to the Marshal, as Head of the State, including that of re-writing the Wallon Constitution of 1875. This was so inevitable that only three votes were cast against acceptance. At the afternoon meeting of the Senate only one such vote was cast.

The next day both houses met to ratify, as a National Assembly, what they had separately agreed to do. By then almost all the great of the Republic were gathered there for its last hours. There was battered and bandaged Paul Reynaud, the man who had thought of ways out of France's dilemmas, and too late had been given power to give effect to them. In him, if anywhere, was the brain of a De Freycinet and a Loucheur, the heart of a Gambetta and a Clemenceau. He represented what ability French democracy had to find the right man in a crisis. There, too, was Léon Blum, the idealist whose well-meant conciliation had prevented France from either making arms in France or putting down her enemies in Spain when they still were weak. He represented the Popular Front, that wave of idealism that then seemed so wonderful, now seems so obstructive. He represented, too, the organized workers. There was Édouard Herriot, whose pipe and mustaches were so familiar in caricatures; the man whom the Chamber, the representative of France, had so often chosen to represent itself and thus France; the man whom Lyons, "the First City of the Republic," had so long chosen to be its mayor. He if any man represented the Republic that was falling. He had often headed the Radical party of Gambetta and Combes, which had been the central force in the Republic, which had fought so bravely in 1870, which had battled for Dreyfus and against the Church, which had been responsible for the

"Bourgeois Program" which the workingman's Popular Front had tried to enact. It was above all Herriot's France that was going down that day, the anti-clerical Jacobin France of the small businessman who ardently believed in free enterprise. Already the Jacobin slogan of *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, had been supplanted by *Labor, Family, Fatherland*. He symbolized what was going.

It was fitting, then, that he should lead its last sally. When Édouard Daladier, who represented the insufficient preparation of France, was accused of cowardice, Herriot sprang to his feet to his defense, pointing out that the Germans were keeping Daladier away. It was fitting that the last National Assembly should stand by its old ways. It saw to it that its meeting was public, and duly recorded. It used for the last time the committee, the device of De Broglie, Gambetta, Jaurès, and the Popular Front, to amend the proposals of the Executive. That committee kept at least the name of democracy by insisting that Pétain's new constitution be referred to the people and to his new corporative bodies for ratification. It was little to turn to the plebiscite so favored of dictators or to their controlled advisory bodies to limit dictatorship, but it was a last blow.

On its deathbed, French democracy showed how ingrained were its ways of making the Executive feel its responsibility to the Nation. Likewise, by making its debates public, it till the last saw to it that when the Nation made up its mind, it had the opportunity of knowing the truth, and had not been deluded. In its death, it proved itself a democracy still; for a democracy, in which the people (or *demos*) may rule (or *kratein*) as they will, two things are obviously essential. One is that the rule is effective, not blocked by individual wills. The other is that the will is honestly that of the people, not foisted upon them. Without responsibility of the government to the people, and free choice of action by the people, no democracy can exist.

That was proved the next day. Albert Lebrun, unlucky like the other re-elected President of France, Jules Grévy,

likewise resigned office a few months after his re-election. This was the end of the office of President of the Republic, whose creation by the Rivet Law of 1871, whose ratification by the Wallon Amendment of 1875, had created and stabilized the Republic. Once more a Marshal of France with a will independent of the people was at the head of the Nation. But this Marshal of France announced his accession to power using the Royal "*We*" over the microphone, showing that the Republic was dead with the end of Parliamentary limitation on the potential dictatorship implicit in France's bureaucracy, and France slipped back into the dictatorship from which the Fourth of September and the National Assembly had rescued her.

The Republic that so died was primarily a middle-class Republic, for its Jacobin ideals appealed most to the middle class. Often it had had the blindness and dilatoriness of a contented middle class; often it had shown the jealousy of superiority of an envious middle class; often it had shown the rapaciousness of a rising middle class. But it had had the virtues of a middle class as well as its vices. Middle classes can fight, as showed the Dutch in their War of Independence, as showed the Elizabethan Sea Dogs and Cromwell's Ironsides. Middle classes can think, as showed the Athenians. The Third Republic had that paradox: that it seemed selfish and petty and yet was great. Its great leaders, Thiers, Gambetta, Ferry, Waldeck-Rousseau, Clemenceau, Poincaré—all had been shrewd, calculating chafferers, buying and selling as best they knew how in the political market place; and yet each in his way had had what Clemenceau had said was essential for political success—"a little flame of idealism." Some had more, some had less; but all had it. The Thiers who had written his last speech for the Republic on his deathbed, the Gambetta who inspired France to fight all that winter of 1870-1871, when he was the heart of the Delegation at Tours, the Ferry who would not betray a confidence to save his government, the Waldeck who dared face a howling Chamber of Deputies and a

potential revolt, the Clemenceau who was willing to make a Cabinet of front-line soldiers and fight on the seas after France fell, the Poincaré who came back to politics to save his country from foreign control—all had that flame.

And it was that flame that burned in French democracy, and made effective its machinery. Just as Athens lasted as long as her citizens were willing to take responsibility, so the Third Republic lasted, not because the people could control their government, but because they dared to govern. Because Gambetta had faith, the Republic was founded. Because the Nation lost faith, Boulanger nearly overthrew the Republic. Because Waldeck-Rousseau inspired faith, the Republic survived the threat of Déroulède and Guérin. Because Clemenceau had faith, the Republic fought off and defeated Imperial Germany. Because Poincaré had faith, France pulled herself out of an economic morass without outside help. And when all was shattered by the iron march of the German armored divisions, the Republic died in a mood of distrust; but with some men, both in London and in Vichy, still showing faith.

Any history of the Third Republic and of democratic France must end recognizing this. French democracy did consist of a machinery of control over a potential dictatorship. That was true, as was shown by the emergence of a dictatorship once the control had been withdrawn, as well as during crucial stages of its history. French democracy also had a firm alliance with the middle class. The feelings toward the Republic of the upper classes and of the workers showed that, throughout its history. But French democracy was more than the opportunist control of a dictatorship by the representatives of a middle class, far more. It was a faith in the people transcending political devices or economic needs. At its beginning and at its end it showed that faith, and deserves honor for it.

APPENDIXES



Appendix One

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE THIRD
REPUBLIC

The Constitution of the Third Republic consisted of three laws: that of February 24, 1875, on the Organization of the Senate, that of February 25, 1875, on the Organization of the Public Powers, and that of July 16, 1875, on the Relations of the Public Powers. The dating of those laws shows the importance of the Senate in the eyes of the National Assembly; the repeal of the first seven articles of the Law on the Senate shows how the Senate was whittled down both in theory and in practice. The amendments to these laws are usually printed as part of them, which is done in this case, except that the outline of the repealed seven articles of the Law of February 24, 1875, is given. Technicalities of phrasing are omitted, to save space. Italics are the author's.

THE LAW OF FEBRUARY 24, 1875.

Article 1. The Senate shall consist of 300 members: 225 elected by the departments and the colonies, and 75 elected by the National Assembly.

Article 2. [Describes which departments shall elect more than two senators.]

Article 3. No one shall be a Senator unless he is a French citizen at least forty years of age, and in the enjoyment of civil and political rights.

Article 4. The senators . . . shall be elected . . . by a college meeting at the capital of the department or colony and composed: (1) of the deputies; (2) of the departmental councilors; (3) of the councilors of the *arrondissement*; (4) of delegates elected, one by each municipal council. . . .

Article 5. [How the Assembly shall vote for Life Senators.]

Article 6. The Senators of the departments and of the colonies shall be elected for nine years, and be renewable by thirds every three years. [Provisions for choosing by lot which Senators of the first election shall have which term.]

Article 7. The Senators elected by the Assembly are irremovable. Vacancies . . . shall . . . be filled by the Senate itself.

[The amendment of August 14, 1881, and the Senatorial Law of December 17, 1884, which ended the election of Life Senators and distributed the 75 seats as vacancies occurred, kept otherwise the general tenor of these articles.]

Article 8. The Senate shall have, concurrently with the Chamber of Deputies, the power to initiate and to pass laws. Money bills, however, shall first be introduced in and passed by the Chamber.

Article 9. The Senate may be constituted a Court of Justice to try either the President of the Republic or the ministers and to take cognizance of attacks upon the safety of the State.

Article 10. [First meeting of the Senate.]

Article 11. [Joins Law on the Senate with Law on the Public Powers.]

THE LAW OF FEBRUARY 25, 1875

Article 1. The legislative power shall be exercised by two assemblies, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The Chamber of Deputies shall be elected by *universal suffrage*. [Parliament may legislate on elections to both chambers.]

Article 2. The President of the Republic shall be chosen by . . . the Senate and the Chamber sitting as a National Assembly. [This is the *Wallon Amendment*.]

Article 3. The President of the Republic shall have the initiative in legislation, concurrently with the members of both chambers. He shall promulgate laws when they have been voted by both chambers; he shall look after and secure their execution.

He shall have the right to pardon; amnesty may be granted only by a law.

He disposes of the armed forces. He appoints to all civil and military offices. He presides over state functions; envoys and ambassadors of foreign powers shall be accredited to him.

Every act of the President of the Republic shall be countersigned by a minister.

Article 4. [Deals with the appointments to the Council of State made under the National Assembly.]

Article 5. The President of the Republic may, with the advice of the Senate, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. . . . [Details ensuring the speedy election of a new Chamber.]

Article 6. The ministers shall be *collectively responsible to the Chambers* for the general policy of the government, and *individually responsible* for their personal acts.

The President of the Republic shall be responsible only in case of high treason.

Article 7. In case of vacancy . . . the two chambers sitting together shall elect a new President. In the meantime the Council of Ministers shall be vested with the executive power.

Article 8. [Revision of the Constitution by votes first of each house separately, then of the National Assembly of them both. Until the powers of Marshal MacMahon's *term* expires, only the President can suggest revision.]

The Republican form of government shall not be made the subject of revision. Members of families that have reigned in France are ineligible for the Presidency of the Republic. [Amendment of August 14, 1884.]

Article 9. [Repealed, June 19, 1879. Fixed sessions of Parliament at Paris.]

New Article 9 [of August 10, 1926]. The independence of the Autonomous Fund is a matter of constitutional law. . . . [The tobacco monopoly and inheritance taxes go to the Autonomous Fund until the debt paid over to it is paid off.]

THE LAW OF JULY 16, 1875

Article 1. The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies shall assemble each year on the second Tuesday of January. . . . The two chambers shall continue in session at least five months each

year. The sessions of each chamber shall begin and end at the same time.

[The clause ordering public prayers for Parliament was repealed August 14, 1884.]

Article 2. [President ends session, orders special session, may adjourn the regular session for not more than a month, and do that not more than twice.]

Article 3. [New President elected at least a month before the term of the old one expires, provisions for emergencies.]

Article 4. [Neither chamber may meet when the other is not in session, except that the Senate may sit as a High Court.]

Article 5. The sittings of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies shall be public. Nevertheless either chamber may meet in secret session. . . .

Article 6. The President of the Republic communicates with the chambers by messages, which shall be read from the Tribune by a minister. The ministers shall have entrance to both chambers, and shall be heard when they request it. . . . [Provisions for special commissioners.]

Article 7. [Provisions for a suspensive veto by the President.]

Article 8. The President of the Republic shall negotiate and ratify treaties. He shall give information regarding them to the chambers as soon as the interests and safety of the state permit. [Certain treaties matters of law.]

Article 9. The President of the Republic shall not declare war without the previous consent of the two chambers.

Article 10. Each chamber shall be the judge of the eligibility of its members. . . .

Article 11. The officers of each chamber shall be elected each year for the entire session. . . . [Senate's officers preside over National Assembly.]

Article 12. The President of the Republic may be impeached by the Chamber of Deputies only, and may be tried only by the Senate. Ministers may be impeached by the Chamber of Deputies . . . and tried by the Senate. The Senate may be constituted into a High Court, by a decree of the President of the Republic, issued in the Council of Ministers, to try all persons accused of attempts against the State. . . .

Article 13. No member of either chamber shall be prosecuted or held responsible on account of any opinions expressed or votes cast by him.

Article 14. No member of either chamber shall, during the session, be prosecuted or arrested for any offense or misdemeanor, except on the authority of the chamber to which he belongs, unless he be taken in the very act. . . .

THE ARTICLE OF JULY 10, 1940

The National Assembly confers full power on the Government of the Republic, under the signature and authority of Marshal Pétain, with a view to promulgating in one or several decrees the new constitution of the French state. That constitution must safeguard the rights of labor, the family, and the fatherland. It will be ratified by the assemblies created by it.

THE VICHY CONSTITUTION, JULY 12, 1940

I. We, Philippe Pétain, Marshal of France, declare that we assume the functions of Chief of the French State. In consequence we decree Article II of the Organic Law of February 25, 1875, is abrogated.

II. We decree: The Chief of the French State has full governmental power. He appoints and dismisses ministers and secretaries of state, who are responsible only to him. He exercises legislative power in the Council of Ministers. [No real limitations exist on the Marshal that he cannot override, except a technical prohibition on declaring war.]



Appendix Two

EXECUTIVES AND PRESIDING OFFICERS
OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC¹

A. The Government of National Defense

President of Council of Ministers—Gen. Louis Trochu, Sept. 4, 1870

Vice-President of Council of Ministers—Jules Favre, Sept. 4, 1870

Chairman of Delegation at Tours	{	Adolphe Crémieux, Sept. 11, 1870 Léon Gambetta, Oct. 8, 1870
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B. The National Assembly

Chief of Executive Power of French Republic—Adolphe Thiers,
Feb. 17, 1871

President of French Re- public and of Council of Ministers	{	Adolphe Thiers, Aug. 31, 1871 Marshal Patrice de MacMahon, Duke of Magenta, May 24, 1873
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Vice-President of Council of Ministers	{	Jules Dufaure, Sept. 12, 1871 Duke Albert de Broglie, May 24, 1873 Gen. Ernest de Cissey, May 23, 1874 Louis Joseph Buffet, Mar. 11, 1875 Jules Dufaure, Feb. 23, 1876
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¹ Dates given are of appointment or election. A French minister generally holds office till his successor takes over, and is responsible in the interim between resignation and replacement.

President of National Assembly	{ Jules Grévy, Feb. 16, 1871 Louis Joseph Buffet, Apr. 4, 1873 Duke d'Audiffret-Pasquier, Mar. 12, 1875
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C. *The Constitution of 1875*

President of French Republic	{ Marshal Patrice de MacMahon, Duke of Magenta, Mar. 8, 1876 Jules Grévy, Jan. 30, 1879; <i>re-</i> <i>elected</i> Dec. 18 for Jan. 30, 1886 M. F. Sadi-Carnot, Dec. 3, 1887 J. Casimir-Perier, June 27, 1894 Félix Faure, Jan. 17, 1895 Emile Loubet, Feb. 17, 1899 Armand Fallières, Jan. 17, 1906, <i>for</i> Feb. 18 Raymond Poincaré, Jan. 17, 1913, <i>for</i> Feb. 18 Paul Deschanel, Jan. 17, 1920, <i>for</i> Feb. 18 Alexandre Millerand, Sept. 23, 1920 Gaston Doumergue, June 13, 1924 Paul Doumer, May 13, 1931, <i>for</i> June 13 Albert Lebrun, May 10, 1932; <i>re-</i> <i>elected</i> Apr. 10, 1940, <i>for</i> May 10
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President of Council of Ministers	{ Jules Dufaure, Mar. 9, 1876 Jules Simon, Dec. 2, 1876 Duke Albert de Broglie, May 16, 1877 Gen. Grimaudet de Rochebouet, Nov. 14, 1877 Jules Dufaure, Dec. 24, 1877 Jules Dufaure, Jan. 30, 1879 Henri Waddington, Feb. 4, 1879 Charles de Freycinet, Dec. 29, 1879
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President of Council of
Ministers (*Cont'd*)

Jules Ferry, Sept. 22, 1880
 Léon Gambetta, Nov. 10, 1881
 Charles de Freycinet, Jan. 30,
 1882
 Charles Duclerc, Aug. 7, 1882
 Armand Fallières, Jan. 30, 1883
 Jules Ferry, Feb. 20, 1883
 Henri Brisson, Apr. 6, 1885
 Charles de Freycinet, Jan. 7, 1886
 René Goblet, Dec. 11, 1886
 Maurice Rouvier, Apr. 18, 1887
 Pierre-Emmanuel Tirard, Dec. 12,
 1887
 Charles Floquet, Mar. 31, 1888
 Pierre-Emmanuel Tirard, Feb. 22,
 1889
 Charles de Freycinet, Mar. 17,
 1890
 Émile Loubet, Feb. 29, 1892
 Alexandre Ribot, Dec. 14, 1892
 Charles Dupuy, Mar. 30, 1893
 J. Casimir-Perier, Dec. 3, 1893
 Charles Dupuy, May 29, 1894
 Alexandre Ribot, Jan. 26, 1895
 Léon Bourgeois, Oct. 30, 1895
 Jules Méline, Apr. 30, 1896
 Henri Brisson, June 28, 1898
 Charles Dupuy, Oct. 31, 1898
 Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau, June
 22, 1899
 Emile Combes, June 7, 1902
 Maurice Rouvier, Jan. 24, 1905
 Jean Sarrien, Mar. 14, 1906 (*de-
 crees post-dated to avoid tak-
 ing office on 13th*)
 Georges Clemenceau, Oct. 23,
 1906
 Aristide Briand, July 25, 1909
 Ernest Monis, Mar. 5, 1911
 Joseph Caillaux, June 29, 1911
 Raymond Poincaré, Jan. 14, 1912
 Aristide Briand, Jan. 21, 1913
 Louis Barthou, Mar. 21, 1913

President of Council of
Ministers (*Cont'd*)

Gaston Doumergue, Dec. 10, 1913
 Alexandre Ribot, June 9, 1914
 René Viviani, June 14, 1914
 René Viviani, Aug. 27, 1914 (*The
 Ministry of Sacred Union*)
 Aristide Briand, Oct. 31, 1915
 Aristide Briand, Dec. 12, 1916
 Alexandre Ribot, Mar. 19, 1917
 Paul Painlevé, Sept. 18, 1917
 Georges Clemenceau, Nov. 1917
 Alexandre Millerand, Jan. 19,
 1920
 Georges Leygues, Sept. 3, 1920
 Aristide Briand, Jan. 16, 1921
 Raymond Poincaré, Jan. 16, 1922
 François Marsal, June 8, 1925
 Édouard Herriot, June 14, 1925
 Paule Painlevé, Apr. 17, 1925
 Aristide Briand, Nov. 29, 1925
 Aristide Briand *and* Joseph Cail-
 laux, June 23, 1926
 Édouard Herriot, July 20, 1926
 Raymond Poincaré, July 24, 1926
 Aristide Briand, July 28, 1929
 Raymond Poincaré, Nov. 11, 1929
 André Tardieu, Nov. 2, 1929
 Camille Chautemps, Feb. 21, 1930
 André Tardieu, Mar. 2, 1930
 Théodore Steeg, Dec. 13, 1930
 Pierre Laval, Jan. 27, 1931
 André Tardieu, Feb. 23, 1932
 Édouard Herriot, June 4, 1932
 Paul Boncour, Dec. 20, 1932
 Édouard Daladier, Jan. 31, 1933
 Albert Sarraut, Oct. 24, 1933
 Camille Chautemps, Nov. 22, 1933
 Édouard Daladier, Jan. 30, 1934
 Gaston Doumergue, Feb. 9, 1934
 Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Nov. 10,
 1934
 Fernand Buisson, June 1, 1935
 Pierre Laval, June 6, 1935
 Albert Sarraut, Jan. 25, 1936

- President of Council of Ministers (*Cont'd*)
- Léon Blum, June 3, 1936
 - Camille Chautemps, June 23, 1937
 - Camille Chautemps, Jan. 28, 1938
 - Léon Blum, Mar. 12, 1938
 - Edouard Daladier, Apr. 10, 1938
 - Paul Reynaud, Mar. 21, 1940
 - Henri Philippe Pétain, June 17, 1940
- President of Senate
- Duke d'Audiffret-Pasquier, Mar. 13, 1876
 - Louis Joseph Martel, Jan. 15, 1879
 - Léon Say, May 25, 1880
 - Philippe-Elie Le Royer, Feb. 2, 1882
 - Jules Ferry, Feb. 24, 1893
 - Paul Challemel-Lacour, Mar. 27, 1893
 - Émile Loubet, Jan. 14, 1896
 - Armand Fallières, Mar. 3, 1899
 - Antonin Dubost, Feb. 16, 1906
 - Léon Bourgeois, Jan. 14, 1920
 - Gaston Doumergue, Feb. 23, 1923
 - A. De Selves, June 19, 1924
 - Paul Doumer, Jan. 11, 1927
 - Albert Lebrun, May 14, 1931
 - Jean Jeanney, June 3, 1932
- President of Chamber of Deputies
- Jules Grévy, Mar. 13, 1876
 - Léon Gambetta, Jan. 31, 1879
 - Henri Brisson, Nov. 3, 1881
 - Charles Floquet, May 4, 1885
 - Jules Méline, Apr. 16, 1888
 - Charles Floquet, Nov. 16, 1889
 - Jean Casimir-Perier, Jan. 10, 1893
 - Charles Dupuy, Dec. 4, 1893
 - Jean Casimir-Perier, June 2, 1894
 - Auguste Burdeau, June 28, 1894
 - Henri Brisson, Dec. 18, 1894
 - Paul Deschanel, June 2, 1898
 - Léon Bourgeois, June 1, 1902
 - Henri Brisson, Jan. 12, 1904

President of Chamber of Deputies (<i>Cont'd</i>)	{	Paul Doumer, Jan. 10, 1905
		Henri Brisson, June 1, 1906
		Paul Deschanel, May 21, 1912
		Raoul Péret, Jan. 19, 1920
		Paul Painlevé, June 1, 1924
		Édouard Herriot, Apr. 18, 1925
		Raoul Péret, July 23, 1926
		Fernand Buisson, Jan. 11, 1927
Édouard Herriot, June 1, 1936		

D. *The Vichy Constitution*

Chief of French State and President of Council—Henri Philippe
Pétain, July 9, 1940
Vice-President of Council—Pierre Laval



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One difficulty in providing a bibliography on the Third Republic is that there are few historical books on it, and few of those are in English. Most of what has been written on the Third Republic is polemical and in French, entertaining and definitely to be suspected of bias. If three such accounts of a given event can be obtained, the omissions and twistings of fact of each will be balanced by the omissions and twistings of fact of the others; and the final result for the reader will be a pretty shrewd idea of what really happened. But a reader who can find and read three such accounts hardly needs a bibliography. A further difficulty is that certain important points in French history are almost completely passed over by every writer on the subject. For instance, to get a clear exposition of the important Army Law of 1832, which controlled the promotions of officers, the author had to turn to a book by a Captain of Somerset Militia, written in 1856.¹ Again, certain books, excellent in their own way, hardly bear on the subject of the growth of democracy in France, and do not find places on this list. However, here is a list of the books that the author has found of most use in interpreting the Third Republic as a democracy. One desiring to go on with the subject should use as a bibliographical aid Professor Rudolph Winnacker's excellent article in the September 1938 number of the *Journal of Modern History*, pp. 372-409. The basic source with which to check the facts of the Third Republic is, of course, the *Journal Officiel* and its off-shoot, the *Débats Parlementaires*.

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