


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Corrections in Volume XXVI

The Editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following errors:

January 14, page 48, right-hand column, 5th line from bottom. In place of on that date read December 20.

March 24, page 474, left-hand column, 2d line from bottom. In place of banks read backs.

April 7, page 549, left-hand column, 10th line. In place of political read potential.

June 2, 1952, page 881, left-hand column. The title of Mr. Linder should read Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs.

June 9, page 902. In the second paragraph of the first note read Herrnburg not Horrenberg. On the same page the second note is dated May 29 not May 30.

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A Trial Balance of U.S. Foreign Policy in 1951

*Address by Secretary Acheson*¹

For this honor I am deeply grateful. And I accept it, not for myself alone, but for all those who serve faithfully in the line of foreign policy. They, and I, will be encouraged and strengthened by it.

This occasion comes as an old year passes and a new one approaches. The junction of years is by tradition a time for taking stock of the past and resolving about the future.

As a public servant in an accountable Government, I would like to respond to this honor you have bestowed upon me by giving an account of what has been done and what remains to be done in the field of our foreign policy.

One of my predecessors, John Hay, was able to sum up the foreign policy of his day in the principles of the Monroe Doctrine and the Golden Rule.

We find ourselves in a more difficult situation. Without departing, we hope, from either doctrine or rule, we have moved into a world grown vastly more complex.

Our country now must bear responsibilities that were undreamed of when most of us were growing up. Our national decisions in these postwar years may be judged by history to be as fateful as any of the great decisions of our national life. They influence the course of events not only for us but throughout the world.

At the same time, foreign policy, instead of remaining the province of a few professionals, has become a part of the everyday life of our people. The state of the world has become a personal question for each one of us. No one knows this better than you who have served your country with honor and gallantry. Many of our countrymen are discovering it once again in Korea, as you discovered it in Europe and the Pacific only a few years ago.

It is not only your right but your duty to ask those who are acting for you in the field of foreign affairs:

¹ Made before the Jewish War Veterans at New York on Dec. 30 and released to the press on the same date.

How are we doing? Are we making some headway toward peace in the world? Are we any better off than we were a year ago? How much longer must we live in the shadow of the danger of war?

These are hard questions. No one can answer them with absolute certainty. But we must try to answer them as well as we can, and that is what I would like to do this evening.

So before we turn the page of the calendar, I would like to look back with you over the ground we have been covering in our foreign policy, so that we can see where we stand now, and what things look like for 1952.

Let us take a trial balance on the year's developments in foreign policy in three important areas of the world—the North Atlantic area, the Near and Middle East, and the Far East. These areas do not cover the whole range of our policy or interests.

When we look at Europe and Asia, we look at them from the vantage point of the Western Hemisphere, which is the foundation of our position in the world. One of our main assets is the circumstance that in this hemisphere we are among friends with common purposes and common interests. And here cooperation among nations is an established habit.

That circumstance was never more strikingly demonstrated than in the special session of the Organization of American States held last spring. The trust, confidence, and cooperation existing in this hemisphere is the product of 60 years of organized work together. It is a possession of all our republics beyond price.

Decisions for Defense of Europe Await Action

To begin our survey, we see that in the North Atlantic area, the year 1951 has been a period of progress and growth, much of it beneath the surface. In the weeks before spring comes there is intense activity in the earth. Life in every form has cracked the shell that holds it, and is pushing up through the half-frozen earth. Some hardy

forms are already through. Over all hangs the threat of a late frost. So, I believe, it is here.

A year ago, the defense of Europe was only a hope. While it is by no means finished, we know now that in the short span of a year, the nations of the North Atlantic area have been able to create both an organization and a spirit which will be capable of defending that area. We know—and our friends in Europe know—that we can build sufficient strength—both military and economic—to deter aggression or check it.

In the closing days of last year, the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) was created by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). President Truman was asked to permit General Eisenhower to serve as Supreme Commander. The engagements were made to create a unified force under his command.

At the beginning of this year, General Eisenhower assumed his command. With great vigor and leadership, and the devoted help of his international staff, he has made SHAPE—the Supreme Headquarters—a dynamic reality. But the defensive force still had to be made adequate. This has meant tackling the toughest of all questions—men, money, equipment, and organization.

This is the work which has gone forward, largely unseen, and gone far.

It has brought us to the point where we can see that the job is do-able, and that by the end of 1952, we can be well along toward our goal. But if we are to achieve that position by the end of 1952, there are three important decisions we shall have to make in the early months of 1952.

The first of these decisions has to do with the quantity and quality of the forces the European nations will furnish.

As you know, the committee of the 12 NATO nations, of which Mr. Harriman is chairman, and which General McNarney so ably served, had had the task of reviewing the military needs for Europe against the economic capabilities of the NATO members. They have tried to reduce to concrete terms how large a military force is needed, and how soon we can have it.

In the background of these questions is the dark shadow of Europe's grave economic and financial problems. They represent a difficulty and a danger for our European friends and for us. But the North Atlantic community has the resources and the skill to surmount them.

Mr. Harriman and the other members of the NATO committee have dug out the facts and drawn up a plan of action. The decision on the forces Europe will create is ready to be acted upon by the Governments of the NATO countries.

A second decision that lies ahead in 1952 has to do with Germany. During the past year we have made great strides in working out an agreement which will restore Western Germany to a place of equality in the world community. It is our hope and belief that this issue will be brought to a suc-

cessful conclusion early in 1952. As you will see, this decision and the next one go hand-in-hand for together they provide for German participation in the defense of Europe without reviving the menace of German militarism.

The third decision will have to do with the creation of a European defense community and a European army.

Within the past few days, the Foreign Ministers of a number of European countries have been meeting again on this complex problem. Many of the difficulties have been worked out, by patient negotiation, and if we can move forward toward a favorable decision on this issue, it will create a framework in which Western Europe can realize its whole, rich potential for defense and for peaceful progress.

The Schuman Plan for the European management of coal and steel, and the European army and defense community, taken together with the decisions on Germany and the Harriman committee recommendations—all these, we and our European friends are making every effort to bring into being in the year before us.

We have come to the threshold of these decisions only with tremendous effort on all sides. But this effort to move toward unity in Western Europe may prove to be the most important step forward taken in the passing year. And 1952 can be a year of historic decision for Europe—the year in which Europe can enter into a new era.

Increasing Responsibilities in Near and Middle East

In the Near and Middle East, however, the picture has been quite different. Here, I think we have lost some ground in 1951.

This is a region of great importance to us, because of its people, its resources, strategic position, and vital communications arteries.

Danger spots in this area are the crisis over the defense of the Suez waterway and the impasse over the development of Iran's petroleum resources. Both offer dangerous opportunities for exploitation by the Kremlin.

Bright spots in the area are Greece and Turkey. These two countries, with United States assistance, have made great progress in building up their economic and military defenses. Both have steadfastly withstood continued pressure from the Soviet Union and are to become a part of the NATO defense system.

As a part of the effort to deal with the underlying conditions of life in the Near East, the United States has formulated for 1952, a substantial program of financial and technical assistance. American experts are already at work on agricultural and industrial development, on social services, and public health.

One week ago, on a mission of this kind, a number of Americans lost their lives in a plane crash near Tehran. One of them was Henry G. Bennett,

chief of the Point Four Program of technical cooperation.

If peace can have its heroes, then these men deserve the name of hero. They have given their lives, as before they gave unsparingly of their energies, in what President Truman has described as "the only kind of a war we seek"—the war against want.

It was a tragic loss to our country, and to the world whom they served. We shall miss their help, but we are resolved to carry forward with their program of aid and cooperation, not only in the Near East, but wherever in the world there is need and a desire for our help.

In addition, some military assistance will be made available to this area under the Mutual Security Program. But the best means for insuring the defense of this region, we believe, is by cooperative effort. The proposed Middle East Command can provide for an association of full and equal partners and could be a strong bulwark in defense of the freedom of this important part of the world.

Meanwhile, the United States continues its efforts through the United Nations to promote peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The new state of Israel has made remarkable progress. But if the large expenditures of capital for border defenses could be allocated to economic development and the natural trade routes could be opened once more, the whole area could prosper. To reach a condition of mutual trust and friendliness will require the continued efforts of men of good will.

For 1952, it is clear that developments in the Near and Middle East will call upon us with a critical urgency for still further resources of leadership, and for a willingness to assume increasing responsibilities in this area.

Problems and Progress in the Far East

The third area we want to look at is the Far East.

The year's transformation in Korea has been great. At this time in 1950, the Chinese Communists were mounting their massive drive to push the U.N. forces into the sea, and the outlook was far from encouraging. Now the aggressor has been driven back and denied the prize of conquest, with terrible losses to his troops. The brave men who did this thing with their nerve and their blood will deserve forever the gratitude of all people who love freedom.

They have done more than repel a specific aggression; they have helped arrest the general forces of aggression.

They have proved that collective security *can* work. They have enabled the United Nations to cope successfully with the same sort of attack which destroyed the League of Nations and brought on World War II. But how much this principle of collective security means in the future

will depend upon us—upon the will and resources with which we and our allies support it.

In 1951, a very great deal was accomplished in Korea.

Military success against the aggressors drove them out of South Korea. This was done without spreading the war to other areas in the Far East and without increasing the danger of general war in the world.

We contended against aggression with firm resolution and sensible restraint, the two qualities most needed for the long pull ahead.

And we maintained unity with our allies in the face of great danger to that unity. The forces of 16 nations fought side-by-side under a U. N. command, backed by a united policy toward the struggle. It was an unprecedented and promising example of international cooperation to support law and order in the world.

The job in Korea is far from done.

Negotiations for an armistice are still going on. Our representatives have been doing a superb job; they have been patient and firm in support of our objectives in Korea.

We do not yet know whether or when we shall have an end to the fighting in Korea, but this much is certain: We shall not rest until our men who are being held prisoner are released. And we shall stand firm against any settlement that rewards aggression, or compromises the security of the Republic of Korea.

But even if an armistice is signed, the need for vigilance and effort will not be over. We shall have to remain on guard against a renewal of Communist treachery. There will remain the task of rehabilitating that suffering land. And there will remain the task of realizing the U. N. political objective of unifying Korea on a basis that provides a decent chance for the Koreans to live as free men.

Half a continent away from Korea lies South-east Asia.

A year ago, the chance of holding off Communist penetration in Indochina looked doubtful in even the most optimistic estimate, though the defenders had shown signs of taking the initiative.

During the year, the Communist threat in Indochina has been contained—a development attributable to French courage, to an increasing determination on the part of the Indochinese people to preserve their freedom against Communist encroachment, and to American aid. The good fight has not been lost, but it remains far, far from won. There are dangerous signs of further trouble from Communist aggression in Indochina, and also in Burma, which will require continued vigilance in 1952.

The course of events in the Philippines over the past year is also one to hearten free men.

A year ago, the young Republic was in trouble. It was under rising pressure from an extensive Communist-inspired rebellion.

In the interval, the Filipinos have found new resources of internal strength. The armed threat has been gradually reduced. The foundations of the future now look strong. Aid from the United States helped in producing these changes, but the finest ingredient was Philippine courage.

1951 was also a year in which important progress was made toward building a structure of peace in the Pacific.

By a series of security treaties, the United States has established firm defense ties with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan.

Another element in this structure of peace was the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Under U.S. leadership, the Japanese peace treaty developed from its first stages through the stage of ratification by Japan during the year. The process brought a heartening demonstration of unity by the free nations in the face of threatening efforts by the adversaries of peace at the San Francisco conference.

The treaty brings Japan back into full status in the society of nations.

The unfinished business for the year ahead includes:

The ratification of the Japanese peace treaty and the Pacific mutual defense treaties;

the completion of specific joint defense arrangements with Japan;

the regeneration of Japanese strength in a collective pattern that will bar the possibility of aggression, and the translation into action of the terms of the peace and defense treaties.

The Far East as a whole provides much that is hopeful on the balance sheet for 1951.

Yet the significance of what has been done will be lasting only if further action in 1952 makes it so. Nothing has yet been done that we can turn away from as a task completed.

U.S. Leadership Inspires Faith in Freedom

This summary gives us not a total picture but only a sampling of developments within the free world.

It has to omit much that counts heavily in the balances and trends. It does not take account of developments behind the Iron Curtain. It does not deal with the total effect of the tremendous increase in our productive power here at home. Nor does it deal with a host of serious problems in almost every part of the world.

But it gives us enough, I think, to draw some conclusions.

What it adds up to, it seems to me, is that we have had both gains and losses in 1951, but that we are better off than we were a year ago.

During the past year the free world has gained in strength and moved appreciably towards greater unity. There are grounds for confidence, but there are no grounds for complacency. We cannot afford to let down at all in vigilance, purpose, and effort.

We are not yet "over the hump." The outcome in the contest between a better future and a return to the Dark Ages is still undetermined.

It is hard to say that any one year is more critical than another, but it seems to me certain that we will have it in our power in 1952 to take action, or to withhold action, which will have a decisive effect upon the cause of peace.

The central responsibility in this cause will remain with the United States. Our nation provides the one great repository of strength for those who value freedom. It is the one nation having margins to share with others.

Our position—lying in both the Western and the Northern Hemispheres, stretching from the tropics to the Arctic, and facing on both the Atlantic and the Pacific—imposes upon us heavy responsibilities and great opportunities.

For a century and a half, the American people have been the leaders in the revolution of the common people.

The greatest asset we have in all the world—even greater than our material power—is the American idea. No one needs to tell an American audience all the things that this holds for us. It is so much a part of our everyday lives that we do not stop to define it, or to put it into packages for export.

But throughout the world, wherever people are oppressed, wherever people dream of freedom and opportunity, they feel the inspiration of the American idea.

What we are trying to do, in our foreign policy, is to make possible a world in which our own people, and all people who have the same determination, can work in their own way toward a better life, without having to bear the yoke of tyranny.

Our belief in freedom is a burning and fighting faith. Freedom is essential to our individual life and our national life. We would suffocate and perish in any other atmosphere.

What we are up against, in our present defense of freedom, is perhaps the hardest test our nation has ever faced since the days of its founding.

It is hardest because it calls upon us, not for sudden burst of patriotic effort, but for steadiness, perseverance, maturity, and understanding.

All that we do here in this country, all that we say and do to each other, whether it is worthy of us or not, echoes abroad among the people who look to us for leadership and a sense of responsibility.

In addition to being a critical year in world affairs, 1952 will also be an election year here at home. If we are to continue to bear our responsibilities in the world—on which the issue of peace or war hangs in the balance—we cannot afford to let excesses of partisan zeal blind us to the sober requirements of our national interest.

And we must always remember that we cannot find security for ourselves, nor inspiration for those who are on our side, if we here in America

trample our own best traditions by prejudice or by a hysterical distortion of the fight against tyranny.

This is a time when resolutions for the new year are made.

If we are to make a resolution for 1952, let it be that we shall strive to be true to ourselves, true to our own best traditions of justice and freedom.

The task ahead will be long, for history, unlike the accounts we keep, is measured not year by year, but in lifetimes.

But if we are true to ourselves and to our hope of the future, we must persevere in the course we are on.

You will remember the words of Abraham Lincoln: "With firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in."

U.S. Seeks Release of American Fliers Held in Hungary

[Released to the press December 26]

Since the U.S. Air Force plane was forced down in Hungary on November 19, it has been the constant and urgent endeavor of the U.S. Government to obtain the release and return of the four U.S. Air Force fliers. The announcement on December 23 of their trial by a Hungarian military court and the assessment against them of fines or 3 months in jail created a new situation. It remains the primary policy of the U.S. Government to seek their release.

The American chargé d'affaires in Budapest has since December 24 had three meetings with officials of the Hungarian Foreign Office in connection with the release of the fliers. Under instructions he has indicated that, provided the fliers are released promptly, this Government will pay the fine imposed on them. Allegedly because of the holidays, the Hungarian Foreign Office has been unable to provide either an official copy of the Hungarian court record or any statement as to the time and manner in which the fliers would be released to American authorities.

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press December 28]

Every American will be relieved that the four American fliers are now safely in our hands. But underlying relief is a deep current of indignation over the treatment they have received.

The American people are rightfully indignant. Because we value the welfare of the individual above all else, we have paid the so-called "fines." But we have not paid willingly, and we state clearly, in order that there may be no misunder-

standing of our attitude in the future, that our patience is not inexhaustible.

In this whole performance, the Budapest regime has ignored the basic rules of long-established international conduct.

Repeated requests were made to the Hungarian authorities to permit American officials to visit the airmen. No such access was allowed either before trial or subsequently when the request was renewed. In the circumstances, in view of the refusal of the Hungarian authorities to permit American officials to exercise this normal right, which is basic to the extension of customary consular protection to American citizens abroad, the U.S. Government will no longer validate the passports of American citizens for travel in Hungary. Furthermore, since the reciprocal basis of the exchange of consular privileges has been nullified by Hungary, this Government is also notifying the Hungarian Legation in Washington that the Hungarian consulates in this country, which are located in Cleveland and New York, should be closed immediately.

Any further statement on this matter must await the opportunity to talk with the released airmen.

U.S. Orders Closing of Hungarian Consulates

[Released to the press December 29]

On December 28 the following note was delivered to the Hungarian Legation in Washington with reference to the detention in Hungary of four members of the U.S. Air Force:

The Government of Hungary in this instance has again clearly failed to live up to the accepted standards of international practice with regard to the right of consular officers to exercise protective functions in behalf of nationals of their country. The detention of four Americans from November 19, 1951, to December 28, 1951, and the refusal by the Hungarian Government, despite repeated requests of the American Chargé d'Affaires, to permit any access to them or communication with them on the part of American consular officers indicate that the Hungarian Government continues, as in previous cases, to place serious restrictions on the exercise of normal consular rights by United States representatives in Hungary.

In these circumstances, the Government of the United States is not prepared to permit the continued operation of the Hungarian consulates general in Cleveland, Ohio, and New York, N.Y. The Minister is accordingly informed that these offices are required to cease all operations immediately and to be closed by midnight, December 31, 1951.

Polish Decree on Valuables On Deposit in Poland

The following was released on December 28 as of interest to owners of movables, valuables, negotiable papers, etc., deposited by them with Polish institutions, banks, enterprises, etc., before May 9, 1945:

The American Embassy at Warsaw has forwarded translation of a Polish Government decree of September 6, 1951, under which such owners are allowed 6 months from the date the decree was published in Poland (the original decree is to be found in *Dziennik Ustaw* No. 47, Sept. 8, 1951) to withdraw these items from deposit. Failing such withdrawal, the decree provides that the objects shall become state property, unless claim has been filed and deposits cannot be returned under Polish regulations. Deposits with museums are specifically excluded from the legislation.

Persons in the United States who have reason to believe that the Polish decree affects them may obtain a translation of the full text of the decree by writing to the Division of Protective Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

The Department of State cannot undertake to supply interpretations or opinions concerning the applicability of foreign law or regulation in any given case.

Owners should therefore communicate with the Polish institutions which hold their deposits, directly or through their agents or attorneys in Poland, rather than with the Department of State or with the American Embassy at Warsaw.

Tax Conventions With Ireland Enter Into Force

[Released to the press December 20]

On December 20, 1951, Secretary Acheson and John Joseph Hearne, Irish Ambassador at Washington, exchanged the instruments of ratification of the two tax conventions between the United States and Ireland which were signed at Dublin on September 13, 1949. The two conventions, one relating to taxes on income and the other relating to taxes on the estates of deceased persons, thereupon entered into force in accordance with their respective terms.

The Senate, on September 17, 1951, gave its advice and consent to the ratification of both of the conventions. Senate approval of the convention relating to income taxes was made subject to certain reservations as follows:

The Government of the United States of America does not accept Article XIV of the convention, relating to the exemption of residents of Ireland from United States tax on capital gains.

The Government of the United States of America does not accept Article XVI of the convention, relating to the exemption of Irish corporations from United States tax on accumulated or undistributed earnings, profits, income or surplus.

Those reservations were accepted by Ireland. The estate-tax convention, which was approved by the Senate without reservations, was ratified by the President on October 18, 1951. The income-tax convention was ratified by the President on December 13, 1951, subject to the reservations quoted above. A proclamation with respect to the entry into force of each of the two conventions will be issued by the President.

Denmark, U.K. Sign Torquay Protocol

[Released to the press December 29]

The U.S. Government has been notified by the headquarters of the United Nations that on December 21, 1951, Denmark signed the Torquay protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The United Kingdom signed the protocol on December 19, 1951.

As a result of its signature of the protocol, Denmark will put into effect on January 20, 1952, the concessions which it granted at the recent conference held at Torquay, England. It may, however, withhold concessions which were initially negotiated with countries which have not yet signed the protocol.

The United States signed the Torquay protocol on April 21, 1951, and withheld most of the concessions initially negotiated with countries which had not signed it. As additional countries signed the protocol, the United States gave effect to the withheld concessions initially negotiated with them. In accordance with the established procedure, the President will send a letter authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to give effect on January 20 to the concessions which were initially negotiated with Denmark but which have been withheld.

Since the United States and the United Kingdom did not negotiate any new concessions at Torquay, no changes in United States tariff rates will result from the United Kingdom's signature of the protocol.

Danish concessions initially negotiated with the United States will apply to a variety of American products, including tomato juice, fuel oils and chemical products, metal products, and machines and apparatus. Concessions negotiated by Denmark at Torquay with a number of countries other than the United States will, when put into effect, benefit additional U.S. exports to Denmark.¹

¹ For information relating to U.S. concessions initially negotiated with Denmark, to come into effect on Jan. 20, 1952, see Department of State press release No. 1120.

OAS Charter Comes Into Effect

By John C. Dreier, U.S. Representative to and Chairman of the Council of the OAS¹

Today we mark an important event in the history of inter-American relations. We have witnessed the deposit of the fourteenth instrument of ratification of the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS). As a result of this action by the Ambassador of Colombia and the Secretary General of the organization, the constitutional document of our organization comes into full legal effect.

Three years ago this month, on December 3, 1948, a similar ceremony was held in this hall. At that time the Government of Costa Rica deposited the fourteenth ratification of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, bringing that important document into effect. Today the foundation of our organization is completed, providing the basis for all the manifold aspects of inter-American relations which are incorporated in the charter of Bogotá.

The broad scope of our organization is best indicated by the charter itself, which states the following essential purposes:

- a) To strengthen the peace and security of the continent;
- b) To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member States;
- c) To provide for common action on the part of those States in the event of aggression;
- d) To seek the solution of political, juridical and economic problems that may arise among them; and
- e) To promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social and cultural development.

The action bringing into effect the treaty of Rio de Janeiro appeared to stimulate the remaining governments to complete their constitutional processes for its ratification. We may hope, therefore, that the action which we have witnessed today will be followed within a short time by the deposit of ratifications of the charter by the remaining seven governments in order that all members of the organization may stand upon an equal footing of benefits and responsibilities.

¹ Excerpts from an address made on the occasion of the coming into effect of the OAS Charter at the Pan American Union at Washington, D. C., on Dec. 13 and released to the press by the Pan American Union on the same date.

Development of OAS

Although the Organization of American States has, under one name or another, been in continuous existence for more than half a century, this is the first time that a formal treaty has been adopted for its constitution. To be sure, at the Sixth International Conference of American States, held at Habana in 1928, a convention regarding the Pan American Union was drawn up and subsequently ratified by a number of states. However, it never received sufficient ratifications to fulfill its own requirements for becoming effective. Until today, the Organization of American States and its forerunners operated on the basis of resolutions adopted at various inter-American conferences.

The fact that we now, after 62 years of informal existence, have put into effect a constitutional treaty is perhaps in more ways than one a sign of the times in which we live. The drawing up and adoption of the charter of Bogotá represents the culmination of a long period of political evolution in the relations of the American states. Ever since the days of Bolívar, the concept of a united continent had fired the imagination of American statesmen. Sixty-two years ago—in 1889—there was held at this city of Washington the First International Conference of American States. One of its main accomplishments was the establishment of an organization through which certain common interests of the American Republics could be carried out. After considerable deliberation, the Conference adopted a resolution establishing the International Union of American Republics, with a permanent secretariat to be located at Washington and to be known as the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics. The function of this infant agency, from which has grown our present organization, was primarily to exchange commercial information. The Commercial Bureau was placed under the supervision of the Secretary of State of the United States as the host government. The Conference saw to it that this first permanent organization—predecessor of the Pan American Union—was kept within modest dimensions. It was allowed a staff of 10 people,

including the porter, and a budget of \$36,000 a year!

Within a few years, however, changes were made in the infant organization, responding to the needs and desires of the member countries. In fact, the very next inter-American conference started the familiar process of "reorganization"! New functions were given to the permanent bureau, the name of which was subsequently changed to the Pan American Union. The United States Government, anxious to share responsibility in the conduct of the Union, invited diplomatic representatives of the other member governments at Washington to meet with the Secretary of State and decide upon matters regarding the Union. This arrangement was confirmed by the second conference, establishing a Governing Board for that organization, the progenitor of the Council of the organization of today.

As time went on and succeeding conferences of the American states met and considered the substance and form of inter-American cooperation, further changes and additions were made to the structure of the inter-American organization. Duties in the field of international law were early given to the new organization. Cultural relations were added to economic affairs as a basic field of inter-American cooperation. Specialized organizations were established to promote technical cooperation in a number of areas that were of vital importance to the welfare of the peoples of America.

Perhaps of even greater significance was the clarification during successive inter-American meetings of the principles which would become the guiding light of the inter-American organization. These principles are well known to all of us. Among them are the peaceful settlement of inter-American disputes; solidarity against aggression; nonintervention; consultation and cooperation for the solution of common problems. They are all rooted in the concept of equality among sovereign nations, in a desire to benefit by cooperation and in a common devotion to liberty and independence, which all the American countries share.

During World War II, for the first time in many decades, the independence of the Western Hemisphere was seriously threatened from abroad. The inter-American organization responded with vigorous and creative action to this problem. In the Meetings of Foreign Ministers at Panamá, Habana, and Rio de Janeiro, and finally at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held at México in 1945, the concept of hemisphere solidarity was advanced to a new point. From these meetings emerged the great American doctrine that an attack upon one American state from any source constitutes an attack upon all.

So vast were the achievements made in this process of inter-American cooperation, particularly from the time of the Seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo in

1933 to the conference of Chapultepec in 1945, that it became evident that some form of charter was highly desirable, if not absolutely necessary. It was to be a document that would, on the one hand, incorporate and fit into a more orderly pattern the organizational structure created during this period of half a century. It would, moreover, incorporate in a single document the principles of cooperation in economic, cultural, and social fields and lay down the basis for defending the peace and security of the Americas. This is the charter that was drawn up at Bogotá. This is the document which enters into force today.

Integration of OAS Under the Charter

Now, it will be clear to all those who know the story of what has gone before—a story which I have briefly summarized—that the charter of Bogotá is not a document of radical innovations. It has set up no startlingly new organs of cooperation endowed with unprecedented powers. It has made no dramatic contribution in the form of new principles of inter-American cooperation. What it has done is, first, to consecrate and clarify those principles which the American states have found to be worthy. It has stated the purposes which respond to the needs of the peoples of our respective countries. And finally it has clarified and improved upon the organization and procedures through which these ends shall be sought and those principles realized.

There is need as never before to demonstrate the validity of the system of international relations which we have developed in the American region. The world would like to know whether we can continue to make it work effectively as an organization, and whether we can make its principles increasingly effective in fact.

We have now the blueprint of our organization. Already much of it has been put into effect, and we may take pride in the tangible achievements already made in the preservation of peace and in cooperation for human welfare.

It is worth bearing in mind, however, that a treaty such as the charter of Bogotá is essentially a statement of how and under what conditions a group of sovereign governments intend to cooperate toward stated ends. The charter does not set up any supernational authority that can exercise its own sovereign powers. Nor do the political bodies established in the charter relieve the individual member governments of their responsibility for determining policies and actions of the inter-American organization. On the other hand, the charter does amply provide for the organs necessary to carry out inter-American cooperation in any important field of mutual interest. Moreover, its provisions include sufficient flexibility so that as time goes on the structure and functioning of the branches of our organization can be adapted to meet the requirements of our regional cooperation. We have in our charter a constitution with-

in which inter-American cooperation can work, live, and grow.

The organization which we have today under our charter represents a great contrast to the small and simple organization which existed even as recently as 20 years ago. Its objectives are broader, its organs more numerous, and its activities and achievements vastly more impressive. On the one hand, it presents a vastly greater opportunity for constructive work. On the other hand, it represents for each of the member governments a vastly increased responsibility for efficient, clear-sighted direction. Like a complex machine of modern science, it requires constant and skillful attention so that its potentialities for useful employment may be realized.

The far-flung and sometimes unrelated activities of the various organs of the inter-American system are, under the charter, to be brought into a more coherent and effective whole. Progress toward this integration has already been made through the application of the organizational features of the charter during the past 2 years. However, much remains to be done in the effective realization of this important goal. These are the problems of wise management, requiring a clear understanding of what an inter-American organization can and cannot do and a prudent care of the resources placed at our disposal.

But above and beyond the problems of organization and management lies the challenge of making effective the principles on which our organization is founded.

In its statement of principles and purposes, the charter sets forth the whole context of our inter-American relationship. It describes our devotion to the principles of peace and mutual respect, our belief in the dignity of man and the validity of democratic processes, and our determination to make human life a materially and spiritually more rewarding adventure. These basic principles are written into the charter not as things completely achieved, but as great goals which must ever inspire the members of our inter-American community. They stem from deep moral concepts upon which, in our belief, must rest any sound system of human relationships.

U.S., Cuba Exempt Yachts From Navigation Dues

[Released to the press December 17]

Following are texts of notes exchanged between the United States and Cuba exempting yachts and pleasure craft from navigation dues:

DECEMBER 12, 1951

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inquire whether the Government of the United States would be disposed to

conclude an arrangement with the Cuban Government with a view to exempting on a basis of reciprocity the pleasure yachts of the two countries from navigation dues and from usual requirements of entry and clearance.

In this relation, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that yachts used and employed exclusively as pleasure vessels and belonging to any resident of the United States are allowed to arrive at and to depart from any Cuban port without entering or clearing at the customhouse thereof and without the payment of any entry or clearance charges, tonnage taxes, or charges for cruising licenses.

If your Government consents to grant on a basis of reciprocity the same facilities to pleasure yachts belonging to any resident of Cuba, I permit myself to propose that the present note and your reply will serve as an arrangement between our two countries.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

DR. LUIS MACHADA,
Ambassador of Cuba

DECEMBER 17, 1951

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note No. 574 of December 12, 1951, inquiring whether the Government of the United States would be disposed to conclude an arrangement with the Government of Cuba with a view to exempting on a basis of reciprocity the pleasure yachts of the two countries from navigation dues and from usual requirements of entry and clearance.

In reply I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that, in view (1) of the statements in your note concerning the extent of such privileges granted by Cuba to pleasure vessels belonging to any resident of the United States and (2) of the provisions of Section 104, Title 46 of the United States Code, the Government of the United States agrees to grant on a reciprocal basis the same privileges to pleasure yachts belonging to any resident of Cuba.

The Government of the United States further agrees, in accordance with your Excellency's proposal, that the note under acknowledgment and this note will serve as an arrangement between our two countries.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

THOMAS C. MANN
Acting Assistant Secretary of State

Release of Names of American Prisoners in China Regretted

[Released to the press December 28]

Following is the text of a letter from Under Secretary of State James E. Webb to Senator William F. Knowland of California, which Senator Knowland released to the press on December 26:

DECEMBER 14, 1951

DEAR SENATOR KNOWLAND: It was with deep regret that I learned of your release to the press of the names of the American citizens imprisoned in Communist China. Mr. Rusk sent you this list in confidence under cover of his letter of October 19. He explained to you that it was the consid-

ered judgment of the Department that the list should not be made public. In response to your telegraphed request of November 30 for further information on this subject, you were told on December 1 that such information would be sent you and it was sent on December 7. I note from the press that you decided to release the list on your own responsibility because you did not consider Mr. Rusk's reasoning valid, and that you did so before receiving the Department's letter of December 7.

The Department of State has given full publicity to the fact that Americans are imprisoned by the Chinese Communist regime. It had withheld publication of the names of individuals for three principal reasons:

(1) We could not guarantee that such a list was exact, since it depended upon pieces of information from a wide range of sources;

(2) In many cases either the persons themselves or their relatives or associates have asked that no publicity be given for fear of impairing rescue moves or for fear of serious consequences to the individuals themselves;

(3) The governments which are seeking to aid these individuals have warned that publicity might jeopardize their efforts.

As you were informed, the Department of State has attached considerable importance to the requests of these people primarily interested in the welfare of the imprisoned persons and of the friendly governments trying to help them, and the Department determined after a thorough consideration of all the facts involved that release of individual names or comment on their situation would be contrary to the welfare of these imprisoned citizens.

It need hardly be pointed out that under the President's constitutional authority for the conduct of foreign relations, it is the President and the authorized officers of the Department of State acting as his agents who have sole responsibility for handling this matter and for determining whether and when this information should be released.

As a United States Senator, you have in the past been given access to classified information on the understanding that it was not to be released to the public. Although the question of whether particular information should or should not be made public may be susceptible to an honest difference of opinion, the decision must be made by the person responsible. I regret that in this instance you chose to disregard this fundamental principle and to take independent action.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES E. WEBB
Acting Secretary

Japan Accepts Jurisdiction Of International Court

International Court of Justice
Communiqué No. 51/55
The Hague, December 10, 1951

The following information has been unofficially communicated by the Registry of the International Court of Justice:

On December 10, 1951, the Registrar of the International Court of Justice received the visit of Takezo Shimoda, Japanese Permanent Delegate at The Hague, and of Keiichi Tatsuke, Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Japan. The latter had come especially to deliver to the registrar a declaration of the Japanese Government accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court over differences concerning the interpretation and application of the peace treaty with Japan of September 8, 1951. This declaration was made by application of article 22 of this treaty.

Text of article 22 reads as follows:

If in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there has arisen a dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by reference to a special claims tribunal or by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request of any party thereto, be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice. Japan and those Allied Powers which are not already parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice will deposit with the Registrar of the Court, at the time of their respective ratifications of the present Treaty, and in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council, dated October 15, 1946, a general declaration accepting the jurisdiction, without special agreement, of the Court generally in respect to all disputes of the character referred to in this Article.

Tax Convention With New Zealand Enters Into Force

[Released to the press December 18]

On December 18, 1951, Secretary Acheson and Sir Carl Berendsen, Ambassador of New Zealand, exchanged the instruments of ratification of the convention between the United States and New Zealand, signed at Washington on March 16, 1948, for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income. The convention thereupon entered into force in accordance with its terms.

The Senate, on September 17, 1951, gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the convention, subject to a reservation as follows:

The Government of the United States of America does not accept paragraph (4) of Article IX of the convention relating to the profits or remuneration of public entertainers.

That reservation was accepted by New Zealand. The convention was ratified by the President on December 10, 1951. A proclamation with respect to the entry into force of the convention will be issued by the President.

Delegates to Liberian Inauguration Ceremonies

The Department of State announced on December 29 that the President has designated a 4-man delegation to represent him during the inauguration ceremonies of the President of the Republic of Liberia, W. V. S. Tubman, which will be held at Monrovia, Liberia, January 5 through January 14, 1952.

Chief of the American delegation to the ceremonies will be the American Ambassador to Liberia, Edward R. Dudley. Other members of the delegation are to be Maj. Gen. James S. Stowell, U.S.A.F., Mary McLeod Bethune of Daytona Beach, Fla. and Washington, D.C., and Carl Murphy of Baltimore, Md.

The United States enjoys particularly close relations with the West African Republic of Liberia. One of the most important missions of the Technical Cooperation Administration, or Point Four, is operating in Liberia. The United States, through the Export-Import Bank, has furnished the capital necessary for the construction of badly needed roads into the Liberian interior and for the installation of a water and sewage system in the capital city of Monrovia. Liberia is one of the few nations in the world to undertake to repay the United States for the total amount of lend-lease aid given it during World War II, aid which went principally to the construction of a modern port at Monrovia.

In addition to these governmental interests, there are many private American interests in Liberia. American firms are engaged in the production of rubber and the mining of high-grade iron ore in Liberia as well as in the development of a cocoa industry and other similar activities. Representatives of several of these American firms are planning to attend the inauguration ceremonies of President Tubman.

President Tubman is being inaugurated for his second term of 6 years. Before beginning his first term as President in 1944, he made a visit to the United States as a guest of the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Telecommunications: Telegraph Regulations (Paris Revision, 1949 with Final Protocol). Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2175. Pub. 4105. 365 pp. \$1.

Telegraph Regulations between the United States and Other Governments—Signed at Paris Aug. 5, 1949; entered into force with respect to the United States Sept. 26, 1950.

Agriculture: Cooperative Program in Honduras. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2209. Pub. 4161. 15 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Honduras—Signed at Tegucigalpa Jan. 30, 1951; entered into force Jan. 30, 1951.

Education: Cooperative Program in Ecuador. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2215. Pub. 4172. 12 pp. 5¢.

Agreements between the United States and Ecuador—Signed at Quito Aug. 15 and 24, 1949; entered into force Aug. 25, 1949. Signed at Quito Aug. 16 and 21, 1948; entered into force Aug. 25, 1948.

Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Panama. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2220. Pub. 4183. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Panama—Signed at Panamá Feb. 26, 1951; entered into force Feb. 26, 1951.

Charter of the Allied High Commission for Germany. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2225. Pub. 4204. 18 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—Signed at Paris June 20, 1949; entered into force Sept. 21, 1949.

Revision of the Charter of the Allied High Commission for Germany. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2235. Pub. 4208. 11 pp. 5¢.

Agreement, with annex, between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—Signed at London Mar. 6, 1951; entered into force Mar. 7, 1951.

Technical Cooperation: Joint Commission for Economic Development. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2240. Pub. 4242. 21 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil—Dated at Rio de Janeiro Oct. 21 and Dec. 19, 1950; entered into force Dec. 19, 1950.

Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace With Japan. International Organization and Conference Series II, Far Eastern 3. Pub. 4392. 468 pp. \$1.25.

Record of Proceedings of the Japanese Peace Conference, held at San Francisco, Sept. 4-8, 1951.

(Continued on page 39)

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned during December 1951

ITU (International Telecommunication Union): Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference	Geneva	Aug. 16-Dec. 3
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations): Latin American Training Center on Agricultural and Allied Plans and Projects. Sixth Session of the Conference	Santiago Rome Rio de Janeiro	Sept. 26-Dec. 20 Nov. 19-Dec. 6 Dec. 4-12
Latin American Meeting on Fertilizer Production, Distribution, and Utilization. Fourteenth Session of the Council	Rome	Dec. 7
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization): Fourteenth Session of the Council	Montreal	Sept. 28-Dec. 14
Third Session of the Facilitation Division	Buenos Aires	Nov. 21-Dec. 7
Who (World Health Organization): Statistical and Census Conference	Cairo	Oct. 15-Dec. 15
Tripartite Conference to Negotiate a North Pacific Fisheries Convention.	Tokyo	Nov. 5-Dec. 14
Special Meeting re Air Traffic Coordination in Western Europe . .	Paris	Nov. 20-Dec. 3
ILO (International Labor Organization): Seminar on Labor Statistics	New Delhi	Nov. 21-Dec. 4
Inland Transport Committee: 4th Session	Genoa	Dec. 4-15
Asian Manpower Technical Conference	Bangkok	Dec. 12-22
Conference to Facilitate the Movement of European Migrants . .	Brussels	Nov. 26-Dec. 8
Joint U.K., U.S., Canadian Discussions on Administrative and Scientific Problems relating to Food Aspects of Civilian Defense.	London	Nov. 26-Dec. 13
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization): Second Regional Conference of Representatives of National Commissions.	Bangkok	Nov. 26-Dec. 10
Special Meeting of the Board of the American International In- stitute for the Protection of Childhood.	Montevideo	Nov. 30-Dec. 1
Third Congress of the Pan American Alliance of the Doctors of Medicine.	Mexico City	Dec. 2-8
Seminar on Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments Statistics .	Panama City	Dec. 3-15
Twenty-seventh Session of the International Statistical Institute .	New Delhi and Calcutta	Dec. 5-18
Fourth International Congress on Mental Health	Mexico City	Dec. 11-19
United Nations: Economic and Social Council: Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Railway Working Party	Bangkok Bangkok Calcutta	Dec. 11-15 Dec. 17-21 Dec. 19-29*
Inland Transport Committee		
Subcommission on Statistical Sampling: 5th Session.		

In Session as of December 31, 1951

International Materials Conference	Washington	Feb. 26-
Four Power Conference on Swiss-Allied Accord	Bern	Mar. 5-
United Nations: General Assembly: 6th Session	Paris	Nov. 6-
Economic and Social Council: 13th Session, Reconvening of .	Paris	Dec. 18-

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Dec. 17, 1951.

*Tentative.

Scheduled January 1-March 1952

ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Legal Committee, Subcommittee on the Revision of the Warsaw Convention	Paris	Jan. 7-
Personnel Licensing Division: 4th Session	Montreal	Jan. 22-
Council: 15th Session	Montreal	Jan. 29-
European-Mediterranean Regional Meeting: 3d Session	Paris	Feb. 26-
United Nations:		
Economic and Social Council:		
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:		
Working Party to Coordinate Work of Governments for the Adoption of a Standard International Trade Classification	Bangkok	Jan. 7-
Subcommittee on Electric Power	Rangoon	Jan. 11-
Committee on Industry and Trade: 4th Session	Rangoon	Jan. 18-
Eighth Session	Rangoon	Jan. 29-
Economic Commission for Latin America:	Santiago	Feb. 10-14
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Meeting to Approve Report to ECOSOC		
Economic Commission for Europe: 7th Session	Geneva	Mar. 3-
Subcommission on Freedom of Information of the Press: 5th Session	New York	Mar. 3-
Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations	New York	Mar. 18-
Commission on the Status of Women: 6th Session	Geneva	Mar. 24-
Technical Assistance Committee	New York	Mar. 24-
Trusteeship Council:	Paris	Jan.*
Special Session		
WHO (World Health Organization):		
Standing Committee on Administration and Finance	Geneva	Jan. 7-
Executive Board: 9th Session	Geneva	Jan. 21-
Meeting of Copyright Experts of the American Republics	Washington	Jan. 14-
UPU (Universal Postal Union):		
Meeting of Executive and Liaison Committee	Bern	Jan. 21-
International Film Festival of India	Calcutta, Madras and New Delhi	Jan. 24-
West Point Sesquicentennial	West Point, New York	Jan.-June
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):		
Council: 9th Session	Lisbon	Feb. 2-
"Colombo Plan" Exhibition	Colombo, Ceylon	Feb. 15-
British Commonwealth Scientific Official Conference	Canberra and Melbourne	Feb. 18-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Advisory Committee on Salaried Employees and Professional Workers	Geneva	Feb. 18-
Governing Body: 118th Session	Geneva	Mar. 11-
Second International Industries Fair	Karachi	Mar. 1-
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Executive Board: 28th Session	Paris	Mar. 3-
First General Assembly of the International Mathematical Union	Rome	Mar. 6-
Second Chicago International Trade Fair	Chicago	Mar. 22-
Fourth Inter-American Conference on Social Security	Mexico City	Mar. 24-

*Tentative.

International Materials Conference

Copper and Zinc Allocations

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee of the International Materials Conference on December 20 announced allocations of copper and zinc for the first quarter of 1952.¹ This is the second consecutive quarter that copper and zinc have been allocated by the Imc.

The governments of the 12 countries represented on the Committee have accepted these allocations. They are Australia, Belgium (representing Benelux), Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In accepting the Committee's recommendation, the Chilean Government has made one reservation which is explained below.

The two distribution plans have been forwarded to the governments of all countries not represented

¹For table of allocations, see Imc press release of Dec. 20.

on the Committee to which allocations were made. Requirements of nonmember countries were considered along with those of member countries.

Only primary copper and zinc have been allocated. Semifabricated products have not been allocated. Exports of semifabricated products are to be maintained, however, at a level commensurate with the exporting country's allocations of metal.

The demands for defense and essential civilian needs have increased over the fourth quarter of 1951. In view of these increased demands, it has been decided, temporarily, to make no provision for strategic stockpiling, without prejudice to the principle of making such provision in future allocations.

The Committee has allocated the total estimated production available to the free world on the same basis, in general, except for strategic stockpiling, as it did for the fourth quarter of 1951.

The allocations for each participating country are again in the form of a "total entitlement for consumption"—the amount of metal which may be processed or consumed by the country concerned, either from domestic production or imports. They do not specify from which source, or sources, a country's metal shall be obtained. Participating countries are, therefore, free within their allocation to purchase from any source or sell to any destination, but it is suggested that, so far as possible, the normal patterns of trade should be followed.

In accepting the distribution plans, governments assume the responsibility for seeing that their allocations are not exceeded.

The Chilean Government accepted again the Committee's recommendations with respect to 80 percent of the copper production of its large mines. With respect to the remaining 20 percent and the production of its small and medium mines it reserves the right to dispose of this tonnage without reference to the allocation scheme. Notwithstanding this reservation, the Chilean Government restated that it will give careful consideration wherever possible to the Committee's recommendations.

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee is not recommending the allocation of lead, but is keeping the supply-demand position under review.

Mexico and Sweden Named to Sulphur Committee

The International Materials Conference announced on December 20 that Mexico and Sweden have accepted its invitation to be represented on the Sulphur Committee.²

²There are 28 member countries in the I.M.C. Mexico is represented also on the Copper-Zinc-Lead and Cotton-Cotton Linters Committees; Sweden has membership also on the Tungsten-Molybdenum and Pulp-Paper Committees.

This brings to 16 the number of countries now represented on this Committee. They are Australia, Belgium (representing Benelux), Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Mexican Government has designated Alfonso Cortina, Minister and Economic Counselor at the Embassy in Washington, as its representative. Agustin Ochoa, Economic Attaché at the Embassy, has been named as alternate.

The Swedish representative on the Committee will be Hubert de Besche, Economic Counselor of the Embassy in Washington and his alternate, Carl Henrik von Platen, First Secretary of the Embassy.

Temporary Arrangement on Export and Import of Primary Nickel

The International Materials Conference announced also on December 28 that the Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee has established a provisional list of export sales and import purchases of primary nickel for the month of January 1952.³ This will allow producers to continue sales during that month, while the Committee develops a plan of allocation for the first quarter of 1952 or any other period which it may deem more appropriate. It is the intention of the Committee to recommend such a plan before the end of January, at which time the temporary arrangement expires.

As in the case of cobalt, the Committee's work has been delayed because some governments were late in submitting their replies to the questionnaire on first quarter 1952 requirements.

It has been agreed by member governments that, as recommended by the Committee, all marketable forms of primary nickel should fall within the allocation from the first of January 1952. These primary forms include some elements which were not allocated in the fourth quarter of 1951, namely, ferro-nickel, nickel, cast-iron, and mattes used directly by consumers of nickel. Conversely, nickel salts which were under allocation in the fourth quarter are excluded from the new arrangement.

In view of these changes in the products to be covered by the allocation, the Committee undertakes to make a complete review of the historical pattern of consumption and of the requirements of each country before recommending an equitable scheme of distribution. This scheme will absorb the export sales and import purchases made in compliance with the provisional arrangement.

All interested governments have been notified of this list of sales and purchases, with which they are requested to conform without prejudice to whatever allocation may be agreed upon at a later date.

³for list of sales and purchases see I.M.C. press release of Dec. 28.

Divergent Views on Disarmament Discussed

On December 10, Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico, President of the General Assembly and chairman of the special subcommittee appointed to discuss proposals for disarmament,¹ transmitted to the chairman of Committee I (Political and Security) the following memorandum, which he had prepared at the request of the subcommittee and which the latter had unanimously approved:

U.N. doc. A/C.1/677
Dated Dec. 10, 1951

Part I. Areas of Agreement

1. Although the discussions in the Sub-Committee have revealed the continued existence of a number of serious divergencies of views between the sponsors of the tripartite draft resolution (A/C.1/667) and of the USSR amendment (A/C.1/668) on points of major importance, they have also revealed a number of points of importance on which there appears to be either agreement or the possibility of agreement. These include certain of the general objectives of the two proposals, the machinery to be used in attaining those objectives, and some of the tasks that are required to be performed.

General objectives

2. The two proposals are in agreement with respect to certain of the general objectives which they seek to achieve. The first paragraph of the preamble of the tripartite draft resolution, which reads:

"The General Assembly,

"Desiring to lift from the peoples of the world the burden of increasing armaments and the fear of war, and to liberate new energies and resources for positive programmes of reconstruction and development,"

has been accepted by the USSR and no amendment thereto has been proposed. The third paragraph of the first item of the Soviet amendment reads:

"Convinced that if all governments sincerely combine their efforts in order to co-operate in an effective and substantial limitation of armed forces and of armaments and also in an immediate and unconditional prohibition of the production of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition, the danger of war will be considerably averted and the security of all nations strengthened".

Paragraph 2 of the tripartite statement (Annex to document A/1943) reads:

"They also believe that if all governments sincerely join in the co-operative and effective regulation and limitation of armed forces and armaments, this would greatly

reduce the danger of war and thus enhance the security of all nations."

Paragraph 3 (a) of the tri-partite draft resolution reads:

"It is a primary objective of the United Nations to bring about the limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments to levels adequate for defence but not for aggression and to achieve effective international control to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons."

So far as concerns the general objectives referred to above, and the specific means of attaining those objectives, there is a fundamental divergence between the positions adopted by the delegation of the Soviet Union on the one hand and the delegations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France on the other hand. That is evident from the three-Power draft resolution and the amendments to it by the USSR delegation, as well as from the attitudes adopted by the delegations of the USSR, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France during the discussion of that matter in the Sub-Committee.

The Commission

3. The sponsors of the two proposals have agreed to the establishment of a new commission to take the place of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, which are accordingly to be dissolved. The three Powers have agreed to accept item 4 of the USSR amendment, namely that the new commission shall be called the "Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission". There is agreement between the two proposals that the new commission shall be "under the Security Council", and also agreement with respect to its membership and its rules of procedure. The three Powers have accepted the formulation proposed by the USSR in item number 2 of its amendments in place of the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution, namely:

"Noting the recommendation of the Committee of Twelve established by resolution 496 (V) that the General Assembly should establish a new commission to carry on the task originally assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments".

The Task of the Commission

4. There is some agreement between the two proposals with respect to the task to be performed by the new Commission. The Commission is to prepare proposals or measures which are to be embodied in a draft treaty or treaties (conventions).

These proposals or measures are intended to achieve, in the words of resolution A/C.1/675 of 30 November 1951, "the universal desire for peace, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, and for the abolition of atomic and other weapons for mass destruction".

The representative of the USSR preferred to define these objectives as the prohibition of atomic weapons, the

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 10, 1951, p. 957.

effective (strict) international control of atomic energy and its use for peaceful (civilian) purposes only, and the limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

There are, notwithstanding, grave divergencies of opinion as to the principles and methods according to which these tasks should be executed.

It should nevertheless be observed that during the discussion of this matter in the Sub-Committee opinions were expressed on the possibility of embarking on a common course to achieve solution of the problems posed by these questions.

Terms of Reference of the Commission

5. Here too, while there are several points upon which agreement has not been achieved at the present time, there is a considerable area of common ground on the following matters to the extent explained below:

(a) the type of armed forces and armaments to be included;

(b) the necessity for disclosure;

(c) the necessity for verification and inspection;

(d) the necessity for safeguards.

(a) *The type of armed forces and armaments to be included*

Both proposals agreed that all armed forces (including para-military, security and police forces) and all armaments (including atomic) should be included in the terms of reference of the commission.

(b) *The necessity for disclosure*

Both proposals agree that there should be full disclosure of information regarding all armaments and all armed forces. While there are some differences with regard to the publication of the information disclosed, it does not appear that these differences are impossible of solution, and they might well be left to the Commission.

The representative of the USSR, however, who favours the simultaneous disclosure of information on both atomic and non-atomic weapons within one month, is absolutely opposed to the whole concept of "progressive" disclosure or disclosure by stages. The representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States wish to make it clear that in their view disclosure should be both progressive and on a continuing basis.

(c) *Verification and inspection*

All four Powers agree on the necessity for verification and inspection. The USSR amendment, like the three Power proposal, referred to the necessity for "effective international inspection"; the USSR Representative stated that such inspection included verification. Moreover, all four Powers agree that the verification and inspection should apply to all armed forces and all armaments.

The USSR representative objected to "inspection on a continuing basis", pointing out that the permanent presence of inspectors or controllers at the establishments in question would hinder their efficient operation and was incompatible with State sovereignty. He was prepared to agree that the international control organ should elicit information on all armed forces, including semi-military forces, security and police forces, and all armaments, including atomic weapons, and should establish effective international inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the aforesaid international control organ, provision being made for control to include also verification of the information submitted.

In addition he was prepared to agree that, in cases of a suspected breach of the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons, special inspections or investigations could be carried out.

The representative of the USSR considered that the resolution to be adopted by the Assembly should also provide for the Commission to be entrusted with the task of working out all details and procedures in the draft convention.

The meaning attributed by the three Powers to the

phrase "inspection on a continuing basis" is that the whole inspection process, whether in the disclosure and verification aspect or in the control aspect, must function continuously once it has been established and must not be limited to a single operation of inspection or verification. This would not necessarily require the permanent stationing of inspectors at all plants. The three Powers also wish to make it clear that inspection should be possible at any time whether or not there is reason to suspect that violations may have taken place. In their view, the control of atomic energy cannot be ensured if it is dependent on inspection alone.

All four Powers appear to agree that the control organ should decide the times and places of inspection and that a majority decision by the control organ in that regard would be binding on all, with no right of "veto".

(d) *Safeguards*

All four Powers are in agreement with the necessity for safeguards to ensure observance of the programme. The representative of the USSR stated that he had no objections in that respect, since the international control organ would have the right to carry out special investigations when suspicions of a breach of the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons arose. The Three Powers pointed out that the safeguards which they have in mind are more extensive in nature than special investigations alone, and furthermore that these safeguards apply to conventional armaments as well as to atomic energy.

The USSR representative stated that that formula would involve inspection on a permanent basis, and that the USSR delegation objected to such a measure. The USSR delegation did not, however, object to the application of such safeguards to the reduction of conventional armaments.

Relations of the Commission with the Organs of the United Nations

6. As has been noted above, both proposals agree that the commission should be established "under the Security Council". The USSR has proposed that the commission should submit its draft convention and its other proposals to the Security Council; the three Powers have proposed that it should report periodically not only to the Security Council but also to the General Assembly or its Members. The representative of the USSR has stated that in the Commission he would be bound only by majority decisions which he accepted, and that the principle of unanimity would obviously also continue to apply in the Security Council. He pointed out, however, that since ultimately the convention would require agreement for its ratification, the question was of no great practical importance, since unanimity of the powers represented in the commission would, in any event, be essential if it was desired that they should sign and ratify the convention.

The Draft Convention or Treaty

7. The Three Power proposal provides that the commission, which would start work within thirty days of the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly, would submit its draft treaty to a world conference when any part of its programme was ready for submission to governments. The USSR proposal on the other hand provides that the commission would submit its draft convention to the Security Council by 1 February 1952. The USSR proposed the deletion of paragraph 6 of the tripartite draft resolution. It appears from the discussion that the USSR prefers a time limit for the submission of the draft treaty or convention but is prepared to adjust its suggested time-table if agreement is possible on major points. The representative of the USSR also proposes that the General Assembly should instruct the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to prepare within three months and submit for the consideration of the Security Council practical proposals for the application of the decisions of the General Assembly.

The International Control Organ

8. Only the USSR amendment refers explicitly to the establishment of an international control organ; the three Powers regard the establishment of such an organ as being implicit in their draft resolution. Moreover, the four Powers are apparently in agreement that the organ's composition, rights and duties would have to be defined in the draft convention.

Relations of the International Control Organ with Organs of the United Nations

9. The USSR proposal provides that the control organ should be established "within the frame-work of the Security Council". The Representative of the USSR, however, stated that majority decisions of the control organ should be binding on all, with no "veto" right. The representative of the United Kingdom observed that the question accordingly might not cause great difficulty and could possibly be disposed of as a matter of drafting by properly defining in the Treaty the respective functions of the control organ and of the Security Council.

The World Conference of All States

10. Both proposals envisage the calling of a world conference to include all states, Members of the United Nations as well as non-Members. The discussions in the Sub-Committee appear to assume that the idea of the conference was a matter of common ground. Nevertheless, there were some substantive differences of opinion with regard to the method and time of convening the world conference, in view of the fact that the three-Power draft resolution rendered the matter dependent on the Commission's decision, whereas the USSR amendments provided for convening the conference as soon as possible and not later than 1 June 1952.

Some differences of opinion also developed over the formulation in the Three Power draft resolution of the proposition that the treaty must be ratified by all nations having "substantial" armed forces. The representative of the USSR objected to the word "substantial" as being too vague and therefore capable of causing subsequent disagreement. It appears, however, that all four Powers are in agreement on the principle that the treaty or convention must be ratified by every country whose armed forces were so important that its failure to ratify would make it unsafe for other countries to be bound.

Staff of the Commission

11. Paragraph 9 of the tripartite draft resolution, dealing with the provision of staff and facilities for the commission, was accepted by the USSR without amendment.

Part II. Areas of Disagreement

12. As was previously indicated, a number of serious and fundamental divergencies of views exist between the sponsors of the tripartite draft resolution (A/C.1/667) and of the USSR amendments (A/C.1/668) on points of major importance. These include the specific means for attaining the general objectives of the two proposals, and the principles that are to be established for the guidance of the Commission.

13. Specific means for attaining the general objectives

The two different conceptions which demonstrate the grave basic divergences dividing the Three Powers from the USSR are illustrated by the following quotations regarding the specific means for attaining the general objectives.

The second paragraph of the preamble of the Three-Power proposals reads as follows:

"Believing that the necessary means to this end is to the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and co-ordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction to levels adequate for defence but not for aggression of all armed forces and all armaments, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure

the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,"

The first paragraph of the first item of the Soviet amendments reads as follows:

"Recognizing as a primary and most important task the unconditional prohibition of the production of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition and also the reduction by one-third of the other types of armaments and armed forces of the five Powers: the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, within one year of the adoption of the relevant decision by the General Assembly and on the basis of the level of armaments and armed forces at the time the aforesaid decision is taken,"

14. The Three Powers propose that the resolution should provide for:

(a) the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments.

The USSR opposes the idea of a system based on "balanced" reduction as it states that balanced reduction is linked to the idea of "levels" and that the emphasis on "balance" detracts from and would postpone the actual decisions on reduction.

(b) [Balanced reduction] to levels adequate for defence but not for aggression.

The USSR opposes this formulation on the ground that the levels envisaged might mean an increase of armaments rather than a decrease and, in any event, this does not constitute a concrete proposal for the reduction of armaments.

(c) The achievement of effective international control to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons.

The USSR opposes this formulation on the ground that it does not provide for the immediate and unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, that it puts control before prohibition, and that unless there is prior prohibition there is nothing to control.

15. The USSR proposes that the resolution should provide for the General Assembly immediately and simultaneously to:

(a) declare the unconditional prohibition of the production of atomic weapons.

This is opposed by the Three Powers on the ground that, until a system of control is in operation, the prohibition would be unenforceable and illusory.

(b) declare the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of the prohibition.

The Three Powers hold the view that the mere declaration would have little meaning unless there were prior agreement on the precise nature of the control and the control system was put into operation.

(c) recommend to the Great Powers to reduce their [existing] armaments and armed forces by one-third within one year.

The Three Powers are of the opinion that this reduction, carried out by a fraction arbitrarily fixed, would preserve or, possibly, even intensify the present imbalance between them and the USSR. Moreover, they state that the measure of the necessary balanced reduction can be determined only on the basis of verified information as to the existing state of armaments.

16. Principles for the guidance of the Commission

The extent of the area of agreement on the terms of reference of the Commission has been previously outlined, while it was at the same time indicated that the Three Powers and the USSR were not in agreement on all the proposed terms of reference. The discussions revealed serious divergencies on several matters, which centre around the following:

(a) International control of atomic energy;

(b) The system of stages of disclosure;

(c) The directives to be given to the Commission

(a) *International control of atomic energy*

17. The Three Powers while expressing a willingness to examine other plans, stated that the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the control of atomic energy unless and until a better or no less effective system could be devised. They stated that this plan had been carefully worked out over a long period of time and had been accepted by the vast majority of the United Nations as the only effective system of control so far devised.

The representative of the USSR stated that this plan of the majority of the United Nations (the Baruch Plan) was completely unacceptable for the many reasons repeatedly advanced by the USSR, the main of which were that the plan would be an infringement on the sovereignty of nations, it would set up a monopolistic trust under the United States, and that the prohibition of the atomic weapon would be indefinitely postponed.

18. The USSR proposed that the system of control should be implemented by an international control organ responsible for control of the enforcement of the prohibition of atomic weapons, provision also being made for effective international inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the control organ. The representative of the USSR stated that unless there was a prior decision for the prohibition of the atomic weapons there would be no prohibition to enforce and nothing to control. Once the basic decision had been taken on the prohibition of atomic weapons and on the establishment of international control for the enforcement of that prohibition, the Commission could within a short time work out measures to ensure the implementation of the General Assembly resolution on the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their production, the use of atomic bombs which have already been manufactured for civilian purposes only and the establishment of strict international control of the enforcement of the said measures, provided for by an appropriate convention.

The representatives of the Three Powers stated that the USSR plan was completely unacceptable to them. They also pointed out that there would be a time-lag between a General Assembly "decision" to establish control and the actual putting into effect of this control, even if the existing broad disagreement as to the nature of the control plan was overcome. In any event, inspection alone was not an adequate safeguard.

The USSR representative stated that the USSR delegation's proposal for a declaration by the General Assembly of an unconditional ban on atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of that ban was a matter of principle with great moral and political significance, and that it was only if there were such a decision that practical steps could be taken to ensure the implementation of that decision. The USSR representative indicated his disagreement with the position of the Three Powers, which in his opinion could only be regarded as delaying the prohibition of atomic weapons.

(b) *The system of stages of disclosure*

19. The Three Powers maintained that there must be progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, carried out concurrently in regard to conventional armaments and armed forces and atomic energy. They considered that the implementation of plans for such disclosure and verification is a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme.

The representative of the USSR was absolutely opposed to the concept of disclosure by stages, which he stated could only result in the indefinite postponement of disclosure of information on the most destructive and dangerous arms, such as atomic weapons.

(c) *Directives to be given to the Commission*

20. The USSR is opposed to the directives to be given to the Commission, which are set out in paragraph 5 of the tripartite draft resolution, concerning the formulation

of criteria, proposals for overall limits on armed forces and armaments and the allocation of armed forces and armaments within national military establishments. The Three Powers maintained that it was necessary to give the Commission directives for working out its plans. The USSR representative had no objection to the Commission being given directives and proposed that the Commission should be instructed to prepare and submit to the Security Council within three months practical proposals for the implementation of the General Assembly resolution on that matter.

Conclusion

21. The points contained in Parts I and II survey the areas of agreement, possible agreement and disagreement which have been disclosed and clarified in the Sub-Committee. Despite the disagreements which exist on a number of matters of major importance in the two proposals, it seems clear that there is some agreement on a number of aspects of the two programmes. The discussions in the sub-committee appear to have helped to widen the areas of agreement on some points of the two proposals.

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¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Discussion of Tripartite Resolution on Disarmament

*Statements by Philip C. Jessup
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly*

U.S. PRESENTS REVISIONS¹

Mr. Chairman, at our session on Wednesday, the delegation of the Soviet Union tabled document 66S/Rev. 1, a revision of the Soviet amendments to the tripartite disarmament resolution.

Yesterday, the delegations of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States tabled document 667/Rev. 1, a revision of the tripartite resolution.²

I regret that the revised Soviet amendments disclose few changes. I had hoped that our earnest discussions in the Four-Power subcommittee might have led to some measure of flexibility in the Soviet position.

With respect to the discussions in the subcommittee, the distinguished delegates of the United Kingdom and France have explained the views of the three powers regarding the work done there—and they have also explained our views on the work which remains to be done here in the First Committee. We do not blink at the difficulties, but the task of disarmament is vital and we intend to get on with that task. With this in mind, and in the light of the discussions in the subcommittee and the many thoughtful opinions advanced by other members of this committee, we have revised document 667, the original tripartite draft resolution. It is to our revised resolution that I wish to address myself this morning.

It is apparent from a reading of the revised Soviet amendments and our revised draft resolution that fundamental differences on matters of principle remain. They are recognized by us and by the Soviet delegate and by all the other members of this Committee. Nevertheless, we have wished to go as far as possible toward meeting the Soviet delegate—"to widen the areas of agree-

ment," as it was put by the President of the General Assembly, who presided with such patience and skill over the deliberations of the subcommittee. It is in the spirit of widening the areas of agreement that we submit our revised draft.

I turn now, Mr. Chairman, to the text of our revised draft. The first paragraph of the preamble is unchanged; that language was agreed upon in the subcommittee.

There is a new second paragraph in the preamble:

Reaffirming its desire that the United Nations develop an effective collective security system to maintain the peace and that the armed forces and armaments of the world be progressively reduced in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.

This paragraph had its genesis in the thought expressed by the distinguished delegate of Lebanon at the meeting of this Committee on the 23d of November. He suggested that the possibility of collective security should be explicitly formulated. We agree that this is an important concept which might well be included in so important a General Assembly resolution.

In what is now the third paragraph of the preamble (formerly the second paragraph), we have deleted the phrase "to levels adequate for defense but not for aggression." The Soviet delegate, as well as several other delegates, questioned this formulation. In connection with the Soviet views, I call your attention to the report of the Chairman of the subcommittee. [Doc. 677, p. 10, paragraph 14 (b).]

The phrase we have deleted was designated to express certain ideas which, surely, everyone accepts.

Pending the development of a collective security system, now referred to in new paragraph 2 of the preamble, surely no state can afford to neglect its defense and the right of self-defense recognized in article 51 of the charter.

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Dec. 14 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1951, p. 889.

All would agree that a prime objective is to prevent aggression, and no state should be armed in such a way as to make aggression possible.

But since these ideas are clear and the general objectives are adequately indicated by the rest of the tripartite resolution, we eliminate this phrase, and thereby eliminate one other particular point of disagreement.

In what is now the fourth paragraph of the preamble, we are proposing another change designed to clear up what has struck some delegates as an ambiguity. The Soviet delegate argued in the subcommittee that the phrase "substantial armed forces" was unclear, the word "substantial" being essentially a matter of subjective opinion. We have attempted to meet his point here by substituting the phrase "whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system." We believe this phrase is within the area of agreement stated in the report of President Nervo. [Doc. 667, p. 8, par. 10.]

In the last paragraph of the preamble, the three sponsors have accepted the second Soviet amendment contained in document 668. The Soviet delegate objected to some portions of the report of the Committee of Twelve [Doc. 677, p. 3, par. 2]; we three regard the recommendation favoring the establishment of a new commission as being the important thought in this paragraph, and we are glad to meet him here.

On the first operative paragraph, we again tried to meet the view expressed by the Soviet delegate in the subcommittee by agreeing to his proposal that the Commission be called the "Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission" [Doc. 677, p. 3, par. 3]. The name, as my British and French colleagues have already observed, is rather unwieldy and does not in fact describe the functions of the new commission, we think, as effectively as does our original name, "Disarmament Commission." However, in our revised text we, of course, include this change agreed upon in the subcommittee.

In the second operative paragraph there is no change.

In the first part of our operative paragraph 3, we have added a phrase at the end of the first sentence to make it clear that the new Commission is to prepare proposals

for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

This, of course, was always our intention; we considered that the thought was covered in the original formulation which dealt with "all armed forces and all armaments." This phrase, in our view, includes atomic-energy control. However, we certainly have no objection to stating this explicitly to make our meaning perfectly clear. Nevertheless, we recognize that this is a paragraph in which one of the fundamental points of disagreement must appear.

In view of the foregoing change in paragraph 3, we have deleted the old subparagraph 3 (a) because it seems unnecessary to restate the objective so often. The deletion of subparagraph (a) and the relettering of the remaining subparagraphs is merely a matter of drafting.

New (a) is old (b) with no change.

New (b) is old (c). Here we have added a phrase,

this inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the international control organ to be established.

This again represents an effort to meet the point of view of the Soviet delegate, who wished this thought to be made explicit. [Doc. 677, p. 6, par. 5 (c), and p. 7, par. 8; cf. par. 4 of revised resolution.]

Subparagraph (c), which is the old subparagraph (d), is introduced by a new sentence:

The Commission shall be ready to consider any proposals or plans for control that may be put forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy.

The three powers believed that this idea was clearly implicit in their first draft, but, in view of the observations of the Soviet delegate, we desire to underscore it. For instance, the Soviet delegate yesterday said, "the three governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France do not wish to depart one iota" from the United Nations plan for the control of atomic energy. We maintain the view that the new Commission should take advantage of the work of the United Nations approved by the General Assembly during the last 5 years, and we therefore believe it is absolutely necessary to retain the rest of this paragraph as originally drafted. The new sentence, however, emphasizes the point that the new commission should be ready to consider any proposals in the field of atomic-energy control or in regard to control in the field of conventional armaments. Since the Soviet Union does not agree with the plan repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly, we hope that its representatives will submit new proposals which the Commission will study.

The changes in paragraph 3 (e) are again drafting changes corresponding to a change in the preamble and designed to clarify the thought and to make it clear that the states embarking on this program can decide among themselves which of them have military strength of such importance that they must become parties before the treaty or treaties shall enter into force.

Paragraph 4 is new. This contains the same thought as is contained in Soviet amendment number 5, and, like our revised 3 (b), makes explicit what was implicit in the original three-power draft: that there must be an international control organ to ensure the implementation of the disarmament plan. In view of the opinions expressed in the subcommittee [Doc. 677, p. 7, par. 8], we have been glad to insert this paragraph to reassure the Soviet delegate.

New paragraphs 5 and 6 are old paragraphs 4 and 5 without change until we reach the subparagraphs of new paragraph 6.

With respect to old 5 (a) and (b), various delegations, including that of the Soviet Union, have found difficulty with the idea of criteria which could be used in devising proposals for limiting and restricting armed forces and armaments. Secretary of State Acheson explained fully our view on this.³ We continue to believe that such criteria can be found. However, in order to avoid the difficulty and in order once again to make it clear that the Commission is free to devise its methods of work, we have deleted old subparagraphs 5 (a) and (b) and replaced them by new 6 (a) which provides that the General Assembly simply direct the commission "to determine how over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed." We hope this will be considered as going forward toward meeting the Soviet view stated in President Neruo's report. [Doc. 677, p. 12, par. 20.]

Subparagraph 6 (b) is old 5 (c) without change.

We have added a sentence at the end of paragraph 7 directing the commission to submit its *first* report not later than June 1, 1952. This is to give further emphasis to our view that the new commission should go to work quickly and press forward as rapidly as possible. It also seeks to meet the Soviet delegate's desire to fix a specific date. We still think that the dates suggested by the Soviet delegate as absolute requirements are unrealistic.

I have attempted to explain the amendments included in our revised draft.

It may be said we have not accepted all the Soviet amendments. Indeed, we have not. I repeat what I said at the outset—that there are fundamental points of disagreement between the Soviet amendments and the several resolutions of the General Assembly in the past years.

Our proposed resolution takes those earlier resolutions of the General Assembly as points of departure. We do not accept the view which we think would be retrogressive, that all of the hard work, the discussions and decisions of the past 5 years should be thrown aside and that we should start all over again.

Our common agreement on the point that the General Assembly should establish a new commission to carry the work forward is important, because genuine progress towards disarmament is likely to be possible only when the commission has worked out the details of the program.

We hope it will there become apparent to the Soviet Union that there is nothing in the program inimical to its best interests, or inconsistent with the independence and security of the Soviet Union or any other state.

We do not propose a program of disarmament

in which the benefits will be on any one side. We propose a program in which the people of the Soviet Union will be as much a beneficiary as all other peoples. We seek no advantage save that of sharing in the general increase in security and the liberation of vast new energies and resources for world economic development.

In the new commission the work of negotiation must continue. All agree that the results of the negotiation must be included in a treaty or treaties which will be subject to ratification. As our new revised text makes even more clear, the Commission will consider all proposals and plans which are advanced. As M. Moch said on Tuesday, we must start from where we are today. The tripartite revised draft resolution does start from the actualities of the present. It also looks to the future by establishing an appropriate forum—the new Commission of Twelve—in which negotiation can proceed.

Speaking for the three sponsors of this resolution, I can say we shall enter those negotiations with the fixed desire and hope that they will result in agreement.

TEXTS OF REVISIONS TO TRIPARTITE RESOLUTION

U.S., France, and U.K.

U.N. doc. A/C.1/667/Rev. 1
Dated December 13, 1951

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

DESIRING to lift from the peoples of the world the burden of increasing armaments and the fear of war, and to liberate new energies and resources for positive programmes of reconstruction and development,

REAFFIRMING its desire that the United Nations develop an effective collective security system to maintain the peace and that the armed forces and armaments of the world be progressively reduced in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter,

BELIEVING that a necessary means to this end is the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and co-ordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,

RECOGNIZING that a genuine system for disarmament must include all kinds of armed forces and armaments, must be accepted by all nations whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system, and must include safeguards that will ensure the compliance of all such nations,

NOTING the recommendation of the Committee of Twelve established by Resolution 496 (V) that the General Assembly should establish a new commission to carry forward the tasks originally assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments,

1. Establishes under the Security Council an Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission. This Commission shall have the same membership as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and shall function under the rules of procedure of the Atomic Energy Commission with such modifications as the Commission shall deem necessary;

³ BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1951, p. 879.

2. *Dissolves* the Atomic Energy Commission and recommends to the Security Council that it dissolve the Commission for Conventional Armaments;

3. *Directs* the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The Commission shall be guided by the following principles:

(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces—including para-military, security and police forces—and all armaments including atomic;

(b) Such verification must be based on effective international inspection to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed; this inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the international control organ (or organs) to be established;

(c) The Commission shall be ready to consider any proposals or plans for control that may be put forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy. Unless a better or no less effective system is devised, the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

(d) There must be an adequate system of safeguards to ensure observance of the disarmament programme, so as to provide for the prompt detection of violations while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country;

(e) The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open to all states for signature and ratification or adherence. The treaty (or treaties) shall provide what States must become parties thereto before the treaty (or treaties) shall enter into force;

4. *Directs* the Commission, when preparing the proposals referred to in the preceding paragraph, to formulate plans for the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of an international control organ (or organs) to ensure the implementation of the treaty (or treaties). The functions and powers of the control organ (or organs) shall be defined in the treaty which establishes it;

5. *Directs* the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the out-set plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution;

6. *Directs* the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments,

(a) to determine how overall limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed;

(b) to consider methods according to which States can agree among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission, concerning the allocation within their respective national military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments;

7. *Directs* the Commission to commence its work not later than thirty days from the adoption of this resolution and to report periodically, for information, to the Security Council and to the General Assembly or to the Members of the United Nations when the General Assembly is not in session. The Commission shall submit its first report not later than 1 June, 1952;

8. *Declares* that a conference of all States should be convened to consider the proposals for a draft treaty (or

treaties) prepared by the Commission as soon as the work of the Commission shall have progressed to a point where in the judgment of the Commission any part of its programme is ready for submission to governments;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to convene such a conference when so advised by the Commission;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish such experts, staff and facilities as the Commission may consider necessary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes of the present resolution.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

U.N. doc. A/C.1/668/Rev. 1
Dated December 11, 1951

1. Replace the second and third paragraphs of the preamble by the following text:

"RECOGNIZING as a primary and most important task the unconditional prohibition of the production of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition and also the reduction by one-third of the other types of armaments and armed forces of the five Powers: the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, within one year of the adoption of the relevant decision by the General Assembly and on the basis of the level of armaments and armed forces at the time the aforesaid decision is taken,

"NOTING that these measures will serve the purpose of strengthening the peace and security of nations and contribute to lightening the heavy economic burden borne by the peoples of the various countries as a result of the ever-increasing expenditure on armaments and re-armament,

"CONVINCED that if all governments sincerely combine their efforts in order to co-operate in an effective and substantial limitation of armed forces and of armaments and also in an immediate and unconditional prohibition of the production of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition, the danger of war will be considerably averted and the security of all nations strengthened",

2. Word the fourth paragraph of the preamble as follows:

"NOTING the recommendation of the Committee of Twelve established by resolution 496 (V) that the General Assembly should establish a new commission to carry on the task originally assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments",

3. Insert the following as paragraph 1 of the operative part:

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, recognizing the use of atomic weapons as an instrument of aggression and mass destruction of peoples to be contrary to the honour and the conscience of nations and incompatible with membership of the United Nations, hereby declares an unconditional ban on atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this ban;

"The General Assembly instructs the Commission on Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments to draw up, and to submit for the consideration of the Security Council by 1 February 1952, a draft convention providing for measures to ensure the implementation of the General Assembly's decisions relating to the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their production, the use, solely for civilian purposes, of the atomic bombs already produced and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of the said convention".

4. Word the first sentence of paragraph 1 of the operative part of the draft resolution as follows and insert it after the new paragraph 1 given above:

"The General Assembly shall set up under the Security Council an Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission";

U.N. doc. A/C.1/668/Rev. 2
Dated December 18, 1951

5. Insert a new paragraph 3 after paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, reading as follows:

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RECOGNIZES that any sincere plan for a substantial reduction of all armed forces and armaments must include the establishment, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international control organ, which shall be responsible for control of the reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces and for control of the enforcement of the prohibition of atomic weapons, so that such prohibition is carried out very accurately and conscientiously, and that this international organ must elicit information on all armed forces, including semi-military, security and police forces, and all armaments, including atomic weapons, provisions also being made for effective international inspection, to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the aforesaid international control organ and for control to include also verification of the information submitted."

6. Replace paragraph 3 of the draft resolution by the following paragraph 4:

"The draft convention shall provide that the aforesaid international control organ be entrusted with control of the prohibition of atomic weapons, and shall define its composition, rights and duties:

"The international organ responsible for control of the prohibition of atomic weapons shall, immediately after the conclusion of the aforesaid convention, carry out an inspection of all establishments for the production and storing of atomic weapons in order to see that the convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons is being enforced";

7. After the above paragraph, insert the following paragraph in the draft resolution:

"RECOMMENDS the permanent members of the Security Council—the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—to reduce the armaments and armed forces at their disposal at the time when this decision is adopted by one third within one year, from the date of adoption of this decision;

DEEMS IT ESSENTIAL for the governments of States Members of the United Nations and also States which are not at present members of the Organization to submit to the international control organ forthwith, and in any case not later than one month after the adoption by the General Assembly of the decisions for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces, complete information regarding the state of their armed forces and all types of armaments, including atomic weapons, at the time of acceptance of the said provisions;"

8. Delete paragraph 4 of the draft resolution.

9. Replace paragraph 5 of the draft resolution by the following paragraph:

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERS it essential to instruct the Joint Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to prepare within a period of three months and submit for the consideration of the Security Council practical proposals for the application of this decision;"

10. Delete paragraph 6 of the draft resolution.

11. Replace paragraph 7 of the draft resolution by the following:

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY INVITES the governments of all States, both Members of the United Nations and States not at present members of the United Nations, to examine at a world conference the question of a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments and also of practical measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control over the enforcement of such prohibition.

"RECOMMENDS that the said world conference be convened at the earliest possible moment and in any case not later than 1 June 1952."

12. Delete paragraph 8 of the draft resolution.

1. Replace the third and fourth paragraphs of the preamble by the following text:

"RECOGNIZING as a primary and most important task the unconditional prohibition of the production of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition and also the reduction by one-third of the other types of armaments and armed forces of the five Powers: the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, within one year of the adoption of the relevant decision of the General Assembly and on the basis of the level of armaments and armed forces at the time the aforesaid decision is taken, "NOTING that these measures will serve the purpose of strengthening the peace and security of nations and contribute to lightening the heavy economic burden borne by the peoples of the various countries as a result of the ever-increasing expenditure on armaments and rearmament,

"CONVINCED that if all governments sincerely combine their efforts in order to co-operate in an effective and substantial limitation of armed forces and of armaments and also in an immediate and unconditional prohibition of the production of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition, the danger of war will be considerably averted and the security of all nations strengthened".

2. Insert the following as paragraph 1 of the operative part:

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, recognizing the use of atomic weapons as an instrument of aggression and mass destruction of peoples to be contrary to the honour and the conscience of nations and incompatible with membership of the United Nations, hereby declares an unconditional ban on atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this ban.

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY INSTRUCTS the Commission on Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments to draw up, and to submit for the consideration of the Security Council by 1 February 1952, a draft convention providing for measures to ensure the implementation of the General Assembly's decisions relating to the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their production, the use solely for civilian purposes of the atomic bombs already produced, and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of the said convention".

3. Insert a new paragraph after paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, reading as follows:

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RECOGNIZES that any sincere plan for a substantial reduction of all armed forces and armaments must include the establishment, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international control organ, which shall be responsible for control of the reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces and for control of the enforcement of the prohibition of atomic weapons, so that such prohibition is carried out very accurately and conscientiously, and that this international organ must elicit information on all armed forces, including semi-military, security and police forces, and all armaments, including atomic weapons, provision also being made for effective international inspection, to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the aforesaid international control organ and for control to include also verification of the information submitted."

4. Replace paragraph 3 of the draft resolution by the following paragraph:

"The draft convention shall provide that the aforesaid international control organ be entrusted with control of the prohibition of atomic weapons, and shall define its composition, rights and duties.

"The international organ responsible for control of the prohibition of atomic weapons shall, immediately after the conclusion of the aforesaid convention, carry out an inspection of all establishments for the production and storing of atomic weapons in order to see that the convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons is being enforced."

5. After the above paragraph, insert the following paragraph in the draft resolution:

"RECOMMENDS the permanent members of the Security Council—the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—to reduce the armaments and armed forces at their disposal at the time when this decision is adopted by one third within one year from the date of adoption of this decision;

"DEEMS IT ESSENTIAL for the governments of States Members of the United Nations and also States which are not at present members of the Organization to submit to the international control organ forthwith, and in any case not later than one month after the adoption by the General Assembly of the decisions for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces, complete information regarding the state of their armed forces and all types of armaments, including atomic weapons, at the time of acceptance of the said provisions;"

6. Delete paragraphs 4 and 5 of the draft resolution.

7. Replace paragraph 6 of the draft resolution by the following paragraph:

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERS it essential to instruct the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to prepare within a period of three months and submit for the consideration of the Security Council practical proposals for the application of this decision"

8. Delete paragraph 7 of the draft resolution.

9. Replace paragraph 8 of the draft resolution by the following:

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY INVITES the governments of all States, both Members of the United Nations and States not at present members of the United Nations, to examine at a world conference the question of a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments and also of practical measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control over the enforcement of such prohibition.

"RECOMMENDS that the said world conference be convened at the earliest possible moment and in any case not later than 1 June 1952."

10. Delete paragraph 9 of the draft resolution.

ANSWERS TO COMMENTS AND AMENDMENTS OF IRAQ, SYRIA, AND LEBANON⁴

The distinguished representative of Iraq concluded his comments at yesterday morning's meeting of this Committee by asking the three-powers and the Soviet Union what was their objective in presenting these amendments and their original resolutions. I cannot, of course, answer what are the objectives of the representative of the Soviet Union. I think, however, that the ob-

⁴Made in Committee I on Dec. 15 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. For text of Mr. Jessup's statement on the Egyptian amendment of Dec. 18, which was received too late to print here, see press release No. 1355 of the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly.

jectives sought by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are quite clear by now. As Secretary Acheson pointed out in his statement before this Committee on November 19, we want to reach an international system which will include the regulation and reduction of all armed forces and all armaments of all types. We wish to attain an international system which includes all nations in the world which have substantial military forces. We wish to attain a system which both prohibits and actually secures the abolition of the use of atomic weapons. We wish to attain a system which includes safeguards by which all of this can be done with security to all nations involved. We want to create the kind of world in which no country will be terrified that some other country or some other group of countries is proposing to attack it or to threaten it or to overawe it. International security is not a problem for four or five powers alone. The distinguished representative of Bolivia, whose great contributions to peace through international organizations in both the League and the United Nations is a matter of historic record, has eloquently brought out that point this morning—the point that international security is a general problem with which we are all concerned. It may be true that some countries may be called upon to make greater contributions than others. The three are prepared to do their part; our countries are prepared to do their part. We want to reach that point of security of which I have spoken by bringing about a reduction in the level of armaments, by bringing about the prohibition of the atomic bomb as the result of an effective system of international control over atomic energy, by bringing about a situation where everyone knows what the situation is in regard to armaments and keeps on knowing it. Those are our objectives.

The distinguished representative of Iraq asks in fact whether we seek here a practical solution which will lead into some agreed upon results from which we can expect a general reduction in world tension. On the other hand, he asks do we merely wish a theoretical result here in the General Assembly, drawing up a basis upon which charges and indictments can be based. Speaking for the three-powers, I say emphatically that it is the former course we follow. We are not asking here to lay a basis for charges or for propaganda advantage. As Secretary Acheson said in his statement before this Committee on November 19, the proposals we put forward:

are not ends in themselves. There is no magic in them which by itself can solve the troubles of this very grievously stricken world. They are proposals which may be a key to solutions in the future. They are proposals which in my estimation open up a broad highway along which we can all march together to find solutions to our problems, to reduce the tensions and difficulties between us, to move toward peace, toward cooperation and away from the very dangerous rapids which all of us can see before us. We can follow that broad, clear path, or we can turn aside into the dark and noisome alleys of

propaganda and bickering and assertion and counter-assertions. We can fritter away the hope of the world. We can fritter it away into little small advantages that are taken of one another here and there for minor and really silly purposes. Or we can seize this great opportunity before us. My country is willing to seize it. Our colleagues in France and Great Britain are willing to seize it with us.

That, Mr. Chairman, represents the objectives of the three-powers.

With the Chairman's permission, I would also like, at this time, to reply to the comments of my distinguished friend from Syria. Faris El-Khoury Bey suggested that this Committee should recommend setting up a new disarmament commission, with very general and vague terms of reference including only points of agreement reached by the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. during the Four-Power subcommittee meetings last week. The distinguished representative from Syria, in addition, suggested that, if this proposal were not acceptable to the four great powers, then the subcommittee should be reinstated so that, under the guidance of the President of the General Assembly the Four Powers might reach agreement on a resolution of this nature.

I must state frankly that I cannot agree with the idea advanced by my distinguished colleague, although I fully appreciate the sincere concern which prompted the suggestion. In the view of the three powers, such an approach would be a retrogression on the part of the General Assembly. We would have given up basic concepts already adopted by the General Assembly and reaffirmed for 5 years. Those basic concepts are valid. It would be dishonest for us to pretend that the negotiations in the new Commission can start with the abandonment of basic principles. Dishonesty on our part or the evasion of facts is not a sound basis for negotiation. We believe, however, that within the framework of those principles and with the flexibility which the revised tripartite resolution leaves to the new Commission, we can proceed to reach agreed solutions in that Commission. As I said yesterday, we hope that in the negotiations in that Commission, it will become apparent to the Soviet Union that there is nothing in the program inimical to its best interests, or inconsistent with the independence and security of the Soviet Union or any other state. We are convinced that we must try to advance toward our common goals, using as guideposts or measuring rods the general concepts already recognized as valid by the General Assembly.

We understand just as well as any other nation represented at this table that it is impossible to start disarming without a firm commitment by the Soviet Union to accept and go along with a particular program. We are convinced, however, that we must plan for this event. We are heartened by the fact that we have all found here certain agreed points. Our revised resolution, as we have said,

seeks to widen the areas of agreement. We earnestly hope that this process will continue, and we think that the new Commission is the proper forum for development of the process.

Actually, our amended resolution does attempt to do what the representatives of Syria and Iraq proposed in their interventions yesterday. Look at paragraph 3 (c), for example, in the operative section, which provides that the Commission shall be ready to consider any proposals or any plans for control that may be put forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy.

My distinguished friend, the representative of Syria, understood this to be limited merely to proposals for control, but that is not what we intended. We believe that the Commission should consider any proposals which are made, or any plans for control, that may be put forward in either the nonatomic or atomic fields. The problem of controls embraces questions of inspection and other safeguards, and matters of determining priorities and practical steps.

Now that gives the Commission the broad, general terms of reference which the representative of Syria so strongly desires. However, it gives these terms of reference within a framework which emphasizes objectives to be sought by the new Commission, and principles for the guidance of the new Commission, which are substantially points either agreed upon by the Four Powers or based upon concepts strongly affirmed and reaffirmed in the past by the General Assembly.

In fact, it seems to me that the revised tripartite proposals follow very much the general concept sought by the representative of Syria, but retain the necessary guideposts established by past General Assemblies.

In his intervention this morning, the distinguished representative of Poland indicated that he was inclined to favor the suggestion made yesterday by the distinguished representative of Syria with regard to a simple resolution merely setting up the Commission without dealing with any of the substantive matters; but even as he indicated his favorable attitude, he hastened to add that of course we should start by accepting the Soviet amendments to the tripartite resolution. Our position is, as I have tried to outline it, in terms of moving forward on a solid basis for negotiation.

I am confident that there is no substantial difference between my views and the views of either of my distinguished friends from Syria or Iraq. In any event, on behalf of the United Kingdom and France, as well as the United States, I would like the distinguished representatives of Syria and Iraq, and likewise the distinguished representative of Pakistan to know that we believe the resolution which they sponsored, and which brought about the Four-Power subcommittee meetings, was a most useful contribution to advancing towards some progress in this most difficult field. We believe that both the Soviet Union and ourselves are

convinced of the necessity for continuing the efforts to reach agreement. We do not believe, however, that we can reach agreement by abandoning here in this Committee some of the principal standards which have been affirmed and reaffirmed in the past by the General Assembly, and leaving the new Commission to start all over again from the beginning.

Mr. Chairman, while I am speaking, I should like also to refer to the amendments submitted by the distinguished representative of Lebanon and laid before us on document A/C.1/678. I shall comment only on those parts of the amendments which apply to the preamble, reserving observations on the fourth amendment until we reach the appropriate paragraph.

The distinguished representative of Lebanon suggested a new first paragraph of the preamble which reads:

Moved by anxiety at the general lack of confidence plaguing the world and leading to the burden of increased armaments and the fear of war.

I can say, Mr. Chairman, that on behalf of the three sponsors of the tripartite resolution that we accept the suggestion for inserting this new paragraph in the preamble. The reasons which were given by the distinguished representative of Lebanon need not be repeated by me. They are convincing.

Now as to his second amendment, I understand that this proposes merely inconsequential and

stylistic changes in the second paragraph of the preamble, which is at present the first paragraph. In regard to that proposal I would remind the Committee that in the subcommittee of four, agreement was reached upon the text of the present first paragraph of the preamble. In view of that fact, we would not like to commit ourselves to any changes in that agreed paragraph unless it appears that the Soviet Union is also willing to accept the first new paragraph proposed by Lebanon and therefore accepts the consequential changes in the second paragraph. On that final point, Mr. Chairman, we will await the views expressed by the Soviet Union on the acceptability of this first paragraph which as I say the three-powers accept.

Error's Note: On December 19, Committee I approved the proposal on disarmament by the U.S., U.K., and France by a vote of 44 in favor, 5 against, and 10 abstentions. Those voting against were Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet Union, and the Ukraine. The abstentions came from Afghanistan, Argentina, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. Burma did not take part in the vote.

Earlier, in a paragraph by paragraph vote, the committee rejected all amendments moved by the Soviet Union. It also rejected Egyptian amendments calling for unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the drafting of a treaty toward this end by Committee VI (Legal).

Finally, the Committee rejected a Polish draft resolution which would have suggested that the new disarmament commission, to be set up under the tripartite plan, be left free to consider both Western and Soviet disarmament schemes. The vote was 6 to 36 with 10 abstentions.

Soviet Charges Against Efforts of Free Nations To Achieve Collective Security

STATEMENT BY ERNEST A. GROSS U.S. DELEGATE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY¹

On November 21, 1951, the Soviet Government presented to my Government a note concerning the United States Mutual Security Act of October 10, 1951, protesting the enactment of this law as an aggressive act toward the Soviet Union and a rude violation by the United States of obligations contained in the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement of November 16, 1933. In that note the Soviet Government stated that it expected the Government of the United States to take proper measures for revocation of the above-mentioned law.

¹ Made in plenary session on Dec. 13 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. Ambassador Gross is permanent U.S. deputy representative to the U.N.

On the following day, November 22, before my Government had had a sufficient opportunity to consider the Soviet note and make a reply to it, the Soviet delegation here in Paris proposed for inclusion in the agenda of the Assembly's sixth session a new item on this subject as an important and urgent matter.

This Soviet complaint brought against the United States is based on a distortion of words in the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The Congress of the United States never intended that any appropriations authorized by the Mutual Security Act should be used for any aggressive activities contrary to the U.N. Charter. The United States has not carried on such aggressive activities, is not doing so now, and has no intention of doing so in the future, whether from the \$100,000,000 authorization appearing in the Mutual Security Act,

or otherwise. There is nothing in the Mutual Security Act to justify the Soviet Union's charge of United States "direct interference" in Soviet affairs.

In accordance with the long-standing policy of my Government, however, the United States made no objection to the inclusion of this item in our agenda when the matter was considered by the General Committee. The United States took this position even though the item in question does not refer to any action which has been taken by the United States under the Mutual Security Act but refers merely to the passage of the law, under which the Soviet delegation has said that some action may be taken. The United States in the General Committee did not object to the inclusion of this item even though there had been no attempt to deal with the matter by direct discussion, as is contemplated by the U.N. Charter.

Despite these defects, the United States has not objected and does not now object to the inclusion of the new Soviet item in our agenda. We welcome inquiry into the new Soviet item because it affords an opportunity for exposing the falsity of the charges of the Soviet complaint. Public discussion is basic to the process of government in the United States, and we are ready to engage in it even with a government whose basic principle is the exact opposite. We do this in the belief that if the Soviet Union would conduct its governmental affairs in the open, much of the fear which now grips the world would disappear. If the Soviet Union were willing to join in open international discussions of its Government's operations, many misunderstandings and suspicions would be removed. Thus, Mr. President, my delegation supports the recommendation of the General Committee that this item be included in the agenda of the sixth session.

The General Committee recommended that the item in question be referred to the Political and Security Committee for consideration there. After reviewing the work-load and the current status of business in the two political committees, and bearing in mind the Soviet assertion that the new item is an urgent and important matter, my delegation questions whether the new Soviet item can receive adequate consideration at an early date if, in line with the General Committee's recommendation, the item is referred to one of the political committees. The United States, therefore, proposes that the new Soviet item be considered directly in plenary session of the General Assembly. There exists ample precedent for such a procedure in the action which the Assembly has taken at previous sessions on such matters as atomic energy, membership, and the Secretary-General's twenty-year program for peace. Indeed, the special committee on the Assembly's methods and procedures recommended that there should be increased use of the practice of direct plenary consideration of selected items.

We believe that the issues relating to the new Soviet item are clear-cut. We do not think they are of such a character as to call for consideration in a committee before they are dealt with by the General Assembly itself. There would be full opportunity in plenary session for a proper consideration of this item.

Accordingly, my delegation proposes that the Assembly, in approving the recommendation of the General Committee that the new Soviet item be included in the agenda of the sixth session, decide not to refer this item to a committee but to consider it in plenary session.

STATEMENT BY MIKE J. MANSFIELD U.S. DELEGATE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY²

The United States denies without reservation or qualification the Soviet allegation that we are interfering in the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union or the states responsive to its control.

The United States has not committed and will not commit any act of aggression against the Soviet Union or any other country. The entire history of the American people and their system of government underscore the fundamental fact that the United States holds aggression to be a criminal act. Let there be no doubts on this score whatever.

What is the charge against the United States which the Soviet Union has placed before the Assembly?

It is based exclusively on the language of an amendment to the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951 enacted by Congress earlier this year. The amendment permits the President to spend up to \$100,000,000 to organize refugees from Iron Curtain countries into "elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

It may be useful to point out that two members of the United States delegation, Mr. Vorys and myself, are well acquainted with the provisions of the Mutual Security Act and with the intentions Congress had in mind under the act.³ We are both members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which considered this legislation. We also sat on the joint conference committee of the House and the Senate which reconciled the differences between the House and Senate versions of the law.

The amendment on Iron Curtain refugees must be understood in terms of the purposes of the Mutual Security Act itself.

The broad objective of the law is "to maintain the security and promote the foreign policy and provide for the general welfare of the United States by furnishing assistance to friendly nations

² Made before Committee 1 (Political and Security) on Dec. 19 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

³ For a statement by Mr. Mansfield and Mr. Vorys, see BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1010.

in the interests of international peace and security."

As a regional defense association similar to the Organization of American States, it derives its purposes from those of the U.N. Charter, which it serves in letter and spirit. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization military forces, still modest compared to the mass armies on the other side of the Iron Curtain, are nevertheless growing. We have high hopes that, pending Soviet agreement to join in a United Nations program of effective world disarmament, they will have the effect of discouraging any further efforts to extend the Iron Curtain westward.

It is only a regime which projects its own image upon the world outside that would see the North Atlantic Pact as an aggressive threat. I think we must remember that no Communist government has ever come to power with majority support in a free and honest election. Regimes of the totalitarian type are not fooled by their 98 and 99 percent votes in favor of the Communist candidates. They know that these are mechanical demonstrations, not votes of confidence. Thus the Soviet type of state has no feeling of confidence in the people it dominates.

This lack of confidence leads the regime to an obsession with its physical safety that is unknown in the free world. The regime begins to lash out at shadows and mythical enemies. There is soon a vicious circle of distrust and suspicion until fear permeates the entire state structure. No one is safe, not even the highest and most respected members of the party, as all of us around this table know only too well.

High government and party officials sometimes disappear without a trace. Others are shot or imprisoned after highly publicized but transparently fake "treason" trials, where the accused is declared guilty before he is tried. The names of these Communist leaders are matters of public record and could easily be cited.

When you have a political organization which devours its own members, is it any wonder that its leaders attribute all manner of sinister motives to the governments of foreign countries?

When aviators from my country wander off their course into Hungarian territory they are forced down by Soviet fighters and alleged to be on an "espionage" mission. Newspaper correspondents from free countries have been tried for "espionage" and thrown into prison. Iron Curtain regimes regard our diplomats as "spies." It would appear as though anyone who enters these countries and who has breathed the air of freedom is looked upon as a secret agent.

And when the men who control these governments search among the masses of their own population for scapegoats and conduct mass arrests, is it any wonder that thousands upon thousands of people yearn for escape?

Finally, is it any wonder that many of these

people insist that they be allowed to join any defensive effort to prevent an extension of the system they have escaped?

It is these people, Mr. Chairman, who are the "escapees" referred to in the amendment to the Mutual Security Act.

There is no safety valve for legitimate political opposition behind the Iron Curtain. The average citizen who disapproves of the regime has few alternatives: he can stay and take it, hoping for better days; he can go into underground opposition and risk imprisonment and execution; or he can try to escape.

In order to achieve that general objective, Congress authorized military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries "to strengthen the individual and collective defenses of the free world; to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interest of the United States; and to facilitate the effective participation of those countries in the United Nations system for collective security."

Thus the act was drawn up in the spirit of article 1 of the Charter. It implements the purpose of the Charter "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace."

The Mutual Security Act, Mr. Chairman, is only the latest illustration of our fundamental policy to help in the building of a strong and healthy international community through economic development and collective security.

The emergence of this policy and the various measures we have put forward to carry it out constitute the most significant chapter in the history of the United States since the war. When the war ended, many countries lay in ruins. Other less-developed countries could not get aid from their more powerful industrial neighbors, who had poured most of their resources into the defeat of the Axis Powers.

It seemed to us that the solution to the problem lay in the concept of mutual assistance. Out of this concept grew the Economic Recovery Program, in which the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern European countries were invited to participate, and programs of technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. Within the United Nations there developed other agencies for economic development which the United States firmly supported. All of these efforts were and are designed to help people help themselves.

But the concept of mutual assistance also involved a parallel and related effort to achieve collective security against any act of aggression or a general war. This effort was made necessary by armed Communist coups d'état in Eastern Europe and unmistakable attempts to extend the Iron Curtain into other free countries. It produced such regional defense associations as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Then, brutally and suddenly, the collective security system of the United Nations itself was called into action to stop the Communist attack on the Republic of Korea. This led inevitably to an intensification and acceleration of our programs of military assistance.

The provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 reflect the broad outlines of the policy developed in the early postwar years—the policy of mutual aid as a means of building a community of free nations, economically strong and capable of defending themselves against attack.

This is a free-world program. If it is underwritten to a great extent by the United States, it is because Americans identify their own freedom and security with the rights, liberties, and national independence of the law-abiding members of the world community.

The total appropriations under the Mutual Security Act come to nearly 7½ billion dollars of economic and military assistance to other free countries. Of this total program of aid a large share will go to support the defense effort of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

On August 17 of this year, when the act was being debated on the floor of the House, an amendment was offered to the section of the bill which deals with the defense of the North Atlantic area. The amendment was accepted and incorporated in the law. It became known as the “escapee clause” because it authorized the President to provide funds for people who had fled from persecution and tyranny behind the Iron Curtain and who wished to join the NATO defense forces.

It is interesting to observe that neither in its note to the United States, nor in the charge it filed almost simultaneously with the United Nations, did the Soviet Government quote the entire amendment.³ For in addition to the so-called People’s Democracies of Eastern Europe, the amendment also refers specifically to people who escape from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and—in the wording of the act—“the Communist dominated or Communist occupied area of Germany and Austria and any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union.”

Meaning of “Escapee Clause” Amendment

We can only speculate as to why the Soviet Union omitted these references in the amendment to the three Baltic countries which it seized in 1940 in violation of solemn pacts of nonaggression and nonintervention. Why did it also leave out the Soviet zone in Austria, or Eastern Germany, from which people have been escaping at the rate of more than 15,000 a month?

In point of fact, the Soviet delegation places relatively little stress on the real purpose of the amendment: to assist refugees from political persecution to take part in the defense of the

North Atlantic community, if they elect to do so. The Soviet case hangs almost entirely on certain deductions drawn from two words in the amendment.

The amendment refers to “selected persons who are residing in or escapees from” the countries and Communist-dominated areas listed. Taking off from this point, the Soviet delegation has conjured up a melodramatic picture of a new fifth column behind the Iron Curtain which stands poised to strike at the old fifth column now in power. In essence, the Soviet argument rests on the assumption that the two words “residing in” constitute a *prima facie* case of aggression and domestic interference.

Perhaps that would be true in a land where wishful thinking about freedom can be a crime against the state.

The U.S. Congress, which passed the Mutual Security Act, is, I think, the best authority as to what the “escapee clause” was actually intended to be. Since this amendment was adopted on the floor of the House and not in committee, the House committee report did not refer to it.

Therefore, the intent of Congress is best expressed by the report to the Senate of the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services on the Mutual Security Act. The comment of the Senate committee report on the amendment was as follows:

This paragraph authorizes the sum of not to exceed \$100,000,000 of the sum authorized to form selected escapees from iron curtain countries into elements of military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In adopting this provision the joint committee desires to make it clear that persons who might be formed into such units would do so only of their own free will.

This was the only formal comment on the amendment by a congressional committee.

This amendment applies only to those people who have managed to flee to this side of the Iron Curtain. The President can use the authority and the funds Congress gave him under the amendment, but it is not mandatory upon him to do so.

In any case, the ultimate determination as to whether these people will form part of the NATO defense forces will depend upon the decision of the NATO partners themselves. If, in the judgment of members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, men who escape from behind the Curtain should be allowed to participate in the defense of Europe, the President has congressional authority to use funds for this purpose.

Up to the present time, no tangible step of any kind has been taken, beyond the passage of a piece of permissive legislation. Neither the President nor the administrative authorities established by the Mutual Security Act have taken any action.

If, as the Soviet delegation claims, all of this constitutes an act of aggression and domestic interference, then we are, indeed, living in a world where words have lost their meaning.

³ BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1951, p. 910.

Soviet Distortion of Motives of Foreign Governments

But assuming that the words still mean the same to the vast majority of mankind, we can only ask why the Soviet Government has made this baseless charge against the United States. How could the Soviet regime twist and distort this amendment to an American domestic law into an act of aggression and interference in the affairs of the Soviet Union and the other Iron Curtain states?

One explanation is that the Soviet Union has been casting about for something new to say against the defense efforts of the North Atlantic community and the wider effort to achieve collective security throughout the free world.

I do not believe it is necessary here to dwell at length on the origin, purpose, and defensive nature of NATO, except to say this: NATO, or something like it, was the inevitable response of the countries of the North Atlantic area to the extension of Soviet power by force and subversion in Eastern Europe and the clear threat to extend that power further. NATO is an attempt to pool resources in a given geographical region to achieve a measure of collective security against this aggressive threat.

It may be that the population of Eastern Europe is a fifth column against the regimes in power. If there is such a fifth column, it has nothing to do with a phrase in the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951, or with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Such a fifth column would be the product of the brutal liquidation of independent political parties, of forced labor without trial for political dissidents, of the denial of all civil rights. It would reflect the denial of all normal relations with foreigners or the world outside, through rigidly enforced state secrets acts, by which casual conversation can be legally changed into espionage, or treason.

It would stem from the uprooting of thousands of families from their homes by force deportations in all of the Iron Curtain countries. We know that within the Soviet Union, for example, several so-called autonomous republics were simply extinguished both during and after the war and that their inhabitants—a million or more people—were sent in cattle cars to Central Asia.

Hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens, left stranded in Germany at the end of the war, refused to return home and sought instead to seek a new life abroad. Many of them are now rebuilding their homes and families in the New World. But by Soviet law these ordinary people, farmers and workers, are traitors and would be shot if they returned to the Soviet Union.

Since the seizure of power by Communist minorities in Eastern Europe since the war, under the protection of the Soviet Army, there has been a tragic new wave of political refugees. From Eastern Germany into Western Berlin and the territory of the Federal Republic, there has been

nothing less than a mass movement involving hundreds of thousands of people.

But then it is relatively easier to cross the line in Germany than to cross it on the Czechoslovak or Hungarian frontiers where the heavily reinforced border guards are on patrol day and night. Human ingenuity is such, however, that men, women, and children continue to get through. Some 1300 to 1500 people manage to break through the Iron Curtain every month, and tens of thousands have come out since 1949.

Special administrative measures have been necessary to take care of the new refugees from persecution. There is maintained in the American zone of Western Germany a transient receiving camp for non-German refugees. Although people from the camp are being resettled as rapidly as possible, the inflow from behind the Iron Curtain continues daily. You will find in the receiving center at any one time the representatives of a dozen or more different nationalities from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Can these people be described as traitors? Is the Ukrainian peasant, or the engineer of a Czech locomotive, or the Polish miner who manages to make his way westward a war criminal, as the Soviet delegation calls these refugees?

How are we to react when these people ask us whether there is something they do to prevent the extension of the system they have risked their lives to escape? Our answer is that they should have the right to join in the defense of free Europe.

If these unfortunate people are granted asylum, if they are permitted to join the NATO defense forces at their own request, does it then follow that the United States or the NATO powers collectively are interfering in the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union and the other Communist states?

It most assuredly does not, Mr. Chairman.

Soviet Violations of Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreement

Yet, in effect, this is the Soviet contention. Moreover, the Soviet Government charges that the United States has thereby violated the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreement of 1933.

The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreement preceded the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the light of the activities and professed goals of the Communist International, President Roosevelt took the initiative for a clear statement on the principle of noninterference.

The agreement included a pledge by the Soviet Government not to permit the formation on Soviet territory of any group whose aim was the overthrow of the Government of the United States. When President Roosevelt had received the necessary assurances from Mr. Litvinov, he stated that the United States would adhere reciprocally to the pledge given by the Soviet Government.

For all practical purposes, the Soviet Government made a dead letter of the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreement shortly after it was signed. On its part, however, the United States has adhered to its reciprocal pledge from that day to this.

Shortly after the establishment of diplomatic relations, the President instructed our Ambassador in Moscow to make oral protests against the violation of the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreement by the Soviet Union. When in 1935, the Comintern met in Moscow and instructed the American Communist Party to use "Trojan-Horse" tactics against the American Government, the President sent a strong note of protest to the Soviet Government. He said the United States anticipated the most serious consequences if the Soviet Government refused to prevent further acts in disregard of the solemn pledge given by it to the United States.

The Soviet Government replied that it was in no way responsible for the activities of the Comintern. But hardly a month after the Soviet regime seized power in 1917, all Allied and neutral missions in Petrograd received this circular note from the Soviet leaders:

The Soviet power considers diplomatic relations necessary not only with governments, but also with revolutionary-socialist parties seeking the overthrow of existing governments.

In the light of the use of the Comintern and now the Cominform by Soviet leaders, we ask the Soviet delegation whether this does not continue to be the policy of the Soviet Government. *The Outline History of the Communist International*, published in Moscow in 1934, states:

Comrade Stalin took a leading part in the working out of the program of the Communist International. There is not a single important decision of the Communist International, not a forecast which is not permeated with Stalin's farsightedness, his ability to map out a line of attack and strike a crushing blow at the enemy.

It is not surprising that Secretary of State Cordell Hull described the Soviet reply to our note of protest as a repudiation of the Soviet pledge "almost in so many words."

Soviet Aggressive Intervention Policy

Soviet interference in the domestic affairs of foreign countries continues to be one of the chief causes of tension in the world today. It is indeed, one of the supreme ironies of all time that the Soviet regime should be pressing a charge of domestic interference against any foreign government, let alone the United States.

The Soviet Union continued to use the Comintern as an instrument for direct action against foreign governments until its formal dissolution in 1943. Who can forget the shameful period between 1939 and 1941 when every Communist Party throughout the world, on orders from Moscow, tried to sabotage the desperate efforts of the de-

mocracies to defend themselves against Nazi aggression?

Since the end of the war, the Soviet Government has persistently followed a policy of aggressive intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations and peoples. Upon the complaint before this Committee, the Soviet Union has imposed dictatorial Communist regimes, responsible not to their own people, but to the Soviet Government itself. The profoundest feelings for family and country of Poles, Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, and others have been deliberately trampled upon.

Only a short time ago the Yugoslav delegation presented to the Assembly a case history of Soviet intervention in the domestic affairs of a foreign nation, in this instance Yugoslavia. When the Yugoslav Communist Party was expelled from the Cominform, the highest leaders of the Soviet state then demanded that the Yugoslav people overthrow the Yugoslav Government.

Nor will the world ever forget the most outstanding case of intervention of all, the Communist attack on the Republic of Korea, supported by Soviet equipment, training, and propaganda. Here was a brutal attempt by a Communist minority to conquer by armed force a small nation that had withstood threats and bluster, a state established under United Nations auspices and now defended by the United Nations. But these are only the most spectacular cases.

The Soviet Government also undertook to use the international Communist apparatus to undermine the policies of other governments beyond its immediate grasp. The signal for this campaign was given in 1947 with the re-creation of a new model of the Comintern in the shape of the Cominform.

Communist Apparatus Abroad

The activities of the Communist apparatus abroad, centrally directed by the Soviet Government, have made it almost impossible for us to have normal disagreements with the Soviet Union. For when the Soviet Government disagrees with you on an important matter of policy it uses the particular Communist instrumentality in your country to wreck that policy by every means possible.

I am not talking about secret directives or underground channels, or mysterious subsidies for the Communist press or anything that is not in the public domain.

I am speaking only of direct instructions sent openly by leaders of the Soviet state to Communist outlets abroad.

I am speaking of the actions of the Soviet Government.

In 1947, when it was invited to participate in the program for European recovery, not only did the Soviet Government refuse that invitation, it also ordered the governments of Eastern Europe

to do likewise, an open case of domestic interference in their internal affairs.

This could have been a simple disagreement on a matter of policy. But in September 1947, the Soviet regime organized the Cominform and called on all Communists to smash the Marshall Plan. The late Andrei Zhdanov, then a member of the Soviet Politburo, told the first meeting of the Cominform in September 1947:

As far as the U.S.S.R. is concerned the U.S.S.R. will make every effort to prevent this plan from being realized. The Communists must be the leading force in the struggle against the new U.S. expansionist plans.

The highly unsuccessful effort of the Cominform to sabotage the recovery of Europe immediately followed.

Two years later, the North Atlantic community made its first steps toward rearmament in the face of the aggressive policies of the Soviet Government. At a meeting in Bucharest, a more urgent directive for direct action within the North Atlantic community was given to the members of the Cominform by M. A. Suslov, editor of *Pravda*, chief organ of the Soviet Communist Party.

He called, indeed, for "energetic, concrete action" in order to frustrate the North Atlantic defense effort. He praised the use of "strikes and demonstrations" and other "forces and levers" for the smashing of the policy opposed by the Soviet Union. Mr. Suslov declared:

It is necessary to use varied forms and methods: mass demonstrations, meetings, gatherings, petitions and protests, public opinion polls, the formation of peace committees, in town and countryside. One should not act in a stereotyped fashion. The concrete conditions of each country should be considered.

These instructions, openly delivered to members of other Communist Parties by an important Soviet representative, indicate a total disregard for the whole principle of noninterference.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there is the whole network of so-called "peace" committees, organized by the Cominform under Soviet direction. These so-called "peace" organizations have duped many innocent people. They are in fact instruments of Soviet foreign policy in foreign countries.

Their prime purpose is not to promote peace, or even to carry on peaceful propaganda. They are part of a general apparatus designed for direct action. We find that special attention is given to the establishment of so-called "peace" committees in plants and factories so as to encourage the workers to sabotage the defense efforts of their countries.

Thus the World Federation of Trade Unions, an international Communist agency, sent out the following instructions to its members on December 9, 1950:

Organize even more resolute action . . . against the transport and production of armaments.

Draw up and put into effect a plan for a powerful unity movement to hinder the rearmament program.

Link closely the struggle for peace with the struggle to satisfy the urgent and vital demands of the working people.

Organized Efforts Against Soviet Interference

I think, Mr. Chairman, that the vast majority of the peoples represented here know that their interests lie in the defense of their own countries and not in promoting the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union. I cite these examples of appeals for direct action only as indications of what actually takes place when the Soviet Government is against you on any important matter of policy. You are immediately confronted with an organized attempt by the Soviet Government to interfere with the policy on your own soil. Nor is there any secret about it, as the public statements I have quoted have demonstrated.

Here is another reason why the American people and, I am sure, the people of many other countries have found it supremely ironic that a charge of domestic interference against the United States has come from the self-appointed center of the international Communist movement. Through the Comintern, then the Cominform, and through local Communist Parties, the Soviet Union has raised domestic interference to the status of an international profession providing employment to many thousands of people.

The American people and many other people have spoken out against this interference. They have spoken out against the domination by the Soviet Government of the states of Eastern Europe, the states listed in the complaint against us. Until the Eastern European countries are once again independent, and in control of their own interests and destinies, Americans will continue to speak out against the tyranny imposed upon them.

It is not an act of aggression, Mr. Chairman, to hope that a people in chains will one day be free. It is not an act of domestic interference to express that hope in public.

This hope of ours that freedom and independence will be world-wide is shared with many millions of people. For Americans, this hope is anchored deep in our own national philosophy. We abide by the self-evident truths stated in our own Declaration of Independence: that governments exist to secure for all men certain inalienable rights; that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed; that when government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government.

The American people have no intention of repealing the Declaration of Independence.

We wish to see the day when all people who have sought asylum with the free nations will have the chance to return peacefully to their homes and start their lives anew in the country of their birth.

It lies within the power of the Soviet Govern-

ment to bring this peaceful and happy change about.

Real security for the Soviet state does not and cannot rest on the domination of other peoples. Real security for any state does not depend upon domination of any kind, but upon the consent of the governed. In that sense, the interests of the Soviet Union and the peoples of Eastern Europe will best be served if the Iron Curtain refugees of today can become the tourists of tomorrow.

Mr. Chairman, the intentions of the United States down through its entire history have been to live and let live. We have desired no territory and we have emerged from two world wars with no conquests of territory. We have sent our men abroad to fight in foreign countries at the side of other nations struggling to save their freedom. We have done so for ideals we thought worth fighting for.

We have placed great trust in the written and the spoken words of other governments because we do not care to see a world in which no trust exists. As an expression of that trust we demobilized our armies after World War II; scrapped our air fleets and put our navy in mothballs.

We have thought it worthwhile to offer help to other countries, including the Soviet Union, because the help was needed. Moreover, our ties with foreign countries are close. We are a nation in which Frenchmen, Englishmen, Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Italians, Russians, Chinese, Japanese, Africans, Scandinavians, Balts, and many other national groups have somehow found a common denominator in the concept of freedom. Where there is imperfect freedom in the United States you will inevitably hear many voices of protest shouting from the housetops.

We Americans—immigrants and the descend-

ants of immigrants from every corner of the world—have no aggressive ambitions. Everything we do we discuss in the open for all the world to hear. We have no hidden motives nor designs against any people anywhere. Nor would this be possible in a nation where all public life goes on in the greatest goldfish bowl in the world.

We have, it is true, come by great international responsibilities in the very recent past. But we do not feel that a position of leadership suddenly arrogates to the leader all the wisdom in the world; or what is worse, the self-delusion of knowing all the answers.

So far as the defense effort of the world is concerned, we regard it as the product of the collective wisdom of free men. But it is instinctive with people who have the power to make up their own minds to seek the way of common sense. That is why we have joined with France and the United Kingdom on disarmament proposals designed to lessen international tension and make the world a more peaceable place to live in.

All of us in the United Nations have a responsibility which is not served by making baseless charges against one another. We are now approaching a great religious anniversary that will be observed in many lands. But the spirit of which this occasion is a symbol is common to all the great religions of the world.

In that spirit, which all peoples share in common, let us express the hope that we can shortly return to the great constructive tasks that lie before us: the reduction of tensions through effective disarmament; the raising of living standards throughout the world; the extension of human rights to all peoples; and the establishment of a firm peace, based on justice, tolerance, and mutual understanding.

U.S. Supports Admission of Italy to the U.N.

*Statement by Ernest A. Gross
Deputy U.S. Representative to the U.N.¹*

I shall, of course, address myself to the special case presented by the question of Italy's admission to the United Nations, although, of course, there are other applicants whose admission my Government warmly supports. According to the plan of the Charter, as we understand it, each applicant for membership is entitled to have its application considered in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. Article 4 of the Charter entitles each applicant to the judgment of the organization and several speakers who have preceded me

¹ Made in the Security Council on Dec. 19 and released to the press on the same date by the U.S. Mission to the U.N.

at this meeting have made that point amply clear. It needs no repetition on my part.

The General Assembly in several resolutions has expressed its judgment that Italy is a peace-loving state within the meaning of article 4 of the Charter and that Italy is able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter. The General Assembly, therefore, considers that Italy should be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

In the view of my delegation, Mr. President, the Security Council should pay the greatest deference and respect to the solemn judgment of the General Assembly, a judgment which has time and again commanded the widest support and author-

ity. To characterize that judgment, as the Soviet delegate has done at our meeting today, as—what he referred to—dictate to the Security Council is, I think, simply another way of saying that the clearly expressed wish of the majority is entitled to no weight and to no respect.

Moreover, Mr. President, the General Assembly's most recent resolution points out to this Council that Italy now has a unique and special qualification based upon her trusteeship responsibilities. That has been made clear, and is known to all. The General Assembly has entrusted to Italy the trust territory of Somaliland. Italy has accepted this responsibility for the future of the peoples of that area and she has also demonstrated that she is willing to carry it out.

We do not agree with the comment which was made by the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union that it is irrelevant or indecisive to note the fact that Italy does have these special responsibilities. They imply and involve actions in and through the United Nations in which Italy on that account alone would have every right to participate.

For these reasons, even if they stood alone, there would be every presumption in favor of the application of Italy to membership in the United Nations. We think, Mr. President, that it is an act of utter irresponsibility for any member of the Security Council to ignore or to reject the repeated expressions of opinion on this question by such a large majority in the General Assembly.

The U.S. Government feels that Italy is entitled to a favorable recommendation from the Security Council and to her seat in the United Nations on the basis of her own unique merits and with an unassailable legal foundation under the Charter.

The U.S. Government stands for separate consideration of applicants for membership. We feel that Italy's application should not be placed in a pool with other applications, some of whom may have very sound and others very illusory claims for membership in this organization. To operate under any other theory would, in our judgment, be to deny careful consideration on the merits separately for each application.

The representative of the Soviet Union refuses to acknowledge the existence of article 4 of the Charter, and therefore misunderstands what the U.S. representative obviously had in mind in referring to the policies of certain applicants, the change of whose policy in our judgment would be needed to enable them to qualify for admission under article 4. It is the ignoring of article 4 which I think has led the Soviet delegate astray and has led him to misconstrue the statements made by responsible representatives of my Government with regard to the necessity for a change of policy in order to enable some of these applicants to qualify for membership.

We think that the Soviet delegate ignores not

only the Charter, article 4 in this respect, but the very language of the International Court of Justice in its opinion of May 28, 1948, which is also ignored by the representative of the Soviet Union. I should like to quote a few sentences from the opinion so that there may be no doubt in any one's mind as to the clarity of view of the Court in this matter.

The provisions of Article 4 necessarily imply that every application for admission should be examined and voted on separately and on its own merits; otherwise it would be impossible to determine whether a particular applicant fulfills the necessary conditions. To subject an affirmative vote for admission of an applicant state to the condition that other states be admitted with that state would prevent Members from exercising their judgment in each case with complete liberty, within the scope of the prescribed conditions. Such a demand is incompatible with the letter and spirit of Article 4 of the Charter.

In the same opinion of May 28, 1948, the Court went on to say that it was of the opinion that

. . . in particular, a Member of the Organization cannot, while it recognizes the conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional condition that other States be admitted to membership in the United Nations together with that State.

The illegal conduct to which the Court points is subjecting an affirmative vote to the condition that other states be admitted. I have restated the exact phrase which the Court used.

Now let us look at what the representative of the Soviet Union proposes. Yesterday he said, and I quote now from the verbatim record of yesterday's proceedings, page 10, "The Security Council has 13 applications before it including that of Italy. The Soviet delegation proposes that all these applications, including that of Italy be considered and that a resolution to admit all the 13 states to the United Nations be adopted." He had stated earlier, and I quote, "If we consider the question of the admission of Italy first, reach no agreement and take no decision, the matter will not be expedited at all." He has made clear from his statement at today's meeting precisely what he meant yesterday.

In short, as we understand it, his point as he stated it yesterday and restated it again today is that 13 applications must be considered together and the Security Council should admit those 13 applications or else the Soviet Union will vote against the admission of Italy.

This we think is a public confession of a policy and a position flatly contrary to the opinion of the International Court of Justice. It is an open admission that the Soviet Union is not willing to let each applicant for membership state its own case and that it will abuse the veto to prevent this from happening.

All the U.S. Government asks is that every applicant for membership be judged on its own merits. That is what article 4 of the Charter requires for every applicant for membership in the United

Point Four Officials Die in Plane Crash Near Tehran

[Released to the press December 23]

The Department of State regrets to announce the deaths in a crash of a Misk airplane in Iran of Henry G. Bennett, Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department; his wife, Vera Connell Bennett, both from Stillwater, Okla.; Albert Cyril Crilley, Special Assistant to the Administrator, Washington, D. C.; Benjamin Hill Hardy, Public Affairs Officer, TCA, Barnesville, Ga.; and James Thomas Mitchell, Audio-Visual Educational Specialist, TCA, Stillwater, Okla.

Also aboard the plane were Jesse Lee Smith of the Centennial Cotton Gin Company, Columbus, Ga.; Louis Hendrik Jordal, identified as a former soldier and apparently a member of the Department of Botany, University of Michigan; and Emijeane Sneideegar, said to be an American of Iranian origin, in transit from Cairo [later identified as Emijeane Snedegar of District Heights, Md., director of nursing for the medical program for Foreign Service employees].

The Misk plane with the Bennett party aboard crashed on the evening of December 22, apparently between 8 and 9 o'clock in a blinding snowstorm, about 5 miles northwest of Tehran. There were 16 passengers and 5 crew members aboard. It was clear that all were instantly killed. Most of the bodies were burned beyond recognition, although a certain amount of identification is being made with the help of unburned papers, jewelry, et cetera. Mr. and Mrs. Bennett were not burned and their bodies were found lying together near the wreckage.

The Misk airplane left Baghdad so late as to put it in Tehran after dark. A heavy snowstorm had set in before the plane arrived over the field at Tehran at 7:10 p.m. The ceiling was low and the tower fired repeated flares and was in radio communication with the plane until 8:45 p.m. The last message reported received from the plane was, "We now see the runway." A large crowd which had gathered to receive the party heard the plane turn and go out of earshot. Among those at the airfield awaiting the plane were Ambassador Loy Henderson and William E. Warne, director of the United States technical and economic aid program for Iran.

Ambassador Henderson returned to the Embassy at 9 p.m., leaving Mr. Warne and other Americans at the airport. Mr. Warne waited at the airport until 11:30, making every effort to get word of the plane.

Nations. This is not a rule laid down by the U.S. Government. It is a rule of law of the Charter, and affirmed by the International Court of Justice.

Of course, it must also be pointed out, Mr. President, that there are 14 pending applications, all of which are referred to by the General Assembly in its 1950 resolution, and of which the General Assembly found that 9 are qualified for admission to the organization. It is a matter of some interest and possible significance that the representative of the Soviet Union has referred merely to 13 applicants. There are actually 14. Although announcing his support for a selected group of applications conditioning his approval of each one on all of the others, the representative of the Soviet Union would have the Security Council believe that he is not opposed to Italy's admission to the United Nations.

When the Security Council last had before it Italy's application for membership in September of 1949, there were 9 members of this Council who voted in favor of Italy, and the action of the Council was frustrated by a Soviet veto based upon reasons which had nothing to do with Italy's qualifications under article 4 of the Charter, but on reasons which the International Court of Justice had considered incompatible with the letter and spirit of article 4 of the Charter.

Yesterday I referred to the application of Indonesia which was considered by the Security Council on September 26, 1950. The representative of the Soviet Union at yesterday's meeting took the position without explaining it further that the Indonesian case was wholly irrelevant because the question, as he said, was a special one, if I understood his words correctly, but that the application of Italy should not be isolated as a special question.

The law of the Charter and of the International Court of Justice is that every membership application is a special case in a sense that it is entitled to separate examination and a vote on its own merits, to use the exact words of the International Court of Justice.

As has been so well said here today, the basic fact is that the United Nations needs Italy and her contribution to this organization. She is entitled to take her place among us on her own merits. The special circumstances arising out of her trusteeship make her a special case. That is why it is before us today. The United States has always supported the right of Italy to membership by our voice and by our votes; both here and in the General Assembly I think my Government has made this clear. As often as the U.S. representative has raised his hand in the Security Council in support of that application, so often has the Soviet Union vetoed it.

How is it possible to regard a vote against the Italian application except as a simple and clear demonstration of lack of faith in the Italian people?

The gendarmerie and other Iranian officials searched for traces of the plane all night under the direction of Ahmad Shafiq, director of Civil Aviation. Wreckage was sighted early on the morning of December 23 during a lull in the snow-storm by an Iranian searching plane in which were Shafiq and Maj. Luther Freas, Assistant Air Attaché. Ambassador Henderson, Mr. Warne, and Vice Consul Lewis Hoffacker arrived with the first search party at the scene at which there was no living person. The wreckage was within 5 miles of the airport in a deep gulley among low hills. The plane had hit one hill, leaving tire tracks; hit a second hill, leaving two propellers; and crashed against the side of the gulley.

Ambassador Henderson reports that the Chief of Protocol of the Foreign Office has called on him to express condolences on behalf of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and other members of the Cabinet at the loss of the distinguished American citizens in the plane crash. Dr. Mosa-deq has telephoned Ambassador Henderson to express his grief and is sending Mr. Bousheri, Minister of Roads, to call at the Embassy on his behalf.

Assignment of Point Four Technicians

The Department of State announced on December 21 that 26 technicians scheduled for Point Four work in 15 countries of Latin America, the Near East, and Africa have finished a 4-week orientation course.

Eighteen are agricultural specialists; four are to work in health programs; and the others will serve in the fields of metallurgy, education, and census. This group of technicians represents 17 states, Alaska, and Hawaii.

The orientation course emphasizes understanding of the customs, religions, cultures, and languages of the people among whom the technicians will live and work.

New Foreign Relations Volume Released

The Department of State released on December 18 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934, volume I (General, The British Commonwealth)*. More than two-thirds of the approximately 800 documents in this volume relate to political and economic problems, the multilateral aspects of which do not permit treatment under separate country headings. The other one-third concerns bilateral relations with the several members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, principally those with Canada.

The political problem of major concern to American negotiators in the area of multilateral diplomacy was that of disarmament. As a follow-up to President Roosevelt's 1933 appeal for the eventual abolition of offensive weapons and for a general pact of nonaggression, the American delegate to the General Disarmament Conference indicated his Government's willingness to achieve, by a separate international agreement if necessary, an effective system for supervision and control of the manufacture of and trade in arms.

This represented a withdrawal from a former objection on constitutional grounds to a convention obligating the United States to establish national supervision of arms manufacture. The United States would also agree to a provision for automatic and continuous inspection under the direction of an international body.

Sponsorship by the United States of a treaty limited to the manufacture of and traffic in arms was undertaken after field reports indicated that the deepening atmosphere of distrust among European governments precluded the negotiation of a general disarmament convention in the near future.

The American Government, vitally interested in the maintenance of European peace and prepared to cooperate in bringing about a general agreement on disarmament, repeatedly asserted its determination to disassociate itself from what it regarded as purely European political negotiations and settlements. It was the political involvement phase, according to Secretary Hull, which would not permit his Government to make any positive commitment on a Soviet proposal for a permanent disarmament conference. The latter project, together with that of a so-called "Eastern Locarno" pact of mutual guarantee, was part of the diplomatic maneuvering among the European powers to deal with the critical issue of the German demand for arms equality and the French insistence on adequate security guarantees.

The documents on Anglo-American discussions, preliminary to a London naval conference in 1935, reveal that insistence by the Japanese on equality of naval armaments dominated the talks. The American representatives sought to pave the way for a percentage reduction on total treaty tonnage of all categories except aircraft carriers, without modification of the ratio established by the Washington treaty of 1922 on naval limitation.

The conversations, which in the final stage included the Japanese, failed to resolve the differences between the Japanese and American Governments as to the fundamentals of future naval limitation. Subsequently, on December 29, 1934, the Japanese Government gave notice that it was denouncing the Washington treaty, to be effective on December 31, 1936.

Other multilateral negotiations covered by the documents include those relating to a Senate committee investigating the munitions industry; in-

tergovernmental debts; an international agreement on rubber production; acceptance by the United States of an invitation to join the International Labor Organization; and protests by foreign governments against the National Recovery Administration shipping code.

This volume is the fourth in a group of five covering the record of American diplomacy for 1934. Volumes II (Europe, Near East, Africa), III (The Far East), and IV (The American Republics) have already been published. Volume V, a second volume on the American Republics, will be issued in 1952.

The principles which guide in the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* together with the names of Department officers responsible for the preparation of the series are included in a preface by the editor. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934*, volume I, was compiled in the Division of Historical Policy Research under the direction of E. R. Perkins, editor of *Foreign Relations*. Copies of this volume (xcvi, 1030 pp.) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents for \$3.75 each.

Recent Releases—Continued from page 13

Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Chile. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2213. Pub. 4214. 13 pp. 5¢.

Agreements between the United States and Chile—Signed at Santiago July 1 and 31, 1949; entered into force Aug. 5, 1949. Signed at Santiago Dec. 28, 1948, Jan. 10, 1949, and Jan. 20 and 21, 1949; entered into force Jan. 22, 1949.

Claims: Reciprocal Indemnity for War Damage to Private Property. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2248. Pub. 4243. 11 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Belgium—Signed at Brussels Dec. 5, 1949, Mar. 17 and Dec. 1, 1950, and Mar. 12, 1951; entered into force Mar. 12, 1951.

Economic Cooperation With the British/United States Zone, Free Territory of Trieste Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as Amended. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2261. Pub. 4285. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the British/United States Zone, Free Territory of Trieste—Signed at Trieste Mar. 29 and Apr. 19, 1951; entered into force Apr. 19, 1951.

Technical Cooperation: Assistance for Eritrea. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2269. Pub. 4315. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom—Signed at London June 15, 1951; entered into force June 15, 1951.

Economic Cooperation With the United Kingdom Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as Amended. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2277. Pub. 4332. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom—Signed at London May 25, 1951; entered into force May 25, 1951.

Economic Cooperation With Austria Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as Amended. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2283. Pub. 4339. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Austria—Signed at Vienna Jan. 16 and Mar. 7, 1951; entered into force Mar. 7, 1951.

Economic Cooperation With the Netherlands Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as Amended. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2285. Pub. 4341. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Netherlands—Signed at The Hague Mar. 7 and Apr. 3, 1951; entered into force Apr. 3, 1951.

Mutual Defense Assistance. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2289. Pub. 4345. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia—Signed at Jidda and at Mecca June 18, 1951; entered into force June 18, 1951.

Defense of Greenland. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2292. Pub. 4349. 14 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Denmark—Signed at Copenhagen Apr. 27, 1951; entered into force June 8, 1951.

International Information and Educational Exchange Program: Fifth Semiannual Report of the Secretary of State to Congress. International Information and Cultural Series 18. Pub. 4374. 70 pp. Limited distribution.

Report of expenditures made and activities carried on under authority of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (P. L. 402, 80th Cong.) during the period Jan. 1–June 30, 1950.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Dec. 23-29, 1951

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN.

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1104	12/20	Ireland: tax conventions
1108	12/21	Assignment of Pt. 4 technicians
1111	12/23	TCA officials dead in plane crash
1112*	12/23	Acheson: Death of TCA officials
1113*	12/23	Acheson: Death of C. M. Ainsworth
1114	12/26	Trial of U.S. fliers in Hungary
1115*	12/28	Memorial service for TCA officials
1116	12/28	Webb: Americans imprisoned in China
1117	12/28	Valuables on deposit in Poland
1118	12/28	Acheson: Release of U.S. fliers
1119	12/29	Closing of Hungarian consulates
1120	12/29	U.K., Denmark sign Torquay protocol
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Achievements of the Marshall Plan

ECA SUMMARIZES EUROPEAN RECOVERY

The following was released to the press by ECA on December 30:

The American people tomorrow close the books on the most daring and constructive venture in peacetime international relations the world has ever seen: The Marshall Plan.

It comes to an end tomorrow along with the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the agency which built a fact out of the plan.

While the Marshall Plan is thus marked complete exactly 6 months ahead of the June 30, 1952 schedule laid down by Congress, the legal powers and functions given to ECA are to finish out their allotted span under the newly created Mutual Security Agency (MSA). Into this new agency, with the new job of helping Europe to gird itself against possible Communist aggression, go also most of the U.S. Government workers who, for 3 years and 9 months, guided the program that changed not only the face of a continent but its whole state of mind.

These workers, totaling only 2,400 in the Washington headquarters and in 25 missions around the world, are credited with spending the largest sum in history on such reconstruction efforts at an administrative cost of less than a third of a cent per dollar. It has been said that "never in human history has so much been spent by so few with such great results." This has been accomplished without "hint of graft or cloud of scandal."

The recovery of Europe from the chaos of 1947, when it was hungry, cold, disorderly, and frightened, can be measured in cold statistics: Industrial production, 64 percent above 1947 and 41 percent above prewar; steel production, nearly doubled in less than 4 years; coal production, slightly below prewar but still 27 percent higher than in 1947; aluminum, copper, and cement production, up respectively 69, 31, and 90 percent from 1947; food production, 24 percent above 1947 and 9 percent above prewar levels.

But the best illustration of the recovery of Europe is the fact that she is now able—even though with great sacrifice—to shoulder part of the heavy burden of rearmament.

And while production figures are impressive, the long-range benefits of what has been called "one

of the most significant demonstrations of international cooperation in peacetime history" lie beyond these, according to Acting ECA Administrator Richard M. Bissell, Jr. Now Deputy Director for Mutual Security under W. Averell Harriman, Bissell becomes operating head of the new MSA, charged not only with economic assistance to the European rearmament program, but also with continuing the program of U.S. economic and technical assistance to Asia.

"When future historians look back upon the achievements of the Marshall Plan," Bissell said, "I believe they will see in it the charge that blasted the first substantial cracks in the centuries-old walls of European nationalism—walls that once destroyed will clear the way for the building of a unified, prosperous, and, above all, peaceful continent."

Effects of the Plan on European Nationalism

The first of these substantial cracks in the walls of European nationalism resulted directly from the "self-help" proviso tied to the offer of American aid in the famed June 5, 1947, address at Harvard University by the then Secretary of State, Gen. George C. Marshall.

Before the U.S. could proceed much further in helping to start Europe on its way to recovery, General Marshall said, "there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take. . . . The initiative . . . must come from Europe."

That initiative took the form of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). For the first time in history, governments of 18 free nations of Europe banded together to work out common solutions to common economic problems and make the best possible use of American aid. Thanks largely to the efforts of the OEEC, some 75 percent of the restrictions which formerly hampered the free movement of goods between countries of Europe have now been removed, and the volume of intra-European trade is now virtually double what it was in 1947.

Out of the OEEC, too, developed the second substantial crack in the barriers to unification, the European Payments Union (EPU), a general

clearinghouse for the varied currencies of Europe that is helping overcome payments difficulties which stood in the way of a free development of trade between nations.

Primed with U.S. dollar aid, ERT has weathered several crises in its first year and a half and has given Europe its first major plunge into the challenging task of economic integration.

The second major step toward economic integration, now almost virtually assured, lies in the dramatic Schuman Plan to fuse the six major continental steel and coal-producing countries into a single market area. Under it, member governments will voluntarily relinquish their sovereign rights to interfere with the production and distribution of steel and coal within their borders, delegating those rights to a supra-national authority.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), made possible through the ties of friendship knit during the first years of the Marshall Plan, is another move toward solidifying Europe.

Finally, in the creation of a single European Army under Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's command, the nations of free Europe may take still another in the series of steps toward unity that could only be classed as a dream before the impetus that was provided in the Marshall Plan.

A Survey of Achievements

The Economic Cooperation Administration has expended nearly 12 billion dollars in grants and loans in carrying out the European Recovery Program—equal to nearly 80 dollars for every man, woman, and child in the United States. To this, the countries of Europe have added the equivalent of another 9 billion dollars in its own currencies to match the American grant-aid dollars. Of the U.S. funds, about 5.5 billion dollars have been used to purchase industrial commodities, mostly from the United States, and another 5.2 billion dollars for the purchase of food and other agricultural commodities such as cotton. Over 800 million dollars has alone gone into the cost of ocean freight for goods sent to Europe. The U.S. contribution to the setting up of the ERT was 350 million dollars and another 100 million dollars has been used since then to help the payments union over rough spots.

In their turn, the Marshall Plan countries in the past 3 years completed or are pushing to completion a total of 27 major projects for the increase of power and 32 major projects for modernizing and expanding the production of iron and steel. Major petroleum refining works number 11 and the volume of refining has quadrupled over prewar. Other industrial projects costing the equivalent of a million dollars or more bring the total of such projects to 132, costing the equivalent of over two billion dollars. About half a billion dollars of the U.S. commodity and technical aid has gone into these projects.

Into other major recovery projects have gone also the equivalent of billions of dollars of the counterpart currencies generated in the Marshall Plan countries to match American dollar aid. Such counterpart funds are used by the respective countries for recovery projects approved by the ECA. Biggest single use—equivalent to more than a billion dollars—has been for the improvement of electric, gas, and power facilities, an improvement that is helping to make possible Europe's rearmament program today.

Similarly vital to Europe's defenses has been the rehabilitation of the continent's run-down and war-smashed railway network, with approved projects for use of counterpart funds totaling more than the equivalent of half a billion dollars. Similarly, counterpart projects for the reconstruction of merchant fleets, port and shipping facilities, and inland waterways have been completed or are in the process of completion in the Marshall Plan countries. Airports, too, have been built or improved with ECA-generated local currencies.

Through such double-barreled use of dollar aid and local funds, Marshall Plan nations, in less than 4 years, have rebuilt their economies to a point that could well persuade the Kremlin that the Europe which looked like such easy pickings in 1946 and 1947 is indeed a formidable bastion today.

Steel production, for example, so necessary to a strong peace or war economy, has risen from less than 31 million tons in 1947 to nearly 60 million tons in 1951. Soviet Russia and her satellites combined have a steel production rate of about 35 million tons.

The average volume of crude oil refined in Europe in prewar years was 12 million tons annually. In 1950-51 the volume of refined products reached 46.8 million tons, or nearly four times prewar.

In 1947, Europe's average monthly electrical production was 131½ million kilowatt hours. In mid-1951 the wheels of Europe's industry were being turned with 20½ million kilowatt hours per month. From a monthly cement production average of less than 2 million metric tons in 1947, Europe's production rose to 4 million tons monthly during the first half of 1951.

Cotton-yarn production in free Europe has risen from a monthly average of 82,000 metric tons in 1947 to 125,000 tons in 1951; wool yarn production is up from 33,000 tons monthly in 1947 to 44,000 tons in 1951.

One of the most dramatic improvements, and one closely tied to Europe's defense capabilities, is in the production of motor vehicles. Monthly production, running at the rate of 54,000 vehicles in 1947, is up to 145,000 vehicles in 1951.

Agricultural production is up 9 percent over prewar and 24 percent over 1947-48, but at the same time there are many more mouths to feed (population is up from 250 million in 1938 to over

275 million in 1951) and Europe is not yet self-sufficient in food production.

Overall, Europe's gross national product—the total sum of its production of goods and services—rose by nearly 25 percent in the less than 4 years of Marshall Plan aid to over 125 billion dollars in 1950. This is a 15 percent increase over prewar levels.

But Europe by no means considers its job finished. Member countries of the OEEC recently issued a manifesto declaring their intention to work for an expansion of total production in Western Europe by 25 percent over the next 5 years.

With her industrial plant rebuilt to better than prewar years, Europe's hope for meeting or surpassing this goal must rest on improved production methods and greater productivity—increased output of goods with the same amount of manpower, machines, and management.

Because it is in this field in particular that the United States far outstrips the rest of the world, it is in this field assistance to Europe is now being concentrated, and that priority aid will continue to be given to Free Europe through the Mutual Security Agency.

Under the productivity and technical-assistance program of ECA, more than 6 thousand representatives of European industries—management, technicians, and workers—have come to the United States for varied periods of intensive studies of U.S. production methods. Nearly 5 thousand American industrial plants and organizations have thrown open their doors to these visitors and given freely of their techniques in everything from plant layout to labor-management relations.

Last month, nearly 300 of Europe's top industrialists—owners or managers of European industries worth nearly 7 billion dollars—came to this country for a study of the "climate" and the attitudes of American management and American labor that have made the United States the world's production leader.

One major key to that high production rate is the theory of "shared-out productivity"—the distribution of the benefits of increased production efficiency to the consumer, in the form of lower prices; to the worker, in the form of higher wages, and to management in the form of adequate profits.

Mutual Security Agency To Continue Field Assistance to Europe

To help bring that key element to the industries of Free Europe, ECA has laid the groundwork for—and the Mutual Security Agency will carry out—a program for providing U.S. technical assistance at the plant and industry level in Europe itself and for the sharing of productivity knowledge and experience among Europe's industries on a continent-wide basis.

Through this concentration on productivity—and particularly on the widest possible sharing of its benefits—the MSA will continue where the Marshall Plan leaves off in the ideological battle against the snares of communism.

While it is still a potent force in some key areas of Europe, the expansion of communism in Western Europe has been abruptly halted and the tide sharply turned back in the years of the Marshall Plan. In country after country, free elections have seen the Communist Party overwhelmed almost to the point of extinction. In France and Italy, while Communist-dominated unions still hold the biggest bloc of workers, their membership losses have been staggering. In France, it is estimated that the powerful CGR has lost from half a million to three million members. In Italy, the Communist-dominated CGIL has lost about 2½ million members.

While the growth of free trade-unions has not matched the losses in the Red-dominated unions, the declining strength of communism is evidenced in the failure, despite concentrated efforts, to close the ports of France and Italy to arms-aid shipments from the United States.

There are still many dark spots in Europe's economic picture. Darkest of all is the widening dollar gap brought on by the inflationary pressures of the free world's rearmament effort. It is a dollar gap that makes mandatory continued economic aid to Europe through the burdensome period of rearmament. But the free world's leaders are convinced that the economic and moral foundation rebuilt by Europe in the past 4 years with the help of the American people through the Marshall Plan will hold firm.

The vision of a new Europe, economically strong, unified as it had never been before, standing resolutely in the ranks of the free countries of the world, has become a fact.

Tomorrow, that chapter of American history which made this possible—the Marshall Plan—is finished. Heavily criticized by some; labeled "the give-away program" by many, it has had the continuous support of the Congress, industry, labor, and nearly every other segment of American life.

To them, the American people who have supported it, belongs whatever verdict is handed down by the unbiased eyes of future history.

WESTERN GERMANY'S PROGRESS UNDER MARSHALL PLAN

*by John J. McCloy
U.S. High Commissioner for Germany¹*

A review of developments in Western Germany covering the past 4 years strikingly shows that the great objectives of the Marshall Plan have been largely accomplished.

¹ Statement made over NBC television on Jan. 6 and released to the press on the same date.

A very few years ago Western Germany was broken, chaotic, and near starvation.

The transformation which has occurred since then might almost be called a miracle. With Marshall Plan help, West Germany has largely re-established itself as a solid, productive country. Its production has increased from 1947 three-fold until it has become the second largest industrial producing country in Western Europe. Despite the fact that Western Germany borders Soviet controlled areas, communism has been definitely blocked.

Germany has likewise made tremendous strides in the production of food, despite the loss of the rich East German farm lands. The influx of 10,000,000 refugees seriously aggravated the food shortage and seriously intensified the grave housing problem, for so much of Germany's housing was lost during the war. Western Germany's record of rebuilding is phenomenal, yet in some sections people are still living five or six to a room. One house in every five built since 1948 has received Marshall Plan aid.

Economic problems of a large order still persist. These must be solved and the economic gains must be consolidated to establish a firm front against Soviet pressure—pressure which is probably greater here than anywhere else in Europe. We must continue to promote an expanding economy capable of sustaining the defense burden. To this end, the Mutual Security Agency, successor to the Economic Cooperation Administration, is designed to help build for defense. To a large extent, the staff used by ECA will be used to carry forward these aims. Western Germany still heavily depends upon outside areas for much of its raw materials and some 40 percent of its food supplies. This requires an ever-active industry and markets if the country is to maintain an economic—and in the long run a political—balance. But the German people are hardworking and imaginative. Moreover they see now what they failed to see for a long period after the close of the war—a glimpse of hope. Others can help, but the chief aid must come from within.

In Germany this economic progress is reflected in political progress for they are related. A freely elected parliament has been functioning for over 2 years, the German Government is a respected active force in international meetings, and the press and people are free. Although the Federal Republic is not yet a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it is working on plans to make an appropriate defense contribution and to participate in the European defense community. In the face of incessant opposition from the East, the question here is no longer so much whether Germany should participate in a Western defense system but rather what should be the form and extent of her participation.

As for the extent of true democratic progress in Germany, I think we can also take some satis-

faction. I have said that reactionary forces from the extreme right have also been blocked but some are still about, and one day they may again make their bid for power. I doubt that they will again prevail—they certainly will not if Germany becomes, as I believe she will, definitely aligned with the democracies of the West. The habit of democracy in Germany may not yet be ingrained, but it is growing.

In short, on the basis of the economic and political progress already made, I feel one can have real faith that a satisfactory way will be found to meet the complex and heavy problems that lie ahead of the German Federal Republic and that it will develop into a constructive and reliable force for democracy in this part of the world.

Secretary Acheson Views Soviet Proposal on Korean Negotiations

When asked at his news conference on January 4 to comment on Andrei Y. Vyshinsky's proposal to break the Korean peace-truce deadlock, Secretary Acheson said that we had to start off by looking at what Mr. Vyshinsky proposed. He noted that the first thing Mr. Vyshinsky proposed was to undo one very important thing which had already been done by the General Assembly, the setting up of the Collective Measures Committee. Secretary Acheson said Mr. Vyshinsky's proposal that the Security Council be called in order to "break the deadlock in Korea" calls for a look at past actions. He pointed out that Mr. Vyshinsky's colleague, Mr. Malik, in August 1950 had produced such a deadlock as had never been seen before in the whole United Nations.¹ Secretary Acheson said that this was not a very promising proposal, stating that the discussions in Korea on the armistice had gone forward over a long time slowly but with definite progress. The Secretary went on to say that the discussions were being conducted admirably by General Ridgway and his associates and he could not see how the conduct of this matter could be improved by being transferred elsewhere. He said that it could only be delayed and hampered. Secretary Acheson said that he felt that specific parts of what Mr. Vyshinsky proposed were nothing short of disastrous.

Secretary Acheson went on to say that as far as a general meeting to relieve tensions was concerned, we had had a meeting of 17 weeks early last year in Paris to try to arrange the very thing that Mr. Vyshinsky wanted to bring about and the Russian delegate, Mr. Gromyko, had done

¹Yakov Malik, Soviet representative in the Security Council, served as president of the Council during August 1950. For statements concerning his tactics as presiding officer, see BULLETIN of Aug. 21, 1950, p. 283; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 326; and Sept. 18, 1950, pp. 451 and 455.

everything in his power to obstruct and frustrate that meeting. Secretary Acheson said he felt that one had to conclude that Mr. Vyshinsky, by holding out some bait—a meeting to relieve tensions—was really attempting to utterly destroy the two things which were going forward satisfactorily, the Collective Measures Committee and negotiations in Korea. He said we would vote against this proposal for the reasons he had just given.

Text of Soviet Proposal

Following is the text of the Soviet proposal as introduced in Committee I (Political and Security) of the General Assembly on January 3 by Andrei Y. Vyshinsky:

U.N. doc. A/C.1/688
Dated January 3, 1952.

CONSIDERING that a basic task of the United Nations is to secure and strengthen international peace and security, and bearing in mind that under the Charter the main responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security has been conferred on the Security Council,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. *Decides* to abolish the Collective Measures Committee,

2. *Recommends* the Security Council:

in accordance with Article 28 of the Charter, to convene without delay a periodic meeting to consider what measures might ensure the removal of the tension at present existing in international relations and the establishment of friendly relations between countries:

to examine at a periodic meeting in the first place the measures which the Security Council should take to help to bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations being held in Korea for the cessation of hostilities.

Military Assistance Agreement With Brazil

[Released to the press January 3]

The Departments of State and Defense announced on January 3 the initiation of the first bilateral negotiations under the program of military-grant aid for Latin America, authorized in the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

Conversations will begin on January 3 in Rio de Janeiro between representatives of the Governments of Brazil and the United States looking to the conclusion of a bilateral military assistance agreement. This agreement would involve the provision of grant aid by the United States to promote the defense of the Western Hemisphere.

The American Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, Herschel V. Johnson, will be assisted in the negotiations by representatives of the Department of Defense. It is anticipated that similar conversations will be held with the governments of several other American Republics. Announcements will be made as arrangements for their initiation are completed.

Cotton Credit for Spain

Credits of up to 12 million dollars for financing the purchase and shipment of U.S. cotton to Spain were announced by the Export-Import Bank on January 4.

The credits are to be established in favor of Spanish commercial banks with the guaranty of the Bank of Spain and the Instituto Español de Moneda Extranjera. They will bear interest at 2¾ percent per annum and be repayable in 18 months and will be available until June 30, 1952, for financing U.S. cotton contracted for and shipped as from the date of establishment of the credits.

The details regarding the operations and procedures under the credits will be announced as soon as they are completed.

U.S., India Expand Point Four Program

[Released to the press January 5]

American assistance under an expanded Point Four Program for speeding up the economic development of India will be made available under an agreement signed on January 5 in New Delhi between India and the United States. The agreement was signed at 4 p.m. New Delhi time (5:30 a.m. Washington time). The Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the United States Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, signed on behalf of their respective Governments.

Under the agreement, the United States will make available 50 million dollars during the current fiscal year, ending June 30, 1952, to be deposited in a special Indo-American Technical Cooperation Fund. The Government of India has agreed to contribute rupees for the projects to be financed out of this Fund. It is estimated that this will result in at least a total amount for the program of rupees 50 crore, which in terms of dollars is the equivalent of 100 million dollars.

The projects to be financed by this Fund will be administered in close cooperation with the central and state Governments. Projects under the Fund will be aimed primarily at raising the level of agricultural production and increasing the food supply of the country, to help reduce India's present dependence on food imports. These imports now average about 5 million tons a year and cost the country about 500 million dollars in foreign exchange, which otherwise could be used for economic development.

Of major importance is the community-development program which has been tentatively agreed upon between the two Governments for financing

out of this Fund. This program contemplates the setting up of about 50 rural-urban development areas in different parts of the country, each consisting of about 200,000 people in about 300 villages. Many of these areas may be selected around the new river-valley projects. Others will be around the new tube well-development projects to be financed by the Fund and also by the central and state Governments in India.

The proposed rural-urban development program is expected to draw upon the combined experience of the Uttar Pradesh Government at the Etawah development project and the newly built townships for displaced persons at Faridabad and Nilokheri. At Etawah, in 3 years time, 79,000 people from 102 villages, covering an area of 100 square miles, have demonstrated how, with cooperative and planned endeavor, food production can be substantially increased. They have also been successful in eliminating, to a large extent, malaria, rinderpest, and other diseases, and in greatly improving literacy. In Faridabad and Nilokheri again, in less than 3 years, good planning and enthusiastic cooperation of the people have enabled modern townships to be built with up-to-date housing, good schools, improved health facilities, and a wide variety of industrial opportunities.

The agreement provides for the formation of an independent central committee of the Indian Government which will determine their policies and provide general supervision of the projects undertaken. Members of the committee will be appointed by the Government of India. Clifford Willson, representing the Technical Cooperation Administration of the U. S. Department of State in India, will be available as consultant to this committee.

The Indo-American Technical Cooperation Fund, in which the American funds will be deposited, will be administered jointly. An officer of the Central Ministry of Finance will be the nominee of the Government of India for this purpose, while Clifford Willson, working under the general supervision of the United States Ambassador in India, will be the nominee of the United States Government. As projects of economic development are approved by the joint administrators, the United States will deposit the required dollars in the Fund.

The new agreement is a supplement to the general Point Four Agreement which was signed between the Governments of the United States and India on December 28, 1950.¹ The agreement represents a considerable expansion of the Point Four Program in India, as provided for in the Mutual Security Act of 1951. In fiscal year 1951, about 711,000 dollars were obligated for expenditure in India on technical-cooperation projects in

agriculture, industrial development, education, public health, rural improvement, mineral and hydro-electric development, handicrafts, and laboratory investigations.

Thus far in fiscal year 1952, approximately 1,500,000 dollars has been allocated for similar work. Of the existing allocations, 185,000 dollars is for training of 48 Indian nationals in the United States in these and related fields. As much as 2,500,000 dollars additional may be expended by the United States in fiscal year 1952 for employment of American technicians in India, making a total of about 4 million dollars available for projects in addition to the joint Fund.

Members of the American negotiating team which helped work out the agreement, besides Mr. Willson, are:

- John A. Loftus, economic adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, who is serving the negotiating group as principal economic adviser
- John P. Ferris, Chief of Regional Planning Development Studies Branch of the Tennessee Valley Authority, serving as valley development expert
- Horace Holmes, widely known chief of Point Four agricultural activities in India, advising the negotiators in his field
- Frank W. Parker, expert in soils and agronomy, U.S. Department of Agriculture, advising on fertilizer production and usage
- Willis Rich, former Chief of Scientific Inquiry, Bureau of Fisheries, U.S. Department of the Interior; and chief fisheries expert, SCAP, Japan, advising on fisheries
- Dr. Estelle Ford Warner, Medical Director, U.S. Public Health Service, with the rank of colonel, advising on public health matters

Mr. Willson, who has the personal rank of minister, was appointed November 29, 1951, to direct the whole Point Four Program in India in consultation with Ambassador Bowles. He has been in charge of planning the Colorado River Great Basin development for the Department of the Interior. He recently returned as ECA settlement adviser to the Government of Turkey in settling 120,000 Turkish refugees from Bulgaria.

U.S. Ships Wheat to Jordan

[Released to the press December 18]

The United States is to supply 9,650 long tons of wheat to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to help that country cope with a serious food shortage caused by failure of the wheat crop, the Department of State announced on December 18.

An agreement between the Governments of the United States and Jordan to cover the terms of the wheat grant was signed in Amman on that date. A general agreement for technical cooperation between Jordan and the United States has been in effect since February 27, 1951.

Ordinarily, Jordan is self-sufficient in wheat

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 8, 1951, p. 67.

production and is able to export small amounts. Wheat is the main crop of this predominantly agricultural economy.

The wheat shipment will cost about \$1,400,000 including transportation. It is being financed under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as a part of the program of technical cooperation and economic assistance in the Near East. The Government of Jordan will sell the wheat through commercial channels. The proceeds will provide local currency (Jordan dinars) with which that Government will share the expenses of Point Four development projects in agriculture, health, education, water resources, and small-scale industries.

The wheat is being supplied by the Commodity Credit Corporation from its stocks in inventory. It will be loaded at Baltimore on or about December 26 aboard the S. S. *Sky Star*.

Convention on Declaration of Death of Missing Persons

Following the receipt of an instrument of accession by Guatemala, the convention on the Declaration of Death of Missing Persons will come into force on January 24, 1952, the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced on December 27.

Formal receipt of the Guatemalan notification is dated Christmas Day, December 25, and, according to the convention's provisions, it will come into force 30 days following deposit of the second instrument of accession. The first, by China, was made on December 20, 1950.

The convention on the Declaration of Death of Missing Persons was drafted by an international conference of plenipotentiaries convened by the General Assembly in the spring of 1950 and opened for accession on April 6, 1950. It stemmed directly from international concern over the disappearance of millions of persons, without any evidence of their death, after the Second World War—mostly because of deportations, concentration camps, and other methods of extermination practiced by the Nazis.

Lack of certainty as to whether they did die and, if so, on what date, has led to legal complications, particularly in cases of remarriage and inheritance. The convention, prepared by representatives of 26 governments, applies to persons whose last known residence was in Europe, Asia, or Africa, and who disappeared between 1939 and 1945 under circumstances which give reasonable

ground to infer that they have died because of the war or because of racial, religious, political, or national persecution. It will also be applicable to persons missing since 1945 in similar circumstances but only in those contracting states which notify the Secretary-General that they agree to this provision.

The convention accords competence to declare a person dead to courts at the missing person's last known residence (whether forced or voluntary), at the place of supposed death of the country of which the missing person was a national and of the country where his property is located. The date of death is to be fixed as the date of disappearance defined as that of the last known indication of the person's existence.

The convention set up an International Bureau for Declarations of Death to serve as an international clearinghouse of information, and to enable tribunals of different states to exchange information. Though not yet established, the Bureau cost is provided for in the current U.N. budget estimates.

Letter of Credence

India

The newly appointed Ambassador of India, Binay Ranjan Sen, presented his credentials to the President on December 19, 1951. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and for the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 1100 of December 19.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Dec. 29, 1951-Jan. 5, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

No.	Date	Subject
1098	12/18	Wheat to Jordan
1100	12/19	India: Letter of credence (rewrite)
1123†	12/29	New TCA administrator
1*	1/2	Visitors to U.S.
2*	1/2	Anniversary of Haiti
3†	1/2	Information Services merged in U.K.
4	1/3	Military assistance to Brazil
5	1/3	U.S. Delegation to Who
6*	1/5	Anniversary of Burma
7†	1/5	VoA programs for U.S. public
8	1/5	McCloy: Marshall Plan in Germany
9	1/5	U.S.—India Point 4 expanded

Plans for Liquidation of IRO

REPORT ON SESSIONS HELD AT GENEVA, OCTOBER 18-27, 1951

by *George L. Warren*

The General Council of the International Refugee Organization (Iro) held its eighth session at Geneva from October 22 through October 27, 1951. The Executive Committee met concurrently from October 18 through October 26, 1951.

The General Council received from the Executive Committee comments on the annual report of the Director General for the year ending June 30, 1951, the financial statements and the report of the auditors for the same period, the status of contributions, the revised plan of expenditures for the supplementary and closure periods beginning July 1, 1950, a report on plans for the termination of operations, and a statement by the Director General on residual problems anticipated to exist after the termination of Iro.

The Director General, in his report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, referred to the liberalization of the immigration criteria of reception countries which had provided resettlement opportunities for 70 thousand additional refugees who would not have been able to move under criteria previously in force. He indicated that considerable progress had been made in arranging facilities for refugees and their dependents who require continual institutional care and treatment. Only 7,101 refugees in this group remained the concern of the Organization on June 30, 1951. By September 30, 1951, this number had been reduced to 2,564. Only 477 remained for whom no satisfactory arrangements had been completed as of that date. Of the 111 thousand refugees for whom responsibility had been transferred to the govern-

ments and authorities of Western Europe, Germany, and Austria on July 1, 1951, many had been resettled overseas in the intervening period.

A recent important development in the experience of the Organization had been the use of the Organization for the movement on a full-cost reimbursable basis of migrants of different nationalities ineligible for Iro services, thus permitting more flexibility in the movement of refugees and economy in the use of ships than would have been possible otherwise. The report also indicated that 166,985 refugees had been resettled during the year under review and 2,169 repatriated, bringing the total of refugees resettled by the Organization up to June 30, 1951, to 955,141, and the number repatriated to 72,423. Resettlement operations during the third quarter of the calendar year 1951 enabled the members of the Council to participate at Geneva during the session in ceremonies commemorating the movement of the one millionth refugee and his family. The Netherlands Government announced at the session that in response to the personal wishes of Queen Juliana, the Netherlands Government would grant admission to an additional 100 to 200 refugees remaining under the care of Iro who require continual custodial care.

Financial Position

The financial statements, considered and accepted by the council, showed that the resources available to the Organization during the year

ending June 30, 1951, totaled \$105,015,393, including stocks on hand on July 1, 1951, valued at \$6,774,447. During that period \$71,173,122 in cash resources had been utilized and inventory values were reduced by \$3,550,362, leaving a net of \$30,291,909 in available resources as of July 1, 1951. Miscellaneous income anticipated during the remaining period of operations and contributions due but not received brought the total resources available for use in the period after June 30, 1951 to \$31,072,474, of which \$27,848,389 were in the form of liquid assets.

The council also learned that two important items of receivable assets still under negotiation were not included in the foregoing figures. The first was a credit balance due the Organization on the food replacement account in Germany, amounting to an estimated \$5,311,395, and the second was a claim against the Government of Australia for \$1,651,060 arising out of the costs of moving refugees to Australia. To the extent that any part of the sums involved in these two items under negotiation become available to the Organization, it was considered possible that resettlement operations might be continued during January 1952 and that arrangements might be made for additional refugees and their dependents who require continual institutional care and who might otherwise be left without assistance upon the termination of the Organization.

After close examination of the financial statements and the auditors' report, the council concluded that the financial position of the Organization was satisfactory in that, with the exception of the German food credit and the Australian claim, all assets would be realized in the intervening period before closure and all liabilities would be satisfactorily settled in the same period.

Plans for Liquidation of IRO

The council, after full consideration, approved the revised plan of expenditure of the supplementary and closure periods beginning July 1, 1950. As against the total amount of \$100,356,962 approved by the council at its previous session, the revised plan proposed the expenditure of \$99,021,511, of which \$5,198,503 was allocated to the administrative budget, \$92,633,008 to the operational budget, and the remaining \$1,190,000 to the closure budget. The revised plan was based on the use of all income which could reasonably be anticipated before the end of the calendar year 1951, and depended especially upon the continuation of favorable factors affecting the shipping program. In the event of failure of any of the income to materialize, the program would have to be curtailed. The plan provided for the resettlement of a total of 231,400 refugees in the period subsequent to July 1, 1950, 9 thousand more than the number estimated in the earlier plan of expenditure. It was noted, however, that unless the

German food credit account and the Australian claim are settled satisfactorily, some 12 thousand refugees expected to receive visas for the United States and other countries will remain in Europe after January 1, 1952, without the possibility of transport. Dependent on these items also is a more satisfactory disposition of the remaining refugees in Shanghai, in the Philippines, in Trieste, and in Greece and Italy.

The council tentatively approved plans for the final liquidation of the Organization which will be reconsidered at a final meeting of the council in late January 1952. These plans call for the liquidation of all of the affairs of the Organization during a 6-month period starting immediately after the date of cessation of operations. At the cessation of operations the estimated staff will total 650, of which 175 will constitute the liquidation staff. Two weeks after the cessation of operations the staff will be reduced to 175 persons and after an additional two weeks to 127 persons. The cost of liquidation, excluding an amount of \$440,000 for final payments to personnel, is estimated at \$750,000.

Residual Refugee Problems

The General Assembly of the United Nations, at its fifth session, had invited the General Council of the Iro (Resolution No. 430 (V) December 14, 1950) to submit a communication on the problem of assistance to refugees remaining uncared for upon the termination of Iro. The drafting of this communication was one of the most important actions of the council at its eighth session. The council decided to transmit to the General Assembly a factual communication describing the residual problems of refugees previously eligible for Iro assistance as distinguished from recommendations to the General Assembly for the solution of these problems. None of the governments represented on the council were prepared to present their views as to the actions which the United Nations might take on the basis of the Iro communication. The communication transmitted (U.N. document A/1948, November 10, 1951) indicated that the Iro had sufficient funds to continue operations until January 1, 1952, and possibly to assist and reestablish several thousand additional refugees during January and February 1952; that the Organization had already repatriated and resettled over 1,000,000 refugees; and that it had made reasonably satisfactory provision for approximately 47 thousand refugees, including their dependents who require continuing custodial care. There will remain, however, in certain areas such as Shanghai, the Philippines, Trieste, Greece, and Italy, limited numbers of refugees whose problems will not have been satisfactorily resolved for economic, political, and other reasons.

The following 15 member governments of IRO were represented at this session of the council:

Australia	Netherlands
Belgium	New Zealand
Canada	Norway
Denmark	Switzerland
Dominican Republic	United Kingdom
France	United States
Italy	Venezuela
Luxembourg	

The Governments of China, Guatemala, and Iceland, members of the Organization, were not represented. The Governments of Austria, Brazil, Germany, Israel, Mexico, and Sweden, as well as the Holy See, the United Nations, and the International Labor Organization were represented by

observers. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees was also present as an observer.

F. Leemaus of Belgium presided as chairman of the council for the session, N. St. C. Deschamps of Australia served as first vice chairman, J. Sturm of Luxembourg as second vice chairman, and P. J. de Kanter of the Netherlands as *rapporteur*. The council adjourned on October 27, 1951, having decided to reconvene at Geneva for its final session late in January 1952. The Executive Committee will reconvene a few days prior to the meeting of the General Council in January.

• *Mr. Warren, author of the above article, is Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State. Mr. Warren was U.S. representative to the October sessions of the IRO.*

Demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir

SECOND REPORT BY THE U.N. REPRESENTATIVE FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

On December 18, Frank P. Graham, U.N. representative for India and Pakistan, transmitted to the Secretary-General his second report to the Security Council (U.N. doc. S/2448).¹ As a result of private negotiations with representatives of India and Pakistan, Dr. Graham reported that he had been successful in enlarging the area of agreement on steps leading toward the holding of a plebiscite in the disputed state. Agreement still has not been reached on four basic points of the compromise plan prepared by Dr. Graham.

Parts I and II of the second report outline the terms of reference given by the Security Council to the U.N. representative and the procedure which he adopted in continuing his negotiations. Following is the text of the remainder of the report:

EDITOR'S NOTE. On Nov. 10, 1951, the Security Council instructed Dr. Graham to continue his efforts to obtain agreement on a plan for demilitarizing the State of Jammu and Kashmir along the lines indicated in his report of Oct. 15.

¹For excerpts from Dr. Graham's Oct. 15 report and from his statement to the Security Council on Oct. 18, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 738. For a statement on Dr. Graham's mission by Amb. Ernest A. Gross, see BULLETIN of Dec. 10, 1951, p. 958, and for the Security Council's resolution of Nov. 10, see *ibid.*, p. 959.

U.N. doc. S/2448
Dated December 19, 1951
[Excerpts]

III

Points of Difference Between the Two Governments

The points of difference of the two Governments in regard to their interpretation and execution of the resolutions of the UNCIP of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 remain on the fundamental issues as they appear in the first report of the United Nations Representative.

Concerning the points of difference between the Governments on the proposals of the United Nations Representative of 7 September 1951, the conversations held by the United Nations Representative with the parties, as well as the answers he has received to the different questions put to them by him, have convinced him that at this stage of the negotiations the parties could not achieve agreement on the draft agreement as a whole, submitted to them by the United Nations Representative on 7 September 1951.

As explained above, the United Nations Representative concentrated his efforts on what in his opinion constituted the two fundamental points of difference between the parties with regard to his proposals for agreement, namely,

(a) The minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, and

(b) The day on which the Government of India would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office.

Minimum of Forces

In his statement to the parties of 7 December 1951² the United Nations Representative pointed out that,

² Annex III, not here printed.

"The number of armed forces to remain at the end of the period of demilitarization should be decisively reduced to the smallest number possible for the final disposal by the Plebiscite Administrator."

In the questionnaires submitted to the parties,² the United Nations Representative had in mind that the Government of India had repeatedly stated that the Government of India was responsible for the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and security could not be made dependent solely on assurances offered, but must be related to the actual conditions prevailing in the area. The United Nations Representative also took into account the fact that in August 1951 the Government of India, in answering a question submitted by the United Nations Representative, had said,

"The expression 'security of the State' referred to in question 9 is intended to connote the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir against incursion of tribesmen, Pakistan nationals and regular Pakistan forces whether acting separately or in concert".

In its answer to the questionnaire the Government of India said³ (paragraph 7),

"It should be noticed that the Indian troops remaining in the State of Jammu and Kashmir at the end of the period of demilitarization under this plan are over 7,000 less than the minimum stated in paragraph 8 of the Prime Minister's letter of September 11th."

Furthermore, in paragraph 8 of its answer to the questionnaire, the Government of India said:

"The quantum of troops proposed in paragraph 5 above should be compared with the force of about a dozen battalions of infantry plus artillery, cavalry and other protective forces which were maintained by the State of Jammu and Kashmir before the partition of India, when the borders of the State were secured against any external threat by the presence of large garrisons in British India at all the strategic approaches to the State, and when conditions of comparative peace and security prevailed on the sub-continent and in the neighbouring countries. Not only has the State since suffered two invasions, but on some of its frontiers extremely unsettled conditions still prevail. These factors must inevitably influence the strength of the forces now required for its security. It should also be pointed out that any appreciation affecting the security of the territory and the strength of the forces required to ensure it, must remain the responsibility of the Government of India."

The Government of Pakistan maintains that,

"... a force of no more than 4 infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units) should be left on each side of the ceasefire line. The Pakistan Government are, however, prepared to agree that so long as the forces on each side of the ceasefire line are of the order indicated above, some slight difference in the strength or description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached."

During the discussions at the military level information received indicated that at some stage of the tentative plan of demilitarization the withdrawals of armed forces would amount to a great proportion compared with those that were there on 1 January 1949. However, the disparity between the number and character of the forces proposed by the parties to be left at the end of the period of demilitarization were so wide that any agreement on the whole plan concerned as a single continuous process could not be reached at this stage.

Appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator

The opinions of the Governments of India and Pakistan concerning the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator were so irreconcilable that the United Nations Representative could not see the possibility of obtaining an agreement at this stage.

The Indian Government insisted that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed as soon as conditions in the State, on both sides of the cease-fire line permitted of a start being made with the arrangements for carrying out the plebiscite, and that to appoint the Plebiscite Administrator before he could function effectively would be premature. On the other hand, the Government of Pakistan emphasized the importance of appointing the Plebiscite Administrator formally to office as much in advance of the final day of demilitarization as possible.

IV

Views of the United Nations Representative Concerning the Problem Confided to Him

The United Nations Representative has endeavoured in the preceding part of his report to present to the Security Council a summary of his efforts to implement the resolution of the Council of 10 November 1951.

In the report to the Security Council dated 15 October 1951 the United Nations Representative reported that the two Governments had indicated agreement on four of the twelve proposals for an integrated plan of demilitarization submitted to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on 7 September 1951.

The four proposals on which agreement had been reached were paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4.⁴

The United Nations Representative can now report agreement on four more proposals, namely, paragraphs 8, 9, 11 and 12.⁵

The representative of India agreed to accept paragraph 12 of the draft agreement on the understanding that the reference made there was not to differences arising in the process of drawing up a programme of demilitarization, but only to differences upon technical details concerning the actual implementation of the agreed programme. The United Nations Representative agreed with this interpretation of paragraph 12.

Agreement has not been reached on the four most basic proposals of the twelve, namely, paragraph 5, 6, 7 and 10. Agreement on these four paragraphs is most essential for carrying out the plan of demilitarization envisaged as an integrated whole in the twelve proposals.

The four basic proposals on which agreement between the parties has not been reached are as follows:

"5. Agree that subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 below the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shall be effected in a single, continuous process;

"6. Agree that this process of demilitarization shall be completed during a period of 90 days, unless another period is decided upon by the representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments referred to in paragraph 9 below;

"7. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:

A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;

(ii) the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State, and

(iii) large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place.

B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;

(ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State Armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in B (i) above will have been carried out;

² Annex VI, not here printed.

⁴ BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 740.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 741.

so that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on the present Pakistan side of the cease-fire line a force of — Civil Armed Forces, and on the Indian side of the cease-fire line a force of —.

"10. Agree that the Government of India shall cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period referred to in paragraph 6 above:"

The United Nations Representative has carefully considered the situation on the sub-continent with regard to the relations between India and Pakistan in general and the Kashmir problem in particular. Furthermore, he has paid careful attention to the views put forward by both parties, and he has sought to narrow the differences between the parties on the basis of the twelve proposals of the plan as a whole which was noted with approval by the Security Council on 10 November 1951.

Accordingly, and with reference to paragraph 4 of the resolution of the Security Council of 10 November 1951, the United Nations Representative now wishes to express his view on the problem arising from the lack of an agreement on four of the twelve proposals, as follows:

(a) With regard to paragraph 5 which reads as follows:

"Agree that subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 below the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shall be effected in a single, continuous process:"

the United Nations Representative repeats the view expressed on page 25, paragraph 56, of his report of 15 October 1951 which reads as follows:

"Agreement that the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be effected in a single, continuous process implied, in the opinion of the United Nations Representative, the implementation of part 11 of the 13 August 1948 resolution, together with paragraph 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution as a whole"

(b) In his opinion, paragraph 6 should read as follows:

"Agree that this process of demilitarization shall be

completed on 15 July 1952, unless another date is decided upon by the representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments referred to in Paragraph 9;"

(c) Paragraph 7 should read as follows:

"Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that on the date referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:

A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;

(ii) the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State, and

(iii) large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place.

B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have withdrawn;

(ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and States Armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in B (i) above will have been carried out; so that on the date referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion to the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949".

(d) Paragraph 10 to be maintained as it stands, namely:

"Agree that the Government of India shall cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period referred to in paragraph 6 above;"

The United Nations Representative, in accordance with the request of the Security Council that he give his views on the problem confided to him, has presented this analysis of the problem and his views thereon, with the hope that they will help the Council to assist the parties in reaching an agreement on the problem of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the more hopeful atmosphere on the subcontinent.

U.N. Committee Approves German Election Plan

*Statements by John Sherman Cooper
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly*

TOWARD A UNITED GERMANY¹

My purpose in speaking again upon the resolution presented by the United Kingdom, France, and the United States is to direct the attention of the Committee to the central issues which the delegation of the United States believes have developed from our deliberations.

At the outset I wish to express the appreciation of my delegation for the genuine interest expressed by all members of the Committee in the problems related to the proposal made by the Governments

¹ Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee of the General Assembly on Dec. 17 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. For a statement by Mr. Cooper on Dec. 5, see BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1018; for text of the tripartite draft resolution, see *ibid.*, p. 1019.

of France, the United Kingdom, and my country. We welcome the constructive amendments which have been tabled by the delegations of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, and Uruguay,² and by Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Netherlands, and Norway.³ We believe that these amendments have improved the original resolution and have made more explicit certain points which were implied in the original draft. My Government fully supports the tripartite resolution as modified by these amendments.

The object of this resolution is to secure the aid of the United Nations in taking a necessary step toward the unification of Germany. The unifica-

² U.N. doc. A/AC.53/L.18, dated Dec. 15, 1951.

³ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/L.17, dated Dec. 14, 1951.

tion of Germany is, as every one of us knows, the most profound wish of the German people. In this case, their wish accords with the fundamental interest of the United Nations—the preservation and promotion of peace.

A divided Germany must always endanger the stability of Europe. A united Germany, democratic and nonaggressive in practice and spirit, would reduce the tensions and fears of the people of both Western and Eastern Europe. It could remove one of the major differences between the three Western Powers and the Soviet Union. The unification of Germany will mark a substantial advance toward peace.

The only legal and just way by which Germany can ever be united is as a result of free elections held throughout all of Germany. An apparent agreement on this point by those having responsi-

bility in Germany has been established during this debate. The German people say this is true; the representatives of the Federal Republic of West Germany and the representatives of the Soviet zone say this is true; the three Western Powers and the Soviet Union say this is true.

Real Issue Between East and West Germany

But when we come to discuss the terms of *free elections*, the real point at issue between the Federal Republic of West Germany and the representatives of East Germany and between the three Western Powers and the Soviet Union becomes clear. The real point of difference is this—What are the conditions which make elections really free?

The representatives of every free nation sitting at this table know that there can be no free elec-

Text of Resolution

U.N. doc. A/AC. 53/L. 11/Rev. 2
Adopted December 19, 1951

WHEREAS the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France, acting on a proposal made by the German Federal Chancellor, have brought before the General Assembly a request for the appointment of an impartial international commission to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone of Germany in order to determine whether existing conditions there make it possible to hold genuinely free elections throughout these areas,

WHEREAS the statements made by the representatives of the Federal Government of Germany, of Berlin and of the Soviet Zone of Germany before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee reveal differences of opinion with regard to the conditions existing in these areas, which makes it essential that such an investigation shall be carried out by an impartial body;

The General Assembly,

HAVING REGARD TO the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as set out in the Charter, taking due account of the responsibilities of the four Powers regarding Germany, and desiring to make its contribution to the achievement of the unity of Germany in the interests of world peace,

1. *Considers* it desirable to give effect to the above request;

2. *Resolves* to appoint a Commission composed of representatives of Brazil, Iceland, Netherlands, Pakistan and Poland which shall carry out immediately a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone of Germany to ascertain and report whether conditions in these areas are such as to make possible the holding of genuinely free and secret elections throughout these areas. The Commission shall investigate the following matters in so far as they affect the holding of free elections;

(a) The constitutional provisions in force in these areas and their application as regards the various aspects of individual freedom, in particular the degree to which, in practice, the individual enjoys freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of speech, press and broadcasting;

(b) Freedom of political parties to organize and carry out their activities.

(c) The organization and activities of the judiciary, police and other administrative organs;

3. *Calls upon* all authorities in the Federal Republic, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone to enable the Commission to travel freely throughout these areas; and to allow the Commission freedom of access to such persons, places and relevant documents as it considers necessary in the course of executing its task and to allow it to summon any witnesses whom it wishes to examine;

4. (a) *Directs* the Commission to report at the earliest practicable date to the Secretary-General, for the consideration of the four Powers and for the information of the other Members of the United Nations, the results of its efforts to make the necessary arrangements with all the parties concerned to enable it to undertake its work according to the terms of the present resolution;

(b) *Directs* the Commission, if it is able to make the necessary arrangements throughout the areas concerned, similarly to report the findings resulting from its investigation of conditions in these areas, it being understood that such findings may include recommendations regarding further steps which might be taken in order to bring about conditions in Germany necessary for the holding of free elections in these areas;

(c) *Directs* the Commission, if it is unable forthwith to make these arrangements, to make a further attempt to carry out its task at such time as it is satisfied that the German authorities in the Federal Republic, in Berlin and in the Soviet Zone will admit the Commission, as it is desirable to leave the door open for the Commission to carry out its task;

(d) *Directs* the Commission in any event to report, not later than 1 September 1952, the results of its activities to the Secretary-General, for the consideration of the four Powers and for the information of the other Members of the United Nations;

5. *Declares* that the United Nations is prepared, after being satisfied that the conditions throughout the areas concerned are such as to make possible the holding of genuinely free and secret elections, to offer its assistance in order to guarantee the freedom of the elections;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish the Commission with the necessary staff and facilities.

tions any place where there is not general freedom. When I speak of freedom, I speak of a freedom that is honored, that is practiced, and that is protected by law. There may be much talk of constitutions and of laws, but if the freedom proclaimed by such documents is violated in practice, their existence serves only to make more reprehensible the wrong done to man.

We have heard the statements of representatives from the Federal Republic of West Germany and from the Soviet zone, and have noted the sharp conflict in their views.

One fact stands out clearly. The spokesmen of the Soviet zone indicated that they do not want to reveal to an impartial international commission the conditions which exist in their area. The Federal Republic, on the other hand, stated its desire to expose itself to such a test.

The representatives of the Federal Republic spoke of the development of democratic government in Western Germany. It is a developing government. In Western Germany, as in all of Germany, there are some remnants of Nazi sympathy which will demand the continuing opposition of the German people.

The distinguished delegate from Israel has spoken of the dangers of a revival of nazism in Germany. The delegation of the United States understands the concern of his country, one which derives from its experience with Nazi Germany. It is an experience whose recurrence all free nations, and certainly those who were the subjects of its aggression, are striving to prevent. The United States, with the United Kingdom and France, has adhered faithfully to the policy and conviction that these influences should never again become effective.

My Government has not overlooked the factors. The criteria established in the resolution are broad enough to include any real and effective resurgence of nazism. Those who oppose the revival of nazism or totalitarianism of any form should be first to support this inquiry.

But most important, we can say that the institutions which free peoples believe are the true means of preventing force and repression exist in Western Germany. I speak of free elections, free information media, and the civil and political rights of the individual.

The guarantee of freedom in Germany lies in the growth of these institutions and in the fulfillment of the natural desire of the German people for self-government.

Can we believe that similar institutions of freedom exist in East Germany? The representatives of the Federal Republic, drawing upon their own knowledge and from information furnished by thousands of refugees from the Eastern zone, told the story of conditions in East Germany. Some members have suggested that too much attention was devoted to these conditions. It was an unpleasant story, but at times it is necessary that unpleasant stories be heard to serve truth.

Just a few years ago, many people did not want to believe that arbitrary arrest, the secret police, and concentration camps existed in Nazi Germany. It was an unpleasant story. Today, it is unpleasant and fearful to know that these same offenses against liberty and the human spirit exist in somewhat different but equally dangerous forms. But this knowledge is necessary if these conditions are to be changed.

The delegation of the United States believes that the conditions described by the representatives of the Federal Republic exist. If they do not, it is difficult to explain why hundreds of thousands of people will leave their homes and even their families to flee from East Germany to West Germany. This strange one-way traffic—strange because it is against every normal instinct of mankind—flows not from West to East, but only from East to West.

Decisions Facing the General Assembly

Mr. President, the first decision that we must make is to determine whether the General Assembly will undertake any responsibility toward helping solve this very serious world problem. It must decide if the Three Power resolution is reasonable and appropriate as an affirmative step in this direction. In making these decisions, I believe that we ought to take into account the influence that the positive interest and action of the United Nations can bring to bear upon the solution of this problem, and we should not allow that influence to be conditioned on the acceptance or rejection of the resolution by any of the occupying powers.

Now, how does this draft resolution help us in this problem?

If it is permitted to function, the commission established by this resolution would ascertain whether the conditions for free elections exist. If this commission were to report that such conditions do exist, the way would be clear for the Four Powers to agree upon the actual holding of the elections as a first step towards a unified Germany. If the report reveals that conditions in any part of Germany do not permit the holding of free elections, it would at the same time provide impartial findings and recommendations which the four occupying powers could use as a basis for further negotiations.

The reason why a disinterested determination of fact by an impartial body is needed became perfectly apparent when the German spokesmen addressed the Committee. Each group made serious charges against the other. A United Nations commission could report the facts impartially; then action could follow.

It is essential that the German people shall be able to express their will freely and without fear of reprisal. It is important also that they know and have confidence that they can do so.

Whatever the report of the commission may be, it is of the utmost importance that it be made by an independent and impartial authority, in whom all the German people may have confidence. It is a necessity which argues strongly for the establishment of a commission by the United Nations.

I would like now to address myself to the alternative proposals which are the subject of resolutions before the Committee, or which have been suggested in speeches.

U.S.S.R.'s Proposal

The delegate of the Soviet Union has stated that the determination of fact proposed by this resolution is one that can be made only by the German people through the representatives of the Federal Republic and of the Soviet zone.

It is a fact, of course, that there are no freely elected representatives of the Soviet zone. But let us suppose such a conference should be called. It is certain that the first question which must be advanced by the representatives of the Federal Republic is whether conditions exist in East Germany which would permit the holding of free elections. It would be an academic exercise to go forward with the formulation of an election law and arrangements for holding an election until this prerequisite is established.

The argument of the delegate of the Soviet Union has a superficial appeal. On closer examination, it is another reflection of their policy—that of emphasizing the machinery of elections and minimizing the basis of free elections—the conditions of freedom in both zones.

It has been urged by others that this Committee should take no action and defer the question of United Nations assistance until the Four Powers have agreed that conditions suitable to the holding of free elections exist throughout Germany. This proposal finds expression in the resolution introduced by the distinguished delegate of Sweden on behalf of his delegation. My delegation is mindful of the interest which has led to this proposal and to its support by several delegations. Nevertheless, we cannot agree that a recommendation that the four occupying powers should attempt at this time to reach agreement on this matter, is the most affirmative and productive action that can be taken by the General Assembly.

The three Western Powers have submitted this new approach to the General Assembly precisely because our efforts to reach agreement with the Soviet Union have failed.

I have already spoken of the efforts made by the three Western Powers over the past few years to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the holding of free elections throughout Germany. Their fruitlessness is best recalled by the record of the 73 futile sessions which the four Deputy Foreign Ministers held in Paris earlier this year.

Whatever agreement in principle might be

found, assuming this much could be achieved in a Four Power meeting, the problem of achieving an impartial determination of conditions affecting elections would still remain. It is our view that the practical effect of the Swedish resolution is to deny the possibility of success for this new proposal and to make delay a certainty.

From larger considerations, my delegation cannot join in the view that a resolution of the General Assembly will be a nullity because the Soviet Union and the representatives of the Soviet zone have expressed their opposition.

I do not believe that the General Assembly should assume that the Soviet Union and the representatives of East Germany can always disregard the recommendations of the United Nations and its offer of aid toward the solution of a problem which they say they seek so passionately.

But, if the Soviet Union and Eastern Germany shall continue to refuse the aid and to ignore the recommendations of the General Assembly, the United States still believes that this action by the Assembly is necessary and valuable.

General Assembly's Moral Responsibility

The great authority of the General Assembly does not come from any power to coerce. It comes from the power to recommend—the power to set an international standard of conduct against which actions can be judged by the people of the world. For the General Assembly to refuse to exercise this power because of the fear that its recommendations will not be followed is for it to abdicate its moral responsibility, to cast aside the opportunity which it uniquely possesses of raising the standards of the conduct of nations. This Assembly, we believe, should establish this commission because it is the right thing to do.

To refrain from taking this action because of the threat of a veto by the Soviet zone authorities would lower the prestige and diminish the effectiveness of the United Nations. As a practical matter, this case has already demonstrated the moral force of world opinion, including the opinion of the people of Germany, on the actions of the Soviet Union and its representatives in Eastern Germany. Originally, the East zone authorities opposed free and secret elections. Originally, General Chuikov would not answer letters of the High Commissioners of the three Western Powers on this subject. But the Federal Republic and the Three Powers continued to press the point. Now, the East German authorities and the Soviet representatives alike proclaim their devotion to the idea of free and secret elections. Originally, the Soviet representatives opposed the Pakistani resolution inviting German representatives to express their views before this Committee. But the Committee adopted this resolution. The Federal Republic and the Government of Western Berlin promptly accepted the invitation. The Soviet

Union found itself depicted to the world as a power denying Germans the right to be heard in the United Nations. It reversed its policy, and spokesmen from the Soviet zone suddenly appeared before the Committee.

The distinguished delegate of the Netherlands said in his able speech that the policy of the occupying powers is affected and influenced continuously by the opinion of the German people in all zones of Germany.

We recall that Mayor Reuter told us that conditions in the Eastern zone of Berlin are better than in the major part of the Soviet zone, because of the example of life in the Western zone and the force of its opinion.

The fact that the United Nations has concerned itself with this problem and that it has offered its aid, to be effective immediately, will have its influence on opinion and may hasten the betterment of conditions. I believe that the General Assembly should be confident about the influence of its recommendations.

The opposition expressed here to the sending of the commission should not deter us from adopting this resolution, if we think it is the right thing to do. Not to do so, in my judgment, would be very unwise. It would be a set-back to the hopes of all Germans for progress toward the unity of their country. Specifically, for the people of the Eastern zone, it would dash the hopes which have been aroused by this proposal. The mere existence of this commission will be a standing reminder to the people in the Eastern zone of Germany that the rest of the world has not forgotten them. Its existence will be a standing reminder of the responsibility to those who by their policies delay the growth of democracy throughout Germany. We have offered this resolution because we want to see Germany unified, but with freedom. We have offered it with the purpose of hastening the day when a unified Germany can play a constructive role in the community of nations.

U.S. VIEWS ON RESOLUTION²

The U.S. delegation voted for this resolution because it believes that the resolution can open the way to the establishment of a unified and independent Germany, free to take a responsible place in the community of nations. This was the same reason which prompted my delegation to join with the delegations of France and the United Kingdom in presenting this proposal to the General Assembly.

The present resolution is the product of careful consideration in the *Ad Hoc* Political Com-

² Press statement made by Mr. Cooper following the adoption of the resolution on the German item by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Dec. 19.

mittee. Other delegations have, in the opinion of the sponsors, improved the original draft a great deal with their amendments and suggestions. We believe the resolution as it now stands is a true United Nations document, reflecting the views of many members and reflecting also a basic purpose of our Charter—to eliminate sources of international tension and thus to improve the prospect of peace.

It has been argued against this proposal that the four occupying powers should settle all these matters among themselves. But it has been precisely the refusal of the Soviet Union to come to reasonable agreement on any problem concerning Germany which led the other three occupying powers to request help from the United Nations. It has been further argued that representatives of East and West Germany should settle this particular question of elections. But it was apparent to all who heard these representatives in the Committee that there was no basis of mutual confidence between them. When there is such basic disagreement on facts and conditions and indeed objectives, then is a good time for the United Nations to exercise its unique functions of impartial investigation.

This investigation in Germany, we believe, can do nothing but good. If the commission reports that conditions are such as to make the holding of genuinely free elections possible, the way will be open for the Four Powers to reach agreement on the actual holding of the elections. If the commission finds conditions unfavorable, corrective action can be taken. In either case, progress can be made toward the objective of free and secret elections resulting in the unification of Germany.

My Government is not much troubled by the statement of the Eastern zone authorities that they will not give entry to the commission. We think they may change their minds when it becomes evident to the Soviet Government that its refusal to let the commission in provides too startling a contrast with its professed devotion to the idea of German unity. We are similarly not too concerned by Poland's refusal to serve on the commission. We think they may change their minds, and we hope they will. In any case, we believe the place for Poland should be kept open on the commission in order to demonstrate what I am sure is the desire of the General Assembly: that the commission should be a balanced one giving expression to the chief differing points of view.

CORRECTION

In the BULLETIN of December 3, 1951, p. 579, footnote no. 1 should read: "Made before Committee I (Political and Security) on Nov. 19 and released to the press on the same date."

Reply to Attacks on U.S. Attitude Toward Human Rights Covenant

*Statement by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly*¹

This statement is a reply to the views expressed by Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukraine, and the U.S.S.R. concerning the United States in this Committee. My observations in this statement accordingly relate to these five countries.

I am interested that these five countries place so much stress on the unity of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in our debates here. In 1948 those five countries did not vote for the Declaration. At that time they were critical of it. Now they cite it for their own purposes. They seem to praise the Declaration one time and minimize its importance another time, so that I must question the sincerity of their reliance on the Declaration at this point.

The delegates of a number of these countries expressed concern that an "illusory" Covenant on Human Rights might be drafted in the United Nations. The term "illusory" is descriptive of the type of covenant which the delegates of these countries are seeking to have drafted in the United Nations. For example, the Soviet Union has repeatedly taken the initiative in the General Assembly and in the Commission on Human Rights for the elimination of any provision in the Covenant on implementation. In the General Assembly last year, the Soviet Union proposed that these articles be deleted on the ground that "their inclusion would constitute an attempt at intervention in the domestic affairs of states and would encroach on their States sovereignty." This proposal was rejected in the Third Committee last year in a roll-call vote. Only the five members of this Committee now attacking the United States voted for this proposal. A similar proposal was

rejected by the Commission on Human Rights at its 1951 session.

These countries protest that the implementation of the provisions of the Covenant would be "shameful." What nonsense is this? A Covenant on Human Rights would indeed be illusory if the proposal of the U.S.S.R. were accepted to delete all implementation provisions from it. It seems to me that freedom must be preserved primarily as we were reminded yesterday. The right to think and freedom to speak freely are among the most important rights, and some of you may realize that these are rights that have become rather illusory in some countries.

Even Mr. Vyshinsky himself acknowledges the lack of freedom in his country when he observes in the book he edited on *The Law of the Soviet State* that in his state "there is and can be no place for freedom of speech, press, and so on, for the foes of socialism." Thus he proclaims a so-called freedom for only those supporting the dictates of the state. Freedom is not really freedom unless you can differ in thought and in expression of your thought.

The speakers from these five countries insist over and over again a condition of perfection exists in their countries. It always seems to me that when things are so absolutely perfect that it would almost shine out and you would not have to express it so frequently. I can only say that I wish it were possible for all of us to be allowed to go to the Soviet Union, for example, to see for ourselves the actual conditions which exist there. It would be very helpful if even some impartial observers were allowed to report to us on the actual conditions existing there.

Now let me turn to the charge made by some of the delegates of these five countries that the United States is disregarding the interests of the Negroes in our country. Unfortunately there are instances of American Negroes being victims of unreasoning racial prejudice in my country.

¹Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) on Dec. 20 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. For an earlier statement by Mrs. Roosevelt on the Human Rights Covenant, see BULLETIN of Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1059.

However, we do not condone these acts in the United States. We do everything possible to overcome and eliminate such discrimination and racial prejudice as may still exist. Racial discrimination in my country is irreconcilable with the fundamental principles of humanity and justice which are embodied in our Bill of Rights.

The Negro in the U.S.

Affirmative steps are continually being taken to combat racial discrimination. Recently the President of the United States issued an Executive order to insure protection against racial discrimination in employment under Government contracts.

The President has on several occasions established advisory commissions to provide evaluations of the progress being made in the United States. The recommendations of these commissions have served to spur further action to obtain the equality we are seeking in my country. Channing Tobias, now on the United States delegation to the United Nations, was one of the Negroes who served on some of these commissions. Some of the recommendations and reports of those commissions were quoted here which show that we do not hide anything that is wrong.

Acts of prejudice and discrimination by private individuals or groups in my country are more than merely deplored by the Government and by the vast majority of the people of the United States. Not only through laws but also by the process of education and in many other ways, efforts are constantly being made to eliminate racial discrimination. It is the official policy of the U. S. Government, as expressed on many occasions by President Truman, that the remaining imperfections in our practice of democracy, which result from the conduct of small groups of our people, must be corrected as soon as possible.

Increased activity in the political life of our country has been characteristic of Negro Americans. They have become a vital factor in the life of our local, State, and National Government. A reflection of this is seen in the number of Negroes holding Government Civil Service appointments. In 1938 there were 80,000 Negroes holding such appointments; this number has increased to 270,000. Not only has there been an increase in the number of such appointments, but also they are constantly assuming more and more responsible positions in the Government.

Negroes in the United States are voting in increasing numbers in all sections of our country.

It was suggested here that in certain places they were still having difficulty under the poll-tax laws. Those laws are rapidly being changed and in many parts of the country where it was not possible it is now possible for Negro citizens to vote.

In addition, the years from 1940 to the present have seen the election of Negro citizens to a number of important local, state, and national offices.

At the same time I wish to point out we do not claim to have reached perfection. We feel that our recognition of how much more yet remains to be done is a source of strength to us because it serves as a stimulant to press ahead with our task in this respect.

It so happens that the very countries which are criticizing the United States in this Committee are not themselves progressing in the fields of human rights and fundamental freedoms in their own countries. That may be only because of the difficulty of communication, but it seems to us that there is a great silence among the people of those countries. It is the silence of a people shut up behind an Iron Curtain where human rights and life are being stifled.

I will not take the time of the Committee to list all the many economic and social advances taking place in my country. They are well-known to all of you even though the five countries to whom I am addressing my remarks repeatedly disclaim knowledge of these facts. Many of you have traveled in the United States. I will simply mention, however, one point—the number of hours per week that the working man is now working in **my country**. The **Federal Fair Labor Standards Act** has established a standard workweek of 40 hours and serves as a deterrent against longer hours by requiring penalty payments for overtime labor. The average of hours worked in all manufacturing industries has now declined to 40½ hours a week. In the railroad transportation industry, the average is 40½ hours a week. In power laundries 42 hours a week is the average. In textile mills, production workers average 41 hours a week. In printing and publishing, workers average slightly less than 40 hours a week.

The charge has also been made that the United States favors two covenants on human rights instead of a single covenant because the United States does not favor economic and social progress in other countries. This is obviously a ridiculous and false argument. It perhaps is unnecessary to answer this argument, since its falsity is so obvious; yet, I should stop for a few minutes to answer it frankly, since from time to time by the repetition of a particular argument, its falsity may soon be forgotten and the fact that it has been repeated so many times without answer tends to lull some into thinking that there perhaps is some merit to the assertion.

What does the record show?

U.S. Aid to Other Countries

The United States Government, in the course of the past 6 years, has made available over 30 billion dollars in the form of loans and grants to various countries. Of this amount, a total of over 5½

billion dollars has been made available to countries in underdeveloped areas. This financial assistance by the U.S. Government does not include our subscription of 635 million dollars to the International Bank. Nor does it include contributions which we have made to U.N. programs such as the International Children's Emergency Fund, the International Refugee Organization, Relief and Rehabilitation for Refugees of Palestine, and the U.N. expanded Technical Assistance Program, contributions which have in large part been used to assist in the improvement of economic and social conditions in underdeveloped areas.

During the fiscal year 1951 alone, the U.S. Government made available on a grant basis over a quarter of a billion dollars for programs of technical and economic assistance to underdeveloped areas.

As is well-known in this Committee, of the total financial contributions to UNICEF—some 155 million dollars—the United States has contributed about 100 million dollars.

Of the 5½ billion dollars made available to underdeveloped areas during the past 6 years by the United States, almost 1½ billion dollars was made available by the U. S. Export-Import Bank. This assistance has been in the form of loans for economic-development purposes to Latin America, the Near East, Africa, and Asia. During a recent period of 1 year, the Bank loaned over 395 million dollars. Of this amount over 96 percent went to underdeveloped areas.

Meeting the needs of underdeveloped areas for basic facilities in such fields as transportation, power, communications, and public health serves as a springboard for attaining higher standards of living for the people in these areas.

I have cited these figures of capital made available for economic development from the United States not for the figures themselves, nor for self-praise. I have cited them only as concrete evidence that the Government and people of the United States are very much interested in the economic development of other countries—and in more than an academic way.

The Congress of the United States this year decided to increase the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank an additional 1 billion dollars. This brings the basic lending capacity of the Bank up to 4½ billion dollars at the present time.

In addition, Congress recently appropriated over 400 million dollars to support a widespread program of economic and technical assistance to agriculture and industry in the Near East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. These funds are to be made available almost entirely on a grant basis.

The U. S. Technical Cooperation Administration, established about a year ago, has been constantly gaining momentum. During the first year of its expanded program, almost 500 requests for technical assistance were approved. By August

of this year, programs were under way in 36 countries in every part of the world.

In addition, Congress has provided that up to 13 million dollars may be available as the United States contribution to the United Nations expanded Technical Assistance Program for the next fiscal period.

I might also mention that the United States share of the 1950 gross assessment budget of the many specialized agencies, including the International Labor Organization, the International Children's Emergency Fund, and the Palestine Refugee Organization, is always a good and fair share. I would like to point out that no contributions to these organizations have been made by the nations attacking the United States.

We understand the difficulties faced by the Soviet Union in rebuilding her economy after the war. We also understand that she is expending funds to assist the countries along her borders whose economy she is now dominating. But if the Soviet Union would cut down the large expenditures she has continued to make since the end of the war for her large armed forces, she would have more funds and resources with which to build a peaceful economy and to assist other countries.

I am not suggesting that the Soviet Union undertake to assist the economic development of other countries as much as the United States is doing—that would not be possible since our economy is so much stronger than that of the Soviet Union—but I am suggesting that the Soviet Union should make some contribution to the many economic and social programs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, to show in practice as well as in their speeches that it has a real interest in the economic and social progress of other nations, particularly the underdeveloped countries.

I hope, Madame Chairman, that I have made it amply clear that the support of my delegation for two covenants on human rights does not stem from any lack of interest in the economic and social progress of people in our own country or any disinterest in the economic and social progress of other countries.

The United States supports two covenants because we believe that two covenants would constitute a practical approach to the question before us. We do not believe it advisable as proposed by some delegations that everything go into one covenant. For all the reasons I have previously stated in this Committee, we would make much greater progress in the achievement of human rights and freedoms in the world by the simultaneous completion of two documents—one on civil and political rights and the other on economic, social, and cultural rights, and the attacks of the countries which I have been answering have not changed my point of view on this subject.

U.S. Explains Vote on Yugoslav Item

*Statement by John Sherman Cooper
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly*¹

On behalf of the delegation of the United States, I would like to speak briefly of the considerations which led my delegation to support the Yugoslav resolution which has been adopted by the General Assembly.

We have given this resolution our support because it provides a series of reasonable recommendations which, if followed, can lessen the tension between Yugoslavia and the seven states listed in the Yugoslav complaint. It cannot be reasonably doubted that such tension exists. In the *Ad Hoc* Committee, we heard Mr. Djilas describe in detail and with thorough documentation the aggressive campaign which is being pressed by the Soviet Union and the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland against the Yugoslav Government. The countercharges made against Yugoslavia during the Committee debate by these seven states confirmed at the very least the existence of a serious state of tension.

The resolution is very mild in its terms and in substance recommends that all of the governments concerned should conduct their relations in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations Charter. It notes the statement of Yugoslavia that it is ready to contribute on its part all that is necessary to carry out these recommendations. It is difficult to understand why the Soviet Union and the other members of the Soviet group oppose so strongly this mild resolution. It is difficult to understand how these states can thus deny their clear obligation to conduct their relations with Yugoslavia or with any other state in accordance with the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter.

Again, Mr. President, in voting for the Yugoslav resolution, my delegation supported the Charter principles of national independence, territorial

¹ Made in a plenary session of the General Assembly on Dec. 14 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

Text of Yugoslav Resolution

U.N. doc. A/L.9
Adopted December 14, 1951

The General Assembly,

HAVING CONSIDERED the complaint submitted to it by the delegation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the activities of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Albania, as well as the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, against Yugoslavia,

VIEWING with serious concern the tension between Yugoslavia on the one side, and the other above-mentioned countries on the other side,

MINDFUL of the purpose of the United Nations "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace",

MINDFUL of the authority of the General Assembly to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations",

1. *Takes note* of the declaration of the Yugoslav delegation that the Government of Yugoslavia for its part is ready to do all that is necessary for the carrying out of the recommendations of the present resolution;

2. *Recommends* that the Governments concerned:

(a) Conduct their relations and settle their disputes in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations Charter;

(b) Conform in their diplomatic intercourse with the rules and practices which are customary in international relations;

(c) Settle frontier disputes by means of mixed frontier commissions or other peaceful means of their choice.

integrity, and self-determination of people. In the case of Yugoslavia, these principles are threatened by aggressive pressures designed to subvert and overthrow the Yugoslav Government. If this campaign continues, there is the danger that it

could lead to serious trouble in the Balkans, with repercussions throughout the world. It is clear to all of us that any new recourse to aggression in the world today might strain to the breaking point the fabric of world peace. It is our duty to strive to reduce these strains on peace and to lessen tension wherever it exists.

The Soviet Union and others in its group have called attention to the economic and military assistance now being provided by my country to Yugoslavia. As we have said so often, we are providing this assistance at the request of Yugoslavia in order to help that country increase its ability to defend itself and to maintain its independence. In this connection, our delegation recalled in the Committee the substantial assistance provided by the American people to the Soviet Union during the war against Nazi Germany. This aid was provided, as it is now provided to

Yugoslavia, despite the fact that the people of the United States reject the Communist philosophy and system. We have provided aid in each case because fundamental principles of national independence and territorial integrity were involved in opposition to aggression. We have provided aid to strengthen the security of the free nations, including the United States, against aggression. These principles, set forth so clearly in the Charter, the United States has always supported.

Yugoslavia has declared in the resolution that has been adopted that it is prepared to contribute on its part all that is necessary to carry out its recommendations. We must hope that the countries listed in the Yugoslav complaint will heed the recommendations that now go to them from the General Assembly, and that they will not ignore its spirit. For in truth, that is all the General Assembly really asks.

Importance of Land Reform

*Statement by Channing Tobias
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

The U.S. delegation is of the opinion that it is highly appropriate that the question of land reform be considered under the topic of economic development of the underdeveloped countries. This problem, as the Economic and Social Council has stated, is a *necessary part of any effective and comprehensive program of economic development.*

Indeed, the U.S. delegation feels that the problem of land reform has an importance that extends beyond the economic sphere. As the distinguished delegate of India stated at the recent Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization—"Individual ownership of land by the farmers themselves is one of the best means of promoting the dignity of the individual and of stabilizing the democratic structure of society." He then went on to say that land reform "is fundamental to the democratic future of the world."

We are glad to note that the 66 countries who are members of the Food and Agriculture Organization agreed with this view and adopted a strong resolution on the subject of land reform. They declared that the elimination of anachronisms and

defects from the existing agrarian structures is essential to economic progress. They stated further that such measures will materially contribute to human freedom and dignity. They emphasized the fact that such measures are needed in order to achieve social stability and democratic development.

Land reform is of transcendent importance. It affects the daily lives of that three-quarters of the world's entire population that depends upon the land for its livelihood. In vast areas of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, where the great majority of the population are farmers, land is at the present time the main source of wealth. Unless that land is held through a system of ownership which best reflects the needs of the people, and unless that land is cultivated by methods best calculated to get maximum results, the economy of the entire world will suffer.

The excellent report which the Secretary-General has prepared in response to the resolution adopted by the fifth session of the General Assembly shows that over a large part of the world such systems of ownership and efficient methods of cultivation do not prevail.

¹ Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Dec. 20 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

What Is Land Reform?

The Food and Agriculture Organization has just enumerated a number of the aspects of this many-sided problem. Its Conference declared "*that in many countries the agrarian structure has most serious defects.*" The FAO Conference pointed particularly to the uneconomic size of farms, the fragmentation of holdings, the maldistribution of landownership, excessive rents, inequitable systems of taxation, insecurity of tenure, perpetual indebtedness, and the lack of clear title to land and water.

If I may be more specific: Let us take a look at the question of interest rates which a farmer must pay in order to buy the seed or the equipment which he needs. In some cases, these rates range from 50 percent to 100 percent a year.

Or, take the question of rents. In some countries tenant farmers have to pay landlords—frequently absentee landlords—rentals as high as 50 to 70 percent of the value of the crops which they produce. Sometimes, they must also pay, in addition, what is in effect, the salary of a middleman—the rent collector.

Sometimes, indeed, the tenant has no assurance that he will be allowed to remain on his land from year to year. How then can he be expected to have either the resources or the desire to improve that land? It has been said that "a man will fight for his farm or his home, but not for a stack of rent receipts." But he will strive to improve his farm or his home if he owns them, or if he has a feeling of security of tenure.

Now, what is it that we have in mind when we talk of land reform? The popular conception of land reform is the breaking up of large estates. Our concept of agrarian reform goes far beyond this. Our concern is with the people who work on the land. Our concern is with a whole series of measures looking toward improving the way of life of the man who actually tills the soil.

To be sure, opportunity to own the land one works is a key part of this concept. But there are other equally important aspects. They include the means for obtaining credit on reasonable terms to purchase land and to acquire the necessary facilities for agricultural production and improved rural living. They include facilities for marketing agricultural commodities at a fair return. They include a system of farm taxation that is not inequitable. They include opportunity for learning improved techniques of agricultural production. They include improved conditions of rural living.

Illustrations of Land Reform

We have already heard the statement of the distinguished representative of China with regard to what has been accomplished through land reform in Taiwan. We look forward to hearing from other of our colleagues as to the accomplishments in their respective countries.

At the recent Food and Agriculture Organization Conference the Japanese delegate described what has recently been accomplished in his country. He stated that before the implementation of the land-reform law, two-thirds of all Japanese farmers rented all or part of the land they cultivated. Rents were usually paid in kind on the basis of about 50 percent of the "normal" crop of the land rented. This, in fact, meant 70 percent or more of the actual harvest. The tenants had no bargaining power. They had no guarantees of secure tenure. Economic instability and social strife were all too prevalent. Tenant disputes and tenant riots occurred frequently.

As a result of the 1946 land-reform laws in Japan the Government purchased agricultural land and resold it to the cultivators. The land was paid for with 24-year bonds of the Japanese Government, bearing 3.6 percent interest. Thus, the entire process of shifting ownership was financed locally.

The results have been impressive! The cultivated area operated by tenants has already been reduced from 46 percent of the total cultivated area to 10 percent. Land which is still being rented is subject to fixed rental ceilings. The landlord-tenant relationship is now based on model leases, thus giving the tenant security of tenure. Moreover, in order to insure that the progress which has been achieved will be maintained, the purchase of agricultural land is restricted to those who will actually cultivate it.

The results of the Japanese experiment were summarized by the Japanese delegate to the Food and Agriculture Organization in the following words: "The successful completion of the reforms in land tenure can be considered a major factor for the future improvement of Japanese agriculture and the alleviation of rural unrest. The Japanese farmer today already enjoys a better living standard than ever before as a result of the land reform programme. Even more important however, he has achieved a new social and political status free of domination by nonagrarian interests."

The United States Interest in Land Reform

As many of my colleagues will recall, the subject of land reform was first introduced into this body by Secretary of State Acheson in the opening plenary session of the fifth assembly. He raised this question because of its vital significance to the world.

Our own land-reform history is a long one. It is a democratic one. It goes back to Thomas Jefferson, one of the founders of our country. It was his philosophy that those who till the soil should own it. To him the small landholder was "the most precious part of a state." This is still our philosophy.

As our Secretary of Agriculture has recently said: "Evidently a little bit of land, a little bit of

opportunity can do for world peace something that great armies cannot possibly accomplish. It is something that happens inside a person. It is something that cannot be shot or chained."

Mr. President, the statements of Mr. Jefferson and our present Secretary of Agriculture are not very different. Both agree that a nation of farm owners, a nation where tenants have the opportunity to become farm owners, is a nation possessing the basic elements of political stability.

The legislative history of our land reform began in 1862. In that year my Government started a program to insure that the undeveloped lands in the western part of the United States would be owned by those who cultivated them.

In that year three steps were taken which have shaped the development of American land reform down to the present.

The first was the parceling out of free 160-acre farms to families who would live on them and till them for 5 years.

The second step was the establishment of a national department of agriculture. Its job is to gather and make available information for the benefit of the farmer. It carries on vast research projects. It makes the results of its experiments available so that the farmer may improve the yield of his land. It carries on extension courses in every field of rural life.

The third thing the Federal Government did in 1862 was to give the States large tracts of land for endowing agricultural colleges. Many of our great agricultural institutions today obtain a large part of their income from these lands.

The American people appreciate the foresight of their forefathers. They feel that our family-owned-and-operated farms have strengthened our national economy. We have benefited from the advances made possible by the research and educational services that were begun almost a hundred years ago. The result has been constantly increasing agricultural harvests. In the past 10 years, our farm production has risen 40 percent.

In the meantime we have striven to keep our farm lands in the hands of their cultivators. Over the years we have developed a coordinated system of farm credit at reasonable interest rates. American farmers today can obtain long-term mortgage credit, short-term operating credit, and emergency disaster loans. We have started a system of crop insurance against unavoidable losses due to weather, insects, and plant diseases.

To aid the farmer in purchasing his materials and selling his crops we have encouraged the development of cooperatives. Today, our cooperatives do an annual business of 9 billion dollars. They are active in the fields of production, marketing, purchasing, and servicing farm machinery. They have been particularly successful in making credit available to our farmers.

We have aided the farmer through soil-conservation measures. We have established grading

and standards for his produce. We maintain State and Federal inspection services.

Our Government has also been active in raising the standards of rural living. Through the Federal Rural Electrification Authority, we are helping the small and the poorer farmers to bring electricity into their homes and farm buildings. Fifteen years ago, when this Government program was started, about 10 percent of our farm families had electricity. Today almost nine out of every ten have it.

Our approach to our farm problem is based on a simple fundamental concept. It is to help the farmer help himself. This approach has produced results. Within the past 15 years the number of tenants—those who rent all the land they operate—has declined from 42 percent to 26.8 percent. Share croppers represent less than 8 percent of the rural population. Even in our southern States, where admittedly conditions have been far from perfect and where the problem has been accentuated by racial inequalities, the proportion of farms operated by share croppers has decreased from 21 percent in 1935 to 12 percent at the present time, a decline from 716,000 to 350,000.

Mr. Chairman, what I have said does not in any way imply that we have solved the problem of land tenure in the United States. We still have problems that must be resolved. We still have problems of tenure, land distribution, and migratory farm labor. We are applying ourselves to their solution and we shall continue to do so.

We recognize, of course, that the program developed to meet the needs of the farmer in the United States cannot be applied automatically everywhere. We do feel, however, that some of our techniques might be adaptable to other countries. We intend to do our best to make the results of our own experience available to those who wish to profit by them.

What Has Been Done Since Last Year

Mr. Chairman, my delegation wants to express its great appreciation of what has been accomplished since our last session in the field of land reform. We wish to compliment the Secretary-General for his comprehensive report. It has served to spotlight the problems and the difficulties which exist in this field throughout the world.

As a consequence of this report, the Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution which my delegation had the honor to sponsor. That resolution, while recognizing clearly that no one measure or group of measures can be expected to meet all situations, nevertheless draws to the attention of governments some 16 major types of measures which might be used singly or in combination to remedy existing anachronisms and defects. The resolution also recommends that the United Nations and the specialized agencies pursue certain specific lines of activity. It provides for regular

reporting on this problem and on the progress achieved.

The Food and Agriculture Organization has this very month completed its first full-scale consideration of agrarian reform. The delegates from its 66 member countries took this matter with the greatest seriousness. The Food and Agriculture Organization resolution, to which I have already referred, lays out its own detailed program of work in this field. We hope that the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the UNESCO will take similar steps.

The ground work has been laid for action. We shall look forward to watching progress achieved in member countries.

The Tenets of Land Reform

Meanwhile, if land reform is to become a reality, there are six tenets which we must constantly keep in the forefront.

1. Land reform must come largely from the efforts of governments themselves. It will not come from the outside, irrespective of any assistance that can be made available by other governments or by intergovernmental organizations. Land reform requires a conviction, not only among the people who live on the land. It requires conviction among public officials and national leaders.

2. If the work of the intergovernmental organizations is to be productive in the field of land reform, they will need the full cooperation of

their member governments. This means that the questionnaire called for by the Economic and Social Council, and which governments will be receiving from the Secretary-General, must be treated seriously.

3. There can be technical assistance in the field of land reform only if it is requested by governments.

4. To be most effective, requests for technical assistance in land reform should be related to complementary programs in the field of rural industrial development.

5. There is no one formula that can be applied across-the-board in all countries. Every country has its own problems. Each type of agriculture involves different problems. Every country must determine its own problems.

6. Land reform must be started now. There is little time to ponder over the perfection of ideal schemes. Progress must not be held back merely because one of the many elements of a plan may not be ready for implementation.

The resolution which we are proud to cosponsor with our friends from Brazil, Pakistan, and Thailand requires no further elaboration on the part of the U.S. delegation. It calls for action. We in the United States stand ready—both through the United Nations and bilaterally—to help in carrying forward this great work. I know that the hundreds of millions of people throughout the world who will be benefited will wish the United Nations success in this matter.

U.S. Reports on Pacific Trust Territory

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations on December 18 made public the report of the United States on its administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the year ending June 30, 1951. The report covers the last years of administration by the Department of the Navy. By Presidential order, the administration of the islands was transferred on June 30, 1951, to the U.S. Department of the Interior, the branch of the Federal Government responsible for the conservation and development of natural resources and for the administration of non-self-governing peoples under United States jurisdiction.¹

The trust territory is composed of the Marshall, the Caroline, and the Mariana Islands (except Guam) covering some 3 million square miles of the Western Pacific Ocean north of the equator. The 96 island units, made up of 2,141 individual

islands with a total land area of approximately 687 square miles, are spread over a region 2,727 statute miles in width and 1,477 miles north and south at its widest point. The territory formerly was mandated to Japan and was wrested from that country during World War II.

The indigenous population of the territory on June 30, 1951, was 55,730. Three-fifths of the inhabitants live on the six principal island units: Saipan, the Palans, Yap, Truk, Ponape, and Majuro. The people are Micronesians, meaning people of the tiny islands. Their cultures vary markedly among island groups and even among islands and atolls in the same geographic areas. This is further complicated by differing degrees of acculturations acquired from contacts with Spaniards, Germans, Japanese, and Americans, each of whom have had a part in history of the islands over the last century and a half. Nine

¹ BULLETIN of July 16, 1951, p. 105.

individual languages are spoken and most of these are subdivided into distinctive local dialects.

On November 6, 1946, while the islands were under military occupation, President Truman announced that the United States was prepared to place the islands under trusteeship, with the United States as administering authority. The draft trusteeship agreement was formally submitted to the Security Council on February 17, 1947, and after slight modification was unanimously approved on April 2, 1947. While the administration of the islands has been conducted by the Department of the Navy, a civilian-type administration (as distinct from military government) has been employed by order of the Secretary of the Navy since July 18, 1947. The Commander in Chief, Pacific, and United States Pacific Fleet, continued to hold the office of High Commissioner of the trust territory until January 8, 1951, when President Truman appointed the Hon. Elbert D. Thomas, former U.S. Senator from Utah, as the first civilian High Commissioner.

The 230-page report, including a pictorial supplement, is preceded by the following review of developments during the year:

During the year July 1, 1950, to June 30, 1951, the peoples of Micronesia have demonstrated increasing ability to undertake responsibility for their political, economic, social, and educational advancement. Understanding and acceptance of democratic principles and procedures have contributed to greater indigenous participation in self-government and judicial affairs. Increased opportunities for interisland contact have stimulated social consciousness of the relations between the various cultures in the Territory. Sharing in the development of economic projects initiated by the Administration has given the people experience in business ventures. Appreciation of the worth of education has increased the numbers of students in the schools and made possible the expansion of the curricula.

Political Developments

Political achievements have been noteworthy both on the municipal and district level. Thirteen more municipalities have chosen to elect their magistrates, thus increasing the number of elected magistrates to 70 percent of those holding office.

The Palau Congress has continued to function well. The Marshall Islands Congress met for the first time on July 4, 1950, and in its deliberations has shown a keen realization of problems of the area. A charter for the Ponape Congress has been prepared in accordance with previously expressed desires of the people and is now being studied by the Provisional Congress which met for the first time in the spring of this year. A charter for the Saipan Congress, giving the Congress advisory powers, is now being discussed by the Saipanese.

Legislative studies have continued to be made at the staff level and recognition of local customs is reflected in the planning for extension of indigenous participation in government. The teaching of the functions of democracy in the schools as well as civil guidance by Administration officials have contributed greatly to the extension and implementation of democratic attitudes. The responsibility for direction of Administrative programs was clarified by the issuance of *Interim Regulation No. 3-50*, reorganizing the Staff of the High Commissioner.

The islanders are playing an increasing part in the judicial system of the Territory. They are members of

several courts and thus are in positions where they can correlate modern law and local indigenous law. Criminal procedures, provisions for law enforcement, provisions for protecting the public health, safety, and morals of indigenes by orders restricting residence, and the Judicial Code have been formalized by the promulgation of *Interim Regulations No. 2-51, No. 4-51, No. 6-51, and No. 8-51*. A "Public Defender and Counselor" was appointed in the fall of 1950 to provide protection for the legal rights of the people and to advise and represent them in civil cases before the courts. The Pacific Islands Insular Constabulary has been reorganized and representative members trained in police and penal procedures at the Constabulary Training School at Truk.

Economic Affairs

The economic situation of the Territory has shown considerable improvement during the past year. This is due both to the further diversification of island economy by Administration-sponsored projects, and to increased production of copra and the high price which it brought on the world market during much of the year. The policy recently adopted by the Administration of making the Island Trading Company the sole exporter of copra and the operation of the previously established Copra Stabilization Fund, benefited copra growers when the price of this commodity collapsed in the spring of 1951.

Money available from the Island Trading Company's Economic Development Fund has been invested in several new projects including poultry and duck breeding, and the planting of cacao. Itc has set aside an additional \$150,000 for the purchase of boats to be used in island passenger and cargo service and two have already been acquired and are in operation. Control of shipping for the benefit of the indigenes has been provided for by *Interim Regulation No. 7-51*.

A survey has been made of the possibility of establishing cattle ranches in the Northern Marianas. Research and survey projects by the Pacific Science Board sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, the United States Geological Survey, and the United States Department of Agriculture have contributed to initiation of further conservation, entomological, and ecological projects.

The Administration has enacted measures for the control of fires and the weed pest lantana by the promulgation of *Interim Regulations No. 5-51 and No. 3-51*. Extensive public works involving improvement of existing facilities, especially dispensaries, schools, and roads, have been constructed. The settlement of land problems has been undertaken in accordance with two *Land and Claims Regulations* issued during the year and some land has already been returned to the owners. Banking facilities have been established by the Island Trading Company and plans for the settlement of various types of claims against the Japanese are in preparation.

Social Improvement

Various programs for social improvement have continued to further a sense of security among the people. More thorough study of conditions in all areas of the Territory has been made possible by the appointment of anthropologists at District Headquarters and in specific areas by the initiation of administrative-medical field trips.

A nutrition survey of both high and low islands, conducted during the year, will provide better information in respect to the efficient utilization of existing food sources. The construction of the model village on Ebeye has been completed and is being utilized by the Marshallese workers employed on Kwajalein. The issuance of *Interim Regulation No. 1-51* has provided laws for divorces, annulments, and adoption.

The medical program has continued to be of great worth to the people and each year sees a corresponding improvement in their health. The medical survey ship U.S.S. *Whidbey* completed its cruise of the Territory in the spring

of 1951 and the data which its staff collected is now being evaluated for use in further improving the health conditions and combatting diseases not yet under control.² A special study of the filariasis problem is being made in the Truk District. *Health Department Orders No. 1 and No. 2* provide for the care of leprosy patients and the reorganization of the public health system.

Education

The public schools of the Trust Territory are continuing to provide not only academic schooling, but also training in health, improving living conditions, and the responsibilities of citizenship. The number of students in the elementary and intermediate schools has increased³ and more indigenes are teaching in the intermediate schools. The Trust Territory Schools for Medical and Dental Assistants at Guam were closed in December 1950 and the students transferred to the Central Medical School at Suva, Fiji. In the fall of 1950 the Pacific Islands Teacher Training School opened a school of agriculture. A larger number of students are studying abroad in schools of higher education. Vocational training and adult education courses have been established as part of the intermediate school curriculum.

Illiteracy has continued to decline and the appointment of a Supervisor of Languages will further assist in solving this problem. The library program has been expanded by the establishment of libraries at each District Headquarters, directed by indigenes trained at the School of Library Administration held at Truk in the spring of 1951. The fostering of indigenous culture remains an integral part of all educational programs.

Change in Administrative Authority

The transfer of administrative responsibility for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands from the United States Department of the Navy to the United States Department of the Interior became effective July 1, 1951, pursuant to Executive Order 10265, issued by the President on June 29, 1951. The transfer was accomplished in accordance with the recommendation of the Secretaries of State, War, the Navy, and the Interior on July 18, 1947, that administrative responsibility for the Trust Territory be transferred to a civilian agency of the Government at the earliest practicable date.

Mechanical details of the transfer were worked out by representatives of the Navy and Interior Departments in the spring of 1951 with a view to making the Government of the Trust Territory independent of naval facilities as rapidly as possible. Title to all personal property and structures owned by the Navy and employed by the Naval Government of the Trust Territory in the administration of civil affairs of the Trust Territory, and all funds controlled by the Government of the Trust Territory were transferred to the Department of the Interior or the Trust Territory Government.

The United States Navy provided for civilian-manned sea transportation and air services in the Trust Territory to replace the logistic support hitherto given by Naval vessels and planes. Accordingly, a contract for sea transportation was awarded to the Pacific Micronesian Lines, Inc., a subsidiary of the Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., to service the area. Seven Naval ships, one large cargo vessel and six smaller cargo vessels, with spare parts, were transferred to the Department of the In-

²The *Whidbey's* survey cruise lasted 4 years. About 75 percent of the inhabitants received individual physical examinations.

³More than 90 percent of the children of school age are enrolled in schools. Attendance is about 95 percent of those enrolled.

terior to form the fleet as soon as they could be provided with civilian crews. As of June 30, 1951, these ships had been overhauled and fitted with improved passenger accommodations.

In addition, the Navy transferred eight service craft and thirty small craft. A contract for air transport was awarded to Transocean Airlines and four Naval PBV-5A aircraft, overhauled and fitted with spare parts, were transferred on June 30.

All Navy communications stations in the Territory and their equipment were transferred, and the Department of the Interior assumed their operation and maintenance. The Island Trading Company took over the operation of commissary stores, hotels, and messes and will operate them on a self-supporting basis. Navy post offices were disestablished on July 1 and replaced with civil post offices established by the United States Post Office Department. The United States Weather Bureau took over the operation of the weather stations.

The timely substitution of civilian personnel for Naval personnel involved the greatest problem of the transfer. A civilian High Commissioner, appointed by the President on January 8, 1951, arrived at Staff Headquarters at Pearl Harbor on January 27.

In order that the continuity of administration might be maintained in so far as possible, the Navy agreed to release from the service both regular and reserve personnel on active duty with the Trust Territory Naval Administration for employment with the Department of the Interior Administration. Seven officers and thirty-nine enlisted personnel transferred to the new administration. Between February 1 and June 30 the majority of the members of the Naval Staff both at headquarters and in the field were gradually replaced by civilians. Naval personnel remained after the arrival of their successors for as long as was necessary to train the new employees in their duties. Five Naval officers and thirty-five enlisted personnel were retained beyond June 30 for the convenience of the Department of the Interior.

In addition, personnel of Naval Construction Battalions employed on public works projects in the Territory were to remain until their tasks were completed. The Naval Staff at Pearl Harbor prepared a booklet of "Basic Facts" and conducted a brief indoctrination course for the new employees prior to their departure for the field.

The transfer of administration was accomplished with no disruption of administrative services to the people of the Trust Territory. Civil Administrators and field trip officers in each District discussed the transfer with indigenous leaders who in turn explained it to their people. The inhabitants of the Territory cooperated fully in all aspects of this operation.

The Micronesians are fast coming of age in a modern world. They are adopting democratic attitudes and applying them to their government; they are becoming more proficient in economic affairs; they are accepting education designed primarily to assist them in improving their own environment. They are showing an increased understanding of their position as inhabitants of a Trust Territory. The progress of the people in all fields is a tribute to the indigenous culture which the Administering Authority continues to respect in accordance with the requirements and desires of a free people.

Expenditures during the year amounted to \$1,346,509, divided as follows:

General administration, \$211,000; legal and public safety, \$159,000; public education, \$385,000; commerce, industry and agriculture, \$65,000; medical care, public health and sanitation, \$299,000; and public works, \$227,000. Local revenues for the year amounted to \$346,326. Funds appropriated by the United States totalled \$1,014,000. Special appropriations for projects connected with the administrative transfer amounted to \$1,011,400.

International Materials Conference

TUNGSTEN AND MOLYBDENUM ALLOCATIONS

The International Materials Conference announced on December 19 that the member governments of the Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee have accepted recommendations for a plan of distribution of tungsten and molybdenum ores, concentrates, and primary products for the first calendar quarter of 1952.

The 13 member countries are Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

This is the third consecutive quarter that these two metals have been allocated by the Imc. Great pressure on available supplies of both tungsten and molybdenum continues. Nevertheless, the Committee is glad to note that the production of both commodities, especially of tungsten, has increased considerably. Along with these increases, however, the total requirements for defense and essential civilian needs have also increased, and estimated requirements still greatly exceed estimated production.

For the first calendar quarter of 1952, the Committee estimates the total production of tungsten in the free world at 3,700 metric tons, and of molybdenum at 4,800 metric tons (metal content in each case).

The Committee has not yet had time to study fully the replies received from governments to its questionnaire on their requirements of tungsten and molybdenum in the first two quarters of 1952. The present plan of distribution is, therefore, provisional for the first quarter of 1952 only, with the understanding that a firm plan for the first 6 months of the year will be worked out, for both metals, as soon as there has been time to complete the study of the replies to the questionnaire. The Committee has recommended that a firm 6-months' plan of distribution for both metals be adopted not later than March 1, 1952. The present provisional allocation will then be merged into the firm 6-months' plan.

In making this latest allocation, the Committee distributed tungsten ores and concentrates on the same basis as it did for the fourth quarter of 1951, with an increase of 12½ percent in the quota for

each country and with the creation of a reserve of about 62 tons for emergency claims and other needs.

In the case of molybdenum, the plan of distribution is identical, so far as concerns the ores and concentrates retained by each country for its own consumption, with the plan adopted for the fourth quarter of 1951. Certain changes have been made in the quotas of primary products allotted, and a reserve has been created of about 40 tons for emergency claims and other needs.

In carrying out the allocations agreed upon, the governments, both of the producing and of the consuming countries, are expected to continue to take upon themselves the obligation of taking whatever action is necessary to render the agreed quotas effective. Consuming countries are asked, if necessary, to buy any part of their quotas which their private importers might refuse to purchase, and producing countries are urged to insure, to the best of their ability, that estimates of production are realized in order to fulfill the pattern of distribution.

Existing contracts will be respected, so far as is possible, in carrying out the allocation arrangements. If, however, such contracts provide for the supply of tungsten or molybdenum to any one importing country in excess of the amounts allocated, it is proposed that the importing country should divert shipments to other importing countries which have not yet filled their import quotas, so far as is possible without upsetting the original contractual arrangements.

Procedures for the review of the operation of the plan, for the adjustment of quotas, and for reports will again be the same as those laid down for the two previous allocations. The operation of the plan will be kept under constant review by the Committee by a system of monthly reviews. Any adjustments necessary because of the nonfulfillment of any part of this plan will be rectified in the 6-months' period following the end of the quarter.

Other interested governments which are not members of the Committee have been informed of the plan of distribution. Under the Committee's

rules of procedure, any such governments may, upon request, present further explanations of their interests orally to the Committee.¹

U.S. Delegation to International Conference

World Health Sessions (WHO)

On January 3 the Department of State announced that two organs of the World Health Organization (WHO) are to hold meetings at Geneva, Switzerland, in January 1952. The Executive Board's Standing Committee on Administration and Finance will convene on January 7. The ninth session of the Executive Board will open on January 21.

Because of the inability of H. van Zile Hyde, U.S. representative on the Executive Board, to attend the forthcoming meetings, the President has designated Frederick J. Brady, assistant chief, International Organizations, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency, to serve as acting U.S. representative. Other members of the U.S. delegation to the two meetings are

Advisers

Howard B. Calderwood, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Donald Blaisdell, U.S. representative for specialized agency affairs, Geneva, Switzerland

The Executive Board Standing Committee on Administration and Finance, composed of seven members, makes recommendations to the Board on subjects pertaining to personnel and financial policies, administrative matters, and on the Director General's budget proposals.

The Executive Board, which meets at least twice yearly, is composed of representatives designated by 18 member nations elected by the Assembly for 3-year terms. Acting as the executive organ of the World Health Assembly, the Board gives effect to the decisions and policies of that body. The last session of the Executive Board was held at Geneva, June 1-8, 1951.

The agenda for the forthcoming meetings includes consideration of numerous items, such as program and budget for 1953; technical-assistance programs for 1953; continuation of study on organizational structure and administrative efficiency of the WHO; the applications of certain nongovernmental organizations for official relations with the WHO; the assignment of Pacific territories for purposes of regional organization; medical-supply services to member states; action arising out of the resolutions of the fourth World Health Assembly (Geneva, May 7-25, 1951) regarding international sanitary regulations and related matters; and the reports of various expert and regional committee meetings.

COBALT ALLOCATION

The International Materials Conference announced on December 28 that the governments of the 11 countries which are represented on the Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee have accepted the Committee's recommendations for a provisional allocation of cobalt for the first calendar quarter of 1952.² These countries include Belgium (representing Benelux), Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Committee has estimated that the total production of cobalt metal, oxides, and salts in the free world will increase in the first quarter of 1952 to reach approximately 2,200 metric tons. The fourth quarter 1951 production is now presumed to be about 1,960 tons, which is less than previous estimates on which fourth quarter allocations had been based.

Although cobalt output is expanding in the free world, requirements for both direct defense and essential civilian consumption are growing to such an extent that they will still greatly exceed the availabilities. In view of this situation, it has been agreed that cobalt should be maintained under allocation.

Owing to the lack of time, the Committee has not yet had the opportunity to examine in detail the Governments' replies to the questionnaire on requirements for the first quarter of 1952, as many of the returns were not received on the date by which they had been requested.

The present quarterly plan of distribution is provisional only. The Committee intends to recommend at the earliest possible time a final allocation based on a careful study of each country's situation, as reflected in its reply to the questionnaire. This allocation would cover the first 6 months of 1952 or any other period which may be found more appropriate. The present provisional plan will then be incorporated into this final allocation.

The provisional plan of distribution has been forwarded to all interested governments for immediate implementation. Governments are expected to take whatever action is necessary to make this plan effective, it being understood that it will be superseded by a final allocation plan at a later date.

¹ For table of allocations, see IMC press release of Dec. 19.

² For table of allocations, see IMC press release of Dec. 28.

U.N. Considers Reservations to Multilateral Conventions

STATEMENT BY BENJAMIN V. COHEN¹

We should like to make a few observations on the question of reservations to multilateral conventions. The observations which we shall make relate both to the opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding reservations to the Convention on Genocide and to the report of the International Law Commission on this subject.

It has been the general practice of the United States to accept and follow the advisory opinions of the Court, even in cases—like that of right of the United Nations to present claims for injuries sustained in the service of the United Nations—where the United States advanced in its arguments before the Court views different from those reached by the Court in its opinions. We believe that the Court's conclusions in its opinion regarding reservations to the Convention on Genocide are generally sound, and we hope that they will be accepted by all states concerned.

We appreciate that broad generalizations on the effects of reservations to multilateral treaties may be dangerous. Reservations may be readily compatible with the object and purpose of some unilateral conventions and not with the object and purpose of others. We strongly approve the reasoning of the Court in the genocide case that reservations are not necessarily incompatible with a multilateral treaty merely because of the objection of one of the parties. On the other hand, we would not suggest that reservations acceptable to some of the parties should always be regarded as compatible with a multilateral convention unless expressly excluded by its terms. Even in the absence of express treaty provisions, the nature and character of some multilateral treaties like that of the Charter of the United Nations might clearly exclude reservations save with unanimous consent.

But we cannot agree with the International Law Commission's suggestion that, in the absence of treaty provisions to the contrary, reservations to

a multilateral treaty should be allowed only if unanimously accepted by all parties. Such a suggestion would not only give every party the right to decide whether it would itself accept a reservation, but would give it the right to veto the acceptance of a reservation by every other party to the treaty.

We think it important to distinguish between the undoubted right of a state, party to a treaty, to refuse to accept so far as it is concerned a reservation made by another state from the question of its right to prevent other parties from accepting a reservation if they wish to do so. In our view, a party to a treaty has a right to object to a reservation so far as it is concerned whether or not the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

We also suggest that a party to a multilateral treaty may object to a reservation affecting a particular and separate part of the treaty and refuse to be bound by that particular and separate part of the treaty in its relations to the reserving state without objecting or intending to object to the reserving state becoming a party to the treaty in all other respects. If we wish to encourage the progressive development of international law through multilateral treaties, we should avoid hasty generalizations regarding the unexpressed intention of the parties in regard to the legal consequences of objections to reservations.

We can see no sound reason for treating the objection of a single party as conclusive, irrefutable proof of the incompatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of a multilateral treaty so far as other parties are concerned, or even as conclusive, irrefutable proof of the unwillingness of the objecting state to accept the reserving state as a party to the treaty in any respect. If the parties to a multilateral treaty intend any such result, let them say so. If they do not evince any such intention, we see no reason for attributing to them such an intention. There is little basis in fact for assuming the general existence of such an intention in light of the accepted and widespread practice to the contrary among American states.

We have had considerable experience in recent years with the operations of the principle of

¹ Made in Committee VI (Legal) of the General Assembly on Dec. 5, 1951, and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. Mr. Cohen is a U.S. delegate to the General Assembly.

unanimity in the Security Council. Experience with the operation of the veto in the Security Council does not warrant the extension of the principle of veto to the treatment of reservations to multilateral treaties. Indeed, in our judgment, experience counsels strongly against the extension of the principle of veto into this field of treaty-making.

While we believe, as the International Law Commission suggests, that organs of the United Nations, specialized agencies, and states should in the course of preparing multilateral treaties give thought to the insertion therein of provisions relating to the admissibility or nonadmissibility of reservations and to the effect to be attributed to them, we recognize that in many cases the contracting parties may prefer to rely upon the general principles applied by the International Court of Justice in the Genocide opinion than attempt in advance to determine what reservations would and what reservations would not be compatible with the treaty. It is not always easy in advance to state the specific standards to be applied in determining the compatibility of many reservations the exact character of which cannot be clearly foreseen or readily defined.

If we assume the parties do not wish to exclude the possibility of reservations compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, then we do see why the question of the compatibility of a particular reservation should be subject to *liberum veto* by any one party not only in relation to its own rights but in relation to those of all other parties. The fact that different parties take different views regarding the compatibility of a particular reservation with a multilateral treaty presents no more difficult problem than that presented when different parties take different positions regarding other important matters arising out of a multilateral treaty. A dispute as to the compatibility of a particular reservation with a treaty—the question whether its acceptance by some states adversely affects the rights of nonaccepting states—can be determined in the same way as other disputes under the treaty.

If the parties to a particular treaty should wish to have the issue of compatibility determined by a poll of the parties, we should think that it would probably be preferable for them to have the treaty leave the decision to a majority vote than accord a right of veto to every party. But even in such a case it would be unwise to generalize without knowing the nature and object of the particular treaty.

Certainly in light of our own experience and that of other American states we repeat that there is little or no basis in fact for assuming that the parties to a multilateral treaty intend to exclude all reservations not unanimously accepted by the parties. We believe that the adoption of any artificial rule which would attribute any such intention to the parties or to give such an effect to the absence

of a reservation clause would unjustifiably and arbitrarily limit the treaty-making power of sovereign states.

Let us remember that we have not yet developed for most matters which are the subject of multilateral treaties a world legislature. We must therefore rely in many fields upon treaties to supply workable rules of laws between the parties. In our judgment we do not advance the progressive development of international law through multilateral treaties by insistence on unanimous consent to reservations.

We recognize the desirability of uniformity, simplicity, and certainty in international law, but not at the expense of throttling the process of multilateral treaty-making. Generally speaking we do not favor a theoretical uniformity which militates against the widest possible acceptance of treaty law.

It is possible that a flexible rule regarding reservations may have a tendency to some extent to stimulate the making of reservations, but it should be remembered that the flexible rule which we urge does not impose a duty on any state in relation to its own rights to accept any reservation. A unanimous consent rule regarding reservations may discourage reservations, but it will also discourage not only the ratification but the signing of multilateral treaties.

Some may say that negotiators should not sign unless they are willing to ratify as signed. But if negotiators feel that their governments must accept a treaty as signed without reservations, negotiators may become increasingly reluctant to sign. When it is recalled, that the wording of clauses in a multilateral treaty may be determined in a conference by a small majority including some states which may never sign or ratify, the wisdom of attaching excessive importance to maintaining the absolute integrity of the original text may well be questioned.

In this connection I should like to quote from the advisory opinion of May 28, 1951 of the International Court of Justice:

... The majority principle, while facilitating the conclusion of multilateral conventions, may also make it necessary for certain States to make reservations. This observation is confirmed by the great number of reservations which have been made of recent years to multilateral conventions.

In this state of international practice, it could certainly not be inferred from the absence of an article providing for reservations in a multilateral convention that the contracting States are prohibited from making certain reservations. Account should also be taken of the fact that the absence of such an article or even the decision not to insert such an article can be explained by the desire not to invite a multiplicity of reservations. The character of a multilateral convention, its purpose, provisions, mode of preparation and adoption, are factors which must be considered in determining, in the absence of any express provision on the subject, the possibility of making reservations, as well as their validity and effect.

Bearing in mind the way that the texts of multilateral treaties are prepared, we think that

It is quite unrealistic to say that negotiators should not sign a treaty unless they are satisfied that their governments will ratify as signed. It may be that states having a cabinet-parliamentary form of government may feel that their representatives if they sign a treaty can go rather far in committing themselves to favoring ratification without reservations. But representatives of states like the United States in which the executive and legislative branches of government are separate and independent, simply cannot be certain whether their legislatures will be prepared to ratify a treaty as signed without reservations.

In some cases, like the Charter of the United Nations, it is clear that states must ratify without reservation or not at all. But we reiterate we do not think that that is the situation with the generality of multilateral treaties.

We do not, of course, mean to suggest that those who participate in the negotiation of multilateral treaties do not have a responsibility to discourage the attachment by their national legislatures to the ratification of multilateral treaties of confusing and incompatible reservations. We think that the International Law Commission has performed a valuable service in calling attention to this responsibility and the very genuine difficulties which may arise from the making of confusing and incompatible reservations, particularly in the case of multilateral treaties.

But the political factors and difficulties involved in treaty-making and treaty ratification cannot be dispelled by any simple rule of law. Politics is an art rather than a science. A rule of law which destroys a state's reservations to a treaty may also destroy a state's participation in a treaty. A treaty widely accepted, although not absolutely uniform in its application to all parties, may be far more preferable than a treaty, theoretically uniform in its application, but effective only as between a relatively few states.

If this Committee or the Assembly is to make any recommendations regarding reservations to multilateral treaties, we feel that we must subordinate the yearning of our profession for uniformity, simplicity, and certainty to the facts of political life which determine the actions of states. We feel that the conclusions of the International Law Commission, if accepted, might possibly simplify the law relating to reservations to multilateral treaties, but would make that law a much less useful instrument in the adjustment of relations between states in the world in which we live.

We see no reason for attempting to give judicial

significance to the administrative functions performed by the Secretary-General in connection with the ratification of treaties. The task of the Secretary-General should be to receive ratifications with or without reservations, to inform all states concerned thereof and to receive such objections as they may make thereto, and to notify all states concerned of such objections. If the Secretary-General has a doubt as to his duty under any treaty, he may seek the advice of the Assembly or, through the Assembly, of the Court.

We are proposing a resolution which will authorize the Secretary-General to continue to perform the valuable administrative services which he has performed in connection with the deposit of documents relating to ratifications of and reservations to treaties without passing on the legal effects of the documents. We think it unwise that we should attempt to anticipate and decide in advance the legal rights of the parties under different treaties and under varying circumstances.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION

U.N. doc. A/C. 6/L. 205
Adopted Jan. 4, 1952

The General Assembly,

BEARING IN MIND the provisions of resolution 478 (V) which (1) requested the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion regarding reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and (2) invited the International Law Commission to study the question of reservations to multilateral conventions,

NOTING the Court's advisory opinion of May 28, 1951, rendered pursuant to the said resolution, and the Commission's report, rendered pursuant to the said resolution,

RECOMMENDS that the organs of the United Nations, the specialized agencies and states should, in the course of preparing multilateral conventions, consider insertion therein of provisions relating to the admissibility or non-admissibility of reservations and to the effect to be attributed to them;

REQUESTS the Secretary-General in relation to reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, to conform his practice to the advisory opinion of the Court of May 28, 1951;

RECOMMENDS to all states that they be guided in regard to the Convention on Genocide by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of May 28, 1951;

INVITES the Secretary-General in respect of future conventions concluded under the auspices of the United Nations of which he is depositary:

(A) to continue to act as the depositary in connection with the deposit of documents containing reservations or objections; without passing upon the legal effect of such documents, and

(B) to communicate the text of such documents relating to reservations or objections to all states concerned, leaving it to each state to draw legal consequences from such communications.

The United States in the United Nations

[December 27, 1951-January 9, 1952]

General Assembly

Committee I (Political and Security)—A resolution carrying forward the recommendations of the Collective Measures Committee (CMC) and directing it to continue for another year its work of strengthening the United Nations collective security system was adopted by the Committee January 8 following a one-week debate. The vote on the resolution, which was sponsored by the United States along with 10 other members of the 14-member CMC, was 51-5 (Soviet bloc)-3 (India, Indonesia, Argentina). A Soviet move to abolish the CMC failed 52 (Argentina)-5-2.

The approved text, which was revised during the course of the debate to meet certain detailed objections by groups of Latin American and Middle Eastern States, recommends that member states take a number of specified measures to enable them—and the specialized agencies and regional defense arrangements to which they belong—to contribute promptly and effectively to United Nations collective action.

Speaking in support of the joint proposal, U. S. Representative Benjamin Cohen said, in part:

The report of the CMC and the resolution before us . . . are based on the proposition that the more effectively the members of the United Nations are organized to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security, the less likely it is that world peace will be challenged. . . . The program we in this Assembly are embarked on is designed to be universal in application, to meet any aggression from any source. It is not directed against any State or group of States. . . . We hope the day will come soon when the Soviet Government will see that its best interests are served by the development of an effective United Nations collective security system, and will lend its active support to the work. . . .

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky angrily denounced the 11-power resolution as a "monstrous" and "war-like" move, and submitted a counterproposal for an immediate high-level Security Council meeting to remove international tension, with "measures . . . to help to bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations being held in Korea" as the first order of business. However, by the time the Soviet formulation, which was strenuously opposed by the United States and

others as an attempt to delay the cease-fire talks and frustrate Assembly efforts to develop collective security, came to a vote, it had been amended, on the joint initiative of France, the United Kingdom, United States, and Brazil to provide simply for a high-level Security Council meeting whenever the Council considered that this might prove useful to ease world tension. The revised text, which made no mention whatever of Korea, was adopted on January 9 by a vote of 50 (U.S., U.S.S.R.)-0-8.

Later the same day, the Committee approved, 47-6 (Soviet bloc, Chile)-3 (Burma, Afghanistan, Mexico) a United States motion to postpone consideration of the next agenda item on the independence of Korea. This action was taken on the understanding—voiced by U.S. Representative Ernest Gross—that

if as we hope, the armistice negotiations are successfully concluded—or, if other developments in Korea should require the matter to be reconsidered, the Committee would take up the many important questions regarding Korea which would then fall within its province.

Ad Hoc Political Committee—Action on Treatment of Indians in South Africa was completed by the Committee January 5 with the adoption 41 (U.S.)-2 (Australia, South Africa)-13 of an amended India-Indonesia-Iraq-Burma-Iran resolution recommending the establishment of a 3-member commission to assist the parties (India, Pakistan, and South Africa) to carry through appropriate negotiations. The Secretary-General was requested, in the event the members of the commission were not nominated within 60 days, himself to undertake the task of helping the three nations to negotiate a settlement of their long-standing dispute.

The idea of having the Secretary-General act as intermediary if the commission plan failed was advanced by Israel in the form of an amendment to the joint draft, after support had developed for an earlier United States suggestion to bring the United Nations official into the picture. The United States abstained on a provision—adopted 31-9-17—calling on South Africa to suspend implementation of the Group Areas Act.

On January 7 the Committee opened consideration of the report of the Palestine Conciliation

Commission. A U.S.-U.K.-French-Turkish resolution was introduced continuing the Commission with its terms of reference unchanged but transferring its headquarters from Jerusalem to New York. The United Nations, U. S. Representative Philip Jessup held in support of the four-power proposal, had the right to expect the parties to make every endeavor to settle their differences themselves, but it should at the same time always be ready to aid them.

Committee II (Economic and Financial)—Consideration of the subitem on integrated economic development was completed by the Committee at meetings January 2-5, with the adoption of two resolutions on this question. Approval 26 (U.S.)-614 was given to an amended Haitian proposal, which, as redrafted by the United States, requests the Economic and Social Council to study "varying ways in which the productivity of peoples everywhere can be increased by the application of existing scientific and technological knowledge." The other resolution—a unanimously-approved compromise text reconciling a Polish proposal with United States and other amendments thereto—dealt with current price and supply problems without mentioning the fact that they had their origin in defense needs. Specifically, it called on U.N. members to consider entering into commercial agreements to facilitate the movement to underdeveloped countries of machinery, equipment, and industrial raw materials.

On January 7, the Committee opened discussion of the subitem on land reform. Two resolutions have been introduced, a joint U.S.-Pakistan-Thailand-Brazil-Israel text calling for a broad approach to the problem based on the conditions and needs of individual countries, and a Polish draft stressing large-scale material assistance to farmers, return of foreign-held agricultural lands, etc.

In submitting the joint text, U.S. delegate Manning Tobias explained that the United States approach to the problem of land reform was based on a simple, fundamental concept. It is to help the farmer to help himself. . . . Our concern is with the people who work the land." Following conclusion of the general discussion, which centered on the experiences of individual countries, the chairman requested the sponsors of the various proposals and amendments to attempt to work out an agreed text.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)—Examination of the refugee problem was inaugurated in the Social Committee January 2 with a statement by G. J. Van Heuven Goedhart,

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, in which he urged the Assembly to authorize his office to issue an appeal for (voluntary) contributions to a 3 million dollar fund for emergency assistance to the most needy of the approximately 1½ million refugees under his mandate. He also sought authority to open branch offices in various parts of the world and asked the Committee to help him persuade governments to ratify the recently adopted Convention on the Status of Refugees.

Committee IV (Trusteeship)—The Anglo-French resolution on the Ewe and Togoland unification problem was adopted by the Committee January 2 following incorporation of a series of amendments sponsored by a group of non-administering powers. The vote was 35 (U.S.)-0-12, with France and the United Kingdom abstaining on the ground that the revised text would have the effect of delaying a settlement of the problem.

The approved resolution recommends that Britain and France consult fully with the various indigenous groups concerned before going through with their plan to set up a Joint Council for Togoland Affairs to advise them on matters of common concern to their adjacent trust territories (French and British Togoland). (The prounification parties have objected to the procedures devised for selecting the Council.) It also recommended extending the scope of the Council and instructed the Trusteeship Council to arrange for an on-the-spot study of the problem.

The Committee then went on to approve a series of resolutions arising out of the report of the Trusteeship Council. These included U.S.-supported proposals to request the Council (1) to constitute a Standing Committee for the Examination of Petitions to meet between as well as during Trusteeship Council sessions, and (2) "to examine the possibility of associating the inhabitants of the trust territories more closely in its work," as well as a U.S.-opposed text recommending association of nonmember countries of the Council with the activities of its subsidiary organs.

"Additional Measures To Be Employed to Meet the Aggression in Korea"—Haiti and Mexico have informed the U.N. Secretariat that they have embargoed the shipment of arms, ammunition, implements of war, etc. to areas under Chinese Communist or North Korean control, as recommended by the General Assembly in its May 18, 1951 resolution. A total of 69 communications concerning implementation of this resolution have now been received from 62 member and non-member nations.

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The State of the Union

*Message of the President to the Congress*¹

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress:

I have the honor to report to the Congress on the state of the Union.

At the outset, I should like to speak of the necessity for putting first things first as we work together this year for the good of our country.

The United States and the whole free world are passing through a period of grave danger. Every action you take here in Congress, and every action I take as President, must be measured against the test of whether it helps to meet that danger.

This will be a Presidential-election year—the kind of year in which politics plays a larger part in our lives than usual. That is perfectly proper. But we have a great responsibility to conduct our political fights in a manner that does not harm the national interest.

We can find plenty of things to differ about without destroying our free institutions and without abandoning our bipartisan foreign policy for peace.

When everything is said and done, all of us—Republicans and Democrats alike—all of us are Americans; and we are all going to sink or swim together.

We are moving through a perilous time. Faced with a terrible threat of aggression, our Nation has embarked upon a great effort to help establish the kind of world in which peace shall be secure. Peace is our goal—not peace at any price, but a peace based on freedom and justice. We are now in the midst of our effort to reach that goal. On the whole, we have been doing very well.

Last year, 1951, was a year in which we threw back aggression, added greatly to our military strength, and improved the chances for peace and freedom in many parts of the world.

This year, 1952, is a crucial year in the defense effort of the whole free world. If we falter, we

can lose all the gains that we have made. If we drive ahead with courage and vigor and determination, we can by the end of 1952 be in a position of much greater security. The way will be dangerous for years ahead, but if we put forth our best efforts this year—and next year—we can be “over the hump” in our effort to build strong defenses.

When we look at the record of the past year, 1951, we find important things on both the credit and the debit side of the ledger. We have made great advances. At the same time, we have run into new problems which must be overcome.

Let us look at the credit side first.

Achievements in 1951

Peace depends upon the free nations sticking together, and making a combined effort to check aggression and prevent war. In this respect, 1951 was a year of great achievement.

In Korea, the forces of the United Nations turned back the Chinese Communist invasion—and did it without widening the area of conflict. The action of the United Nations in Korea has been a powerful deterrent to a third world war. However, the situation in Korea remains very hazardous. The outcome of the armistice negotiations is still uncertain.

In Indochina and Malaya, our aid has helped our allies to hold back the Communist advance, although there are signs of further trouble in that area.

In 1951 we strengthened the chances of peace in the Pacific region by the treaties with Japan and by defense arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.

In Europe, combined defense has become a reality. The free nations have created a real fighting force. This force is not yet as strong as it needs to be; but it is already a real obstacle to any attempt by hostile forces to sweep across Europe to the Atlantic.

In 1951 we also moved to strengthen the security

¹Excerpts from the President's message delivered to the Congress on Jan. 9, and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

of Europe by the agreement to bring Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty.

The United Nations, the world's great hope for peace, has come through a year of trial stronger and more useful than ever. The free nations have stood together in blocking Communist attempts to tear up the Charter.

At the present session of the United Nations in Paris, we, together with the British and the French, offered a plan to reduce and control all armaments under a foolproof inspection system. This is a concrete, practical proposal for disarmament.

But what happened? Vyshinsky laughed at it. Listen to what he said: "I could hardly sleep at all last night . . . I could not sleep because I kept laughing." The world will be a long time forgetting the spectacle of that fellow laughing at disarmament.

Disarmament is not a joke. Vyshinsky's laughter met with shock and anger from people all over the world. And, as a result, Mr. Stalin's representative received orders to stop laughing and start talking.

If the Soviet leaders were to accept this proposal, it would lighten the burden of armaments, and permit the resources of the earth to be devoted to the good of mankind. But until the Soviet Union accepts a sound disarmament proposal, and joins in peaceful settlements, we have no choice except to build up our defenses.

During this past year, we added more than a million men and women to our armed forces. The total is now nearly 3½ million. We have made rapid progress in the field of atomic weapons. We have turned out 16 billion dollars' worth of military supplies and equipment, three times as much as the year before.

Economic conditions in the country are good. There are 61 million people on the job; wages, farm incomes, and business profits are at high levels. Total production of goods and services in our country has increased 8 percent over the last year—about twice the normal rate of growth.

Perhaps the most amazing thing about our economic progress is the way we are increasing our basic capacity to produce. For example, we are now in the second year of a 3-year program which will double our output of aluminum, increase our electric-power supply by 40 percent, and increase our steel-making capacity by 15 percent. We can then produce 120 million tons of steel a year, as much as the rest of the world put together.

This expansion will mean more jobs and higher standards of living for all of us in the years ahead. At the present time, it means greater strength for us and for the rest of the free world in the fight for peace.

New Problems Arise

Now, I must turn to the debit side of the ledger for the past year.

The outstanding fact to note on the debit side of the ledger is that the Soviet Union, in 1951, continued to expand its military production and increase its already excessive military power.

It is true that the Soviets have run into increasing difficulties. Their hostile policies have awakened stern resistance among free men throughout the world. And behind the Iron Curtain, the Soviet rule of force has created growing political and economic stresses in the satellite nations.

Nevertheless, the grim fact remains that the Soviet Union is increasing its armed might. It is still producing more war planes than the free nations. It has set off two more atomic explosions. The world still walks in the shadow of another world war.

And here at home, our defense preparations are far from complete.

During 1951 we did not make adequate progress in building up civil defense against atomic attack. This is a major weakness in our plans for peace, since inadequate civilian defense is an open invitation to surprise attack. Failure to provide adequate civilian defense has the same effect as adding to the enemy's supply of atom bombs.

In the field of defense production, we have run into difficulties and delays in designing and producing the latest types of airplanes and tanks. Some machine tools and metals are still in extremely short supply.

In other free countries, the defense build-up has created severe economic problems. It has increased inflation in Europe and has endangered the continued recovery of our allies.

In the Middle East, political tensions and the oil controversy in Iran are keeping the region in a turmoil. In the Far East, the dark threat of Communist imperialism still hangs over many nations.

This, very briefly, is the good side and the bad side of the picture.

Taking the good and bad together, we have made real progress this last year along the road to peace. We have increased the power and unity of the free world. And while we were doing this, we have avoided world war on the one hand, and appeasement on the other. This is a hard road to follow, but the events of the last year show that it is the right road to peace.

We cannot expect to complete the job overnight. The free nations may have to maintain for years the larger military forces needed to deter aggression. We must build steadily, over a period of years, toward political solidarity and economic progress among the free countries in all parts of the world.

Our task will not be easy; but if we go at it with a will, we can look forward to steady progress. On our side are all the great resources of freedom—the ideals of religion and democracy, the aspiration of people for a better life, and the industrial and technical power of a free civilization.

These advantages outweigh anything the slave world can produce. The only thing that can defeat us is our own state of mind. We can lose if we falter.

The middle period of a great national effort like this is a very difficult time. The way seems long and hard. The goal seems far distant. Some people get discouraged. That is only natural.

But if there are any among us who think we ought to ease up in the fight for peace, I want to remind them of three things—just three things.

First: The threat of world war is still very real. We had one Pearl Harbor—let's not get caught off guard again. If you don't think the threat of Communist armies is real, talk to some of our men back from Korea.

Second: If the United States had to try to stand alone against a Soviet-dominated world, it would destroy the life we know and the ideals we hold dear. Our allies are essential to us, just as we are essential to them. The more shoulders there are to bear the burden the lighter it will be.

Third: The things we believe in most deeply are under relentless attack. We have the great responsibility of saving the basic moral and spiritual values of our civilization. We have started out well—with a program for peace that is unparalleled in history. If we believe in ourselves and the faith we profess, we will stick to the job.

Tasks Ahead Require Courage

This is a time for courage, not for grumbling and mumbling.

Now, let us take a look at the things we have to do.

The thing that is uppermost in the minds of all of us is the situation in Korea. We must—and we will—keep up the fight there until we get the kind of armistice that will put an end to the aggression and protect the safety of our forces and the security of the Republic of Korea. Beyond that, we shall continue to work for a settlement in Korea that upholds the principles of the United Nations. We went into Korea because we knew that Communist aggression had to be met firmly if freedom was to be preserved in the world. We went into the fight to save the Republic of Korea, a free country, established under the United Nations. These are our aims. We will not give up until we attain them.

Meanwhile, we must continue to strengthen the forces of freedom throughout the world.

I hope the Senate will take early and favorable action on the Japanese peace treaty, on our security pacts with Pacific countries, and on the agreement to bring Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty.

We are also negotiating an agreement with the German Federal Republic under which it can play an honorable and equal part among nations and take its place in the defense of Western Europe.

But treaties and plans are only the skeleton of our defense structure. The sinew and muscle of

defense forces and equipment must be provided.

In Europe we must go on helping our friends and allies to build up their military forces. This means we must send weapons in large volume to our European allies. I have directed that weapons for Europe be given a very high priority. Economic aid is necessary, too, to supply the margin of difference between success and failure in making Europe a strong partner in our joint defense.

In the long run, we want to see Europe freed from any dependence on our aid. Our European allies want that just as much as we do. The steps that are now being taken to build European unity should help bring that about. Six European countries are pooling their coal and steel production under the Schuman Plan. Work is going forward on the merger of European national forces on the Continent into a single army. These great projects should become realities in 1952.

We should do all we can to help and encourage the move toward a strong and united Europe.

In Asia the new Communist empire is a daily threat to millions of people. The peoples of Asia want to be free to follow their own way of life. They want to preserve their culture and their traditions against communism, just as much as we want to preserve ours. They are laboring under terrific handicaps—poverty, ill health, feudal systems of land ownership, and the threat of internal subversion or external attack. We can and must increase our help to them.

That means military aid, especially to those places like Indochina which might be hardest hit by some new Communist attack.

It also means economic aid, both technical know-how and capital investment.

This last year we made available millions of bushels of wheat to relieve famine in India. But far more important, in the long run, is the work Americans are doing in India to help the Indian farmers themselves raise more grain. With the help of our technicians, Indian farmers, using simple, inexpensive means, have been able since 1948 to double the crops in one area in India. One farmer there raised 63 bushels of wheat to the acre, where 13 bushels had been the average before.

Our Technical Missionaries

This is our Point Four Program at work. It is working—not only in India—but in Iran, Paraguay, Liberia—in 33 countries around the globe. Our technical missionaries are out there. We need more of them. We need more funds to speed their efforts, because there is nothing of greater importance in all our foreign policy. There is nothing that shows more clearly what we stand for, and what we want to achieve.

We have recently lost a great public servant who was leading this effort to bring opportunity and hope to the people of half the world. Dr. Henry

Bennett and his associates died in the line of duty on a Point Four mission. It is up to us to carry on the great work for which they gave their lives.

During the coming year, we must not forget the suffering of the people who live beyond the Iron Curtain. In those areas, minorities are being oppressed, human rights violated, religions persecuted. We should continue to expose those wrongs. We should continue and expand the activities of the Voice of America, which brings our message of hope and truth to those peoples and other peoples throughout the world.

I have just had an opportunity to discuss many of these world problems with Prime Minister Churchill. We have had a most satisfactory series of meetings. We thoroughly reviewed the situation in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. We both look forward to steady progress toward peace through the cooperative action and teamwork of the free nations.

Turning from our foreign policies, let us now consider the jobs we have here at home as part of our program for peace.

The first of these jobs is to move ahead full steam on our defense program.

Our objective is to have a well-equipped, active defense force large enough—in concert with the forces of our allies—to deter aggression and to inflict punishing losses on the enemy immediately if we should be attacked. This active force must be backed by adequate reserves, and by the plants and tools to turn out the tremendous quantities of new weapons that would be needed if war came. We are not building an active force adequate to carry on a full scale war, but we are putting ourselves in a position to mobilize very rapidly if we have to.

This year I shall recommend some increases in the size of the active force we are building, with particular emphasis on air power. This means we shall have to continue large-scale production of planes and other equipment for a longer period of time than we had originally planned.

Planes and tanks and other weapons—what the military call “hard goods”—are now beginning to come off the production lines in volume. Deliveries of hard goods now amount to about a billion and a half dollars' worth a month. A year from now, we expect this rate to be doubled.

We shall have to hold a high rate of military output for about a year after that. In 1954 we hope to have enough equipment so that we can reduce the production of most military items substantially. The next 2 years should therefore be the peak period of defense production.

Defense needs will take a lot of our steel, aluminum, copper, nickel, and other scarce materials. This means smaller production of some civilian goods. The cutbacks will be nothing like those during World War II, when much civilian production was completely stopped. But there will be considerably less of some goods than we have been used to these past 2 or 3 years.

Meeting the Crisis With Moral Strength

This demonstration of the way free men govern themselves has a more powerful influence on the people of the world—on both sides of the Iron Curtain—than all the trick slogans and pie-in-the-sky promises of the Communists.

But our shortcomings, as well as our progress, are watched from abroad. And there is one shortcoming I want to speak plainly about.

Our kind of government above all others cannot tolerate dishonesty among its public servants.

Some dishonest people worm themselves into almost every human organization. It is all the more shocking, however, when they make their way into a Government such as ours, which is based on the principle of justice for all. Such unworthy public servants must be weeded out. I intend to see to it that Federal employees who have been guilty of misconduct are punished for it. I also intend to see to it that the honest and hard-working majority of our Federal employees are protected against partisan slander and malicious attack.

I have already made some recommendations to the Congress to help accomplish these purposes. I intend to submit further recommendations to this end. I will welcome the cooperation of the Congress in this effort.

I also think that the Congress can do a great deal to strengthen confidence in our institutions by applying rigorous standards of moral integrity in its own operations—and by finding an effective way to control campaign expenditures—and by protecting the rights of individuals in congressional investigations.

To meet the crisis which now hangs over the world, we need many different kinds of strength—military, economic, political, and moral. And of all these, I am convinced that moral strength is the most vital.

When you come right down to it, it is the courage and the character of our Nation—and of each one of us as individuals—that will really decide how well we meet this challenge.

We are engaged in a great undertaking at home and abroad—the greatest, in fact, that any nation has ever been privileged to embark upon. We are working night and day to bring peace to the world and to spread the democratic ideals of justice and self-government to all people. Our accomplishments are already remarkable. We ought to be full of pride in what we are doing—and full of confidence and hope in the outcome. No nation ever had greater resources, or greater energy, or nobler traditions to inspire it.

And yet, day in and day out, we see a long procession of timid and fearful men who wring their hands and cry out that we have lost the way—that we don't know what we are doing—that we are bound to fail. Some say we should give up the struggle for peace, and others say we

ould have a war and get it over with. They want us to forget the great objective of preventing another world war—the objective for which our soldiers have been fighting in the hills of Korea.

If we are to be worthy of all that has been done for us by our soldiers in the field, we must be true to the ideals for which they are fighting. We must reject the counsels of defeat and despair. We must have the determination to complete the great work for which our men have laid down their lives.

In all we do, we should remember who we are and what we stand for. We are Americans. Our forefathers had far greater obstacles than we have, and much poorer chances of success. They did not lose heart, or turn aside from their goals, in that darkest of all winters in American history,

at Valley Forge, George Washington said "We must not, in so great a contest, expect to meet with nothing but sunshine." With that spirit, they won their fight for freedom.

We must have that same faith and vision. In the great contest in which we are engaged today, we cannot expect to have fair weather all the way. But it is a contest just as important for this country and for all men as the desperate struggle that George Washington fought through to victory.

Let us prove, again, that we are not merely sunshine patriots and summer soldiers. Let us go forward, trusting in the God of Peace, to win the goals we seek.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 9, 1952.

The President Exchanges Views With Prime Minister Churchill

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ

Released to the press by the White House January 9

The President and the Prime Minister held four meetings at the White House on January 7 and 8, 1952. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Lord Ismay, and by the Paymaster-General, Lord Herwell. The President's advisers included the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Mr. Charles E. Wilson, and Mr. W. Averell Harriman. The visit of Mr. Churchill and his colleagues also afforded opportunities for a number of informal meetings.

At the end of the talks the President and the Prime Minister issued the following announcement:

During the last two days we have been able to talk over, on an intimate and personal basis, the problems of this critical time. Our discussions have been conducted in mutual friendship, respect and confidence. Each of our Governments has thereby gained a better understanding of the thoughts and aims of the other.

The free countries of the world are resolved to unite their strength and purpose to ensure peace and security. We affirm the determination of our Governments and peoples to further this resolve, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. The strong ties which unite our two countries are a massive con-

tribution to the building of the strength of the free world.

Under arrangements made for the common defense, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.

We share the hope and the determination that war, with all its modern weapons, shall not again be visited on mankind. We will remain in close consultation on the developments which might increase danger to the maintenance of world peace.

We do not believe that war is inevitable. This is the basis of our policies. We are willing at any time to explore all reasonable means of resolving the issues which now threaten the peace of the world.

The United States Government is in full accord with the views expressed in the joint statement issued in Paris on December 18, 1951, at the conclusion of the Anglo-French discussions. Our two Governments will continue to give their full support to the efforts now being made to establish a European Defense Community, and will lend all assistance in their power in bringing it to fruition. We believe that this is the best means of bringing a democratic Germany as a full and equal partner into a purely defensive organization for European security. The defense of the free world will be strengthened and solidified by the creation of a

European Defense Community as an element in a constantly developing Atlantic Community.

Our Governments are resolved to promote the stability, peaceful development, and prosperity of the countries of the Middle East. We have found a complete identity of aims between us in this part of the world, and the two Secretaries of State will continue to work out together agreed policies to give effect to this aim. We think it essential for the furtherance of our common purposes that an Allied Middle East Command should be set up as soon as possible.

As regards Egypt, we are confident that the Four Power approach offers the best prospect of relieving the present tension.

We both hope that the initiative taken by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will lead to a solution of the Iranian oil problem acceptable to all the interests concerned.

We have discussed the many grave problems affecting our two countries in the Far East. A broad harmony of view has emerged from these discussions; for we recognize that the overriding need to counter the Communist threat in that area transcends such divergencies as there are in our policies toward China. We will continue to give full support for United Nations measures against aggression in Korea until peace and security are restored there. We are glad that the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France will be meeting in the next few days to consider specific measures to strengthen the security of Southeast Asia.

We have considered how our two countries could

best help one another in the supply of scarce materials important to their defense programs and their economic stability. The need of the United Kingdom for additional supplies of steel from the United States, and the need of the United States for supplies of other materials, including aluminum and tin, were examined. Good progress was made. The discussions will be continued and we hope that agreement may be announced shortly.

We have reviewed the question of standardization of rifles and ammunition in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Neither country thinks it wise at this critical time to take the momentous step of changing its rifle. In the interest of economy, both in time and money, we have agreed that the United States and the United Kingdom will continue to rely upon rifles and ammunition now in stock and currently being produced. In the interest however of eventual standardization, we have also agreed that both countries will produce their new rifles and ammunition only on an experimental scale while a common effort is made to devise a rifle and ammunition suitable for future standardization.

The question of the Atlantic Command is still under discussion.

Throughout our talks we have been impressed by the need to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by every means within our power and in full accord with our fellow members. We are resolved to build an Atlantic community, not only for immediate defense, but for enduring progress.

Behind the Iron Curtain: A Year-End Review

1951 proved to be an unhappy year behind the Iron Curtain. Month after month, and in country after country, the story has been the same. It is one of increasing dissatisfaction, unsuccessful repression, new purges, mass deportations, and other forms of Communist frightfulness in the now familiar Soviet pattern.

In the free world, by contrast, 1951 has been a year of rising strength, rising hope, and rising production, combining to build new bulwarks against Soviet aggression and promote the cause of peace.

China

In China, one of the countries where food production has fallen in spite of so-called "land reform," mass executions, and the liquidation of landlords, year-end reports describe a growing coolness between Peiping and Moscow.

Soviet Zone of Germany

A January death sentence against an 18-year-old resistance worker was commuted to 15 years because of a wave of public anger which greeted the penalty pronounced originally. The radio had carried the youth's words to millions of other Germans: He preferred death to life without freedom.

In August the Soviet Union assembled some 2 million youths from all over the world in Berlin for mass exhibition and indoctrination. The program backfired when more than half of those assembled visited the free zones of Berlin. There they learned they had been fed with lies concerning conditions in the Western world. Hundreds of the youthful visitors disobeyed Communist orders to ask asylum on free soil.

Late in the year Lt. Col. Fedya Astrachov, head of Russia's uranium-mining project in East Ger-

Bankruptcies in Soviet Zone of Germany

More than 16,000 private industrial, trade and handicraft enterprises in the Soviet zone have gone out of business since the beginning of the year, according to the trade registers of the individual Soviet zone states, said *Die Neue Zeitung* Sept. 18.

In addition, the East zone authorities have received 10,000 applications for deletion from the trade registers. The number of bankruptcies of private enterprises in the Soviet zone is still on the increase.

—Hicog Information Bulletin,
December, 1951

many and a Stalin prize winner, likewise fled to freedom in the West.

Then at the year's end, Soviet censorship was reimposed on all communications in the Russian zone of Germany, particularly private mail.

Czechoslovakia

As a climax to the steady exodus of Czech and Slovak refugees, a trainload fled to freedom in September.

Jaroslav Konvalinka and Karel Truska, the two Czech trainmen who took the freedom train through the Iron Curtain into Western Germany, are now in the United States enjoying the freedom they sought in leaving their native land.

In October—a month later—declining coal production in the Ostrav-Karvina region posed a problem for the Communist regime which it has not yet solved. The Czech Communist organ *Rude Pravo* called the production rate “utterly unsatisfactory,” and “disgraceful and inexcusable” and Interior Minister Vaclav Nosek conceded that his program of overtime work and Moscow-inspired slogans had failed to produce the coal needed. He predicted a “coal disaster.”

Another Czechoslovak news development during the year was the arrest of Rudolph Slansky, Moscow-trained Communist leader who had been responsible for the earlier removal and arrest of former Foreign Minister Vladimir Clementis. Slansky had been Secretary-General of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia, and later was Vice Premier. Until his arrest and imprisonment on charges of espionage and related offenses he was presumed to be a Moscow favorite.

Poland

In Poland on October 31, the Communist regime announced the arrest of former Vice Premier Wladyslaw Gomulka and four other high officials. Gomulka was charged with “activities especially dangerous during the reconstruction of Poland.”

Food supplies were getting shorter in Poland also as the so-called reconstruction program lagged. A new meat-rationing system was explained officially in December as intended to take care of such privileged meat-eating classes as po-

lice agents, factory managers, miners, and members of the armed forces. A Warsaw radio broadcaster reported that these groups were to have more meat than other Poles because “they are more important than others.”

Stettin reported the “first sizable anti-Soviet demonstrations in Poland since 1945.” A drunken Russian major who had killed five Poles was stoned. Several Polish militiamen were killed by the crowd. There were some two thousand arrests.

Hungary

In Hungary thousands of innocent persons were deported. Deportations from Budapest started in mid-May. They were halted 2 months later following a wave of suicides, and after the purge program had become a world scandal. Then, in November, they were quietly resumed, and at last reports were continuing.

The Budapest Government found it necessary to “explain” during the summer interruption in the deportations that “only” 4,000 members of “the former ruling class” had been deported. But according to unbiased evidence from nongovernment sources, the number of disappearances totaled between 60,000 and 80,000. Whole families, including children and the aged and sick, were herded into boxcars and shipped to unannounced destinations. Their property was confiscated.

On June 28 Archbishop Groesz, Catholic primate of Hungary and successor to the imprisoned Cardinal Mindszenty, was convicted on false charges of espionage, and sentenced to 15 years in prison. The trial followed the Mindszenty pattern of 2 years ago. The charges were almost identical and in addition to espionage included black marketeering and plotting to overthrow the Communist regime. Another of his “offenses” was refusal to sign the latest Communist “peace manifesto.”

Hungary also suffered from inflation. Prices of food and industrial goods soared when rationing was ended. Vice Premier Matyas Rakosi predicted that removal of restrictions would end the high free-market prices. Actually, prices on many items jumped as much as 60 and 100 percent.

Rumania—Bulgaria

Rumanian partisans first showed their hand openly in April when they disrupted a railroad and fought a 3-day battle with the Rumanian militia. There were similar episodes both in Rumania and Bulgaria later in the year as resistance to Communist rule was expressed in sabotage and other demonstrations by partisans fighting for freedom.

Austria

Soviet authorities in Vienna showed their sensitivity to discussions of Communist slave labor by seizing and destroying thousands of books on this subject prepared by the American Federation

of Labor. This action was designed to prevent the books from falling into the hands of anti-Communists in Austria and neighboring countries. The volumes seized contained maps showing the exact locations of slave camps within the Soviet Union, with estimated numbers of their inmates.

Soviet Oppression Elsewhere

In Brussels an international commission of jurists heard testimony from former inmates of Soviet slave-labor camps and ruled that the Soviet Union's oppression in this respect equaled that of Hitler. Prosecutor David Rousset estimated that between 15,000,000 and 25,000,000 persons are being worked as Soviet forced laborers. Assistant Prosecutor E. de Beer said 17 percent of the total

populations of Latvia and Lithuania had been arrested by Soviet authorities in these areas and that 60,000 Lithuanians had been deported to Russia.

Troubles also mounted in the Soviet Union itself. From the Ukraine, Russian Georgia, and peripheral areas of Russia to the east and southeast came reports of both violent and passive resistance to Moscow's rule, necessitating reinforcement of Soviet garrisons in these Russian districts.

These reports, together with a rising tide of escapes and escape attempts as thousands of refugees left or tried to leave Russian territory, contributed additional detail to the story of Soviet troubles and human courage in resisting oppression.

U. S. Proposes To Submit Soviet Lend-Lease Issue To International Court

[Released to the press January 9]

On January 7, 1952, Secretary Acheson transmitted a note to the Soviet Ambassador at Washington, Alexander S. Panyushkin, replying to the Soviet notes of August 21 and August 28, 1951.

The Soviet note of August 21 had again rejected U.S. requests for Soviet return of all lend-lease vessels. The Soviet note of August 28 rejected the U.S. proposal made on April 27, that the question of a satisfactory lend-lease financial settlement be submitted to international arbitration.¹

U. S. NOTE OF JANUARY 7, 1952

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your Government's Note No. 71 of August 21, 1951 concerning the request of the Government of the United States that the Soviet Government return to the United States naval, military and merchant vessels loaned to your Government under the Lend-Lease Act and the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942. I also have the honor to refer to your Government's note No. 73 of August 28, 1951 concerning the proposal of the Government of the United States that the question of the determination of a fair and reasonable lend-lease financial settlement be submitted to arbitration.

¹ For texts of U.S. notes of Feb. 7, Apr. 6 and 27, and July 2, see respectively BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1951, p. 302; Apr. 23, 1951, p. 646; May 7, 1951, p. 744; and July 23, 1951, p. 145.

In the latter note your Government rejects the proposal of the Government of the United States that the question of a satisfactory financial settlement be submitted to arbitration. In addition a verbal proposal of \$300 million was made by the Soviet representative on August 24, 1951. It was indicated at that time that the Government of the United States considers this amount as far from fair and reasonable compensation for lend-lease articles of the United States which remained in Soviet custody at the end of the year. Furthermore, in your note of August 21, 1951, your Government again indicates that it does not intend to meet its obligation to return the lend-lease vessels as requested by the President of the United States. Instead your Government continues to evade this obligation, which is clearly and specifically stated in Article V of the Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, to return lend-lease articles as requested by the President of the United States. In attempting to justify its evasion of this obligation your Government refers to "understandings" relating to the sale of some of the vessels.

These so-called "understandings," however, were offers made long ago by the Government of the United States which were explicitly conditioned upon the prompt conclusion of a mutually satisfactory over-all lend-lease settlement. This condition was not met by your Government. Therefore, the Government of the United States, acting within its legal rights and in full accord with

[Unofficial translation]

No. 71

SIR: In connection with your note of April 6, 1951, I have the honor to communicate the following:

The references in your note to a previous exchange of notes fully confirm the fact that an understanding concerning the sale of lend-lease vessels to the Soviet Union was reached earlier between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America. At the same time these references indicate that the Government of the United States of America itself valued this understanding as a necessary part of a mutually satisfactory general settlement of lend-lease obligations resulting from the Soviet-American agreement of June 11, 1942.

Thus, it is stated in the note of the Government of the United States of America of February 27, 1948, in connection with the agreement of the Government of the U.S.S.R. to buy 36 merchant vessels of wartime construction received under the Lend-Lease Act at prices announced by the United States, that the agreement of the Soviet Government concerning these vessels "solves one of the several questions necessary for a general satisfactory settlement of obligations" resulting from the Soviet-American agreement of June 11, 1942.

In the note of the Government of the United States of America of August 8, 1949, agreement was expressed to sell to the Soviet Union lend-lease merchant vessels of prewar construction for the sum of 13 million dollars offered by the Soviet Government and it was also indicated that "the agreement on this question satisfactorily solves one more of several questions of a general settlement." By requesting the return of all lend-lease vessels now, the Government of the United States of America violates the understanding reached earlier concerning the sale of the merchant vessels and some of the naval vessels to the Soviet Union, in which connection a legitimate doubt arises in the mind of the Soviet Government as to the earnestness of the statements of the U. S. Government concerning its desire to reach a speedy and mutually satisfactory general settlement of lend-lease accounts. The U. S. Government's renunciation of the understanding reached on individual questions can only make the achievement of a general settlement more difficult.

As has been repeatedly stated earlier, the Government of the U.S.S.R. longs for a very rapid achievement of an agreement with the Government of the United States of America concerning a full and final settlement of lend-lease accounts and has repeatedly sent its representatives to Washington to conduct negotiations with the representatives of the United States. It is toward this very goal that the efforts are directed of the Soviet representatives in the lend-lease negotia-

he terms of the Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, informed representatives of the Soviet Government on January 27, 1951, that all of the lend-lease vessels which were loaned to the Soviet Government under lend-lease procedures and remain the property of the Government of the United States, are of use to the Government of the United States; and, at the same time, the return of these vessels to the United States was requested in accordance with Article V of the Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942. Moreover, on the same date representatives of the Soviet Government were informed that the previous conditional offers by the Government of the United States to sell some of the vessels had long since lapsed and that none of the vessels were available for sale to the Soviet Government. On February 7, 1951, the Government of the United States confirmed in its note its request for the return of all the lend-lease vessels.

It is to be noted that on October 12, 1948, the Government of the United States demanded the return to the United States of 186 naval craft in addition to 3 icebreakers and 28 frigates. These 86 vessels at no time had been offered for sale to the Soviet Government on any basis. Even in this instance the Soviet Government has refused to meet its obligation.

It is the view of the Government of the United States that the return of all lend-lease vessels is essential to the conclusion of a satisfactory overall lend-lease settlement. It is also the view of this Government that the Soviet Government is clearly in default on its obligations by not returning these vessels to the United States.

If the Soviet Government remains unwilling to return these vessels to the United States, the Government of the United States suggests that the question be resolved by submission of the matter to the International Court of Justice for adjudication. For that purpose, the Government of the United States proposes that the Soviet Government join with it in submitting the following question to the Court with the understanding that both Governments will be governed by the Court's decision.

Does the failure of the Soviet Government to return lend-lease vessels to the United States, as requested by the Government of the United States, constitute a default by the Soviet Government in its obligation under Article V of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, to return lend-lease articles when so requested?

The Government of the United States therefore requests that the Soviet Government immediately make the necessary arrangements for the return of the lend-lease vessels as requested or agree to the submission of the question of the vessels as stated above to the International Court of Justice for adjudication.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

DEAN ACHESON

tions which were resumed on January 15 of this year in Washington and are taking place at the present time. For this very purpose there is also a Soviet naval expert in Washington.

It is well known that in the course of the previous negotiations and exchange of notes the Soviet Government, guided by the ardent desire to achieve an agreement with the Government of the United States of America, made essential concessions and introduced a number of constructive proposals which create the possibility of a successful completion of the negotiations concerning the settlement of lend-lease accounts.

In the light of the foregoing, the attempts of the Government of the United States of America to justify its renunciation of the understanding reached earlier concerning the lend-lease vessels by referring to the alleged avoidance by the Soviet party [to the negotiation] of the achievement of a speedy and satisfactory settlement and hence the nonfulfillment of the conditions under which these vessels could be sold, are groundless, and run counter to the true state of affairs.

Insisting, in spite of the understanding, on the return of an insignificant number of merchant vessels by the Soviet Union while three-fifths of the whole tonnage of the merchant marine of the U.S.S.R. is laid up, and also requesting the return of an insignificant number of very dilapidated small naval vessels while much larger naval ships are being sold up to this time by the United States to other countries, the Government of the United States of America takes a position which appears as discrimination with respect to the Soviet Union and which contradicts the principles of the agreement between our countries of June 11, 1942, and obviously makes the achievement of an agreement difficult.

The Soviet Government considers that a steadfast observance of the understanding reached earlier is a necessary condition for the achievement of a general and mutually satisfactory settlement of lend-lease accounts.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my high considerations.

B. KARAVAEV
(*Chargé*)

SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 28, 1951

[Unofficial translation]
No. 73

SIR: In connection with your note of April 27, 1951, which contains the proposal of the United States Government to transfer to an arbitration court for decision the question of payment for the residue of lend-lease in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor, on the instructions of the Government of the U.S.S.R., to communicate the following:

The Government of the Soviet Union is aiming

as before at the quickest attainment of agreement with the Government of the United States of America on a full and final settlement of the lend-lease accounts by means of bilateral negotiations. From the practice of international relations it is well known that, in the presence of good will on the part of both negotiating parties, it is just such bilateral negotiations which are the best and most rapid way of attaining a mutually satisfactory agreement. The agreements on payment for the use in the U.S.S.R. of the patents on oil refining processes, which were achieved in the course of the present negotiations between the U.S.S.R. Purchasing Commission in the United States of America and four American firms, can serve as an example of this. Implementation of the proposal of the United States Government regarding transfer to an arbitration court for decision of the question of payment for lend-lease residue would mean the termination of direct bilateral negotiations between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America and would in essence represent a rejection of the very possibility of achieving agreement on a full and final settlement of the lend-lease accounts.

The Government of the United States tries to base its proposal on the fact that direct negotiations regarding the over-all sum have not resulted in the achievement of an agreement on this question. However, it is well known to the Government of the United States of America that such an agreement was not achieved only because the American side set an excessively high sum as compensation for the residue of lend-lease goods of the so-called "civilian type."

The United States Government indicates in its note that it tried to reach an agreement on lend-lease with the Soviet Union allegedly on the basis of those principles which were applied in the settlement of the accounts of the United States of America with Great Britain. This statement does not correspond with reality either with regard to the size of the over-all sum of compensation or with regard to the conditions of its payment.

Lend-lease deliveries to the Soviet Union were, it is known, at least two times less than the deliveries made by the United States to Great Britain. Moreover, the figure of \$800,000,000 set by the United States Government for the lend-lease residue in the U.S.S.R. is almost twice as large as the sum subject to payment by Great Britain, which, as is known, consisted of \$472,000,000. The American side tries to base the excessively high sum of compensation proposed to the Soviet Union on an arbitrary division of lend-lease residue into articles of "civilian" and "military" types. In this connection it is appropriate to point out that with regard to the U.S.S.R. the American Government unfoundedly counted as articles of "civilian" type many articles which were considered as articles of "military" type in the accounts of the United States of America with Great Britain.

Naturally such a discriminatory attitude toward the Soviet Union cannot contribute to the settlement of the lend-lease accounts.

From a comparison of the conditions proposed to the Soviet Union for the payment of compensation with the conditions on which were settled the lend-lease accounts with Great Britain, it is also seen that the credit conditions proposed to the Soviet Union place the U.S.S.R. in a significantly worse position than Great Britain. The conditions proposed to the Soviet Union provide for the payment of compensation in 30 annual installments with payments beginning from July 1, 1951, and with the calculation of interest during several years before the signature of the agreement, while at the same time for Great Britain these conditions provide for payment of compensation in 50 annual installments with payments beginning and interest calculated only from 5 years after the conclusion of the agreement. From a comparison of these conditions, it follows that with the same nominal two percent annual interest rate, the interest rate paid by Great Britain proves to be significantly lower and for the Soviet Union significantly higher than the indicated nominal rate.

Thus the proposals of the United States Government with regard to the size of the total amount and the conditions of its payment have a discriminatory character and therefore cannot be a basis for a mutually satisfactory agreement.

Such proposals advanced by the United States Government contradict the principles of the June 11, 1942 agreement, according to which the final lend-lease settlement must be made with calculation of the advantages received by the Soviet Union from the United States of America as well as those advantages which the United States of America received from the military efforts of the Soviet Union, whose huge contribution in the attainment of victory over the common enemy is generally known.

In its note the United States Government states that it is not asking payment for lend-lease articles used by the Soviet Union in the war period and that this fact allegedly bears witness that it fully recognizes the contribution of the Soviet Union to the victory over the common enemy. Such a statement by the American Government is at least misplaced, since according to the basic lend-lease agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America of June 11, 1942, the United States of America has no grounds for raising the question that the Soviet Union compensate the United States for the value of the lend-lease articles delivered to the Soviet Union and destroyed, expended, or used during the war period. The agreement of June 11, 1942, obligates the Government of the United States to calculate precisely at the time of settlement of the lend-lease residue accounts, the contribution of the

Soviet Union to the military efforts against the common enemy and all advantages which the United States Government received from the operation of this agreement. As is known, according to the definition of President Roosevelt set forth in the preamble of the basic lend-lease agreement, "the defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States." This means that all deliveries of lend-lease articles to the Soviet Union were made for purposes vitally important to the United States of America. The position taken by the United States Government in the negotiations for settlement of the lend-lease accounts does not correspond with this agreement and contradicts the allegation contained in the note that the Government of the United States gives "great recognition of the community of interest of our two Governments in the achievement of the common victory and takes full cognizance of the part played by the Soviet Government in this effort."

The agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America of June 11, 1942, is not a commercial transaction or loan: its very title states that it is an agreement regarding the "principles applied to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression." In this connection the reference contained in the note of April 27 of this year that "the Government of the United States has never agreed to give most-favored-nation treatment in connection with any lend-lease settlement whatsoever" can scarcely fail to call forth astonishment. Taking a discriminatory position toward the U.S.S.R. in the question of settlement of the lend-lease accounts, the United States Government by this very fact ignores the principles serving as the basis of the lend-lease agreement of June 11, 1942. Such a position of the United States Government contradicts its affirmation of striving to attain a quick, mutually-satisfactory agreement on the settlement of the lend-lease accounts.

In the light of what is set forth above and also in view of the fact that in the lend-lease agreement of June 11, 1942, such a system of settling disagreements was not provided for, the Soviet Government considers unacceptable the proposal of the United States Government for arbitration, advanced in its note of April 27, 1951.

The Soviet Government again reaffirms its readiness to settle the lend-lease accounts by means of direct bilateral negotiations and expresses the hope that in the future course of these negotiations the Government of the United States of America will show the necessary cooperation for the rapid conclusion of the negotiations.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

B. KARAVAEV
(Chargé)

U.N. Commission To Discuss Prisoners of War

[Released to the press January 9]

U.S.S.R. ASKED TO PARTICIPATE

On January 8, 1952, the American Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow, Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., delivered a note to Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Fedor T. Gusev informing the Soviet Government of the U.S. intention to send a representative to a meeting of the United Nations Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War which is scheduled to convene at Geneva on January 21, 1952.¹ The note urges that the Soviet Government likewise participate and afford the Commission every assistance in the discharge of its humanitarian task. Text of the note follows:

On December 11, 1951, J. G. Guerrero, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War established by the resolution of December 14, 1950, of the United Nations General Assembly, addressed a letter to the United States Government.² In this letter Mr. Guerrero indicates the decision of the Commission to invite those Governments directly interested in the Prisoners of War problem to establish contact with the Commission with a view to studying jointly the measures which it would be possible to take in this connection and requests the U.S. Government to designate a representative with whom the Commission could confer during its session which is scheduled to start in Geneva on January 21, 1952. It is the understanding of the U.S. Government that the Soviet Government has also received an invitation to participate. The United States has already

¹The Ad Hoc Commission was established by a resolution of December 14, 1950, of the U.N. General Assembly to investigate the situation of World War II prisoners of war who are still in custody, and about whom no information has been received, and take whatever steps possible to facilitate their repatriation. For text of the resolution and statement made thereon by Edith S. Sampson, alternate U.S. representative to the General Assembly, see BULLETIN of Jan. 8, 1951, p. 68.

²Not printed here.

informed the Commission of its intention to send a representative to this meeting.

It is the hope of the U.S. Government that the Soviet Government, despite refusal to date to associate itself with the afore-mentioned resolution or to assist the Commission in its attempts to obtain factual information, will now agree to cooperate to the fullest extent possible in this most recent attempt to find a satisfactory solution to the prisoners of war issue.

The human tragedy involved in the continued detention of hundreds of thousands of German and Japanese nationals taken into Soviet custody in the course of the war, who have been neither repatriated nor accounted for, hardly needs elaboration. It is therefore the earnest hope of the U.S. Government—a hope which we know is fervently shared by the families of these unfortunate individuals—that the Soviet Union will join other interested nations in affording the Commission every assistance in its efforts to bring about the return of all those still alive and to account for those who have died.

U. S. COOPERATES WITH COMMISSION

The U. N. Commission on Prisoners of War, which has invited certain interested governments, among them the United States, to a meeting at Geneva beginning on January 21, was appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with the resolution passed at the fifth session of the General Assembly on December 14, 1950.³ Sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, the resolution provided for the establishment of an impartial, humanitarian commission to investigate the situation of World War II prisoners of war still unaccounted for and to take such steps as it

³BULLETIN of Jan. 8, 1951, p. 73.

might find possible to facilitate the repatriation of all those now alive.

It is a tragic fact that 6½ years after the cessation of hostilities in World War II hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war, Germans, Japanese, and Italians, known to have been in Soviet hands, have not been returned to their home countries nor has information regarding their whereabouts and situation been furnished their home governments, relatives, or friends.

It is our earnest hope that the U.N. Commission will be successful in its humanitarian task. This Government is cooperating fully with the Commission and is sending a representative to the Geneva meeting.

Free World Unity

[Released to the press January 9]

The following is a summary of remarks made on January 9 by John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary, before the Association of American Colleges at Washington:

Mr. Dulles took as his theme George Washington's statement that in every society each member must "give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest." He said that the nations which were members of the free world were not yet doing that sufficiently to preserve their liberty from total loss in the face of the monolithic unity of the Soviet Communist world.

The United Nations

"The United Nations," Mr. Dulles said, "as the Town Meeting of the World, exerts a unifying influence on free-world opinion. This is of immense value; but it does not provide organic unity for security which is needed to match the organic unity for offense by which the free nations are threatened. This kind of unity must be developed through voluntary associations which are provided for by articles 51 and 52 of the U.N. Charter."

European Unity

Mr. Dulles recalled his own long advocacy of greater European unity as indispensable for European strength and security and expressed hope that through economic measures such as the Schuman Plan, and defense measures including the Pleven proposal for a European Defense Community, there was developing European unity "which can alter for great good the future course of history." He said General Eisenhower's part in stimulating this effort was an outstanding achievement.

Mr. Dulles recalled that he had told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1947, when it first considered interim aid for Europe, that any such aid "would work in reverse, if it merely makes temporarily tolerable a European structure which is obsolete."

Asian Unity

Turning to Asia, Mr. Dulles foresaw greater difficulty in achieving unity because Russia's "Asia first" policy was formidable and because Western colonialization had left, as an aftermath, much distrust between the free East and the free West. He hailed the initiative represented by the Japanese peace treaty and the security treaties with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan. He recalled that these had largely stemmed from General MacArthur's insistence, forcibly expressed in June 1950, that the United States take an initiative for peace and security in that part of the world.

"Our occupation policies, now crowned by a liberal peace, mean" Mr. Dulles said, "that Japan can soon emerge as an important factor in world defensive strategy against militant communism. That is the goal of our policy. There is dire need for more effective participation by the peoples of the East in the defense of freedom."

Japan and Soviet Russia

The highest testimonial yet paid to the success of our policy is Premier Stalin's New Year's Day message to the Japanese people. Until then, the Soviet leaders had treated the Japanese with contempt. They refused themselves to make peace and they tried to prevent others from making peace by threatening that this might lead the Soviet Union to revive active hostilities against Japan; they refused to return Japanese prisoners of war as they had solemnly promised; they demanded that the Emperor be hanged; they seized without warrant Japanese islands and unjustifiably closed the seas to Japanese fishers; they demanded that Japan be permanently disarmed and permanently subjected to Russian military dominance through a Red navy monopolistic patrol of the very waters which flow between Japanese home islands.

"When I was in Tokyo last April I discussed the tactics of terrorism which the Soviet Communists were then employing and I said that if we persisted honorably and courageously in our search for peace such 'tactics of Bolshevik communism cannot prevail.' This is now proved by the fact that the Soviet leaders, seeing that Japan cannot be frightened, now reverse their tactics and talk to Japan as a nation to be wooed.

"The Japanese naturally and properly want to restore peaceful relations with all of their former enemies; but they will, I predict, not accept Rus-

sian words as a substitute for Russian deeds. The Japanese, as they return to independent status, will face many problems that are new and unfamiliar to them. But some of the old problems will still be there and one of these, unhappily, is the problem of Russian imperialism. The Japanese, perhaps, better than any other people in the world, know that danger and the need to be ever alert."

Conclusion

Mr. Dulles concluded with the hope that the development of United States-Japanese relations would show that the East and West can cooperate in equal fellowship; that the East need not fear arrogance or domination by the West; and that there can consequently be broader and closer association for securing and expanding freedom in Asia.

Progress of the Schuman Plan

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press January 11]

Now that Germany has ratified the Schuman Plan, a critical corner has been turned in the political evolution of postwar Europe. In the brief span since the end of World War II, Germany, Italy, France, and the Benelux nations have gone far in fashioning the political and economic ties which should mean the end of centuries of sporadic hostilities among them. The progress made so far is a tribute to the courage and imagination of the people and the statesmen of these countries.

Visit of Netherlands Premier

The Department of State announced on January 9 that Willem Drees, Netherlands Premier, will pay an informal visit to the United States from January 12 until January 24.

Mr. Drees will arrive at New York on January 12. The Netherlands Premier will also visit Bridgeport, Conn., as an example of a small-sized American industrial city.

Mr. Drees, who is the Labor Party head of his country's Government and a leader of the labor movement, will meet with labor leaders at New York.

At Pittsburgh, Mr. Drees will inspect some steel plants and the national headquarters of the United Steel Workers of America.

At Washington, Mr. Drees will call on President Truman and Secretary Acheson and will

have luncheon with the President and several Cabinet members. Mr. Drees will pay an informal visit to the Capitol and to a military establishment in the neighborhood of Washington.

Allocation of Crude Oil For Venezuela

[Released to the press January 7]

The President, on January 5, 1952, signed a proclamation which continues for 1952 the 1951 allocation by countries of imports of crude oil, topped crude oil, and fuel oil which are permitted entry into the United States at a reduced rate of import tax. The 1952 quota allocation is as follows: Venezuela 59.4 percent; the Netherlands (including overseas territories) 18.7 percent; all other countries 21.9 percent. The calendar years 1946-49 are taken as the representative period specified in the proclamation for the purpose of determining the allocation by country.

Under the trade agreement with Venezuela signed in 1939, imports of crude oil, topped crude oil, and fuel oil which are subject to import tax are permitted entry at the rate of 10½ cents a barrel, up to and not in excess of 5 percent of the total quantity of crude petroleum processed in refineries in continental United States during the preceding calendar year. Imports of these products subject to import tax in excess of the 5 percent quota enter the United States at a higher rate of 21 cents a barrel.

The quantities of petroleum products allocated to each country of export under the 1952 quota will be announced by the Treasury Department after determination by the Department of the Interior of the total quantity of crude petroleum processed in refineries in continental United States in 1951. In November the Bureau of Mines estimated that the crude runs to stills in the United States in 1951 would reach approximately 2.4 billion barrels. In 1951 approximately 104.5 million barrels were imported at the 10½-cent rate out of an estimated total import figure for 1951 of 309 million barrels.

The text of the proclamation follows:

A P R O C L A M A T I O N ¹

1. WHEREAS on December 29, 1950 I proclaimed such allocation among countries of production of the quantity of crude petroleum, topped crude petroleum, and fuel oil derived from petroleum, including fuel oil known as gas oil, entitled to a reduction in the rate of import tax during the calendar year 1951 not in excess of the annual amount equal to 5 per centum of the total quantity of crude petroleum processed in refineries in the continental United States during the preceding year as would be required or appropriate to carry out (1) the definitive trade agree-

¹ 17 Fed. Reg. 185.

ment with Venezuela entered into on November 6, 1939 (54 Stat. 2377), particularly Article VII and Item 3422 of Schedule II thereof, and (2) the trade agreement entered into on October 30, 1947 consisting in part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (61 Stat. (Parts 5 and 6) A7, A11, and A2051), particularly Article XIII thereof;

2. WHEREAS under the terms of said proclamation of December 29, 1950 the aggregate quantity of crude petroleum, topped crude petroleum, and fuel oil derived from petroleum including fuel oil known as gas oil, entitled to a reduction in the rate of import tax during the calendar year 1951 up to not in excess of an annual amount equal to 5 per centum of the total quantity of crude petroleum processed in refineries in continental United States during the preceding year was allocated among countries of export on the basis of the proportions of the total imports for consumption in the United States of America supplied during the calendar years 1946 through 1949, which years were representative of the trade in such products;

3. WHEREAS the proportions of total imports into the United States of America of such petroleum and fuel oil supplied by countries of export during the years 1946 through 1949 were as follows:

Venezuela	59.4 per centum
Kingdom of the Netherlands (including its overseas territories)	18.7 per centum
Other foreign countries	21.9 per centum


4. WHEREAS Venezuela has requested the allocation among the countries of export of the quantity of such petroleum and fuel oil entitled to a reduction in duty by virtue of the said Item 3422 of Schedule II annexed to the said definitive trade agreement with Venezuela and that the representative period specified in recital 2 hereof be retained for the calendar year 1952;

5. WHEREAS I find that, taking into account special factors affecting the trade, imports into the United States of America from all countries of such petroleum and fuel oil during the years 1946 through 1949 as specified in recitals 2 and 3 hereof are representative of the trade in such products;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, do proclaim that, of the total aggregate quantity of crude petroleum, topped crude petroleum, and fuel oil derived from petroleum, including fuel oil known as gas oil, entitled, during the calendar year 1952, to a reduction in the rate of import tax by virtue of the said Item 3422 of Schedule II of the said definitive trade agreement with Venezuela, no more than 59.4 per centum shall be the produce or manufacture of the United States of Venezuela, nor more than 18.7 per centum the produce or manufacture of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (including its overseas territories), nor more than 21.9 per centum the produce or manufacture of other foreign countries.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fifth day of January in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-two and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-sixth.



By the President:
 DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State

January 21, 1952

Military Assistance Negotiations With Peru

[Released to the press January 7]

The Departments of State and Defense have announced that negotiations are being initiated on January 7 at Lima with the Government of Peru looking to the conclusion of a bilateral military-assistance agreement. The American Ambassador at Lima, Harold H. Tittman, is being assisted by representatives of the Department of Defense in the negotiations. They are being carried on under the terms of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which authorized a program of military grant aid for Latin America.

It was announced on January 3 at Washington and Rio de Janeiro that similar bilateral negotiations were being initiated between the Governments of Brazil and the United States.¹

New VOA Transmitter for Broadcasts to Far East

[Released to the press January 10]

The Department of State announced on January 10 that bids had been accepted for a 7-million dollar short-wave transmitter plant to be located on the west coast which will give the Voice of America a powerful new signal to carry its message to the Far East.

The exact location of the transmitter has been narrowed down to two sites, both in the State of Washington, and as soon as a final selection is made, contracts will be awarded and immediate construction will begin. The two sites, one located in the Grays Harbor area and the other in the Port Angelis area, both satisfy technical considerations. Location will depend upon a number of cost factors, such as land-clearance expenses. These are now being determined, and the Department expects to reach a decision very soon.

This new plant, and a sister transmitter which will broadcast from the east coast, will be among the most powerful known to exist in the world. They were authorized by Congress as another step in the continuing effort of the U.S. Government to reach people everywhere with the Campaign of Truth.

The transmitter is expected to be completed in 18 months.

¹ BULLETIN of JAN. 14, 1952, p. 47.

Restlessness of Youth: An Asset of Free Societies

by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt¹

Youth is never satisfied with things as they are. Young people in all countries wish to protest against the injustices they see about them. They are not easily fooled by façades of high-sounding words thrown up to conceal bad deeds. They tend to cut through words to the heart of an issue.

When they hear the phrase "free world" they want to know what is meant. They are not satisfied with the way things are going in any part of the world. They see great tasks and hard struggles ahead of them to make a better life. The "free world" cannot be used as a pious phrase to suggest that the people in one part of the world have achieved the full freedom they seek. It is rather a phrase which points the direction toward which the peoples can move and are moving.

In the "free world" the dissatisfaction with things as they are, the striving for ideals and hopes, can find peaceful expression through free institutions. The restlessness of youth is a precious asset of free societies because it always promises regeneration of new vitality from decade to decade.

But where fundamental freedoms and human rights have been suppressed by ruling oligarchies, the youth has no outlet for its struggles against the status quo. Its dynamic urges are channeled through marching clubs, military machines, and propaganda organizations in support of a ruling class which is self-perpetuating.

While such a dictatorship is in the first bloom of its own youth, it can attract the youth by revolutionary words, by pageantry, and by vigorous activities. But tyrants grow old and become increasingly corrupted by arbitrary power.

Their high-sounding words soon stand in bleak contrast to their evil deeds. Their promises are in contrast to their performances. It is my deep

conviction that any society which does not provide freedom for the upcoming generations to work openly and honestly for their aspirations contains within it the seeds of its own destruction.

A tyrant can never tell who is for him or against him because he cannot enter the secret heart of any man.

Youth's Obligations

Youth which is free to work for a better life in the open with the tools of human rights has first of all the obligation to strengthen this freedom and preserve it against all attacks. Young people who are still free to read, to discuss, to question and to seek the truth can find out for themselves how freedom has been bludgeoned in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. They can see for themselves the growing gaps between words and deeds behind the Iron Curtain. They can take direct testimony from those who are fleeing from these slave societies.

They can read for themselves the new laws in the so-called people's democracies which state plainly that anything which is not published as a government hand-out is to be regarded as a state secret, and whoever inquires about such things is guilty of espionage or spying. They can see that these laws make it impossible for the people to find out from the public press or radio anything which the government doesn't want them to know.

Of course, these laws are in themselves proofs of the weakness and fear of the ruling minorities who try to impose them. You and I know that they cannot work for long, because people, and especially young people, have ways of satisfying their hunger for news and truth.

Yet, it is a sad thing to have to suffer long years of darkness, and to have to struggle for a new light of freedom.

You have precious freedoms which you do not have to lose if you will use them in your struggles for a better life and defend them against both the

¹An address made before Les Jeunes Amis de la Liberté at Paris on Dec. 18 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. Mrs. Roosevelt is a U.S. delegate to the sixth session of the General Assembly.

wiles of propagandists and the threats of aggressors.

You know from bitter experience what it is like to live under a dictatorship imposed by an aggressor. You know how precious freedom is by recalling your own experience of the Nazi occupation. And you know, as we have learned in the United States, that freedom can be preserved or won only by the collective effort of free men.

The United Nations is the greatest agency we have through which free men may cooperate to preserve their freedom by collective actions. In the United Nations they can work together for social and economic improvements, and thus strengthen their free societies. In the United Nations they can unite their moral, political, economic, and military strength for collective defense.

The forces against freedom understand that their only hope of imposing dictatorial regimes on new areas of the world lies in the disunity of the free world. Hence, they use every propaganda trick to sow confusion and dissention in the ranks of free peoples. They exploit every feeling of fear and antagonism to divide the free nations, and break the spirit for collective resistance to aggression.

If we are determined not to lose our freedoms, we must use our heads in an active campaign to expose the propaganda designed to divide us, and to promote the unity and cooperation of free people.

At this General Assembly, we are engaged in a great effort to keep the issues clear on the questions of peace and security, in the hope that the Soviet Union will recognize the determined will and clarity of thought of the people of the free world and abandon its policy of substituting propaganda for honest negotiation on real disarmament.

Truth vs. Slogans

We should realize that the truth about complex problems is harder to understand than slogans and emotional appeals that do not meet the issue. Therefore, those who wish to defend their freedoms have a difficult task of education to perform constantly in order to prevent the sloganized propaganda from misleading people.

One of the main issues on which we must all be clear is the question of peace and disarmament. As you know, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States joined in putting before the General Assembly a proposal for the limitation, control, and balanced reduction of all arms and armed forces. This proposal has been ridiculed by Mr. Vyshinsky, who has put forward old Soviet proposals which are simple and beguiling. His main purpose is to confuse the issues of peace and to slow up or stop our actions to build collective security.

The people of this world want peace itself, not mere words in new pacts of peace. They got pacts

of nonaggression from Hitler as his favorite prelude to his blitzkriegs. Now they want deeds, not words.

Let us remember that the making of war itself is an international crime. This was firmly established at the Nürnberg trials. This was accepted by every government which ratified the United Nations Charter. This means that the use of any weapon from a gun to an atomic bomb to attack or to threaten another state is prohibited. Regardless of what weapons may be used, aggression is a crime and is strictly prohibited. We have all signed the paper containing this promise.

But this is not enough. The people want us to translate our promise into performance.

Knowing as they do the terrible destruction that armies, planes, and tanks and guns can cause, they will not accept a mere paper prohibition of one weapon. They want all weapons and all armies put under international control so that war itself is effectively prohibited.

When a nation only wants to prohibit the one weapon that happens to offset its mass armies, its hypocritical purpose is easy to expose. The real test for a nation is its willingness to submit to international control its whole military machine so that it becomes impossible for any nation to launch an aggression.

On the problem of the control and prohibition of the use of atomic energy for weapons, there is a perfect illustration of the need for clarity of thought on the part of free people in order not to be deluded by Soviet tricks of propaganda. Let me try to put the issue in the simplest way.

Suppose I held in my right hand a small block of Uranium 235. It is often called "fissionable material." I am going to call it "the stuff that explodes." This stuff is what people the world over want to have put under international control so it cannot be used in weapons.

Suppose I held in my left hand a piece of paper on which I had written these words: "Cross my heart, I promise never to use the explosive stuff in a bomb if you will agree to let me keep it and use it as I please."

This, in my right hand, is the stuff that threatens destruction. This, in my left hand, is the paper pledge to prohibit the use of it in a bomb.

Now I ask you: Do you want signatures of foreign ministers on this piece of paper, or do you want to have the United Nations control this stuff? Which will be effective in prohibiting its use for destructive purposes?

Would you trust any signature on the paper if the signer refused to give up his possession of the stuff to an international authority?

Only Soviets Say "No"

The United Nations plan calls upon all nations to put this explosive stuff in the hands of an international guard. So far only the Soviets have

said "no." They have insisted on having and controlling the explosive stuff to use for purposes they say are "peaceful."

They just want a new piece of paper which says none of us shall use this explosive stuff in bombs. After we sign such a piece of paper, they say we can probably work out some sort of inspection to find out whether anybody actually has any containers of this stuff labeled "bombs." However, the inspectors will not be allowed to find out how much of this stuff anyone may have in containers labeled "peacetime use."

There is only one simple fact that people have to understand to see that this affords no protection at all. The simple fact is that the stuff that explodes is exactly the same for bombs as for peacetime use.

We say, "Let's have international control of the stuff that goes bang."

They say, "Let's just sign a paper promising not to let the stuff explode."

They ask the people of the world to take their word. We ask that the United Nations take control of the stuff itself so nobody can break his word.

Ah, but we are told that this would prevent countries from doing what they please with this explosive stuff. It certainly would.

The people aren't afraid of words and labels; they are afraid of the stuff that explodes. They aren't so simple as to feel safe if this explosive stuff is nicely labeled "peacetime use only," when they know it can become bombs by just putting it in special boxes marked "A-bombs."

The United Nations plan says each country can have as much of the stuff as it can use up in peaceful projects week by week, month by month. We must have an international authority to guarantee that atomic stuff is being used as each country claims it is being used.

But if each nation has a big warehouse of the atomic stuff, and it is even a secret how much they have, the labels can be changed overnight from "peacetime use" to "bombs." What kind of prohibition is that? Who would feel safe under that kind of control?

Why do the Soviet spokesmen reject the idea of getting what they need as they need it from the United Nations authority? Oh, they claim they couldn't trust the international authority to let them have what they need.

You see, we come back to the question of trust. They want us to trust them on their own word not to change the labels on this explosive stuff and use it in bombs. But they won't trust the authority composed of all nations to allot to them what they need for peacetime use.

In other words, they simply refuse to put this stuff under international control.

The United Nations plan is the best way advocated so far to control the explosive stuff and thus

prohibit its use in weapons. We are ready to consider any other plan that will control the explosive stuff as effectively. But we demand real control of the stuff that explodes.

This is only one illustration of why clear and realistic thinking is required if free men are not to lose their freedom in a fog of confusion and sophistry.

It goes without saying that no man would knowingly give up his freedom for mere promises of food or shelter or employment. Most people realize that these things have to be produced and cannot be promised or merely voted by politicians. The basic question is: Will they be produced by free men or by slaves?

Free men have never deliberately chosen the path of dictatorship. They have never in a free election voted for parties advocating totalitarian doctrines. In a clear contest between the principles of freedom and the doctrine of dictatorship, there is no doubt where the overwhelming majority will stand.

The danger comes from the confusions and disensions which the skilled propagandists of totalitarian parties disseminate—not primarily to win supporters but to divide and weaken their adversaries.

You have the great opportunity of helping this generation to face its problems with responsibility and realism. You can help unite freedom-loving people to prevent aggression and promote peace.

U.S. Modifies Concession On Hatters' Fur

[Released to the press January 7]

The President has signed a proclamation modifying a U.S. tariff concession on certain grades of hatters' fur, effective after the close of business February 8, 1952.¹ The concession was originally made in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade concluded at Geneva in 1947. The action modifying the concession is based on an investigation and report to the President by the U.S. Tariff Commission and is being taken under section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 and in accordance with the provisions of article XIX (the "escape clause") of the General Agreement.

The Presidential proclamation puts into effect higher rates of duty on certain hatters' fur in accordance with the recommendations of the Tariff Commission following the Commission's investigation. This investigation was conducted in response to an application to the Tariff

¹ 17 Fed. Reg. 187.

Commission by representatives of the domestic industry.

The Tariff Commission's report and the President's action apply to "hatters' fur, or furs not on the skin, prepared for hatters' use, including fur skins carotated," described in item 1520 of the U.S. schedule (schedule XX) of the General Agreement. The present rate of duty is 15 percent. The new rate of duty will be 47½ cents per pound, but not less than 15 percent or more than 35 percent ad valorem. Under this new duty the maximum rate of 35 percent will apply to hatters' fur valued at \$1.36 or less; the minimum rate of 15 percent will apply to fur valued at \$3.162½ or more per pound; and the rate of 47½ cents per pound will apply to imports valued between those two prices. Thus there will be no change in the duty on hatters' fur valued at \$3.17 or more per pound. Imports of hatters' fur in recent years have come principally from Belgium, France, and Italy.

The escape clause (article XIX) of the General Agreement requires that any contracting party invoking it shall notify the other parties of its action and shall consult with regard to that action if consultation is desired. If agreement is not reached in such consultations and the action is nevertheless taken, other contracting parties having a substantial interest in exportation of the product may take compensatory action. They may suspend substantially equivalent concessions which they have granted to the contracting party invoking the escape clause, unless such suspension is disapproved by the contracting parties to the General Agreement acting as a group. The required notice in this case has been given to the other contracting parties and consultations have been begun with the countries principally concerned.

In its report to the President the Tariff Commission stated that it "will keep developments with respect to hatters' fur under constant review for the purpose of making whatever recommendation may hereafter be warranted by changed conditions." The White House has released a letter from the President to the Chairman of the Tariff Commission in which the President expresses the opinion that it would be worthwhile to adopt a regular procedure for periodic review and report with respect to every instance of modification of a trade-agreement concession pursuant to an escape clause. The President's letter indicates that while it is essential to safeguard American industry from serious injury, it is also necessary to insure that trade-agreement concessions are not modified for a period longer than required to prevent or remedy the injury. The letter states that retention of the modifications for a longer period could have various adverse effects. It could harm American exporters by encouraging other countries to apply retaliatory withdrawals of concessions. It could injure American consumers by unnecessarily adding to the cost of goods they buy. It could also impede American foreign-policy objectives by denying other friendly nations the opportunity to earn dollars needed for their economic recovery and mutual defense. Accordingly, the President states that he has requested that an Executive order be prepared for his consideration which would call for a full investigation and report by the Tariff Commission on each escape clause modification at periodic intervals in order to determine whether or not the modified concession should be continued.

Copies of the Tariff Commission's report to the President are obtainable from the Commission. The President's letter to the Chairman of the Commission and his proclamation are incorporated in White House press release of January 7.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Collective Security Under Law

*Statement by Benjamin V. Cohen
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly*¹

The Collective Measures Committee has carried out its study of methods to strengthen international peace and security in a constructive spirit.

In these beginning steps we are advancing toward a primary goal of the Charter—the creation of a system of collective security under the United Nations. Progress toward this goal is gaining momentum through the collective action in Korea; through the Uniting for Peace resolution last year; through the labors of the Collective Measures Committee reflected in its report. Our attention now should be directed to ways and means of carrying forward this momentum and of giving to the United Nations the means that it needs to preserve the peace and to insure that its strength and that of individual states will not be used save in the common interest.

The learned and judicious chairman of the Collective Measures Committee, the distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador Muniz, has already explained to us, in his opening statement on December 3, the spirit and purpose with which the Committee approached its work. As he has stated:

The Report of the Collective Measures Committee is not a political proposition for the United Nations General Assembly to act upon. It is essentially an enquiry into methods, procedures and techniques which may guide United Nations action in coordinating and integrating the resources of Member States in the event of a breach of the peace or act of aggression. It should be viewed as a study, an analysis, an exploration of collective means of defense and coordinated action by nations de-

termined to defend the purposes and principles of the Charter and resolved not to recognize the use of force or threat of force as a valid means for the prosecution of political objectives.

The report of the Collective Measures Committee and the resolution before us, which we are cosponsoring and supporting, are based on the proposition that the more effectively the members of the United Nations are organized to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security, the less likely it is that world peace will be challenged.² This report and resolution emphasize the fact that the more promptly the members of the United Nations are prepared to act in defense of peace and law under the Charter, the less likely it is that local aggression will take place or if it occurs will develop into a world war. They make clear that the organization of a system of collective security is not intended to exclude but to facilitate efforts to obtain peaceful settlement in accordance with the Charter. As the chairman of the Committee explained, the report is directed not to the creation of alliances against any state or group of states, but to the organization of peace and law.

The resolution is intended to strengthen the cause of peace and to diminish the chance of war. Furthering the purposes of the Uniting for Peace resolution, this resolution seeks to give practical expression to the will of the people of this earth for collective security under law. It recognizes, as the report itself points out, that “the increasing

¹ Made before Committee I (Political and Security) on Jan. 2 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

² For text of the report, see U.N. doc. A/1891; and for text of resolution see BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1027. For article based on the report, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1951, p. 771.

difficulty of localizing any conflict, and the destruction, suffering and chaos that would result from another world war make the need for an effective system of collective security greater than ever before."

Collective Action in Korea

We all hoped at San Francisco and we all voiced our intentions there that the United Nations should provide an effective system of collective security. Our hopes were long deferred. They took on new life when the United Nations acted in Korea. Despite the sombre tragedy of Korea, resolute United Nations action there showed the United Nations can act if there is the will on the part of its member states and their people to act. Korea has proved that collective action under the Charter can be achieved. The Uniting for Peace resolution reflects the determination of the United Nations that Korea should mark the beginning of the progressive development of an effective collective-security system. We earnestly hope that all members of the United Nations without exception will unite in this development.

Now the report of the Collective Measures Committee opens further avenues toward progress. The report shows how the system can be improved. The draft resolution underscores the first and most important truth about collective security: that states must understand and accept the responsibilities of United Nations members in making collective security work. The United Nations is not a body distinct from its members, but a body which derives its strength from its members; it is a living institution through which the members can concert their actions and combine their strength if, and only if, they have the will and purpose to do so.

This report suggests measures by which we can concert our actions and combine our strength in case of need if that is our will and that is our purpose. The steps envisaged in the resolution will contribute to increased faith and confidence in the United Nations as a security organization. As this faith and confidence grow, there is greater likelihood that states, individually and collectively, can take further steps to strengthen the system of collective security. We are only beginning to realize the great potentialities of the Charter.

In our discussions now, it is natural that Korea will be much in our thoughts. We have already learned much from the Korean experience—much that should be done and much that should not be done. One lesson Korea teaches is that all of us have a stake in collective action. It is a matter of self-interest for each of us to contribute to any such action as much as we can. Only thus can we insure the broadest United Nations character of any operation and make the aggressor feel the full moral force of world action in support of world law. Only thus can we make more nearly equi-

table the sharing of the burden and the sacrifice. Only thus can we—by repelling aggression, whenever or wherever it may occur—deter potential aggression in the future.

We must all hope that an armistice will soon be arranged in Korea. Not only will this end the suffering and bloodshed: It will mark the first time in history that an aggressor has been forced to abandon his adventure by the collective action of an international organization. But the job is not done. The moral and material strength of the United Nations is still needed. If, despite all our efforts, an armistice is refused, renewed military efforts will be essential to meet continued aggression. Even if there is an armistice, members will still face the need of maintaining forces in Korea until peace and security are fully restored; they will also face the need of contributing to the relief and rehabilitation of the Korean people.

Principal Parts of Proposed Resolution

I should now like to comment briefly on some of the principal parts of the proposed resolution.

In the first place the resolution takes note of the report of the Collective Measures Committee and approves its conclusions.

The body of the report deals with the methods and techniques through which the combined action of states can be made most effective against an aggressor. It does not attempt to anticipate specific situations or to lay down inflexible rules to be applied to any and all cases. On the contrary, the guiding principles developed in the report are principles of general application which can be adapted to the circumstances of a specific case. Thus if the United Nations should again have to undertake collective action to meet aggression, its members would not have to start afresh and improvise the necessary steps from the outset, as was done in Korea. The procedures and arrangements outlined in the report are ready for use and can readily be adapted for the coordination of national and international action if they are ever needed.

The conclusions of the report were carefully worked out by the Committee on the basis of its studies. My Government fully supports them, and the resolution before us provides for their adoption by the General Assembly. Indeed the principal operative clauses of the resolution are derived from the conclusions of the report. Most of these are to insure that states take the necessary preparatory action for the great cooperative enterprise of making the United Nations a more effective instrument of collective security. The resolution specifically urges member states to take such further action as is necessary to maintain within their national armed forces elements which can be made promptly available for service as United Nations units. It further urges member states to take such steps as may be necessary to provide assistance and facilities to United Nations forces

engaged in collective military measures undertaken by the Security Council or the General Assembly. It recommends that member states examine their legislation and administrative regulations to insure that they can carry out promptly and effectively United Nations collective measures. It recommends further that they continue the survey of their resources to determine the nature and scope of the assistance they may be able to extend in support of collective security.

The responses from member states to the recommendation in the Uniting for Peace resolution that they maintain elements for United Nations service in their national forces were, on the whole, encouraging. Most members affirmed their support of the principle of that resolution, and their desire to increase their ability to join in United Nations collective measures. But obviously more needs to be done. Many states have not replied. Others have indicated that they are not yet in a position to translate their moral support into material action. But the Uniting for Peace resolution envisaged a continuing program, and hopes cannot be translated into action overnight. What is important is that states recognize their responsibility to be in a position of readiness to contribute to collective action. To assist the states in meeting this responsibility, the proposed resolution also requests the Secretary-General to establish the Panel of Military Experts provided for in the Uniting for Peace resolution so that technical advice regarding the organization of United Nations units may be available to states requesting it.

The proposed resolution also recommends to member states that, in addition to their individual participation in the collective security system of the United Nations, they seek to secure the maximum support from other international arrangements or agencies to which they belong. As the Collective Measures Committee points out in its report,

There should be a mutually supporting relationship between the activities of such arrangements or agencies and the collective measures taken by the United Nations. Thus, collective self-defense and regional arrangements or agencies may, within the limits of their constitutional status, provide effective forces and facilities in their respective areas in order to carry out the Purposes and Principles of the Charter in meeting aggression.

Mutually Supporting Relationship

In his opening address in the plenary debate this year, the U.S. Secretary of State urged that this principle of the mutually supporting relationship be developed.³ It is easy to see why the principle is important. The United Nations system is stronger when it is bolstered by the combined defensive strength of states which have joined together for their own security. These individual states have increased their collective strength by

combining together; their combination adds to the strength of an international organization. It is requisite in today's troubled world, and consonant with the Charter, for states to cooperate in defensive arrangements. So long as these states remain faithful to their obligations under the Charter, such arrangements cannot fail to serve the purposes of the Charter. By relating such arrangements expressly to the universal collective-security system, we help assure that such arrangements will be employed in the service of Charter principles and will not degenerate into mere military alliances, employing force or the threat of force for the achievement of narrow purposes inconsistent with the Charter.

The mutually supporting relationship between local or regional defensive arrangements and the United Nations has been clearly recognized by my Government. This has been particularly true in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 7 of the treaty which is a clear expression of the relationship of the treaty to the Charter provides:

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

In recommending ratification of the treaty to the U.S. Senate, the Committee on Foreign Relations had this to say in its report:

Lest there be any misunderstanding about the relative position of the treaty and the United Nations Charter, article 7 makes clear the overriding character of the Charter with respect to the obligations of the signatories who are also members of the United Nations. This principle is in accordance with the provisions of article 103 of the Charter which stipulates that—

"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."

The provisions of the Charter thus govern, wherever they may be applicable, any activities undertaken under the treaty.

The Charter also bestows upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In the opinion of the committee the treaty rightly recognizes the primary responsibility of the Security Council in this field and makes clear the intent of the signatories not to compete with this responsibility or interfere with it in any way.

This desire not to compete with or impair the authority of the United Nations is applicable not only to the Security Council but to other organs of the United Nations, which, the committee understands, the parties intend to use wherever appropriate.

This was the position of my Government when we ratified the North Atlantic Treaty. It is and has been our position in relation to the Organization of American States and other defensive arrangements, as well as in relation to the North Atlantic Treaty. The 21 American Republics which have combined their strength in the Organization of American States have in similar fashion recognized the mutually supporting relationship

³ BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1951, p. 803.

between that organization and the United Nations, both in the Charter of the Organization of American States and in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Article 1 of the OAS Charter states expressly that "Within the United Nations, the Organization of American States is a regional agency." The Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance provides in article 10 that "None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligation of the High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United Nations," and all of its other provisions reflect its perfect concordance with the U.N. Charter. The Charter provides the purposes and principles governing such arrangements. Thus within the Charter and in accordance with its purposes and principles, such arrangements contribute to the collective security system of the United Nations.

The proposed resolution further invites states not members of the United Nations to take note of the report of the Collective Measures Committee and to consider ways and means in the economic, as well as in other fields, whereby they could contribute most effectively to collective measures undertaken by the United Nations. We have not yet achieved the universality of membership which the Charter envisaged and which most of us are sincerely anxious to see. Until we are able to reach this goal, we can at least invite states, not yet members, to associate themselves with us in contributing to collective measures undertaken under the Charter.

Finally the proposed resolution directs the Collective Measures Committee to continue its studies for another year. The Committee, in our view, has made an admirable beginning. But it has had a difficult and complex assignment. Much work remains to be done. In this connection I might mention one topic in which my Government continues to be interested, and that is the possibility of a United Nations Legion, as suggested by the Secretary-General and others. A truly international force serving only the United Nations is certainly a matter worthy of study. Perhaps the practical difficulties make it difficult of realization in the near future. Still we feel that the matter should be explored.

Universality of Collective Measures Program

My Government, Mr. Chairman, views the first year's work of the Committee with satisfaction, and is proud of having participated in it. In that work we have sought only the goal of the Charter: To strengthen the fabric of the world community and thus to strengthen peace. Collective security is an indispensable element in moving toward that goal.⁴

⁴ For a statement embodying U.S. views on the Report of the Collective Measures Committee, see BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1951, p. 666.

My mind goes back to San Francisco, Mr. Chairman, to the words of a speaker who said:

Only if conditions are created such as will guarantee that no violation of the peace or the threat of such a violation shall go unpunished, and the adoption of necessary punitive measures is not too late, will the organization of security be able to discharge its responsibility for the cause of peace. Thus, the point at issue is the creation of an effective organization to protect the general peace and security of nations for which all the sincere partisans of the peaceful development of nations have long been yearning but which has always had numerous irreconcilable enemies in the camp of the most aggressive imperialists. After innumerable sacrifices born in this war and after suffering and hardships experienced in these past years, the urge of nations for the establishment of such an organization is especially strong.

The speaker was Mr. Molotov, then Foreign Secretary of the Soviet Union. His words are as true today—after the "suffering and hardships experienced in these past years"—as they were when he spoke them. If all the Great Powers would cooperate and use their strength for greater security under the United Nations, the hopes that were dimmed after San Francisco would burn brightly once again.

The program we in this Assembly are embarked on is designed to be universal in application: To meet any aggression from any source. It is not directed against any state or group of states. As far as my Government is concerned, it will always remain that way. We hope the day will come soon when the Soviet Government will see that its best interests are served by the development of an effective United Nations collective-security system, and will lend its active support to the work.

Last year, we all agreed that the Security Council should continue its efforts to provide the United Nations with forces under the provisions of article 43 of the Charter; and that the collective-measures program now under discussion should simultaneously go forward. The report of the Collective Measures Committee makes it clear that, by giving the United Nations the strength it needs under this program, we are not doing anything inconsistent with or in derogation of the prompt application of article 43. On the contrary, the experience of the United Nations and its member states in preparing for collective action and in developing a collective-security system, will affirmatively assist the application of article 43 whenever the time comes that that article can be applied.

Relation of Collective Action and Disarmament

I should like to stress the fact that there is an intimate relationship between a program of collective security and a program of disarmament. The two, by their nature, go hand in hand. In the disarmament field, we look to the day when no nation will have armed forces or armaments which could pose a threat to a neighbor. In the collective-security field, we look to the day when nations

will rely not so much on their own forces as on the United Nations for their security. If states are assured that in case of attack they will not stand alone, they will need fewer arms for their defense. As progress is made in disarmament, the task of building collective security becomes simpler. As collective security is built, the task of disarmament becomes simpler. The two march together. That is why the disarmament resolution adopted by this Committee on December 19 reaffirms the desire that "the United Nations develop an effective collective security system to maintain the peace and that the armed forces and armaments of the world be progressively reduced in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter." The goal is a world order where disputes are settled by peaceful means, where force is used only under international sanction to preserve the peace, and where men turn their energies and resources to peaceful and productive uses. Disarmament and collective security are the two great enterprises for peace that this General Assembly has before it.

There is one other relationship I must mention before I conclude. That is the relationship between collective measures and the pacific settlement of disputes. The pacific settlement of disputes is a chief function of the United Nations; most of our time here in the political field is devoted to it. Some have expressed the fear that

On January 3 Committee I approved the Collective Security Resolutions by a vote of 51 to 5 (Soviet bloc), with 3 abstentions, Argentina, India, and Indonesia.

by emphasizing collective measures we are in some sense detracting from pacific settlement. My Government regards pacific settlement and collective measures as inseparable parts of collective security under the Charter.

As the Secretary-General, in his annual report this year, has said:

I believe that the development of a strong and effective United Nations collective security system combined with renewed efforts at mediation and conciliation, can improve the chances of ameliorating and, in time, settling the great political conflicts that most endanger world peace today. The greater the ability of the United Nations to foil attempts to solve conflicts of national interest by force, the more likely will it be that those conflicts can be settled by negotiation.

These are the thoughts we must keep before us. If we succeed in building an effective security system, there will be less likelihood that an aggressor will risk the penalties bound to follow aggression. The object of effective collective security is to relieve the world of the scourge of war and the fears of war. Thus by building collective security we can release the constructive energies of the world for the constructive tasks of peace and

human welfare. We can open up new possibilities for pacific settlement and the processes of peaceful change. We can proceed to promote human rights, fundamental freedoms, and human well-being and give everyone a stake in the peace worth preserving.

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

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- Measures to Combat the Threat of a New World War and to Strengthen Peace and Friendship among the Nations. A/1962, November 17, 1951. 3 pp. mimeo.
- Coordination Between the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. Administrative budgets of the specialized agencies for 1952, and development of common services. Seventh report of 1951 of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. A/1971, November 24, 1951. 21 pp. mimeo.
- Appointment of an Impartial International Commission Under United Nations Supervision to Carry Out a Simultaneous Investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone of Germany in Order To Determine Whether Existing Conditions There Make it Possible to Hold Genuinely Free Elections Throughout These Areas. A/AC.53/L.13, December 7, 1951. 3 pp. mimeo.
- Information Transmitted by Governments Concerning Prisoners of War. A/AC.46/R.1/Rev.1, December 26, 1951. 19 pp. mimeo.
- Compilation of Replies From Governments on Prisoners of War. A/AC.46/7, December 31, 1951. 19 pp. mimeo.

Economic and Social Council

- Economic Survey for Latin America 1950. Recent trends and developments in the Argentine economy. E/CN.12/217/Add.1, April 9, 1951. 96 pp. mimeo.
- Economic Development of Guatemala. E/CN.12/218/Add.4, May 2, 1951. 63 pp. mimeo. 5 charts.
- Theoretical and Practical Problems of Economic Growth. E/CN.12/221, May 18, 1951. 113 pp. mimeo.
- Economic and Social Council. Twelfth Session, February 20 to March 21, 1951 (Santiago) and Special Meeting on April 13, 1951 (Lake Success). Disposition of agenda items. E/INF/44, June 25, 1951. 126 pp. mimeo.

Secretariat

- Documents Index Note No. 36. Check List to the Economic and Social Council and to its Subsidiary Organs, as of 1 June 1951. 53 pp. mimeo.

¹Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Document Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Status of International Agreements at end of 1951.

The tabulation below, released to the press by the United Nations on January 2, 1952, shows the progress or status of the multilateral conventions and agreements deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with the exception of those relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947) and its Protocols.

[Asterisks added by the editor of the BULLETIN indicate agreements to which the United States is a party.]

Action in 1951

Title	Date	Signatures with reservations	Signatures without reservations	Ratification, acceptance, or accession	Date in force
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of United Nations.*	Feb. 13, 1946— adopted by General Assembly.	In force with regard to each state on deposit of instrument of accession. Total to end of 1951: 38
Constitution of the World Health Organization.*	July 22, 1946— signed at New York.	Panama, Japan, Spain, Germany	Apr. 7, 1948 Membership total (1951): 78
Protocol concerning the Office International d'Hygiène publique.*	July 22, 1946 signed at New York.	Panama	Oct. 20, 1947
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.	Dec. 9, 1946— adopted by the General Assembly.	Denmark, China, Belgium	Jan. 12, 1951
Protocol amending agreement, Conventions, and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs concluded in 1912, 1925, 1931, 1936.*	Dec. 11, 1946— signed at Lake Success.	Haiti, Ecuador	Dec. 11, 1946, between signatories without reservations or states depositing instrument of accession.
Protocol to amend Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of and Traffic in Obscene Publications (1923).	Nov. 12, 1947— signed at Lake Success.	Greece	Nov. 12, 1947 Amendments in force as of Feb. 2, 1950
Protocol to amend conventions of 1921 and 1933 for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, and Women of Full Age.	Nov. 12, 1947— signed at Lake Success.	Greece	Nov. 12, 1947 Amendments in force as of Apr. 24, 1950
Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization.*	Mar. 6, 1948— signed at Geneva.	Ireland, Burma, Belgium	On the day that 21 states, of which 7 shall each have a total of at least 1,000,000 gross tons of shipping, have become parties. Total to end of 1951: 8
Agreement on Most-Favored-Nation Treatment for Areas of Western Germany under Military Occupation.*	Sept. 14, 1948— signed at Geneva.	Oct. 14, 1948
Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the 1931 convention as amended by the 1946 protocol.*	Nov. 19, 1948— signed at Paris.	Indonesia, Belgium.	Dec. 1, 1949

Title	Date	Signatures with reservations	Signatures without reservations	Ratification, acceptance, or accession	Date in force
Protocol amending International Convention Relating to Economic Statistics (1928).	Dec. 9, 1948— signed at Paris.				Dec. 9, 1948 Amendments in force as of October, 9, 1950
Revised General Act on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes.	Apr. 28, 1949— adopted by General Assembly.			Norway	Sept. 20, 1950
Protocol amending International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic (1904) and International Convention for Suppression of White Slave Traffic (1910).*	May 4, 1949— signed at Lake Success.			Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Union of South Africa	May 4, 1949 (amendments in force June 21, 1951, as regards agreement of 1904 and August 14, 1951, as regards convention of 1910)
Protocol to amend the Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications (1910).*	May 4, 1949— signed at Lake Success.			Czechoslovakia, Pakistan.	May 4, 1949 Amendments in force as of March 1, 1950
Agreement providing for the Provisional Application of the Draft International Customs Conventions on Touring, Commercial Road Vehicles, and the International Transport of Goods by Road.	June 16, 1949— signed at Geneva.				January 1, 1950
Protocol relating to International Transport of Goods by Containers under the Tir Carnet Regime (additional protocol to above).	March 11, 1950— signed at Geneva.				March 11, 1950
Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory Materials of an Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Character, with Protocol of signature.*	July 15, 1949— opened for signature at Lake Success.			Syria	90 days after deposit of 10th instrument of acceptance or accession. Total to end of 1951: 5
Memorandum of Understanding Relative to Application to the Western Sectors of Berlin of the Agreement on Most-Favored-Nation Treatment (Above).*	Aug. 13, 1949— signed at Annecy.				Aug. 13, 1949
Convention on Road Traffic.*	Sept. 19, 1949— signed at Geneva.			Monaco	30 days after deposit of 5th instrument of ratification or accession. Total to end of 1951: 4

Title	Date	Signatures with reservations	Signatures without reservations	Ratification, acceptance, or accession	Date in force
Protocol concerning Countries or Territories at Present Occupied.*	Sept. 19, 1949— signed at Geneva.
Protocol on Road Signs and Signals.	Sept. 19, 1949— signed at Geneva.	Monaco	15 months after deposit of 5th instrument of ratification or accession. Total to end of 1951: 2
Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials.	Nov. 22, 1950— signed at Lake Success.	Afghanistan, France, Iran, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden (signatures must be followed by ratification)		Thailand, Yugoslavia, Cambodia	The day the tenth instrument of ratification is deposited. Total to end of 1950: None
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others.	March 21, 1950— signed at Lake Success.	Yugoslavia, Denmark, Brazil (signatures must be followed by ratification).		Yugoslavia	July 25, 1951 90 days after the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification or accession
Convention on the Declaration of Death of Missing Persons.	April 6, 1950— signed at Lake Success.	Guatemala	January 24, 1952. Total to end of 1951: 2
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.	July 28, 1951— signed at Geneva.	Austria, Belgium, Colombia, Denmark, German Federal Republic, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia.	Israel, Norway, Liechtenstein, Sweden, Switzerland.	90 days after the date of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession. Total to end of 1951: None

Korean Armistice Negotiations

Prisoner of War Problems

The following is a statement of principles recommended by the United Nations Command for the exchange of prisoners of war and civilians, which Rear Admiral R. E. Libby, U. S. N., delivered on January 2 at a meeting of the military subcommittee discussing prisoner exchange:

Certain areas of agreement and certain differences of opinion have emerged from our exchange of views on the prisoner of war problem during the period it has been under discussion. Among them are these:

First, your side wants all the POWs to be released following the signing of the armistice. The UNC agrees that this should be done, under an equitable formula.

Second, your side has incorporated into your army many thousands of our soldiers who fell into your hands as POWs. From your standpoint, your action in this connection was in accordance with your traditional policy toward POWs. According to you, the POWs were "re-educated" and "released at the front". The fact that practically all of them later reappeared in your own army is explained away by the alleged fact that they exercised their own volition in joining it.

From our standpoint, the wholesale incorporation of POWs into your army is contrary to the rules of warfare and a violation of the rights of the men concerned, since there is reasonable doubt that the prisoners were free

from duress in making this decision. The rules of warfare and the rights of the individual under those rules require that you refrain from using POWs in work connected with military operations and that you shelter the prisoners from the effect of military operations. Manifestly, these requirements are not met by the incorporating of POWs into your own military forces. It is the view of the UNC that all former soldiers of the Republic of Korea Army who were incorporated into your army through your mechanism of impressment should be returned to their status as POWs.

Moreover, since the outbreak of hostilities on 25 June 1950 your side has conscripted many civilian nationals of the ROK and accepted a certain number of deserters from the ROKA into your army. Both of these practices are consistent with your doctrines of warfare. But both are inconsistent with ours. It is our view that deserters, just as involuntary captives, should be accorded a POW status. The fact that it was with his consent that you placed a deserter from our forces in your army does not change our view that he should now, for the purpose of prisoner of war exchange, be placed in a POW status.

Third, your side takes the position that all POWs should be returned to the side with which they were identified when they were captured. The UNC, on the other hand takes the view that all bona-fide residents of the ROK as of 25 June 1950 are nationals of that state. From that

fact they derive their certain rights and have certain responsibilities which are not set aside by the accident of war. Consequently, the disposition of persons of this category who have been taken into custody by the UNC while fighting against the ROK is a matter for our side alone to determine. It is of no concern whatever to your side.

Fourth, the tides of warfare in Korea have displaced many civilians of both sides from their homes. Sometimes this resulted from accident; sometimes from military necessity. Whatever the cause, many former residents of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are now in the territory under the control of the ROK and vice versa. Your side has alluded frequently during these discussions to the conditions under which these refugees are living. You have expressed the thought that these displaced civilians should be permitted to return to their homes as soon as the armistice is signed. The UNC, too, sees no reason why displaced civilians should not be permitted, if they so desire, to return to their former homes under the armistice agreement. Moreover, it considers that failure on the part of the armistice delegations to insert a permissive provision in the Armistice Agreement would be to disregard the needs of these people unnecessarily.

In determining its opinion on the question of release and exchange of POWs the UNC has accorded recognition to the viewpoints of both sides as set forth above and has developed a proposal which in large measure reconciles them. Our proposal provides for the release of all POWs. In this respect it is consistent with the principle advocated by your side. With respect to repatriation, the UNC proposal differs from yours in that it expressly provides that all repatriation will be voluntary.

To accomplish this the UNC proposal embodies the principle, advanced and advocated by your side, that a soldier from one side who becomes a POW of the other side can, upon his "release," exercise his individual option as to whether he will return to his own side or join the other side. However, the application of this principle of freedom of choice as regards repatriation is extended, under the UNC proposal, to include all personnel who are, or should be eligible for repatriation under concepts held by either side. The proposal extends the right of individual self-determination to former ROKA soldiers who came under your control and who are now in your army. It extends it to the residents of the ROK who were inducted into the Korean People's Army following the outbreak of war. It extends it to nationals of the ROK who fought on your side but who are now in our hands as interned civilians or as POWs. Finally, it extends it to displaced civilians on both sides. Specifically, the principle is applied to the following groups.

A. Approximately 16,000 nationals of the ROK who were identified with the KPA and the Chinese People's Volunteers and whom the UNC now holds as POWs.

B. Approximately 38,000 nationals of the ROK who were incorrectly classified initially as POWs and who have since been reclassified as interned persons.

C. All former ROKA soldiers who came into the custody of the KPA and CPV and who were subsequently incorporated into the KPA.

D. All bona-fide residents of the ROK who were inducted into the KPA subsequent to 25 June 1950.

E. Approximately 11,000 soldiers of the UN and of the ROKA who are now held as POWs by the KPA and the CPV.

F. Approximately 116,000 soldiers of the KPA and CPV who are now held as POWs by the UNC.

G. Foreign civilians interned by either side.

H. All civilians who, on 25 June 1950, were bona-fide residents of the territory under control of one side and who are, at the time of the signing of the armistice, within the territory under control of the other side.

The principle of individual self-determination is a valid principle only if adequate machinery is provided to insure that the decision of the individual is made

freely and without duress. Neither side would be satisfied that persons were accorded an opportunity to express their desires on repatriation freely and without duress if the interviewing process was conducted by or under the unilateral aegis of one of the respective belligerents. Thus, there is a requirement under the UNC proposal for an impartial neutral organ to conduct and supervise the interview in which the individual expresses his choice as regards repatriation.

The fact that both sides have, to a degree, accepted the services of the International Committee of the Red Cross suggests that this agency, which is ideally suited and fully qualified, perform this function. Therefore, the UNC proposal provides that the ICRC be requested to supervise the exercise of the right of individual self-determination as relates to both POWs and displaced civilians. To afford additional assurances to both sides the proposal provides that, in the case of POWs, the individual expression of choice on repatriation will be made at the exchange point or points. There, the process will be under the close scrutiny of representatives of both belligerents.

In order that neither side will gain a military advantage through the exchange of POWs under the Armistice Agreement, the UNC proposal contains a parole feature. Under this provision, POWs repatriated by one side after all POWs held by the other side have been exchanged will be required to give their parole not to bear arms against the captor in the future. The delivery of the POW is subject to acceptance of this agreement by the military authorities of the side to whom the POW is delivered.

The UNC proposal is as follows:

1. POWs who elect repatriation shall be exchanged on a one-for-one basis until one side has exchanged all such POWs held by it.

2. The side which thereafter holds POWs shall repatriate all those POWs who elect to be repatriated in a one-for-one exchange for foreign civilians interned by the other side, and for civilians and other persons of the one side who are at the time of the signing of the armistice in the territory under control of the other side, and who elect to be repatriated. POWs thus exchanged shall be paroled to the opposing force, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual shall not again bear arms against the side releasing him.

3. All POWs not electing repatriation shall be released from POW status and shall be paroled, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual will not again bear arms in the Korean conflict.

4. All remaining civilians of either side who are, at the time of the signing of the armistice, in territory under control of the other side, shall be repatriated if they so elect.

5. In order to insure that the choice regarding repatriation is made without duress, delegates of the ICRC shall be permitted to interview all POWs at the points of exchange, and all civilians of either side who are at the time of the signing of the armistice in territory under the control of the other side.

6. For the purposes of paragraphs 2, 4 and 5, civilians and other persons of either side are defined as those who on 25 June 1950 were bona-fide residents of either ROK or the DPRK.

In summary, the UNC proposal provides for the release of all POWs, including soldiers of the other side who may have been incorporated into the army of the detaining power. Thus, it is consistent with the first principle advanced by your side that all POWs be released. As regards repatriation, it permits freedom of choice on the part of the individual, thus insuring that there will be no forced repatriation against the will of an individual. It provides repatriation not for POWs alone but for those other victims of war, the displaced civilians. All those who desire it are permitted to return to their former

(Continued on page 111)

The United States in the United Nations

[January 10-16, 1952]

General Assembly

The U.S.-U.K.-French resolution establishing a 12-member Disarmament Commission to meet within 30 days and prepare proposals for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic, was adopted by the General Assembly January 11 by a vote of 42-5 (Soviet bloc)-7 (Argentina, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Yemen). The next day, the Assembly, by vote of 51-5 (Soviet bloc)-3 (Argentina, India, Indonesia), approved the 11-power resolution carrying forward the recommendations of the Collective Measures Committee and extending its life for another year.

The proposal for a high-level Security Council meeting whenever the Council feels such a meeting would serve to remove international tension carried 57-0-2 (China, Argentina). Soviet charges of "interference" and "aggression" against provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 were rejected (42-5-11) for the second time. The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee plan for a three-member commission to assist India, Pakistan, and South Africa to settle their dispute concerning the treatment of Indians in South Africa was approved 44 (U.S.)-0-14.

Also adopted were 10 resolutions dealing with various aspects of economic development, including technical assistance, financing, and land reform. The vote on the highly controversial Cuba-Chile-Burma-Egypt-Yugoslavia proposal, requesting the Economic and Social Council to prepare detailed plans for a special fund to make grants and loans to underdeveloped countries was 30-16 (U.S.)-11. Finally, the Assembly adopted 32 (U.S.)-17-5 an amended United States resolution on reservations to multilateral conventions which had been approved by the Legal Committee January 4 following a 3-week debate. *Inter alia*, the approved text recommended that United Nations organs, specialized agencies and states should, in preparing multilateral conventions, consider the insertion therein of provisions relating to the admissibility of reservations. The Secretary-General was requested to continue to perform his depositary functions "without passing on the legal effect" of reservations or objections.

Committee I (Political and Security)—Discussion of the Soviet item on "Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations" was opened in the Committee January 14 with the submission by the U.S.S.R. of a revised text of the 8-part proposal which it introduced at the beginning of the session. The new text provides that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of international control should be put into effect simultaneously, and that the international control organ would have the right to carry out inspection on a "continuing basis" provided it did not interfere in domestic affairs.

The Soviet-bloc countries have tried—with little or no success—to convince the Committee that these provisions represent important "concessions" on the part of the Soviet Union. Meantime, strong support has developed for a U.S.-U.K.-French motion to refer all five parts of the Soviet resolution which deal with disarmament to the newly created Disarmament Commission. United States Representative Ernest Gross stated in support of the three-power proposal:

The testing ground for Soviet good faith—and our own—is and should be the Disarmament Commission. In the Disarmament Commission, we will be prepared not only to submit our own proposals but also to examine with care these and all other proposals submitted by the Soviet Union. We hope that the Soviet Union will reciprocate.

There has been little or no support from non-Soviet sources for the other three parts of the Soviet resolution—declaring participation in the Atlantic Pact illegal, stressing the necessity of an immediate armistice in Korea and withdrawal of foreign troops, and recommending conclusion of a Big Five peace pact.

Ad Hoc Political Committee—A resolution maintaining the Palestine Conciliation Commission in existence to assist the Arab States and Israel in reaching agreement on outstanding Palestine issues was adopted by the Committee January 15 at the conclusion of an 8-day debate. However, so far reaching were the changes made in the original U.S.-U.K.-French-Turkish proposal to continue the Commission that none of the four sponsoring powers was able to vote for the final text.

The main effect of these changes—which were sponsored by Pakistan and Colombia, among

others, and supported by the Arab States—was to enlarge the Commission (which heretofore consisted of the United States, France, and Turkey) to seven members, to stress strict observance of (all) previous Assembly resolutions (whether applicable or not) and to place special emphasis on repatriation and/or compensation of Arab refugees.

The vote on the amended resolution as a whole was 43-13 (Soviet bloc, U.S., France, U.K., Israel, Netherlands, Peru, New Zealand, Uruguay)-2 (Turkey, Sweden).

Committee II (Economic and Financial)—A composite resolution on land reform, which, to quote United States Representative Channing Tobias, "can go a long way . . . to raise the standards of living of the hundreds of millions of people who work the land," was adopted by the Committee January 10 by the overwhelming vote of 43 to nothing with the five Arab States abstaining. The approved text, which was sponsored jointly by the United States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Chile, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, and Thailand, combines the essential features of the original U.S.-Pakistan-Thailand-Brazil text with most of the main provisions of the much narrower Polish proposal.

On January 11 the Committee opened discussion of a U.S.-Chilean resolution designed to pave the way for prompt, concerted, and effective action by governments, intergovernmental organizations and voluntary organizations in the event of emergency famines. Among other things, the two-nation proposal urges governments to promote and facilitate the work of voluntary non-governmental agencies organized to meet famine conditions and to promote agricultural development, and to correlate and integrate the resources and programs of such agencies with their resources and programs.

The importance of voluntary aid was underscored by United States Representative Channing Tobias in his introductory statement. "We believe," he said, "that one of the most rapid and effective ways . . . to meet (famine emergencies) will be by taking the fullest advantage of aid offered on a voluntary basis . . ."

The two sponsors have accepted a number of amendments, most of which had the effect of plac-

ing greater emphasis on long-range measures and chronic problems, and it appears from the debate thus far that the revised text will be adopted by a large majority. Also before the Committee is a Czech resolution—entitled "Deterioration of the position of the working population as a result of the armaments race in a number of countries"—which has been used by the Soviet bloc for another in its series of broad-gauged attacks on United States policies.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)—The Committee January 10 approved a seven-nation resolution authorizing the High Commissioner for Refugees to issue an appeal for funds for emergency aid to the most needy among the 1,500,000-odd refugees within his mandate. The vote was 39-5 (Soviet bloc)-6 (U.S.). In explaining the United States abstention, Mrs. Roosevelt made it clear that there was "no prospect" that the United States Government would contribute to the proposed fund. The approved resolution also appeals to states to give refugees within the mandate of the High Commissioner every possible opportunity to benefit from migration programs.

Committee IV (Trusteeship)—During the week, the Committee completed action on a number of resolutions arising out of the report of the Trusteeship Council and other agenda items dealing with the administration of trust territories. These included (1) an amended Haiti-India-Lebanon-Philippines-Yemen resolution—adopted 38-7 (U.K., France)-6 (U.S.)—which, *inter alia* invites administering authorities to submit information on the "period of time in which it is expected that the trust territory shall attain the objective of self-government or independence"; (2) an amended Brazil-France text—approved 45 (U.S.)-0-5—following up previous Assembly recommendations for the "complete abolition" of corporal punishment in trust territories; and (3) an amended India-Philippines proposal—passed 33-7 (U.S.)-7—requesting the Trusteeship Council to prepare for the next Assembly session a special report analyzing each of the administrative unions to which a trust territory is a party, and setting up a special Assembly committee to make a preliminary examination of the Council's report.

Delegates Named to Child Protection Institute

The Department of State announced on January 12 that the President has appointed Martha M. Eliot, M.D., Chief, Children's Bureau, Social Security Administration, Federal Security Agency, as U.S. technical delegate, and Elisabeth Shirley Enochs, Chief, International Technical Missions, Office of the Commissioner for Social Security, Federal Security Agency, as alternate U.S. technical delegate on the Directing Council of the American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood (AIIPC). Both appointments are for 3-year terms.

Formally established in 1927, the American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood is an intergovernmental body which serves as a center of action, information, advice, documentation, and study on all questions relating to child life and welfare in the Americas. The Institute conducts bibliographical research, collects information by correspondence, and, on the request of member states, the 21 American Republics, undertakes field studies and gives advisory service. United States participation in the Institute was authorized by an act of Congress, approved May 3, 1928. Meetings of the Directing Council, which serves as the governing body of the Institute, are held annually at Montevideo, Uruguay. The last session was held November 30-December 1, 1951.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

International Trade Classification

The Department of State has announced that a meeting of the Working Party on Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) will convene at Bangkok, Thailand, January 7-12, 1952. Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, and U.S. representative on the Statistical Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (Ecosoc), will serve as U.S. representative to the meeting. Flourney H. Coles, Jr., Special Technical Economic Mission, Bangkok, will serve as an adviser.

The principal agenda item of the forthcoming meeting is consideration of uniform methods for the adoption and use of the SITC by countries of the region and possible adaptations of the Classification to meet special regional needs. The findings of the meeting will be submitted in a report to ECAFE.

In July 1950, Ecosoc approved the SITC, which was designed to replace the old League of Nations Minimum List of Commodities for International Trade Statistics as a basis for systematic analysis of world trade and as a common basis for the reporting of trade statistics to international agencies. Ecosoc recommended that all governments make use of the Standard Classification, either by adopting it, with such modifications as might be necessary to meet national requirements, as a basis for compilation of data on imports and exports; or by rearranging their statistical data in accordance with the SITC for purposes of international comparison. The wide acceptance of this recommendation by countries important in world trade, together with the coordinated efforts of regional groups of experts, such as the forthcoming Working Party meeting at Bangkok, have greatly facilitated the collection and analysis of comparable figures on the foreign trade of different countries.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointment of Officer

On December 14 the President announced the recess appointment of Edward J. Sparks of New York to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Bolivia.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Jan. 7-12, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN.

No.	Date	Subject
1099	12/18	Answer to attack on passport operations
1123	12/29	Appointment of Pt. 4 special consultant
7	1/5	VOA to supply scripts to U.S. public
10*	1/7	Visitors to U.S.
11	1/7	Venezuelan tariff on crude oil
12	1/7	Military assistance to Peru
13	1/7	Higher duty on batters' fur
14	1/7	Working Party Meeting (ECAFE)
15*	1/8	Anniversary of Saudi Arabia
16	1/9	Acheson: Replies to U.S.S.R. lend-lease
17	1/9	Note: Prisoners of war
18	1/9	Dulles: Free world unity
19	1/9	Investigation of prisoners of war
20	1/9	Point 4 Director to Iraq (rewrite)
21	1/9	Visit of Netherlands Premier (rewrite)
22	1/10	New VOA transmitter
23*	1/10	Spruance: Ambassador to Philippines
24*	1/11	Visitor to U.S.
25*	1/11	Acheson: Death of Gen. de Lattre
26	1/11	Acheson: Progress of Schuman Plan
27	1/12	Childhood Protection Institute

THE DEPARTMENT

VOA To Supply Scripts to U.S. Public

[Released to the press January 5]

To satisfy a long-felt demand of American broadcasters and the listening public for background material on the activities of the Voice of America, a transcribed dramatic series has been prepared expressly for domestic radio stations. Availability of the programs as a public service and at no charge to stations was announced on January 5 at Washington, by George E. Hughes, Vice President of the Associated Broadcasters, Inc., and William A. Wood, Chief of Radio, Department of State.

Based upon actual files of the State Department, the series consists of 13 quarter-hour programs, each dramatizing a different phase of the international broadcasting organization.

The Voice, in its campaign of truth, is fighting a verbal battle for the minds of men. This series of dramatizations portrays the techniques used by the Voice in its broadcasts to free nations and Iron Curtain areas, as well as the extent of coverage and effectiveness.

Entitled "Your Voice of America," the series is recorded in Hollywood and features Gerald Mohr, motion-picture actor currently under contract to Universal-International films, plus a host of professional radio talent. Programs are produced by Will H. Voeller, written by Robert C. Vinson, and directed by Frank K. Danzig with music by Del Castillio and his orchestra. The series utilizes a documentary format with Mohr as narrator. It is designed to provide U.S. broadcasters with a suitable series telling the story of the Government's international broadcast operation.

"Your Voice of America" is contributed by Wesley I. Dunn, Chairman of the Facilities Group of the Radio Advisory Committee to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, and president of the Associated Broadcasters, Inc., of San Francisco, Calif., which is producing, recording, processing, and distributing the series.

Radio stations within the continental limits of the United States can obtain the series without charge by writing The Associated Broadcasters, Inc., Box 87, Hollywood, Calif. Programs 1 through 8 will be mailed by January 15, with the remaining five chapters in the series available immediately thereafter.

Following is a synopsis of the 13 programs, outlining topics and types of material used:

No. 1—Why the Voice Speaks

Introductory program on the work of the Voice of America, with examples of absurd Soviet lies and effectiveness of the Voice program.

No. 2—Cardinal Mindszenty Story

Dramatized history of the trial of the Hungarian Cardinal and one way in which the Voice of America told the truth about Red persecution of this prelate.

No. 3—Money Talks

A dramatic story of how the Voice of America forced the Hungarian Communist Government to delay the issuance of new "forint" banknotes for 7 months.

No. 4—As One Free Nation to Another

Includes many of the unusual approaches used by the Voice of America in broadcasting to a free nation, this time Italy.

No. 5—Escape to Freedom

The story of Madam Kasenkina, the Russian school teacher who leaped from the third floor of the Soviet Consulate in New York and now lives in peace in this country. Amazing account of what the Voice of America broadcast within 5 minutes after the incident occurred. Whole story heard on the streets of Moscow within 1 hour.

No. 6—The Uninvited Guest

The unwelcome reception given to the 28-man Rumanian delegation that visited Bulgaria for May Day celebrations June, 1950. . . . four of them never returned! And despite Bulgarian efforts to hush the story . . . the Voice of America learned of it, broadcast it, and the people heard. . . .!

No. 7—Two Weeks in August

Dramatized story of how the Voice of America invited the young Red delegates to the August 1951 Berlin Youth Festival to visit the West zone of Berlin and see the free world for themselves. The youth came. . . .!

No. 8—The President Speaks

How the Voice of America beams the words of the President to the four corners of the world.

Answer To Attack on Passport Operations

[Released to the press December 18]

Ruth B. Shipley, Chief of the Passport Division, Department of State, on December 18 took sharp exception to a statement released by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate that passports were being granted to known Communist agents. Mrs. Shipley—recalling that during her more than 23 years as Chief of the Passport Division, Congress had time and again commended not only the efficiency of the Division but also its scrupulous adherence to both the spirit and letter of all laws governing passports—said that she was at a loss to understand the subcommittee's unjustified attack on the passport operation. She added that Senator McCarran, chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee, had recently congratulated her and praised the work of the Division in no uncertain terms.

Mrs. Shipley characterized the subcommittee's allegations that the Department had issued passports to known Communists and to people known to have Communist connections as "preposterous." She made the following statement:

During 1951 the Passport Division issued and renewed considerably more than a quarter of a million passports to American citizens who were going abroad for various purposes. Any system of investigations or checkings which would have disclosed the adverse information regarding the 18 persons mentioned would have resulted in the delay of sailings of thousands of reputable American citizens and completely disorganized various transportation systems.

The applications of the 18 persons mentioned by Senator McCarran came in during the time the Passport Division was receiving 1,500 to 2,000 applications each day. No information available to the Passport Division or contained in the applications indicated that the applicants were Communists or that they were going to the Soviet Union.

The Passport Division is primarily an office which renders a valuable and necessary service to citizens of the United States who travel abroad. The bulk of the American traveling public are reputable, law-abiding citizens and are probably above the average in education, intelligence, and stability. The Department does not feel in view of its experience over many years that it is warranted in treating this large group of citizens as potentially subversive by establishing at this time procedures which would delay and hinder *bona fide* travelers in an effort to detect cases such as those mentioned by the Subcommittee. Even the most simple form of checkup would delay the issue of passports from 2 weeks to 3 months and would require considerable additional personnel, for which no appropriation has been made.

During the period from February 1951 to the present time the Department in endeavoring to carry out the spirit of the McCarran Act has refused or withdrawn passport facilities in hundreds of cases. Included in the "withdrawals" are the 18 in the statement attributed to Senator McCarran.

It is of course as difficult to prevent the issue of passports upon the basis of false application as it is to prevent the commission of other crimes which involve fraud and perjury. Whenever such fraud is discovered the matter of prosecution is taken up promptly with the appropriate authorities. A number of leading Communists and Soviet agents have been convicted of passport violations including Earl Browder, William Weiner, Nicholas Dozenberg, Harry Kweit, Charles Krumbein, Pat Devine, Ossip Garbor, Edward Blatt, and Aaron Sharfin. At the present time it is not possible to prosecute a Communist who obtains a passport without fraud or uses a passport since the penal provisions of the McCarran Act are not effective. When such provisions become effective it is believed that they will have a deterring effect upon Communists wishing to travel abroad.

Stanley Andrews Appointed Special Consultant for Point 4

[Released to the press December 29]

Secretary Acheson announced on December 29 that Stanley Andrews, Director of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, U.S. Department of Agriculture, has been appointed Special Consultant to the Secretary of State to assist in the development and execution of the Point Four Program of technical cooperation in underdeveloped areas. Mr. Andrews is taking temporary leave from the Department of Agriculture to accept this assignment and will leave at once to complete the mission on which Henry G. Bennett, Technical

Cooperation Administrator, was engaged at the time of his death in an airplane crash near Tehran.

In making the announcement, Secretary Acheson pointed out that Mr. Andrews is thoroughly familiar with the Point Four Program and was one of Mr. Bennett's closest advisers.

Jonathan B. Bingham, Deputy Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration, who has served as Acting Administrator since Mr. Bennett's departure from the United States, will continue in that capacity.

The trip begun by Mr. Bennett was for the purpose of inspecting Point Four programs in operation and negotiating agreements with countries in which programs are not yet under way.

The Point Four Program, which has been in operation a little over a year in the Near East and South Asia, now has American technicians in 11 countries of those areas on a variety of projects, mainly in the fields of agriculture, natural-resources development, health and sanitation, and education. More than 200 trainees and leaders from these countries are studying in the United States or at regional training centers under Point Four training grants.

Corrections

In the BULLETIN of December 24, 1951, p. 1018, the first sentence of footnote No. 1 should read: "Made before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee of the General Assembly on Dec. 5 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date."

In the BULLETIN of December 31, 1951, p. 1058, the end of the second sentence should read ". . . enacted by the Federal Congress, Executive Orders, Regulations, and decisions of the Federal Courts."

In the same BULLETIN, p. 1064, the continued head should read "Roosevelt—*Continued from page 1059.*"

Armistice Negotiations—Continued from page 106.

homes. Finally the proposal provides for a supervisory organ to interview the persons involved to insure that, whatever their choice, such choice will be made freely and without duress.

In advocating your proposal of an all-for-all exchange of prisoners of war your side has many times asked the question, "What could be fairer than the release and repatriation of all prisoners of war following the armistice?" Today, in the proposal, the UNC gives you the answer to that question. The release of all persons who are or should be classified as prisoners of war, and the repatriation of those who desire to be repatriated, is fairer than the release and forced repatriation of all prisoners of war. Moreover, it is fairer to permit displaced civilians who so desire to return to their former homes, under the Armistice Agreement, than to neglect their interests in that agreement.

We ask your earnest consideration and early acceptance of this proposal.

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The Department of State

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January 28, 1955

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Mutual Assistance Problems Discussed by U.S. and U.K.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL ISSUE COMMUNIQUÉS

[Released to the press by the White House January 18]

SUPPLY OF SCARCE MATERIALS

In their communiqué of January 9, 1952, the President and the Prime Minister announced that they had considered how the United States and the United Kingdom could best help each other in the supply of scarce materials and that discussions were continuing.¹

These discussions have now been completed. Agreements have been reached which, taken together within a framework of mutual assistance, will make it possible for the two countries to carry out more effectively their common task of contributing to the strength and security of the free world. The United States will help the United Kingdom to meet its most serious shortage, steel, and the United Kingdom will help alleviate one of the United States most serious shortages, aluminum, and will also assist the United States in getting supplies of tin.

The United Kingdom requirements of steel for 1952 were reviewed in detail. On the basis of these requirements, and after allowing for supplies of foreign ore to be diverted to the United Kingdom by arrangement between the United Kingdom and the United States steel industry, the United States undertook to make available to the United Kingdom for purchase during 1952 steel (including scrap and pig iron now earmarked for the United States from overseas sources) to a total figure of 1,000,000 long tons. This includes the steel allocated for the first quarter in the previously announced arrangement. About 80 per cent of the amount supplied will be steel, mostly in the form of ingots. This represents less than one per cent of the total United States production. It has been agreed that the United States may vary the proportions between the steel products and the steel making materials to be supplied.

This will be of the greatest assistance to the United Kingdom in meeting its defense and essential civilian needs, and will help the United Kingdom industry to take care of some of the essential needs of other friendly countries for structural steel and plate steel, thereby relieving the pressure on overburdened United States facilities.

In the absence of a change in the present supply situation, it is not anticipated that any of the steel to be furnished to the United Kingdom will be supplied in structural or plate or in shapes that

are in serious short supply in the United States. Most of the steel will be supplied in the last half of 1952 when a portion of the United States steel expansion program will have been completed. Deliveries to the United Kingdom will be confined to those items in reasonably free supply.

The steel shipments to Britain will be so arranged as to time and types that no cut will be required in steel allocations already made to United States industry for the first and second quarters of 1952.

United States requirements for aluminum and tin were also reviewed. On the basis of these requirements, the United Kingdom agreed to make available to the United States a total of 55,100,000 pounds of aluminum. This represents an increase, to be spread evenly over the last three quarters of 1952, of 33,060,000 pounds of aluminum over the arrangements made recently with the United States by the United Kingdom. This quantity is equivalent to about 10 percent of the total United Kingdom annual supply. The United States has agreed that it will replace this aluminum by the middle of 1953. It is expected that much of the United States aluminum expansion program will be in operation by that time.

The United Kingdom has agreed to make available to the United States 20,000 long tons of tin during 1952 at \$1.18 per pound, f.o.b. Singapore. Both Governments agreed that it would be desirable if more normal arrangements for the conduct of the tin trade could be established as soon as possible.

These arrangements will enable the United States to more nearly meet its essential tin plate requirements and improve its aluminum allocations to defense and civilian industries.

It was noted that both countries would continue to use their best efforts to expand and accelerate their programs for increasing production of scarce materials, both at home and overseas.

The two Governments also reviewed and expressed satisfaction with the progress which has been made through the International Materials Conference toward effecting equitable distribution of key raw materials.

These arrangements should make a valuable contribution to the defense programs of the two countries, and increase their ability to meet the acute shortage in the free world of steel, tin plate, and other strategic materials.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 21, 1952, p. 83.

NATO OPERATIONS IN EASTERN ATLANTIC

The President and the Prime Minister with their advisors have had several discussions relating to the arrangements about the Atlantic Command recommended by NATO and accepted by the late Government of the United Kingdom. As a result of their discussions they agreed that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government would recommend to NATO certain alterations in the arrangements designed to extend the United Kingdom home command to the 100 fathom line. They also agreed on the desirability of cer-

tain changes which would provide greater flexibility for the control of operations in the Eastern Atlantic. These changes however do not go the full way to meet the Prime Minister's objections to the original arrangements. Nevertheless the Prime Minister, while not withdrawing his objections, expressed his readiness to allow the appointment of a Supreme Commander to go forward in order that a command structure may be created and enabled to proceed with the necessary planning in the Atlantic area. He reserved the right to bring forward modifications for the consideration of NATO, if he so desired, at a later stage.

Close Anglo-American Unity Urged for Defense of Global Freedoms

Address by the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, to the Congress¹

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress, this is the third time it has been my fortune to address the Congress of the United States upon our joint affairs. I am honored indeed by these experiences, which I believe are unique for one who is not an American citizen.

It is also of great value to me on again becoming the head of His Majesty's Government to come over here and take counsel with many trusted friends and comrades of former anxious days.

There is a lot for us to talk about together, so that we can understand each other's difficulties, feelings, and thoughts, and do our best for the common cause. Let us therefore survey the field this afternoon with cool eyes, undimmed by hate or passion, guided by righteous inspiration and not uncheered by hope.

I have not come here to ask you for money—to ask you for money to make living more comfortable or easier for us in Britain. Our standards of life are our own business, and we can only keep our self-respect and independence by looking after them ourselves.

During the war we bore our share of the burden and fought from first to last unconquered, and for a while alone, to the utmost limit of our resources.

Your majestic obliteration of all you gave us under lend-lease will never be forgotten by this generation of Britons or by history.

Dollar Exchange and Sterling Area Finance

After the war, unwisely as I contended and certainly contrary to American advice, we accepted as normal debts nearly 4 thousand million pounds

sterling of claims by countries we had protected from invasion or had otherwise aided, instead of making counterclaims which would at least have reduced the bill to reasonable proportions.

The thousand-million loan we borrowed from you in 1946 and which we are now repaying was spent not on ourselves, but mainly in helping others. In all since the war, as the late Government affirmed, we have lent or given to European or Asiatic countries 30 hundred-million pounds in the form of unrequited exports. This, added to the cost of turning over our industry from war to peace and rebuilding homes shattered by bombardment, was more than we could manage without an undue strain upon our life energies from which we shall require both time and self-discipline to recover.

Why do I say all this? Not to compare our financial resources with yours, for we are but a third of your numbers and have much less than a third of your wealth; not to claim praise or reward but to convince you of our native and enduring strength and that our true position is not to be judged by the present state of the dollar exchange or by sterling area finance.

Our production is half as great again as it was before the war; our exports are up by two-thirds; recovery while being retarded has been continuous and we are determined that it shall go on.

As I said at Fulton, in Missouri, 6 years ago, under the auspices of President Truman, let no man underrate the abiding power of the British Commonwealth and Empire. Do not suppose we shall not come through these dark years of privation as we came through the glorious years of agony, or that half a century from now you will not see 70 or 80 millions of Britons spread about

¹ Made on Jan. 17 and reprinted from *Cong. Rec.* of Jan. 17, 1952, p. 279.

the world and united in defense of our traditions and way of life and of the world causes which you and we espouse.

If the population of the English-speaking commonwealths be added to that of the United States we will all have such cooperation with all that such cooperation implies, in the air, on the sea, and all over the globe, and in science, industry and moral force, there will be no quivering precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. I am very glad to be able to say the same to you here today.

The Problem of New Rearmament

It is upon this basis of recovery in spite of burdens, that the formidable problem of the new rearmament has fallen upon us.

It is the policy of the United States to help forward in many countries the process of rearmament. In this we who contribute ourselves two-thirds as much as the rest of Europe put together require your aid if we are to realize in good time the very high level of military strength which the Labor government boldly aimed at and to which they committed us. It is for you to judge to what extent the United States interests are involved. Whether you aid us much or little, we shall continue to do our utmost in the common cause. But, Members of the Congress, our contribution will perforce be limited by our own physical resources and thus the combined strength of our two countries and also of the free world will be somewhat less than it might be.

That is why I have come here to ask, not for gold but for steel, not for favors but equipment, and that is why many of our requests have been so well and generously met.

At this point I will venture, if I may, to make a digression. After a lot of experience I have learned that it is not a good thing to dabble in the internal politics of another country. It is hard enough to understand one's own. But I will tell you something about our British politics all the same.

In our island we indulge from time to time in having elections. I believe you sometimes have them over here. We have had a couple in 20 months, which is quite a lot and quite enough for the time being. We now look forward to a steady period of administration in accordance with the mandate we have received. Like you we tend to work on the two-party system. The differences between parties on our side of the Atlantic, and perhaps elsewhere between British parties, are often less than they appear to outsiders. In modern Britain the dispute is between a form of socialism which has hitherto respected political liberty on the one hand, and, on the other, free enterprise regulated by law and custom. These two systems of thought, whose differences, I assure you, give plenty of room for argument between political op-

ponents, fortunately overlap quite a lot in practice.

Our complicated society would be deeply injured if we did not practice and develop what is called in the United States the bipartisan habit of mind, which divides, so far as possible, what is done to make a party win and bear in their turn the responsibility of office and what is done to make the nation live and serve high causes.

I hope here, Members of Congress, you will allow me to pay a tribute to the late Senator Vandenberg. I had the honor to meet him on several occasions. His final message in these anxious years gave the feeling that in this period of United States leadership and responsibility all great Americans should work together for all the things that matter most. That, at least, is the spirit which we shall try to maintain among British leaders in our own country and that was the spirit which alone enabled us to survive the perils of the late war.

But now let me return to my theme of the many changes that have taken place since I was last here. There is a jocular saying: To improve is to change, to be perfect is to have changed often. I had to use that once or twice in my long career; but if that were true, everyone ought to be getting on very well. The changes that have happened since I last spoke to Congress are indeed astounding. It is hard to believe we are living in the same world. Former allies have become foes; former foes have become allies; conquered countries have been liberated; liberated nations have been enslaved by communism. Russia, 8 years ago our brave ally, has cast away the admiration and good will her soldiers had gained for her by their valiant defense of their own country. It is not the fault of the Western Powers if an immense gulf has opened between us. It took a long succession of deliberate and unceasing words and acts of hostility to convince our peoples, as they are now convinced, that they have another tremendous danger to face and that they are now confronted with a new form of tyranny and aggression as dangerous and as hateful as that which we overthrew.

Communist China, Korea, and Japan

When I visited Washington during the war I used to be told that China would be one of the Big Four Powers among the nations and most friendly to the United States. I was always a bit skeptical; and I think it is now generally admitted that this hopeful dream has not yet come true, but I am by no means sure that China will remain for generations in the Communist group. The Chinese said of themselves several thousand years ago: "China is a sea that salts all the waters that flow into it." There is another Chinese saying about their country which is much more modern. It dates only from the fourth century. This is the saying: "The tail of China is large and will not be wagged." I like that one.

The British democracy approves the principle of movable party heads and unwaggable national tails. It is due to the working of these important forces that I have the honor to be addressing you at this moment. You have rightly been resolute, Members of the Congress, in confronting Chinese Communist aggression. We take our stand at your side. We are grateful to the United States for bearing nine-tenths or more of the burden in Korea which the United Nations have morally assumed. I am very glad, but whatever diplomatic divergencies there may be from time to time about procedure, you do not allow the Chinese anti-Communists on Formosa to be invaded and massacred from the mainland. We welcome your patience in the armistice negotiations and our two countries are agreed that if the truce we seek is reached only to be broken, our response will be prompt, resolute, and effective. What I have learned over here convinces me that British and United States policy in the Far East will be marked by increasing harmony. I can assure you that our British hearts go out in sympathy to the families of the 100,000 Americans who have given their lives or shed their blood in Korea. We also suffer these pangs for the loss of our own men there, and not only there, but in other parts of Asia as well under the attack by the same enemy.

Whatever course events in Korea may take in the near future, and prophecy will be difficult, much too difficult for me to embark upon it. I am sure our soldiers and your soldiers have not made their sacrifice in vain.

The cause of world law has found strong and invaluable defense, and the foundations of the world instruments for preserving peace, justice, and freedom among the nations have been deepened and strengthened. They stand now not on paper but on rock.

Moreover, the action which President Truman took in your name and with your full support in his stroke against aggression in Korea has produced consequences far beyond Korea, consequences which may well affect the destiny of mankind. The vast process of American rearmament, in which the British Commonwealth and Empire and the growing power of united Europe will play their part to the utmost of their strength, this vast process has already altered the balance of the world and may well, if we all persevere steadfastly and loyally together, avert the danger of a third world war or the horror of defeat and subjugation should one come upon us.

Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, I hope the mourning families throughout the great Republic will find some comfort and some pride in these thoughts.

Another extraordinary change has taken place in the Far East since I last addressed you. Peace has been made with Japan. There, indeed, I congratulate you upon the policy which, in wise and skillful hands, has brought the Japanese Nation

from the woe and shame of defeat in their wicked war back to that association with the western democracies upon which the revival of their traditions, dignity, and happiness can alone be regained and the stability of the Far East assured.

Southeast Asia

In the anxious and confused expanses of Southeast Asia, there is another sphere where our aims and interests and those of the French, who are fighting bravely at heavy cost to their strength in Europe, may find a fertile field for agreement on policy. I feel sure that the conversations we have had between our two foreign Secretaries, Mr. Eden and Mr. Acheson, men whose names and experience are outstanding throughout the world, will help to place the problems of Southeast Asia in their right setting.

It would not be helpful to the common cause—for our evils all spring from one center—if an effective truce in Korea led only to a transference of Communist aggression to these other fields. Our problems will not be solved unless they are steadily viewed and acted upon as a whole in their integrity as a whole.

The Middle East

In the Middle East enormous changes have also taken place since I was last in power in my own country. When the war ended, the western nations were respected and predominant throughout these ancient lands, and there were quite a lot of people who had a good word to say about Great Britain. Today it is a somber and confusing scene. Yet there is still sunshine as well as shadow. From the days of the Balfour declaration I have desired that the Jews should have a national home, and I have worked for that end. I rejoice to pay my tribute here to the achievements of those who have founded the Israelite State, who have defended themselves with tenacity, and who offer asylum to great numbers of Jewish refugees.

I hope that with their aid they may convert deserts into gardens. But if they are to enjoy peace and prosperity, they must strive to renew and preserve their friendly relations with the Arab world, without which widespread misery might swallow all.

Britain's power to influence the fortunes of the Middle East and guard it from aggression is far less today, now that we have laid aside our imperial responsibility for India and its armies. It is no longer for us alone to bear the whole burden of maintaining the freedom of the famous waterway of the Suez Canal. That has become an international rather than a national responsibility. I welcome the statesmanlike conception of a Four-Power approach toward Egypt announced by the late British Government, in which Britain, United States, France, and Turkey may share with Egypt

in the protection of the world interest involved among which Egypt's own interests are paramount.

Such a policy is urgent. Britain is maintaining over 50,000 troops in the Suez Canal zone who again might be well employed elsewhere—not for national vainglory or self-seeking advantage, but in the common interest of all nations. We do not seek to be masters of Egypt. We are there only as the servants and guardians of the commerce of the world. It would enormously aid us in our task if even token forces of the other partners in the Four Power proposal were stationed in the canal zone as a symbol of the unity of purpose which inspires us. I believe it is no exaggeration to state that such token forces would probably bring into harmony all that movement by which the Four Power policy may be made to play a decisive part by peaceful measures and bring to an end the wide disorders of the Middle East, in which, let me assure you, there lurk dangers not less great than those which the United States has stemmed in Korea.

Europe

Now I come to Europe where the greatest of all our problems and dangers lie. I have long worked for the cause of a united Europe, and even of a United States of Europe, which would enable that continent, the source of so much of our culture, ancient and modern, and the parent of the New World, to resume and revive its former splendors. It is my sure hope and conviction that European unity will be achieved and that it will not ultimately be limited only to the countries at present composing Western Europe. I said at Zurich in 1946 that France should take Germany by the hand and lead her back into the family of nations, and thus end the thousand-year quarrel which has torn Europe to pieces, and finally plunged the whole world twice over into slaughter and havoc. Real and rapid progress is being made toward European unity, and it is both the duty and the policy of both Great Britain and our Commonwealth, and of the United States, to do our utmost—all of us—to help and speed it. As a forerunner of a united Europe there is the European army which could never achieve its necessary strength without the inclusion of Germany. If this necessary and urgent object is being achieved by the fusion of the forces of the continental nations outside what I have called, in former times, the Iron Curtain, that great operation deserves our fullest support. But, Members of Congress, fusion is not the only way in which the defense of Western Europe can be built. The system of a grand alliance, such as has been created by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is no bar to the fusion of as many of its members as wish for this closer unity; and the United States, British, and Canadian troops will stand, indeed are already

standing, shoulder to shoulder, with their European comrades in defense of the civilization and freedom of the west. We stand together under General Eisenhower to defend the common cause from violent aggression. What matters most is not the form of fusion or melding—a word I learned over here—but the numbers of divisions and of armored divisions, and the power of the air forces and their weapons available for unified action under the supreme commander.

We in Britain have denuded our island of military formations to an extent I have never seen before; and I cannot accept the slightest reproach from any quarter that we are not doing our full duty, because the British Commonwealth of Nations, spread all over the world, is not prepared to become a state or group of states in any continental Federal system on either side of the Atlantic.

The sooner strong enough forces can be assembled in Europe under united command, the more effective will be the deterrents against a third world war. The sooner also will our sense of security and the fact of our security be seen to reside in valiant, resolute, and well-armed manhood, rather than in the awful secrets which science has wrested from nature. These are at present, it must be recognized, the secrets, the supreme deterrent against a third world war and the most effective guarantee of victory in it.

If I may say this, Members of the Congress, be careful above all things, therefore, not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure, and more than sure, that other means of preserving peace are in your hands.

It is my belief that by accumulating deterrents of all kinds against aggression we shall in fact ward off the fearful catastrophe, the fears of which darken the life and mar the progress of all the peoples of the globe. We must persevere steadfastly and faithfully in the task unto which, under the United States' leadership, we have solemnly bound ourselves. Any weakening of our purpose, any disruption of our organization will bring about the very evils which we all dread, from which we all suffer and from which many of us would perish.

We must not lose patience and we must not lose hope. It may be that presently a new mood will reign behind the Iron Curtain; if so, it will be easy for them to show it, but the democracies must be on their guard against being deceived by a false dawn.

We seek or covet no one's territory; we plan no forestalling war; we trust and pray that all will come right. Even during these years of what is called the cold war material production in every land is continually improving through the use of new machinery and better organization, and the advance of peaceful science. But the great bound forward in progress and prosperity for which mankind is longing cannot come until the shadow of war has passed away. There are, however, his-

toric compensations for the stresses which we suffer in the cold war. Under the pressure and menace of Communist aggression the fraternal association of the United States with Britain and the British Commonwealths and the new unity growing up in Europe, nowhere more hopeful than between France and Germany, all these harmonies are being brought forward perhaps by several generations in the destiny of the world. If this proves true, and it has certainly proved true up to date, the architects in the Kremlin may be found to have built a different and a far better world structure than what they planned.

Bismarck once said that the supreme fact of the nineteenth century was that Britain and the United States spoke the same language. Let us make sure that the supreme fact of the twentieth century is that they tread the same path.

Japan's Future Policy Toward China

Following is an exchange of correspondence between Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan, and John Foster Dulles, consultant to the Secretary of State; texts of the letters were released to the press on January 16 and 17 respectively.

DECEMBER 24th, 1951

DEAR AMBASSADOR DULLES: While the Japanese Peace Treaty and the U. S.-Japan Security Treaty were being debated in the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors of the Diet, a number of questions were put and statements made relative to Japan's future policy toward China. Some of the statements, separated from their context and background, gave rise to misapprehensions which I should like to clear up.

The Japanese Government desires ultimately to have a full measure of political peace and commercial intercourse with China which is Japan's close neighbor.

At the present time it is, we hope, possible to develop that kind of relationship with the National Government of the Republic of China, which has the seat, voice and vote of China in the United Nations, which exercises actual governmental authority over certain territory, and which maintains diplomatic relations with most of the members of the United Nations. To that end my Government on November 17, 1951, established a Japanese Government Overseas Agency in Formosa, with the consent of the National Government of China. This is the highest form of relationship with other countries which is now permitted to Japan, pending the coming into force of the multilateral Treaty of Peace. The Japanese Government Overseas Agency in For-

mosa is important in its personnel, reflecting the importance which my government attaches to relations with the National Government of the Republic of China. My government is prepared as soon as legally possible to conclude with the National Government of China, if that government so desires, a Treaty which will reestablish normal relations between the two Governments in conformity with the principles set out in the multilateral Treaty of Peace. The terms of such bilateral treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China, be applicable to all territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of the National Government of the Republic of China. We will promptly explore this subject with the National Government of China.

As regards the Chinese Communist regime, that regime stands actually condemned by the United Nations of being an aggressor and in consequence, the United Nations has recommended certain measures against that regime, in which Japan is now concurring and expects to continue to concur when the multilateral Treaty of Peace comes into force pursuant to the provisions of Article 5 (a) (iii), whereby Japan has undertaken "to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action". Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance concluded in Moscow in 1950 is virtually a military alliance aimed against Japan. In fact there are many reasons to believe that the Communist regime in China is backing the Japan Communist Party in its program of seeking violently to overthrow the constitutional system and the present Government of Japan. In view of these considerations, I can assure you that the Japanese Government has no intention to conclude a bilateral Treaty with the Communist regime of China.

Yours sincerely,

SHIGERU YOSHIDA

JANUARY 16, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I acknowledge the receipt by pouch of your letter of December 24, 1951 in which you express the intentions of your Government with reference to China. This clear statement should dispel any misapprehensions which, as you suggest, may have arisen from statements, separated from their context and background, made during the course of debate in Japan on the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

I am grateful to you for your letter and I respect the courageous and forthright manner in which you face up to this difficult and controversial matter.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Administration of Displaced Persons Act: An Example of Democracy in Action

by *Hervé J. L'Heureux*
*Chief of the Visa Division*¹

When Congress in 1950 amended the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, the Department and its consular officers were given the major responsibility for the administration of four new programs:

1. The issuance of up to 18,000 immigration visas to Polish veterans in Great Britain;
2. The issuance of up to 4,000 immigration visas to refugees from China;
3. The issuance of 7,500 immigration visas to Greek refugees and of 2,500 visas to Greek immigrants entitled to preference status under their quota;
4. The issuance of immigration visas to European refugees in Europe outside Germany, Austria, and Italy, usually referred to as out-of-zone refugees.

While the Department carried out these four programs jointly with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department shared with the Displaced Persons Commission and the Immigration and Naturalization Service the responsibility for the immigration of all other classes of immigrants benefiting under the Displaced Persons Act.

Of the four programs for which the Department carried the primary responsibility, the first three terminated with the expiration of the pertinent provisions of the law on December 31, 1951. Let me briefly review to what extent we were able to complete these programs satisfactorily.

Issuance of Visas to Refugees

Of the 4,000 visas authorized for refugees from China, approximately 3,300 have been issued. Most of these refugees had fled from Communist China to the Island of Samar in the Philippines. A member of my staff was assigned to go to Samar as visa consul. He and his American staff shared all hardships, cheerfully, with those they came to help. The office of the American consulate on Samar consisted of a flimsy hut surrounded by refugee tents. The offices were separated from each other and from the public waiting room by strips of canvas. The nine men on the consular staff shared a small hut for living quarters. When our consular office was opened, about 3,300 refugees were on the island. About 2,700 of these were

found to be qualified and were issued immigration visas for the United States. Most of the others were received by other countries. While our staff was rightfully proud of their work on Samar they also discovered that life on this South Sea island was not exactly the way it is painted in Hollywood and "South Pacific."

While administrative facilities for the issuance of visas to Polish war veterans in Great Britain were available without any serious difficulty or staff limitation, the number of visas issued fell considerably short of the authorized number of 18,000. Only approximately 11,100 visas were issued to this group of immigrants. This was due primarily to the fact that not enough Polish veterans applied for visas. Many of them had found a permanent home in Great Britain and therefore did not avail themselves of this opportunity to gain admission to the United States.

The 7,500 visas authorized for Greek refugees were all issued. Of the 2,500 visas authorized for the so-called Greek preferential group, approximately 1,500 were issued since there were not enough qualified applicants who could benefit from this provision of the Displaced Persons Act.

The quota numbers authorized, which were not used by these special groups, have not been lost. You will recall the Displaced Persons Act provided that the number of visas authorized for these special groups was to come out of the total of 341,000 visas authorized for displaced persons in general. Numbers not used by these groups were made available to the general group of displaced persons. The problem of reserving sufficient numbers for these special groups, to meet the anticipated demand and, on the other hand, to make them available to the general group of displaced persons once the special demand was satisfied, was one of the major responsibilities of the Visa Division under the Displaced Persons Act. This called for much planning and calculation and keeping in close touch with the day-to-day operations. During the last months and weeks of the program, some 11,000 numbers which had been held available for special groups, particularly for Polish war veterans and certain orphan children, were released for the use of other displaced persons when it became reasonably clear these special groups would not use them.

¹ Address made before the Third National Resettlement Conference of the Displaced Persons Commission at Chicago, Ill., on Jan. 18 and released to the press on the same date.

Regulations for Out-of-Zone Refugees

The fourth group of displaced persons, for whom the Department has been assigned the primary responsibility, consists of the so-called out-of-zone refugees for whom visa issuance is authorized under section 3 (c) of the amended Displaced Persons Act. This group is different from all others in various respects. First of all, visas may be issued to this group through June 30, 1954. In order to qualify for visa issuance under section 3 (c) of the Displaced Persons Act, an alien must have entered an area or country in Europe outside Italy or the American, British, or French sectors or zones of Germany and Austria between September 1, 1939 and January 1, 1949 and they must establish that they are persons of European national origin displaced from the country of their birth or nationality, or of their last residence as a result of events subsequent to the outbreak of World War II. They also are required to establish that they are unable to return to any of such countries because of persecution, or fear of persecution, on account of race, religion, or political opinions. Also, they must not have been firmly resettled in any other country. The law provides that between July 1, 1950 and June 30, 1954, 50 percent of the nonpreference portion of the immigration quotas under the 1924 Act are to be made available to these aliens.

In order to carry out the mandate of Congress with respect to this group of refugees, our quota control officer must first satisfy the visa demand from persons entitled to first and second preference quota status. Since the Immigration Act of 1924 gives the first call on 50 percent of each quota to first preference quota immigrants and first call on the other 50 percent to second preference quota immigrants, there may be no nonpreference portion left if the demand for visas by these preference groups is sufficiently large. In other words, 50 percent of that portion of each quota which is not used by these preference groups is to be made available to the out-of-zone refugees. The calculation of this figure is complicated by the fact that under the law the first and second preference demand under quotas over 300 is to be satisfied on a month by month basis, while for the purpose of the out-of-zone refugees the law prescribed that quotas be computed on an annual rather than on a monthly basis. To comply with this provision we have to estimate the probable demand for preference quota visas within each of the 4 fiscal years during which visas may be issued to the out-of-zone refugees, and on the basis of these estimates we have to decide how many quota numbers we can safely authorize for the out-of-zone refugees without exhausting all available quota numbers for which a demand may arise if our estimates should prove to be incorrect.

Here are some data which may be of interest to you in connection with the issuance of visas to out-of-zone refugees. In all, about 5,000 visas

have been issued to these refugees during the last 18 months. By far the largest number, approximately 2,700 visas, went to natives of Poland. The next largest group of out-of-zone refugees are natives of Czechoslovakia, who were issued approximately 680 visas. In addition, substantial numbers of visas have been issued under section 3 (c) of the Act to natives of Hungary, Lithuania, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Latvia. We had even two Swiss, one French, one British, and one Irish quota immigrant who qualified as out-of-zone refugees.

All numbers presently available for the issuance of visas under section 3 (c) have already been allocated under the quotas of Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. Some few additional quota numbers authorized under section 3 (c) of the Displaced Persons Act will become available in March. Section 3 (c) numbers are currently available from the quotas of the following countries: Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Germany, and Italy.

Many of the agencies represented here today have been accredited by the Department of State for the out-of-zone refugee program. Those of you who are interested in helping with this program but have not yet applied for their accreditation, should do so without delay since our consular officers are not permitted to accept agency assurances, unless the organizations are approved for the specific section of the Displaced Persons Act under which they wish to sponsor the admission of aliens. Also, may I remind you that different from all other programs, in connection with the visa application of out-of-zone refugees only assurances identifying the particular applicant by name, so-called named assurances, may be accepted by consular officers. Regulations exclude the submission for section 3 (c) cases of so-called unnamed assurances which request the admission of an alien having specific skills or other qualifications without identifying the applicant by name.

I know you are all interested in the total number of visas which have been issued under the Displaced Persons Act up to December 31, 1951. I had hoped I could bring these data with me today but unfortunately we have not yet received the final figures from all consulates concerned with the administration of the program. On the basis of the reports already received I believe it can be estimated that some 312,000 visas have been issued to the so-called Iro refugees and persecutees under section 2 (c) of the Act.

Effect of Displaced Persons Act on Future Immigration

Before I conclude my remarks I should like to discuss briefly the effect the admission of displaced persons will have on the volume of future immigration. As you know, with few exceptions, persons admitted under the Displaced Persons Act

are quota immigrants. The Congress facilitated their admission to the United States by permitting that visas issued to them be charged to the quotas for future years, with a future quota charging limit of 25 percent of the respective quotas for the years 1950 to 1954 and a limit of 50 percent of each quota for the years thereafter. While this provision permitted the rapid movement of displaced persons to the United States it will of course have a bearing upon the volume of future immigration.

The extent to which the admission of displaced persons will affect the volume of future immigration, becomes evident from the following data which show the fiscal year up to which annual quotas have in part been absorbed by visas issued to displaced persons:

Country:	Year
Albania	1956
Austria	1955
Bulgaria	1963
China (white)	1964
Czechoslovakia	1958
Danzig	1958
Estonia	2146
Greece.	2013
Hungary.	1985
Iran.	1956
Latvia.	2274
Lithuania	2087
Poland.	1999
Rumania.	2004
Trieste.	1958
Turkey	1964
U. S. S. R.	1978
Yugoslavia.	2001

Those of us in the Department of State and in the Foreign Service concerned with the displaced persons program have done everything possible to make it a successful one. During the last days of December members of my staff in the Visa Division were available on a 24-hour schedule to handle last minute calls for quota numbers from Frankfurt, Munich, and other places. The Consulate General in Frankfurt in a preliminary report on the closing stages of the major part of the displaced persons program wrote that work was carried on all day on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to process the maximum number of applicants. The subconsular office at Funkkaserne near Munich, for example, which had a normal complement of 10 officers, obtained the service of seven additional vice consuls from the Munich Consulate General, for the final days of the program. All officers worked until midnight on December 30 and December 31.

Our part in the program, however, could not have been accomplished had it not been for the fine cooperation we had from many agencies, particularly the voluntary agencies, many of which are represented here today. We also had the splendid cooperation of John Gibson, the chair-

man of the Displaced Persons Commission, and the other members of the Commission and his staff, as well as from the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Public Health Service. I think the fact that we could resolve satisfactorily the many new and challenging problems presented by the displaced persons program was a telling example of democracy in action and I believe we can be proud of this achievement.

Nomination of Special Representative For MSA Program in Europe

On January 14 the President nominated William H. Draper, Jr., to be U.S. special representative in Europe with the rank of Ambassador.

Mr. Draper will represent the U.S. Government as a whole and will be responsible to the President. He will be concerned with the various aspects of the Mutual Security Program in Europe. He will act for the Director for Mutual Security in providing on a regional basis coordination, continuous supervision, and general direction of the military and economic assistance programs. He will be charged with seeing that these programs are effectively integrated and administered so as to assure that the defensive strength of the nations concerned shall be built as quickly as possible on the basis of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid. He will also exercise general supervision over the European activities of the Mutual Security Agency.

The U.S. special representative will maintain close liaison with the American Ambassadors to the various European capitals, the U.S. deputy to the North Atlantic Council, and the Commanding General of the U.S. European Command. He will also maintain close contact with the U.S. members of the various North Atlantic Treaty agencies in Europe and with the United States elements of General Eisenhower's headquarters.

Proposals for improvements in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are presently under active consideration. As this reorganization moves forward, it is expected that the U.S. special representative will become the senior United States civilian representative in Europe responsible for North Atlantic Treaty as well as Mutual Security Program matters.

Charles M. Spofford Resigns

The President on January 14 accepted the resignation of Charles M. Spofford as deputy U.S. representative to NAC. For texts of letters exchanged between Mr. Spofford and President Truman, see White House press release of Jan. 14.

Goals of Mutual Security Agency Described

W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security, on January 15 announced the organizational structure of the new Mutual Security Agency (MSA) and described it as "a streamlined set-up with far-reaching objectives geared to the tempo of world conditions of 1952."

Pointing out that the MSA was created by Congress as a global agency with equal responsibilities in Asia and Western Europe, Mr. Harriman said the role of the new agency was more challenging and far reaching than that of its predecessor, the Economic Cooperation Administration. He explained:

ECA was created to aid in the economic recovery of Western Europe from World War II and was later extended to administer economic assistance to the Far East. In Europe, the new MSA will work towards the creation of a "dynamic and expanding" economy capable of achieving the present rearmament goals of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, and, at the same time, laying the basis for improved standards of living which can be realized after completion of the military buildup. In the Far East, MSA will work to help the free people realize their aspirations.

The Free World must build sufficient military strength to deter communist aggression any place in the world. At the same time our job is to help improve standards of living, particularly among the lower income groups, create political stability, sound currencies, and expanding economies.

Mr. Harriman, who is responsible for the coordination of foreign-aid activities of the State Department, Defense Department, and MSA, announced the delegation of all operating functions of MSA to Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Deputy Director for Mutual Security.¹

"As so much of my time must be devoted to the work of coordinating the economic, military and technical assistance programs authorized by the Congress in the Mutual Security Act," Mr. Harriman said, "I have placed the operating activities of the MSA in the hands of my Deputy."

To provide for coordination of the military and economic assistance programs in Europe, the President yesterday nominated William H. Draper, Jr., to be U.S. special representative in Europe. In this post, Mr. Draper will act for Mr. Harriman in providing coordination, continu-

ous supervision, and general direction of the programs of the MSA and Department of Defense on a regional basis.

Paul R. Porter, who has been acting chief of ECA activities in Europe, becomes director of the European Office of the Mutual Security Agency. In this position, Mr. Porter will head MSA's European regional office with headquarters in Paris.

Explaining MSA's operating structure, Mr. Bissell said that the agency will tackle its global task with a single purpose—the building of strength for the free world. He noted that its methods will differ greatly between the Far East and Western Europe.

"Around the world, however," Mr. Bissell said, "MSA will work towards providing hope for a better life and a free society."

Technical Assistance in Asia

In the Far East, Mr. Bissell said, MSA will be primarily engaged in helping newly independent and underdeveloped countries to build strong governments and expand their economies to provide for the basic human needs of their people. This goal can be reached, he said, through a program of technical assistance coupled with a small amount of commodity and equipment aid.

The MSA's Asian program will be of a self-help nature with the participating countries making very substantial contributions by meeting local costs both through payments into counterpart funds and directly from their budgets. The programs will emphasize the grass-roots, village-level approach with projects designed to have an immediate broad impact as well as assistance at focal points of the local economy.

Mr. Bissell said that the work in the Far East would include activities in the fields of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, transportation, power, public health, handicraft and other small industries, education, public administration, and general engineering advisory services.

The agency will assist these countries in the development of raw materials which are needed by the industrial countries of Europe and the United States.

In Europe, Mr. Bissell said, MSA will attempt to aid in the creation of a "dynamic and expand-

¹ On Jan. 17 the White House announced the resignation of Mr. Bissell, effective Jan. 18. His successor has not yet been announced.

ing" economy, by promoting the economic and political unification of Europe, together with a drive to increase industrial and agricultural productivity.

Because of the present threat of Communist aggression, Mr. Bissell said, MSA in Europe must give priority to projects in support of the defense program of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this connection, MSA will provide people—highly trained production specialists—as well as dollars and assistance in helping Western Europe to secure the necessary raw materials and tools to meet their production goals.

Referring to the Benton Amendment to the Mutual Security Act,² Mr. Bissell said that MSA would give major attention to the job of creating a healthier, expanding economy with participation of free private enterprise, the elimination of cartels and monopolistic business practices, and the development and strengthening of free labor union movements.

"We will continue to give strong support to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in its efforts to break down trade barriers," Mr. Bissell said. "The creation of a larger market area will powerfully stimulate competitive enterprise, increased output and a greater well-being. The goal we will urge is a single market for all of Western Europe."

European Unification

The economic and political unification of Europe, Mr. Bissell said, is the long-range target of the Mutual Security Program.

"Only Europeans can take the steps necessary to achieve real unification," the Deputy Mutual Security Director declared, "but our backing can be a powerful boost."

Among the important steps taken under the Marshall Plan toward economic unification, Mr. Bissell particularly noted the successful establishment of the European Payments Union and the overwhelming majorities by which the legislative bodies of both France and Germany recently ratified the revolutionary Schuman Plan for pooling Europe's major coal and steel industries.

Emphasizing that these forward steps must be

²"Sec. 516. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress that this Act shall be administered in such a way as (1) to eliminate the barriers to, and provide the incentives for, a steadily increased participation of free private enterprise in developing the resources of foreign countries consistent with the policies of this Act, (2) to the extent that it is feasible and does not interfere with the achievement of the purposes set forth in this Act, to discourage the cartel and monopolistic business practices prevailing in certain countries receiving aid under this Act which result in restricting production and increasing prices, and to encourage where suitable competition and productivity, and (3) to encourage where suitable the development and strengthening of the free labor union movements as the collective bargaining agencies of labor within such countries."

continued, Mr. Bissell listed the following as possibilities that should be considered by the European countries: a European-wide customs union, a "Schuman Plan" in the fields of agriculture and transportation, and a single European monetary system.

The MSA's program in the Far East will provide technical and economic aid to the countries of Burma, the Associated States of Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Formosa. In Europe, MSA will provide economic and/or technical assistance to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Trieste, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. Some of the Western European countries are not expected to require any direct dollar assistance but may participate in the technical assistance program and other phases of MSA's activities. Participation of these countries in the MSA aid program is conditioned on their entering into agreements required by the Mutual Security Act.

One of the most significant changes wrought by Mr. Bissell in the set-up of MSA is a heavily increased emphasis on assistance to the Far East with an assistant director in charge of this phase of the agency's activities.

Although stressing that the enlarged Asian program does not signify a let-up in the European program, Mr. Bissell said the Far East program "is reaching this new operational phase at a time when the whole question of U.S. economic aid policy in the area has become a matter of major importance."

To assist in the operation of the MSA, Mr. Bissell announced the appointment of C. Tyler Wood as Associate Deputy Director; D. A. FitzGerald as Assistant Director for Supply; and Harlan Cleveland as Assistant Director for Europe. The Assistant Director for the Far East will be named shortly.

Mr. Wood, a former ECA Assistant Administrator, has been Deputy U.S. special representative in Europe for the last year and a half. Mr. FitzGerald, who came to ECA in April 1948 from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, served for more than 3 years as director of ECA's Food and Agriculture Division before becoming ECA Assistant Administrator for Supply in July 1951. Mr. Cleveland has served as Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Program for the last 28 months.

A new defense production division is to be added to the staff of the Assistant Director for Europe. Its major function will be to maximize European defense production and to strengthen the NATO machinery in this field. It will work with MSA's Washington staff to relate MSA defense production objectives and activities to the aid allotment process and the use of counterpart funds—foreign currency deposited to match American grant aid—

(Continued on page 137)

New Soviet Disarmament Proposal Examined

*Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson*¹

The General Assembly has passed a resolution endorsing the fundamental principles of the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces and creating a disarmament commission to carry out such a program.² It directed this commission to consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments as the first and indispensable step in carrying out the over-all program.

Only the Soviet bloc voted against this resolution. The next day the Soviet Union reintroduced what they called new proposals on disarmament. The same Soviet bloc that had first voted against our proposals characterized their proposals as a momentous step toward an acceptance of the Western position.

If this were true, then, indeed, a great step forward would have been taken. But what do the Soviet proposals really amount to? We have examined them very carefully, and unfortunately the advertised concessions are more apparent than real.

We have here one more attempt by the Soviet Union to get the General Assembly to condemn atomic weapons as "weapons of aggression," to "proclaim the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons," and to "proclaim the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of such prohibition." These proclamations would take place now. At some later date, provided agreement were reached, this "proclaimed" prohibition and "proclaimed" control would be put into effect simultaneously. The Soviet objective is obvious. They continue to seek a "paper" prohibition and give no assurance that they would agree to any effective control system which would insure prohibition.

The idea that prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of a control system be made simultaneous was first submitted by Mr. Vyshinsky himself 3½ years ago during the Paris Assembly of 1948. When it became clear at that time that the controls that the U.S.S.R. had in mind were their own inadequate proposals—made almost 5 years ago—the General Assembly rejected this maneuver. Apparently, this idea has now been dusted off and resubmitted.

The Soviet Union also states that the international control organ shall have "the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis; but it shall not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of States." What the Soviet Union would appear to give with one hand it takes away with the other.

But neither of these points goes to the heart of the real issue. What we must have in the field of international control is a control system giving an international agency sufficient powers to insure that atomic weapons would be effectively prohibited. This is not a question of semantics.

On January 19, the disarmament portion of the Soviet proposal was sent to the Disarmament Commission by a General Assembly vote of approval on Committee I's recommendation. The vote was 40 to 5 (Soviet bloc), with 3 abstentions, India, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

It is perfectly clear that no system of inspection alone, be it periodic or continuous, can insure the effective prohibition of atomic weapons. This has been recognized by all members of the United Nations with the exception of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Under the U.N. plan the international control agency would own all the atomic materials and would own, operate, and manage all atomic facilities that make or use such materials in dangerous quantities. A system of control based upon these safeguards is the only one so far devised that can be both workable and effective. We are prepared to examine any other pro-

¹ Made on Jan. 16 and released to the press on the same date.

² BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1952, pp. 23 and 28.

posals that might be equally or more workable and effective. We are also prepared to examine these latest dressed-up Soviet proposals in the Disarmament Commission just created by the General Assembly. At this time, however, we do not see how or in what manner these proposals advance the cause.

Text of Soviet Draft Disarmament Resolution

U.N. doc. A/C.1/698
Dated Jan. 12, 1952

1. The General Assembly declares participation in the aggressive Atlantic bloc and the creation by certain States, and primarily by the United States of America, of military, naval and air bases in foreign territories incompatible with membership of the United Nations.

2. The General Assembly recognizes it to be essential that: (a) The countries taking part in the Korean war should immediately end military operations, conclude an armistice and withdraw their forces from the 38th parallel within a period of ten days;

(b) All foreign troops and also foreign volunteer units should be withdrawn from Korea within a period of three months.

3. The General Assembly, considering the use of atomic weapons, as weapons of aggression and of the mass destruction of people, to be at variance with the conscience and honour of peoples and incompatible with membership of the United Nations, proclaims the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition, it being understood that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of international control shall be put into effect simultaneously.

The General Assembly instructs the Disarmament Commission to prepare and submit to the Security Council, not later than 1 June 1952, for its consideration, a draft convention providing measures to ensure the implementation of the General Assembly decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their production, the use of already-manufactured atomic bombs exclusively for civilian purposes, and the establishment of strict international control over the observance of the above-mentioned convention.

4. The General Assembly recommends the permanent members of the Security Council—the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—to reduce the armaments and armed forces in their possession at the time of the adoption of this recommendation by one-third during a period of one year from the date of its adoption.

5. The General Assembly recommends that forthwith, and in any case not later than one month after the adoption by the General Assembly of the decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the five Powers, all States should submit complete official data on the situation of their armaments and armed forces, including data on atomic weapons and military bases in foreign territories. These data shall be submitted with reference to the situation obtaining at the time when the above-mentioned decisions are adopted by the General Assembly.

6. The General Assembly recommends the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of an international control organ, the functions of which shall be to supervise the implementation of the decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces, and to verify the data submitted by States regarding the situation of their armaments and armed forces.

With a view to the establishment of an appropriate system of guarantees for the observance of the General Assembly's decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments, the international control organ shall have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis; but it shall not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of States.

7. The General Assembly calls upon the Governments of all States, both Members of the United Nations and those not at present in the Organization, to consider at a world conference the question of the substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments and also the question of practical measures for prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing international control over the observance of such prohibition.

The General Assembly recommends that the above-mentioned world conference should be convened at the earliest possible date and, in any case, not later than 15 July 1952.

8. The General Assembly calls upon the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union to conclude a peace pact, and to combine their efforts for the achievement of this high and noble aim.

The General Assembly also calls upon all other peace-loving States to join in the peace pact.

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¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

U.S. Answers Soviet Demand for Abrogation Of Mutual Security Act

*Statement by Mike J. Mansfield
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly*¹

MR. PRESIDENT: In explaining our vote against the Soviet resolution, I wish to deal briefly with the motives of the Soviet Government in presenting this matter to the General Assembly and insisting on its discussion here. The actual charges against the Mutual Security Act as "aggression" and "domestic interference" were, of course, without any foundation whatever. In speech after angry speech, the Soviet representative utterly failed to substantiate the vicious accusations made by the Soviet Government against my country.²

The question arises as to why the Soviet Union wished to take up the valuable time of the General Assembly with these baseless accusations. Indeed, the question occurred to many of us in the First Committee when this matter was under discussion. During explanations of vote in the committee, the question was put bluntly and forthrightly by the very able representative of Liberia, Mr. Cooper.

The Liberian delegate pointed out that the Soviet representative had seemed unconcerned about the outcome of the vote. What, Mr. Cooper asked, had the Soviet representative hoped to achieve? Propaganda?

Now that this exceedingly bitter debate is behind us and we can see the problem in more accurate perspective, the answer to the question put by Mr. Cooper becomes increasingly clear. It was, indeed, propaganda. But not necessarily propaganda against the Mutual Security Act. It was part of a general assault launched by the Soviet delegation at the beginning of this Assembly against the United Nations collective security

system and the regional collective security systems which strengthen it.

The specific point at issue in the Mutual Security Act was an amendment permitting the expenditure of funds to organize Iron Curtain refugees into "elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

I made a statement to the First Committee giving absolute and unconditional assurances that the appropriation would be spent for no other purpose than the defense of the North Atlantic community.³ That statement was fully concurred in by Mr. Vorys, also a member of the United States delegation to the General Assembly and a member of the Republican Party in Congress. Mr. Vorys and I spoke both for Congress and for the delegation, which represents the executive branch of the American Government.

And yet the Soviet Government demanded the abrogation of the entire law. It was at once obvious, when you examined the law, that its abrogation would strike a tremendous blow at the growing collective-security system of the free world and to important programs of economic assistance to free countries.

It would, for example, wipe out American contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, funds for resettlement projects in Israel, technical assistance for areas in Africa, and funds for the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.

In short, Mr. President, it was clear that the Soviet Union was aiming at a very large target. It wanted nothing less than the wholesale collapse of a vast free-world program providing both for the strengthening of collective security through military assistance and for human welfare through economic and technical assistance.

As further "evidence" of alleged American "interference" in the affairs of countries within the Soviet orbit, Mr. President, the Soviet representative spoke at length of four American fliers forced down in Hungary. He charged that they were engaged on a mission of "espionage," although in

¹ Made in plenary session on Jan. 11 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

² Text of the Soviet resolution, U.N. doc A/2031 of Jan. 2, 1952, reads as follows:

"The General Assembly *Condemns the 'Mutual Security Act of 1951'*, adopted in the United States of America and providing for the appropriation of funds for subversive activities against certain States, as an act of aggression and as interference in the internal affairs of other States, in contravention of the principles of the United Nations Charter and of the generally acknowledged rules of international law; and *Recommends* the Government of the United States of America to take the necessary measures to repeal this Act."

³ BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1952, p. 29.

fact they were lost in bad weather on a routine flight to Belgrade. These men were held incommunicado for 2 weeks by Soviet authorities on Hungarian territory. At no time during the course of their extensive interrogation and their solitary confinement by Soviet authorities were they accused of espionage, for the reason that no evidence of espionage could be found.

These men were finally subjected to a so-called "trial" and fined \$120,000, not for espionage but for a violation of the Hungarian frontier. The American Government, knowing that it was paying ransom, willingly provided the money so that the lives of four American citizens would not remain in jeopardy.

But in no sense do we consider closed this incident involving such open contempt and disregard for the most elementary rights of foreign nationals.

The world knew nothing of the whereabouts of the plane, until it was announced by Tass, the Soviet state news agency. The world knew nothing about the so-called "trial" until the Soviet representative told the First Committee during this very debate that the men had received "due attention from *our* border authorities" and would receive further attention from "*our* military and judicial authorities."

All of this happened, Mr. President, on the soil of the supposedly sovereign state of Hungary. And yet the Soviet Government has the right to

station troops in Hungary only to safeguard its communications to the Soviet zone of Austria. This violation of human rights, used by the Soviet representative to buttress charges of "domestic interference" against my Government, demonstrated instead the control exercised by the Soviet Union over the internal affairs of one of the countries it holds captive.

It was on a level with the other "proof" of alleged domestic interference and aggression drawn by the Soviet delegation from the language of the Mutual Security Act.

The chairman of the First Committee, Mr. President, rightly stated during the debate that heated discussions of this sort complicate rather than facilitate the work of the United Nations.

Mr. Vyshinsky, in submitting this resolution to the Assembly, has thrown another monkey wrench at the machinery of the United Nations and has missed again. We suggest that he put his monkey wrench away for good and begin to seek openings not for further attacks against us but for constructive and cooperative efforts within the United Nations.

We have voted down his resolution. But the door for real cooperation continues to remain open to him, and to the Soviet delegation. Perhaps it is not too much to hope that one day he will lead his delegation through the door, shake hands, and get down to working with the rest of us for peace, friendship, and international cooperation.

U.S. Urges Continuation of Palestine Conciliation Efforts

*Statement by Philip C. Jessup
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

The United States delegation has given careful consideration to the report of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, as indeed it has followed closely the work of the Commission during the past year. Our Government, with the other members of the United Nations, is deeply interested in seeing the problems remaining after the Palestine conflict solved in accordance with the principles of the United Nations and the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. The United States, like the United Nations, is desirous of seeing peaceful, friendly relations between the Arab States and Israel established on a sound basis in the common interests of those states and in the interest of security and well-being in the entire Middle East. The United Nations has the right to expect the parties to make every endeavor to achieve a settlement of their differences themselves in harmony with the principles of the United Nations Charter. At the same time the United Nations must always

be ready to assist the parties to do so. Despite the present lack of definitive solutions for the political problems remaining in Palestine, progress has been made. The achievements of the United Nations, through the armistice agreements and through the continuing surveillance of the Truce Supervision Organization; the continued concern of the Security Council; the activities of the UNRWA; and the persistent efforts of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, have contributed vital elements in keeping the way open to peaceful, permanent settlement of the Palestine problems and the stabilization of the area.

In our opinion, it would be unjustifiable and unwise to conclude from the history of the Palestine Conciliation Commission's efforts during the past 3 years, and in particular of its efforts during 1951, that avenues to a final settlement of the Palestine problems are blocked. While the commission would appear to have tried all the approaches and procedures open to it under relevant resolutions of the General Assembly without achieving its objectives, nevertheless it is the very

¹ Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Jan. 6 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

U.S., U.K., French, and Turkish Draft Resolution

U.N. doc. A/AC.53/L.22 Dated Jan. 5, 1952

The General Assembly,

RECALLING its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 and 394 (V) of 14 December 1950,

HAVING EXAMINED the report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/1985),

NOTING that agreement has not been reached between the parties on the final settlement of outstanding questions,

RECOGNIZING that in the interests of the peace and stability of the Near East efforts to achieve such a final settlement should be continued,

CONSIDERING that the governments concerned have the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences

1. *Urges* the governments concerned to seek agreement with a view to an early settlement of their outstanding differences in a spirit of justice and realism and on the basis of mutual concessions; and for this purpose to make full use of United Nations facilities;

2. *Expresses* its appreciation to the Conciliation Commission for Palestine for its efforts to assist the parties to reach agreement on their outstanding differences;

3. *Notes* with regret that, as stated in paragraph 87 of the report, the Commission has been unable to fulfill its mandate;

4. *Considers* nevertheless that, in the light of paragraph 86 of the report, the Conciliation Commission for Palestine should continue to be available to the parties to assist them in reaching agreement on outstanding questions;

5. *Authorizes* the Conciliation Commission for Palestine in its discretion to designate a representative or representatives to assist it in carrying out its functions;

6. *Decides* that the headquarters of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine should be transferred to the Headquarters of the United Nations, a representative of the Commission being maintained at Jerusalem;

7. *Requests* the Conciliation Commission for Palestine to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities for carrying out the terms of the present resolution.

function of the United Nations to continue conciliation efforts wherever and whenever they can effectively be asserted. The United Nations cannot afford to "give up" in these efforts to encourage the peaceful settlement and normal relations which we know the parties themselves need and desire.

The United States, as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, supported the comprehensive pattern of proposals which the commission submitted to the parties for their consideration at the recent conference held in Paris. We supported these proposals as being fair and realistic and in the hope that the parties would be able to adopt them in a spirit of compromise. The United States continues to believe that these proposals contain constructive elements which can

usefully be drawn upon in the interest of progress toward a just settlement of the differences between the parties.

We attach great importance to the fact that each of the parties has expressed to the Palestine Conciliation Commission its desire to continue to cooperate with the United Nations for the achievement of stability in Palestine. The United Nations must continue to hold itself ready to assist the parties to realize that desire through constructive action.

The Palestine Conciliation Commission has patiently endeavored to carry out the mandate which it received from this Assembly. It deserves the appreciation and respect of all United Nations members. Despite discouragement and set-backs, its usefulness, in our view, is not ended. After careful consideration, the United States believes that at this stage of the Palestine Conciliation Commission's work, the Commission should be continued, but with its seat at United Nations Headquarters, holding itself available to assist the parties in reaching a final settlement of their problems. We fully agree with the idea that the Commission should be empowered to appoint one or more representatives to assist it on specific issues, whenever circumstances indicate that such a course might be helpful. The members of the Commission would, of course, need to keep fully in touch with all aspects and developments of the Palestine problem and closely associated with representatives of each of the parties.

We recognize that the views and feelings of both sides remain in sharp contrast on many points and that much suffering and bitterness continue to exist as a result of the conflict in Palestine. We are convinced that the United Nations must and can point the way toward eliminating this suffering and bitterness by continuing its efforts to bring about a political settlement, at the same time striving to improve the economic and social condition of the peoples of the area. It is our hope that the Arab States and Israel, fully recognizing the dangers in the present situation, will see that it is within their power to facilitate progress toward a solution of their differences by making renewed efforts with the help of the United Nations machinery that is available to them.

It is with this hope that the United States delegation had joined in submitting the draft resolution which has been received by the members of this committee. This resolution is not an attempt to solve at this session the complex problems remaining, but is a sincere effort to assist the parties to bring about such a solution in due course. It is our belief that at this session of the General Assembly, the most helpful approach is the relatively modest one followed in our proposed resolution. We suggest to the members of this committee that a debate confined to these aspects of the whole problem will prove in the long run to have best served the interests of all concerned.

Soviet Resolution on Aggression Called Inconsistent With U.N. Charter

*Statement by John Maktos
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

The Soviet Union has introduced a resolution to define aggression.

The representative of the Soviet Union tells us that the definition of aggression will deter aggression. But the view which prevailed in San Francisco, when the Charter was drafted, was different. In that view, which the United States shared and still holds, definition of aggression is not in the interest of peace. A great objection to definition of aggression is that it will be in the interest of aggression.

The view which prevailed in San Francisco was that there should be no definition of aggression in the Charter, that a definition would go beyond the purpose of the Charter.

The delegate of Chile stated yesterday that a definition was not included in the Charter because of the so-called veto provision. That was not the reason. As was stated there, and it is true today:

The progress of the technique of modern warfare renders very difficult the definition of all cases of aggression. It may be noted that the list of such cases being necessarily incomplete, the Council would have a tendency to consider of less importance the acts not mentioned therein; these omissions would encourage the aggressor to distort the definition or might delay action by the Council. Furthermore, in the other cases listed, automatic action by the Council might bring about a premature application of enforcement measures.

In brief, those who drafted the Charter properly considered that their task was to prepare a constitutional document. Accordingly, the Charter deals with great purposes and principles and with the major organs to carry forward those purposes and principles. The statesmen who created the Charter believed that states should be held to high intent and that their representatives in the General Assembly and in the Security Council should have the discretion to carry forward that high intent.

The task of statesmanship in the United Nations is to promote the principles of the Charter. This task calls for judgment, courage, devotion, and

imagination. It demands of us more than is required of those who formulate municipal regulations for the punishment of petty offenders. It demands of us more than is required of the police magistrates who apply those regulations. It is for these reasons that the terms of the Charter are broad and the responsibility of those who represent states is great. The good will of states cannot be measured with a foot rule. The evil purposes of states cannot be controlled by a mechanical device. The actions of states must be judged in accordance with the great principles of the Charter, applied with wisdom and imagination in a dynamic world.

A Priori Definition as Camouflage for Aggression

The Charter established the obligation to refrain from aggression. Resolutions of the General Assembly implement this obligation. An additional resolution defining aggression would not be likely to deter a state which sought to violate this obligation. As stated yesterday by the representative of the United Kingdom, countries embark on aggression only if they think it is going to be successful. If they think their attack will succeed, they will not worry very much about the consequences. It is the moral force and the will of the United Nations to act with courage and determination under the Charter that deters aggression. Indeed, a *a priori* definition might make aggression easier. It might serve as camouflage for aggression.

The resolution of the Soviet Union provides that "in an international conflict that state shall be declared the attacker which first commits" certain acts. One of these acts is "the carrying out of a deliberate attack on the ships or aircraft of" another state. Under this provision, would the United States have been considered guilty of aggression if it had learned of the Pearl Harbor mission in time to take the offensive and prevent the attack by attacking and destroying the enemy force en route? It is a strange definition of aggression that would make a state an aggressor if it defended its shores from invasion and which

¹Made in Committee VI (Legal) on Jan. 10 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

would require a state to wait until its defenses had been destroyed before defending itself.

It has been contended during the discussion that a definition is possible. As stated by the representative of Greece, we are not engaged in providing a philological definition. Of course, it is easy for any one of us to make up a definition. What the General Assembly should bear in mind is the progressive development of international law. The lawmaker takes into account not only the question whether it is legally possible to make a law but whether such a law would serve the ends for which it is intended. In determining the desirability of a proposed law, account is taken of various pertinent factors—economic, social, political, and many others. To take account only of the question whether a proposed law is legally possible is unwise and dangerous.

It has been argued that legal questions can be distinguished from political ones. This is not the issue before this committee. The issue is whether the proposed progressive development of international law so far as the definition of aggression is concerned will serve the ends for which it is intended. We believe that to provide such a definition would be futile and dangerous.

It has been pointed out during the discussion that other principles of law have been defined. There is no doubt about this, but we believe that the issue before the committee is not whether other principles are definable but whether aggression should be defined. In all juridical systems there are certain concepts which are not defined but are left purposely elastic because in that status they serve better the ends for which they are framed. This is particularly true where situations are so varied that a definition may fail to anticipate situations that should be covered. Even in the field of criminal law there are elastic terms, such as attack, fraud, reasonable doubt.

It has been the consistent opinion of the United States that, because of the very nature of the question, it would not be possible to arrive at a satisfactory definition of aggression. Because of the dynamic nature of present world events, any enumeration of acts which constitute aggression must of necessity be incomplete.

A definition of aggression could not take all the circumstances into account. It could not be made adaptable to the myriad combinations of facts or to all the schemes and evasions of an aggressor.

My delegation cannot believe that we can usefully formulate a definition which could give assurance to meet the situations created by the infinitely complex interplay of the factors that are involved in aggression. An incomplete definition would be worse than no definition at all. The very able speeches of the delegates of Greece and of the United Kingdom made it unnecessary to expatiate on this point.

The alternative to a definition by enumeration, i. e., a definition in general terms, as so ably dem-

onstrated in the speeches just mentioned, would be undesirable. Rather than a general definition, it is the opinion of my delegation that it is preferable to leave the term undefined and to permit the requisite organs of the United Nations to pass upon the aggressive nature of acts on a case-by-case basis. Both kinds of definition are open to the overriding objection referred to at the beginning of this speech.

Furthermore, crystallization should take place in the maturity of the law, not in its development. What constitutes aggression in law is still a problem in the developmental stage. With various kinds of aggression being alleged in many parts of the world, it would not be wise to crystalize the law.

History of Past Attempts To Define Aggression

In support of his arguments for a definition of aggression, the representative of the Soviet Union set forth some of the past efforts to define aggression and has referred to some citations. We believe that past efforts show that *a priori* definition without regard to the facts of a specific case is unwise.

The history of the past thirty years is strewn with the wreckage of unsuccessful attempts to define aggression. The Covenant of the League of Nations used the word "aggression" in Article 10, but in the Covenant there is no definition of the word or any general criteria for ascertaining whether aggression had been committed. A special committee was formed in 1922 to define the term; its conclusion was that the term could not be satisfactorily defined and that decisions as to whether or not aggression had occurred should be left entirely to the League Council.

At the Second Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations in 1933 the Soviet Union presented a five-point definition, which is often referred to as the Litvinov formula. It is the basis of the Soviet resolution before this Committee. At London on July 3 and 4, 1933, during the Monetary and Economic Conference, the Soviet Union signed two conventions by which it accepted the Litvinov formula. Yesterday, the representative of Byelorussia referred to these conventions in order to show that the Litvinov formula had been accepted in international practice. That definition is subject to the general objections to definition. In addition, it seems not to have withstood the acid test of preserving the political independence and territorial integrity of such cosignatories of the nonaggression pacts concluded by the Soviet Union in 1933 as Estonia and Latvia.

The representatives of Greece and of the United Kingdom have shown the difficulties of the Soviet resolution. The resolution is also open to the overriding objection that it does not take account of the legality of the use of armed force at the behest of the United Nations or, in fact, of the primary

responsibilities of the United Nations in the field. In effect, a resort of force has become one instrument of the international community for the restoration of peace and security. When force is employed as such an instrument, the old meanings of "self-defense" and "aggression" are not adequate, since they are traditionally cast in terms of individual self-help. The needed line between legal and illegal resort of force is one which should be left for determination by the appropriate United Nations organs in each particular case upon its merits.

In the course of repeated and voluminous discussions among statesmen and scholars, two chief arguments have usually been advanced for defining aggression. One is that prior agreement is necessary to establish when preventive action by one or more states against another can or must be taken to keep the peace or to prevent the unreasonable use or threat of force. The other is that punitive action against a peacebreaker should be based on his breaking a rule of law defined and known in advance. Neither argument applies under the Charter since the machinery for authorizing or ordering preventive action is already set up, while the matter of punishment can be taken care of by seeing who violates the decisions and disregards the recommendations of the organs of the United Nations. With these fundamental needs met, the drafters of the Charter at San Francisco were able to weigh incidental advantages and disadvantages to definition, and this is what they found:

C. Determination of Acts of Aggression

A more protracted discussion developed in the Committee on the possible insertion in paragraph 2, Section B, Chapter VIII, of the *determination of acts of aggression*.

Various amendments proposed on this subject recalled the definitions written into a number of treaties concluded before this war but did not claim to specify all cases of aggression. They proposed a list of eventualities in which intervention by the Council would be automatic. At the same time they would have left to the Council the power to determine the other cases in which it should likewise intervene.

Although this proposition evoked considerable support, it nevertheless became clear to a majority of the Committee that a preliminary definition of aggression went beyond the possibilities of this Conference and the purpose of the Charter. The progress of the technique of modern warfare renders very difficult the definition of all cases of aggression. It may be noted that, the list of such cases being necessarily incomplete, the Council would have a tendency to consider of less importance the acts not mentioned therein; these omissions would encourage the aggressor to distort the definition or might delay action by the Council. Furthermore, in the other cases listed, automatic action by the Council might bring about a premature application of the enforcement measures.

The Committee therefore decided to adhere to the text drawn up at Dumbarton Oaks and to leave to the Council the entire decision as to what constitutes a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. [Report of Committee 3, Third Commission, United Nations Conference on International Organization, Doc. 881, III/3/46, San Francisco, June 10, 1945, reproduced in XII UNCIO, Documents 502, 505.]

It will be noted that the above quotation contains the method proposed by the representative of Colombia, i. e. an enumerative list plus power in the Security Council to determine other cases of aggression. This plan was considered and rejected. As stated above, the reason for the rejection was because the conference felt that such a plan would be unwise. It was not rejected because of the reason given by the representative of Colombia, i.e. the unanimity rule.

What Is the Intention of the Soviet Resolution?

Even in the narrower context of defining the crime of aggression for the purposes of the Nürnberg Charter (which did not in fact define aggression) the Soviet representative at the 1945 London Conference which drafted the Charter stated that "when people speak about aggression, they know what that means, but when they come to define it, they come up against difficulties which it has not been possible to overcome up to the present time." (Quoted by Mr. Spiropoulos in his report to the International Law Commission, 2d sess., on the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, A/CN.4/25, Apr. 26, 1950, p. 25.)

The Soviet Union, as has been seen, both at San Francisco and at the London Conference of 1945 indicated full awareness of the limitations of the device and clear preference for not defining the word. One may well wonder why the Soviet Union is so anxious now to have a list of aggressive acts.

With respect to the observations of the delegates of Chile and Colombia regarding definitions adopted in the American system, it may be useful to note that the implied similarity between the family of American Republics and the United Nations cannot be stretched beyond a certain point. The American Republics are so closely knit that the unit is different from the United Nations. Among friends one does not have to guard his life or to exercise unusual caution. But where the danger of aggression is greater, different measures must be taken in the political, military, or legal fields.

The Soviet proposal before us is practically identical with that introduced in Committee I at the fifth session of the General Assembly. The representative of the Soviet Union told us that it is intended to deter aggression. Is this the real intention of the resolution? Such a statement would have been easier to agree with if the record of the acts of the Soviet Union had been different from what unfortunately it is. We all know the facts, and it is unnecessary to repeat them here. But I should like to mention that the record shows that the Soviet Union is not in favor of resort to the International Court of Justice. And as for developing international criminal law, the Soviet Union did not desire even to participate in the

United Nations committee which dealt with the problem whether there should be an international criminal court.

There is danger that an instrument alleged to be intended to deter aggression may be a trap and may be turned to purposes not contemplated by those willing to agree with its contents in good faith. It may be intended for propaganda—and in order to harass and embarrass countries rather than to prevent international friction. It may be invoked in a manner in which its supporters never contemplated, although the opportunity was plain to see.

False charges may be brought under it. It may be contended that proof of falsity would show that the charges were baseless. But such proof may be difficult of easy access in some cases, and in any case it may take time. In the meantime innocent countries may be smeared before the world. Irreparable damage may well be the result.

The representative of the Soviet Union quoted from a treatise on international law a statement in favor of defining aggression.

As stated above, in the course of repeated discussions among statesmen and scholars, one could find such views. But convincing arguments by eminent international lawyers may be cited to show that definition of aggression might not be adaptable to the actual facts in certain cases. As one great international lawyer, John Bassett Moore put it, "What may be aggression in one instance may by no means be aggression in another instance. Each case must be tried on its merit. . . ." (*American Journal of International Law*, vol. 27, p. 627.) Another has said, "I therefore remain opposed to this attempt to define the aggressor, because I believe that it would be a trap for the innocent and a signpost for the guilty." (Sir Austin Chamberlain, *International Conciliation Documents*, 1930, p. 611.)

The International Law Commission, consisting of eminent international lawyers, endeavored to find a suitable definition but none was found by it.

In the Soviet resolution aggression is given the meaning of "first" attack; however, this definition is most illusory. It merely shifts the job of definition to the word "first" and other terms following it. Knowledge of a state's preparing to execute an immediate attack, like that of Pearl Harbor, might be considered grounds for immediate resort to force by the threatened state. Which state, under the "first" doctrine is "first," or guilty of an attack? A definition of aggression might even aid a potential aggressor. To ask a state to wait in order not to attack "first" a potential aggressor may give the enemy a great tactical advantage.

History and specific formulae apart, there is nothing to be gained by making the term "aggression" more precise, even were this possible and desirable, when it is only one of three conditions which, under article 39, the Security Council may

find to require action to preserve the peace. If the Council finds a "threat to the peace," a "breach of the peace," or an "act of aggression," the same consequences in terms of Charter procedure may attach. So far, the Soviet Union has not suggested a definition of "threat to the peace" or "breach of the peace." Absent such definition, one of aggression is either an academic exercise or motivated by considerations other than the pursuit of clarity under article 39.

Definition of Aggression Seen as Confusing

History indicates the futility of attempting a definition of aggression which will in fact confuse or restrict future discussion and decision more than it will clarify or guide it. Reason indicates the absurdity of straining at the gnat of defining what is probably the narrowest of three criteria for findings, any one of which can be the basis of identical action by the United Nations.

A definition may hamper the full freedom of the United Nations. Until certain facts develop to bring a situation within the definition, a United Nations organ might be reluctant to interfere. Appropriate action might be delayed with consequent great tactical advantages to the enemy and fatal effect for the victim.

Article 39 of the Charter specifically provides that the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and take steps accordingly. In the light of the manner that the veto has been taken advantage of in certain cases, is it reasonable to assume that a definition of aggression would not add to the difficulties? A definition of aggression all too often would prove a snare and a delusion, particularly when national interests are at stake. It is unwise to have a juristic ideal which not only fails to take account of political realities but may be a guidepost for a malefactor. There is a point beyond which the saving legal fictions will not work. As stated above, aggressors will not refrain from an attack because of a word or a phrase. Analogies between municipal and international law cannot go beyond a certain point. The problem of international disarmament, for instance, has nothing in common with the problem of individual disarmament, the prohibition against the carrying of weapons by an individual.

An attempt at a comprehensive definition of aggression would be inconsistent with the system of the Charter which contemplated that whether there has been aggression should be determined by the appropriate organ of the United Nations, on the facts of a given case. A *priori* definition would disregard article 39 of the Charter which provides that the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. A definition of aggression adopted by the General As-

Text of Soviet Draft Resolution

U.N. doc. A/C.6/L.208
Dated Jan. 5, 1952

The General Assembly,

CONSIDERING it necessary to formulate directives for such international organs as may be called upon to determine which party is guilty of aggression,

Declares:

1. That in an international conflict that State shall be declared the attacker which first commits one of the following acts:

(a) Declaration of war against another State;
(b) Invasion by its armed forces, even without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;

(c) Bombardment by its land, sea or air forces of the territory of another State or the carrying out of a deliberate attack on the ships or aircraft of the latter;

(d) The landing or leading of its land, sea or air forces inside the boundaries of another State without the permission of the Government of the latter, or the violation of the conditions of such permission, particularly as regards the length of their stay or the extent of the area in which they may stay;

(e) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;

(f) Support of armed bands organized in its own territory which invade the territory of another State, or refusal, on being requested by the invaded State, to take in its own territory any action within its power to deny such bands any aid or protection;

2. Attacks such as those referred to in paragraph 1 may not be justified by any arguments of a political, strategic or economic nature, or by the desire to exploit natural riches in the territory of the State attacked or to derive any other kind of advantages or privileges, or by reference to the amount of capital invested in the State attacked or to any other particular interests in its territory, or by the affirmation that the State attacked lacks the distinguishing marks of statehood:

In particular, the following may not be used as justifications for attack:

A. The internal position of any State; as, for example:

(a) The backwardness of any nation politically, economically or culturally;

(b) Alleged shortcomings of its administration;

(c) Any danger which may threaten the life or property of aliens;

(d) Any revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movement, civil war, disorders or strikes;

(e) The establishment or maintenance in any State of any political, economic or social system;

B. Any acts, legislation or orders of any State, as for example:

(a) The violation of international treaties;

(b) The violation of rights and interests in the sphere of trade, concessions or any other kind of economic activity acquired by another State or its citizens;

(c) The rupture of diplomatic or economic relations;

(d) Measures in connexion with an economic or financial boycott;

(e) Repudiation of debts;

(f) Prohibition or restriction of immigration or modification of the status of foreigners;

(g) The violation of privileges granted to the official representatives of another State;

(h) Refusal to allow the passage of armed forces proceeding to the territory of a third State;

(i) Measures of a religious or anti-religious nature;

(j) Frontier incidents.

3. In the event of the mobilization or concentration by another State of considerable armed forces near its frontier, the State which is threatened by such action shall have the right of recourse to diplomatic or other means of securing a peaceful settlement of international disputes. It may also in the meantime adopt requisite measures of a military nature similar to those described above, without, however, crossing the frontier.

sembly could not control the Security Council; presumably, even if the definition proposed by the Soviet Union had been adopted, it would still seek to allege that there was no aggression against the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, or would even allege that it was the United Nations which committed aggression in Korea.

Let us see what has happened already in the Assembly and more particularly in the Committee. Let us assume *arguendo* that the Assembly had adopted the Soviet resolution verbatim. What did the Soviet representative say before this Committee? That the United States was the aggressor in Korea. Presumably the Soviet Union will continue to consider the action in Korea as aggression. Here is then a situation in which the United Nations action in Korea is branded as aggression notwithstanding a definition of aggression.

In other words, the Soviet Union, the state that introduced the resolution defining it, would disregard reality entirely, would disregard the definition, would apply its own notions of what con-

stitutes aggression, and would not be deterred from resorting to force by the adopted definition.

Obviously, the Soviet resolution is not intended to include the action of Chinese Communists in Korea. Concerted action by hundreds of thousands of organized Chinese Communist troops has been given the label of "volunteer" action. Had the Soviet definition been adopted before this so-called "volunteer" action, the Soviet Union would have been the first to deny that such action came within the definition of aggression. What would a general definition of aggression help with respect to such action in Korea? As stated above, aggressors resort to attack for motives of such a nature that any hope that the definition of aggression would act as a deterrent does not take account of political realities.

What is needed is a will to make the Charter work. It is not a definition of aggression which is needed but a sincere desire on the part of all nations to live up to the obligations and principles of the Charter.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Copyright Experts of the American Republics

On January 14 the Department of State announced that Luther Evans, Librarian of Congress, would serve as Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Meeting of Copyright Experts of the American Republics opening on that date at the Pan American Union at Washington. The other members of the U.S. delegation are as follows:

Advisers

Roger C. Dixon, Chief, Business Practices and Technology Staff, Department of State

Arthur Fisher, Register of Copyrights, Library of Congress

Sidney Kaye, Attorney, New York, N.Y.

John Schulman, Attorney, New York, N.Y.

The first draft of the Universal Copyright Convention was prepared during the Meeting of the Committee of Copyright Specialists of the Sixth General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), held at Paris, June 18–July 11, 1951. The purpose of this draft convention is to simplify, unify, and codify the copyright laws of all of the nations of the world. The Committee was unable to agree upon the text of an article for incorporation in the convention which would clarify the relationship between this convention and the existing inter-American conventions in the copyright field and accordingly recommended that interested countries study the problem among themselves prior to the intergovernmental conference for negotiation of the Universal Copyright Convention, scheduled to convene at Geneva later this year. As a result of this recommendation, the Council of the Organization of American States, by resolution of October 17, 1951, convoked the forthcoming Meeting of Copyright Experts of the American Republics.

The agenda for the meeting is limited to one topic only, which, according to the report of the Copyright Committee of the Organization of American States, is, "Consideration and drafting of the text of article XVI of the draft of the universal convention prepared by the UNESCO Committee of Copyright Specialists, for the purpose of defining the relation of the inter-American system of copyright protection to the proposed world system and of determining the legal effect of that convention on the Pan American conventions."

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East

On January 14 the Department of State announced that the President had designated Merrill C. Gay, Economic Adviser, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, as U.S. representative with the personal rank of Minister, and Walter M. Kotschnig, Director, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, as U.S. alternate representative, to the eighth session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), which will convene at Rangoon, Burma, on January 29.

Mr. Gay and Mr. Kotschnig will also serve as chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the U.S. delegation to the fourth session of the Committee on Industry and Trade of ECAFE, which will convene at Rangoon on January 18.

Other members of the U.S. delegations to the two meetings are as follows:

Eighth session of ECAFE and fourth session of the Committee on Industry and Trade

Principal Adviser

Robert E. Asher, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State

Advisers

James H. Boulware, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, Rangoon

Rufus Burr Smith, Commercial Attaché, American Embassy, Bangkok

Arthur W. Stuart, Chief, Far Eastern Division, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

Committee on Industry and Trade

Adviser (in addition to those listed above)

Wilson E. Sweeney, Attaché, American Embassy, New Delhi

The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, one of the three regional economic commissions of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc), was established by an Ecosoc resolution adopted on March 28, 1947. The purpose of this Commission is to (1) initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the economic reconstruction of Asia and the Far East, for raising the level of economic activity in the region, and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of countries within the region, both among themselves and with other coun-

tries of the world; (2) conduct or sponsor investigations and studies of economic and technological problems and developments within territories of Asia and the Far East; and (3) undertake or sponsor the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of economic, technological, and statistical information. Fourteen member governments and eight associate member governments comprise the membership of ECAFE. The last session of the Commission was held at Lahore, Pakistan, February 28-March 7, 1951.

At its eighth session the Commission will review the reports of several of its subsidiary bodies, including the Inland Transport Committee, the Committee on Industry and Trade, and the Working Party on the Standard International Trade Classification. Other agenda items to be considered by the Commission include technical assistance for economic development; activities of the ECAFE Secretariat in the field of statistics, particularly those activities relating to the promotion of improved statistical methods and techniques in the various countries of the region; the report by the International Labor Office on its activities in relation to the ECAFE region; the Food and Agriculture Organization's report on food and agricultural conditions in Asia and the Far East; and adoption of the annual report of the Commission to the Economic and Social Council.

The agenda for the fourth session of the Committee on Industry and Trade includes consideration of such matters as activities in the field of mineral-resources development; trade between the ECAFE region and Europe; activities relating to trade promotion and travel; and the reports of various subcommittees and working parties. The findings of this Committee will be summarized in a report which will be submitted to the eighth session of the Commission.

The fourth session of the Subcommittee on Iron and Steel of ECAFE will convene at Rangoon on January 15. The U.S. delegation to this meeting is as follows:

Members

Rufus Burr Smith (Chairman)
David A. Andrews, Assistant Chief, Foreign Geology Branch, U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior
Wilson E. Sweeney

The first session of the Subcommittee on Electric Power of ECAFE, which convened on January 11 at Rangoon, was scheduled to adjourn January 14. The U.S. delegation was as follows:

Members

Rufus Burr Smith (Chairman)
David A. Andrews
Anthony F. Bisgood, Chief, Industry Division, Special Technical and Economic Mission, Bangkok
Stanley Phillippi, Irrigation Specialist, Special Technical and Economic Mission, Bangkok

MSA—Continued from page 125

for military production. This group also will be the primary channel for Msa's relations with the Defense Department on defense production policy, offshore procurement, and related matters.

Following is a list of Msa country mission chiefs:

Austria	Clarence E. Meyer
Belgium-Luxembourg	Huntington Gilchrist
Denmark	Charles A. Marshall
France	Henry R. Labouisse
Germany (Federal Republic)	Michael S. Harris
Greece	Roger D. Lapham
Iceland	Edward B. Lawson
Ireland	Albert J. Dexter
Italy	M. Leon Dayton
The Netherlands	Clarence E. Hunter
Norway	John E. Gross
Portugal	James Minotto
Trieste	M. Leon Dayton
Turkey	Russell H. Dorr
United Kingdom	William L. Batt
Yugoslavia	Richard F. Allen
Burma	Abbot L. Moffat
China (Formosa)	Hubert G. Schenck
Associated States of Indo-china	David Williamson
Indonesia	Samuel P. Hayes
Philippines	Roland R. Renne
Thailand	Austin F. Flegel

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Jan. 14-19, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

No.	Date	Subject
28†	1/14	Miller: Assistance to Latin America
29†	1/14	Germany: External debts conference
30†	1/14	Pierson: External debts conference (combined with No. 29)
31	1/14	Gay and Kotschnig to ECAFE
32	1/14	Evans: Meeting of copyright experts
33†	1/15	Bahamas: Proving ground extension
34*	1/15	IEP fellowships.
35†	1/15	Ecuador: Military assistance
36†	1/15	Barnard: Special representative (rewrite)
37	1/16	Japan: Yoshida to Dulles
38*	1/15	Webb: Our Foreign Policy
39	1/16	Acheson: Soviet atomic control plan
40	1/16	L'Heureux: Displaced persons act
41†	1/17	Miller: Hemispheric relations
42	1/17	Japan: Dulles reply to Yoshida
43	1/17	International Information Administration
44†	1/18	Pt. 4 appointments (rewrite)
45†	1/18	Bowles: Speech at Hartford
46†	1/18	Resignation of Hawkins (rewrite)
47†	1/19	Chile: Military assistance

The United States in the United Nations

[January 17-23, 1952]

General Assembly

Action on the Soviet Union's eight-point "peace" program was completed by the Assembly, meeting in plenary session January 19. The five paragraphs which dealt with disarmament were referred to the new Disarmament Commission in accordance with a U.S.-U.K.-French proposal, adopted 40-5 (Soviet bloc)-3 (India, Saudi Arabia, Syria). The other three provisions were decisively rejected for the second time.

The Assembly also adopted 20 resolutions reported out by the Trusteeship Committee. These included 12 resolutions on trusteeship matters, 6 dealing with non-self-governing territories, and 2 on South West Africa. One Committee-approved proposal—calling on the Trusteeship Council to associate United Nations members not represented on the Council with the activities of its subsidiary bodies—failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority.

Committee I (Political and Security)—The Committee concluded January 23 a 5-day general discussion of the item on admission of new members. Debate centered on two resolutions (1) a Peruvian proposal inviting all states which have applied or may apply for membership to present all appropriate evidence relating to their qualifications under article 4 of the Charter and recommending that the Security Council reconsider all pending and future applications in the light of such evidence, basing its action exclusively on the conditions contained in the Charter; and (2) a Soviet move to have the Council reconsider (presumably favorably) the applications of 13 states previously denied admission, plus that of Libya.

Of the 13 states mentioned in the Soviet resolution, 8—Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon, and Nepal—failed of acceptance because of the Soviet veto, and 5—Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Outer Mongolia—because their applications did not receive the necessary seven votes in the Security Council. Applications are also pending from the Republic of Korea, the "People's Democratic Republic of Korea," Vietnam, and the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam."

The Peruvian formula was widely supported during the debate, although a number of changes

were suggested, most of which were later accepted. Very few delegates have taken a clear-cut stand, pro or con, on the Soviet proposal. However, considerable support has been evidenced for the "principle of universality." United States Representative Ernest Gross, in reiterating the United States position in support of the admission of "all qualified States," flatly rejected the Soviet Union's "package deal" as illegal, and warned that "blackmail" of this sort "is always sought in installments." He generally supported the Peruvian plan.

Earlier, the Committee completed action on the Soviet item, "Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations." The U.S.-U.K.-French resolution referring to disarmament proposals contained in the U.S.S.R.'s omnibus resolution to the Disarmament Commission was adopted 53-5 (Soviet bloc)-2 (India, Afghanistan). The remaining provisions were rejected as follows: paragraph directed against Atlantic Pact and overseas bases, by 46 (U.S.) 5-7; subparagraph calling for end of military operations in Korea, conclusion of armistice, and withdrawal from 38th Parallel within 10 days, by 42 (U.S.)-5-12; subparagraph calling for withdrawal from Korea within 3 months of all foreign troops and "volunteer units" by 42 (U.S.)-7 (Soviet bloc, Egypt, Yemen)-10; and paragraph recommending conclusion of Five Power peace pact, by 35 (U.S.)-11 (Soviet bloc, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Burma, Afghanistan, Yemen)-13.

Ad Hoc Political Committee—By a vote of 43-0-7 (Soviet bloc, Argentina, Canada), the Committee, January 22, adopted a U.S.-U.K.-Turkish-French resolution endorsing the United Nations Relief and Works Agency's program for the relief and reintegration of some 900,000 Palestine refugees now scattered over 100,000 square miles of territory in five different Arab countries. The program envisages the expenditure of 50 million dollars for relief and 200 million dollars for reintegration over a 3-year period starting July 1, 1951. Governments were urged to make voluntary contributions to the extent necessary to complete the program.

Speaking in support of the Agency program, United States Representative Philip C. Jessup ex-

pressed the conviction that it would be of benefit to all concerned. He said:

It will restore to the refugees . . . the dignity of earning their own livelihood and will enable them to contribute to the social and economic betterment of the areas which have given them asylum. Finally, it points the way to the termination of both relief and reintegration at the end of the 3-year period envisaged.

Committee II (Economic and Financial)—On January 19 the Committee, by a vote of 42-0-5 (Soviet bloc), approved an expanded U.S.-Chilean resolution urging all governments “cooperatively” to attack the problems of hunger and famine on a wide front and calling on the Secretary-General to devise procedures for prompt and concerted action by governments, intergovernmental organizations, and voluntary agencies in the event of emergency famines. A Soviet amendment which attempted to link the shortage of food and chemicals with the so-called “arms race” was rejected, as was the Czech resolutions on the “deterioration of the position of the working population as a result of the armaments races in a number of countries.”

Also adopted, 44-0-5 (Soviet bloc), was a U.K.-French resolution requesting the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies represented on the Technical Assistance Board to send additional experts to Libya to complete a previous survey of the problem of Libyan war damages. They were further asked to give sympathetic consideration to requests for assistance with economic development programs, including the repair and reconstruction of damaged property and installations.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)—The Committee on January 19 approved the U.S.-Indian-Belgian-Lebanese plan to have the Human Rights Commission draft two separate covenants on human rights—one containing civil and political rights, the other containing economic, social, and cultural rights—for the simultaneous approval of the next (Seventh) General Assembly. The two covenants would be opened for signature at the same time, according to the approved formula. Adoption of the four-nation proposal climaxed a spirited 4-week debate, during which a concerted effort was made by the U.S. and others to persuade the Committee to reverse the 1950 Assembly decision in favor of including both sets of rights in the same covenant.

Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary)—A six-power resolution giving effect to the Secretary-General's proposal for a 7.5 percent cost-of-living increase for members of the United Nations Secretariat was adopted by the Committee by a vote of 33-14 (U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R.)-8. The United States favored a 5-percent increase. Approval 35-5 (Soviet bloc)-1 was given to another resolution, authorizing the Secretary-General to incur additional expenditures not to exceed 3 million dollars for the purpose of completing the United Nations' Permanent Headquarters in New York City. Of the total, one million dollars is to be charged against the 1952 budget, with the remainder to come out of the Working Capital Fund. Efforts to remain within the original headquarters budget (65 million dollars) proved unsuccessful due to world-wide increases in the cost of materials.

Committee VI (Legal)—Concluding a 2-week debate on the question of defining aggression, the Legal Committee on January 21 adopted a composite resolution reflecting what appeared to the view of a majority of speakers that it would be “desirable” to define aggression. No action was taken on the U.S.S.R. and other texts which purported to define the term. However, the approved resolution provided for further study of the question at the next Assembly session on the basis of a “thorough” report to be prepared by the Secretary-General. The vote was 28-12 (U.S., U.K.) with 7 abstentions. The United States position, as set forth by John Maktos, is that

definition of aggression is not in the interest of peace The evil purposes of States cannot be controlled by a mechanical device It is the moral force and will of the United Nations to act with courage and determination under the Charter that deters aggression.

Additional Measures to be Employed to Meet the Aggression in Korea—Haiti and Mexico have informed the United Nations Secretariat that they have embargoed the shipment of arms, ammunition, implements of war, etc., to areas under Chinese Communist or North Korean control, as recommended by the General Assembly in its May 18, 1951 resolution. A total of 69 communications concerning implementation of this resolution have now been received from 62 member and nonmember nations.

Senate Considers Accession of Greece and Turkey To North Atlantic Treaty

Statement by Secretary Acheson¹

It gives me great pleasure to appear before you today in support of the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty which the President has submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. This protocol provides that upon its entry into force, following its approval by all of the NATO Governments, Greece and Turkey are to be invited to accede to the Treaty.

It is less than 5 years since this country authorized aid to Greece and Turkey to help them maintain their independence and national integrity. The strength of these two countries, increased by their own efforts and by our aid, will now be integrated with that of the other NATO countries, thus consolidating the defensive strength of the NATO. The executive branch of this Government actively sponsored this development during the Ottawa meeting of the North Atlantic Council in September 1951 which led to the protocol now under consideration.

Greece and Turkey share the attachment of the present NATO members to democratic principles and to the principle of collective security. They will be important elements of strength in the NATO not only because of their strategic location on the southeast flank of General Eisenhower's command but because of their inherent strength and their determination to maintain their independence and freedom. In turn they will benefit from the collective strength of the NATO, to which they contribute.

Favorable action by the Senate on the protocol will be a logical extension, required in view of the present world situation, of a most important foreign-policy decision which was initiated on March 12, 1947. On that day President Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress in behalf of a policy of American support to "free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." He requested authority to provide for assistance to Greece and Turkey to help these countries maintain their independence and national integrity. At that time the very existence of the Greek state was threatened by the activities of Communist-led guerrillas

who were defying the Government's authority. Soviet pressures against Turkey were manifested by the Soviet proposal for joint Turkish-Soviet defense of the Turkish Straits, Soviet claims to two large provinces of eastern Turkey, and the Soviet announcement in March 1945 that it would not renew the Turkish-Russian Treaty of Friendship.

Recognizing the importance to the free world of the survival of Greece and Turkey, the Congress responded promptly to the President's request and authorized assistance in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948.

Thus we moved to prevent the piecemeal murder of independent nations, a decision based, as the President said, on a "frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."

With the aid thus authorized, and with subsequent programs of aid, the most recent being incorporated in the Mutual Security Act of 1951, Greece and Turkey have been and are being strengthened militarily and economically. It is a strength based not only on the material assistance which our aid programs make possible but on the steadfast determination of these two countries to maintain their independence and to resist external aggression, regardless of the source. It is a strength which has helped to deter Communist aggression in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East areas, areas of great importance to the security of Western Europe and the United States.

Benefits Inherent Under NATO Membership

A new stage in the cycle has been reached. Greece and Turkey seek to integrate their strength, which we have helped develop, with that of the United States and the other 11 NATO countries. By so doing, they will be contributing to the greater effectiveness of the collective-defense system which has been created under the North Atlantic Treaty for the preservation of peace and security, thereby enhancing their own security as well as that of the other NATO members.

The desire of Greece and Turkey to participate

¹Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Jan. 15. The Committee on Jan. 15, in executive session, favorably reported the protocol to the Senate.

with the United States in collective-defense arrangements, either through membership in the NATO or through other regional or bilateral security arrangements, is not new. It had been expressed on many occasions, following the initiation of programs of aid to these countries in 1947, for their own experience had demonstrated to them the wisdom of creating "situations of strength" as a deterrent to aggression. But this Government, in the early days of NATO, felt that it should not undertake such further responsibilities until the NATO structure had been firmly established and until greater progress had been made in developing the collective strength of its members.

In September 1950, however, a first step was taken by NATO to establish closer association with Greece and Turkey. They were invited by the North Atlantic Council to associate themselves with such appropriate phases of the military planning work of the NATO as were concerned with the defense of the Mediterranean. This invitation was accepted by the two countries, but the association with NATO which it offered was not considered by them as an adequate solution to their security requirements. This Government continued to examine the question of whether developing further security arrangements would maximize the contribution which these countries could make toward the common goal of the Free World.

In the spring of 1951, with the developing strength of NATO, the executive branch concluded that it was desirable and feasible to conclude formal security arrangements with Greece and Turkey and that membership of these countries in the NATO would be the preferred form of arrangement. This Government then raised the question with the United Kingdom and France because of their treaty relationship with Turkey, arising out of the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance concluded in 1939. It also raised it with the other NATO members.

Each of the NATO members, faced with a proposal which involved an extension of the sphere of mutual interest and responsibility, naturally had to examine the problem, as we had done, from the viewpoint of its own interests and to reach its own decision. Thorough discussion of the problem by the Deputies of the North Atlantic Council, with the advice of NATO military agencies, led to general recognition that the participation of Greece and Turkey in a collective-defense system on a reciprocal basis was in the interest of all concerned. Whether NATO membership or some other form of security arrangement would be most effective was then given consideration. As a result, at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa in September 1951, a resolution proposed by this Government recommending that the NATO governments undertake the steps necessary to permit extension of an invitation to the two countries to accede to the Treaty was unanimously accepted. The entry into force of the protocol now before the Senate

for its advice and consent will result in the invitation being issued.

What does accession to the Treaty mean for Greece and Turkey? In the event they are attacked, they will stand, not alone, but as partners in a community of nations which is growing ever stronger and is pledged to consider an attack on any member of the community as an attack on all. It is through the development of the collective strength of the Treaty members—economic and political as well as military strength—that the necessary deterrent to aggression can be created. The strength which Greece and Turkey are ready to contribute to a common cause will increase their own ability to maintain their freedom and independence and to insure their peaceful development, free from coercion. It will not lighten the burden of keeping themselves strong which they have been bearing willingly but it multiplies the benefits which they will derive from full and active participation in the NATO collective-defense system. In addition, they will be equal members in an organization which seeks to develop cooperative action among its members in the economic and cultural fields as well as in the military field.

But the accession of Greece and Turkey to the NATO is also important to us.

The benefits of NATO membership for Greece and Turkey not only add to their security but to ours. One need only look at a map to appreciate the strategic importance of these two countries to the West. They guard the eastern approaches to the Mediterranean, including the strategically important warm-water route from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. In addition, Turkey flanks the land route from Russia to the rich oil fields of the Middle East. The known determination of Greece and Turkey to maintain their independence and national integrity and to develop their strength has made them increasingly effective barriers to Soviet expansion in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East areas. Their continued alinement with the free world and the integration of their strength with that of the collective strength of the present NATO members thus has great significance in terms of our own security.

Potential Combat Effectiveness

Both countries have large military forces in being—forces designed to defend, not extend their territories—as well as substantial numbers of reserves. These forces offer a formidable deterrent to the aggressive aspirations of their neighbors. American equipment and training have helped these two countries modernize their defense establishments and their combat effectiveness is steadily increasing.

The Greek Army has developed into a well trained and well equipped fighting force. In 1949 it succeeded in destroying the Communist-led guerrillas and in restoring authority to the Greek

Government throughout Greek territory. The guerrilla war is now over and Greece has continued to keep large forces under arms because of the threat from the North. Approximately 40 percent of its budgetary expenditures continue to be devoted to defense.

Turkey's military forces in being will be among the largest of the NATO countries. The Turkish Army has a centuries-old tradition of defending its territory. It is an army which has been steadily developing its combat capabilities, for the cornerstone of Turkish national policy is self-defense and, to this end, the maintenance of national defense forces at the highest possible standard. The equipment and training which the United States has been supplying to aid in that development are being eagerly and effectively utilized. Very substantial progress has already been achieved in the modernization which the Turks recognized that their army required. International tensions and pressures from without have led the Turks to continue to maintain their military expenditures at a high level, averaging well over one-third of their total budgetary expenditures in the postwar years.

This willingness of the two countries to maintain large numbers of men under arms and to bear the burden of effective military establishments is further convincing evidence of the importance which they attach to their independence and freedom. But equally important to the free world is their recognition of the advantages of collective security, a principle to which they have given active support. They were among the first countries to respond to the appeal of the United Nations for forces to resist the Communist aggression in Korea. Their fighting men have earned for their countries the admiration and respect of us all by their gallant heroism and the military qualities that they demonstrated on the field of battle.

It is worth some emphasis that Greek and Turkish efforts have been directed solely to the defense of their own freedom and that of other free nations. They have not manifested the slightest intent to use their power for self-aggrandizement or aggression. This is in full accord with the policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the United Nations. Those who have sought to brand the NATO as an aggressor organization will have to stretch the truth to read aggressive intent into the expanded NATO. Then false accusations of aggressive intent are merely a means to try to divide and weaken our members. The free people of the world will not be misled by such obvious propaganda tactics in the light of the peaceful record of the 14 countries involved.

Progress Toward Democracy

Both Greece and Turkey are democratic countries, working as are the present NATO members to strengthen their free democratic institutions, one

of the principal objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty. The political stability of the Greek Government has been considerably enhanced since 1947 and its authority has been established throughout the land. Martial law, made necessary by guerrilla warfare, has been lifted and the Greeks have on several occasions in recent years freely expressed their choice for Parliamentary representation in free and independent elections. The Communist Party is outlawed and its influence is limited. The United Democratic Left Parties (EDA), which are generally considered in Greek circles to be strongly though covertly influenced by the Communists, hold only 4 percent of the Parliamentary seats.

In Turkey there has been a very conspicuous development of democratic processes since 1947, culminating on May 14, 1950, in the first national elections during the lifetime of the young Republic in which fully organized opposition parties participated. As a result of these elections the party which had governed the Republic since it was founded in 1923 turned over the reins of government, in an atmosphere of calm, to a party founded only 4 years previously. I doubt that this event has many parallels in the history of democratic development. One party rule has frequently led to democratic rule but usually as a result of violence or revolution. The Turkish elections are an example of an evolutionary development, a development foreseen and planned by the founder of the Republic and carried on by his successor. That it could occur in a period of serious international tensions in an area directly exposed to the threat of external aggression is testimony to the maturity of the Turkish people and their leaders. Certainly, Turkey's internal stability and the unity of its people on Turkey's foreign policy give strength to, as well as derive strength from, Turkey's efforts to help maintain a high standard of military defense. Communism finds very few supporters in Turkey. The Communist Party is banned and Communist adherents in the country are believed to number less than $\frac{1}{10}$ of 1 percent of the population.

Both countries have been following a policy of active cooperation with the West. Economically as well as politically, their principal ties are with the Western nations. They participate in the Council of Europe and in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. They are adherents to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. They play an active role in the U.N. and are staunch supporters of the principles of the U.N. Charter. Turkey, for example, is now a member of the Security Council and is one of the members of the Palestine Conciliation Commission as well as the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Greece has recently been elected to the Security Council.

Our own relations with them have been traditionally friendly and have been becoming in-

creasingly close since our programs of aid were initiated in 1947. Fundamentally we share the same aspirations—the creation of conditions in which we and other nations can be free from coercion tyranny. We are finding an ever-growing community of interests as we come to know and understand each other better.

To sum up, I believe that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO, while representing an extension of our formal security arrangements, provides a more than compensating increase in the security of this country and of the North Atlantic community as a whole. It is a case of mutual benefits. Their strategic location, their military capabilities and determination, their active support of the principle of collective security, their increasingly successful efforts in strengthening their free institutions, their record of support of the principles of the U.N. Charter, and the mutually satisfactory and close relationship which we have enjoyed in recent years are factors which lead inescapably to this conclusion. In the interest of maximizing the defensive strength of the free world through the integration of their strength into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Greece, the “cradle of Western democracy,” and Turkey, the “easternmost bastion of Western democracy,” should be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Report on Trade Agreement Escape Clauses

Message from the President to the Congress

[Released to the press by the White House January 14]

Pursuant to the provisions of subsection (b) of Section 6 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 (Public Law 50, 82nd Congress), I hereby submit to the Congress a report on trade agreement escape clauses.

A review of the existing trade agreements in the light of the policy expressed in subsection (a) of Section 6 and its legislative history shows that all except six are in conformity with this policy. One of these six agreements is in the process of being terminated and another is under renegotiation which is likely to include the addition of escape clause provisions. Subcommittees of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements have been directed to recommend to that Committee at an early date proposals with regard to the remaining four of these agreements.

There is attached a detailed report on this subject prepared for me by the Trade Agreements Committee.¹ Since this is the first report to the

Congress under Section 6, the attached report contains an explanation of the development of the use of escape clauses and the extent to which they have been made applicable to an increasingly large number of concessions.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 10, 1952.

TEXT OF TRADE AGREEMENTS COMMITTEE'S REPORT

(Pursuant to the provisions of sec. 6 (b) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951)

Section 6 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 provides as follows:

(a) No reduction in any rate of duty, or binding of any existing customs or excise treatment, or other concession hereafter proclaimed under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, shall be permitted to continue in effect when the product on which the concession has been granted is, as a result, in whole or in part, of the duty or other customs treatment reflecting such concession, being imported into the United States in such increased quantities, either actual or relative, as to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products.

(b) The President, as soon as practicable, shall take such action as may be necessary to bring trade agreements heretofore entered into under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, into conformity with the policy established in subsection (a) of this section.

On or before January 10, 1952, and every six months thereafter, the President shall report to the Congress on the action taken by him under this subsection.¹

The effect of this new provision of trade-agreements legislation is a statutory requirement (1) that all future trade-agreement concessions shall be subject to an escape clause conforming to the policy established in subsection (a) of section 6, and (2) that, as soon as practicable, the President shall take such action as may be necessary to bring existing trade agreements which do not contain such an escape clause into conformity with the

¹The report of the Senate Committee on Finance, which proposed section 6 in its present form, explained that “the principle of including an escape clause in existing agreements is not mandatory unless such action would be practicable” (S. Rept. 299, April 27, 1951, 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 5). In opening the debate on this provision in the Senate, Senator George, chairman of the committee, stated that, “In general, this amendment is designed to allow the greatest possible freedom in the operation of existing and future trade agreements without resultant serious injury to domestic producers” (97 Congressional Record (May 21, 1951), 5620). He continued:

“Recognizing, however, the varying situations which exist in our trade relations with different countries at different times, the committee places no time limit upon the President, and makes the principle of including the escape clause in existing agreements mandatory only if such action would be practicable. This is to make sure that no important interest in this country will be jeopardized by action which might be unwise or precipitate under the circumstances” (*ibid.*, 5620, 5621).

¹H. Doc. No. 328.

policy of subsection (a) of section 6 and to report to the Congress periodically on the action taken in this respect.

A review of existing trade agreements in the light of the policy expressed in section 6 (a) and its legislative history shows that all except six are in conformity with this policy. As is indicated more fully later in this report, one of these six agreements is in the process of being terminated and another is under renegotiation which is likely to include the addition of escape clause provisions. Subcommittees of the Trade Agreements Committee have been directed to recommend to that committee at an early date proposals with regard to the remaining four of these agreements. Since this is the first report to the Congress under section 6 (b), the enumeration of the steps taken pursuant thereto is preceded by an explanation of the development of the use of escape clauses and the extent to which they have been made applicable to an increasingly larger number of concessions.

Ever since the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act in 1934 it has been the policy of the President to direct the operations of the trade-agreements program in such a way as to avoid serious injury to domestic industries. The extent to which domestic industries are protected against serious injury, through procedures followed in preparing for the negotiation of trade agreements, safeguards written into the concessions granted on specific products, and avenues of escape after the agreements become effective, has been called to the attention of the Congress in connection with the periodic renewals of the trade-agreements authority. A detailed description of these procedures and safeguards is contained in the report of the Ways and Means Committee on the 1951 renewal (H. Rept. No. 14, January 29, 1951, 82d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 11-14). This report summarizes these procedures and safeguards as follows:

Measures to assure that no United States industry will suffer serious injury or threat of serious injury through a concession in a trade agreement are provided for: (1) in the procedures followed before a trade agreement is negotiated; (2) in the individual concessions themselves; and (3) in the general provisions of the agreement which apply after the agreement becomes effective (*ibid.*, p. 11).

In the early trade agreements negotiated under the Trade Agreements Act separate provisions were included to safeguard against each of various specified contingencies which might arise after the agreement became effective. For example, many of the early agreements contained a provision under which individual tariff concessions could be modified or withdrawn on short notice if it should develop after the agreement entered into force that third countries were getting the major benefit of the concession and serious injury was being caused or threatened to the domestic industry by increased imports of the product con-

cerned. Another safeguarding provision found in many early trade agreements permitted termination or modification of the agreement on short notice in the event of wide variations in exchange rates threatening serious injury to domestic industries.

Subsequently, broader safeguarding provisions were included in later agreements largely because of the impossibility of foreseeing, at the time of making an agreement, all the situations which might arise under the agreement to require safeguarding action. Hence, beginning with the trade agreement with Argentina (signed October 14, 1941),² it has been the policy to rely upon provisions broad enough in scope to afford the basis for action in the event that situations should arise after the conclusion of the agreement of such a character as to threaten serious injury to domestic industries in either of the countries party to the agreement. Although all of these provide protection against serious injury to domestic producers, the exact text of the broad escape clauses included in them has varied somewhat.

In the trade agreements with Argentina (art. XII), Iceland (art. XII), Iran (art. IX), Peru (art. XI), and Uruguay (art. XII), which were concluded between 1941 and 1943, escape provisions, substantially similar to each other were inserted, which are broad enough in scope to afford the basis for prompt action in the event that circumstances should arise of such a kind as to threaten serious injury to domestic industries. Briefly described, the escape provisions in each of these agreements provide for consultation and discussion in the event of any situation arising which has the effect of prejudicing an industry or the commerce of one of the parties to the agreement; such consultation is to take place with a view to effecting a mutually satisfactory adjustment of the matter, but if no agreement can be reached, the contracting party desiring to take the action may do so by terminating the agreement in whole or in part on short notice.

In the light of the experience gained in the operation of the trade-agreements program there was developed what has become known as the standard escape clause. On February 25, 1947, the President issued Executive Order No. 9832, in which he directed that all trade agreements entered into thereafter should include the standard escape clause. Later Executive orders (No. 10004 of October 5, 1948, and No. 10082 of October 5, 1949) continued the President's specific instruction regarding the standard escape clause with no substantial change. This clause provides in substance that trade-agreement concessions may be suspended, withdrawn, or modified if it should be found after the agreement becomes effective that as a result in part of the concession a product is

² The texts of this and later escape-clause provisions discussed are reproduced as an appendix to this report.

being imported in such increased quantities as to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products. By virtue of section 6 (a) of the 1951 Extension Act the Presidential instruction set forth in these orders has become a statutory requirement to be followed in the negotiation of all new trade agreements.

The original negotiations leading to the multilateral trade agreement, known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, were completed at Geneva, Switzerland, in October 1947 and, in compliance with Executive Order 9832, that agreement contains the standard escape clause (art. XIX). The trade agreement with Paraguay (1946, art. XII) also contains the standard clause with only minor variations.³

The standard escape clause permits the modification or withdrawal of concessions under conditions which are stated in terms substantially equivalent to those used in section 6 (a) of the 1951 Extension Act, which sets forth the policy of Congress that trade agreement concessions should not be continued in effect under specified conditions. The clause is also substantially equivalent to the relevant provisions of section 7 of that act prescribing the method for carrying out this policy, which is through the withdrawal or modification of concessions if the President determines such action is warranted after investigation and report to the President by the Tariff Commission. The earlier escape clauses in the trade agreements with Argentina, Iceland, Iran, Peru,⁴ and Uruguay,⁵ while not so specifically worded, are sufficiently broad in their language to permit such action to be taken by the United States. Consequently, these five trade agreements and those to which the standard escape clause is applicable are in conformity with the policy set forth in section 6 (a).

The Executive has in recent years brought an ever-increasing proportion of trade-agreement concessions, including those contained in earlier trade agreements, within the scope of the standard escape clause. This has been the case particularly since 1947, in connection with the multilateral negotiations with respect to the General Agreement. The original negotiations for this agreement at Geneva were carried on among 23 coun-

tries.⁶ Subsequently, as a result of negotiations completed at Annecy, France, in October 1949 and at Torquay, England, in April 1951, 13 additional countries⁷ have acceded to that agreement.

In connection with the Geneva, Annecy, and Torquay negotiations, it has been the consistent policy of the United States, in those cases where we had earlier bilateral trade agreements, to arrange with the countries concerned for the suspension or termination of existing bilateral agreements as these countries became contracting parties to the General Agreement. Hence, our earlier bilateral trade agreement obligations to countries becoming contracting parties to the General Agreement have been superseded by trade-agreement obligations to them under the General Agreement which are subject to the standard escape clause. For example, our earlier bilateral trade agreements with such important trading countries as Canada (1938), the United Kingdom (1938), France (1936), Belgium (1935), and the Netherlands (1935) have all been superseded by the General Agreement. This has also been the case with our bilateral agreements with Brazil, Cuba, Finland, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, and Sweden.

As of January 1, 1952, the United States had trade-agreement obligations with 32⁸ countries under the General Agreement. The tariff concessions of the United States to these 32 countries, included in its schedules to the General Agreement, which are subject to the standard escape clause in that agreement, include approximately 85 percent of the import trade of the United States.

The trade agreement with Switzerland, signed in 1936, did not originally contain the standard escape clause, but on October 13, 1950, it was agreed by the two countries that the standard escape clause should thereafter be applicable to the 1936 agreement.

In addition to the trade agreements already discussed which are in conformity with the policy of section 6 (a), the United States was, at the time of the enactment of the 1951 Extension Act, a party to bilateral trade agreements with six other countries as follows: Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Turkey, and Venezuela.

³ Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States.

⁴ Austria, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Nicaragua, Peru, Sweden, and Turkey.

⁵ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Italy, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Southern Rhodesia, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, and United Kingdom.

³ A comparable escape clause was also in the trade agreement with Mexico (1942, art. XI), which is no longer in force.

⁴ This agreement has been terminated as a result of the accession of Peru to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in October 1951.

⁵ Uruguay has undertaken negotiations for accession to the General Agreement, but has not yet acceded. Steps have been initiated for the termination of this bilateral agreement if Uruguay becomes a contracting party to the General Agreement.

Steps are now under way for the termination of the agreement with Turkey (signed in 1939) following the accession of that country to the General Agreement in October 1951.

In the case of the trade agreement with Venezuela, which was signed in November 1939, formal public notice of intention of this Government to negotiate with the Government of Venezuela to supplement and amend the agreement was given on August 29, 1951 (16 F. R. 8868). In these negotiations the United States will seek inclusion in that agreement of an escape-clause provision in conformity with the policy set forth in section 6 (a) of the 1951 Extension Act.

The Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements has set up subcommittees with instructions to formulate proposals with regard to the other four agreements—with Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—in the light of the 1951 Extension Act and to report to it by March 1, 1952. The tariff concessions made by the United States in these four agreements are limited almost entirely to products such as bananas, coffee, and other tropical specialties which are noncompetitive with domestic production.

APPENDIX

Escape Clause Provisions

I—PROVISIONS IN EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Executive Order 9832, February 25, 1947:

“PART I

“1. There shall be included in every trade agreement hereafter entered into under the authority of said act of June 12, 1934, as amended, a clause providing in effect that if, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the concession granted by the United States on any article in the trade agreement, such article is being imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause, or threaten, serious injury to domestic producers of like or similar articles, the United States shall be free to withdraw the concession, in whole or in part, or to modify it, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent such injury.” (3 CFR, 1947 Supp., p. 127.)

Executive Order 10004, October 5, 1948:

“10. There shall be applicable to each concession with respect to an article imported into the United States which is granted by the United States in any trade agreement hereafter entered into a clause providing in effect that if, as a result of unforeseen developments and of such concession, such article is being imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or similar articles, the United States shall be free to withdraw the concession, in

whole or in part, or to modify it, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent such injury.” (3 CFR, 1948 Supp., p. 231.)

Executive Order 10082, October 5, 1949:

“10. There shall be applicable to each tariff concession granted, or other obligations incurred, by the United States in any trade agreement hereafter entered into a clause providing in effect that if, as a result of unforeseen developments and of such concession or other obligation, any article is being imported in such relatively increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive articles, the United States shall be free to withdraw or modify the concession, or suspend the other obligation, in whole or in part, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent such injury.” (3 CFR, 1949 Supp., p. 127.)

II—PROVISIONS IN TRADE AGREEMENTS

Trade Agreement with Argentina, October 14, 1941:

“ARTICLE XII

“1. If the Government of either country should consider that any circumstance, or any measure adopted by the other Government, even though it does not conflict with the terms of this Agreement, has the effect of nullifying or impairing any object of the Agreement or of prejudicing an industry or the commerce of that country, such other Government shall give sympathetic consideration to such representations or proposals as may be made with a view to effecting a mutually satisfactory adjustment of the matter. If no agreement is reached with respect to such representations or proposals, the Government making them shall be free to suspend or terminate this Agreement in whole or in part on thirty days' written notice.” (56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1696, 1697.)

Trade Agreement with Uruguay, July 21, 1942:

“ARTICLE XII

“1. If the Government of either country should consider that any circumstance, or any measure adopted by the other Government, even though it does not conflict with the terms of this Agreement, has the effect of nullifying or impairing any object of the Agreement or of prejudicing an industry or the commerce of that country, such other Government shall give sympathetic consideration to such representations or proposals as may be made with a view to effecting a mutually satisfactory adjustment of the matter. If no agreement is reached with respect to such representations or proposals, the Government making them shall be free to suspend or terminate this Agreement in whole or in part on thirty days' written notice.” (56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1635.)

Trade Agreement with Iran, April 8, 1943:

“ARTICLE IX

“1. If the Government of either country should consider that any circumstance, or any measure adopted by the other Government, even though it does not conflict with the terms of this Agreement, has the effect of nullifying or impairing any object of the Agreement or of prejudicing an industry or the commerce of that country, such other Government shall give sympathetic consideration to such written representations or proposals as may be made with a view to effecting a mutually satisfactory adjustment of the matter. If agreement is not reached with respect to the matter within thirty days after such representations or proposals are received, the Government which made them shall be free, within fifteen days after the expiration of the aforesaid period of thirty days, to terminate this Agreement in whole or in part on thirty days’ written notice.” (58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1327.)

Trade Agreement with Iceland, August 27, 1943:

“ARTICLE XII

“If the Government of either country should consider that any circumstance, or any measure adopted by the other Government, even though it does not conflict with the terms of this Agreement, has the effect of nullifying or impairing any object of the Agreement or of prejudicing an industry or the commerce of that country, such other Government shall give sympathetic consideration to such written representations or proposals as may be made with a view to effecting a mutually satisfactory adjustment of the matter. If agreement is not reached with respect to the matter within thirty days after such representations or proposals are received, the Government which made them shall be free, within fifteen days after the expiration of the aforesaid period of thirty days, to terminate this Agreement in whole or in part on thirty days’ written notice.” (57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1086.)

Trade Agreement with Paraguay, September 12, 1946:

“ARTICLE XII

“1. If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the concession granted on any article enumerated and described in the Schedules annexed to this Agreement, such article is being imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or similar articles, the Government of either country shall be free to withdraw the concession, in whole or in part, or to modify it to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent such injury. Accordingly, if the President of the United States of America finds as a fact that imports of any article enumerated and described in Schedule II are entering the United States of America under

the circumstances specified in the preceding sentence, he shall determine whether the withdrawal, in whole or in part, of the concessions with regard to the article, or any modification of the concession, by the imposition of quantitative regulations or otherwise, is necessary to prevent such injury, and he shall, if he finds that the public interest will be served thereby, proclaim such finding and determination, and on and after the effective date specified in such proclamation, and so long as such proclamation remains in effect, imports of the article into the United States of America shall be subject to the customs treatment so determined to be necessary to prevent such injury. Similarly, if the Government of the Republic of Paraguay finds as a fact that any article enumerated and described in Schedule I is being imported into the Republic of Paraguay under the circumstances specified, it may, if it finds that the public interest will be served thereby, withdraw in whole or in part the concession with regard to the article, or modify the concession by the imposition of quantitative regulations or otherwise, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent such injury.

“2. Before the Government of either country shall withdraw or modify a concession pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the Government of the other country as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford such other Government an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action; and if agreement with respect thereto is not reached the Government which proposes to take such action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so and the other Government shall be free within thirty days after such action is taken to terminate this Agreement in whole or in part on thirty days’ written notice.” (61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2700, 2701.)

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947:

“ARTICLE XIX

“EMERGENCY ACTION ON IMPORTS OF PARTICULAR PRODUCTS

“1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.

“(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect to a preference, is being

imported into the territory of a contracting party in the circumstances set forth in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products in the territory of a contracting party which receives or received such preference, the importing contracting party shall be free, if that other contracting party so requests, to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession in respect of the product, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury.

"2. Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the CONTRACTING PARTIES as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford the CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting parties having a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action. When such notice is given in relation to a concession with respect to a preference, the notice shall name the contracting party which has requested the action. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition that consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action.

"3. (a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the action is not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue the action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or continued, the affected contracting parties shall then be free, not later than ninety days after such action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which written notice of such suspension is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the application to the trade of the contracting party taking such action, or, in the case envisaged in paragraph 1 (b) of this Article, to the trade of the contracting party requesting such action, of such substantially equivalent obligations or concessions under this Agreement the suspension of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove.

"(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, where action is taken under paragraph 2 of this Article without prior consultation and causes or threatens serious injury in the territory of a contracting party to the domestic producers of products affected by the action, that contracting party shall, where delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the taking of the action and throughout the period of consultation, such obligations or concessions as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury." (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A58 to A60.)

Agreement with Switzerland, October 13, 1950:

"1. If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by the Government of the United States of America or of Switzerland under the Trade Agreement signed in Washington January 9, 1936, including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of either country in such relatively increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry in that territory producing like or directly competitive products, the Government of the United States of America or of Switzerland shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.

"2. Before the Government of the United States or of Switzerland shall take action pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph one above, it shall give notice in writing to the other Government as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford such other Government an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action and with respect to such compensatory modifications of the Trade Agreement as may be deemed appropriate, to the extent practicable maintaining the general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions in the Agreement. If agreement between the two Governments is not reached as a result of such consultation, the Government which proposes to take the action under Paragraph one shall, nevertheless, be free to do so and, if such action is taken, the other Government shall be free, not later than ninety days after the action has been taken and on thirty days' written notice, to suspend the application to the trade of the Government taking action under Paragraph one of substantially equivalent obligations or concessions under said Trade Agreement. The Government taking action under Paragraph one shall then be free, within thirty days after such suspension takes effect, to terminate said Trade Agreement on thirty days' written notice. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, action under Paragraph one may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, under the condition that consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action. Where an action taken without prior consultation causes or threatens to cause serious injury in the territory of the other Government to the domestic producers of products affected by the action, that Government shall, where delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the taking of the action and throughout the period of consultation, such obligations or concessions as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury." (16 F. R. 11945, 11946.)

Recommendation for Further Extension of 1948 Rubber Act

*Message of the President to the Congress*¹

[Released to the press by the White House January 14]

On January 14, 1950, pursuant to the provisions of the Rubber Act of 1948, I transmitted to the Congress my recommendations concerning the synthetic rubber industry in the United States, together with a report on the subject from the Assistant to the President. That report included a history of the synthetic rubber industry, an analysis of its current status, and a comprehensive review of the problems of disposal of the Government-owned plants. This message, therefore, is limited to consideration of the character and significance of important changes during the past 2 years.

Six months after my previous report on synthetic rubber was prepared, and one day after I signed the bill extending the Rubber Act of 1948 until June 30, 1952, North Korean Communist forces crossed the 38th parallel in Korea. Less than 6 months later, when these invaders had been hurled back, Chinese Communist forces crossed into Korea from Manchuria.

The Communist aggression in Korea has demonstrated to the world beyond any doubt the true intentions of the Soviet leaders, and their willingness to use armed attack, if necessary, to accomplish their objectives. The Korean invasion has made it eminently plain that the entire free world lives in the constant danger of further Communist aggression. United Nations successes in Korea have been great, but the threat of a third world war is still very real and very menacing.

To meet this threat, this Nation, together with the other nations allied with us, has undertaken a vast preparedness program. This program involves raising and equipping promptly sufficient armed forces to resist aggression if it should come, and expanding our mobilization base so that we will be able to shift quickly to a full war footing if that should prove necessary. This involves, in turn, assuring an adequate and uninterrupted supply of the critical materials needed for defense production.

The problem is particularly acute in the case of rubber. Most of the world's natural rubber is pro-

duced in Southeast Asia where Communist subversion and sabotage are now a serious problem. Communist invasion of these areas is an ever-present possibility.

A stockpile of natural rubber is a partial protection against loss of production in these areas. I am happy to report that in the past 2 years, despite Communist activities in rubber-producing areas, natural rubber production has been maintained at high levels, and despite soaring world demand for rubber, we have made substantial progress in accumulating a natural rubber stockpile. Our minimum objectives will soon be met, and if international conditions do not worsen, it may be possible to begin soon to taper off our stockpile purchasing of rubber.

Our accelerated rate of stockpiling in the past 2 years has been made possible largely by the existence of our synthetic rubber industry. Government operation of the synthetic rubber plants over the past 2 years has been highly successful. Total production in Government-owned plants has been increased from an annual rate of 270,000 tons in January 1950 to a present annual rate of 850,000 tons, and we should be able to reach 950,000 tons within a few months. This is a remarkable record and reflects credit both on the Government officials directing the program and the private concerns reactivating and operating the plants for the Government.

In reviewing the Government's synthetic rubber activities, it is important to distinguish between GR-S, the general purpose rubber used chiefly in tires but also in many other products, and butyl, a special purpose rubber used primarily in inner tubes.

GR-S was being produced in Government-owned plants in January 1950 at an annual rate of 217,000 tons. In the spring of 1950, production was increased to meet rising demand, and following the Korean invasion, all stand-by facilities were reactivated and expansions of capacity of existing plants were undertaken. At present, Government production of GR-S is at an annual rate of 770,000 tons, and is expected to rise to an

¹ H. Doc. No. 326.

annual rate of 860,000 tons by the third quarter of this year.

During most of the past year and a half, because of the time required to reactivate stand-by facilities, it was not possible to increase production fast enough to meet rising demand. In recent months, however, production has kept ahead of demand and allocation controls over GR-S have recently been terminated. It is anticipated that production in 1952 will not only meet all domestic demands but will also provide a substantial margin for export, thus facilitating stockpile purchases of natural rubber.

Increased costs, particularly the high costs of feedstocks produced from alcohol which have been required to achieve the present levels of GR-S production, have necessitated increasing the price of GR-S from 18½ cents a pound to 26 cents in order to operate the GR-S facilities, as a whole, without loss.

Two technological developments have improved the ability of GR-S to compete with natural rubber. First, "cold rubber," a type of GR-S, which was a relatively new product 2 years ago, has proved to be superior to natural rubber in most tire treads. Second, it has been found that low-cost oil can be added, as an extender, in the production of GR-S, thus introducing important cost savings with no significant change in quality. Research investigations now in process promise further advances.

As a result of these technological developments, GR-S is in a better position to compete with natural rubber than it was 2 years ago. It is still probable, however, that GR-S could not compete for bulk uses with natural rubber offered at significantly lower prices over a considerable period of time.

Butyl production, in January 1950, was at an annual rate of 52,000 tons in the two Government-owned butyl plants. Present production is about 80,000 tons and capacity of the plants is being expanded to an annual rate of 90,000 tons by the middle of this year. Because of increased costs, the price was increased in December 1950 from 18½ cents to 20¾ cents a pound in order to permit continued operation without loss.

Demand for butyl has far exceeded production since Korea. This rising demand was the cumulative result of the high level of production of automotive tubes, the high price of natural rubber relative to butyl, and restrictions on the use of natural rubber. Growing recognition of the superiority of butyl over natural rubber for inner tubes, and the potential usefulness of butyl in nontransportation products, indicate that demand for butyl will probably continue to exceed capacity output of the two plants.

Research in butyl rubber has been entirely privately financed. A number of new applications for this rubber, now the lowest priced new rubber available, have been developed. In particu-

lar, research on all-butyl passenger tires has yielded very promising results which could result in a many-fold increase in demand for butyl.

The experience of the last 2 years reinforces the conclusions of the 1950 report, to the effect that butyl is in a strong position to compete with natural rubber.

Recommendations

The fact of open conflict and the demonstrated threat of further aggression, the fact that our stockpile goals have not yet been fully met, and the fact that we are fully utilizing the available capacity for producing synthetic rubber, require that we avoid actions which could interfere with continued production of synthetic rubber to meet all our needs. My recommendations are prepared with this objective in mind.

As I pointed out 2 years ago, difficult disposal problems result from the large number of plants in the GR-S segment of the Government synthetic rubber program. The possibility of a need for Government support of GR-S for security purposes in the event of a sharp decline in the price of natural rubber creates further problems. The 1950 report also pointed out that among the main advantages of Government ownership are the efficiencies and economies of operation of the entire GR-S industry as an integrated unit. These could probably not be fully maintained if the plants were owned by a number of independent companies. Disposal of the GR-S facilities might result in occasional losses of production because of the loss of coordinated operation of the GR-S and feedstock facilities and the loss of the flexibility of integrated operations. The possibility of such losses must be avoided under present circumstances, when maximum production is essential.

This factor is not present in the case of the two butyl facilities. Each of these facilities is a highly integrated plant, and disposal should involve no significant interference with plant operation.

One reason for disposing of the butyl facilities is currently more relevant than it was when the 1950 report was written. As noted above, the demand for butyl is considerably above the capacity of the existing plants. Additional butyl capacity would be highly advantageous. Although there is nothing in the present law to prevent private firms from constructing a butyl plant, they are reluctant to do so when it means entering into competition with the Government operating on a "no profit-no loss" basis. It would obviously be desirable to create circumstances which would stimulate private business interests in building additional facilities.

Two years ago I recommended that the Congress authorize transfer of the Government's rubber facilities to private ownership and recommended a disposal plan. It is still my belief that it would

be in the national interest to have the authority to dispose of the synthetic rubber plants. For the reasons I have just given, however, and in consideration of the action taken by the Congress in June 1950 in extending the Rubber Act of 1948, it is my conclusion that disposal of GR-S facilities should be temporarily deferred. I therefore recommend that the Rubber Act of 1948, with respect to GR-S, be extended for another 2 years. With respect to butyl, I should like to suggest that the Congress give consideration to authorizing disposal of these plants according to the general principles outlined in my previous report, and to the termination of authority to require the consumption of butyl rubber. I believe, however, that under either alternative—disposal with security safeguards, or continued Government ownership—the national security will be fully protected. I have been so advised by the Secretary of Defense.

I have consulted the Chairman and members of the National Security Resources Board in the preparation of this report.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 14, 1952.

THE DEPARTMENT

International Information Administration Established

[Released to the press January 18]

The Department of State announced on January 18 the establishment of the International Information Administration to conduct its consolidated international information and educational exchange activities. Wilson Compton, former industry executive and former president of the State College of Washington, was named as the Administrator of the new organization. Under the new plan the international information operation will be given a higher status reflecting the increased importance of its work. Its Administrator will report directly to the Secretary of State.

Mr. Compton will assume the operational responsibilities for the international information and educational exchange programs formerly carried by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, along with the responsibilities formerly carried by the General Manager of these programs. The General Managership has recently been filled on an acting basis by Thurman L. Barnard, former vice president of a major advertising agency, who is now undertaking certain overseas inspection and evaluation assignments for the Secretary, beginning in the Far East. Both Assistant Secretary Edward W. Barrett and Mr. Barnard

helped develop the new plan and both recommended it to the Secretary of State.

The purpose of the reorganization is to give the foreign information program added impetus by setting up its operational head directly under the Secretary of State, giving him undivided responsibility and a clear line of authority over his program from start to finish, while assuring that the information program continues to be operated in full support of U.S. foreign policy. The Administrator will have the complete job of operating the foreign information and educational exchange program.

The Department explained that the new plan is designed to provide greater operational flexibility while maintaining close ties between the foreign information and educational exchange program abroad and foreign policy as a whole. It is intended to preserve completely the essential connections between the operating information program and those areas of the Department which provide intelligence and foreign-policy guidance. For this purpose it is planned to keep the necessary foreign information staffs in each of the regional bureaus and to keep the International Information Administration completely tied in with the Department's communications and intelligence services.

The Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs will hereafter concentrate on serving as top policy adviser to the Secretary on information and psychological considerations in the foreign-policy field and participating in top policy considerations in the Department. He will have no direct operational responsibilities in the international field.

The Department's foreign-information program is based primarily on the Smith-Mundt Act, which was passed by Congress in 1948. The program has been rapidly expanded in the last year following the appropriation in the fall of 1950 of more money for what the President called a "Campaign of Truth." During the current fiscal year the program has available \$85,000,000 appropriated under Public Law 402, Public Law 584, and certain other subsidiary legislation. The Department also has additional funds for the construction of radio transmitters at various locations in the United States and abroad.

In addition to the "Voice of America" radio network, which now carries the message of U.S. foreign policy to foreign peoples in 46 languages, Mr. Compton will head an organization which also uses motion pictures, books, pamphlets, exhibits, educational exchanges, information centers, and other media in the fight for peace with freedom and resistance to Communist propaganda throughout the world.

Mr. Compton, who was president of Washington State College from 1944 to 1951, has had a career as a business administrator, economist, lawyer, and Government official.

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What Is Point Four?

Address by Secretary Acheson¹

There could be no tribute more fitting to the memory of Franklin Delano Roosevelt than this program dedicated to the Point Four idea.

The whole idea of Point Four is one that looks toward the future with boldness and imagination, as did Franklin Roosevelt.

Indeed, there are signs that his own thoughts were turning in this direction in the last months of his life.

When Franklin Roosevelt was returning from Europe on what turned out to be his last voyage, one of the matters that preoccupied him was the relation between underdeveloped areas and the problem of world peace.

In the course of a press conference on board the *Quincy*, he spoke prophetically of the need for helping the people of Iran and the other countries of the Middle East with irrigation, reforestation, education, and health—the very things we are now carrying forward vigorously under the trademark of Point Four.

Both in Europe and in Asia, the war was still raging, but his mind was already turning to the problems of keeping the peace after the guns had been stilled.

These problems, however, were to be the burden of another man. Less than 2 months later, the awesome responsibilities of the Presidency became the duty of a man whose resolute courage and staunch character have led and inspired people everywhere in the cause of world peace—Harry S. Truman.

It was for President Truman to carry on with the task begun by President Roosevelt of building the United Nations and repairing the destruction of that terrible war.

And to him also fell the task of leading the free nations in the resolute defense of their freedom against the renewal of aggression.

These have been magnificent achievements. But there is another that history will credit especially to the account of President Truman. His was the practical imagination that conceived the program known throughout the world simply as Point Four.

¹Made before the Americans for Democratic Action at New York, N. Y., on Jan. 25 and released to the press on the same date.

Three Years of Progress

Today, 3 years to the month since President Truman announced this “bold, new program” of technical cooperation, and 1½ years since it went into operation, Point Four has become a settled part of American foreign policy.

And although the program is young, it is already apparent that Point Four is a success.

Figures do not reveal the whole story, but they give some indication of progress.

Under the Point Four Program, we now have 619 American technicians serving in 34 countries, and there are 372 people from other countries studying techniques here in the United States. All told, there are some 216 Point Four projects under way in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. And side by side with these are many other technical-cooperation projects being carried on by the United Nations, by private agencies, and by other agencies of our Government.

But this is primarily a human enterprise we are talking about—an exchange of skills and information—and you cannot get the full story from statistics. This story has to be told in terms of people.

One man comes to mind at once. A man who called himself “an old Oklahoma dirt farmer.” became one of the best ambassadors the American people ever had. From Azerbaijan to the Ganges, people will remember Henry Garland Bennett as a man who knew how to make things grow.

I have elsewhere paid tribute to Mr. Bennett and his three associates, who lost their lives last month while on a Point Four mission in Iran. It was a tragic loss. Even the one year in which Mr. Bennett served as Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration imprinted indelibly upon the program his sound judgment and his sense of dedication.

More than anywhere else, the success of the Point Four Program is to be found in the work of hundreds of shirt-sleeve diplomats all over the world. They are men from our farming states, who ride muleback or walk among the farmers of other countries. They sift the soil in their gnarled and expert hands, and they know how to make it support life.

I speak of such men as Horace Holmes, County Agent from Tennessee, who has been working miracles in India; and Frank Pinder, of Florida, who has walked through most of Liberia like a modern Johnny Applesseed, leaving a trail of growing things where he has been. Women, too, play a gallant part in this pioneering effort—women like Elizabeth Clark of Jamestown, R. I., who has braved tropical heat and the cold of high altitudes to teach health and nutrition to villagers in Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia.

Now, I have heard some critics paraphrase Voltaire's famous remark, and say that this Point Four Program is neither bold nor new, and isn't much of a program.

Of course, American missionaries have been carrying medical and agricultural information to the world for many years. And even before the Point Four Program came along, this Government was doing some of these things in Latin America and elsewhere.

But these Point Four activities have a new significance, which makes them more than unrelated good deeds. Under the Point Four Program, these activities are but the first steps in a process that can change—and is changing—the whole aspect of life in these areas. This process has profound social and political effects, and that is what makes it an important part of our foreign policy today.

For example, the work of Horace Holmes with a group of Indian farmers in one small area in northern India—not more than 100 square miles in size—has been followed by an agreement with the Government of India under which that work will be multiplied by 50 times. In the small demonstration area, wheat production had been doubled by means that were simple and at hand. It is believed that this enlarged program, based on that demonstration, will, within 5 years, eliminate the threat of famine from India, and in 10 years, will double India's present food production.

This work will be done under a special Indo-American Technical Cooperation Fund, to be jointly financed by the two Governments. The fund will make possible the establishment of 50 rural-urban development areas, around river valley projects and tube wells.

Each development area will have modern housing, good schools, improved health facilities, and many industrial opportunities.

But that isn't all. The chain reaction of economic development, once started, goes far beyond the immediate range of Point Four work. The work of the fund is only one part of India's new 5-year economic development plan. Under it, India, using the facilities of the Colombo Plan and of seven agencies of the United Nations, is making a concerted attack on illiteracy and disease, and will build roads, dams, power lines, factories, hospitals, and schools.

Here is a program that illustrates the exciting

possibilities that open up from the small beginnings of the Point Four project.

Before I leave this discussion of the Indo-American Fund, I would like to say a word about the man whose great energy and good will contributed so much to its realization, an alumnus of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), our Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles.

With that limitless energy of his, Ambassador Bowles has in 3 months' time covered most of the subcontinent by jeep and plane, and has become a friendly and familiar figure all over India. His grasp of the complex problems of that part of the world is a great asset in developing a closer friendship between India and the United States.

Fundamental Concepts of Point Four

Just before Mr. Bennett left on his trip to the Middle East, he dictated a memorandum to his staff, in which he expressed some concern about the misunderstandings that had grown up about the nature of the Point Four Program. He had intended, on his return, to devote a major speech to that subject.

Since that, sadly, is not possible, I would like to discuss with you this evening some fundamentals of the Point Four Program as I see them.

Most people, I think, agree that Point Four is a good idea, even if they may not know much about how it works. But the program suffers quite as much from its friends who think of it as a cure for all the ills of the world, as from its enemies who dismiss it as a sentimental give-away notion.

I think it will help us to support this program intelligently if we are very clear about why we are doing this Point Four Program, and just what it is we want it to do for us.

Now, why is it we are carrying on this program?

First of all, we can clear away several mistaken notions.

It is not philanthropy that motivates us. I don't think we need to be embarrassed to admit to disinterested idealism. But there is a hard-headed self-interest in this program, and other nations will cooperate with us with more confidence if we say bluntly why we are in it.

Nor is the Point Four Program primarily something to beat down the Soviet menace. The Soviet threat is very real and dangerous, and the successful operation of the Point Four Program does help to meet it. But this a byproduct; the Program has a much more enduring and fundamental purpose than that, and we should be carrying it forward even if there were no Soviet threat.

Finally, although the Point Four Program does have the effect of developing overseas market sources of raw materials, even this is not its primary purpose.

Our reasons, I think, are more basic than of these things.

Point Four, it seems to me, is a fundamen

political and philosophical idea. It grows out of our whole approach to the problems presented by nature to civilization.

One hundred and seventy years ago, de Crèvecoeur wrote, in one of his *Letters from an American Farmer*: "Americans are the western pilgrims, who are carrying along with them that great mass of arts, sciences, vigor and industry which began long since in the east; they will finish the great circle."

How prophetic those words!

The stream of civilization of which we are a part is built upon the confidence of man that he can harmonize his purposes with the forces of nature.

Not for us the fatalism which accepts natural catastrophes as "the will of God," and shrugs helplessly before floods, famines, and droughts.

Not for us the philosophy of conflict, between mankind and a brutish nature, or of man against man.

Instead, our society faces the forces of nature with a cheerful—perhaps even a cocky—confidence, bolstered no doubt by the experience of our forefathers in pushing across the great plains and mountains and forests of this continent not very many years ago.

The experience of the courageous sea captain a few weeks ago captured our imagination, not just as an act of individual heroism, but as an expression of the discipline of a captain's duty toward his ship. But our farmers also know a discipline toward the land; and all of us feel the discipline we impose upon ourselves of our duty toward our country and each other.

And just as the drama of the sea captain brought into play the organized apparatus of society, so also does our society organize itself—although sometimes belatedly, it is true—to support men confronted with floods and droughts and the pestilences and vicissitudes of nature. The TVA and the Columbia River Development are symbols of this attitude. So, too, are the farm credit systems, the agricultural experiment stations, the farm extension system—and the Point Four Program.

These are not philosophical abstractions I have been talking about. These disciplines of society serve a practical political purpose; they are the structure and the fabric of our system of responsible and representative government.

Now this brings us close to the heart of our real interest in the Point Four Program.

It is our faith—our deepest conviction—that representative and responsible government is more deeply in accord with man's nature than any other system of government. We also believe that representative and responsible governments by their nature contribute toward world peace.

We have an interest, therefore, in the development of representative and responsible governments in the world, since it creates an environment

in which we can live peacefully and continue to develop our own society. This is the central purpose of our whole foreign policy.

But the setting in which we operate is a revolutionary one. We live in a time when two revolutionary movements have been crisscrossing the face of the earth.

One of these is the revolution of technology, which in the nineteenth century, brought industrialization to Western Europe and North America, and is now beginning to stir the countries called "underdeveloped."

The other revolution is represented by our Declaration of Independence and our Bill of Rights. I am speaking of the contagious ideas of liberty, justice, and independence expressed in the French and American Revolutions just a century and three quarters back. This is the ferment we see at work today in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere in the world.

It is the juncture of these revolutionary forces in the underdeveloped areas of the world that gives meaning to the Point Four Program. For the new technology gives us not only the instruments of a better life, but also the means of mass communication and education by which to transmit this knowledge. And if, in so doing, we can help people not only to develop the soil, the water, and the resources of their lands, but to develop the culture that suits them and fits their needs, and to fulfill their aspirations for responsible and more representative government—then these revolutionary forces can be constructively channeled, and contribute to the peace of the world. If not, the world will continue to be swept by the rip tides of conflict.

Influence on Underdeveloped Areas

Now if we look at the Point Four Program with these things in mind, a number of interesting considerations present themselves to us.

We see that we cannot be indifferent to the social impact of our ideas and our science upon the people in these parts of the world. The revolutionary concepts I have mentioned, and Western education and science have had a powerful and disquieting impact upon some sections of the people in the so-called backward areas.

This has been true particularly of urban groups. These people—students, teachers, small merchants, professionals—although but a small proportion of the population, have been most sensitive to the impact of Western modernism, and quickest to respond with heightened expectations. But in the rigid social and political structures which prevail in most of these areas, these expectations have not been readily fulfilled.

The clash between modernism and traditionalism has been violent. The result has been bitter frustration, which has increased discontent and a search for radical solutions.

In some areas, the rural populations, squeezed between absentee landlord and money lender, are aroused from centuries of passivity by desperation and misery. In these areas, they too join in the search for radical solutions.

These are the flames of discontent that feed the fires of nationalism. The force of nationalism, as we have seen many times in history, can be either a constructive or a destructive force. It is capable of energizing a whole people to great bursts of creative effort.

But it can also lead to paths of violence, to jingoism, hatred, and totalitarianism. We see this happening in some parts of the world today. And when this happens, it is not only self-destructive, but it jeopardizes the whole fabric of peace in the world.

This creates a complex problem for us in our relations with these areas. Our present security, in the face of the grave and immediate threat of aggression which hangs over the entire world, requires the maximum stability possible in these areas. But our long-term interests are best served if people's aspirations for representative and responsible governments are fulfilled in a peaceful and orderly fashion.

This requires of us the kind of wisdom, as Justice Brandeis used to say, that leads a man not to stand in front of an approaching locomotive. For if we allow ourselves to become identified with the obstacles to change, in the face of the oncoming and irrepressible dynamic forces alive in these areas, we shall intensify the conflict and alienate the people of these countries from our side.

But if, in our Point Four Program and all other activities that affect the underdeveloped areas, we seek to encourage and assist the governments of these countries to deal responsibly and effectively with the aspirations of the people, and by our influence and our aid assist in the development of representative institutions—then we shall be serving our own ultimate interests and the interests of world peace.

Operating Considerations

This analysis suggests not only a general emphasis in our technical cooperation programs, but a number of specific operating considerations.

One is that we need to give due attention to the opportunities open to the urban populations to find useful and satisfying application of their newly acquired ideas and education. It often happens that many from among this group participate as technicians in the programs for rural areas, but this has not always been sufficient.

A second consideration is that, in relation to the rural groups, we must be concerned not only with techniques of agriculture, but also with the relationship of the farmer to the land he tills. To make a decent living out of farming, a farmer must either own his land or use it under fair con-

ditions and terms of tenure, and he must in addition have access to credit on reasonable terms.

A third point is that we must continue to stress the self-help character of the Point Four Program. Point Four can accomplish a great deal for the amount of money it costs, because its chief contribution is in the communication of technical skills. Recipient countries have put up three out of every four dollars expended, on the average, and the prime responsibility for financing economic development, on the foundation laid by Point Four, rests with the recipient countries. It is a sound principle, which has been part of the basic conception of Point Four, that the economic development to follow upon the technical cooperation programs should in the main be financed by private capital.

The fourth consideration is best expressed by Mr. Bennett in the memorandum to which I referred earlier. In that memorandum to his staff, Mr. Bennett described the Point Four Program as "a simple, down-to-earth, self-help program designed primarily to assist other peoples in increasing their food production, bettering their health conditions, and improving their educational systems."

Eighty percent of the Point Four work falls into these three categories, of food, health, and education. Of these, the most urgent is food. The Food and Agriculture Organization has estimated that it would be necessary for the underdeveloped areas to produce by 1960 approximately twice as much food as they have been producing in recent years in order to achieve a minimum adequate standard of living. This goal has been the objective of the administrators of the Point Four Program, and a point of principal emphasis. Progress toward industrialization in these areas, as in the United States, will be most effective if it rests upon a sound agricultural base.

There is one final consideration I would like to put forth. It grows, I believe, out of all the others I have mentioned. The Point Four Program must be regarded as a long-term proposition. It is not an overnight miracle drug. It can produce results at every step of the way—and the encouragement of seeing one year's crop bigger than the last is a necessary spur to continued effort—but the fundamental results will only become apparent over a number of years.

Although I have not referred directly to the valuable technical assistance program carried on by the United Nations and its agencies, we consider our participation in that program an essential part of our Point Four activities. Support for the United Nations' program is central to the United States approach to technical assistance. We are proud to have played a leading part in the expansion of the United Nations Technical Assistance Program. Our experience has shown the wisdom of our intentions to continue to carry out these activities, wherever practicable, through

the United Nations and its specialized agencies. This not only gives practical meaning to the Charter's reference to the United Nations as "a center for harmonizing the actions of nations," but it makes full use of the United Nations' capacities for encouraging and assisting peaceful and orderly transitions.

These are the thoughts I would like to leave with you about the Point Four Program. I have not sought to cover all aspects of its work, but rather to direct your attention to its fundamental character, as I see it, and to some of the challenging problems it faces.

This much I think can be said with assurance, that if the program continues to receive the steadfast interest and support of the American people, it will continue to become an ever more important element in our foreign policy.

What is more, in these simple actions the world will find and understand the true meaning of our American heritage.

West Germans Urged To Resist Political Lethargy

by John J. McCloy

*U.S. High Commissioner for Germany*¹

Here in the southwest corner of Germany, the civilizations of France and Germany have always been interwoven. In this city, therefore, it is especially appropriate for us to honor such French and German statesmen as Schuman and Monnet, Adenauer and Hallstein, whose vision and courage have given the free world great hope. The ratification of the Schuman Plan can become an historical event of prime importance. We all know, however, that France and Germany have more than coal and steel to give to the world. Together they can nurture and strengthen the roots of civilization and peace. The University of Freiburg, strategically located at the French-German crossroads, has a challenging opportunity to be a center of thought and action in the new community of Europe.

Today I would like to discuss briefly the role of the University, that is, the role of the student and scholar in Germany.

In a different way and for different reasons you stand today at the beginning of an epoch such as faced young Americans a hundred years ago. A new world was in the making, and new challenges faced the young men of the day. New ideas and new concepts had to be developed.

At this moment great opportunities are open to German students and German scholars. The

Schuman Plan, the European community, the coming together of the free world to defend its freedom mean that horizons are widening, chances are growing. A continent rather than a country is your home. But all these opportunities cannot be realized if people assume that all that is needed is the vote of parliaments elsewhere or the Bundestag in Germany. Work, imagination, sacrifice on the part of the people will be needed to give spirit and life to these new developments.

Such is the compelling challenge to the European student and scholar: to become proficient in his chosen profession or work; to recognize his obligation to the society in which he lives; to be a democratic leader in thought and action. No village is too small, no city too large in which to make a contribution to the new community of free men.

The importance of the participation of every citizen in the life of the community may be seen in the following example, which takes me into the political arena.

I need not tell you why the outside world watches for any evidence of the rebirth of nazism in this country. It is my belief that the German people, who have also suffered terribly as a result of Nazi rule, ought to be in the forefront of those opposed to any recrudescence of nazism.

My office frequently undertakes studies to determine the strength of neo-Nazi movements in the Bundesrepublik. Our research, I am glad to say, suggests that only 13 percent of the German people would today support a Nazi-like party or movement. Of course it is incomprehensible that even 13 percent of the German people would again support such aberrations. Nevertheless this percentage shows there is no immediate threat.

The real danger, according to our surveys, lies in the apathy of millions of men and women in this country, in their failure to recognize that they must act in defense of their own liberties. Here, for example, are some of the results of our surveys:

(1) Eighty-seven percent of the people questioned stated they would not support a neo-Nazi party. That is encouraging.

(2) But, in order to get at the deeper problem, the following question was asked: "Suppose a new party—similar to the NSDAP—would try to come to power in the Bundesrepublik, what would be your attitude toward it?"

Here are the results:

Only 20 percent said "I would do everything I could to prevent it." Thirty percent: "I would not like to see it happen, but I would not do anything to prevent it." Twenty-three percent: "I would not care." Ten percent: "I would like to see that happen, but I would not do anything for it." Three percent: "I would welcome it and do everything I could to support it." Fourteen percent expressed no opinion on the matter.

It strikes me as rather alarming that such a sizable part of the population should be so in-

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Baden, on Jan. 21 and printed from telegraphic text.

different to the political structure of their country. This is particularly important in Germany where political lethargy in the recent past induced the excesses which wrecked this country. Since 1945 many Germans have said that the personal risks during the Hitler years and fear of punishment prevented action on their part. Today there are no concentration camps in the Bundesrepublik. And there is no fear of punishment. Men are free to speak and to take a stand; there will be no concentration camps, either Nazi or Communist; there will be no punishment, Nazi or Communist, if every German citizen, now and in the years ahead, is active in the defense of his own liberties. Nobody in this country should ever again be prepared to say: "I couldn't do anything about it; I was only an ordinary citizen."

Public opinion surveys are obviously not conclusive about the state of a people's mind. I repeat, nevertheless, that not enough Germans are alert to resist extremist movements. Much remains to be done before all of us can be confident that democratic habits and tendencies are secure in Germany.

It is a fact that since 1945 there have been some strong democratic developments in this country. There are outstanding groups, organizations, men and women who are working vigorously to strengthen the Bundesrepublik as a progressive, liberal force in the European community. Partnership in that community gives reason to believe that the German people will be in a better position to develop their democratic institutions and beat off any attack of repressive forces. But as I have said, every student and scholar carries the obligation, whoever he is and wherever he may be, to play a leading role in this conflict.

Soviet Tactics Further Delay Austrian Treaty Negotiations

[Released to the press January 25]

Following is the text of a note from the Secretary General of the Austrian Treaty Deputies delivered to the Soviet Embassy in London on January 24, 1952:

I have the honor to state that I have been requested by the Deputies for the Austrian Treaty of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to inform you as follows:

The three Deputies have taken note that the Soviet Government wish to give further study to their communication of January 19th,¹ and that in the meanwhile a Soviet representative is unable to attend a meeting of the Deputies for the Austrian Treaty.

The three Deputies recall that a representative

of the Soviet Government was invited on December 28, 1951 to attend such a meeting on January 21, 1952.¹ On the eve of the proposed meeting the Soviet Government sent a reply making the attendance of the Soviet Deputy dependent on an assurance by the Western Deputies that they would agree to discuss certain issues having no relation to the conclusion of the Treaty. For nearly two years the Soviet Deputy has delayed agreement on the Treaty by his insistence upon prior consideration of these issues. The situation has now been further aggravated by the Soviet Government making acceptance of its conditions a prerequisite to a meeting.

The three Deputies regret that the failure of the Soviet Deputy to take part in the proposed meeting is continuing to delay the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty. Persistence of the Soviet Government in its present attitude would inevitably lead to the conclusion that the Soviet Government is deliberately seeking to obstruct the completion of the Austrian Treaty and the restoration of independence to the Austrian people.

The three Deputies still hope that a Soviet representative will be able to attend a meeting at an early date for the purpose of completing the Treaty. The chairman remains ready to call a meeting of the Deputies as soon as this can be mutually agreed.

New VOA Transmitter For Broadcasts to Far East

[Released to the press January 24]

The Department of State on January 24 announced the selection of Dungeness in the Port Angeles area of Washington as the site for a 7-million dollar short-wave transmitter plant to carry the Voice of America across the Pacific and into the Far East.

The new transmitter, when completed in about 18 months, will give the Voice the most powerful radio signal known to exist in the world today.

The Department plans to construct a sister transmitter on the East Coast for broadcasts to Europe and Latin America. Announcement of the site selected for the East Coast transmitter is expected within a few days.

The two transmitters and the new floating transmitter, which has been installed aboard a special Coast Guard ship and is expected to be in operation next month, will help carry the Government's Campaign of Truth to the most remote areas of the world.

¹ Not printed here.

The Partnership Which Must Not Fail

by *Chester B. Bowles*
*Ambassador to India*¹

I believe it was Paul Hoffman who once remarked that it was possible to pick up 50 percent of the information about a new country during the first 3 months of your stay there, but that it would take at least 30 years to learn the remaining 50 percent.

I've been in India scarcely 3 months and if I have 50 percent of the answers about that vast, fascinating, and complex country, I am at least on schedule. However, I have had a rather rare opportunity to get around India and talk with the people as well as the Government officials in New Delhi. I've already traveled some 7,000 miles by plane and another 1,800 by auto. I've had half a dozen very illuminating interviews with Prime Minister Nehru and hundreds of roadside conversations with the farmers in the country and with the people in the great cities. I suppose I have drunk tea in at least 35 village houses.

I've talked at many of the great Indian universities and submitted to some rather grueling question and answer sessions, with Communist-minded students often leading the attack. I've had interesting conversations with all the chiefs of missions of the other countries in New Delhi, as well as with our American press correspondents, and others who have been in India a long, long time. I've been out in the field with our American Point Four technical assistants who are doing a magnificent job working hand-in-hand, with our Indian friends, helping them with the many economic development programs which I will discuss in a few minutes.

In short, I am going to give you today not only my own impressions of India but what I have picked up from a great deal of plain dealing wherever I have gone. I feel qualified to tell you something about the New India—the free nation of India—second largest in the world—born scarcely 4 years ago, and now working earnestly and intelligently to overcome the staggering problems, some of which were inherited after 200 years as a colonial possession.

Free peoples everywhere have a crucial stake

in this great enterprise. If it succeeds—if free democratic governments meet the test in India—new hope and courage will be brought to all the hundreds of millions of peoples of Asia. If it fails in India and is succeeded by the police state methods of communism, the whole of Asia may be irretrievably lost, and democracy's position throughout the world gravely endangered.

India wants to do its utmost to meet this challenge. I have been deeply impressed with the determination and courage of the Indian people. They are a proud people—proud of their great culture, their love of peace, their strong family ties. They are an independent people. Many of them admire much about the civilization which we have built up in the West. Yet they have their own ideas as to the kind of life they want to live. They appreciate deeply our cooperation and assistance in helping them with their economic problems, but only if it is offered as one free and equal partner to another free and equal partner—and with no strings attached.

Let me emphasize that India has been moving ahead remarkably fast with her development programs even without our assistance. The Indian Government, though it has been operating only since 1947 and is beset with staggering problems, which few other nations have ever faced, is doing everything within its powers to establish itself on a firm economic and political basis.

Food is India's overriding problem. In 1943 an estimated 3 million people starved to death in one province. And so India has launched a five-year plan with great emphasis on increased food production. The plan calls for the annual minimum production of 7 million additional tons of food by 1956.

The situation is now critical. In some areas, particularly in the South, the monsoons have failed for 3 years in succession. When you drive through this parched area, you see Indian farmers working from sunup to sundown, drawing water up from almost empty wells, bucket by bucket, to dump it into primitive irrigation ditches so that it can run down and nourish tiny patches of cultivated land. With luck an Indian farmer, working with his bullock, can haul up 150 10-

¹ Address made before the Hartford Foreign Policy Association at Hartford, Conn., on Jan. 18 and released to the press on the same date.

gallon buckets of water per day—enough to irrigate approximately one-half acre of land, provided the well does not dry up.

Development of Water Resources

By contrast, a simple tube well, powered with a small diesel engine, can irrigate from two to three hundred acres. Under India's five-year plan, five thousand such needed tube wells are planned. One thousand of them are already under construction. All of this is part of the general plan to add 15 million acres of irrigated land to the 50 million acres now in existence. That will make 65 million acres out of the total 250 million cultivated acres for all of India.

Of course, wells are only one source of water. One hundred and thirty-five river projects to provide irrigation and power are already under construction and an additional 122 are awaiting the go-ahead signal. Eight of them are large multipurpose river projects that are patterned after our own TVA or Boulder Dam. You may be surprised to learn that India has the biggest river valley development program in the world and twice as much irrigated land as any other country.

One obstacle standing in the way of further cultivation of Indian land is the tough, destructive kans grass, a weed of the sugar cane family with very deep roots, which covers 2 million acres of land in Central India. Heavy tractors and cutting equipment, purchased by the Indian Government with a loan financed by the World Bank, are hacking away this weed so the land can be cleared to produce badly needed food.

Land reform is another basic problem which the Indian people must overcome. Over the years an oppressive land system developed under which the zamindars, who are hereditary collectors of land taxes for the Government, dominated two-thirds of the country. In most of India these zamindars had a right to set land rentals and to turn a peasant off his land in order to collect a higher tax from the next occupant.

This antiquated system has been declared illegal, and in spite of stiff resistance from the well-entrenched zamindars, it is now being gradually eliminated. Within the next 2 or 3 years, tens of millions of Indian peasants will be permitted to buy their own land or to deal directly with their Government for the first time in hundreds of years.

Laws against money lenders have already been passed and interest on loans is officially limited to a small fraction of what was formerly charged. Enforcement is gradually becoming more effective and cooperative credit societies are displacing the money lenders in some sections.

A major part of the annual increase in food production is expected to come through better use of land which is already being cultivated. The opportunities here are very great.

Indian farmers have always made much poorer use of fertilizers than do the Chinese. Their seeds are often of low quality. Every day billions of gallons of water which could vastly increase food production on parched lands are flowing unchecked to the sea, while in the rainy seasons floods take a heavy toll. In many villages farming methods remain much as they have been for centuries.

The new Indian Government is tackling these problems to the very limit of its resources. All over India, extension work teams are demonstrating the spectacular increase in food production which is possible through modern plowing, adequate fertilizer, improved seeds, and better use of water facilities.

One striking demonstration area is located at Etawah in Uttar Pradesh. Ninety-seven villages with a population of 79,000 men, women, and children covering a total area of some 90,000 acres are included in this development.

With the assistance of Indian agricultural technicians of the Uttar Pradesh State, led by Horace Holmes, a practical American agriculturist from Tennessee, food production has already been increased by an average of 46 percent, with many farms showing increases three or four times greater.

For 2,000 years or longer there has been little change in the plow used by the average Indian farmer. Indian and American technicians developed small turning plows, took them into the fields and gave practical demonstrations. A few farmers agreed to try the new plow. They compared the results with the old native methods and found that they could plow more land in less time. Other farmers followed their lead. Now hundreds of plows are sold each year through the local cooperative.

Industrial Problems

India is the most industrialized nation in Asia, except for Japan. Industrially, however, it faces a long, hard, uphill climb. In the late eighteenth century, India possessed technical skills and a level of artisanship which compared favorably with those of Western Europe. However, industrial development was retarded during India's long status as a colony.

Gradually industrial restrictions were relaxed. Although today India is the eighth largest industrial country in the world, with its vast population of 350,000,000 it should be much higher up the list. It produces 1 million tons of steel, yet has a present need of 2 million tons.

Most Indians believe the Government should own the railroads, natural resources, communications facilities, and perhaps one or two heavy industries when private investment is unavailable. Other industries would be developed by private capital. Yet, the average Indian has a deep-seated fear of capitalist exploitation and so far

the Indian Government has not taken sufficient steps to encourage private investment. The old style nineteenth-century capitalism, with its sweatshop wages, disregard for the health and welfare of the workers, and emphasis on speculative short-term profits is more familiar to many Indians than our dynamic, socially conscious American private enterprise system.

However, there are signs that the Government of India is modifying its attitude toward foreign investments. Recently it guaranteed a new oil refinery against nationalization for a minimum of 25 years, and offered other inducements. I understand additional guarantees are being considered for other refineries.

India faces staggering problems in other fields besides agriculture and industry. Only about 15 percent of the people can read and write, and in India there are 11 major languages and more than 200 minor languages. A determined effort is being made to improve the school system in India. In one or two areas the literacy rate is now as high as 90 percent.

The life expectancy of the average Indian is less than 30 years of age at birth, compared with 67 in the United States. Yet here again progress is being made in stamping out disease and improving the public-health facilities in the cities and villages. The death rate is only one-half of what it was a generation ago and the infant mortality rate has been reduced 25 percent. The birth rate has fallen off slightly, but not to any appreciable extent. The population of India is still increasing at the rate of several millions per year. An Englishman who left India 10 or 15 years ago and returned today would find that the population had increased by a figure roughly equal to the population of Great Britain.

Political Reforms

The Indian Government has also made progress with its political reforms. When the British left India in 1947 there were nine provinces and 584 princely states. Although responsible to British officials, many of these autocrats held the power of life or death over their subjects. The ruler's private purse was supplied from public revenues.

Most of these relics of feudalism have now ceased to exist. Virtually all of the former princely states, covering an area of 588,000 square miles, have been merged with each other or with nearby provinces or otherwise integrated into workable administrative units. The Maharajahs have been pensioned at a small fraction of their original income. Democratic institutions have been established and the citizens of these former principalities now elect their administrators in free elections.

It is true, of course, that one of these princely states—Kashmir—endangers the security of not only India and Pakistan but the entire area of

South Asia. There is no denying the destructive influence which this open sore has on the economies and policies of both countries. Yet when we consider the stupendous governmental surgery which was required to establish the new India, it is a miracle that there were not a dozen Kashmirs.

The Indian Constitution, under which the present elections are now being held, was modeled closely after the Constitution of the United States, and other democratic countries. In spite of the high rate of illiteracy in India and no previous experience in voting procedure, close to 50 percent of those eligible to vote are going to the polls.

The Indian judiciary is alert and independent, and patterned after the Anglo-Saxon tradition of common law.

The caste system has been outlawed by the Constitution. Religious freedom has been established. There are 45 million Moslems living in peace among the predominantly Hindu population of India.

It is often forgotten that the refugee problem resulting from the division of India and Pakistan is substantially greater than that which the Western Allies faced in Germany. Today 9 million refugees are receiving reasonably adequate care without a penny of help from the International Refugee Organization or other foreign governments.

Not far from Delhi at a place called Faridabad, some 30,000 refugees have built their own new town in less than 2 years. They have built homes for their families, a 150-bed hospital, and established small industries which provide employment for the head of each family. It is expected that by April of this year, 20,000 more refugees will join this community. The total cost of this development project—under 5 million dollars—will be repaid to the Central Indian Government by the refugees themselves within a 25-year period.

Today law and order prevails throughout most of India. Communist terrorism has been effectively suppressed. India has more Communists in jail than any other country. There is very little banditry and the crime records of India's large cities compare favorably with cities in the United States.

Gratitude for U. S. Aid

I think all of you will agree from this evidence I have cited here—and I could go on giving other examples for a long time—that India is tackling her problems with determination and foresight. However, she needs help and deeply appreciates it—provided it comes without strings and from one equal partner to another equal partner. Wherever I have been in India, people have come up to me and expressed their gratitude for the loans for grain foods which the United States made last year.

A few weeks ago Prime Minister Nehru and I signed a new agreement in New Delhi under terms of which the United States will make available 50 million dollars to help India speed up her economic development program through expansion of the technical-assistance programs already in progress and the giving of grants especially in the agricultural field.² India will put up an equivalent amount in her local currency. India will do most of the work.

Let me tell you something about this new program. It will fit in perfectly with the five-year-plan of the Government of India and will be administered in close cooperation with the Central and State Governments in India. It will concentrate on increasing food production. Some 50 development centers will be established in various parts of the country, most of them in the vicinity of the new river-valley projects which I have already mentioned, or near new tube well-developments areas. Upwards of 200,000 persons will be brought together in each of these centers. They will pool their efforts and talents in raising as much food as possible, in building their own houses and schools, in constructing more modern public-health facilities so they guard against malaria and other diseases. They are team projects with everyone pitching in to do his share.

Many of these centers will pay their own way. Originally they will be financed by Government loans, made possible by grants from the 50 million dollar fund. However, as the centers develop and their productive capacity increases, they will begin to make repayments on the loans, and when the money used in financing one center has been paid back, it will be used again for new projects.

In addition to establishing these cooperative centers, teams of technicians—including agricultural experts, public-health officers, teachers—are going out into the Indian villages and help the villagers with their problems. Under this program it is hoped that 15,000 villages will be aided.

Yet there are some 500,000 villages in India. So this is really just a start in tackling the problems which lie ahead. This is the kind of program which should gather momentum as it begins to roll into high gear. With our assistance, the Indians will be able to speed up work on their irrigation projects, on digging of more and more tube wells, and greatly expanding the number of urban-development centers and village-improvement projects. Personally, I'd like to see 100,000 Indian villages benefiting from this type of assistance.

India cannot grow enough food to be self-supporting for the next 4 years. Faced with the choice of importing food to keep her people alive, or importing machinery and equipment, the Government of India will not ignore starvation. I believe that in the next 4 years additional quantities of grain and perhaps some commodities on either

a loan or grant basis will have to be obtained by India. This will make it possible for India to use its available funds for the purchase of desperately needed machinery, tools, and equipment.

Greater productivity in the land is the key to the success of the great democratic experiment India is making. Tube wells, river-valley development, better farm equipment, improvement in the use of the soil will do the job. I believe it is in our interest to help India increase food production. I personally believe we should be prepared to assist India substantially during the next 4 years, on a grant or loan basis to assist them in getting the most out of their land.

Why should we concern ourselves with the problems of Indian villagers? I can suggest many reasons. One, because we have a natural desire to help all decent people who believe in freedom and the dignity of the individual. Two, because our forefathers in the early days of our country, learned that they could survive only by the good-neighborly give-and-take spirit which characterizes the American tradition. What was true on the American frontier 2 centuries ago applies today on the frontiers of the free world. Three, because we have learned from experience that tanks and machine guns are not the most effective weapons in fighting communism. Communism has brought a new degree of urgency to the situation. Communism got its hold in China on the village level. It must be beaten in India on the village level by proving that free men working together can obtain more of the really good things of life than by bowing to rule by force and decree.

The next 5 years may determine which system—free democratic government or Communist dictatorship—proves the more successful. If the Indian economy stagnates while China with its brutal methods succeeds in providing even moderately improved living standards for its masses—and whether we like it or not China has already made progress in that direction—the Communist appeal throughout Asia will become almost irresistible. Even though the leaders of free nations contend that China's gains were achieved only through the ruthless destruction of human life and human values, this viewpoint will be thrust aside by people impatient to improve their own situation.

On the other hand, a victory for democracy in India will enable tens of millions of Asiatic peoples to develop a robust new faith in themselves, in their ancient cultures, and in the ideals of the free world.

Trends in Foreign Policy

We must not allow the natural differences which arise between the United States and Indian Governments to obscure the fact that India is definitely alined on the side of the free nations. Prime Minister Nehru has stated in clear terms that India would defend itself against outside aggres-

² BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 47.

sion. Indians deplore the word "neutralism" as applied to their foreign policy. In recent sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, India voted as the United States did on 38 occasions, and differed from the American stand only twice. India, like the United States, believes in freedom and equality for all nations, for orderly justice, and for a world at peace. In its foreign relations with its neighbors and the world, India—like the United States—believes in the settlement of disputes in an orderly way.

Sometimes I believe we Americans often fall into the easy rationalization that other nations must be either 100 percent for us or 100 percent against us. The Indian people do not accept the theory that they are sinners because they do not always agree with our policies.

I have often been asked about India's attitude toward the U.S.S.R. The people of India and the Indian Government generally started out, I believe, with a very sympathetic attitude toward the U.S.S.R., going back before the Second World War. That was based on the fact that Russia's material gains started more or less from scratch—the background of an agricultural country increasing its productivity.

The disillusionment with the Soviet Union began when the Communist Party in India broke with the Congress Party on the issue of supporting the United Kingdom in the last war. The Communist Party in India was playing the game, of course, that they have always played, that whatever is good enough for the Soviet Union is good enough for them and they took the position very solidly opposing independence, and this caused a split and made the Communists distinctly unpopular.

A second factor was the armed Communist revolts taking place in 1947 and 1948 in Travancore and Cochin and other parts of India when a great many people were killed and there was a great deal of violence, and these were put down with great violence.

Today I find that few of the Indian people over 35 years are pro-Soviet. Some of the young people in the colleges and universities are dangerously pro-Soviet, and I should estimate the percentage runs as high as 40 or 50 percent in some sections. However, among the leaders in government there are certainly none. They aren't always clear as to what the Soviet is trying to do, and they have a sort of disillusioned attitude about it. They hoped it would be different. They hoped the brutality which they admitted was there was just a quirk of the Russian temperament and not part of the thing itself. They began to appreciate it was part of the thing itself, and today I think the Soviet Union has slipped sharply in the estimation of the Indian people.

Vyshinsky's speech on disarmament, in which he said he laughed all night, was quoted in practically every paper in India and it was the cause of real shock to the people of India.

The most effective Soviet propaganda in India is paper-covered books. The Communists have an ingenious way of handling them. The Soviet Government presents these books to the local Communist parties as a gift. The local Communist parties then sell them, and in that way they finance their local Communist activities, with no apparent direct subsidy. All they get is the gift of the books which they in turn sell. The Indian Government is getting on to that and beginning to realize that the Communist opposition is being financed by the Soviet Union.

Relations With China

The Indian attitude toward China is a very complex zone. First of all, the Soviet Union has done a successful job of trying to convince people all through this area that the American people and the Western people will not accept the Asian people as equals.

The second point is that both Asia and India have been the victim, as they see it, of Western exploitation.

Third, both India and China face huge economic difficulties as countries with quite substantial resources still in a very low agricultural stage of development and they feel some community of interest in how those problems can be licked.

Fourth, the Chinese, contrary to the U.S.S.R., have handled themselves in India with great skill. The cultural delegation which recently came down from China was a big success. Their failure lay in the fact that although many spoke English fluently, none of them would speak English in India. One of the members of the delegation had studied in the United States, and he had to have his views interpreted to his old friends who had known him for years, and this was quoted all around.

A fairly typical conversation, of a Chinese delegate to an Indian in the Government, would run something like this:

Let us not argue about the U.S.S.R. We are not necessarily in partnership with them. We feel indebted to them because they have taken up our cause but you don't like them so let us not argue about them and let us not argue about America. We have our views. You don't share all of them. Let us spend our time talking about our mutual problems. We are a great Asian nation like yourself—the two most heavily populated countries in the world. We are trying to solve our problems through a people's democracy.

This approach tells the Indians what they want to hear, that China has no designs on India; it tells them things they want to hear and they are inclined to go along and believe it.

However, I believe there is a growing disillusionment in India with China—a gradual growing fear of what China has on its mind as far as aggression is concerned, starting I believe with Tibet. There is a great deal of talk about Tibet and fears about Tibet. The Indian people are concerned

about the fact that there are many troops in Tibet—many more than are needed to hold down a docile people. There is concern about the northern boundary of Nepal and a great deal of discussion on that also.

Prospects for Success

Now, in closing, I'm going out on a limb and say a bit about the future of India. As most of you know I'm an optimist of deep-seated convictions. I believe the great test of democratic government in India will succeed. On the other hand, I recognize that there are many, many opportunities for mistakes. If success is achieved—if free India overcomes its problems—the victory will be a victory for the Indian people, not for assistance which the United States has given and—I hope—will continue to give to India.

If democratic government fails in India, the entire free world will suffer a catastrophic setback all through Asia. This set-back will be even greater, in my opinion, than that which the free world suffered when China was conquered by communism. The lesson of China forewarned us of what could happen in India. If we can not profit from this lesson, the future is dark indeed.

What can we Americans do to prevent this catastrophe?

First, we must give the Indian people a much clearer picture of the United States and the American people. Most Indians have an unbalanced conception of Americans. They often misunderstand and exaggerate racial discrimination in the United States. The Cold War often makes it necessary for us to talk in military terms, in terms of world strategy, and this irritates the Indians. Furthermore, many of them still believe that the Western nations will revert to the policies of the nineteenth century colonial period.

India must see the best in America. We do not make friends by boasting of the material comforts and the high standard of living we enjoy. Talk of bath tubs, radios, and television sets does not make it easier for people in other lands to know and like us.

We have a great democratic tradition. It embodies the ideas of Jefferson, of Jackson, and Lincoln, Teddy Roosevelt and Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie. One great idea runs through the philosophies of these men:—every individual is important; governments exist for him. He does not live to serve the state.

We have tried to live by this powerful idea and we believe it has served us well. It is important to us that India understand that this concept of individual freedom is basic in our society.

We are carrying a tremendous burden in our struggle for a free world. We are often uncertain, and in spirit, I think, we are humble in the face of this responsibility. We have made mistakes. We will probably make more. We must

get across to India our deep and grave concern with these problems, our anxiety to preserve democratic freedoms as we search for answers. We should welcome their help and search out the contributions they can make in their own way.

We are making progress with this information work. Most of the kinks in our information service have been ironed out in the last year and the information program is now moving along in high gear.

Second, we must face up to the fact that we must increase aid to India. This will cost money, but it is a small fraction of what we spend in the rest of the world.

Third, we must never lose sight of the fact that when we deal with India we are dealing with an Asiatic country. By shirking the difficult task of recognizing India as a part of Asia and thus refusing to recognize the realities of 1952, the free nations will surely alienate all of Asia and perhaps even bring about their own downfall.

The rest depends largely on India. As I said before, I'm an optimist. I believe India will meet the challenge. The next 5 years may tell the story. Everyone who believes in human freedom and ultimate dignity of man will be affected by the outcome.

Agreement for Extension of Bahamas Proving Ground

[Released to the press January 15]

The United States and the United Kingdom on January 15 concluded an agreement for the extension of the Bahamas Long Range Proving Ground to include the Turks and Caicos Islands, a dependency of the Government of Jamaica. The agreement was signed on behalf of the United States by Secretary Acheson and on behalf of the United Kingdom by Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador at Washington.

The agreement will permit the United States, jointly with the United Kingdom, to establish and operate in the Turks and Caicos Islands technical and supporting facilities at selected sites which are necessary for acquiring data and maintaining continuous control of the guided missiles throughout their flight.

The agreement will continue in force for the duration of the 1950 Bahamas Long Range Proving Ground Agreement, which was for 25 years, and likewise authorizes the United States, jointly with the United Kingdom, to launch, fly, and land guided missiles in the designated range area, and to operate such vessels and aircraft in the area as may be necessary for purposes connected directly with the operation of the range.

The missiles to be flight-tested will be unarmed

and will carry instruments for measuring missile performance, for control of the missile, and for destruction of the missile in flight, if necessary for reasons of safety. Radar and visual surveillance will be maintained along the range to determine the presence and location of any air or surface craft in the area.

Export-Import Bank Loan To Bolivian Tungsten Mine

The Export-Import Bank on January 18 announced approval of a loan of \$580,000 to Compagnie Aramayo de Mines en Bolivie to assist in financing the expansion of the production of tungsten from the Pacuni mine in Bolivia.

The Pacuni mine has been a producer of tungsten for a number of years and has extensive ore reserves. The loan will be used in large part for the purchase and transportation to Bolivia of U.S. mining and milling equipment, and in some part to assist in meeting certain other costs of a development program at the mine. The mining company also will make a substantial further investment from its own funds in order to increase the rate at which it will produce tungsten concentrates.

The borrower has agreed to sell to the United States Emergency Procurement Service the tungsten it will produce in 1952-54 so as to increase the U.S. supply of this strategic commodity.

The terms of the credit require that, if not previously liquidated by prepayment resulting from shipments to the Emergency Procurement Service, repayment of principal will be made in three semi-annual installments beginning in December 1953 with interest at the rate of 5 percent per annum on outstanding balances payable semiannually.

Point Four Agreement: Michigan State and Colombian Colleges

On January 22 the Department of State announced that a Point Four agreement had been completed by an exchange of notes between the Colombia Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy at Bogotá for a long-term cooperation between Michigan State College and two agricultural colleges in Colombia—the Facultad Nacional de Agronomía at Medellín and the Facultad de Agronomía del Valle at Palmira. The Department of State and the Department of Agriculture are assisting in the project.

Paul Herbert, head of the Department of Forestry at Michigan State, is already in Medellín on a short-term assignment to help the Facultad

Nacional de Agronomía organize a forestry department. Seven other Michigan State staff members left East Lansing last week with their families, to take the long-term assignment. They will arrive at the Colombian colleges in time to be ready for the opening of the school year there February 6. They will work with the local staffs to develop stronger curricula and strengthen subject-matter departments. In addition, they will teach in the colleges and will work with nearby experiment stations.

Previous to the development of this agreement, President John A. Hannah, Dean Ernest L. Anthony of the Michigan State College School of Agriculture, and J. Dennett Guthrie of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, visited the Colombian colleges in September. Staff and equipment needs were agreed upon at that time. Dean Carlos Madrid and Dean Guillermo Ramírez visited East Lansing and Washington last November.

Latin American Mechanics To Receive Training in U. S.

[Released to the press January 21]

Training for 60 mechanics from Central and South America will be provided in the United States through Point Four funds under agreements between the Technical Cooperation Administration and 10 Latin American Republics, the Department of State announced on January 21.

The students will be trained in auto-diesel mechanics and welding at the Nashville Auto-Diesel College, of Nashville, Tenn. Ten of the selected trainees will come from Mexico, ten from Colombia and five each from Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Ecuador, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. The cost will be \$150,000 and will be borne by Point Four as a part of its program of education and training.

Students are expected to begin classes about the middle of March. The first class will consist of 20 mechanics. Two similar classes will begin studies 10 days or 2 weeks later.

Arrangements have been made for the students to live in private homes in Nashville to aid them in their study of English and to give them an insight into the manner in which an American family lives. Plans also include employment each Saturday in private garages and machine shops to give the students practical experience. Side trips will be conducted to industrial centers to round out the training. The expenses of these trips will be paid either by the student's home country or by the student himself out of his earnings during the 42 weeks which constitute the technical and practical training.

Once they have completed their training, the mechanics will return to their homes and will assist in the local instruction of other mechanics without the necessity of their traveling to the United States. The scarcity of skilled mechanics is great in many of the Latin American countries, and Point Four is helping to supply the need through such programs as this.

Eric Johnston Named Chairman Of Development Advisory Board

*Following is the text of the letter of acceptance sent by Eric A. Johnston to President Truman in answer to the latter's request for his services as Chairman of the International Development Advisory Board:*¹

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As your request that I accept the chairmanship of the International Development Advisory Board comes on the heels of ten months of government service, I wanted to consult with the board of directors of the Motion Picture Association of America before making my decision. I am pleased to tell you that, with the approval of the board, I accept this challenging assignment.²

I agree with you that the Point Four program embodies all those things that we stand for in America, and all those things that we seek to achieve as a leader in the free world.

We are strong at home for the reason that we have come a long way in narrowing the economic gaps in our society. This has come about through constantly expanding production in all lines by the closest cooperation among our people. We have given reality to the ideal of partnership in its truest sense.

I like to think that America's role in world leadership lies in extending this partnership ideal. This is not to propose that we remake the world in our own image. Rather it is to suggest that we help other free countries help themselves in becoming strong and self-sustaining members of the society of nations.

It is a tragic fact that in the world today two-thirds of the people still engage in the ageless struggle against poverty and want. The gap between well-being and want is still too wide in too many lands to give the free world the solid foundation of economic strength it must have to survive.

The Point Four program is the greatest con-

tribution we can make to narrowing these gaps. As a businessman I regard it as a far-sighted and prudent investment. It gives a hand to those who are willing to use their own.

It gives a hand in two ways:

By sharing our techniques, our genius in production and our store of knowledge;

By making it possible for private American capital to make investments or to enter into working partnerships with local capital on an equitable basis.

This concept offers the widest opportunities for lasting good at minimum expense to the taxpayer. It takes account of the fact that economic strength springs from self-reliance and self-support. And it recognizes that essentially the job of each nation in developing its resources and expanding its productivity must be done within by its own efforts.

These are the convictions, Mr. President, that prompt me to accept the chairmanship. I appreciate the confidence you have shown in me by asking me to take this post.

Military Assistance Negotiations

The following negotiations are being conducted under the terms of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which authorized a program of military grant aid for Latin America:

Ecuador

The Departments of State and Defense announced on January 15 that negotiations are being initiated on that date at Quito with the Government of Ecuador looking to the conclusion of a bilateral military-assistance agreement. The American Ambassador at Quito, Paul C. Daniels, is being assisted by representatives of the Department of Defense in the negotiations.

Chile

The Departments of State and Defense announced on January 20 that negotiations were being initiated on that date in Santiago with the Government of Chile looking to the conclusion of a bilateral military-assistance agreement. The American Ambassador at Santiago, Claude G. Bowers, is being assisted by representatives of the Department of Defense in the negotiations.

Colombia

The Departments of State and Defense have announced that negotiations were initiated on January 21 at Bogotá with the Government of Colombia looking to the conclusion of a bilateral military-assistance agreement.

The American Ambassador at Bogotá, Capus M. Waynick, is being assisted by representatives of the Department of Defense in the negotiations.

¹ Released to the press by the White House on Jan. 23. For text of Mr. Truman's letter to Mr. Johnston, see White House release of the same date.

² For text of Executive Order 10159, which called for establishment of the International Development Advisory Board, see BULLETIN of Sept. 25, 1950, p. 499.

Europe's Problem of Excess Population

CONFERENCE AT BRUSSELS ON MIGRATION AND COMMITTEE FOR MOVEMENT OF MIGRANTS FROM EUROPE

by George L. Warren

The Conference on Migration, convened by the Belgian Government at the suggestion of the U.S. Government, met in Brussels from November 26 through December 5, 1951. The Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe, established by decision of the Conference on Migration, held its first session for the purposes of organization at Brussels from December 6 through December 8, 1951.

The initiative of the U.S. Government in suggesting the holding of the Conference on Migration was based on specific acts of Congress. Section 16 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended (P. L. 555, 81st Cong.), authorized the U.S. Government to participate in an international conference to develop ways of alleviating the problems of excess population in certain countries in Europe. At the time of the convening of the Conference on Migration it appeared that upon the termination of operations by the International Refugee Organization (Iro) on December 31, 1951, there would remain in Europe some 25,000 ethnic Germans eligible for admission to the United States under section 12 of the Act, without the means of transport. Section 115 (e) of the Eca Act of 1948, as amended (P. L. 535, 81st Cong.), directed the Eca Administrator to encourage the emigration of surplus manpower from participating countries to areas where such manpower could be effectively utilized. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 (P. L. 165, 82d Cong.) in section 101 (a) (2) authorized the expenditure of funds up to \$10,000,000 to effectuate the principles set forth in section 115 (e) of the Eca Act of 1948, as amended. The appropriations legislation (P. L. 249, 82d Cong., 1st sess.), under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, earmarked \$10,000,000 to be used specifically for migration purposes.

In order to implement the foregoing acts of Con-

gress, the Department invited the Belgian Government, and the Belgian Government accepted, to convene a Conference on Migration at Brussels on November 26, 1951. Out of a total of 34 governments invited by the Belgian Government to attend the Conference, 27 governments listed below were represented at Brussels—19 as full participants, and 8 as observers;

Governments represented as full participants

Australia	Greece
Austria	Italy
Belgium	Luxembourg
Bolivia	Netherlands
Brazil	Switzerland
Canada	Turkey
Chile	United Kingdom
Colombia	United States
France	Venezuela
German Federal Republic	

Governments represented by observers

Argentina	Norway
Denmark	Paraguay
Guatemala	Peru
Israel	Sweden

The remaining countries which either declined the invitation, did not reply, or reported they were unable to send representatives were Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Portugal, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, and Uruguay.

Observers

United Nations
 Holy See
 International Labor Organization
 International Refugee Organization
 Organization for European Economic Cooperation
 Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
 Council of Europe
 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
 International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions
 Standing Conference of Voluntary Agencies
 International Social Service

The Conference was opened by a welcoming address by Joseph Meurice, Minister of Foreign Trade in the Belgian Government, replacing Paul van Zeeland, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was temporarily absent from Brussels. Franz Leemans, counselor of the Belgian Government and representative of Belgium at the Conference, was unanimously elected chairman and served in this capacity throughout the Conference and the first session of the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe. Count Giusti del Giardino of Italy was elected first Vice-Chairman; Ambassador A. de Souza Filho of Brazil, second Vice-Chairman; and Dr. von Trutzschler of the German Federal Republic, *Rapporteur*. Roswell D. McClelland of the Office of European Affairs, Department of State, served as secretary of the Conference and of the Provisional Committee.

At the opening session on November 26, 1951, the U.S. representative presented a plan for the establishment of a provisional intergovernmental committee on migration to facilitate the movement of migrants from Europe. This plan proposed that 12 ships to be relinquished by the Iro on December 31, 1951, be taken over to move during one year of operations approximately 115,000 persons who would not otherwise be moved from Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and Greece to countries of immigration overseas at an overall estimated cost of approximately \$34,000,000. The United States would contribute \$10,000,000 of this sum, provided a total budget of approximately that proposed was adopted. It was suggested that membership in the Committee be open to governments committed to the principle of the free movement of persons under established emigration and immigration laws and that each member as a matter of obligation contribute an agreed share to the administrative expenses of approximately \$3,000,000. Contributions to the operating fund would be voluntary. Of the U.S. contribution, approximately \$1,000,000 would be allocated to the administrative expenses and \$9,000,000 to the operating fund, which was set at \$14,000,000.

The general discussion following presentation of the U.S. proposal indicated virtually unanimous acceptance of the proposal in principle. Some representatives expressed disappointment at the limited number of migrants and refugees to be moved. There was general agreement that the proposed organization should be provisional, flexible in character and temporary, that its administrative expenses should be held to a minimum, and that the maximum of the resources made available should be allocated to operations. There was also unanimous agreement that refugees should be included among the persons to be moved. Questions were raised as to the necessity for utilizing the Iro ships in the proposed movement on the ground that commercial shipping might prove ade-

quate for the purpose. The draft resolution proposed by the U.S. representative was criticized sympathetically by some representatives because it failed to reflect in its text proper balance between the interests of emigration and immigration countries. The basic elements of the plan, however, received general acceptance and were considered well suited to meet the current requirements of emigration and immigration countries with respect to migration.

Questions were raised as to the working relationships between the proposed Committee and other international and nongovernmental bodies. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees made a plea for a special status as a nonvoting member of the proposed Committee. The representatives of two international organizations of trade unions—the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions—made pleas for direct participation in the proposed Committee by representatives of trade unions.

At the close of the general discussion, the U.S. representative in replying to the foregoing observations agreed that the plan proposed was a modest one but emphasized the necessity of demonstrating the viability of the plan prior to its expansion to meet more adequately the total problem of surplus populations and of refugees requiring movement. It was essential, he said, to build soundly on small beginnings and to develop on the basis of accumulating experience. He assured the Conference that the proposal did not in any way envisage that the Committee would trespass in its activities on those of any other existing organization and that any assistance which could be afforded by other bodies engaged in related activities would be welcomed. He pointed out that the plan proposed operations for 1 year during which the Government members of the proposed Committee might decide in the light of existing experience whether the plan was to be expanded, extended, or terminated.

With respect to the question of shipping, the U.S. representative stated that he was convinced that the ships presently operated by Iro and reconditioned at great expense to international funds would be required for the movement of migrants and refugees, if additional members were to be moved from Europe beyond those presently moving under other auspices. In order to remove all possible concern that the proposed Committee might compete with normal commercial operations, he stated that the United States would propose that the Committee adopt a policy of utilizing all commercial shipping offered which would meet essential requirements; namely, adequate accommodations in accordance with the regulations of ports of embarkation and disembarkation, availability when needed at specific ports of embarkation for travel to specific destinations,

and prices comparable to those established in the Committee's experience in operation. A working party of experts on shipping set up by the Conference later made a similar recommendation. The U.S. representative also expressed the advantages to be gained in operating a fleet of ships for migration purposes under international auspices such as greater flexibility in movement, savings in costs, and shipping schedules arranged to suit the particular requirements of emigration and immigration countries.

Following this response to the general discussion, the Conference proceeded to amend the draft resolution establishing the committee submitted by the U.S. representative and to examine the proposed administrative and operational budgets together with the texts of various resolutions required to be adopted in order to bring the proposed intergovernmental Committee into formal existence.

Following is the text of the basic "Resolution To Establish a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe" (Document MCB/9) as formally adopted by the Conference on December 5, 1951, by a vote of 16 for, none opposed, and 1 abstention.

THE GOVERNMENTS adopting this resolution
RECOGNIZE

that there exists a problem of surplus population and refugees in certain countries of Europe, while certain overseas countries offer opportunities for the orderly absorption of additional population;

that the problem is of such magnitude as to present a serious obstacle to economic viability and co-operation in Europe;

that, whereas a general improvement in economic conditions and increased production would provide increased possibilities for employment and settlement in Europe and, by facilitating intra-European migration, would offer a very important contribution to the solution of the problem, an increase in European emigration to countries overseas nevertheless remains another necessary element;

that a close relationship exists between economic development and immigration;

that international financing of European emigration should contribute not only to solving the problem of population in Europe, but also stimulate the creation of new economic opportunities in countries lacking manpower;

that, while technical assistance may make an important contribution to the solution of the economic problems of the underdeveloped countries, the development of all existing or potential possibilities of immigration into these countries also constitutes an important factor for the solution of these problems;

that the present volume of migration is insufficient to meet the needs of emigration countries or to allow full use of the possibilities offered by immigration countries;

that there is need for the pursuit by the appropriate international agencies of all migration activities falling within their respective fields;

that the provision of facilities for the transport of migrants who could not otherwise be moved without such facilities can make an important contribution to increased migration;

that, although the movement of migrants should as far as possible be effected by the normal commercial shipping and air transport services, co-ordination in this field is necessary in order to enable the movement of the largest

possible number of migrants by those services, and furthermore to ensure that the I. R. O.'s present shipping facilities are applied to the extent necessary to secure an additional movement of migrants;

that steps should be taken to provide transport facilities for such refugees as may desire and have the opportunity to emigrate from overpopulated countries; and

that, consequently, provisional intergovernmental arrangements between the democratic governments which adopt or may hereafter adopt this resolution are necessary in order to move persons who are attached to the principles to which these governments subscribe and who desire to emigrate to overseas countries where their services can be utilized in conformity with generally accepted international standards of employment and living conditions, with full respect for human rights; and

AGREE

(1) to constitute a "Provisional Inter-Governmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe";

(2) that the purpose of the Committee will be to make arrangements for the transport of migrants, for whom existing facilities are inadequate and who could not otherwise be moved, from certain European countries having surplus population to countries overseas which offer opportunities for orderly immigration, consistent with the policies of the countries concerned;

(3) that the terms of reference of the Committee will be:

(a) to provide and arrange for land, sea and air transportation, as required;

(b) to assume responsibility for the charter of such ships operated under the auspices of I.R.O. as may be required;

(c) to co-ordinate a shipping programme utilizing commercial shipping facilities to the maximum extent possible and the chartered ships transferred from the I.R.O. to secure those movements for which commercial facilities are inadequate;

(d) to take such actions as may be directly related to these ends, taking account of such national and international services as are available;

(e) to take such other actions as will be necessary and appropriate to discharge the foregoing functions;

(4) that among the migrants with whom the Committee will be concerned are included refugees and new refugees for whose migration arrangements may be made between the Committee and the governments of the countries affording asylum;

(5) that membership in the Committee will be open to governments with a demonstrated interest in the principle of the free movement of persons and which undertake, subject to approval by the proper governmental authorities, to make a financial contribution to the Committee, the amount of which will be agreed to by the Committee and by the government concerned;

(6) that the Committee will elect its own officers, establish its Rules of Procedure, establish such sub-committees as it may decide (including an inter-governmental sub-committee on the co-ordination of transport), and exercise the powers required to carry out its purpose;

(7) that the Committee will agree to a plan of operations, a budget, a plan of expenditure and the terms and conditions under which available funds shall be spent, in accordance with the following principles:

(a) each country of reception will retain control of standards of admission and the number of immigrants to be admitted;

(b) only those services will be undertaken by the Committee which are essential to the movement of migrants who could not otherwise be moved;

(c) the Committee will ensure that its administration is conducted in an efficient and economical manner;

(d) any member government making a contribution to the operating fund will be able to stipulate

the terms and conditions under which that contribution can be used;

(8) *that the Committee will appoint a Director responsible to the Committee;*

(9) *that the Committee shall vest the Director with the powers necessary to carry out the responsibilities entrusted to him by the Committee;*

(10) *that the Committee will give early consideration to the question of the relations to be established with international, non-governmental and voluntary organizations conducting activities in the field of migration and refugees; and*

(11) *that the Committee will examine the need for its continuing existence beyond a twelve-month period.*

The Governments voting for the resolution were Australia, Austria, Brazil, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, France, the German Federal Republic, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. The Austrian representative, though absent at the vote, had previously directed that his vote be recorded as favorable. The United Kingdom representative abstained on the ground that further examination of the proposal would need to take place in London. Of the governments represented by observers, Argentina voted for the resolution and Guatemala abstained. These votes were not recorded in the final tally. Colombia, Paraguay, and Venezuela were absent at the vote; Denmark, Israel, Norway, Peru, and Sweden responded as observers.

The text of the resolution as finally adopted did not deviate in any important matter of substance from that originally submitted by the U.S. representative. Of the Governments voting for the resolution, Austria, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, the German Federal Republic, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States indicated at Brussels their firm intention to become full members of the Committee. With the exception of the United States, all of these Governments would need to take appropriate actions later to make their financial contributions available to the Committee. The representatives of Australia, Canada, France, and Belgium, while supporting the project of the Provisional Committee wholeheartedly, stated that formal action of adherence to the Provisional Committee and financial participation would require a few weeks in time after the Brussels conference. The final position of the Government of Turkey with respect to membership in the Committee remained uncertain at the end of the Conference.

The Conference on Migration adjourned on Wednesday, December 5, 1951. The Provisional Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe convened for its first session on the morning of December 6, 1951. The 15 Governments represented at the first session of the Provisional Committee are listed as follows in the groups into which they were divided later, mainly for purposes of allocating percentages of contributions to the members of the Provisional Committee:

Emigration Countries

German Federal Republic
Greece
Italy
Netherlands

Immigration Countries

Australia
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile

Interested Countries

Belgium
France
Luxembourg
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

The procedure adopted during the first session of the Provisional Committee was to review and amend in advance each resolution proposed, the adoption of which would be required to complete the formal steps necessary to bring the Committee into existence. Formal adoption of all the resolutions took place at the final public meeting of the Provisional Committee on December 8. This was done in order to give each Government representative the maximum opportunity to consult his Government prior to the necessity of taking formal action. The officers of the Conference were elected as officers of the Committee for the first session. Roswell D. McClelland continued as secretary. The observers representing interested organizations and the Holy See remained in attendance at the meetings of the Provisional Committee.

Paragraph (10) of the operative part of the resolution adopted by the Conference reads:

AGREE that the Committee will give early consideration to the question of the relations to be established with international, non-governmental and voluntary organizations conducting activities in the field of migration and refugees;

While it was anticipated that the problem of the relations to be established with other organizations would be discussed at Brussels, time did not permit an adequate exploration of all the questions involved, many of which would require recommendations of a technical nature from the director of the Provisional Committee when elected, and action on this matter was consequently deferred to the second session of the Provisional Committee.

In the discussion on the budget of administrative expenditures originally proposed in the amount of \$3,060,300, there was unanimous insistence that the total be reduced and that the maximum funds available to the Committee be applied to operations. The final result was a decision to reduce the administrative budget to \$2,359,060. This was accomplished in the main by a reduction in the proposed international staff,

both in terms of numbers and by utilizing a larger number of local staff personnel at national as distinguished from international salary scales. Certain proposed items of expenditure were also frozen pending decisions to be taken by the Committee at later sessions.

The operating fund of \$14,000,000 was accepted without change. Of this fund, it was decided that \$3,000,000 would be required for working capital and that \$11,000,000 would be available for the payment of movement of migrants for which no reimbursement proved possible. The U.S. proposals that contributions to the operating fund which would be voluntary consist of (a) outright contributions in cash without restriction as to use; (b) contributions restricted in use, such as for the movement of refugees only; (c) advance contributions in cash against which reimbursements owing, would be charged later; and (d) reimbursement for services rendered were accepted without modification. Certain representatives indicated that their governments would make contributions to the operating fund to be restricted to the payment of movement for refugees.

The procedure followed in allocating percentage contributions to the administrative expenditures to the members of the Provisional Committee was to assign to the United States, in the first instance, three-ninths of the total and two-ninths each to the groups of emigration, immigration, and interested governments. Each group thereafter worked out the allocation of percentages within its own group. A final decision on allocations was that the highest contributor in any group should not be allocated a larger percentage than the highest contributor in any other group, excluding the United States. The ultimate result was that the Governments of Germany and Italy of the emigration group, Canada in the immigration group, and France and the United Kingdom in the group of interested Governments, each accepted a percentage contribution of 8.4 percent, subject to later confirmation and the completion of appropriation actions by their respective parliaments.

The decisions on allocations of contributions were based in part upon earlier acceptance as to the estimated sources and destinations of the migrants to be moved as follows:

<i>From</i>		<i>To</i>	
Germany-----	55, 000	Canada-----	40, 000
Italy and Trieste..	35, 000	United States----	*25, 000
The Netherlands..	15, 000	Australia-----	25, 000
Austria-----	6, 000	Brazil-----	18, 000
Greece-----	5, 000	Chile-----	4, 000
		Bolivia-----	3, 000
Total-----	116, 000	Other countries--	1, 000
		Total-----	116, 000

*U.S. Displaced Persons Act—Sec. 12 eligibles.

There was general agreement in view of U.S. interest and initiative in the creation of the Provisional Committee that the director should be

an American. However, the U.S. representative was not in a position to make a specific nomination for this post at Brussels. In consequence, the Committee decided to vest in Franz Leemans, representative of Belgium and chairman of the Committee, and George L. Warren, the U.S. representative, the powers and duties of the director temporarily until the second session of the Committee when it was expected that a nomination would be made. This was done on the understanding that Mr. Leemans and Mr. Warren would immediately designate Pierre Jacobsen, formerly Deputy Director of Iro, provisionally as deputy director of the Provisional Committee in order that appropriate effective action could be taken between the first and second sessions of the Committee in establishing the headquarters of the Committee at Geneva, organizing staff, and in assuming responsibility for the Committee for the takeover of Iro ships as they were released individually upon the completion of their last trips under the Iro during January 1952. This would insure continuing operation of the ships without a gap in service.

The Committee in its final public session on the afternoon of December 8, 1951, formally adopted a series of resolutions implementing the decision to establish the Committee, all by a vote of 14-0-1. The United Kingdom abstained on each vote. The important actions taken were the adoption of the budget in the total sum of \$36,954,000; the plan of expenditure for one year of operations \$33,954,000, including authority to the director to incur obligations and make expenditures under the plan; the scale of contributions; financial regulations; rules of procedure; a statement defining the powers and duties of the director; and a resolution vesting the duties and powers of the director in the persons of Mr. Leemans and Mr. Warren. The Committee also voted to meet early in February at the call of the chairman.

Members of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House Judiciary Committee, under the chairmanship of Congressman Francis E. Walter, alternate U.S. representative, attended all of the meetings of the Conference and many meetings of the Committee. The House members included, in addition to Mr. Walter: Representative Chauncy W. Reed (R., Ill.); Representative Michael Feighan (D., Ohio); Representative Clifford Case (R., N. J.); Representative Frank L. Chelf (D., Ky.); and Representative Angier L. Goodwin (R., Mass.).

The Provisional Committee adjourned its first session on December 8, 1951, to reconvene at Geneva in February 1952.

• *Mr. Warren, author of the above article, is adviser on refugee and displaced persons, Department of State. Mr. Warren was U.S. representative to the meetings of the Migration Conference and the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee.*

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During January 1952

ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):	
Legal Committee: Subcommittee on Revision of the Warsaw Convention.	Paris Jan. 7-22
United Nations:	
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:	
Meeting of Working Party on Standard International Trade Classification.	Bangkok Jan. 7-12
Subcommittee on Electric Power	Rangoon Jan. 11-14
Subcommittee on Iron and Steel: 4th session	Rangoon Jan. 15-17
Committee on Industry and Trade: 4th session	Rangoon Jan. 18-28
Council on Libya, Final Meeting	Geneva Jan. 8-
WHO (World Health Organization):	
Standing Committee on Administration and Finance	Geneva Jan. 7-19
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade):	
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee for Agenda and Intersessional Business of the Contracting Parties.	Geneva Jan. 14-15
Meeting of Copyright Experts of the American Republics	Washington Jan. 14-20
UPT (Universal Postal Union):	
Executive and Liaison Committee Meeting	Bern Jan. 21-31

In Session as of January 31, 1952

International Materials Conference	Washington Feb. 26, 1951-
Four-Power Conference on Swiss-Allied Accord	Bern Mar. 5, 1951-
United Nations:	
General Assembly: 6th session	Paris Nov. 6, 1951-
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Commission on Prisoners of War	Geneva Jan. 21-
Economic and Social Council:	
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 8th session	Rangoon Jan. 29-
First Meeting of the <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Restrictive Business Practices.	New York Jan. 29-
WHO (World Health Organization):	
Executive Board: 9th session	Geneva Jan. 21-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):	
Personnel Licensing Division: 4th session	Montreal Jan. 22-
Council: 15th session	Montreal Jan. 29-
International Film Festival of India	India Jan. 24-
West Point Sesquicentennial	West Point, N. Y. January

Scheduled February 1-April 30, 1952

Caribbean Conference on Industrial Development	San Juan Feb. 4-
United Nations:	
General Assembly:	
Final Meeting of Special Committee on the Balkans	Athens Feb. 5-
Economic and Social Council:	
Economic Commission for Latin America:	
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Meeting to Approve Report to Ecosoc.	Santiago Feb. 10-
Working Party on Insecticides	Geneva Feb. 11-
Economic Commission for Europe: 7th session	Geneva Mar. 3-
Subcommission on Freedom of Information and of the Press: 5th session.	New York Mar. 3-
Technical Assistance Committee, Working Party	New York Mar. 8-
Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations	New York Mar. 18-
Commission on the Status of Women: 6th session	Geneva Mar. 24-
Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 7th session	New York Apr. 17-
Commission on Human Rights: 8th session	New York Apr. 21-

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State.

Trusteeship Council: Tenth session	New York	Feb. 27-
IRO (International Refugee Organization):		
11th session of the Executive Committee	Geneva	Feb. 7-
9th session of the General Council	Geneva	Feb. 11-
"Colombo Plan" Exhibition	Colombo	Feb. 15-
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):		
Council: Ninth session	Lisbon	Feb. 16-*
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations):		
Meeting of the Committee on Commodity Problems	Rome	Feb. 18-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
2d Session of the Advisory Committee on Salaried Employees and Professional Workers.	Geneva	Feb. 18-
Governing Body: 118th session	Geneva	Mar. 3-
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations.	Geneva	Mar. 17-
4th Inter-American Conference on Social Security	México, D. F.	Mar. 24-
5th Regional Conference of American States Members	Rio de Janeiro	Apr. 17-
Metal Trades Committee: 4th session	Geneva	Apr. 21-
British Commonwealth Scientific Official Conference	Canberra and Melbourne	Feb. 18-
Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe: 2d session.	Geneva	Feb. 18-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
European-Mediterranean Regional Meeting: 3d session	Paris	Feb. 26-
Conference on German External Debts	London	Feb. 28-
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade):		
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee for Agenda and Intersessional Business of the Contracting Parties.	Geneva	Feb. (Last week)
Pakistan International Industries Fair	Karachi	Mar. 1-
Meeting of Special Committee of the International Sugar Council	London	Mar. 3-
WHO (World Health Organization):		
Official Medical Historians Liaison Committee	Simla, India	Mar. 3-
1st General Assembly of the International Mathematical Union	Rome	Mar. 6-
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Inter-American Seminar on Human Rights	Habana	Mar. 11-
International Conference on Copyrights	Paris	April
2d Chicago International Trade Fair	Chicago	Mar. 22-
Caribbean Fisheries Conference	Trinidad	Mar. 24-
International Cattle Exposition	Habana	March
International Exhibition of Drawings and Engravings	Lugano	Apr. 10-
Milan International Trade Fair	Milan	Apr. 12-
Fourth Inter-American Travel Congress	Lima	Apr. 12-
Iru (International Telecommunication Union):		
Administrative Council: 7th session	Geneva	Apr. 17-
South Pacific Commission: 9th session	Nouméa	Apr. 18-
Lyon 34th International Fair	Lyon	Apr. 19-
PASO (Pan American Sanitary Organization):		
Executive Committee: 16th meeting	Washington	Apr. 21-*
Health Congress of the Royal Sanitary Institute	Margate, England	Apr. 22-
Cannes Film Festival	Cannes	Apr. 23-
6th International Hydrographic Conference	Monte Carlo	Apr. 29-

*Tentative.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

International Film Festival

The Department of State announced on January 23 that Frank Capra, noted Hollywood motion-picture producer and director, and Floyd E. Brooker, documentary film producer and currently Chief, Audio-Visual Branch, Mutual Security Agency, have been selected to serve as U.S. representatives to the First International Film Festival of India. The festival will be held in four cities: Bombay, January 24-February 6, Madras, February 7-13, New Delhi, February 14-20, and Calcutta, February 21-27.

The first of its kind in India, the festival is intended to emphasize the importance of motion pictures in helping to influence and benefit the lives of peoples throughout the world. Approximately 46 nations are expected to participate in this event.

U.S. participation in the festival, in addition to the U.S. delegation, will consist of a group of full-length feature entertainment films and shorts, as well as nine government-produced motion pictures, covering cultural, scientific, and educational topics.

Personnel Licensing (ICAO)

The Department of State announced on January 22 that the fourth session of the Personnel Licensing Division of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) would convene that day at Montreal, Canada. The U.S. delegation is as follows:

U.S. Delegate

John J. Quina, chief, General Rules Division, Bureau of Safety Regulation, Civil Aeronautics Board

Alternate U.S. Delegate

George E. South, International Personnel Licensing Standards, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Advisers

Everett T. Burnard, operations specialist, International Standards, Air Transport Association of America, Inc.

Roland M. Dolder, airman standards specialist, Civil Aeronautics Board

Ludwig G. Lederer, M. D., medical director, Capital Airlines

Bert A. Shields, airman standards specialist, Civil Aeronautics Board

John E. Smith, M. D., chief of medical standards branch, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

The Personnel Licensing Division is one of 11 technical "divisions" of the Air Navigation Commission, as established by the ICAO Council. These divisions are responsible for formulating for the Commission, and for eventual Council action, recommendations on standards, recommended practices and procedures, which appear to be necessary or desirable for the safety and operational efficiency of international air navigation. The divisions function as technical or specialized conferences open to delegations from all 57 ICAO contracting states. The Personnel Licensing Division deals with matters relating to the licensing of pilots and other crew members of international air carriers, and covers the full range of their qualifications and privileges. The third session of this division met at Montreal, March 30-April 23, 1948.

The fourth session will further consider the qualifications and privileges of (a) the private pilot with reference to piloting for remuneration, (b) the commercial pilot and senior commercial pilot, (c) copilots, and (d) aircraft maintenance engineers. A study will be made of the Standards and Recommended Practices in annex 1 (Personnel Licensing) of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and the curricula for the courses of approved training in the light of experience in implementing annex 1 and with particular relation to (a) standards for the flight-instructor rating, (b) the advent of turbined-engined airplanes in international air transport, (c) ratings for air-traffic controllers, and (d) requirements for flight radiotelephony operators. Consideration will be given to the possible estab-

lishment of higher standards of airline-transport pilots to meet current operating conditions and standards for helicopter pilots. The agenda also includes such matters as medical requirements for personnel licensing and the possible establishment of two grades of instrument ratings.

International Materials Conference

Crude Sulphur Allocation

The Sulphur Committee of the International Materials Conference on January 24 announced the allocation of crude sulphur for the first 6 months of 1952.¹ This is the first of the IMC Committees to adopt a longer period than one quarter for allocating. The longer allocation period should prove to be of considerable assistance to those countries making procurements.

In preparing a plan of distribution, the Committee was confronted with the fact that estimated requirements of sulphur as such for 1952 amounted to 7,364,100 long tons, as compared with an estimated production of 5,825,100 long tons, representing a shortage of 1,539,000 tons.

Sulphur consumption in 1951 is expected to have reached 6,179,900 tons as against an estimated production of 5,823,600 tons; consumption in 1950 was 6,128,200 tons as compared with a production of 5,722,000 tons.

The shortfalls in 1950 and 1951 were met by reductions in stocks, mainly in the producing countries, especially Italy and the United States. In 1952 no further substantial reduction of the stock position in producing countries can be contemplated. Therefore the Committee found it necessary to reconcile consumption with estimated production.

In the fourth quarter of 1951, allocations included the exports of four producing countries only—Italy, Mexico, Norway, and the United States. In making the present allocations the Committee took into account all exporting countries for which data are available. It came to the conclusion that the exports of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and Japan also should be included in the allocation arrangements.

As had been done in previous allocations, the Committee dealt only with crude sulphur and did not allocate the relatively small quantities which enter into international trade as crushed, ground, refined, and sublimed sulphur, and in the form of flowers. The Committee expects, however, that trade in these forms of sulphur will continue to follow the normal pattern.

¹ For text of the allocation schedule, see IMC press release No. 57 of Jan. 23, 1952.

The United States in the United Nations

[January 24-30, 1952]

General Assembly

A resolution maintaining the Palestine Conciliation Commission in existence to assist the Arab States and Israel in reaching agreement on outstanding issues was adopted by the General Assembly, meeting in plenary session January 26, by a vote of 48 (U.S.)-5 (Soviet bloc)-1 (Iraq). This action followed elimination of the provision enlarging the Commission from 3 to 7 members and incorporation of two Canadian "compromise" amendments dropping references to the repatriation of refugees and to the strict observance of previous Assembly resolutions.

Also approved 49-0-5 (Soviet bloc) was the U.S.-U.K.-Turkish-French resolution endorsing the United Nations Relief and Works Agency's 250 million dollar 3-year program for the relief and reintegration of 900,000 Palestine refugees. On the economic side, the Assembly, by a vote of 48-0-5 (Soviet bloc), adopted the U.S.-Chilean proposal for a coordinated attack on hunger and famine, as well as several other resolutions arising out of the report of the Economic and Social Council.

On January 29, approval, 30-0-6 (Soviet bloc, Syria), was given to a U.K.-French text recommending steps to solve the problem of Libyan war damages. Also adopted 39-5 (Soviet bloc)-5 was the resolution on Eritrean economic and financial arrangements (see Committee II).

Committee I (Political and Security)—By a vote of 24 (U.S.)-9 (Soviet bloc, India, Indonesia, Israel, Burma)-25 (France, U.K.), the Committee on January 29 approved a Chinese resolution determining that the U.S.S.R. had "failed to carry out" its 1945 treaty of friendship and alliance with China. Specifically, the resolution finds that the Soviet Union obstructed the efforts of the National Government to reestablish its authority in Manchuria, and that it gave military and economic assistance to the Chinese Communists in their effort to overthrow the National Government.

Adoption of the Chinese resolution came at the end of a 3-day debate during which China's charges were examined by the Committee against

the background of more recent developments in the Far East, with particular reference to the threat of further Communist aggression in South East Asia. Highlight of the discussion was a statement by United States Representative John Sherman Cooper—with which the United Kingdom, France, and New Zealand subsequently associated—that

Communist aggression in South East Asia would, in the view of my Government, be a matter of direct and grave concern which would require the most urgent and earnest consideration by the United Nations.

Mr. Cooper's declaration, which was made "on instructions of my Government" was prompted by concern over the "threat of further Communist aggression in Asia which may be latent" in earlier (January 3) Soviet charges that the United States was transporting "Kuomintang" troops from Taiwan to Thailand and Burma and that it planned to maintain Chinese Nationalist troops on the borders of Thailand, Burma, Vietnam, and Yunnan in preparation for aggressive acts against the Chinese People's Republic. Twice, the United States representative categorically denied the charges—and twice the Soviet delegate repeated them. Burma, on the other hand, said it had accepted assurances that the United States had nothing to do with the "Kuomintang stragglers" there.

Earlier (January 25), the Committee completed action on the membership item. Two resolutions were approved: (1) a revised Peruvian text—adopted 36 (U. S.)-9 (Soviet bloc, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden)-12—which called on the Security Council to reconsider all (18) pending applications for membership in the United Nations, taking into account "such facts and evidence as states applicants for membership may present," and to base its action exclusively on Charter conditions; and (2) a U.S.S.R. proposal—passed 21 (U.S.S.R.)-12 (U.S.)-25 (U.K., France)—calling on the Council to reconsider 14 specified applicants, among them five Soviet satellites. On the initiative of Argentina, the U.S.S.R. resolution notes "the increasing general sentiment in favor of universality of the United Nations."

Ad Hoc Political Committee—A resolution congratulating the people and Government of Libya

on the establishment (December 24) of Libyan independence and considering that it should "now" be admitted to the United Nations was approved by the Committee January 28 by 48-0-0, with the Soviet bloc not taking part in the vote. The resolution, which also requests the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies to continue to extend technical assistance to Libya "upon its request," was sponsored by a group of 11 states, including the United States.

U.S.S.R. and Egyptian proposals for the withdrawal of foreign troops and liquidation (or transfer to Libyan hands) of foreign bases were rejected 32 (U.S.)-6 (Soviet bloc, Iran)-14 and 29 (U.S.)-13 (Soviet bloc, Egypt, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia)-11, respectively. The majority view was that the two proposals were inconsistent with Libya's status as a sovereign and independent nation. Representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France stressed that the Libyan Government had of its own free will granted them permission to retain troops and bases on Libyan soil.

On January 30 the Committee approved 44-0-5 (Soviet bloc), a Dominican resolution urging the Eastern European countries harboring Greek children to facilitate their early return to their homeland. The approved proposal notes with concern that of the four countries—Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia—invited last month to consult with the Standing Committee on the Repatriation of Greek Children, only Czechoslovakia had entered into consultations. Rumania declined the invitation, and Hungary and Bulgaria did not even bother to reply, according to the report of the Standing Committee.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)—Climaxing a long and often heated discussion of the principle of self-determination and of the question of its inclusion in the Human Rights Covenants, the Committee January 25 adopted a composite resolution deciding in favor of the inclusion of an article on the right of all peoples and nations to self-determination "in reaffirmation of the principle enunciated in the Charter . . . drafted in the following terms: 'All peoples shall have the right to self-determination.'" The article, the resolution further provided, should stipulate that all states, including those having responsibility for the administration of non-self-governing territories, should promote the realization of the right of self-determination.

In addition, the Human Rights Commission was

requested to prepare, along specified lines, recommendations concerning international respect for self-determination of peoples. The vote was 33-9-10, with the United States casting a negative ballot on the ground that the resolution completely tied the hands of the Commission.

Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary)—"Permanent Staff Regulations" governing the "fundamental conditions of service and the basic rights, duties and obligations" of the United Nations Secretariat were approved by the Committee January 25 by a vote of 46 (U.S.)-0-4. The new regulations strengthen the Secretary-General's authority to terminate the appointments of staff members with fixed-term or temporary contracts. At present, less than half of the Secretariat staff hold permanent contracts.

Committee VI (Legal)—During the period January 23-29, the Committee adopted a number of resolutions, including (1) a Venezuelan text which had the effect of turning down the request of the International Law Commission that its members be placed under a full-time basis; (2) a United Kingdom proposal deferring communication to nonmember states ("for the purpose of accession") of the Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes pending ratification by 10 members; (3) a United Kingdom-Israel resolution requesting the Secretary-General to draw up plans for the possible publication of four documents designed to make evidence of customary law more readily available; and (4) a French-Iranian draft aimed at enabling certain nongovernmental organizations to attend Assembly meetings. The United States voted for all four resolutions.

Peace Observation Commission—Acting on the recommendation of the Assembly, the 14-member Commission established on January 23 a Balkan subcommission—comprising Sweden, Colombia, Pakistan, France, and the United States—with authority to dispatch observers to any area of international tension in the Balkans on the request of any state(s) concerned. Later the same day, Greece's United Nations representative, in a message to the members of the subcommission, requested "the immediate dispatch of observers to the frontier areas of Greece." The subcommission held its first meeting January 31, and unanimously approved a United States resolution complying with the request. Six observers are to be sent, one to be supplied by the United Kingdom and one each by the members of the subcommission.

International Security and Foreign Relations ¹

The vast rearmament program upon which this Nation has entered has a single objective—the building of defensive forces and a mobilization base which will serve as a deterrent to Communist aggression and which can, if the deterrent fails, give us and our allies the strength to defeat the aggression.

For that purpose, strength within the United States is not enough. The areas most vulnerable to aggression are not in the Western Hemisphere. They are in Europe, in the Middle East, and in Asia. To deter aggression and provide for our own security require not only building up our own strength but also building strength in these areas.

The foreign policy and international programs of the United States, as well as our own military program, recognize that fact. That is why American forces are now serving with our allies in Korea and Europe. That is why the Congress last year authorized the Mutual Security Program of military and economic assistance to nations which have common security interests with us and a determination to preserve their freedom.

The bulk of expenditures for international security in this budget is for military and economic assistance. Other major expenditures are for the campaign of overseas information and education, for participation in the United Nations and other international organizations, and for the regular activities that make up the conduct of foreign affairs.

Military and economic assistance: I will soon submit to the Congress specific recommendations for the Mutual Security Program totaling about 7.9 billion dollars. Expenditures for military, economic, and technical assistance in the fiscal year 1953 are estimated at 10.5 billion dollars, as compared with 6.9 billion dollars in the present fiscal year. The bulk of the assistance will go directly toward helping to build adequate military defenses. The program will also include substantial sums for technical assistance and development work, under the Point Four concept, to help the people of economically underdeveloped areas move forward in solving their most pressing problems.

¹ Excerpts from the *Budget of the U.S. Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1953*, which is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., at \$5.75 a copy (paper cover). Also see H. Docs. 285 and 286, 82d Cong., 2d sess.

International security and foreign relations

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1953
	1951 actual	1952 estimated	1953 estimated	
Military and economic assistance:				
Present programs . . .	\$4, 497	\$6, 868	\$7, 186	\$14
Mutual Security Program (proposed legislation)			3, 339	7, 900
Conduct of foreign affairs:				
Overseas information and education	40	110	157	170
Participation in international organizations and other	190	218	162	154
Total	4, 727	7, 196	10, 844	8, 238

The solving of these problems is of vital importance in meeting the threat of subversion, which in many areas of the free world is graver than the threat of military attack.

The increase in Mutual Security Program expenditures will be due to a sharp acceleration in deliveries of military equipment to our allies overseas. Expenditures for these deliveries and for certain other forms of military assistance, such as training, are estimated at 4.0 billion dollars in the current fiscal year and 8.0 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1953. During the past 18 months these deliveries have been smaller than originally planned, partly because of the demands of the Korean conflict, and partly because of the time required for the production of complex long-lead-time equipment. Our production of weapons is now increasing at a rate which will make possible deliveries in the magnitudes required for the scheduled build-up of free world forces. Accordingly, I have directed that a policy of allocating military equipment be established which will assure that United States forces in Europe and NATO forces, as well as other forces of certain foreign countries which in the case of war are most likely to be first attacked, are adequately equipped.

Our Mutual Security Program is a vital and

indispensable element in building security for the free world as a whole and for this country. Under this program, friendly nations overseas will be able to obtain the crucial margin of resources—military or economic—which they need in order to develop rapidly their own potentials of strength against aggression and subversion. The strength they can build will be joined with the strength we are building in the total fight for security and peace.

We cannot, as two world wars have proved, isolate ourselves from threats to other free men. This Nation cannot stand by and see free peoples overrun. In the end, that could only mean isolation of this country in a world organized against it by Soviet masters.

Military and economic assistance to Europe: Through the efforts of the Europeans themselves, combined with the additional resources we are making available through our military and economic assistance programs, real progress is being made in Europe toward the urgent objective of achieving adequate defense forces.

As of 18 months ago, the North Atlantic Treaty countries in Europe had virtually no combat-ready defensive units in all of continental Western Europe, except for certain naval forces and the ground divisions and air squadrons on Occupation duty in Germany. Since then, the active strength of their forces has been substantially increased; in terms of men on active duty, their effective ground strength now exceeds that of our own Army. Air cover and naval support are being provided in increasing amounts. Moreover, the units have been brought to a higher state of effectiveness through longer periods of service and more thorough training and through substantial additions to equipment including replacement of obsolete weapons. Finally, many of the scattered units of the various countries are now, under the command of General Eisenhower, being welded into a single fighting force, and supporting systems of communications, supply, and bases are being developed. Combined defense expenditures of the nine European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have been increased sharply, from the equivalent of 4.5 billion dollars in fiscal year 1950 to an amount estimated at more than 9.0 billion dollars in the current fiscal year.

Over the coming months progress in building European defenses will be even more rapid, under plans recently developed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Temporary Council Committee, under United States chairmanship. This Committee has reviewed the present status of European defenses and the further requirements estimated by the military leaders of the member nations and by General Eisenhower's international headquarters. It has developed a realistic plan of action for a rapid build-up of effective defense forces backed by well-trained and quickly mobilizable reserves. This plan of action is designed to

see that nonessentials and duplications are stripped out and that the highest priority jobs are done first. In spite of these reductions, it will still be necessary for many of the member countries to make substantially larger efforts than previously planned, and we, in addition to our contribution of forces, will have to provide expedited deliveries of military equipment and economic assistance.

On the basis of this new plan of action two important conclusions emerge. First, it is now clear that within 12 more months Western Europe can have a compact force which would offer strong resistance in the event of an attack. Secondly, under the new plan it is now clear that within a few years it will be possible to attain a level of Western European defenses which would make invasion there so costly, and so unlikely of success, that the danger of its being attempted would become remote.

Our mutual-security aid is an essential component required to achieve the new defense plan on schedule. We will provide planes, tanks, guns, production equipment, raw materials, and other supplies which are needed to carry out the plan but which the Europeans cannot obtain from their own resources.

The largest part of this aid will be in the form of military equipment. The equipment we provide will have the direct effect of bringing to combat readiness additional air wings, ground divisions, and naval units defending Western Europe against aggression. To an increasing extent, the equipment we provide will be procured in Europe. This will somewhat lighten the production burden on this country, and by stimulating European military production will help to bring nearer the day when Europe will be able to maintain her forces without further assistance from us.

To enable the European countries to expand their defense programs on schedule, other aid in the form of commodities—economic aid—will be needed. The economy of Europe is undergoing a serious strain, in part because of its own expanding defense programs and in part because of world-price movements associated with the defense build-up of the free world as a whole. Two of the key countries, Britain and France, have been unable in recent months to pay for essential imports except by dipping deeply into their limited dollar reserves. As the European defense programs expand, and industry and manpower are directed toward defense rather than producing for export, European dollar deficits will continue to be serious although not nearly so large as those which had to be dealt with in the immediate postwar years.

To meet these problems it will be necessary for the European countries to take additional measures to facilitate allocation of resources to defense and to prevent internal inflation. But despite such measures, the Europeans will require our aid in meeting the problem of dollar deficits without interruption of the defense build-up.

The Mutual Security Program will also include assistance to certain European countries not included in the North Atlantic Treaty. This budget includes funds for military and economic assistance to help maintain the independence of Yugoslavia, which stands as an example to Soviet satellites that independence can be achieved. Greece and Turkey, key barriers to Soviet expansion into the eastern Mediterranean, are maintaining large forces which are expected to be integrated soon into the North Atlantic Treaty defense system. Through military and economic assistance we will continue to assist them in carrying this heavy burden. Negotiations are also in process leading toward German participation in European defense.

Assistance to other areas of the free world: The vulnerability to internal and external aggression of many parts of the non-European free world, especially the Middle East and Asia, requires that we make the strongest efforts to help these areas gain in strength and stability.

Our Mutual Security Program for these areas, as compared with Europe, will place proportionately more emphasis on economic aid and technical assistance than on supplying military equipment. So long as conditions exist to feed the fires of Communist agitation—conditions of poverty, disease, illiteracy, and economic stagnation—there will be the continuous danger of subversion and internal collapse. These problems are deep-rooted and stubborn, but they can be solved. Under the Act for International Development and other legislation, this country adopted a long-range policy of working directly with the underdeveloped countries to help them solve these problems and lay a firm foundation upon which they can build with their own resources. This policy has helped them to achieve progress within their own economies, and to increase their contribution of vital raw materials to the rest of the free world. In each instance our assistance is predicated on the maximum possible effort by the recipient country to solve its own problems.

In the Middle East, events during the past year have emphasized the urgency of achieving stability and more adequate defenses. Much can be accomplished by programs of technical assistance to deal with basic problems of low productivity which underlie much of the region's difficulties. This budget provides funds for our contribution for the second year of the 3-year program for reintegration of Arab refugees and other funds for assistance to the Arab States, Iran, and Israel.

In Asia, the Mutual Security Program for the fiscal year 1953 will provide for a continued flow of military equipment, to assist the troops of France and of the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, in their gallant fight against the Communist insurgents in Indochina. We are

providing, and will continue to provide under this budget, military equipment and other supplies to the Chinese forces defending Formosa. Philippine troops, with weapons supplied under the Mutual Security Program, are making good progress in suppressing the Communists who have been a dangerous threat to the economic and political development of the Republic.

The needs of Asian countries for economic aid vary substantially from country to country. Some countries are rich in resources; here the great need is for technical assistance to help them more quickly master the complex problems of developing and organizing their resources for the welfare of their people. In Indonesia, for example, technical assistance will be provided to help this young republic develop its resources and establish essential administrative, health, and educational facilities so as to increase the stability of its democratic government. To other countries in Asia we are supplying technical assistance and also developmental aid to supplement their own development programs. In India, for example, the Government has undertaken a large-scale program of agricultural expansion in order to meet the increasing pressure of population in relation to food production. In spite of mobilizing every resource it can, India will require some aid from us to help solve her agricultural problem.

In Latin America it is essential that we continue our part of the jointly financed programs of technical assistance, which are making an important contribution toward solving problems of health, education, and agricultural productivity. The Latin-American economy continues to attract a large flow of private American capital. Key development projects, including those for strategic materials, will continue to be financed primarily on a loan basis, especially by the Export-Import Bank under its recently increased loan authority. This budget also contains limited funds for military assistance to Latin America.

We are also contributing to United Nations technical assistance programs. In addition, the broad purposes of the Point Four concept are being furthered by private investment, by loans from our Export-Import Bank, many of them for strategic materials development, and by loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In preparing the Mutual Security Program for underdeveloped countries, careful consideration has been given to all loan possibilities.

Overseas information: Expenditures for our overseas information and educational exchange program, basic to our Campaign of Truth, are estimated at 157 million dollars in the fiscal year 1953. The increase of 47 million dollars over the current fiscal year will be needed for expanded radio facilities, including shipborne transmitters, capable of reaching more and more people behind the Iron Curtain and overpowering Soviet jam-

ming attempts; for transfer of the Army's information program in Japan to the State Department; and for a general intensification of our efforts in the most critical areas of the world.

This vital program is coordinated with other parts of our total security effort. Soviet propaganda and agitation use every possible device, direct and concealed, to pervert the hopes and play upon the fears of free peoples. Internal subversion, buttressed by propaganda techniques rather than the commitment of Soviet armies, has played the leading part since World War II in the expansion of the Soviet Empire. Against these menacing instruments of the cold war, the Campaign of Truth has been making substantial

gains. The overseas information program, speaking through every possible medium—radio, press, motion pictures, information centers, exchange of persons—is exposing the true nature of the Communist menace and explaining to the rest of the world the truth about our objectives.

Other foreign affairs: In addition to the funds for overseas information and education, this budget includes expenditures of 162 million dollars for the conduct of other foreign affairs. We and our allies must make sure, through the United Nations and other channels, that war does not come about from a misunderstanding of our true motives or from a failure to understand our determination to resist tyranny.

President's Economic Report Released

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS¹

The past year has been marked by great gains in our basic economic strength. These gains have enabled us to move forward toward our security objectives with far less strain upon the economy than would otherwise have been possible.

It is the tragic necessity of our time that we and other peace-loving peoples must devote so large a part of our resources to building up our military strength. But it is because we seek peace—a just and lasting peace—that we have shouldered this burden. If, despite our best efforts, another world conflict should come, the cost would be beyond description. If we succeed in the effort for peace, our productive ability will enable us to achieve a material well-being never before known.

This effort for peace finds the people of the United States substantially in agreement. We all know that we must stand firm against aggression, build up our defenses, cooperate with other free peoples, and hold the door open for the fair settlement of international disputes. Our basic international policy is backed by national unity.

But our foreign policy cannot succeed, if there is excessive division on domestic matters. Economic issues and international issues are now inseparably connected. It is a fundamental fact that the defense program itself, and our aid to friendly nations, must be related to the capacity of our economy. If we overestimated the strength

of our economy, we could weaken our power to resist aggression. If we underestimated its strength, we could fall short of doing the things that can and must be done to prevent aggression.

Without continued economic growth, the defense burden could make us weaker year by year. Without economic stability and control of inflation, the resulting hardships could disastrously affect millions of our people. Without agreement on economic fundamentals at home, group conflicts or political conflicts could weaken our ability to withstand the communist threat.

It is only natural that the scope and operation of a program of this magnitude should evoke some disagreement and criticism. This can be constructive. But it would be most unfortunate if, in those economic matters which affect our world security, we were divided by narrow partisanship rather than united by the desire to find the best possible solution.

To agree upon wise policies, it is essential to know and understand the facts. These facts are available, and they are compelling. They show that our basic economic strength is greater than it was a year ago. They point the way to the necessary policies that we should follow. They reveal why all of us can and need to stand upon common ground.

The Harder Job Ahead

Government outlays for the major security programs are estimated to rise from a current annual rate of 45 billion dollars to almost 65 billion by the

¹ Excerpts from *The Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress January 1952*, which is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., at 55 cents a copy (paper cover).

end of this calendar year. As a proportion of total output, the increase will be from 14 percent to more than 18 percent. These over-all figures do not fully portray the impact. In 1952, more than a third of the output of the construction and metal-working industries will be taken for military purposes. Military production and construction will claim more than a fourth of our copper supply, and half of our aluminum supply.

Though the major expansion will take place this year, the program which I am submitting will call for a further increase in the rate of security outlays during calendar 1953. We cannot hope that security program expenditures will start declining toward a lower rate until 1954.

But the most difficult problems will be within the next 12 months. After we cross this hurdle, continued expansion of our raw materials base, and slackening of military requirements for materials, will considerably ease the strain. In the meantime, however, it will be necessary to curtail the use of critical materials for many peacetime products. Serious problems will be faced by some smaller manufacturing firms, unable to convert their plants to defense production or to find substitute materials.

I want to direct special attention to that part of our security effort which is aimed at increasing the strength of other free nations. Most of our aid is going to Western Europe. During the 2 years of the Marshall Plan prior to the Korean outbreak, industrial production in Western European countries rose 30 percent. Nevertheless, their recovery was far from complete when they had to undertake heavy new defense burdens. Since June 1950, they have added substantially to their armed forces and have more than doubled their defense expenditures. While their industrial production has risen another 15 percent during this period, it still is far below the level required for defense and for economic stability.

The Western European countries can shoulder only part of their heavier defense outlays through increased productivity. In addition, cuts must be made in their domestic consumption, which only recently has been restored to the prewar levels, and in capital investment, which is needed to build long-run economic strength. Exports, which are necessary if self-support is to be achieved, are also being limited. If these countries tried to produce or buy abroad, solely with their own resources, all the goods needed for defense, the probable result would be drastic cuts in living standards, intolerable inflation, and grave danger to political stability.

It is only a matter of intelligent self-interest on our part to add something to the resources of these countries. And it is essential for us to understand that, whether we make this addition in the form of "military aid" or "economic aid," the objective and the function are the same: common security. When we supply military goods, some of the most

dangerous cutbacks in European civilian production can be avoided. When we supply economic assistance, some European productive facilities and foreign exchange are released for defense. The form of aid that best serves the purpose in a particular case is not something which can be decided in the abstract. It depends upon the changing circumstances in the individual European countries.

We are also providing aid to the nations in the Near East and Africa, in Asia and the Pacific, and to the other American Republics. Much of it is military aid. A somewhat lesser amount—but one which has been steadily increasing—is being directed to attacking the more general problems resulting from underdevelopment. Chronic poverty now affects the ability of some of these countries to maintain independence in the face of threatened aggression or subversion. This calls for a demonstration—by positive and sustained action by the free nations as a whole—that the economic aspirations of underdeveloped countries can best be realized in association with the rest of the free world.

Our reliance on other nations of the free world is not simply a matter of combined military strength. Our productive potential is vitally dependent on supplies of critical raw materials—particularly metals—coming from abroad. We are joining with the other free countries in efforts to encourage the production and achieve a fair distribution of such materials.

The Real Meaning of Economy

Our economic and military aid to free nations banded with us against aggression must be kept under vigilant and continuous review. It must be coupled with assurance that the countries receiving it are doing their full share. But it would be false economy, after all our efforts since World War II to help rebuild economic life and maintain political stability in war-damaged countries, to reverse the process by weakening the aid program. We must recognize that strength or weakness at any point in the free world adds to strength or weakness at every point. It would not be true economy to spend a dollar for the common defense on one side of the Atlantic, when it would contribute more to the common defense if spent on the other side of the Atlantic.

There has recently been growing appreciation in the United States that the defense programs of the countries of Western Europe should not move so fast as to reduce standards of living below a level consistent with political stability and immunity against internal subversion. Some adjustments are now being made to take account of this fact. But it would not be true economy, because some partners in a joint enterprise have not the

resources to do all that would be desirable, for the strongest partners to relax from doing its best.

If our own security efforts, through their demand upon raw materials and their effect upon world prices, are imposing an excessive burden upon other nations, there are right and wrong ways to meet this problem. We are lessening the pressures upon prices and raw materials, not by relaxing our security program, but rather by cutting somewhat into nonessential consumption and investment; by holding down domestic inflation through an effective anti-inflationary program; and by making cooperative efforts to share scarce materials and to stabilize international prices. This is the right approach. The proposal to solve the whole problem by drastically cutting the security effort everywhere is false economy—because the nub of the problem is to maintain a mutual security program which in total is adequate to the danger confronting us. It would be superficially easy—but disastrous—to reduce the defense strain by torpedoing the defense program.

Aiding Other Free Nations

We must maintain a realistic attitude toward foreign aid. Mindful of the limitations of our own economy, we must also be mindful that some other countries are confronted by economic and political strains far more serious than ours. In the final analysis, the free world must be made more secure if we are to be secure.

Our foreign policy objectives require continued provision of both military and economic aid to free nations. Both types of aid are necessary. Our North Atlantic Treaty partners, in particular, are undertaking heavier burdens, whether they rebuild their defenses by buying military equipment from other countries, or by cutting civilian production to produce military goods themselves.

These countries are making great efforts to shoulder these burdens through their own productive efforts. This requires, among other things, that they have outlets for some of the goods which they can produce and want to exchange for other goods which they need to import. In this connection, I again recommend the repeal of Section 104 of the Defense Production Act, which restricts our imports of certain goods which the European and other countries have available for export to us on mutually advantageous terms.

It is necessary to encourage the efforts which underdeveloped countries are making to further their own economic development, and to support these efforts by providing as much technical and economic assistance as we can afford and as they can effectively use for that purpose.

We shall continue to share scarce capital goods by providing priority and other supply assistance for the export of such goods for essential purposes

abroad. We shall also continue to participate actively in international arrangements to encourage production and equitable distribution of scarce raw materials in the free world. Such measures help to expand the supply of goods and to restrain dangerous inflationary forces.

International transactions of the United States during 1951 saw the expansion in exports of goods and services, which reached a peacetime record of more than 20 billion dollars, exceed the expansion in imports. Imports also reached a new high, despite a slump in commodity imports in the second and third quarters. Exports of semi-finished and finished products increased in quantity as well as price. The export surplus, which had fallen to an annual rate of 1.5 billion dollars in the second half of 1950, increased to a rate of about 6.5 billion in the second half of 1951.

Foreign aid extended during 1951 increased by much less than the export surplus, and the gold and dollar outflow was reversed. Exports of private capital dropped below their 1950 level. United States private investors continued to encounter obstacles to investment abroad.

In other free nations, total industrial production, money incomes, and prices rose in 1951 compared with 1950, but agricultural production showed little change from the preceding crop year. The balance of payments positions of some countries, notably the United Kingdom and France, became worse during the year, and the general economic situation deteriorated in a number of countries. The worldwide rise in prices, set off by the Korean hostilities, slowed up or was partly reversed in most countries during the first half of 1951, although in many it was resumed during the second half of the year.

CORRECTIONS

In the BULLETIN of December 31, 1951, p. 1075, the last sentence of the second paragraph should read: "The extending legislation authorized the continuance of the program to June 30, 1953, and provided that not more than \$100,000 a year might be made available for the purpose."

In the BULLETIN of January 14, 1952, p. 43, the first sentence should read: "*The following was released to the press by ECA on December 29.*"

Treaties With Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines Presented to the Senate

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON¹

It is with deep awareness of the historical significance of this occasion that I come before you today for the purpose of presenting to the United States Senate for its advice and consent four treaties—the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines, the Security Treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and the Security Treaty with Japan—the ratification of which will lay a strong foundation for our policy in the Pacific and profoundly strengthen the community of freedom-loving nations.²

The interest of the United States in Asia is historic. Interchange between the two continents extends back to the infant days of the American Republic, when sailing ships navigated the Horn to trade with China and the East Indies. Our ties with Japan date back to 1853 when Commodore Perry first sailed into Tokyo Bay—ties which over the years were strengthened by extensive trade and cultural interchange. Our relationship to the Philippines was for over 40 years that of a guardian, a relationship which by mutual desire and agreement prepared them for self-government and culminated in their independence. Our ties with Australia and New Zealand are based on common language and institutions and the comradeship growing out of our association during the world wars.

The treaties with Japan which are before you are based on a spirit of reconciliation and mutual confidence and trust. As early as 1943, in the midst of war, the U.S. Government began its planning for the occupation of Japan, an occupation based not on retribution but on altruistic principles directed solely toward the purpose of rebuilding a peaceful Japan which could assume its full responsibilities as a member of the community of nations. The reforms carried out by Japan under the guidance of General MacArthur and General Ridgway have been far reaching; mili-

taristic influences have been eradicated; a forward-looking program of land reform has been enacted—a program which stands in marked contrast to the so-called land reforms of Communist-dominated countries; free labor unions have been fostered; women's rights have been guaranteed; and a government under civil control and responsible to the wishes of all the people has been established. These reforms evoke a sincere response from the Japanese people and were carried out in a spirit of close cooperation and understanding. The strong and continuing support which these measures have received from a majority of the Japanese is indicative of the increasing identity of interest which has been created between the democracies and Japan.

While John Foster Dulles, the Special Representative of the President, will explain in further detail the bases of our policy toward Japan and will reply to any questions which you desire to put to him, I would like to state at this time that the Treaty of Peace with Japan not only reestablishes Japan as a sovereign independent nation but also does justice to the countries ravaged by Japanese aggression. An integral part of the treaty is Japan's declaration of its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices. The treaty confirms the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration that Japan's territory shall be limited to the four main islands and some minor islands and that Japanese prisoners of war shall be repatriated. The treaty recognizes that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. It also recognizes that in view of Japan's scarcity of resources, these arrangements shall impose neither additional liabilities on other Allied Powers nor a foreign exchange burden on Japan. The provisions of this treaty provide a basis for Japan to take its place in the community of peaceful and law-abiding nations—a basis clearly confirming to Japan not only its rights but also its responsibilities.

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Jan. 21 and printed from *Cong. Rec.* of Jan. 21, p. A304.

² For texts of these treaties, see BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1951, p. 349; *ibid.*, p. 335; July 23, 1951, p. 148; and Sept. 17, 1951, p. 464.

However, Japan cannot defend her new-found freedom alone, nor can any other free nation of Asia stand alone against the ruthless forces of Soviet imperialism threatening the peace of the world today. The continued independence of these countries depends on their achieving a unity based on principles of collective security which will deter any would-be aggressor, and it is to this end that the Government of the United States has negotiated the three security treaties now presented to you.

In mutual recognition by the United States and Japan of the power vacuum that would be created in Japan upon the removal of the forces of the occupation, the United States in the security treaty with Japan expresses its present willingness to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression. Furthermore, in order to foster conditions leading to peace and security in the western Pacific and to relieve the states therein of fears of any possible revival of Japanese militarism, the United States negotiated with the Governments of Australia and New Zealand a security agreement and confirmed its historical relationship with the Republic of the Philippines through a treaty of mutual defense. The essence of the treaties lies in the recognition by each party that an armed attack in the Pacific area upon one of its partners in the treaty would be dangerous to its peace and safety. Accordingly, each declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

The ratification of these treaties will give courage and hope to millions of people in the Pacific area, whose primary desire is to live at peace with their neighbors. It is our hope that these treaties will serve as a point of departure for the development of an effective system of regional security in the Pacific. As Americans, we can be proud of the leadership which we have taken in negotiating these treaties which reaffirm our historic interest in the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the countries of the Far East.

It was a hundred years ago this year that Commodore Perry sailed from the United States to the Far East, an event which was to result in the end of Japan's isolationism and feudalism and in her emergence as a modern state. During the past century, in the course of her coming of age, Japan has made mistakes—mistakes which finally brought her to the brink of disaster. I believe that she has come to a clear realization of the fallacies of her past actions and that she is now prepared to assume her full share of responsibility in the cause of international cooperation and peace.

The four treaties which are before you will open the way for a new era in the Pacific.

STATEMENT BY JOHN FOSTER DULLES³

MR. CHAIRMAN: You and the members of your Committee are familiar with these four treaties for you have helped to make them. For this reason, and because the President's transmittal included detailed article by article explanations, I shall defer until the question period a discussion of the texts, stating first the basic propositions which I deem to be controlling.

Free Nations' Need of Japan

My first proposition is this: The community of free nations needs Japan.

Japan is not just a spot on the map. Japan is a living community which can contribute largely to the happiness and well-being of others.

Japan's culture, both ancient and modern, commands world-wide appreciation and acclaim. The Japanese, perhaps more than any other people, know how to get happiness out of beauty. Their craftsmanship is of a high order. They are highly literate and industrious, and they are brave. They know the West better than many Eastern countries, and are especially qualified to help to bring about a closer understanding between the East and West.

Japan is the only important industrial nation of Asia. Its existing plants, at full capacity, can produce 10 million tons of crude steel per annum and launch 800,000 gross tons of ships per annum. Japan has the capacity, through its skills, industry and trade, not only to achieve for itself a good measure of well-being but to do so in ways that will help the less developed countries to raise their living standards and to develop their resources and industrial capacity.

If, however, Japan, instead of being one of the free nations, became captive to Soviet communism, that would involve a major shift in the present power position. Japan's capabilities could be exploited to give long-range overseas striking power to the vast human and natural resources which Soviet communism already controls on the Asian mainland. Stalin, whose views are not negligible, has said that with Japan the Soviet Union would be "invincible."

The Soviet leaders do not disguise the fact that they seek, above all, to be able to exploit the industrial capabilities of Japan and Germany. If they came into control of both these countries, or perhaps either, the stage would be set for a climactic struggle of doubtful outcome.

The community of free nations needs to deny to Soviet communism the chance to use Japan for evil, and it needs for itself Japan's vast capacity for good.

³ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Jan. 21 and printed from *Cong. Rec.* of Jan. 21, p. A295. Mr. Dulles is Consultant to the Secretary.

Japan's Need of the Free World Community

My second proposition is this: If the community of free nations needs Japan, so also does Japan need the free world community.

Tsarist Russia was the historic enemy of Japan, and the Soviet Communists have enthusiastically taken over that role. They have closed in on Japan, seizing its northern islands, and seeking, by conquest of Korea, to complete Japan's encirclement. They have refused to repatriate the Japanese prisoners. At the San Francisco Peace Conference the Soviet Government gave a preview of its intentions by demanding that their Red Navy have, in perpetuity, a monopolistic right to patrol not only the straits which surround Japan but even the straits which separate the Japanese home islands.

The Japanese, now wholly disarmed, need collective security as is envisaged by the U.N. Charter. Without that, their sovereignty would evaporate in a matter of hours and the new hopes and worthy ambitions which now inspire the Japanese people would be ruthlessly extinguished.

Mutual Goals of Japan and the Free Community

My third proposition is this: The mutual goals of Japan and the free community can be obtained only if Japan gets peace and freedom.

The Japanese are a proud and sensitive people. They have demonstrated the capacity to be a great people, although at times they have been misled as to the nature of true greatness.

They accepted in defeat the Potsdam surrender terms, which were severe, and they have scrupulously and honorably carried them out. They expect their victors to be equally honorable and scrupulous and they would deeply and justifiably resent being kept in subjection for reasons unrelated to the surrender terms.

General MacArthur, who for five and one-half years administered the surrender terms as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, was uniquely in a position to judge whether and when Japan was entitled to liberation. He said in June 1950:

The Japanese people have faithfully fulfilled the obligations they assumed under the instrument of surrender and have every moral and legal right to the restoration of peace. On this point all of the Allied Powers concerned are in full accord and publicly committed and their failure to protect Japan in this right would be a foul blemish upon modern civilization. We should not allow ourselves to be deterred from moving invincibly forward along a course which we ourselves and the entire world recognize to be morally and legally right.

Failure to satisfy Japan's moral and legal right to restoration of peace and complete sovereignty would, General MacArthur said, be looked upon in Japan and throughout Asia as "colonialization:" and limitations on Japanese sovereignty, even if legally conceded by Japan, would, he said, be of little practical value because their effectiveness

would, in turn, "be limited by the bitterness and resentments which would thereafter dominate the Japanese mind."

The foregoing statements were made by General MacArthur a year and a half ago and they inspired the Japanese peace and security treaties now before you.

I have seen General MacArthur within the last fortnight, and he has assured me that he holds to the same views which he expressed as set out above.

Japan as a Dependable Member of the Free Nations

My fourth proposition is this: Japan can be relied upon to be a dependable member of the community of free nations.

The Japanese are an intensely patriotic people who love their country and their distinctive culture and civilization. They respect and revere their Emperor and the stability and unity of the nation which he symbolizes. The Japanese women with their new privileges and dignities, the industrial workers now organized for collective bargaining, and the farmers, who have largely become owners instead of tenants, cherish the new rights and opportunities which have come to them under the wise policies of the Occupation and which are reflected in the new Japanese Constitution and post-surrender legislation. All of the people long for a lasting peace which will erase the awful horror of the last war.

The Japanese are eager to join in the U.N. search for collective security and their voluntary identification with resistance to aggression in Korea has been dramatic and has incurred the wrath of the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders.

The Japanese enforced in the strictest way the U.N. embargo against Red China and North Korea. They facilitated the passage of U.N. troops and supplies through Japan by giving them the highest priority on their overcrowded communications system. They turned over their best hospitals and resort hotels to invalided U.N. military personnel who were evacuated from Korea. They manufactured and shipped gratis about 2½ million yards of cotton cloth for civilian relief in Korea. The Japanese people offered blood donations far exceeding the United Nations quotas. Perhaps most significant of all was the fact that when the United States armed policing forces were totally withdrawn from Japan for use in Korea, there was not a single instance of Japanese insubordination to the Occupation rule and Japanese employees effectively took over the guarding of United States installations.

In Japan, as elsewhere, there are some confused and misled people, and Communist propaganda seeks to multiply their number. But it has no great success, for the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people identify their mortal enemy

and know that, if they fell under Soviet domination, that would mean an end to their national independence; that their Emperor would be liquidated as a "criminal;" that all of their newly won human rights and dignities would vanish and that, instead of peace, the Japanese, like the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists, would be required to pour out their life blood to serve the ambition of their foreign masters.

In this connection I call attention to the statement of the Japanese Prime Minister, contained in his letter to me of December 24, 1951.⁴ He declares his Government's desire to establish treaty relations with the National Government of China and he sets forth the hostility of the Communist regime of China which precludes such relations with it. The Japanese Government, in this matter, shows an insight and a courage which must command our respect and admiration.

Of course, Russia and Communist China have raw materials and markets that Japan could use to advantage. The Communists can offer what looks like attractive economic bait. But the Japanese people, before they bite, will be wary, knowing that this bait may be on a hook and that the hook may be on a line and that the line may run to Moscow.

The Japanese see the Soviet and Chinese Communist menace for what it is and can be trusted to resist that menace to the limit of their ability. Also their ability is considerable because of their long experience with Russian and oriental ways. Their ideas may not always be identical with ours, but that will not automatically mean that the Japanese are wrong or disloyal to our common cause.

I do not ignore the fact that unless the 84 million people of Japan find the possibility of decent survival in freedom, they may eventually succumb to the "security" of captivity. But given reasonable access to free world markets and sources of raw materials, Japan can prosper without major dependence on Russia and Communist China. The last few years show that.

Even before the enactment of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act), the Japanese have been cooperating in United States policy to prevent the export to the Soviet bloc of any goods of strategic significance and the Japanese on January 17 promptly certified under the provisions of the Battle Act that they have imposed not only a total embargo on the shipment to the Soviet Union and countries under its domination of items deemed by us to be of strategic military significance but that it is also controlling the export to the Soviet bloc of additional items not subject to embargo under title I of the act but subject to control under title II.

Trade between Japan and the Communist main-

land has, for some time, been negligible. During the first 9 months of 1951 less than one percent of Japan's imports were from Communist China and less than one percent of her exports were to mainland China.

As Prime Minister Yoshida said at San Francisco, "The role of China trade in Japanese economy, important as it is, has often been exaggerated, as proven by our experience for the past 6 years."

During those 6 years, without any large trade with Russia or China, Japan's economy has been substantially rebuilt and her living standards, except for housing, restored to approximately those of prewar. It is true that this has involved substantial U.S. economic aid averaging about 400 million dollars a year for the first 5 years. On the other hand, these were abnormal years for Japan, involving the rehabilitation of her industry from the dislocations of the war. In 1946 Japan's industrial output was 33 percent of the prewar average. By 1951 it was 140 percent of the prewar average. Exports in 1946 averaged only 6,500 million dollars per month, in contrast to the current rate of about 125 million dollars per month.

During the past year Japan has more than earned its way in the world with the help of receipts from economic services rendered in Japan for account of the U.N. action in Korea and other expenditures by the U.S. forces in Japan. Japan will continue for some time to earn substantial amounts of dollars in consequence of United States and United Nations expenditures in the area for security and economic purposes.

Japan's economic future involves uncertainties. But unless the free nations become irresponsible, Japan will not be forced, by economic conditions, to align itself with the Communist mainland area or to strengthen the Communist military potential.

Japan will need what the Potsdam surrender terms promised, namely, "access to raw materials" and "participation in world trade relations." She will need to modernize her industrial plant, which is now somewhat obsolete, and to develop further her large natural sources by hydroelectric power. Such needs call for technological help, which can be supplied from the United States, and it perhaps calls for foreign investments from public or private sources.

As a long-range proposition, it is obviously abnormal that Japan should be divorced from the raw materials and markets that are close at hand. We do not, however, have to conclude that on that account Japan must eventually become a Communist satellite. The sound assumption is that the present situation must itself be changed so that China's national interests and her peoples' true aspirations will not be sacrificed to the alien imperial designs of Moscow. In other words, we must assume that there will be a change from the present China situation which compels the free

⁴ BULLETIN of Jan. 28, 1952, p. 120.

nations to restrict closely their economic relations with mainland China.

The best informed Japanese are convinced, with us, that the alien doctrine of communism cannot permanently conquer the Chinese spirit or liquidate the innate individualism of the Chinese race. The Chinese nation will not permanently suffer the imposition of a tyranny which places them in the service of alien masters. There will be an end to a tyranny which the Chinese will come more and more to hate. We should assume the impermanence, not the permanence, of the present Moscow-oriented rule of China.

We cannot expect change in China to take place automatically. To realize such change will require something besides negative and purely defensive policy in Asia on the part of the leaders of the free world, notably the United States. It will require determination to promote freedom and independence in Asia and action consistent with that determination as opportunities arise.

The mood of the people of Japan, like the mood of other free peoples who are close neighbors of Asian communism, will in the long run largely depend on the attitude and action of the other free nations. If they persevere in positive policies in support of real national independence in Asia, Japan will be a dependable and able coadjutor.

Faith in Freedom

My fifth proposition is this: We can and should have faith in freedom.

It is not possible to predict with certainty what the future will be in Asia, and, in a sense, the Japanese Peace Treaty is an act of faith—faith that the best weapon against despotism is not more despotism but more freedom.

It was because the peace treaty was infused with that spirit that it attracted unprecedented support throughout the free world.

At the San Francisco Peace Conference the opening statement I made on behalf of the U.S. delegation concluded with these words:

There are, in Japan, newborn institutions of freedom. But they will not flourish if military rule continues indefinitely to be supreme.

Dignity cannot be developed by those who are subject to alien control, however benign.

Self-respect is not felt by those who have no rights of their own in the world, who live on charity and who trade on sufferance.

Regard for justice rarely animates those who are subjected to such grave injustice as would be the denial of present peace.

Fellowship is not the mood of peoples who are denied fellowship.

Those sentiments became the central theme of the Conference, as delegate after delegate responded. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan said of these words that they would “resound around the globe.” The chief delegate of Ceylon reminded us that the peoples of Asia had always had a special admiration for Japan because she

had been able to resist the Western colonialism to which most of Asia had been subjected, and that failure to restore Japan’s freedom would be bitterly resented throughout Asia.

What the United States proposed caught the imagination and won the good will of the free nations assembled at San Francisco because, at a critical time and at a critical place, we again demonstrated our faith that men in freedom are more to be depended upon than men in bondage. That is why 48 free nations signed this treaty in a dramatic act of peace making unity the like of which the world has never seen before. That is why the Soviet delegation went down to the most ignominious defeat in conference history, as it became clear that their words masked an intent to hold the Japanese people in bondage.

In recent years our nation has become powerful in a military and economic way, and there is a temptation to seek certainty through coercion and imposed contracts, rather than to put trust in freedom. Some, in other countries, fear that the United States which they knew and loved may succumb to that temptation of its new power, and they now shun an intimacy with us which, in earlier days, they would have sought.

Those who seek certainty through impositions which deny freedom are stupid. They may, initially, get an illusion of certainty, but it is an illusion which will quickly be shattered by rebellious conduct.

This nation found true greatness in its dedication to human liberty and, throughout our history, we have found strength and security in the good will of men everywhere who loved freedom and who looked upon us as the champion of freedom. I feel confident that it is the overwhelming desire of the American people that their foreign affairs be conducted in accordance with that great tradition. We have sought to do so in this matter. The Japanese Peace Treaty is, essentially, an act of liberation and I feel confident that the Senate will voice its approval of that act.

U.S. Concern for Pacific Allies

My sixth proposition is this: The United States should make clear its concern not merely with Japan but also with our former allies in the Pacific, namely, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.

There is really no doubt in any quarter that an armed attack upon Australia, New Zealand, or the Philippines would involve the United States. The peoples and governments of these countries feel understandably, that our position in this respect could usefully be formalized, particularly in view of the new relationship which we will be assuming toward Japan by virtue of the peace treaty and the United States-Japan security treaty. Indeed, the interest of the United States will be served by making clear, in Monroe Doc-

trine language, our sense of common destiny with the brave Pacific peoples who were with us in the great Pacific war. It is highly appropriate that not only our friends, but our potential enemies, should learn that our concern with Europe, evidenced by the North Atlantic Treaty, and our concern with Japan in no sense imply any lack of concern for our Pacific allies of World War II, or lack of desire to preserve and deepen our solidarity with them for security. The security treaties with these three countries are a logical part of the effort not merely to liquidate the old war but to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific as against the hazard of new war.

Conclusion

The four treaties before you do not, of course, mark the outer boundaries of our concern in Asia and the Pacific. The United States has a deep interest in the peace, security, and welfare of many Asian nations which are not parties to the security treaties now before you. Indeed, even as regards the four Pacific nations which now join with us in security arrangements, it may be that the present separate arrangements are not the last best word. You will note that each one of the security treaties indicates the expectation of the parties that there will be further security developments.

The steps for peace and security now proposed are only a beginning. There will be continuing need for the United States, in cooperation with other free nations, to sustain an ever-mounting initiative in Asia and to develop ever-growing fellowship with the peoples of Asia who would be free. It is, however, necessary to consolidate our present position before we move on, and that consolidation involves the ratification of these treaties.

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment Made to ICIS

[Released to the press by the White House January 12]

Raymond P. Whearty, Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) of the National Security Council, on January 12 announced that effective immediately Edward R. Trapnell, Associate Director, Information Services, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, has been appointed to full-time duty as Executive Secretary to the ICIS Subcommittee on Executive Order 10290.¹

¹ 16 Fed. Reg. 9795.

Executive Order 10290, signed by the President on September 24, 1951, prescribed "Regulations Establishing Minimum Standards for the Classification, Transmission, and Handling, by Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch, of Official Information Which Requires Safeguarding in the Interest of the Security of the United States."

The ICIS Subcommittee on Executive Order 10290 was created to carry out the direction contained in the President's letter to the heads of executive departments and agencies, issued at the time of signing the Executive order, wherein he stated:

To put the matter bluntly, these regulations are designed to keep security information away from potential enemies and must not be used to withhold non-security information or to cover up mistakes made by any official or employee of the Government. . . . In order to further the above objectives of protecting that information upon which the security of the Nation depends, of limiting classification to purely security matters, of using the lowest appropriate classification, and of downgrading or declassifying information as rapidly as conditions permit, I have directed the National Security Council through its Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security to furnish advice and assistance to the Departments and agencies in connection with these regulations and to maintain a continuing review of the classification activities in every Department or agency to insure uniform and proper application of these regulations, including declassification whenever possible.

The subcommittee is composed of one public information officer and one security officer representing each of the four member departments of the ICIS, namely, the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, and Justice. The members are:

1. STATE DEPARTMENT:
Carroll Kilpatrick, Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations
Charles Dulin, Security Officer
2. TREASURY DEPARTMENT:
Robert A. Dillon, Information Service
Chester L. Callander, Security Officer
3. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT:
Lt. Col. Joseph Edgerton, Office of Public Information
Col. Sidney S. Rubenstein, Assistant Security Coordinator
4. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT:
Leo F. Cadison, Information Officer
Clive W. Palmer, Security Officer

Basic responsibility for carrying out the regulations is vested in the respective executive departments and agencies by the order. Included among the various steps being taken in these agencies are the initiation of revisions of internal agency regulations to bring them into conformity with the order; the establishment of intra-agency procedures to effect the objectives of the order; the orientation of information and security officers and in turn of all personnel in the executive branch concerning the intent, purpose, and operation of the order, etc. Supplementing these activities under the order, the Subcommittee on Executive Order 10290 will maintain a continuing review of the classification activities in every department and agency to insure uniform and proper application of the Executive order and regulations, in-

cluding declassification whenever possible. It is the responsibility of the subcommittee to prepare a positive and continuing program for the departments and agencies in this field; to insure a continuing review of the manner in which the internal regulations of the departments and agencies are effected; to insure the establishment of an inspectional system in each department and agency to the end that each department will have a fixed place of responsibility for the classification and declassification of security information; and to recommend any additional measures and procedures which will contribute to effecting the objectives of the order including suggestions emanating from government and nongovernment sources.

Point Four Directors for Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica

The Department of State announced on January 23 the appointment of directors of technical cooperation in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica. All the newly appointed officials at present are assigned to the direction of Point Four activities in their respective countries.

J. Burke Knapp, member of the Joint Brazil-United States Economic Development Mission, Director of Technical Cooperation for Brazil; H. Jackson Davis, head of the health and sanitation field party of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA), Acting Director for Uruguay; Theodore I. Gandy, chief of the health and sanitation field party for Chile, Acting Director for that country; and Howard M. Gabbert, head of the agricultural mission of the IIAA in Costa Rica, Director there.

The country directors, under the guidance of the respective U.S. Ambassador, will administer activities involving the cooperation of U.S. governmental agencies under the over-all direction of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, which is responsible for U.S. Point Four programs in all Latin American nations.

Resignations

James E. Webb as Under Secretary, effective January 23. For text of Mr. Webb's letter of resignation to the President and the President's reply, see White House press release of January 23.

Edward W. Barrett as Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, effective January 23. For text of Mr. Barrett's letter of resignation to the President and the President's reply, see White House press release of January 23.

Appointment of Officers

Thurman L. Barnard as special representative of the Secretary for an overseas inspection and evaluation assignment, effective January 15.

Stanton Griffis Resigns As Ambassador to Spain

On January 21, 1952, President Truman accepted the resignation of Stanton Griffis as American Ambassador to Spain. For the text of Mr. Griffis' letter of resignation and the President's reply, see White House press release of that date.

Resignation

Harry C. Hawkins as Director of the Foreign Service Institute, effective March 1.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Jan. 21-25, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

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36	1/15	Barnard appointment as special representative (rewrite)
43	1/17	International Information Administration
44	1/18	Pt. 4 appointments (Latin America) (rewrite)
45	1/18	Bowles' speech at Hartford Foreign Policy Assoc.
46	1/18	Resignation of Hawkins (FSI) (rewrite)
48	1/21	Latin American mechanics' training in U.S.
49†	1/21	Colombia: Military assistance
50*	1/21	Deputy representative to U.N.
51*	1/21	Nomination of first minister to Libya
52	1/21	McCloy speech at Freiburg, Baden
53†	1/21	Pt. 4 program in Iran to be expanded
54†	1/22	6th Grassland Congress
55†	1/22	Mansfield: U.N. Pow Commission
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57	1/22	Michigan State and Colombian Colleges
58	1/22	U.S. delegation to Icao
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60*	1/23	Tribute to Robert P. Patterson
61	1/23	Directors of Tca for Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica
62	1/23	First Film Festival of India
63*	1/23	New Under Secretary, 3 Asst. Sec.
64†	1/23	Libya: Point 4 agreement
65	1/24	New Voa transmitter for Far East
66	1/24	Acheson—What is Point 4?
67†	1/25	Allison—The Japanese peace
68*	1/25	Barrett—Campaign of Truth
69†	1/25	Brown—Mobilizing materials
70*	1/25	Truman congratulations on Vietnamese holiday
71	1/25	Note to Soviets on Austrian treaty
72	1/25	Point 4 directors for Ecuador, Panama, Haiti (rewrite)
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appreciated.

FAO Mobilizes World Food Production

by Charles F. Brannan
Secretary of Agriculture

World population is increasing faster than world food production. There is less food per capita in the world now than there was before the war. This was the hard fact that dominated the discussions at the sixth session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations in Rome from November 19 through December 6, 1951.

This fact ran like a thread through all of the statements that were made by the heads of the delegations of the 64 countries represented at the Conference, and by the various high officials in international affairs who addressed the Conference. Although wonderful progress has been made in some areas of the world, it was at once a rebuke and a challenge to some FAO member countries to learn that after 6 years of dedication to FAO's objectives of increasing food production and providing a better life for the people of the world, there is less food per person now than there was before FAO came into existence.

This deplorable fact does provide a sense of urgency and renewed dedication to the purposes and work of FAO. How to alter this fact, and reverse the trend, was the core of all debates and actions.

The key to reversing the trend was strikingly stated by the late Henry G. Bennett, the Administrator of the U.S. Technical Cooperation, or Point Four Program, when he addressed the Conference toward its close. He said: "We must face the reality that we are losing the fight of increasing food production as compared with increasing population in the world, and it is not necessary. We can win the fight. It can be won because we have enough scientific and technical knowledge now available, if applied, to produce sufficient food to feed adequately and well all of the teeming millions of the world. . . . By joining hands together we can win this fight and can win it in this generation." The way to win it, Mr. Bennett said, is through universal education, through experimentation and research, and through extension.

Attacking the Problem

Ways and means of meeting the problem were the principal concern of Commission I, one of the three commissions into which the Conference was organized.

Commission I covered agenda items on world food and agriculture policy, land reform, international commodity problems, migration, famine relief, and others of the same sort.

At the same time, Commission II undertook a detailed review of the work of the various divisions of FAO and other key subjects closely allied with the program of work. Commission III examined and set the level of FAO's budget for 1952 and 1953 and took up a number of necessary administrative problems.

Although the limitations under which FAO must function were recognized in the discussions by Commission I, an immediate action program was proposed to "set in motion an upward spiral of agricultural production and productivity in the underdeveloped and food-deficit areas."

The proposal, offered by Director General Dodd, came under two headings—planning and action. Under planning, it was suggested that the Conference set a world target of increased agricultural production for the next 5 or 10 years, that member countries set up agricultural development programs to achieve their part of the world target, and that these programs be reviewed at regional meetings in the spring of 1953 to promote regional coordination. The action phase of the program proposed that member countries establish or strengthen their extension services. The extent to which these targets are achieved rests primarily with national governments, since FAO can only advise but cannot enforce any actions.

The debate in Commission I on the proposals to increase production illustrated the enormous complexity of agricultural problems involved and their tremendous range. For instance, as soon as discussion started on increasing production, the

Conference ran directly into the problem of maintaining adequate prices of agricultural products. The age-old fear of farmers, of course, is that production in excess of immediate demand means surpluses which depress prices for agricultural products.

Many delegates pointed out the need for some guarantee to farmers that increased production will not mean lower prices. Two types of action were suggested: National programs and international ones. The national programs would be something on the order of our commodity loan and price support programs.

The case for international price guarantee programs was put most strongly by Pierre Martin, president of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers. This is an international nongovernmental organization made up of national farmers' organizations, and one of a number of such organizations that consult with FAO and are entitled to address the FAO Conference. Mr. Martin stressed the fact that problems of agricultural production are inescapably linked with those of distribution and urged, among other measures, that international commodity agreements be negotiated with the object of assuring supplies to importing countries and markets to exporting countries at equitable and stable prices.

When the debate on the proposals was concluded and recommendations accepted, first by Commission I and then by the full Conference, they received full approval.

In carrying out these discussions and taking responsibility for expressing the views of the United States throughout the sessions, I want to express full appreciation for the able support and counsel from advisers in the U.S. delegation who represented the Senate and House Agriculture Committees; farm, fishery, and consumer organizations; and the U.S. Departments of Interior, State, and Agriculture. Because of these competent advisers, the U.S. was able to make major contributions to all aspects of the problems discussed and to the consideration of FAO's work in general.

Targets Set for Increased Production

For the years immediately ahead, the Conference set a target for an increase in world food production of at least one to two percent over the rate of population increase. It recommended that member governments of FAO should set up and carry out agricultural development plans to achieve their part of this objective. These plans and progress in meeting the goals will be reviewed in regional meetings in the spring of 1953. Meanwhile, the Director General is authorized to initiate measures to help governments increase their production.

AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES

The Conference concluded that increased production could only be achieved if farmers were

assured of a fair return for their products. It put the main burden for giving farmers this assurance on each member government. It also reaffirmed its faith in international commodity agreements as a means of assuring stable markets and recommended that the Economic and Social Council, when it reviews chapter VI of the Havana Charter, consider providing for negotiating commodity agreements in times of shortages or fluctuation, as well as in times of surpluses. It agreed that the work of FAO's Committee on Commodity Problems be continued and expanded and suggested that the Committee devote attention to measures, in addition to international commodity agreements, to improve the marketing of agricultural commodities both nationally and internationally.

The Committee was specifically requested to consider whether proposals for international action should be developed to deal with rice and several other commodities.

In this connection, there was a most interesting discussion of regional agricultural integration. This is a particularly lively topic in Europe, where a number of suggestions for European agricultural arrangements have been made, somewhat along the lines of the Schuman Plan for coal and steel. None of these plans is as yet sufficiently crystallized to become a concrete proposal, and the Conference recognized that the main responsibility for developing regional arrangements rests outside FAO. It did, however, give its blessing to any regional discussions designed to increase agricultural efficiency and productivity and expand trade through the reduction of trade barriers on both a regional and a world-wide basis.

This discussion of regional agricultural arrangements was particularly useful to the U.S. delegation, since it provided an opportunity for the United States to let other countries, particularly those of Europe, know where the United States stands on this question. The delegation asked that a statement of the U.S. position be inserted into the record. The statement says, in brief, that the U.S. recognizes the need for integration of the European market and, without endorsing any specific plans for regional integration, welcomes any developments that give real promise of improving the efficiency of production and marketing, the progressive elimination of trade barriers, and the expansion of trade not only on a regional but also on a world-wide basis.

LAND REFORM

One of the most satisfactory actions of the Conference for the U.S. delegation was taken on land reform. This is no new subject for FAO. A special FAO study group on world food problems in 1946-47 highlighted "archaic ill-adapted systems of land tenure and rural organization," as one of the main factors holding back improvements in world agriculture.

This subject has been on the agenda of other FAO conferences, but never has it been debated so thoroughly as at this Conference. It was preceded by the action on land reform of the U.N. General Assembly last fall and the Economic and Social Council this past summer and had a solid basis in a comprehensive report on land reform prepared jointly by FAO and the United Nations at the request of the General Assembly. Furthermore, the United States had taken the prime role in the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council actions. The Conference resolution on land reform was substantially the resolution introduced by the United States, with some amendments to improve our original resolution.

The discussion of this subject at the FAO Conference was in the nature of a reasoned examination of the problems of putting land reform programs into effect, as revealed in statements made by a number of the delegates. FAO has the advantage that none of the Soviet bloc countries is a member, whereas in the U.N. General Assembly and in the Economic and Social Council, the discussions are colored by the efforts of the Soviet bloc countries to use land reform as a basis for political propaganda. I believe that the U.S. delegates to these meetings, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Isador Lubin, have done magnificent jobs of showing up the falsity of Soviet land reform promises as being a one-way road to serfdom under the state and the Communist Party. The groundwork they laid made possible the excellent action of the FAO Conference on this problem.

The title "land reform" is not satisfactory. It has become associated in peoples' minds with just one aspect of the problem: breaking up large holdings into small ones. This is misleading and inadequate to describe what we in the United States mean by the term.

Our meaning embraces the belief that the best relationship of man to the soil he works is individual ownership, especially from the standpoint of the greatest incentive to increased production and good land management. Therefore, opportunity for ownership of land is a key part of our concept. This may involve either redistributing large holdings or consolidating small ones. But our experience and that of other countries has shown that mere ownership of land is not enough. A farmer must be able to make a living on the land he owns, and he must be given fair conditions of tenancy as a prelude to eventual ownership. This brings into play a number of measures, such as instruction in the best methods of farming, opportunity to obtain credit at reasonable rates, facilities (especially cooperatives) for getting supplies and for marketing products, and reform of exorbitant rents and taxes.

The debate on land reform has stimulated a great deal of interest. There was general approval of the U.S. resolution, as amended by several other delegations. The Conference recog-

nized that action on this problem must be up to governments themselves, and urged member governments to put the various measures included in the broad concept of land reform into effect. It also urged them to ask FAO for assistance through its technical assistance program in getting these measures under way. It asked the Director General to be ready to assist governments and to organize regional training centers or conferences on land reform. On this last point, many of the delegates mentioned the great value of the World Land Tenure Conference held this fall at the University of Wisconsin. Many delegates also indicated that Conference action on land reform would help them get action in their own countries.

OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN BY COMMISSION I

Investment for agricultural development: On this item, the Commission reached conclusions for national and international action. On national action, member governments were urged to promote the establishment of credit facilities for farmers, fishermen and foresters. On international action the Director General was instructed to continue and intensify his cooperation with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and, among other steps, organize further training centers on economic development in cooperation with other U.N. agencies. Successful training centers of this sort have already been held or are in process in the Far East, the Middle East, and Latin America.

Migration: Action on this subject included approval of the relations that have been worked out between FAO and the International Labor Office and recommendation for cooperation with other international agencies having primary responsibility for helping people migrate from densely populated places to those which can absorb more people. The Conference agreed that FAO would stand ready to advise Governments and international agencies on specific land settlement programs.

Food shortages and famine: This item was referred to the FAO Conference by the Economic and Social Council. The Conference agreed, as recommended by the Economic and Social Council, that FAO would assume responsibility for keeping a close check on developing food shortages. If FAO, after thorough examination, feels that international action is required, the Director General was requested to report this to the United Nations and call a meeting of the FAO Council or interested governments to see what governments and voluntary agencies can do to relieve the shortages.

This discussion of food shortages brought up the question of establishing an emergency food reserve which can be made available to relieve famine. Since this problem has a number of complex angles of deep concern to all governments, such as how the food reserve would be financed

and controlled, the question was referred to FAO's Council for further consideration.

Program of Work

FAO's work program in technical assistance, agriculture, economics, forestry, fisheries, and nutrition was discussed division by division in Commission II of the Conference.

It would be hard to say where the U.S. delegation made its greatest contribution to the Conference, but one of our most solid accomplishments resulted in approval of the job of assessing and redirecting FAO's program for the immediate future and its long-term trends. This was done by a Working Party appointed by the last Conference to review the long-term trends of FAO's activities. Philip V. Cardon, until recently the Department's research administrator, served as chairman of this small group of representatives of governments and achieved the necessary agreement among diverse views on a clear and workable charter for FAO's activities. This Working Party recommended priorities for FAO's program, giving highest priority to activities designed to increase supplies of food. This establishment of priorities was especially valuable, since over the years of its existence, FAO—with a completely inadequate budget—has been asked repeatedly at Conferences to undertake a great number of projects. The Working Party report cuts through the diversity and complexity of these assignments and permits FAO to concentrate on its most essential jobs.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The discussion on FAO's expanded technical assistance program caused feelings of achievement and pride to Conference delegates. As FAO's Deputy Director General Sir Herbert Broadley put it, "During the past year a new inspiration has swept through the Organization, thanks to the advent of the Technical Assistance Program." This program is made possible by a separate U.N. fund subscribed to by most of the members of the United Nations. FAO was allotted 29 percent of this fund for the first year, which amounted to about 4 million dollars. The Conference was unanimous in its approval of the remarkable job FAO has done in getting its technical assistance program under way rapidly and competently.

Despite the difficulties involved in moving FAO headquarters from Washington to Rome, FAO had signed technical-assistance agreements—by the time of the Conference—with 48 countries or territories, had 226 experts from 32 countries either in the field or returned from short-term assignments, 45 more in the process of being assigned, and had requests for 107 additional ones.

One aspect of the technical assistance work that drew special attention was the need for coordi-

nation of the various technical assistance programs, the international programs of other U.N. agencies, as well as those of national scope, such as the U.S. Point Four Program and the British Commonwealth's Colombo Plan for Asian countries.

EXTENSION SERVICES

One of the special items on the agenda of Commission II was a discussion of extension services. In previous FAO conferences, the U.S. representatives had stressed the U.S. view that extension services are of paramount importance for getting the world's knowledge of improved techniques in agriculture put to use by farmers themselves.

But there has been a rather general misunderstanding of what extension work is, not only in FAO but in other national and international organizations and discussions. There has been an impression, for example, that technical assistance itself is extension work. But the U.S. delegation made it clear at this Conference that the essential element of extension work is an organization that goes right down to the farmer, with an agent in the local area who can and will work with farmers on a day-to-day basis—backed by an organization that will give him the information he needs to work with farmers in a form that is most useful. The U.S. delegation pointed up the need for training in educational and informational techniques, such as film strips, press, radio, and others, to do an effective job of getting information on improved agricultural techniques extended to farmers.

At this Conference, our delegation felt that for the first time there was general understanding of what we were talking about and general acceptance of the first-line importance of extension work for improving world agriculture and increasing world production.

INTERNATIONAL PLANT PROTECTION CONVENTION

This Conference approved a revision of the International Plant Protection Convention of 1929 to strengthen and coordinate international efforts to prevent the spread of plant diseases and pests. It provides, among other measures, for immediate world reporting of outbreaks of plant diseases or pests. The proposed revision was discussed at several special meetings at which the United States was represented by people especially qualified in the field of plant disease and pest control. We feel that this convention is a sound and useful instrument. After the Conference approved the convention, Mr. Cardon signed it for the United States as did representatives of 21 other governments. Others are expected to sign it later. The convention will have to be approved by Congress in order to make U.S. participation effective.

LOCUST CONTROL

Conference approval was also given to recommendations of a technical meeting that FAO had held to discuss the problem of control of the desert locust. As a result of Conference action, FAO will set up a Technical Committee on Desert Locust Control to permit a regional approach to the problem, since locusts cross national boundaries and separate national actions are ineffective.

In addition to being an effective approach to the problem, this Conference action is a good example of coordination between United States and FAO technical assistance programs. The United States has agreed to make equipment for combatting locusts available through its technical-assistance program for use by specific countries in the area on the advice of FAO's Desert Locust Control Committee.

WORK OF DIVISIONS

In general, the U.S. delegation was well satisfied with the work of FAO's Divisions of Agriculture, Economics, Forestry, Fisheries, and Nutrition, after a detailed review of the work of each.

Agriculture: In addition to the actions already noted, the Conference was particularly interested in seeing that work in rural welfare and cooperatives was pressed vigorously. Animal disease control activities were especially commended. Through the technical-assistance program it now looks as though eradication of the deadly tropical rinderpest disease is possible.

Economics: Among the projects stressed were those on national goals and programs, the World Census of Agriculture, commodity studies, training centers on economic development, and improvement of national statistical services.

Forestry: Some of the especially noteworthy actions were the adoption of Principles of Forestry Policy for the guidance of member countries in their forestry programs; approval of the establishment of an International Chestnut Commission to control the blight that threatens to become an important factor in the economy of European countries; efforts to increase production of wood pulp and paper; and greater attention to land and water conservation and range management. The Conference gave particular approval to training programs such as the Forest Fire Control Study Tour held in the United States last summer in cooperation with the U.S. Forest Service and ECA.

Fisheries: During the discussion on this subject, the Conference approved the establishment of a Latin American Fisheries Council to promote improved production and utilization of fish in the Latin American region. Emphasized also was the Conference estimate that world fish production could be doubled over its present figure without risk to resources.

Nutrition: Subjects that drew special emphasis included programs to relieve the shortage of pro-

tein foods, the importance of good nutrition and good home management to child welfare, FAO's stepped-up work in home economics, and the good cooperation that has been developed with the World Health Organization (WHO) through a joint FAO-WHO Nutrition Committee. This Committee has worked on a number of subjects, including a report on prevention and treatment of severe malnutrition in times of disaster.

FAO's Budget and Administration

Some of the most vigorous debates of the Conference took place in Commission III on the level of FAO's budget for 1952 and 1953, the scale of contributions that member governments contribute to the budget; the currency in which the contributions are to be paid; and a number of other financial and administrative problems.

BUDGET FOR 1953

After a pro and con discussion of budget problems—and particularly in view of the added work load Commission I and II had agreed upon as a desirable goal for 1953—a budget of \$5,250,000 was approved for 1953—the same as for 1952. Because of unavoidable delays in filling vacancies caused by the transfer of FAO headquarters from Washington to Rome, the organization ended the year 1951 with a surplus of about \$600,000. This surplus was used to pay off a loan obtained from the United Nations for financing the move to Rome.

SCALE OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY FAO MEMBER COUNTRIES

Since 1949, when the U.S. contribution to FAO was increased from 25 to 27.1 percent, this country has maintained that it was unwilling to consider any increase in its contribution to FAO until reductions were made in its contributions to other international organizations, such as the U.N., WHO, and UNESCO, and that when such reductions were realized, the United States would be willing to reconsider its position regarding its percentage contribution to FAO. At the FAO Conference, Canada, France, Egypt, South Africa, and the United Kingdom all stressed the importance of achieving greater uniformity between the scale of contributions in FAO and other international organizations. They called attention to the fact that inasmuch as the U.S. contributions to the U.N., UNESCO, and WHO had been or were being reduced in 1952, it was appropriate, in the light of the previously stated U.S. position, that the FAO contribution ceiling be raised. In view of this development the U.S. representative stated that since progress had been made in reducing the inordinately high ceilings in the United Nations and some of the other specialized agencies, the United States would not object to the proposal that the FAO ceiling be raised but that for the

present his Government could not support adoption of a ceiling higher than 30 percent.

Accordingly, the Conference adopted a 30 percent ceiling on contributions of any member country to the FAO. Thus, the U.S. contribution for 1952 and 1953 will be 30 percent of the amount budgeted for operating the Organization. In dollars, the U.S. contribution will be \$1,575,000 for each of the two years 1952 and 1953.

CURRENCY OF CONTRIBUTIONS

When FAO was headquartered in Washington, all contributions were paid in U.S. dollars. After the move to Rome, however, a number of countries felt that member countries should be required to pay their contributions in their own currencies freely convertible into lire. After considerable debate by the full Conference, it was agreed that the Conference will determine the proportionate share of the Organization's dollar needs that will be paid by each country, after determining what currencies member countries intend to use in making their contributions.

Elections

Four new members, Japan, Argentina, Laos and Nepal, were voted in as members of FAO at the Conference. With Hungary and China dropping out during 1952, and with Peru considered no longer a member because its parliament has never ratified its membership, this makes a total of 67 countries which are members of FAO.

The entire 18-country membership of FAO's Council was elected at this Conference. Twelve countries took office immediately, and six will begin their 3-year terms in 1953. The Council meets at intervals between the biennial sessions of the full Conference of all member countries. Brazil, Canada, Chile, Italy, Australia, Egypt, France, India, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, the Union of South Africa, and the United States were all reelected to the Council. Finland, Cuba, the Philippines, the Netherlands, Colombia, and Spain were elected to fill positions previously held by other countries.

Professor Josue de Castro, Director of the National Nutrition Laboratory of Brazil, was elected independent chairman of the Council. He succeeded Viscount Bruce of Melbourne, who has been one of the guiding spirits of FAO from its beginning, and had a major hand in developing the ideas which led to FAO's founding. The Conference approved a suggestion of the U.S. delegation to express its great appreciation for the leadership and service Lord Bruce has given to FAO and its great regret at his retirement from active participation in FAO's work.

Norris E. Dodd was reelected as Director General of FAO for a 2-year term.

Conclusions

Canada's Minister of External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, summed up FAO's position very well when he addressed the Conference after Secretary Acheson's talk. Congratulating FAO on its work, he said: "While many of FAO's accomplishments are unspectacular, they contrast favorably with those of some international bodies that are spectacular but represent no achievement."

I came away from this FAO Conference with a definite feeling, which I believe was shared by all of the U.S. delegation, that the Organization is really settling down to the serious job for which it was created. It has gone through a shaking down period since its founding, both in its physical and administrative arrangements and in its policies.

Now FAO is well established in its permanent headquarters, with an excellent staff. It has a clear charter as to what its long-term objectives are, and it has the means, through its technical-assistance program, for making real progress toward the achievement of its truly noble goals.

Statement by Secretary Acheson Before FAO Meeting at Rome ¹

[Excerpts]

It is a long time ago to the day, the very late part of 1942, when I was informed one afternoon that President Roosevelt was going to issue an invitation to an international conference on the subject of food and agriculture. The war was in a very discouraging state at that time. It seemed to me quite curious that the President of the United States should be thinking about postwar problems at a time when we had not really grappled with war problems. As one looks back on it one sees tremendous wisdom of that step. It was of most vital importance that in the very beginning of this war when people were putting forth the most determined effort to deal with the most discouraging situation, there should be a leader who saw beyond the immediate crises into the future, and with unerring judgment picked out the most important thing to begin with, which was food and agriculture.

It seems to me to have been a great stroke of genius which led President Roosevelt to think of food and agriculture as the first matter to receive attention in the middle of the war, looking toward postwar problems; and as we think about it, it gives us moments of sadness, because it would have been so easy for this—first of all the international organizations—to have been the one which per-

¹Made on Nov. 29, 1951, and released to the press by FAO on the same date.

haps could have led the way to an understanding and a developing kinship between the East and the West. At our first meeting, the Soviet Union and many of its close neighbors were present. At the second meeting in Quebec they attended and we hoped they were going to go along with us. What evil genie entered someone's mind to lead to a different result, I cannot understand. Surely no one looking at you gentlemen around this room, and you ladies, could believe that here is concentrated some imperialistic capitalism which is directed toward some malevolent purpose in the world. Surely it could not have been thought in the Soviet Union that they were so well fed and so well clothed that no improvement was possible in their situation. It hardly seems possible that they could have taken the view that they were not interested in what the rest of the world had to eat or to wear, and yet for some reason they were unwilling to join with us in the very great program which you ladies and gentlemen have undertaken and are carrying forward so successfully. Why that happened, I don't know. It is one of the great tragedies of history. Perhaps it can be repaired. I earnestly hope it can.

In speaking to the United Nations General Assembly in Paris some weeks ago I suggested that it would be possible and highly desirable, I thought, in fields of agriculture and industry, to set for ourselves targets against which we could judge our progress over the future years. I am delighted to see that that idea has occurred to you also here and that your Director General has suggested that you set for yourselves goals of agricultural production which should be reached over the next 10 years. It seems to me that that is a matter of greatest possible importance.

I remember when I was a young man, which seems longer ago than anyone could possibly remember, I used to be interested in rowing and rowed in a crew, and we had a practice then which I think has some relevance to this situation. If you are rowing or going to row a long race you have to establish standards for yourself. How do you establish these standards? It is very difficult to do it by rowing alone with a watch; the time and the tide and the wind, or accident—one thing or another affects the performance. So what we used to do was to have, say, four crews, one at each mile post, and each crew would begin to row their mile at a set time in the way in which it would be necessary for us to excel if we were going to achieve the desired standards. That gave something which was almost predictable. It was quite impossible for one crew really to set a standard over 4 miles, but one crew could do it for each mile and therefore as you went along you knew where you were against some approved standard. Now that, I think, is what these goals are. We must have a standard against which we can see our production. We know now that at the present moment we are losing this battle between popu-

lation and food supply. We must do something to turn the tide. If we have goals then we can see where we are each year and know whether the battle is going in our favor or whether it is going against us. And another thing which I think your Director General has said which seems to me very wise—that it is not enough to have abstract or abstruse targets or goals which can be understood by those who are intellectually familiar with this field, but all of this must be translated into terms of performance at the level of the man who is actually doing the work. One of the important things in our crew experience and our crew standards was that the man at the sweeps knew what he had to do, that he was behind or ahead or doing well or doing badly, but he was the person who had to be told—not some person in a newspaper office, not some professor at a university, but the man who is doing the work. And therefore, what you have to have in the field in which we are interested here is something which is translated into terms of effectiveness to the man behind the plow. He has got to know what is required of him; and to know how he can do more, if more is required. Therefore, it seems to me that what you are doing is exactly the right thing to do and tremendously important, and I hope you go ahead with it with the greatest possible vigor.

You have also been dealing here in your meeting with the question of technical assistance, and here is another thing in which I am wholeheartedly with you, not only because of the great importance of the thing but because it is something with which I have some kind of personal connection; it is happily in the Department of State that the technical-assistance program is located and, therefore, I have a direct and institutional interest in this same problem in which you are interested.

And I note that the very interesting fact is coming out here that it is in the developed countries where the most progress has been made in the increase of agricultural production compared with the standards of the thirties. It is in these countries where one would expect that the great emphasis would have been laid upon industrial effort, but it is in those countries where the greatest rate of progress has been made in the field of agriculture. Where this great progress is needed is in the underdeveloped countries and I think this gives us the clue that we need to know, and that is that it is in technical assistance that the answer to this problem lies. The developed countries have the technique. The underdeveloped countries do not have it, and it is absolutely essential that they should have it, and it is absolutely essential that it should be done through your great organization, and that is where it is being done. You have done a superb job on this and any possible cooperation and help that the Department of State can give directly to you through the United Nations or through the Department of Agriculture of the United States, we shall do it.

One more word. You are talking here, you are working here dealing with resolutions on the subject of land reforms. That is a matter which we in the Department of State have believed is absolutely foremost in our whole international relations. It is in this matter of the reform of the ownership and utilization of land, with its attendant circumstances that go with it, because land-ownership reform alone is not enough. Along with it have to go institutions for credit, proper taxation and things with which you are far more familiar than I. It is in this front in which we really meet and grapple with the misleading slogans of communism, and therefore we in the Department of State have from the very beginning urged that this matter of land reform should become a primary objective within our own country,

in our international relations and in those areas of the world which are now the battleground between freedom and communism. And so far as we have been able to affect the ebb and flow of this battle, I think our Government and our Department have thrown their full weight into the fight to help in tipping the scales toward the most progressive and rapid action possible.

I think that if one examines the record of the Government of Korea under the help of the United Nations and the United States, if one looks at what has been done in the Philippines, one will see that our help has been put at the disposal of countries who wish to take rapid and forward actions, and there is no field in which you can make a greater and more useful contribution than this one.

The Key to a Free World: Unity of Purpose and Action

by Howland H. Sargeant

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs¹

It is always an opportunity to talk to people who have an active concern with America's role in world affairs. It is always an opportunity to address those who see international politics as something more than the proverbial game of chess.

In international politics—as indeed in domestic politics—it is people, their relationships, and the conditions of their existence that determine action.

The United Nations takes due note of this fact in its Charter. And well it might. For there is a very specific relationship between the drive for peace and stability and the freedom, the health, and the welfare of the world's peoples.

We cannot have one without the other. And we cannot have either without mutual understanding and trust.

The road to such understanding remains a long and a hard one. The work of the United Nations, and of UNESCO in particular, has gotten us on that road, but the end is certainly not yet in sight.

We are well aware of the Iron Curtain which the Kremlin has created to insulate the Russian and satellite peoples from the free exchange of ideas. We are becoming increasingly aware of the bamboo curtain which Peiping has dropped between some 450 million Asians and the free world.

Are we equally aware of the barriers to understanding that exist among the peoples of the free world?

In a speech delivered at the University of California 2 years ago, Secretary Acheson labeled the Soviet idea blockade as one of the basic causes of existing international tension.

But Mr. Acheson also pointed out that the Soviet leaders would not change their conduct until the progress of the free world convinced them that they had nothing to gain by continuing to act as they did. And the free world's progress, Mr. Acheson said, depended greatly upon the course of action America pursued in relation to the other free peoples.

That course of action—and here I quote Mr. Acheson—“is not one which this Nation can adopt without consideration of the needs and views of other free peoples.”

Exactly why are the views of the other free peoples so important to us? Why must we care what others think of us?

The answer is clear.

In this kind of world, no nation is so strong that it can afford to ignore what other peoples think. America is no exception to the rule.

We Americans cannot “go it alone.” We need the other free peoples even as they need us. Freedom as we know it is being subjected to an assault which has had no parallel in modern history. And we who believe in freedom must meet that assault together.

Only in this way can the free peoples protect themselves. Only through unity, strength, and a firm belief in common principles can the free peoples hope to build the conditions of a stable peace.

Knowing what others think of us is funda-

¹Excerpts from an address made before the Third National Conference for the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, New York, N. Y., on Jan. 29 and released to the press on the same date.

mental if we Americans are to do our share in promoting that understanding upon which our own security and that of the entire free world depends. But knowing how others get their impressions of us is equally fundamental.

Do they get their impressions solely from our diplomatic actions? Is the American Government's international information program our only voice overseas?

Frankly, the answer is "no."

The United States is a Nation of many voices. Any democracy is.

The American GI stationed overseas is one of America's voices. His actions, his appearance, his standards of conduct—all of these tend to create impressions about America.

The American tourist, the diplomat, the businessman abroad—these too are the voices of America from the standpoint of the other peoples.

The President's State of the Union message, congressional enactments bearing on foreign-aid programs, the character and quality of American books, newspapers, and movies—these are the voices of America.

Public positions taken by American educational, civic, and social organizations—are not these voices of America for those who read or hear about them overseas?

America, from the standpoint of the non-American, is a Nation of many voices. And this thing we call opinion among foreign peoples is a thing of many facets.

I should like, now, to explore some of them. I should like, in particular, to consider two clear-cut but related questions. The first is: What are the key attitudes of the peoples of the free world? And the second is: What do the free peoples think of America and Americans?

Obviously, there are no short, snappy answers to these vital questions. Nor can they be answered with mathematical precision. But they can be answered.

What, then, are some of the free-world attitudes with which we Americans need to be concerned?

The Attitude of Free Europe

Let us begin with Free Europe. Allowing for the many differences in outlook of the Western European countries, these are some of the hopes and aims that they share in common:

Informed non-Communist public opinion in all countries indicates an acute awareness of the Communist menace. That awareness, on the part of both people and government, has tended to soften national rivalries in the interest of building a common defense.

But the Western Europeans—like us Americans—are nevertheless extremely conscious of national prestige. They are also proud of their cultural heritage—and with reason. The average European is very sensitive to his economic

position as an individual. And understandably so. Despite the great progress Free Europe has made in the industrial sphere since the end of World War II, his living standard is still a long way from prosperous.

The average European's preoccupation with peace is, if possible, even more acute than our own. The fact that the last war left much of Europe in a shambles, that the people of Western Europe were subjected to military occupation by the aggressor, that they suffered terrible casualties and deprivations—all of these things have made their longing for peace an intense one.

Tied in with this longing is the acute fear that political miscalculations beyond their control might reduce their territory to a no-man's land pitted by atomic bombs or to a renewal of occupation by conquest.

This great yearning for peace—among other factors—may cause many Europeans to lean heavily on the hope that the danger of an immediate Soviet attack is less acute than others might believe it to be. This should not surprise us, however, since the wish is often father to the thought.

That great progress has been and is being made toward building defensive unity in Europe is a tribute to the essential realism which permeates European political thinking. The urgent hope for peace and stability has not destroyed that realism.

South and Southeastern Asia's Attitude

The situation in southeast and southern Asia differs from that in Europe in several important respects. The attitudes of governmental leaders and informed public opinion in the countries of non-Communist Asia have been conditioned by the impact of colonialism and by an awareness of their need for economic development.

Perhaps the greatest concern of these peoples is with independence. Peoples who have only recently secured independence or autonomy are bound to be very conscious of it and of their achievements as a national group.

We Americans, like the peoples of Western Europe, tend to take our independence for granted if only because we have had it for so long. We are proud of our Nation and of our national accomplishments. That is true enough. But most of us are a good deal less sensitive to the international implications of nationalism than are those Asian peoples to whom independence of action is a newly won right.

The peoples of south and southeastern Asia are also particularly concerned with the unhindered development of their own native culture and their own traditions. They are proud of that culture and tradition. And they feel that, given the advantages of technology, the progress they can make in the strengthening of their cultural inheritance will be second to none.

There is no question but that the great majority of Asian peoples want peace and stability. But we should be naïve if we did not realize that they also want a decent standard of living. Good food and good health mean so much to those for whom poverty and disease have been constant companions.

Another factor conditioning Asian attitudes is inadequate understanding of the fact that Communist imperialism would impose upon them a colonialism far worse than the old colonialism they have been busy throwing off. Moreover, the Asians, except for those immediately threatened by Soviet or Chinese Communist military power, see less of the military strength available to support this new imperialism than the Europeans who are virtually living under Soviet guns.

Attitude of Near and Middle East Peoples

Many of the attitudes prevailing in southern and southeastern Asia may, in varying degrees, be found in the countries of the Near East. Nationalism is a very potent factor there. And so is the desire to preserve culture and tradition.

Religion, in particular, is a vital part of the Near Eastern culture. Foreign customs and technological developments which run contrary to religious teachings and practice can do much to breed dislike and discontent for those who seek to introduce them.

Those countries which lie close to Soviet Russia's southern borders are well aware of the menace to the north. However, there are many thinking non-Communists in the area who believe that the best bet for their countries would be to adopt a neutral attitude in the current struggle between Communist totalitarianism and the free world.

The adverse economic position of the great majority of Near and Middle East peoples makes the matter of bare existence a primary concern for them. And this is certainly one of the basic problems which the free world faces in the Near East.

Now, I have tried to give you a broad view of the attitudes and sensitivities that prevail in three different areas of the free world. I have spoken, for the most part, in generalities. But if my comments have served to give us some insight into the nature of the problem we face in furthering understanding between ourselves and our free-world neighbors, they have served their purpose.

Free World's Opinion of the U. S.

And that brings me to the second basic question I posed a little while ago. What do the other peoples of the free world think of America?

By and large, it can be said that their attitude is ambivalent. That is, they like and dislike us at the same time and often for the same traits. Generally speaking, we are admired for our great technological progress, our ability to get things done, our practicality, and our generosity.

At the same time, there is a tendency to condemn us as materialists—as people who disregard the spiritual things in life. There is a widespread feeling that we are somewhat conceited and domineering. And in the eyes of many Western intellectuals, we are sorely lacking in culture.

I have already pointed out that the free peoples are greatly concerned with peace, with independence, and with economic welfare. And I have tried to point up the fact that, though attitudes toward these things vary from area to area, that variance is primarily one of degree.

In short, a people which is particularly preoccupied with peace is not, because of this, without concern for its economic well-being. A people which is most vitally concerned with economic conditions does not therefore lack a real desire for peace.

With this in mind, I think we might well re-examine some of the basic attitudes shared by the free peoples with the idea of relating these attitudes to specific opinions of the United States.

For example, let us look again at the free peoples' attitude toward peace and security. How does that attitude shape up in terms of free-world opinion of us?

By and large, the free peoples are impressed with our military potential. They consider us essentially nonaggressive. They see us as interested in the security of other free peoples. They believe that our strength is the best guaranty that the Soviet Union will not declare an all-out war. They believe that our strength and interest in other nations are their best bets for security, should war come.

But the free peoples also think that our concern with military preparations and our efforts to organize our collective defense arrangement may lead to war. At the same time, they feel that there is a possibility that we may return to isolationism and thus endanger their security.

If the free peoples relate the United States to their desire for peace in both a favorable and an unfavorable light, they do likewise in the matter of political independence and national status.

They feel that the United States has traditionally sided with independence movements. They believe that we regularly back international organizations which offer opportunities for weaker nations to achieve status in the world community. They see in our defense of human and political rights a genuine desire to assist the political aspirations of all the free peoples.

But there is also a feeling among some of the free peoples that our support of the independence ideal is merely a cover for an urge to expand. They are inclined to question our professions of good will toward the colored races. They fear that our great political power will operate to impose our influence upon other nations with a consequent loss of status for those nations.

Let us look at another of the free peoples' as-

pirations—the longing for economic well-being. How does it fit in with their attitude toward the United States?

The free peoples believe that we have displayed our generosity and our ability to provide large-scale economic aid particularly in regard to the productive recovery of Western Europe. They believe that our interest in freer trade will help to relieve some of the marketing problems of the more advanced countries. They see in our wealth, technical ability, and willingness to assist others, the promise of help for underdeveloped countries seeking to solve their own economic problems.

At the same time, the free peoples see certain of our trade policies as working to America's advantage at their expense. They fear that acceptance of American aid may mean involvement in conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. They are very sensitive to any implication that such aid is given them as objects of charity but welcome it when they feel they are partners in an enterprise for the common good. And finally, they tend to question the permanence of our economic policies.

These, then, are some of the attitudes of the other free peoples toward the United States. Obviously, these attitudes are not everywhere expressed in the same way or in the same degree. Among some peoples, they are openly expressed and widely shared. Among others, they are evident only among those who are politically vocal. Among still others, they are present but seldom expressed.

The crucial point is that unfavorable attitudes do exist. That many of these unfavorable attitudes are without substantial basis in fact is less important than their presence among so many of our friends. Clearly, mutual understanding, like most precious commodities, is not easily come by.

Such would be the case under the best of circumstances. The existence of a totalitarian conspiracy whose aim is the destruction of freedom as we know it certainly does not help matters. It makes more imperative than ever the need to give the free peoples the chance to see America and American culture as they really are.

Progress Against Communist Assaults on Freedom

I am happy to report that we are making progress in this direction. This, despite the fact that many of our foreign friends do not see us in exactly the light in which we should like them to see us.

In this connection, it would be well to remember that we Americans have yet to earn the privilege of wearing halos on earth. We are ordinary humans with ordinary human foibles just like the other peoples of the world. We must expect criticism. And we must take it in stride. For such has always been among the costs of leadership.

A vital point to bear in mind is that our inter-

national information and education program is reaching an ever-widening audience. America's Campaign of Truth is reaping results.

The Voice of America is broadcasting in some 46 different languages and has an audience of more than 300 millions. Our press materials daily reach an estimated 10 thousand foreign newspapers with readership of more than 100 million. The 91 million copies of periodical and pamphlet literature which we expect to publish by the end of the current fiscal year will be made available to some 900 million readers.

Last year, our films reached an audience of 500 million in 86 different countries. In the past fiscal year, nearly 8 thousand students, teachers, professors, and civic leaders came to this country from abroad or went abroad under the educational exchange program. Six thousand of these came to the United States and returned or will return to tell America's story to the home folks.

Truly, we have made advances in the international information field. But we must be realistic. We still have a long way to go.

Our efforts are certainly not uncontested. The Soviet Union and its satellites have stepped up their propaganda barrage. They are using every conceivable medium. They are spending about 1½ billion dollars on propaganda activities—more than fifteen times what the American taxpayer is putting into his international information program.

The vicious Soviet campaign of lies and half-truths is universal and constant. The "hate America" theme is ever present. Statements by American leaders, no matter how remote their relationship to international affairs, are twisted, turned, and literally stood on end to serve as grist for the Soviet propaganda mill. The so-called "seamy" side of American life is exploited with devilish deceit so as to play up our faults to the complete exclusion of our virtues. America is pictured as being on the verge of economic collapse though we are in the midst of economic plenty.

The Soviet campaign of hatred and deception is unrelenting. But I certainly do not want to leave the impression that it cannot be coped with. The contrary is true.

Further, Soviet propagandists, like their masters, are far from infallible. They are human beings. They make mistakes. And some of their mistakes have been stupendous.

Mr. Vyshinsky's reaction to the disarmament proposals recently submitted to the United Nations by Britain, France, and the United States is an excellent case in point. Mr. Vyshinsky said he couldn't keep from laughing. His laughter, he said, had kept him awake all night.

The Kremlin took a careful—but belated—look at the reaction of the world's peoples. The people were not laughing. So Mr. Vyshinsky was instructed to stop laughing. But the damage had been done.

The peoples of the free world had had a chance to see the face of imperialism leering from behind the mask of peaceful intentions which the Kremlin has assumed for propaganda purposes. The free peoples had seen the Soviet Government, which constantly prated of peace, reveal by its actions that its goal was anything but peace.

The free peoples must continually retain this awareness of Soviet motives. They must be continually alert to what lies behind Moscow's global propaganda drive.

We Americans owe it to ourselves and to our allies to do everything possible to maintain this alertness. We must never falter in our efforts to expose the Kremlin's machinations for what they are. We can never expect to promote genuine understanding of America among the free peoples if we do otherwise.

Those who would understand each other must be ever aware of the obstacles they face in common.

I have already pointed out that the task ahead of us is a hard one. It would be a grave error to underestimate it.

It would be equally erroneous to assume that the Government agency concerned with the psychological defense of freedom can handle that task alone. We have depended heavily upon private organizations in the past. We must and will continue to do so in the future.

We must look to private initiative to help us give the other free peoples the opportunity to see American culture for what it really is.

The Need for Private Initiative

What are some of the things which we should like to see private initiative undertake in the immediate future?

We should like to see American publishers promote the publication and sale of American books in countries where publishing has yet to be highly developed. Through the selection of books competent to present an adequate, honest view of American life as well as to explode the tissue of lies being woven by Soviet propaganda, much could be done to further genuine understanding among the literate peoples of the world.

We should like to see American private enterprise cooperate by providing funds for textbooks and other equipment for schools in areas where formal education is just beginning to get a foothold. This kind of assistance is particularly urgent in light of the fact that the Soviets have not hesitated to pour carefully slanted texts into such schools when the occasion has arisen.

We should like to invite American newspaper editors to cooperate by giving foreign journalists a chance to spend several weeks or months working on American papers. We want foreign newspaper people to get an on-the-spot view of how the wheels of American journalism turn by helping to turn those wheels.

We should like to see private groups in key communities throughout the country take on the task of seeing to it that foreign visitors are properly integrated into community life. The universities and colleges have already set an excellent example in this respect, particularly in regard to students and professors.

We should like to see the educational institutions take the lead in expanding these efforts to include all foreign visitors. We should like to see private organizations play the major role in giving the person from abroad a real opportunity to see the home community in action and to make an honest appraisal of what he has seen.

These, then, are but a few of the positive measures currently under consideration—measures which will require the full-scale cooperation and support of private groups. You here in this audience are representative of just such groups. It is not too much to say that you and others like you will be bearing an increasing share of the responsibility for furthering other peoples' understanding of us and our understanding of them.

For understanding—as I have already indicated—is a two-way street.

And America's security is directly related to the manner in which traffic flows along that street.

But America's security is certainly not the only consideration here. America's well-being cannot be segregated from that of the free world as a whole.

The key to a stable peace and to self-preservation for the free peoples lies in unity of purpose and unity of action.

That unity will be maintained and will flourish only if those who have united continue to develop their tolerance, their respect, and their understanding of each other.

Conference on German External Debts

[Released to the press January 14]

It has now been agreed by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America and the German Federal Government that an international conference concerned with the settlement of German external debts will open at London on February 28, 1952. The Conference will take place under the direction of the Tripartite Commission on German Debts, whose members are Sir George Rendel for the United Kingdom, F. D. Gregh for France, and Warren Lee Pierson for the United States.

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are arranging for the participation of representatives of creditor interests in their countries. The Governments of

the following interested countries have been invited to send governmental and private creditor representatives to the Conference: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, Egypt, Greece, India, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Union of South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, and Colombia. In addition, the Bank for International Settlements, which also has a creditor interest, has been invited.

The Tripartite Commission on German Debts has undertaken preparatory work which will serve as the basis for the Conference. This work includes the holding in June and July 1951 of preliminary consultations with the representatives of French, United Kingdom, and United States creditors and with the German delegation on external debts. In November and December 1951 the Commission and the German delegation discussed the settlement of the debts owing to the French, United Kingdom, and United States Governments by the German Federal Republic for postwar economic assistance.¹

The Conference is intended to provide an opportunity for negotiations for the settlement of German prewar external debts between representatives of the German Federal Government and the German debtors on the one hand, and representatives of the creditor interests concerned on the other hand. The principal task of the Conference will be to work out a plan of settlement for the various categories of German debts.

When the negotiations at the Conference have been concluded, it is intended that an intergovernmental agreement shall be drawn up which will be based on the results of the Conference and will give international sanction to the debt settlement. It will be open to interested governments, whether or not they have participated in the Conference, to accede to this agreement.

Normalization of Germany's financial and commercial relations with the rest of the world should result from the International Conference on German Debts, according to Ambassador Pierson.

Commenting on the announcement of the convening of the Conference made by the State Department, Mr. Pierson added that the resumption of such normal relations should be a major step forward in the establishment of an independent Germany.

Mr. Pierson pointed out that since the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had obtained from Germany a priority of payment for their claim for postwar economic assistance the convening of a conference to establish a pattern for settling Germany's prewar debts was impossible without first meeting two conditions. One condition was that the three Governments reach

an agreement with Germany on the amount Germany will be expected to pay for postwar economic assistance. The other was that the three Governments indicate their willingness to defer their priority if an acceptable pattern for the settlement of prewar debts is worked out between Germany and her creditors.

The agreement with Germany for payment of the claims of the three Governments for postwar economic assistance was negotiated in December by Mr. Pierson and his British and French colleagues on the Tripartite Debt Commission. In the course of these negotiations, each of the three Governments agreed to a considerable write-down of its claim. The United States claim was reduced from \$3,200,000,000 to \$1,200,000,000, payable in 35 years at 2½ percent interest. The claim of the United Kingdom was reduced from £201,000,000 to £150,000,000, and that of France from \$15,700,000 to \$11,840,000, payable in francs. The French and United Kingdom debts are to be paid in 20 years without interest.

Mr. Pierson expressed the opinion that the agreement of the three Governments to settle their claims for postwar economic assistance on these terms has established a framework within which it should be possible for the negotiations in the forthcoming International Conference to come to a successful conclusion.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Jan. 25–Feb. 2, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

No.	Date	Subject
29	1/14	German debts conference
30	1/14	Pierson: Debts conference
41	1/17	Miller: Hemispheric relations
74	1/25	Mexico: Military assistance
75*	1/26	Anniversary of India
76*	1/26	Anniversary of Australia
77	1/28	Tax negotiations with Australia
78*	1/28	Visitors to U.S.
79	1/28	Sargeant: Key to a free world
80	1/28	New VOA transmitter
81*	1/29	McVeagh: Ambassador to Portugal
82†	1/30	Vincent testimony before Senate
83*	1/30	Jesse Hill retires
84†	1/30	U.N. drafts cartels agreement
85	1/30	Cuba: Military assistance
86	1/31	Rusk: Adm. negotiations with Japan
87	1/31	Cooper: Chinese charges in U.N.
88*	1/31	Anniversary of Yemen
89†	1/31	Fisher: U.S. role in world affairs
90†	2/1	Point 4 First course completed
91	2/1	Point 4 director to Saudi Arabia
92	2/2	Pakistan expands Point 4 Program

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1021.

The Conduct of Hemispheric Relations

by Edward G. Miller, Jr.

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

In view of the great importance to us of the 20 countries to the south and of our importance to them, our Government's policies and actions in regard to them merit the closest scrutiny and attention. We might, therefore, begin by reviewing some of the basic rules that we follow in our dealings with these countries.

Let us start out by clearing away some of the underbrush and listing a few of the things that our Government does not do in dealing with these countries.

The first rule is one that is basic in the personal make-up of every American, namely, that you don't push people around even if you are much bigger than they are. Translated into international parlance this means mutual respect for other nations even though they are small; scrupulous regard for their sovereignty; and nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries. One of the principal factors in our relations with Latin America is the disparity between our strength and size on the one hand and the size of many of those countries on the other. Nevertheless, the individuals which those countries produce are in no sense less great than individuals which we produce.

The first rule leads to the second, namely, that we don't try to make other nations over into our own image. We are justly proud of many of our great institutions but, nevertheless, we have much to learn ourselves from other countries. The Latin American countries are different in many respects from us. They come from different stock with different traditions which they cherish as much as we cherish our traditions. They are proud people who do not like meddling in their affairs. Therefore, we seek to understand and respect their traditions and their institutions.

A third rule is that we do not engage in the conduct of foreign relations for the sake of seeking from other countries their approbation or affection in the abstract. We must pursue a national foreign policy based upon our own enlightened self-interest which, of course, includes the need of hav-

ing strong allies and access on a fair and equal basis to the materials we need. We must become accustomed to thinking of our foreign relations in these terms rather than in terms of a vague wistfulness for the admiration of other people. This means that we must become accustomed to receiving criticism—even on occasion unjust and unfair criticism—from countries whose interests are basically in accord with ours without letting that deflect us from carrying out the policy which our national interest demands. This will mean patience and forbearance on the part of a people which often acts on the basis of emotions and impulse. But all of us must bear in mind that the United States is carrying the greatest burden of responsibility that any nation has carried in history and this imposes upon all of us the highest possible degree of dignity and discipline. We must also remember that our size and power and the extent of the commitments which the world situation has forced upon us make it all too easy for other countries to try to shift the blame to us for their political and economic ills.

At the same time, while we do not push other people around and while we will always seek to exercise the degree of patience and forbearance which I have mentioned, we nevertheless expect from other countries, including the smallest of our allies, respect for our legitimate rights and interests. Too often in the minds of people abroad the size of this great country, our deliberate restraint in the exercise of our power, and the instinct toward generosity of our people have become confused with flabbiness. The mere fact that we are large and that we live by the principle of nonintervention does not mean that we will not expect scrupulous reciprocity from other people in regard to our legitimate rights and interests. Bad faith, deliberate misconstruction and hostility, where they occur, are bound to injure our relations with the country concerned. One good slogan in conducting relations between nations is that "cooperation begets cooperation."

Review of Objectives

Turning this around, let us state some of our objectives in more positive terms.

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the Chamber of Commerce at Portland, Oreg., on Jan. 21 and released to the press on the same date.

First, each citizen will expect his Government to stand up for our own national interests and the specific interests of our nationals abroad. We seek not only to protect and defend the legitimate existing investments and trade relations of American private interests, but we also seek equal opportunity, in general, for American firms abroad. I emphasize the word legitimate because our Government cannot be expected to help or advise those who seek unfair advantage in other countries or who do not conform scrupulously to the laws of other nations. Furthermore, our citizens must always have in mind that their Government's ability to protect a specific interest must always be viewed in the context of our total relations with a particular country. Nevertheless, the subject of protecting American interests abroad is one which gives us serious concern at a time which requires more than ever regard for the sanctity of contracts and international agreements.

At the same time, we in the Department of State must necessarily, in many cases, present the views of foreign countries here at home since we cannot expect fair treatment of Americans abroad unless we can assure them of reciprocal treatment in our own country. This is one reason why the Department of State has, in general, never been a popular agency in the United States since, for the very reason that we are the agency which must defend Americans abroad, we must also try to be in effect the conscience of the American people in regard to the treatment which they accord to other nations.

We have constant specific negotiations going on with other countries in regard to such matters as route permits for air carriers, shipping rates, radio broadcasting frequencies, import duties, price ceilings on imported products, export quotas, and a myriad of other matters which form the daily grist of our mill.

We in the Department of State must often make very difficult decisions which in many cases involve putting the national interest ahead of a specific local interest in our own country. At the same time, other countries must realize that they have to play their part in the maintenance of good relations with us and I am sorry to say that this is too often forgotten by people who feel that the size and power of the United States imposes upon us the exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of good international relations. I am optimistic enough, however, to believe that as the United States in recent years has increasingly demonstrated the stability and fairness of its foreign policies, suspicion of our motives has diminished and leaders in other countries are realizing the importance of their making reciprocal efforts to cultivate good relations with us and to avoid actions which will impede our official efforts to accord them fair and equitable treatment.

Third, while, as I have said, we do not seek admiration as such from other people, we do seek

understanding of our policies and our customs without seeking to impose them on others. The decrease of suspicion in regard to the United States in Latin America which has occurred in the last 25 years has been an essential factor in the improvement of our relations. We still have some ways to go in this direction and nothing will contribute more to eliminating the last vestiges of suspicion than a clear understanding abroad of our purposes in the world today. Consequently, we operate throughout Latin America the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Program which though it may be imperfect in some respects is nevertheless in our opinion making headway in spreading understanding of this country and its policies.

Fourth, we want to help our friends to realize their ambitions in the way of achieving economic and political maturity. We help those who seek our help through programs of technical and financial cooperation, programs which are lumped under the term "Point Four." All of this assistance in Latin America is done on a basis under which other countries make their contributions to the program, in many cases exceeding the amount of ours. This is a long-term process but those of us who are familiar with developments in Mexico, Brazil, or Chile, for example, take hope from their example which shows that in the 10 years since the outbreak of World War II the economies of those countries have been radically altered. The same is true of Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and others. Furthermore, in most of these countries the greatest impact has been made by private capital, both domestic and foreign.

Finally, in regard to our positive objectives, we seek to strengthen our system of collective security. In this hemisphere that system is based on the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947 within the broader framework of the United Nations Charter. It is our objective to help and encourage our neighbors to the south in every appropriate way to carry out our mutual responsibilities under this treaty in the maintenance of hemisphere defense.

Assistance to American Firms Abroad

Let us now look at some of the specific applications of the policies which we pursue in helping American firms abroad. I have mentioned our work in the field of foreign trade. The volume of this work in the Department of State has increased substantially in recent years as the interest of our citizens in this trade has become more intense. Although today our main problem in our export trade is finding enough materials to go around to meet domestic and foreign demands, farsighted American traders are looking forward to the day when the enormously expanding market in Latin America will help to maintain a high rate of domestic production. There are unfortunately

many obstacles, with which we are all too familiar, in foreign trade. We are constantly receiving inquiries for help in obtaining export licenses and many questions come in to us as to the possibility of these countries abandoning the export licenses and control system that make life so hard for exporters. The main fact to be faced in this connection is that Latin America is expanding at a tremendously rapid rate in relation to their own production of capital equipment and also in relation to their exports to us and the rest of the world. The population of this area is growing faster than any other in the world. This has made most of the countries in the hemisphere adopt control systems affecting imports so as to permit them to direct the use of their foreign exchange resources in the manner which they conceive to be consistent with their development needs. In other countries, efforts to deal with this same basic problem and with the imbalance that from time to time exists as between imports and exports have led countries to adopt a multiple exchange rate system which likewise creates particular problems for exporters and investors.

In cases where exporters come to us with legitimate problems arising from import and exchange controls, we do our best to cooperate with them. Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund, of which most of the countries in this area are members, is doing excellent work in this field by providing expert fiscal advice to its members in an effort to simplify exchange controls.

We must bear in mind at all times that in dealing with other countries in regard to this type of problem, it is up to the other country to decide for itself what it believes to be best in its own interest. We cannot impose our views, however strongly we may feel that the policy being pursued by other countries is not wise. We must understand that in countries where the problem of economic development is almost an obsession, the basic essentials of living are more important than luxuries.

We have seen extremely favorable developments in some countries, particularly in Mexico and Peru, in regard to the simplification of exchange controls. We expect that as the dollar position of other countries improves as the result of present favorable raw material prices, other governments will move in the same direction. At the same time, we must bear in mind that as present emergency shortages develop more seriously there will be an increasingly pent-up demand in other countries for all kinds of manufactured goods. Many of these countries remember the experience which they went through after World War II when the substantial dollar reserves accumulated during the war depreciated in real earning power when our own price controls over manufactured goods were abolished in 1946. A contributing factor to the loss of earning power was the fact that many of these reserves were depleted on nonessential goods. Consequently, it can be expected that one factor

which these countries will have in mind in approaching their exchange control problems will be the preservation of the value of their reserves.

As I have said above, one of our main difficulties in the field of foreign trade today is our inability to meet all domestic and foreign requirements for products which are in short supply, such as iron and steel products, heavy equipment in general, and raw materials such as newsprint and sulphur. This has required us to impose controls over the export of many products, and the resulting system of export licenses and priorities which exporters are required to obtain impose decided burdens on our foreign trade. The Department of Commerce is making every effort to simplify procedures and make these controls as easy as possible on our exporters and on our friends abroad. They have been imposed not because we like controls but because of the needs of the emergency and they will be removed as soon as the burden of our rearmament effort permits. In the meantime, both our export trade and our friends abroad should be patient and should remember that these kinds of restrictions and accompanying red tape are simply part of the price which we all have to pay in the struggle to maintain our freedom.

I think we can all agree here today that whatever party is represented in the administration which will be in office a year from today—whether it is Republican or Democratic—we can assure our friends to the south that the policies which we pursue with regard to them will remain stable. I say this with confidence because, as I have said, our present policies in regard to Latin America have been worked out through trial and error over a period of 25 or more years by administrations drawn from both political parties. We can all take satisfaction in the stability of our policy in this hemisphere.

The Good Neighbor Policy, as we practice it today, is for us an historic bipartisan national policy. It has been wrought by Democrats as well as by Republicans and the names of Hoover and Stimson in the Republican Party can take their place along with those of Roosevelt and Hull. This is the greatest guarantee that we can offer to our friends of the Americas, that regardless of how hard fought may be our ensuing political campaign, they can look forward with confidence to working with us in the future as they have in the past.

Correction

In the Bulletin of January 21, 1952, p. 85, the italic subhead, *Austria* should be deleted and the material under that head should be included under the head *Soviet Oppression Elsewhere* on p. 86.

In the same issue, p. 103, in the tabulation on the status of international agreements at the end of 1951, delete the asterisk after the first title "Convention on Privileges and Immunities of United Nations."

New VOA Transmitter for Europe and Latin America

The Department of State announced on January 28 that a 4-square mile tract near East Arcadia, N. C., has been selected as the site for a powerful new radio transmitter to carry the Voice of America's programs to Europe and Latin America.

Contracts have been awarded and construction will begin immediately on the new facility, with completion expected in about 18 months.

The new installation will be similar in cost, design, and power to one being constructed on the West Coast at Dungeness, Wash. The Department announced last week that the West Coast transmitter would be a 7-million-dollar short-wave plant and would give the Voice the most powerful radio signal known to exist in the world today.

The two stations, when completed, will help carry America's Campaign of Truth to areas which are now difficult to reach. The Department also envisions a group of powerful relay transmitters which will ring the Iron Curtain areas and make jamming more difficult.

Inter-American Center Established at Miami

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS by a joint resolution approved September 27, 1950 (Public Law 853, 81st Congress), the Congress has expressed its endorsement of the establishment of the Inter-American Cultural and Trade Center in Miami, Florida, as a permanent, nonprofit, self-sustaining enterprise for the development of improved relations and increased trade with the republics of Latin America; and

WHEREAS the joint resolution recites that Miami is suitable for the location of such a Center because it is a natural gateway of the United States to Latin America and possesses certain additional advantages; and

WHEREAS the joint resolution also recites that the State of Florida and the city of Miami will donate lands and money for the construction of this Center; and

WHEREAS the effective functioning of the Center will encourage the mutually beneficial exchange of goods and services between the nations of the Western Hemisphere, thereby fostering the solidarity of the American republics; and

WHEREAS the aforesaid joint resolution authorizes and requests the President, by proclamation or in such other manner as he may deem proper, to grant recognition to the Inter-American Cultural and Trade Center in Miami;


NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, in consonance with the joint resolution, do hereby call upon officials and agencies of the Government to assist and cooperate with the Inter-American Cultural and Trade Center in Miami, Florida, and I invite the participation of all the nations of the Western Hemisphere therein.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

¹ 17 Fed. Reg. 983.

DONE at the City of Washington this thirtieth day of January in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-sixth.

By the President:
DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State



Military Assistance Negotiations

The following negotiations are being conducted under the terms of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which authorized a program of military grant aid for Latin America:

Mexico

The Departments of State and Defense announced on January 25 that the Governments of Mexico and the United States have agreed to initiate negotiations looking to the conclusion of a bilateral military assistance agreement. The American Ambassador in Mexico City, William O'Dwyer, will be assisted by representatives of the Department of Defense in the negotiations.

Cuba

The Departments of State and Defense announced negotiations are being initiated on January 30 at Habana with the Government of Cuba looking to the conclusion of a bilateral military assistance agreement. The American Ambassador in Habana, Willard L. Beaulac, is being assisted by representatives of the Department of Defense in the negotiations.

Tax Treaty Negotiations To Open With Australia

[Released to the press January 28]

United States and Australian tax officials will meet at Canberra in the last half of March 1952 for technical discussions looking to the conclusion of conventions between the two countries for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and to taxes on the estates of deceased persons.

If bases for agreement are found, drafts of the proposed terms will be prepared by the participants and submitted to their respective governments for consideration with a view to signing.

In preparation for the discussions, interested persons are invited to submit information and suggestions to Eldon P. King, Special Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Washington 25, D. C.

The Japanese Peace Settlement

by *John M. Allison*

*Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

The President on January 10, 1952, laid before the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent the Peace Treaty with Japan and three related treaties which our Government has negotiated over the past year: the Security Treaty with Japan, the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines, and the Security Treaty with Australia and New Zealand—four treaties, which I believe we can without reservation point to as a milestone in American diplomatic history. These treaties mark the end of an era in the Pacific, an era which saw Japan's emergence from feudalism to become one of the most powerful military nations in history, her senseless precipitation of a major war which brought misery to her people and almost total destruction to her cities, and her subsequent occupation by the Allied Powers, an occupation which was designed not to wreak vengeance upon her defeated and helpless people, but to guide them into peaceful paths and to prepare them for responsibilities which no nation today can ignore.

The Japanese Peace Settlement is no hastily built structure put together over the past few months. Its origins date back to 1943, when in the midst of the war the U.S. Government began to lay plans for the occupation of Japan. True, at that time we had little idea of what conditions would be at the end of the war; we had no way of knowing how much of Japan would be left, how many of its institutions would survive, or what materials would be available to build the new Japan. However, we did know that Japan would not utterly disappear, that her people were industrious and courageous, and that her society was cooperative and cohesive. We also knew that, whatever happened in Japan, she was not likely to be a negligible factor in the postwar Pacific world; that, while her military machine might be smashed, her geographical position, the industrial know-how of her people, and her demonstrated ability to absorb new ideas and adapt them to her own needs would always be a factor

important to the rest of Asia and to ourselves. It followed that whatever we did in Japan would have a direct bearing on the other countries of Asia and that a stable, peace-loving Japan was an essential step toward the solution of Asia's age-old problems.

As events turned out, we were relatively fortunate. Despite the terrible material damage she suffered and the final abject surrender of her military masters in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945, the foundations of Japan's society remained solid. The wheels of government continued to turn; the people after some apprehension over the prospect of a foreign occupation returned to their daily business; and the process of rehabilitation and reform got under way with neither confusion nor fanfare. All in all, it was the most unusual occupation in history. From the beginning there was complete cooperation between victor and vanquished, a cooperation so close that in retrospect it is difficult to give credit in the proper place for the goals accomplished. Certainly a large factor in the success of the occupation was the wise and understanding leadership of General MacArthur and his staff, who carried out the policies of the U.S. Government and the Far Eastern Commission effectively and skillfully. Another factor was the constructive aid and counsel given by the countries associated with the United States on the Far Eastern Commission. But we must not forget the part played by the Japanese Government and the Japanese people themselves during the occupation. Their willing cooperation was evident from the very beginning, and they deserve tribute for the spirit which they have shown throughout.

Problems Faced in Japanese Occupation

In general, the Occupation in Japan was faced with two broad problems. The first was a negative one—that of eradicating for all time Japan's capacity to wage aggressive war and the residue of feudalism which made her susceptible to militaristic ideas. In short order this problem was met by a series of measures designed to demobilize and disarm the country, purge militaristic and other ultranationalist elements from public life,

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the New York Bar Association at New York, N. Y., on Jan. 25 and released to the press on the same date.

eliminate undesirable influences in the school system, and smash the machinery of thought control.

The second problem—one which called for a constructive program—was that of building a new Japan which would be peaceful and democratic. Here the Occupation in cooperation with the Japanese Government embarked on a series of measures which finally resulted in the Japan we know today. A new constitution clearly providing for a representative government directly responsible to the people was promulgated. The Imperial House, an anomaly to the American eye, but nevertheless an institution which has stood the test of time and which has proved itself to be a strong element of stability in the Japanese social and political structure, was retained as “the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people,” but without political attributes and the false trappings of mythology which in the past resulted in the Emperor’s being used by unscrupulous elements for their own ends. A responsible parliament, based on universal suffrage, was created. Individual liberties were broadened and guaranteed in a bill of rights. Government, police functions, and education were decentralized in order to promote democracy at the grass roots. The huge financial monopolies, which in prewar years had fallen under the control of the military clique, were deconcentrated in an effort to broaden the base of their control.

Three groups of Japanese citizens in particular were freed from legal and economic bondage and given their due rights in modern society. The women of Japan, hitherto second-class citizens, were given equal status under the law and granted suffrage; and statistics of the last elections in Japan reveal that some 90 percent got out and voted—a percentage which I believe puts us to shame. Labor was encouraged to form unions, and today over five and one-half million Japanese participate in these unions, which are free from governmental interference.

Lastly, the farmers, numbering more than half of the population of Japan have been raised from economic oblivion and under a series of land-reform laws have recovered ownership of the land which is rightfully theirs. As of 1949, 88 percent of the farmers of Japan owned the land they tilled as contrasted with 54 percent in 1945.

With the accomplishment of these reforms, it was our conviction that Japan had discharged in full her obligations under the Potsdam Surrender Terms and was now entitled to a peace settlement which would restore her to a position of sovereign equality in international life.

Preparation for Peace Treaty

We first thought that the Treaty of Peace with Japan might be concluded in the same way as treaties in the past—around a conference table. Accordingly, in 1947 the United States proposed

that the governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission meet at a preliminary conference to discuss plans for a Japanese peace treaty. Here we were stopped by the Soviet Union, who insisted that the matter could be considered only by the Council of Foreign Ministers—where, of course, the Russians would have, in effect, a veto. In this manner, the Soviet Union, if it wanted to block a Japanese peace settlement, had nothing to lose. It could oppose any proposals made at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and, by insisting that only that body had authority to act in the matter, it could prevent consideration of the treaty by any other means.

Therefore, in 1950 the United States decided to abandon the conference method and instead began to seek peace through a series of diplomatic consultations and written exchanges of views with all interested governments—including that of the Soviet Union. The work of Ambassador John Foster Dulles, as special representative of the President, in this endeavor is too well known to require further elaboration here. The Presidential Mission led by him visited 10 capitals, exploring the problems of the treaty with the leaders of the various countries concerned. The United Kingdom, in the meantime, was carrying on similar discussions with the countries of the British Commonwealth. Enough areas of agreement were found in the course of this preliminary survey to enable the United States to prepare a draft text by March of 1951 for circulation to over 20 countries. The United Kingdom also drafted a text based upon its discussions with the members of the Commonwealth and in June of 1951; these two texts were reconciled and circulated to all interested powers. Despite its claims to the contrary, the Soviet Union was given a full opportunity to contribute to these discussions in a constructive manner and on an equal basis with the other participating countries. The Soviet Union, however, chose to confine its protests to matters concerning the procedure by which the treaty was developed rather than to substantive aspects of the treaty text.

During these international consultations, Mr. Dulles and his staff worked as closely as possible with the U. S. Congress, informing the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee of developments as they occurred. Not only were the Members of Congress informed on these matters, but their opinions were solicited and their suggestions taken into account and incorporated into the language of the treaties. From both parties in the Congress we received the utmost cooperation.

In fact, I think it is not an exaggeration to say that the Treaty of Peace with Japan and the related treaties concerning the security of the Pacific area are the results of a greater cooperative effort than the world has heretofore seen with respect to international agreements. In the fullest

sense of the phrase, they are "open covenants, openly arrived at." The unanimity with which the delegates at the San Francisco Conference signed the Treaty of Peace with Japan, in the face of the obstructionist tactics of the Soviet Union and its satellites, is a vivid testimony of this fact.

What the Terms of the Treaty Mean to Japan

The Japanese Peace Treaty has been widely acclaimed as a treaty of reconciliation, and it is certainly that. But it is more, too. It is a treaty which brings Japan back as an equal member of the world community. Her future actions are limited only by those standards of international conduct commonly respected by all nations and specifically expressed in the aims of the United Nations Charter. Under this treaty, the people of Japan are being given an opportunity to make a positive contribution to world progress.

Though the terms of the treaty are generous, they are not lax. There are stern articles in the treaty which have been required both by the provisions of the Potsdam Surrender Terms and by international standards of justice. Japan has been stripped of former territory which she gained as a result of aggression; she will be required to pay damages for the depredations inflicted upon other countries by her armed forces.

However, it has been stipulated that these damages shall not be exacted from Japan at the expense of her economy. Rather, she will be expected to furnish the services of Japanese people in production, technical assistance, salvaging, and other work which in some measure will compensate for the damages done. This new concept of reparations may well pave the way toward increased international cooperation and, if Japan is wholehearted and sincere in her efforts, create an atmosphere of friendship that would have been otherwise impossible to achieve.

Pacific Security Treaties

With this in mind, I would like to dwell briefly upon the concept of Pacific security. The Japanese Peace Treaty is the keystone of the arch of collective defense in the Far East. Without a free and independent Japan, it would be difficult and costly to maintain the security of the Pacific area.

The initiative, talent, and ability of the Japanese people—as well as their sincere cooperation—are essential to the long-term stability of the region. However, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines; the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States; and the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan are important and necessary adjuncts to the system of collective defense which we have built and upon which we will rely.

These treaties are based upon one premise—the sure conviction that no nation stands alone in the

Pacific. It is this conviction which gives meaning to the treaties and which welds them into a system which will do more to promote peace and deter aggression in the Pacific area than any one nation, acting alone, could ever hope to accomplish. In making these agreements, each nation recognizes that its own security is assured only so long as its neighbor's remains out of danger.

Other Problems Discussed

I do not want to leave with you the impression that the conclusion of these four treaties settles all the problems of the Pacific. Actually nothing could be more unrealistic than an attitude on the part of our own people or on the part of the Japanese that with the ending of the state of war and Japan's resumption of her sovereign rights as a nation, nothing further need be done. Very real problems remain for the United States, Japan, and the other off-shore areas of the Pacific if they are to develop soundly and maintain their integrity in the face of imperialistic aggression.

ECONOMY

The ending of the state of war does not solve Japan's economic problems. Her 83 million people contained in an area no larger than California must continue to live. Under the Occupation this was made possible by large-scale economic aid from the United States, aid amounting to nearly 2 billion dollars. That aid has now ceased, and, if Japan is to survive, she must manufacture and export goods which can be exchanged for food and raw materials. This poses serious problems for Japan is not only deficient in such vital materials as rice, coking coal, iron, manganese, cotton, wool, rubber, and timber but has also lost her former markets in Manchuria and other parts of the Chinese mainland. It is true that the war in Korea has given a stimulus to Japanese trade and enabled Japan to earn needed dollars through United States procurement of supplies for its forces in Korea. However, this condition can only be temporary, and in the long run Japan must look farther afield to the countries of Southeast Asia and other parts of the world for her trade. Her one advantage in facing the problem lies in the relative efficiency of her industry—particularly her managerial talent and her skilled labor. However, this advantage alone cannot guarantee Japan's foreign trade. She must have access to raw materials and markets.

REARMAMENT

A further problem is that of rearmament. The Japanese have experienced the horrors of war at first hand—not only in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but in the incendiary raids on Tokyo and every other city and town of any industrial importance. They have experienced the

anguish of waiting in vain for their soldiers to be repatriated—up to the present the Soviet Union has failed to return to Japan or otherwise account for well over 300,000 prisoners of war. They have seen how a military clique can seize control of the civil government and under the guise of patriotism drive a nation into imperialism, war, and disaster. They also know the economic sacrifice involved in maintaining military forces.

A few Japanese—particularly those who have not had occasion to observe the wide gulf between the official statements and the actual practices of the Soviet Union—would like to put their heads in the sand and follow a neutralist policy in the hope that Japan might be overlooked. Some of these persons may be sincere, but they are obviously lacking in perception. They have apparently forgotten the fate that has befallen Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Chinese mainland. They have misinterpreted the lesson of Korea—one which clearly demonstrates the aims of the Soviet Union in the Far East. Fortunately, this group is in a minority. The great majority of Japanese realize that their only hope lies in positive measures for defense.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER POWERS

Another problem, one of immediate practical import, lies in the attitude of other powers toward Japan. The peace settlement with Japan, while opening the way for Japan's return to the inter-

national family, does not guarantee that the scars of war are all healed. Many countries—particularly those who have suffered under the Japanese military yoke—for instance, our sister Republic of the Philippines, will not forget their experience for many years. Others, like Australia and New Zealand, who were directly threatened by a Japanese invasion, still fear that in some way or other it might happen again. Japan will face much latent hostility in the areas where she made war, and only a patient determination on the part of the Japanese people to follow the path of peace and the slow healing process of time will enable Japan to wipe out completely her record of the past.

These are the main problems, then—the necessity for strengthening Japan's economy through increased foreign trade, the need for rearmament for defensive purposes, and the continuation of the healing process in Japan's relations with her neighbors—with which we shall all be concerned in the months and years to come. So far as we have been able, we have sought to prepare Japan for her new responsibilities and through this series of treaties to pave the way for stability in the Pacific. I believe that as Americans we can take just pride in these accomplishments. Their lasting success, however, will depend on a continuing identity of interest between the group of nations who have thus expressed their faith in one another. It will depend upon whether each of us can keep that faith.

Administrative Agreement Negotiations With Japan

*Statement by Dean Rusk
Special Ambassador of the President*¹

I was greatly honored by the request of the President of the United States that I undertake this mission which has brought me once again to Japan. My respect for your great country and for the role which it can play in our modern world community and my strong convictions about the essential harmony of our basic national interests add to the satisfaction which I feel in accepting this mission on behalf of my country. We feel ourselves most fortunate, Mr. Minister,² that the

Government of Japan has seen fit to ask you to serve as its representative in our discussions and are honored to be associated with you in the task which is now before us.

May I express at the beginning my understanding that our present negotiations are on a government-to-government basis; that we are to consider matters which relate to the period which begins with the coming into effect of the peace treaty and the restoration to Japan of its full sovereignty; and that these present negotiations are free discussions between our two Governments on the basis of sovereign equality. This does not mean that the responsibilities of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers are modified or finished in any way prior to the effective date of the peace treaty; it means, however, that the Supreme Commander understands and agrees with the view of

¹Made at the opening of the first session of the administrative agreement negotiations at Tokyo on Jan. 29 and released to the press on the same date. President Truman on Jan. 23 appointed Mr. Rusk as his special representative with the personal rank of Ambassador to the administrative agreement negotiations.

²Katsuo Okazaki, State Minister in the Japanese Cabinet.

my Government that the Japanese Government is free to participate in these negotiations and is free to conclude an agreement upon its own responsibility. That is the same broad basis upon which the peace treaty and the security treaty themselves were concluded and is, in our opinion, the basis upon which we should now seek a mutually satisfactory accord on administrative arrangements.

It is also my understanding, Mr. Minister, that we are here seeking an agreement which shall be fully known to and understood by the peoples of our two countries. The close association of our two great Nations in the cause of peace has nothing in it to be concealed. Fears and suspicions which may be sown by those who are trying to divide us can be dissolved by complete public understanding of what it is we shall agree to do. In fact, I believe our Governments have a very definite responsibility to carry out a positive public information program in this field.

As our delegation sees it, our present task is to negotiate an administrative agreement between our two Governments called for in article 3 of the security treaty.³ We should like to work out an agreement which will establish, in the words of the security treaty itself, "conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan."

Since our point of departure is article 3 of the security treaty, and since the security treaty stands in intimate relation to the peace treaty, we believe our work here should be conducted within and be governed by the broad framework of these two treaties, both of which have been ratified by Japan and are now before the Senate of the United States in accordance with our own constitutional arrangements. Another important agreement in the background of our present discussion is the exchange of notes between our two Governments on September 8, 1951,⁴ concerning continued support and assistance by Japan to the United Nations forces, in the words of the exchange of notes, "engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force."

With the coming into effect of the Japanese peace treaty, it is entirely clear that Japan will take its place in the world community as a sovereign equal. It is a basic factor in the arrangements which we are now to consider.

The highest expression of sovereignty in our modern world community is not found in unilateral freedom of action which disregards the rights of others or which places in jeopardy the common interests upon which the world community is founded. The Charter of the United Nations states, for example, that "the organization is based upon the principle of sovereign equality of all its members." That very same Charter, however, sets forth in considerable detail agreed limitations upon unilateral action which are necessary

to accomplish the purposes and to give effect to the principles of the Charter itself.

The greater the nation and the more widespread its interests and responsibilities, the greater are its obligations to respect the rights of its neighbors and to act in such a way as, in the words of the Preamble of the Japanese peace treaty, to "cooperate in friendly association, to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security." The United States, for example, is a member of a large number of international organizations, and as such our sovereignty is exercised in continuous process of joint action and cooperation with others. At the present time, the United States has concluded security arrangements with almost 40 other nations in all parts of the world in a significant effort to establish a just and durable peace. In emphasizing, therefore, our regard and respect for the full sovereignty which Japan will enjoy in consequence of its Treaty of Peace, I would wish to register our view that it is no infringement or diminution of sovereignty for Japan to act voluntarily in concert with others to give effect to the great principles which find expression in the Charter of the United Nations.

U. S. Approach to the Administrative Agreement

The security treaty between the United States and Japan came about because of the disarmed state of Japan, because of great dangers which would arise both for Japan and for the rest of us if Japan should be left defenseless, and in acknowledgment of the desire of the Government of Japan that, under these circumstances, American armed forces be retained in this area. In the Preamble of the security treaty, Japan states that it desires, as the provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter an armed attack upon Japan. The disposition of such forces in and about Japan, at the request of Japan, necessarily involves facilities and areas for use of such forces. Further, it is inherent in the situation that such force must have the capability of carrying out its military mission, in this instance, those referred to in article 1 of the security treaty. Our present task, therefore, appears to us to be that of giving practical effect to arrangements which are implicit in the agreements which our two Governments have already reached.

Another element in the background of our present work is the expectation expressed in the security treaty that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, "always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter."

³ BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1951, p. 464.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 465.

The administrative agreement which we have before us deals with arrangements for United States forces and does not enter into such measures as may commend to the Government and people of Japan for their own defense.

Unfortunately, in the modern world the steps which have to be taken for our elementary security involve substantial costs. Speaking for my own countrymen, we should greatly prefer to use our resources for the improvement of our standards of living, for the social and cultural development of our people and for the assistance to our friends abroad in the great pursuits of peace. It is a matter of concern and disappointment that the great effort of the world community to establish peace is being frustrated by the appetites and ambitions of those who now constitute a serious threat to the peace of the world. The presence of United States forces in and about Japan will involve costs, and we believe these costs should be shared upon an equitable basis in the light of our respective abilities to bear them.

The approach of the United States to the administrative agreement reflects an understanding regard for the economic and social well-being of the Japanese people and for the special problems which you will face in restoring a prosperous nation. We shall willingly try to find arrangements for U.S. forces in Japan which will impose the least practicable burden upon the commercial, industrial, and agricultural processes by which the Japanese people must earn their livelihood. Important facilities and areas are being constantly released by General Ridgway, and his representatives are ready to work closely with representatives of the Japanese Government to find arrangements which bring into the closest har-

mony possible the needs of the Japanese economy and the essential requirements of our forces.

Hostile propaganda has attempted, Mr. Minister, to misrepresent cynically and falsely the purposes which underlie the security arrangements between United States and Japan. Peace is a profound desire of my country. To achieve it we have joined in building the United Nations; we have poured out our wealth—wealth which is not unlimited—in a mighty stream to help repair devastation and to meet hunger and distress which breed disorder and war. We have been patient in negotiations and ready to seek solutions to outstanding problems in good faith. We have resisted the violent attacks upon the peace of the world in the hope of preventing a general conflagration arising from unchallenged aggression. Our initiative, our men, and our material resources have been used in an effort to establish peace. It is on that basis that we have sought and welcomed the close association between ourselves and Japan. No one who if prepared to keep the peace and to live in accordance with purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, would take exception to this association or be anxious about its meaning.

I have no doubt, Mr. Minister, that the basic interests of our two countries are largely the same, that the peoples of our two countries are working for the security of their homes, a chance to earn a decent living, and opportunity to enjoy the essential rights of free men. It is in recognition of these underlying factors that we are happy to meet here and to work with you in conclusion of the arrangements which will mark the further cooperation of our two countries.

Expansion of Point Four Activities in Africa and Near East

PROGRAM IN IRAN

[Released to the press January 21]

The Point Four Program in Iran will be greatly expanded as a result of an understanding reached on January 19. An exchange of notes embodying the general scope and terms of the expanded program was concluded between Prime Minister Mosadeq on behalf of the Government of Iran and William E. Warne, director of technical cooperation in Iran, on behalf of the Government of the United States.

The United States may contribute as much as \$23,450,000 toward the program of technical cooperation and economic development in Iran in the current fiscal year, compared with approximately \$1,460,000 in fiscal year 1951.

Specific projects to be undertaken under the terms of the new understanding will be worked out between representatives of the United States Government and the individual ministries concerned, or such other representatives as the Prime Minister may designate.

After the expanded Point Four Program had been approved by the Council of Ministers, Mr. Mosadeq immediately appointed a four-man committee to work with United States officials in carrying out the plan. Members of the new committee are Mr. Maleki, Minister of Health, chairman; Mr. Hesabi, Minister of Education; Engineer Taleghani, Minister of Agriculture; and Mr. Zangeneh, Managing Director of the Plan Organization.

It is expected that the major part of the United

States contribution will be used for enlarging and extending the rural improvement program which is already under way. Ten regional centers, of which seven are already in operation, help to develop specialized services in agriculture, health, sanitation, and education. Teams of specialists work among the people of the villages, helping them dig wells for clean water, obtain better seeds, improve their farming methods, make better use of irrigation water, adopt more efficient tools, establish new schools, and generally improve their standards of living and farming. Iranian technicians work with the Americans assigned to these centers, gaining knowledge and skills which they in turn hand on to other villages and other people.

The rural improvement program is the basis of Iran's long-range plan for raising the level of food production and the health and living standards of the people. Point Four has been assisting in this program under a memorandum of understanding between the two Governments signed October 19, 1950.¹ The agreement set up a Joint Commission, consisting of five Iranians and four Americans, with an Iranian chairman, which continues to plan and carry out this work.

Also under consideration is the use of approximately 4 million dollars for urgently needed industrial rehabilitation and modernization. The main purpose is to develop small industries for processing local raw products, including food and housing materials, as well as goods and equipment needed for economic development.

It is expected that about 250 thousand dollars will be spent on training (in the United States or at regional training centers) of Iranian nationals selected by their Government.

At present, 62 American technicians and administrative personnel are working in Iran on the Point Four Program under the direction of the Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State. It is expected that by the end of the current fiscal year there will be more than 150 such personnel in Iran. The great majority of these will be technicians in the fields of agriculture, public health and sanitation, and education, working directly with the people in the villages and on the farms.

AGREEMENT WITH LIBYA

[Released to the press January 23]

The U.S. Government concluded a Point Four General Agreement with the new Government of Libya, on January 21, 1952, the Department of State announced on January 23. The agreement was signed at Tripoli with Andrew G. Lynch, Chargé d'Affaires, signing for the United States and Ali Bey Jerbi, acting Prime Minister, signing for Libya.

A Point Four General Agreement had been signed with the Governments of Great Britain and France on June 15, 1951, as the administering authorities of Libya while the former Italian colony was in the process of becoming an independent nation under the auspices of the United Nations.

Under the provisions of the agreement signed with the Libyan Government, the United States, through the Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State, will provide approximately 1 million dollars for the current year to assist the efforts of the Libyan people to better their living conditions. The Point Four program calls for improving agricultural production, health and sanitation conditions, developing water resources, and helping the Government establish the framework of a sound public education system.

John W. Jago, a career employee of the Department of State, was appointed on November 14, 1951, to direct the technical cooperation program in Libya.

Mr. Jago recently returned from Libya for a short period of consultation with officials of the Department of State and is now en route to his post.

The Libyan Government, with the aid of the United Nations and friendly governments, is establishing a Public Development and Stabilization Authority and a Finance Corporation to carry out a development program for the country.

The agricultural program will be developed around a farm extension service, including the operation of demonstration farms in agronomy and stock raising, and vocational agricultural education. Vernon D. Bailey, an Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations extension specialist, who had been assisting the Government of El Salvador in developing its agricultural extension since 1947, was assigned to Libya in November 1951 to be chief of the agricultural improvement program.

As agriculture in Libya is handicapped by the scarcity of water, a program for developing a greater supply of water and its efficient utilization will be carried out. A study will be made by a water and soil survey team of U.S. experts.

The health and sanitation program will be carried out mainly by treating students and developing a program of instruction in the public schools in health and personal hygiene; and by teams which will carry out control programs against malaria, tuberculosis, trachoma, and other diseases prevalent in Libya.

Attention will be given also to helping develop secondary roads in certain agricultural regions, as the amount of arable land in Libya is limited and the country's dependence on agriculture makes it necessary to open up as much of the untapped potential farming area as possible.

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 30, 1950, p. 703.

U.S. Lends Support to Chinese Charges of Soviet Treaty Violation

*Statement by John Sherman Cooper
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

The charges by the Chinese Government against the Soviet Union which we are now considering have been before the General Assembly for more than 2 years. From the time the Chinese delegation first introduced this question, the United States has taken the position that the charges were properly within the jurisdiction of the United Nations, and it has supported the measures designed for their investigation.

The Republic of China, in the resolution before us, accuses the Soviet Government of violating the Chinese-Soviet treaty of friendship and alliance of August 14, 1945. Specifically, it charges that the Soviet Union obstructed the efforts of the National Government of China to reestablish its legitimate authority and control in Manchuria, which had been occupied by the Japanese forces. It charges also that the Soviet Union gave military and economic assistance to the Chinese Communists in the effort that they were making to overthrow the National Government, when it had bound itself to render such assistance to the National Government.

The Republic of China has presented a very clear issue to this committee. It asks the General Assembly to determine, on the basis of factual evidence, that its charges are correct that the Soviet Government has violated the treaty of friendship and alliance of August 14, 1945.

It is the view of the United States that these charges of treaty violation against the Soviet Union are sustained by the factual evidence given this committee by Dr. Tsiang and by evidence available to us from non-Chinese sources. In consequence, the United States supports a determination by the Assembly that the Soviet Union violated the Chinese-Soviet treaty of August 14, 1945.

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) of the General Assembly on Jan. 28 and released to the press on Jan. 31.

U.S. Belief in the Sanctity of International Treaties

Beyond the issue of the treaty violation, about which I shall speak later, there is another important question which I know this committee will consider. That question is whether it is of relevance or value for the United Nations to make a determination of a treaty violation which has been an accomplished fact for several years. I say that it is the position of the U.S. delegation that a determination of this treaty violation is relevant and of importance.

In the first place, we believe that the sanctity of international treaties is of tremendous significance to the world. Since the beginning of this century, many nations, large and small, have worked toward the goal of an international system based upon law and order. The World Court, the International Court of Justice, the League of Nations, and now the United Nations are evidences of that effort. Experience has taught us that the regime of law and peace which we seek cannot be maintained unless nations act in good faith and will keep their word.

It is one of the great tragedies of our time that during these years when this great effort for world order has been made, we have seen many solemn international agreements casually violated by aggressive powers. Treaties of nonaggression and noninterference have been used as deliberate camouflage for aggression by the modern total state. Treaties of friendship and alliance have been cynically ignored by aggressive powers as they have attacked their treaty partners. Many countries have placed faith in the word of powerful states, have found the word was counterfeit, and have been casualties of this sinister business.

When states cannot depend upon the written pledges of other states with which they have entered into treaties, especially treaties of nonaggression, noninterference, friendship and alliance, there is a condition which can degenerate

into international lawlessness and even into open warfare.

This resolution will not roll back the calendar. Determination by the Assembly that the Soviet Union violated the treaty of 1945 will not of itself undo what has taken place in China, nor restore to its people control over their great destiny. But the adoption of this resolution will be a pronouncement by the United Nations of its insistence upon the solemnity of international obligations and its concern that they be observed. It is important that the Assembly express its moral judgment on the violation of this treaty in the hope that it may deter other treaty violations in the future, and the consequences that follow. In a larger sense, therefore, the General Assembly, in passing upon the charges submitted by the Chinese delegation, will concern itself with the future as well as with the past.

Main Elements of the Chinese-Soviet Treaty of 1945

The breach of a treaty of the importance of the Chinese-Soviet treaty, considering the setting in which it was executed, should be no longer ignored.

The Chinese-Soviet treaty of 1945 was a pact of enormous importance between two great powers.

It was signed on the very day Japan surrendered. The bitter war which the Chinese people had waged against Japanese imperialism had finally ended. For a longer time than any other people, the Chinese people, led by the National Government, had stood firm in the face of the enemy, loyal to the cause of Chinese freedom and independence. From their heroic resistance, the Soviet Union itself had drawn benefits. One of the effects of the prolonged struggle of China against Japan was the protection of the Far Eastern area of the Soviet Union from the threat of Japanese aggression at a time when the Soviet armies were hard pressed in the West.

The treaty was a series of arrangements establishing the principles and conditions which would govern Chinese-Soviet relations in the postwar period. Those general principles are concisely stated in articles V and VI of the basic document.

Article V stated:

The high contracting parties, having regard to the interests of the security and economic development of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the coming of peace, and to act according to the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and of noninterference in the external affairs of the contracting parties.

Article VI stated:

The high contracting parties agree to render each other every possible economic assistance in the postwar period, with a view to facilitating and accelerating reconstruction in both countries and to contributing to the cause of world prosperity.

The notes and agreements exchanged on the same day were intended to carry into effect the general principles of the treaty. They promised to each of the contracting parties certain advantages. The agreement which established joint Chinese-Soviet operation of the Manchurian trunk railways enabled the Soviet Union to establish a control which Dr. Tsiang has told us meant "control of the economic life of the region." Other agreements permitted the Soviet Union special rights in the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur.

It is clear that the treaty gave great advantages to the Soviet Union, especially in terms of the extension of its influence into Manchuria.

In making these great concessions, China expected the friendship and cooperation of the Soviet Union in the execution of its postwar task. The National Government had the right to believe that the Soviet Union would keep its pledge to assist it in reestablishing its authority in those areas occupied by the Japanese forces, and in the task of reconstruction and development. V. M. Molotov, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, had given this promise of his government in the first note annexed to the treaty:

In accordance with the spirit of the aforementioned treaty, and in order to put into effect its aims and purposes, the Government of the U. S. S. R. agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies

Text of Chinese Resolution

U.N. doc. A/L. 76
Adopted Feb. 1, 1952

The General Assembly,

CONSIDERING that it is a prime objective of the United Nations "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained",

NOTING that the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concluded on 14 August 1945 a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance which provides, *inter alia*,

(a) That the Contracting Parties "agree . . . to act in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs", and

(b) That "the Soviet Government agrees to render China moral support and assist her with military supplies and other material resources, it being understood that this support and assistance will go exclusively to the National Government as the Central Government of China",

FINDING that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics obstructed the efforts of the National Government of China in re-establishing Chinese national authority in the three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) after the surrender of Japan and gave military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists against the National Government of China,

DETERMINES that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in its relations with China since the surrender of Japan, has failed to carry out the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 14 August 1945.

and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the Central Government of China.

Throughout the treaty and notes there run again and again the Soviet promises of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and of noninterference in its internal affairs.

The Soviet representative last Saturday refused to face the issue of the violation of these pledges by his government. He argued instead that the charge had no validity because, he said, Dr. Tsiang was not the legal representative of the people of China.

But the status of the Chinese delegation is not an issue here. And in any event, Mr. Malik's thesis is devoid of morality or ethics. He tells the committee in effect that the perpetrator of a crime cannot be accused of wrongdoing because it is claimed that the victim is dead.

The Soviet delegation also spoke of the so-called corruption of the National Government, as though that were germane to the issue of the treaty violation. We are not inquiring into the morality of the National Government, although the record discloses that it kept its treaty promises to the Soviet Union. More accurately, it is an inquiry into the morality of the Soviet Union. Nor, I feel sure, will the committee be diverted by Mr. Malik's run-of-the-mill attack on the United States. The issue before us is a treaty violation. We are looking for answers to certain basic questions.

1. Did the Soviet Union work in close and friendly collaboration with the Chinese National Government?

2. Did it provide all possible economic assistance to the National Government?

3. Did it provide the National Government with moral, material, and military support to the exclusion of all other political groups in China?

4. Did the Soviet Union show its respect for the complete sovereignty of the National Government of China over Manchuria?

Our answer is that the Soviet Government did not honor these commitments and, in failing to honor them, violated the Chinese-Soviet treaty of 1945.

U. S. Corroboration of Chinese Charges

In determining our answers to these basic questions, we rely both upon unrefuted evidence presented to the committee by the Chinese delegation and upon our own independent observation at the time.

Many Americans were in China during the period immediately following the signing of the treaty. We were collaborating with the Chinese National Government as the Central Government of China. Later on, our diplomatic representatives tried to mediate a settlement between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists, so that peace would be restored to China. Students of Far Eastern affairs are also familiar with the

reports of General Wedemeyer and the Pauley Commission which went into Manchuria in 1946.

I point out these facts to show that the United States had independent sources of information in China during the early postwar years and through those sources can corroborate the charge of the Chinese delegation that the Soviet Union violated the treaty of 1945.

The most obvious violation of the treaty of 1945 was the looting of Manchuria during the period of Soviet occupation. This was more than a violation of the economic promises of the treaty. It destroyed the very basis of the treaty.

It was the act neither of a friend nor an ally.

Disturbing reports of removals of plant equipment and machinery from Manchuria by the Soviet Union began reaching the United States in the fall of 1945. Early in 1946, the United States protested against removals from the Manchurian industrial complex.

The Soviet regime was contending at the time that it was entitled to take out so-called Japanese "war booty." It proceeded to remove this equipment before any decisions had been taken on the question of Japanese reparations, without consulting China or any other power which had fought Japan, and with utter disregard for its disastrous effects on the Chinese economy.

To get the facts about Japanese assets in the area, President Truman sent a mission of American experts to Manchuria in the summer of 1946. One objective was to "prove or disprove reports that crippling removals had been made from the area." What they found was appalling.

Soviet forces entered Manchuria from Siberia and Outer Mongolia on August 9, 1945. Japan was already preparing to surrender. In Moscow, the Chinese and Soviet Governments were negotiating the treaty of friendship and alliance signed a few days later. Japanese resistance was confined to northern Manchuria, and within a week it ended.

The Pauley report stated that:

Southern Manchuria, which contained over 80 percent of Manchurian industries was taken practically unopposed, and with little if any damage. There was ample opportunity for the orderly occupation of the entire area.

The Soviet forces occupied an area whose economy was in great part intact and whose industries were active and of great significance to China. When they withdrew in the spring of 1946, they left much of Manchurian industry in ruin.

I have here the full report of the American Mission to Manchuria, headed by Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley. It is a lengthy and detailed document covering all the major industries of Manchuria. It includes many photographs of plants and mines stripped of essential machinery.

With the permission of the chairman, I would like to read a few excerpts from the findings of the Pauley Mission.

Upon their arrival in the industrial areas of Manchuria, the Soviets began a systematic confiscation of food and other stockpiles and in early September started the selective removal of industrial machinery. It is apparent that they planned to complete these removals by December 3, 1945, the date originally set for the withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Manchuria.

The Soviets did not take everything. They concentrated on certain categories of supplies, machinery and equipment. In addition to taking stockpiles and certain complete industrial installations, the Soviets took by far the larger part of all functioning power generating and transforming equipment, electric motors, experimental plants, laboratories, and hospitals. In machine tools, they took only the newest and best, leaving antiquated tools behind. In the old Mukden arsenal, for example, about one-third of the tools were taken. While in the new arsenal, virtually everything was taken or demolished.

Not only were buildings and structures damaged by the removal of the equipment, but the taking of some key equipment, such as generators and pumps from mines resulted in the loss of current production, and in irreparable damage to the mines by flooding. The removal of power facilities not only halted all current industrial production, but also made it impossible to maintain and protect the plants themselves. Water works and sewage facilities in the large cities were made inoperable because of lack of power.

By far the greatest part of the damage to the Manchurian industrial complex occurred during the Soviet occupation and was primarily due to Soviet removals of equipment, and to Soviet failure to preserve order. After the Soviet withdrawal, Chinese Communist action resulted in further damage to some of the installations.

The Panley Mission reported that the Soviets removed from Manchuria 1,486 locomotives, 2,267 passenger cars, and 27,320 freight cars. By removing this railway property, the Soviet Union had clearly violated the railway agreement under the treaty. In summary, as the result of Soviet removals of equipment in Manchuria, it was estimated that the capacity of the electric-power industry was reduced by 71 percent. Coal production was reduced by 90 percent; steel production by 57 percent; pig iron by 71 percent; railway-shop capacity by 50 percent; the metal-working industry by 80 percent; aluminum manufacturing was completely incapacitated; telephone and telegraph installations were 50 percent removed or destroyed; laboratory installations were 90 percent removed or destroyed.

The Commission reached the following conclusions:

In Manchuria the confiscation and removal of food stocks, the destruction attendant upon and following the removals of machinery, the almost complete halting of productive effort with no regard for the harmful effects upon the Chinese population, all indicate that there were long-range strategic reasons behind the Soviet actions. The chaos caused by the Soviets has produced a condition of instability both politically and economically which will take a long time to correct. It left a populace hungry, cold, and full of unrest.

In its appraisal of damages, the report stated that "two billion U.S. dollars is considered to be a conservative estimate of the damage resulting from the Soviet occupation."

But the repercussions of this Soviet policy were

much wider. Manchuria was a place from which the rehabilitation, development and unification of China could logically have been started. The destruction of its industrial potential was a body blow to the economic welfare of the Chinese people and their government.

Soviet Obstruction in Manchuria

Now, let us look for a moment at the other aspect of the "close and friendly collaboration" which the Soviet Union gave to the National Government. How did the Soviet Union assist the National Government in its effort to reestablish its authority in Manchuria? How did it observe its obligation to provide "moral support and aid in military supplies and other natural resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the Central Government of China?"

Here, Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer to the report of Lieutenant General Wedemeyer to President Truman on September 19, 1947. This report, you may remember, was critical of the National Government on some grounds. For that reason, the Soviet delegation sometimes uses it for quotation.

I repeat that we are not concerned here with the failings of a government, but with the evidence of a treaty violation placed before the Assembly.

The Wedemeyer report refers specifically to violations by the Soviet Union of both the letter and the spirit of the Chinese-Soviet treaty of 1945. Contrary to the spirit of the treaty, it found for example that the Soviet Government had shown "no evidence of a conciliatory or cooperative attitude." In particular, Soviet actions in Manchuria had strengthened the position of the Chinese Communist forces "with political, economic and military repercussions on the National Government's position both in Manchuria and in China proper." These actions had made peace and stability in China more difficult. Let me quote briefly from the Wedemeyer report:

The Chinese Government's position in Manchuria has been seriously weakened by Soviet actions. In spite of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 and its related documents the Soviet Union has hindered the efforts of the Chinese Government to restore its control over Manchuria, has not given the "moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources" provided for in these documents and has not permitted the Chinese Government freely to take over the civil administration of Dairen and the Port Arthur area. Rather, the Soviet Union has assisted the Chinese Communists in Manchuria by the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and by making available, either directly or indirectly, large quantities of surrendered Japanese equipment. Soviet machinations in Western Sinkiang and among the Mongols have further embarrassed the Chinese Government. In brief, the Soviet Union has given no indication of any effort to assist the Chinese Government and has, instead, taken action which has aided the Chinese Communists in Manchuria.

Now it must be remembered that there were no

Chinese Communist military forces in Manchuria at the time of the Japanese surrender. Moving in during the early period of the Soviet Occupation, they were permitted to become an important military factor. On the other hand, as Dr. Tsiang stated, the early entry of Chinese Government forces was prevented by the Soviet refusal to permit their use of Dairen as a port of entry, and the obstruction of their movement by rail, sea, and airlift. Further, their entry was blocked by the delay in the Soviet withdrawal, long beyond the time promised by Marshal Stalin.

The net effect of this obstruction was to allow the Chinese Communists an opportunity to build up their forces in Manchuria.

Summary of Factors Sustaining the Chinese Position

Thus, Mr. Chairman, it can be determined from facts that the Soviet Government violated its 1945 treaty of friendship and alliance with China. Its actions in Manchuria alone sustain the case made by the Chinese delegation. Pledged to friendship and alliance, the Soviet Union was hostile. Pledged to assist, it refused assistance. Pledged to cooperate, it obstructed. Pledged to provide material resources, it gave none, but seized those of China. Pledged to support the legal Government of China, it gave its aid to the Communist armies.

Before I conclude, I turn again to the question of the relevance of a determination of the violation of the treaty by the Soviet Union. I state again that the United States holds that this determination is of value. We should emphasize that standards of right and wrong must be applied to great and small nations alike.

The fact that the Soviet Union violated provisions of the Chinese-Soviet treaty immediately after it was signed strongly suggests that it never meant to honor the treaty at all. This would not be inconsistent with other Soviet actions taken in the face of solemn treaty and other commitments, such as the absorption of the Baltic States, the invasion of Finland, and various provisions of the Potsdam agreement. Earlier during the present session, the Assembly received a great volume of evidence of Soviet violations of agreements with Yugoslavia, following the latter's expulsion from the Cominform. Other treaty violations by the Soviet Government could be cited. The violation of the Chinese-Soviet treaty of 1945 is simply one more indication that the Soviet Union cynically disregards its treaty commitments when such conduct serves its own ends.

The history of this treaty is of the greatest significance to the General Assembly. Its violation helped to start a chain of events of direct concern to the United Nations.

Manchuria, controlled by Communist China and in which the Soviet Union had attained a position of great influence, was used as a staging area from

which there came Korean forces as spearhead divisions of the North Korean Army when it invaded the Republic of Korea. The tanks, and heavy artillery, included in the deliveries to North Korea in April and May 1950, came over the railway by way of Mukden and Antung, Manchuria.

Following the North Koreans, the Chinese Communists themselves came from their Manchurian staging area to enter the Korean war. Indeed, less than a year after the signing of the second Chinese-Soviet treaty of alliance—the treaty signed by Moscow and the Chinese Communists in February 1950—the Chinese Communists had invaded a neighboring country in defiance of the United Nations and were condemned by the General Assembly as having themselves engaged in aggression.

Nor can we predict where the chain of events will stop. Immediately after the Chinese Communists came to power, they began to talk of “liberating” other Far Eastern countries in the name of the International Communist Movement headed by the Soviet Union.

On January 3 in the First Committee of this Assembly Mr. Vyshinsky made certain allegations concerning my Government and other members of the United Nations. In that statement the Soviet representative said:

It is the Chinese People's Republic which is the victim of aggression and which is subjected to danger day by day and minute by minute on the part of the United States and its allies.

He went on to say that the American command is busy transferring Kuomintang troops from Taiwan to Thailand and to the western part of Burma; that the United States is busy preparing large-scale military operations on the border of the Chinese People's Republic through the military occupation of certain states; that the United States plans to maintain Chinese Nationalist troops on the border of Thailand, Burma, Vietnam, and Yunnan province in preparation for new aggressive acts against the Chinese People's Republic and other states in that area. Referring to Korea, he stated that the United States will declare that these illegal acts are defensive measures against Chinese Communist aggression and that they indicate a plan to have the defensive acts of the Chinese Communists branded as aggressive acts in the future as, he says, they were in Korea.

It is with considerable reluctance that my Government feels compelled to repeat and give further currency to these Soviet allegations. Needless to say they are entirely false and without foundation. If we refer at all to the Soviet representative's recent statements, it is because my Government and the peoples of the world are concerned over the possible significance which this statement might have for the future of international peace. The world well remembers that there were similar charges of aggression in Korea

leveled against the United States and other free governments by the Soviet representatives and other Communist spokesmen in an effort to justify Communist aggression in Korea. Do the false charges made by the Soviet representative on January 3 presage Communist aggression in Indochina or Thailand or Burma? Would the Soviet representative then say that such action is "defensive" against "aggression" by my Government and other governments of the free world, charges which the Soviet representative has already fabricated?

I am sure that all of the peace-loving states represented here must share the concern of my Government over the threat of further Communist aggression in Asia which may be latent in the

Soviet representative's statement of January 3. At this time I must, on instructions of my Government, state clearly that any such Communist aggression in Southeast Asia would, in the view of my Government, be a matter of direct and grave concern which would require the most urgent and earnest consideration by the United Nations.

Mr. Chairman, we are not dealing with an academic exercise. The treaty violation, it is true, is an accomplished fact, but its consequences are still with us. The United Nations should pronounce a judgment on the side of international law and order. This judgment can be rendered by the passage of the resolution presented to us by the Chinese delegation.

U.S. Urges Support for New Plan of Assistance to Palestine Refugees

*Statement by Philip C. Jessup
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly*¹

We have now come to the question of deciding upon the directive which the General Assembly should give to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees concerning its further work. We are vitally concerned with the welfare of these homeless people. We are concerned with the question of how to improve their lot—how to give them hope and encouragement. A brighter future must await them. At the moment, these 875,000 refugees are homeless. It seems indisputable that something can be done to improve their lot and to prepare them for a fuller life in whatever community they may eventually resume permanent residence.

As has been indicated by the chairman of the committee in the announcement which he has just made, the four sponsors of the resolution which was tabled on January 16, having ascertained that some of the language was subject to misinterpretation, have welcomed an opportunity to discuss that resolution with some of their colleagues. Pending the conclusion of this reconsideration, I shall confine myself to discussing the general problem as presented to the committee by the reports.

We are dealing with a humanitarian question here in this committee now. In my country, when we learn that somewhere in the world a devastat-

ing flood or other catastrophe of nature has made refugees of hundreds or thousands of people, we do not stop to debate whether the catastrophe might have been averted. We help those who are in trouble. The facts of history show that when Americans know about misery and want, their hearts go out to the people in distress.

I cite the case of my own countrymen because it is a case I know. But I am equally sure that the great humanitarian instincts which ennoble the human race are the same in every country.

With respect to the problem before us, who among us will say that we shall let human beings suffer and die while we study and assess the causes of their suffering? In fact, the history of the United Nations effort and aid to the Palestine refugees shows that peoples everywhere have responded to the human need as their hearts inclined them and as their capacities permitted. Some have been able to give money or the services of devoted men and women, or clothing, or food, or transportation, or housing, or blankets, or aid in administration. Those who are located in proximity to the refugees can aid in ways which are not open to others of us who are located at a distance and have no governmental authority on the spot where the unfortunate people are to be found. If one has authority to say to this man go and he goeth and to that man come and he cometh, surely that one will say come and go in aid of the refugees who are at our threshold. And

¹ Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Jan. 17 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on the same date.

if one is at a distance from the scene, available resources will be placed at the disposition of those who are ready and willing to assume the burden of wise and careful administration.

Special Report Made by the U.N. Relief and Works Agency

Mr. Chairman, I am glad to have an opportunity to pay tribute to all who have participated in this humanitarian enterprise—to Mr. Blandford, who has borne the labor and heat of the day in the service of his fellow-men; to his colleagues and staff; to the many voluntary humanitarian and religious agencies and to the specialized agencies of the United Nations, and UNICEF, all of whom have contributed immeasurably to the welfare of the refugees.

Now, Mr. Chairman, as was pointed out to us by the director in his statement yesterday, the committee has before it two reports on assistance to Palestine refugees. The first is the report of Mr. Blandford, as director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. That is Doc. Supp. No. 16/A/1905. The second is the Special Report of the Director and the Advisory Commission of the Agency, which is Doc. Supp. No. 16A/1905/Add.1, which under the resolution of December 8, 1949, is composed of representatives of four countries.

The United States delegation is impressed by the graphic manner in which the report of the director presents the refugee problem and by its clarity and insight. I am sure the members of the committee appreciated the significance of his statement yesterday that "the refugees have had a measure of shelter from the storms of controversy as well as from the storms of nature."

I think that the director's report provides us with the material for a thorough and sympathetic appreciation of the problem of the refugees. The following passage is a striking summary of the situation:

Today, after nearly three years, the refugees are still scattered over 100,000 square miles of territory in five different countries; still dependent on relief and without knowledge of the future; the victims of circumstances they are unable to grasp. Legally, humanly, and economically speaking, they are little better off than they were when they first left Palestine, since against the sporadic and low-paid work that some of them have found must be set the exhaustion of the resources that others managed to bring out.

The plan envisaged in the special report which is before us is not so much a new plan as the logical development of previous efforts by the agency in the light of its experience. The underlying consideration in the creation of UNRWA by the General Assembly was the hope that employment of refugees on constructive projections would arrest the demoralizing effects of long-continued relief and the development of a professional refugee mentality. It was further hoped to reduce the

number of persons on relief to those unable to work. Thus the cost of relief would be reduced to a point where host governments could continue it without international assistance. With that in view a phase of public works—such as road building, afforestation and a miscellaneous variety of smaller projects—was undertaken.

Uncertainties as to the availability of funds hampered the development of plans and projects. The desired results of reducing permanently the relief rolls were not achieved during this phase. However, a new note of activity was injected in the refugee picture and a valuable experience was gained. As a result of this experience it became clear that all refugees cannot find homes and jobs in the immediate areas where they are now located. There must be movement from the sites of present refugee camps to areas of greater economic opportunities.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the resolution of the last General Assembly which was adopted without a single dissenting vote outlined the work of UNRWA for the ensuing year and expressed the belief that "the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement is essential for the time when international assistance is no longer available." Emphasis was thus placed on works leading to reintegration rather than temporary employment on public works.

I think it might be well to consider the meaning of this word "reintegration." In paragraph 112 of his report, the director says it "can be broadly interpreted as the building of homes in areas which would permit the refugee to become self-supporting, without prejudicing rights to repatriation or compensation in accordance with other General Assembly resolutions."

New Plan Would Grant More Freedom to Refugees

The plan contained in the special report lays the ground on a broader basis for a sound enduring investment in the reintegration contemplated by the resolution of the last General Assembly. The refugee who cooperates in the plan does not forfeit his freedom of action. At the end of the period he will retain his freedom of choice. He will be free to choose whether to stay where he is located or to settle elsewhere according to the possibilities which may become open to him. In the meantime, he will have had an opportunity to acquire more varied skills and also capital needed for what he may want to do later on.

Needless to say, the plan cannot succeed without the cooperation of the refugees themselves and of the countries in which they are now located.

This will require, for instance, willingness on the part of governments concerned to reach agreement with the Agency on specific projects including the making available of public lands. To

U.S., U.K., French, and Turkish Draft Resolution

U.N. doc. A/L. 59
Adopted Jan 26, 1952

The General Assembly

RECALLING its Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 as amended by Resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950,

HAVING EXAMINED the report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/1905) and the special joint report of the Director and Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (A/1905/Add.1),

HAVING CONSIDERED the three-year programme of relief and reintegration recommended by the Director and Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency,

1. *Commends* the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the development of a constructive programme which will contribute effectively to the welfare of the refugees;

2. *Endorses*, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (II) of 11 December 1948, or to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 relative to reintegration either by repatriation or resettlement, the programme recommended by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the relief and reintegration of Palestine refugees, which envisages the expenditure of \$50 million for relief and \$200 million for reintegration, over and above such contributions as may be made by local governments to be carried out over a period of approximately three years starting as of 1 July 1951;

3. *Recognizing* the concern of the United Nations in the problem of the Palestine refugees, Urges the governments of the countries in the area to assist, with due regard to their constitutional processes, in the carrying out of this programme and to extend to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, a subsidiary organ established by the General Assembly, their co-operation in the elaboration of specific projects, and in the general performance of its functions;

4. *Invites* the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to explore with the governments concerned arrangements looking toward their assuming administration of reintegration projects at the earliest possible date;

5. *Requests* the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to explore with the governments concerned the desirability and practicability of transferring the administration of relief to those governments at the earliest possible date, and considers that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency should continue to carry the cost of the supply programme, subject to paragraphs 2 and 6, and to provide assistance for the health, welfare, and education programme along with the duty of making such inspec-

tion, and such verification of accounts as may be necessary;

6. *Considers* that relief expenditures should be reduced in suitable proportion to reintegration expenditures;

7. *Decides* that the amount of \$20 million provided in Resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 should be increased to \$27 million for direct relief for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1952;

8. *Decides* that consequent upon paragraph 2 above, the amount of \$30 million provided in Resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 for reintegration should be increased to not less than \$50 million, and credited to the reintegration fund provided for in that Resolution for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1952;

9. *Approves* the budget recommended by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the fiscal year 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953, of the equivalent of \$118 million of which \$100 million shall be available for reintegration and \$18 million for relief;

10. *Authorizes* the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to transfer funds allocated for relief to reintegration;

11. *Urges* the Member Governments to make voluntary contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to termination the programme set forth in paragraph 2 above;

12. *Requests* that negotiations regarding contributions for the proposed three-year programme be carried out by the Negotiating Committee for Extra-budgetary Funds established by the Resolution adopted at the 352nd meeting of the General Assembly on 7 December 1951;

13. *Expresses* its appreciation of the assistance afforded to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency by the specialized agencies and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and urges them to render all services possible to strengthen the programme of refugee relief and reintegration; and to co-operate with the Secretary-General and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in ensuring that the total assistance of the United Nations to Palestine refugees is rendered with the maximum of co-ordination and efficiency;

14. *Expresses* its appreciation to the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations whose programmes have afforded valuable supplementary assistance to Palestine refugees, and again requests them to continue and expand to the extent possible the work which they have undertaken on behalf of the refugees.

On January 26, the General Assembly approved the Palestine Assistance Resolution by a vote of 49 to 0 with 5 abstentions (Soviet bloc).

make it succeed, it will also be necessary for the governments concerned to cooperate in the development of efficient working arrangements such as granting various kinds of facilities to enable the refugees to move freely and to work wherever there is an opportunity for employment as well as the facilitating of arrangements for the prompt and free movement of materials and equipment.

As the special report tells us, "the central conclusion and purpose" of its findings and recommendations is "to agree upon a formula which will promise the refugee an end to camp life and ration lines; promise the governments a termination of social and economic dislocation; and promise contributors a definite time when large relief expenditures will stop."

We learn further from the special report, Mr. Chairman, of the director and Advisory Commission that the Agency's explorations for reintegration opportunities demonstrate the possibilities that exist for cooperation by the governments concerned. In Egypt there has been full cooperation on an exploratory project in the Sinai. In Jordan also the Agency has, with the help of the Jordanian Government, explored a variety of projects. Recent consultations with the interested governments, moreover, have made it possible to outline new possibilities of cooperation and constructive action.

Appeal Made for Full Cooperation of Other Nations

The sum of 250 million dollars proposed for the carrying out of this plan is a large one and it must be raised by voluntary contributions. After the 3-year plan was brought to the attention of the Congress of the United States, the Congress authorized a liberal contribution for the present fiscal year. We have no authority to make commitments regarding future action by the Congress, but I would like to call attention to the fact that the Joint Senate Committee which recommended authorization of the U.S. contribution for this year recognized in strong terms the importance of the program. The contribution of the United States has been generous, but the program cannot succeed unless other governments also make substantial contributions. We appeal to all the countries to come forward with assistance to the greatest extent possible. The Negotiating Committee established at this session of the General Assembly will approach the representatives of the various governments for contributions. Our representative on the Negotiating Committee will be able to give his associates on that committee details as to the nature of the U.S. contribution. The terms and conditions under which payments would be made from the maximum appropriation of 50 million dollars for this year and the relation of the U.S. contribution to other contributions will be fully stated in the Negotiating Committee.

I appeal to all delegations present today to pave the way for the work of the Negotiating Committee by explaining to their Governments the urgency of the need for contributions and the constructive use to which they will be put. Remember that approximately 900,000 human beings are involved. Means must be found to help them out of their present hopeless state and the demoralizing existence of relief camps. We must launch this plan and launch it with confidence and must demonstrate that the United Nations intends to see it through.

It is important, Mr. Chairman, that all appropriate facilities of the United Nations be made

available to the Agency in the execution of the plan outlined in the report which is before us. One such facility, as the director suggested yesterday, will be authority to draw upon the United Nations Working Capital Fund for advances if and when such advances may be necessitated by temporary delays in the flow of funds from contributing governments. It would therefore seem in order to suggest that the chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee address a letter to the chairman of the Fifth Committee asking that committee to take the necessary steps for granting the appropriate authority to the Secretary General to draw on the Working Capital Fund for the purpose of advancing funds as available and as required to finance temporarily the operation of the agency. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the committee so decide upon the completion of its discussions.

I have emphasized, Mr. Chairman, the deep interest of the U.S. delegation in this plan. We will give it the strongest possible support. The proposal that there should go forward simultaneously with relief a 3-year plan of economic enterprise which will afford an opportunity for homes and jobs for the refugees will prove in our opinion to be of benefit to all concerned. It will restore to the refugees, we believe, the dignity of earning their own livelihood and will enable them to contribute to the social and economic betterment of the areas which have given them asylum. Finally, it points the way to the termination of both relief and reintegration at the end of the three-year period envisaged. We feel that it can become one of the most constructive of United Nations undertakings, and that it may prove to be one of the most important enterprises sponsored by any international organization.

The U.S. delegation deeply regrets every delay which impedes the determination by the General Assembly that work shall go forward under the wise and constructive plan which Mr. Blandford and his associates have laid before us. The problem of how best to afford assistance to the Palestine refugees is not for us a question of politics or of prestige. We are moved by that deep instinct of humanitarianism which, I venture to say, the peoples of the Near East as much as, if not more than any other peoples, are conscious of in visible symbols as well as in the present friendship and in the lasting memory of many devoted men and women. Debates do not halt the ravages of storms and tempests, of cold and disease. Here a little, there a little, line upon line, we might argue points of vantage but while we did so, men and women and children would suffer.

The plan in the report which is laid before us, which the U.S. delegation supports, opens to the refugees doors of hope and of opportunity. Let us all join in holding those doors open.

U.N. Commission on Prisoners of War Meets at Geneva

SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD THE COMMISSION

On January 8, 1952, the United States Embassy in Moscow delivered a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union informing the Soviet Government of the U.S. intention to send a representative to a meeting of the U.N. Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War, which convened at Geneva on January 21, 1952.¹

In spite of the tenor of the Soviet note sent in reply, the United States continues to hope sincerely that the Soviet Union can see its way clear to participate in the deliberations of the United Nations Ad Hoc Commission. The tragedy involved in the total absence over 6 years after the end of World War II of any information concerning the fate of hundreds of thousands of German, Italian, Japanese, and other prisoners of war warrants the full efforts of all nations concerned to repatriate the men still held and to give the families of those who have died an accounting. The United States will continue to offer every assistance in an effort to secure a final solution of this issue.

Following is an unofficial translation of the Soviet note received on January 21 and released to the press on January 22:

In connection with the note of the Embassy of the United States of America of January 8, 1952, regarding repatriation of Japanese and German prisoners of war from the Soviet Union, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. considers it necessary to refer to the note of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. to the State Department of July 16, 1950, and to the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the United States of America of September 30, 1950, in which is given a comprehensive answer on these questions.

As regards the reference of the Government of the United States of America to the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations Commission on Prisoners of War, as is known, this Commission

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 21, 1952, p. 90.

NOTE: The Soviet note of July 16, 1950, referred to in the Soviet note above, merely pointed to TASS statements of April 22 and June 9, 1950. These TASS announcements claimed that all but 2,467 Japanese prisoners of war had been returned. The note of September 30, 1950, claimed that all German prisoners of war had been returned except 13,532 still being retained for war crimes and 14 in consequence of illness.

was created under pressure from the United States and England in violation of the United Nations Charter and is illegal.

The mentioned American note cannot be considered other than as a slanderous attack against the Soviet Union to which the Government of the United States of America resorts obviously in order to deprecate the guilt of those German and Japanese war criminals who drew Germany and Japan into the war adventure resulting in the Second World War and who are being used by ruling circles in the United States of America for preparation for a new world war.

U.S. CONCERN FOR SOLUTION OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR PROBLEM

by Mike J. Mansfield²

The Government of the United States desires also to express its appreciation of the efforts which the Commission has already made and is now making to bring closer to solution the problem of repatriating or otherwise accounting for those persons detained as the result of World War II whose fate is still unknown.

We are faced here with the total absence of official information concerning these hundreds of thousands of human beings—a flagrant violation of accepted international legal and moral standards. Vast numbers of people have simply vanished—a tragedy which goes beyond their own fate, whether it be death or continued imprisonment. It is a tragedy which strikes at their families and relatives, who do not know whether they are alive or dead. But human nature being what it is, the families of prisoners of war will continue to hope that the missing father or son still lives; they will continue to use every means at their command to find out what happened to him and to get him home.

I would do the same. I am sure that the members of the Commission would do the same.

For many years these families looked to the

² Excerpts from statement made before the U.N. Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War at Geneva, Switzerland, on Jan. 22 and released to the press on the same date. Mr. Mansfield is U.S. representative to the meeting of this Commission.

occupation powers alone for help. We did our best to provide that help, as I think members of the Commission will agree from their examination of the series of diplomatic exchanges with the Soviet Union on this question. But we met a blank wall, a refusal to face even the most obvious facts in the situation. Then, as you know, we decided to enlist the assistance of the United Nations. The result was the General Assembly's decision to establish the Commission on which you now sit.

Now, in a sense, the hopes of these people have been transferred to you. It is a great responsibility. But you will not be alone. I think you will find a great deal of cooperation as you get more and more into the investigative phase of your work. Much information already has been collected. It can be made available to you.

The Commission has given itself directives with which the United States is in complete agreement. The first is a matter of principle. You, as the commissioners, decided unanimously during your meeting last summer that you would seek a solution to the problem of prisoners of war in a purely humanitarian spirit. The United States associates itself with that decision of the Commission, because from the very beginning we have considered this as a humanitarian problem of the most fundamental sort.

The second directive was more a matter of definition. The Commission, in the words of Mr. Guerrero's invitation to us, interpreted the expression "prisoners of war" as including persons who, though no longer prisoners, are still being detained for one reason or another. This too, it seems to us, was a wise decision. For the Commission would certainly wish to know whether former prisoners of war are being detained under some other arbitrary or technical status.

Now the Commission moves on to the next phase of its work. You have invited us here to consult with you so that your humanitarian task will be effectively discharged.

The United States believes that the members of the Commission would want now to determine the facts about prisoners of war, to get answers to the basic questions of who they are, where they are, who are dead and who are still alive. And having determined the answers to the basic questions, it will want to take steps to have these people repatriated to their homes, countries, and their families. Now we are quite aware that the Commission will have to face certain hard realities. The Soviet Union, despite what we consider overwhelming evidence to the contrary, maintains that it does not have any more prisoners of war, that they have all been repatriated. All, that is, with the exception of a few thousand who are being detained in connection with war crimes. But we do not know even who these men are or where

they are being kept, or of what crimes they have been accused. No names whatever have ever been furnished.

To get at the facts, the Commission might well ask the Soviet Government for its cooperation by allowing the Commission to carry on studies on the territory of the Soviet Union. This is not an unreasonable request in light of the Soviet claim that it has fulfilled all of its obligations of the repatriation of prisoners of war. If that is actually the case, the Soviet Government should be the first to invite the Commission to make a study within the Soviet Union.

The United States has repatriated all prisoners of war taken by the American forces. If the Commission should decide to study prisoner-of-war data in the United States, my Government extends it a most cordial welcome. We will cooperate with you in every way. Indeed, we already have informed the Commission in reply to its note of September 10 that we would make available pertinent files on war prisoners at the Prisoner of War Information Bureau at Fort Holabird in Baltimore.

One special problem related to the Commission's work has to do with a small number of Japanese still in the United States. They are the last of a much larger group originally brought from Peru to the United States during World War II and since repatriated either to Japan or to their former homes in Peru. The Commission was informed about this group in our letter of August 15 and we note that this problem has been placed on the agenda of this session. We will be pleased to furnish information regarding these persons to the Commission at its convenience.

Much information and evidence on the question of prisoners of war has been collected by the governments most immediately affected. There are eye-witness reports, letters, army records, and other sorts of documentary material which the Commission may wish to examine and evaluate. Thus it might be very worthwhile for the Commission to go to Germany, Japan, and to Italy to study this evidence at first hand.

These are all possibilities and methods of procedure which the Commission may wish to explore.

It is appropriate that the Commission is developing the current stage of its work in Geneva, whose very name is synonymous with humanitarian effort, particularly in connection with the care and repatriation of prisoners of war.

The members of the Commission have been selected both for their concern with problems affecting human welfare and for their strict impartiality. These will be important qualities to draw upon in the months ahead. We wish the Commission every success in the completion of its important task.

The United States in the United Nations

[January 31–February 6, 1952]

General Assembly

The General Assembly concluded its 13-week sixth session February 5 after approving 51-5 (Soviet bloc)-2 (Chile, Yemen), a U.S.-U.K.-French resolution deferring consideration of the two Korean items on the agenda to a special session (see next page).

On January 31 the Assembly took up Secretary-General Lie's progress report on the development of his 20-year program for achieving peace through the United Nations—an item not taken up in Committee. Following an all-day discussion, a resolution was adopted 45-5 (Soviet bloc)-0 requesting the appropriate United Nations organs to continue to give consideration to those portions of the 10-point plan with which they were particularly concerned and to report any progress to the next Assembly session.

During the final week of the session, the Assembly, at daily plenary meetings, gave final approval to a series of resolutions reported out by its Political, *Ad Hoc* Political, Social, Budgetary, and Legal Committees. The resolution determining the U.S.S.R. had failed to carry out its 1945 treaty of friendship and alliance with China was confirmed 25-9 (Soviet bloc, Burma, India, Indonesia, Israel)-24.

Approval 43 (U.S.)-8 (Soviet bloc, Sweden, Denmark, Norway)-7 was accorded the Peruvian resolution recommending that the Security Council reconsider all 18 pending membership applications on the basis of Charter requirements. The Soviet proposal for reconsideration of 14 specified applicants (including five Soviet satellites) failed to receive the two-thirds majority necessary for adoption. The vote on the Soviet formula, which had been approved in Committee, was 22, for; 21 (U.S.), against; with 16 (U.K., France) abstentions.

In opposing the U.S.S.R. proposition, United States Representative Ernest Gross pointed out that the Soviet practice of vetoing qualified applicants unless its own candidates were admitted simultaneously made it all the more necessary that other members "observe scrupulous adherence to the law of the Charter." "When a permanent

member [of the Security Council] seeks to use its veto power to coerce its fellow members into violating the Charter they should resist it just as vigorously as they would resist any other form of coercion," he said.

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee resolution advocating United Nations membership and continued technical assistance for the new state of Libya passed 53-0-0, with the Soviet bloc not taking part in the vote. The U.S.S.R. proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops and liquidation of foreign bases was again defeated, this time by 34-6 (Soviet bloc, Egypt)-10. The vote on the resolution urging all countries harboring Greek children to take steps to facilitate their early return was 51-0-5 (Soviet bloc).

The resolution authorizing the High Commissioner for Refugees to appeal for funds to aid the most needy of the refugees within his mandate was approved 38-5 (Soviet bloc)-8 (U.S.). The Social Committee's verdict in favor of two human rights covenants—one containing civil and political rights and the other containing economic and social rights—was upheld 27 (U.S.)-20-3, following defeat by a four-vote margin of a Chilean counterproposal for a single covenant containing both sets of rights. Approval 42-7 (U.S.)-5 of the composite resolution giving the Human Rights Commission precise directives for the drafting of an article on self-determination followed deletion of a paragraph specifying the contents of the "recommendations" on this matter which the Commission was also asked to prepare.

On the recommendation of its Social Committee (see below), the Assembly decided 44 (U.S.)-0-9 to defer detailed discussion of freedom of information problems until its next session. Consideration of the item on stateless persons was likewise put off till next year.

The Assembly requested the Economic and Social Council to reconsider two aspects of its plan to reorganize its Commission structure. It did this by approving resolutions adopted earlier at a joint meeting of the Economic and Social Committees (1) calling for continued annual meetings of the Commission on the Status of Women; and (2) authorizing the Subcommittee on the Pre-

vention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities "to continue its tasks." Another Committee-approved proposal, to ask the Council to reverse its decision to discontinue the Economic, Employment and Development Commission, was rejected in plenary. The United States voted against all three resolutions.

A set of 13 basic principles designed to guide the Secretary-General and the General Assembly in planning, organizing, and conducting the public information services of the United Nations was approved, and the Secretary-General was asked to use them as a guide in framing his 1953 budget estimates. The Legal Committee resolution calling for consideration by the next Assembly session of the question of defining aggression carried 30-12 (?U.S., U.K.)-8.

Joint Committee I, II, and III—A joint meeting of the Political, Economic, and Social Committees acted February 2 to prevent premature Assembly consideration of Korean political issues from complicating the Korean armistice negotiations at Panmunjom. It adopted 51-5 (Soviet bloc)-2 (Yemen, Chile) a U.S.-U.K.-French resolution directing the Secretary-General to convene a special Assembly session at the United Nations Headquarters in New York to consider the two Korean items on the agenda of the current session "upon notification . . . of the conclusion of an armistice in Korea" or "when other developments in Korea" make this "desirable."

The items referred to are (1) the problem of the independence of Korea; and (2) Relief and rehabilitation of Korea. The approved text also requested the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds to undertake negotiations regarding voluntary contributions to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency's program for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea. In introducing the three-power proposal, United States Delegate Ernest Gross said in part:

The United States is disturbed by the slow course of the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom. We share with all other peace-loving nations a profound sense of disappointment that a satisfactory end to the hostilities has not yet been reached despite the sincere and patient efforts of the United Nations side. . . . The United States is most anxious that the General Assembly should proceed to its consideration of the political and economic aspects of the Korean problem. . . . Precisely because we are anxious to go forward, we desire to avoid premature political discussions which could postpone or complicate the conclusion of an armistice. It is the armistice which will open the way to constructive consideration of political issues.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)—The Committee February 2 approved 38 (U.S.)-5 (Soviet bloc)-5 (U.K.) an eight-nation resolution deferring detailed consideration of all freedom of information problems (including the question of the draft convention on freedom of information) until the next Assembly session "for early discussion." This action followed a 4-day

debate centering on the Oatis case during which the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, Brazil, the Netherlands, and Ecuador endorsed the United States charges that the imprisonment by Czechoslovakia of the Associated Press Bureau head was not only "one of the most flagrant violations of freedom of information in recent times" but also part of a "calculated attack" on this freedom.

"The perpetrators of this attack against freedom of information . . . must realize that their deed will not be forgotten—that with the passage of each month in prison Oatis will rally more and more voices of protest." United States Representative Channing Tobias asserted January 30 in placing the record of the case before the Committee. He added:

The reason why this record is an indictment of the present government and not of the accused is precisely because it shows that any legitimate gathering of news and reporting has been made a crime in Czechoslovakia. . . . He [Oatis] confessed to doing his job as a good reporter. His interrogators insisted that good reporting was espionage—which, of course, it is in Czechoslovakia. So Oatis confessed that he was guilty of *their* kind of espionage.

Disarmament Commission—The Disarmament Commission, at its first organizational meeting February 4, adopted its rules of procedure, agreed that its meetings would, in principle, be open, and decided to reconvene in New York sometime after February 16. The chairmanship of the Commission, which consists of the 11 members of the Security Council plus Canada, is to be rotated on a monthly basis.

Security Council

India-Pakistan Question. The Security Council agreed January 31 to ask Dr. Frank P. Graham, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, to continue his negotiations aimed at bringing about a settlement of the long-standing dispute between these two countries over the State of Kashmir. The decision to keep Dr. Graham on the job was taken without formal vote (U.S.S.R. recording an abstention) after seven members, including the United States, had supported a United Kingdom proposal, submitted January 30, to authorize the United Nations Representative to return to the Indian subcontinent for "one final attempt" to get the agreement of the two parties on a plan for the demilitarization of the disputed area preparatory to a plebiscite to determine its future.

The consensus was that Dr. Graham had made significant progress in the course of previous attempts to bring the parties together on the basis of his own 12-point "proposals," and that, in the words of United States Representative John Ross, "this progress has not been and should not be halted."

Proposals Relating to Construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway

*Message of the President to the Congress*¹

[Released to the press by the White House January 28]

CONGRESS URGED TO AUTHORIZE JOINT U.S.-CANADIAN COMPLETION OF SEAWAY

I wish to call to the attention of the Congress the immediate urgency of action on legislation to authorize the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project.

As the result of events that have taken place since the first session of the Eighty-second Congress, we confront an entirely new situation in dealing with this public improvement—a project recommended by every United States President and Canadian Prime Minister since World War I.

For eleven years, since 1941, there has been before the Congress for approval an Agreement between the Canadian and United States Governments providing for joint construction of the St. Lawrence project. The Congress has not yet approved this Agreement. Now the Canadian Government has officially proposed, if the Congress does not approve the 1941 Agreement at an early date, to construct the seaway as a solely Canadian undertaking, simultaneously with the construction of the power phase of the project by the Province of Ontario in association with an appropriate agency in the United States.

Prime Minister St. Laurent of Canada visited Washington last September in order to lay this proposal before the United States Government.² At that meeting, we found ourselves in complete agreement on the vital importance to the security and the economies of both Canada and the United States of proceeding as rapidly as possible with both the seaway and the power phases of the projects. We agreed completely that the best way to proceed was through joint construction under the 1941 Agreement. We also agreed that the Canadian alternative proposal for constructing the seaway by the Canadian Government is feasible, and that if an early commencement of joint development under the 1941 Agreement is not authorized, the seaway and power works should proceed as the Canadians suggest.

¹ H. Doc. No. 337.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1951, p. 581.

Subsequently, on December 21, 1951, the Canadian Parliament authorized the establishment of a St. Lawrence Seaway Authority empowered to cooperate with the United States in constructing the seaway under the 1941 Agreement. Thus, the Canadians are prepared to proceed immediately with the seaway if the Congress approves that Agreement.

Furthermore, in the event the United States does not elect to proceed with joint completion of the seaway under the 1941 Agreement, Canada's Seaway Authority is empowered to construct all the navigation works required to complete the seaway from Lake Erie to Montreal, at present the head of deep-draft ocean navigation on the St. Lawrence River.

Under the 1941 Agreement, certain locks and canals would be built on the United States side of the St. Lawrence River. If Canada builds the seaway by itself, all locks and canals would, of course, be built on the Canadian side.

Another Act passed by the Canadian Parliament in December provides for the development of power in the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence River, to be undertaken by the Province of Ontario in association with an appropriate agency in the United States. Thus the Canadians are prepared to proceed immediately with the power works also, either under the 1941 Agreement—a clearly preferable method—or as part of the Canadian alternative proposal.

The International Joint Commission

Under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, an International Joint Commission, composed of three members each from the United States and Canada, was established to review and approve water resource development projects which materially affect the level or flow of boundary waters, when such projects are not otherwise provided for by special agreement. In a note from the Canadian Ambassador to the Secretary of State on January 11, 1952, the Canadian Government offi-

cially informed our Government of the recent Canadian legislation, and requested our cooperation in preparing appropriate applications to the International Joint Commission.

In response to this note, the Secretary of State informed the Canadian Ambassador that the United States Government hopes that the Congress will soon approve the 1941 Agreement. At the same time, in order that there may be a minimum of delay in the construction of the project in the event the Congress does not approve the 1941 Agreement at an early date, we agreed to cooperate with the Canadians in advance preparations for presenting the matter to the International Joint Commission.

Copies of these notes are attached to this message for the information of the Congress.

This is the situation as it now stands. It is a very different situation from that which the Congress has previously considered. Through all the years that the St. Lawrence project has been a public issue in this country and in Canada—those years now numbering about 50—the principal arguments have revolved around the question of whether the seaway part of the project should be constructed. This question is no longer at issue. The Canadian note of January 11 states, "The Canadian Government is prepared to proceed with the construction of the seaway as soon as appropriate arrangements can be made for the construction of the power phases of the St. Lawrence project as well."

The question before the Congress, therefore, no longer is whether the St. Lawrence seaway should be built. The question before the Congress now is whether the United States shall participate in its construction, and thus maintain joint operation and control over this development which is so important to our security and our economic progress.

I strongly believe that the United States should join as a full partner with Canada in building the seaway. We should not be content to be merely a customer of Canada's for the use of the seaway after it is built.

We should join in constructing the seaway, first, because it is important to our national security.

Exhaustive Congressional hearings have been held on the 1941 Agreement. Reports recommending the St. Lawrence project as one of exceptional and direct value to our Security—and to Canada's—are on record before the Congress from the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Resources Board, the United States-Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense, and other responsible agencies. The security value of the project has been recognized in the Barkley Resolution offered in the Seventy-ninth Congress, in the Vandenberg Resolution of the Eightieth Congress, and in the Resolutions to implement the 1941 Agreement introduced under bipartisan sponsorship by 26 Senators, and sev-

eral Members of the House, during the first session of the Eighty-second Congress. Each of these measures has proposed Federal construction of the United States share of the works as the best means of safeguarding their potential benefits to the people of the United States.

Potential Benefits of the Seaway

Competent and unbiased experts have always come to the conclusion that the construction of a deep water channel connecting the Great Lakes with the Gulf of St. Lawrence will be of great importance to the strong and expanding transportation network and industrial capacity which are fundamental to our national security. It has been shown over and over again that the cost of the relatively small amount of materials and manpower needed for this project will be fully repaid in tolls and power receipts; and, in addition, the project will yield savings and returns in transportation and power benefits far surpassing its cost.

In recent years, a new and very important consideration has been added. The United States steel industry is now building toward an annual production of 120 million tons. At the same time, our supplies of high grade iron ore, available from open pit mining which can be readily expanded in an emergency, are being rapidly depleted. Such ore will shortly be available in large quantities from new discoveries in the Labrador-Quebec area of Canada. The importance of a relatively safe inland waterway to bring this ore economically to the steel centers around the Great Lakes increases every year.

Second, we should join in constructing the St. Lawrence seaway because it will be of very large significance to the commerce and the industry of our country. The seaway will be self-liquidating through the collection of tolls. The great bulk of the traffic will be bound to or from the United States, but if Canada builds the seaway, Canada will set the tolls. The Canadian legislation provides that tolls shall be set high enough to repay the cost of the seaway; and, of course, Canada could keep on charging tolls even after the seaway is paid for.

Under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, the tolls must be set so that Canadian and United States shippers pay the same amounts for the same kinds of cargo. Nevertheless, since different kinds of cargo will be of different importance to the two countries, it is obviously of great significance for us to have an equal voice with Canada in establishing the schedules of tolls on the seaway.

This is no mere matter of academic interest. For example, millions of tons of iron ore will move through the seaway every year to the great steel manufacturing and fabricating plants on or near the Great Lakes. The level of tolls for that ore will be of vital importance to the economic stability and growth of our basic steel industry in the

Midwest, and to the hundreds of companies and hundreds of thousands of workers directly engaged in or connected with that industry. Aside from iron ore, large amounts of agricultural products, raw materials, and industrial products will move through the seaway in one direction or another. We can have an adequate voice in setting the tolls on all these cargoes only if we join in constructing the seaway.

We should join with Canada in building the seaway, third, because it is a project along our common boundary in which both countries have a substantial interest. The long standing record of friendship and cooperation between the United States and Canada has been a remarkable example of the way in which free countries should conduct their joint affairs. The record of friendship and cooperation is built on mutual respect and mutual responsibility. Just as the different parts of our own country should and do work together for the common welfare, so our two countries should work together in matters that will benefit us both.

In the case of the St. Lawrence project, by far the most important undertaking proposed along our common border, differences of opinion in the United States have long blocked a development that means a great deal to the growth and progress of Canada, as well as ourselves. We have already trespassed on the good will of our Canadian neighbors. And meanwhile, potential navigation has been choked off and immense amounts of potential hydroelectric power have been lost. The St. Lawrence project will greatly benefit both Canada and the United States. We should build it together.

It should be noted that the Federal Power Commission as recently as December 1950, on consideration of an application by a State agency for a license to construct the power facilities in the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence River jointly with a Provincial agency of Canada, found, after exhaustive investigation and extensive public hearings, that the entire seaway and power project should be constructed by the United States jointly with Canada and so recommended to the Congress.

Joint U. S.-Canadian Participation Urged

For the reasons I have stated, I believe most strongly that it is in our national interest to participate on an equal basis with Canada in the construction, management, and control of the St. Lawrence project.

The project is of great importance to our national security and our economic growth. The materials and manpower to build it are available. The funds invested in it will be repaid with interest. And in return for making a self-liquidating investment, we will gain the inestimable advantage of having an equal voice in the management and control of this key link in our national trans-

portation system. I do not see how anyone can fail to recognize the common sense of participating in this project.

I am fully aware that there has been strong opposition to the seaway on the part of certain railroads and port interests in our country who feel they would be adversely affected. I have always believed that this opposition overlooked the fact that economic growth and expansion in our country—which are as important to the railroads and the ports as they are to anyone else—depend on continuous development of our resources to increase our productive capacity and job opportunities. Regardless of what may have been their conclusion in the past, however, those who have previously opposed the project must now look at the matter in a new light. The project is to be built, whether or not we take part in the construction of the seaway. Those who have opposed the seaway in the past surely must realize that in these changed circumstances it is a plain matter of national self interest to join in its construction.

No great nation has ever deliberately abandoned its interest in any of the vital waterways of the world. Indeed, the record has been the opposite—nations have vied furiously, and have often fought, over control of key water gateways such as the Dardanelles, the Suez Canal, and the Straits of Gibraltar.

Even on our peaceful continent, no Congress in the history of this Nation has failed to recognize and to assert the joint interest of the United States in the boundary waters of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River, whenever the question has been presented.

It seems inconceivable to me, now that this project is on the eve of accomplishment, that the Congress should allow any local or special interest to divest our country of its rightful place in the joint development of the St. Lawrence River in the interest of all the people of the United States.

I strongly recommend, therefore, that the Congress promptly enact legislation to carry out the 1941 Agreement for joint completion of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 28, 1952.

U. S., CANADA DISCUSS REFERENCE OF APPLICATIONS TO COMMISSION

The following is the text of a note sent by the Canadian Ambassador to the Secretary of State:

JANUARY 11, 1952.

No. 35

SIR: I have the honour to refer to the discussion of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project between the Prime Minister of Canada and the Presi-

dent of the United States which took place in Washington on September 28, 1951.

At that time, the President and the Prime Minister agreed on the vital importance to the security and the economies of both countries of proceeding as rapidly as possible with both the seaway and the power phases of the project. The Prime Minister indicated that the Canadian Government would be willing to construct the seaway as a solely Canadian project if it is not possible to have the joint development undertaken on the basis of the 1941 Agreement. The President agreed to support this Canadian action if an early commencement of the joint development did not prove possible.

The Canadian Parliament has recently passed legislation providing on the one hand, for a power development on the St. Lawrence River, to be undertaken by the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario and an appropriate agency in the United States, and on the other hand, for the establishment of the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority to construct the seaway either in cooperation with the United States, as provided for in the 1941 Agreement, or as a solely Canadian undertaking. This legislation may now be brought into force at any time by proclamation.

The Canadian Government is prepared to proceed with the construction of the seaway as soon as appropriate arrangements can be made for the construction of the power phases of the St. Lawrence Project as well. Failing approval of the 1941 Agreement by the Congress, it will be necessary to refer the project to the International Joint Commission for approval. In order to proceed as rapidly as possible with the project, which the President and the Prime Minister have agreed is of vital importance, the cooperation of the United States Government in preparing concurrent applications for approval of the project to the International Joint Commission is requested.

Such a preparatory step would in no way prejudice the possibility of proceeding with the project on the basis of the 1941 Agreement in the event that the Congress should approve that Agreement. On the other hand, it is desirable to seek the approval of the International Joint Commission as soon as practicable in order to avoid any further delay in the event that the Congress does not approve the 1941 Agreement early in the present session.

It is proposed that appropriate officials of our two countries discuss the steps to be taken in proceeding with a reference of applications to the International Joint Commission for the construction of the project. A series of meetings beginning the middle of this month, either in Washington or in Ottawa, would be most appropriate for this purpose.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

H. H. WRONG

Following is the text of the note sent in reply by the Secretary of State to the Canadian Ambassador:

JANUARY 11, 1952

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of January 11, 1952 concerning the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project.

My Government notes with gratification that the Canadian Parliament has passed legislation providing, on the one hand, for the construction of the power phase of the project to be undertaken by the Hydro-Electric Commission of Ontario and an appropriate agency in the United States; and on the other hand, for the establishment of the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority to construct the seaway, either in cooperation with the United States as envisaged in the 1941 Agreement, or as a solely Canadian undertaking.

As you know, the President hopes that the Congress of the United States will approve, at an early date, the 1941 Agreement providing for joint construction of the St. Lawrence Project. Should the Congress, however, not approve the 1941 Agreement at an early date, the Government of the United States is prepared, in order to avoid further delay in the construction of the St. Lawrence Project, to cooperate with the Government of Canada in referring the project to the International Joint Commission for approval on the understanding, as expressed in your note, that your Government is prepared to proceed with the construction of the Seaway as soon as appropriate arrangements can be made for the construction of the power phases of the St. Lawrence Project as well.

In order that there may be a minimum of delay in the construction of the project, which the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada have agreed is of vital importance to the security and the economies of both countries, my Government is ready to cooperate with your Government in undertaking such preparatory steps as may be advisable in presenting concurrent applications to the International Joint Commission. On behalf of my Government, I accept your proposal that appropriate officials of our two countries discuss the steps to be taken in proceeding with the reference of such applications. I agree that a series of meetings to be held either in Washington or in Ottawa, or at such other place as may be convenient, would be the most appropriate method for implementing this proposal. Although it is not possible for me now to propose an exact date, I expect that my Government will be prepared to begin these discussions sometime this month. I shall inform you as soon as my Government is ready to join in the discussions which you have proposed.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

DEAN ACHESON

Mutual Security Funds Allotted to U.K. for Support Of Defense Program

[Released to the press by the White House January 28]

On January 28, W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security, announced the decision to make available to the United Kingdom 300 million dollars of mutual-security funds to support the U.K. defense program. Mr. Harriman made known this decision in identical letters, dated January 27, to the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Senate Appropriations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the House Appropriations Committee. Following is the text of that letter, also the text of Mr. Harriman's letter of January 8 apprising the committees of the background for the action which was taken:

LETTER OF JANUARY 27

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This letter is to inform you of further developments since my letter of January 8, 1952, on the subject of the situation presented, from a mutual security point of view, by the recent rapid deterioration in the economic and financial position of the United Kingdom.

As I pointed out in my previous letter, during the last six months of 1951, Britain suffered a very serious drain on its dollar revenues, sharply reversing the favorable trend which had prevailed during the previous twelve months. The total drain amounted to \$1,532 million, with the result that Britain's dollar reserves as of December 31, 1951, stood at only about \$2,355 million.

The United Kingdom has initiated measures to curtail non-defense imports and domestic civilian demand in order to conserve dollar earnings and dollar reserves, and is preparing to take additional measures. The Commonwealth countries, as a result of the recent conference of Commonwealth Finance Ministers in London, are now considering "certain definite proposals calculated in the aggregate to insure that the sterling area as a whole will be in balance with the rest of the world in respect of the second half of 1952." It is our considered conclusion, however, that these measures cannot alone suffice to meet the present crisis. The United Kingdom is dependent on its dollar earnings for many essential imports. The flow of these imports must be adequately maintained to make possible a level of production capable of

supporting the defense program on which the United Kingdom has embarked and which has recently been recommended by the Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, of which I am chairman.

As a result of a careful assessment of the situation, arrangements are being made whereby an amount of up to \$300 million of existing Mutual Security funds will be made available for expenditure by the Government of the United Kingdom to support its defense program and contribute to maintaining the strength and stability which are essential to that program. This decision has been taken after consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Defense and with their concurrence.

As I stated in my previous letter, this will involve a transfer of military end-item funds under the provisions of section 101 (b) of the Mutual Security Act. The President has indicated his willingness to make the determination required by that section, upon the recommendation of the foregoing officials and myself.

The raw materials and components to be financed by this \$300 million will be directly related to the defense program. In addition, the Government of the United Kingdom has agreed to apply the sterling counterpart to the maintenance of its defense production program.

We estimate that if this amount were not made available to the United Kingdom, it would be necessary for the United Kingdom to reduce its defense program by more than twice as much. In light of the fact that the British are now producing more military equipment than all the other European NATO countries combined, it is considered particularly important that such a reduction in its defense program should not have to be made. It seems clear that this \$300 million will contribute to the fulfillment of the military matériel requirements of mutual defense more effectively in the form contemplated than if the same funds were to be used to procure military end-items in the United States.

Prime Minister Churchill in his recent address to the Congress¹ set forth the firm resolution of the United Kingdom to do its part in the common

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 28, 1952, p. 116.

cause. During the discussions concerning the arrangements covered in this letter, the United Kingdom has given further assurance of its determination to carry out a defense program to the utmost of its capabilities and resources. The \$300 million is designed to help the United Kingdom achieve this objective. For its part, the United Kingdom has already taken measures and is about to take further measures to reduce its dollar expenditures and to increase its dollar receipts.

I am prepared at any time to discuss this matter in person with you and your Committee, if you should so desire.

Sincerely yours,

W. A. HARRIMAN
Director for Mutual Security

LETTER OF JANUARY 8

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Officials of the Executive Branch concerned with the Mutual Security Program have been giving urgent attention to the situation presented by the recent rapid deterioration in the economic and financial position of the United Kingdom. I believe the importance of this development is such that you should be informed of the salient facts and the considerations which underlie our thinking.

From a financial point of view, the United Kingdom is presently carrying by far the heaviest share of the world-wide defense effort of the European NATO countries, and aside from the United States, has the largest program for production of military matériel. It was the first European country to undertake a very large increase in its defense effort after Korea, and did not condition this program on receipt of United States assistance.

The root of the current problem lies in the very serious losses suffered from Britain's foreign exchange reserves during the last six months, sharply reversing the favorable trend that prevailed during the year ending June 30, 1951. This dollar drain has been due in considerable part to factors associated with the free world rearmament effort, although it has been aggravated by an abnormal lag in dollar receipts and acceleration in dollar payments. If present trends continue, the consequences to the mutual defense program of Western Europe could be extremely serious.

This problem has been under review for some time, centering in discussions between American representatives in London and officials of the British Treasury and other departments concerned. Certain remedial measures have already been taken by the British Government and further such measures are now being worked out. In addition, the cooperation of British Commonwealth countries will be sought at a meeting to be

attended by their Finance Ministers this month. It appears clear, however, that economic assistance from the United States will also be required. Such assistance, together with the further measures which the United Kingdom is attempting to work out, would be designed to deal with the situation in such a way as to make possible the maintenance of Britain's full contribution to NATO and other free world defense requirements. The discussions in London are taking into account the United States-United Kingdom agreement of July 7, 1950, supplemental to the European Payments Union Agreement, whereby the United States undertook during the period ending June 30, 1952, to reimburse the United Kingdom for dollars lost as a result of use by other participants in the European Payments Union of the large sterling balances that they held when the European Payments Union was established. A payment of about \$10 million, which is expected to comprise the bulk of this obligation, was made on December 28, 1951, pursuant to this agreement.

At the time of the preparation of the estimates for the Mutual Security Program presented to the Congress early in 1951, the situation then prevailing in the United Kingdom indicated that no economic assistance for that country would be required and consequently no specific provision was made for such assistance in the estimates. Toward the end of the Committee hearings on the proposed legislation, the deterioration of the United Kingdom's situation had definitely appeared, and the possibility that some economic assistance might be required to help meet the situation was pointed out in the testimony of representatives of the Economic Cooperation Administration. However, despite the fact that no specific estimate was made for economic assistance to the United Kingdom, it is not anticipated that the furnishing of such assistance will make necessary a request for a supplemental appropriation in the current fiscal year. A current re-evaluation of the military and economic positions and requirements of all European recipients of mutual security assistance, including the United Kingdom, is now being made. This re-evaluation indicates that funds already available under the Mutual Security Act taking into account the provisions authorizing a limited transferability of funds from the military end-item program to the economic program, can cover those minimum requirements which have to be met before the coming into effect of such additional mutual security assistance as may be enacted by Congress for the fiscal year 1953.

You will, of course, be kept apprised of further developments and I shall be happy to discuss the situation in person with your Committee, if you so desire.

Sincerely yours,

W. A. HARRIMAN
Director for Mutual Security

Status of Negotiations Under Terms of Mutual Security Act

[Released to the press by the White House January 22]

On January 22, W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security, sent the following letter containing a brief report on MSA negotiations to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the House Armed Services Committee.

As you know, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 provides, in Section 511, that military, economic or technical assistance may not be furnished to any nation unless certain assurances have been received from them. Under Section 531 of the Act, Section 511 became effective ninety days after the date of enactment of the Mutual Security Act, January 8, 1952. This letter is a brief report of the results of the negotiations which have been carried on in connection with Section 511 by the United States diplomatic missions in each of the countries receiving assistance.

All of the countries to whom assistance is authorized in order to further military effort have fulfilled the requirements of Section 511 (a) with the single exception of Iran. Our Ambassador to Iran is continuing his discussions with the Government of that country with a view to coming to a satisfactory understanding which would qualify Iran to continue to receive military assistance from the United States. In the mean-

time, shipments of military matériel to Iran are being held in abeyance in accordance with the law. Satisfactory assurances under the terms of Section 511 (b) qualifying Iran to continue to receive economic and technical assistance have been received from that Government and economic and technical assistance will go forward.

Satisfactory assurances required by Section 511 (b) with respect to economic or technical assistance have been provided by all of the other countries now receiving such assistance with the following exceptions: Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Iraq and Ireland. In the case of the first four of these nations, our representatives are continuing their discussions. When satisfactory assurances are received, assistance will be promptly resumed.

In the case of Ireland, a special situation developed. The Mutual Security Act amended the purposes of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, under which Ireland has been receiving assistance. The Government of Ireland has found itself unable to subscribe to the amended purposes of the Economic Cooperation Act and therefore, as required by the terms of that Act, it has been necessary to suspend assistance to Ireland. The Government of Ireland has been advised that the United States is prepared to consider proposals which are consistent with the requirements of United States law.

If the Committee so desires, I shall be glad to discuss the particular factors involved in each case mentioned in this letter.

Relevant Portions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951

SEC. 2. The Congress declares it to be the purpose of this Act to maintain the security and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interest of the United States and to facilitate the effective participation of those countries in the United Nations system for collective security. The purposes of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended (22 U. S. C. 1571-1604), the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (22 U. S. C. 1501-1522), and the Act for International Development (22 U. S. C. 1557) shall hereafter be deemed to include this purpose.

Eligibility for Assistance

SEC. 511. (a) No military, economic, or technical assistance authorized pursuant to this Act (other than assistance provided under section 408 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended) shall be supplied to any nation in order to further military effort unless the President finds that the supplying of such assistance will strengthen the security of the United States and unless the recipient country has agreed to—

- (1) join in promoting international understanding and good will, and maintaining world peace;
- (2) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension;
- (3) fulfill the military obligations which it has assumed under multilateral or bilateral agreements or treaties to which the United States is a party;
- (4) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities, and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world;
- (5) take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense capacities; and
- (6) take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilization of the economic and military assistance provided by the United States.

(b) No economic or technical assistance shall be supplied to any other nation unless the President finds that the supplying of such assistance will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace, and unless the recipient country has agreed to join in promoting international understanding and good will, and in maintaining world peace, and to take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension.

Senator Knowland Replies To Under Secretary Webb on U. S. Prisoners in China

*Following is the text of a telegram sent to Under Secretary Webb by Senator Knowland of California on December 21, 1951, and released to the press by Senator Knowland on December 26:*¹

Your letter of December 14 was awaiting me upon my return to Oakland. As a Member of the United States Senate I believe that the Congress of the United States which is co-equal branch of the Government also has a responsibility in regard to American citizens who are unjustly imprisoned by Communist governments any place in the world. I shall be prepared to discuss this further with you in person when I return to Washington and also intend to discuss the issues involved on the floor of the United States Senate. It so happens that I have received a considerable number of communications from relatives of imprisoned American citizens expressing their great appreciation for the action I took in making the names known to the American people.

There was a time in our history when the Government of the United States was prepared to use more than words in protecting Americans abroad. That was prior to the time the Government of the United States embarked upon a policy of vacillation and weakness in a matter of this grave nature. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 enunciated the doctrine of "Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead."

What I want to know specifically is whether or not the Department of State has taken steps in the current cease-fire negotiations to assure that the 33 Americans now jailed in China, the 30 or more under house arrest, and the 300 who have been refused exit visas to get out of Red China are able to leave Red China and return to the United States.

I do not intend to remain silent when if this opportunity passes these Americans may remain prisoners or compulsory residents of China for months or years to come unless a strong stand is taken by this Government now. I am as conversant as are you with the President's constitutional authority in regard to foreign relations, but

¹For text of Mr. Webb's letter to Senator Knowland, see BULLETIN of Jan. 7, p. 11.

I am also aware that as elected representatives of the American people the Members of Congress have a responsibility also.

I do not understand that the executive branch of the Government has either the right or the authority to suppress information relating to imprisoned and detained Americans so that neither the Nation nor Congress are fully informed. You may rest assured that both as a Member of the Senate and of the Appropriations Committee this issue will be pressed until these Americans are freed.

THE CONGRESS

Legislation

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The Principal Ingredients of U.S. Foreign Policy

by *Adrian S. Fisher*
*Legal Adviser*¹

When a person whose daily concern is world affairs and American foreign policy gets up before an audience, he is often strongly tempted to be cosmic. This evening I will do my best to resist this temptation and I will try to avoid others which seem to beset people in my line of work.

I have a reason for doing so. In the situation that we now face and which will probably be with us for some years to come, the cosmic approach is not suitable. There is no denying that world affairs are now in a crisis stage. It is therefore possible to argue that the year 1952 is a year of decision.

What happens in Europe to give it a unity it has never known and one which is probably essential to the survival of the continent; what happens in Asia to keep it from being swallowed up by Communist imperialism; what happens behind the Iron Curtain to hamper and disturb the Kremlin; what happens in the Middle East and Africa to keep that area from being the booster charge which detonates a global explosion—all these and other sources of confusion and alarm will have to be faced up to this year to save civilization, or else we condemn it to continued attrition from the enemies of mankind.

Nevertheless, these and the other ingredients of the crisis which now engages us appear to have a potential staying power which could carry them into 1953. Therefore it is by no means impossible that a year hence we could also term 1953 a year of decision. It is also conceivable that the same might be said of 1954.

My purpose in making this point is not to paint you a picture of unrelieved gloom. I think at the moment that an attitude of cautious optimism can be justified. I am making the point because I believe it important that we recognize the distinct possibility that this crisis, or major elements of it, may be with us for some time. If this is recognized, the belief that all that is needed is a single burst of effort is clearly in error. We must gear our plans and prepare ourselves for a steady and

sustained effort, one that is pursued with all the determination and single-mindedness that we can muster.

Factors in the Prevention of Global War

I am not of the opinion that a global war is just around the corner or that such a conflict is inevitable. Moreover, it is my private conviction that the problem of peace and war, in the traditional sense, does not confront us. I have reached this opinion from what we have seen of Soviet tactics and from the deductions we can make as to Soviet strategy. The Communists seem to be set on a course which is just short of total war. I believe that we can look for them to pursue this course until the Soviet leadership is driven to the conclusion that it can get them nowhere.

The Kremlin will be driven to this conclusion only if America and her friends meet the grueling test of patience and firmness to which they will be indefinitely subjected. This constitutes a challenge which is without precedent in our own experience and perhaps in the history of any modern nation.

Patience is not an American characteristic. We are not by our own free choice inclined to gradualism. Our disposition is to do things in a hurry, to get in and get it over with. Under current conditions, if we forget ourselves and indulge our native preference we risk disaster. For the sake of all that we hold dear we must learn to take the long view—particularly if a refusal to do so is to fly in the face of every dictate of common sense.

The factors underlying this requirement can be simply stated.

We want peace—honorable peace—but peace as the best hope of man.

We recognize that in a real sense there may be no such thing as victory in a war which counts nuclear fission among its weapons. At the same time, we are aware that we must build our defenses if we hope to discourage an aggressor or defend against an attack.

We know that wisdom demands that we lead from courage rather than fear, and from calculated strength rather than anger. We cannot af-

¹ Address made before the Roosevelt Day Dinner of the Americans for Democratic Action at Chicago, Ill., on Jan. 31 and released to the press on the same date.

ford the luxury of flying off the handle. We cannot afford the luxury of fondling our prejudices.

We must further set ourselves to squeeze the last drop of benefit from our experiences in the last 30 years.

Stilling the Voices of Isolationism

For example, when I hear certain voices that are now loud in the land and which cry the doctrine of a new model isolationism—a sort of hydromantic version of the tragic error that seized us during the twenties, and even during the thirties, I wonder whether some of us ever learn. I cannot help thinking that if we had not reneged on joining the League of Nations, Hitler might never have gained power and the Second World War might not have occurred.

Even after the yoke of fascism was fastened on Germany and Italy, America could still have made its influence felt. So well indoctrinated were some Americans in the specious philosophy of isolationism and self-sufficiency that when President Roosevelt made his quarantine speech in 1937, he found that public opinion withheld support for active measures against totalitarianism.

As the clouds of war gathered and darkened, we did take measures such as the destroyer-for-bases deal to help the side to which we belonged. But we did not recognize that we were irrevocably committed until the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor and we found ourselves automatically at war.

Until recently it seemed that among other things, the bombs that blasted Pearl Harbor also destroyed the spell of isolationism which had previously held us in its thrall. But if I read correctly the drift in certain quarters this impression would appear incorrect. The rebuilt model of the “we can go it alone” concept has been streamlined a bit, and to some degree updated. But these modifications cannot hide the fact that it is essentially the same old isolation which holds the same perils for the future of the United States.

During World War II and after it, the United States adopted a policy which held that peace was best secured through collective security. Fundamentally, this policy accepted the thesis that world peace could not be broken down into compartments, that a threat to peace in one region was a threat to the peace of all regions. In practical terms the immediate application of that policy called for the United States to shoulder the burden of world leadership which had been thrust upon it and to join with other nations who valued liberty in immunizing the free world against Soviet encroachment. This was indicated in the simple interest of saving our own necks. And now at a crucial stage in putting this policy across when perhaps for the first time we can see the outlines of success on the horizon, some groups in this country are actually suggesting retreat.

This tactic denies all the lessons of the past and breeds doubt and terror throughout the free world.

We have heard further outcries recently against our efforts to fight aggression in Korea. We might have washed our hands of Korea, but what would have been the result? Instead of being halted in its tracks, Communist aggression might by now have made a clean sweep of southeast Asia. Indochina, Malaya, Burma could not have withstood the tide. These countries are not yet free of threat, but if we had not taken our stand in Korea, they might have been engulfed long months ago.

If we had failed to match the challenge in Korea, much that has been done to strengthen the non-Soviet world against Communist imperialism would have remained undone. Our own Nation would not have mobilized, Western Europe would not have gone so far to protect itself, we would not at this hour be occupying a staunch position against all eventualities, critics of our foreign policy would have urgent reason to talk about our “survival,” instead of exploiting the possibility of our going under as the small change of campaign chatter.

Our action in Korea was unavoidable, if the Truman Doctrine with reference to Greece and Turkey meant anything. When we undertook in southeast Europe to halt Communist penetration, the great majority of Americans understood and approved the step. When we undertook to halt Communist penetration in Korea, most Americans understood and approved. In the one instance, we saved Greece and Turkey from the jaws of the Russian bear. In the other instance, we upset his program, notified him that he could trespass only at his peril, instilled threatened peoples with a fresh courage, and gave ourselves an opportunity to gird our loins.

That may seem to be the wrong course to some people, but in terms of our own interest and the well-being of mankind, it is the only thing we could have done without taking a risk greater than anything the Korean intervention has cost us. It is tragic that so many lives and so much treasure had to be expended, but this sacrifice is beyond being cheapened by partisan attacks. There is a logic of justice and right, which sometimes has to be expressed in terms of force. That is the logic of Korea, and whoever denies it denies the best in our American heritage and consigns the rest of the free world to chaos and the long night.

The Faith of Our Fathers

The men who wrote our Constitution and set the feet of this Republic on the road to greatness had a lively sense of the example the United States was setting. From his retirement, James Madison wrote to a friend:

The free system of government we have established is so congenial with reason, with common sense, and with

a universal feeling, that it must produce approbation. . . . Our country, if it does justice to itself, will be the workshop of liberty to the civilized world, and do more than any other for the uncivilized.

That phrase, "workshop of liberty," is projected in twentieth-century terms by our present foreign policy. We have through trial and error, through adversity mixed with hard work and good fortune managed to reach a plateau of freedom from which we can view the posture of world affairs through the wisdom gained by our own experience. Our fortunate situation and what we have learned along the hard road that brought us to it imposes upon us an obligation to the rest of mankind. That obligation requires us to do what we can to help them to a similar position. This is not as unselfish as it appears on the surface. We have learned that we cannot live unto ourselves alone. We realize that insofar as we are concerned our freedom cannot be preserved if the freedom of other nations is snuffed out.

This is the essence of the American idea and is the wellspring of the enormous vitality which has enabled the United States to surmount every emergency which it has encountered and continue to grow and prosper. Yet, it is an idea which those who demand that we abandon Korea and get out of Europe categorically reject.

President Monroe's definition of our role in world affairs aptly sums up that combination of idealism and practicality which has served us so well in the past and which will guarantee our future welfare. Our domestic critics are fond of reproaching America for moralizing in the field of foreign policy. I contend that our national interest is best looked after when we are guided by the fusion of moral values and practical consideration. Those who discuss power politics as though it were something removed and separate from the things we live by spiritually seem to me to be at odds with all that has made America what it is today.

Application of the Policy of Containment

In terms of our present objectives, the moral values as well as the material are essential to success. We are engaging at this moment in a determined struggle to contain communism and to prevent its poison spreading into new areas. This effort at containment involves military, economic, and political reconstruction in areas endangered by the Soviet drive. In toto it is the negative phase of U.S. policy. It includes the situations of strength which we are building in Western Europe, at key points in the Mediterranean, in the Middle East, and in the Far East. It is based on three major premises. These premises are of equal importance and are completely interdependent. The Soviet Union bases its foreign policy to a very large degree on the harsh fact of military power. Therefore, if a nation or a group of nations is to stand up to Moscow or deal with

Stalin with any semblance of parity, that nation or group of nations must be able to call upon sufficient military strength to command the respect of the Kremlin.

As long as the appeal of communism is strongest in areas where there is hardship and want, that appeal must be combated by an improved standard of living so that a man's work produces the necessities of life and perhaps a few luxuries as well.

Finally, as long as communism depends on robbing a person of his faith in the future of the free world and on creating social chaos and confusion, that tactic must be countered by building the individual's confidence in his ability to manage his own affairs and by instilling in him the will to resist Soviet encroachment.

The foregoing summary will serve our purpose here, although it involves some oversimplification and—insofar as it labels the last two premises as merely negative—is inaccurate. Obviously, economic and social rehabilitation have important positive facets.

In applying this policy of containment, the Government of the United States embarked on a series of moves which are unequalled for boldness and imagination in this country's history. Although it is practically forgotten in the present emergency, the interim-aid program, a forerunner of the Marshall Plan, was instrumental in checking a Communist threat in both Italy and France. Shortly thereafter, Greece and Turkey were gravely menaced by Soviet pressure. Greece had to contend with a Communist-instigated revolt within its own borders and at the same time refused to be cowed by the sabre rattling of Soviet puppets across its borders. Because of threatened Soviet moves against its northern provinces, Turkey was maintaining a military force on a scale far beyond the power of the nation's economy to sustain.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID

The United States responded with the Truman Doctrine of combined military and economic aid. The success of this action is now a matter of history. The Greek revolt was crushed and the present Government is far stronger than the earlier regime. Turkey is a stable and determined friend in a highly strategic area.

I do not think I need to do more than remind you of the Marshall Plan and its great effectiveness in aiding the reconstruction of Western Europe. There were other steps taken to give needed economic assistance to friendly free nations in southeast Asia and in the Pacific area which were effective in checking internal Communist threats and in strengthening and stabilizing the governments concerned.

When then Secretary of State Marshall launched the program, now known by his name, at Harvard University in June 1947, he identified its purpose

as "the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which the free institutions can exist." To a considerable degree this purpose has been achieved.

Despite a reluctance on the part of the free nations to again engage in raising a military force, realism required that all hands take into account the potential menace of the Red army and the Kremlin's habit of using its military force as a blackjack in dealing with other nations. Plain common sense dictated that defenses be erected. If the underlying principle of collective security—a joint defense based on self-help and mutual aid—was to be applied, a political framework had first to be put together. This framework was developed through the regional defense agreements exemplified by the Organization of American States, the North Atlantic Pact, the proposed Federated Command for the Middle East, and the Pacific security arrangements.

To give the initial impetus to these defense agreements, the United States launched the U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program and followed up with the combined economic and military aid which is now going forward under the Mutual Security Program.

With these provisions for the setting up of a defensive shield which would deter Communist aggression and make impossible the bargain-basement conquest so dear to their hearts what might be called the holding aspect of American policy is rounded off. But in terms of what Monroe described as a "workshop of liberty" it is only a part of the necessary program.

There must be essential positive factors which meet the challenge of communism and demonstrate the immeasurably greater values of freedom and democracy. A part of this program is economic in nature, but the type of assistance that we were able to offer through the Marshall Plan does not suffice. The Marshall Plan and kindred programs were intended mainly for economically advanced countries and peoples victimized by war; countries with economies which had once been staunch, people who had known prosperity, enjoyed political and social stability, pursued the arts of successful living.

POINT FOUR: ASSISTANCE TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

But what about that vast multitude who belong to an entirely different category, the underprivileged billions who for one reason or another have never been emancipated from poverty, disease, and ignorance, the men and women of the world who fit Edwin Markham's line from the "Man With the Hoe": "Humanity betrayed, plundered, profaned, and disinherited." I direct your attention to the concluding stanza of that poem:

O masters, lords and rulers in all lands,
How will the future reckon with this man?
How answer his brute question in that hour
When whirlwinds of rebellion shake all shores?

These whirlwinds of revolt are shaking the shores and hinterland of Asia and Africa. Nationalism is giving a special edge to the long frustration of the past. How are we to deal with this ferment? We cannot afford to be indifferent to it. We can be sure the Communists are not indifferent. The people of underdeveloped areas are meat and wine for the Commies—not because the poor devils yearn for Stalin but because the promises of Stalinism offer at least the appearance of an escape from the wrongs and sorrows of their existence.

Only a few days ago, Secretary Acheson spoke on this very point. He said:

It is the juncture of . . . revolutionary forces in the underdeveloped areas of the world that gives meaning to the Point Four Program. For the new technology gives us not only the instruments of a better life, but also the means of mass communication and education by which to transmit this knowledge. And if, in so doing, we can help people not only to develop the soil, the water, and the resources of their lands, but to develop the culture that suits them and fits their needs, and to fulfill their aspirations for responsible and more representative government—then these revolutionary forces can be constructively channeled and contribute to the peace of the world. If not, the world will continue to be swept by the rip tides of conflict.²

In proposing the Point Four Program, President Truman called for democracy to attack those ancient tyrants, "hunger, misery, and despair." That call has not yet been fully heeded. But even a year and a half of limited effort has already revealed a feasible way of extricating helpless human beings from the fell clutch of circumstance. Already our specialists and experts working at the grass-roots level have shown that they can clear the way to a new earth for forgotten men and women. And this is possible without any great outlay of money, without imposing our will on anyone, merely through combining technical knowledge with a certain missionary zeal to help people help themselves.

All this may sound like typical American sentimentality to people who pride themselves on being realists. But it is actually hard common sense—at once short-range and in a large frame of reference. There was a day when, for one reason or another, the state of underdeveloped areas of the world was one of "innocuous desuetude." But there is nothing innocuous in the forlorn status of teeming millions in unadvanced areas. In many areas their condition has been transformed into a churning flood eating away at the ordered life of the world. The choice before us is between trying to meet this challenge and leaving it to work its will upon the foundations of civilization.

Point Four is a peculiarly constructive phase of that great mission to which the United States has been called—to "bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free." In the light of that service, what becomes of the argu-

² BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 157.

ments of those who urge that we set up a Fortress America and reconsider a foreign policy replete with global obligations? It is profoundly depressing that, at this late hour, we now hear demands that we retire from the field in utter disregard to the fact that, as one of the trustees of civilization, America would thereby be betraying itself and the rest of mankind.

THE CAMPAIGN OF TRUTH

In practical terms the debate over these issues goes deeper than the question of this country's course in world affairs. Like it or not, we are locked in a struggle for the minds of men. The outcome of this struggle will determine whether or not men shall remain masters of their individual destinies or shall become the pawns of totalitarianism.

At this moment the heavy artillery that the United States can bring to bear is that which fires ideas. In a manner of speaking, the American guns are transmitters, moving pictures, and the printed matter which carry the news and the ideas that are components of the Campaign of Truth. In popular terms we are speaking of the propaganda that is beamed through the Iron Curtain, but we are not dealing in propaganda as such. We are dealing in the facts of American life and telling the story of the ways of men in societies where men are free. We are thus striking at the soft spot in the monolith of communism. The Iron Curtain was dropped to prevent the penetration of these ideas because they constitute the one area where rigid Soviet controls cannot be applied.

The Soviet Union has built jamming mechanisms by the hundreds in a vain attempt to silence the Voice of America, but despite this all-out effort, we know that we are getting through to the satellites and to the Russian people. We know also that pictures and printed material, detailing the differences between a life in the West and life in the Kremlin, have reached areas in the Soviet sphere. Testimony to the impact that this material is having on the subject peoples is provided by the strenuous Soviet methods to keep it out. Every month, this drive to reach into the heart of Soviet territory with the facts and the ideas that unmask communism, and its betrayal of human dignity, is increased. A few weeks ago "Operation Vagabond" was launched. I say launched because the *Vagabond* is a ship, or more accurately, a floating transmitter which will cruise the seas off Soviet shores and provide a mobile barrage for the news-starved subjects of the Politburo.

We believe the injunction, "Know the truth and the truth shall set ye free." And we are doing all in our power to help the people of the Soviet Union know it.

THE UNITED NATIONS

A third element in the free world counteroffensive is the United Nations organization. Here we have a force for peace which has gained steadily in strength and effectiveness since its inception. In its beginnings it provided the conference table over which international disputes could be settled without resort to force. It was also a highly effective form for the airing of differences between nations so that world opinion could gain an unprejudiced evaluation of the rights and wrongs of a particular issue. In June of 1950 the United Nations matured. Confronted with a flagrant breach of peace, the representatives of 54 nations joined forces to condemn the aggression and then urged the membership to meet force with force. The membership responded, and as a result, for the first time in the history of the modern world, troops of nearly a score of nations are fighting to beat back an aggression and preserve peace.

It is conceded that all participants in this action have not contributed the maximum according to their capacity. That is something which the United States is doing everything in its power to remedy. But it is not as important as the implications of the action itself. In its true meaning the Korean move signifies that the principle of collective security has been translated into an actuality. That in itself is an accomplishment of huge proportions.

The point we have now reached recalls a situation which prevailed more than 30 years ago when another debate involving the similar issue of American leadership and support for an international organization was raging.

On this occasion Woodrow Wilson said:

The world outside of America is asking itself the question "Is America going to stand by us now, or is it at this moment of final crisis going to draw apart and desert us?" I can answer this question here and now. It is not going to draw apart and it is not going to desert the nations of the world. America responds to nothing so quickly or unanimously as a great moral challenge. It is much more ready to carry through what now lies before it than it was even to carry through what was before it when we took up arms in behalf of the freedom of the world.

But Wilson's affirmation of faith came too soon. The bitter-enders in the Senate played upon popular lethargy, and our country rejected the role of leadership. It took a depression and another World War to drive home to the American people a full realization of the part they had to play. But, by then, what would have been relatively simple had grown formidably complicated. A new factor had been injected into the international equation. Soviet imperialism had emerged to bedevil the situation. Now nothing could be tried or done without having to contend with the ruthless, unpredictable hostility of Moscow.

I believe that Wilson's declaration of faith is now being redeemed. I feel that in the marrow

of their bones the American people know that what we are testing is the validity and strength, and the endurance of the principles of American democracy against the dogma of communism.

I feel, also, that in the marrow of their bones the American people are determined that the way of life which they represent will be the one which will endure.

Death of King George VI

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House February 6]

A world personage who maintained the highest traditions of the English constitutional monarchy passes in the death of His Majesty King George VI.

From his accession to the throne through all the ills which beset the world throughout the years of his reign—including the most disastrous war in history—he played his part nobly and with full understanding of the responsibility which was his. His heroic endurance of pain and suffering during these past few years is a true reflection of the bravery of the British people in adversity.

The King was ever conscious of his obligations as sovereign of a nation which through centuries has been the champion of personal liberty and those free institutions which ruthless dictators despise. He shared to the end of his reign all the hardships and austerities which evil days imposed on the brave British people. In return he received from the people of the whole Commonwealth a love and devotion which went beyond the usual relationship of a King and his subjects. This relationship flowed from the kindness of the King's heart and his complete dedication to those he both ruled and served.

The visit of the late King and his gracious Queen to this country heightened the good relations between our two peoples. Then there followed the visit last year of Her Royal Highness, now Queen Elizabeth II. It is a commentary on present day democracy that the daughters of the King of England and the President of the United States could exchange visits on a basis of friendship and mutual understanding and good will.

My deepest sympathy goes out to the British people. God bless Queen Elizabeth and may her father's exemplary memory provide the courage and inspiration she will need in the great responsibilities that lie before her.

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press February 6]

We learned this morning with profound sorrow of the death of His Majesty King George VI.

The loss to his subjects is great. The American people, so long bound by close ties of friendship to Great Britain and the Commonwealth, sympathize in their loss. During his reign Great Britain endured the most perilous and trying times in her history, and throughout her ordeal he worked unceasingly and unsparingly for his country and his people. The courage with which he bore his own suffering in the last years was a symbol of his indomitable spirit. It is a characteristic English spirit and the King possessed it in abundance.

The President has expressed for all of us our deepest sympathy to the Royal Family and to the British people.

May God bless the young Queen and grant her the strength and wisdom to fulfill her high responsibilities as her father did before her. May her reign be long and her peoples prosper throughout it.

Admiral McCormick Designated Commander of NATO Naval Forces

[Released to the press by the White House January 30]

The President on January 30 sent the following letter to Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, U.S.N.:

MY DEAR ADMIRAL MCCORMICK: The North Atlantic Treaty Nations have agreed that a Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, should now be appointed and have requested that I designate a United States officer. I have designated you for this new international command which embraces a large area under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I am informed that the Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will issue a directive to you concerning your responsibilities and authority as the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

You are hereby assigned operational command, of the United States Armed Forces assigned to the U.S. Atlantic Command, to the extent necessary for the accomplishment of your mission.

You are hereby authorized to use officers and enlisted personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces and civilian employees of the U.S. Government, on your staff as you consider appropriate in numbers and grades as necessary.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Secretary of State and to the Secretary of Defense for their guidance.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

VOA's Counterattack on the Siren Voice of Moscow

by Edwin M. J. Kretzmann

Policy Adviser, Officer of International Broadcasting¹

In a few weeks the Voice of America will celebrate the tenth anniversary of its first broadcast, born of wartime necessity. Many of the people who took part in that event are still members of the staff and the experience they have accumulated and passed on to the newer members of the staff is unique and invaluable. To this has been added the professional and technical experience of American radio and many outstanding experts in the field of foreign affairs.

To all these factors must be added one more very important element—the correct evaluation of the misunderstandings and deliberate distortions which are current abroad about the United States and its foreign-policy objectives. The study of this background necessitates continuing analysis of all material emanating from the Kremlin and its world-wide network of agents—the Communist parties of all countries. It also requires sympathetic understanding of the things that are bothering our friends and allies in the free world. We would be remiss in discharging our duty to you if we failed to take these factors into account in tailoring our output to achieve the maximum result.

All this adds up to the fact that into every broadcast, pamphlet, or film must go a sober appraisal of our own strength and weakness, appreciation of the likes and dislikes of our audience, and a full realization of the nature and singleness of purpose of our sworn adversary—the men in the Kremlin. It is abundantly clear by now that to these men only one thing matters—the preservation and extension of their power. To serve this end they have the vast and sinister apparatus of the Cominform devoted to blackening the motives and aims of the free world. They command the subversive activities of Communists everywhere whose first and only allegiance is to further the imperialistic aims of the Politburo. They spend from 10 to 20 times the amounts we do on propagating their perverted version of issues confronting the world today. But with all their efforts they have been unable to produce a single new and

challenging ideal to spearhead their campaign. Their entire stock in trade consists of stolen and traduced ideas—ideas once held in esteem by all aspiring men, but in their versions shamefully caricatured and skillfully disguised to substitute the form for the substance down to their ridiculously and mockingly redundant “Peoples’ Democracies.”

The U.S. Psychological Offense: A Tale of Three Cities

Seen against this background the United States achieved three major psychological victories during the year 1951—three victories, which like all victories, were built on a cumulative series of successes and must continue to be protected like all hard-fought gains. But for purposes of historical convenience we can link these three victories with three cities spanning three continents and arbitrarily assign three dates to mark the turning point of the tide. On March 19 at Santiago, Chile, the myth was exploded that the Soviet Union represents the workers’ paradise. On September 3 at Geneva the fiction that communism’s version of land reform, that ideal which attracts so much of the Asiatic world, really benefits the peasants and farmers, was laid to rest. And at Paris, on November 8, Mr. Vyshinsky’s hysterical laughter in reaction to our introduction of genuine proposals for peace and disarmament marked the end of the Kremlin’s cruelest and most cynical hoax on mankind—the phony peace campaigns. This tale of three cities bears greater exposition since the events that led up to and followed these dates serve best to illustrate the bitter struggle which goes on continuously for men’s minds and hearts.

Santiago, Chile: Discovery of the Soviet Slave Labor Force

When the United Nations Economic and Social Council voted on March 19, 1951, at Santiago, Chile, to hold a world-wide inquiry into the use of forced labor, over the vociferous objections of the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, it represented the culmination of a long struggle on the

¹An article based on an address made before the Federation of Jewish Women’s Organizations, New York, N.Y., on Jan. 16.

part of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to bring to the attention of the world the appalling and inhuman conditions in these slave-labor camps which are an integral part of the Soviet economy. The subject was first brought to the attention of the United Nations in 1949, but the Soviet Union blocked all efforts to launch an inquiry. Then followed the long and painful process of gathering the evidence, which was difficult because the Iron Curtain exists precisely to hide this sort of thing.

A spectacular development on the road to enlightenment was the Rousset trial in Paris. In November 1949 David Rousset proposed the creation of an impartial commission composed exclusively of former inmates of Nazi concentration camps to investigate slave labor wherever it might exist and, in particular, in the Soviet Union. The French writer was immediately villified by the Communist weekly *Lettres Françaises* and accused of forging his evidence relating to the Soviet Union. Rousset brought suit for libel. After many delays caused by the stalling tactics of the Communist defendants, the case was tried and Rousset produced victim after victim from many nations, most of them ex-Communists and Socialists, who produced irrefutable testimony of conditions in the slave-labor camps in what the Communists love to describe as the workers' paradise.

Rousset won his case and the Communists were forced to pay the libel charges and print the verdict in their press. Later Mr. Rousset aided in presenting a public hearing in Brussels which again fully exposed the existence and extent of the practice of slave labor in the Soviet Union. Although these stories were given little coverage by the American press, the Voice of America covered them in scores of scripts, did special recordings of the testimony in various languages, and generally megaphoned the trials to the world.

But documentary evidence was needed. This too was found, and the Voice is proud to have played a part in uncovering it. It was photostated and dramatically presented at Santiago by Miss Toni Sender of the American Federation of Labor. More evidence is now being accumulated, all tending to show that the Soviet Union maintains a slave-labor force of approximately 10 million people or more. In official Soviet documents these are designated as correctional camps for political recalcitrants, but the evidence on commitments points clearly to two motivations: one, economic, the most shameful exploitation of human labor by a regime which makes a fetish of freeing "workers in capitalist countries" from exploitation; and two, political, as a means of maintaining power by terror, which feeds upon itself and grows inexorably. We continue and will continue to expose hypocrisy and deception, but since March 19, 1951, at Santiago, Chile, the Soviet Union and its slavish imitators have gone on the defensive. It is our

business now to see that no one is deceived about the true economic and social conditions in the Kremlin's slave empire.

Geneva, Switzerland: Land Reform Program

Perhaps our tale of land reform should really be date-lined Tokyo, because it was there and in Korea that we demonstrated by deeds and not by slogans what genuine land reform can accomplish. It is one of the ironies of history that General MacArthur has never been given adequate credit for this accomplishment, but I can assure you that without the general's accomplishments there would have been no turning point at Geneva on September 3. The case of land reform illustrates also the distinctive difference, and, I think, the blessing of our propaganda—the deed must match the word. We have no Iron Curtain to conceal the disparities between actuality and our pretensions—we do have a free, inquiring press which trumpets to the world when injustice is done, or when Government officials go astray, and by the same token our propaganda can never be better than our policies. The profound reverse effect upon the shaping of our policies brought about the necessity of explaining and defending them in a world-wide information service, which has only begun to be felt.

In the case of land reform the happy marriage of policy and propaganda was there. During the 5 years from 1946 to 1951 in Japan over 3 million farmers received land, thus bringing about an important social and political reform. A similar and perhaps even more far-reaching reform was well on its way in Korea when interrupted by the assault of the North Korean Communists on June 25, 1950. To us in the United States, the concept of land reform may seem remote, but in the vast areas of Asia where the gap between the few wealthy landowners and the large dispossessed mass of peasants was a complete void, "land reform can mean the difference between explosive tensions and stability, between apathy and hope, between serfdom and citizenship" as America's representative Isador Lubin put it in Geneva.

The reality behind the Communist slogans has quite different objectives. Communists, too, have held out to the farmers and peasants the lure of land of his own as bait. Initially they gave it to him by forcibly expropriating it from others. The next step was to levy upon the temporarily blissful landowner so large a quantity of deliveries in kind or such heavy taxes that he soon found himself in worse bondage than before. And then he was collectivized and became a hopeless serf to the all-controlling government.

The Voice of America has been exposing the falsity of these Communist promises in literally hundreds of scripts and continues to do so today, but our major emphasis is now upon our own positive policy as it has been successfully demonstrated in Japan and Korea. Land reform was

first raised to the level of a foreign-policy objective in the speech by Mr. Acheson before the U.N. General Assembly at New York in September 1950,² but the full program was launched at Geneva on September 3, 1951, and since then another psychological advantage has passed from the hands of the Soviets to us.

Paris, France, and the Laughter of Vyshinsky

And now the last of the tales of three cities—the story of peace. Never before in the history of the world has a greater hoax been attempted on more people than the parade of peace petitions, peace committees and councils, and peace protestations which the Soviet Union has cynically exhibited in the last few years. In the face of the fact of its expansion by sheer military force in all areas of Eastern Europe, in the face of its provocative action in Iran, its attempted military subversion of Greece, its belligerent threats to Turkey, its engineered *coup* in Czechoslovakia under the shadow of the Red army, its sabre-rattling in Berlin and Vienna, and its repudiation of a treaty with China to help its vassals seize power there, the Soviet Union chose to gamble that the world would rather believe its honeyed words than face the realities of recognizing the threat of this new imperialism.

No one so sincerely detests a “warmonger” as the invader who wishes to cross a border unopposed, or put his foot on a neighbor’s neck without meeting resistance. The fighting begins only if the victim resists the invader. Otherwise the imperialist aggressor wages his war of conquest in what he calls a “peaceful” fashion. But something happened in Korea on June 25, 1950, that shocked the world into realizing that peace without freedom and justice is worse than death. A week before the North Korean Communists launched their invasion they proudly announced that more than half the population had signed the Stockholm Peace Petition, a fact which was duly noted and stressed in the Voice of America’s first broadcast on the subject. And the behavior of the Soviet regime and of Mr. Malik soon and quite clearly demonstrated that peace in their concept meant submission.

That was the tocsin for the free world and it responded with a lift.

But as the months dragged on and the fighting in Korea stalemated, the looming burden of armament with its equally bleak prospects of a long, drawn-out armed truce or a show-down of military force as the only alternatives depressed the world again to the point where the siren voice of Moscow’s propaganda again found an ear.

During this period the Voice of America and every other agency of the free world had been busy exposing the shame and hypocrisy of Moscow’s peace pretensions. But it lacked the positive side, the hopeful alternative that showed a

way out of the dilemma. That came with the proposal of the United States, Britain, and France in Paris on November 7 to achieve a genuine disarmament. Mr. Vyshinsky’s laughter was not the good-natured chuckle of a savant at the ineptitude of his opponent’s proposal. It was rather the hysterical laugh of one who has his mask of peace stripped from his face and stands naked and foolish before his public. His subsequent tirades and fulminations bear out this theory. The latest session of the so-called World Peace Council in Vienna was by all accounts a desultory and disappointing affair. It is inconceivable that the Soviet Union can ever again make any headway with its peace propaganda unless it is prepared to accept in good faith at least some of the disarmament proposals.

But it is equally inconceivable that the men in the Kremlin can change their policy. Like Hitler they have become the victims of the forces they have unleashed. They know that in their own people and in the people they have enslaved through their puppet regimes they have created a force which will destroy them as surely as it destroyed Hitler and other tyrants before him. They know that fresh oppression produces greater resentment and unrest, the only answer to which in their system is the imposition of new and greater terror. And so the chain reaction will develop to its inevitable end.

Meantime the pretense of their propaganda will increasingly lose its effectiveness if we can continue to hold the spotlight upon it. A regime which in 33 years of conscious pretension to the social revolution has not been able to reach the level of social and economic well-being of some of the less highly developed countries—it has actually enslaved more men in concentration camps than the entire industrial working class in the Russia of 1917 that the Bolshevik seizure of power promised to free—this regime can scarcely pose as the prophet of a future better world unless all sources of true information are blacked out by neglect or indifference.

A great deal of our effort in the radio field—almost 40 percent of it—is devoted to reaching the people behind the Iron Curtain, where despite Soviet efforts to jam us out, we still penetrate as one of the few voices of uncontrolled information. To them we like to speak in terms of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s prayer for the United Nations:

Yet most of all, grant us brotherhood, not only for this day but for all years—a brotherhood not of words but of acts and deeds. We are all of us children of the earth—grant us that simple knowledge. If our brothers are oppressed, then we are oppressed. If they hunger, we hunger. If their freedom is taken away, our freedom is not secure. Grant us a common faith then man shall know bread and peace—that he shall know justice and righteousness, freedom and security, an equal opportunity and an equal chance to do his best, not only in our land but throughout the world.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 2, 1950, p. 523.

Campaign of Truth Intensifies Activity in Field of Religion

[Released to the press February 4]

As a part of this Government's Campaign of Truth, the United States now is intensifying its counteroffensive against Communist attacks on the moral and religious aspects of American life.

This was emphasized in a report to Congress which was made public on February 4 by the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange.

In its sixth semiannual report to the Congress, the Commission pointed to its recommendation that stress be placed on developing "a community of purpose between ourselves and all peoples of the world who cherish moral and spiritual values so as to protect them."

The Department of State has reported to the Commission that through its information centers abroad, it is now conducting "the most effective presentation of the moral and religious aspects of American life through selected, balanced collections of U.S. publications which portray America's spiritual heritage and religious values in true perspective."

Included among the nearly 2 million books in the 165 U.S. information centers overseas are copies of the Bible and such periodicals as *Christian Century*, *Commonweal*, and *Commentary*.

In addition to materials issued by various religious faiths, the centers also offer such Government-prepared publications as *100 Things You Should Know About Communism in Religion* and *Tensions Within the Soviet Union* (which includes a section on Communist persecution of religious groups).

The Department reported to the Commission that approximately one percent of the materials in its information centers is now of a religious nature.

"A general balance is sought between Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish materials," the Department told the Commission and added that "publications of an extreme religious bias or of purely sectarian nature are not provided."

Because of this policy the Department said that "a certain handicap exists because there are a relatively limited number of publications available in this field which can be considered appropriate for inclusion in an official United States Government activity, and are also suitable for a foreign audience."

The Advisory Commission's report also reaffirmed a previous recommendation by the Commission that "public funds not be used for the exchange of professional religious workers, lay or ordained, for the purpose of engaging in pastoral, missionary, or other professional religious activities."

The report recommended, however, that "persons engaged in study, teaching, or research in religious fields should be considered eligible for grants financed from public funds and should be judged on the same basis as candidates in other professional fields, on a thoroughly impartial and nondiscriminating basis."

The Commission's report said that the Department of State had accepted the first of these recommendations and is giving "serious consideration" to the second.

The Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange is composed of five outstanding educators who are appointed by the President. It makes a continuing study of the Department of State's Educational Exchange Program and reports its recommendations and findings to the Secretary of State and Congress.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Launching the Campaign of Truth: First Phase. International Information and Cultural Series 19. Pub. 4375. 67 pp. Limited distribution.

Sixth Semiannual Report of the Secretary of State to Congress on the International Information and Educational Exchange Program July 1 to Dec. 31, 1950.

Permanent Third Member of the Italian-United States Conciliation Commission. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2232. Pub. 4205. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Italy—Exchange of notes at Rome Feb. 12 and 13, 1951; entered into force Feb. 13, 1951.

Education: Cooperative Program in Panama. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2234. Pub. 4207. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Panama—Signed at Panamá Sept. 22 and Oct. 10, 1950; entered into force Oct. 12, 1950.

Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Venezuela. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2242. Pub. 4223. 9 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Venezuela—Signed at Caracas Mar. 6 and 15, 1951; entered into force Mar. 15, 1951.

Continued on page 257

Mobilizing Materials for Defense

by Winthrop G. Brown

Director, Office of International Materials Policy¹

Before Korea the United States was in a state of great prosperity. We were increasingly realizing the dream of ever-higher standards of living for all our people. We had high employment and rising national income and ever-increasing production of the vast variety of things our people want and know so well how to make.

In Europe, countries were rebuilding the destruction of war; increasing production way above prewar levels.

And in the less-developed countries of the world there was a tremendous drive for a higher standard of living for the masses of the people, for roads and power plants and factories and irrigation projects and farm equipment and clothing and sewing machines.

To produce all that goes into these vast national efforts takes tremendous quantities of raw materials—steel and copper and tin and wool, and all the rest.

All of this was good. It was, and still is, just what we want.

And then Korea brought home to us the ugly truth that had been apparent for a long time that all this fruitful process of peaceable development was threatened; that the only way to repel that threat was to develop in the free world a military strength formidable enough to deter any aggressor.

So we in the United States, and other friendly countries also, turned to the task of building planes and guns and tanks, of equipping armies, and of building the factories and power plants necessary to support them.

And this job takes raw materials, lots and lots and lots of them, so much that in some cases the demands of our military alone for some materials are more than the total free world supply.

Establishing Priorities and Controls

As a result, there just aren't enough materials to go around. We can't have all the guns we need and all the butter we would like to have. In consequence, we as a Nation have to make some hard

¹Excerpts from an address made before the Southwestern Savings and Loan Conference at Biloxi, Miss., on Jan. 30 and released to the press on the same date.

choices, to establish priorities, and to do without certain things.

We have to find out what is most needed, to see that these essentials are provided first, to see that necessary cuts in other uses are distributed fairly, to see that the essential needs of friendly countries are met, to increase the world supply of these materials as much as possible, and to do all this without skyrocketing prices.

This means controls. It means controls because that is the only way to make sure that scarce aluminum, for example, will be used in building bombers instead of making venetian blinds, or that scarce copper will go into plants to produce the power necessary to make aluminum and steel instead of into roofing. Voluntary arrangements can never do this job, if for no other reason than that the information needed to do it right can only be collected in one place, and that unless there is central enforcement the honest citizen who cooperates is at the mercy of the chiseler who doesn't.

Nobody likes controls; even the people who administer them. This may surprise you, but by and large it's true. Just take my own case, for example. Before Korea I was working to expand trade, to break down governmental obstacles to trade, to create conditions in the world in which private businessmen could do their business in their own way with the most free competition possible. Today I am working largely on controls, national and international, to see that they are fair, that materials are sent where they are most needed, and that controls are no more restrictive than necessary. It isn't nearly as pleasant a task. But it has to be done and done well, if we are to be able to get back to concentrating on more normal types of work.

Well, what is the Government doing about all this? How does it go about seeing that the infinitely complicated American economy is so adjusted that it will produce first things first and dispense with nonessentials?

First of all, we have to find out what is most needed. Direct defense requirements, of course, come first. The military submit their requirements for tanks and guns and planes and other kinds of equipment. Those requirements are then

translated into tons of steel and pounds of copper and nickel and other materials. These requirements have priority. Then we find out from people in industry and from Government agencies who work in the field what requirements will be for such things as railroads and civil aviation and for new factories and power plants necessary to support defense production. And we translate these railroad cars and airplanes and ships and factories and power lines and generators into tons of steel and pounds of other metals. And we look at the records and talk to industry and find out what the country's demands are for consumer goods of all kinds—automobiles and refrigerators and radios and furniture and housing—and translate those into materials. And we do the same for roads and schools and all the major items that the country uses.

And then, since in this interdependent world we cannot think of the United States alone, we try to find out the needs of other friendly countries that are dependent on us for their supplies of a great variety of items and materials and much of their military equipment.

And we add up the totals and compare them with the supply of each material that is likely to be available.

This is some job! You all know how tough it is to estimate materials requirements for a house or a school or an office building. Estimating requirements for the total needs of the United States and its allies, which is what Mr. Wilson and his colleagues in the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) have to do, is just that much more complicated.

And it takes lots of time and many pieces of paper and cooperation from businessmen all over the country. It is only the people who are going to use the materials who can tell how much they need and what they need it for. If they don't give the Government the information it asks, it won't know where the materials are really needed, or be able to plan for the necessary supply. Forms are a nuisance. Questionnaires are a plague. But they serve a purpose vital to all of us.

After adding up the total requirements, the Government has found that for most important materials the demand is much larger than the supply. Military needs have to be met first. The next step is to decide which other things are most necessary and which things we can most easily get along without. These decisions are normally made by ODM in consultation with the affected industries and they are normally carried out in ways that will allow the greatest flexibility to the people affected. For example, an industry may be limited to a percentage of its use in a previous base period. It would be free to use the amount that was available to it in any way it wished and in the manner that would cause the least dislocation to its business. Or the use of given materials might be prohibited entirely for

a lot of purposes for which substitutes are available. Or businessmen might be required to limit the inventories that they can keep, and so on.

In the three most important materials—steel, copper and aluminum—the control is almost absolute. No one can use any of these materials except for an approved use.

This procedure would be difficult enough if it were simply a question of distributing available quantities of particular materials. But there is another factor in the picture that is just as important to the individual businessman as the amount of the material that he is going to get, and that is the question of when he gets it. I am sure many of you must be familiar with the experience of having a building or other project well under way, having your workmen on the job, and all your materials and equipment ready except for one vital element, the lack of which holds up the whole project. It won't do any good, for example, to build a new steel mill if we don't have the power to supply it or the wire necessary to bring the power into the plant. Therefore, when the program for allocation of each commodity is worked out, it has to be fitted into other programs to be sure that the flow of materials into industry is balanced as well as adequate.

You have to do this for each job you undertake. Washington has to do it for all of the jobs being undertaken by everybody all over the country.

Problems of Procurement

So much for the problem of putting the materials we have to work. The other side of the picture, that of actually getting the materials themselves, is just about as complicated.

Contrary to popular impression, the United States is a "have-not" nation in most of the raw materials most vital to defense production. Of the roughly 70 so-called "critical and strategic" materials we are nearly self-sufficient in only 7. We produce only a part of our normal needs in 24. We don't produce any of 35. Someone once estimated that it takes 31 different countries to produce the materials needed to make a modern automobile.

Our copper comes not only from home but from Chile, Canada, Mexico, Peru and Africa; wool from Australia and New Zealand; cobalt from the Belgian Congo and Canada; lead and zinc from Africa, Mexico, and Peru. Even our great steel production—the largest in the world—is dependent upon iron ore which comes from such widely separated spots as Canada, Newfoundland, Sweden, North Africa, Venezuela and Brazil, and upon manganese which comes from India, Brazil and Africa. Tungsten comes from Spain, Bolivia and Australia. Tin comes from Malaya, Indonesia, the Belgian Congo, and Bolivia.

Thus, the materials we need come from all over the world. And almost every other country in the

world is interested, to a greater or less extent, in getting some of those materials too.

So just as we have the problem in the United States of seeing to it that the supplies available to us are fairly distributed in a way that will best produce the things we need the most, so we have the problem internationally of seeing that the supplies available to the free world are distributed fairly among the countries of the free world in a way that will best produce the things that we need the most.

We dealt with the same problem in World War II. But then it was in many ways an easier problem than it is today. In the first place, we were then in a state of total war. It is always much easier for people to accept drastic measures of control in such a period than it is in the current period of partial mobilization, particularly when the present condition is one that is likely to last for a long time. In the second place, in World War II the United States and the United Kingdom had absolute control of the seas and could pretty much control by their own efforts the distribution of materials throughout the world.

Today, however, we are happily not in a state of total war, and we hope we will not be. We have to take into account a far greater degree of civilian requirements than we did in World War II, and the United States and the United Kingdom do not have available the means of enforcing control of distribution of materials that they had in World War II.

So we had to adopt a different approach.

It was obviously undesirable simply to let everyone scramble for an inadequate supply of materials. That would not have got the materials where they were needed; would have resulted in even higher prices than have developed; and it would have caused a lot of ill will. It was obviously not possible to create a supergovernment that would do internationally what each government does internally with respect to distribution of materials. It was obviously not necessary to have international machinery to deal with all scarce materials.

Creation of International Materials Conference

So what happened was a very simple and, at the same time, a very pioneering experiment. The United States, Britain, and France looked over the scene and decided that there were a dozen or so important commodities which then presented real international problems. These commodities were sulphur, tungsten and molybdenum, manganese, nickel and cobalt, wool, cotton, copper, lead and zinc, and newsprint.

The three Governments then invited the countries which accounted for the vast majority of the free world production and consumption of these materials to meet together in Washington to try to agree as to how they could most fairly be distributed among the countries of the free world,

to see how supplies might be increased, and to see what could be done by the various countries to economize in their use.

These invitations were accepted by almost every country invited to participate. International committees met and got to work. They called themselves the International Materials Conference. The problem they faced was much the same problem the U.S. Government faced which I have just described. They had to find out how much of each of the materials with which they were working would be available, how much each of the countries represented, and also the countries not represented, would need, and when there was not enough to go around, how the deficit could most fairly be apportioned.

Their first problem was to get at the facts. They had to find out how much would be needed and how much would be available. If this is hard in the United States, it is even harder internationally. Each country kept its figures on a different basis. Some kept very few figures at all. Each country considered different things important. Some countries could present a very good justification for their requirements; others were not able to do so, even though their needs might have been equally deserving. Few had very accurate estimates of supply.

When the totals were added up, it was clear that almost everyone needed more than he would be able to get. So the next job was to see how the inadequate supply available could be most fairly distributed.

In the United States this is hard enough. And there the Government can decide and enforce its decisions. In the international field there is no supergovernment. The committees doing the job have no formal constitution. They have no powers of compulsion. They can merely recommend action to governments.

Yet, since they started their work in the spring of 1951, they have been able to agree upon the international allocation for the last quarter of 1951 and the first quarter of 1952, and in some cases for the third quarter of 1951 as well, of copper, zinc, nickel, cobalt, sulphur, tungsten, molybdenum, and some newsprint.

They agreed that there were such adequate supplies of cotton, lead and manganese that no international allocation was needed. They failed to agree on any action for wool.

These allocations were not only recommended by the committees. They have been accepted and put into effect by the governments represented.

This is a very remarkable achievement; particularly when you think how absolutely vital a satisfactory distribution of these key materials is to both the producing and the consuming countries. It is the more remarkable that the allocations have been so handled that not only have the allocations been accepted and put into effect by the countries that developed them in the commit-

tees, but there has been hardly a single complaint from any nonparticipating country that the allocation which it received was not fair. This was accomplished by inviting in representatives of countries not members of the committees and hearing their case and consulting them as to their requirements.

Problem of International Price Control

There is one other big set of problems concerning materials that I want to mention.

As every businessman knows, people are interested not only in how much material they get and when they get it, but what they have to pay for it. And this question of price is, of course, absolutely vital to all producers. So when we deal with materials domestically and when we deal with them internationally, we keep running into the question of price.

This is a very thorny and tangled question, because it involves a head-on collision of at least two major national objectives. The first of these objectives is to avoid inflation. One of the easiest ways to stimulate inflation is to start a steady rise in raw materials prices, because these prices, as you know, enter into everything that is made and are pyramided as they go on through the manufacturing and selling process.

On the other hand, it is a vital national objective for us to get more of these scarce materials produced. If we don't get more of them we won't be able to do a lot of the things that we absolutely have to do. The most effective, most direct and most natural way of getting more production of almost anything is to offer a higher price. So there's the dilemma. If you don't raise the price, you don't get enough materials. If you do raise the price, you tend to get inflation.

Our stabilization policy also collides with the law of supply and demand. Prices can be controlled reasonably effectively within the country, because legal means of enforcement are available and, moreover, people are generally disposed to accept controls on prices of what they sell when they see that the prices of what they buy are also controlled. This is, however, not true internationally. There are no legal means for enforcement of price-control measures and, in most cases, the producers have to buy at least a large proportion of what they need in uncontrolled markets.

Moreover, most producers of raw materials are very allergic to the idea of limits on the prices they charge because they say: "It's all very well for you consumers to want to put a ceiling on prices of our products when there isn't enough to go around and prices are going up. But when did you ever do anything to help us out in times when there was far too much of our product and prices were going way down? You were glad to take

advantage of the low prices then. You should be willing to pay high prices now."

So the problem that we face is what kind of an arrangement can be made with the producers which will not do violence to our program of price stabilization domestically, which will give them a fair price and will get us the materials we need. Any ideas will be much appreciated!

This is by no means the end of the catalog of problems connected with raw materials. But I think I've said enough to demonstrate that although the fundamental job which this country is trying to do of building formidable military strength for ourselves and our allies and maintaining the highest level possible of civilian activity at the same time can be very simply stated, the job of achieving it is infinitely complicated. Because of limiting factors that are just as real and just as simple as the fact that there aren't enough raw materials to go around, we can't build the military strength that we require and maintain the easy civilian life to which we have become accustomed. Therefore, hard choices are involved and sacrifices have to be made. The question is not whether we get along with less, but how we do it. And the more clearly this is understood all through the country, and the more everyone cooperates with each other and the Government, the more efficiently the job will be done, and the more fairly to all concerned.

Voluntary Exports for Relief and Rehabilitation

[Released to the press February 7]

Charles P. Taft, chairman of the advisory committee on voluntary foreign aid, has reported to Assistant Secretary Thorp that voluntary exports of goods and funds for relief and rehabilitation for the 6 months ending December 31, 1951, reported by 44 agencies registered with the committee approximated 29 million dollars in value. Church agencies—Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish—accounted for 60 percent, CARE 25 percent, American Relief for Korea 7 percent, and agencies of general service 8 percent. More than 75 percent of the goods and funds were distributed to nationals and refugees in 14 countries of the 90 beneficiary areas scattered throughout the world. These countries were Germany, Korea, Italy, Israel, Austria, Great Britain, France, Japan, Greece, India, Lebanon, Arab Palestine, Jordan, and Syria.

Denmark: Copyright Extension

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS the President is authorized, in accordance with the conditions prescribed in section 9 of title 17 of the United States Code, which includes the provisions of the act of Congress approved March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, as amended by the act of September 25, 1941, 55 Stat. 732, to grant an extension of time for fulfillment of the conditions and formalities prescribed by the copyright laws of the United States of America, with respect to works first produced or published outside the United States of America and subject to copyright or to renewal of copyright under the laws of the United States of America, by nationals of countries which accord substantially equal treatment to citizens of the United States of America; and

WHEREAS satisfactory official assurances have been received that since March 1, 1913, citizens of the United States have been entitled to obtain copyright protection for their works in Denmark on substantially the same basis as citizens of Denmark without the need of complying with any formalities, provided such works secured protection in the United States; and

WHEREAS, by virtue of a proclamation by the President of the United States of America, dated April 9, 1910 (36 Stat. 2685), citizens of Denmark are, and since July 1, 1909, have been, entitled to the benefits of the aforementioned act of March 4, 1909, other than the benefits of section 1 (e) of that act; and

WHEREAS, by virtue of a proclamation by the President of the United States of America, dated December 9, 1920 (41 Stat. 1810), the citizens of Denmark are, and since December 9, 1920, have been, entitled to the benefits of section 1 (e) of the aforementioned act of March 4, 1909:

Now THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid title 17, do declare and proclaim:


That with respect to (1) works of citizens of Denmark which were first produced or published outside the United States of America on or after September 3, 1939, and subject to copyright under the laws of the United States of America, and (2) works of citizens of Denmark subject to renewal of copyright under the laws of the United States of America on or after September 3, 1939, there has existed during several years of the time since September 3, 1939, such disruption or suspension of facilities essential to compliance with the conditions and formalities prescribed with respect to such works by the copyright laws of the United States of America as to bring such works within the terms of the aforesaid title 17, and that, accordingly, the time within which compliance with such conditions and formalities may take place is hereby extended with respect to such works for one year after the date of this proclamation.

It shall be understood that the term of copyright in any case is not and cannot be altered or affected by this proclamation, and that, as provided by the aforesaid title 17, no liability shall attach under the said title for lawful uses made or sets done prior to the effective date of this proclamation in connection with the above-described works, or in respect to the continuance for one year subsequent to such date of any business undertaking or enterprise lawfully entered into prior to such date involving expenditure or contractual obligation in connection with the exploitation, production, reproduction, circulation, or performance of any such work.

¹ 17 Fed. Reg. 1143.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fourth day of February in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and fifty-two and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-sixth.



By the President:
DEAN ACHESON
Secretary of State.

Recent Releases—Continued from page 252

Vocational Education: Cooperative Program in the Dominican Republic. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2244. Pub. 4229. 17 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Dominican Republic—Signed at Ciudad Trujillo Mar. 16, 1951; entered into force Mar. 16, 1951.

Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Brazil. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2236. Pub. 4237. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil—Signed at Rio de Janeiro June 13 and 29, 1950; entered into force Aug. 25, 1950.

Red Cross Field Hospital in Korea. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2268. Pub. 4314. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Sweden—Signed at Washington June 27, 1951; entered into force June 27, 1951.

Technical Cooperation: Assistance for Libya. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2270. Pub. 4316. 9 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—Signed at London June 15, 1951; entered into force June 15, 1951.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2271. Pub. 4317. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ethiopia—Signed at Addis Ababa June 16, 1951; entered into force June 16, 1951.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2272. Pub. 4318. 12 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Cuba—Signed at Habana June 20, 1951; entered into force June 20, 1951.

Exchange of Official Publications. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2297. Pub. 4353. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and India—Exchange of notes signed at New Delhi Nov. 8, 1950 and Jan. 11, 1951; entered into force Jan. 11, 1951.

New Airways System for Western Europe

**SPECIAL MEETING ON COORDINATION OF AIR TRAFFIC,
PARIS, NOVEMBER 20-23, 1951**

by Thomas T. Carter

Since the beginning of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), control of air traffic in the European area has been recognized as a difficult problem brought about, mainly, by (1) the lack of an air-traffic-control system and associated facilities with standardized practices and procedures; (2) the lack of an established airways system; and (3) the lack of effective coordination between the civil and military authorities. Several air-traffic-control plans for Europe have been developed at ICAO regional meetings, but for one reason or another none has been successfully put into effect.

During the past year, a substantial increase in military air traffic, particularly in jet aircraft operations and in the establishment of numerous prohibited or restricted areas, has aggravated Europe's air-traffic-control problems. United States and other international air carriers have been obliged, therefore, to re-route and, in some instances, even to curtail their operations.

Last May the Netherlands Government, greatly disturbed over the increased operating difficulties that civil air operators encountered, proposed that ICAO study the problem with the view to convening a special meeting to which military experts of the states concerned would be invited. On June 29 the ICAO Council requested the interested states as a matter of urgency to furnish their comments by August 6. The replies to such an inquiry confirmed the seriousness of the problem and a special meeting was convened at Paris October 8-12, 1951.

Two important and encouraging developments resulted: (1) all states represented agreed that the establishment of an airways system would be an important step toward the solution of the increasingly complex problem of coordinating civil and military air operations in Western Europe; and (2) at an informal meeting held at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)

outside the ICAO framework on October 12, the military advisers of each delegation agreed that an international airways traffic-control system should be established for Western Europe without delay and recommended this course of action to their respective chiefs of delegations.

It was the consensus of the ICAO meeting, however, that although considerable progress had been made, a further meeting of the interested states outside the ICAO framework should be convened in the near future to continue the discussions, either under the auspices of NATO or on invitation of the French Government to the states concerned. It was subsequently agreed to proceed on the basis of the second alternative and, accordingly, France issued invitations to Denmark, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as representatives of the Allied High Commission in Germany, to send civil and military representatives to a further meeting at Paris beginning on November 20.

The composition of this U.S. delegation to this meeting was as follows:

Thomas T. Carter, U.S. Civil Air Attaché, Paris; Howard F. Rough, C. A. A. Aeronautical Adviser to the Department of State, American Embassy, Paris; John T. Straker, Commander, USN, Naval Air Facility, Port Lyautey; Roland B. Sturtevant, Chief Adviser, London International Field Office, C. A. A. Department of Commerce.

The French secretariat in advance of the meeting proposed the following agenda:

1. Chairman's summary of circumstances leading up to the meeting. *Purpose of the meeting:* Establishment of an Airways Network for Western Europe in terms of civil and military requirements.
2. Analysis and bearing of the document worked out at the SHAPE meeting October 12, 1951, by the military representatives attached to the Delegations of the NATO nations accredited to ICAO.
3. Airways Network as proposed by the civil authorities.
4. Flight itineraries required for civil aviation in West-

ern Europe and for which the organization of an airway is not justified.

5. Chart of areas exclusively reserved to the military authorities (training, bombing, target practice, etc.) to be provided by the said authorities.

6. General organization of air traffic control in areas of heavy military traffic.

7. Procedures to be drawn up for civil and military traffic outside the airways and outside the restricted military areas.

Comments in Regard to 6 & 7—The purpose of the meeting is to reach an agreement on the establishment of definite and lasting airways. The detailed elaboration of the above questions should be carried out by every nation concerned as a matter of urgency.

8. Possibility of a further civil and military meeting before ICAO meets in February 1952.

At the first plenary session of this meeting on November 20 two functioning bodies were established: the chiefs of the delegations and a synthesis committee. The latter was to act as a working group and was responsible for adjusting and consolidating the individual airways plans of the states concerned into a Western European airways system. The former was responsible for resolving questions posed by the working group and for reaching the final decisions of the conference.

The synthesis committee studied the airways plans of the individual countries in order to make the necessary changes and adjustments to establish a consolidated airways network. It had some difficulty in the smoothing out of certain routes, particularly between Belgium and France. However, the work of the synthesis committee progressed well, and, at the final plenary session on November 23, the meeting unanimously agreed on a definite plan for an airways system for Western Europe. The president of the conference, M. Nottet of Belgium, transmitted the final report of the meeting to the Council of ICAO to assist that body in preparing for the Europe-Mediterranean Air Navigation Meeting in February 1952, where the problem is expected to be studied further.

The accomplishments of this conference from the point of view of United States interests were very satisfactory. A number of difficult problems of implementation remain to be solved before the newly agreed-upon airways system in Western Europe can become a reality. The problems include the distribution and layout of air-navigation facilities and the organization of flight-information services in regions of heavy military traffic and the organization of joint control of the airways. Despite such difficulties of implementation, the U.S. delegation feels that the Western European states concerned will exert every appropriate and feasible effort to implement the agreed-upon airways plan as soon as possible.

Resulting from the two recent successful meetings at Paris is a vitally important momentum directed to the solution of Western Europe's air-traffic-control problems. In the opinion of the majority of the delegates attending the meeting, much greater progress has been made than was thought possible in midsummer of 1951. The end

of the road can now be seen more clearly, and, if the approaching ICAO European-Mediterranean Air Navigation Meeting is successful in capitalizing on the results of the recent Paris meeting, a further important step will have been taken by the European states to put their air space in order.

• *Thomas T. Carter, author of the above article, is Civil Air Attaché for the American Embassy at Paris. Mr. Carter was Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Special Meeting on Air Traffic.*

U.N. Committee Considers Restrictive Business Practices

[Released to the press January 30]

Representatives of 10 U.N. countries met at U.N. headquarters at New York on January 29, 1952, to draft an agreement against cartels and other restrictive business practices in international trade. The U.S. representative at the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Restrictive Business Practices of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) is Corwin D. Edwards, Director of the Bureau of Industrial Economics, Federal Trade Commission.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee on Restrictive Business Practices was established by a resolution adopted on September 13, 1951, at the thirteenth session of the Economic and Social Council.¹ The Committee is composed of representatives of Belgium, Canada, France, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay.

The main purpose of the meeting at U.N. headquarters is to prepare for the Economic and Social Council the draft of an international agreement to implement the Council's resolution that U.N. members should act together to prevent restrictive business practices adversely affecting international trade. The program seeks effective cooperative international measures to eliminate those cartel or other restrictive business practices in international trade which divide up markets, foster monopolistic control of industry, or otherwise eliminate competition in trade whenever these practices curb expansion of production or trade, interfere with economic development of underdeveloped areas of the world, or lower standards of living.

The Committee is also charged with the responsibility for the preparation of a report, based on information to be obtained from governments, specialized agencies of the United Nations and other sources, on restrictive business practices, and on measures which have been taken by individual member states to eliminate them.

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1951, p. 595.

U.S., U.K., France Propose Special General Assembly Session On Korean Problems

*Statement by Ernest A. Gross
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

Members of the First Committee will recall the discussions which led it to decide to postpone for the time being the consideration of the Korean item on its agenda. Since some members of the Joint Committee may not be familiar with those discussions, I should like to review briefly the reasons which have prompted my Government, along with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, to introduce the present draft resolution.

The United States is disturbed by the slow course of the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom. We share with all other peace-loving nations a profound sense of disappointment that a satisfactory end to the hostilities has not yet been reached despite the sincere and patient efforts of the United Nations side.

My Government, responsible for the Unified Command of the United Nations, has consistently made and continues to make every possible effort to achieve an armistice under honorable and satisfactory conditions. From the beginning of the aggression on June 25, 1950, the United States has loyally supported all United Nations efforts to bring this aggression to an end and to conclude a just and durable peace. The initiative for peace has, from the start, been with the United Nations.

The United States is most anxious that the General Assembly should proceed to its consideration of the political and economic aspects of the Korean problem. We hope this will lead to the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea, and to the economic recovery and rehabilitation of that devastated land. These are matters to which my Government has always attached, and continues to attach, the highest priority.

Avoiding Political Discussions

Precisely because we are anxious to go forward, we desire to avoid premature political discussions

¹ Made in Committee I and Joint Committees II and III (Political and Security, Economic and Financial, Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) on Feb. 2 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. Mr. Gross is U.S. deputy representative to the United Nations.

which could postpone or complicate the conclusion of an armistice. It is the armistice which will open the way to constructive consideration of political issues. A lasting political solution to the Korean problem must rest on a sound and secure foundation. The successful conclusion of the negotiations at Panmunjon will provide that foundation.

Tripartite Resolution on Korea

U.N. doc. A/L. 107
Approved Feb. 5, 1952

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

DESIRING to facilitate to the greatest possible extent the negotiations in Panmunjon and the conclusion of an armistice in Korea, and

WISHING to avoid premature consideration of items 17¹ and 27² of the agenda of the present session,

I.

Decides that (a) upon notification by the Unified Command to the Security Council of the conclusion of an armistice in Korea, the Secretary-General shall convene a special session of the General Assembly at the permanent Headquarters of the United Nations to consider the above-mentioned items, or (b) when other developments in Korea make desirable consideration of the above-mentioned items, the Secretary-General, acting in accordance with Article 20 of the Charter and with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, shall convene a special session or an emergency special session of the General Assembly at the permanent Headquarters of the United Nations.

II.

Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds established by the resolution adopted at the 352nd meeting of the General Assembly on 7 December 1951³ to undertake negotiations regarding voluntary contributions to the programme of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for relief and rehabilitation of Korea.

¹ The problem of the independence of Korea: Report of the United Nations Commission for the unification and rehabilitation of Korea.

² Relief and rehabilitation of Korea: Report of the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction.

³ U.N. doc. A/L. 4.

Discussion here and at this time of political issues, in conjunction with the current military negotiations in Korea, could only make more involved the already complicated problems which now face the commanders in the field. Such discussion would involve this Committee in matters of a technical military nature, which can be resolved satisfactorily only by the military negotiators on the scene in Korea.

The wisdom of keeping military questions separate from political or territorial matters has repeatedly been recognized by all parties to the negotiations. Moreover, this was made clear even before the negotiations had begun. On June 23, 1951, the world received an indication, too long deferred, that the aggressors in Korea at last were seeking to begin armistice negotiations. The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister within a few days told the American Ambassador that the armistice which the Soviet Government envisaged would be limited strictly to military questions, without involving political or territorial considerations.

Neither peace in Korea nor any settlement of its political problems is possible until a satisfactory armistice has been reached. Only when it has been reached can we fruitfully move on to the problems of the long-term settlement.

The draft tripartite resolution is designed to meet this requirement. Let there be no mistake as to our motives in proposing this course. The resolution provides for the immediate calling of a special session of the General Assembly in New York upon notification by the Unified Command to the Security Council of the conclusion of an armistice in Korea.

The draft contemplates that the General Assembly will move immediately toward the attainment of the political objectives in Korea once an armistice has been concluded.

The resolution also provides for the calling of a special or emergency session when other developments in Korea make this course desirable. We make no recommendations here as to the precise conditions under which such a session might be called. Such machinery can appropriately be put into operation when the majority of the United Nations deems this step advisable in the light of the then existing situation.

Under the formula proposed in this draft resolution, the authority of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea will continue unimpaired. In other words, the U.N. machinery designed to assist in the accomplishment of the unification of Korea will remain in operation as long as necessary, or unless and until it is superseded.

Program of Korean Relief

Part II of the draft deals with a most serious and pressing problem—the program for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea.

Under the draft resolution, agenda item No. 27, the consideration of the report by the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction, would be deferred. From this it follows that there would likewise be deferment of that part of agenda item No. 22 which relates to section 1 of chapter VII of the Economic and Social Council Report on relief and rehabilitation of Korea. This, we think, is in keeping with the suggestion to defer consideration of the political question.

But it is most important, I suggest, that the General Assembly authorize the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds to go forward in seeking contributions for the continuation of the program of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA). Part II provides for this.

While hostilities in Korea continue, it is impossible for the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, created on December 1, 1950, by the General Assembly, to undertake full responsibility for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea. The emergency relief needs of the Korean people have been met under the direction of the United Nations Command, over 200 million dollars of goods and services have been supplied through the Unified Command. Approximately 20 million dollars of this amount has been contributed by various governments, nongovernmental organizations and international agencies; the balance has been made available by the United States Government.

The original program of UNKRA was established at 250 million dollars to meet the basic needs of relief and rehabilitation of Korea during the first year of its full-scale operation. Although the military situation has prevented UNKRA from undertaking this full program during the past year, UNKRA has been furnishing technical assistance and providing personnel. They are engaged in the distribution of relief supplies, the prevention of epidemics, related health and welfare activities, and short-term economic rehabilitation.

UNKRA has recently completed arrangements with the United Nations Command for joint programming. This will enable UNKRA to carry out a number of projects of relief and rehabilitation in Korea in the immediate future. Some of this can be done even before the cessation of hostilities. UNKRA can also plan to assume full responsibility for relief and rehabilitation with maximum efficiency when the military circumstances permit.

Of the 205 million dollars pledged to UNKRA, a relatively minor part has been paid in cash. Additional payments are required to meet UNKRA's immediate financial needs; and additional pledges will be needed to bring the total up to the 250 million dollar program.

Part II of the draft resolution will permit the Negotiating Committee to approach governments at the appropriate time regarding their contributions to UNKRA. We hope that additional payments and pledges will be obtained to permit

UNKRA's program in Korea to go forward and to come into full-scale operation as soon as the military situation permits. In this way the United Nations will continue to fulfill the responsibility it has assumed, through the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, for assisting the Korean people to relieve their suffering and to repair the devastation which aggression has brought to their country.

Along with other loyal members of the United Nations, we are fully aware of our responsibilities to see that Korea becomes unified and independent. Of most immediate importance, however, is our responsibility to insure that nothing shall be done which will delay or prevent the end of the aggression in Korea under conditions which will safeguard the future of the Korean people and the peace of the area.

U.N. Directs Further Mediation of Kashmir Dispute

*Statement by John C. Ross
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

When last the Security Council considered a report from the U.N. representative [for India and Pakistan] Frank Graham, the U.S. representative observed that the practice of mediation is one of the greatest of arts, and it is certain that in his own country Mr. Graham is one of its most distinguished practitioners. This fact is even more clearly apparent today. The U.N. representative has been patient; he has been tolerant; he has been accurate; and he has been dispassionate. His aim is, as it has been, to build agreement, brick by brick, to form the structure of a settlement between two sovereign states. This is a purpose as simple to state as it is difficult to accomplish in the tensions of the world in which we live and of which we are all a part.

His report of December 18, 1951² and his oral presentation of it to the Security Council on January 17, 1952, are monuments, if one requires them, to this art of mediation. His report is outstanding for one thing alone. It carefully states the issue. The issue is to find an agreed, and I emphasize the word agreed, not an imposed solution for three questions. "First, a definite period for demilitarization; second, the scope of demilitarization and quantum of forces that will remain at the end of the period of demilitarization; third,

the day for the formal induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator." (S/PV/570, page 27).

Mr. Graham goes beyond stating the issue. He has put before the Security Council the principles on which the questions can be resolved. First, there must be agreement of the parties if the settlement is to be lasting, and naturally agreement must involve compromise. One can search in vain in his report for any suggestion or any implication of an imposed settlement that would force upon the parties or the people of Kashmir a political future not of their own choosing. He is attempting to bring about a free and impartial plebiscite. To use his own words when he addressed this Council a few weeks ago: "The Plebiscite would keep the promise made to the people of Jammu and Kashmir who are worthy of the right of their own self-determination through a secure and impartial plebiscite."

The second principle implicit in his work is that this dispute must not be deadlocked, but must show movement along the road to settlement. Time is running against both parties. One side or the other may feel that delay will somehow favor its cause. But delay and frustration are not allies of either side. They are mortal enemies of both. The forces of chaos work internally and also from the outside. Time is not a luxury to any of us whose objectives and principles are fundamentally similar. Whoever would suggest, in seriousness, that all of the structure, built brick by brick, be abandoned? Again I would let the U.N. representative speak for himself. He told us a few weeks ago that the time has passed when society can safely take slow decades and centuries to

¹ Made in the Security Council on Jan. 30 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

² For excerpts from Mr. Graham's first report, transmitted to the Security Council on Oct. 15, 1951, also excerpts from his statement before the Security Council on Oct. 18 in which he analyzed the main proposals and recommendations of the report, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 738. For excerpts from the second report of Dec. 19, 1951, see BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 52.

muddle through adjustments. Social drift and unsettled disputes, he added, and he mentioned specifically the Kashmir issue, can now possibly involve mankind, if allowed to go unchecked, in the swift and total tragedy of global war.

The U.N. representative has put before the parties a 12-point program. It provides a logical and well balanced framework in which to carry out the demilitarization upon which the parties themselves have agreed and which they have also agreed is a necessary prelude to the holding of a plebiscite. Through that plebiscite, the parties have agreed that the people of the State can exercise their right of self-determination. My Government feels today as it did when Ambassador Gross addressed the Council on November 10³ that these 12 points form a solid basis on which the parties can reach agreement (S/PV.566, page 12). Since last November Mr. Graham has made progress. It has been slow, but progress there has been. He has formulated the outstanding issues which I stated a minute ago and which are now all that stand between the parties and a completely operative agreement. In one way or another, he tells us, solutions can be found for these problems. I was struck by what he said of the fixing of a day for the induction into office of a plebiscite administrator. This he has called a linchpin that would integrate his program. My Government agrees.

As one looks around the Council table and sees the two parties to the dispute sitting here with the U.N. representative, one sees in this fact tangible evidence of a desire to settle this case by the peaceful means which members of the United Nations have obligated themselves to use in the settlement of disputes. If we look back to the Graham report of October 15 of last year there was agreement on four of his 12 principles; then in his report of November 19 there was agreement on four more, thus reducing the issues to their bare bones. This is the progress which has been made up to now toward the settlement of the Kashmir question.

The United States feels that this progress has not been and should not be halted. In coming weeks we shall look for clear evidence of movement toward settlement of the basic issues. The United States feels that none of the remaining issues is an insurmountable barrier between the parties and a peaceful solution—a Charter solution—an agreed solution. Not lightly should the parties or any of us cast away the fabric of agreement as it now exists.

The Security Council gave its representative a heavy task by its resolution of March 30, 1951, which, in its third and fifth paragraphs, instructed him to effect demilitarization and analyze the points of difference between the parties. The Se-

curity Council has further instructed him on November 10, 1951, in paragraph 2 of its resolution:

to continue his efforts to obtain agreement of the parties on a plan for effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

This is precisely the task upon which Mr. Graham is now engaged. The Council has asked him for reports from time to time.

Mr. Graham has narrowed the issues to two critical ones, and the emphasis must now be put on resolving these two issues. The efforts of the next weeks will either see these issues resolved or we shall know that patience, persistence, and wisdom have once again been unrewarded except, perhaps, by frustration and dilatory maneuvers. In this sense, Mr. Graham's continued effort might justly be described as a final one.

We agree that Mr. Graham needs no further directive from the Security Council, and we feel that this continued effort will necessarily involve his return to the subcontinent of India and Pakistan and will involve a report, a final report, which we should expect by the end of March, as various of our colleagues have indicated this afternoon.

He told us on January 17 that "negotiation" is still the way to solution of the unresolved issues. He also expressed the view that the time has met with the place and the opportunity to settle this dispute. We agree with this view. We would also venture to express the hope that leadership by the parties—indeed, real statesmanship on their part—will lead to a successful "negotiation" and speedy solution of this dispute which has too long remained unsolved.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers issued in 1951: S/2417, November 23; S/2420, November 24; S/2421, November 28; S/2423, November 30; S/2424, November 30; S/2427, December 3; S/2428, December 3; S/2429, December 4; S/2431, December 7; S/2433, December 7; S/2436, December 10; S/2437, December 12; S/2438, December 12; S/2439, December 12; S/2440, December 17; S/2441, December 17; S/2444, December 18; S/2445, December 18; S/2447, December 19; S/2453, December 31; S/2454, December 31; S/2455, December 31; S/2456, December 31; S/2457, December 31.

³ BULLETIN of Dec. 10, 1951, p. 958.

The Soviet Pattern in the Sixth General Assembly

by Philip C. Jessup

U. S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹

I look on the whole business of the Assembly as part of the process of "parliamentary diplomacy." You have a process in the United Nations which is in part normal diplomatic negotiation and partly the kind of parliamentary process which you have in any national legislative body. I think it is very important to keep those two factors in mind, because you are all conscious of the way those supplement and interfere with each other as the committee meetings go along.

The thing that struck me in the final sessions was the statement that Mr. Malik of the Soviet Union made in the joint meeting of the First, Second, and Third Committees on the Korean item, that the third world war had started. He said, of course, that it had been started by the "aggressive Anglo-American bloc." The fact that he chose to put it in that way, I think, has a good deal of significance. It is, of course, directly contrary to the belief which we have constantly adhered to that there is no necessity of another war, it isn't inevitable, and that it can be prevented.

As I have been thinking about his statement, it seemed to me that which it might reflect is the fact that the Soviets over a period of time have been seeking to create a Soviet monopoly of the word "peace." And the initiative of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in moving forward with disarmament proposals at this time tended to break the monopoly. It certainly took the initiative away from them. And now, when they can't monopolize the peace theme any more, they are swinging over to the "line" that the third war is here. In other words, I think that is in a sense an acknowledgment of defeat, although they won't admit it.

I think it is interesting that they tie this statement to the colonial issue and talk about the aggression of the West in Korea, in Indochina, in Malaya, in Burma, in Egypt, in Tunis, Morocco, etc.

¹ Excerpts from extemporaneous remarks made before the United Nations Correspondents Association at Paris on Feb. 5, and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on Feb. 7.

Personally, I don't think that one can recall too often the statement of Stalin in his book on *The Problems of Leninism*. The gist of it, as you remember, is the statement of how you move in on the Asiatic countries; that first you promote nationalism because nationalism will throw out the old colonial powers; and then having promoted nationalism to the point where you eliminate the colonial powers, you then develop internationalism in the sense of the Communist International, and you move them into the Communist sphere.

That is a pattern which I think has been borne out by their actions all the way through. When they find that a country in following this nationalistic revolt against colonialism is not also moving into the Communist sphere, then they quickly change, as they did in the case of Indonesia. When they found that Indonesian independence was being aided by the United States and other countries, they immediately began to denounce Hatta and Soekarno as traitors to the cause of nationalism.

On that general field, it seems to me the United States position has been made pretty clear. People have wondered a little bit about the stand of the United States on the Moroccan issue and on our general relations with the Arab States, but the recent speech of Secretary Acheson,² I think, was not only a very forthright statement but at the same time a reiteration in strong terms of a theme which the American Government has sounded several times before in the last 2 years.

Since the end of the war, 15 different states have come into existence as new independent states—India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Libya, the Philippines, etc. All of them, of course, have attained their independence from the Western so-called colonial powers.

Contrast that development with the absorption of states into the Soviet system: the disappearance of the Balkan States, and the practical disappearance of the satellite states as independent members of the community of nations.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 155.

Soviet Attitude Toward Information

Now, let me make a few observations on the general question of information and news coverage. It seems to me one of the very real problems in the whole international field.

One of the striking remarks which one of the Soviet representatives made—it was Mr. Pavlov in the Third Committee when Mr. Tobias was talking about the Oatis case—was that if any newsman sticks his nose into the Soviet Union, he will have his paws chopped off. A very graphic description, I think, of their general attitude on the question.

I think it is rather interesting to look at some statistics on the area of the Soviet Union which is closed to foreigners. Following the recent decree shutting off additional areas, we figure that 80 percent of Soviet territory, inhabited by about 65 percent of the total Soviet population, is now, in effect, closed to foreigners.

That, frankly, is the sort of picture which bothers us in terms of making progress in the whole disarmament field. As you know, we are not convinced that you are going to get anywhere with disarmament unless you have an inspection system.

Conflicting Friendships

Moving into the general field of the Assembly, I sometimes feel that many of the problems that arise for the United States result from having so many friends. Most of the difficulties we have had in this Assembly result from the fact that we are friends of both parties to several disputes. You can run down the list; take our old Indonesian case, for example. We liked the Dutch; we had very close relations with them. On the other hand, we had great sympathy with the Indonesians; and those two friendships were in conflict.

The same thing is true throughout the history of the Palestine case in our friendship for Israel and in our friendship for the Arab States.

It is true today in terms of the problems in North Africa; with our friendship for France on the one hand, and our general sympathy with the people who are aspiring to a larger measure of self-determination, autonomy, and independence.

All the way around, we really don't feel that we are parties to many of these tense controversies in terms of being on one side or the other. We feel that we are friends to both sides. Frequently, one

or the other gets irritated with us because we are not giving 100-percent support to their side. It is one of our major problems.

Soviet Behavior in International Negotiations

I'd like to say another word about the Soviet attitude in negotiations. They operate on a 100-percent basis. My first experience with that was in the first commission I served on, the United Nations Codification Commission. We had one case where the Russians were, as usual, arguing one thing and we were arguing another. Koretzky, the Soviet representative, kept repeating his position and we kept moving in an effort to meet him. We finally got up within 95 percent of his position, and he was still saying No, No, No, and he voted against the 95-percent compromise. We then went back to the original and he lost 100 percent. I asked him afterward why he did that. "You knew perfectly well that if you turned down the compromise you would lose everything," I told him. "Well," he said, "I am not interested in compromises. My instructions were to get so and so."

Take for instance the disarmament discussions, the various changes which were introduced in the Tri-Power drafts in an attempt to meet various points that Vyshinsky brought up in the Four-Power subcommittee or brought up in the debates. The Soviets really were not in the least interested in that kind of advance. You have got to come all the way to meet them before they are interested.

I think that is further illustrated by the fact that when you do come around to a point of agreement, you don't get it so often through small concessions gradually bringing positions together. You are apt to get it, as you have all seen, I think, in a rather violent speech which denounces the other side 100 percent but ends up, "However, the Soviet delegation being in favor of peace accepts the proposition." They can make that kind of a 100 percent shift much easier that they can move, I think, a few inches at a time.

We have much greater flexibility and I think our tradition and habit is to move toward an accommodation; and this is something that they lack.

The U.S. in the U.N.,

a weekly feature, does not appear in this issue.

Reports of U. N. Command Operations in Korea

THIRTIETH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 16-30, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2412
Transmitted November 15, 1951

I herewith submit Report Number 30 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-30 September, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqué numbers 1023-1037, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

No substantive progress was made during this period toward conclusion of a military armistice agreement. The recess in negotiations, initiated by the Communists on 23 August, remained in effect. Because Kaesong is in enemy-held territory, the enemy has the continuing capability of fabricating incidents at any time detrimental to the harmonious conduct of negotiations. Consequently, on 6 September 1951, I proposed that the liaison officers meet at Pan Mun Jom to discuss the selection of a new site where negotiations could be continued without interruptions. On 12 September 1951, Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai replied to my letter and demanded that the United Nations Command participate in the reinvestigation of alleged incidents already investigated in full. The Communist Command completely ignored the United Nations Command proposal that liaison officers meet to establish conditions that would be mutually satisfactory for the resumption of armistice negotiations.

In my reply on 17 September, it was pointed out that all alleged incidents have already been investigated, that the results of investigations have been furnished the Communist side, and that, except for the 10 September incident, United Nations Command forces were not involved. In this regard, the United Nations Command has consistently demonstrated an objective and responsible

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Amb. Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Nov. 15. For texts of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th reports to the Security Council on U.N. Command operations in Korea, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43; and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. Reports nos. 1-11 are published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108, respectively. The 12th, 13th, and 14th reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the 15th and 16th reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the 17th report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the 18th in the BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, in the BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 828; the 19th report in the BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 910; the 20th report in the BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 948; the 21st report in the BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 30; the 22d in the BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 155; the 23d and 24th reports in the BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1951, p. 265; the 25th report in the BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 303; the 26th report in the BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1951, p. 510; the 27th report in the BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1951, p. 709; and the 28th and 29th reports in the BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1028.

attitude. I again proposed that liaison officers meet to discuss conditions for a resumption of the military armistice negotiations.

On 19 September, the Communist leaders again brought up the reinvestigation of "unsettled" incidents. This I flatly rejected on 23 September, again stating that United Nations Command liaison officers were prepared to meet to discuss conditions for terminating the recess.

Liaison officers from both sides met daily from the 24 to the 27 of September, inclusive. During these meetings the Communist liaison officers refused to discuss conditions for resumption of the armistice. On 27 September in a message to the Communist side I stated that since Communist liaison officers have stated that they were not authorized to discuss and arrange satisfactory conditions for resumption of armistice talks, I wished to submit a proposal. I proposed that both delegations meet as early as possible at a place approximately midway between the battle lines in the vicinity of Songhyon-Ni, and that upon resumption of meetings at this place both delegations be prepared to return to the discussion of agenda item two. To date no substantive response has been made by the Communist side to this proposal.

During the period covered by this report, hostile ground forces put up vigorous resistance to strong local attacks by United Nations Forces. During the long period of buildup, the enemy has thoroughly integrated his defensive positions which now include extensive earthworks, land mines, obstacles, and some tactical wire. These defenses are well manned and are relatively well supported by artillery and mortars. Recently, the enemy has employed anti-aircraft weapons against ground elements in his defensive operations.

Despite the strength of the hostile defenses, United Nations Forces made local gains of one to three miles on the eastern and western fronts and thoroughly probed hostile positions on the central front. During the latter part of the period the enemy made strong local attacks on various parts of the front and registered slight gains against newly acquired United Nations positions. Front lines at the close of the period ran northeast from Munsan to Chunggang, thence eastward to Sohui, and northeast to the vicinity of Pohang.

On the western front, United Nations Forces re-established the three advanced patrol bases which had been driven in by enemy attacks during the preceding period. Hostile action against bases at Kangso and Amhyon consisted primarily of small-scale attacks, probes, and artillery harassment. At Pangyo, United Nations Forces overcame bitter resistance after three days of fighting and by 19 September had re-established a patrol base two miles northwest of the town. Later the enemy made several unsuccessful attempts to dislodge United Nations Forces at Amhyon and Pangyo. On the extreme west flank there were numerous patrol contacts in the immediate vicinity of United Nations lines near Korangpo and west of Kangso.

Along the thirty mile central front from Chunggang to the Pukhan River near Tungdae, the enemy continued to intercept United Nations patrols in the immediate vicinity of United Nations lines. On 21 September, three United Nations Task Forces made deep probing attacks beyond Tuchon and Haso and in the direction of Chuktao. The enemy opposed these attacks with determination and provided strong artillery support to defending garrisons.

The attacks disclosed well-developed anti-tank defenses. Enemy forces in the Tungdae area gave ground in the face of repeated United Nations attacks until 26 September. Thereafter, the enemy launched a series of counterattacks and succeeded in forcing United Nations Forces back several hundred yards. By the end of the period United Nations Forces had absorbed these attacks and were restoring their positions.

The most significant gains of the period were made on the eastern front in the vicinity of Hoegok. Although the North Korean Forces bitterly defended every hill and elevation and conducted countless counterattacks, the enemy was driven back approximately two miles to the north on a ten-mile front. This action eliminated a major portion of the Hoegok pocket and greatly improved the United Nations lines. United Nations Forces made slight gains in equally heavy fighting to the south and east of Sohui and advanced more than two miles on the extreme east flank. As the period closed, the enemy was making strong efforts to regain lost ground in the Hoegok area.

There was still no clear indication as to when the enemy might undertake a major offensive. There was much activity in rear areas on the western front, and the bulk of the immediately available hostile reserve forces are deployed in rear of that part of the front. A definite increase in the number and strength of hostile probing attacks was noticeable, and the enemy has substantially increased his capabilities for offense or defense. In any case, the enemy is capable of strong offensive action at times of his choosing.

In the past fortnight United Nations Naval forces accelerated the tempo of their attacks against coastal supply arteries on both coasts of Korea. The surface forces were particularly active in night and day bombardment of rail and highway coastal routes, bridges, and important junctions. Standing close in to the beaches in spite of enemy artillery fire, United Nations destroyers, assisted by aerial spotting, silenced Communist gun positions and inflicted heavy losses on enemy troop concentrations and supply activities. The heavier guns of the battleship *New Jersey* and the cruisers *Belfast* and *Toledo* reached far inland to inflict precise destruction on targets reported by aerial observers. United States, British, Australian, and Korean ships of all types including amphibious ships pounded Wonsan with shells and rockets for protracted periods in conjunction with repeated strikes by United Nations Naval aircraft. From the mouth of the Han River north to Chinnampo on the west coast and from the front line position near Kansong north to Chongjin on the east coast, United Nations Naval gunfire exacted a heavy toll of the enemy without damage to any ship. Naval gunfire in support of United Nations Ground Forces operating near the east coast was particularly effective.

Adding to the destruction of the enemy's main supply routes along both coasts, Fireflies and Sea Furies on the carrier *Glory* were prominent in the heavy attacks on Wonsan. Ranging far inland across the front, carrier aircraft repeatedly demonstrated their ability to deliver tactical close air support with deadly accuracy and effectiveness. To the hundreds of known enemy casualties inflicted by the carrier planes must be added damage or destruction of trucks, locomotives, box cars, tunnels and bridges, and endlessly repeated rail and highway cuts that harassed and choked the enemy's internal supply routes. Although confronted by increasingly clever camouflage and dispersal and by much heavier anti-aircraft fire, United Nations pilots relentlessly ferreted out Communist bivouacs and supply dumps as targets for their varied weapons. Marine squadrons based on carriers and Korean airfields concentrated their attacks in close air support on front line troops and night and day strikes against enemy supply routes.

Helicopters operating from the forces afloat continued to perform mine reconnaissance to assist in check mine-sweeping. They also performed spotting, rescue, and supply missions. Ashore United States Marines employed

helicopters for the movement of elements over difficult terrain for the first time in combat. The evacuation of wounded directly from the front lines to hospitals by means of helicopters continued to be a major factor in markedly reducing the percentage of fatalities among the wounded, and there were a number of daring rescues of downed aviators accomplished by these aircraft deep in enemy territory.

United Nations aircraft directed by Far East Air Forces continued air operations at a rate ranging from 800 to 1,000 sorties a day. Low clouds and rain failed to hinder the United Nations effort.

The interdiction program was maintained with continued success. Medium and light bombers and fighter-bombers severally handicapped the movement of Communist supplies by attacking rail lines, marshalling yards, bridges, and other vulnerable points of the main supply routes. The heaviest attack was made when medium bombers struck a single major target with 96 tons of 1,000 pound bombs. Night operations conducted by light bombers and Marine fighter bombers assisted in establishing a new record for damage and destruction of rail and highway rolling stock. The combined effort resulted in the removal of 92 locomotives, 2,007 railroad cars, and 8,060 vehicles from the Communists' rail and highway systems during the period.

Enemy airfields were kept unserviceable through additional attacks made by B-29's. Fighters provided escort and flak suppression as required to permit the successful completion of these missions.

Close support of the United Nations front line forces was rendered by all types of United Nations aircraft. Both visual and radar methods of bombing were employed in striking the enemy's troop concentrations and emplacements near the front lines. The 500 pound air bursting bombs remained one of the most effective weapons in carrying out these close support missions on a round-the-clock basis.

The enemy's opposition to United Nations air operations increased sharply toward the end of the period after having been non-existent for a short time. To counteract this threat, F-84's and Royal Australian Air Force Meteor-S's augmented the F-86's on fighter sweeps in north-western Korea. Despite aggressive attacks by the MIG-15, United Nations aircraft successfully carried out their attacks. Aerial combat, involving from ten to 140 aircraft from both sides, resulted in the destruction of seven MIG-15's and one F-86, and the damage of 19 MIG-15's and four United Nations fighters. Royal Australian Air Force Meteor-S's claimed their first MIG kill since entering the conflict. Combat cargo aircraft maintained their support of the combat units in contact with the enemy, increasing their effort as required by the limited offensives of the ground forces. For the first time since May, ammunition was airlifted from Japan to the forward airfields. The rest and recuperation program continued the air movement of 1,500 combat veterans a day.

The movement, by military necessity, of refugees south from forward combat areas has practically ceased. Revised estimates bring the total refugees at present to 3,500,000 including 425,000 from North Korea. Movement north by refugees is an effort to resettle their homes and work their farms is virtually completed for this season, and all are now attempting to stabilize their situation for the approaching winter season, seeking permanent locations with the help of the governmental and United Nations Civil Assistance Agencies. A limited amount of tentage and supplies for temporary shelter are being provided for refugees by the United Nations Command in view of the coming winter.

Currently, the available quantities of lumber imported under the civil relief program are being distributed from various ports in connection with the rehousing programs in all provinces, especially in Chungchong-Namdo and Kyonggi-Do where greatest devastation occurred last year. A rehabilitation housing project of 100 houses located at Tal Song Gun, five miles north of Taegu, was opened 16 September 1951. Projects such as these serve some-

what to alleviate the acute housing situation. However, the number of refugees needing shelter far outnumbered those that can be provided for in this way. During the past year United Nations members and voluntary agencies have made generous contributions of clothing and blankets. However, these have now been consumed, and there is an urgent need for winter clothing and blankets to meet the requirements for the coming winter.

The Seoul City Government is acutely aware of the dangers of a large increase in the city's population. Every means is now being used to stop further entry into the city. The atmosphere within the city and other parts of Kyonggi-Do province is still quite tense. Against this uneasy background the government and the people continue their efforts toward rehabilitation and reestablishment of their homes and industry. Conditions in the Seoul City Hospital are showing much improvement due to the influence of the Danish nurses and their campaign of instruction there. They have made excellent progress in teaching and training Korean nurses.

There has been a steady decrease over several months in the incidence of communicable disease, which is attributable to the mass immunization program recently completed and the prompt action taken by United Nations Civil Assistance teams when infectious diseases are reported. A new immunization program is scheduled to begin in October. A medical team was dispatched recently to Kurye Gun (Cholla-Namdo province) to render medical aid to a large number of civilians wounded as the result of increased guerrilla attacks in the area.

Doctor Otto Lehner has been accredited to the United Nations Command as the senior delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross under the provisions of Article 9 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. Doctor Lehner arrived in Tokyo on 25 September 1951 and will visit Korea in the near future accompanied by Frederick Bieri, one of the previously accredited International Committee of the Red Cross delegates to the United Nations Command.

During the protracted Communist delay of the armistice discussions United Nations Command leaflets and loud-speaker and radio broadcasts have given wide and regular publicity to Communist frustration of efforts for the restoration of peace. These media have counteracted the enemy's studied attempts to distort the facts and shift to the United Nations Command responsibility for continued delay in progress toward peace. United Nations leaflets and broadcasts disseminated to Chinese and North Korean soldiers have supplied the information denied them by their own officers. Reiterating that the first United Nations objective in Korea is the restoration of peace, these media have constantly reminded enemy soldiers of the futility of sacrificing their lives in any new offensive which the Communists may undertake to launch. They have also emphasized the fundamental friendship of all free nations for the Chinese and the Korean people despite Communist efforts to spread dissension and strife among them.

THIRTY-FIRST REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1-15, 1951²

U.N. doc. S/2432
Transmitted December 5, 1951

I herewith submit Report Number 31 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 October, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqué numbers 1038-1052, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Although no meetings of the delegations took place during this period, some progress was made, through meetings of liaison officers, in establishing proper conditions

² Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Dec. 5.

for a resumption of negotiations. On 3 October 1951, Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai replied to my letter of 27 September '51 which proposed Songhyon-Ni as a conference site. Their reply insisted that Kaesong, in Communist-held territory, be kept as the conference site. I replied on 4 October 1951 rejecting Kaesong and requesting the Communist commanders to propose a site between the battle lines. On 7 October '51, Generals Kim and Peng replied proposing Pan Mun Jom as a conference site and further proposing a rectangular neutral zone to include Kaesong and Munsan. Liaison officers met at Pan Mun Jom on the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 14th of October. At the close of the period full agreement between liaison officers on the conditions for resuming the conference had not been reached, but substantial progress had been made.

On 12 October '51, an unfortunate incident occurred. Investigation has established beyond reasonable doubt that United Nations Command jet aircraft made two ground strafing attacks (they dropped no bombs) in the Kaesong area about 1730 hours on the afternoon of 12 October '51, the same aircraft making both attacks. On 14 October '51 in a letter to Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai, I stated that these attacks had been made in violation of United Nations Command standing instructions which specifically direct all units and pilots to avoid attack or overflight of the Kaesong area, that beyond reasonable doubt United Nations jet aircraft had made the attacks, and that the United Nations Command, therefore, accepted responsibility. The United Nations Command will continue to make every effort to prevent any recurrence of incidents which violated previously made agreements.

The enemy attitude continued essentially defensive throughout the period as United Nations Forces applied heavy pressure on various parts of the front in strong local attacks. Although hostile forces offered determined resistance and their front line elements were heavily supported by artillery and mortar fire, they failed to prevent limited United Nations gains in several sectors. United Nations forces continued vigorous reconnaissance and combat patrolling, but most patrols were promptly intercepted by hostile screening forces. A Chinese Communist army relieved a North Korean corps in the Odong sector, extending the Chinese Communist zone of responsibility into the area east of the Pukhan River. Otherwise there were no significant changes in enemy dispositions. Front lines at the close of the period ran north-east from Munsan to Chunggang, thence eastward to Sohui, and northeast to the vicinity of Pohang.

On the western front, United Nations forces initiated strong limited objective attacks on the twenty-mile front from Kigong to Orijong. In the Kigong sector, the enemy resisted with great determination from 3 to 9 October but made no decisive attempts to recover lost ground thereafter. In this action, the United Nations line advanced three to four miles westward to the immediate vicinity of Kigong. Fighting for high ground to the south and east of Orijong began on 1 October and continued to twelve days. The enemy bitterly contested every United Nations advance and mounted repeated counterattacks, some of which were temporarily successful.

During these operations a number of United Nations Command units distinguished themselves in action against the enemy.

The 15th Infantry of the 3rd Infantry Division in an attack characterized by aggressiveness and superb coordination captured the key hill 487 on 29 September '51. The capture of hill 487 afforded an excellent wedge into enemy defenses along line Jamestown, objective of operations. COMMANDO. On 3 October, in coordination with the 1st Cavalry Division on its left, the 15th Infantry attacked west along the ridge running west from hill 487 to hill 477. The enemy tenaciously defended this ridge line from well prepared bunkers and emplacements, and only through a very aggressive attack with excellent coordination of all supporting units was the 15th Infantry able to wrest this key position from the enemy and inflict heavy losses on the Communist forces.

The key terrain to line Jamestown in the right portion of the 1st Cavalry Division zone was the hill mass dominated by hills 313, 347, and 418. In the left of the zone, the critical terrain was hill 346, the ridge extending northeast therefrom and hill 287 on the north of the ridge. The 7th Cavalry with the Greek Battalion attached and the 8th Cavalry with the Thailand Battalion attached shared equally in the success of the operation. The capture of hills 313, 347, and 418 was a combined effort of elements of the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments and the Greek Battalion which took hill 313. The enemy fought stubbornly in this area and launched strong counterattacks. The bitter and determined battle fought by our troops resulted not only in the capture of the hills but also hundreds of enemy casualties.

The 1st Commonwealth Division made its main effort on the right against hills 238 and 355. The nature of the enemy defense and the characteristics of the manner in which he conducted his defense was much the same as that found in the 1st Cavalry Division zone. Some of the heaviest artillery and mortar fire so far employed by the enemy was received by the attack element, and the enemy launched vicious and fanatical counterattacks in an effort to halt the drive. Despite the all-out efforts of the enemy the attack was successfully pressed and completely defeated the enemy, inflicting heavy casualties and forcing the withdrawal of his decimated forces.

The nature of the enemy defense encountered in the above operation indicated that he planned to hold his position at all costs. Bunkers varying in size from very small to large enough to hold approximately a hundred men were reduced. The ridges were rimmed with deep, connecting, and sometimes covered trenches. Artillery positions were found in caves dug into the sides of hills. In spite of all Communist preparations, the persistent efforts in conducting the attacks on D Day by elements of the British, Cavalry, and 3rd Divisions succeeded in forcing the enemy to give up his extremely well prepared positions. Before yielding to the attack, the enemy lost 2,500 counted killed, and additional 500 estimated killed, 20,000 estimated wounded, and 427 prisoners of war to the combined air, artillery, and infantry weapons of the attacking troops. Much of the fighting, particularly near the tops of hills and ridges, was at grenade range and bayonet point.

The aggressiveness, fortitude, outstanding leadership, and excellent coordination with which these units conducted this operation brought about the early success of the attack and resulted in advancing the United Nations line in these zones from three to four miles. The seizing of the assigned objective secured terrain dominating the avenues of approach which had been successfully utilized by the enemy in the past and denies to him the use of important assembly areas for future attack against our forces.

On the thirty-mile central front from Chunggang to the Pukhan River, action was confined to patrolling and local probing during most of the period. On 12 October, United Nations forces attacked on a ten-mile front south of Haso and Chikong and made moderate initial gains against variable resistance. Although the enemy is believed to have disposed one of his densest masses of artillery behind this sector, the bulk of his defensive fires were directed against United Nations artillery positions. Hitherto, nearly all hostile artillery fire has been directed against attacking infantry troops.

The most intense action of the period took place on a twenty-mile sector of the eastern front immediately to the east of the Pukhan River. Fighting was virtually continuous in a bitter contest for high ground to the south of Amdong and Tupo. In one instance, United Nations forces fought for six days, from 6 through 11 October, to take a hill in the Amdong area; and elsewhere substantial enemy forces counterattacked repeatedly to retake dominating heights. Toward the end of the period, however, the hostile defenses showed signs of weakening, and United Nations forces on the Amdong-Tupo front succeeded in pushing one to three miles northward.

Although the enemy retains the capability of reverting to the offensive at any time of his choosing, his attitude at the close of the period was predominantly defensive. It is apparent that he is prepared for continued hostilities in that he has issued winter uniforms and has continued to maintain a high level in troop strength, training of reserves and replacements. He has continued to replace losses in combat units and has continued the periodic relief of exhausted units on the front. The steady volume of heavy traffic in the hostile rear indicates a strong effort to maintain high levels of supplies in forward areas. The preponderance of hostile reserves is still disposed in rear of the western front.

During the first two weeks of October, United Nations naval units bombarded enemy coastal positions and traffic arteries along the Korean seaboard from the front lines far to the north. On the west coast gun positions within thirty miles of the mouth of the Yalu were shelled by a British destroyer, while twenty miles up the Han River New Zealand and Australian frigates continued to pound enemy concentrations. On the east coast, surface ships methodically hammered bridges and rail and highway junctions from Kosong north to Chongjin. Surface striking forces steamed into Hungnam harbor to deliver the heaviest attacks on that Communist port since United Nations forces were withdrawn last December. The siege of Wonsan was continued and a British task group struck the Kojo area. In spite of increasing return fire from enemy coast artillery, no major casualties or damage to ships was received from this source although the United States Destroyer *Earnest G. Small* was damaged and suffered 27 casualties when she struck a mine. An enemy jet strafing and bombing attack on the Destroyer *Twining* resulted in no damage, but was notable as the first air attack on a naval unit in many months.

Carrier aircraft including Australian Sea Furies and Fireflies, Marine Corsairs, Skyraiders, and Banshee and Panther jets concentrated the majority of their attacks on inland transportation routes and equipment, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and smashing bridges, tunnels, warehouses, and marshalling yards with bombs and rockets. Close air support night-heckler missions and attacks on troop centres in the mountainous interior filled out the schedules of the carrier forces.

Shore-based Marine aircraft devoted their major effort to close air support but also carried out such varied missions as interdiction, night flare drops, and laying telephone lines from helicopters. Night and day operations were launched to add steadily to lengthening enemy casualty lists.

Assisted by helicopter spotting the smaller naval surface units continued check mine sweeping and interception of the occasional enemy small craft that attempted to penetrate the United Nations blockade. Although frequently subjected to heavy fire, they carried out dozens of useful tasks close in to the enemy beaches. Patrol boats and helicopters on several occasions gallantly rescued pilots shot down in hostile territory and surrounded by the enemy. A number of floating mines along both coasts of North Korea were detected and sunk.

United Nations land-based aircraft under the direction of the Far East Air Forces increased slightly their rate of air activity during the current period. Primary emphasis was placed on close support of the ground forces in their new offensives and on the current interdiction programme which has been in progress for over a month. Additional air operations included airlift, counter air, reconnaissance, flare and leaflet drops, and other specialized missions. Aircraft and crews from South Africa, Thailand, Australia, Greece, and the Republic of Korea, as well as the United States Air Force and the United States Marine Corps participated.

Close air support was rendered to the United Nations ground units in contact with the enemy by an average of seventy-five fighter aircraft a day. During daylight hours fighter bombers used napalm, rockets, bombs, and machine gun fire to neutralize targets designated by ground and

airborne tactical air control parties. At night, targets adjacent to the front lines were attacked by light and medium bombers, thus permitting the enemy no respite. These attacks materially reduced the enemy's resistance to friendly advances.

The interdiction program, designed to reduce to a minimum the forward flow of enemy supplies, continued as a highlight of Korean air activities and was carried out on a round-the-clock basis. Hundreds of fighter bombers and light and medium bombers joined in the program by attacking supply dumps, marshalling yards, vehicle parks, bottle-necked traffic, and rail and highway bridges, as well as rail lines, rolling stock, and vehicles. The effectiveness of the program is indicated by the enemy's strenuous efforts to prevent the complete disruption of his transportation networks. Specific indications are the redeployment of anti-aircraft defenses to key communications facilities, a shift in the pattern and route of night truck traffic, cannibalization of rail lines, and heavy redeployment and commitment of labor forces to the affected areas.

Counter-air operations continued throughout the period with medium bombers striking North Korean airfields daily. Combat air patrols over northwestern Korea resulted in the destruction and damage of many enemy aircraft and permitted the medium bombers and fighter bombers to operate with relative freedom although the versatile fighter bombers on occasion were required to release their bombs prematurely in order to counter attacks by enemy jets. Additional defense was provided United Nations bombers by fighters which made flak suppression strikes against anti-aircraft installations in the vicinity of the objective areas.

Aerial combat accounted for the destruction or damage of over thirty-five MIG-15 aircraft. Ground fire from enemy troops and aerial combat resulted in the loss or damage of approximately twenty-five United Nations aircraft. The prompt and efficient action of air rescue personnel resulted in the saving of many crews from capture by the enemy.

Combat cargo aircraft lifted over 35,000 personnel, evacuated 4,500 sick and wounded personnel, and moved 4,500 tons of freight and supplies.

Pursuant to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, a continuously expanding program of intellectual, recreational, and vocational opportunities is being provided prisoners of war by the United Nations Command. Thousands of illiterates are learning to read and write their own language. Through the media of radio broadcasts and motion pictures, increasing numbers of prisoners are learning something of the outside world. Entertainment is furnished not only by radio programs and movies, but also in the form of plays and programs written and produced by the prisoners themselves. There is increasing interest in vocational training and in the production of items to improve camp facilities. The construction of permanent type winter housing has employed a large number of prisoners, both skilled and unskilled. Other large-scale vocational projects are under way.

Since the beginning of the Korean operation and the break-out from the Pusan perimeter, much has been accomplished in the public health and welfare field for the civilian population of Korea. Extensive medical facilities have been developed for not only the destitute but also for the use of the general population.

At the present time there are 93 hospitals and 343 dispensaries operating under the direction of United Nations Civil Assistance Command. The current average load is 8,516 in-patients and 22,790 out-patients.

The new fiscal year 1952 immunization program will commence shortly and shipment of smallpox and typhus vaccines to Korea will begin 15 October 1951.

Member nations and voluntary relief agencies have made generous contributions during the past year. However, additional supplies are needed to meet coming winter conditions.

THIRTY-SECOND REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 16-31, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2469
Transmitted Jan. 5, 1952

I herewith submit report number 32 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 October, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 1038-1053, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Some progress was made in negotiating a military armistice during the period. On 22 October 1951 liaison officers of the United Nations Command and Communist forces signed an agreement which specified terms of resumption of armistice negotiations. On this same date the senior delegate for the United Nations Command ratified the agreement by forwarding signed copies of it to the Communist delegation. On 23 October 1951 the Communist delegation in turn ratified the agreement. The text of the agreement and the mutually accepted understandings with respect to the agreement follow:

Text of the agreement:

1. The specific site at which the conference of the delegations will be resumed in the vicinity of Pan Mun Jom is indicated on the attached map.

2. The conference site area is a circular area having a radius of 1,000 yards centered on the conference site as shown on the attached map.

3. No hostile acts of any kind shall be carried out by any armed force of either side, including all regular and irregular units and armed individuals of the ground, naval and air forces, against the conference site area as defined above.

4. Except for the military police provided for below, no armed personnel of either side shall be permitted in the conference site area. Designated officers of both sides shall be jointly responsible for the security and the preservation of order within the conference site area. Each side shall provide a military police detachment of 2 officers and 15 men to assist in the performance of these duties while the delegation parties are present in the conference site area. During periods when the delegation parties are not present in the conference site area, 1 officer and 5 men of the military police from each side will be stationed in the conference site area. The military police shall carry only small arms, namely pistols, rifles and carbines.

5. Both delegations and their parties shall have free access to, and free movement within the Pan Mun Jom conference site area. The composition of each delegation party shall be as determined by the senior delegate thereof.

6. Physical facilities and communication and administrative arrangements with respect to the negotiations and the conference site area will be as agreed upon by the liaison officers of both sides. The delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers will be responsible for providing a suitable joint facility for use as a meeting place of the delegations and for the arrangements within the conference room. Except for this installation, each delegation will provide its own facilities.

7. All armed forces of both sides, including all regular and irregular units and armed individuals of the ground, naval and air forces, shall refrain from hostile acts of any kind against the circular area having a radius of 3 miles centered on the traffic circle at Kaesong, against the camp area of the United Nations Command Delegation contained within a circle having a radius of 3 miles centered as indicated on the attached map, and against the area of 200 metres to either side of the Kaesong-Pan Mun Jom-Munsan road as indicated on the attached map. Text of mutually accepted understandings with respect to the agreement:

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Amb. Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Jan. 5.

1. The term armed forces as used in the agreement includes only the armed units and armed individuals under the control of or prompted either overtly or covertly by either side. When the factual findings of joint investigation prove beyond reasonable doubt that the persons responsible for an incident are under the control of or prompted either overtly or covertly by either side, that side shall not evade its responsibility for the incident.

2. Investigation of reported violations of agreements shall be conducted as has been the practice of the liaison officers in the past.

3. Agreements reached between the liaison officers on matters concerning the resumption of the armistice conference by the delegations will be the draft of the related part of the agreement of over-all arrangements to be stipulated by the delegations for the entire duration of the armistice negotiations.

4. All previous security agreements and agreements regarding the Kaesong conference site area and neutral zone are superseded by the agreement of security arrangements for the entire duration of the armistice negotiations when the latter agreement is stipulated by the delegations of both sides.

5. Except under weather and technical conditions beyond control, the military aircraft of both sides shall not fly over the conference site area at Pan Mun Jom; the military aircraft of the United Nations Command shall not fly over the Kaesong area and the area of the road from there to the conference site area at Pan Mun Jom; the military aircraft of the Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteers shall not fly over the Munsan area and the area of the road from there to the conference site area at Pan Mun Jom.

The delegations met on 25 October. This was the first meeting since the Communists suspended negotiations on 22 August. It was agreed to resume sub-delegation meetings for the purpose of discussing agenda item 2, the demilitarized zone. As of 31 October 1951, sub-delegation meetings continue.

The enemy remained on the defensive throughout the period. He was liberal in the use of artillery and mortars, and intercepted nearly all United Nations reconnaissance patrols. Occasionally he put up vigorous, sustained resistance to local United Nations attacks, and held United Nations forces to relatively minor gains except in the Kumsong area and to the east of the Pukhan River. There was no significant change in enemy strength or dispositions. At the close of the period the line of contact ran generally northeast from Haechang through Pan Mun Jom to the vicinity of Orijong, thence eastward through Chungdong to Kumsong, east and south to Pyonam, east to Sehui and northeast to Kosong.

On the western front the enemy continued to be particularly sensitive in the sector immediately northeast of Otan. Patrol clashes were numerous and local fighting was particularly vigorous on the 10-mile sector from Otan to Orijong. In this area hostile patrols made numerous probing attacks. United Nations forces attempting to seize some high ground to their immediate front in the area south and southeast of Chungdong met stiff resistance punctuated by sharp counterattacks, but overpowered the hostile troops and seized their objectives.

The most noteworthy operation on the central front was a United Nations advance of 5 miles on a 10-mile front south of Kumsong, which, by 23 October, had carried our forces to a general east-west line about a mile south of the town. The Colombian Battalion, first South American ally in Korea, was also the first UN element into the town of Kumsong. On 26 October this battalion's fine performance was commended by the Commanding General Eighth Army. Thereafter, patrols reconnoitered in the Urban area. Hostile delaying action against this attack followed a variable pattern of resistance. During this advance the Second and Sixth Republic of Korea Divisions performed with distinction. Their well co-ordinated aggressive attacks resulted in heavy enemy casualties and

the capture of large numbers of enemy personnel. The professional skill of these Republic of Korea Divisions is attested by their comparatively light casualties during the operation. Farther to the right, south of Talchon, the enemy fought stubbornly throughout the period, but by 28 October, hard-driving United Nations forces succeeded in matching the 5-mile advance of the troops on their left. During the fighting in the Kumsong area the performance of the 38th United States Infantry Regiment and the Netherlands Battalion, Second United States Infantry Division, was outstanding. Elsewhere on the central front, both sides patrolled extensively. As the period closed, hostile forces were extremely sensitive to United Nations reconnaissance patrols.

Action on the eastern front was primarily confined to intensive patrolling, as United Nations combat patrols maintained continuous pressure on hostile screening forces. The enemy exhibited great determination in his attempt to intercept and turn back all United Nations probing forces. Sharp local fights took place to the south of Mulgiji and to the south and southeast of Chongsong. In the Mulgiji area, bitterly resisting hostile forces were driven 2 to 3 miles northward by 29 October. Resistance in the Chongsong area held United Nations forces to minor gains, and heavy fighting continued at the close of the period. On the east coast United Nations forces advanced to the vicinity of Kosong.

Although the hostile attitude remained primarily defensive, and enemy forces on the central front appear to have been caught off-balance by our limited objective attacks there, the enemy still retains a powerful potential for offensive action. He continues to hold a heavy mass of reserves behind his western front. Front line units have maintained a generally defensive attitude, and have made no serious efforts to retake ground lost to United Nations forces in recent months. Prisoners of war still speak vaguely of a "Sixth phase offensive," but no longer specify a date for it. At the same time, the enemy continues his strenuous effort to maintain the combat strength and fire power of units on the line of contact.

In the last 2 weeks of October United Nations Naval Forces, including ships of 9 nations, continued to effectively blockade the coasts of North Korea, and bombarded troop concentrations, transportation routes and supply centres within range of their guns. Bridges, shore batteries, and enemy soldiers suffered damage from the rain of projectiles directed by ground and air observers. Close Naval support gunfire took a steady toll of the enemy at both ends of the battle line, while at Wonsan and Hungnam essential Communist supply activities were able to continue operations only by accepting continuous severe losses of personnel and equipment. A gauge of the effect of this constant harassment is the enemy's determined effort to drive off the attacking ships with increased numbers of heavy calibre shore batteries, as evidence by battle damage inflicted on USS *Helena*, USS *Ulvert M. Moore* and Republic of Korea Heavy Frigate *Apnok*. Casualties were light on the damaged ships, and attacking surface units accepted the counterfire as a measure of the enemy reaction to their efforts, which, to a limited extent, relieved United Nations soldiers all across the front from Communist artillery fire.

Naval and Marine Air units flying from carriers and shore bases intensified their strikes to interdict the enemy's supplies, and methodically blasted rail lines, bridges, tunnels, rolling stock, truck convoys, and supply dumps in northeastern and western Korea. Enemy gun positions, bunkers, and exposed troops across the battle-front received napalm, bomb, rocket and strafing attacks delivered in close support of United Nations ground forces. In addition to evacuating wounded, rescuing pilots and small units isolated in enemy territory, and spotting enemy dispositions, the helicopters successfully undertook a sizeable combat air resupply mission, and an aerial wrecker service for the first time during this period. An inconclusive air encounter near Suncheon between Marine Panther Jets and MIG-15's was noteworthy

as evidence of increasing aggressiveness on the part of the Communist fighters.

Patrolling vessels, including most of the smaller units, destroyed a number of enemy sampans and fishing vessels, and detected and destroyed moored and floating mines. They also recovered downed air crews and performed a multitude of other varied and important missions. Worthy of special mention was the daring recovery of a pilot in Hingnam Harbour by the USS *Conway* when the destroyer steamed, boldly and alone, within range of enemy shore batteries to complete a speedy rescue.

United Nations aircraft under the Far East Air Forces continued high sortie rates, flying approximately 15,000 sorties during the period, despite limiting factors of seasonal fogs and of a few days of poor weather induced by a typhoon in the area. The highlights of air activities were the increased enemy counter air operations, the neutralization of 3 airfields in northwest Korea, and numerous exploits of air rescue units.

Enemy air opposition, rising from bases in Manchuria, was the heaviest yet encountered in northwestern Korea over a prolonged period. Except for the days of typhoon weather, our aircraft daily encountered an average of 150 jet planes seeking to protect the enemy's remaining air, rail and highway facilities north and west of Pyongyang. Our claims for the period are 16 MIG's destroyed and 41 damaged, all in air-to-air combat; the most successful single day was 16 October when 10 MIG's were destroyed and 5 damaged. The enemy's anti-aircraft defenses are continuously increasing with present estimates of his AAA strength being nearly 400 guns and over 1,400 automatic weapons.

The neutralization of airfields in North Korea was marked by medium bomber attacks on jet airfields at Samcham, Taechon, and Namsi where new construction progress had been under observation by aerial reconnaissance for over a month. Nearly 100 air landing facilities in North Korea are under continuous surveillance to determine when and to what extent the fields are being made operable. Heavy anti-aircraft fire at Taechon downed 1 medium bomber and, on the Namsi attack, MIG-15's from across the Yalu inflicted considerable damage and some losses upon the bomber force.

Fighter bomber and night intruder attacks continued to be directed toward interdiction of enemy logistics capabilities. 70 locomotives and 1,200 rail cars were destroyed or damaged, principally in the areas from Sinanju north to the border, and over 3,000 vehicles were destroyed. Rail cuts were accomplished in over 1,300 places while 112 bridges were damaged.

Combat Cargo Units mounted over 3,200 sorties, lifting more than 5,600 tons of cargo and 48,000 personnel including 6,234 sick and wounded.

This period saw the rescue of 29 airmen from deep within enemy territory. On 22 October all 12 crew members of the B-29 hit by flak over Taechon bailed out and in less than one hour were recovered by United Nations Command aircraft. This example is typical of the splendid search and rescue operations which have been performed in Korea. Since hostilities began, Far East Air Forces rescue aircraft have recovered more than 700 United Nations personnel from behind enemy lines and evacuated nearly 2,500 critical medical cases from rugged terrain where conventional transport was impossible or impractical.

There were no air attacks on United Nations Command ground installations during the period.

On the occasion of United Nations Day, 24 October, and during the weeks preceding and following, United Nations Command leaflets and radio broadcasts devoted particular attention to explaining the United Nations and its objectives. This opportunity was taken for restatement of the fundamental position of the United Nations Command in the Armistice discussions, and for reiteration of its mission of repelling Communist aggression and restoring international peace and security in the area. With

the resumption of Armistice discussions late in October, continuing efforts were made by the United Nations Command to disseminate as widely as possible, through leaflets and broadcasts, an accurate and objective explanation of the points at issue and the United Nations stand on them.

U.N. Working Party To Study Insecticide Shortages

[Released to the press February 5]

The international action necessary to alleviate the present critical shortage of insecticides required for public-health purposes is to be the subject of study by a Working Party which has been established by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and which is to meet at Geneva, Switzerland, on February 11, 1952.

Earl R. Beckner, chief, Chemicals and Semi-Manufactured Products Branch, Manufactured Products Staff, Department of State, has been designated to serve as United States representative on the Working Party.

Louis N. Markwood, director, Chemical Division, Department of Commerce, will serve as adviser to the United States representative.

At the fourth World Health Assembly in May 1951, it was pointed out that (1) the use of insecticides for the control and eventual eradication of certain communicable diseases had been adopted by many countries as integral and major parts of their total efforts to improve both the health and economic standards of large proportions of their populations; (2) the efficacy of control measures and the eventual conquest of insect-borne diseases was dependent upon the regular and adequate provision of the insecticides required; and (3) the availability of such insecticides had been sharply affected by the shortage of raw materials (chlorine, benzene, sulphuric acid) resulting from altered production priorities in connection with the development of defense programs in the major producing countries. The fourth World Health Assembly adopted a resolution in which governments were requested to take vigorous action to maintain capacity production of insecticides and to facilitate their export, and in which the United Nations was requested to investigate the international aspects of the problem.

Acting upon this request, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on September 4, 1951, directed the Secretary-General of the United Nations to establish a Working Party to study the problem.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Scientific Liaison

On February 6, the Department of State announced that J. Wallace Joyce, deputy science adviser, has been designated to represent the U.S. Government as an observer at the British Commonwealth Scientific Official Conference which is to be held at Canberra and Melbourne, Australia, during the period February 18 through March 7, 1952.

The primary purpose of the Conference will be to enable the top-ranking official scientists of the British Commonwealth countries to consider ways and means of insuring the fullest possible collaboration among the civil government scientific organizations of the Commonwealth. It is anticipated that, by virtue of the attendance of a U.S. observer at the Conference, closer and more extensive liaison will be established between the scientists of the United States and of the British Commonwealth countries.

Prominent among the items which are to be considered at the Conference are (1) the development of scientific liaison offices; (2) scientific representation abroad; (3) methods of Commonwealth collaboration in science; (4) relations with international organizations; and (5) information and abstracting services. The participants will also discuss the reports of several specialized Commonwealth scientific conferences and the methods used in several Commonwealth countries for applying the results of official scientific research.

IRO Meetings

On February 7 the Department of State announced that the President has designated George L. Warren,¹ Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, to serve as U.S. representative at meetings of two organs of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) which are to be held at Geneva, the eleventh session of the Executive Committee, beginning on February 7, and the ninth session of the General Council, beginning on February 11.

Mr. Warren will be assisted at the meetings by the following Advisers:

Donald C. Blaisdell, U.S. representative for Specialized Agency Affairs, Geneva, Switzerland.

Michael A. Farrell, chief, Displaced Persons Branch, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Austria, Vienna.

¹On Feb. 2, the President appointed George L. Warren to be U.S. representative on the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe.

Guy J. Swope, chief, Displaced Populations Division, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt.

John Z. Williams, assistant chief, Displaced Populations Division, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt.

The Executive Committee and the General Council of the Iro will be concerned at their forthcoming meetings with the approval of plans for the final liquidation of the Organization, which has been in existence since July 1947 and which since that time has resettled more than one million displaced persons and refugees in new homes and repatriated nearly 73,000 to their home countries. Among the specific agenda items to be considered by both bodies are (1) the semiannual report of the Director General for the period July 1-December 31, 1951; (2) financial reports for the 3 months ended September 30, 1951, and proposals or further financial reports; (3) a final plan of expenditure; (4) a report by the Director General on outstanding operational problems as of February 1, 1952; and (5) a report by the Director General on the liquidation of the Organization.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Feb. 4-9, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

No.	Date	Subject
69	1/25	Brown: Mobilizing materials
82	1/30	Vincent testimony before Senate
84	1/30	U.N. drafts cartels agreement
89	1/31	Fisher: U.S. role in world affairs
93*	2/4	Anniversary of Ceylon
94	2/4	Cultural program intensified
95	2/5	Insecticide shortage
96†	2/6	Linder: Duties on tuna imports
97	2/6	Acheson: Death of King George VI
98	2/6	Scientific conference
99	2/7	Thorp to Sen. Ferguson on Imc
100	2/7	Cady: Point 4 director at Colombia
101†	2/9	Mexican labor agreement
102	2/7	Kenan: Ambassador to U.S.S.R.
103	2/7	Warren: Iro representative
104†	2/7	Cowen: Nato accomplishments
105	2/7	Relief and rehabilitation exports
106*	2/7	Frederick Larkin retires

THE DEPARTMENT

Point Four Appointments

John R. Neale, Albion W. Patterson, John L. Hummel, George J. Greco, and John K. Chattey as country directors of technical cooperation in Peru, Paraguay, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua respectively.

Charles Preston Blanks, Ernest C. Jeppsen, and Vance Rogers as country directors for Ecuador, Panama, and Haiti, respectively.

John C. Cady as country director of technical cooperation for Colombia.

Samuel S. Stratton as country director of technical cooperation in Saudi Arabia, effective February 1.

Louis Henry Rohrbach as country director of technical cooperation in Iraq, effective January 9.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

John Carter Vincent Repudiates Pro-Communist Allegations¹

[Released to the press January 30]

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

I have requested an opportunity to meet with you for two reasons. First, to repudiate under oath certain irresponsible but very grave allegations made against me before this Committee and secondly, to give the Committee whatever other assistance I may in the conduct of its investigation.

On August 23, 1951, before this Subcommittee, Mr. Morris asked a witness, Louis Budenz, the following question:

"Mr. Budenz, was John Carter Vincent a member of the Communist Party?"

Mr. Budenz replied: "From official reports I have received, he was." Insofar as the printed record shows, Mr. Budenz did not produce or describe the "official reports" to which he referred.

Later Mr. Morris again inquired:

"Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that it was an official Communist Party secret shared by few people that at that time John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party?"

"Yes, Sir," replied Mr. Budenz.

Mr. Budenz also testified that I was described "as being in line with the Communist viewpoint,

seeing eye to eye with it." When questioned as to his source, he answered: "that was stated by Communist officials in the Politburo at that time, by Mr. Browder and Mr. Jack Stachel."

I have never met either Browder or Stachel, but it is pertinent to recall that Mr. Browder testified before the Tydings Committee that he knew of no connection that I had with the Communist Party either directly or indirectly.

On October 5, 1951, Mr. Budenz again appeared before the Subcommittee.

Mr. Morris asked: "Mr. Budenz, have you identified John Carter Vincent to be a member of the Communist Party before this Committee?"

Mr. Budenz replied: "Yes, Sir, from official communications."

Later, during this same hearing, Mr. Morris said that "Mr. Budenz reported to me, as a Naval Intelligence Officer, the fact that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party, and I made a report on that fact."

Gentlemen, anyone, including Budenz, who before this Subcommittee or anywhere else, testifies that I was at any time a member of the Communist Party is bearing false witness; he is, to put it bluntly, lying. I do not pretend to know what motives guide Mr. Budenz. In my own case, his motives seem to be clearly malicious. He has endeavored before this Subcommittee to support his allegations by strained suggestion and devious insinuation.

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee—I am not a Communist and have never been a member of the Communist Party. I have never sympathized with the aims of communism. On the contrary, I have worked loyally throughout the 27 years of my Foreign Service career in the interest of our own Government and people. I am strongly attached to the principle of representative democracy and to our system of free enterprise. These being the facts, the members of the Committee will appreciate, I am sure, how disagreeable it is for me to find it necessary to affirm my devotion to our democratic institutions because of unfounded allegations made by Budenz or anyone else.

We cannot dismiss the Budenz testimony as a "mistake." Any attempt through malicious testimony to cause the American people to lose confidence in their officials, or in each other, is in itself subversive to the interests and security of our country. When, as in my case, the official represents his country abroad, the effect may be doubly harmful.

I am in full accord with the objectives of this subcommittee. The internal security of the United States, now probably more than ever before in our history, is vitally important to all of us. Our American way of life is threatened from within as well as from without. But we cannot, as I wrote you, Mr. Chairman, on November 9th,²

¹ Statement made before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security on Jan. 30.

² BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1951, p. 922.

defend democracy with perfidy or defeat communism with lies. And I wish to state, not as an official of our Government who has been falsely accused, but as a citizen who is deeply concerned for the welfare and security of his country, that irresponsible testimony, such as Mr. Budenz is wont to give, might have its use in a totalitarian state but has no place in our American democracy.

Mr. Budenz has made other allegations concerning me which are equally untrue though less material. Other witnesses have appeared before your Committee and made statements concerning me which are factually incorrect. Mr. Eugene Dooman's testimony concerning the formulation of a postwar surrender policy for Japan is most inaccurate; in fact, some of the policies which Mr. Dooman charges that I formulated were actually formulated under his chairmanship of the committee dealing with the problem, or by govern-

mental agencies in which I had no responsibility. Admiral Cooke's testimony about my attitude toward making available certain ammunition to the Nationalist Government of China is in error. I wish to assure you that I am prepared to discuss and correct all such testimony and discuss any other issues which this Committee may wish to consider.

But, Gentlemen, my main purpose in seeking an opportunity to come before you has been accomplished. At the Subcommittee Hearings of October 5, 1951, Senator Smith is reported as saying: "Mr. Vincent should come here and challenge Mr. Budenz' statement and say 'I am not a Communist'. That draws the issue."

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I now solemnly repeat:

I am not and never have been a Communist. I so draw the issue.

Senate Resolution Endorses European Federation

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WITH THE PRESIDENT

Senators Fulbright, McMahon, and Sparkman to the President

JANUARY 30, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: AS you know, since becoming Members of the United States Senate, our efforts have been directed toward the establishment and maintenance of peace and the preservation of the dignity of man. In order to be fully equipped to make the maximum contribution toward the achievement of this end, we have given constant study and consideration both to political and economic history and to the possible solutions to the many problems confronting those people of the world desiring peace and freedom.

We have discussed these questions with our colleagues and with many of the leading statesmen of the world. We have long been convinced and, are now more firmly convinced than ever, that the creation of a political federation in Europe would be a great contribution—in fact, a necessary step—toward the achievement of these objectives.

The will to achieve federation is present among the people of Europe, as well as among their statesmen and their leaders. We believe the necessity is felt. This Government has taken positive steps to encourage, indeed to facilitate, such a federation. The Congress has manifested in legislation over the past several years its interest in European unity. What is now needed is a clear statement by this Government formally declaring

its sympathy for the creation of a political federation in Europe. We should encourage the European countries to call a constitutional convention to lay the groundwork for European political federation at the earliest possible date.

With this in mind, we intend to introduce the attached resolution in the United States Senate. It is our sincere hope that you will find it possible to lend it your support and encouragement.

Respectfully yours,

J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
United States Senator.

BRIEN MCMAHON,
United States Senator.

JOHN J. SPARKMAN,
United States Senator.

The President to Senators Fulbright, McMahon, and Sparkman

JANUARY 30, 1952¹

DEAR SENATORS: I have your letter advising me of your intention to introduce a resolution designed to bring about a declaration by this Government of its sympathy for the early creation, within the framework of the North Atlantic community, of a political federation in Europe.

I believe such a declaration would do much to encourage our European friends to move ahead vigorously toward this objective. I believe sin-

¹ Printed from *Cong. Rec.* of Jan. 31, p. 690.

cerely that the creation of a political federation in Europe, uniting the strength of free peoples on that continent, would be one of the greatest contributions that could be made toward the advancement of freedom and the maintenance of peace.

It is my hope that the United States Senate will give this resolution its careful consideration and its wholehearted approval.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

STATEMENTS BY SPONSORS²

Senator Fulbright

Mr. President, I consider this to be a very historic resolution. For centuries some of the wisest men in the world have advocated the political unification of Europe. Many of the bloodiest wars, particularly the two world wars in which we have been involved, have grown out of the friction which has resulted from the political and economic fragmentation of Europe. So this resolution we are advocating is not an idealistic dream. The European leaders themselves are taking the lead and are making progress toward the economic integration of their countries, as proved by the adoption of the Schuman plan only a few days ago by the legislature of Western Germany.

Mr. President, I am very pleased, indeed, that the President of the United States has given his strong approval to the resolution. In my opinion, it is one of the most hopeful and farsighted policies he has ever supported.

Senator McMahon

Mr. President, I appreciate the cooperative spirit which has been evidenced by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in this matter. I hope the committee will be able to consider the resolution very quickly, because it is a matter of the first importance. I came firmly to that conclusion after attending the meeting at Strasbourg of the 14 Members of Congress who convened with the delegates of the European Consultative Assembly for a 5-day meeting.

This resolution, if adopted, would place the Senate on record in favor of the immediate calling of a constitutional assemblage in Europe for the purpose of bringing about a United States of

Europe, which means the political, economic, and military unification of that continent. I say to the Senate that unless that is achieved, we shall not be able to relieve ourselves of the burden which we are now carrying.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION³

WHEREAS it is now well recognized, both here and abroad, that many past wars, including the two World Wars, have had as one of their underlying causes political disunity in Europe; and

WHEREAS a vast majority of the statesmen of the Western World now agree that further European unity is vital to the economic and military security of the free world; and

WHEREAS it is the policy of this Government to encourage all measures looking toward the closer association of the European nations; and

WHEREAS this Government has already taken positive steps, such as the enactment of the European recovery program and the encouragement of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union, which have paved the way for greater unity; and

WHEREAS a number of important nations of Europe have demonstrated the sincerity of their desire to attain further unity by initiating such unification programs as the Schuman plan, the Council of Europe, and the European defense community; and

WHEREAS the Foreign Ministers of France, the Federal German Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg declared on December 30, 1951, that the unification of Europe remains one of the essential goals of their Governments; and

WHEREAS it is believed that the realization of this desire would produce a powerful new democratic state, capable of sustaining itself politically, economically, and militarily and able to contribute greatly to the achievement of world peace; and

WHEREAS it is clear that the United States has a profound interest in a strong and free Europe; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the United States Senate that this Government declare its interest in the early creation within the framework of the North Atlantic community of a united states of Europe, or whatever other form of political federation the countries concerned deem most suitable; be it further

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that it would welcome the calling of a European constitutional convention to lay the groundwork for a European political federation at the earliest date possible; and be it further

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that this Government now proclaim its intention of cooperating with any new European federal government that may be brought into being; and finally be it

Resolved That it is the sense of the Senate that the collaboration of a united states of Europe and the United States of America along with the other free nations of the world, dedicated to the same principles, would be one of the greatest contributions of this century to the preservation of freedom and the attainment of peace on earth.

² Made in the Senate on Jan. 31 and printed from the *Cong. Rec.* of that date, p. 690.

³ S. Res. 269.

Explanation of Authority and Responsibility for IMC

[Released to the press February 7]

Following is the text of a letter from Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, to Senator Ferguson concerning the International Materials Conference:

FEBRUARY 7, 1952

MY DEAR SENATOR FERGUSON: In your speeches in the Senate of January 31¹ and February 4,² you directed certain questions to the Secretary of State concerning the International Materials Conference. The answers to your questions are given below, but first, let me state what the International Materials Conference is and why it was established.

The International Materials Conference (IMC)³ is the collective title applied to 7 autonomous commodity committees, a Central Group, and a Secretariat, which were organized early in 1951, at the initiative of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Serious shortages in raw materials and rapidly rising raw material prices were threatening to jeopardize defense production and the struggle against inflation in the countries of the free world. International consultation and action were clearly required. The IMC was established to provide a framework of international consultation in which the major producing and consuming countries of the free world could review the supply and demand position of important commodities, could seek to reach agreement on action to be taken by governments for increased production and more effective conservation and use of the commodities, and could develop agreed measures for equitable distribution of the available supplies.

Your first question was "By what authority in law does the IMC operate?"

The authority for the participation of the United States in this Conference is the authority of the President to negotiate with other countries in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States. The IMC has no authority to tell any government what it may or may not do with respect to any material. The IMC can only develop agreement among the representatives of countries that they will recommend that their governments take specific action to solve urgent problems. The

governments retain their full right to reject these recommendations. As a matter of fact, the recommendations developed in the IMC have been generally accepted by the participating countries and the nonmember governments.

You also ask "Who decides as to the selection of some commodities and the exclusion of others? Who decides what countries may join?"

The raw materials selected for coverage by the commodity committees were those which in the opinion of the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France required immediate attention because of the widespread need for them and the great apparent shortage. The seven committees then established, and now functioning, are as follows:

Copper, lead and zinc; cotton and cotton linters; manganese, nickel and cobalt; pulp and paper; sulphur; tungsten and molybdenum; and wool.

Not all commodities in short supply were considered suitable for IMC consideration. In some cases existing international machinery was considered adequate. In others, the commodity was limited in its use or production to a very few countries. Some commodities, such as coal, foodstuffs or petroleum, were not subject to serious shortages. Some commodities are so diversified in nature that for practical reasons they could not be considered effectively by a multilateral group.

The Central Group of the IMC was established to decide whether any new committees should be established, to supervise the work of the Secretariat, and to effect such coordination of the commodity committees as might be required. The Central Group originally consisted of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and France, but the Group was quickly expanded to include representatives of Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, and Italy as well. It also includes one representative each from the Organization of American States and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. The Central Group has not added any committees to the seven originally established.

The organizational principle which was followed in the commodity committees was that each should be composed of a small enough number of representatives to enable it to work efficiently and effectively, and at the same time a large enough number of countries to give adequate representation to the major producing and consuming inter-

¹ *Cong. Rec.* of Jan. 31, 1952, p. 695.

² *Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1952, p. 761.

³ BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 23.

ests in the commodity concerned. The original selection of the countries was, therefore, based on their statistical position as producers or consumers of the commodities concerned.

The commodity committees have from 11 to 16 members, representing between 80 and 90 percent of the free world production and consumption of the commodities concerned. Each committee has developed its own rules of procedure and has the power to revise its membership. A country may join a committee if it is sponsored by two members and if it receives a favorable vote. There have been several instances of members being added since the establishment of the committees. In all, 28 countries are members of at least one committee.

You ask how IMC decisions are made, how countries go about obtaining materials from the IMC, what is the appeals procedure, and is each country entitled to one vote.

The first task of an IMC committee is to accumulate and review the facts of supply and demand. The committees therefore circulate questionnaires on requirements, production, consumption, and stocks to all countries which are significant producers or consumers. If an examination of the facts in the committees shows a substantial disparity between available supplies and the requirements of the free world for defense and essential civilian purposes, the committees recommend a plan of equitable distribution.

The first programs for sulphur, tungsten, and molybdenum were developed for the third quarter of 1951, and for copper, zinc, nickel, and cobalt beginning in the fourth quarter of 1951. The committees have not made quarterly recommendations for the other commodities. World supply and demand in lead and manganese were judged to be about in balance; cotton and cotton linters, while in short supply last year, are now expected to be much easier; the wool committee did not agree on the scope of the wool shortage nor on steps to alleviate it. The pulp and paper committee dealt with newsprint on an emergency basis to enable the press of various countries in the free world to continue publication in instances where there were extreme shortages of supplies. The total quantity of newsprint on which recommendations have been made by IMC is about $\frac{3}{10}$ of 1 percent of world production. This figure is to be compared with the consumption of newsprint by the United States, which is approximately 64 percent of the production in the free world.

Countries which are members of a committee are, of course, active in presenting their own requirements. Countries which are not members of a committee are given the opportunity to appear before the committee and explain their requirements. If a country thinks that the committee has not given proper weight to its requirements, it is entitled to appeal the decision and to ask that the matter be reopened in the committee.

Controversies in the committees are not nor-

mally resolved by voting. In every case the purpose is to reach general agreement, and, if possible, to have unanimous acceptance of a committee recommendation. Since no country has delegated any authority to the IMC, it would clearly be impossible to accomplish effective collaboration on the distribution of an item in short supply if any important country concerned was not disposed to cooperate and to consider the committee recommendations to be of service to its own interests.

The results of the work of the IMC are given full publicity, and regular information bulletins are used to advise the public of the progress of committee work. Special announcements of quarterly recommendations are issued.

The basic principle in domestic allocation of scarce materials is an equitable distribution in accordance with essentiality of need, giving first priority to the defense effort. The international policy of the United States has the same objective and the same criteria. It is this general principle which has guided the United States in its actions in the IMC.

The chief U.S. delegate to the IMC is an official of the Defense Production Administration (DPA). He is responsible for determination of the position of the United States with respect to any question before the IMC committees. In developing this position, he receives the advice of all interested agencies, including the Department of State among others.

The U.S. delegates to the individual commodity committees come from a number of agencies. They are selected on the basis of their qualifications for conducting the negotiations and for their knowledge and background in the specific commodity. They receive their instructions from the DPA, and they are answerable to the DPA for the results of their negotiations. Formal action by the Government of the United States in accepting a recommendation of the IMC committee is taken by the DPA, with the advice of the interested agencies. In each case in which a proposal for distribution has been accepted by the United States, the supply authorities have been satisfied that the share received by the United States has been fair.

You have inquired concerning consultation with consuming industries in the United States, and have made a number of comments on the relationship of IMC allocations to domestic needs. I understand that Manly Fleischmann, Administrator of the Defense Production Administration, has covered most of these points in his press conference of February 6.

I believe that the above answers cover your questions, except those concerning the domestic situation to which it is more appropriate for Mr. Fleischmann to reply. However, I should like to add a word about the significance of the IMC to the conduct of our international relations. In a period of commodity shortages, difficult and delicate problems arise between the United States and

other countries, both with respect to our obtaining from foreign sources our appropriate share of those materials of which our supply is inadequate, and in determining the extent to which we should permit the continuation of the export to particular foreign destinations of materials which we control. It is greatly to our interest to achieve the most effective international distribution and use of these commodities, for the support and defense and essential civilian activity. The existence of a forum in which these commodity problems can be discussed by the major producers and consumers of each, is of tremendous value. Each country becomes aware of the problems faced by other countries, is encouraged to accept its share of the burdens resulting from the shortages, and to seek constructive ways of increasing available supplies. Although it cannot be expected to eliminate the existence of shortages, the IMC has proved to be a means of bringing into a world situation, which threatened to be a source of international ill-will, a form of international collaboration which has led to the substantial satisfaction of all countries concerned.

In view of the public nature of the discussion of this subject, the Department is making this letter available to the press after you have received it.

Sincerely yours,

WILLARD L. THORP
Assistant Secretary

Further Emergency Allocation Of Newsprint

The Pulp-Paper Committee of the International Materials Conference on January 25 announced a further emergency allocation of newsprint.

In the emergency allocation announced, the fourth of its kind, the Committee recommended the shipment of 6,150 metric tons of newsprint to the following countries:

	<i>Metric tons</i>
Ecuador	500
Germany, Federal Republic of	2,000
Israel	400
Spain	750
Turkey	500
Yugoslavia	2,000
<i>Total</i>	6,150

In the three previous allocations, a total of 27,500 metric tons of newsprint were allocated to 15 countries in special need. Today's action brings the Committee's total tonnage of emergency allocations to 33,650 metric tons to 18 countries. Ecuador, Israel, and Turkey are being assisted for the first time.

The total amounts allocated to date are as follows:

	<i>Metric tons</i>
Brazil	1,200
Chile	1,000
Dominican Republic	500
Ecuador	500
France	4,700
Germany, Federal Republic of	7,000
Greece	1,440
India	2,250
Indonesia	1,500
Israel	400
Malaya and Singapore	630
Nicaragua	400
Pakistan	450
Philippines	2,340
Spain	1,750
Turkey	500
Uruguay	1,200
Yugoslavia	5,890
<i>Total</i>	33,650

The newsprint allocated is from North American sources.

The Committee has received reports from the countries concerned on the status of shipments against the previous allocations and has found that all tonnages allocated have been shipped except some purchased by a few countries to whom deliveries are now being completed.

The Committee has been considering for some time and has agreed upon plans for a broader newsprint program for 1952 which would center upon encouraging trade in newsprint through normal commercial transactions. The 1952 over-all newsprint situation will be reviewed in February on the basis of new statistical returns requested from all countries of the free world concerning their production and requirements. After these data have been studied, the Committee will embark upon the broader newsprint program if such action is warranted.

The objectives of the broader program now contemplated would be to recommend again strictly limited emergency assistance to countries in special need and concurrently, by special measures, to encourage also the resumption of newsprint trade between producers and foreign publishers through commercial channels. The Committee does not, however, contemplate a plan involving general allocation of world newsprint supplies. The tonnage likely to become available under such a combined program would be limited. Thus it would still be necessary for all countries to do their utmost to secure their full requirements through usual commercial channels without relying upon assistance from the Committee.

The Pulp-Paper Committee reported also that Canada has reserved the right to consider a price policy, for the present and future allocations, which would result in newsprint prices closer to levels prevailing in the recipient countries. This policy recognizes the need to eliminate claims for assistance which in some cases may be based solely on considerations of price rather than supply.

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The Greek Question

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1951-52): Part I

by Harry N. Howard

Summary Account of the Greek Question

No longer a major problem in the United Nations, as it was during the years 1946-49 when guerrilla warfare raged within Greece and along its northern frontiers, the Greek question was among the first to be considered and solved, in its essential aspects, at the sixth session of the General Assembly in 1951-52. The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, to which the problem was referred, dealt with the problem of dissolving the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) and replacing it by a Balkan Subcommittee of the Peace Observation Commission in six meetings between November 19 and November 23, 1951, and considered the question of the repatriation of Greek children in meetings on November 23, 26, 1951, and January 29, 30, 1952.

As the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans itself had noted in its reports of 1950 and 1951,¹ the character of the Greek problem had changed, and, although a threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece continued, that threat was now part and parcel of the more general danger to the peace and security of the Balkan region as a whole. Moreover, the Special Committee's important service to the cause of peace, since its inception in November 1947, was clear. The Secretary-General pointed out that the United Nations had "been concerned over a five-year period with threats to the independence of Greece," and it was "generally recognized that the unceasing watch by the United Nations over the northern border of Greece" had "contributed largely to the amelioration of a dangerous situation between that country and its neighbors."²

But it was also agreed that, although the Special Committee had now finished its work, observation should be continued through the establishment of a Balkan Subcommittee of the Peace

Observation Commission, which Commission had been created by the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution adopted on November 3, 1950.³ Of course, the Soviet representative and those of the Soviet satellites agreed with none of this reasoning, repeated all the propaganda of past years, and once more attempted to perpetrate the annual fraud with respect to alleged "executions" in Greece and "mass terror," while in their own countries the gallows and the firing squad took their almost daily toll of victims charged with sabotage, espionage, and treason.

On November 23, 1951, the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee adopted a Greek proposal terminating the Special Committee on the Balkans (50-5-1), and another calling on the Peace Observation Commission to establish a Balkan Subcommittee (50-5-3). At the plenary session of December 7, 1951, the General Assembly approved the latter resolution (48-5-1) and rejected a Soviet proposal, almost identical with those which had been submitted in past years, which placed responsibility for the troubled situation in the Balkan area on the United States. Some weeks later, after failure of the Soviet satellites to make any effort to consult with respect to the repatriation of the Greek children, the *Ad Hoc* Committee, on January 30, 1952 (44-0-5) approved continuation of the Standing Committee to consult concerning this humanitarian problem, and the General Assembly approved this action on February 2, 1952 (51-0-5).

Meanwhile, the Peace Observation Commission, meeting on January 23, 1952, decided (12-2), with the Soviet and Czechoslovak representatives in opposition, to establish a Balkan Subcommittee, composed of representatives of Colombia, France, Pakistan, Sweden, and the United States, with headquarters at the seat of the United Nations. At the same time, the Greek Government requested the "immediate dispatch of observers to the frontier areas of Greece," and on January 31, at its

¹ See especially U.N. docs. A/1307, ch. v; A/1857, ch. vi.

² U.N. doc. A/1844, Add. 1.

³ For text and background, see *Uniting for Peace* (Department of State publication 4035, 1950).

first meeting, the new Balkan Subcommittee agreed to send observers. With this action, the Greek problem entered a new phase, the Peace Observation Commission had its first question, and, on February 5, the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, its work well done, came to an end.⁴

The General Debate

In view of the more pressing problems before the General Assembly, there were few references, during the general debate, to the Greek question. De Pimentel Brandao, of Brazil, pointed out on November 8 that the actions of the United Nations both in Greece and in Korea were genuine achievements in the development of collective security. Secretary Acheson also made passing reference to Greece, in connection with his description of the Soviet record in the United Nations, in which he charged that⁵

the record of the past year . . . does not reveal a single action . . . by the Soviet Union to indicate that it is willing to co-operate with the rest of the world in abating tensions and the danger of war. Its only contribution has been an artificially created "mass movement", built around slogans for peace. Despite these slogans, the familiar methods of threat and subversion are today being used against Yugoslavia as once they were used against Turkey. The method of attack by guerrilla forces to upset governments is used today in Indo-China as it once was in Greece.

A more general threat in the Balkan region, with Yugoslavia as a special target, had been indicated by the Yugoslav White Book in February 1951 and by later Yugoslav charges. But the General Assembly had hardly opened its deliberations in Paris when, on November 9, the Yugoslav delegation circulated a memorandum concerning the "hostile activities of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Albania, as well as the Governments of Czechoslo-

vakia and Poland, against Yugoslavia."⁶ In explaining the memorandum, the Yugoslav delegation stated that for more than 3 years, the U.S.S.R. had been "instigating, organizing and exercising pressure" against Yugoslavia in an attempt to overthrow the Government. With this end in view, the Soviet Union and the Cominform states were "organizing spy, subversive and terroristic activities against Yugoslavia," and "special centers for the training of terrorists" had been established. This was a theme with which the General Assembly had long been familiar, for, as Secretary Acheson had already pointed out, these were the very activities which, for a number of years, had been carried on in Greece.

When Jean Politis, the representative of Greece, spoke on November 12, he referred rather less to particular Greek problems than to the more general issues before the Sixth General assembly.⁷ He felt that "the outlook was far from reassuring" in the political and security field, and expressed Greek support for further efforts at remedying the shortcomings of the Charter along lines which had been initiated in 1950 in the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution. Greece, he indicated, was especially interested in article 73 of the Charter, which failed to mention the objective of complete emancipation of the peoples in non-self-governing territories, an obvious, if oblique, reference to the Cyprus question.⁸ Coming more particularly to the Greek question, Mr. Politis referred to the abduction of tens of thousands of Greek children, with a view to "perverting their souls," noting that perhaps by now they were "neither Greek nor children" and that it might be too late for effective action by the United Nations. In closing, Mr. Politis declared that the spirit of aggression in the world had already accounted for two victims, Greece and Korea. After fighting for 3 years for the liberation of Greece from the evil spirit of aggression, the sons of Greece had now joined the United Nations Forces to combat that evil on the other side of the globe. But he did not mean to imply that the United Nations had failed in the field of international security, for the prompt and decisive way in which the United Nations had faced the problem in Korea was sufficient proof to the contrary.

But Mr. Politis also pointed to the work of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. He believed that, by its conscientious labors, by its

⁴ For the various reports concerning the Greek question in the United Nations see U.N. docs. S/360, A/574, 644, 935, 981, 1307, 1857. For summaries of the problem see H. N. Howard, *The United Nations and the Problem of Greece* (Department of State publication 2909); *The General Assembly and the Problem of Greece*. BULLETIN supplement of Dec. 7, 1947 (Department of State publication 2986); "The Problem of Greece in the Third Session of the General Assembly," *Documents and State Papers*, January 1949 (Department of State publication 3438); *Greece and the United Nations, 1946-1949* (Department of State publication 3645); *The Greek Question in the Fourth General Assembly of the United Nations* (Department of State publication 3785); *Report of UNSCOB to the General Assembly: A Summary Account*, BULLETIN of Sept. 4, 1950, p. 363; "The Greek Question in the Fifth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations," *ibid.*, Feb. 26, 1951, p. 333; "The United Nations and Greece: The UNSCOB Report to the Sixth General Assembly," *ibid.*, Oct. 1, 1951, p. 531; *The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951* (Department of State publication 4446), p. 812.

⁵ U.N. doc. A/PV.535. See also BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1951, p. 806.

⁶ See especially Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, *White Book on Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria Toward Yugoslavia* (Belgrade, 1951), pp. 481; U.N. docs. A/1857, 1917, 1946. For Mr. Kardelj's elaboration on this theme in the general debate on Nov. 15, see U.N. doc. A/PV.345 (provisional).

⁷ U.N. doc. A/PV.340.

⁸ For a more direct reference to the Cyprus question, on the part of Mr. Mavros, of Greece, in Committee IV, on Nov. 22, 1951, see U.N. doc. A/C.4/SR.208.

"prompt and objective findings," the Special Committee had helped to shed full light on a matter which those who had instigated, aided, and abetted the guerrilla warfare in Greece had every reason to keep shrouded in mystery.⁹

Discussion in the Ad Hoc Political Committee

THE QUESTION OF EXECUTIONS

At its session on November 13,¹⁰ the General Assembly allocated the Greek question to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee for discussion. The deliberations of the Committee began on November 19, following the organization of the Committee, with the selection of Ambassador Selim Sarper of Turkey as chairman. The representatives of the Arab and certain Asian States, in particular, with the support of the Soviet representative, sought prior consideration of the Libyan problem, since Libya was scheduled to achieve independence by January 1, 1952. But an Afghan proposal to that effect was rejected by a vote of 31-19-6; and, by a vote of 32-16-9, it was decided first to discuss the Greek question and then to take up the Yugoslav complaint against the Soviet Union and its satellites.¹¹

Immediately thereafter, Yakov Malik, the Soviet representative, in accord with the previous practice of the Soviet delegation, brought up the question of alleged death sentences in Greece. In this subject, he professed a purely "humanitarian" interest, citing a cable received by Andrei Vyshinsky on November 16 from "twelve Greek democrats" under death sentence, a similar telegram having been sent to the President of the General Assembly and to the delegations of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.¹² The telegram stated that the authors had been sentenced by a special military court for participation in the struggle for "peace and democracy" and requested intervention in their behalf. "Motivated by high humanitarian principles," Mr.

Malik thought that article 2 (7) of the Charter as to domestic jurisdiction was not involved; referred to the approach to a similar problem at the Third and Fourth General Assemblies in 1948 and 1949, "with a view to saving lives"; introduced a draft resolution requesting the President of the General Assembly to enter into negotiations with the representatives of the Greek Government for the purpose of "reprieving the death penalty"; and blandly stated that rejection of his proposal "would be tantamount to ignoring the most elementary humanitarian principles."¹³

Ambassador Sarper, the chairman, opposed discussion of such an "irrelevant" matter and, in the light of his ruling in the First Committee in 1950, considered it out of order. But he permitted Mr. Politis, of Greece, to reply. Mr. Politis thought the subject "constituted an interference in the domestic affairs of a Member State in violation of the Charter" and added that if the "iron curtain" were raised to permit qualified investigators to enter, and "they were fortunate enough to return," they would "bring back valuable information which might be edifying to peoples less advanced in the fields of freedom, justice and humanity." Nor could he refrain from reference to "the kidnapping of children, the execution and shooting of dissidents, the vast forced labour camps, the deportation of millions of people to remote areas, and the systematic de-nationalization of certain countries." He then outlined the activities of the leader of the 12 convicted Greeks, indicating that they were "representatives of a country where terror reigned and of a regime which had encouraged communist aggression against Greece and Korea involving hundreds of thousands of victims." The Soviet representative's "indignation was possibly due to his chagrin at seeing nations, which it was hoped to undermine, ready and decided to defend themselves."¹⁴

Thereupon, the chairman put his ruling to a

⁹ The only other reference to the Greek question in the general debate was in the remarks of Carlos Azucar of El Salvador, who reminded the General Assembly that there were still unsolved problems with respect both to Greece and Palestine, among others. See U.N. doc. A/PV.344 (provisional).

¹⁰ U.N. docs. A/PV.342, A/1950, A/AC.53/2, 3.

¹¹ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.1.

¹² For appropriate texts see U.N. docs. A/1964, 1967, 1973, 1974. For the Soviet propaganda barrage during 1951 see U.N. docs. A/1768, 1783, 1789, 1796, 1797, 1820, 1840, 1842, 1847, 1854, 1886, 1889, 1892, 1915, 1916, 1937, 1953, 1960, 1963. For past history of the problem, see H. N. Howard, "The Problem of Greece in the Third Session of the General Assembly," *Documents and State Papers*, January 1949, pp. 581-582; *The Greek Question in the Fourth General Assembly of the United Nations*, pp. 7-11; "The Greek Question in the Fifth Session of the United Nations," *BULLETIN* of Feb. 26, 1951, pp. 338-339.

¹³ See U.N. docs. A/AC.53/SR.1, p. 4; A/AC.53/L.1. The utterly hollow character of the Soviet maneuver, obviously designed to mislead and distract the unwary, is well illustrated by the fact that not once has the Soviet representative ever protested against the very real death sentences carried out in the Eastern European satellites of the U.S.S.R.. Although there appear to have been only *eight* executions in Greece since 1949, a mere fragmentary list of death sentences publicly announced since September 1949 among the Soviet satellites, leaving aside wholesale purges, indicates that more than 200 executions for alleged espionage, treason, and sabotage have been carried out, as follows: Albania 34, Bulgaria 39, Czechoslovakia 51, Hungary 3, Poland 53, and Rumania 19. It may also be noted that on Dec. 19, 1951, the Soviet Government announced the trial and execution of two alleged Russian-refugee "spies," the first *officially* announced executions since revival of the death penalty in 1950 for "traitors, spies and saboteurs."

¹⁴ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.1. See also Mr. Politis' communications of Nov. 24, 28, 1951 in U.N. docs. A/1979, 1986.

vote and was sustained by a vote of 32-5-16, and the Committee adjourned.¹⁵

UNSCOB AND THE PEACE OBSERVATION COMMISSION

Mr. Politis opened the discussion of the Greek question on November 20, with a brief history of the problem and a description of the important work which had been accomplished by the Special Committee on the Balkans since 1947.¹⁶ Although unable to complete its conciliatory role, its work had not been in vain:

It had served to bring out the true intentions of the various parties and show clearly where the responsibility lay. It was impossible, therefore, to lay too much stress on the importance of the service rendered by the Special Committee to the cause of peace. The high aim which it had set itself and the efforts it had made to achieve that aim as objectively and conscientiously as possible were a demonstration of the moral principles on which the entire United Nations was founded.

By its work, the Special Committee "had succeeded in dispelling the obscurity and confusion which were the chief weapons of the subversive elements." Nevertheless, as the report of the Special Committee had indicated, the character of the problem had changed, and that body was no longer necessary. The Greek delegation, therefore, introduced a draft resolution,¹⁷ approving the report of the Special Committee, expressing the appreciation of the General Assembly for "the invaluable services rendered for the preservation of peace and security in the Balkans by the members of the Special Committee," gratitude to the observers, and the decision "to discontinue the Special Committee within 60 days after the adoption of this resolution." Mr. Politis also stated that, in accord with the view of the Special Committee that "the General Assembly consider the advisability of maintaining United Nations vigilance over the Balkans," Greece had joined with France, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States in submitting a further draft resolution.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb, who agreed with Mr. Politis, spoke very briefly.¹⁸ He, too, felt the Special Committee no longer necessary and thought it had performed a very useful service in keeping "the

world informed about the situation on the northern frontier and on the foreign help given to the Greek guerillas." The activities of the subversive elements had thus been exposed by what was obviously an impartial body, whose work represented one of the major successes of the United Nations.¹⁹ Nevertheless, he thought, it would be

wise to continue to bear in mind the general situation in the area. Even if the United Nations no longer had direct representatives in the Balkans, they might set up a special Balkan sub-commission, to sit in New York, which would be in a position to send observers to any Balkan country provided that that country wished it to do so.

That was, indeed, the sense of the draft resolution now submitted to the Committee. Proposed by France, Greece, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States,¹⁹ based on the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of 1950, the draft resolution requested the Peace Observation Commission to establish a Balkan Subcommission, composed of not less than three nor more than five members, with its seat at the United Nations Headquarters, with authority:

(a) To despatch such observers as it may deem necessary to any area of international tension in the Balkans on the request of any State or States concerned, but only to the territory of States consenting thereto;

(b) To visit, if it deems necessary, any area in which observation requested under (a) is being conducted;

(c) To consider such data as may be submitted to it by its members or observers and to make such reports as it deems necessary to the Peace Observation Commission and to the Secretary-General for the information of Members.

Benjamin V. Cohen, of the United States, also spoke briefly in the same vein,²⁰ noting that it was the fifth time that the General Assembly had considered the Greek problem and expressing the view that the United Nations could "take great pride in what it has done to preserve the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece." Mr. Cohen pointed out that the United Nations and its Special Committee had "steadfastly maintained vigilance along the Greek frontiers" and

¹⁵ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.1. Mr. Malik protested that the chairman had deprived the Committee of the opportunity "to discuss the possibility of saving the lives of twelve persons. The results of that decision would remain on the conscience of the chairman and of his supporters." Mr. Katz-Suchy, of Poland, made a similar point on Nov. 20 (U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.2). Chairman Sarper also ruled Ambassador Eban, of Israel, out of order on Jan. 23, when the latter, on a point of order during the Palestine discussion, recalled his appeal to President Padilla Nervo to intercede with the Iraqi Government to spare the lives of two Jews condemned to death in Baghdad (U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.47).

¹⁶ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.2.

¹⁷ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/L.2.

¹⁸ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.2.

¹⁹ U. N. doc. A/AC.53/L.3. See also Resolution 377 A (V). Composed of representatives of China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay, the Peace Observation Commission was to "observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." At the first meeting of the Commission on Mar. 16, 1951, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross noted: "Previous United Nations experience with observer groups shows how useful they can be. . . . This was very much the case, for example, in Greece, where assistance was being given from neighboring countries to the forces attempting to overthrow the Greek Government. The sending into the area of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans demonstrated that the United Nations was concerned about the tension in this area. . . . Its presence was, no doubt, a deterrent to aggression from beyond the Greek borders." (BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1951, p. 554).

²⁰ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.2; for text, see appendix I, which will be printed in the next issue.

that that vigilance had been "an important and powerful factor in deterring would-be aggressors against Greece from enlarging the scope of their hostile activities against that country." The Special Committee had rendered a signal service by its "persistent watchfulness and reporting," and it had "convincingly disproved the repeated propaganda charges accusing Greece of planning some kind of aggression against her neighbors." Although its work was essentially finished, Mr. Cohen considered it rash, in view of the tension in the Balkan area, to assume that vigilance was no longer necessary. The United Nations would, therefore, be well advised to make specific provision "for the instant renewal of observation anywhere in the Balkans, on the request of any state or states concerned," and he believed that action should be taken under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution.

Although there was no desire to invite "the renewal of aggressive action," either against Greece or any other Balkan country, Mr. Cohen felt that the United Nations should be ready, if aggression or a threat did occur, "to focus the spotlight of informed world opinion on the true facts of the situation." He closed by remarking that the changed character of the threat to Greece, "now clearly but part of the broader situation of tension prevailing in the Balkans," made "the establishment of a subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission advisable," and he urged other members of the Committee to support the joint draft resolution, "whose only purpose and only justification is the cause of peace."

There was, of course, very general agreement with the two draft resolutions which had now been set forth. Both Mr. Salazar (Dominican Republic) and Mr. Castro (El Salvador) endorsed the program, the latter emphasizing that the special Balkan Subcommission "should be entitled not only to send observers but itself to travel to the Balkans in the event of a serious threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of any of the countries in that region."²¹ Messrs. Guell (Cuba) and Macedo (Uruguay) also expressed their approval.²² Mr. Patijn, of the Netherlands, inquired whether the subcommission would be entitled to send observers to any part of the Balkans where serious international tension might arise without having to refer to the Peace Observation Commission since it should be able "to take speedy action if circumstances called for it."²³ Mr. Cohen indicated, in response, that the subcommission would be authorized "to act immediately at the request of any interested State" although he had not discussed the point with his colleagues, and Mr. Politis agreed that it "would

have full authority to send observers to the area at the request of the countries concerned."²⁴ Among others who agreed, Mostafa Bey, of Egypt, expressed his admiration for the work accomplished by the Special Committee and thought it would be useful now to replace it by a Balkan Subcommission, as had been proposed.²⁵

Some wished to close the debate at this point, but both Mr. Tsarapkin (U.S.S.R.) and Mr. Katz-Suchy (Poland) objected. The latter noted an "appeal to the General Assembly and various governments by a group of Greek prisoners at present detained in Crete." This was an obvious attempt, once more, to reopen an old propaganda theme, but Chairman Sarper declared that he "would not allow a discussion to be opened which was irrelevant to the question before the Committee" although the Polish proposal could "be studied by the Secretariat and the Chairman and appropriate action taken."²⁶

Mr. Muniz, of Brazil, opened the debate on November 21 with a statement supporting the dissolution of the Special Committee on the Balkans and the establishment of a Balkan Subcommission.²⁷ Brazil had been a member of the Special Committee, and, among other things, Mr. Muniz stressed that the Greek problem should now come "within the framework of the system of collective security which the United Nations was endeavouring to bring into operation under the terms" of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution. He also emphasized that the proposed subcommission, whose actions would in no way violate article 2 (7) of the Charter, "was a natural corollary of the collective security system," which the United Nations was "slowly and determinedly building." He felt that the Greek situation, like "all situations which potentially threatened the maintenance of peace," eventually should be dealt with through an effective collective security system. But the United Nations must not relax its efforts "to achieve that security and alter the pattern of international behaviour with that end in view."

SOVIET OPPOSITION

Mr. Tsarapkin (U.S.S.R.) maintained the position which his delegation had pursued since 1947,²⁸ that the inclusion of the Greek question on the agenda was unjustified, that the charges concerning Albania and Bulgaria were unfounded, and that the continuance of the "illegal" Special Committee on the Balkans "in any form whatsoever was completely unwarranted." Discussion of the Greek problem had been intended "by certain pow-

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.3.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²¹ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.2.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

ers" to "divert attention from the true facts of the situation in Greece; to blind public opinion" to the domestic measures in Greece and its "aggressive plans" against Albania and Bulgaria; to conceal "the flagrant interference" of the United States and the United Kingdom in Greece and "their aggressive designs in the Balkans"; and "to slander the people's democracies by preposterous charges."

Mr. Tsarapkin then made the usual charges against the Special Committee which, he asserted, "had actually become the Balkan intelligence organ of the United States Government." Moreover, by "displaying the Communist bogey," the United States "put obstacles in the way of Greek industrial development and endeavoured to keep the country as a source of raw materials for the benefit of American monopolies." In his view, too, the "complete dependence of Greece on the United States and on the United Kingdom had been achieved by its inclusion in the Atlantic bloc,"²⁹ and a "terrorist regime" had been instituted in Greece "in order to keep the freedom-loving Greek people in subservience," instances of which were the death sentences recently leveled against "twelve Greek patriots." Mr. Tsarapkin then plunged into the familiar subject of the Greek "terror":

Despite the profound indignation of the Greek people and of world public opinion, despite the condemnation of terrorism pronounced at the third, fourth and fifth sessions of the General Assembly, the movement had lost nothing of its violence and trials were held continuously by extraordinary military tribunals. The country had been transformed into a vast concentration camp. . . . It was essential that mass political slaughter in Greece should cease; the General Assembly must once more take up the cause of the victims of political terrorism. It must demand the annulment of death sentences, cessation of terrorism, the proclamation of a general amnesty and the closing of concentration camps. Peace could not be brought back to Greece so long as the representatives of the democratic movement were being persecuted and so long as the United States of America helped to maintain that situation by its interference in the country's domestic affairs.

The proposal to establish another organ was "merely an attempt to retain the Special Committee under another name." Instead, the Soviet representative proposed the immediate liquidation of the Special Committee, and, in line with past Soviet policy, introduced his own draft resolution, which, like the Soviet comments, had an altogether familiar ring; it recommended:³⁰

(a) The cessation of interference in the affairs of Greece by the United States of America;

(b) The declaration in Greece of a general amnesty, the abolition of death sentences passed by Greek courts on Greek democrats, including annulment of the death

sentence passed by a special military tribunal in Athens on 16 November 1951 on 12 Greek patriots;

(c) The establishment of diplomatic relations between Greece and Albania, and between Greece and Bulgaria;

(d) The dissolution of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.

Mr. Tsarapkin's views, of course, were re-echoed dutifully by the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Byelorussia, who spoke on November 22, although neither added anything to the discussion.³¹

GENERAL SUPPORT FOR A BALKAN SUBCOMMISSION

Meanwhile, Mr. Lopez (Philippines), who spoke on November 21, favored dissolution of the Special Committee and the establishment of a Balkan Subcommittee of the Peace Observation Commission.³² He wondered, however, whether such a body would have sufficient authority to act, and felt that

a reasonable interpretation of the Commission's terms of reference would be that it should be in a state of readiness to comply with any request that might be addressed to it [by the General Assembly, the Security Council or the Interim Committee]. The establishment of a Balkan Subcommittee could be viewed as part of the necessary process whereby the Peace Observation Commission would place itself in that state of preparedness.

Since the maintenance of international peace and security was likely to be endangered in other regions as well as the Balkans, Mr. Lopez hoped that the Peace Observation Commission would be authorized to frame its organization on a regional basis in order to be able to establish "any subcommittees that circumstances might make desirable." Mr. Lopez was also concerned that doubt might arise as to whether the Balkan Subcommittee could send observers to any territory without reference to the parent body. He was likewise concerned with its composition and felt that it would be advisable "that the stipulation regarding membership should be broadened in order to allow the participation of states which were not members of the Peace Observation Commission."³²

Additional support came from the representatives of South Africa, Colombia, Chile, and China, the latter indicating that the General Assembly was the proper authority to confer powers on the Peace Observation Commission and on any subcommission which might be established.³³ Mr. McDonnell (Canada),³⁴ who spoke on November 22, believed the Greek Government abler than any other to decide "how the United Nations could best safeguard the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece" and, therefore, supported the establishment of a subcommission. He noted that "the use to be made of the proposed subcommission would depend mainly on the Balkan countries themselves. Contrary to the insinu-

²⁹ Both Greece and Turkey were recommended for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on Sept. 21, 1951. The United States Senate, on Feb. 7, 1952, by a vote of 73-2, approved ratification of the protocol to this effect.

³⁰ See U.N. docs. A/AC.53/L. 5, 6.

³¹ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.4.

³² U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.3.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.4.

ations of certain representatives, the United Nations would not force its good offices on anyone but would remain at the disposal of all who appealed to it."

Of particular interest were the remarks of Mr. Prica (Yugoslavia),³⁵ who noted that "the situation in the Balkans was liable to constitute a threat to international peace" and that it was "desirable that the United Nations should continue to deal with it and should request one of its organs to observe developments in that area." Moreover, "it was logical to entrust that duty to a sub-commission of the Peace Observation Commission," but "the sub-commission's observers would of course only be sent to countries which made a request to that effect." Mr. Prica recalled the repeated Soviet and satellite propaganda as to "executions" and "political terror" in Greece, declaring that, while the Yugoslav delegation had always supported requests for the repeal of death sentences,

it nevertheless considered that it was not for those who had made the Greek democratic movement an instrument of their own policy to claim to be the protectors of democracy in Greece. It was, moreover, odd to find that the U.S.S.R. draft resolution only concerned twelve patriots condemned by the military tribunal in Athens and was silent with regard to General Markos, leader and organizer of resistance against the fascist invaders of Greece, of whom there had been no further news since it had been learnt that he was in Hungary. . . .

Mr. Prica also enumerated other counts in the score against the Soviet Union on this "humanitarian" subject and stated that Yugoslavia could "not support the U.S.S.R. draft resolution, the true aim of which was to make use of the tragic fate of human beings to serve a hegemony contrary to the independence of the Balkan nations."

Mr. Tange (Australia) replied to the Soviet charges against the Special Committee and declared that it had not only done useful work, but that³⁶

its members and observers had spared no effort in the fulfilment of their dual functions: first, to promote conciliation between Greece and its northern neighbours and establish diplomatic relations between them; and, secondly, to furnish the United Nations with carefully sifted evidence of the threat to the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece.

Similarly, Mr. Bokhari (Pakistan)³⁷ was gratified that the Greek Government no longer believed continuance of the Special Committee necessary and believed that a Balkan Subcommittee should

be established although he believed it superfluous to define its functions in detail. It would be better "to leave to the sub-commission and the States concerned the responsibility of taking any measures which might prove necessary." But he hoped the appointment of the subcommission, "which should serve the interests of all States," would not "give rise to any unjustifiable suspicion."

Mr. Corner (New Zealand), who also paid tribute to the Greek people, referred to the material assistance which had been given to them by the United Kingdom and the United States.³⁸ He thought establishment of a Balkan Subcommittee "a sound measure" since the "present threats to Greece and Yugoslavia from the Cominform fully justifies the maintenance of an observer body in that region." Mr. Savut (Turkey) shared these views, expressed the anxiety which the situation in Greece had caused the Turkish Government for the past 5 years, and pointed out that the threat to Greece "had not entirely disappeared."³⁹

THE URUGUAYAN PROPOSAL ON DEATH SENTENCES

As the meeting drew to a close on November 22, Mr. Macedo (Uruguay) requested an opportunity to speak in order to submit a resolution concerning recently pronounced Greek death sentences. The draft resolution, which expressed no judgment but was concerned merely with the penalties, was similar to resolutions presented in 1948 and 1949 and requested the President of the General Assembly "to use his good offices to induce the Government of Greece to commute the penalties imposed by the Greek courts and to refrain from executing the death sentences pronounced."⁴⁰ Mr. Politis, of Greece, immediately protested that, although he respected the motives of Mr. Macedo, the draft resolution had lost its purpose, in view of the chairman's ruling on November 19. Similarly, Ambassador Sarper thought it inadmissible but gave no ruling on the subject, article 112 of the Rules of Procedure being applicable, in his view, and the meeting was adjourned.⁴¹ But when the Committee met on November 23, it discussed the matter again, with members of the Soviet bloc making much use of the occasion for propaganda purposes.⁴² Ultimately, the chairman repeated his ruling of November 19 and stated that the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Uruguay was "inacceptable." On challenge, the ruling was sustained by a vote of 26-11-19.⁴³

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*; A/AC.53/L.8.

³⁸ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.4.

³⁹ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.5. In this connection, five more Czechoslovak nationals were executed on Feb. 7, 1952, bringing the total of announced executions in Eastern Europe since October 1951 to 130.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.* It is of interest to note that M. Karaivanov, writing in the official organ of the Yugoslav Communist Party, *Borba*, on Dec. 4, 1951, declared that Markos, the former Greek guerrilla chieftain, had been murdered by Nicholas Zadhariades, the Greek Communist leader, who supplanted him after the Yugoslav-Cominform break in 1948.

⁴² U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.4.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

After this strange interlude, discussion of the Greek question continued on the afternoon of November 23, Mr. Macedo (Uruguay) indicating his support of a Balkan Subcommission.⁴⁴ Mr. Ordonneau (France) also thought it "wise to envisage the establishment of a sub-commission of observation in a region where the situation had improved but was far from being stabilized."⁴⁵ While Mr. Palamarchuk (Ukrainian S.S.R.) repeated the Soviet position, Mr. Tamba (Liberia) utterly rejected it.⁴⁶ But he was followed by Mr. Katz-Suchy (Poland),⁴⁷ who reiterated the Soviet thesis all over again, noting the Greek aspirations with regard to Northern Epirus and declaring that "it was strange to note that, while the population of Cyprus was claiming union with Greece, the Greek Government did not dare to say anything about its rights to that island, which was at present a base for British troops." Called to order for irrelevance, Mr. Katz-Suchy indicated that he was speaking "strictly within the subject of threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. Cyprus was part of Greece."⁴⁸ Once more he referred to the "prevailing political terror" in Greece and to the invitation to Greece to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as "a direct threat to the independence of Bulgaria and Albania" and called for the end of the Special Committee on the Balkans and a cessation of "foreign interference" in Greece. Andraos Bey (Egypt), on the other hand, challenged the Soviet position and felt that all who really wished to safeguard the independence of Greece must support the resolutions submitted by Greece and by the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Greece, and Mexico.⁴⁹

Before the Committee was ready to vote, Mr. Politis made a reply to the Soviet charges against Greece.⁵⁰ Among other things he referred to an espionage ring which had been found recently in Athens and pointed out that

all the reports of the Special Committee on the Balkans had established that the countries within the Soviet Union's sphere of influence had shared in the conspiracy against Greece. . . . It was inevitable to ask who financed such subversive organizations, the activities of which were obviously co-ordinated. That co-ordination was made clear from the report of the Special Committee on the Balkans, and was proof of the connivance of the USSR and the people's democracies. The representatives

of those countries had therefore no right to discuss the domestic affairs of Greece, since it was not possible to be at the same time the guilty party and the judge.

Moreover, as representatives of regimes "based on terror," they "were in no position to pass judgment on respect for human rights in other countries." Nor could Mr. Politis accept the Soviet thesis concerning executions in Greece as at all genuine. As to the alleged "aggressive designs of Greece on Albania and Bulgaria," he stated:⁵¹

Since the peace treaty . . . those countries had closed their frontiers, refused to comply with the clauses of the treaty and broken off all contact with Greece. It was Greece that had proposed to Bulgaria and Albania the resumption of diplomatic relations, but their reply had been that they would only accept such a proposal if Greece complied with the conditions formulated by the USSR, namely, if it changed its form of government.

Greece's sole aim was to maintain itself on the land which it had occupied for three thousand years. Greece's strength resided in the courage of its sons and in the defence of the freedoms and institutions which were its pride.

Mr. Politis was also grateful for British and American assistance to Greece, and Mr. Cohen intervened to state that the aid given by the United States was "a continuance of the type of aid given to other peoples during the war under the lend-lease programme, of which the Soviet Union had received a generous share."⁵²

At the end of this discussion on November 23, the Committee,⁵³ after rejecting a Soviet amendment calling for immediate dissolution of the Special Committee on the Balkans, adopted by a vote of 50-5-1 the Greek proposal calling for its dissolution within 60 days after approval of the resolution by the General Assembly. The customary Soviet resolution⁵⁴ calling for cessation of "foreign interference" in Greece, a "general amnesty," repeal of death sentences, renewal of diplomatic relations with Albania and Bulgaria, and dissolution of the Special Committee was rejected on a paragraph-by-paragraph vote, and a vote on the resolution as a whole, under rule 128, was refused.

⁵¹ When similar charges were made in Committee I on Jan. 24, 1952, Mr. Politis pointed out that Greece had accepted the efforts of the Conciliation Committee in 1948 and 1949, whereas Albania and Bulgaria had rejected its proposals. (U.N. doc. A/CC.1/SR.499).

⁵² U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.6. For a similar statement, on Nov. 13, 1950, see BULLETIN of Feb. 26, 1951, p. 347. Mr. Cohen pointed out that the aid remained subject to conditions laid down by the United Nations and was not impressed by the Soviet insistence "that there could never be freedom in Greece until Greece was willing to accept the dictates of the Cominform."

⁵³ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.6, A/AC.53/L.2, L. 5. A Chilean draft resolution was withdrawn.

⁵⁴ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/L.6. The paragraphs were rejected as follows: Preamble, 32-8-11; cessation of interference, 46-5-8; amnesty, 37-5-12; executions, 31-10-13; diplomatic relations, 22-12-18; dissolution of Unscob, 33-9-12.

⁴⁴ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.6.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ See also the remarks of Mr. Mavros (Greece) in Committee IV, Nov. 22, on Cyprus (U.N. doc. A/C.4/SR.208).

⁴⁹ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.6.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* See also U.N. docs. A/1979, 1986.

India's Participation in Economic Development Programs

by Willard L. Thorp

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When we talk about economic development, we are not talking about castles in the air, but about a vital process which is actually going on. The world economy is not standing still. In many countries these are days of great change.

We all know of the great political changes since the end of the war. Some countries have lost their independence and have become satellites. Other countries have become independent and assumed sovereign responsibility for their own future. There are no such startling revolutionary changes in the social and economic field. But here, too, something new has been added. The magnificent statement of purpose in the United Nations Charter—"We the peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom"—is a determination which is finding its expression in many countries at this very moment. And the collective expression in the U.N. Charter is also finding its manifestation in new international arrangements and greatly increased efforts to make the ideal of social and economic progress a reality.

Before the development of modern communication and transportation, it was possible for the people in many areas to live in complete ignorance of the possibility of progress. There was no disturbing gap between their ambition and their realization. They lived as their ancestors had lived, suffered as their ancestors had suffered, and brought up their children to follow in their own limited footsteps.

There is very little of such contentment in the world today. The flow of information in the free world has brought to millions an awareness that abject poverty, disease, and misery are not the only way of life. In a sense, we in America have aggravated this discontent, for they have heard and sometimes seen demonstrations of the political, social, and material advancement which the American people have achieved in an environment of freedom and opportunity. In many areas, their

discontent has been fanned by Communist propaganda. This discontent can lead to disorder and chaos, or it can provide the driving force for constructive action. Whether these peoples proceed in democratic ways with the encouragement and cooperation of the free world, or whether they accept glittering Communist promises, is a great challenge to them and to us. This challenge carries with it an urgent requirement of sustained and effective action by the free world.

Rate of Progress Depends on Outside Cooperation

It is easy to agree that poverty, disease, and ignorance are enemies which must be conquered—that social and economic progress are desirable objectives. It is more difficult to do something about it. However, certain things are clear. Most important is the fact that these problems must be tackled within and by each country concerned. Social progress and economic development cannot be imported. They must be an integral part of the life process of the country and must be incorporated into the living organism.

Progress necessarily implies change—often great change. There may need to be changes in institutions, changes in the way of doing things, and even changes in the attitude towards change. The process may require substantial short-run sacrifices, as energies and efforts are devoted to the future rather than the present. These things, and more, the country must do itself.

This is not to say that many forms of encouragement and support cannot come from outside. In fact, in most underdeveloped areas, the rate of progress will turn in large part on outside cooperation. However, assistance from the outside can achieve little unless there is an inner compulsion to progress, a determination on the part of the people and the government involved, and a concrete program for action. But, once that determination is established and responsibility for action assumed, it can be strengthened and aided greatly by international cooperation. For countries as for individuals a little help of the right kind at the right time can completely change the future.

¹ Address made before the Fifth Annual Rochester Institute of International Affairs, at Rochester, N. Y., on Feb. 16 and released to the press on the same date.

International participation can take many forms, but it can be briefly summarized under the two headings of "experience" and "capital." It would be absurd for any country to try to rediscover for itself all the hard-won advances of science and technology made elsewhere, as well as the equally important body of experience in practical application. The problem for the relatively underdeveloped countries is not so much one of making new discoveries as of adapting and applying techniques and skills presently being utilized in other countries.

Even with outside aid, the problem faced by any country of achieving the widespread application of new skills and techniques is tremendously difficult. To create an educational system, teachers may first have to train other teachers. To improve agriculture may require the creation of an agricultural extension system, though it took decades to build our own network of county agents. Public health development will require a great increase in the number of doctors and nurses. And the knowledge required for the care and use of machinery cannot be acquired over night. These are tremendous undertakings for any country in terms of both cost and effort. Yet there is no other way to deal effectively with poverty, disease, and ignorance.

The second requirement for economic development is capital. In many of these countries, the national product and the standard of living are so low that there is little margin that can go into investments that would increase productivity. The problem of obtaining capital within any country for economic development is essentially one of sacrificing the present for the future. Whether the capital is saved by individuals or raised through government taxes, it means that purchasing power is taken out of current consumption for the purpose of increasing productivity in the future. For countries with an already miserable standard of living, this is a painful choice.

But obtaining capital from outside sources also raises problems both for the receiver and the source. The country seeking capital must face such matters as the distrust which there may be of "foreign" influence and the undesirability of undertaking an obligation requiring the meeting of interest charges and repaying principal in the future in foreign currencies. At the source there are all the questions which arise in connection with making any investment as to risk and return. Nevertheless, capital is needed, whether it be for a hoe, a tractor, or a power plant, if standards of living are to be substantially increased.

One further general point needs to be made, and that is that there is no inevitably right pattern or form of economic development. Each country faces a different set of problems, not merely created by varied resource patterns, but also by its cultural characteristics and the nature of its institutions. Oftentimes, basic work in fields such

as health and education are first essentials. Energies, at first, may have to be largely dedicated to public service projects such as road building, water supply, or drainage. But, fortunately, development projects are cumulative. Progress in one field opens the door to progress in another. Sometimes, there may be a spectacular achievement, such as the elimination of a disease like malaria from an area. More often, the gains will be slow as compared with the need. But there is no other way. The very fact that the effort is being made and sustained makes progress and hope the keynote of society rather than sterility and despair.

Discussion of Developments in India

I have been talking in general terms about social and economic progress and the urgency of action. I wish that I could report in considerable detail on the steps which are being taken in many different countries. However, I think it may be helpful to take one country as an example, and therefore I propose to discuss briefly some of the developments in India.

India achieved its independence in 1947, and her constitution became effective about 2 years ago. Although it has had the tremendous problem of establishing a new government, India has already moved ahead vigorously in the direction of social and economic progress. A country with about two-fifths the area of the United States, India's population is about 350 million as compared with our 150 million. Almost 70 percent of the population are dependent upon agriculture, although there is some industrial development, notably textile, steel, cement, and jute manufacture. It has urban problems too, for Calcutta has over 2 million inhabitants and Bombay about 1.5 million. The level of its productivity is indicated by the fact that the average annual income amounts to about \$60 per person. The new political status has resulted in a new democratic structure instead of the 9 provinces and 584 Princely states, and the problems in establishing an effective government operation are not easily overcome. In addition, there are tremendous problems posed by the heritage from the past in the social and economic field.

I have already said that ultimate responsibility for economic development in any country rests with its government. Under the British rule, considerable planning had been done. However, in 1950 the new government of India established a Planning Commission to develop a comprehensive development program for the public sector of the Indian economy. The Central Government, in consultation with the state governments, has assumed the full responsibility for undertaking steps to develop the Indian economy over a 5-year period. This is a national program approved by the national parliament.

The plan is not merely a blueprint of projects but also is built around a budget. It is to be financed primarily from internal financial resources. The government, for instance, has estimated that from budgetary surpluses, increased state taxes, long-term internal borrowing, economies in nondevelopmental budgetary items, and domestic private investment it will be able to provide about two-thirds of the total cost of the 5-year program which calls for an outlay, translating rupees into dollars, of \$3.8 billion. The remaining one-third of the cost will be covered from other sources such as Colombo Plan aid, foreign loans and grant assistance, and private foreign investment.

Any development program, to be effective, must both meet the immediate needs of the economy and provide a base for further development. In the case of India, the most pressing problem both now and in the future is that of providing sufficient food for the growing population. About half of the Indian program is directly related to the development of agricultural production. It aims at an increase of 7.2 million tons in food-grains, 1.2 million bales of cotton, 375 thousand tons of oil seeds, and 690 thousand tons of sugar. This is to be accomplished through the introduction of new agricultural techniques, increased availability of fertilizers, and an increase in irrigation facilities. Other aspects of the program, designed to create a better balance in the economy, involve expenditures in the fields of transport and communications, and industry. It is worthy of note that the industrial sector in the plan is largely reserved for private investment.

Having assumed the responsibility for its own economic development, and having drawn up a program for that development which meets the most pressing needs of the economy and makes maximum use of internal financial and material resources, the government has already started to put the program into effect. It has also sought external assistance to help solve its problems. Let me describe some of the channels through which it is obtaining what I described as "experience." I shall speak of four—the United Nations, the Colombo Plan, the United States directly, and private agencies.

India already has many technical experts of its own, many of whom have studied abroad. It has excellent universities. Nevertheless, the Indian Government recognizes that the success of its development program depends to a large extent on having a much larger supply of specially trained personnel, along with adequate facilities for additional training in such fields as agronomy, public health, education, and the many other aspects of economic development.

Through the United Nations and its specialized agencies, between July 1, 1950, and December 31, 1951, 57 fellowships to train Indians abroad have been granted and \$558,000 provided both for these

fellowships and the provision of experts to India. UNESCO is assisting India in expanding and improving its training facilities in national laboratories and technological and educational institutes. The FAO has provided assistance in the development of forest resources, land reclamation, rice breeding, and for the control of crop pests. The WHO has assisted India in fighting malaria, cholera, tuberculosis, and is erecting a plant for the production of antibiotics. These various activities are being done in part as regular activities of the organizations involved, and in part from the special technical assistance fund to which 55 countries have made contributions.

Assistance From Specialized Agencies

This brief sketch of U.N. activity indicates the range and scope of the skills and resources supplied by the United Nations and its specialized agencies to assist the Indian Government in meeting its varied problems. I should like to add that the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East of the United Nations (ECAFE), is making studies of problems in this area which affect not only Indian economic advancement but relationships throughout this whole area.

The work of ECAFE includes, among other things, conferences of technicians on the mobilization of domestic capital, studies of the structure of industrial organization, surveys of raw material resources in the regions, and work in the field of flood control.

Turning from the U.N. effort, in which the United States is fully cooperating, let us look at another international effort more regional in character whereby "experience" is exchanged. You have undoubtedly heard of the "Colombo Plan," named after the city of Colombo in Ceylon. This is a term somewhat loosely used to designate an arrangement for periodic consultation among nations interested in economic development in South and Southeast Asia. Its formal title is the Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia. This Committee has issued a report describing development plans and projects of a number of countries in the region together with their estimates of cost, covering a period of 6 years. Participating countries include Australia, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand participating as observers. None of the participating countries is obligated to accept the programs and financial estimates in the report and so far economic aid programs emerging from within this framework are on a country-to-country bilateral basis. Through the technical assistance phase of the Colombo Plan, specialists in such practical fields as nursing and tractor maintenance have been sent to India, and 137 Indians given special

training in appropriate fields. The Colombo Plan is also important in connection with providing foreign capital, which I shall discuss later.

Still another channel through which "experience" is flowing to India, is the technical cooperation program of the United States. The U.S. Government has extended aid to India for the past 2 years. In fiscal year 1951 this aid was in the form of technical cooperation and totaled \$634,000. Of this amount nearly \$400,000 was obligated for agriculture and rural development work. An example of the work undertaken is the Etawah project in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Here under the guidance of Horace Holmes, a former county agent from Tennessee, 79,000 people from 102 villages covering an area of 100 square miles have demonstrated how, with proper training, cooperation and planning, food production can be increased, disease controlled, and education improved. Other types of assistance extended with U.S. Point Four aid include experts in soil research, agricultural machinery, ground water geology, mineral geology, child welfare, vaccines, and locust control. In addition, a Point Four grant of \$150,000 was made available to the American Friends Service Committee to undertake a program of rural improvement.

For the fiscal year 1952 about 54 million dollars has been allocated by the Technical Cooperation Administration for aid to India. On January 5, 1952, the United States and India signed an agreement providing for American cooperation under an expanding Point Four program. Under this agreement the United States will make available 50 million dollars for use in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952. The Indian Government is placing an equivalent amount of rupees in a common fund. This money is being used to finance projects administered in close cooperation with the Central and State Governments of India. The projects are aimed primarily at increasing the food supply of the country.

To achieve the maximum amount of development amongst the greatest number of people, the Indian Government has adopted a scheme of community development projects. Each of these projects will be made up of some 300 contiguous village areas totaling about 300 villages per area inhabited by about 200,000 people. There will be 65 of these projects, encompassing about 13 million persons. In each of these areas a combined program of development of agriculture, public health, and education will be initiated like the Etawah project I have just mentioned. The Ford Foundation has agreed to assume responsibility for the operation of 15 of these projects. The remaining 50 will be the responsibility of the Indian Government in cooperation with U.S. technicians utilizing part of the joint Indo-American fund. The primary object of this comprehensive community level approach to development is to increase agricultural production while at the same

time dealing with the related health and education problems which confront the grass root areas. They will be demonstration centers for all of India. It is a direct program in which the people can participate fully, and whose success is vitally dependent on their cooperative efforts.

In addition to all these channels, technical assistance is reaching India from various private sources. Through the years private funds from various countries including the United States have supported educational institutions, the training of Indian students abroad, and various experimental projects, particularly in the fields of agricultural development and rural welfare. At present, so far as we know, a total of 669 projects are being undertaken by U.S. mission groups in India in the fields of education, medicine, social services, industrial training, and agriculture. Similar work is being undertaken by Canadian and English mission groups. Most of these projects are small in comparison with the work being undertaken by the larger philanthropic organizations. The Ford Foundation is at present operating or making plans for activities in fields related primarily to agriculture, both in supporting certain community projects, and in increasing training and extension techniques. The Rockefeller Foundation is also operating projects in India, in the field of medicine and public health, as well as a fellowship program. It is reported that the Wattumull Foundation has a substantial program for India in the fields of education and population control.

One cannot help but be impressed with the variety of sources from which technical aid is coming, yet it is small indeed when compared to the need and the opportunity. The effectiveness of these experts is greatly enhanced by the support which they are given by the Indian Government.

Aid From Capital

The same variety of sources and type of activity is found in the field of capital. First is the assistance from a U.N. specialized agency—the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which has already extended three loans totaling 59.8 million dollars to India for economic development projects.

The first such loan, for railway rehabilitation, was made in August 1949 and provided 32.8 million dollars. This loan was to provide railway equipment for the reconstruction and development of the Indian railways. The Indian railway system was in need of extensive repair because of the heavy deterioration during the war owing to heavy military use and lack of maintenance. The Bank loan provided the financing necessary to purchase rolling stock, boilers, spare parts, and other needed railway equipment.

The second loan for 8.5 million dollars was extended in September 1949 to finance the import of equipment necessary for the reclamation of agri-

cultural land. This equipment is being used to clear millions of acres of land infested with a weed known as Kans Grass, and for a pilot program to clear about 100,000 acres of jungle land. The equipment purchased was primarily heavy duty type tractors and the related spare parts and auxiliary equipment.

The third loan for 18.5 million dollars was extended in April 1950 for the further development of the Damodar River Valley, the country's most important industrial area. This loan is being used to finance the cost of the Bokaro-Konar power project which includes the largest steam electric plant in India. The loan will finance the purchase of power-house equipment for the Bokaro steam plant, construction equipment for the Konar Dam, transmission lines, and equipment for substations. This project will provide electric energy for the expansion of coal production in the area and for the exploitation of other mineral deposits. The project will also supply water for irrigation in parts of the valley.

In 1951, at the request of the Indian Government, the I.M.R. sent a mission to India to "re-assess the country's economic and financial position, examine the planning, financing, and execution of India's development program, and report to the Bank on any projects the Government may submit for its attention." This mission has completed its survey and is now preparing this report.

In addition, there is assistance in the form of capital from other governments. Under the Colombo Plan, India has received grants of economic aid from Canada of 15 million dollars, Australia 9.4 million dollars, and New Zealand \$700,000. The United Kingdom has expressed its willingness to release the equivalent of 98 million dollars of blocked sterling balances held by India for each year of the program. These are sums available for the use of the Government of India in connection with its development program.

I have mentioned already the U.S. program for the current year of 54 million dollars. While part of this will go to finance technical cooperation, some of it will be spent for equipment which may be regarded as in the capital category. In addition to meet the emergency famine conditions in India, the Congress of the United States in 1951 authorized the granting of a loan of 190 million dollars to India to cover the purchase of badly needed wheat. The sale of this wheat in India brings Indian rupees in to the hands of the Indian Government, and they will be used to assist financing of economic development projects, particularly to increase food production to avoid drastic famine conditions in the future.

Importance of Private Capital Investment

One of the basic principles which the United States Government has emphasized in connection with economic development is the importance of

private capital investment. Not only does private investment bring capital, but it also brings with it technical knowledge and management experience. In the case of India, Ambassador Sen, speaking recently to an American business audience, pointed out the desire of India for American private capital investment. As an example, he pointed out the agreement signed on November 30, 1951, between the Government of India and the Standard Vacuum Oil Company of the United States providing for the establishment by the latter of a petroleum refinery at Bombay. This agreement has far-reaching implications for the role of private foreign investment in India. As a result of this agreement the StanVacCo was acclaimed by the Indian press "as the first foreign concern to make a large investment in free India to set up a new industry."

The agreement provides that StanVac will form an Indian company which will own and operate the refinery. About 25 percent of the cumulative preference stock of the new company will be offered to Indian investors. The company has agreed to install a 1-million ton refinery. It has agreed to train Indian personnel and to expend up to 2.5 million rupees to construct housing for Indian workers at the installation.

The Indian Government for its part has guaranteed the company against nationalization for a period of 25 years, and has agreed to give adequate compensation if the company is subsequently nationalized; to grant the necessary exchange facilities, including the payment of profits; to permit the company to import the required machinery and plant equipment at a low rate of duty and to import crude petroleum duty-free until India itself produces this resource in quantities adequate to meet the company's needs. The government has also indicated that it will install the necessary harbor facilities and use its good offices to help the company acquire land for the plant and for the housing of the employees.

It is understood that similar agreements are under negotiation with other oil companies. Other private foreign investments, especially British and Swiss, have been made in Indian industries, such as motor transportation and machine tools. In addition, private firms in countries such as Switzerland, Sweden, and Canada are "investing" in India in the form of technical cooperation. This generally involves providing materials and personnel for the training of Indians in industrial techniques in such fields as antibiotics manufacture and the production of railway equipment.

I have dwelt at length on the many programs at present proceeding in India, because through looking at one country it is easy to see realistically all the complicated facets of cooperative and coordinated endeavor on an international public and private basis that can and should give impetus to national economic development programs.

The Indians are determined to be a free and

equal partner in the achievement of a peaceful world. Our Ambassador to India recently pointed out that, if free democratic government meets the test in India, new hope and courage will be brought to all the hundreds of millions of peoples of Asia. The elections in India reveal the urgency of effective economic development work. The Government of India has accepted the challenge. Should this great effort fail, and should it be succeeded by a Communist police state, democracy's position throughout the world would be gravely endangered, and Asia's participation in a free world almost irretrievably damaged.

Programs such as I have outlined for India are going forward in many countries today, each in its own way. But I wish to make one final point, and that is that their progress is also dependent upon world economic and political conditions. Some relatively underdeveloped country may bend every effort to increase productivity through sound and effective planning of projects, through programs for the development and application of technical skill, through the mobilization of capital and the improvement of transportation and communications. It may undertake a complete program of land reform, with better land use, land tenure, farm financing and marketing facilities and the like. It may be aided by the United States or by other governments or by private agencies and private capital. But its future is still largely dependent upon world economic and world political conditions.

Men and nations achieve their highest economic potentials through the exchange of goods and services. A favorable world economic environment is one in which there is a relatively free exchange of goods among nations and where the exchange of currencies does not face the hampering restrictions that have almost been the rule in recent years. Then increased productivity can be associated with the best form of distribution and exchange.

The great essential in the political world is peace. It is hardly necessary for me to suggest that war is the great destroyer of economic and social progress. That is one reason why we must build up the military and economic strength of the free world to defend itself against hostile and aggressive encroachments of Soviet empire-building.

We must be ready to defend ourselves, but we do not need to be on the defensive. Progress is being made in the free world. The amazing recovery in Europe with the aid of the Marshall Plan, the great programs of emergency assistance, the self-help projects like Point Four and economic development, the effort to reduce trade barriers—these are all major investments in the peaceful future. These investments have been made, as all investments are made, because we have had faith in the future. We are not alone in that faith. Other countries are investing in the future too.

Secretary Acheson once called the technical-assistance program a program of using material means to achieve nonmaterial ends. Our investment in the future throughout the world is in reality an investment in human freedom and opportunity, in social and economic progress, and in peace. If these things are important to us, it follows that we must move forward with courage and determination, working at home and with other nations, to achieve these great ends.

Point Four Program in Pakistan To Be Expanded

[Released to the press February 2]

The Governments of the United States and Pakistan concluded an agreement in Karachi on February 2 through which increased American cooperation under Point Four will be made available for the technical and economic development of Pakistan.

The agreement was signed by Fazlur Rahman, Minister of Economic Affairs and of Commerce and Education, for Pakistan and by Ambassador Avra M. Warren for the United States. Under its terms, the United States will make 10 million dollars available this fiscal year for projects agreed upon by the two Governments. This sum is to be matched by an equal or greater amount in rupees by Pakistan.

The new agreement, which supplements a Point Four general agreement signed February 9, 1951,¹ provides for joint administration of the funds by a Point Four Country Director to be appointed by the Technical Cooperation Administration and an official to be named by the Pakistan Government. These two officials will be responsible for approving the projects to be carried out. Discussions are now under way in Karachi regarding projects in agriculture, power development, transportation, public health and sanitation, education, industrial development, and other fields.

When Pakistan became a nation in 1947, it was more than 85 percent agricultural. It was evident that a diversification of the economy was essential to increase the standard of living and generally strengthen the national economy. Present plans for Point Four technical cooperation with Pakistan emphasize the development and processing of the country's own resources, largely agricultural, into consumer goods for local consumption. Today, for example, Pakistan spends 150 million dollars yearly on textiles, which represent about 40 percent of the value of its commercial imports. With the installation of modern machinery, Pakistan plans to make more of the cloth

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1951, p. 299.

it needs and to divert the foreign exchange thus released to the purchase of capital goods.

Pakistan is engaged in a 6-year development program embracing more than 100 projects. The expanded Point Four cooperation program will aid in carrying out many of these projects and will be coordinated with technical and economic assistance from other sources such as the Colombo Plan, United Nations, the World Bank, and non-governmental agencies.

One of the major problems facing Pakistan is the housing and care of the hundreds of thousands of refugees who today are living in makeshift tents or without shelter. Another problem is the complete rehabilitation of the railroads. In the past, such heavy use was made of the Pakistan railroads that the rolling stock was left in a greatly depreciated condition and the 7,000 miles of track in need of repair. Point Four technicians will advise on housing and on the rehabilitation of the transportation system.

Since last February, when the Point Four general agreement was signed, more than \$700,000 has been allotted to Pakistan for technical cooperation projects in agricultural extension work; locust control; and technical advice in the manufacture of firebrick, standardization of the steel industry, truck-body design, water supply and sewer systems, and census statistics. Of the total allotment, \$385,000 was for 91 trainees now in the United States to gain expert knowledge in the fields of agriculture, reclamation and hydroelectric power, public health, education, industrial training, census, railways, highways, maternal and child health, fisheries, coast and geodetic sur-

veys, civil aviation, and housing and town planning.

A campaign against the desert locust in Pakistan last summer was a highly effective demonstration of Point Four cooperation. The locust has for ages been one of the most serious threats to crops and food supply in this part of the world. Pakistan has long had a well-organized locust-control program, based on poisoning, dusting, and other ground-control measures. Following an urgent request for additional help in dealing with the locust invasion last summer, the United States supplied several airplanes and pilots. The results of aerial spraying, which had never before been tried in Pakistan, were so impressive that the Pakistan Government is now buying several American spraying and dusting planes and is training a number of select pilots under an American Point Four instructor.

Earle Gill, chief of the Pakistan division of the TCA, heads a group of American technicians which will work out the details of the new program with Pakistan officials. Others in the group are J. Robert Fluker, Acting Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs of the Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State; William Turnage, Associate Chief, Economic Development staff, Department of State; Dr. Richard F. Boyd, New England Regional Director of the United States Public Health Service; and Karl G. Knaus, extension specialist of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, now serving as consultant to the Pakistan Ministry of Food and Agriculture in charge of the extension program in Pakistan.

An International Materials Policy for a Free World

by Manly Fleischmann

*Defense Production Administrator*¹

The agreement on basic metals just reached by the United States and the United Kingdom is an important milestone in the development of a sound international materials policy essential to the strength and survival of the free world.² While the substantive advantages of the agreement to each nation are obvious, the arrangement has longer range significance not yet generally understood on either side of the Atlantic.

As Defense Production Administrator, I was active in the negotiations which led up to the

eventual agreement. I wish to describe some of the considerations which cause me to assign an importance to the accomplishment which may not be readily apparent to persons less directly concerned.

Significance of U. S.—U. K. Agreement

The substance of the mutual contract is simply stated. The United States, in the midst of a tremendous mobilization effort, is short of aluminum and has also been unable to buy tin at what we consider a reasonable price in the world markets. The British have an even greater need for steel in any form. As a result of the arrangements

¹An address made before the Foreign Policy Association, New York, N. Y., on Feb. 14 and released to the press by the Defense Production Agency on the same date.

²BULLETIN of Jan. 28, 1952, p. 115.

just concluded, each nation will find its particular problems measurably eased. We will sell to the British approximately 1,000,000 tons of steel in shapes and forms which we can best spare; they will sell to us some 55,000,000 pounds of aluminum and 20,000 tons of tin at a price we are willing to pay.

It is significant at the outset to note that the agreement has met with both commendation and criticism in each country, though the affirmative reaction has been predominant here and in England. Such criticism as has been heard in this country is to the effect that we cannot spare either the steel or the scrap which it will one day generate; in England, it is suggested that the tin price given us is unconscionably low.

I want to make it perfectly clear that I am not particularly concerned about the exact balance sheet that arises from the transaction, though I think it can be demonstrated (as I shall attempt to do later) that the debits and credits are comparable if one can weigh steel in one scale and aluminum and tin in the other. But even if I thought that the United Kingdom had the better of the bargain, I would still be certain that both countries would win in the long run.

My immediate responsibilities have to do with the mobilization of the nation's productive capacity and the rapid build-up of our military strength. As a citizen, however, and as one whose basic interests lie in the field of international relations, I am convinced that our long-term national security and the hope for a peaceful world depend primarily on the construction and progressive strengthening of a grand alliance among the free nations. It is impossible to conceive of the erection of any such alliance except on the tested cornerstone of Anglo-American unity.

So, I would not feel that any vital American interest had been neglected if England, beset by economic and industrial problems which threaten her very existence, had in fact obtained benefits under the agreement more desperately needed by her than this nation needs what we will receive. When the free world alliance is strengthened, every free nation is the gainer—and it should be noted that in this case American aid, if it be called that, will not cost the American taxpayer one cent.

Association of Nations in International Trade

I now wish to examine the basic problem which gave rise to this most recent experiment in international cooperation—the interdependence of free nations in mobilizing our resources for security, for survival, and eventually for the winning of a peaceful world.

The association of nations in international trade has always been a source of mutual economic gain. In time of peace, the objective was a rising living standard in all participating countries, secured through maximizing in all nations the benefits de-

rived from the specialized resources, scientific knowledge, managerial capacity, and labor skills in each nation. This was the objective to which Cordell Hull dedicated his fight for reciprocal trade agreements.

Now we have even more urgent reasons for searching out ways and means for stimulating and organizing the agreements on the use of materials among the associated free nations. It is no longer a matter of maximizing economic benefits. The objective is survival—survival for the United States and survival for the free world.

Two thoroughly misleading ideas are in general circulation today. The first, reflecting the tradition of the limitless resources of the American economy, and its unparalleled productive capacity, is that going it alone we can achieve any economic objectives we choose to establish. The second, reflecting our experience in World War II, is that if we make an enormous productive effort within a short period of time we can assure our safety into the indefinite future. In my judgment, both of these ideas are erroneous, and their currency is dangerous to our national security.

Partly as a result of the depletion of our own natural resources and partly as a result of the changing technology and scale of military and industrial production, we have become to a considerable extent a "have not" nation. A recent report of the U.S. Bureau of Mines indicates that out of 38 important industrial minerals, we are self-sufficient in only 9. For another 20, domestic production provides less than 60 percent of our requirements. For 7 of these 20 minerals, we are dependent on other countries for just about 100 percent of our needs. The special material requirements of the mobilization program, multiplying at a fantastic rate our needs for nickel, copper, cobalt, columbium, uranium, and many other minerals, have greatly increased our dependence on foreign sources of supply. Even our great steel industry, with its unparalleled production capacity, can support the expansion now under way only by drawing on newly developed foreign sources of iron ore. American self-sufficiency in raw materials is a myth. We must reorient our thinking and we must plan our international policies to reflect this reality.

In addition, the crisis that confronts this generation is different in character and different in timing from the crises we faced in the two world wars of this century. The great pressure under which we live and the great dangers that we face may continue indefinitely. We must be concerned not only with securing a larger production of munitions items as quickly as we can get it—we must also be concerned with assuring the continuance of the development of new weapons and the expansion of our productive resources so that at any time in the future we will be in a position to move rapidly to maximum output of military goods. At the same time we must assure the health

of our economy and the welfare of our people by continuing to maintain high living standards and high employment.

The accomplishment of these objectives presents problems in organizing production wholly unlike those we faced in 1942. It requires the projection of production planning over a time span of years, including policies and programs for materials supply. It imposes responsibilities for purposeful integration of military, industrial, civilian, and export-import programs.

We cannot follow the pattern of 1941-45. Then, the combination that built our victory included a powerful, all-out drive for munitions output during an initial period of time bought for us by our allies, and the protection afforded our home front by distance. Now, we are mobilizing against a threat whose time of impact is unknown; the projection of the period of danger makes it impossible to follow the former policy of shutting off civilian production to devote all our resources to military production; and the raw materials balance sheet is markedly less favorable unless we make, in cooperation with our allies, more effective and more imaginative use of our collective resources. Then, we were fighting a war. Now, we are faced with a crisis whose magnitude and duration are not known. We need strength, and the potential for more strength. We need flexibility and momentum, and the capacity to direct that momentum.

When this nation decided to disarm at the conclusion of World War II, we did not fully understand the circumstances of the times. We chose to disarm, as it now appears, in the face of four technological revolutions which cannot fail to have a massive impact on the conditions of human life. There have been many technological revolutions in the past, but never, I think, has there been such a concurrence of forces leading to change as has appeared within the last decade. I have in mind specifically developments in the fields of atomic energy, jet propulsion, electronics, and petrochemicals. Any one of these four technological revolutions would have enormous implications for the problems of national survival. The four together, with their related problems of timing and materials supply that I want to discuss with you, raise issues of the greatest seriousness and introduce new concepts with respect to the unity of the free world.

Problems of Supply and Production

No one can immerse himself in the problems of materials supply and production requirements as I have done without becoming directly aware of the great dependence of this economy on foreign sources of supply. Contrary to popular belief, however, the nations on which we depend for materials are not content to accept payment in dollars if they cannot spend them for the materials and

products they need. They will send us what we need from them only if they are assured that we will send them what they need from us.

Nor can we dodge the fact that this will mean sacrifices. It will mean, on occasion, giving up supplies for which we have urgent domestic requirements. It will mean comparable sacrifices for them. These economic costs can be assessed fairly only in relation to the economic gains growing out of our imports. These gains are not always readily measurable in terms of dollars. Nor is the exchange always in terms of physical goods. It is essential that we understand this process in order to grasp its importance and in order to persuade people that the sacrifices are worthwhile and in the national interest. We must take a larger view of these issues than that of one member of Congress who recently told me that he was in favor of the deal we had worked out with the British for the exchange of metals except for the part where we sold them our steel.

Against this background, the arrangements recently concluded with the British illustrate in concrete terms the possibilities that can be developed by an imaginative approach to the problems of mutual needs and mutual assets.

American critics of this and any other transaction involving the export of any material in short supply generally regard themselves as taking a hard-headed and realistic view of the national interest. My own judgment is to the contrary. I think they fail to understand how much we have gained through the exchange; they look only at the outgo and not at the income side of the transaction. And in the larger view, I think they are unrealistic in their failure to grasp the net gain to the entire free world when its total economic strength, its mobilization potential, and its safety is increased.

ALUMINUM PRODUCTION

Let us now examine the account in more detail. As we looked forward to the first quarter of 1952 last fall, we faced a very difficult problem in aluminum. While we have planned an expansion of our aluminum production capacity that will increase our output by over 80 percent in less than 3 years, mobilization requirements, particularly for aircraft, have risen sharply before much new aluminum production has come in. Our analysis of requirements for early 1952 showed that, after meeting direct military and important defense-supporting needs, so little aluminum would be left that allotments to manufacturers of less essential civilian products would have to be cut back sharply; in some cases to less than 15 percent of their consumption in a comparable period before the Korean invasion. This would have closed hundreds or perhaps thousands of firms—most of them small—and caused widespread unemployment. Even worse, this action would have pre-

ceded by only a few months the time when the completion of a good part of the aluminum expansion program would make possible larger allotments for civilian production. The aluminum secured from the British has enabled us to increase allotments to these firms. It seems probable that it will make it possible for most of them to stay in business until our own production can take up the supply burden.

TIN PRODUCTION

The facts with respect to tin are even simpler. That metal is essential to production of every kind—military, industrial, and civilian—and we produce domestically none of our needs. Here, as elsewhere, we must import to live. For many months recently we were able to import only the smallest amounts and none from our usual major sources. The completion of our purchase contract with the British has drastically altered this most difficult and irritating international dilemma, and the assurance of an adequate supply of tin at reasonable prices now seems capable of attainment in the immediate future.

So much for our gains.

SUPPLYING STEEL TO U. K.

On the other side of the transaction, you are familiar with the very difficult problems encountered by the United Kingdom in trying to support a substantial volume of military output and at the same time maintain reasonable living standards for its people. The British are making an effort to support the mobilization program at least as great as that of any of the nations with which we have allied ourselves. As Mr. Churchill pointed out so dramatically in his recent speech before Congress,³ they need raw materials, principally steel. Increased imports from us, added to larger supplies of iron ore and scrap that we are assisting them to secure from other countries, will make it possible for them to sustain their mobilization effort without slackening, thereby contributing to the collective security of all free nations.

In sum, we have given up a limited quantity of steel that might possibly have been used here, though we have the option to deliver only those shapes and forms which are in easiest supply. In return, we have secured aluminum and tin that will, in my judgment, help us in the months ahead beyond any possible sacrifice in steel. In addition, we have made a contribution toward strengthening the defense of the free world from which we can secure, now and in the future, benefits that cannot be measured in dollars.

It is an amusing footnote to this transaction that though representatives of the American steel industry were critical of an earlier arrangement of the same sort, they have generally approved the

present agreement, since it has provided them with a market for what may well be excess steel in some forms and shapes before the end of 1952.

We have developed similar arrangements with Canada, which is a principal supplier of many materials of critical importance to our mobilization effort. I believe we should encourage the extension of these arrangements and explore ways and means of stimulating comparable relationships with other nations of the free world. In this way we will give important support to our policy of shoring up weak points in the free world's defenses and building areas of strength on which we can count.

"Exchange of Availabilities"

Let me make it perfectly clear that these arrangements are not "barters" or "swaps" in any real sense. The basic idea is rather an "exchange of availabilities"—that is, that each nation of the free world contributes what it can to the attainment of the goal of mutual security. Sometimes this will be much; sometimes little or nothing, but the material requirements of "haves" and "have nots" alike must be fairly considered and taken care of, for the defensive chain is no stronger than its weakest link.

I think it is of the greatest importance to recognize that on many occasions the exchange may be in terms of ideas or technological "know how," which cannot be assessed in the ordinary measures of barter arrangements. Brains cannot be classified by nationality, nor can weights be assigned to metallurgical or chemical processes. We may be the major munitions plant for democracy, but we are by no means the only laboratory of the free world. The British, for example, have an enormous capacity for creative engineering upon which we are drawing to our mutual benefit, as witness their invaluable contributions to the sciences of radar and jet propulsion. The international exchange of scientific knowledge and technological capacity is just as important as the international exchange of materials.

If we explore our relations with other countries in the free world with these points in mind, we find increasingly that allies can be associated with each other in a variety of different ways. Many of the free nations have demonstrated a sensible and far sighted attitude toward this issue, and it is imperative that we begin to recognize the diverse nature of their contributions.

I will say frankly that I do not think it undiplomatic or wrong to consider ways of developing effective exchange relationships with nations that are in a position to help us, or for this nation to take the lead in canvassing the possibilities openly and frankly on that basis. It seems to me that our common cause is advanced as the realization spreads that the defense of the free world is built on the elements of strength possessed by all

³ BULLETIN of Jan. 28, 1952, p. 116.

of the associated nations and does not rest at all, as is sometimes alleged, on a one-way flow of assistance that always originates in the United States. Directly and indirectly we have received much more help from our allies than most discussions have indicated. But the potential is still more impressive than the realization and deserves the most careful exploration.

The military and mobilization problems which beset this nation are duplicated in all the free nations associated with us in a common defense. In other countries the difficulties are intensified by the destruction of resources, inflation, the disappearance of financial assets, and unfavorable trade balances. In many countries unemployment and inflation are the irritants of social unrest that weaken democratic governments and inhibit their ability to support a substantial mobilization program. They have the same compelling reasons we have to search out policies and procedures for assuring economic utilization of materials and skills throughout the free world. In terms of abilities, as well as in terms of real national interest, an imaginative exploration of exchange possibilities—ranging well beyond materials—is the surest way to mutual strength and security.

Such arrangements may be worked out bilaterally, or they may be the subject of multilateral agreements, such as those embodied in the International Materials Conference, which has already demonstrated its worth in this field.

Minimizing Price Competition

To the extent that we can secure international agreements allocating materials on the basis of need, giving full effect to the composition of each nation's need in terms of normal use and current requirements for military purposes, we can minimize the destructive price competition for critical materials in world markets that has been weakening our efforts to hold off inflation and simultaneously distorting material flows without reference to the free world's defense. The international allocation of materials is as necessary and logical in this period of supply-demand unbalance as we have found domestic allocation to be in similar circumstances. We could not hope to achieve the balanced military and civilian program that we are organizing—in the face of requirements running from 50 to 100 percent in excess of supply—if we allowed price competition in free markets to direct the distribution of steel, copper, and aluminum. The essence of our programing operations under the Controlled Materials Plan in this country is that critical materials in short supply shall not be pre-empted by the highest bidders or move in accordance with normal pre-Korean consumption patterns. Rather, they are channeled to users in terms of relative essentiality of need consistent with established mobilization objectives. There are just as compelling reasons for

using the same criteria to direct the international flow of such key materials as nickel and copper. We cannot afford waste in the distribution of these resources, nor should we confound our attempts to prevent inflation and stabilize purchasing power by engaging in an auctioneering approach to material flows in world markets.

Authority of International Materials Conference

Recent criticism of the International Materials Conference (IMC) proceeds upon the wholly erroneous assumption that we have illegally signed away our right to secure our fair share of the scarce materials of the world and that we are being short-changed in the division of the supply. Nothing could be further from the fact.

In truth, the International Materials Conference has only the power to recommend—its decisions can be carried out only by full agreement of the member nations—but it is a tribute to its work that such agreements have usually been unanimous.

Again, far from being short-changed, the United States' allocations have regularly been much larger than our pre-Korea share of the international supply, this being a proper recognition of the vast demands of our tremendous mobilization effort. Our current difficulties with copper, for example, come not at all from an inadequate IMC allocation but result from our inability to find a seller who will deliver copper at our present ceiling price.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I have tried to make clear my conviction that we should, as rapidly as possible, examine with every free nation ways and means to develop more arrangements like the steel for aluminum and tin transaction recently concluded with the British. In one respect or another we are all "have nots," although collectively our material resources are large enough, if wisely administered, to meet our total mobilization requirements. I believe we can do more not only with the Atlantic nations. There are material resources in the areas of the future that only now are stirring with economic life—in the Middle East, in Africa, and in Asia, for example. In many instances, their capacity to supply our minor strategic imports, such as columbite and cobalt, constitutes a ceiling over crucial military production in the United States.

I see nothing that could be called unstatesmanlike, or even undesirable as a matter of international tactics, in bringing within the range of common discussion our needs and theirs. Not the least among the benefits to be derived by other countries from the conclusions of such mutually advantageous arrangements with the United States would be the realization by large numbers of our own people that we are really part of an

international team—members of another grand alliance. We are prone to think only that the welfare and defense of other nations is dependent upon our aid. The American public often erroneously tends to think of American assistance as a one-way street benefiting no one but the recipient. Startling as it may seem, the truth is that our own nation could not even build its defenses—even the defenses of our own border—without the aid of the other nations of the free world which produce the materials which we lack. A recognition of this principle and its extension in operation will accord to all of the nations of the free world the status of valued partners in the most important of all international undertakings. I am confident

that we can make substantial progress in this direction, using our recent arrangements with the British and the Canadians as an example of what can be accomplished in such matters.

I have no fears about the ability of the free world to maintain itself if it understands the special characteristics of the crisis of our times and organizes its resources to meet them. It will take moral courage and patience of a kind that were not called for in the last great war. It will take a willingness to recognize change and accommodate to it. Above all, it will take the wisdom to act together to build on mutual strengths, rather than yield to the selfish urge to speculate for temporary advantage in dollars or in materials.

Economic Developments in Western Germany, July-December 1951

by *William K. Miller*

The West German economy in the late months of 1951 resumed the strong upward trend that has been characteristic since the currency reform of June 1948. After a slow period in the late spring and summer months, which saw industrial production dip well below the postwar record of April and May, a pronounced recovery took place in September, October, and November, and the industrial production index and other indicators of economic activity reached new postwar highs. The December slump in industrial production, however, was more than seasonal.

The foreign trade and payments position of the Federal Republic showed a pronounced amelioration, especially in relation to the rest of Western Europe. At the beginning of April 1951, Germany had a cumulative debit with the European Payments Union (EPU) of 445 million dollars. This debit was reduced to 273 million dollars by July 1, and converted to a small credit balance at the end of the year. The balance with

the Western Hemisphere, however, did not show commensurate improvement.

Reports of difficulties in coal, steel, and other raw-material supplies persist, but these difficulties are generally considered far less critical than they were several months ago. Agricultural production reached record highs. There was a moderate rise in prices generally, with the basic materials index remaining far above the cost of living index, and continuing to rise at a more rapid rate. Unemployment rose considerably during the period but showed no marked trend if due allowance is made for the seasonal factor.

Economic recovery in West Berlin, despite a measurable improvement in the late months of the year, remained at a level far below that of the Federal Republic, and unemployment in Berlin continued at a high level.

Industry

Industrial production in Western Germany reached a postwar record high in November at 148 percent of the 1936 level. The spring and early summer months had seen a slackening in the rise of industrial activity, and then a definite slump. This decline resulted from a variety of factors, including raw-material shortages, reduced industrial buying due to high inventory positions, slackening of consumer demand, conservative banking policy, and import restrictions. At midyear, industrial production had fallen off several points from the April-May postwar high. The slump continued in August and the index fell to 129, 10

Background References

For articles on Western Germany's economic situation during 1950-51, see BULLETIN of Jan. 15, 1951, p. 100; March 26, 1951, p. 491; May 7, 1951, p. 738; June 11, 1951, p. 937; and Aug. 13, 1951, p. 255. For a background statement on the European Payments Union, see BULLETIN of May 1, 1950, p. 681. For summaries of the 1948 currency-reform laws, see BULLETIN of June 27, 1948, p. 835, and Aug. 1, 1948, p. 141. A thorough survey of the postwar coal situation in Germany appeared in the *Hicos Information Bulletin* for December 1951.

points below the level of April and May. A sharp upturn began in September and continued through the following 2 months, nearly duplicating, at a higher level, the remarkable gains made in the same months of 1950. In December the index fell 11 points to 137 (according to preliminary figures), a slump considerably in excess of the expected seasonal decline, but still stood 9 points above the index for December 1950.

The September–November gains were spread over all types of industries. Decreases occurred in only a few, and seasonal factors are important in most of these. Shoes, leather, and optical and precision instruments were among the leaders. In addition, coal, iron ore and other metal mining, iron and steel, stones and earths, potash and salt mining, steel construction, machinery, glass, electrical equipment, crude oil, chemicals, electricity, gas, ceramics, paper, and textiles reached postwar highs. Light metal production was down substantially, but this was due to a shortage of electric power at some of the facilities that operate at a high level only during the warmer months.

The coal shortage, which was serious in the early months of the year, eased considerably, as a result, primarily, of increasing production and substantial imports from the United States. Coal production, which had reached a low daily average for the year at 373,000 tons in September, maintained its expected seasonal rise and reached a level of almost 400,000 tons per working day in November and a total of somewhat over 10 million tons for the month. This level compares with a daily average of 384,000 tons in 1936, which is considered a normal prewar year; the record high of 448,000 in 1938; and averages of 284,000 for 1948, 338,000 in 1949, and 365,000 in 1950. Coal exports for the third quarter were 6.14 million tons, including the Saar exchange of about 900,000 tons, and the quota established by the International Authority for the Ruhr for the fourth quarter was 5.1 million tons, excluding the Saar exchange. This figure was agreed upon by the German Government with the other members of the Authority, and there was also agreement on quotas of 5 million tons for the first quarter of 1952, and 5 million tons plus 15 percent of production over 395,000 tons a day for the second quarter. Imports for the third quarter of 1951 reached the unusually high level of 2.6 million tons, primarily because of shipments of 1.3 million tons from the United States, and were running considerably higher during the fourth quarter. Coal stocks apparently were increasing somewhat but were still at levels far below normal at the year's end.

The Ruhr Authority, in November, considered the new export prices for German coal, along with the question of export quotas, and agreed to accept the new price schedules retroactive to July 1, 1951.

With increased coal availability, iron and steel production rose to postwar record levels; crude steel production of 1,256,500 tons in October ap-

proached rated capacity. Crude steel production, including castings, totaled 13.5 million tons for the year and maintained an annual rate of over 14 million tons during the last half.¹ Output of finished steel reached corresponding levels.

A significant part of the increased production of iron and steel was attributable to imported coal from the United States: over 300,000 tons of pig iron and 250,000 tons of crude steel in the month of October.

The scrap shortage continues to be an important problem for the steel industry in Germany, as it is elsewhere. The fuel problem, however, is now primarily one of cost rather than availability. Because of the higher cost of imported fuel as well as other increased production costs, an increase in the basic price of steel of DM 37 per ton was permitted. The steel order book continued to stand at a very high level.

A control ordinance issued in May 1951 for the purpose of regulating the distribution and use of nonferrous metals is having noticeable effects. The supply situation in metals generally was considerably easier in August and September, though nickel and electrolytic copper remained very tight and primary aluminum, copper and zinc fairly short. Resmelt aluminum and brass were abundant.

Progress in the chemical industries was erratic, apparently because of shortages in raw materials such as rock phosphate, phosphorus, phosphorous trichloride, sulphur, casein, kogasin, phenol, sodium chlorate, and potassium permanganate. However, chemicals reached a new postwar high in November.

Electric-power supplies decreased to subnormal levels in September and October, as a result of low water storage levels at the hydroelectric facilities and inadequate coal supplies. This led to consumption restrictions in North Rhine-Westphalia early in October and general restrictions decreed by the Federal Ministry of Economics for all *Laender* later in the month. The situation improved considerably in November, but restrictions continued in effect.

Railway freight car demands rose sharply in the last part of September, in response to harvest requirements, and remained at a level of about 72,000 cars per working day until the middle of November, when they resumed a more normal rate. The *Bundesbahn* was able to meet about 90 percent of peak demands. An increase in railway rates was approved by the *Bundesrat* and became effective October 15, 1951. The average increase in passenger rates was about 5 percent, and increase in freight tariffs ranged from 15 to 25 percent. If

¹The limitation on steel production under the agreement concerning industrial controls of April 3, 1951, is 11.1 million tons a year, but the agreement provides that the High Commission will allow crude steel to be produced outside the foregoing limitation where this will facilitate the defense effort.

present price levels remain stationary, the new rates should make it possible for the German railways to pay their own way in 1952, although the past year will show a substantial deficit.

Insufficient investment capital for the basic industries has been a primary bottleneck to industrial expansion. To alleviate this situation, the Federal Parliament passed a law in December to provide funds for rehabilitation and modernization of plants in these industries. A DM 1 billion fund is to be established through compulsory loans from income of other industries. The firms levied upon are entitled to receive securities of the beneficiary firms.

Agriculture

Estimates of the 1951 harvests indicate record levels for Western Germany. For the year, Western Germany produced a greater portion of its own food than at any time since the war, although very substantial imports of course were still required. Grain crops were excellent, sugar beets at a new high, and the potato crop the second largest on record. Vegetable oil crops also were up. Good crops, combined with heavy import deliveries, increased reserve stocks of basic food commodities substantially in the closing months. The supply of all types of foods was relatively good.

Labor

Unemployment rose considerably between July 1 and December 31, 1951, largely because of the seasonal factor. The increase in the winter months is, of course, due for the most part to decreased activity in outdoor industries, such as construction and building materials, and in agriculture. Employment of wage and salary earners reached a new postwar high of 14,884,500 at the end of September, an increase of 450,000 over the corresponding date for 1950. During October registered unemployment reached a new low for over 2 years at about 1,215,000. The decrease in unemployed from July through October was less marked than during the same period of the previous year, however, and the increase in the closing months, particularly December, was rather sharp. Registered unemployment reached 1,653,000 at the end of the year.

A notable occurrence of the period was a 4-week work stoppage in the Hesse metal industries, the longest and largest strike in postwar Germany. The walk-out was terminated in September by management-union acceptance of a mediation proposal. The strike had been considered a test of strength by union and employers, transcending in importance the confines of Hesse. The union had announced that any gains achieved would be used as a basis for fulfillment of wage demands in the metal industry in other areas. Shortly afterward, 700,000 metal workers in North Rhine-Westphalia

achieved increases, and the metal workers of Rhineland-Palatinate and Bremen were soon to follow. Building workers throughout the Federal Republic also obtained an increase in their basic wage.

Foreign Trade and Payments

Improvement of the foreign trade and payments position of the Federal Republic was pronounced, especially as regards the ERM. As of April 1, 1951, the Federal Republic had a cumulative debit with ERM of 445 million dollars, far in excess of her quota. As a result of restrictive measures relating to imports, Germany began running a steady surplus in trade with other ERM members and reduced the debit to 273 million dollars by July 1. This trend continued in the following months, and in November a small credit balance was achieved. A cumulative surplus of 43 million dollars existed at the end of the year. Import restrictions applying to a wide variety of commodities were liberalized as of January 1, 1952, in compliance with recommendation by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).

The improvement in the over-all foreign trade balance, while by no means commensurate with the improvements in the ERM position, was very satisfactory. As measured by value, both exports and imports increased markedly during the period, and both reach postwar records in September, when exports were 325 million dollars and imports 375 million dollars. The official figures for October and November showed considerably decreased totals for both exports and imports, but exports again reached a new high in the reported December total of 377 million dollars. For the 6-month period as a whole, there was a slight export balance amounting to about 60 million dollars. This compares with an export balance of over 300 million dollars with ERM. Trade with the Western Hemisphere and with the United States continued to show substantial import balances. In view of changes in the terms of trade, exports on a volume basis receded somewhat from previous levels, but the September volume of imports was a new high.

The principal reason for the large and sudden increase in September imports was the revision of the tariff system effective October 1, 1951. The new tariffs are ad valorem rather than being based on standards of quantity and weight and are generally higher than the old. Importers made a marked effort, therefore, to use outstanding licenses on commodities for quick delivery. Seasonal imports of grain and other agricultural products and heavy imports of coal from the United States also contributed to the increase.

A new system for reporting exports, which became effective October 1, 1951, probably undervalued exports for October and November. The high figure for December, on the other hand, is partially due to the statistical lag, making up much

of the deficit in the reported totals for the previous two months. Import figures were not affected by the new system.

Prices

Prices generally remained level or moved downward somewhat during the third quarter, but resumed an upward trend in the last 3 months of the year. The cost-of-living index rose only three points over the 6-month period, from 167 to 170 (1938=100), but the basic materials index continued the rapid rise that has been in evidence since the invasion of Korea, climbing from 247 to 262, and the industrial products index climbed from 221 to 228. All of the closing figures were highs for the period since the currency reform, though the cost of living index is still approximately equal to the levels of the winter of 1948-49.

Finance

The volume of money continued to increase at a steady rate, as it has nearly every month since the currency reform. The total volume of money, including currency in circulation and all types of bank deposits, was slightly over DM 33 billion (or 7.85 billion dollars) as of October 31, 1951, an increase of DM 1.5 billion since June 30. The greater volume of currency in circulation, sight deposits at commercial banks, and savings deposits accounted for the increase. The expansion of the volume of money, however, was little more than commensurate with the general increase of prices, and relatively tight credit policies continued to prevail.

Federal Government receipts continued to run somewhat short of expenditures in July and August, but exceeded expenditures in September. This was a temporary phenomenon, due largely to payment of quarterly corporate tax installments, and there was again a deficit in October. The trend of Federal Government receipts was markedly upward, however, a result primarily of increased return from the turn-over tax, the October increase in the corporate tax, and increased receipts from the corporate tax due to increased industrial activity. The Federal Government introduced special luxury tax proposals in an effort to find further sources of revenue, but these proposals were considered politically dead at year's end.

The value of the Deutschemerk in the free market fluctuated, moving from \$0.219 as of June 30, 1951 (Swiss free market) to \$0.201 on September 30, and was around \$0.21 at the end of the year. The official rate throughout the period was approximately \$0.238.

Berlin

The industrial production index for West Berlin fluctuated during the period, with a low of

41 (1936=100) for August and a high of 51 for November. Although there was evidence of an upward trend, the November figure representing a seven point increase over the figure for June, industrial and commercial activity remained far below levels achieved in the Federal Republic, and unemployment continued to be a serious problem. The total number of registered unemployed decreased from 292,000 to 277,000 between July and December, but this apparent improvement was due largely, if not entirely, to the removal from the rolls during the period of several thousand persons who had registered as unemployed but are no longer seeking work. The number of employed rose somewhat during the autumn months, but fell in December, presumably because of seasonal factors, and stood at 896,000 (including self-employed) at the end of the year. This represents a small improvement over December 1950. The registered unemployed still constitute around 24 percent of the total labor force, however, or about 27 percent if the calculation is based on the wage and salary earning labor force.

A negative balance in West Berlin's current external commodity trade continued, despite evidences of some reduction in the monthly debit balances. By far the greater part of this trade is with the Federal Republic. Trade with foreign countries showed consistent credit balances, though these were generally less than 10 percent of overall debit figures.

Berlin's second postwar Industry Fair was held during October, with results that were generally considered satisfactory. There were 778,000 visitors to the 2-week exhibition, including 30,000 from West Germany and 4,500 from foreign countries.

• *Mr. Miller, author of the above article, is an economist in the Office of German Affairs.*

Letters of Credence

Austria

The newly appointed Ambassador of Austria, Max Loewenthal-Chlumsky, presented his credentials to the President on February 13. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 112 of February 13.

Philippines

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Philippines, Carlos P. Romulo, presented his credentials to the President on February 15. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 116 of February 15.

Greek-Turkish Protocol to NATO Enters Into Force

[Released to the press February 15]

On February 15, 1952, the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey, which was opened for signature at London on October 17, 1951, came into force.¹ Article III of the protocol provides that it shall enter into force when each of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of its acceptance thereof. Notifications of acceptance of the protocol were received by the United States Government on the following dates:

Belgium	February 14, 1952
Canada	January 21, 1952
Denmark	February 2, 1952
France	February 14, 1952
Iceland	January 29, 1952
Italy	February 15, 1952
Luxembourg	February 5, 1952
Netherlands	February 7, 1952
Norway	January 24, 1952
Portugal	February 8, 1952
United Kingdom	December 6, 1951
United States	February 11, 1952

Acting under the provisions of article I of the protocol, the United States Government, on behalf of all the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, is communicating to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and to the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Article I of the protocol further provides that the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey shall each become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States.

VOA Equips Broadcasting Ship

[Released to the press February 14]

The Voice of America will unveil the first seagoing radio broadcasting station with the commissioning on February 15 of the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter *Courier* at the Bethlehem Steel Company's Hoboken, N.J., shipyard.

Members of Congress, the Treasury and State Departments, and Coast Guard will participate in commissioning ceremonies on the *Courier* flight deck beginning at 2 p.m.

After a shake-down cruise in the Caribbean and a period of testing, the *Courier* will be put into operation as a floating relay base for Voice of America broadcasts beamed to listeners behind the

Iron Curtain. Wilson Compton, new head of the International Information Administration, which operates the Voice of America, said the ship, equipped with powerful medium-wave and short-wave transmitters, is "designed to provide another electronic weapon for combating Soviet jamming and to enable the Voice of America to cover areas beyond the reach of present broadcasts."

The transmitting equipment is the most powerful of its kind ever installed on a ship. It consists of one 150 kw medium-wave transmitter (three times the power of the largest American broadcasting station), two 35 kw short-wave transmitters and supporting communications equipment. It will pick up Voice of America signals transmitted from Stateside facilities and beam them directly into target countries.

Commanded by Capt. Oscar C. B. Wev, U.S.C.G., the 5800-ton, 338-foot vessel will be manned by a Coast Guard crew of 80, including 10 officers trained in radio. Voice of America engineers will supervise the operation of the transmitting equipment.

Although capable of broadcasting from the open sea, the *Courier* is scheduled to operate while anchored at undisclosed locations. It may use either land-based antenna or antenna supported by a captive barrage balloon filled with helium. The ship will carry a supply of balloons, 69 by 35 feet in size, and 150,000 cubic feet of helium. A winch under the flight deck will spool the balloon cables in and out.

The floating transmitter was developed under a project known as "Operation Vagabond," which was approved by the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and announced by the Department of State in April of 1951. Congress is being asked to authorize funds for additional seagoing transmitters of similar design. The project was developed to provide maximum mobility and 24-hour, all-weather operation. The ability of the vessel to shift operational areas as required and to remain in one place as long as needed is expected to open new listening areas to the Voice of America and provide new problems for the Soviet jamming apparatus.

The seagoing relay base also will enable the Voice of America to cope with changing political conditions by shifting the vessel to critical areas as needed.

The ship will be used to relay, rather than originate, programs although it is equipped with a small studio and control center should program announcements or originations become required. One hold of the vessel contains diesel engines capable of generating 1,500,000 watts of electrical power for the radio equipment.

The diesel-powered ship is a former Navy cargo vessel owned by the Maritime Administration. It was demothballed and transferred to the Department of State and will be transferred to the Coast Guard when commissioned.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct 22, 1951, p. 651.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

North Atlantic Council

On February 12, the Department of State announced that the United States delegation to the ninth session of the North Atlantic Council which will convene at Lisbon, Portugal, on February 20, 1952, is as follows:

United States Representative

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury
Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense
W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security

Deputy United States Representative

Charles M. Spofford, Chairman, North Atlantic Council
Deputies

Advisers

Omar N. Bradley, General of the Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
David K. E. Bruce, American Ambassador to France
Henry A. Byroade, Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State
William H. Draper, Jr., United States Special Representative in Europe
Lincoln MacVeagh, American Ambassador to Portugal
John J. McCloy, United States High Commissioner for Germany
Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Andrew N. Overby, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Members

Theodore C. Achilles, Deputy to Mr. Spofford
Robert G. Barnes, Department of State
Lucius D. Battle, Department of State
Royden E. Beebe, Jr., Colonel, U.S.A.F., Office, Secretary of Defense
N. A. Bogdan, Staff, U.S. Deputy, London
Charles H. Bonesteel, III, Staff, U. S. Deputy, London
Ralph Burton, Bureau of the Budget
Chester V. Clifton, Colonel, U.S.A., Aide to General Bradley
Thomas L. Crystal, Colonel, U.S.A., Assistant to Mr. Draper

Arthur C. Davis, Vice Admiral, U.S.N., U.S. Deputy, Standing Group
Edmund J. Dorsz, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
Stanley W. Dzubian, Lt. Colonel, U.S.A., Office, Secretary of Defense
Daniel K. Edwards, Staff, U.S. Deputy, London
C. Burke Elbrick, Staff, U.S. Deputy, London
Sidney H. Fine, Assistant to Mr. Draper
William J. Galloway, Staff, U.S. Deputy, London
C. Dillon Glendinning, Treasury Department
John Hulley, Mutual Security Agency
William T. Ketcham, Jr., Staff, U.S. Deputy, London
Helen P. Kirkpatrick, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Ridgway B. Knight, Coordinator, Department of State
Perry Laukhuff, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State
George A. Lincoln, Colonel, U.S.A., Assistant to Mr. Harriman
Douglas MacArthur, II, Political Adviser to SHAPE
Edwin M. Martin, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Willis S. Mathews, Colonel, U.S.A., Aide to General Bradley
Alfred R. Matter, Captain, U.S.N., Office, Secretary of Defense
William T. Nunley, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
William D. Pawley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Carey A. Randall, Colonel, U.S.M.C., Aide to Mr. Lovett
Jacques J. Reinstein, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State
Alvin C. Roseman, Mutual Security Agency
Henry Tasea, Mutual Security Agency, Paris
William N. Tomlinson, Treasury Representative, Paris
Laurence C. Vass, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
George H. Willis, Treasury Department
James E. Wood, Treasury Department
Jerauld Wright, Vice Admiral, U.S.N., U.S. Member, Standing Group

Executive Secretary

Harold G. Kissick

Assistant Executive Secretaries

Robert E. Read
Livingston D. Watrous

Movement of Migrants From Europe

On February 12 the Department of State announced that the President had appointed George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, as United States representative on the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe.

Mr. Warren will be assisted at the second session of the Provisional Committee, which will convene at Geneva, Switzerland, on February 18, 1952 by the following advisers:

Donald C. Blaisdell, United States representative for Specialized Agency Affairs, Geneva, Switzerland
Michael A. Farrell, chief, Displaced Persons Branch, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Austria, Vienna
Guy J. Swope, chief, Displaced Populations Division, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt
John Z. Williams, assistant chief, Displaced Populations Division, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt

At the suggestion of the U.S. Government, the Belgian Government convened a Conference on Migration (Brussels, November 26-December 5, 1951) to enable interested governments to consider plans for the establishment of international machinery to facilitate the movement of European migrants to overseas countries of resettlement. By a resolution adopted on December 5, 1951, the Conference established the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe.¹ The Provisional Committee held its initial organizational session at Brussels December 6-8, 1951.

At its second session, the Provisional Committee will elect a director, appoint external auditors, review a progress report and plan of operations to be submitted by its directorate, consider the establishment of relations with other organizations performing services in the field of migration and on behalf of refugees, and take any other actions that may be deemed necessary to facilitate the movement of migrants and refugees.

Primary Nickel Allocation

The Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee of the International Materials Conference on February 4 announced establishment of a plan of distribution of primary nickel for the first quarter of 1952.²

¹ For an article written by Mr. Warren on the Brussels Conference and Provisional Committee meeting, see BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 169.

² For table of allocations, see I.M.C. press release of Feb. 4.

All of the 11 governments represented on the Committee have given notice of their acceptance of the allocation. The member countries are Belgium (for Benelux), Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Committee's recommendations have been forwarded to all interested governments for immediate implementation.

It will be recalled that an arrangement was announced on December 27, 1951, concerning export sales and import purchases of nickel for the month of January. This enabled producers to continue their sales while the first quarter allocation scheme was still under review. The interim arrangement for January is now absorbed by the present plan of distribution for the first quarter of 1952.

This plan, like the January arrangement, applies to all marketable forms of primary nickel, including the ferro-nickel and nickel cast iron produced from New Caledonian ores, as well as the sintered oxide (matte) exported from Canada to the United States. These three products were not under allocation in the fourth quarter of 1951. On the other hand, nickel salts, which were previously allocated, are now excluded from I.M.C. distribution. This was done largely to avoid the complications which arose from the fact that, in some countries, salts are manufactured from forms of primary nickel, while, in others, salts are manufactured directly from refinery residues and scrap materials.

The availability of primary nickel for the first quarter of 1952 is estimated at 33,583 metric tons. This figure is not comparable to the production estimate of 31,500 tons on which the fourth quarter allocation had been based, since the products under allocation are not the same.

Production is far from meeting requirements, and all efforts are being made to increase it. The Nicaro mines in Cuba are resuming production, and their estimated output for the first quarter of 1952 is included in the present allocation; the yield from the French mines in New Caledonia is expected to rise substantially in the latter part of the year. Also, the Committee is now studying methods of encouraging the expansion of marginal mine production.

In establishing the present plan of distribution, the Committee has recognized a measure of priority for defense requirements and has allowed at the same time, a minimum supply of nickel for essential civilian consumption in order to insure the stability of the economies of the Free World countries.

The Committee is giving full consideration to the problem of continuing exports of semimanufactured products to countries whose industries are dependent upon the import of such products. Countries participating in the present allocation

tion have been asked to take all necessary measures to eliminate nonessential uses of nickel. The Committee intends to send a separate report to interested governments on the conservation of nickel and cobalt, including the use of nickel for coinage. Governments will be requested to supply full information on the steps they are taking to economize in the use of these metals.

Sixth International Grassland Congress To Be Held in August

The Departments of State and Agriculture and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) jointly announced on January 22 that the Sixth International Grassland Congress will be held August 17-23, 1952, at Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa., under the sponsorship of the United States Government and FAO.

The Congress will provide an opportunity for scientists and technicians from various parts of the world to exchange information concerning the production, improvement, management, and use of grassland. It is expected that, by focusing attention on grassland matters, the Congress will provide the participating countries with increased means for developing more balanced agricultural economies and will lead to the more effective production of livestock products—especially meat and milk—and other food supplies, higher levels of nutrition, and better methods for the conservation of land and water resources.

The agencies in the United States which are cooperating in making arrangements for the Congress are the Department of State, Department of Agriculture, Department of the Interior, Mutual Security Agency, the land grant colleges and universities, and interested national trade organizations and societies.

Approximately 65 countries have been invited by the U. S. Government to participate in the Congress.

The program for the Congress, which has been developed by the Organizing Committee, provides for the holding of sectional meetings to discuss various major topics relating to grassland. The topics selected are (1) genetics and breeding, (2) improvement and management of pastures, meadows, and turf, (3) improvement and management of range lands, (4) ecology and physiology of grasslands, (5) soil management and fertilization, (6) seed production and distribution, (7) soil and water conservation, (8) harvesting and preservation of forage, (9) use of forage in livestock feeding, (10) machinery, (11) experimental procedures in grassland research, and (12) improvement and management of tropical grasslands.

All inquiries and correspondence regarding the Congress should be addressed to W. R. Chapline, executive secretary, Organizing Committee, Sixth International Grassland Congress, Department of State, Room 1049, 1778 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington 25, D. C.

All of the previous grassland congresses have been held in Europe. The first was held in Germany in 1927, the second in Sweden and Denmark in 1930, the third in Switzerland in 1934, the fourth in Great Britain in 1937, and the fifth in the Netherlands in 1949. The United States was represented for the first time at the 1937 Congress and again sent representatives to the Fifth Congress in the Netherlands in 1949. The Fifth Congress voted to hold the Sixth Congress in the United States.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

- Thirteenth Report to Congress of the Economic Cooperation Administration. Supplement. 82d Cong., 1st sess. 94 pp.
- St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project. Message from the President of the United States. H. Doc. 337, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 7 pp.
- Proposed Supplemental Appropriation for the Department of State. Communication from the President of the United States. H. Doc. 343, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 2 pp.
- Owners of Certain Finnish Sailing Vessels. S. Rept. 1132, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. Res. 34] 7 pp.
- Investigating the Administration of the Trading With the Enemy Act Since December 18, 1941. S. Rept. 1135, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. Res. 245] 1 p.
- Suspending the Import Duties on Tungsten. S. Rept. 1136, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. R. 5248] 5 pp.
- Revision of Immigration and Nationality Laws. S. Rept. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 2550] 51 pp.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Feb. 9-15, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

No.	Date	Subject
54	1/22	6th Grasslands Congress
92	2/2	Pakistan expands Point 4 Program
101†	2/9	Mexican labor agreement
107	2/11	VOA unveils "Courier"
108*	2/11	Anniversary of Egypt
109*	2/11	Snow: "McCarthyism"
110	2/12	NAC: 9th session
111	2/12	Warren: Movement of migrants
112	2/13	Austria: Letter of credence (rewrite)
113†	2/13	Point 4 health director (rewrite)
114*	2/14	Death of Dr. Charles C. Hyde
115†	2/15	5th Information report
116	2/15	Philippines: Letter of credence (rewrite)
117	2/15	Thorpe: India's economic dev.
118	2/15	Greece & Turkey: Protocol to NATO

The United States in the United Nations

General Assembly

Technical Assistance Conference.—Fifty-one countries pledged a total of \$18,802,000 for the 1952 operations of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance at the Second United Nations Technical Assistance Conference at Paris February 6-7. Ten more countries indicated that they would make contributions but did not specify the amount.

The final amount of contributions from the United States, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland will depend on whether or not the total pledged reaches the target figure of \$20,000,000 set by the General Assembly when it requested the Secretary-General to convene the Conference. Only \$484,000 more is needed in further pledges to secure for the program the full benefit of the maximum contributions offered by those four countries, and thus bring the total to \$20,000,000.

In the case of the United States, the maximum contribution authorized by Congress is \$12,000,000, with the amount actually to be contributed not to exceed 60 percent of the total. At the Conference, the United States made a firm pledge of \$11,400,000 (based on the assumption that a \$19,000,000 total would be reached) "with the condition that the United States pledge may be increased to not more than \$12,000,000 in the event all pledges made prior to April 15, 1952, by governments inclusive of a United States pledge of \$12,000,000 total \$20,000,000."

Jean Lesage (Canada), chairman of the Conference, said he was confident that the full amount would be pledged by April 15, when the final act of the Conference is to be closed. Eighty-one countries, members of the United Nations or of one or more of the eight specialized agencies participating in the Expanded Program, were invited to the Conference, with 62 of these actually taking part. Absentees included the five Soviet-bloc countries, Mexico, Jordan, Portugal, and South Africa.

United Nations Commission to Investigate Conditions for Free Elections in Germany.—The Commission held a series of informal meetings at Paris February 11-14 at which it considered a number of procedural and organizational matters connected with its future work. Geneva was

chosen as the Commission's headquarters, and it will reconvene there on February 21.

The Commission is composed of Brazil, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Pakistan. Poland was also named to the group but refused to serve. The Commission was established by the General Assembly on December 20, 1951, to carry out an on-the-spot investigation to determine whether conditions exist for free all-German elections.¹

Security Council

Membership.—A proposal to recommend Italy's admission to the United Nations was vetoed by the Soviet Union in the Council on February 6, for the fifth time. The vote was 10-1 (U.S.S.R.). The proposal was introduced by France on December 19, 1951, in compliance with a General Assembly resolution, adopted on December 7, asking the Council to give urgent consideration to the immediate admission of Italy.

A Soviet counterproposal for the simultaneous admission of 14 applicants, including Italy, was rejected: 6 (U.S.)-2 (U.S.S.R., Pakistan)-3 (U.K., France, Chile). The other applicants named in the U.S.S.R. resolution were: Albania, Outer Mongolia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Finland, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon, Nepal, and Libya.

Following the vote, United States Representative Ernest Gross said, in part:

I think that tomorrow a great many people in the world will be asking why Italy is not a member of the United Nations. . . . All of us, including the representative of the Soviet Union, agree that Italy is qualified under the United Nations Charter. Then we want to know, why is Italy not among us? Italy is not a member of the United Nations for the plain reason that its admission has been consistently and unjustly thwarted by the Soviet Union. Again today, for the fifth time, the representative of the Soviet Union has said No to the Italian people. He has again arbitrarily used his veto to keep out a state whose admission is wholeheartedly supported by the great majority of the members of the United Nations.

I believe that the Italian Government and the Italian people will hardly be gratified at this renewed effort to make their admission a matter of horse trading nor will they be flattered by being put on the same level

¹ For text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 55.

with a shadow state like Outer Mongolia or with states which have shown neither the willingness nor the ability to assume the obligations of United Nations membership.

Military and Relief Assistance for Korea—Forty-two member states and 4 nonmember countries have offered assistance in the collective United Nations action in Korea, according to a United Nations summary of military and relief aid through January 15, 1952. Of these, 27 nations have offered military aid and 38 assistance for emergency relief.

The summary disclosed that of the 27 countries offering military assistance, 17 at present have ground, air, or naval units fighting with United Nations Forces in Korea. Eight countries have air and sea transports in action, and seven have placed hospital and medical field units at the disposal of the Unified Command. The Unified Command has deferred acceptance of five offers of military aid.

Economic and Social Council

Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices—The *Ad Hoc* Committee, at its first session, January 29–February 6, completed plans for the collection, from governments and other sources, of information on restrictive business practices affecting international trade. Arrangements were made to undertake a comparative study of national legislation and statutory regulations relating to restrictive business practices and of measures taken by individual member states to restore freedom of competition.

The Committee, which is composed of 10 United Nations members (including France, the United Kingdom, and the United States), was established by the Economic and Social Council in September 1951.² It is expected to hold its next session at the end of April.

At its first session, the Committee also began examination of methods to be adopted by international agreement to deal with the restrictive business practices problem. The Committee is under instructions to prepare and submit to the Council not later than March 1953 “proposals on methods to be adopted by international agreement” for the purpose of implementing a recommendation to member states contained in the Council resolution setting up the Committee.

² For text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1951, p. 595.

In this recommendation, members are called upon to take appropriate measures (based on the principles set forth in chapter V of the Havana Charter) and to cooperate with one another “to prevent, on the part of private or public commercial enterprises, business practices affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets or foster monopolistic control, whenever such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade, on the economic development of underdeveloped areas, or on standards of living.”

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)—The eighth plenary session of ECAFE was held at Rangoon, Burma, from January 29 to February 9. Among other things, the Commission approved the convening of a regional conference on mineral resources; requested supplying countries to make increased efforts to assist countries of the region in the supply of iron and steel products and capital goods generally; agreed to assist the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration in arranging for a group of experts from Asian countries to study methods of the Japanese iron and steel industry; approved the proposed work on small-scale industries and handicrafts marketing; approved continued work on DDT and anti-biotics, increased attention to building and housing materials, continued work on trade promotion, projects on trade analysis including marketing and distribution surveys, the working of trade and financial agreements, and the intensification of work on problems relating to financing economic development and the mobilization of domestic capital.

In the field of technical assistance, the Commission expressed the wish that the number of regional training centers might be increased. Training centers in a variety of fields are an efficient and economical method of technical training.

In connection with the programs of agrarian reform adopted by the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), ECAFE adopted a resolution providing for close cooperation. Furthermore, it was agreed that ECAFE would work with FAO in establishing a joint unit on agricultural problems.

In addition, the Commission adopted a resolution requesting Ecosoc to include Japan within the geographic scope of ECAFE and the admission of Japan as an associate member of ECAFE.

Progress Toward Mutual Defense

EXCERPTS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S FOURTH REPORT ON MDAP¹

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL


To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 329, Eighty-first Congress, First Session (63 Stat. 714), I am transmitting herewith the Fourth Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, covering the period from April 1, 1951, to October 9, 1951.

I am able to report to the Congress and the people of the United States that substantial and continuing progress has been made toward the goals of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The continued strengthening of defense potential of the free nations has stimulated their friendship for the United States and served increasingly to deter aggressive ventures.

It is clear, however, that the systematic creation of military strength in the free world posed many difficult and complex problems. We have not solved all of them, nor even a majority of them. Much remains to be done. It is my belief, however, that our achievements, and those of the nations associated with us, now have provided the all-essential base on which the free world can complete the structure of an invincible mutual defense.

With the appointment of a Director for Mutual Security, in accordance with the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program enters a new phase in which it becomes integrated even more closely into the fabric of our total foreign aid program. It has therefore seemed appropriate to include in this Fourth Report a summary of the operation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program over the past 2 years and a survey of the principles and current problems of military assistance.



THE WHITE HOUSE
February 12, 1952

¹ H. doc. 352; transmitted Feb. 13.

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of Report

This fourth and final semiannual report is submitted to the Congress of the United States under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which was enacted into law on October 6, 1949. It covers the operations of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program during the period April 1, 1951, to October 9, 1951, and is designed to provide Congress, as required by section 410 of that act, with a factual account of the progress of the Program in relation to its basic objectives, a brief description of the major problems, and an estimate of the significance of developments throughout the world as they have had a bearing upon the general pattern of the Program and its administration during the period under review.

This report marks the end of a 2-year period during which the emphasis of United States assistance has shifted gradually from economic rehabilitation to aid in increasing the military strength and effectiveness of countries in the free world. The climax to this shift in emphasis came with the action taken by the Congress in the mutual-security legislation to create a unified program of foreign aid, including military assistance, under a Director for Mutual Security. The Mutual Security Act (Public Law 165, 82d Cong., 1st sess.) was approved on October 10, 1951, and most of its provisions became effective on that date. W. Averell Harriman was confirmed as Director for Mutual Security on October 19, 1951. On behalf of the President and subject to his direction, Mr. Harriman will have primary responsibility for the continuous supervision and general direction of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. He is required to administer the assistance programs under the act—technical, economic, and military—“so as to assure that the defensive strength of the free nations of the world shall be built as quickly as possible on the basis of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.”

To present this policy development adequately requires an account somewhat broader than the customary 6-month summary of progress. An

effort has been made, therefore, to embody certain features which would serve to make this Fourth Report more useful and self-contained. For example, there has been included a brief restatement of the genesis and general philosophy underlying the Mutual Defense Assistance Program as it relates to the basic objective of United States foreign policy. The principal elements of the Program have also been reviewed to show the progression from one phase to another in the development of organization and of administrative patterns and procedures. Likewise, in the interests of maintaining continuity and placing operations during the 6 months under review in their proper perspective, the treatment of certain aspects of the Program has been expanded to include summaries of previous developments in the 2-year period which ends with the completion of this report. Finally, since the Program is necessarily long-range in its nature and designed to assist our associates in the free world to strengthen their collective military power until it is such as to deter armed aggression and make peace secure, this report undertakes to indicate the general direction and form the Program may take in the future and the role it can play in furthering the foreign-policy objectives of the United States.

Brief Global Summary of Events

To view in full perspective the actions taken under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, it is necessary to see them not only in the context of over-all United States policy but also within the framework of current world events. Operation of the Program in the period April through October 1951 reflected the impact of certain world developments at the same time that the Program itself was a part of those developments and exerted an influence upon them. A brief survey may help bring into focus this interdependence and the critical importance of the mutual-defense-assistance principle.

Europe [Title I; see pp. 17-51 of report]

During the 6-month period under review, the European scene remained relatively stable. There were few dramatic political or economic developments, and there was little evidence of impending major crises, though the trend in the prices of raw materials was causing some concern. Tension with the Soviet bloc continued, of course, and the Russian propagandists remained vigorous in the dissemination of their so-called "peace" propaganda, while at the same time continuing to express veiled threats against various European nations, particularly Yugoslavia.

There were no spectacular changes in political conditions. The French elections in May 1951 resulted in a victory for the middle-of-the-road coalition which has governed France since 1947, although the Right Wing parties led by General de

Gaulle picked up considerable strength. The Communists lost substantially in Parliament but showed only a slight decline in percentage of the over-all popular vote. In the Netherlands, a new Cabinet was formed in April, ending 8 weeks of caretaker government. The new Cabinet represented essentially the same political coalition as the previous Cabinet and, with minor exceptions, had the same membership.

The period was marked by a greater cooperative effort by the European countries in solving their common problems. On April 18, delegates of France, Western Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg signed the Schuman Plan treaty, under which a single market will be created for the coal and steel production of Western Europe. On July 24, delegates of these same nations signed in Paris an interim report recommending the creation of a unified European army.

The members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continued a steady advance toward their long-range military goals. On April 2, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower issued General Order No. 1, activating the Supreme Allied Command Europe and establishing the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE). Two days later the United States Senate enacted a resolution approving the assignment of additional American troops to Western Europe for service under General Eisenhower. Meanwhile, certain political steps were taken to facilitate the contributions of several nations to the European defense build-up. On July 9, Congress received a presidential request to end the state of war with Germany, and on September 14 the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States announced their aim of replacing the present occupation statute with West Germany with a contractual relationship, paving the way for full German membership in the democratic community of Western Europe. On July 18, the Secretary of State announced that the United States was exploring with the Spanish Government what Spain might be willing and able to do to contribute to the strength of the common defense against aggression. Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, met with General Franco on July 17, after which a military survey team was sent to Spain, followed later by an economic survey team. Finally, on September 26, the American, British, and French Governments issued a declaration on the Italian peace treaty, which laid the groundwork for a greater role for Italy in Western defense.

Economic developments in Europe during this period were generally unfavorable. Wholesale prices, which have increased by approximately 25 percent since the spring of 1950, continued to rise. An especially serious aspect of the problem is the fact that the prices of the raw materials which Europe requires for its manufacturing and trade have risen about 35 percent since the outbreak of

hostilities in Korea, while the prices which Western Europe receives for its own exports have increased only 12 percent. These and other factors have created serious difficulties for the Europeans in meeting their defense commitments.

Near East [Title II; see pp. 51-57 of report]

Developments in the Near East have been characterized by conflicts and disorders which threaten the security and stability of the area.

The British-Iranian oil dispute has been a most serious development. On July 5, the International Court of Justice, to which the United Kingdom has appealed the dispute, indicated interim measures to insure continued production of petroleum and urged that no action be taken prejudicial to the rights of either party. On July 9, the Iranian Government rejected these proposals, and on the same day President Truman sent a personal message to Premier Mosadeq. On July 15, Mr. Harriman, Special Assistant to President Truman, arrived in Iran to help work out a solution. Mr. Harriman worked on the problem for 6 weeks in Tehran, but a solution was not achieved and the Anglo-Iranian discussions were suspended. When further efforts failed to find a solution, the Security Council of the United Nations, at the request of the United Kingdom, considered the question from October 1 to October 19. In the end, the Security Council could not agree on a resolution calling for the resumption of negotiations.

Other developments in the Near East include the unilateral decision on the part of Egypt to terminate the Anglo-Egyptian treaty respecting the Suez Canal, and frictions arising out of the Palestine conflict.

Far East [Title III; see pp. 57-65 of report]

Developments concerning the Far East during the period covered by this report centered largely around truce talks in Korea, the continuing Communist aggression in Indochina, guerrilla warfare in the Philippines and Malaya, civil disturbances in Burma, insecurity in Indonesia, and the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan in San Francisco.

On June 23, the Soviet representative to the United Nations, Jacob Malik, made a guarded proposal for truce and armistice talks in Korea. Two days later, President Truman answered the Soviet proposal by stating that the United States stood ready to join in any real effort to settle the war in Korea. On June 29, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, broadcast a message to the Communists proposing negotiations on board a Danish hospital ship, and on July 1 the Communists accepted the proposal for negotiations, requesting Kaesong instead as the site. On July 8, the United Nations-Communist negotiators held their first meeting at Kaesong. In welcoming the truce negotiations in Korea, the President made clear that the conflict in Korea

was only part of a wider world conflict and that we should not and would not relax our efforts in building up our military strength.

Armistice negotiations continued until August 22, when they were broken off by the Communists, who made charges that the U.N. forces had violated the neutrality of the Kaesong area. During the ensuing period, the U.N. commanders made repeated efforts to reopen negotiations. On September 6, General Ridgway replied to the Communist charges of violation of the truce zone and suggested that U.N. and Communist officers meet at Panmunjom to discuss selection of a new site for armistice negotiations. On September 17, General Ridgway repeated this offer. In their reply of September 20, the Communists insisted upon resumption of talks at Kaesong but expressed a willingness to discuss at some other location the basis for resuming those talks provided that it would be agreed to include the alleged U.N. neutrality violations on the agenda. Agreeing to these proposals on September 27, General Ridgway suggested a new location as the point at which new talks should take place. The Communist commanders refused this suggestion on October 3, and on October 4 the U.N. Command left it to Communist officers to name a place other than Kaesong free from the exclusive military control of either side. Throughout this period of negotiations, the U.N. forces continued to build up their strength and to repel repeated Communist attacks.

In Indochina the military situation generally improved under the able leadership of the late Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. Efforts on the part of the Communist forces under Ho Chi Minh were successfully repulsed. On July 15, 1951, the Vietnamese Government issued orders calling for war mobilization in its fight against the Communists in Indochina.

The Communist-inspired Huk guerrilla warfare against the established government in the Philippines continued actively, although during the 6-month period under review the Philippine armed forces made increasingly telling blows against the insurrectionists.

In Indonesia and Burma the authorities continued to experience difficulty in the maintenance of law and order, while in Malaya jungle warfare against the Communist insurrectionists proceeded unremittingly.

The signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, was a major step toward the development of security in the Far East. Other agreements contributing to the same goal included a bilateral security treaty signed by the United States and the Philippines on August 30; a mutual-security treaty entered into on September 1 by the United States, Australia, and New Zealand; and a bilateral security treaty signed by the United States and Japan on September 8. All these developments marked important steps in building an adequate security structure for the Pacific area.

A New Organization and Administration

The new mutual-security legislation approved by the Congress immediately preceding the close of the period covered by this report realigns the responsibilities for direction and coordination of the Mutual Security Program.

This legislation fixes responsibility for coordination and supervision of programs of military, economic, and technical assistance in a Director for Mutual Security. This officer will carry out for the President essentially the same responsibilities for all forms of foreign programs as the Department of State has exercised in the past in the direction and coordination of Mbar programs, except insofar as they concern or relate to the basic foreign policy responsibilities of the Department.

In addition, the new legislation provides for the establishment of a Mutual Security Agency, which the Director for Mutual Security will also head. It will take over, at least until June 30, 1952, the powers, functions, and responsibilities of the Economic Cooperation Administration. After that date, under the provisions of the new law, the Agency will have those powers, functions, and responsibilities conferred by the Economic Cooperation Administration Act which the President determines are necessary for (a) the development and administration of programs of assistance designed to sustain and increase military effort in the recipient countries, including assistance for the production and construction of equipment and matériel in those countries; (b) the provision of equipment, commodities, services, and financial or other assistance; and (c) the provision of economic assistance to foreign nations for which the United States has a responsibility as a result of participation in joint control arrangements.

EXCERPT FROM TITLE I: EUROPE

The Defense Build-Up

Perhaps the most significant development during the period from April to October 1951 was the steady and unpretentious work being carried on to increase, day by day, the real defensive strength of Western Europe. On the whole, it was not a period of spectacular decision-making. Rather, it was a period of implementing decisions which had already been made.

Beginning in April, the Supreme Allied Headquarters was activated, and General Eisenhower undertook the task of organizing the troops assigned to him by the various NATO nations. New assignments of troops were made at various times during the period. Meanwhile the hard work of inducting new conscripts, of training them, and of providing them with arms and supplies continued throughout the NATO area. NATO bases and installations were being built. Joint training maneuvers were being conducted and military equipment and supplies continued to roll off the

production lines in gradually increasing numbers. Step by step, and piece by piece, the sinews of real military power were being constructed.

The Temporary Committee of the Council

By mid-1951 it was becoming apparent that the European NATO countries were having increasing difficulty in meeting the defense commitments that they had already made and would have even greater difficulty in making the additional commitments which were deemed necessary in order to create an optimum military force by 1954. These difficulties resulted from various circumstances, including the post-Korean increase in raw material prices, domestic inflation, the strain of the rearmament program already undertaken, and the substantial reduction by the United States Congress in the amount of dollar-aid originally requested for Western Europe. It became apparent that it would be unrealistic to attempt to continue to develop and implement military plans without reviewing them in the light of the real economic and political capabilities of the NATO countries.

As a result, the North Atlantic Council in its September meeting at Ottawa created a Temporary Committee of the Council (TCC) to undertake an independent analysis of the estimated defense requirements of the NATO area and a similar analysis of the total political and economic capabilities of the member countries. W. Averell Harriman was made chairman of this committee; Sir Edwin Plowden of Great Britain and M. Monnet of France served as vice chairmen. Other NATO countries appointed men of similar stature. Essentially the task of the committee was to recommend ways and means by which the defense efforts of the NATO countries could reach the minimum compatible with NATO security objectives and the extent consistent with their capabilities, and, at the same time, to recommend measures for reducing the estimates of military requirements so as to achieve a reconciliation which would provide a basis for future planning and implementation. In order to carry out this task the committee was directed to study such problems as financial measures, economic conditions, political limitations, military priorities, and production bottlenecks.

The committee began its work in October with the expectation that it would be prepared to submit a final report by December 1951.

The European Defense Community

While a number of problems must be solved in connection with the goal of achieving a substantial West German contribution to NATO defense, including the creation of a new political status for West Germany and the completion of contractual relations between West Germany and the three powers currently occupying West Germany, perhaps the key question has been the revival of a

German national army. The NATO nations of Western Europe have opposed the re-creation of a German national army, and there is considerable opposition to such a step within West Germany itself. It appears as a logical alternative that the best feasible way by which a West German contribution can be made is to include that contribution within the framework of an integrated Western European army. Six nations—France, Italy, Western Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—had already, in April 1951, begun to study the possibilities of uniting their national forces into a European defense force, which in turn would be subject to the jurisdiction of a supranational European defense community.

Delegates of the six nations, meeting in Paris, reached agreement on an interim report on June 24. This report recommended the creation of a European defense community with united military forces, and included recommendations on many detailed measures for bringing this defense community into being. Inevitably such a major undertaking raises a large number of controversial issues among individual nations, and the interim report did not attempt to resolve all these issues. It provided, however, a useful beginning, and since its issuance, the participating governments have continued the negotiations. By October agreement had been reached on several additional points, and there was reason for hope that the European defense community and the European defense force would become realities within a few months.

While the European defense force is primarily a problem for the nations directly concerned, the United States Government has taken a strong friendly interest and has encouraged the participating nations to continue their efforts to reach agreement. The successful establishment of the European defense community would not only be a vital step toward the integration of Germany into the community of Western democracies and permit an early German contribution to Western defense, but it would also be an important step on the road to greater European unity.

Closer Association Among the NATO Countries

One of the important steps undertaken by the North Atlantic Council during its September meeting at Ottawa, in addition to the decision on Greece and Turkey already mentioned, was the creation of a committee to study ways and means of bringing the North Atlantic countries closer together in the nonmilitary fields. From the beginning it has been recognized that NATO is more than a defensive alliance. Article 2 of the treaty expresses the aim of achieving close cooperation among the signatory countries in strengthening their free institutions, bringing about a better understanding of their common principles, elimi-

nating conflicts in economic policies, and promoting conditions of stability and well-being. While the first task of NATO has been to develop adequate defensive strength, and while this must continue as the chief priority for the foreseeable future, representatives of the NATO countries agree that the time is ripe to give serious consideration to building closer cooperation in various nonmilitary fields. The five-nation committee appointed at Ottawa was directed to make an initial study of this matter and to submit recommendations concerning the areas in which and the methods by which nonmilitary cooperation can be usefully undertaken. The committee was instructed specifically to make recommendations on the following matters:

Coordination and frequent consultation on foreign policy, having particular regard to steps designed to promote peace.

Closer economic, financial, and social cooperation, designed to promote conditions of stability and well-being, both during the period of rearmament and thereafter, within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or through other agencies.

Collaboration in the fields of culture and public information.

These aspects of NATO's activities may assume increasing importance in the future.

Continued Organizational Improvement

During the period under review two significant organizational changes took place to assist NATO in dealing more effectively with the complex questions facing it. The separate ministerial committees were abolished and combined into a unified council with membership open to the foreign, defense, financial, and other interested ministers. The terms of reference of the North Atlantic Council of Deputies were also clarified to permit each deputy to represent all departments of his Government.

CONCLUSION

The period April 1 to October 9, 1951, was a period of progress under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The additional confidence and feeling of security discernible among the free nations of the world demonstrated that the objectives of the Program are attainable.

In the short span of 2 years important measures of cooperation have been effected in Western Europe and elsewhere in a wide area of fields and among various groupings of countries. Such concerted action is based on an increasing awareness that divided these countries will fall—together they will stand as free and independent nations. These nations are now using their combined resources to preserve their freedom. The strength

that will come from the collective efforts of this combination will far exceed the strengths of the separate national components.

Our military leaders are firm in their conviction that time is on our side if we make proper use of it. There can be no slackening or faltering. The United States and other countries of the free world must continue to press with full vigor the effort now well under way to create situations of strength as a bulwark against the spread of Communist imperialism and as a necessary means to-

ward the preservation of the cultural and political heritages of free peoples throughout the world.

Much remains to be done. Further progress in building the security of the free countries of the world depends upon continuation of the mutual defense effort, as provided in the Mutual Security Act of 1951. With the very considerable momentum that has been generated over the past 2 years, the future should witness the accomplishment of the basic objectives of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program at a greatly accelerated pace.

Additional Economic Assistance for France, Greece, Turkey, The United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia

[Released to the press by the White House February 5]

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO HEADS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

The President on February 5 sent the following identical letters to Tom Connally, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate; James P. Richards, chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives; Richard B. Russell, chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate; and Carl Vinson, chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: It has become clear during the past two months that additional resources must be made available to France, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia during this fiscal year to permit them to meet their present and projected defense plans. Each of these countries is an important part of the defense plans of the free world; France and the United Kingdom are joined with the other countries of NATO in a common defense plan with a common strategy under the supreme commands set up by the NATO, Greece and Turkey possess military forces that have been built up and equipped with United States assistance over several years and will shortly become members of NATO, Yugoslavia occupies a vital strategic position on the flank of Western European defense. It is in the interest of our national defense and our mutual security with the other nations of the free world that the defense programs of those countries should be carried out.

I have therefore determined, pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, that it is necessary for the purpose of that Act to transfer \$478,160,000 from the

appropriations granted pursuant to Section 101 (a) (1) thereof for military assistance to Europe, to the appropriations granted pursuant to Section 101 (a) (2) thereof for economic assistance to Europe. I am satisfied that this transfer of funds will in fact contribute more to military strength in Europe than if the same funds were to be used to procure military end-items for delivery to the countries concerned. The military effort on the part of these countries which will be made possible by this transfer will be considerably larger than the amount of funds transferred.

Of the amount so transferred, \$300,000,000 will be allotted to the United Kingdom for the importation of commodities essential to the maintenance of the defense effort of the United Kingdom as set forth in Mr. Harriman's letter to you of January 28, 1952; \$100,000,000 will be allotted to France under the terms of the understanding reached with the French Government last November as reported to you in a letter from the Office of the Director for Mutual Security dated December 11, 1951, with the counterpart funds accruing from such assistance to be used by the French Government for procurement of supplies for the campaign in Indochina; and the remainder will be allotted to Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, to assist those countries in carrying out the defense programs discussed between their governments and the Government of the United States.

I have made this determination upon the recommendation of the Director for Mutual Security with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense.

This letter is intended to constitute the notification to your Committee required by Section 101 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

I am enclosing for the information of your Com-

mittee the recommendation I received from the Director for Mutual Security.

Sincerely,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM MUTUAL SECURITY DIRECTOR

[FEBRUARY 4, 1952]

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Mutual Security Act of 1951 provides, in Section 101 (b), that the President may transfer between military end-item assistance for European countries and economic assistance for European countries up to 10% of the total appropriations granted for those purposes.

I recommend that \$478,160,000 of the amount appropriated for military end-item assistance pursuant to Section 101 (a) (1) of the Mutual Security Act be made available by such a transfer for economic assistance to certain European countries. This sum has been agreed by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense to be essential to provide support to the defense efforts of France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

It has become clear in the past two months that additional resources must be made available to these five countries during this fiscal year to permit them to meet their present and projected defense plans. I am satisfied that the funds requested to be transferred will in fact contribute to the defense effort more effectively in the form of economic aid than if the same funds were used to procure military end-items for delivery to Europe. The military effort made possible by this additional economic aid will be considerably larger than the amount of the additional aid itself. I therefore believe that this transfer of \$478,160,000 is necessary for the purpose of the Mutual Security Act, and I recommend it for your approval.

I am also attaching brief statements on each of the countries for which additional aid is recommended.

Sincerely,

W. A. HARRIMAN
Director for Mutual Security

Appendix: Country Statements

FRANCE

The strength of French military forces is a key element in the effective defense of the free world, both in deterring the threat of Soviet aggression in Europe and in stemming active Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. In both areas French forces constitute the largest ready contingent and occupy geographical positions of key strategic importance. France has initiated the proposed European Defense Community; with United States support France is carrying on sizable military operations against Communist aggression in Indochina and is organizing and equipping new indigenous forces in the Associated States of Indochina for the long-term security of that area.

The projected French defense program for calendar year 1952 involves expenditures equivalent to \$3,500 million, about 11 percent of the country's estimated national product. Nearly one-third of this budget will be devoted to the campaign in Indochina.

Realization of this French defense effort is directly dependent upon the ability of France to maintain an adequate volume of dollar imports. During the month of November the French Government was forced to consider a drastic cut in dollar imports because of the low level of dollar earnings in relation to the French import program for this fiscal year. It was apparent that the reduction in the import program being considered by the French Government would seriously and adversely affect French production and financial stability. As an immediate consequence of such a reduction in the level of imports the French Government would have had to reduce its defense program by an amount substantially larger than the value of the imports to be eliminated from the French program.

To explore means of minimizing the impact on the French defense program by avoiding an undue reduction in the level of imports, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director for Mutual Security held several conversations with members of the French Cabinet at the end of November. During these conversations, which were joined by the Secretary of the Treasury, the French import requirements were considered in relation to prospective dollar availabilities to France. The two major elements discussed were the amount of economic aid to be received by France under the Mutual Security Program this year, and the extent of U.S. Government expenditures in France and French North Africa which would occur in connection with military construction and the stationing of U.S. troops abroad. Representations were made to the French at that time that, through expenditures under the U.S. defense program and the Mutual Security Program, a total of \$600 million could be available to France in the Fiscal Year 1952 provided that the French Government carried out the full military effort of which France is presently capable, in accordance with the analysis of the Temporary Council Committee of NATO, and provided that the French Government gave fullest cooperation in the development of the various facilities necessary for support of United States and other NATO defense forces and in facilitating U.S. procurement in France.

Of this \$600 million, expenditures of the U.S. Government in France and French North Africa for certain bases and other military construction and for the provision of U.S. forces were expected to amount to about \$300 million. Economic aid then programmed for France out of Mutual Security funds and already discussed with the French Government amounted to \$150 million, and \$11 million was available for special assistance to specific defense production projects. Of the remainder, it has been agreed by the interested agencies that \$100 million should be made available by transfer under Section 101 (b) of the Mutual Security Act to finance necessary imports into France with the corresponding counterpart funds to be used to finance supplies for the campaign in Indochina, and that \$30 million should take the form of purchases of military supplies for the Indochina war for which the French would otherwise have to pay dollars, to be administered under Title III (Asia and Pacific) of the Mutual Security Act.

UNITED KINGDOM

During the last six months of 1951 Britain suffered very serious losses from its foreign exchange reserves, sharply reversing the favorable trend that prevailed during the year ending June 30, 1951. The total of such losses was \$1,532 million, with the result that Britain's reserves as of December 31, 1951, amounted to only about \$2,335 billion.

The United Kingdom took additional measures in November 1951 to curtail non-defense imports and domestic civilian demand in order to conserve dollar reserves, and

on January 29, 1952, announced further measures for the same purpose. The Commonwealth countries, as a result of the recent conference of Commonwealth Finance Ministers in London, are now considering "certain definite proposals calculated in the aggregate to insure that the sterling area as a whole will be in balance with the rest of the world in respect of the second half of 1952". It is our considered conclusion, however, that these measures cannot alone suffice to meet the present crisis. The United Kingdom is dependent on its dollar earnings for many essential imports. The flow of these imports must be adequately maintained to make possible a level of production capable of supporting the defense program on which the United Kingdom has embarked and the maintenance of which has recently been recommended in the analysis of the Temporary Council Committee of NATO.

For a short period the necessary level of imports could be maintained by further depletion of the United Kingdom's gold and dollar reserves; but at anything like the recent rate of drawing on reserves, they would very soon be exhausted. To permit the adjustments that would be necessary to avoid exhaustion of the United Kingdom's gold and dollar reserves, measures would have to be taken immediately to reduce the consumption of raw materials and divert hastily to export production many of the industries which are now supporting the British defense effort.

The amount of \$300 million will in no way reduce the necessity for the measures already taken or about to be taken by the British Government to reduce its dollar requirements and to increase its dollar receipts.

The United Kingdom is now carrying the heaviest share of the defense effort of the European NATO countries. Aside from the United States, the United Kingdom has the largest program for the production of military equipment; the British are now producing more military equipment than all the other NATO countries combined. The United Kingdom was the first European country to undertake a very large increase in its defense effort after Korea; that enlarged defense effort was not conditioned on the receipt of U.S. economic assistance. In view of the difficulties involved in, and the time required for, initiating defense production, any serious interference in the defense production presently under way in the United Kingdom could be exceedingly costly even if at a future period the British dollar position permitted reconversions to defense production.

It has been estimated by the Mutual Security Agency that, in order to earn or save an amount of dollars equal to the \$300 million here recommended to be made available to the United Kingdom by transfer, a reduction of more than twice that amount in the British defense program would be required. It is consequently considered of great importance to United States defense objectives in Europe that the British Government not find it necessary to cut back the defense program either because of unavailability of necessary materials or because of the necessity for using defense plant capacity for production of dollar earning exports to finance imports of necessary raw materials.

The items to be financed under this aid program for the United Kingdom will include steel, aluminum, nickel, sulphur, copper, petroleum products and other raw materials and components related to the defense program. In addition, the Government of the United Kingdom will apply the sterling counterpart to its defense production program.

Prime Minister Churchill stated in his recent speech to the Congress, "We shall continue to do our utmost in the common cause." The United Kingdom has since again assured us of its determination to carry out its defense program to the fullest extent of its resources and capabilities.

GREECE

Economic aid to Greece has been cut drastically from the 1951 level of \$275 million. Economic recovery was such that it was estimated early this fiscal year that about \$170 million of aid would be sufficient to support the basic

economy, even though Greek defense expenditures had been increased by about 12 percent.

During the ensuing months, however, there has been a sharp deterioration in the Greek economic situation. Unless increased imports can be financed, the Greek defense expenditure program will be jeopardized. It is the opinion of U.S. military authorities that any reduction in the Greek defense effort will seriously affect the defensibility of the area, and it has accordingly been agreed that an additional amount of approximately \$10 million of economic aid should be furnished to Greece during this fiscal year.

TURKEY

Turkey's defense program provides for an increase in troop strength, a badly needed non-commissioned officers training program, an increase in the production of such weapons and supporting military items as Turkish industry is effectively able to produce, and a number of other special projects which are vital to the defense of this key strategic area.

In order to make possible the carrying out of this program, it has been agreed that an additional \$25 million of economic aid should be made available to permit a total of \$70 million to be allotted to Turkey during this fiscal year. Without this assistance Turkey would have to curtail seriously the resources going into its defense program and into certain developmental projects of strategic importance.

YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia occupies a vital strategic position on the flank of the defense of Western Europe. It is under direct threat of aggression, and its ability to defend itself is considered essential to the security of Western Europe.

In order to sustain Yugoslavia's very heavy defense effort, substantial outside assistance is needed in support of what is still a primitive economy still suffering from the loss of markets and sources of many imports which attended the break with Soviet Russia in 1948. To some extent, this assistance can and will be furnished by the United Kingdom and France, in accordance with a tripartite agreement to which the United States is a party. The major share of the imports which Yugoslavia must have, however, must come from non-European sources, and they cannot be obtained by Yugoslavia without substantial U.S. assistance.

The present financial plan of the Yugoslav Government calls for a further restriction on the share of the output for civilian consumption and investment for non-defense purposes, while expanding the share of current defense expenditures and investment for defense production. Cuts in U.S. assistance below the level planned would be felt directly in the military program, since the non-military sectors are already being compressed to a low level.

Although it is doubtful if Yugoslavia would undertake any quantitative cuts in its military expenditures, the quality of its defense effort would suffer seriously. We are furnishing them with a considerable quantity of military end-items from this country, but in order to attain a balanced and effective fighting force, they themselves must provide clothing, personal equipment, military reserve stocks, ammunition and all of the armaments which they are capable of producing. In order to do this, Yugoslavia must import substantial quantities of POL, cotton, hides, steel and other products which must be paid for in dollars. They cannot do it, however, unless the United States is willing to provide financial assistance.

Yugoslavia has recently presented the U.S. with a list of dollar requirements considerably in excess of any requests thus far received. These lists have been rigorously screened down to what is considered a bare minimum, but it has been agreed that additional economic aid of approximately \$43 million must be provided during this fiscal year in support of the Yugoslav military effort during this fiscal year.

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Germany's Economic and Political Progress

by John J. McCloy

U.S. High Commissioner for Germany¹

This is the third year in succession that my family and I have had the privilege of being in Berlin to celebrate the coming of the New Year. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak again over RIAS, this great voice of freedom, with the people of Berlin and with the people of Germany—all Germany.

Each of these years has marked great improvement and progress in the Federal Republic. Economic rehabilitation in the West has been spectacular.

The latest index of production in the Federal Republic has reached the astounding mark of 148 percent of 1936. Keep in mind that this is entirely nonmilitary, for up to the present there has been no production of armaments whatsoever in the Federal Republic. It is regrettable that political conditions have continued to retard heavily progress in the Soviet zone and that the people in that zone and in the satellite countries have not been able to enjoy the benefits of such increased production.

In contrast to the figure for the Federal Republic just given, the production index in West Berlin is only 51 percent of 1936. That, however, is an increase of 34 percent since 1949, when, owing to Soviet strangulation, it was down to a low of 17.

In the political field likewise the progress of the Federal Republic has been spectacular. The Federal Government has gone through the period of organizational pains. It now has achieved a place of dignity in world councils, and its opinions are weighed and respected by an ever-growing circle of nations.

The Federal Republic is rapidly approaching the status of full partnership with the free nations. In the conventions now being negotiated with the Federal Government, the Western Allies are reserving only those rights which the Soviet threat makes necessary. The reserved rights are those

¹ Address broadcast over RIAS, the American-sponsored radio station in West Berlin, on New Year's Eve, 1951, and is reprinted from the *Hicoq Information Bulletin* of January 1952.

1. Incidental to the security of the Allied troops in Germany.

2. Necessary to maintain the freedom of this city of West Berlin and its people.

3. Necessary to preserve Allied and German rights at the final peace negotiations.

The reservations are clearly in the interest of the German people themselves. They are also necessary for the preservation of the security of the free world. They emphasize the determination of the Western Powers to stand beside the German people against totalitarian aggression.

Paralleling our relationship with the Federal Republic we intend to grant to the authorities of this city, control over their own affairs, subject only to the special limitations necessary to preserve our rights to remain in and protect the city.

I have just referred to the remarkable economic and political progress which the Federal Republic has made in the last year. I will refrain from any comparison with the Soviet zone of Germany or with life in the satellite countries or in Russia itself. The differences are apparent to us all.

German Expressions of Democratic Faith

Five months ago, during the so-called World Youth Festival here in Berlin, I met and talked with hundreds of young men and women from the Soviet zone. We met here at RIAS and at my house in Dahlem. Together, we had an unusual chance to discuss openly the questions which were on their minds. Meeting with these young people was one of the most vivid, if indeed it was not the most moving, experience I have had in my years in Germany.

These young men and women showed courage in coming to the Western sectors. The seriousness of their questions and the eagerness with which they sought information and light showed how deep the urge for freedom and human dignity was rooted in them. The visit of hundreds of thousands of these young people to West Berlin, and not the staged demonstrations in East Berlin, became the significant news of the world last August.

In my opinion there is a direct connection be-

tween this dramatic expression of democratic faith and the action taken recently in Paris by a great majority of the United Nations, approving a commission to investigate conditions for holding free elections in all parts of Germany. The action taken in Paris was the response of free nations to the desire of the entire German people for unity in freedom.

The people of this city, which has given so many demonstrations of its will to be free, should be particularly encouraged by this evidence of support. For our part we reaffirm our determination to protect this city which has become a new symbol of freedom to the world. We do not know what new efforts the Soviets may make in the coming year to break the spirit of Berlin or to restrict the well-being of its people. We do know that the forces—moral and physical—which now stand with this city in the defense of its freedom are becoming more and more powerful. The Western Allies are staying in Berlin and the ties between the Federal Republic and this city will not only be maintained but grow ever stronger. Sustained economic aid to Berlin from the Federal Republic during the coming year now seems assured.

The year just passed has continued to accentuate the world-wide pattern of Communist tactics. Today, the Germans are not the only people to know the agonies of abbreviated prisoner-of-war lists. Today, the United States is also a victim of Communist brigandage and ransom. Every day for the past 18 months American families have received the news of a father, son, or brother killed, wounded or missing in action.

The American people are learning again the hard way. For 30-odd years we refused to accept the hard facts of our own experience. We demobilized our forces immediately after World War I, a conflict in which we finally played a decisive role. We watched Hitler and the Japanese warlords prepare their bid for world power and we remained unarmed. Only at the last hour did we marshal our enormous potential of manpower and material. And again, after Hitler's defeat, we demobilized. Our armies, in response to the demands of the people, disappeared like water on a hot stone.

U.S. Hopes for United European Defense

The United States does not intend to let this happen again. We are determined now to make a more timely effort to stop aggression before it grows into war. For the past year we have been engaged in a vast process of military and industrial rearmament. Together with the nations of the European and Atlantic Community, we are

building a solid, united defense so that neither the Soviet nor any other would-be totalitarian aggressor will dare take a chance of destroying the peace.

Our policy contains no elements of aggression and under it none would be condoned. But let it be clear that this time we refuse to be deterred by sham peace propaganda. This sham propaganda has been spread by the same men who, during the period of our demobilization, not only maintained and expanded their own armed forces, but also did not hesitate to use them when they felt they could do so without serious challenge.

The grand process of integration that is now going on in the free world is the surest way to defend the peace. The European army under the European community, the Schuman Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are by their community character nonaggressive and at the same time are powerful guarantors of peace.

This great and strong Community of Free Nations, of which the Federal Republic will be an equal partner, is bound to forward the cause of German unification. The European army or the Atlantic community will not bring about unification by force. But events occur as much by moral as by physical force. A Europe united in its own defense against aggression, against any system that is based on slave camps, secret police, and thought control, will extend its moral and political influence deep into oppressed areas. This moral force will have a powerful impact upon millions of people now living under Communist oppression. It will set in motion an irresistible demand for participation in a life of freedom which, particularly in the case of Germany, will not be stopped by an artificial line drawn through the middle of the country. No tyranny, however militarily powerful, can long withstand it. Unification of Germany in freedom and freedom for the people of Western Europe are bound to be accelerated as a result of this influence.

Already the progress in building the European-Atlantic community has had its effect on the problem of German unification. A year ago, the Communists rejected out of hand many Western proposals to bring about the reunification of Germany. Now they are making extensive efforts to pose as champions of a united Germany—and the only factor that has caused this retreat is the growing determination and strength in the West.

We cannot guarantee freedom in 1952 to the East sector of Berlin, to the Soviet zone of Germany, or to the people of Eastern Europe. But of this we can be certain: If in the coming year the people of the West continue to move in the direction they are going, the cause of freedom for all the peoples of Europe will be greatly advanced.

Communiqués on European Defense Meetings Held at London

Following is the text of a communiqué issued at London by Secretary Acheson, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of France, and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden of the United Kingdom at the conclusion of meetings held on February 17, 18, and 19 relating to the European defense community and NATO; also, the text of a communiqué concerning Germany's role in the defense community issued jointly by the three Foreign Ministers and Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany.

TRIPARTITE COMMUNIQUÉ OF FEBRUARY 19

During their meetings at the Foreign Office on the 17th, 18th, and 19th of February, the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States and France considered a number of questions which were subsequently discussed with the German Federal Chancellor. They also examined the relationship to be established between the European defense community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and the United States declared their abiding interest in the establishment and integrity of the European defense community and, in association with the Foreign Minister of France, studied means by which their governments could support and cooperate with the community. These subjects will be matters of continuing consultation between the three ministers and between their governments in order to find appropriate means of giving the community the desired cooperation and support.

The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and the United States recalled the decision of their governments to maintain armed forces in Europe which, in association with the European defense forces, will contribute their fair share in joint defense of the North Atlantic area.

QUADRIpartite COMMUNIQUÉ OF FEBRUARY 19

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France and the United Kingdom and the Chan-

cellor of the German Federal Republic met for discussions in the Foreign Office on the 18th and 19th of February. They reviewed the position reached in the parallel negotiations in Paris and in Bonn, now approaching a successful conclusion, for the establishment of the European defense community and for the creation of a new relationship between the three Western powers and the Federal Republic of Germany based on a series of freely negotiated conventions.

The Foreign Ministers and the Chancellor are well pleased with the results of their work. They reached agreement on outstanding issues arising from the negotiations in Bonn. The question of Germany's financial contribution to European defense is dealt with below.

On the difficult problem concerning the future regulation and distribution in the interests of Western defense of arms production in the states of the European defense community they have reached certain conclusions and provided for a series of meetings which they are confident will produce speedy results.

They reached agreement on methods for dealing with the question of war criminals now detained in the Federal Republic.

They reviewed the report made by the Executive Bureau of the Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the financial contribution of the Federal Republic to Western defense. The ministers agreed that this report, which reached them on the 16th of February, should be published tonight. There is every prospect that an agreed decision on the total financial contribution of the Federal Republic to defense will be reached by the end of the current week.

Negotiations on other matters arising out of this report, including the distribution of the Federal Republic's contribution, will proceed at once in Bonn between representatives of the German Federal Republic and of the three powers.

The four ministers welcome the progress made towards the conclusion of the treaty for the establishment of the European defense community which will provide a solid foundation for the agreements to be concluded between the three Western powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. This treaty and the agreements will constitute a single structure designed to bring about

the association of the Federal Republic with the free world and to solidify the defense of Western Europe.

The four ministers discussed the relationship between the European defense community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and agreed on certain recommendations which will be made by the three foreign ministers to the NATO Council for settling this question.

It will be the concern of the four governments, together with the other interested governments, to ensure the preservation and the progressive

strengthening of the European defense community which, as a part of the wider Atlantic community, creates a partnership for peace.

The four ministers are agreed that continuing efforts should be made to accomplish the unification of Germany through democratic and peaceful means.

The four ministers are convinced that their meeting has removed the obstacles which have hitherto delayed the conclusion of the negotiations and has thus marked a decisive advance in the cause of peace.

Correspondence Relating to Soviet Attitude Toward Austrian Treaty Negotiations

[Released to the press January 25]

On September 14, 1951, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and France declared in a joint communiqué issued at Washington¹ their unanimous view that there was "no justification for any further delay in the conclusion of a treaty for the reestablishment of a free and independent Austria." The communiqué went on to say: "This has been the constant aim since the conclusion of hostilities. They will not desist in their efforts to bring the Soviet Government to the same view and to that end they have decided to make a new and resolute effort in the meetings of the Austrian Treaty Deputies to fulfill the long over-due pledge to the Austrian people."

In furtherance of this agreement of the three Foreign Ministers, the next chairman of the Deputies for the Austrian State Treaty, Samuel Reber, U.S. Deputy, issued an invitation on December 28, 1951, through the Secretary General of the Austrian Treaty Deputies. The invitation suggested that a meeting be held at London on January 21, 1952. The British and French immediately accepted this invitation. The Soviets did not respond until January 18 when the Soviet chargé at London sent the following letter to the Secretary General:

SOVIET LETTER OF JANUARY 18

Confirming receipt of your letter of December 28 on the question of convening a conference of the Foreign Ministers' deputies for the preparation of a state agreement with Austria in London on the twenty-first of January, I consider it necessary to state the following:

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1951, p. 486.

As is well known, the Soviet delegate introduced a proposal at the last conference of the Foreign Ministers' deputies to carry out in all four zones of Austria an investigation of the implementation by the Austrian Government of the decisions of the Four Powers on demilitarization and denazification in order that the Allied Council might present a report on the results of this investigation. Such an investigation has at the present time become even more necessary than before.

The Soviet delegate at the conference of deputies has also pointed out repeatedly that in the circumstances that have arisen the question of a treaty with Austria cannot be viewed independently of the question of the implementation by the Governments of England, the U.S.A., and France of their obligations under the peace treaty with Italy so far as concerns the creation of the Free Territory of Trieste. This has not, up to the present time, been done because of opposition on the part of the United States, England, and France, while Trieste has been turned into an Anglo-American military base. In such circumstances, what guarantee is there of the fulfillment of a treaty prepared with Austria?

In connection with the proposal to convene a new conference of deputies, the Soviet delegate requests to be informed of the agreement of the British Government, and of the Governments of the United States of America and France also, to review at this conference of the deputies the above-mentioned proposals of the Soviet delegate on the carrying out of a four-power investigation in Austria and on the implementation of the decision about the Free Territory of Trieste.

Copies of this letter have also been sent by me to the representatives of the United States and

France at the conference of the deputies for the preparation of a draft Austrian treaty.

SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPLY OF JANUARY 19

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th of January, which has been referred to the representatives of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. They requested me to inform you as follows:

"The express purpose of the meeting which has been called for the 21st of January is to conclude the Austrian treaty as speedily as possible. It is the firm wish of the three governments thus to relieve Austria of the presence of occupying forces and to obtain the re-establishment as soon as possible of Austria's independence and sovereignty which was promised to that country as long ago as 1943 by the Moscow Declaration.

"In order to achieve this end the three governments are prepared for their part to proceed with the meeting as proposed and the three deputies have notified the Secretary General of their readiness to do so. The chairman has accordingly suggested that the meeting take place at 3 p. m. Monday, the 21st of January, at Lancaster House.

"As regards the issues of de-Nazification and demilitarization mentioned by the Soviet Government in its letter of the 18th of January, the three Western deputies point out that the position of their governments has been made plain in the Allied council in Vienna, which under the control agreement of the 28th of June, 1946, is the proper body to consider such questions. As regards the Soviet allegations about Trieste, the three deputies wish to recall that they have clearly demonstrated in previous meetings that this issue has no relation to the Austrian treaty."

I shall be grateful if you will inform me whether you are in agreement with the chairman's suggestion concerning a meeting.

NOTE: No substantive reply to this letter has been received to date, although the Soviet chargé on January 21 sent the following message to the Secretary General:

SOVIET MESSAGE OF JANUARY 21

In connection with your letter of January 19, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to state that, as formerly, it considers that question of Austrian treaty cannot be examined independently of fulfillment by the Austrian Government of decisions of four powers on demilitarization and denazification of Austria and of question of fulfillment by Governments of England, U.S., and France of their obligations according to the peace treaty with Italy in that part which concerns the Free Territory of Trieste. Your answer to the letter of the Soviet delegation, which was received

on the 19th of January, requires study. In view of this the Soviet representative will not be able to attend the meeting of deputies on January 21.

[The Secretary General, having received no further reply to his letter of January 19, sent a note to the Soviet Embassy at London on January 24. For text of this note, see BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 160.]

Goal of Freedom: Collective Security

*by Ambassador Myron M. Cowen
Consultant to the Secretary*¹

We have long since learned that no single nation, on its own resources, can keep itself secure against the Soviet Communist plan of world imperialism and aggression. This realization has been expressed in the North Atlantic Treaty in which each of the member nations is pledged to come to the aid of any member who is attacked by an aggressor. The United States and Canada will join forces with the other members from Europe to stop any such attack. And these countries will come to our aid if we are attacked.

This treaty, which will be 3 years old in April, was signed by its members specifically—and I quote—"to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law." Under it, these nations are building a protective force with General Eisenhower at its head, bringing together the manpower and military defense resources of all our countries. You, as newly commissioned pilots, are key members of those forces.

The strength of the free world, of which the NATO nations are a key part, I am glad to say, has been steadily growing. The year just ended was a period of real progress; we are hoping that 1952 will show even greater gains. All the NATO nations are working especially hard at the task and your own achievements vividly illustrate that fact.

Nobody knows, of course, what the next move of the Soviet rulers will be, but world events of the last 2 years have demonstrated the wisdom of the course taken by our free nations toward collective security. We have been wise, under the North Atlantic Treaty, to build up military units and train and equip them jointly to meet aggression.

The Soviet leaders have learned full well that we are united in our stand. Korea especially has shown them not only that the free world will pool its forces to stop aggression but also that collective security will work. The Soviet leaders know

¹Excerpts from an address made before the graduation of a class of jet pilot cadets from Belgium, Norway, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the United States at Williams Air Force Base, Chandler, Ariz., on Feb. 9 and released to the press on the same date.

now that the concerted action which met the Communists when they invaded the Republic of Korea will be put into play again if Communist forces move from subversion to open aggression in Europe.

This fact has a particular significance, since we all know that a key aim in the Soviet strategy has long been to move westward to control all of Europe. The Soviet leaders did not demobilize their armed forces after the war, and they have been devoting prodigious sums to their military prowess in the years since. We know that they used the threat of their armed forces to help them take over in Eastern Europe. It is apparent that they have been counting on the threat of overpowering force to move farther west.

We believe that those who use force will respect force, and only force. We know that the Kremlin backed away from situations of improved strength in Greece and Turkey. We believe that safety today lies in collective strength of the free world; it cannot afford to be weak.

There is no doubt that the free world by wholehearted mutual effort and sacrifice can stem the drive of the Kremlin toward world domination because the free world can muster far more strength than the Communist-dominated world possesses. It has the courage and skills and the creative and productive capacities. The free world can outproduce the Soviet Empire many times. It has the advantage of free minds and spirits able to throw their full abilities and energies into the defense of freedom.

But we need more and more of the type of pooled effort represented in the work of this graduating class. Through collective security, through regional organizations of strength, through joint building and training of our armed forces, through pooling weapons and equipment, through coordinating raw materials and other resources, through making our common energies one, we can keep the peace. Our mutual safety lies in mutual strength.

The Greek Question

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1951-52): PART II

by Harry N. Howard

THE REPATRIATION OF THE GREEK CHILDREN

The Committee was now ready to consider, as the General Assembly had since 1948, the question of the repatriation of the Greek children. While the Greek Red Cross had estimated that 25,000 Greek children had been removed from Greece during 1948-1949, the Communist "Free Greece" radio, on March 28, 1949, openly admitted that more than 17,000 children had been taken across the northern frontiers of Greece. The Committee had before it a number of reports on the subject, concerning which, as in the past, with the single exception of Yugoslavia, nothing whatsoever had been done, despite the efforts of the International Red Cross. Far from cooperating, either with the International Red Cross or with the Standing Committee established in 1950, the Soviet satellites carried on a persistent propaganda campaign against the Yugoslav repatriation.⁵⁵ It was indeed curious, but not surprising,

that the Soviet representative was able, on August 22, 1951,⁵⁶ to produce a list of Greek children in Yugoslavia, whose parents allegedly lived in Czechoslovakia although the satellites were never able to verify any lists of Greek children on their territories for return to their parents in Greece through cooperation with the International Red Cross.

In its 1951 report, the Special Committee on the Balkans had voiced once more "its deep anxiety concerning the fate of the missing children." The report of the International Red Cross, dated August 3, 1951,⁵⁷ outlined the "insurmountable obstacles" which had been encountered. The International Red Cross report of November 7, 1951,⁵⁸ detailed the story of the failure, with the Yugoslav exception, pointing out that 289 children had been repatriated from that country and that a further party of 300 was to be returned as

⁵⁵ See U.N. docs. S/1780, 1784, 1798, 1821, 1839, 1882, 1888, 1910, 1921, 1927, and 1969, for the Soviet and satellite charges and the Greek and Yugoslav denunciation of this propaganda.

⁵⁶ U.N. docs. A/1871, 1876.

⁵⁷ U.N. doc. A/1848.

⁵⁸ U.N. doc. A/1932. In fact, 96 children were repatriated on Oct. 29, 1951 from Yugoslavia (A/AC.16/1296).

soon as it had received the necessary civil status documents.

In a further report of November 8, 1951,⁵⁹ the Secretary-General described the work of the Standing Committee, composed of representatives of Peru, the Philippines, and Sweden, which was advising him concerning the problem, and pointed out that although "every attempt" had been made, through the United Nations and the International Red Cross, to find some opening through which some progress could be made, none had been found. He felt that some new procedure should be adopted and urged that, at an early stage during the session, the General Assembly invite representatives of the governments directly concerned to discuss the best means for repatriating the Greek children, more than 12,000 applications for such repatriation having been received. The Red Cross had already made clear, however, that political, not merely "technical" considerations, constituted the insuperable obstacle.

THE DISCUSSION IN THE AD HOC POLITICAL COMMITTEE

The procedure outlined above was proposed in a draft resolution submitted on November 23⁶⁰ by the delegations of Peru, the Philippines, and Sweden, requesting the chairman to consult with the President of the General Assembly and the chairman of the Standing Committee, with a view to inviting representatives of the Governments concerned to meet with the Standing Committee, if possible not later than December 15. Meanwhile, discussion was to be postponed.

Mr. Grafstrom (Sweden), a member of the Standing Committee, recalled on November 23 that, despite Assembly resolutions, only Yugoslavia had made any effort at repatriation, and he noted the views of the Secretary-General, the Red Cross, and the Standing Committee that "success could be expected only through a frank exchange of views by the parties concerned," although he was well aware that "political," not "practical," considerations were the real obstacles.⁶¹ There was general agreement that the substantive discussion should be postponed, for, as Mr. Kyrrou (Greece) indicated on November 26, the time was not "ripe" for such consideration, and the draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by a vote of 49-0-5, with the Soviet bloc abstaining. While Messrs. Lewandowski (Poland) and Hajek (Czechoslovakia), in explaining their abstentions, made their expected comments concerning Greece, Mr. Prica (Yugoslavia) remarked that "certain countries were showing a marked lack of goodwill." Mr. Kyrrou pointed out that there was yet a third question, the repatriation of members of the Greek military forces captured by the Greek

guerrillas and moved to the territories of the northern neighbors of Greece.

Mr. Grafstrom reported on January 7, 1952, that, despite the Committee's unanimous resolution of November 26, 1951, "no action had been taken by any of the Governments concerned" and that "the attempt to bring the solution of the problem nearer must therefore be regarded as a failure," and there was no longer any reason to postpone discussion.⁶² The next day, Mr. Grafstrom indicated that Czechoslovakia had appointed a representative to confer with the Standing Committee.⁶³ By January 22, the Standing Committee had held three meetings with the Czechoslovak representative, without immediate results as to the repatriation of 138 children to Greece, although the latter indicated that negotiations with the International Red Cross could take place in Prague. The Rumanian Government charged the General Assembly with violating its own resolutions and rejected consultation.⁶⁴

During the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's discussion of the problem on January 29, Mr. Kyrrou (Greece) charged that the Greek children were simply being used as "guinea pigs for a new fratricidal strife," and representatives of Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States appealed for repatriation. The representative of the Dominican Republic introduced a draft resolution⁶⁵ thanking the International Red Cross, the Secretary-General, and the Standing Committee for their efforts, noting with satisfaction repatriation of Greek children from Yugoslavia, expressing hope for some progress in the case of Czechoslovakia, regretting that other states had rejected consultation, and urging that steps be taken to facilitate the early return of these children to their homes. To this effect the Standing Committee was continued, and the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies were requested to continue their efforts and to report their progress to the seventh session of the General Assembly.

The discussion continued on January 30, with representatives of the Soviet bloc, notably those of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, continuing their propaganda attack against Greece and charging that the latter had not fulfilled the conditions for repatriation, despite statements to the contrary on the part of the International Red Cross.⁶⁶ The Committee refused to accept this reasoning, however, and, by a vote of 44-0-5, approved the Dominican proposal.⁶⁷ At the meeting

⁵⁹ U.N. doc. A/1913.

⁶⁰ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/L.4/Rev. 1. See also the amendment submitted by the Belgian, Luxembourg, and Netherlands delegations (U.N. doc. A/AC.53/L.9).

⁶¹ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.7.

⁶² U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.33 (Provisional).

⁶³ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.34 (Provisional).

⁶⁴ See especially U.N. doc. A/AC.53/L.44 for Report of the Standing Committee on the Repatriation of Greek Children.

⁶⁵ See U.N. docs. A/AC.53/SR.55, 56; A/AC.53/L.51.

⁶⁶ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/SR.57.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

on January 31, Mr. Kyron withdrew a draft resolution with respect to the repatriation of Greek Army personnel since he had been advised that the 1950 resolution on this matter was still valid.⁶⁸

End of the Greek Case

The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions recommended approval of an amount of \$85,000, the provision proposed by the Secretary-General being limited to the estimated expenditure for the liquidation of the activities of the Special Committee on the Balkans. Since the financial consequences of action by the Balkan Subcommission could not be forecast, however, the Secretary-General proposed that any expenditure arising therefrom should be met by advances from the Working Capital Fund, as a commitment relating to the maintenance of peace and security.⁶⁹ On the other hand, the Advisory Committee recommended a budget of \$30,000 to cover reimbursement of expenses to be incurred by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies with respect to the problem of the repatriation of Greek children.⁷⁰

PLENARY DISCUSSION OF THE GREEK CASE

The plenary session of the General Assembly was ready for decision concerning the dissolution of the Special Committee on the Balkans and the establishment of a new Balkan Subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission on December 7, 1951.⁷¹ Before proceeding to the vote, Mr. Tsarapkin (U.S.S.R.) essentially summed up the Soviet case by repeating all the Communist propaganda against the Special Committee and plunging into the usual tirade against the "terror in Greece." He was dutifully followed by the representatives of Poland, the Ukraine, and Czechoslovakia.⁷²

The attack on Greece was so vitriolic that Mr. Politis felt impelled to reply. He pointed out, among other things, that accused persons in Greece "had the benefit of the measures of clemency in force," including those recently brought to the bar of justice. He added:⁷³

The Soviet Union conceived long ago its plan for subjecting Greece to communist rule. To that end all the European countries, where its influence is paramount, were cunningly mobilized. . . . The lowest dregs of

society were carefully recruited and enlisted in that horde of demons and furies that over-ran Greece and everywhere unleashed a storm of hatred and bloody riot. Innocent people were tortured, hanged or shot in the market place without any kind of trial, on a simple order from the political commissars. . . . There were more than 100,000 victims, many of them decapitated by the emissaries of the Cominform, doubtless in the name of peace and democracy, with the old tin cans, a specially sadistic feature designed to heighten the terror they brought upon us. . . .

You will, I feel sure, agree that it is entirely inadmissible that those who bear the main responsibility for these disgusting acts should come to this platform and lecture honestly democratic nations on human rights and humanitarian principles. It is high time to put a stop to such trickery.

The General Assembly was now ready to vote. As in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, the Soviet amendment to the Greek resolution, to terminate the Special Committee on the Balkans immediately, was rejected by 48-5-4, and the two resolutions with respect to terminating the services of the Special Committee on the Balkans and to establishing a Balkan Subcommission, were approved by 48-5-1. The Soviet proposal was rejected by a paragraph-by-paragraph vote,⁷⁴ and then as a whole by a vote of 38-5-6.

The plenary session of the General Assembly considered the problem of the repatriation of the Greek children on February 2, 1952.⁷⁵ The failure of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania to participate in consultations with the Standing Committee was scored while Mr. Kyron expressed some hope that the Czechoslovak promise to enter into discussions with the International Red Cross would prove fruitful. Once more, however, the Soviet representative, offered the standard excuses for failure to act on previous resolutions of the General Assembly. In the end the resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee was approved by a vote of 51-0-5.⁷⁶

THE BALKAN SUBCOMMISSION

On December 15, 1951, the Secretary-General advised the Peace Observation Commission of the action of the General Assembly with respect to the establishment of a Balkan Subcommission.⁷⁷ Thereupon, on January 23, that body met to consider the matter.⁷⁸ A draft resolution had been prepared by the delegation of Colombia, and Sir Gladwyn Jebb, of the United Kingdom, proposed that the new Balkan Subcommission be composed of representatives of Colombia, France, Pakistan,

⁶⁸ U.N. docs. A/AC.53/SR.58; A/AC.53/L.52. This action completed the docket of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.

⁶⁹ U.N. docs. A/C.5/481, A/2040.

⁷⁰ U.N. docs. A/C.5/496, A/2105.

⁷¹ It was decided, by a vote of 21-1-18, that further discussion was unnecessary (U.N. doc. A/PV.351). See appendix 2 for Mr. Cohen's statement of Dec. 7, 1951.

⁷² U.N. doc. A/PV.351.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* While the paragraphs on cessation of U.S. interference, general amnesty, death sentences, and dissolution of Unscob were all rejected by a vote of 37-5-7, that on establishment of diplomatic relations between Greece and Albania and Bulgaria was approved by 15-10-20. See appendix 3 for texts of resolutions approved.

⁷⁵ U.N. doc. A/PV.371.

⁷⁶ U.N. doc. A/2104.

⁷⁷ U.N. doc. A/CN.7/3. See also appendix 4.

⁷⁸ U.N. doc. A/CN.7/SR.2.

Sweden, and the United States.⁷⁹ Mr. Tsarapkin (U.S.S.R.), who was echoed by Mr. Nosek (Czechoslovakia), challenged the legality of establishing a Balkan Subcommittee and sought, once more, to re-argue the entire Greek case.⁸⁰ Ambassador Gross reiterated the services of the Special Committee on the Balkans and thought the Soviet Union, which had charged the United States with aggressive designs in the Balkans, would be glad to have an impartial commission in the area. Mr. Abbas (Iraq) favored establishment of the subcommission, adding that "that type of peace observation might well be extended elsewhere, and in particular to the Middle East, where considerable tension prevailed." In the end, the resolution was approved by 12 votes to 2.⁸¹

The Greek Government, on January 23,⁸² requested "the immediate dispatch of observers to the frontier areas of Greece," in order that the continuity of observation not be interrupted. At a meeting of the Balkan Subcommittee on January 31, that body unanimously adopted a resolution inviting Colombia, France, Pakistan, Sweden, and the United States each to make one observer available for service and the United Kingdom to make one observer available to serve as principal observer. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to make arrangements for the continuation of the services of six observers of the Special Committee on the Balkans until the new observers arrived in Greece.⁸³

A few days later, on February 2, the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans held its final public session at Athens and terminated its work in Greece on February 5, 1952. Vigilance in a troubled area was now to be maintained under the new peace machinery of the United Nations. Meanwhile, Greece, which, like Turkey, had contributed to the United Nations Forces in Korea in the interest of international peace and security, was now on the road to membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, on December 20, 1951, was elected to membership in the Security Council.

• *Mr. Howard, author of the above article, is United Nations Adviser for the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.*

Appendix 1

Statement by Benjamin V. Cohen to the Press on December 7, 1951

The United States delegation welcomes the action just taken by the sixth General Assembly on the two resolutions put forward by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee after its discussion of the Greek case.

The first of these resolutions brings to a close the work

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* A/CN.7/5.

⁸⁰ U.N. doc. A/CN.7/SR.2.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* See also appendix 5.

⁸² U.N. doc. A/CN.7/SC.1/1.

⁸³ U.N. doc. A/CN.7/SC.1/2. See also appendix 6.

of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB). Since the end of 1947, the Special Committee has faithfully and successfully carried out its task of observing and reporting on conditions along the northern frontiers of Greece. We believe that the United Nations through this Committee has made a vital contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in the Balkans. The members and observers of this Committee deserve the highest praise of all those who wish to see the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter prevail in relations between states.

The United States is pleased that the direct threats to Greece have abated sufficiently to permit the Assembly to dissolve the Special Committee.

But since a situation of considerable tension continues to exist in the Balkans—the General Assembly has wisely, in our view, decided that the United Nations should maintain in readiness a small subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission which could, on short notice, provide direct observation in any part of the Balkan area if such service is called for. The United States believes that this represents a healthy and sound development of the role assigned to the Peace Observation Commission in the Uniting for Peace Resolution adopted by the General Assembly last year.

The Greek people deserve the highest praise for their steadfastness and fortitude in meeting and surmounting the dangers to their freedom and independence. In their struggle to preserve their freedom they have had the moral and political support of the free world, and the material support of the United States and other law-abiding states in a position to provide material assistance. But it should not be forgotten that the persistent watchfulness of the United Nations was of great and invaluable aid in guarding the independence of Greece from the threats of her Cominform neighbors.

We believe that the United Nations can take just pride in the peace-keeping efforts it has made during the period when Greece was severely menaced. We are convinced that the maintenance of a Peace Observation Subcommittee for the Balkans, ready to send observers to any troubled part of that area when desired, should be able to alert the world to dangers to peace should they arise in that area.

Appendix 2

Statement by Benjamin V. Cohen in Ad Hoc Political Committee on November 20, 1951

This is the fifth time that the Greek case has come before the General Assembly. The United Nations may take great pride in what it has done to preserve the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. Since 1949 there has been a marked improvement in the situation along the Greek frontiers and that progress has been maintained. Although border incidents continue to occur, they are significantly reduced in scope and importance.

The Greek people and the Greek National Army have borne the major burden of freeing Greece from guerrilla warfare carried on against her with the active support and assistance of her Cominform neighbors. The United Nations and its Special Committee on the Balkans have steadfastly maintained that vigilance along the Greek frontiers. United Nations vigilance has been an important and powerful factor in deterring would-be aggressors against Greece from enlarging the scope of their hostile activities against that country.

The improvement of the situation along the northern Greek frontiers in the last 2 years, and especially the improvement in Greek-Yugoslav relations—in line with recommendations of the General Assembly—have permitted Greece to devote more of her energy and resources to binding up of her wounds and laying the foundations for a more stable and secure existence for her people.

Meanwhile, the character of the threat to Greece has changed substantially, as is brought out in the report of

the Special Committee. Such threat as remains is now part of general tension in the Balkan area. The change is reflected in the use by the Cominform in the Balkans of familiar subversive techniques, political and economic pressures, and attempted intimidation. It is difficult to say in what precise part of the Balkans the more general threat now prevailing might flare into danger of major importance. For the moment Greece may be less immediately threatened by aggression than before. But she remains, with others, exposed to the more general threat of aggression in the Balkans which might be directed at any point at any time as may be dictated by Cominform strategy.

The United States has been deeply interested in the welfare and freedom of the Greek people and has generously helped the Greek people to maintain their freedom. UNSCOP by its presence in Greece, and by its persistent watchfulness and reporting, has helped materially to reduce the likelihood of an early renewal of externally supported guerrilla warfare in Greece. It has set before the world the true picture of relations between Greece and the states to the North, including states of Central and Eastern Europe, and has convincingly disproved the repeated propaganda charges accusing Greece of planning some kind of aggression against her neighbors. UNSCOP has by its work made a significant contribution to the preservation of world peace and security.

The United States delegation agrees with the delegation of Greece that it is now appropriate to bring the work of UNSCOP to a close. It is a body which, with its observers, deserves the high praise and gratitude of all peace-loving members of the world community. The possibility, I might say probability, that UNSCOP's work would soon be concluded was foreshadowed in last year's General Assembly resolution on the Greek question. At the same time, it would be rash, in light of present international tension and, in particular in the tension in the Balkan area, for the United Nations to assume that no further watchfulness over that area, or machinery available to conduct on the spot observation are needed. This point is well brought out in the fourth recommendation contained in the report of the Special Committee of August 15, 1951, to the General Assembly.

The United Nations would, in our judgment, be well advised to make specific provision at this time for the instant renewal of observation anywhere in the Balkans, on the request of any state or states concerned, and within the territory of states consenting thereto. Last year the General Assembly established, under its Uniting for Peace Resolution, a Peace Observation Commission whose function it is to observe and report on situations of international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The present state of affairs in the Balkans, as the United States sees it, is just such a situation of tension. It would be logical and prudent for the General Assembly to bring into play the constructive influence toward peace which the Peace Observation Commission can bring to bear in terms of the present Balkan picture, of which the Greek situation is a part.

The United States believes that the best means of doing this is to authorize the creation of a small subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission which would be authorized to provide United Nations observers for areas of tension in the Balkans when so requested by any state or states directly concerned. Observation, if called for, as I have already suggested, would take place only within the territories of states prepared to admit the observers. Such a subcommittee could sit at the United Nations Headquarters with authority to visit and travel in those areas in which observation might be requested. The subcommittee should be authorized to consider data submitted to it by its members or observers, and to make such reports to the Peace Observation Commission and the Secretary-General, for the information of member states, as it might deem necessary. In this way, the United Nations would have ready for immediate service a

body equipped to observe and report on any situation involving a threat to peace in the Balkans which might be called to its attention by states in that area.

We certainly do not wish to invite the renewal of aggressive action against Greece or against other Balkan countries. We hope it will not occur. But we should be ready in advance, if aggression or major threat of aggression occurs, to focus the spotlight of informed world opinion on the true facts of the situation. The United States believes that this can best be done by action by the General Assembly providing for the kind of subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission which I have just described. Such a body would maintain itself in readiness instantly to send out observers to the field at the request of one or more Balkan states, without need for further action by the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Interim Committee.

The United States would like to feel that it will not be necessary for any Balkan state to apply for the observation services which the proposed new body could render. Nevertheless, we believe that the changed character of the threats to Greece which are now clearly but part of the broader situation of tension prevailing in the Balkans, makes the establishment of such a body advisable. Accordingly, the United States has joined with the delegations of the United Kingdom, Greece, France, and Mexico in presenting a draft resolution along the lines which I have just outlined. We urge other members of the Committee to support this resolution whose only purpose and only justification is the cause of peace.

Appendix 3

Resolutions on Discontinuance of Special Committee and Establishment of Balkan Subcommission

U.N. doc. A/1984
Adopted December 7, 1951

A.

The General Assembly,

HAVING CONSIDERED the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans,

1. Approves the said report;
2. Expresses its deep appreciation of the invaluable services rendered for the preservation of peace and security in the Balkans by the members of the Special Committee;
3. Expresses its warm gratitude for the gallantry with which the observers of the Special Committee have carried out their difficult and dangerous task;
4. Decides to discontinue the Special Committee within sixty days after the adoption of the present resolution.

B.

The General Assembly,

RECALLING its resolution 377 (V) (Uniting for peace), part A, section B establishing a Peace Observation Commission which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,

CONSIDERING that the situation in the Balkans may require prompt establishment of observation as contemplated in resolution 377 (V), part A, section B,

RESOLVES to request the Peace Observation Commission to establish a Balkan sub-commission, composed of not less than three nor more than five members, with its seat at the United Nations Headquarters, with authority:

- (a) To despatch such observers as it may deem necessary to any area of international tension in the Balkans on the request of any State or States concerned, but only to the territory of States consenting thereto;
- (b) To visit, if it deems necessary, any area in which observation requested under paragraph (a) is being conducted;
- (c) To consider such data as may be submitted to it

by its members or observers and to make such reports as it deems necessary to the Peace Observation Commission and to the Secretary-General for the information of Member States.

Appendix 4

Resolution on Repatriation of Greek Children

U.N. doc. A/2104
Adopted February 2, 1952

The General Assembly,

VIEWING WITH CONCERN the reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and the Secretary-General, and in particular the fact that, with the exception of Yugoslavia, none of the countries harbouring Greek children has yet taken the necessary steps to enable the Greek children to return to their homes, as provided for in resolution 193 C (III) of 27 November 1948 and the subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly on the matter,

RECOGNIZING that the United Nations must continue its efforts, from a humanitarian point of view, to enable the Greek children to return to their homes,

NOTING the report of the Standing Committee on the Repatriation of Greek children that of the governments invited to send representatives to enter into consultations with the Standing Committee on the problem during the present session of the General Assembly, only one has actually participated in the consultations,

1. *Thanks* the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies, the Standing Committee on the Repatriation of Greek children and the Secretary-General for their efforts to give effect to General Assembly resolutions 193 C (III), 288 B (IV) and 382 C (V);

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that a further group of Greek children has been repatriated from Yugoslavia;

3. *Expresses* the hope that it will be possible to make rapid progress with the repatriation of the Greek children in Czechoslovakia;

4. *Deeply regrets* that all the other States harbouring Greek children have declined to enter into consultations with the Standing Committee with a view to giving effect to the resolutions of the General Assembly on the matter;

5. *Considers* that the technical and other grounds advanced by those countries harbouring Greek children which have declined to co-operate fully in the solution of the problem are not insurmountable or such as to constitute a reason for further delay in permitting the return of children in respect of whom requests for repatriation have been submitted and verified by the international Red Cross organizations;

6. *Urges* all countries harbouring Greek children to take steps to facilitate the early return of the children to their homes;

7. *Decides* to continue the Standing Committee with the terms of reference previously laid down;

8. *Requests* the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies to continue their work for this humanitarian purpose;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report from time to time to Member States on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution, and requests the international Red Cross organizations and the Secretary-General to submit reports on the progress achieved

before the seventh regular session of the General Assembly is convened.

Appendix 5

Resolution of Peace Observation Commission Establishing Balkan Subcommission

U.N. doc. A/CN.7/6
Adopted January 23, 1952

The Peace Observation Commission,

TAKING NOTE of resolution A/L.1 adopted at the 351st meeting of the General Assembly on 7 December 1951,

ESTABLISHES a Balkan Sub-Commission which for the calendar year of 1952 shall be composed of five members namely Colombia, France, Pakistan, Sweden, and the United States of America, with its seat at the United Nations Headquarters, with authority:

(a) To dispatch such observers as it may deem necessary to any area of international tension in the Balkans on the request of any State or States concerned; but only to the territory of States consenting thereto;

(b) To visit, if it deems necessary, any area in which observation requested under sub-paragraph (a) above is being conducted;

(c) To consider such data as may be submitted to it by its members or observers and to make such reports as it deems necessary to the Peace Observation Commission and to the Secretary-General for the information of Member States;

REQUESTS the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities.

Appendix 6

Resolution of Balkan Subcommission

U.N. doc. A/CN.7.SC.1/2
Adopted January 31, 1952

The Balkan Sub-Commission,

TAKING NOTE of the request dated 23 January 1952 from the Government of Greece for the immediate dispatch of observers to the frontier areas of Greece,

1. *Decides* to conduct observation in the frontier areas of Greece within the terms of reference laid down by General Assembly resolution A/L.1 of 7 December 1951, and, pending further evaluation of the requirements of such observation;

2. *Invites* the Governments of Colombia, France, Pakistan, Sweden and the United States of America each to make available to the Sub-Commission one observer and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to make available one observer to serve as principal observer, utilizing where desired individuals listed in the Panel of Field Observers envisaged in General Assembly resolution 297B(IV);

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to continue the services of six of the United Nations observers presently available in Greece, who shall observe until the arrival in Greece of the observers designated under paragraph 2 or until the Sub-Commission makes alternative arrangements;

4. *Instructs* the principal observer to submit to the Sub-Commission periodic reports and any special reports which he may deem necessary;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities to the observer group.

Greece and Turkey Deposit Instruments of Accession to NATO

[Released to the press February 18]

On February 18, 1952, Ambassador Feridun C. Erkin of Turkey and Ambassador Athanase G. Politis of Greece deposited with the Government of the United States of America the instruments of accession by their respective Governments to the North Atlantic Treaty. These instruments were deposited with the U.S. Government in accordance with the provisions of article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and of article I of the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey. The protocol entered into force on February 15, 1952. The North Atlantic Treaty entered into force for Greece and Turkey on February 18, 1952.

Following are the texts of statements made on February 18 at the ceremony for deposit of the Greek and Turkish instruments of accession:

Statement by Acting Secretary Webb

I am pleased to represent my Government as depositary of the North Atlantic Treaty and of the protocol in accepting the instruments of accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty. The devotion which these two countries have manifested to the principle of collective security is well known to us all. I am confident that through their accession to the Treaty a significant contribution will be made to the greater effectiveness of the collective-defense system which has been created under the Treaty, thus enhancing the security of the NATO countries among which they are now numbered, as well as the rest of the free world.

Speaking on behalf of the United States as a NATO member, I heartily welcome these two countries as fellow members in an organization which provides the framework for constructive and fruitful cooperation between all of the members, having as its objective the preservation of world peace and security.

Statement by Ambassador Feridun C. Erkin of Turkey

I am very happy to hand over to you an instrument of the accession of Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

As you know, since the beginning I have been very closely associated with this work which brought us to the happy end we are witnessing. We know that the negotiations have been very long, very difficult, very complicated. But they have been conducted on both sides on the basis of a perfect friendship and mutual trust.

The Turkish people will never forget the central part which has been played by the American people and the American Government in initiating

the invitation which has been addressed to my country to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In fact, this invitation has constituted a climax of such friendly consideration and moral support as the military-aid program and economic aid.

The Turkish people are very happy to join today on a legal and formal basis the defense system to which they always belonged virtually and spiritually. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been created under the provisions of the United Nations Charter which has been signed and ratified by the overwhelming majority of the countries. Therefore, the Treaty constitutes international law and nobody is entitled to raise any objection to the system itself nor to the accession of Turkey. I am quite certain that the ties of friendship and cooperation already very close between Turkey and the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will constitute a fruitful alliance.

So far as I am concerned, I shall always treasure my close association to the negotiations as the finest and most pleasant recollections of my whole diplomatic career.

Statement by Ambassador Athanase G. Politis of Greece

It is with deep feelings of honor and satisfaction that I deposited with the United States Government this instrument of accession of Greece to the North Atlantic Treaty. I am sure to express the sentiment of the Royal Greek Government and the entire Greek Nation if I say that the Greeks are fully aware of the obligations arising from this Treaty and that they are determined to the last to live up to these obligations.

The Greek Nation will never forget the important part which the United States took in the negotiations which ended with the ceremony of today. I ask you, Mr. Secretary, to convey to the United States Government the sincere thanks of the Royal Greek Government and of the entire Greek Nation for their untiring endeavours. May I also ask you to express to the other member Governments the thanks of my Government.

Expanded Point Four Agreement With Jordan

[Released to the press February 16]

Plans for a greatly expanded Point Four Program in Jordan to aid that country in its economic development were embodied by a program agreement signed on February 12, 1952, in Amman between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the U.S. Government, the Department of State

announced on February 16. The United States Minister to Jordan, Gerald A. Drew, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Jordan, Tawfiq Pasha Abul Huda, signed the agreement for their respective governments.

Under the new agreement, the United States will contribute \$2,780,000 and Jordan over \$1,000,000 (in dinars) to a joint fund for the operation of the Point Four Program of economic development. The new agreement supplements the general agreement for Point Four cooperation between the two countries which was signed February 27, 1951.¹

The program in Jordan calls for increasing agricultural production to feed the increased population, improving health and sanitation conditions, developing water resources, improving the education system, making effective use of underdeveloped mineral resources, organizing processing plants for raw materials, and improving transportation.

Because of the nature and magnitude of the Point Four Program in Jordan and the fields in which it will operate, a special organizational structure is provided for in the program agreement. This will involve the establishment of cooperative departments in appropriate ministries of the Jordanian Government along the lines of those originated by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in 1942 as administrative devices for United States technical cooperation with the governments of the American Republics.

These departments will provide an effective means for the joint participation of American and Jordanian technicians in planning and executing the action programs. Each will be a special bureau in the ministry having jurisdiction over the particular agriculture, health, education, or water-resources projects.

The basic problem underlying all others in Jordan is the inadequate supply of water. Water-resources development will be the most important single activity of the Point Four Program. Irrigation projects will increase the acreage of land under cultivation. Underground water supplies will be developed and the restoration of ancient reservoirs will be continued. The cleaning out of a number of these cisterns, which have been filled with sand and silt during the centuries, was started last year.

The agricultural program will include the development of an extension and demonstration service, the production and distribution of better seed and planting stocks, and the improvement of poultry and livestock.

The health and sanitation program will be aimed at reducing the incidence of such preventable diseases as malaria, trachoma, tuberculosis, and dysenteries. Work on the establishment of a central government laboratory is already under way. The laboratory will serve not only the in-

terests of the health program, but will also be used for agricultural research.

The educational program will include rural primary education and teacher training, vocational education, a teacher-training institute for women, and the expansion of the facilities of the agricultural school.

Under the director of technical cooperation to be appointed in Jordan, there will be a staff of American technicians in the field of agriculture, health and sanitation, water-resources development, education, mineral and industrial development, and census organization.

In addition to the sending of American technicians to Jordan, the program agreement provides for the training of Jordanians in the United States in order to develop a group of trained people in the various technical fields.

The contributions the Jordanian Government will make to the joint funds in local currency will be counterpart funds generated by the sale of the shipment of wheat made available in accordance with the economic agreement signed by the two governments on December 20, 1951.² The shipment of wheat was financed under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as part of the program of technical and economic cooperation in the Near East, and was carried out because of the serious food shortage in Jordan caused by failure of the 1951 wheat crop.

Appointment of U.S. Members To Caribbean Commission

[Released to the press February 18]

The President announced on February 18 the appointment of two commissioners to the U.S. section of the Caribbean Commission for a period of 2 years—Senator Luis Negrón López who succeeds former Governor Jesús T. Piñero, and Sol Luis Descartes who succeeds Rafael Picó. In accepting the resignations of Governor Pinero and Mr. Picó, the President spoke of their outstanding contributions to the work of the Caribbean Commission, of their interest in the people, and understanding of conditions of the Caribbean area which gave impetus to their enthusiasm for creative action in the work of the Caribbean Commission. The Caribbean Commission is an advisory and consultative body on economic and social matters to the Governments of France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and their 15 non-self-governing territories in the Caribbean.

Senator Negrón López is one of the most distinguished legislative leaders and lawyers in Puerto Rico. He is Vice President of the Puerto Rican Senate and leader of the majority party.

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 26, 1951, p. 500.

² BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 48.

He served as a member of the House of Representatives of Puerto Rico from 1940-44 and as a Senator from 1944 to the present. Mr. Descartes is Treasurer of the Government of Puerto Rico and has been associated with that Government since 1934 in the fields of agriculture, economics, and industry. Mr. Descartes is at present chairman of the Caribbean Research Council, an

auxiliary body of the Commission, and has served as an adviser to several international conferences.

Other members of the U.S. section of the Caribbean Commission are Ward M. Canaday, President of Willys-Overland Corporation, Co-Chairman; and Alonzo G. Morón, a native of the Virgin Islands of the United States, President of Hampton Institute, Hampton, Va.

U.S. Signs Military Assistance Agreements with Ecuador and Peru

The Departments of State and Defense have announced the signing of bilateral military assistance agreements with the Governments of Ecuador and Peru.

The agreement with Ecuador was signed at Quito on February 20 on behalf of the United States by Paul C. Daniels, Ambassador to Ecuador, and on behalf of Ecuador by Neftali Ponce, Foreign Minister of Ecuador.

The agreement with Peru was signed at Lima on February 22 on behalf of the United States by Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., Ambassador to Peru, and on behalf of Peru by Manuel C. Gallagher, Foreign Minister of Peru.

The Military Assistance Agreements just signed are consistent with, and conform to, inter-American instruments already in effect, such as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty), the resolution on Inter-American Military Cooperation approved at the Washington Meeting of Foreign Ministers of 1951, and the continuous planning of the Inter-American Defense Board.

Negotiations for similar agreements, involving the provision of military-grant aid by the United States to promote the defense of the Western Hemisphere, are in progress with certain other American Republics. These negotiations were initiated under the program of military-grant aid for Latin America, authorized in the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The program to be carried out will assist in the development of the capabilities of the countries concerned to join in performing missions important to the security of all the American Republics. Such agreements illustrate the spirit of cooperation prevailing among the American Republics which makes it possible for them to concentrate, through self-help and mutual aid, upon increasing their ability to contribute to the collective defense of the Western Hemisphere, and, by serving as a deterrent to potential aggressors, contribute to the maintenance of world peace.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT WITH ECUADOR¹

The Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Ecuador:

Conscious of their pledges under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and other international instruments to assist any American State subjected to an armed attack and to act together for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere;

Desiring to foster international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations through measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and principles;

Reaffirming their determination to give their full cooperation to the efforts to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated by the Charter and to obtain agreement on universal regulations and reduction of armaments under adequate guarantee against violation;

Taking into consideration the support that the Government of the United States of America has brought to these principles by enacting the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which provide for the furnishing of military assistance to nations which have joined with it in collective security arrangements;

Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the furnishing of such assistance by one contracting Government to the other;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each Government will make or continue to make available to the other, and to such additional governments as the parties hereto may in each case agree upon, such equipment, materials, services, or other military assistance as the Government furnishing such assistance may authorize and in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed. The furnishing of any such assistance as may be authorized by either party hereto shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Such assistance shall be so designed as to promote the defense and maintain the peace of the Western Hemisphere and be in accordance with defense plans under which both Governments will participate in missions important to the defense and the maintenance of the peace of the Western

¹ For text of similar agreement with Peru, see Department of State press release 139 of Feb. 22.

Hemisphere. Assistance made available by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement will be furnished under the provisions, and subject to all the terms, conditions and termination provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the Mutual Security Act of 1951, acts amendatory and supplementary thereto and appropriation acts thereunder. The two Governments will, from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph.

2. The Government of Ecuador undertakes to make effective use of assistance received from the Government of the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement for the purpose of implementing defense plans, accepted by the two Governments, under which the two Governments will participate in missions important to the defense and the maintenance of the peace of the Western Hemisphere, and will not, without the prior agreement of the Government of the United States of America, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished.

3. Arrangements will be entered into under which equipment and materials furnished pursuant to this Agreement and no longer required for the purposes for which it was originally made available (except equipment and materials furnished under terms requiring reimbursement) will be returned to the Government which furnished such assistance for appropriate disposition.

4. In the common security interest of both Governments, the Government of Ecuador undertakes not to transfer to any person not an officer or agent of such Government, or to any other Government, title to or possession of any equipment, materials, or services furnished to it by the Government of the United States of America under this Agreement, without the prior agreement of the Government of the United States of America.

5. The two Governments will establish procedures whereby the Government of Ecuador will so deposit, segregate, or assure title to all funds allocated to or derived from any program of assistance undertaken by the Government of the United States of America so that such funds shall not be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure or other legal process by any person, firm, agency, corporation, organization or government, when in the opinion of the Government of the United States of America any such legal process would interfere with the attainment of the objectives of the said program of assistance.

6. Each Government will take such security measures as may be agreed in each case between the two Governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified military articles, services or information furnished by the other Government pursuant to this Agreement.

ARTICLE II

Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent with security to keep the public informed of operations under this Agreement.

ARTICLE III

The two Governments will, upon request of either of them, negotiate appropriate arrangements between them to provide for the availability of patent licenses and technical information required in furtherance of the objectives of this Agreement. In these negotiations consideration shall be given to the inclusion of an undertaking whereby each Government will assume the responsibility for all claims of its nationals arising under such arrangements, and such claims arising in its jurisdiction of nationals of any country not a party to this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

1. The Government of Ecuador undertakes to make available to the Government of the United States of America local currency in sucres in an amount to be agreed for the use of the latter Government for its administrative

and operating expenditures in connection with carrying out the purposes of the Mutual Security Act.

The two Governments will forthwith initiate discussions with a view to determining the amount of such local currency in sucres and to agreeing upon arrangements for the furnishing of such local currency.

2. The Government of Ecuador will, except as otherwise agreed, grant duty-free treatment and exemption from internal taxation upon importation or exportation to products, property, materials, or equipment imported into its territory in connection with this Agreement or any similar agreement between the United States of America and any other country receiving military assistance.

ARTICLE V

1. The Government of Ecuador agrees to receive personnel of the Government of the United States of America who will discharge responsibilities of the latter Government in connection with the implementation of this Agreement. Such personnel will be accorded facilities to observe the progress of assistance furnished pursuant to this Agreement. Such personnel who are nationals of the United States of America, including personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their relations with the Government of Ecuador, operate as a part of the Embassy of the United States under the direction and control of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, and shall be accorded all privileges and immunities conferred by international custom to Embassy personnel of corresponding rank. Privileges and courtesies incident to diplomatic status, such as diplomatic automobile license plates, inclusion on the "diplomatic list", and social courtesies may be waived by the Government of the United States of America for its personnel other than the senior military member and the senior Army, Navy and Air Force officer and their respective immediate deputies.

2. The two Governments will negotiate arrangements for classification of personnel and for appropriate notification thereof to the Government of Ecuador.

3. The Government of Ecuador shall grant, upon request of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission of the United States of America, exemption from customs duties on articles imported for the personal use of such personnel and of members of their families.

ARTICLE VI

Existing arrangements relating to Armed Forces missions of the United States of America established under other instruments are not affected by this Agreement and will remain in full force.

ARTICLE VII

In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, under which the two Governments have agreed as provided in Article I, to furnish assistance to each other, the Government of Ecuador agrees to facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States of America for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon of raw and semi-processed strategic materials required by the United States of America as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Ecuador. Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to reasonable requirements for domestic use and commercial export of Ecuador.

ARTICLE VIII

In the interest of their mutual security, the Government of Ecuador will cooperate with the Government of the United States of America in measures designed to control trade with nations which threaten the security of the Western Hemisphere.

ARTICLE IX

The Government of Ecuador, reaffirming its determination to join in promoting international understanding and good will and maintaining world peace, and to take such

action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension, agrees to fulfill the military obligations which it has assumed under multilateral or bilateral agreements or treaties to which the United States is a party; to make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities, and general economic conditions to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world; and to take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense capacities.

ARTICLE X

Whereas this Agreement has been negotiated and concluded on the basis that the Government of the United States of America will extend to the other party thereto the benefits of any provision in a similar agreement concluded by the Government of the United States of America with any other American Republic, it is understood that the Government of the United States of America will interpose no objection to amending this Agreement in order that its provisions may conform, in whole or in part, to the corresponding provisions of any similar Military Assistance Agreement, or agreements amendatory thereto, concluded with an American Republic.

ARTICLE XI

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature, and shall continue in force until one year after the receipt by either party of written notice of the intention of the other party to terminate it, except that the provisions of Article I, paragraphs 2 and 4 and agreements made pursuant to the provisions of Article I, paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 and of Article III shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments.

2. The two Governments shall, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application or amendment of this Agreement.

3. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both equally authentic, at Quito, this twentieth day of February, 1952.

U.S.-Canadian Agreement On Great Lakes Safety

[Released to the press February 21]

An Agreement between the United States and Canada for the Promotion of Safety on the Great Lakes by Means of Radio was signed at Ottawa on February 21. Stanley Woodward, American Ambassador to Canada, and Commissioner Edward M. Webster, Federal Communications Commission, signed the agreement on behalf of the United States. Lionel Chevrier, Minister of Transport, signed on behalf of Canada.

The need for such an agreement has long been recognized. The Congress in Public Law No. 97 (75th Cong.), approved May 20, 1937, directed the Federal Communications Commission to study the problem of safety on the Great Lakes. The congressional committees considering this subject also expressed the hope and expectation that the Department of State would insure that any action taken by the United States affecting radio on ships on the Great Lakes would be worked out

in agreement with Canada. The Commission made its report to Congress on December 16, 1940. Subsequently discussions were held with interested shipping and communications companies operating on the Great Lakes and with Canadian authorities.

The project had to be postponed during the war years and work on it was not resumed until early 1950. The present agreement has been coordinated with all interested industry and government organizations and is the result of negotiations between United States and Canadian authorities which were held at Ottawa in May 1951.

The agreement is effective on the Great Lakes and their navigable connecting tributary waters as far east as Montreal. It provides for the authorized use of radiotelephony as a means of communication of distress signals for shipping on the Great Lakes with the distress frequency (2182 kc) and the present working frequencies being continued. It further agrees on the need for making compulsory the carriage of radiotelephone equipment on all Lake shipping of 500 gross tons and over and on all passenger-carrying vessels over 65 feet in length. All such vessels and all shore stations would be required to maintain constant listening watch on the distress-calling frequency.

The agreement must be ratified by each Government and will come into force 2 years after the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

Commendation for Overseas Information Program

[Released to the press February 15]

Increasing effectiveness of the Department of State's overseas information program is noted by the United States Advisory Commission on Information in its fifth report to the Congress made public on February 15.

The Commission, made up of outstanding leaders in private industry, stated in an over-all conclusion regarding international information activities that "the program has increased considerably its effectiveness but—constant and continuing effort will be required to achieve its full potential."

Commenting on the new International Information Administration, the Advisory Commission noted it "long has favored more strength and flexibility in the organization of the information work," and consequently has favored the establishment of a semiautonomous agency.

In an appendix to the report, the Commission notes that its own activities have been considerably augmented and improved through the establishment of four advisory committees in the major media fields of information, i. e., press and publi-

cations, radio, motion pictures and general business, giving attention to more detailed matters than that included in the work of the Commission. The members of these committees are outstanding leaders in the appropriate fields of private industry.

The report is signed by Erwin Canham, Chairman and Editor of the *Christian Science Monitor*; Philip D. Reed, Chairman of the Board of the General Electric Company; Mark A. May, Director of the Institute of Human Relations, Yale University; and Ben Hibbs, Editor of the *Saturday Evening Post*. The fifth member of the Commission, Justin Miller, Chairman of the Board of the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, did not sign the report. He is on leave of absence from the Commission since his appointment as Chairman of the Salary Stabilization Board on November 8, 1951.

Export-Import Bank Grants Cotton Credits

Japan

The Export-Import Bank of February 21 announced that arrangements have been completed for the operation of a credit of \$40,000,000 for the purchase and export of cotton to Japan recently authorized by the Export-Import Bank.

The credit bearing interest at 2.75 percent per annum and repayable in 15 months is extended to the Bank of Japan, which will use Japanese commercial banks in the capacity of agent. The Japanese commercial banks will in turn utilize the services of U.S. commercial banks. The Bank of Japan has designated for this purpose the following U.S. commercial banks:

Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association
 Bank of the Manhattan Company
 Bankers Trust Company
 The Chase National Bank of the City of New York
 Chemical Bank & Trust Company
 First National Bank of Chicago
 Guaranty Trust Company of New York
 Irving Trust Company
 Manufacturers Trust Company
 The National City Bank of New York
 J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation
 Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Company

The credit is to be used to finance the purchase of raw cotton, excluding spinnable waste, which has been purchased under contract entered into subsequent to December 21, 1951, and shipped subsequent to the date of the contract. The purchases and shipments are to be made in the customary manner with the order being placed by the textile mills in Japan or their agents with U.S. shippers. Financing of purchases will be effected through

letters of credit under which 15 month drafts will be drawn on the Bank of Japan for the delivered value of the cotton. The letters of credit issued for this purpose are to expire not later than June 15, 1952.

All inquiries relating to other details of the operation of this credit should be addressed in due course by the American cotton shipper to his bank or banks in the United States or his agents in Japan.

Colombia

The Export-Import Bank on February 21 announced that arrangements have been completed with various United States commercial banks designated by banks in Colombia under which the \$20,000,000 credit by the Export-Import Bank to finance shipments of United States raw cotton to Colombia has been put into effect.

The credit was extended to Colombian cotton spinners with the financial backing of the Colombian banks and the Banco de la Republica.

The Colombian cotton spinners apply to authorized Colombian banks to open letters of credit, in favor of American cotton shippers. A letter of credit covers the delivered dollar cost of the cotton and provides for payment to the American shipper upon presentation of his draft drawn without recourse accompanied by complete ocean documents. The draft is drawn on a Colombian spinner. It carries a maturity of 15 months after date and bears interest at 2.75 percent per annum.

Cotton eligible for financing is to be contracted for subsequent to dates of agreements between Colombian banks and the Export-Import Bank which vary from December 19, 1951, to January 7, 1952, and the cotton is to be shipped subsequent to the date of the contract of sale. Letters of credit are to expire not later than October 15, 1952.

Inquiries should be addressed to the following United States banks who are operating the credit:

Bank of America	San Francisco, California
Bank of the Manhattan Company.	New York, New York
Bankers Trust Company	New York, New York
The Chase National Bank of the City of New York.	New York, New York
Chemical Bank and Trust Company.	New York, New York
First National Bank of Chicago.	Chicago, Illinois
Grace National Bank of New York.	New York, New York
Guaranty Trust Company of New York.	New York, New York
The Hanover Bank	New York, New York
Irving Trust Company	New York, New York
Manufacturers Trust Company.	New York, New York
The New York Trust Company.	New York, New York
J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation.	New York, New York
The Second National Bank of Houston.	Houston, Texas

Problems Affecting North Pacific Fisheries

TRIPARTITE FISHERIES CONFERENCE AT TOKYO, NOVEMBER 4—DECEMBER 14, 1951

by *William C. Herrington*

The Tripartite Fisheries Conference at Tokyo represented a vital step in a sequence of events which it is hoped will lead to the solution of old and persistent problems critical to the conservation of some of the major fisheries of the North Pacific and to the good relations between the three countries which participated. The proposed International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, which was drafted at the Conference and recommended to the Governments of the United States of America, Canada, and Japan, is to be signed as soon as the Treaty of Peace with Japan comes into effect. This step will mark the culmination of efforts to obtain recognition of U.S. conservation programs and principles formulated by the fisheries interests of the Northwest and Alaska 30 years ago.

Some of the largest fisheries of the United States lie in the North Pacific Ocean. Salmon and halibut, the most important of these fisheries, were developed many years ago; soon the strong market demand led to intensive exploitation which threatened the continued productivity of these resources. Extensive research programs by the United States and, in the case of halibut and Fraser River salmon, by the United States and Canada, determined measures required for maintaining the productivity of these fisheries. Stringent conservation measures for a time limited the income of many of the fishermen and in some cases caused temporary hardships, but this program in the long run served to maintain the resources at a high productive level and to give the fishermen security.

In addition to encouraging the development of conservation programs, the U.S. Government and industry during this period were seeking acceptable methods of eliminating causes of friction between U.S. fishermen and those from other countries who desired to fish those waters. The high

level of productivity of these resources has made them extremely attractive to the fishermen of other countries. The high yields would make it profitable for long-range fishing fleets from such countries to operate in waters off U.S. coasts during the peak of the productive season, harvest a large share of the allowable yield, and then move on to other areas. Those who have had experience in the field of fishery conservation management and regulation have consistently argued that it would be impossible to maintain stringent conservation programs for long should this threat develop into active participation.

The highly productive conserved fisheries of the North Pacific have been increasingly subject to this threat as the result of improvements in boats,

Related Materials on Fisheries

- "United States Policy on the High Seas", an article by Walter M. Chapman, *BULLETIN* of January 16, 1949, page 67, comments on the goal at which the United States aims—to provide the possibility of management for each high-seas fishery in the world to the end that the population of fish upon which the fishery works will be kept at that level at which a maximum crop can be harvested year after year.
- "International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries", a report on the first meeting of the Commission by Edward Castleman, *BULLETIN* of June 11, 1951, page 954, reviews certain organizational questions and adopted rules of procedure, financial regulations, and fiscal and administrative resolutions.
- "International Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Conference, Washington, January 26 through February 8, 1949", *Documents and State Papers* for March and April 1949, page 707, includes a text of the Final Act together with the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.

equipment, and techniques which now make long-range fishing more efficient and profitable.

Fisheries and International Policy

Since the latter stages of World War II, the U.S. fishing industry had hoped that limitations on Japanese fishing operations would be imposed as a condition of the Treaty of Peace. Various measures have been proposed, such as restricting Japanese fishing operations to the seas west of the International Date Line or to waters more than 150 miles from our coast line. The Government of the United States, however, being concerned with all the varied interests of the fishing industry, promotion of international good will, rehabilitation of the Japanese economy, and maintenance of freedom of access to the unutilized raw materials of the high seas, has found it impossible to fit such proposals into our over-all international policies.

Some felt further that the proposals went beyond what was required to meet the conditions necessary for encouraging the continued conservation of our fully utilized and conserved fisheries, and would provide a dangerous precedent for fencing off areas of the high seas. However, continued and intensive study was given this problem, with the result that during the spring and summer of 1951 a new and promising approach was developed.

The idea which provided the key to a final solution was that the United States propose to Canada and Japan that in order to encourage the conservation and full utilization of fishery resources the three countries should recognize and agree upon certain principles and conditions and voluntarily abstain from exploiting stocks of fish when these conditions were fulfilled. The principles provided that when any stock of fish

(1) was being fully utilized so that more intensive fishing would not result in a substantial increase in yield which could be sustained year after year,

(2) was the subject of a conservation program involving limitations on exploitation or other regulations for the purpose of maintaining or increasing its maximum sustained productivity, and

(3) was the subject of an extensive research program for conservation purposes,

then this situation should be recognized by any of the three countries which was not sharing and had not recently shared in the exploitation of this stock, and such countries should agree to continue to abstain from sharing in the exploitation, in order to encourage the continued conservation by the other country or countries.

This idea was incorporated into a draft which also included proposals for cooperative research on joint fisheries and regulation when needed, effective enforcement provisions, and a Commission to administer and supervise the provisions of the convention. Provision was made for a high de-

gree of flexibility to enable the Commission to handle both bilateral and trilateral problems and thus eliminate the necessity of negotiating additional fishery treaties among the three nations as new problems developed.

Because of the fact that some of the concepts involved in these proposals were new, it was necessary to explore their possibilities thoroughly and discuss their application with interested agencies of the U.S. Government and with the Department's Advisory Committee from the Pacific Coast fishing industry. The proposals also were discussed with representatives of the Canadian Government.

Agreement on Draft Proposals

Agreement was finally reached on the proposals in July 1951, and the Governments of Canada and Japan were asked if they were ready to enter into negotiations for a fisheries treaty on this general basis. Both Governments answered in the affirmative, and the Government of Japan invited the United States and Canada to participate in a Tripartite Fisheries Conference to convene at Tokyo early in November. Both the United States and Canada accepted.

As to the reasons for holding the Tripartite Conference in Japan, a number of considerations were involved. The primary one was that some of the conservation proposals to be made by the U.S. delegation would be ideas new to the Japanese Government representatives, fishing industry, and public. It was essential for the expeditious consideration of these proposals that the Japanese negotiators be able to confer with the various groups and that the Japanese Government and fishing industry, standing behind the regular delegation, have an active part in all decisions in order to promote acceptance of the final results of the Conference. The course of the negotiations fully justified these conclusions.

The U.S. delegation for the Tripartite Fisheries Conference was well qualified to represent the fisheries interests concerned with the proposed convention.¹ The delegation included four advisers from the Pacific Coast fishing industry and one from the fishery departments of the Pacific Coast State governments. The industry advisers were recommended by the Pacific Fisheries Conference, and all were members of the Department's Pacific Coast Fisheries Advisory Committee.

The other members of the delegation included the Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Under Secretary of State, the Assistant Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Interior Department, and the senior Foreign Affairs Officer from the Office of the Special Assistant.

Canada was represented by her Minister, Deputy Minister, and two other representatives of

¹ For list of delegates, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1951, p. 789.

the Ministry of Fisheries, a member of Parliament, Canada's diplomatic representative in Tokyo, and an adviser from the fishing industry.

Japan was represented by her Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Director General of the Fishery Agency, and a large delegation from the Diet, the Fishery Agency, and the fishing industry.

The first week of the negotiations was taken up primarily by explaining and answering questions with respect to the U.S. proposals. The second week was devoted to explanation and questions with respect to the Japanese counterproposals. By the third week the respective positions of the three delegations had become fairly clear.

Interests of the Three Powers

All three countries wished to have a fisheries convention, but their reasons were diverse. The United States desired a convention to safeguard her major conservation programs in the North Pacific, to provide the facilities for friendly cooperative research and management of joint fisheries not now covered by treaties, and to avoid the friction and ill will between U.S. fishermen and those of other countries which threatened to increase with the expansion of Japanese fishing operations.

Canada was primarily concerned with safeguarding her conservation programs without complicating or restricting her participation in the exploitation of stocks of fish along the adjacent coasts of the United States or complicating her past fishery relations with the United States. She did not anticipate any joint fisheries with Japan for some time to come. Japan desired a fishery convention to satisfy the terms of article 9² of the Treaty of Peace, to show her willingness to cooperate with other countries in fishery conservation programs, but above all to reiterate and strengthen her claim to the right of Japanese fishermen to exploit stocks of fish anywhere on the high seas.

Each delegation had specific limits on what it could concede to the others. Beyond such limits each would have preferred to take its chances without a convention. The negotiations from the third week on provided a series of recurring crises as major issues were developed, hotly debated, and at last surmounted. Proposals and counterproposals were drafted and redrafted in attempts to solve critical issues by changes in phraseology.

Acceptance of proposals was not made easier by the fact that the convention under negotiation would establish a possible pattern for other fisheries treaties between Japan and each of the other

² "Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas."

countries of Asia. Each proposal was thoroughly examined by the Japanese in the light of its potential implication with respect to each of these countries, for the Japanese believed with some justification that any concession or provision in the United States-Canada convention might be demanded by each of the other countries. Any slight infringement on her free and equal access to the resources of the high seas, she feared, might be inflated by others until it became a hazard to her planned expansion of operations in the Western Pacific.

Moreover, the U.S. delegation went to Tokyo with a set of proposals which had been drafted so tightly to get agreement among differing United States interests that there did not seem to be room for any further changes without losing needed support at home. Yet, to meet the Japanese and Canadian requirements and get an approved draft, it was necessary to dismember the U.S. draft almost completely and then salvage the most essential fragments and build a new structure. Without the advisers' knowledge of the problem, representation in the industry, and assistance in drafting and planning, it would not have been possible to proceed with the negotiations and have reasonable assurance that the completed draft would not be repudiated in the United States.

The draft convention finally developed and recommended to the three countries is a good one from the point of view of each country. The United States gets basic assurances with respect to the major conservation programs in the North Pacific and a mechanism for friendly handling of future problems arising between the United States and the other two countries. Japan gets recognition of her historical interests, assurance that she can reenter fishing areas without friction with U.S. fishermen, a friendly means of handling fishery problems with the United States and Canada, and a convention which will help rather than handicap her in negotiating fishery treaties with other countries. Canada gets the reassurances she was seeking with respect both to her conservation programs and to her fishing operations along the adjacent coasts of the United States.

• *Mr. Herrington, author of the above article, is Special Assistant to the Under Secretary and served as chairman of the Tripartite Fisheries Conference.*

TEXTS OF DOCUMENTS

On December 14, 1951, at the conclusion of the Tripartite Fisheries Conference, representatives of the United States, Canada, and Japan signed a document entitled "Resolutions and Request of the Tripartite Fisheries Conference." Resolution I expressed the delegates' gratitude to the host country. Following are the texts of the remaining resolutions, the request, and the proposed convention and protocol drafted during the conference:

Resolution II

The representatives of the Governments of the United States of America, Canada, and Japan here assembled, recognizing the mutual interest of their respective Governments in the development and proper utilization of stocks of fish in the North Pacific Ocean, and believing that this end can best be attained by international collaboration, do hereby recommend to their respective Governments that a convention conforming to the draft which has here been agreed to by their representatives and is appended to these Resolutions and Request be concluded between the three countries as speedily as possible.

Resolution III

Believing that it is necessary to follow principles which provide a sound basis for the orderly development and exploitation of high seas fisheries in the interest of maximum sustained yields the Conference recommends that, in negotiating with other Governments in respect to problems similar to those covered by this Convention, the Contracting Parties shall give full consideration to the spirit and intent of this Convention.

Request

The Conference requests:

That as soon as may be convenient after entry into force of the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean the Government of the United States of America initiate steps for the holding of the first meeting of the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission without prejudice, however, to the determination of the ultimate location of the seat of the Commission.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the following representatives sign the present Resolutions and Request.

DONE in triplicate, in the English and Japanese languages at Tokyo, on the fourteenth day of December, nineteen hundred fifty-one.

United States of America:

WILLIAM C. HERRINGTON
WARREN F. LOONEY

Canada:

STEWART BATES
A. R. MENZIES

Japan:

RYUTARO NEMOTO
S. IGUCHI

Proposed International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean

The Governments of the United States of America, Canada and Japan, whose respective duly accredited representatives have subscribed hereto,

Acting as sovereign nations in the light of their rights under the principles of international law and custom to exploit the fishery resources of the high seas, and

Believing that it will best serve the common interest of mankind, as well as the interests of the Contracting Parties, to ensure the maximum sustained productivity of the fishery resources of the North Pacific Ocean, and that each of the parties should assume an obligation, on a free and equal footing, to encourage the conservation of such resources, and

Recognizing that in view of these considerations it is highly desirable (1) to establish an International Commission, representing the three Parties hereto, to promote and coordinate the scientific studies necessary to ascertain the conservation measures required to secure

the maximum sustained productivity of fisheries of joint interest to the Contracting Parties and to recommend such measures to such Parties and (2) that each Party carry out such conservation recommendations, and provide for necessary restraints on its own nationals and fishing vessels,

Therefore agree as follows:

Article I

1. The area to which this Convention applies, hereinafter referred to as "the Convention area", shall be all waters, other than territorial waters, of the North Pacific Ocean which for the purposes hereof shall include the adjacent seas.

2. Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to affect adversely (prejudice) the claims of any Contracting Party in regard to the limits of territorial waters or to the jurisdiction of a coastal state over fisheries.

3. For the purposes of this Convention the term "fishing vessel" shall mean any vessel engaged in catching fish or processing or transporting fish loaded on the high seas, or any vessel outfitted for such activities.

Article II

1. In order to realize the objectives of this Convention, the Contracting Parties shall establish and maintain the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, hereinafter referred to as "the Commission."

2. The Commission shall be composed of three national sections, each consisting of not more than four members appointed by the governments of the respective Contracting Parties.

3. Each national section shall have one vote. All resolutions, recommendations and other decisions of the Commission shall be made only by a unanimous vote of the three national sections except when under the provisions of Article III, Section 1 (c) (ii) only two participate.

4. The Commission may decide upon and amend, as occasion may require, by-laws or rules for the conduct of its meetings.

5. The Commission shall meet at least once each year and at such other times as may be requested by a majority of the national sections. The date and place of the first meeting shall be determined by agreement between the Contracting Parties.

6. At its first meeting the Commission shall select a Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary from different national sections. The Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary shall hold office for a period of one year. During succeeding years selection of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary from the national sections shall be made in such a manner as will provide each Contracting Party in turn with representation in those offices.

7. The Commission shall decide on a convenient place for the establishment of the Commission's headquarters.

8. Each Contracting Party may establish an Advisory Committee for its national section, to be composed of persons who shall be well informed concerning North Pacific fishery problems of common concern. Each such Advisory Committee shall be invited to attend all sessions of the Commission except those which the Commission decides to be *in camera*.

9. The Commission may hold public hearings. Each national section may also hold public hearings within its own country.

10. The official languages of the Commission shall be Japanese and English. Proposals and data may be submitted to the Commission in either language.

11. Each Contracting Party shall determine and pay the expenses incurred by its national section. Joint expenses incurred by the Commission shall be paid by the Commission through contributions made by the Contracting Parties in the form and proportion recommended by the Commission and approved by the Contracting Parties.

12. An annual budget of joint expenses shall be recommended by the Commission and submitted to the Contracting Parties for approval.

13. The Commission shall authorize the disbursement of funds for the joint expenses of the Commission and may employ personnel and acquire facilities necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article III

1. The Commission shall perform the following functions:

(a) In regard to any stock of fish specified in the Annex, study for the purpose of determining annually whether such stock continues to qualify for abstention under the provisions of Article IV. If the Commission determines that such stock no longer meets the conditions of Article IV, the Commission shall recommend that it be removed from the Annex. Provided, however, that with respect to the stocks of fish originally specified in the Annex, no determination or recommendation as to whether such stock continues to qualify for abstention shall be made for five years after the entry into force of this Convention.

(b) To permit later additions to the Annex, study, on request of a Contracting Party, any stock of fish of the Convention area, the greater part of which is harvested by one or more of the Contracting Parties, for the purpose of determining whether such stock qualifies for abstention under the provisions of Article IV. If the Commission decides that the particular stock fulfills the conditions of Article IV it shall recommend, (1) that such stock be added to the Annex (2) that the appropriate Party or Parties abstain from fishing such stock and (3) that the Party or Parties participating in the fishing of such stock continue to carry out necessary conservation measures.

(c) In regard to any stock of fish in the Convention area;

(i) Study, on request of any Contracting Party concerned, any stock of fish which is under substantial exploitation by two or more of the Contracting Parties, and which is not covered by a conservation agreement between such Parties existing at the time of the conclusion of this Convention, for the purpose of determining need for joint conservation measures;

(ii) Decide and recommend necessary joint conservation measures including any relaxation thereof to be taken as a result of such study. Provided, however, that only the national sections of the Contracting Parties engaged in substantial exploitation of such stock of fish may participate in such decision and recommendation. The decisions and recommendations shall be reported regularly to all the Contracting Parties, but shall apply only to the Contracting Parties the national sections of which participated in the decisions and recommendations.

(iii) Request the Contracting Party or Parties concerned to report regularly the conservation measures adopted from time to time with regard to the stocks of fish specified in the Annex, whether or not covered by conservation agreements between the Contracting Parties, and transmit such information to the other Contracting Party or Parties.

(d) Consider and make recommendations to the Contracting Parties concerning the enactment of schedules of equivalent penalties for violations of this Convention.

(e) Compile and study the records provided by the Contracting Parties pursuant to Article VIII.

(f) Submit annually to each Contracting Party a report on the Commission's operations, investigations and findings, with appropriate recommendations, and inform each Contracting Party, whenever it is deemed advisable, on any matter relating to the objectives of this Convention.

2. The Commission may take such steps, in agreement with the Parties concerned, as will enable it to determine the extent to which the undertakings agreed to by the Parties under the provisions of Article V, Section 2 and the measures recommended by the Commission under the

provisions of this Article and accepted by the Parties concerned have been effective.

3. In the performance of its functions, the Commission shall, insofar as feasible, utilize the technical and scientific services of, and information from, official agencies of the Contracting Parties and their political sub-divisions and may, when desirable and if available, utilize the services of, and information from, any public or private institution or organization or any private individual.

Article IV

1. In making its recommendations the Commission shall be guided by the spirit and intent of this Convention and by the considerations below mentioned.

(a) Any conservation measures for any stock of fish decided upon under the provisions of this Convention shall be recommended for equal application to all Parties engaged in substantial exploitation of such stock.

(b) With regard to any stock of fish which the Commission determines reasonably satisfies all the following conditions, a recommendation shall be made as provided for in Article III, Section 1, (b).

(i) Evidence based upon scientific research indicates that more intensive exploitation of the stock will not provide a substantial increase in yield which can be sustained year after year,

(ii) The exploitation of the stock is limited or otherwise regulated through legal measures by each Party which is substantially engaged in its exploitation, for the purpose of maintaining or increasing its maximum sustained productivity; such limitations and regulations being in accordance with conservation programs based upon scientific research, and

(iii) The stock is the subject of extensive scientific study designed to discover whether the stock is being fully utilized and the conditions necessary for maintaining its maximum sustained productivity.

Provided, however, that no recommendation shall be made for abstention by a Contracting Party concerned with regard to: (1) any stock of fish which at any time during the twenty five years next preceding the entry into force of this Convention has been under substantial exploitation by that Party having regard to the conditions referred to in Section 2 of this Article; (2) any stock of fish which is harvested in greater part by a country or countries not party to this Convention; (3) waters in which there is historic intermingling of fishing operations of the Parties concerned, intermingling of the stocks of fish exploited by these operations, and a long-established history of joint conservation and regulation among the Parties concerned so that there is consequent impracticability of segregating the operations and administering control. It is recognized that the conditions specified in subdivision (3) of this proviso apply to Canada and the United States of America in the waters off the Pacific Coasts of the United States of America and Canada from and including the waters of the Gulf of Alaska southward and, therefore, no recommendation shall be made for abstention by either the United States of America or Canada in such waters.

2. In any decision or recommendation allowances shall be made for the effect of strikes, wars, or exceptional economic or biological conditions which may have introduced temporary declines in or suspension of productivity, exploitation, or management of the stock of fish concerned.

Article V

1. The Annex attached hereto forms an integral part of this Convention. All references to "Convention" shall be understood as including the said Annex either in its present terms or as amended in accordance with the provisions of Article VII.

2. The Contracting Parties recognize that any stock of fish originally specified in the Annex to this Convention fulfills the conditions prescribed in Article IV and accordingly agree that the appropriate Party or Parties shall abstain from fishing such stock and the Party or Parties

participating in the fishing of such stock shall continue to carry out necessary conservation measures.

Article VI

In the event that it shall come to the attention of any of the Contracting Parties that the nationals or fishing vessels of any country which is not a Party to this Convention appear to affect adversely the operations of the Commission or the carrying out of the objectives of this Convention, such Party shall call the matter to the attention of other Contracting Parties. All the Contracting Parties agree upon the request of such Party to confer upon the steps to be taken towards obviating such adverse effects or relieving any Contracting Party from such adverse effects.

Article VII

1. The Annex to this Convention shall be considered amended from the date upon which the Commission receives notification from all the Contracting Parties of acceptance of a recommendation to amend the Annex made by the Commission in accordance with the provisions of Article III, Section 1.

2. The Commission shall notify all the Contracting Parties of the date of receipt of each notification of acceptance of an amendment to the Annex.

Article VIII

The Contracting Parties agree to keep as far as practicable all records requested by the Commission and to furnish compilations of such records and other information upon request of the Commission. No Contracting Party shall be required hereunder to provide the records of individual operations.

Article IX

1. The Contracting Parties agree as follows:

(a) With regard to a stock of fish from the exploitation of which any Contracting Party has agreed to abstain, the nationals and fishing vessels of such Contracting Party are prohibited from engaging in the exploitation of such stock of fish in waters specified in the Annex, and from loading, processing, possessing, or transporting such fish in such waters.

(b) With regard to a stock of fish for which a Contracting Party has agreed to continue to carry out conservation measures, the nationals and fishing vessels of such Party are prohibited from engaging in fishing activities in waters specified in the Annex in violation of regulations established under such conservation measures.

2. Each Contracting Party agrees, for the purpose of rendering effective the provisions of this Convention, to enact and enforce necessary laws and regulations, with regard to its nationals and fishing vessels, with appropriate penalties against violations thereof and to transmit to the Commission a report on any action taken by it with regard thereto.

Article X

1. The Contracting Parties agree, in order to carry out faithfully the provisions of this Convention, to cooperate with each other in taking appropriate and effective measures and accordingly agree as follows:

(a) When a fishing vessel of a Contracting Party has been found in waters in which that Party has agreed to abstain from exploitation in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, the duly authorized officials of any Contracting Party may board such vessel to inspect its equipment, books, documents, and other articles and question the persons on board.

Such officials shall present credentials issued by their respective Governments if requested by the master of the vessel.

(b) When any such person or fishing vessel is actually engaged in operations in violation of the provisions of

this Convention, or there is reasonable ground to believe was obviously so engaged immediately prior to boarding of such vessel by any such official, the latter may arrest or seize such person or vessel. In that case, the Contracting Party to which the official belongs shall notify the Contracting Party to which such person or vessel belongs of such arrest or seizure, and shall deliver such vessel or person as promptly as practicable to the authorized officials of the Contracting Party to which such vessel or person belongs at a place to be agreed upon by both Parties. Provided, however, that when the Contracting Party which receives such notification cannot immediately accept delivery and makes request, the Contracting Party which gives such notification may keep such person or vessel under surveillance within its own territory, under the conditions agreed upon by both of the Contracting Parties.

(c) Only the authorities of the Party to which the above-mentioned person or fishing vessel belongs may try the offense and impose penalties therefor. The witnesses and evidence necessary for establishing the offense, so far as they are under the control of any of the Parties to this Convention, shall be furnished as promptly as possible to the Contracting Party having jurisdiction to try the offense.

2. With regard to the nationals or fishing vessels of one or more Contracting Parties in waters with respect to which they have agreed to continue to carry out conservation measures for certain stocks of fish in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, the Contracting Parties concerned shall carry out enforcement severally or jointly. In that case, the Contracting Parties concerned agree to report periodically through the Commission to the Contracting Party which has agreed to abstain from the exploitation of such stocks of fish on the enforcement conditions, and also, if requested, to provide opportunity for observation of the conduct of enforcement.

3. The Contracting Parties agree to meet, during the sixth year of the operation of this Convention, to review the effectiveness of the enforcement provisions of this Article and, if desirable, to consider means by which they may more effectively be carried out.

Article XI

1. This Convention shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged as soon as possible at Tokyo.

2. This Convention shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of ratifications. It shall continue in force for a period of ten years and thereafter until one year from the day on which a Contracting Party shall give notice to the other Contracting Parties of an intention of terminating the Convention, whereupon it shall terminate as to all Contracting Parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, have signed the present Convention.

DONE in triplicate, in the English and Japanese languages, both equally authentic, at Tokyo this _____ day of _____ one thousand nine hundred fifty _____

ANNEX

1. With regard to the stocks of fish and the waters named below, Japan agrees to abstain from fishing, and Canada and the United States of America agree to continue to carry out necessary conservation measures, in accordance with the provisions of Article V, Section 2 of this Convention:

(a) Halibut (*Hippoglossus stenolepis*)

The Convention area off the coasts of Canada and the United States of America in which commercial fishing for halibut is being or can be prosecuted. Halibut referred to herein shall be those originating along the coast of North America.

(b) Herring (*Clupea pallasii*)

The Convention area off the coasts of Canada and the United States of America, exclusive of the Bering Sea and of the waters of the North Pacific Ocean west of the meridian passing through the extremity of the Alaskan Peninsula, in which commercial fishing for herring of North American origin is being or can be prosecuted.

(c) Salmon (*Oncorhynchus gorbuscha*, *Oncorhynchus keta*, *Oncorhynchus kisutch*, *Oncorhynchus nerka*, *Oncorhynchus tshawytscha*)

The Convention area off the coasts of Canada and the United States of America, exclusive of the Bering Sea and of the waters of the North Pacific Ocean west of a provisional line following the meridian passing through the western extremity of Atka Island, in which commercial fishing for salmon originating in the rivers of Canada and the United States of America is being or can be prosecuted.

2. With regard to the stocks of fish and the waters named below, Canada and Japan agree to abstain from fishing, and the United States of America agrees to continue to carry out necessary conservation measures, in accordance with the provisions of Article V, Section 2 of this Convention:

Salmon (*Oncorhynchus gorbuscha*, *Oncorhynchus keta*, *Oncorhynchus kisutch*, *Oncorhynchus nerka* and *Oncorhynchus tshawytscha*)

The Convention area of the Bering Sea east of the line starting from Cape Prince of Wales on the west coast of Alaska, running westward to 168°58'22.59" West Longitude; thence due south to a point 65°15'00" North Latitude; thence along the great circle course which passes through 51° North Latitude and 167° East Longitude, to its intersection with meridian 175° West Longitude; thence south along a provisional line which follows this meridian to the territorial waters limit of Atka Island; in which commercial fishing for salmon originating in the rivers of the United States of America is being or can be prosecuted.

Protocol to the Proposed International Convention For the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean

The Governments of the United States of America, Canada, and Japan, through their respective Plenipotentiaries, agree upon the following stipulation in regard to the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, signed at Tokyo on this _____ day of _____, nineteen hundred fifty _____.

The Governments of the United States of America, Canada, and Japan agree that the line of meridian 175° West Longitude and the line following the meridian passing through the western extremity of Atka Island, which have been adopted for determining the areas in which the exploitation of salmon is abstained or the conservation measures for salmon continue to be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Annex to this Convention, shall be considered as provisional lines which shall continue in effect subject to confirmation or readjustment in accordance with the procedure mentioned below.

The Commission to be established, under the Convention shall, as expeditiously as practicable, investigate the waters of the Convention area to determine if there are areas in which salmon originating in the rivers of Canada and of the United States of America intermingle with salmon originating in the rivers of Asia. If such areas are found the Commission shall conduct suitable studies to determine a line or lines which best divide salmon of Asiatic origin and salmon of Canadian and United States of America origin, from which certain Contracting Parties have agreed to abstain in accordance with the provisions of Article IV, and whether it can be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that this line or lines more equitably divide such salmon than the provisional lines

specified in sections 1 (c) and 2 of the Annex. In accordance with these determinations the Commission shall recommend that such provisional lines be confirmed or that they be changed in accordance with these results, giving due consideration to adjustments required to simplify administration.

In the event, however, the Commission fails within a reasonable period of time to recommend unanimously such line or lines, it is agreed that the matter shall be referred to a special committee of scientists consisting of three competent and disinterested persons, no one of whom shall be a national of a Contracting Party, selected by mutual agreement of all parties for the determination of this matter.

It is further agreed that when a determination has been made by a majority of such special committee, the Commission shall make a recommendation in accordance therewith.

The Governments of the United States of America, Canada, and Japan, in signing this Protocol, desire to make it clear that the procedure set forth herein is designed to cover a special situation. It is not, therefore, to be considered a precedent for the final resolution of any matters which may, in the future, come before the Commission.

This Protocol shall become effective from the date of entry into force of the said Convention.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol.

DONE in triplicate at Tokyo this _____ day of _____ one thousand nine hundred fifty _____.

Canada:
Japan:
United States of America:

**United Nations Documents:
A Selected Bibliography¹**

Security Council

Letter dated 6 November 1951 from the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine to the Secretary-General transmitting a report in accordance with the Security Council Resolution of 18 May 1951 (S/2157). S/2389, November 8, 1951. 12 pp. mimeo.

Trusteeship Council

Population, Land Categories and Tenure in Togoland Under British Administration. T/AC.36/L.30, November 14, 1951. 10 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned during February 1952

United Nations:		
General Assembly: 6th Session	Paris	Nov. 6, 1951- Feb. 5, 1952
Meeting of <i>Ad Hoc</i> Commission on Prisoners of War	Geneva	Jan. 22-Feb. 8
Final Meeting of Special Committee on the Balkans	Athens	Feb. 5 (1 day)
Economic and Social Council:		
First Meeting of the <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Restrictive Business Practices	New York	Jan. 29-Feb. 6
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 8th Session	Rangoon	Jan. 29-Feb. 9
Working Party on International Action on Critical Shortage of Insecticides	Geneva	Feb. 11-25*
Economic Commission for Latin America: Meeting of Committee of the Whole	Santiago	Feb. 11-14
WHO (World Health Organization):		
Executive Board: 9th Session	Geneva	Jan. 21-Feb. 4
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Personnel Licensing Division: 4th Session	Montreal	Jan. 22-Feb. 14
International Film Festival of India	India	Jan. 24-Feb. 27
Caribbean Conference on Industrial Development	San Juan	Feb. 4-15
IRO (International Refugee Organization):		
Executive Committee: 11th Session	Geneva	Feb. 7-9
General Council: 9th Session	Geneva	Feb. 11-16
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Meeting of Committee on Commodity Problems	Rome	Feb. 18-27
Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe: 2d Session	Geneva	Feb. 18-27*
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade):		
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee for Agenda and Intersessional Business of the Contracting Parties	Geneva	Feb. 25-27

In Session as of February 29, 1952

International Materials Conference	Washington	Feb. 26, 1951-
Four-Power Conference on Swiss-Allied Accord	Bern	Mar. 5, 1951-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Council: 15th Session	Montreal	Jan. 29-
Air Navigation Commission: 9th Session	Montreal	Jan. 29-
Third European-Mediterranean Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Paris	Feb. 26-
"Colombo Plan" Exhibition	Colombo	Feb. 15-
British Commonwealth Scientific Official Conference	{Canberra	Feb. 18-
	{Melbourne	Feb. 26-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Second Session of the Advisory Committee on Salaried Employees and Professional Workers	Geneva	Feb. 18-
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):		
Council: 9th Session	Lisbon	Feb. 20-
United Nations:		
Trusteeship Council: 10th Session	New York	Feb. 27-
International Conference on German Debts	London	Feb. 28-

Scheduled March 1-May 31, 1952

United Nations:		
Economic and Social Council:		
Subcommission on Freedom of Information and of the Press: 5th Session	New York	Mar. 3-
Economic Commission for Europe: 7th Session	Geneva	Mar. 3-
Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations	New York	Mar. 18-
Special Session of Ecosoc	New York	Mar. 24 (1 day)
Commission on Status of Women: 6th Session	Geneva	Mar. 24-

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Feb. 21, 1952.

*Tentative.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled March 1–May 31, 1952—Continued

United Nations—Continued

Economic and Social Council—Continued		
Technical Assistance Committee, Working Party	New York	Mar. 24–
Narcotic Drugs Commission: 7th Session	New York	Apr. 17–
Human Rights Commission: 8th Session	New York	Apr. 21–
Fourteenth Session of Ecosoc	New York	May 13–
Social Commission: 8th Session	New York	May 19–
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Governing Body: 118th Session	Geneva	Mar. 3–
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations	Geneva	Mar. 17–
Fifth Regional Conference of American States Members	Rio de Janeiro	Apr. 17–
Metal Trades Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Apr. 21–
Iron and Steel Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	May 5–
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Executive Board: 28th Session	Paris	Mar. 3–
Executive Board: 29th Session	Paris	May 10–
International Sugar Council, Special Committee	London	Mar. 3–
First General Assembly of the International Mathematical Union	Rome	Mar. 6–
Consultative Committee on Economic Development of South and South-east Asia (Colombo Plan)	Karachi	Mar. 10–
Caribbean Fisheries Conference	Trinidad	Mar. 24–
Fourth Inter-American Conference on Social Security	Mexico City	Mar. 24–
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
CCIR International Radio Consultative Committee:		
Study Group I	The Hague	Apr. 1–
Study Group III	The Hague	Apr. 1–
Study Group V	Stockholm	May 15–
Study Group VI	Stockholm	May 15–
Study Group XI	Stockholm	May 19–
Administrative Council: 7th Session	Geneva	Apr. 17–
Drawings and Engravings, International Exhibition of	Lugano	Apr. 10–
Fourth Inter-American Travel Congress	Lima	Apr. 12–
South Pacific Commission: 9th Session	Nouméa	Apr. 18–
PASO (Pan American Sanitary Organization):		
Executive Committee: 16th Meeting	Washington	Apr. 21–
Milan International Fair	Milan	Apr. 12–
Cannes International Film Festival	Cannes	Apr. 23–
Sixth International Hydrographic Conference	Monaco	Apr. 29–
WHO (World Health Organization):		
Fifth Assembly	Geneva	May 5–
Caribbean Commission: 14th Meeting	Guadeloupe	May 5–
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Working Party on Fertilizers	Java	May 5–
Working Party on Rice Breeders	Java	May 5–
International Rice Commission: 3d Session	Java	May 12–
Meeting on Fisheries Statistics	Copenhagen	May 26–
Rubber Study Group: 9th Meeting	Ottawa	May 5–
UPU (Universal Postal Union):		
Thirteenth Congress of the	Brussels	May 14–
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):		
Planning Board for Ocean Shipping:		
Fourth Meeting	Washington	May 15–
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance	Denmark	May 19–
Sixth Annual Assembly	Montreal	May 27–
Ninth International Congress of Agricultural Industries	Rome	May 23–
PICMME (Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe):		
Third Session	Geneva	May–

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers issued in 1952: S/2461, January

2; S/2462, January 2; S/2464, January 3; S/2470, January 8; S/2471, January 8; S/2472, January 8; S/2474, January 12; S/2475, January 12; S/2476, January 12; S/2477, January 12; S/2482, January 17; S/2487, January 25; S/2489, January 25; S/2490, January 25; S/2491, January 25; S/2497, January 29; S/2498, January 29; S/2499, January 29; S/2503, January 29; S/2504, January 29; S/2509, February 2.

Reports on United Nations Commissions

AD HOC COMMISSION ON PRISONERS OF WAR MEETS AT GENEVA

The United Nations Commission on Prisoners of War was established by the resolution entitled Measures for the Peaceful Solution of the Prisoner of War Problem, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 14, 1950. The members of the Commission, appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations, are Chairman José Gustavo Guerrero (El Salvador), Vice President of the International Court of Justice; Judge Aung Khine of the High Court, Rangoon, Burma; and Countess Bernadotte of Sweden. The first session of the Commission, which opened on July 30, 1951, at New York and continued to August 15, was closed. The second session of the Commission, which began at Geneva on January 22, 1952, and ended on February 8, was a public session.

The Commission had invited the 11 governments most concerned to send representatives to the public session. Of the 11 only the U.S.S.R. was not represented. The countries accepting the invitation were Australia, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The United States representative to the United Nations Commission on Prisoners of War was Mike J. Mansfield, Member of Congress from Montana. His deputy was Donald Blaisdell, Permanent Representative of the United States to the European Office of the United Nations.

At the opening session of the conference, the representatives of all of the countries (except The Netherlands) made statements regarding the prisoner of war problem. Following these meetings private hearings were held by the Commission for the representatives asking for a hearing or for representatives invited by the Commission to discuss specific problems. Considerable information was furnished the Commission at these private

sessions, particularly by the Japanese, German, and Italian representatives.

The United States representative was invited to appear before the Commission on January 30 to inform the Commission regarding the small number of Peruvian Japanese still remaining in the United States of the group brought to this country for security reasons during World War II, about whom the United States had informed the Commission last summer.

The closing public session of the Conference was held on Friday, February 8. At this session Judge Guerrero, Chairman, gave a general review of the work of the session and the future plans of the Commission.

It was announced that the next session of the Commission would be held at Geneva beginning August 25 and that it, too, would be a public session. In the intervening months, additional information is to be furnished to the Commission Secretariat at New York by certain of the governments whose prisoners of war are still in the U.S.S.R. The Commission is preparing a report on the work of the conference.

The Government of the United States in the statement presented by Mr. Mansfield at the opening session suggested that one important task that the Commission might accomplish would be a determination as to the facts in the prisoner of war situation and that one way of accomplishing this task would be for the Commission to make on-the-spot investigations in Germany and Japan, the countries having the greatest number of prisoners still in custody of the U.S.S.R. The Commission, however, decided that for the time being at least it would not visit those countries.

The entire session was harmonious. It was evident that it was the sincere desire of all to solve the tragic problem of the hundreds of thousands of missing persons.

GERMAN ELECTIONS COMMISSION REPORTS TO ALLIED HIGH COMMISSION

Following is the text of a letter sent on February 23 by the United Nations Commission To Investigate Conditions for Free Elections in Germany to the Chairman of the Council of the Allied High Commission in Germany:

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that at its 356th plenary meeting, held on December 20, 1951 at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, the General Assembly of the United Nations, having regard to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the Charter, taking due account of the responsibilities of the Four Powers regarding Germany, and desiring to make its contribution to the achievement of the unity of Germany in the interest of world peace, adopted a resolution whereby, *inter alia*, it appointed a Commission composed of representatives of Brazil, Iceland, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Poland which "shall carry out immediately a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone of Germany to ascertain and report whether conditions in these areas are such as to make possible the holding of genuinely free and secret elections throughout these areas."

The above mentioned Commission constituted itself during a meeting held on February 11, 1952 at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, with the participation of the following representatives: Ambassador Ali Haider Abbasi, representing Pakistan; Minister Antonio Mendez Vianna, representing Brazil; Minister Max Kohnstamon representing the Netherlands; and Counsellor Kristjan Albertson, representing Iceland. Poland, the fifth member of the Commission, conveyed on January 18, 1952 its decision not to participate in the Commission. At its first meeting in Paris, the Commission decided to transfer its headquarters to Geneva, effective February 21, 1952.

In accordance with the terms of reference of the Commission as laid down in the General Assembly resolution of December 20, 1951, a copy of which was communicated to the appropriate German authorities through you by the Secretary-General of the United Nations by cablegram 322 dated December 22, 1951, the first task of the Commission will be "to report at the earliest practicable date to the Secretary-General for the consideration of the Four Powers and for the information of the other members of the United Nations, on the results of its efforts to make the necessary arrangements with all the parties concerned to enable it to undertake its work."

The Commission therefore decided at its third

meeting held on February 21, 1952 at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, to discuss with the responsible authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone of Germany the arrangements deemed necessary by the Commission in order to enable it to undertake its work.

The Commission would appreciate your kindness in transmitting to the appropriate authorities in the Soviet Zone of Germany the fact that members of the Commission wish to discuss with them the arrangements deemed necessary by the Commission to enable it to undertake its work. The Commission would appreciate it if arrangements could be made to hold this meeting on Monday, March 17, 1952.

The Commission would further appreciate your kindness in transmitting to the appropriate authorities in the Eastern Sector of Berlin the fact that members of the Commission wish equally to discuss with them the arrangements deemed necessary by the Commission to enable it to undertake its work. The Commission would appreciate it if arrangements could be made to hold this meeting on Friday, March 21, 1952.

The Commission would be grateful if you would inform it as soon as possible of the names of the representatives designated to receive the members of the Commission and of the place designated by the authorities concerned for these meetings.

In conclusion, the Commission wishes to state that both the Commission, on the one hand, and all the authorities in Germany and the German people, on the other hand, have common objectives and, indeed, a good deal of common ground on the basis of which they can all cooperate to set up the edifice of a free, united, and democratic Germany.

The Commission has decided to release to the press the text of this letter 48 hours after its dispatch to you by cablegram.

Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

A. MENDES VIANNA,
Chairman,
United Nations Commission to
Investigate Conditions for
Free Elections in Germany.

The same letter has been sent to Gen. V. Chui-kov, Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission for Germany.

**The U.S. in the U.N. a weekly feature,
does not appear in this issue.**

THE DEPARTMENT

Point Four Appointments

Claude Burton Hutchison as country director of technical cooperation in Pakistan, effective February 20.

Dr. Henry van Zile Hyde as director of the Point Four Health Staff, effective February 13.

Confirmations

On February 6 the Senate confirmed the nomination of David K. E. Bruce as Under Secretary.

On January 31 the Senate confirmed the nomination of John M. Allison as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

U.S. Member Named to UNRWA Advisory Commission

On February 20, the Senate confirmed the appointment of Edwin A. Locke, Jr., as the U.S. Member of the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). This assignment is in addition to Mr. Locke's activities as Special Representative of the Secretary to coordinate economic and technical assistance in the Near East under the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

Point Four Technicians Complete Course

On February 1, the Department of State announced that 30 technicians and administrative personnel completed a special 4-weeks' course at the Foreign Service Institute as final preparation for various overseas assignments under the Point Four Program, which is administered by the Technical Cooperation Administration.

Sixteen will serve in Latin American countries, 11 in the Near East and South Asia, and 3 in Africa. They are from 22 States and the Territory of Alaska. Their specialties embrace agriculture, public health, education, forestry, civil aviation, and fiscal affairs. Three of the number are women.

Twenty persons in the group will be accompanied to their posts by members of their families.

The Foreign Service Institute course emphasizes language, culture, religion, and local custom encountered at the various posts of duty. Wives of many of the men in the group also took the course.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

John Carter Vincent Cleared Of Disloyalty Charges

[Released to the press February 19]

The Department of State announced on February 19 that career diplomat John Carter Vincent had been completely cleared by the Department of charges involving his loyalty to the United States and his security as a Government employee. The favorable decision on Mr. Vincent's loyalty is being referred to the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission where it will be reviewed on a post-audit basis as are all such decisions. The favorable security finding, however, is not subject to post-audit review.

The Department stated that Mr. Vincent, who is assigned to Tangier as American diplomatic agent and minister, will return to Tangier on February 20 to resume his duties with the Department's full confidence and best wishes.

Mr. Vincent, who was educated and grew up in Georgia, has been in the U.S. Foreign Service for 27 years. Prior to his Tangier assignment, Mr. Vincent served as minister to Switzerland, and previous to that he served as Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, having been appointed to that position by then Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.

Following is the text of a letter from Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, to John Carter Vincent which is being made public at Mr. Vincent's request:

FEBRUARY 18, 1952

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: This is to convey that you have been completely cleared by the Department of State, on all the evidence, in regard to charges as to your loyalty to the United States and as to your security. The favorable decision in regard to the loyalty aspects of your case will be referred to the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission for post-audit review. The Department's security decision, however, is final.

The Secretary has asked me to reaffirm the Department's full confidence in you and to tell you that, as you return to your duties as American Diplomatic Agent and Minister to Tangier, you take with you the Department's appreciation for your twenty-seven years of conscientious service and best wishes for the future.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE

Confirmations

On February 20, 1952, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Lincoln MacVeagh to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Spain.

On February 20, 1952, the Senate confirmed the nomina-

tion of Walter J. Donnelly to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Austria.

On January 18, 1952, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Raymond Ames Spruance to be American Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of the Philippines.

On December 8, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomination of George C. McGhee to be American Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Turkey and to serve concurrently and without additional compensation as Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Turkey.

On February 6 the Senate confirmed the nomination of Henry S. Villard as the first American Minister to the United Kingdom of Libya.

Resignation

On February 7 President Truman accepted the resignation of Admiral Alan G. Kirk as American Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For text of Admiral Kirk's letter of resignation and the President's reply, see White House press release of that date.

Legislation Affecting Tuna Fish Imports

Statement by Harold F. Linder

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹

A few days ago, the Department of State filed with the chairman an interim report on H. R. 5693. In its interim report, the Department indicated that it did not believe that, under present circumstances, the proposals contained in H. R. 5693 were appropriate in all respects. Accordingly, our interim report suggested certain modifications of H. R. 5693. In the course of my testimony, I shall try to explain the reasons which have led to the Department's view and to elaborate upon the proposal suggested in our interim report.

Last fall the Department was invited to testify before a subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee on the question whether any changes were needed in our duties on tuna-fish imports. The hearings had been called hurriedly, in the face of what appeared to be an emergency situation. At that time, it appeared that some 200 west coast tuna clippers were tied up, with every prospect that they would stay tied up for some time to come. A large investment appeared to be threatened and serious unemployment appeared to exist. Meanwhile, imports of fresh and frozen tuna fish were coming in duty free, at a rate higher than ever before. Moreover, stocks of canned tuna fish had risen to high levels and prices of tuna had declined at a time when other prices were rising.

We had little time for the kind of detailed analysis we would have liked to make before taking a position on the proposals under consideration by the subcommittee. Our superficial analysis at the time indicated that in part the critical situation in the tuna fleet had resulted

from a previous increase in the rate of duty on tuna canned in oil. The rate on tuna in this form had increased from 22½ percent to 45 percent ad valorem effective January 1, 1951, as an automatic consequence of the termination of our trade agreement with Mexico; this termination, as you know, had occurred for reasons unconnected with the tuna situation. Toward the end of 1950, the prospective duty increase had naturally led the trade to import larger than ordinary shipments of tuna. After the beginning of 1951, imports of canned tuna fish in oil fell off while imports of fresh and frozen tuna increased sharply. Altogether, imports of tuna in all forms in 1951 were somewhat below 1950.

At the time, there were a great many things about the situation which were unclear to the Department. We had no way of knowing whether the problems of the tuna fishing fleet were temporary or permanent. We had no knowledge of comparative costs of production here and abroad. We had no real measure of the effects of any particular course of action on foreign countries nor of their reactions to the various proposals.

Our testimony, therefore, had to be couched in the most general terms. We pointed out our deep concern that restrictive measures on tuna imports could harm the Japanese by cutting off an important source of dollar earnings, could increase pressures on Japan to trade heavily with Communist China, and could drive the Japanese to pursue unfair trade practices in other products in an effort to earn the dollars they need. We urged that Congress should make every effort to obtain all the relevant facts before any action was taken. At the conclusion of the hearings, however, in view of the unique nature of the situation and the com-

¹ Made before the Senate Finance Committee with respect to H. R. 5693 on Feb. 6 and released to the press on the same date.

pling prima facie case of injury, we did not express any objection to an immediate imposition of a temporary three-cent duty on fresh or frozen tuna, so long as it was to be accompanied by a thorough investigation. Our letter of October 12, 1951, to Mr. Doughton set forth that position, stating that we had no objection to H. R. 5693, the bill now before this committee.

Foreign Policy Implications

In the period since we testified before the Ways and Means Subcommittee, the Department has had an opportunity to analyze the problem much more carefully. We now feel more strongly than ever that legislation affecting tuna-fish imports must be framed with the utmost care, in view of its repercussions on our foreign policy. The problems of foreign policy involve principally Japan and Latin America. The principal foreign supplier of tuna to the United States is Japan. While Japanese exports of tuna fish to the United States in all forms is only about one-tenth of our domestic production, nevertheless, it ranks second in the list of Japanese exports to the United States. Japan's reliance on tuna exports to obtain the raw materials and foodstuffs it needs has been increased by the present virtual embargo on its trade with the China mainland. At the same time, Japan's sales here have been restricted since World War II by the reduced demand for silk in the United States. Accordingly, a curtailment of Japan's tuna exports tends to defeat our efforts to place the Japanese economy on a self-sustaining basis and to create significant risks for our policies in the Far East.

The problem, as far as Latin America is concerned, contains a number of other elements. Peru has expressed its deep concern to the Department with respect to H. R. 5693 because of its belief that the bill will cause serious injury to the Peruvian fishing industry. The Peruvian tuna industry is a new industry, built up during and after the Second World War with the encouragement of the U.S. Government, which at that time was making every effort to increase the supplies of protein food available for world consumption. It has helped make fishing one of Peru's leading export industries, on which substantial numbers of people are dependent. Peru is fearful that a three-cent duty may destroy its industry and result in the loss of an important source of foreign exchange.

The Governments of Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, and Mexico have also expressed their concern regarding H. R. 5693. Although these countries are not large exporters of tuna to the United States, they consider that they have a primary interest in this legislation because they are hopeful one day of developing a tuna industry in the fishing grounds adjacent to their coasts.

This brings me to another important point with regard to the Latin American tuna situation—one

which was not explored, so far as I know, in the House subcommittee's hearings. Much of the catch of tuna fish by the United States clipper fleet takes place in waters off the shores of these Latin American countries. In fact, the American fleet ordinarily has to enter waters within the three-mile limit of the shores of these countries to obtain the live bait which it needs for its tuna fishing. In the past, Latin American countries have readily licensed these activities. The operations have been profitable and fairly harmonious for all concerned. The Latin Americans have collected license fees and provided shore facilities and labor. Our tuna fishermen have obtained bait immediately offshore and caught fish in the deeper waters off those coasts. Now, however, the Governments of these countries are being asked by various groups interested in the development of their economies to reconsider whether it is in their long-run interests to make these resources available to the American fleet. If it becomes impossible for the Latin Americans to market such tuna as they catch because of a prohibitive tariff in the United States, there is a possibility that the American fleet may be unable to obtain access to the bait it needs and may be faced with constant claims that they are violating the territorial waters of the countries off whose shores they may be fishing.

I want to make one final point regarding the foreign-policy implications of this action. Of late, foreign countries have felt growing uncertainties regarding the foreign economic policy of the United States; they have been asking with increasing frequency whether we are abandoning our general approach of negotiating for reducing unnecessary governmental barriers to trade and expanding the volume of world trade. Such incidents as the passage of section 104 of the Defense Production Act have had a very deep impact.

This growing sense of uneasiness on the part of other countries is especially unfortunate at this particular moment of time. At this moment, the free nations of the world must develop their economic ties and support each other with their economic strength to the utmost extent. One of the principal jobs of those countries is to provide the leadership and set the example which would make that sense of cohesiveness possible. This does not mean, of course, that we should not legislate in our own national interest when that interest is directly imperiled. But it does mean that in any such move the interests of the United States as a whole must be considered. That kind of appraisal must include our interest in maintaining strong allies, in reducing the need for dollar aid by other countries, and in avoiding the weakening of our political and economic ties with the rest of the free world. It means, therefore, that any restrictive action to deal with the kind of problem created by the tie-up of a part of our tuna fleet should be taken with restraint and should be thoroughly justified by the facts.

The Domestic Picture

With this in mind, the Department has continued to study the domestic situation as carefully as time and available data have permitted. Although doubtless the committee will have access to detailed statistics and reports from other agencies and individuals, I would like to describe the domestic picture in general terms as we see it now. The average domestic catch of tuna has about doubled since before the war. Fishing off the west coast has been supplemented by fishing in more distant waters off Central and South America, using larger, more expensive, and more elaborately equipped vessels which freeze their catch and can stay away from port for weeks or months. Boats of this type now number over 200 and many of them have been built or have been converted from naval ships in recent years. Among the smaller boats in the trade, many are vessels formerly engaged in other fisheries or still engaged part time in other fisheries. This record of rapid expansion of investment strongly suggests that at least until recently tuna fishing has been exceptionally profitable.

While this domestic expansion was going on, imports of tuna in all forms, fresh, frozen, and canned, reappeared in volume, increasing from 9.5 million pounds in 1949 in terms of the canned yield to 57 million in 1950 and dropping back to 41 million in 1951. These imports were no doubt stimulated, as was domestic production, by the strong demand for tuna which had been to a large extent unfilled during the early postwar years and to the special factors which I described earlier in my testimony. The relative importance of imports in 1950 was higher than in the prewar period; in 1950 imports in all forms accounted for 27 percent of the total supply, as compared with 16 percent for the period of the 1930's.

At the moment, there are indications that the most acute phase of the fleet's difficulties may have been passed. Foreign imports in all forms in 1951 have not been as heavy as in 1950, either in relative or in absolute terms. Moreover, there are indications that domestic stocks of tuna have gone down somewhat. And in the last week or so, some of the clipper fleet has gone out to sea again. And, above all, consumption seems to be still strongly on the increase.

This is not to say that all the problems of the fleet and the canning industry have been solved. There is still no way of predicting with any assurance the level at which the fleet will be operating during the coming year. Moreover, the canning industry is still concerned with the shift in imports to canned tuna in brine, a shift whose impact on the industry is not yet clear in all respects.

Three-cent Duty Held Inappropriate

All things considered, however, the present situation seems to call for a less drastic remedy than

seemed appropriate last fall. At that time, faced with a prima facie case of serious injury and with an apparent emergency, the Department did not feel that it should recommend against the enactment of a temporary duty of three cents a pound on fresh and frozen tuna fish. There was no pretense on the part of any of the witnesses before the House subcommittee that this was scientific rate-making; it was frankly described as a stop-gap measure, the effects of which are most uncertain. Now, therefore, with a better comprehension of the total United States interests which are involved and with a significant reduction in the acuteness of the problem, the Department is of the view that a three-cent duty would be inappropriate. Instead, the Department proposes that the bill be amended to permit the duty-free entry of a limited amount of fresh and frozen tuna fish from foreign sources, and that the three-cent duty be applied to the amount entering in excess of such an amount. The Department has struggled hard to find some basis for fixing this duty-free quantity at a level which would be equitable and reasonable for all concerned, including the domestic industry. On weighing all the facts, we are inclined to believe that any amount less than 25 million pounds in fresh and frozen form would be unreasonably low.

This 25-million-pound figure, which is equivalent to 11 million pounds in the canned form, would represent a great deal less than the fresh and frozen imports which came in during 1950 and 1951; in these 2 years, the figures corresponding to the proposed 11-million-pound figure were 20 million pounds and 28 million pounds, respectively. The figure would represent about 6 percent of the estimated consumption in the United States in 1952. The figure has a certain historical justification since it is the same proportion as prevailed between fresh and frozen imports and total consumption during the period 1931 to 1939 and 1946 to 1951.

We have also given some thought to the question of administering the proposed quota. It would appear desirable that the bill permit an allocation of the quota by countries or groups of countries. It would also appear desirable that one-quarter of the annual quota should be available in the first quarter of the year, one-half in the first 6 months, and three-quarters in the first 9 months.

Of course, there is no certainty in the results which this proposal would produce. Accordingly, we are still of the view that any legislation on this subject should be temporary and should be accompanied by a basic study, as provided in H. R. 5693. We also take note of the fact that the Tariff Commission is currently investigating the import situation with regard to canned tuna in brine and canned bonito in oil and brine under the escape clause procedure provided in the Trade Agreements Act.

Comments on the Risk of Military Action in Japan By the Soviet Union or Red China

SECRETARY ACHESON'S LETTER TO SENATOR WILEY¹

During the course of hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Japanese peace treaty, Senator Wiley in a letter to Secretary Acheson raised the question as to whether the Soviet Union or Communist China might attempt to send armed forces into Japan in pursuance of alleged "belligerent" rights. Secretary Acheson's reply follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 5, 1952.

HON. ALEXANDER WILEY,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR WILEY: I have your letter of January 29, 1952, raising the question of whether the Soviet Union or Communist China, as non-signatories of the multilateral peace treaty, might, after that treaty comes into force, attempt to send armed forces into Japan in pursuance of alleged "belligerent" rights.

This is a matter which has, of course, been given the most thorough consideration over the past few years.

It is my judgment that the risk of Soviet or Red China military action in Japan or elsewhere is neither diminished nor increased by purely legalistic considerations. I believe that in such matters the leaders of the Soviet Union and of other nations dominated by the Soviet Union act externally not because of the presence or absence of legalistic rights, but because of their own determination of what is in their over-all interest. If they want to take external action, they will find or invent legal pretexts. If they do not want to take the action, they will not take it even though legal pretexts exist or can be invented.

The Potsdam surrender terms of June 26, 1945, to which the Soviet Union subsequently adhered, did not give the Allies individually and independently the right to occupy Japan. Whatever individual rights of occupation there might have been were merged voluntarily by the Allies into a single "allied" occupation, which was to come to

an end after certain stated objectives had been achieved. As a consequence of the Potsdam surrender terms, therefore, the only right to occupy is a collective right. Article 7 provides:

Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

Article 12 provides:

The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty, as you know, was signed by 48 Allied nations, including a large majority of the members of the Far Eastern Commission and of the Allied Council in Japan, including the United States, which it was agreed should designate the supreme commander who would control all the occupation forces. It is the view of the Government of the United States that this action constituted a conclusive determination that the "new order" referred to in article 7 in the surrender terms is established; that there is "convincing proof that Japan's war-making power has been destroyed," so that there is no longer any right to initiate occupation under paragraph 7; and that the objectives of the Potsdam surrender terms "have been accomplished" and "that there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government" so that the occupying forces of the Allies should be withdrawn from Japan in accordance with article 12 and as more fully set out in the treaty of peace.

Under these circumstances, any effort of any single power hereafter to assert independent belligerent rights of occupation would not be an exercise of belligerent rights but a violation of the Potsdam surrender terms by which the Allied Nations, including the Soviet Union, are bound.

Upon the coming into force of the multilateral peace treaty, there will simultaneously come into force the security treaty between Japan and the United States, article II of which provides:

During the exercise of the right referred to in article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, powers,

¹ Printed from Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d sess., on Japanese Peace Treaty and other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific, Jan. 21, 22, 23, and 25, 1952, p. 63.

or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air, or naval forces to any third power.

It can, therefore, be assumed that Japan would oppose any effort by the Soviet Union or Chinese Communists to send armed forces into Japan in the guise of "occupying" forces.

You refer to the fact that there exists in Japan what you refer to as an "imbalance" between western forces and Russia's eastern strength. It is quite true that in Japan as well as many other places subject to armed attack from the Soviet sphere of influence there is an "imbalance" of power insofar as regards the actual forces which would initially be brought into play at the various hypothetical points of contact. However, initial and local "imbalance" is not necessarily the determining factor. There is also to be taken into account the total power, military and industrial, actual and potential, which might be brought into play if there should be armed aggression.

Recent developments do not suggest that either the Soviet Union or Communist China contemplate an effort to "occupy" Japan with their armed forces. Prior to the San Francisco Peace Conference Communist propaganda suggested that as a possibility in an effort to frighten the free nations from proceeding with a Japanese peace. Since they were not frightened, but went ahead, the Communist propaganda line has changed. It is no longer menacing against Japan but rather an attempt to woo Japan with kind words and promises of peaceful trade relations. In this connection I refer to Mr. Stalin's New Year's message to the Japanese people. Also, since the peace treaty was signed, the personnel of the Soviet mission in Tokyo has been changed in character to reduce the military personnel and to increase the economic and political personnel.

I believe that the courageous initiative which we, with the other free nations, have taken in relation to the Japanese peace has had a salutary influence for peace and while dangers and hazards obviously exist, these are not, in my opinion, increased by consummating our peace and security treaties with Japan. I believe, indeed, that the risk would be greatly increased if we faltered in these matters.

As bearing on the Soviet reaction to the "legalities," I enclose a copy of the statement which General MacArthur made on this subject in June 1950.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

(Enclosure: Statement by General MacArthur.)

I was never in agreement with the reasoning advanced by some that a peace treaty without the Soviet would either favorably alter the Soviet's legal position vis-à-vis the Japanese problem or be seized upon by the Soviet as the basis for intensified pressure upon Japan. The Soviet has demonstrated time and again that his decisions are based solely upon political expediency and relative military capabilities, without the slightest regard for prior commitment or legalistic reasoning. Any move which the United States makes is fraught with the danger of Soviet retaliation but hardly more so than is maintaining the status quo vis-à-vis Japan, whereunder the Soviet is smarting with a sense of complete frustration—Gen. Douglas MacArthur, June 1950.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

- Assisting in Preventing Aliens from Entering or Remaining in the United States Illegally. S. Rept. 1145, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 1851] 5 pp.
- Review of Bipartisan Foreign Policy Consultations Since World War II. S. Doc. 87, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 48 pp.
- Eleventh Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. S. Doc. 92, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 211 pp.
- Agreement Supplementing the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation With Italian Republic. Message from the President of the United States. S. Exec. H., 82d Cong., 2d sess. 6 pp.
- Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation With Kingdom of Denmark, With Protocol Relating Thereto. Message from the President of the United States. S. Exec. I, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 18 pp.
- Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation With the Kingdom of Greece. Message from the President of the United States. S. Exec. J, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 19 pp.
- Report of the Special Study Mission to Germany and Certain Other Countries. Supplemental Report on Israel by Hon. Jacob K. Javits, New York. Committee print. 82d Cong., 2d sess. 9 pp.
- Report on Germany. Report of the Special Study Mission to Germany and Certain Other Countries. Committee print. 82d Cong., 2d sess. 48 pp.
- Legislation and Documents Relating to the Mutual Security Act of 1951, With Explanatory Notes. Committee print. 82d Cong., 2d sess. 41 pp.
- Mutual Security Act of 1951 and Other Basic Legislation. With Explanatory Notes. Committee print. 82d Cong., 2d sess. 120 pp.
- The Katyn Forest Massacre. Hearings before the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre. Oct. 11, 1951. 29 pp.
- Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Jan. 21, 22, 23, and 25, 1952. 182 pp.

Further Funds Requested for Construction of Inter-American Highway and Rama Road

*Statement by Edward G. Miller, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs¹*

I appreciate greatly this opportunity to appear before the House Committee on Public Works to support H.R. 6094 and H.R. 6390, which include an authorization for funds to complete the Inter-American Highway and the Rama Road in Nicaragua. While it is my duty as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to discuss these bills with you, it is also a real privilege and a pleasure to support them because I am convinced, without reservation, that the Inter-American Highway will produce great benefits for the United States as well as for the cooperating countries of Central America. Moreover, I am equally convinced, as I hope you will be, that our undertaking to construct the Rama Road in Nicaragua should be fulfilled at the earliest possible moment.

In May of 1950 I appeared before the Senate Committee on Public Works to support the authorization and appropriation of funds for the continued survey and construction of the Inter-American Highway. As you will recall, Public Law 769 of the 81st Congress was approved on September 7, 1950, and the sum of \$4,000,000 for fiscal year 1951 and \$3,000,000 for fiscal year 1952 were later appropriated to be available, until expended, for construction of the Inter-American Highway. Four of the Central American nations, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, thus far have executed the agreements required by that act and construction work is in progress. Now I appear before you to support further authorization of funds for the construction and completion of the Inter-American Highway, and for the construction of the Rama Road.

The Inter-American Highway

Let me refer first to the Inter-American Highway. The Department of State strongly believes that the Inter-American Highway should be completed as soon as possible and that U.S. cooperation, which is essential to this end, should be continued. It is clear to all of us what road construc-

tion means to isolated areas and the effect that better transportation has on the economies of such areas. You can see on the chart that the Inter-American Highway will join the Central American area to the United States and will provide the only means of surface communication among the six nations. Thus it is not necessary at this time to discuss in detail the obvious and many benefits which will accrue to the Central American nations with the completion of the road. It is essential, however, that we discuss today why the United States should continue to participate in this cooperative project, at a time when so much highway-construction work is necessary at home.

Participation by the United States in the construction of the Inter-American Highway is obviously and quite frankly based on the principle of enlightened self-interest. Cooperation on the Inter-American Highway is the single most important way in which the United States can help to promote economic progress and political stability in the relatively underdeveloped countries of Central America and Panama. As you are well aware, the stronger these nations are both economically and politically the greater will be the contribution they can make to the security of the hemisphere.

As a contribution to economic development, the Inter-American Highway and its access roads will improve transportation between the countries of Central America and the United States. It will facilitate the exploitation of commodities of strategic value to the United States and indirectly will increase the consumption of imports from here. As these nations expand their production and income they will be encouraged to import more products, particularly such manufactured goods as automobiles, machinery, and farm equipment. The greatest proportionate share of any newly generated import demand should be supplied by the United States which today in dollar value furnishes about 70 percent of the total imports of the six countries concerned. In 1950 this amounted to \$202,000,000.

¹ Made before the House Committee on Public Works on Feb. 20 and released to the press on the same date.

From a military point of view the highway will provide a land route to the Panama Canal and will be of value in hemispheric defense.

Finally, the Inter-American Highway is not a new project. It has been the publicly announced intention of this Government, affirmed by Congress in the language of its enactments, to see its construction through to the Panama Canal. Accordingly, approximately \$40,000,000 have been appropriated by the Congress thus far for investment in the Inter-American Highway, at first for reconnaissance surveys beginning in 1930 and then with larger appropriations for construction beginning in 1941.

We are now at a point where the completion of this project is within reach. It is important to carry this work through in order that the United States, as well as the other countries, will realize the full value of the substantial investments already made in the Highway.

The Department of State, therefore, supports section 4 of H.R. 6094 which authorizes \$56,000,000 to enable the United States to cooperate with the Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua in the survey and completion of construction of the Inter-American Highway within the borders of those Republics. Note that any of the funds appropriated must conform to the procedure and limitations of section 11 of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1950. In brief, section 11 provides that the other cooperating Governments shall provide all necessary right-of-way, where practicable; will not impose any highway toll; will not levy any fee or tax on U.S. vehicles or persons of the United States that does not apply to nationals; will grant reciprocal recognition of drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations; and will provide for the maintenance of the Highway after its completion.

The Department would like to suggest that an over-all authorization of \$56,000,000 without time limitations has certain advantages over a specific yearly authorization, as provided in H.R. 6390. The Department foresees that in some years it might not only be possible but highly desirable, in the interest of economy, to take advantage of an opportunity to enter into construction contracts at favorable rates and carry out the construction faster than would be possible under a fixed yearly authorization. On the other hand, there may well be times when the status of construction and the availability of matching funds of the Central American nations is such that an appropriation in any single year, based on a fixed authorization, might not be justifiable. Accordingly, a lump sum authorization of \$56,000,000, without time limitation, would permit the Congress to have greater flexibility in adjusting annual appropriations realistically to conditions which are not always predictable and, where possible, to take advantage of economies in the scale of operations.

Line 21, page 5, of section 4 of H.R. 6390 provides that not to exceed \$3,000,000 of the appropriation authorized may be expended without requiring the country or countries in which such sums may be expended to match any part thereof. The Department respectfully suggests that the language of the bill concerning matching funds be changed to authorize the nonmatched expenditure of a specific percentage, such as one-third of the funds actually appropriated in any year, rather than the fixed amount of \$3,000,000 of the appropriation authorized for each fiscal year.

The Rama Road

Now, with respect to the Rama Road, I should like to point out that the Department of State has consistently taken the position that the terms of an executive agreement between the United States and Nicaragua will not be honored in full until the Rama Road, which was begun under authorization of the agreement, is finished from San Benito to Rama, and until a survey is completed from Rama to El Bluff.

The U.S. agreement to construct the Rama Road stems from conversations held in 1939 between President Somoza of Nicaragua and President Roosevelt. At that time, the Nicaraguan President asked that the United States undertake the construction of a canal across Nicaragua, a right which we obtained in the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1914. The War Department recommended against the construction of a canal and also against the construction of a barge canal using the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua. However, agreement was reached on the construction of a road from San Benito to Rama as a substitute. Accordingly, on April 8, 1942, this Government in an official note stated that it would be willing to construct a highway between San Benito and Rama and to survey and recommend a route from Rama to El Bluff.

The Department realizes that such an agreement cannot bind the Congress later to appropriate funds for its fulfillment. In this case, however, funds which were properly available to the Executive for such an agreement and which were considered adequate when it was made, were exhausted when the agreement was only partially honored.

Nicaragua, understandably, looks upon the agreement as a formal and binding commitment of the U. S. Government. It confidently expects that the Congress of the United States will honor this agreement by providing funds for its fulfillment. The Bureau of Public Roads estimates that the \$8,000,000 authorized in this bill would be sufficient for this purpose. Nicaragua is a country whose Government and people are particularly friendly to the United States and who offer consistent and valuable support for United States policy in international matters of the greatest importance. The Department believes it would

be most unfortunate if Nicaragua's confidence in the fulfillment of an agreement made in good faith with the United States were to be frustrated.

Regarding the specific language of section 5 of H.R. 6390 the Department desires to make the following comments and suggestions:

1. (Section 5, (1) page 6, line 25) That the words "where practicable" be inserted after the words "minimum width". It is considered that the requirements of this paragraph as now written may be found impracticable and excessive, especially in urban and agricultural areas where the costs would be exorbitant.
2. (Section 5, (4) page 7, line 17) That there be added as a final phrase to this sub-section after the word "parties" the phrase "or any other treaty or international convention establishing similar reciprocal recognition." This is necessary in order to afford applicability of the Road Traffic Convention of 1949,² an agreement of world-wide scope which eventually will supersede the Regional Convention for the Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic.
3. (Section 5, (b) page 7, line 24) That the words "and for a survey but not for the construction of a road from Rama to El Bluff" be inserted after the word "Rama" because the agreement with Nicaragua requires, in addition to construction of a road from San Benito to Rama, the survey but not the construction of a route from Rama to El Bluff.

I sincerely hope that this committee will approve the authorization for both the Inter-American Highway and the Rama Road. Very simply, it is in the national interest of the United States to do so. The political, economic, and military advantages to the United States favor prompt and affirmative action by the Congress.

Discussions on Economic Assistance to Yugoslavia

[Released to the press February 19]

Representatives of the British and French Governments have come to Washington to confer with American officials on the program of economic assistance to Yugoslavia. These discussions began February 19 at the Department of State.

The principal representatives are

For the United States: Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs

For the United Kingdom: Sir Francis Mudie

For France: Christian Auboyneau

Mr. Thorp will be assisted by representatives of the Department of State, the Mutual Security Agency, and the U.S. economic aid staff in Belgrade.

² For an article by H. H. Kelly on the preparation, formulation, and signature of this convention, see BULLETIN of Dec. 12, 1949, p. 875a.

U.S., Mexico To Extend Migratory Labor Agreement

[Released to the press February 9]

The Government of the United States and the Government of Mexico have agreed to extend to May 11, 1952, the existing Migratory Labor Agreement which is due to expire February 11. A bill designed to eliminate the flow of clandestine immigrants into this country was approved by the Senate on February 5, and it will next be taken up by the House of Representatives. Meanwhile, the Government of the United States and the Government of Mexico are in accord that there should be no interruption to the program whereby Mexican agricultural workers may legally enter the United States, when determined to be necessary, on terms agreeable to both Governments.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Feb. 16-22, 1952

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NAC Meeting Strengthens Defense of North Atlantic Community

REVIEW OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS AT LISBON

*Address by Secretary Acheson*¹

The past 2 weeks have been a time of historic decision for the forces of peace in the world.

The way is open to us to support these decisions with actions which will carry us far forward in maintaining peace and safeguarding our freedom.

If we act with vigor and firmness, we can prove once again that free people, when resolute, are unconquerable.

My report to you tonight concerns these events of the past 2 weeks. I wish to put these events in the perspective of our foreign policy, and to discuss with you some problems that lie ahead.

As you know, Secretaries Snyder and Lovett and Mr. Harriman and I have been attending, under the instructions of the President, a meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Lisbon. And I have had a series of talks in London with the Foreign Ministers of Britain and France, and with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

There were five major accomplishments of this series of meetings:

First, agreement was reached on the forces to be made available to General Eisenhower's NATO command during this calendar year.

Second, agreement was reached on the bases and facilities to be built and maintained for these forces.

Third, agreement was reached approving the creation of a European Army by six nations, including West Germany.

Fourth, agreement was reached by which the return of West Germany to a place of equality and responsibility in the European Community can be achieved.

And fifth, NATO itself was reorganized and greatly strengthened.

These agreements and actions represent great progress. But the success of these measures will depend upon how vigorously they are followed up by further action.

I know that our press and radio have carried full reports of these meetings. Rather than repeat familiar details, it would be useful for us to ex-

amine the pattern and design of actions taken against the background of our continuing foreign policy.

Pattern and Design of Actions Taken

The situation we faced after the war was one in which old systems of power were shattered. Not only the enemy states, but many Allied nations as well, were desperately weakened, and their economic and political relationships had suffered drastic changes.

Wherever weakness showed itself, there too was the threat of Soviet expansion.

The free peoples of the world need two things to protect themselves against this threat. The first is strength. The second is unity.

What we have been seeking to do is to help strengthen and unite free nations, so that there will be no tempting opportunity for further aggression.

This is the meaning of our efforts to support and strengthen the United Nations. This is why our forces are fighting against Communist aggression in Korea.

The steps by which we are helping Japan to return to the community of free nations are part of this pattern. And this has to do with the defense arrangements we have made with the Philippines, with New Zealand, and Australia.

This is the meaning of the fight now going on against Communist rebellions in Malaya and Indochina.

This is the purpose of our economic and military aid to independent nations in the whole crescent from the Far East, through southeast Asia and the Middle East.

And this has to do with the measures we have taken to strengthen this hemisphere, through the Organization of American States, and our close relations with Canada.

The events we are concerned with tonight have to do with the efforts we and our allies have been making to develop strength and unity in this vital area of Western Europe.

This area has a direct and immediate relation to the security of the entire North Atlantic community and to the security of the entire world.

At the end of the war, Europe was not only weakened, but fragmented. To the East, there stood a strong, centrally controlled power, show-

¹ Made over radio and television at Washington on Feb. 29 and released to the press on the same date.

ing expansionist designs. The chilling knowledge that Europe stood defenseless against the danger of being overrun from the East had a depressing effect upon Europe's will and its confidence, upon its efforts to achieve economic recovery and political stability. It was in these circumstances that the task of building a strong and unified Europe, secure against aggression, was undertaken.

I won't go into all the steps by which we aided Europe in the economic field through the Marshall Plan and other aid programs; nor the means by which Communist encroachments against Iran and against Greece and Turkey were stopped. I know these are familiar to you.

Less than 3 years ago, as part of our task, we concluded the North Atlantic Treaty, by which we assured one another that an attack upon any of us would be considered an attack upon all.

1948, you will remember, had been the year of the Communist seizure of Czechoslovakia, and the beginning of the Berlin blockade. But it was also the year of the Vandenberg resolution, in which the Senate expressed the determination of this country to stand side by side with our friends against attack. It was in the spring of the following year—April 1949—that this determination was given expression in the North Atlantic Treaty.

The next step was to translate the words of the treaty into the solid substance of strength and unity.

Defense Plans Developed

First the military experts of the member nations developed joint strategic defense plans.

But paper divisions and long-range mobilization plans will not deter aggression, in an age when we cannot count upon a cushion of time to prepare to defend ourselves against attack. In building up their military forces, our European allies had to start almost from scratch, but they have tackled the job with determination. Since 1949, our allies in Europe have doubled their military budgets. Every one of them has lengthened its period of military conscription. Military production in Europe has been expanded almost four times beyond the 1949 level. More than half a million men have already been added to their military forces on active duty. Even more important has been the steady conversion of these troops into effective combat units, through improved organization, training and equipment.

A little more than a year ago, a unified NATO defense force was established under the command of General Eisenhower, to which the European NATO countries contributed a major part of their national forces. Since 1949 the number of organized combat divisions available to NATO has more than doubled.

All of these things were undertaken not merely for their military sake—important as that is—but because they are part of the still larger idea

of helping to bring about real unity to the European Community within the framework of the Atlantic community.

One of the great tasks has been to bring Germany back into the European family of nations. This is a matter of importance and deep self-interest both to the Germans and to the rest of Western Europe. If you look at a map of Europe, you can see at once that it makes a great deal of difference whether Europe is to be made defensible west of the Rhine, or near the Elbe, where the Iron Curtain now cuts through Germany. And it makes a great deal of difference not only to the Germans themselves, but also to the people of Scandinavia, the Low Countries, to England, France, and Italy.

But in dealing with this matter, we were grappling with problems that had roots in the ancient past, aggravated by events still fresh in memory. There was a natural and reasonable desire on all sides not to create conditions that would permit a recurrence of the terrible events of the past.

The statesmen of Europe understood fully that it was right and proper and necessary that Germans should be enabled to participate in the defense of an area in which their own country lies. But the problem that worried the people of Europe, including the Germans themselves, was: How to do this without raising again the danger of unbridled German militarism? And how to restore Germany to a position of dignity and equality in this effort so that it would willingly and enthusiastically participate?

Now these things I have been talking about were involved in the meetings with the British and French, and later the Germans, at London; and in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon. These issues, as you can see, are intricate and complex, but they were brought to a focus at these meetings in the five main points I cited a moment ago.

The first thing we wanted to do at Lisbon was to reach agreement on a realistic plan for increasing NATO's military forces. The Supreme Command must be assured of the largest number of effective combat forces that can be developed this year, and we wanted to lay the groundwork for further increases in 1953 and 1954.

Goals for Various Countries

In order to do this, it was necessary to determine the real economic capacity of each NATO country and to agree on specific goals for each country. It was also necessary to get agreement on the military and economic measures which the various countries must take in order to reach these goals.

All these things were done. A temporary council committee worked out realistic goals in consultation with each government. The estimates for 1952 were accepted as firm goals. The forces which will be made available in Europe by the end

of 1952 will constitute a real fighting force composed of a specified number of ground combat divisions, air formations, and naval forces. The figures for 1953 and 1954 were adopted as provisional goals, to be used for planning purposes. To achieve these goals will require great effort and balanced and economical use of resources. But the important thing we found out was that it was possible to accomplish. Agreement has been reached that it can be done and on what forces each of the partners are to provide in 1952.

The second thing we had to do was to agree on the construction of facilities required for the effective maintenance and operation of these forces. There must be airfields. There must be communications—port facilities—headquarters and other installations—many things which require construction and financing. This becomes complicated because these facilities need to be built and maintained in common in order to allow these unified forces to operate.

One thing I can't explain to you is how these facilities came to be called by the name of "infrastructure." But despite this heavy handicap, good progress was made on this issue too.

Agreement was reached as to how these costs—in the neighborhood of 400 million dollars—should be shared so that the work of getting these facilities built could go forward without interruption.

European Defense Community

The third point concerns the establishment of the European Defense Community. The achievement of this great unifying step, which accords with the efforts and policies of both the executive and legislative branches of our Government, is of vital importance to our country. We are deeply concerned that it should come into existence, and continue in existence, in unity and in growing strength. All of this adds to European security and to our own.

For more than a year, six states of Western Europe, including West Germany, have been working together to find a way of merging their military forces on the continent into a European Army. These forces would be under a common control, so that none of these countries would constitute a threat to any other, and so that the most effective use may be made of these forces in the common interest.

The European Defense Community will include not only ground, naval, and air forces but economic and political institutions. This bold and imaginative venture holds great promise for the future.

What the North Atlantic Council did was to give its blessing to the principles which France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the Federal Republic of Germany have worked out to establish the European Defense Community.

When this treaty is completed and ratified—which we hope will be accomplished without delay—German units will be developed as part of a European Army, which is to be part of the NATO Supreme Command.

The European Defense Community will be closely interlocked with NATO. Each will be important to the other. They will meet together, as needed. Security guarantees between the two organizations now agreed upon will be presented to legislative bodies. And in this way, West Germany will be closely associated with the whole defense arrangements for Western Europe.

Restoration of Germany

This, in turn, was closely related to the fourth main point dealt with in these meetings; that is, the restoration of Germany to a responsible and equal place among nations. What we would like to see is the peaceful unification of all Germany under conditions of freedom. This remains our aim, but the history of Soviet obstruction and Communist policy in postwar Europe does not encourage us to hope that this goal can be achieved in the immediate future. Therefore, what the three Occupying Powers—Britain, France, and ourselves—are now seeking to do is to put an end to the Occupation of Germany through a series of contractual agreements between these three Governments and the Federal Republic. These agreements would establish German sovereignty to the fullest extent possible in the present world situation. Coupled with the European Defense Community arrangements, they would provide the necessary safeguards against aggressive militarism.

We succeeded, at London and Lisbon, in reaching decisions which open the way to the conclusion of these agreements. This involved some extremely difficult and tangled problems, such as the amount of the German contribution to the common defense. In all these problems, our European colleagues demonstrated statesmanship of a high order. It was inspiring to see people face resolutely and courageously the problems of the future, not dwelling in the fears and resentments of the past.

It was a thrilling thing to feel the hope and excitement with which Europe responded to the progress made against these ancient national rivalries which have caused so much mischief for so long. The job is not completed, but 2 years of patient work have brought us close to the point where these measures for creating a European Defense Community and ending the Occupation of West Germany can be reduced to words and laid before national legislature for their action. They have brought us to the dawn of a new day in Europe.

Finally, the fifth point at these meetings concerned the reorganization and strengthening of NATO. At this meeting of the Council, we had the special pleasure of welcoming Greece and

Turkey to membership in the organization. Their joining with us is not only valuable for the common defense, but is of particular symbolic importance. Here are two countries who not long ago were hard beset by Communist pressure, and whose independence was supported by the doctrine which bears the name of our President. These countries not only withstood the Communist onslaught, but they have become strong and dependable allies.

Important steps were taken to strengthen the institutions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to enable it to carry out the difficult tasks it must face in passing from the planning to the action stage of its existence. It was agreed to establish a permanent headquarters in Europe near the European Defense Community and SHAPE, with a Secretary General, and a Council that would remain constantly in session and keep the defense programs of the members under continuous review. The responsibilities of the Supreme Command were increased.

Progress Toward a United Europe

The progress made on these five points, taken together, is a great stride toward the goal of a strong and united Europe.

These are not completed actions. Hard work remains to be done. Let us look at some of the problems which lie ahead of us in these fields.

These negotiations will now go on to another stage—one that is familiar to us—one in which these actions will be debated, discussed, and acted upon by the representatives of the people in each of these countries. This is as it should be. In our free societies, meetings of ministers cannot be decisive unless they are deeply rooted in the understanding and support of the people and the people's representatives.

These discussions will raise problems in many countries. The debate and votes yesterday in the French Chamber of Deputies illustrate the problems which will arise. The difficulty there was not over approval of the actions taken at Lisbon, but over the internal measures which should be adopted in carrying them out.

I am convinced that the problems which will arise can and will be solved. What brings hope and conviction—which in my own case refuses to be dimmed by any difficulties—is that these decisions which we have been discussing are of the most far reaching importance and benefit for each nation individually, for the whole group of nations together, and for the hope of all men for peace. Individual national interests and the common interests of all are both served by these decisions. I believe that this great and inspiring truth will be clearly evident to the people in all countries as they discuss these measures, and that it will inevitably gain their support.

Our friends in Europe have grave economic problems. These are, and must be, dealt with

courageously and cooperatively. In our own country, within a few days, the President is submitting to the Congress the Mutual Security Program for the coming year. This program is playing a vital part in the structure of strength which is being built in Europe. It deserves our utmost support.

The days of danger are still with us. The forces which will be available in Europe by the end of this year are not the total forces required to assure the maintenance of peace. This is true even when the productive power of the United States and our air power is added. But they will be an effective and united force, which will grow in the years that follow. We have agreed on a good and useful and possible year's work. It will reduce but not remove the dangers we face. This can only be done by hard work.

The strength and unity of free nations must be built, step by step, to achieve security against attack. We build this in the firm faith that free societies will prove stronger in the long run.

But this, in the final analysis, depends upon the support of the people, and upon none more than the people of the United States.

A vital ingredient of this whole structure is the steadiness and determination of the people of this country.

A week ago tonight, while we were meeting at Lisbon, there occurred the anniversary of the birth of George Washington. I thought of how great the difficulties must have seemed to Washington and the people of his time; how insuperable the obstacles; how many good reasons existed why this country, when weak and disunited, could never succeed.

But then, as now, success did not come from dwelling upon difficulties.

If instead we summon up the will and the resolute spirit that enabled Washington and a group of determined men to lay the foundations of this great country, we will succeed. And we must succeed.

In Europe, the home of democratic freedom and the other great ideals of Western civilization, what we are helping to build is not only a bastion of freedom but a new reality. The unity of Europe has been brought closer to realization than ever before in history.

The events of the past 2 weeks will be remembered for the giant strides that have been taken toward this goal, this vision which has the power to arouse the devotion and excite the enthusiasm of the people of an entire continent.

Many attempts have been made to unite the continent of Europe by force and have failed. But free men will accomplish by peaceful means what tyrants have never been able to do, and in so doing, they will demonstrate the creative energy and power of freedom which will continue to flourish long after tyrannies have been forgotten.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

[Released to the press February 26]

The ninth session of the North Atlantic Council was held in Lisbon from February 20 to February 25, 1952, under the chairmanship of the Honorable Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.

On February 18, the kingdom of Greece and the republic of Turkey acceded to the treaty, and representatives of their respective Governments attended throughout the session. In all, thirty-five Ministers of fourteen countries took part in the discussions of the council.

(2)

The Council made further progress in dealing with current and long-range problems of the Atlantic community. The decisions taken and the agreements reached by the Council are the practical result of projects initiated at earlier sessions and reflect the continuing work of the treaty agencies. They represent the united efforts of member Governments to safeguard the peace, stability and well-being of the North Atlantic community through the strengthening of their collective defense.

(3)

The Council took note of a report of the Paris conference on the European Defense Community and a report by the occupying powers on the proposed contractual arrangements with the German Federal Republic. The Council found that the principles underlying the treaty to establish the European Defense Community conformed to the interests of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. It also agreed on the principles which should govern the relationship between the proposed community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Council agreed to propose to its members and to the European Defense Community reciprocal security undertakings between the members of the two organizations. Such undertakings would require ratification in accordance with the constitutional processes of the states involved. All these decisions are inspired by the conviction that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Defense Community have a common objective, to strengthen the defense of the Atlantic area, and that the development of the European Defense Community should be carried forward in this spirit. Therefore, the Council considered that the obligations and relationships between the communities should be based on the concept of two closely related organizations, one working, so far as this objective is concerned, within the framework of, and reinforcing the other.

(4)

The Council took detailed and comprehensive action based on the recommendations of the Tem-

porary Council Committee. The decisions taken by the Council provided for the earliest building-up of balanced collective forces to meet the requirements of external security within the capabilities of member countries. Agreement was reached on the specific defensive strength to be built this year, and on a definite program of measures to be taken this year to increase defensive strength in following years. A number of important steps were agreed to be taken by the treaty organization and by member governments to accomplish this building-up with a more efficient use of resources. Policies designed to maintain and strengthen the economies and social stability of member countries were agreed and recommended to governments.

(5)

Agreement was reached on the financing of a further portion of the infrastructure program, for airfields, communications and headquarters.

(6)

The terms of reference of the Standing Group and of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Europe, were revised to reflect added responsibilities, notably for equipment priorities and planning for the logistical support of the military forces.

The Council agreed that the ground and air forces of Greece and Turkey assigned to NATO will operate under the over-all command of SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) through Commander in Chief, Southern Europe. The naval forces of Greece and Turkey will remain for the present under their national Chiefs of Staff, operating in close coordination with all other naval forces in the Mediterranean. The Standing Group was directed to continue its study of command of naval forces in the Mediterranean area and their coordination with land and air forces and to submit a definitive report to the Council at its next meeting.

(7)

The Council also took action to adapt the Treaty Organization to the needs arising from the development of its activities from the planning to the operational stage. The North Atlantic Council, while continuing to hold periodic ministerial meetings, will henceforth function in permanent session through the appointment of permanent representatives. The Council decided to appoint a Secretary General, who will head a unified international secretariat designed to assist the Council in the fulfillment of the increasing responsibilities. All civilian activities of the organization will be concentrated in the geographical area where are situated other international agencies whose work is closely related to that of the Treaty Organization and with which close administrative connec-

tion is essential to efficiency. These are presently situated in the vicinity of Paris. When these changes become effective, the Council will assume the functions hitherto performed by the Council Deputies, the Defense Production Board, and the Financial and Economic Board.

(8)

The Council adopted a report of the Atlantic Community Committee, established at its Ottawa meeting. This report emphasized the importance of economic cooperation, the expansion and liberalization of trade, and the possibility of working out closer cooperative arrangements with other bodies, particularly the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation). In approving the analysis of the problem of the movement of labor between member countries in the report of the Atlantic Community Committee, the Council acknowledged the importance of this problem and endorsed the resolution of the Temporary Council Committee on this subject. It was agreed that the permanent North Atlantic Treaty Organization should keep this problem under continuous review, and make recommendations for the elimination, by the most effective utilization of manpower resources, of general or specific manpower shortages which hinder defense production. As cooperation in the field covered by the five-power Atlantic Community Committee is of direct and common concern to each member of the Council, it was decided that the future work in this sphere should be transferred to the Council.

(9)

The Council issued a declaration reaffirming the aims of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the promotion of peace through defensive strength and enduring progress.

The Declaration of Aims

In the course of their discussions in Lisbon the members of the North Atlantic Council reviewed the aims of their association.

They wish once more to emphasize that this association was forged as a shield against aggression. Its first aim is peace, and the armed strength which is being built up by the united efforts of the member nations will be used only for the defense of their countries and the security of their peoples.

The plan for the build-up of defense forces for the North Atlantic Treaty area laid down by the Tcc has been adopted at the present session of the Council in the belief that defensive strength will prove the best deterrent to aggression.

The Council has learned with approval of the main provisions of the plan worked out between five of its members (France, Italy, Belgium, the

Netherlands, Luxembourg) and the (West) German Federal Republic for a European Defense Community.

The establishment of this community will help to promote the closer association of the Western European countries and to strengthen the defense of the North Atlantic area.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, respecting the principles on which the community is founded, will support and cooperate with its institutions.

The arrangements to govern the relationships between the two organizations which have been approved at Lisbon will insure that in pursuit of the common objective, the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, the E.D.C. will reinforce and work within the framework of NATO.

The partnership between the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty is not for defense alone but of enduring progress. The members of the Council look forward to the time when the main energies of their association can be less concentrated on defense and more fully devoted to cooperation in other fields, for the well-being of their peoples and for the advancement of human progress.

Then, as now, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will have to play its part, and to this end it has been agreed in Lisbon to strengthen its structure so that it may become a still more effective association of like-minded nations determined to maintain in peace the unity of purpose and effort achieved in the face of present dangers, and to express itself by continuous collaboration on common problems.

The understanding and sense of fellowship which the members wish to see develop between their countries cannot be achieved by governmental action alone. All citizens can play their part in the work of uniting the peoples in one Atlantic community which will afford, in ever increasing measure, the benefits of peace, freedom and prosperity.

TEMPORARY COUNCIL COMMITTEE REPORT ADOPTED

[Released to the press February 25]

Following is the text of the press release on the Report of the Temporary Council Committee issued at Lisbon on February 24:

1. The North Atlantic Council yesterday adopted the plan of action of its Temporary Council Committee. The approval of the Council resolution on the Temporary Council Committee report brought to a successful conclusion the work of the Temporary Council Committee, established by the Council at its meeting at Ottawa on September 19, 1951.

2. By its resolution on the Tcc report, the North Atlantic Council agreed on specific policies and plans for building NATO defensive strength during the present year. NATO nations agreed to provide

approximately 50 divisions in appropriate conditions of combat readiness and 4,000 operational aircraft in Western Europe as well as strong naval forces. It further provided a definite program for taking measures this year necessary to increase the defensive power of NATO in following years. This defensive force does not include the contributions of Greece and Turkey.

There was general agreement that this increase in defensive power will constitute an important increased deterrent against aggression. While not covered specifically by the Council action at Lisbon, it was recognized that Allied strategic air power is already a powerful deterrent to aggression and in the event of attack would be a most valuable addition to the defense of Western Europe.

3. The primary task of the Tcc was to develop a plan of action reconciling the issues arising from the requirements of a militarily acceptable defense plan and the politico-economic capabilities of the member countries. Through the work of a screening and costing staff under the direction of General McNarney, it considered ways and means of building balanced effective defensive forces at minimum cost. At the same time it made a careful appraisal of the politico-economic capabilities of each NATO country and of the economic problems which will have to be dealt with in order to develop those capabilities.

4. The Council resolution, derived from the Tcc report, lays the emphasis on defense which is prompt, effective and practicable. This requires (a) action for the earliest build-up of balanced collective forces, (b) policies designed to maintain and strengthen the economic and social structure of each country and (c) appropriate organizational arrangements.

(1) The threat which the member countries of NATO now face clearly requires that they promptly build up their effective forces. The various elements of this build-up should be kept in balance so as to make possible at all times the maximum combat-ready forces as an effective deterrent against aggression.

(A) The Council resolution stated measures essential to the achievement of the planned build-up of NATO defensive strength in this and following years. These measures emphasized:

(1) Economy in the use of resources for defense,

(2) The elimination of less essential defense activities,

(3) Adoption of detailed measures developed by Tcc for improving the combat efficiency of national forces,

(4) A further development of NATO-wide equipment supply planning,

(5) Initiation of a system of NATO priority recommendations to assist in the allocation of equipment by nations,

(6) An increased efficiency through improved organizational arrangements.

On these and other points, specific recommendations have been agreed to by NATO governments, and instructions for action given with provisions for NATO follow-up.

(B) The directives defining the duties and responsibilities of General Eisenhower and of the military committee's standing group have been revised to reflect added responsibilities.

(C) The Tcc plan of action included the assumption that Germany will in subsequent years contribute forces through the European Defense Community to the defense of Europe.

(2) Adequate defensive strength can be created and maintained only if the economic and social foundation in each country remains sound and healthy. The Council made a number of recommendations for strengthening the economies of the participating countries, involving national and cooperative action. The Council recommended that all NATO governments should take all practicable measures

(A) To encourage general economic expansion;

(B) To increase production of scarce raw materials and to control their use as necessary to conserve supplies and insure defense requirements are met;

(C) To prevent inflation by adoption of necessary sound fiscal, financial, and monetary policies;

(D) To facilitate labor mobility among NATO countries and to alleviate manpower shortages in defense industries;

(E) To adopt measures to improve the equitable distribution of the internal burden of defense in the NATO countries;

(F) To maintain essential imports through a satisfactory solution of balance of payments problems, in particular by increasing the dollar earnings of European countries.

(3) NATO activities are shifting in emphasis from the planning to the operational stage. The machinery and methods of operation of NATO must be adjusted to this new situation. In particular, the Tcc recommended methods to develop and keep up to date a NATO-wide defense program which is balanced, feasible and economical. On this basis, there is a need for continual planning and follow-up by NATO agencies, based on annual reviews of the Tcc type, by the permanent NATO, to provide a firm program for the immediately ensuing year and provisional guidance for longer-term actions.

The Council recognized the existence of a number of military, economic and political problems which the member countries face in implementing fully its recommended program for 1952. The Council agreed that urgent and sustained action on these problems is of vital importance to the achievement of NATO security objectives, and urged that

the governments and the NATO agencies undertake without delay the specific actions required.

The Council resolution recognizes that the risk of aggression will continue. It also recognizes that there is a great urgency for increased defensive power in the North Atlantic Treaty area on a truly operational basis, and that governments individually and collectively should devote their best efforts to this end.

5. The Council invited the Governments of Greece and Turkey to consider with appropriate NATO bodies the applicability of the findings and recommendations of the TCC to Greece and Turkey. It opened the way for the participation of Greece and Turkey on a full and equal basis in the annual review to be undertaken beginning next summer.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON¹

The North Atlantic Council meets today at an important stage of its life. We have already laid the foundations for success and are approaching the difficult and intricate task of building upon these foundations an enduring structure of strength and freedom. Confronted by situations which have their roots deep in history, our governments have met these problems squarely. They have taken courageous decisions. The job we now face is the hard, unspectacular one of translating these decisions into action.

We have all come a long way since we first met in 1949. We have studied our weaknesses and learned what we must do in order to be strong. We have constructed in NATO the machinery through which we can work together effectively. We have developed strategic plans which will permit our countries to take coordinated action in the event of an attack.

We have combined to create a force through which we can make the most effective use of our collective defensive strength. Each of our countries has increased its financial, productive, and human efforts and has taken steps which will lead to further increases in the immediate future.

Significant progress has been made toward the integration of Europe for its greater safety and more assured development. The Schuman Plan has merged the iron and steel resources of Western Europe. The creation of the European Defense Community has been brought to a point where the approval of this Council for its form and authority can be obtained. There are many details still to be worked out, and there are still doubts in the public mind which must be set to rest. But we are now agreed on the broad principles, and I think that all the nations concerned can move forward confidently to make it a reality.

Today we welcome Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Council. This marks a significant

milestone in the efforts of the free world to insure international peace and security. These countries have long been making an effective contribution to the attainment of that end by their steadfast opposition to all aggressive oppressions, by their active role in the United Nations, and by their effective contribution to the collective action in Korea. Their entry into NATO constitutes recognition by Greece and Turkey and by the other NATO countries that the principles and purposes of collective security to which we are all dedicated will be furthered by this new association.

All these events testify to the creative capacity of democracy to master new problems with new solutions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was itself a creation of democracy. Along with the British Commonwealth and the United Nations, it must rank as one of the great democratic institutions invented in half a century. Being confronted and endangered by one of the oldest types of political institutions, a rigid military autocracy ruled by police power, it bespeaks the will of the democracies to safeguard their freedom. It bespeaks their political maturity in being able to keep that freedom unimpaired while putting forth the effort to build up their collective strength.

While we have reason to take pride in what our countries have accomplished, I know we are all sobered by the realization that the hardest part of the journey still lies ahead. What we have done will be of little value unless we finish the job. We must make decisions that will not be easy to make, and we must take actions that will strain all of us to the utmost.

These actions cannot be taken by this Council alone. It is a task for governments and for peoples. We must develop the concrete military strength which alone can insure our peoples against the destruction and suffering of another world war.

At a time when we are beginning to make real progress in building our defensive strength—at a time when armies on paper are being translated into armies in the field—and at a time when we know that so much remains to be done—I am confident you will not find it inconsistent for me to pause briefly to consider what is to be done with this strength once it is attained. Even more important, perhaps, is what we will *not* do with this strength.

The people of my country and the peoples of the other countries of the Atlantic community do not cherish military strength for its own sake. They know that they need military strength to be secure against aggression. They know that a vacuum of weakness, as seen in Korea, constitutes a fatal temptation to autocracies determined to expand. They know that unless this vacuum is replaced by strength, we will eventually be undermined and overwhelmed. For this reason, we seek

¹ Made at the opening meeting of the ninth NAC session at Lisbon on Feb. 20.

to build forces adequate to deter aggression or to meet it. We do not seek to create greater strength than we need for this purpose; we do not desire military forces great enough to launch a preventive war. We desire peace, and the aim of all of the efforts which we have undertaken—of all the sacrifices which we have made and are about to make—is solely to insure that we will be able to live in peace.

While the immediate task of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is to build military strength as rapidly as possible, the importance of NATO in the long run goes far beyond the creation of military strength. There must be economic and social and moral strength. Future hope lies in the development of a community of free peoples, strong in their minds and hearts as in their resources—strong enough to meet any challenge that may be offered by those who still hold the ancient doc-

trine that might makes right and who regard the fundamental human aspirations and sympathies of our peoples as weaknesses to be despised.

By working together as we have worked in the past, we can prove once again that these human qualities are our greatest resource. They will permit the inventive faculties of democracy to build institutions which can master the problems of power raised by modern science.

Once we have become sufficiently strong, we shall still be on trial. Our wisdom and creativeness will be challenged. We shall need to be resolute of spirit, restrained in temper, and audacious in concept, but when I look back over the last years I take heart for the years ahead. The problems they will bring will be no more formidable or complex than those we have already faced and surmounted. We will succeed because we *must* succeed.

Treaty and Law Under the Constitution

by *Denys P. Myers*

According to article VI, paragraph 2 of the United States Constitution as published in a "correct copy" by the First Congress:

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.

By that stipulation, the Government of the United States deals as a single entity with other governments and there is made possible uniform performance of its international undertakings in the States which by the tenth amendment of the Constitution retain "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States."

The present study is an examination of the circumstances in which this paragraph of article VI originated, embodying both the historical situation that brought the problem to attention and the evolution of the provisions in the Federal Convention.

A Feature of a Federal Government

A provision that treaties shall be the law of the land is understandable in a federal system of

government. The majority of national governments are unitary; that is, the local authorities are subject to the national regime and lack autonomy except for specified local matters, with the central government enacting laws applicable to the whole people and in many cases those applicable only to specific provinces or other divisions. Enforcement machinery is centralized. Responsibility for harmonizing activities of the national government and subordinate divisions is concentrated in the former. The situation is different in a state organized under a federal government, for its subordinate divisions possess a large measure of autonomy in passing laws of local application and have administrative authority to a considerable extent, usually under their own constitutions. Adjustment of national and provincial authority requires continuing examination of the line of distinction between them.

The foreign relations of a state are essentially unitary, for a nation must deal with foreign states with a single voice and a single authority. Recognition of this fact is expressed in the constitutions of federal states. The constitutions of the Argentine, Brazil, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Mexican States, the United States of Indonesia, the Swiss Confederation, the United States of Venezuela, and the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia in one way or

another give the national government exclusive or paramount authority over foreign relations and treaties.

These constitutions accomplish the purpose in various ways. The Argentine and Mexican constitutions follow the United States pattern and make treaties the law of the land. Venezuela provides that treaties shall be approved by the Congress as law. The French Union gives treaties regularly ratified and published "the force of law even when they may be contradictory to internal French laws." Brazil and Indonesia lodge all matters relating to foreign relations in the central government and condition ratification of a treaty upon approval by legislation. The Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia distinguish between treaties applying to the country as a whole and arrangements which units may make with adjacent countries on matters of local interest.¹ In addition, many recent constitutions, both federal and unitary, incorporate the rules of international law as part of their municipal law, with the effect that the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* is accepted as an obligation.

Resolution of the Constitutional Congress

The provision of article VI, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of the United States was evolved by the Federal Convention (May 25–September 17, 1787) while the Continental Congress, which had charged it with reporting adequate amendments to the Articles of Confederation, was seriously engaged in obtaining compliance of the States with obligations assumed by the United States in the treaty of peace which established their independence.

Article 4 of the treaty of peace of September 3, 1783, with Great Britain provided that creditors "shall meet with no lawful impediment" to recovery of the full value of debts, and article 6 stipulated that there should be no future confiscations or prosecutions for the part taken by any person in the war. The ratifications of the treaty were exchanged May 12, 1784, though it was proclaimed in the United States January 14. Notwithstanding these provisions, prosecution of persons who had not supported the Revolution was frequent and excited; thousands of the British sympathizers escaped persecution by emigrating to Canada, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York,² Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia

¹ The Constitution of the Soviet Union reserves treaties to the central government and allows the Union republics to make "agreements." A treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the Polish Republic signed at Moscow Feb. 15, 1951, provided for an exchange of about 250 square miles of territory east of Lublin. The Soviet territory exchanged was in the Ukrainian Republic, which was not a party to the treaty.

² The nullification of the Trespass Act in New York resulted from *Rutgers v. Waddington* (1784), a case won by Alexander Hamilton.

passed laws obstructing the collection of British debts. On their side, the British in retaliation continued to occupy the fortresses along the western frontier of the Northwest Territory, to the detriment of American traders³ and notwithstanding the provision of article 7 for withdrawal of all "armies, garrisons, and fleets from the United States." Further, many Negro slaves had escaped to the West Indies along with the evacuation of British troops, and had been set free by the British governor, which also was an infraction of article 7.

The American minister to London, John Adams, had presented a memorial on these matters dated November 30, 1785, to the British Secretary of State on December 8, 1785, and had received a reply dated February 28, 1786, which Adams had reported to the Congress. His letter of March 4, 1786, had been referred to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, John Jay, who reported back to the Congress on October 13, 1786.⁴ When this report was considered by the Congress on March 21, 1787, it unanimously agreed to the following resolutions:⁵

Resolved, That the Legislatures of the several States cannot of right pass any Act or Acts for interpreting, explaining or construing a national treaty or any part or clause of it, nor for restraining, limiting or in any manner impeding, retarding or counteracting the operation and execution of the same; for that on being constitutionally made, ratified and published they become in virtue of the Confederation part of the Law of the Land, and are not only independent of the will and power of such Legislatures, but also binding and obligatory on them.

Resolved, That all such Acts or parts of Acts as may be now existing in any of the States repugnant to the treaty of peace ought to be forthwith repealed, as well to prevent their continuing to be regarded as violations of that treaty as to avoid the disagreeable necessity there might otherwise be of raising and discussing questions touching their validity and obligation.

Resolved, That it be recommended to the several States to make such repeal rather by describing than reciting the said Acts, and for that purpose to pass an Act, declaring in general terms, that all such Acts and parts of Acts repugnant to the treaty of peace between the United States,

³ In the spring of 1787 there were offered on the London market 360,000 skins which would have been American-owned if the occupation had not continued.

⁴ The report (*Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789*, xxxi, pp. 781–874) contains all the documents, which are separately printed in *The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States of America from . . . 10th September, 1783 . . . to March 4, 1789*, II, pp. 542, 581–648. The memorial of November 30, 1785, complained of continued British occupation of the posts of Oswegatchie, Oswego, Niagara, Presque Isle, Sandusky, Detroit, Michilimackinac, and others. Lord Carmathen's reply of Feb. 28, 1786, charged American violation of articles 4 and 7 of the treaty of peace and transmitted notes of complaints against Massachusetts Bay, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, with a memorial from British citizens concerning unpaid debts. The report of the Secretary of State of October 13, 1786, fully examined the State laws, reasoned the facts, and embodied the resolutions and letter recommended to Congress.

⁵ *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789*, xxxii, pp. 124, 181–182.

and his Britanic Majesty, or any Article thereof, shall be and thereby are repealed; and that the Courts of Law and Equity in all causes and questions cognizable by them respectively, and arising from or touching the said Treaty, shall decide and adjudge according to the true intent and meaning of the same, any thing in the said Act or parts of Acts to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding.⁶

Action on the Resolutions

The report of the Secretary of State of October 13, 1786, was supplemented on April 6, 1787, by a draft circular letter to the Governors of the States, which quoted those resolutions in a reasoned framework of exposition and included a draft law for their consideration, with the comment that the more the laws "were of the like tenor throughout the States, the better." The Congress on April 13, 1787, unanimously agreed to the letter, which was sent to the States under the signature of Arthur St. Clair, president of the Congress.⁷ The letter cited article 9 of the Articles of Confederation for asserting that with respect to treaties the States "cannot severally participate (except by their delegates) nor with it [the Confederation] have concurrent jurisdiction."

By direction of Congress the Secretary of State next reported on April 23, 1787, draft instructions to the Minister at London, which were to include communications of the resolutions of March 21 and the circular letter to the States of April 13, 1787, with a proposed statement "that Congress are taking effectual measures for removing all Cause of Complaint on their part". The Minister to London was to be instructed⁸ to inform his Britanic Majesty "that Congress do candidly admit, that the 4th and 6th Articles of the Treaty of Peace have been violated in America, and that they consider the 7th Article as having been violated on the part of Great Britain". Congress did not consider this proposal until July 18, 1787, when it appointed a committee to report on it.⁹ The committee's draft, which was approved July 20, 1787,¹⁰ modified the above candid language to read "that Congress have taken measures for removing

all Cause of complaint relative to the infraction of the 4th and 6th Articles of the treaty of peace." The charge of violation of article 7 was dropped but a paragraph proposing a convention determining the value of property "carried away contrary to the 7th Article" retained.

These instructions were transmitted, with certified copies of the other papers, on July 31, 1787, to the Minister at London, who on September 22 acknowledged their receipt.¹¹ In his letter of transmittal the Secretary of State was able to send word "that several of the States have removed all obstacles to the full and fair operation of the treaty," and he appended textual information concerning compliance by New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Maryland, and of action taken by Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.

Secretary Jay on October 16, 1787, sent to Adams the resolutions of Congress permitting him to relinquish his post as minister plenipotentiary on the expiration of his commission on February 24, 1788, and enclosed the printed Journals of Congress to September 25 and copies of newspapers.¹² This sending undoubtedly included the Constitution, which was reported to Congress on September 20. When Adams saw the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on February 14, 1788, the Marquis of Carmarthen presumed that "the States will all immediately adopt the new Constitution. I have," he added, "read it with pleasure. It is very well drawn up."

At the time, the Americans were irked at the failure of Great Britain to send a minister to their country, and in the light of that feeling Adams termed this remark an "oracular utterance," signifying "that there is not as yet any national Government, but that as soon as there shall be one, the British Court will vouchsafe to treat with it." This attitude Adams regarded as an argument in favor of the new Constitution.¹³

Concurrent Origin of Constitutional Provision

While much of this was going on, the Federal Convention was in session. Called by resolution of Congress dated February 21, 1787, to "render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Union," it convened May 25 and as early as May 29 had before it a proposal recognizing treaties as the law of the land. Bearing upon the same matter, the Congress on July 13, 1787, adopted the Ordinance for the Government of the United States, North-West of the Ohio River, providing for a national regime in the region where Great Britain still occupied fortresses regardless of

⁶ *Diplomatic Correspondence*, cited, II, p. 756, 804.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 796. The Constitution of the United States was printed in London at that period.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 826.

⁶ Adams reported on May 14, 1787, that when he showed the resolutions of Congress to the British Secretary of State, the Marquis of Carmarthen on May 10 said they "did the highest honor to Congress" and hoped they might be communicated formally (*Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States of America from . . . 10th September 1783 . . . to . . . March 4, 1789*, II, pp. 747, 751; the text of the resolutions on p. 648).

⁷ *Journals of the Continental Congress*, xxxii, pp. 177-184; *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States of America from . . . 10th September, 1783 . . . to . . . March 4, 1789*, II, p. 649.

⁸ *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1787*, xxxii, p. 229; *Diplomatic Correspondence*, cited, II, p. 655.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 369 note. The Committee included John Kean (S. C.), Richard Henry Lee (Va.), and Nathan Dane (Mass.).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 378; *Diplomatic Correspondence*, cited, II, p. 758.

article 7 of the treaty of peace. The language of all drafts clearly reflected the resolutions of Congress of March 21, 1787.

Such was the situation and the problem to which article VI, paragraph 2, of the Constitution gave a solution while the States themselves were under pressure to apply the principle with reference to the treaty of peace that recognized their independence as a Union.

Edmund Randolph (Va.) submitted to the Convention on May 29, 1787, a series of 15 resolutions (known as the Virginia Plan) in which resolution 6 empowered Congress¹⁴

to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation;

to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of the Union.

These three propositions were agreed to in the Committee of the Whole on a first reading on May 31. To the third was added, on motion of Benjamin Franklin, the clause "or any Treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union,"¹⁵ the whole proposition being agreed to without debate or dissent. On June 8 a motion by Charles Pinckney (S.C.) seconded by James Madison (Va.) to strike out the whole clause and to substitute for it: "to negative all laws which to them shall appear improper" was defeated, 3 ayes, 7 noes, 1 divided.¹⁶

This motion was an effort to invest Congress "with an indefinite power to negative legislative acts of the States," as Mr. Madison said in seconding it.

In making the motion, Mr. Pinckney

urged that such a universality of the power was indispensably necessary to render it effectual; that the States must be kept in due subordination to the nation; that if the States were left to act of themselves in any case it wd. be impossible to defend the national prerogatives, however extensive they might be on paper; that the acts of Congress had been defeated by this means; nor had foreign treaties escaped repeated violations; that this universal negative was in fact the corner stone of an efficient national Govt.¹⁷

The debate by delegates of North Carolina, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and South Carolina dealt with the extent of the power proposed, its necessity being assumed.

The Randolph (Virginia Plan) resolutions as agreed on first reading were reported from the

¹⁴ Max Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, I, p. 21. The Virginia Plan reputedly represented the ideas of the large States, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, while the New Jersey Plan was considered to represent the views of the small States.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 47, 54, 61.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 162. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia voted to strike out the clause; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia voted to retain it; and Delaware was divided.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 164, from Madison's notes.

Committee of the Whole to the Convention on June 13, 1787, but on June 15 William Patterson submitted a series of resolutions (New Jersey Plan) and both sets were recommitted to the Committee of the Whole. Among the New Jersey resolutions was this one:

Res'd that all Acts of the U. States in Congs. made by virtue & in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the articles of confederation vested in them, and all Treaties made & ratified under the authority of the U. States shall be the supreme law of the respective States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States or their Citizens, and that the Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding. . . .¹⁸

On June 19 the Committee of the Whole voted, 7 ayes, 3 noes, 1 divided, to disagree with the New Jersey propositions and to report the Randolph (Virginia Plan) resolutions.

In the debate before this decision James Madison stated that the New Jersey Plan could not "render the acts of Congs. in pursuance of their powers even legally *paramount* to the Acts of the States" because its ratification would be effected by the legislatures rather than by the people at large. It was evidently on this premise that he had referred to treaty violation earlier in his speech:¹⁹

1. Will it prevent those violations of the law of nations & of Treaties which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars? The tendency of the States to these violations has been manifested in sundry instances. The files of Congs. contain complaints already, from almost every nation with which treaties have been formed. Hitherto indulgence has been shewn to us. This cannot be the permanent disposition of foreign nations. A rupture with other powers is among the greatest of national calamities. It ought therefore to be effectually provided that no part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring them on the whole. The existing confederacy does [not] sufficiently provide against this evil. The proposed amendment to it does not supply the omission. It leaves the will of the States as uncontrolled as ever.

The three clauses of Randolph's sixth resolution agreed to on first reading May 31 came before the Committee of the Whole in revised form on July 17.²⁰

On motion of Roger Sherman (Conn.) seconded by James Wilson (Pa.), the following revised clause was rejected, 2 ayes, 8 noes:

To make laws binding on the People of the United States in all cases which may concern the common interests of the Union; but not to interfere with the government of the individual States in any matters of internal police which respect the government of such States only, and wherein the general welfare of the United States is not concerned.

Gunning Bedford, jr. (Del.), seconded by Gouverneur Morris (Pa.), moved the amendment of the

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 245, from Madison's notes.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, II, p. 21; details added from Madison's notes, p. 25 ff.

next clause, which was done, 6 ayes, 4 noes, and the amended clause was agreed to, 8 ayes, 2 noes, in the following form:

and moreover to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.

The next clause, which provoked some debate, read:

to negative all laws passed by the several States contravening in the opinion of the national legislature, the articles of union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union.

Gouverneur Morris (Pa.) opposed this proposal as not necessary, if the Government had sufficient legislative authority. Roger Sherman (Conn.) thought it was unnecessary on the ground that the courts of the States would find invalid any law contravening the authority of the Union. Luther Martin (Md.) considered the power improper; he inquired whether all state laws would be permitted to operate only after submission to the Congress. James Madison (Va.) said the negative on the laws of the States was essential to the efficacy and security of the general government, and elaborated on that point. Morris and Sherman were opposed to the negative, and Charles Pinckney (S. C.) closed the debate by urging the necessity of the negative. The clause was rejected by a vote of 3 ayes to 7 noes.

Luther Martin (Md.) then moved the following which was agreed to unanimously and without debate:

Resolved that the legislative acts of the United States made by virtue and in pursuance of the articles of Union and all Treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the respective States as far as those acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citizens and Inhabitants—and that the Judiciaries of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding.

On July 23, 1787, the Committee of the Whole voted unanimously to refer their work to a committee "for the purpose of reporting a Constitution conformably to the Proceedings aforesaid." On July 24 this Committee of Detail was appointed: John Rutledge (S. C.), Edmund Randolph (Va.), Nathaniel Gorham (Mass.), Oliver Ellsworth (Conn.), and James Wilson (Pa.).

The plan of Charles Pinckney (S. C.), which was mentioned on May 29, was referred to the Committee of Detail on July 24; it contained the following paragraph:²¹

All acts made by the Legislature of the United States pursuant to this Constitution & all Treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the Supreme Law of the Land & all Judges shall be bound to consider them as such in their decisions.

²¹ *Ibid.*, III, p. 599.

Printed copies of the report of the Committee of Detail were laid before the Convention on August 6, 1787. It is a recognizable prototype of the final Constitution.²² It did not carry over the resolution of July 17 relating to conflicting State and national legislation, but in listing the powers of the "Legislature of the United States" and in specifying limitations on the powers of the States, it realized that intent.²³ The other resolution of July 17 was revised to omit the phrase "as far as those acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States," with other language slightly altered:²⁴

The Acts of the Legislature of the United States made in pursuance of this Constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the several States, and of their citizens and inhabitants; and the judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions; anything in the Constitutions or laws of the several States to the contrary notwithstanding.

On the motion of Mr. Rutledge, the first clause of this text was amended without discussion on August 23 to read: "This Constitution & the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof." "All treaties made" was expanded on August 25 to "all treaties made or which shall be made" on motion of James Madison, seconded by Gouverneur Morris, in order "to obviate all doubt concerning the force of treaties preexisting."

The Convention appointed the Committee of Style and Arrangement on September 8 and on September 12 it reported in print the text which it had put together, the finished form of which "fairly belongs to the pen of Mr. Morris."²⁵

The clause under consideration was not discussed in the further proceedings of the Convention. In this final form as article VI, paragraph 2, of the Constitution it reads:²⁶

This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state, shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.

The drafting changes in the final form consisted of punctuation and simplification. "Supreme law of the several States" became "supreme law of the land," which reasonably justified omission of

²² *Ibid.*, II, p. 177.

²³ See the Constitution article I, sec. 8, par. 18, and sec. 10; also article IV, sec. 1. However, Charles Pinckney on August 23 introduced the principle in a different form but withdrew it after a motion to commit it failed (Farrand, *op. cit.*, II, p. 382).

²⁴ Farrand, *op. cit.*, II, p. 183.

²⁵ James Madison to Jared Sparks, Apr. 8, 1831, *ibid.*, III, 499; Gouverneur Morris wrote to Timothy Pickering, Dec. 22, 1814, that "that instrument was written by the fingers which write this letter," *ibid.*, III, p. 420.

²⁶ The style of this text follows the copy of Sept. 28, 1787, as submitted by Congress to the States for ratification and as printed in a "correct copy" by the First Congress.

“and of their citizens and inhabitants” as an unnecessary or tautologous specification. Judges are bound “in their decisions” (an omitted phrase) by which they express themselves. “Several States” becomes “every state” in one place and “any state” in another. No member in the Convention perceived any alteration of meaning in these changes.²⁷

The distinction between laws made pursuant to the Constitution and treaties made “under the authority of the United States” seems to have originated in Charles Pinckney’s draft. It was intended to include under the Constitution treaties which existed already, such as the treaty of peace then in controversy with Great Britain, and which had entered into force under the Articles of Con-

federation. Alexander Hamilton (N.Y.) on June 18, 1787, read a sketch of ideas which he later wrote out for James Madison. The Hamilton plan contained this sentence: “The laws of the United States, and the treaties which have been made under the articles of the confederation, and which shall be made under this Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Land, and shall be so construed by the Courts of the several States.”²⁸ The scope of the phrase treaties made “under the authority of the United States” was unquestionably understood in that sense by the State conventions which ratified the Constitution.

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The Stature of Germany in European Affairs

On December 31, 1951, John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, submitted his 9th Quarterly Report on Germany for the period October 1–December 31, 1951, to Secretary Acheson and W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security. Included in the report are sections on Germany Unity, German Nationalism, Berlin’s Economy, Economic Situation in the Soviet Zone, Employment and Unemployment, and Foreign Trade.

Following is the text of Mr. McCloy’s letter of transmittal:

I have the honor of submitting my Ninth Quarterly Report covering the period from October 1 to December 31, 1951.

The period was characterized by the rapid growth of the Federal Republic’s stature in European affairs. It was marked by the November conference of the Western Foreign Ministers with the Federal Chancellor in Paris; by a heightening of the prospects for ratification of the Schuman Plan; by West Germany’s determined stand for European integration in the Council of Europe at

Strasbourg, and for a truly integrated European defense in the Paris discussions; and by the United Nations’ adoption of a West German proposal for an impartial UN investigation to determine whether the conditions for holding free and secret all-German elections exist in the four zones and in Berlin. The Federal Republic’s exports continued to rise, the production index resumed its upward movement and coal output showed a promising increase. Mounting unemployment was attributed to seasonal factors. Thus, on the verge of the New Year the Federal Republic presented a generally encouraging picture.

A milestone in the progress of the Federal Republic was reached when on November 22 Federal Chancellor Adenauer joined the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., U.K. and France in Paris to put the finishing touches on the draft of the “General Agreement” on contractual arrangements designed to replace the Occupation Statute. The understanding reached by the four Ministers paved the way for the conclusion of five conventions embodying in detail the terms of the new relationship. These were in various stages of negotiation at the close of the period under review. They embody arrangements and principles affecting the changeover to the new relationship and, if somewhat complex and difficult of negotiation, it must be recalled that unlike a general treaty they cover the manifold details involved in the final liquidation of a complete governmental system as well as the arrangements relating to the

²⁷ Luther Martin (Md.), who proposed the text of the clause on July 17, 1787, but who was not present after September 4 and did not sign the Constitution, did not mention this clause in his slashing speech in opposition to its acceptance in the Maryland Legislature on November 29, 1787 (Farrand, *op cit.*, III, pp. 151–59, 172–232). In a letter of March 19, 1788, however, he regarded the final text of the clause as “worse than useless” since it was “an express compact and stipulation with the general government that it may at its discretion, make laws in direct violation of” “every right and privilege secured to them by our [Maryland] constitution” (*ibid.*, III, p. 287).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, III, p. 628; art. VII, par. 6 of the plan.

continued presence in Germany of large bodies of Allied troops and their dependents. In spite of the problems presented it appeared that the conventions would be concluded in the near future. Upon ratification of the whole treaty structure by the Parliament, the Federal Republic will attain virtual sovereignty, except in the few fields where the present international situation necessitates the retention of certain specified but limited powers by the Western Allies.

When the French National Assembly ratified the Schuman Plan Treaty on Dec. 13, 1951, Europe moved significantly closer to integration. The Foreign Affairs and Economic Policy committees of the German Federal Lower House subsequently recommended approval of the Plan, thus virtually ensuring the realization of this epochal venture. Final debate on the Plan was scheduled for Jan. 9, 1952, when the government bill was to have its third reading in the Federal Lower House. After the establishment of the Schuman Plan High Authority, the functions of the International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR) and of the agencies of the Allied High Commission deriving from the Ruhr Agreement will be progressively eliminated as the High Authority assumes corresponding or related functions under the Schuman Plan Treaty. Thereafter, apart from the completion of the de-concentration programs in Germany (which is a basic prerequisite to the creation of a single market for the European coal and steel community), the German coal and steel industries, together with those of the partner nations, will be subject only to the directions of the Schuman Plan High Authority.

During the closing session of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers the voice of the Federal Republic was raised strongly in support of genuine European integration. The Federal Chancellor, in his dual capacity as Foreign Minister, addressed the Consultative Assembly on December 10. He stressed not only the necessity for decisive action to lay the foundation for a unified Europe, but also the need for speed in building a strong military and economic community capable of resisting successfully the menace of communism. When the Foreign Ministers of the six nations participating in the negotiations on the European Defense Force (EDF) subsequently met in Paris, Germany again took a positive stand in favor of a unified budget as well as other measures which would signify the creation of a true European force. How the budget of the EDF was to be managed was not resolved during December 1951. Nor was the problem of the supervisory organization fully solved. While France, Italy and Western Germany advocated a common defense budget and a federal organization, the Benelux Countries, motivated largely by constitutional difficulties, favored national budgets and a less centralized arrangement. It was hoped, however, that satisfactory solutions would be found early in 1952.

In the United Nations, West German representatives were heard for the first time when a delegation from the Federal Republic and West Berlin pleaded for the necessity of investigating conditions for all-German elections in the four zones and Berlin. This demand had been formulated in September by the Federal Government as one of the prerequisites to free and secret elections which were themselves prerequisites to Germany's reunification. After first declining to appear before the United Nations, the German Communist rulers of the Soviet Zone acting apparently under the pressure of world opinion reversed their position and sent a delegation to the General Assembly. Their refusal to acquiesce in such an impartial investigation by the UN was not unexpected. The impressive UN vote approving the Western proposal to establish an impartial investigating commission demonstrated the moral support which the world gives to the principle of German unity based on elections which are truly free.

That the German Soviet Zone rulers were more than reluctant to bare the political conditions of their police state to the inquisitive eye of an impartial observer was understandable; less so were the "reasons" advanced for the rejection of the proposed commission. The East Germans claimed that they, together with the West Germans, were quite able to reach an understanding under quadripartite supervision by the U.S., U.K., France and U.S.S.R., apparently within the framework of the Allied Control Authority. This position ignored the fact that the four powers have for six years unsuccessfully tried to adjust their views with regard to German unification. Moreover, the Communist proposal would mean the reintroduction of the Soviet veto.

An investigation under the auspices of an international body of which all four powers were charter members and which had proved its effectiveness in dealing with difficult situations in the past would give the Communists, if sincere, an opportunity to participate in a positive step toward unification based upon world support.

Communist attempts to use the unity question as a device, if not to prevent, then at least to retard the Federal Republic's integration with the West, have not succeeded. But the last attempt in this regard has probably not even yet been made. The issue of unification is one which troubles large numbers of Germans who have not the slightest attraction to totalitarian concepts. There are few if any independent Germans who would accept unification at any price. There are many who earnestly seek it if freedom can likewise be secured and they would not consciously take any steps which precluded a unified Germany. But increasing numbers of thinking Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain have begun to realize that, far from obstructing unity, full West German partnership in the free European community will prove

to be the most effective way to achieve peaceful unification on democratic terms. Indeed, it is significant that the Soviet appeals for unity have increased in quantity and character as the prospects of European integration improved. The daily growing moral, economic and military strength of this community cannot fail to continue to exert an irresistible force toward such a unification.

There was a continued rise in the volume of the Federal Republic's exports throughout the last quarter. The balance of payments with other OEEC countries took a favorable turn, thus once again permitting in early 1952 a partial liberalization of foreign trade, which had been bridled somewhat six months ago. At the same time, the German industrial production index reached the unprecedented mark of 148 percent of the 1936 figure. Since Germany's industrial potential and manpower reserves are still not fully used, it appears probable that the utilization of these facilities for the benefit of Western European defense would lead to a further economic expansion.

An especially welcome development was the increase in coal production recorded during the past three months. Efforts of a German Coal Production Committee consisting of government, management and trade union representatives constituted in early October to further coal production had already resulted in an increase of the daily coal output. When its plans are fully carried out, it may be expected that one of the most serious bottlenecks in European production will be eased, and the working and living conditions of the miners improved at the same time. This increase, together with the lateness of winter weather, confounded the predictions of a disastrous coal shortage made by those who had been attacking the German coal export quotas with such vehemence a few months ago.

Moreover, the significance of coal as an irritant in Allied-German relations was likewise diminished when agreement was reached on November 22 within the International Authority for the Ruhr on a reduction of the German coal export quota, and on a retroactive price increase for Ruhr coal. Simultaneously, a formula was agreed under which other IAR countries could draw from increased German coal production on a sliding scale.

A major step in the regulation of the German debt question was taken on December 11. The Tripartite Commission on German Debts, during the course of negotiations with the German delegation, announced in London its terms for the settlement of the claims arising from the postwar economic assistance given to Germany by the Governments of the U. S., U. K. and France. The Allies stated that they had agreed to a scaling down of their claims which reduced German indebtedness to the U. S. from \$3.2 billion to \$1.2 billion; to the U. K. from £201 million to £150 million; and to France from \$15.7 million to \$11.8

million. The German delegation was informed that the Allied governments are prepared to make important concessions, both with respect to priority and to the total amounts of their claims concerning postwar assistance, on the clear understanding that these concessions are conditional upon the achievement of a satisfactory and equitable settlement of Germany's prewar debts. Fair arrangements were made regarding terms of repayment, while it was also understood that neither the Federal Government nor its nationals would present any counter claims against the three powers in connection with or incidental to their activities in Germany since the end of hostilities.

The economic situation in the Soviet Zone revealed continuing and drastic efforts to make it an integral part of the Soviet orbit economy. A "Five Year" Plan regulating all economic activity was designed to achieve this purpose. Piece work, overtime work without overtime pay, "competitions" between factories for an increase in production, and a complete subordination of Communist-led trade unions to the almighty state were the outward signs of the "progress" made in the Soviet Zone in introducing Communist labor conditions.

Notwithstanding price reductions in the state-run "HO" stores selling rationed goods at black market prices, the standard of living of the population was still low. The export to Russia of vast quantities of goods from current East German production continued. Despite the hardships of the population, determined efforts were made, and with some success, to refurbish the outward appearance of the Soviet Zone and to make it to an increased measure independent of Western Germany. Public building in East Berlin increased to the accompaniment of much propagandistic fanfare and extensive rubble clearance appeared to be going on in the more conspicuous sectors of the city. Undoubtedly the striking contrast between the Allied and Soviet Sectors of the city was becoming hard to bear, for after a long period of dismal inactivity, a determined effort appears now under way to propagandize the East Sector by erecting a number of undistinguished monolithic public buildings, tribunes, parade areas and similar adornments to counter the more natural and active development of life in the West Sectors of the city. Certain housing projects are also planned. The attraction of Western Germany and of the Western Sectors of Berlin manifests itself in the uninterrupted flow of East Germans to the West, but all this stresses the need for housing in the West.

While gains could be recorded during the past three months in the economic rehabilitation of Berlin, Soviet harassment of outgoing trade from the three Western Sectors of that city continued. Ignoring the understandings laid down by the West German representatives at the time of the signing of the Interzonal Trade Agreement on

September 20, the Communists continued to interfere with the free movement of goods in certain important categories. In consequence, the Federal Republic had virtually stopped trade with the East Zone. The Soviet Zone authorities could readily create conditions which would permit the resumption of interzonal trade on a normal scale, but they have been slow to do so.

On the surface, there was a decrease in the somewhat noisy activities heretofore characteristic of the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party. Perhaps this could be attributed in part to the Federal Government's move to have that party declared unconstitutional by the newly established Constitutional Court. It appeared that the leaders were concentrating their efforts on internal and covert activities, at least pending the outcome of the Federal Government's action before the Court to have the party outlawed. At the Government's request the Court will also test the constitutionality of the Communist Party.

Political statements of certain former generals at the head of the veterans' associations gave rise to considerable excitement. But with the resignation of the provisional head of the top veterans' organization, brought about by public pressure because of his derogatory remarks regarding the participants in the July 20, 1944 plot against Hitler, the way seemed clear for the election of officers who would better represent the rank and file of former German soldiers. It is to be hoped that such leaders will limit their activities to the legitimate business of looking after the welfare of their members.

In its first decision, the Federal Constitutional Court on October 23 upheld the Federal Law on the political reorganization of Southwest Germany, and ordered a plebiscite to be held in the states of Wuerttemberg-Baden (U.S. Zone), Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern and Baden (both in the French Zone). When held on December 9, the plebiscite resulted in a 70 percent majority in favor of combining the three areas into one southwest state, thus creating the third largest state in Western Germany. Although some resistance to the merger was still alive in Baden, it was expected that by the spring of 1952 this new and strong state would be a reality.

On Jan. 31, 1952, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) will have terminated its program in Germany. It could look with pride on its successful activities involving the migration of several hundred thousand displaced persons to other countries where they found permanent new homes. Organized as a successor to UNRRA, the IRO has played an important role in alleviating the plight of millions of DPs brought to Germany as slave labor during the war. There still remained a "hard core" of several tens of thousands of DPs who, for various reasons, could not be resettled outside Germany. A tolerable existence for the displaced persons who will continue to be sup-

ported by the German economy will be guaranteed by the continued efforts of welfare organizations and by humane West German legislation.

The Office of the U.S. High Commissioner in Germany moved in November to a new location in the immediate vicinity of Bonn, the seat of the Federal Government. This move, involving great administrative effort and extensive building, was successfully completed without undue interruption in the functioning of the individual offices. This move was symbolic of the growing importance of Bonn as a capital and of the approaching change in status of the U.S. representation in Germany from that of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany to a regular Embassy. The offices and apartments relinquished in the Frankfurt area are being utilized to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces and their dependents.

Notwithstanding inevitable setbacks and irritations, the progress of the Federal Republic in 1951 was impressive. West Germany had not yet taken the final step which would remove the last vestiges of the Occupation regime. But its industrious people under a democratic government seemed about to eliminate the last political and economic barriers and to attain again an honorable position of economic independence and political importance alongside the other nations of the free world. The year 1952 would very likely see the emergence of a new Europe where, instead of a multitude of competing nations, a strongly knit community would be formed, and where the people could raise their eyes to higher horizons of freedom and well being.

Bonn/Mehlem
Germany
December 31, 1951

Further Efforts Toward Conclusion of Austrian Treaty

[Released to the press simultaneously at Washington, London, and Paris February 28]

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America are seriously concerned that arrangements which had been made for discussion by the deputies for the Austrian treaty to take place on the 21st of January for the purpose of concluding the treaty, were frustrated owing to the failure of the Soviet deputy to attend.

The three Governments recall that Austria, the first country to be occupied by Hitler, was promised her freedom and independence in a declaration made in Moscow in the name of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-

lies in 1943. France associated herself with this declaration on the 16th of November 1943. The Governments then announced their determination that Austria should be liberated from German domination and reestablished as a free and independent country. Yet 8 years afterwards and despite 258 meetings of the deputies to conclude the treaty, Austria has not yet regained her full independence. Her laws are submitted to a foreign body before being passed, her communications are controlled and censored, and, above all, her territory is divided into zones occupied by foreign troops with all the economic and moral hardship on the Austrian people that this implies.

The Austrians ardently desire to see terminated a state of affairs which should rightly have ended long ago. The three Governments fully share this aspiration and consider that renewed efforts should be made to solve a problem with which the world ought no longer to be confronted. They are, therefore, urgently examining new proposals so that the Four Powers may be enabled to fulfill their pledge made in the Moscow Declaration to restore to Austria her full freedom and independence.

NOTE: In releasing the above statement at Washington, the Department of State emphasized that no consideration is being given to the conclusion of a separate treaty for Austria without Soviet participation.

Yugoslavia: Four Years' Resistance to Soviet Aggression

*by George V. Allen
Ambassador to Yugoslavia¹*

It will be 4 years in June since a sudden peal of thunder cracked behind the Iron Curtain. The Communist regime of Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia had broken with Soviet Russia. It was as important, in the political field, as the explosion of an atomic bomb.

Everyone asked: What does it mean? Is it real? Will the break last? Will Tito get by with it?

These questions are still being asked today.

Fortunately, we've been able to observe and study at close range the effects of this political explosion.

Since June 1948, the break between Yugoslavia and Russia has continually widened and deepened. At the same time, relations between Yugoslavia and the West have slowly but steadily improved. Today, the Yugoslav Army and people, stoutly resisting Soviet threats and pressures, stand as a bulwark of strength against aggression and thus buttress the whole European defense system.

Yugoslavia's ability to resist is important to the preservation of peace and security in the whole North Atlantic area, and thus far the preservation of the United States.

Let's take a look at Yugoslavia's position in Europe. Yugoslavia is about the size in area of the State of Oregon. She has a population of approximately 16 $\frac{1}{4}$ million people.

¹ Address made on "Battle Report" over NBC television network on Feb. 24 and released to the press on the same date.

A close look at the picture will show you that Yugoslavia is hemmed in by the Iron Curtain countries of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. At the same time Yugoslavia is a shield for Italy and Greece. She also has a vital strategic position on the Adriatic Sea.

It is not difficult to see how she protects the southern flank of a defense system that runs from the North Sea down through the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Western Germany, Australia, Italy, Greece, and Turkey.

Western Military and Economic Aid

Although Yugoslavia is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States and other NATO nations are cooperating in giving her military assistance. Economic aid is now being extended under an agreement reached with Britain and France last June. Since then, the three nations have granted Yugoslavia 75 million dollars, of which the United States contributed about 50 million. This week, in Washington, representatives of the three nations are meeting again to review the situation and consider the question of further economic assistance. This assistance has been largely in the form of urgently needed raw materials purchased both in this country and elsewhere.

But has Yugoslavia been doing anything to help herself? She has, against great odds. The break with Soviet Russia in 1948 necessitated a complete

turn-around in Yugoslavia's trade. A blockade by Russia and the satellite countries suddenly cut off all sources of supply, including such vital commodities as gasoline and coke. Here is one country where we don't have to worry about the problem of East-West trade. Moreover, in 1950 the country experienced a terrible drought, which drastically reduced the grain crop, wiped out agricultural exports, and threatened famine.

This critical situation was saved principally by the prompt shipment of food from the United States. In spite of tremendous difficulties, Yugoslavia today is making as great an effort as any country in Europe to provide for its own defense.

Will To Resist Aggression

How would Yugoslavia hold up as an ally in the event of a war? Since her separation from the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia has been subjected to continued and increasing pressure by the Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain countries. Yet, through it all, the Yugoslavs have held firm. They have a tough army; one that's had much experience in fighting to defend its homeland. Its mere existence now serves the cause of peace. In my opinion, and in the opinion of most foreign observers in Belgrade, including diplomats and journalists, the Yugoslav Army would fight well, consistently, and effectively against any effort to subjugate the country. I may add that this also seems to be the opinion of Joseph Stalin.

Can we be sure that Tito is first a Yugoslav rather than first a Communist? There is no question in my mind that Tito has chosen his course. National independence for Yugoslavia is his first and foremost aim.

Internationally, Tito is adhering to the U.N. concept of collective security in Europe. In U.N. sessions, Yugoslav delegates have taken a strong line in denouncing Soviet imperialism and aggression. On the domestic side, the Yugoslav Government has demonstrated a broader approach to its problems. Tito has widened public discussion; he has—for the moment at least—slowed down collectivization of farms. In the economic field the Yugoslav Government has modified the centralized control and the imitation of Soviet practices which marked its previous policies, and has taken more account of economic realities.

I don't want to overemphasize these changes. Tito remains a Communist. He has not left the world in any doubt on this score.

Moreover, United States recognition of the present Government of Yugoslavia and our grants of economic and military assistance do not reflect approval by our Government of the internal policies of the Yugoslav regime. We have not left the world, or Tito, in any doubt on this score. In a note handed to the Yugoslav Government, we stated specifically that our assistance "should not be interpreted as implying endorsement of meas-

ures undertaken by the Government of Yugoslavia suppressing or destroying religious, political, or economic liberty."

Our policy in Yugoslavia is, and should continue to be, thoroughly realistic. Certainly the Yugoslavs are proceeding on that basis—and would be foolish not to. When we each know clearly where we stand, there is no reason for concern about Yugoslav-American relations. They are progressing well.

Agreement With Israel For Economic Assistance

[Released to the press February 27]

An agreement providing for economic assistance has been concluded by an exchange of notes between the Governments of Israel and the United States, the Department of State announced on February 27. The exchange took place at Tel Aviv on that date between U.S. Ambassador Monnett B. Davis and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett of Israel.

An interim agreement completed at Washington, D. C., on December 7, 1951, between James E. Webb, Acting Secretary of State, and Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel, has already made available \$25,730,000 of the \$50,000,000 appropriated by Congress under section 205 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951.¹

The agreement makes available during the current fiscal year the remainder of the \$50,000,000 for specific relief and resettlement projects for refugees coming into Israel. The program is being administered by the Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State.

Under the terms of the agreement the Government of Israel is to earmark an equal amount of its own currency to be used for these projects. Both U.S. dollars and Israeli currency will be expended under the general direction of the U.S. Director for Technical Cooperation in Israel, Bruce McDaniel, and Ehud Avriel, of the office of the Prime Minister of Israel.

Letters of Credence

New Zealand

The newly appointed Ambassador of New Zealand, Leslie Knox Munro, presented his credentials to the President on February 26, 1952. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 147 of February 26.

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1015.

U.S., Japan Sign Administrative Agreement

The Department of State announced on February 28 that the United States and Japan had signed at Tokyo on that date an Administrative Agreement in implementation of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States.¹ The Security Treaty was signed on September 8, 1951, at San Francisco in order to provide an unarmed and defenseless Japan with the necessary protection against the menace of Communist aggression by maintaining United States Armed Forces in and about Japan. This treaty was voluntarily agreed to by Japan in the exercise of its inherent sovereign right of individual and collective self-defense recognized in the Treaty of Peace With Japan as well as in the Charter of the United Nations.

The Agreement conforms in general to the agreements which have been concluded with sovereign countries throughout the world where United States forces are maintained. Concluded on a basis of sovereign equality and trust by direct negotiation between the two countries, the Agreement is satisfactory to both the United States and Japanese Governments and will strengthen the close bonds of mutual interest and regard between their two peoples.

The present Administrative Agreement, which is an executive agreement, makes the practical administrative arrangements for the disposition of the armed forces of the United States called for by the Security Treaty. This Agreement is within the framework and purposes of the Security Treaty and deals only with the use of facilities and areas, the sharing of costs, the jurisdiction over persons, certain privileges and exemptions, and the method of continuous mutual consultation, which are necessary and appropriate for the United States Armed Forces to carry out effectively their security mission. The Agreement does not deal with the problem of possible future increases of Japan's own defensive capacity nor does it include any commitments by the United States or Japan with respect to the action to be taken in an emergency except that the two Governments will consult. So far as concerns the use of facilities and areas in Japan in support of the United Nations' security action in Korea, the Japanese Government in an exchange of notes on September 8, 1951, affirmed its willingness to "permit

and facilitate the support in and about Japan" of forces engaged in such United Nations' actions.

By implementing the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan an important step has been taken in the defense of peace and security in the Pacific area and in the steady progress of democratic nations toward a system of collective security for peace and freedom which has been developing within the framework of the United Nations Charter.

TEXT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENT

PREAMBLE

Whereas the United States of America and Japan on September 8, 1951, signed a Security Treaty which contains provisions for the disposition of United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan;

And whereas Article III of that Treaty states that the conditions which shall govern the disposition of the armed forces of the United States in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments;

And whereas the United States of America and Japan are desirous of concluding practical administrative arrangements which will give effect to their respective obligations under the Security Treaty and will strengthen the close bonds of mutual interest and regard between their two peoples;

Therefore, the Governments of the United States of America and of Japan have entered into this Agreement in terms as set forth below:

ARTICLE I

In this Agreement the expression—

(a) "members of the United States Armed Forces" means the personnel on active duty belonging to the land, sea or air armed services of the United States of America when in the territory of Japan.

(b) "civilian component" means the civilian persons of United States nationality who are in the employ of, serving with, or accompanying the United States armed forces in Japan, but excludes persons who are ordinarily resident in Japan or who are mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article XIV. For the purpose of this Agreement only, dual nationals, United States and Japanese, who are brought to Japan by the United States shall be considered as United States nationals.

(c) "dependents" means

- (1) Spouse, and children under 21;
- (2) Parents, and children over 21, if dependent for over half their support upon a member of the United States armed forces or civilian component.

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1951, p. 464.

ARTICLE II

1. Japan agrees to grant to the United States the use of the facilities and areas necessary to carry out the purposes stated in Article I of the Security Treaty. Agreements as to specific facilities and areas, not already reached by the two Governments by the effective date of this Agreement, shall be concluded by the two Governments through the Joint Committee provided for in Article XXVI of this Agreement. "Facilities and areas" include existing furnishings, equipment and fixtures necessary to the operation of such facilities and areas.

2. At the request of either party, the United States and Japan shall review such arrangements and may agree that such facilities and areas shall be returned to Japan or that additional facilities and areas may be provided.

3. The facilities and areas used by the United States armed forces shall be returned to Japan whenever they are no longer needed for purposes of this Agreement, and the United States agrees to keep the needs for facilities and areas under continual observation with a view toward such return.

4. (a) When facilities and areas such as target ranges and maneuver grounds are temporarily not being used by the United States armed forces, interim use may be made by Japanese authorities and nationals provided that it is agreed that such use would not be harmful to the purposes for which the facilities and areas are normally used by the United States armed forces.

(b) With respect to such facilities and areas as target ranges and maneuver grounds which are to be used by United States armed forces for limited periods of time, the Joint Committee shall specify in the agreements concerning such facilities and areas the extent to which the provisions of this Agreement shall apply.

ARTICLE III

1. The United States shall have the rights, power and authority within the facilities and areas which are necessary or appropriate for their establishment, use, operation, defense or control. The United States shall also have such rights, power and authority over land, territorial waters and airspace adjacent to, or in the vicinity of such facilities and areas, as are necessary to provide access to such facilities and areas for their support, defense and control. In the exercise outside the facilities and areas of the rights, power and authority granted in this Article, there should be, as the occasion requires, consultation between the two Governments through the Joint Committee.

2. The United States agrees that the above-mentioned rights, power and authority will not be exercised in such a manner as to interfere unnecessarily with navigation, aviation, communication, or land travel to or from or within the territories of Japan. All questions relating to frequencies, power and like matters used by apparatus employed by the United States designed to emit electric radiation shall be settled by mutual arrangement. As a temporary measure the United States armed forces shall be entitled to use, without radiation interference from Japanese sources, electronic devices of such power, design, type of emission, and frequencies as are reserved for such forces at the time this Agreement becomes effective.

3. Operations in the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces shall be carried on with due regard for the public safety.

ARTICLE IV

1. The United States is not obliged, when it returns facilities and areas to Japan on the expiration of this Agreement or at an earlier date, to restore the facilities and areas to the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the United States armed forces, or to compensate Japan in lieu of such restoration.

2. Japan is not obliged to make any compensation to the United States for any improvements made in the facilities

and areas or for the buildings or structures left thereon on the expiration of this Agreement or the earlier return of the facilities and areas.

3. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to any construction which the United States may undertake under special arrangements with Japan.

ARTICLE V

1. United States and foreign vessels and aircraft operated by, for, or under the control of the United States for official purposes shall be accorded access to any port or airport of Japan free from toll or landing charges. When cargo or passengers not accorded the exemptions of this Agreement are carried on such vessels and aircraft, notification shall be given to the appropriate Japanese authorities, and such cargo or passengers shall be entered according to the laws and regulations of Japan.

2. The vessels and aircraft mentioned in paragraph 1, United States Government-owned vehicles including armor, and members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component and their dependents shall be accorded access to and movement between facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces and between such facilities and areas and the ports of Japan.

3. When the vessels mentioned in paragraph 1 enter Japanese ports, appropriate notification shall, under normal conditions, be made to the proper Japanese authorities. Such vessels shall have freedom from compulsory pilotage, but if a pilot is taken pilotage shall be paid for at appropriate rates.

ARTICLE VI

1. All civil and military air traffic control and communications systems shall be developed in close coordination and shall be integrated to the extent necessary for fulfillment of collective security interests. Procedures, and any subsequent changes thereto, necessary to effect this coordination and integration will be established by mutual arrangement.

2. Lights and other aids to navigation of vessels and aircraft placed or established in the facilities and areas in use by United States armed forces and in territorial waters adjacent thereto or in the vicinity thereof shall conform to the system in use in Japan. The United States and Japanese authorities which have established such navigation aids shall notify each other of their positions and characteristics and shall give advance notification before making any changes in them or establishing additional navigation aids.

ARTICLE VII

The United States armed forces shall have the right to use all public utilities and services belonging to, or controlled or regulated by the Government of Japan, and to enjoy priorities in such use, under conditions no less favorable than those that may be applicable from time to time to the ministries and agencies of the Government of Japan.

ARTICLE VIII

The Japanese Government undertakes to furnish the United States armed forces with the following meteorological services under present procedures, subject to such modifications as may from time to time be agreed between the two Governments or as may result from Japan's becoming a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization or the World Meteorological Organization:

(a) Meteorological observations from land and ocean areas including observations from weather ships assigned to positions known as "X" and "T".

(b) Climatological information including periodic summaries and the historical data of the Central Meteorological Observatory.

(c) Telecommunications service to disseminate meteorological information required for the safe and regular operation of aircraft.

(d) Seismographic data including forecasts of the estimated size of tidal waves resulting from earthquakes and areas that might be affected thereby.

ARTICLE IX

1. The United States shall have the right to bring into Japan for purposes of this Agreement persons who are members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents.

2. Members of the United States armed forces shall be exempt from Japanese passport and visa laws and regulations. Members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents shall be exempt from Japanese laws and regulations on the registration and control of aliens, but shall not be considered as acquiring any right to permanent residence or domicile in the territories of Japan.

3. Upon entry into or departure from Japan members of the United States armed forces shall be in possession of the following documents: (a) personal identity card showing name, date of birth, rank and number, service, and photograph; and (b) individual or collective travel order certifying to the status of the individual or group as a member or members of the United States armed forces and to the travel ordered. For purposes of their identification while in Japan, members of the United States armed forces shall be in possession of the foregoing personal identity card.

4. Members of the civilian component, their dependents, and the dependents of members of the United States armed forces shall be in possession of appropriate documentation issued by the United States authorities so that their status may be verified by Japanese authorities upon their entry into or departure from Japan, or while in Japan.

5. If the status of any person brought into Japan under paragraph 1 of this Article is altered so that he would no longer be entitled to such admission, the United States authorities shall notify the Japanese authorities and shall, if such person be required by the Japanese authorities to leave Japan, assure that transportation from Japan will be provided within a reasonable time at no cost to the Japanese Government.

ARTICLE X

1. Japan shall accept as valid without a driving test or fee the driving permit or license or military driving permit issued by the United States to a member of the United States armed forces, the civilian component and their dependents.

2. Official vehicles of the United States armed forces and the civilian component shall carry distinctive numbered plates or individual markings which will readily identify them.

3. Privately owned vehicles of members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component and their dependents shall carry Japanese number plates to be acquired under the same condition as those applicable to Japanese nationals.

ARTICLE XI

1. Save as provided in this Agreement, members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents shall be subject to the laws and regulations administered by the customs authorities of Japan.

2. All materials, supplies and equipment imported by the United States armed forces, the authorized procurement agencies of the United States armed forces, or by the organizations provided for in Article XV, for the official use of the United States armed forces or for the use of the members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, and materials, supplies and equipment which are to be used exclusively by the United States armed forces or are ultimately to be incorporated into articles or facilities

used by such forces, shall be permitted entry into Japan; such entry shall be free from customs duties and other such charges. Appropriate certification shall be made that such materials, supplies and equipment are being imported by the United States armed forces, the authorized procurement agencies of the United States armed forces, or by the organizations provided for in Article XV, or, in the case of materials, supplies and equipment to be used exclusively by the United States armed forces or ultimately to be incorporated into articles or facilities used by such forces, that delivery thereof is to be taken by the United States armed forces for the purposes specified above.

3. Property consigned to and for the personal use of members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, shall be subject to customs duties and other such charges, except that no duties or charges shall be paid with respect to:

(a) Furniture and household goods for their private use imported by the members of the United States armed forces or civilian component when they first arrive to serve in Japan or by their dependents when they first arrive for reunion with members of such forces or civilian component, and personal effects for private use brought by the said persons upon entrance.

(b) Vehicles and parts imported by members of the United States armed forces or civilian component for the private use of themselves or their dependents.

(c) Reasonable quantities of clothing and household goods of a type which would ordinarily be purchased in the United States for everyday for the private use of members of the United States armed forces, civilian component, and their dependents, which are mailed into Japan through United States military post offices.

4. The exemptions granted in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall apply only to cases of importation of goods and shall not be interpreted as refunding customs duties and domestic excises collected by the customs authorities at the time of entry in cases of purchases of goods on which such duties and excises have already been collected.

5. Customs examination shall not be made in the following cases:

(a) Units and members of the United States armed forces under orders entering or leaving Japan;

(b) Official documents under official seal;

(c) Mail in United States military postal channels and military cargo shipped on a United States Government bill of lading.

6. Except as such disposal may be authorized by the Japanese and United States authorities in accordance with mutually agreed conditions, goods imported into Japan free of duty shall not be disposed of in Japan to persons not entitled to import such goods free of duty.

7. Goods imported into Japan free from customs duties and other such charges pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 may be re-exported free from customs duties and other such charges.

8. The United States armed forces, in cooperation with Japanese authorities, shall take such steps as are necessary to prevent abuse of privileges granted to the United States armed forces, members of such forces, the civilian component, and their dependents in accordance with this Article.

9. (a) In order to prevent offenses against laws and regulations administered by the customs authorities of the Japanese Government, the Japanese authorities and the United States armed forces shall assist each other in the conduct of inquiries and the collection of evidence.

(b) The United States armed forces shall render all assistance within their power to ensure that articles liable to seizure by, or on behalf of, the customs authorities of the Japanese Government are handed to those authorities.

(c) The United States armed forces shall render all assistance within their power to ensure the payment of duties, taxes, and penalties payable by members of such forces or for the civilian component, or their dependents.

(d) Vehicles and articles belonging to the United States armed forces seized by the customs authorities of the Japanese Government in connection with an offense against its customs or fiscal laws or regulations shall be handed over to the appropriate authorities of the force concerned.

ARTICLE XII

1. The United States shall have the right to contract for any supplies or construction work to be furnished or undertaken in Japan for purposes of, or authorized by this Agreement, without restriction as to choice of supplier or person who does the construction work.

2. Materials, supplies, equipment and services which are required from local sources for the maintenance of the United States armed forces and the procurement of which may have an adverse effect on the economy of Japan shall be procured in coordination with, and, when desirable, through and with the assistance of, the competent authorities of Japan.

3. Materials, supplies, equipment and services procured for official purposes in Japan by the United States armed forces, or by authorized procurement agencies of the United States armed forces upon appropriate certification shall be exempt from the following Japanese taxes:

- (a) Commodity tax
- (b) Travelling tax
- (c) Gasoline tax
- (d) Electricity and gas tax

Materials, supplies, equipment and services procured for ultimate use by the United States armed forces shall be exempt from commodity and gasoline taxes upon appropriate certification by the United States armed forces. With respect to any present or future Japanese taxes not specifically referred to in this Article which might be found to constitute a significant and readily identifiable part of the gross purchase price of materials, supplies, equipment and services procured by the United States armed forces, or for ultimate use by such forces, the two Governments will agree upon a procedure for granting such exemption or relief therefrom as is consistent with the purposes of this Article.

4. Local labor requirements of the United States armed forces or civilian component shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Japanese authorities.

5. The obligations for the withholding and payment of income tax and of social security contributions, and, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, the conditions of employment and work, such as those relating to wages and supplementary payments, the conditions for the protection of workers, and the rights of workers concerning labor relations shall be those laid down by the legislation of Japan.

6. Members of the civilian component shall not be subject to Japanese laws or regulations with respect to terms and conditions of employment.

7. Neither members of the United States armed forces, civilian component, nor their dependents, shall by reason of this Article enjoy any exemption from taxes or similar charges relating to personal purchases of goods and services in Japan chargeable under Japanese legislation.

8. Except as such disposal may be authorized by the Japanese and United States authorities in accordance with mutually agreed conditions, goods purchased in Japan exempt from the taxes referred to in paragraph 3, shall not be disposed of in Japan to persons not entitled to purchase such goods exempt from such tax.

ARTICLE XIII

1. The United States armed forces shall not be subject to taxes or similar charges on property held, used or transferred by such forces in Japan.

2. Members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component and their dependents shall not be liable to pay any Japanese taxes to the Japanese Government or to any other taxing agency in Japan on

income received as a result of their service with or employment by the United States armed forces or by the organizations provided for in Article XV. The provisions of this Article do not exempt such persons from payment of Japanese taxes on income derived from Japanese sources nor do they exempt United States citizens who for United States income tax purposes claim Japanese residence from payment of Japanese taxes on income. Periods during which such persons are in Japan solely by reason of being members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, or their dependents shall not be considered as periods of residence or domicile in Japan for the purpose of Japanese taxation.

3. Members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents shall be exempt from taxation in Japan on the holding, use, transfer *inter se*, or transfer by death of movable property, tangible or intangible, the presence of which in Japan is due solely to the temporary presence of these persons in Japan, provided that such exemption shall not apply to property held for the purpose of investment or the conduct of business in Japan or to any intangible property registered in Japan. There is no obligation under this Article to grant exemption from taxes payable in respect of the use of roads by private vehicles.

ARTICLE XIV

1. Persons, including corporations organized under the laws of the United States, and their employees who are ordinarily resident in the United States and whose presence in Japan is solely for the purpose of executing contracts with the United States for the benefit of the United States armed forces shall, except as provided in this Article, be subject to the laws and regulations of Japan.

2. Upon certification by appropriate United States authorities as to their identity, such persons and their employees shall be accorded the following benefits of this Agreement:

(a) Rights of accession and movement, as provided for in Article V, paragraph 2;

(b) Entry into Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article IX;

(c) The exemption from customs duties, and other such charges provided for in Article XI, paragraph 3, for members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents;

(d) If authorized by the United States Government, the right to use the services of the organizations provided for in Article XV;

(e) Those provided for in Article XIX, paragraph 2, for members of the armed forces of the United States, the civilian component, and their dependents;

(f) If authorized by the United States Government, the right to use military payment certificates, as provided for in Article XX;

(g) The use of postal facilities provided for in Article XXI;

(h) Exemption from the laws and regulations of Japan with respect to terms and conditions of employment.

3. Such persons and their employees shall be so described in their passports and their arrival, departure and their residence while in Japan shall from time to time be notified by the United States armed forces to the Japanese authorities.

4. Upon certification by an authorized officer of the United States armed forces depreciable assets except houses, held, used, or transferred, by such persons and their employees exclusively for the execution of contracts referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be subject to taxes or similar charges of Japan.

5. Upon certification by an authorized officer of the United States armed forces, such persons and their employees shall be exempt from taxation in Japan on the holding, use, transfer by death, or transfer to persons or agencies entitled to tax exemption under this Agree-

ment, of movable property, tangible or intangible, the presence of which in Japan is due solely to the temporary presence of these persons in Japan, provided that such exemption shall not apply to property held for the purpose of investment or the conduct of other business in Japan or to any intangible property registered in Japan. There is no obligation under this Article to grant exemption from taxes payable in respect of the use of roads by private vehicles.

6. The persons and their employees referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be liable to pay income or corporation taxes to the Japanese Government or to any other taxing agency in Japan on any income derived under a contract made in the United States with the United States Government in connection with the construction, maintenance or operation of any of the facilities or areas covered by this Agreement.

The provisions of this paragraph do not exempt such persons from payment of income or corporation taxes on income derived from Japanese sources, nor do they exempt such persons and their employees who, for United States income tax purposes, claim Japanese residence, from payment of Japanese taxes on income. Periods during which such persons are in Japan solely in connection with the execution of a contract with the United States Government shall not be considered periods of residence or domicile in Japan for the purposes of such taxation.

7. Japanese authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over the persons and their employees referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article in relation to offenses committed in Japan and punishable by the law of Japan. In those cases in which the Japanese authorities decide not to exercise such jurisdiction they shall notify the military authorities of the United States as soon as possible. Upon such notification the military authorities of the United States shall have the right to exercise such jurisdiction over the persons referred to as is conferred on them by the law of the United States.

ARTICLE XV

1. (a) Navy exchanges, post exchanges, messes, social clubs, theaters, newspapers and other non-appropriated fund organizations authorized and regulated by the United States military authorities may be established in the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces for the use of members of such forces, the civilian component, and their dependents. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, such organizations shall not be subject to Japanese regulations, license, fees, taxes or similar controls.

(b) When a newspaper authorized and regulated by the United States military authorities is sold to the general public, it shall be subject to Japanese regulations, license, fees, taxes or similar controls so far as such circulation is concerned.

2. No Japanese tax shall be imposed on sales of merchandise and services by such organizations, except as provided in paragraph 1 (b), but purchases within Japan of merchandise and supplies by such organizations shall be subject to Japanese taxes.

3. Except as such disposal may be authorized by the United States and Japanese authorities in accordance with mutually agreed conditions, goods which are sold by such organizations shall not be disposed of in Japan to persons not authorized to make purchases from such organizations.

4. The obligations for the withholding and payment of income tax and of social security contributions, and, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, the conditions of employment and work, such as those relating to wages and supplementary payments, the conditions for the protection of workers, and the rights of workers concerning labor relations shall be those laid down by the legislation of Japan.

5. The organizations referred to in this Article shall provide such information to the Japanese authorities as is required by Japanese tax legislation.

ARTICLE XVI

It is the duty of members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents to respect the law of Japan and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this Agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in Japan.

ARTICLE XVII

1. Upon the coming into force with respect to the United States of the "Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces," signed at London on June 19, 1951, the United States will immediately conclude with Japan, at the option of Japan, an agreement on criminal jurisdiction similar to the corresponding provisions of that Agreement.

2. Pending the coming into force with respect to the United States of the North Atlantic Treaty Agreement referred to in paragraph 1, the United States service courts and authorities shall have the right to exercise within Japan exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses which may be committed in Japan by members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, excluding their dependents who have only Japanese nationality. Such jurisdiction may in any case be waived by the United States.

3. While the jurisdiction provided in paragraph 2 is effective, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) Japanese authorities may arrest members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, or their dependents outside facilities and areas in use by United States armed forces for the commission or attempted commission of an offense, but in the event of such an arrest, the individual or individuals shall be immediately turned over to the United States armed forces. Any person fleeing from the jurisdiction of the United States armed forces and found in any place outside the facilities and areas may on request be arrested by the Japanese authorities and turned over to the United States authorities.

(b) The United States authorities shall have the exclusive right to arrest within facilities and areas in use by United States armed forces. Any person subject to the jurisdiction of Japan and found in any such facility or area will, on request, be turned over to the Japanese authorities.

(c) The United States authorities may, under due process of law, arrest, in the vicinity of such a facility or area, any person in the commission or attempted commission of an offense against the security of that facility or area. Any such person not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States armed forces shall be immediately turned over to Japanese authorities.

(d) Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 (c), the activities outside the facilities and areas of military police of the United States armed forces shall be limited to the extent necessary for maintaining order and discipline of and arresting members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents.

(e) The authorities of the United States and Japan shall cooperate in making available witnesses and evidence for criminal investigations and other criminal proceedings in their respective tribunals and shall assist each other in the making of investigations. In the event of a criminal contempt, perjury, or an obstruction of justice before a tribunal which does not have criminal jurisdiction over the individual committing the offense, he shall be tried by a tribunal which has jurisdiction over him as if he had committed the offense before it.

(f) The United States armed forces shall have the exclusive right of removing from Japan members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents. The United States will give sympathetic consideration to a request by the Government of Japan for the removal of any such person for good cause.

(g) Japanese authorities shall have no right of search or seizure, with respect to any persons or property, within facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces, or with respect to property of the United States armed forces wherever situated.

At the request of the Japanese authorities, the United States authorities undertake, within the limits of their authority, to make such search and seizure and inform the Japanese authorities as to the results thereof. In the event of a judgment concerning such property, except property owned or utilized by the United States Government, the United States will turn over such property to the Japanese authorities for disposition in accordance with the judgment. Japanese authorities shall have no right of search or seizure outside facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces, with respect to the persons or property of members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, or their dependents, except as to such persons as may be arrested in accordance with paragraph 3 (a) of this Article, and except as to cases where such search is required for the purpose of arresting offenders under the jurisdiction of Japan.

(h) A death sentence shall not be carried out in Japan by the United States armed forces if the legislation of Japan does not provide for such punishment in a similar case.

4. The United States undertakes that the United States service courts and authorities shall be willing and able to try and, on conviction, to punish all offenses against the laws of Japan which members of the United States armed forces, civilian component, and their dependents may be alleged on sufficient evidence to have committed in Japan, and to investigate and deal appropriately with any alleged offense committed by members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, which may be brought to their notice by Japanese authorities or which they may find to have taken place. The United States further undertakes to notify the Japanese authorities of the disposition made by United States service courts of all cases arising under this paragraph. The United States shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from Japanese authorities for a waiver of its jurisdiction in cases arising under this paragraph where the Japanese Government considers such waiver to be of particular importance. Upon such waiver, Japan may exercise its own jurisdiction.

5. In the event the option referred to in paragraph 1 is not exercised by Japan, the jurisdiction provided for in paragraph 2 and the following paragraphs shall continue in effect. In the event the said North Atlantic Treaty Agreement has not come into effect within one year from the effective date of this Agreement, the United States will, at the request of the Japanese Government, reconsider the subject of jurisdiction over offenses committed in Japan by members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents.

ARTICLE XVIII

1. Each party waives all its claims against the other party for injury or death suffered in Japan by a member of its armed forces, or a civilian governmental employee, while such member or employee was engaged in the performance of his official duties, in cases where such injury or death was caused by a member of the armed forces, or a civilian employee of the other party acting in the performance of his official duties.

2. Each party waives all its claims against the other party for damage to any property in Japan owned by it, if such damage was caused by a member of the armed forces or a civilian governmental employee of the other party in the performance of his official duties.

3. Claims, other than contractual, arising out of acts or omissions of members of, or employees of the United States armed forces in the performance of official duty or out of any other act, omission or occurrence for which the United States armed forces is legally responsible,

arising incident to non-combatant activities and causing injury, death, or property damage in Japan to third parties shall be dealt with by Japan in accordance with the following provisions:

(a) Claims shall be filed within one year from the date on which they arise and shall be considered and settled or adjudicated in accordance with the laws and regulations of Japan with respect to claims arising from the activities of its own employees.

(b) Japan may settle any such claims, and payment of the amount agreed upon or determined by adjudication shall be made by Japan in yen.

(c) Such payment, whether made pursuant to a settlement or to adjudication of the case by a competent tribunal of Japan, or the final adjudication by such a tribunal denying payment, shall be binding and conclusive.

(d) The cost incurred in satisfying claims pursuant to the preceding subparagraphs shall be shared on terms to be agreed by the two Governments.

(e) In accordance with procedures to be established, a statement of all claims approved or disapproved by Japan pursuant to this paragraph, together with the findings in each case, and a statement of the sums paid by Japan, shall be sent to the United States periodically, with a request for reimbursement of the share to be paid by the United States. Such reimbursement shall be made within the shortest possible time in yen.

4. Each party shall have the primary right, in the execution of the foregoing paragraphs, to determine whether its personnel were engaged in the performance of official duty. Such determination shall be made as soon as possible after the arising of the claim concerned. When the other party disagrees with the results of such determination, that party may bring the matter before the Joint Committee for consultation under the provisions of Article XXVI of this Agreement.

5. Claims against members of or employees of the United States armed forces arising out of tortious acts or omissions in Japan not done in the performance of official duty shall be dealt with in the following manner:

(a) The Japanese authorities shall consider the claim and assess compensation to the claimant in a fair and just manner taking into account all the circumstances of the case including the conduct of the injured person, and shall prepare a report on the matter.

(b) The report shall be delivered to the United States authorities who shall then decide without delay whether they will offer an *ex gratia* payment, and if so, of what amount.

(c) If an offer of *ex gratia* payment is made, and accepted by the claimant in full satisfaction of his claim, the United States authorities shall make the payment themselves and inform the Japanese authorities of their decision and of the sum paid.

(d) Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the jurisdiction of the Japanese courts to entertain an action against a member or employee of the United States armed forces, unless and until there has been payment in full satisfaction of the claim.

6. (a) Members of and civilian employees of the United States armed forces, excluding employees who have only Japanese nationality, shall not be subject to suit in Japan with respect to claims specified in paragraph 3, but shall be subject to the civil jurisdiction of Japanese courts with respect to all other types of cases.

(b) In case any private movable property, excluding that in use by the United States armed forces, which is subject to compulsory execution under Japanese law is within the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces, the United States authorities shall upon the request of Japanese courts, possess and turn over such property to the Japanese authorities.

(c) The United States authorities shall cooperate with the Japanese authorities in making available witnesses and evidence for civil proceedings in Japanese tribunals.

7. Disputes arising out of contracts concerning the procurement of materials, supplies, equipment, services, and labor by or for the United States armed forces, which are not resolved by the parties to the contract concerned, may be submitted to the Joint Committee for conciliation, provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not prejudice any right which the parties to the contract may have to file a civil suit.

ARTICLE XIX

1. Members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, shall be subject to the foreign exchange controls of the Japanese Government.

2. The preceding paragraph shall not be construed to preclude the transmission into or outside of Japan of United States dollars or dollar instruments representing the official funds of the United States or realized as a result of service or employment in connection with this Agreement by members of the United States armed forces and the civilian component, or realized by such persons and their dependents from sources outside of Japan.

3. The United States authorities shall take suitable measures to preclude the abuse of the privileges stipulated in the preceding paragraph or circumvention of the Japanese foreign exchange controls.

ARTICLE XX

1. (a) United States military payment certificates denominated in dollars may be used by persons authorized by the United States for internal transactions within the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces. The United States Government will take appropriate action to insure that authorized personnel are prohibited from engaging in transactions involving military payment certificates except as authorized by United States regulations. The Japanese Government will take necessary action to prohibit unauthorized persons from engaging in transactions involving military payment certificates and with the aid of United States authorities will undertake to apprehend and punish any person or persons under its jurisdiction involved in the counterfeiting or uttering of counterfeit military payment certificates.

(b) It is agreed that the United States authorities will apprehend and punish members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, or their dependents, who tender military payment certificates to unauthorized persons and that no obligation will be due to such unauthorized persons or to the Japanese Government or its agencies from the United States or any of its agencies as a result of any unauthorized use of military payment certificates within Japan.

2. In order to exercise control of military payment certificates the United States shall have the right to designate certain American financial institutions to maintain and operate, under United States supervision, facilities for the use of persons authorized by the United States to use military payment certificates. Institutions authorized to maintain military banking facilities will establish and maintain such facilities physically separated from their Japanese commercial banking business, with personnel whose sole duty is to maintain and operate such facilities. Such facilities shall be permitted to maintain United States currency bank accounts and to perform all financial transactions in connection therewith including receipt and remission of funds to the extent provided by Article XIX, paragraph 2, of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XXI

The United States shall have the right to establish and operate, within the facilities and areas in use by the United States armed forces, United States military post offices for the use of members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents, for the transmission of mail between United States military post offices in Japan and between such military post offices and other United States post offices.

ARTICLE XXII

The United States shall have the right to enroll and train all eligible United States citizens, residing in Japan, in the reserve organizations of the armed forces of the United States, except that the prior consent of the Japanese Government shall be obtained in the case of persons employed by the Japanese Government.

ARTICLE XXIII

The United States and Japan will cooperate in taking such steps as may from time to time be necessary to ensure the security of the United States armed forces, the members thereof, the civilian component, their dependents, and their property. The Japanese Government agrees to seek such legislation and to take such other action as may be necessary to ensure the adequate security and protection within its territory of installations, equipment, property, records and official information of the United States, and for the punishment of offenders under the applicable laws of Japan.

ARTICLE XXIV

In the event of hostilities, or imminently threatened hostilities, in the Japan area, the Governments of the United States and Japan shall immediately consult together with a view to taking necessary joint measures for the defense of that area and to carrying out the purposes of Article I of the Security Treaty.

ARTICLE XXV

1. It is agreed that the United States will bear for the duration of this Agreement without cost to Japan all expenditures incident to the maintenance of the United States armed forces in Japan except those to be borne by Japan as provided in paragraph 2.

2. It is agreed that Japan will:

(a) Furnish for the duration of this Agreement without cost to the United States and make compensation where appropriate to the owners and suppliers thereof all facilities, areas and rights of way, including facilities and areas jointly used such as those at airfields and ports, as provided in Articles II and III.

(b) Make available without cost to the United States, until the effective date of any new arrangements reached as a result of periodic reexamination, an amount of Japanese currency equivalent to \$155 million per annum for the purpose of procurement by the United States of transportation and other requisite services and supplies in Japan. The rate of exchange at which yen payments will be credited shall be the official par value, or that rate considered most favorable by the United States which on the day of payment is available to any party, authorized by the Japanese Government or used in any transaction with any party by the Japanese Government or its agencies or by Japanese banks authorized to deal in foreign exchange, and which, if both countries have agreed par values with the International Monetary Fund, is not prohibited by the articles of the Agreement of the Fund.

3. It is agreed that arrangements will be effected between the Governments of the United States and Japan for accounting applicable to financial transactions arising out of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XXVI

1. A Joint Committee shall be established as the means for consultation between the United States and Japan on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of this Agreement. In particular, the Joint Committee shall serve as the means for consultation in determining the facilities and areas in Japan which are required for the use of the United States in carrying out the purposes stated in Article I of the Security Treaty.

2. The Joint Committee shall be composed of a representative of the United States and of Japan, each of whom shall have one or more deputies and a staff. The Joint Committee shall determine its own procedures, and arrange for such auxiliary organs and administrative services as may be required. The Joint Committee shall be so organized that it may meet immediately at any time at the request of the representative of either the United States or Japan.

3. If the Joint Committee is unable to resolve any matter, it shall refer that matter to the respective governments for further consideration through appropriate channels.

ARTICLE XXVII

1. This Agreement shall come into force on the date on which the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan enters into force.

2. Each party to this Agreement undertakes to seek from its legislature necessary budgetary and legislative action with respect to provisions of this Agreement which require such action for their execution.

ARTICLE XXVIII

Either party may at any time request the revision of any Article of this Agreement, in which case the two Governments shall enter into negotiation through appropriate channels.

ARTICLE XXIX

This Agreement, and agreed revisions thereof, shall remain in force while the Security Treaty remains in force unless earlier terminated by agreement between the parties.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

United States Note to Japan.

TOkyo, February 28, 1952

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to refer to our discussion on the terms of the Administrative Agreement signed today, in which Your Excellency stated as the opinion of the Japanese Government that, as the occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers comes to an end on the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the use of facilities and areas by United States forces on the basis of occupation requisition also comes to an end on the same date; thereafter, the use of facilities and areas by United States forces must be based upon agreement between the two Governments, subject to the rights which each might have under the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the Security Treaty, and the Administrative Agreement. I hereby confirm that such is also the opinion of the United States Government.

In Article II, paragraph 1, of the Administrative Agreement, it is stipulated that, "agreements as to specific facilities and areas, not already reached by the two Governments by the effective date of this Agreement, shall be concluded by the two Governments through the Joint Committee provided for in Article XXVI of this Agreement." The United States Government is confident that our two Governments are agreed that consultation shall be on an urgent basis in order to complete such arrangements at the earliest possible date. With this in mind, the United States Government is prepared to join with the Japanese Government in constituting a preliminary working group, consisting of a representative and the necessary staff from each Government to begin such consultations immediately, with the understanding that the arrangements made by the Preliminary Working Group shall be put into effect as agreed and that the task of

the Preliminary Working Group would be taken over by the Joint Committee upon the effective date of the Administrative Agreement.

However, unavoidable delays may arise in the determination and preparation of facilities and areas necessary to carry out the purposes stated in Article I of the Security Treaty. It would be much appreciated, therefore, if Japan would grant the continued use of those particular facilities and areas, with respect to which agreements and arrangements have not been completed by the expiration of ninety days after the effective date of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, pending the completion of such agreements and arrangements.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

DEAN RUSK

*Special Representative of the President
of the United States of America*

Japanese Note to the United States

TOkyo, February 28, 1952

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date in which Your Excellency has informed me as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to our discussion on the terms of the Administrative Agreement signed today, in which Your Excellency stated as the opinion of the Japanese Government that, as the occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers comes to an end on the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the use of facilities and areas by United States forces on the basis of occupation requisition also comes to an end on the same date; thereafter, the use of facilities and areas by United States forces must be based upon agreement between the two Governments, subject to the rights which each might have under the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the Security Treaty, and the Administrative Agreement. I hereby confirm that such is also the opinion of the United States Government.

"In Article II, paragraph 1, of the Administrative Agreement it is stipulated that, 'agreements as to specific facilities and areas, not already reached by the two Governments by the effective date of this Agreement, shall be concluded by the two Governments through the Joint Committee provided for in Article XXVI of this Agreement.' The United States Government is confident that our two Governments are agreed that consultation shall be on an urgent basis in order to complete such arrangements at the earliest possible date. With this in mind, the United States Government is prepared to join with the Japanese Government in constituting a Preliminary Working Group, consisting of a representative and the necessary staff from each Government, to begin such consultations immediately, with the understanding that the arrangements made by the Preliminary Working Group shall be put into effect as agreed and that the task of the Preliminary Working Group would be taken over by the Joint Committee upon the effective date of the Administrative Agreement.

"However, unavoidable delays may arise in the determination and preparation of facilities and areas necessary to carry out the purposes stated in Article I of the Security Treaty. It would be much appreciated, therefore, if Japan would grant the continued use of those particular facilities and areas, with respect to which agreements and arrangements have not been completed by the expiration of ninety days after the effective date of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, pending the completion of such agreements and arrangements."

The Japanese Government fully shares the desire of the United States Government to initiate consultations on an urgent basis in order to complete arrangements for the use of facilities and areas at the earliest possible date. The Japanese Government agrees, therefore, to the immediate constitution of the Preliminary Working Group re-

ferred to in Your Excellency's Note, with the understanding that the arrangements made by the Preliminary Working Group shall be put into effect as agreed and that the task of the Preliminary Working Group would be taken over by the Joint Committee upon the effective date of the Administrative Agreement.

With full appreciation of the contents of Your Excellency's Note, I have the honor, on behalf of the Japanese Government, to confirm that the Japanese Government will grant to the United States the continued use of those particular facilities and areas, with respect to which agreements and arrangements have not been completed by the expiration of ninety days after the effective date of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, pending the completion of such agreements and arrangements.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

KATSUO OKAZAKI
[Minister of State]

Comments on Relations Between The U.S. and Ecuador

by Edward G. Miller, Jr.
*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

In this distinguished group, which represents such varied contacts with Ecuador, it is natural to recall the long established U. S.-Ecuadorean business associations. Friedrich Haussarek, U.S. Minister to Ecuador, jotted down some notes on a visit to Guayaquil in 1861. At that time, 91 years ago, a U.S. company had introduced gas-light into the port city. A U.S. company had built the steamboats that were solving a major transportation problem on the Guayas River and its tributaries. U.S. companies had constructed an iron foundry, and had sent down two prefabricated houses for the officers of the port. And the fire engine that clattered down Guayaquil's streets had come from Baltimore. Nor were such U.S. imports confined to the coast. Haussarek described also a cotton factory on Don Pedro Perez Pareja's *finca* near Otobalo, all of the machinery having been shipped from Paterson, N.J., at a transportation cost of \$40,000, considerable in those days.

That was quite a while ago, and the interchanges have increased steadily through the years. Consider the works completed the past year, proposed or under way, with the aid of Export-Import Bank loans. They include waterworks projects—Guayaquil, Quito, and Ambato; improvements for both the Quito and Guayaquil airports; modern machinery for rice growing; highway equipment for the Quevedo-Manta highway; rolling stock and equipment for the railroad connecting the capital with Guayaquil. It is an imposing list, even if that were all. But it is only a part of

¹ Address made before the Ecuadorean-American Assoc., New York, N. Y., on Feb. 27, and released to the press on the same date.

what Ecuador is doing, much of that and other activity being through her own resources and her own initiative.

Consider, also, for example, what Point Four has meant already to Ecuador.

Ecuador's economy is based on subsistence agriculture. It is an urgent problem. The Cooperative Agricultural Experiment Stations, jointly financed by Ecuador and the United States, are centers of investigation and extension work where Ecuadorean and U.S. technicians assigned by the Department of Agriculture work side by side in a program of agricultural improvements.

Experimental campaigns against tuberculosis and other diseases have been started in Ecuador, and these programs may well result in setting the pattern for similar work elsewhere in the world. The Institute of Inter-American Affairs is carrying on with Ecuador, through cooperative agencies known as *Servicios*, programs in the fields of health and sanitation and of education. The *Servicios* are jointly staffed by Institute and Ecuadorean personnel. They are financed jointly by contributions from the Government of Ecuador and from the Institute on behalf of the U.S. Government. The objective of all these programs is to make available to Ecuador the benefit of our technical experience. Consequent agricultural and industrial development will result naturally in enlarged economic opportunities.

In connection with the *Servicios*, it is a special pleasure to recall that this week marks an important anniversary. The health and sanitation programs now carried out by them were launched all over Latin America as a wartime effort by the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. And the very first of these programs ever established was inaugurated in Ecuador, 10 years ago almost to the day, on February 24, 1942. It was followed 3 years later by a field program in education.

There is nothing surprising in finding Ecuador first in such a field. Among the most important products of the vegetable kingdom originating in the Americas, several were first discovered for the European market in Ecuador, among them quinine, which was taken from Ecuador's southern province of Loja to cure the malarial fevers of the Vicerine at Lima; rubber, which the French naturalist Condamine took from the Ecuadorean coast to Europe; cacao, tagua, the toquilla used in hat making.

It is an amazing country, no matter how you look at it. It is liberally endowed with samplings of most of the world's climates and most of the world's topography. What has been called the "vertical geography" of Ecuador stands out boldly in the Avenue of Volcanoes; and in the ladder-pattern of mountain ranges. The Republic has known revolutions and natural disasters. I myself have seen Ecuador tragically devastated by the earthquake of 1949, and I know the country's

valiant efforts to bring reconstruction from the ruins.

President Galo Plaza, good friend of the United States and strong supporter of hemisphere solidarity, has declared that "The battle for freedom and the rejection of the inevitability of poverty and injustice should not have any geographical limitations." Our legislators showed their appreciation of this Ecuadoran attitude when they established a record by 17 times interrupting with applause that speech by President Plaza before the joint session of Congress on the occasion of his memorable visit last year.²

Ecuador's love of freedom has always been a national characteristic. It was 100 years ago last July that Ecuador decreed the abolition of slavery in Lincolnian words that long antedated Lincoln's own Emancipation Proclamation: "The few slaves who still remain in this land of free men," declared the Ecuadorian decree, "are a contradiction to the republican institutions which we have adopted since 1820; an insult to religion, morality, and civilization; and a reproach to the Republic, its legislators, and its governors."

I am reminded that Lincoln is remembered and revered in Ecuador. Ecuador has on different occasions and in different ways demonstrated her admiration for him. One enduring memorial is the charming little park called the Plaza Abraham Lincoln. That park, which fronts the U.S. Embassy and marks the termination of the handsome dual avenue in Quito, will some day, I hope, be further adorned by a statue of Lincoln as a gesture from Ecuador's friends in the States to the friends of the United States in Ecuador.

Ecuador, which a century ago made such proud profession of faith as a land of free men, is well aware that in the present crisis of history, freedom must be on guard so that no aggressor will attack and overcome it. The valiant republic is located like a lighthouse and a watchtower on the Pacific coast. Her great transport terminus of Guayaquil stands 2,000 miles due south of our own great transport terminus of Miami. Her islands, the Galápagos, extend 500 miles along the route from Panama to Australia.

We all remember—the free world cannot forget—Ecuador's splendid contributions to hemisphere solidarity in making those strategic islands available for air bases in World War II.

With equal solidarity, equal determination that aggression shall gain no foothold in this hemisphere, Ecuador and our own country have just signed a military assistance agreement.³ Ecuador was thus the first country in the hemisphere to sign the first of a series of such bilateral agreements between the United States and other republics of this hemisphere, in order to deter potential aggressors and to safeguard the peace in which is our present welfare and our future hope.

The Pioneer Concept Behind the Point Four Program

by Eric Johnston

Chairman, International Development Advisory Board¹

Tonight I want to talk with you about the economic partnership of the free nations of the world. I want to say a few words about where we fit in that partnership and what we in the United States can do to strengthen it as a going concern.

That idea of economic partnership within the community of free nations is the way I like to think of the Point Four Program. A numeral designation scarcely can be called descriptive of what we are trying to do through the program of technical cooperation with nations in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

All of us have differing ideas about what this program of technical cooperation is and what it ought to be.

At some time or other we probably have heard it described as a global dole, a world-wide WPA, or a hand-out that is draining away our resources.

On the other hand, we may have heard that this was dollar diplomacy dressed in 1952 clothes or Yankee imperialism masquerading as altruism.

You know as well as I that although these labels may be catchy, they are anything but accurate.

Since the President has asked me to serve as Chairman of the Board that helps formulate Point Four policies, I thought you might like me to give you my conception of what this program is and the direction it properly should take.

If I had available for this occasion all the skills and talents of my own industry—the motion-picture industry—I might be able to do a more adequate job. I know that it would take Hollywood and the sound camera to capture and present some of the great drama that is taking place under this program in various parts of the world today.

But since in my capacity as a part-time bureaucrat I can't call on these resources, I'll have to use a homelier means to make my point.

Sometimes, when I ponder the various problems that come before our Board, my thoughts turn back to the simpler and more neighborly life that some of us knew in America in our childhood, or that our fathers and grandfathers knew before us.

I think back to the days when we were mainly an agricultural people, when we worked in the fields from dawn till dusk, and then, in the evenings, when the chores were done and supper was over, we took it easy, digging out the cellar.

But no matter how busy we were with our own work, we could always find time or take time to help a neighbor when he needed a hand.

If neighbor John's barn burned down, he could

¹Remarks made before the Chamber of Commerce, Portsmouth, Va., on Feb. 28 and released to the press on the same date.

² BULLETIN of July 9, 1951, p. 68.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 336.

count on the whole community to show up and help him rebuild. He could count on the men to turn to with their saws and hammers and their brawn. And the women of the community would be on hand to help with the food.

We had a sound economic and social basis for that kind of neighborliness. Every one of us in the community knew that a barn was essential if John was to continue as a self-supporting member of the group.

And we also knew the importance of having good neighbors around us. We could count on their rifles if the security of the community was threatened. We could count on them to bring in soup and help mind the children if our wives took sick.

If we had a good corn crop and the man next door had a good hay crop, we could swap back and forth when we needed the other's goods. And it was mighty nice to have someone you could visit with.

If recalling some of those virtues and customs of pioneer life in America seems a homely introduction to remarks about economic partnership, I like to think the analogy is apt.

I don't think that I have to recite very much recent world history to make the point that every free nation in the world today needs good neighbors and strong neighbors—that is, if it expects to remain free.

And any nation and every nation needs self-supporting neighbors—that is, if it expects to remain solvent itself.

How can we get strong and self-supporting neighbors in the community of free nations today?

I think we can do it by hewing to the very pioneer pattern of America that we like to talk about in Chambers of Commerce everywhere in this land of ours.

Dividends of Point Four

All of us know how that helping of one another—of sharing our know-how, telling our neighbors about improved strains of livestock, better seeds, new tools and methods, has paid dividends. It has paid dividends in industry, in medicine, in education, and many things besides agriculture.

But as practical men of business, you ask whether this concept can pay dividends if extended to other nations. Can Point Four produce results? Has it produced results and do they justify our expenditure? These are the questions you should ask, that all of us should ask about any government program.

Let's look at the record. Let's take some specific cases.

India is one of the countries to which we have extended technical assistance.

One of the agricultural extension workers assigned to India undertook to demonstrate to the

farmers of his area the use of improved seed, better methods of cultivation, and the use of modern tools. With this technical assistance, the farmers of the region boosted their wheat production from 13 bushels to 26 bushels per acre and increased their potato yield from 119 to 245 bushels per acre.

I think we can appreciate the meaning of those figures a little better if we compare them to our own production. Our national average in 1950 was about 16½ bushels of wheat per acre and 185 bushels of potatoes per acre.

To be sure, the case I have mentioned represents only the work of one man in a small area of a subcontinent. But it is that very kind of example, set by one man or one small area, that brought our own great advances in scientific agriculture. And what did it cost? The salary of one man.

I mention this example for another reason. The production of more food and fiber, better agriculture, must be the foundation stone for the economic development of all the free world.

Here in the United States, our great industrial civilization could not exist and could never have been developed without first a productive agriculture. Less than a century ago, it took one family out of two in this country to grow the crops we needed. Today one family out of eight can do that job.

What is the situation in other lands? In the free world to which we still have access, and from which our support must come, more than a billion people of Latin America, Asia, and Africa are desperately poor and continually hungry. Eight out of ten live on the land. But they cannot grow enough to feed themselves—let alone the rest of their people.

That constant hunger takes a terrible toll. These billion persons have a life expectancy of 33 years, compared to 68 in the United States.

In these same lands, eight out of ten people cannot read or write. Two out of every three of these men, women, and children suffer all their lives from diseases we know how to prevent.

Hunger, disease, illiteracy—these are the things we are attacking in our program of economic partnership. And with good reason. We cannot expect hungry and diseased people to be self-sufficient.

Last spring, we sent two entomologists to Iran when that country was hit by its worst locust plague in 80 years. Using small planes and apparatus for spraying insecticide, these men were able to save 54,000 acres of crops in 18 different localities.

In some areas of Liberia, food was so scarce that cabbage was sold by the leaf—not by the head. A small onion cost a nickel. The scrawny chickens laid eggs the size of robins' eggs.

Just the effort of one extension worker changed all that. Villages that formerly knew only want now grow enough food for themselves and even

have vegetables left over to send to market. Several hundred roosters of good strain were imported. Their progeny furnished the brood stock for a developing poultry industry with chickens that lay hen-sized eggs.

These chickens were considered so remarkable that persons came from miles around, traveling by canoe, walking, or by whatever means, just to get a look at them. And when they came, they were shown modern methods of poultry husbandry, given a few eggs to start better flocks of their own.

I could cite many more examples of accomplishments like these. If they seem less than spectacular I'm sure it's because they deal with things that we take for granted in this country. And because we take these things—higher crop yields, control of insect pests, improved strains of poultry and livestock—for granted I think we tend to forget how really important they are.

In January of this year there were 619 American technicians working around the world in 33 countries. While most of the work was in agriculture, health, and education, there are other important fields of activity. Roads must be built to take produce to market. Water and mineral resources must be surveyed. The techniques of modern public administration, industrial development, and housing must be learned.

What is the cost of this undertaking? Last year we spent 35 million dollars and for this year we have a budget of 200 million dollars. And I think you will want to know that our dollars have been matched threefold by the countries which have sought technical assistance.

Activities in Latin America

I have mentioned just a few things that have been done in the Far East, the Middle East, and in Africa. Certainly one of the most important areas in which we are operating is closer to home—the Latin American countries which are our next-door neighbors.

In my opinion we need to intensify our activities in the Latin American countries whose well-being is so important to all of us.

You can recall the prewar emergency, and the early days of World War II, and the sense of urgency that we felt about the good-neighbor policy. I know that in Washington, women's clubs gave up bridge and took up the study of Spanish and Portuguese. Hundreds of persons went to night schools to study Latin American history and government. Libraries did a booming business in books on Central and South America. I'm sure the same things happened here in Portsmouth and pretty generally throughout the United States. All of a sudden we had discovered our friends to the south, and we did our best to get acquainted with them in a hurry.

Many of the projects begun by the Coordinator

of Inter-American Affairs have been continued. Private enterprise, notably the Basic Economy Corporation, established by the Rockefellers, has extended a helping hand. More recently technical cooperation has been made available through our program of economic partnership. Right now we are making notable strides in controlling insect pests in the warm lowland areas of Central and South America that have plagued the local livestock industry. A new insecticide, a derivative of turpentine, is making it possible to control ticks and lice and grubs that in the past have caused heavy losses to cattle raisers.

In Cuba we are helping an important new industry become established. That is the growing of a soft fiber plant from which bags for the local sugar crop can be manufactured. We are helping Central American countries increase their production of coffee yield by developing improved strains of trees. We have introduced into Guatemala, where beans are an important staple in the diet, new varieties which yield twice as much as those formerly grown. In one section of Peru our extension workers with their know-how and show-how helped the community increase its cash crop twelvefold inside a 4-year period.

Yes, we are doing all these things and they are important to our economic partnership. But I'd like to see us, as a people, recapture more of that sense of urgency about Latin America that we had some years ago.

Particularly I'd like that sense to pervade our business community. Because, as I see it, we can only have economic partnership in a real sense if private enterprise joins in the undertaking. Some types of projects, such as those we have initiated, properly are within the province of government. Many more are within the sphere of private investment and management.

Among the things that I hope our Board can come up with are means for stimulating investment of private American capital in these countries on a basis of partnership with local capital.

When I visited South America during World War II at the request of President Roosevelt to survey economic conditions, I saw great possibilities for our businessmen to join with local interests in the establishment and management of needed local enterprises.

Those possibilities, I believe, still exist in large measure. Two things are essential if they are to be realized.

First, there must be a recognition on the part of American investors that local interests in the foreign country and the country itself have a legitimate right to share in the proceeds of the enterprise on an equitable basis. They have a proper claim to take part in the initial financing and to have a voice in management on a partnership basis.

Second, there must be a recognition on the part of foreign countries that they can attract private American investment only if they provide certain

safeguards. The capital outlay itself must be safeguarded. And the right to withdraw earnings at a fair rate must be assured.

It would be naive for us to assume that private enterprise can take its proper place in our program of economic partnership unless these two basic conditions are present.

Custom dictates that I should wax eloquent in bringing these remarks to a close. But let me break with tradition. Let me say simply that the new light of hope that we are bringing to the face of mankind, to a billion persons who are basically like ourselves, who want only the chance to get along in the world, is more eloquent testimony to the worth of economic partnership than anything I could say here tonight.

If we can do just that one thing—keep the eyes of mankind alight with hope—we shall be assured of mankind's faith in us. And we shall have kept faith with ourselves.

Lessons Learned of Czechoslovakia

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House February 25]

Four years ago, the Communists seized control of the free country of Czechoslovakia. By infiltrating every important branch of the Government, they had strangled all sources of independent opposition in that nation—all but one—the students and young people.

In the last few hours of Czechoslovakia's freedom, more than 5,000 students of Charles University marched toward their President's house to plead with him to save their country from the Communists. But before they could reach their destination, Communist police fired into the orderly crowd, wounding several students.

February 25 should be a very special day for the young men and women of all nations. Let it serve as a symbol—a reminder of youth's determination and will to resist, in the face of hopeless odds.

But let it also serve as a warning to all people, young and old, who are so fortunate that they still have their freedom.

Since February 25, 1948, the world has learned the lessons of Czechoslovakia. The world has learned that communism is aggressive—that communism means conquest, oppression, and slavery.

Four years ago, the students of Charles University taught us that we must do more than resist—we must be prepared to resist. We are putting this lesson of collective security into practice in Korea, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Pacific defense treaties.

All this we learned at the price of freedom for

Czechoslovakia and other nations temporarily under the Communist yoke. Let us never forget our lesson.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Education, Cooperative Program in Chile. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2246. Pub. 4231. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile—Signed at Santiago Jan. 16, 1951; entered into force Jan. 16, 1951.

Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Brazil. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2247. Pub. 4238. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil—Signed at Rio de Janeiro Dec. 27, 1950; entered into force Feb. 13, 1951.

Veterans' Claims: Facilities for Adjutant General Records Department, Philippines Command, United States Army. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2253. Pub. 4257. 9 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines—Signed at Manila July 25 and 28, 1949; entered into force July 28, 1949.

United States Educational Foundation in Iraq. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2327. Pub. 4269. 9 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iraq—Signed at Baghdad Aug. 16, 1951; entered into force Aug. 16, 1951.

Technical Cooperation: British Dependent Overseas Territories. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2281. Pub. 4337. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and United Kingdom—Signed at London July 13, 1951; entered into force July 13, 1951.

Kindley Air Force Base, Bermuda: Provision of Civil Aircraft Facilities. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2282. Pub. 4338. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and United Kingdom—Signed at Washington Mar. 23 and Apr. 25, 1951; entered into force Apr. 25, 1951.

Parcel Post—Postal Union of the Americas and Spain. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2287. Pub. 4342. 43 pp. 15¢.

Agreement, final protocol, and regulations of execution between the United States and other governments—Signed at Madrid Nov. 9, 1950; entered into force July 1, 1951.

(Continued on p. 399)

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

**THIRTY-THIRD REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD
NOVEMBER 1-15, 1951¹**

U.N. doc. S/2507

Transmitted January 28, 1952

I herewith submit report number 33 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 November, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 1069-1083, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Military armistice negotiations continued during the period. Item Two of the agenda concerning the establishment of a demilitarized zone was discussed in joint sub-delegation meetings. At the close of the period no agreement had been reached. The fundamental divergence of views between the Communists and our representatives with respect to agenda item Two is whether the cease-fire portion of the military armistice should be put into effect now or after agreement is reached on other items of the agenda. The Communists hold that as an "act of good faith" we should agree to a *de facto* cease fire concurrently with the acceptance of the present line of contact as a basis for a demilitarized zone. At the first meeting of the

two delegations on 10 July 1951 we made our position abundantly clear. The senior United Nations Command delegate in his opening statement said: "It is understood, of course, that hostilities will continue in all areas, except those neutral zones agreed upon, until such time as there is an agreement on the terms governing the armistice and until such time as an approved armistice commission is ready to function". At the plenary session of 30 July 1951, General Nam Il, the senior North Korean delegate, stated: "As to the continuation of hostilities during the negotiations, you say that I held that the hostilities should cease during the negotiations. That is absolutely an incorrect statement. I thought that the hostilities would continue during the negotiations and I will continue to think so. Until the signing of the agreement of the armistice, the hostilities will continue on both sides." This statement is diametrically opposed to the present illogical and unreasonable Communist position.

To accept a *de facto* cease fire would jeopardize the United Nations military position and military negotiations in Korea. A *de facto* cessation of hostilities prior to reaching agreement on armistice terms would enable the enemy to augment his ground and air strength in close proximity to the battle line. The security of United Nations Command forces would thereby be seriously compromised. With a *de facto* cease fire the enemy could prolong indefinitely discussions on other agenda items. Among these items is the vital subject pertaining to an exchange of prisoners of war.

The enemy remained on the defensive on the central and eastern front during the period. However, action on the western front included an increase in local enemy aggressiveness. Hostile patrol actions and local small-scale probing attacks along the entire battle line during the period were almost entirely limited to the hours of darkness. Enemy action during daylight hours consisted principally of interception of United Nations Command patrols. The relief of exhausted enemy units continued. For the first time in six months, the enemy found it necessary to draw on his reserves in the west to replace several

¹Transmitted to the Security Council by the deputy U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Jan. 28. For texts of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th reports to the Security Council on U.N. Command operations in Korea, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43; and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. Reports nos. 1-11 are published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108, respectively. The 12th, 13th, and 14th reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the 15th and 16th reports, *ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the 17th report, *ibid.*, Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the 18th, *ibid.*, May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, *ibid.*, May 21, 1951, p. 828; the 19th report, *ibid.*, June 4, 1951, p. 910; the 20th report, *ibid.*, June 11, 1951, p. 948; the 21st report, *ibid.*, July 2, 1951, p. 30; the 22d, *ibid.*, July 23, 1951, p. 155; the 23d and 24th reports, *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1951, p. 265; the 25th report, *ibid.*, Aug. 20, 1951, p. 303; the 26th report, *ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1951, p. 510; the 27th report, *ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1951, p. 709; the 28th and 29th reports, *ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1028; and the 30th, 31st and 32d reports, *ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266.

battered units in the central sector. Front lines at the close of the period remained substantially unchanged.

On the western front from 2 to 8 November the enemy displayed his greatest degree of aggressiveness in recent months. In one case a hostile division supported by approximately two armoured battalions launched night attack against United Nations Command positions in the Kigong-Otan area. Similar attacks, but in lesser strength, were made in the Chudong and the Sagimak areas. Although the attacking enemy in several instances secured initial advantages, he was unable to exploit his gains. The enemy's employment of armour was cautious; he took care to avoid close engagements with United Nations Command armour. The enemy remained sensitive to forward United Nations Command movement, intercepting United Nations Command patrols and raids along the entire sector during the period and employing a liberal quantity of mortar and artillery fire in these efforts. As a result of vigorous United Nations Command counteraction, the close of the period saw the enemy in possession of only two of his newly acquired terrain features. Tactically these features are, in themselves, unimportant.

On the central front principal enemy activity centered in the Kumsong area, and on the eastern shoulder of the recently United Nations Command-created Kumsong salient southwest of Talchon. In the former area the enemy's attention was directed toward intercepting United Nations Command infantry and armoured patrols. Newly laid anti-tank minefields, newly constructed anti-tank obstacles and artillery fire were utilized against United Nations Command patrol efforts. Southwest of Talchon the enemy unsuccessfully made almost nightly attempts to resecure recently lost positions. Early in the period prisoners reported that reserves drawn from the west were relieving the enemy units battered during the preceding period in the Kumsong salient.

Numerous patrol clashes and several enemy efforts to secure dominating heights characterized the action on the eastern front. Early in the period United Nations Command elements attacked and gained the sole remaining height dominating Kosong from the south. Limited enemy efforts to retake this objective and other local enemy attempts to secure positions southeast of Tupo were unsuccessful. The enemy's most determined patrol-interception efforts occurred in the area south of Tupo, where he employed anti-tank measures of all types in an effort to reduce the damaging effect of United Nations Command armoured patrols.

Despite the increase in enemy aggressiveness on the western front, the preponderance of available evidence fails to reveal any firm indications of imminent, major enemy offensive action. Nevertheless, the enemy's continuous logistical effort, his

recent aggressiveness, employment of armour and the strength of his reserves serve to demonstrate clearly his continued capability for powerful offensive action in any single sector.

United Nations Command warships patrolled both Korean coasts to maintain an effective blockade around the peninsula, and continued bombardment of enemy coastal communications. The onset of winter and attendant foul weather reduced aerial bombardment and interdiction programmes, but did not prevent United Nations Command aviators from attacking railroads, rolling stock, supply and munition depots and enemy troop concentrations. The white background of snow made enemy troops and rear area activities easier to distinguish in compensation for lowering skies and reduced visibility. Naval gunfire was intensified whenever flight operations were curtailed. At both ends of the battle line "floating artillery" furnished continuous close naval gunfire support for ground forces. In far northwest Korea the cruiser *Belfast* and the Canadian destroyer *Athabaskan* shelled gun positions and troop centres on the main land and coastal islands. The siege of Wonsan continued through the thirty-eighth week. The Royal Navy Frigate *Black Swan*, one of the first United Nations Command ships to fight in Korea, closed a gallant chapter in her log as she set course for England after serving on the far Eastern stations since July 1945.

Shore and carrier-based Marine pilots concentrated with telling effect on close air support missions.

Routine minesweeping and patrol bomber reconnaissance were continued effectively. A number of floating mines were reported and destroyed during the period as the Communists continued to violate the rules of warfare by planting these unlawful weapons to menace all shipping.

One United Nations Command twin-engined Neptune patrol bomber on a weather reconnaissance flight over the Northern Sea of Japan did not return to base on 6 November and is presumed to be lost. Intensive search for survivors has had negative results.

United Nations Command Air units under the operational control of Far East Air Forces, flying over 12,000 sorties, continued to apply heavy pressure against the enemy with emphasis being placed on the rail networks, airfields and enemy front line troop units. Weather was generally favourable for flying on eleven days, marginal on one day, and very unfavourable on the 6th, 12th, and 15th when heavy clouds settled over all of Korea. Vehicle sightings and claims dropped during the period as bright moonlight permitted North Korean night traffic to move without lights.

Air-to-air duels between United Nations Command jets and enemy MIG-15 interceptors continued as the highlight of the air war. MIG opposition was encountered daily when the weather was good and revealed that enemy tactics, aggress-

siveness, and state of training varied considerably. On many occasions the MIGs appeared to avoid aerial combat even under favourable conditions while on other occasions large formations broke to the attack in an orderly and aggressive manner. The quality of the Communist pilots varied radically, sometimes being reported as equivalent to that of student pilots, while at other times the superior aerobatics performance of MIGs indicated that they were flown by pilots who are experienced and competent. There seems to be good reason to assume that Northwest Korea is being used by the Communists as a combat training centre for jet pilots. Despite border restrictions, superiority in numbers and the ability of Communists to choose the time and place for attack, United Nations Command fighter kills continued to outnumber those of the enemy by better than three to one during the period of this report. During the fifteen day period United Nations Command pilots destroyed seven MIGs and damaged twenty-one. F-86 aircraft were responsible for the majority of these victories; F-84 Thunderjets, F-80 Shooting Stars, and Meteor-8 jets of the Royal Australian Air Force accounted for the remainder. Night interception of United Nations Command aircraft by Communist night fighters is becoming more common although little loss or damage to our aircraft has resulted from this cause to date.

Fighter bombers of the Fifth Air Force and attached Marine, South African, and Republic of Korea Air Force flew over 1,180 sorties in close support of United Nations Command ground units. Flaming napalm, machine guns, bombs and rockets were used to force the enemy from his infantry bunkers and artillery positions all along the front. At night United Nations Command aircraft assisted the ground troops by bombing targets selected by the Army, by flare lighting battle ground areas, and by distributing leaflets over enemy line.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

German Debts

The Department of State announced on February 27 the names of the persons who will attend the International Conference on German Debts to represent various U.S. creditor groups.

The Conference, which will convene at London on February 28, is being held under the auspices of the Tripartite Commission on German Debts, whose members are Warren Lee Pierson for the United States, Sir George Rendel for the United Kingdom, and F. D. Greggh for France. The principal task of the Conference will be to work out a plan of settlement for the various categories of German prewar external debts.

Heavy fighter bomber forces were also engaged in the systematic destruction and isolation of carefully selected segments of the enemy rail network. During the period 1,170 rail cuts were made by dive and low level bombing. On the return from these targets, the fighter bombers sought out and attacked with their remaining ordnance any enemy activity north of the bomb line. These armed reconnaissance missions accounted fifty-two locomotives, 450 rail cars and 2,380 supply buildings which were destroyed or damaged during the period.

United Nations Command reconnaissance aircraft continued to secure valuable intelligence information on enemy ground dispositions, air targets, vehicle movements, airfield status and weather. More than 1,000 reconnaissance sorties were flown with some penetrations extending through the MIG infested areas to the northern boundary of Korea.

Medium bombers operating from bases in Japan and Okinawa attacked airfields, bridges, rail facilities, supply concentrations and front line troop positions, using both radar and visual bombing methods as dictated by the weather.

Aircraft of Far East Air Forces Combat Cargo Command air lifted 47,835 passengers and 4,680 tons of freight for all forces.

The armistice discussions at Panmunjom continued to constitute a major subject of United Nations Command leaflets, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasts. Through these media, detailed summaries and explanations of the armistice negotiations are disseminated as widely as possible in Communist-held areas of Korea. United Nations Command radio broadcasts are received in free Korea as well. Enemy soldiers are being told of the continued Communist obstructionist tactics which may subject them to the hardships of another winter of war.

The Foreign Bondholders Protective Council will undertake the representation of holders of German governmental dollar bonds and corporate dollar bonds that are governmentally guaranteed. The council has designated the following persons to attend the Conference on its behalf:

James Grafton Rogers, President of the Council
Harvey K. Bundy, member of the Executive Committee
Kenneth M. Spang, Vice President of the Council
Dudley B. Bonsal, Counsel

The American Committee for Standstill Creditors of Germany has designated the following to represent United States holders of standstill credits:

Andrew L. Gomory
Russell G. Smith
Erven C. MacVeagh
Erving H. Adler

Parker McCollester of the law firm of Lord, Day and Lord has been designated as spokesman for the Mixed Claims Commission Award Holders Committee. He will be assisted at the Debt Conference by S. A. Challender, Amos J. Peaslee, and R. H. Porters.

Gordon Michler will attend the Conference in the interest of commercial and miscellaneous creditors in the United States. Mr. Michler, who is associated with the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, is also chairman of the German Committee of the National Foreign Trade Council.

Arrangements for the representation of the holders of corporate dollar bonds are now being completed and will be announced at an early date.

United Nations Trusteeship Council

On February 25 the Department of State announced that Francis B. Sayre, U.S. representative on the United Nations Trusteeship Council, will attend the tenth session of the Council which will open at New York on February 27. He will be assisted by the following other members of the U.S. delegation:

Special Representative

Elbert D. Thomas, Special Representative for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; High Commissioner, Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Advisers

William I. Cargo, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State
Donald D. Heron, Adviser to the Special Representative for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
James R. Fowler, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State
Chester E. Herrick, Lt. Comdr., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Administration and Plans Division, Department of the Navy
Louis McNutt, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
Emil Sady, Office of Territories, Department of the Interior
Curtis C. Strong, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

The Trusteeship Council, one of the principal organs of the United Nations, was established in December 1946 to assist in carrying out the functions of the United Nations with respect to the International Trusteeship System established by the Charter. At the present time there are 11 trust territories, 7 in Africa (Tanganyika under British administration; Ruanda-Urundi under Belgian administration; Somaliland under Italian administration; Cameroons under British administration; Cameroons under French administration; Togoland under British administration; and Togoland under French administration); and 4 in

the Pacific area (Western Samoa under New Zealand administration; Nauru and New Guinea under Australian administration; and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands administered by the United States). The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is a strategic trust territory administered by the United States pursuant to the trusteeship agreement between the United States and the Security Council of the United Nations.

Membership on the Trusteeship Council is evenly divided between six states which administer trust territories (Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States) and six states which do not (China, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Iraq, Thailand, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). Italy, the administering authority for the trust territory of Somaliland, but not as yet a member of the United Nations, participates without vote in the work of the Council.

Major items on the agenda of the Council will include the examination of annual reports on the four Pacific trust territories—Western Samoa, Nauru, New Guinea, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; the examination of petitions; arrangements for the 1952 visiting mission to trust territories in West Africa; the revision of the Trusteeship Council's provisional questionnaire; and consideration of resolutions adopted by the sixth session of the General Assembly. The Council's Committee on Rural Economic Development and its Standing Committee on Administrative Unions are expected to meet during the session.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

The Department of State announced on February 25 that the Panel for Sub-area V of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries will convene at Ottawa, Canada, on February 26, 1952. The United States delegation is as follows:

U.S. Commissioners

John L. Kask, Chief, Office of Foreign Activities, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior
Bernhard K. Knollenberg, Chester, Conn.
Francis W. Sargent, Director, Division of Marine Fisheries, Department of Conservation, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Boston, Mass.

Advisers

Herbert W. Graham, Chief, North Atlantic Fishery Investigations, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior
Howard A. Schuck, Biologist in charge of Groundfish Investigations, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, Woods Hole, Mass.

Observer from the U.S. Industry Advisory Committee

Patrick McHugh, Secretary Treasurer, Atlantic Fisherman's Union, 49 Hardwick Street, Brighton, Mass.

The International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries was established in accordance with the provisions of the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.

which was concluded at Washington on February 8, 1949, and which entered into force on July 3, 1950. The Commission is charged with the responsibility of keeping under continuous review all pertinent information concerning the international fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean; coordinating and disseminating all information concerning such fisheries; and making recommendations to governments on conservation measures deemed necessary to maintain such fisheries at a maximum level of sustained production. As stated in the convention, the Commission is composed of panels for each of five sub-areas of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean. The Governments of Canada and the United States comprise the membership of the Panel for Sub-area V, which covers that portion of the total area adjacent to the New England coast.

The purpose of the forthcoming meeting is to determine whether members of Panel V should recommend to the full Commission the adoption of regulatory measures for conservation of the fisheries in Sub-area V. A joint report, containing preliminary recommendations for the regulation of fisheries in that area, has been prepared by Canadian and U.S. fisheries scientists, and will serve as a basis of discussion at the Ottawa meeting.

THE DEPARTMENT

Expression of Confidence in Ambassador Cochran

Statement by Acting Secretary Webb
[Released to the press February 26]

On behalf of the Department of State, I wish to deny reports appearing in the press this morning that consideration is being given to recalling Ambassador Merle Cochran from Indonesia.

Ambassador Cochran, in accordance with instructions from this Government, informed officials of the Indonesian Government that under the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, an agreement under section 511 (a) of the Act would be necessary to permit the United States to continue extending military as well as economic assistance, but that an agreement pursuant to section 511 (b) would be adequate to permit the continuation of economic assistance.

It was decided by both Governments that an agreement under section 511 (a) would be most suitable, in order to facilitate the availability of equipment needed by the Indonesian Government for the maintenance of internal security. Ambassador Cochran has acted throughout in accordance with the Department's instructions and enjoys the full confidence of the Department of State.

Recent Releases—

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Postal Union of the Americas and Spain. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2286. Pub. 4344. 68 pp. 20¢.

Convention, final protocol, and regulations of execution between the United States and other governments—Signed at Madrid Nov. 9, 1950; entered into force July 1, 1951.

Relief Supplies and Packages for India—Duty-Free Entry—Payment of Transportation Charges. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2291. Pub. 4348. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and India—Signed at Washington July 9, 1951; entered into force July 9, 1951.

Air Base at Dhahran. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2290. Pub. 4346. 17 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia—Signed at Mecca and at Jidda June 18, 1951; entered into force June 18, 1951.

Launching the Campaign of Truth—Second Phase. International Information and Cultural Series 20. Pub. 4401. 50 pp. Limited distribution.

Seventh Semiannual Report of the Secretary of State to Congress on the International Information and Educational Exchange Program, January 1 to June 30, 1951.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Feb. 23—Mar. 1, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

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*149	2/27	Anniversary of Dominican Republic
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152	2/27	Conference on German debts
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155	2/28	Japan: Admin. agreement announced
156	2/28	Johnston: Remarks on Pt. 4
157	2/29	Acheson: NATO accomplishments
†158	3/1	President: Broadcast on VOA

¹ Since the press release, containing the unofficial text of the agreement, was issued, the official text has become available; it is the latter version which is printed on p. 382.

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The Mutual Security Program: A Program for Peace

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I recommend that the Congress authorize the continuance of the Mutual Security Program for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1953. Such action is essential to advance our program for world peace and to protect the security of the United States.

The Mutual Security Program provides equipment, supplies, and technical cooperation to enable friendly countries to carry out military and economic programs that will bring very great returns in increasing their security and our own. In such case, the countries concerned are driving to accomplish objectives which will bring closer to full realization our mutual goals of freedom and peace under the great principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Without some resources from us to add to their own, these objectives cannot be accomplished.

My support for this program rests on four propositions:

First, the plain fact is that we cannot achieve lasting security for ourselves except in association with other nations.

Second, the funds provided by the United States under the Mutual Security Program are essential to the success of the common efforts we are making with other free nations for peace.

Third, the funds thus invested by the United States will yield far larger returns, in terms of our own security, than if the same amount were used for our own defense establishment.

Fourth, the cost of the Mutual Security Program, together with the much larger costs of our military services and other defense measures, are well within our economic capacity.

Introduction

I do not need to review here the tragic circumstances which have compelled this Nation to undertake massive programs for national defense and for mutual security. Most of us fully understand

today the grimness of the threat which Soviet aggression carries for the survival of civilization.

Neither do I need to dwell upon the fact that all our military preparations are defensive preparations. We are seeking to create strength in the world sufficient to prevent aggression. We do not contemplate expenditures in the magnitude or of the character necessary to launch aggression. These facts underline the statement which cannot be too often repeated: Our objective is peace, not war.

The point I do want to emphasize, for there still appear to be some people who do not recognize it, is that to achieve peace we must work together with other nations.

Some people would have us withdraw to our own shores and gamble our national safety on air and naval power. A glance at some of the vital materials that go into air and naval power illustrates how self-defeating this would be. Four-fifths or more of the manganese, the tin, and the chrome in a United States destroyer or jet fighter comes from outside the western hemisphere. Should we turn our back on the rest of the world, these and other precious resources, so vital to our own security, would not only be lost to us, but in all probability would be added to the military strength of the Soviet empire.

Without our friends abroad, the threat of aggression would move close to our own shores. Without their armed forces, the bases on their soil, and the raw materials from their mines and forests, our military power would be gravely hampered in its defense of the United States, and our whole economy would be seriously weakened. Our support and assistance for other nations, therefore, are not in the nature of charity. These are not hand-outs which we can carelessly offer or withdraw without regard to the effect on our own safety. The problems of American survival would be multiplied to an incalculable extent if we had to face the Soviet threat without the support and assistance of other nations.

The Mutual Security Program is justified not only by these hard strategic and military realities. It is, in addition, the only course which fulfills our position as a world leader in the battle for freedom and the rights of man. That is the reason so many nations freely join with us in a common faith in democracy and a common desire for peace. These nations are our friends, and not our satellites. As friends, they contribute to the

¹ H. doc. 382; transmitted Mar. 6. Also printed as Department of State publication 4531. For text of the radio and television address on the Mutual Security Program which the President delivered on Mar. 6, see White House press release of the date.

shared wisdom and faith of the free world—a wisdom and faith on which no single nation can claim a monopoly. We must accordingly take care to treat them as friends. We must not act as though we wished to degrade them to the rank of satellites by exacting a rigid and humiliating subservience which no free nation could with dignity accept. We will never be defeated as long as we truly stand for a free partnership of free peoples. The unconquerable power of the free world lies in the fact that loyalties are not concerned.

The concrete requirements of American security compel us to a policy of international cooperation. But it would be, I believe, a misrepresentation of the American people to suppose that self-interest—even wise and enlightened self-interest—is the only cause for our concern with the outside world. As a nation, we have been dedicated through our history to the belief that responsible men deserve a democratic government and a free society. This belief is the essence of our way of life. We would betray our intermost convictions if today we were to flee the cause of the free peoples. If through inaction we desert the cause of democracy, the democratic hope may be exterminated in broad areas of this earth. If we rise to our historic traditions, we can add powerful momentum to the democratic counter-offensive which inspires in the people of the world a sense of their own destiny as free men—and which will in the end burst the bonds of tyranny everywhere on earth.

The pursuit of mutual security through mutual strength is thus the keystone of the broad foreign policy which the United States and other free nations have adopted as the surest road to lasting peace.

The American people have steadfastly supported this foreign policy since the Second World War. Its pattern today is sharp and clear. If I were to make a brief definition of our policy, I would call it the policy of peace through collective strength. We are joined with other countries in the patient and systematic building in the free world of enough military strength to deter external Communist aggression, and of economic and political and moral strength to remove internal threats of Communist subversion and point the way toward democratic progress.

I wish to emphasize very strongly that all these forms of strength are necessary if we are to achieve freedom and peace. The plain and inescapable fact is that they are indivisible. Neither military strength nor economic strength nor political strength nor moral strength can do the job alone.

Military strength is the first necessity, for without a shield against aggression the free world would be helpless before the enemy. Military strength must be built, and we must help build it, in Europe and in other critical areas of the

world. But military strength is not just a matter of delivering arms to our allies. It is also a matter of defense support to enable our allies to do more to expand and equip their own defense forces.

And even arms and defense support together do not provide a full answer to the Soviet threat; to believe that they do is dangerously to misunderstand the nature of the foe. The gun is but one weapon in the Soviet arsenal of aggression. If we ignored the necessity for building moral and political and economic strength, we would expose ourselves to the danger of Communist gains which could be at least as damaging as outright aggression. Since the Soviet Union does not rely exclusively on military attack, we would be foolish indeed to rely exclusively on military defense.

Outline of the Program

The funds required under the Mutual Security Program fall into two broad categories.

The first of these, which is by far the larger, is for assistance in building up the military strength of friendly nations. This aid is of two types: (1) direct military aid, primarily in the form of military equipment and components thereof, and (2) defense support—primarily in the form of raw materials, commodities, and machinery—to enable other countries to sustain and increase their military efforts where that type of support produces greater returns in military strength than would an equal amount of direct military aid. The bulk of the direct military aid and of the defense support will go to strengthen the defenses of the free nations in Europe. Amounts for direct military aid and defense support make up about 90 percent of the total funds recommended for the Mutual Security Program for the fiscal year 1953.

The second broad category is for economic and technical assistance, primarily for the underdeveloped areas of the world, where economic progress is the first essential in the battle for freedom. Some of these funds will in fact also support defense efforts in certain countries in Southeast Asia, where Communist aggression is an immediate menace. Amounts recommended for economic and technical assistance are about 10 percent of the total.

The distribution of the amounts recommended is shown in more detail in the following table:

In the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the Congress provided for an integrated program, administered by appropriate operating agencies under the general direction of the Director for Mutual Security. These arrangements are working well, and I recommend that they be continued. Under them, direct military aid will be administered by the Department of Defense. The Mutual Security Agency will administer defense support in Europe, together with technical and economic

assistance in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. In South Asia, the Near East, Latin America, and the independent states of Africa, economic and technical assistance will be administered by the Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State.

We shall continue our policy of closely coordinating the Mutual Security Program with the technical assistance programs of the Organization of American States and the United Nations and its agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization. In addition, we shall continue to encourage, to the maximum extent possible, the investment of private capital for economic development abroad, and we shall continue to relate outlays under the Mutual Security Program to the loans being made by the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

EUROPE

Today, the problem of achieving security and strength in free Europe, in my judgment, is on the way to solution. The last 5 years have recorded remarkable gains as a result of actions we have taken under our policy of peace through collective strength—first in Greece and Turkey; then, in 1948, through the European Recovery Program, and since 1949 through the growing defensive power of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The American contribution did not of itself create these gains; but it did supply the essential margin without which the Europeans could not have fought their way out of their post-war slough of despond.

Five years ago, many European nations were on the verge of economic or political collapse. A divided and despairing continent—next to our own, the most productive and industrially powerful in the world—lay open for Soviet conquest.

How different the picture is today. Europe has made immense advances—in economic output, in military strength, in political self-confidence, in

progress toward unity. Today, the Soviet Union knows that it cannot achieve its purposes in Europe, so long as the policy of collective strength continues.

Europe still has far to go. Economic health and vitality in Europe require a series of specific actions—varying from country to country—to raise industrial and agricultural productivity, to knock down trade barriers and exchange restrictions, and to encourage the vigorous forces of competition in European and world markets. They require further progress toward the democratic goals of a fair distribution of income, strong and free trade unions, fair and effective tax systems, and programs of land reform.

Above all, we in the United States do not believe that Western Europe can achieve its full strength without accelerated progress toward unity. Only this unity can release the great potential energy of free Europe. We will continue in every way we can to encourage its attainment.

The difficulties are very great. It is only candid to report that progress in this direction has not always been as fast as we hoped. Yet, in many respects the progress has been most impressive.

A revolution has been taking place in European thinking. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union have laid foundations for joint action in the economic and financial fields. In the Schuman Plan, six countries are creating an international authority for the production and distribution of coal and steel. Under the European Defense Community, the same six countries are planning to establish common armed forces, a common defense ministry, and a common military budget.

Europe has moved faster toward integration in the last 5 years than it did in the previous 500. At every stage in this movement, the United States has provided encouragement and support. If this progress continues in the next 5 years—and I am confident it will—a new Europe will emerge

Mutual Security Program, 1953

(In millions)

	Direct military	Defense support	Economic and technical	Administration	Area totals
Europe	4,070	¹ 1,819	5,889
Near East and Africa	606	196	802
Asia and the Pacific	611	² 408	1,019
American Republics	62	22	84
Multilateral Technical Assistance, Migration, and Relief Package Freight	30	30
Administration	75	75
Total	³ 5,350	1,819	656	75	³ 7,900

¹ Includes economic assistance for Austria.

² Includes assistance to support military efforts in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

³ Columns do not add to totals because of rounding.

as a great and creative partner in the defense of freedom.

It is this progress toward European economic recovery and political unity which makes possible a growing defense effort in Western Europe. The build-up of military strength there since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty has been most encouraging. In the coming fiscal year, European military expenditures will be considerably more than twice as large as they were in the year preceding the Communist aggression in Korea. Production of military matériel in Western Europe has multiplied about four times in that period. The European nations have lengthened the training periods under their compulsory military service programs and have substantially enlarged and improved their armed forces. The pace of the military build-ups has given many millions of Europeans new confidence in their capacity to resist aggression.

This is an impressive record of progress. Of course, the record is far from perfect—especially in view of the urgency of the threat posed by aggressive Soviet imperialism. We can find many specific weaknesses and shortcomings to criticize—and some people in our country fasten their attention so exclusively on such things as to advocate that the defense of Europe be abandoned. I do not wish to minimize the shortcomings, but the fundamental question to ask is: “Are we moving at a substantial rate in the right direction? Is real progress being made?” The answer is obvious. So is the conclusion to be drawn. The record abundantly warrants confidence in our European allies, and our continued steadfast support for them.

Two weeks ago, at Lisbon, the member nations took the most far reaching strides in European defense since the adoption of the North Atlantic Treaty itself in 1949. The North Atlantic Council at Lisbon endorsed the specific means through which the forces of the European Defense Community—including German contingents—will be organized and tied into General Eisenhower’s command. After months of planning by the special committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Harriman, the Council made specific and concrete decisions providing for the more rapid build-up of forces and for the provision of the necessary equipment and construction to support them.

By the end of this calendar year, General Eisenhower’s command is expected to have at its disposal a formidable force—including some 50 army divisions, about half of them on active duty, and some 4,000 military planes—and a sound base for further build-up in 1953 and 1954. These forces, joined by those of Greece and Turkey, will bring within measurable distance the time when even the most foolhardy man in the Kremlin will not dare risk open attack.

In order to equip the forces being raised by our allies under the Lisbon agreements, we as well as

they must step up our efforts. There have been delays in our own production and delivery of arms. And combat requirements for Korea have, of course, received top priority for deliveries from our current output. I am assured that production is now being accelerated substantially, and I have consequently directed that deliveries to the North Atlantic Treaty defense forces be greatly speeded up.

The rearmament effort has also created problems in Europe. The European economy, after its extraordinary comeback in the years of the European Recovery Program, has now been subjected to new and severe pressures. The Marshall Plan was designed to help restore minimum economic health, not to produce a surplus capable of creating military forces adequate for European defense. Today, not only has rearmament imposed a heavy direct burden, but the global consequences of rearmament—including rises in the prices both of raw materials generally and of finished goods from the United States—have drastically upset the European balance of payments. Substantial and sustained efforts will be necessary to meet these problems, even with our help.

However, the European countries have a sizable capacity to increase their armed forces, to construct military bases and facilities, and to produce military equipment and supplies—if we provide the crucial margin of raw materials and other support for their defense efforts. If we provide this margin of resources, the European countries will be able to produce far more military equipment than they otherwise could, and to maintain far larger armed forces than would otherwise be possible. Our defense support will allow them to use plants, machinery, materials, and manpower which exist in Europe, but which otherwise could not be devoted to defense purposes. For this reason, our defense support is an extremely economical way to achieve military strength for our mutual security. The funds included in the Mutual Security Program for defense support will yield, according to the best estimates, more than twice as much military strength in Europe as would the same funds spent for the direct transfer of military equipment from the United States.

Accordingly, the Mutual Security Program for Europe is planned so that the United States will provide both weapons and defense support. The form of assistance—whether military equipment or assistance in financing imports of raw materials and other items where required to make possible the necessary level of European defense efforts—has been decided in each case on the basis of which form produces the most results in defensive strength at the least cost.

In addition to the funds for the North Atlantic Treaty countries and Western Germany, limited amounts are included in the Mutual Security Pro-

gram for Yugoslavia, whose defiance of the Soviet Union is giving heart to untold millions behind the Iron Curtain; for Austria, where continued economic assistance is necessary to maintain economic stability in the face of occupation of part of the country by Soviet forces; and for facilitating emigration from Europe under international arrangements. We expect soon to complete arrangements with Spain which will assist in the defense of the Mediterranean area; our part in these arrangements will be carried forward with funds already made available by the Congress.

ASIA, AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA

Outside of Europe, our policy of building collective strength for peace must meet and overcome a very different range of problems. The most serious problems of Asia, Africa, and Latin America occur in the underdeveloped areas—the areas which have not yet shared in the benefits of the bursts of scientific and technical advance of the last two centuries.

The people of many of these areas confront the legacy of centuries of neglect—they are in many cases desperately poor, defenseless before famine and disease, disabled by illiteracy. At the same time, they have a new and burning determination to improve their living standards, to fulfill their desire for self-government, to control their own futures. As old social structures have failed to meet the basic needs of their peoples, the popular energy, so long pent up, is bursting forth in fierce nationalism and in fierce demands for real economic change.

These conditions would exist even if there were no Soviet threat to world peace. But the pressure of Soviet communism, working overtime to exploit the turbulence of the underdeveloped areas, greatly increases the necessity for speed in meeting these conditions—speed in the interest, not done of orderly and democratic development, but of the security of the whole free world.

As a nation born in a struggle for individual freedom, we cordially welcome the aspirations of people to free themselves from oppression and misery. To place ourselves wholeheartedly at their side, we must work with them in their struggle against poverty and famine and illiteracy and disease. In the Point Four concept, we have means of joining hands with the constructive forces of these areas before bitterness and frustration drive them into a fatal alliance with Soviet communism.

Point Four means making our scientific advances and technical know-how available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. Point Four means technical missionaries at work, and it also means the supplies and equipment that are needed to put new techniques into effect.

No one should think that Point Four involves

some single formula or program which is to be applied everywhere, in equal measure, throughout the underdeveloped regions of the world. The kinds of aid we plan must be tailored both to what we can afford at any given time and to the specific situation in each country. Our experience in Latin America has demonstrated that Point Four operations, to be successful, must be supported by adequate supplies and equipment. The supplies and equipment can be financed in various ways.

Some countries can attract private investment capital and loans to finance most of their outlays for economic development. Other countries can earn enough dollars from their own exports to finance most of the equipment and supplies they need. In still other countries, where neither loans nor private capital can meet the need, this Government must provide substantial quantities of supplies and equipment to assure real progress on vital programs for development. That is the direction we are taking in India today, and in other places where the need is particularly urgent and where the local plans are firm enough to produce a sound result.

Today, we have technical and economic missions in 40 countries. The shirtsleeve diplomats of Point Four are carrying the American revolution to the villages and farms of the world. They are providing farmers with better seed and better fertilizer, better methods of plowing and sowing, and better means of harvesting and saving the crops. They are helping to fight malaria and dysentery, trachoma, and rinderpest. They are providing training in the techniques of modern government. They are helping to build roads and canals and dams, schools, and hospitals. They are teaching people to read, to revitalize the soil, to irrigate it, to drain it. In short, they are teaching people by methods of peace to change their own world without bloodshed.

The funds we invest in Point Four will yield direct and immediate results in terms of larger food production, better communications, more agricultural and health specialists, engineers, and other technicians. But even more important are the longer term results. For the magic of this work is its multiplying effect: If we can help train 10 teachers, they can train hundreds of children; if we can help set up 10 demonstration farms, hundreds of farmers can come and learn to use new methods; if we can help drill a hundred new wells or build a new irrigation dam, thousands of farmers can increase their yields and plow back their earnings into further improvements. In this way, a relatively small investment can bring immense results.

In one district in India, the production of food has already been increased 46 percent. Repeat this across the continents of Asia and Africa and Latin America, and we enter a new era in the history of man.

The Near East presents a sharp challenge to American statesmanship. The countries of these areas are of vital importance to the security of the free world, but the problems of achieving constructive and orderly development are extremely difficult.

Living standards are generally very low. Transportation and land tenure systems are often archaic. Political and religious controversies simmer throughout the region. Nationalism is sometimes misdirected into fanatical outbursts which ignore the benefits to be gained from international cooperation. The Communists are doing their best to stir up confusion and trouble.

Most of these problems can only be solved by the people of these countries finding ways to make solid progress in developing economic strength and effective free institutions. But we can and must help them.

We can help dig wells for irrigation and clean water in Iran and Iraq. We can help set up farm credit institutions and agricultural extension services in Lebanon and Liberia. We can help build roads and establish public health services in Israel. We can help build up school and hospital services in countries throughout the area. For projects of this type, I recommend economic and technical assistance in this area (including help for the Arab refugees) of 196 million dollars.

Military assistance for nations in this area is recommended in the amount of 606 million dollars. Most of these funds are for Greece and Turkey, whose military assistance programs are carried under the heading of the Near East; defense support funds for those countries are included with those for Europe.

To help in maintaining security in the Near East, the United States has joined with Turkey, France, Great Britain, and three Commonwealth countries in proposing the establishment of a Middle East Command. We hope this Command will become the center of cooperative efforts by all countries concerned for the defense of the region as a whole from outside aggression.

Asia and the Pacific

Much of Asia at this moment is under Communist attack. The free nations are holding the line against aggression in Korea and Indochina, and are battling Communist-inspired disorders in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines. The loss of any of these countries would mean the loss of freedom for millions of people, the loss of vital raw materials, the loss of points of critical strategic importance to the free world.

The Mutual Security Program for this area includes military assistance in the amount of 611 million dollars, and economic and technical assistance of 408 million dollars, some of which will

contribute directly to the defense programs of certain countries of Southeast Asia.

Of our military assistance, a large part will go to Indochina where the troops of the French Union and of the Associated States are battling valiantly against the Communist-led forces, and another large part will go to continue to help prepare the Chinese armies on Formosa to resist Communist aggression. The rest will go to the Philippines and Thailand, to help build forces strong enough to insure internal security.

As in the Near East and Africa, however, security in Asia is far more than a military problem. Our military assistance is essential to check the encroachments of Communist imperialism. But the long-run promise of stability and progress lies, not alone in arms, but in the provision of sufficient economic and technical support to enable the peoples of Asia to conquer their old, deep-seated and agonizing economic problems and to share in the benefits of an expanding world economy.

In India, for example, the key to economic progress lies in boosting food production. This is the only way to remove the constant threat of famine and ease the desperate struggle for a daily livelihood. It is the only way of freeing funds now spent to import food, so they can be used instead for productive investment in developing natural resources, transportation, and industry.

The whole future of India as a free nation may well lie in her ability to raise her food production and do it quickly.

We must support India's own efforts to get this done. The Indian Government has already set in motion a plan under which, in a very few years she will be able to grow the food needed by her people, and will have established a sound basis for further economic development. It is a good plan, practical and definite. India itself is financing most of it. And we are greatly stepping up our aid for this plan with confidence that the sum we spend will bring concrete results.

This is an example of how our aid can produce large-scale results by supporting the efforts of the people of the Asian countries. In the same way, we are helping to expand irrigation in Pakistan to eliminate malaria in Thailand, to increase rice yields in Burma.

It is vital that this work be carried forward rapidly. For in this region, there is still time to set in motion programs which will tap the energies of the people and give them solid hope for advancement under governments determined to resist Communist expansion. We must not let this opportunity go by default. Let it never be said of the American people that our eyes are focused only on what might have been—that we grow concerned about the countries of Asia only after they have been lost to the enemy. The bold and wise investment of American funds in this

region in the next few years can make a vital difference to the future of freedom.

Special note should be taken of the contribution that the new, free Japan can make to the growth of economic strength in Asia. A growing trade partnership of Japan with Southeast and South Asia can benefit everyone concerned. Such a partnership in free Asia can result in a self-supporting, expanding regional economy, free of permanent dependence on United States economic aid, and free from the danger of satellite slavery under the Soviet orbit.

Latin America

I do not need to restate here the inestimable importance of Latin America. Its governments and its peoples are joined with us in the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty to bolster the security of the free world. It is a most important source of vital raw materials; and it carries on with us a large and mutually advantageous trade. In case of emergency, its military forces can partially relieve ours of some of the important tasks connected with hemisphere defense.

In order to assist hemisphere defense, I am recommending military assistance of 62 million dollars for the Latin American countries. In addition, I recommend 23 million dollars to carry forward the remarkable technical cooperation work now under way in 19 Latin American states to develop agriculture and natural resources, education, health, transportation, and other fundamental services. This includes 1 million dollars for our share of the technical cooperation work of the Organization of American States. This assistance—supplemented as it is by substantial amounts of private loans and investments and public loans through the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank—has already helped materially to raise living standards, speed economic development, and reduce vulnerability to undemocratic movements of the extreme right or the extreme left. The policy of the good neighbor has been one of our most successful policies; we must not falter in our loyalty to that policy today.

Conclusion

The major national security programs I am recommending for the fiscal year 1953, including the Mutual Security Program, total about 64 billion dollars. This request raises once again the question whether the American nation can afford so much money for national security. This is a serious question. It requires a serious answer.

Certainly the total security program—of which the Mutual Security Program is a relatively small part—is by any standard a large one. It has resulted in some unavoidable economic dislocations

and inflationary pressures. Yet, the burden has been carried with remarkably little strain.

The fundamental reason for this is that our national production has been expanding rapidly, and will continue to rise. Security expenditures, measured in 1951 prices, rose about 18 billion dollars from 1950 to 1951; but the increase in our national output was even larger—totaling about 26 billion dollars. During the next 2 years, we can continue to raise output by not less than 5 percent annually, increasing the gross national product (at 1951 prices) to about 340–345 billion dollars in 1952, and to about 355–360 billion in 1953, compared with 327 billion in 1951 and 301 billion in 1950. If output rises at this rate, we will have increased our total annual production about one-fifth in 3 years. Even with the immense diversion to security purposes, production should be high enough, by the beginning of 1953, to permit total civilian consumption and capital investment at least 50 percent higher than during World War II.

There will certainly be cutbacks in some things. Yet, even if automobile production should drop to around 4 million units this year, it must be remembered that this is only slightly less than the average production of 1948 and 1949. If housing should dip below one million units, it must be remembered that we have succeeded in producing more than one million units per year in only 3 years of our history. And as we expand our output of vital materials such as steel and aluminum, we can again increase the output of such civilian items.

All in all, our present security expenditures are clearly within our economic capacity. And as our basic productive strength continues to increase in the years ahead, we should be able to carry more easily the substantial security costs which may continue to be necessary.

Let us consider for a moment the costs of possible alternatives to our present policy.

The alternative of premeditated and deliberate war is one which no democratic or God-fearing people can for a moment entertain. Even if we were insane enough to consider it, however, it would obviously entail expenditures immensely greater than our present ones, not to speak of the terrible waste and destruction of human life, property, and natural resources.

Another alternative—of contracting our commitments and retreating to the Western Hemisphere—has a momentary seductiveness, because it would seem to relieve us of the contributions we are now making to collective defense. But, in fact, if we followed the policy of retreat, we would have to try to replace the contributions to our security which now come from the cooperation of our allies. We could not replace some of those contributions at any cost; others only at very high cost, not just in money, resources, and military manpower, but in the precious political and eco-

conomic freedoms we are mobilizing to defend.

The policy of retreat would deprive us of armed forces which, if called upon to fight for the defense of their own countries, would at the same time be fighting for the defense of ours. It would deprive us of essential raw materials. It would impose upon us a much higher level of mobilization than we have today. It would require a stringent and comprehensive system of allocation and rationing in order to husband our smaller resources. It would require us to become a garrison state, and to impose upon ourselves a system of centralized regimentation unlike anything we have ever known.

In the end, when the enemy, encouraged by our retreat, began to organize the rest of the world against us, we would face the prospect of bloody battle—and on our own shores. The ultimate costs of such a policy would be incalculable. Its adoption would be a mandate for national suicide.

I am asking the Congress for 7.9 billion dollars for the Mutual Security Program—an amount which will bring returns no other policy could hope to produce so economically.

I am deeply convinced, after studying the matter carefully, that if there is any question about this amount, it is not whether it is too large, but whether it is too small.

These funds are needed—all of them—to pay for essential parts of the total undertaking to help free nations build adequate combined defenses. If the military assistance funds are reduced, this will mean a corresponding reduction in the effective combat forces which can be created in Europe and Asia, and a serious disruption of the timetable for achieving adequate defenses. If the defense support funds are reduced, it will mean that our partners in this endeavor will be unable to raise and train the scheduled forces or unable to expand their own military production as planned. If economic and technical funds are reduced, there will be a corresponding reduction in what we can do to help countries in Asia, the Near East, Africa, and Latin America to strengthen themselves, and a correspondingly greater danger of these areas falling to Communist aggression or subversion.

I would not counsel the Congress to spend one dollar more than is necessary to support our policy of peace. But there is no economy more false than that which is summed up in the tragic phrase, "too little and too late." Such a policy risks the loss of our investment as well as our objective. It would be foolish and dangerous to withhold a dollar now at the risk of expending, not just many times as many dollars, but human lives as well, a few years later.

The question is frequently—and properly—asked: How long are we going to have to continue this type of program? I cannot—no one can—give an answer in terms of a specific month and year. But I can say that one of the central pur-

poses in everything we are doing under the Mutual Security Program is to build strength which will eliminate the need for assistance from the United States.

This is not a program for carrying the rest of the world on our backs. This is a program for getting the other free nations on their own feet, so they can move ahead without special help from us or anyone else.

As the Mutual Security Program moves ahead—as larger military forces become equipped and trained, as economic strength continues to increase—we can expect the costs to the United States to decline. This is not only our own desire; it is also the natural hope and objective of the people of other countries. Free people do not relish dependence on other nations. They wish to achieve as rapidly as possible the economic health and vigor which will enable them to sustain their own programs of defense and economic progress. The Mutual Security Program will hasten the day when this will become possible.

History has thrust a fearful responsibility upon the United States. Today, the survival of freedom and civilization on this earth may depend on the initiative and decisions taken in our own Nation's capital. The free peoples look to us for leadership. Leadership implies more than a recognition of the problem. It implies also a capacity to work out a joint solution with our partners, and to stay with it till the end; it implies resolution and fortitude. We have shown that we understand the threat. But some are doubtful whether we will stay the course until we achieve peace in a free world.

I am not in doubt. I know that we shall succeed. It is perhaps true that our history has been characterized by impatience, by a passion for quick results. It is equally true, however, that it has also been characterized by perseverance and determination—the perseverance of the pioneer, making his steadfast way into the unknown West; the determination of the farmer and worker, transforming a savage wilderness into the strongest and most productive nation known to history. Perseverance and determination, steadfastness and dependability—it was these qualities, and not recklessness or imprudence, which built America. It is our obligation to turn these qualities outward. We must show the world that we can meet any crisis, and that temporary frustration will not drive us to panicky aggression or to ignominious retreat. This is the challenge of free world leadership.

In the last analysis, our leadership must stand or fall on the moral power behind it. No nation, of course, can undertake policies which are not squarely and solidly based on national self-interest. But world leadership in these perilous times calls for policies which, while springing from self-interest, transcend it—policies which serve as a bridge between our own national objectives and

the needs and aspirations of other free people.

I deeply believe that the Mutual Security Program is an expression of a new spirit in the world—a spirit based on faith in democracy and human decency, and looking to a new collaboration among nations and peoples. It expresses the deep reality of our friendship for other peoples—the sincerity of our determination to join with them in building a world where freedom, justice, and security will exist for all.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 6, 1952.

ADDRESS BY W. AVERELL HARRIMAN²

We are met at an extraordinary moment in history. Tremendous changes are taking place in the world. New institutions are being invented, new attitudes shaped as the free world labors to unite and organize its strength to deter Soviet aggression. The pace of history is now so swift that a man is hard pressed to keep up with it. Preoccupied as we are with the things which touch us immediately, we sometimes fail to comprehend the magnitude of events, and, seeing them separately, miss the pattern into which they fall.

Perhaps it is because I have just come back from the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon that I feel so keenly the sweep of history and our role in steering it. Our leadership is inspiring confidence that through unity of purpose and action a world war can be prevented and the foundations laid for peace.

At Lisbon new long strides were taken towards the security of the free world. Two profoundly significant factors affected the work of the conference:

The first was the determination of the governments of those ancient antagonists, France and Germany, to join with their neighbors in merging military forces in a single defense establishment. With a Franco-German understanding it becomes possible to bring Western Germany into the European Defense Community and to conclude the contractual agreement ending the occupation. Thus the full political, economic, and military potential of Western Europe can be utilized.

The second factor which made progress possible at Lisbon was development of procedures whereby the nations of the North Atlantic Community now sit down together, analyze their several capabilities and decide among themselves on a combined plan of action for common defense.

Thus when the Ministers met at Lisbon, they

were able to go forward and to adopt a detailed plan of action for strengthening the security of the West. This plan called upon each of the participating nations to put forth further efforts and to ask for continued sacrifices by its people. This our partners are willing to undertake because they see clearly what can be accomplished and that this is worth the effort in creating a real deterrent to aggression. There was a new confidence, a new determination among the Ministers at Lisbon, a new conviction that by working together we can expand our economies year by year to meet the increasing defense effort, and in time improve the conditions of the people.

The conference at Lisbon has a very real importance for the citizens of Philadelphia and for everyone in the United States. We can feel more secure because our allies in Europe are going forward with us to build strong military forces to protect the Western World. This could not have been undertaken but for our inspiration and tangible help. If that inspiration flags and if that help is withdrawn, the whole defense structure and the faith on which it rests can be undermined. The great hope of peace would fade and only the Kremlin would profit.

It is the Kremlin's objective to frustrate the plans that have been set afoot by disrupting the great coalition of the North Atlantic. By every device in their power they are seeking to separate the nations who have come together for common defense. This is no time for us to falter. This is the moment to move forward and to consolidate the gains made over the past 5 years.

Two wars, in quick succession, are bitter proof that the only way to discourage aggression and to defend ourselves against attack is in company with others. No single country is big enough, or strong enough, or rich enough to guarantee its own security. The other nations of the free world have learned that same lesson. So, when a new version of the old tyranny arose to menace the world, there was a notable drawing together of the nations who cherished their freedom. When it became clear with Korea that the Communists would not shrink from outright aggression, this movement toward unity was greatly accelerated.

Who would have thought even a short time ago that we would see the Parliaments of France and Germany voting to accept the principle of merging their military forces into the European Defense Community? For centuries, the rivalry of those two countries has soaked the soil of Europe in blood. Yet in a split second of history we are seeing these ancient enemies being brought together by the common need for security from a greater danger.

It is high tribute to the farsighted vision of French statesmanship that the initiative for this step and the other revolutionary concept of the Schuman Plan came from France. It is remarkable, too, in the light of the long tradition of Ger-

² Made on Mar. 4 at Philadelphia, Pa., before a forum conducted by the Philadelphia *Bulletin*, and released to the press on the following day by Mr. Harriman's office. Mr. Harriman is Director for Mutual Security.

man militarism, that a majority of the Bundestag does not want an independent German army, and has accepted the principle of combining their forces with those of their neighbors, for their own security as well as everyone else's.

It is true that there remain certain reservations by each side, but in the light of the fundamental agreement, these difficulties should be resolved.

The draft treaty setting forth the plan is virtually completed. This plan is for six nations, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to join in a European Defense Community with a supranational authority. There are plans for an assembly made up from members of the individual national assemblies. There will be a council of ministers with a defense commission to carry out the executive responsibilities of a defense department. There will also be a court to adjudicate differences and interpret the agreements.

The European Defense Community will be associated with the still larger but less tightly knit collective body, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, now streamlined and strengthened as the result of Lisbon. In fact the European Defense Community could not have been contemplated except within the context of the North Atlantic Community. The six-nation European Army will be a part of the total NATO force—the Eisenhower Army, as they call it in Europe. It is important not to get the two confused. The United Kingdom which is at the center of the British Commonwealth is not joining the European Defense Community but is making her contribution, just as we do, to the larger NATO forces under General Eisenhower, by stationing troops on the Continent.

Work of the Temporary Council Committee

Another thing to remember is the speed with which NATO has been developing. After all, it was only 2½ years ago that the North Atlantic Treaty was ratified by the member countries. After the surprise attack in Korea it became evident that defense preparations must be speeded. It was only a year ago that Eisenhower took over the command of the embryonic forces then being developed by each member country. Last September the Council at Ottawa recognized that it was necessary to reconcile an acceptable defense position for Western Europe with the capabilities of the member countries. A Temporary Committee of the Council was established to undertake this task. Each country was represented on this Committee. I was the United States member and acted as its chairman.

We set about our task by taking stock first of what military forces existed and then what resources of men, equipment, and finance could be made available for immediate build-up. This was the first time in history that free nations in peace-

time had joined together in submitting all the necessary information to analyze what the military program of each country was, whether it was effective, and whether each was doing its fair share.

An international military staff under General McNarney analyzed the military programs for the Committee. He pointed out the weaknesses that existed in the individual programs, and through open discussion, obtained agreement on far-reaching improvements in the plans of each participating country, including our own.

Things began to move without waiting for the completion of the report. Two countries undertook to extend their universal military service from 12 to 18 months. Other countries increased the number of their regular forces and extended the period of service for specialists, all with the objective of developing combat-ready forces as quickly as possible. Recommendations were made for priorities for equipment to be available to those units which would be trained and ready. An economic staff analyzed the military budgets and the economic capabilities and problems of each country, and pointed out in some cases that greater efforts were possible.

Working together, the Committee as a whole recommended individual and collective action in the economic field. Plans were made to promote the expansion of production and a generally expanding economy in Western Europe in order to carry the increased defense program and to overcome the economic difficulties confronting Europe. It became clear that Western Europe, just as this country, can substantially increase production if enough raw materials are available. All countries can work together to mutual advantage to increase the output of those essential materials.

The European countries agreed to increase their military effort as their production expands. Where a larger financial contribution was feasible, additional efforts were agreed to.

Thus the Temporary Committee developed a plan of action in the military field and in the financial and economic area through which we could build up the maximum balanced collective force as rapidly as possible. This means that each country will concentrate on the most important tasks which it is best qualified to undertake for the collective strength. We thus will obtain a maximum economy and elimination of the duplication which results from the simple combination of separate and independent forces developed on a nationalistic basis.

The Temporary Committee's plan of action was adopted by the Lisbon Conference. The member nations agreed to provide by the end of 1952 approximately 50 divisions—about half combat ready and the rest capable of rapid mobilization—and 4,000 operational aircraft in Western Europe, as well as strong naval forces.

Steps were decided upon to lay the foundation for further build-up in 1953 and beyond. It was

agreed to give more responsibility to General Eisenhower and the other NATO military authorities, and the civilian organization was greatly strengthened. It was agreed that the permanent organization should carry on continuously the type of review undertaken by the Temporary Committee, in order to set each year firm goals for the next year and the years ahead in light of changing conditions.

With Lisbon, NATO has moved from the stage of general planning to that of concrete action.

Lisbon's Impact on the Mutual Security Program

Now all of this which is happening in Europe has the most direct bearing on our situation here in the United States. Our great defense effort has two parts—the expansion of our own military forces, representing by far the major part of our defense expenditures; and then the contribution we make to our security by enabling other nations to strengthen themselves. This is the Mutual Security Program. This program is about 12 percent of our total budget for defense. In a very real sense, it is this 12 percent which makes the rest of our effort fully effective.

The myth that this country could somehow make itself safe by arming to the teeth and letting the rest of the world go hang has been pretty well exploded. We are dependent on the rest of the world for the very stuff of which our armaments are made. We couldn't arm ourselves to the teeth if raw materials from the rest of the world were denied us. That's just the way things are. Furthermore, if the productive resources and skills of Western Europe were to be added to those already controlled by the Kremlin, then our present preponderance of industrial capacity would be offset.

We cannot be secure while the rest of the world is insecure. We cannot be safe while the rest of the free world is defenseless. It is obviously and urgently to our best interest to make certain that the free world remains free and that our friends have the means to stand guard with us against the common danger.

Our investment in strengthening our friends and allies abroad is the best and least costly way to add to our own security. The weapons and materials which we send abroad make it possible for our partners to put forth a much greater and more effective effort. If we fail to continue this, then our own forces and our own expenditures would have to be drastically increased, and even then we could not obtain the same measure of security. Then, too, when the NATO forces are fully equipped we can hope for a lower level of our defense expenditures.

There are those who say we should spend our money only on our own defenses. They talk as if our defenses were steel and concrete. But our defenses are not steel and concrete—they are men.

Our planes are for men to fly. Tanks are for men to fight in. Guns are for men to shoot. To me it is the height of isolationism to reserve to the young men of our country the exclusive privilege of fighting for freedom. We have friends and allies in the world who are ready to fight. They are only partially equipped. They need equipment to make them effective allies.

There are those who complain about taxes for the Mutual Security Program. What better investment for the coming generation can we make than to provide them with well-equipped allies? But beyond this, I am convinced that if we carry on with our whole security program fully and effectively, we can prevent another world war. And it's the only way to prevent it.

Main Provisions of MSP

Later this week the President will recommend to the Congress the appropriation of just under 8 billion dollars for Mutual Security.³ I do not see how we can do the job for less. Besides our support of NATO, the program includes extensive contributions to our security in the Far East, and limited amounts for the Middle East and South America.

By far the greater part of the program is to provide finished military items to help equip our friends and allies both in Europe and in Asia. This spells the difference between their having effective forces and ineffective forces. It spells the difference between discouraging further aggression or perhaps inviting it.

Another part of the program is to provide funds for materials to support the defense effort of our allies. Without this our friends could produce less equipment and train fewer men. We would be faced with the alternative of seeing weaker defenses in Europe, or sending more equipment or men from the United States.

The third part of the Mutual Security Program is technical and economic assistance to the underdeveloped countries—the Point Four Program. I will discuss this later on.

I have used the phrase "defense support." Let me explain what it is. By "defense support," is meant those contributions we are making to enable the Europeans to buy the raw materials they need to increase their military effort. If we provide the dollars to buy certain of the materials they lack, it makes it possible for them to produce equipment of far greater value and to put more men into the armed forces.

That's defense support—it's a different concept from the Marshall Plan. Under the Marshall Plan we gave these countries help to rebuild their economies. Now through defense support we are helping them expand their military programs for our mutual security.

³ For text of the President's message to Congress, see p. 403.

All of us are concerned that each country do its share. In the Temporary Committee I found that the Europeans are equally concerned. It's hard to make a precise estimate. The situation is different in each country in terms of such things as gross national product, per capita income, pay of the armed services, available resources, and industrial capacity. We must remember that our gross national product on a per capita basis is over three times that of European members of the North Atlantic Treaty and, therefore, the defense effort is harder on the average European. But one thing I found was that they all had pride in their country's doing its fair share.

The French, for instance, are planning to spend more than the amount indicated by the Temporary Committee's analysis. The French are trying to raise forces large enough to balance those of Germany in the European Army and at the same time carry the heavy load of the long and costly war against communism in Indochina. Last week the French Assembly, with only the Communists dissenting, voted to approve this expanded defense program. It was on the question of who was to pay the necessary tax increase that the Government of Premier Faure was overthrown.

In spite of what we hear, the French people are paying heavy taxes. French taxes are collected in a different way from ours, much more from sales taxes than from income taxes. But in fact the French people pay a larger percentage of the national income in total taxes than we do.

The British were the first in Europe to enlarge their defense program. Their military production is now greater than that of all the other Western European countries put together. Britain is not only contributing to General Eisenhower's forces in Europe but is fighting Communists in a jungle war in Malaya and maintaining sizeable forces in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

There is a new spirit in Europe which the North Atlantic Treaty has imbued. Denmark, which has not had a military tradition, has instituted universal military service for the first time in her history. Her young men, now that they have modern weapons, are beginning to feel they can defend their country.

For their part the Norwegians, who share a common frontier with the Soviet Union, are determined to resist any attack. I heard in Norway an expression that if they are invaded, there will be a gun in every window.

To the original North Atlantic Treaty area have been added Greece and Turkey with their fighting forces on Europe's right flank. We are also sending military equipment to Yugoslavia. They have a large number of men under arms, but badly need modern equipment. When I saw Marshal Tito last summer, he made it clear to

me that he is determined to resist any Russian or satellite attack.

The Point Four Idea

Not all of our Mutual Security Program is military, because not all of the threat is military. The Communists have many insidious techniques with which they seek to undermine the structure of freedom. They fish in troubled waters, and they find opportunities in many parts of the world. Over half the people of the free world are in slavery to hunger and disease. We are trying through the Point Four Program to help these people free themselves from that slavery and give them real hope for a better life, in place of the false hopes held out by the Communists.

There's a quotation I like from Jonathan Swift. He wrote:

Whoever could make two ears of corn, or two blades of grass, to grow upon a spot of ground where only one grew before, would deserve better of mankind than the whole race of politicians put together.

Swift had the Point Four idea 200 years ago. Today, we Americans, with our scientific knowledge, are literally helping people grow two ears of corn where one grew before. This is a new kind of international diplomacy, and will be more effective where people are hungry than all the old kinds of diplomacy put together.

Through our new kind of diplomats, farmers, and health officers, we are showing the peoples of underdeveloped countries how to increase their food production and how to stamp out the diseases which go with hunger and lack of modern knowledge. We are also helping them add to their wealth by expanding the production of the raw materials which they need and the world needs.

By this means we add to our own strength by creating new sources of supply for things which are vital to our production. We are building for our own future and insuring our own expanding economy by stimulating an expanding world economy. By freeing people from the slavery of hunger and disease we are creating the conditions in which freedom and stability can be maintained.

The point I want to emphasize is that this entire enterprise on which we and our friends are embarked offers the only clear hope for a peaceful world. The goal is in sight. I am satisfied that by and large our allies are doing their part. We must continue to do ours.

There are times when it seems that we in the United States are carrying a disproportionate share of the burden. By any reckoning the load will be heavy, if only because we are the strongest of the partners. With only one-tenth of the population of the free world, our gross national product just about equals that of all the rest of the free world put together. That is why we can afford to do what we are doing.

There are those who fear that this program is too great a drain upon our financial resources. I can only say that the money requested for the Mutual Security Program represents less than 2½ percent of our national output. This 2½ percent—only one-seventh of what we are spending on our own defense establishment—does not seem too much to pay for an essential part of our security.

There are many questions of detail about this program on which there may be differing views. But the overriding fact is that this is a program through which security can be achieved. It seems to me that we are at a critical moment in history—a moment when the decisions we now make will mold the shape of things to come. We stand today at one of those watersheds of history from which

the future will flow in one direction or another. It lies within our power to determine which direction it will take.

We have had difficult decisions to make before. We have not shirked them. For the last 5 years we have steadfastly pursued a course which is unprecedented in history. We have made great strides in the right direction. It is unthinkable that we should now turn aside.

Our program for peace is based upon strong and willing allies to stand guard with us on the frontiers of freedom. To the very degree that we have strong allies our ability to preserve our own freedom is reinforced.

Our future cannot be separated from the world's future. It is in our hands to make that future one of prosperity and peace.

The Nature of Foreign Policy

by Charles B. Marshall

I shall define the foreign policy of the United States as the courses of action undertaken by authority of the United States in pursuit of national objectives beyond the span of jurisdiction of the United States.

That is a lot of big words. Let me put the idea another way. Our foreign policy unfolds in the things done by the U.S. Government to influence forces and situations abroad.

The meaning of the phrase "things done" should not be construed too narrowly. In this field, utterance is a form of action, and pronouncements may be deeds, especially when they convey meaning about intended or possible actions rather than merely expressing abstractions and moralizations.

My definition of foreign policy may sound strange. Let me justify it.

Foreign policy may be viewed as something distilled into chapters of a book or as a process involving a lot of daily hard work by many people. I am discussing it in the second sense—in the way that one might talk of a painting as the resultant in a process of putting paint on canvas, rather than as an ultimate effect hanging statically in a museum.

The two elements in my definition to be stressed are these: Foreign policy is generated in actions. The things acted upon in foreign policy are things lying beyond the direct control of this country.

Those two things are simple and obvious. Yet they are often overlooked. The overlooking of them leads to a lot of misunderstanding.

A year or so ago I spoke in a midwestern city. In the question period a lady in the audience asked

me to lay out briefly the course of policy for the next 10 years.

I declined, saying I could not foresee events that far ahead.

The lady reduced to 5 years the span of the prophecy she sought.

I disavowed clairvoyance even in that more modest degree.

She became impatient. She said surely I could tell something about the future—something to be counted on—something to be taken for granted by a policy planner such as I in the laying-of plans.

I said there was indeed a sure element in the future: it was trouble; it was bound to occur; its timing, its points of arrival, and its guises were unpredictable; but that trouble would come as safe a proposition as I could imagine.

My lady questioner became more impatient. She asked: If foreign policy was not a design to keep trouble away, then why have one—since one obviously could find trouble without the expense, effort, and time required for attending to foreign policy?

I said that the test for a nation as for an individual was not its success in abolishing trouble but its success in keeping trouble manageable—in generating the moral strength to face it and the capacity for handling it.

She spurned that answer. The lady said that if the Department of State was full of individuals like me, who took trouble for granted, that it was no wonder that the United States found itself in so much of it all the time.

A few weeks ago I had a different—yet in some ways similar—experience.

I took part in a round-table. Another participant appeared to hold me personally to blame for the shortcomings of what he described as a foreign policy of expediency.

My question as to whether he preferred a foreign policy of inexpediency did nothing to stem the tide of his scorn.

He said a foreign policy must consist of principles discovered in natural law and not susceptible of being compromised or tampered with and that the only way to conduct a successful foreign policy was to set these principles up as absolute standards of conduct and then persevere in them without regard to the limitations of circumstance.

The limitations of circumstance as a factor in foreign policy, he assured me, were figments of the craven mind that wants to avoid trouble instead of seeing national life as the opportunity of service to the eternal principles of right.

I did not fare very well in either of those arguments. In both cases the other participants were thinking about foreign policy only in terms of objectives.

I was thinking of foreign policy as relating to means and ends and to the gap between them.

Meshing Concepts and Facts

Ends are concepts. Means are facts. Making foreign policy consists of meshing concepts and facts in the field of action.

Suppose money grew on trees. Suppose power were for the asking. Suppose time could be expanded and contracted by a machine as in the story by H. G. Wells. Suppose Aladdin's lamp, the seven-league boots, and the other fairy-tale formulae for complete efficacy were to come true and be made monopolistically available to Americans. We would have then a situation in which we could do anything we wanted. We could then equate our policy with our goals.

In the world of fact, however, making foreign policy is not like that at all. It is not like cheer-leading. It is like quarterbacking. The real work comes not in deciding where you want to go—that is the easiest part of it—but in figuring out how to get there.

One could no more describe a nation's foreign policy in terms solely of objectives than one could write a man's biography in terms of his New Year's resolutions.

Foreign policy consists of what a nation does in the world—not what it yearns for or aspires to. The sphere of doing, as distinguished from the sphere of desire and aspiration, is governed by limits. Adam Smith pointed out that economic behavior derives from imbalance between means and ends and the circumstance that ends therefore tend to conflict. The same is true in foreign policy.

Let me illustrate that in terms of present problems.

To begin, let me identify the fundamental purpose enlightening our conduct as that of preserving a world situation and enabling our constitutional values to survive.

That we must keep in mind when speaking of national interest as the basis of our foreign policy. To me the phrase "national interest" does not mean a set of aims arrived at without regard to values. I cannot think of our foreign policy except in relation to the character of the Nation and its political institutions.

That has a bearing on the choice of means in the conduct of foreign policy. An accountable government cannot lead a double life. It is foreclosed from using such means as would destroy the very values it would save.

The main purpose enlightening our foreign policy holds true in all stages of our national life. It will continue as long as our country continues in the tradition we know. It is objectified in different ways as the world situation changes.

Elements in the World Situation

The world situation concerning us in the recent past and the present has been characterized by five main elements.

The first is the result of complex historic changes, notably two World Wars. A falling away in power among several nations once of primary greatness has occurred. This leaves two states of first magnitude, each with a great geographic span and great resources of power. One of these is our country.

The second relates to the situation of the other main element in this bipolar world of power, the Soviet Union. It is in the grip of tyrannous rulers. They achieved power by conspiracy. They have never dared risk their hold on power by resort to any procedure of consent. They have remained conspirators after becoming governors. They require tension and conflict within and at the periphery so as to hold onto power. They use in the service of this aim a political doctrine emphasizing the patterns of violence—class conflict, subversion, and so on.

As the third element, I cite the climate of intimidation and fear in much of the world resulting from the circumstance that the Soviet Union has great military forces either under direct control or amenable to its purposes and that these forces are deployed along a huge span bearing on northern and central Europe, the Mediterranean area, the Middle East, southeast Asia, and Japan.

Fourth, the dislocation of economic patterns and the exhaustion and demoralization of peoples in consequence of invasion, occupation, and oppression in World War II have created situations affording special opportunities for Soviet communism working within other countries as a conspiratorial force in the service of the Soviet rulers.

Fifth, the weakening of old restraints in Africa, the Middle East, and east Asia and the impulse

to wayward use of freedom among peoples unaccustomed to the usages of responsibility and preoccupied with redressing old grievances, real or fancied, have created opportunities for the Soviet Union, alert as it is to the quest of advantage in the troubles of others.

In these circumstances our endeavor has been along four general lines.

First, we have sought to develop stronger situations in the areas where the choices made by the peoples and governments in the great confrontation coincide with ours. We have done this so as to relieve the sense of anxiety—and with it the intimidatory power of the Kremlin—among the nations disposed to go along with us. In this category I put our alliances, military and economic assistance to our allies, and our efforts to return our former enemies to full relationships with other nations.

Second, we have sought to insure that the areas where the crisis of politics is sharpest—the areas of contest, such as southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the Arab areas—shall not be lost.

Third, we have sought to exercise leadership in working toward the ideas of responsibility and peaceful adjustment in contra-distinction to the Soviet pattern of turmoil and conflict. This aim enlightens our attitude of trying to combine responsibility with new found freedom among the Middle Eastern and the southeast Asian countries. It reflects itself in our support of the United Nations pattern, in our confrontation of aggression in Korea, and in our attempts to bring about a system of arms limitation that will not reward faithless performance.

Fourth, we have sought to steer away from the tragedy of another world war.

I am referring here not to objectives divided into neat categories distinct from each other but to concurrent phases of a process. That sounds very bureaucratic, but I do not know how better to convey the idea that in reality these things do not have such nice separateness as they seem to have when one talks or writes about them. These inter-related aims tend in part to support each other, and in part they also tend to contradict each other.

For example, at a certain point the pace of generating military strength may run counter to the requirements for a sound economic basis among our allies.

In another instance, the effort at countering aggression might be carried to lengths that bear against the aim to avoid a general war.

In still another, the impulse to deal sympathetically with the aspirations of a people new to freedom and not adjusted to its obligations may run counter to the economic necessities of another country which is allied with us or to the strategic necessities of our allies and ourselves.

Again, trying to help with the military needs

of one area may require the diversion of arms and supplies from others who also need them.

Such are the dilemmas that arise when our power is not sufficient for doing all the things we want to do.

Finding Choices of Action

What requires judgment and timing in the highest degree, along with the fortitude that can defer hopes without surrendering them, is the job of threading a course through such contradictions as these and striving as best one can to find choices of action consistent with all of the aims concurrently.

That is the job of making the best of situations in the knowledge that such is the only way of making them better. The job consists mainly of the rationing of power among aims. There—not in the formulation of aims but in the rationing of power among aims—is where a foreign policy really takes form.

In my definition at the outset I said that the decisions were made under authority of the United States. That authority exists in the grant of the executive power to the President and in the grant of legislative power to the Congress. I shall wave aside the constitutional question and the political question of the paramountcy of authority in these matters.

The agencies and departments of the Government concerned in foreign policy serve as staff advisors to the President and, under his direction, to the Congress in the making of the fundamental decisions.

A staff function of this character carries duties but no prerogatives. The President and the Congress are entitled to seek counsel where they wish within the Government or outside it.

The same holds true within the Department of State. In making up his mind as to what advice to give the President, the Secretary is certainly entitled to seek counsel where he wishes.

I am one of several members of a staff which is only one among many elements within the Department of State producing advice for the Secretary of State. I am setting forth here not the conclusive word but only my own views, developed not in theory, but by observations.

As I see it, the job of making the decisions which generate foreign policy calls for two ranges of perception.

The first of these is the sense of the situation being dealt with. By that I mean knowledge of the background and of the local factors.

The second is a sense of perspective. By that I mean a grasp of the relation and proportions between the instant problem and all other problems arising in other places and foreseeable in other ranges of time and competing with the instant problem in the apportionment of power.

These two ranges of perception are not mutually

exclusive things. A situation can exist only in an environment. An environment entails a relation to other things. Moreover, a perspective can be taken only from a point in space or a moment in time—and a point in space and moment in time mean a situation. The differences between these two senses are differences in emphasis.

As I see it, the planning function in foreign policy relates to a particular sense of responsibility for the perspectives.

The usefulness of planning is as an essential ingredient in the process of bringing problems to decision. The job of keeping clear on proportions and relations is indispensable in this business. Only systematic and continuous forethought can insure that a problem will be viewed in all its implications before a decision is made and action launched. Without it, decision and action would all too likely be quixotically impulsive, and the resources of capability would all too likely be overdrawn and the policy itself rendered insolvent.

I do not suggest that this special attention to perspectives originated only when the Policy Planning Staff was established in 1947. No doubt the Jeffersons, the John Quincy Adamses, and the Seward had resources to forethought in making up their minds.

In recent years, however, the concerns of the United States have become unprecedentedly various and their scope unprecedentedly vast. That circumstance accounts for the usefulness of having within the Department a staff with a frame of reference as wide as that of the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

It is exacting business. Our problems reflect upon and from each other like the facets of a crystal. An alteration in any facet shifts the light that shines from and through all the rest. The proportions and interrelation of our problems undergo unceasing change.

Limits of Planning

I take note of a fallacy that planning contains the remedy for all vexations and points the way around every dilemma. The idea that all our problems can be solved through the employment of total planning is persistently put forth. Since some planning is good, more would be better, and the most possible best of all—thus runs the reasoning.

Imagine trying to salt a stew according to that scheme of logic.

The limit of utility in planning inheres in this. At any moment it is possible to draw one's perspectives on the future in the light of the data at hand, but it is not possible to draw a perspective on what one's perspective will be at some later stage in time.

Wisdom cannot be stockpiled.

Brains are not susceptible of being carried around in a brief case.

There is no sound way of preempting judgment.

It is not possible to tell better today how to handle a problem arising 6 months hence than it will be when the time comes.

It may be—it is—possible and necessary to keep proportions intact and up to date so as to have them ready for the moment of decision—but the judgment of the moment itself cannot be foreclosed.

I take note also of the notion that planning is a self-inductive process and that planners should stay remote from the arena of responsibility and plan and plan and plan in communion with other planners who plan and plan and plan.

Quite the contrary, the important thing is for the planner to keep the roots of his thinking in the exigencies of real problems.

I recall the story of the shingler who became so fascinated with his work on a foggy day that he shingled five feet beyond the eaves. That is what would happen if planning were carried on as a self-contained activity complete within its own system of logic.

The idea that planning can make everything tidy, answer all problems before they happen, foresee all eventualities, and prepare in advance the pat answer for every exigency is first cousin to the idea that power can be just as great as you want to make it.

Power is the capacity to achieve intended results. It is always limited. Not all the elements bearing on a nation's destiny can ever be brought completely within the nation's control.

Machiavelli pondered this in *The Prince*. He concluded that a .500 batting average on the field of destiny was about as much as might be hoped for.

The figure strikes me as too high, but many persons expect much more than the Florentine did.

I refer not to their personal expectations. Most people are not dismayed by having to manage their financial problems along month to month. People go on driving cars year after year without ever permanently solving their parking problems.

Yet some of my friends, and many persons in this country, some of whom write editorials or sit in seats of authority, persist in believing the desirable and achievable situation for the State to be one of perfect efficacy in its world relations.

When perfect efficacy is not obtained, these people feel dismay and sense betrayal.

I recall a story told in Mexico. A man heavy in need and great in faith wrote a letter asking for 100 pesos. He addressed it to God and mailed it. The postmaster had no idea how to handle the letter. He opened it, seeking a clue. He was touched by the man's story of need. He passed the hat among the postal employees. Thus 75 pesos were raised. These were placed in an envelope to await the return of the importuning man. A few days later he was back, inquiring for mail. He was given the envelope, opened it,

counted the money, and glowered. Then he went to the counter and scribbled out another letter. It read: "Dear God: I am still 25 pesos short. Please make up the difference. But don't send it through the local post office. I think it is full of thieves."

The expectation of perfect efficacy in the conduct of foreign affairs reflects itself in the "whodunit" approach to world problems.

Viewing Problems in Proper Proportions

I am concerned here, however, not so much with the tendency to ascribe to personal villainies all the difficulties of national existence as with the question of the proper proportions in which to view the problems.

This is consequential. As an accountable Government, our Government must stay within the limits permitted by public opinion. To the degree that unrealistic notions about what is feasible are factors in public opinion, unnecessary limits are imposed on the scope of action in foreign affairs, and rigidities harmful to our true interests result. This is borne constantly upon the mind of anyone having responsibilities in the making of foreign policy.

Several things occur to me as sources of the expectation of complete efficacy.

One of them is the consciousness of an extraordinarily successful past. The diplomatic course in the evolution from a colonial beachhead to a power of highest magnitude was one of matchless performance. Just as a man may lose his perspectives in calling up his departed youth, it is all too easy for us to lose a sense of proportion about our national problems by harking back to what we did when horizons were open and distance and the balance of power afforded us a shield.

Another influence I might call faith in engineering. That stems from our natural pride in the physical development of our country. Popular tradition treasures the idea that in the realm of creation all things are possible to those who will them. The margins available to us have made his almost true so far as the development of our own country is concerned.

Some of the popular ideas derived from science reflect this same material optimism. I think these are due not so much to the leaders of science themselves as to the popular interpreters of scientific achievement. From them we get the notion that cumulative knowledge can solve anything and that every problem is by definition solvable. Whatever may be the validity of this notion in the material relations which are the field of science, an error comes in trying to apply it as a universal.

Another contributing circumstance is that so much of foreign policy now stems from legislation. Legislation is law, law is to be obeyed, and an objective expressed in law is bound to be achieved. So goes the notion.

This idea bears particularly on congressional expectations in relation to foreign aid. The Congress has written into foreign aid legislation as conditions upon recipients many purposes whose consummation is devoutly to be wished. Some of these are such that they could be realized only in considerable spans of time and under governments with great margins of political power derived from energized and purposeful public support. The lack of such conditions in Europe is the heart of the difficulty. I find incredible the idea that phrases enacted by one country's legislature can *ipso facto* solve problems, the solution of which requires redressing the factors of political power in another country.

This topic came up the other day in a conversation with a friend of mine who serves very ably in the House of Representatives. He was perturbed at the lag among European nations in realizing some of the domestic and international reforms prescribed by the Congress in the foreign aid legislation. I commented along the same line as I have spoken here. He agreed with me. Then he added that the Congress would have to write the conditions tighter next time. Thus runs the endless faith in the compulsiveness of law.

Besides faith in making laws, let me mention faith in advertising. Where a perfume is marketed not only for its odor but also as a guarantee of domestic bliss, where automobiles are sold as means to capture the esteem of neighbors as well as means of transport, and where life insurance is offered not only as protection but also as a help for insomnia, it is natural to demand of foreign policy not only that it should handle the problems at hand but also that it should lead to a transfiguration of history.

Foreign Policy—A Responsibility, Not a Commodity

This idea and all its implications are fit to be spurned. I shudder whenever I hear anyone refer to "selling" our foreign policy. Let me say for my Planning Staff colleagues and for myself that we regard foreign policy not as a commodity but as a responsibility, the American public not as our customers but as our masters, and ourselves not as salesmen but as stewards.

I spoke along these lines recently to a very able group of business men visiting the State Department, Sloan Foundation Fellows from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. One of them commented that by disclosing its foreign policy too much in terms of moral purposes rather than in terms of actual problems to be handled within practical limits of capability, the Government itself encouraged the tendency that I was decriing.

That was a good point. I was reminded of the story that at the Battle of New Orleans, General Jackson, seeing that the targets were being missed, ordered his artillerymen to elevate the guns a little lower. That counsel applies here.

As one other influence, a very important one, giving rise to the expectation of perfect performance, I shall cite the confusion of force and power.

By force I mean first the capacity to transmit energy and so to expend it as to do vital harm to a foe, and second, the deterrent, compulsive effect exerted by the existence of this capacity.

The capacity for force is only one of many elements in a nation's power reservoir. The others pertain to its economic strength, the internal integrity of its political position, the degree of confidence and good will which it commands abroad, and many other factors.

A nation's intentions and its power interact on each other. What we seek is in part determined by what we can do. What we can do is determined in part by what we are after.

Furthermore, our own aims and power acting as functions of each other are in an interactive relation with adversary intentions and capabilities, which also relate to each other as interdependent variables.

Foreign affairs are a complex business. Gross errors result in the attempt to treat them on the basis of the misleading notion that all the problems of power can be reduced to the nice simplicity of calculations of force.

Wars occur when nations seek to impose their wills by effecting drastic changes in the ratios of power through radical action in the factors of force.

The force factors are susceptible of precision in military planning. The elements are concrete. The speeds of ships, their capabilities for carrying men and cargo, the distances, the fuel requirements of planes and tanks, and the fire power of divisions, and so on are known factors.

The military planning process, insofar as it relates to the ponderables of real or hypothetical campaigns, turns out tidy and complete results.

I do not mean that battles and campaigns are fought according to preconceived schedules. I mean only that insofar as advance planning is employed in the military field, the quotients are precise, the columns are even, and the conclusions concrete.

Furthermore, within the time and space limits of a campaign, the problem of force can be brought to an absolute solution. It really is possible to achieve the surrender of all of an enemy's forces or to eliminate armed resistance in a particular place for a particular time.

I speak here in no sense of professional disdain for military methods. I have served more of my life as a staff officer in the Army than in the line of foreign policy. I recognize the utility and necessity of military methods of thinking for military purposes. I am aware also of their limitations for other purposes.

It is easy for the unwary to jump to a fallacious conclusion that if all human affairs were laid out

with the precision of military plans, then all problems could be brought to as complete solution as can the problem of force in the conduct of a victorious military campaign.

This is the sort of thing one gets to when one tries to find the solution of all of the Nation's problems in the world, instead of taking the historically realistic view that the job is one of managing the problems, not of getting rid of them.

It is only a few steps from the notion of solution to the notion of employing force as a solvent.

This is an easy fallacy for those souls anxious for history to be tidy and all conclusions certain.

The exercise of force, however, is only an incident. The problems of power are endless. Wars only occur. Politics endures.

Some of my colleagues who bore with me as I tried out these comments thought I discounted too heavily the qualitative importance of objectives in foreign policy and reflected too somber an outlook.

Let me make the proportions clear.

I do not disparage the importance of objectives. Only in the light of ultimate purposes can one know how to proceed problem by problem in this field.

Moreover, I do not believe that good is forever beyond reach, but I am sure that the way to it is difficult and long.

The young Gladstone was advised by his mentor that politics was an unsatisfactory business and that he would have to learn to accept imperfect results.

That advice has wisdom for the conduct of a foreign policy.

The never ending dilemmas inherent in measuring what we would like to do against what we can do impose great moral burdens. These are beyond the capacity of some individuals to bear. Sometimes they become intolerable for whole societies.

The rebellion against that burden sometimes takes the form of an abdication of will, and relief is sought in a passive fatalism about the problems of national existence.

Again the rebellion may take the form of resorting to the counsel of violence as the solvent for the difficulties and restraints which life imposes.

In either form, the rejection is a rejection of life itself, for life imposes on nations, as on men, the obligation to strive without despair even though the way may be long and the burdens heavy.

To recognize this is in itself a source of strength.

As Keats tells us,

To bear all naked truths; And to envisage circumstance,
all calm; That is the top of sovereignty.

• Charles B. Marshall, the author of the above article, is a member of the Policy Planning Staff.

Dedicatory Ceremonies for the "Courier"

On March 4 President Truman welcomed to Washington the Voice of America's new floating transmitter, the U.S. Coast Guard cutter "Courier," with a world-wide broadcast.

As the President spoke, his voice was heard overseas by audiences in Europe, Latin America, and the Far East. Relay stations at Tangier, Munich, Ceylon, Manila, Honolulu, and facilities of the British Broadcasting Company beamed the President's message to listeners in all parts of the world via 37 transmitters. Immediately following the English language broadcast, the message was translated into 45 languages for rebroadcast.

The address highlighted a 45-minute program. Attending the ceremonies, which marked the tenth anniversary of the Voice of America, were Cabinet members, members of Congress, high military officials, and civic dignitaries. Other speakers included Secretary Acheson, F. Joseph Donohue, Commissioner of the District of Columbia, and Wilson Compton, Administrator of the U.S. International Information Administration, who presided. Text of the President's address and of Secretary Acheson's remarks follow:

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT¹

[Released to the press by the White House March 4]

I am speaking to you today from a ship. It is a special kind of ship, and it will perform a very special mission.

This vessel will not be armed with guns or with any instruments of destruction. But it will be a valiant fighter in the cause of freedom. It will carry a precious cargo—and that cargo is Truth.

This ship is named the *Courier*. It is well named, for it will be carrying a message. It will be carrying a message of hope and friendship to all those who are oppressed by tyranny; it will be carrying a message of truth and light to those who are confused by the storm of falsehood that the Communists have loosed upon the world.

This vessel is a floating radio transmitter which is to broadcast programs for the Voice of America.

¹Also printed as *Cargo of Truth*, Department of State publication 4525.

It will be able to move from place to place, beaming our Campaign of Truth to people behind the Iron Curtain whom we have thus far been unable to reach.

The *Courier* is a small ship—it is not as big as a destroyer—but it is of tremendous significance. Its significance lies in the fact that it will carry on the fight for freedom in the field where the ultimate victory has to be won—that is in the minds of men.

As the world stands today, free peoples must have strong military forces to protect themselves against aggression. But the final solution for the ills that plague the world can never lie in armies and navies and air forces. The final solution cannot be reached until all nations are willing to live together in peace. The final victory cannot be won until the truth has made all people free.

There is a terrific struggle going on today to win the minds of people throughout the world.

The rulers of the Kremlin are trying to make the whole world knuckle under to the godless, totalitarian creed of communism. They are busy everywhere spreading propaganda to stir up fear and hate and to set nation against nation.

The free nations of the world have not yielded to the onslaught of Soviet propaganda. We have undertaken to answer it with the truth—for we know that the truth is the best answer. To bring the truth to peoples everywhere, we are using magazines, newspapers, motion pictures, libraries, and information centers in all parts of the world. We must use every means to combat the propaganda of slavery.

This ship is an important part of that campaign. Our arguments, no matter how good, are not going to influence people who never hear them. The purpose of this ship is to help get our message through.

There is one thing I want this ship to say—over and over again—to our friends throughout the world, and especially to the people of the Soviet Union and those behind the Iron Curtain:

The United States of America is working night and day to bring peace to the world. As President of the United States, I say with all my heart that we yearn for peace, and we want to work with all nations to secure peace.

We have no quarrel with the people of the Soviet Union or with the people of any other country.

For almost two centuries the people of the United States have lived at peace with the peoples of Russia and China and the other countries whose rulers are now assailing us. Only a decade ago, when the peoples of Russia and China were suffering under two of the most savage invasions in history, we came to their aid. We helped them to save their countries.

I want to say to these people today, as we said then: We are your friends. There are no differences between us that cannot be settled if your rulers will turn from their senseless policy of hate and terror and follow the principles of peace.

Today, the aggressive policies of your rulers are forcing us to arm to defend ourselves. But we cannot find in our hearts any hate against you. We know that you are suffering under oppression and persecution. We know that if you were free to say what you really believe, you would join with us to banish the fear of war and bring peace to the earth.

Your Government, with its newspapers and radios, may try to make you believe that the United States is a hostile country, bent on war. But that is not true. I want you to know that our highest aim is peace and friendship—and an end to the horrors of war.

Wherever you may be listening to this broadcast, remember this: The people of the United States extend the hand of friendship to you across the seas. The future may look dark, but let us have faith together that all peoples will one day walk in the sunlight of peace and justice.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press March 4]

We are dedicating the *Courier* to a task which is in the best tradition of our country. The men who founded this Nation, in promulgating the Declaration of Independence, acknowledged the necessity and propriety of "showing a decent respect for the opinions of mankind." This principle remains an important part of our foreign policy today.

We are engaged in a great effort to strengthen and unite the free people of the world, in order that peace may be secure against aggression, and that freedom may continue to flourish.

Our greatest ally in this effort is the truth. We have faith that wherever the people of the world can know the truth, they will support and sustain this great effort. That is why what President Truman has called "The Campaign of Truth" is a central part of our foreign policy today.

And that is the great mission of this ship, the *Courier*—to bear to the people of the world—to our friends who are free and those who are not free—the truth about what is happening in the

world, and about our efforts in behalf of peace and freedom.

The *Courier*, a ship of the sea that has been dedicated to the cause of peace, symbolizes our aspiration for the day when all our effort, and all our strength, may be devoted to peaceful and constructive ends. This is the ultimate purpose of all that we do.

On this occasion, the work of two men whose vision and energy helped to make the *Courier* a reality is deserving of tribute—Edward W. Barrett, who was until recently Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, and Howland H. Sargeant, Mr. Barrett's successor.

I know that the Campaign of Truth, as it is carried forward by the *Courier* and all the other media of communication, through the continued efforts of Mr. Sargeant and Mr. Compton, will continue to advance the best traditions and purposes of our country.

Tax Conventions With Finland

[Released to the press March 3]

On March 3, 1952, Secretary Acheson and Johan A. Nykopp, Minister of Finland in Washington, signed two conventions (treaties) between the United States and Finland for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion, one with respect to taxes on income and the other with respect to taxes on estates and inheritances.

The provisions of the income-tax convention are similar in general to those contained in income-tax conventions now in force between the United States and Canada, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The provisions of the estate-tax convention are similar in general to those contained in estate-tax conventions now in force between the United States and Canada, France, Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom. The two conventions with Finland are, in all respects, consistent with policies expressed by the U.S. Senate during the 1951 session of the Congress in connection with consideration of a large number of then pending tax conventions and protocols. (See S. Ex. Rept. No. 1, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.)

The conventions with Finland provide that instruments of ratification shall be exchanged. The income-tax convention provides that it shall become effective for the taxable years beginning on or after January 1 of the year in which the exchange of instruments of ratification takes place. The estate-tax convention provides that it shall become effective on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall be applicable as to estates or inheritances in the case of persons who die on or after that date.

Agreement Reached on German Contribution to Defense

QUADRIPARTITE PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ

The negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the French Republic on the one hand and the German Federal Republic on the other, regarding the amount of the Federal Republic's financial contribution to defense in 1952/53, have now resulted in agreement.

The Federal Government has declared that it will base its defense contribution in the NATO year 1952/53 on the figure recommended by the members of the Executive Bureau of the Tcc [Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Council]. This means that, in addition to those expenditures for defense purposes in the regular public budget of the Federal Republic, there will be an average monthly defense contribution of 850 million deutschemarks following establishment of the European Defense Community. It is proposed that the amounts of future total German defense contributions will, of course, be established under the same principles as apply to all participating countries.

In the meantime, the three powers will exercise their best effort to maintain at the lowest possible figure their Occupation costs for the period prior to the coming into effect of the treaty establishing the European Defense Community.

TEXT OF TCC REPORT ON GERMANY

On February 16 the Executive Bureau of the Temporary Council Committee (TCC)² of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization made the following report to Secretary Acheson, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of France, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden of the United Kingdom, and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany, who were meeting at London.³ The three Foreign Ministers and Chancellor Adenauer reviewed the report on February 18 and 19 and agreed that it should be made public on February 19.

1. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Allied High Commission have requested the

¹ Issued at Lisbon and Bonn on Feb. 26; printed from telegraphic text.

² The members of the Executive Bureau—W. Averell Harriman, Sir Edwin Plowden of the United Kingdom, and Jean Monnet of France—were joined during some of their discussions on Germany by Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr., U.S. special representative in Europe.

³ For text of the quadripartite communiqué on these meetings, see BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 325.

members of the Executive Bureau of the Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, acting in their personal capacities, to examine the financial and economic capacity of the Federal Republic to make a global contribution to Western Defense in the financial year 1952/53 which would be comparable with the contributions of the principal member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was requested that our recommendation be based on the same factors and considerations which were used in arriving at the defense contribution of other countries.⁴ A memorandum was submitted by the Federal Republic suggesting a defense contribution of DM 10.8 milliards for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1952, together with various economic and financial data.

2. The procedure we have followed has been the same as that followed in the examination of the position and abilities of other countries. Likewise we have used the same definitions for the defense contribution as has been applied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to all countries. This does not imply that any government expenditures excluded by such a definition necessarily have a lower order of priority, or that they can be neglected in assessing the ability of any country to contribute to defense. As requested, we have considered the defense contribution only for the year 1952/53, recognizing that the amounts for future years and their method of determination must be established at a later date.

3. The major task of the Temporary Council Committee has been to determine the maximum defense contribution within the politico-economic capabilities of the countries participating in the common defense effort so as to develop the defensive strength required to deter aggression. A basic principle underlying that common effort has been the equitable sharing of the defense burden among the participating countries since an effective collective effort is possible only if all countries play their full part. The concept of maximum effort within politico-economic capabilities means, however, a recognition of the need for expanding total output so that the defense programs of the participating countries could be carried out without weakening the basic economic structure of such countries. It was recognized that temporarily slower progress towards some otherwise attainable improvements in the social and economic life of the various countries would be involved. However, it was considered that such slower progress was inevitable, given the need to achieve the task of providing an environment of security within which the aspirations of the free peoples for peace and human progress will be realized.

4. In assessing the maximum politico-economic capabilities of the various countries for the Temporary Council Committee, a large number of factors had to be considered. The principal ones were the total economic output of the country and its composition; the possibilities

⁴ For text of the North Atlantic Council's press release summarizing the Tcc recommendations for building NATO's defensive strength, see BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 368.

Comparative Gross National Product and Defense Expenditures (October 1951 prices)

	1950/51 (Actual)	1951/52 (Estimated)	1952/53 (Estimated)
<i>United States</i>			
(a) Gross National Product (billiards of \$)	291	305	323
(b) Defense Expenditures (billiards of \$)	20	44	57
(c) Defense Expenditures in proportion to National Product.	6.9%	14.4%	17.6%
<i>United Kingdom</i>			
(a) Gross National Product (millions of £)	12,750	13,100	13,450
(b) Defense Expenditures (millions of £)	965	1,431	1,731
(c) Defense Expenditures in proportion to National Product.	7.6%	10.9%	12.8%
<i>France</i>			
(a) Gross National Product (billiards of Francs)	10,250	10,800	11,400
(b) Defense Expenditures (billiards of Francs)	750	1,145	1,250
(c) Defense Expenditures in proportion to National Product.	7.3%	10.6%	11.0%
<i>Germany</i>			
(a) Gross National Product (billiards of DM)	96.3	101.8	*107.3
(b) Defense Expenditures (billiards of DM)			11.25
(c) Defense Expenditures in proportion to National Product.			10.5%

NOTE: Gross National Product is taken at "factor cost". The defense expenditures shown above represent actual expenditures for 1950/51 and estimated expenditures for the two following years. Actual expenditures for the current year will not be known until the fiscal year is over. It is currently expected that expenditures in the present year may lag slightly in the United Kingdom because of

production difficulties that have been encountered in the case of major equipment items, though those lags will be made up in the following periods. In the United States, production difficulties have also been encountered. In the case of France, it seems evident that the budgeted defense expenditures for the present year will be exceeded, due to heavy costs being incurred for the war in Indo-China.

*The proportion of German defense expenditures to Gross National Product would be less if, as the members of the Executive Bureau believe, the German Gross National Product reaches a level significantly higher than the German official forecast given above.

for expanding that output; the real per capita income; the practical possibilities of diverting additional resources to defense; the balance of payments position; the Government financial situation; and certain special factors in cases of particular countries. It is evident that these diverse considerations cannot be incorporated in any simple formula to give a ready calculation of the appropriate defense effort. They do, however, provide the basis for broad qualitative assessments. It is on the basis of such qualitative assessments, after careful study of all the relevant factors, that the levels of defense expenditure for all countries were appraised. We have been guided in considering the size of the German contribution, by the same motives and factors.

5. The striking feature of the German economy is the important advance it has made in the last few years in attaining a level of production consonant with its resources and technical skills. Although still lagging behind other countries, the volume of production already is above that of 1938 and substantially exceeds the level of 1936. On the other hand, mostly because of the influx of refugees, the population of the Federal Republic is not far from 25% larger than pre-war so that while current production levels appear quite favorable, the volume of total output must take care of the needs of this enlarged population.

6. Production had fallen to extremely low levels as a result of wartime destruction and the dislocations of the immediate post-war years, and the recovery process in Germany started later than in other countries. Since 1948, however, progress has been exceptionally rapid. The gross national product in real terms has risen at an average of 16% a year. Although rates of increase were larger in the earlier years, industrial production in 1951 was more than double that of 1948. On the financial side, too, the chaos of the immediate post-war years has been overcome. A successful monetary reform has been carried out and the Federal Republic has achieved a high degree of financial stability. It is significant that the shock of the Korean crisis in mid-1950 affected the cost of living much less in Western Germany than in most other countries.

7. Similarly, with respect to the balance of payments, the serious problem which faced the Government of the Federal Republic has yielded to the policies and efforts directed toward its solution. The need for foreign support has substantially declined. Exports have had a striking expansion over the past three years and, though they leveled off toward the close of 1951, the overall foreign payments position in that year was in approximate balance. The balance of trade with the dollar area in 1951/52 is expected to show a deficit of less than \$300 million against which there will be considerable net dollar receipts on invisible account.

8. In summary, it is apparent that the economy of the Federal Republic has made great strides in overcoming the tremendous difficulties of a few years ago, a tribute to the energy and hard work of the German people. Nonetheless, the German economy is confronted with several special problems which we have carefully weighed in assessing its ability to contribute to the common defense on a fair and equitable basis. It must be recognized, however, that difficult problems exist in every country and these have had to be taken into account in appraising their defense efforts. This is not to deny that the German problems with regard to the large influx of refugees, the vital needs of reconstruction and the support of Berlin have a special force.

9. Probably the most important of these, which affects the economy in many ways, is the problem of the nine million persons that have been added to the population as a result of their expulsion or flight from the East. The refugee problem is significant from an economic standpoint quite apart from the tragic situation created for many families. It is the essential reason why there is still heavy unemployment, averaging about 1.4 million workers during 1951, despite the fact that industrial production is above pre-war levels. Both the population increase involved and the heavy unemployment are reflected in a lower per capita income than would otherwise obtain and a level of per capita income that is somewhat below that of comparable countries of Western Europe. The added population has meant also that a high level of investment was required to provide not only housing but opportunities for productive employment. The fact that

Increase in Defense Expenditures from Year to Year
(October 1951 Prices)

	Percent	
	1951/52	1952/53
<i>United States</i>		
(a) Percentage increase in defense expenditures above previous year.	120	30
(b) Proportion of annual increase in national product absorbed by increased defense expenditures	171	72
<i>United Kingdom</i>		
(a) Percentage increase in defense expenditures above previous year.	48	21
(b) Proportion of annual increase in national product absorbed by increased defense expenditures	133	86
<i>France</i>		
(a) Percentage increase in defense expenditures above previous year.	53	9
(b) Proportion of annual increase in national product absorbed by increased defense expenditures	72	17

a significant number of refugees have not yet been integrated into the economy has resulted also in a need for relatively high taxes to finance a high volume of transfer payments.

10. On the other hand this inflow of population has also had favorable effects in the Germany economy. The bulk of the new population has been absorbed into the economy and is making an important contribution to increased production. In fact, it is largely because they have contributed to a larger working force that the level of total German production is above pre-war. Their role in the attainment of higher production will continue as the further absorption of refugees takes place.

11. A special problem of comparable importance is that of continued reconstruction and investment requirements. The damages incurred by Germany in the course of the war were extremely severe and a greater volume of reconstruction remains to be done than in other countries. As has been mentioned above, investment needs have been augmented by the large inflow of refugees. Great progress has been made in fulfilling these various capital requirements, as is shown, for example, by the present level of construction of approximately 350,000 dwelling units a year. The high proportion of investment which made that progress possible has been one of the factors accounting for a comparatively lower level of consumption. The economy is now well beyond the initial stages of recovery. It is the experience of other countries that the percentage of investment can decline as economic rehabilitation proceeds, although its absolute level may be maintained or even increased. From now on, it is probable that in Germany it will be possible to meet essential requirements for investment with a somewhat smaller proportion of an expanding total national product.

12. The problem of Berlin is one of great difficulty, arising from the combination of its special geographic situation and the hard core of unemployment which exists there. We commend and attach great importance to the efforts of the Federal Republic to maintain and improve the economic position of Berlin, and to the continuance of financial aid by the Federal Republic for this purpose. Part of the expenditures of Berlin actually fall within the commonly applied definition of defense expenditures and such expenditures, whether met out of Federal support or out of the Berlin Municipal budget, should be included as part of the defense contribution of the Federal Republic. Most of the budgetary and other support given to Berlin, however, does not fall within the definition of defense expenditures, but it does largely exceed what is normally done to assist distressed areas, and this burden has been taken into account as an excep-

tional factor in assessing the ability of the Federal Republic to contribute to defense.

13. In assessing the comparative capability of the Federal Republic, the existence of considerable unemployed resources in Germany must be counted as a potential asset. There is a considerable difference in the burden represented by additional defense effort that can be provided by the output flowing from formerly unemployed people and previously idle capacity than when it must be provided by diversion from the existing use of resources. Of course, difficulties stand in the way of the immediate use of unemployed resources. An important difficulty in Germany is the severe shortage of dwelling units which seriously limits the mobility of labor. Although a similar problem exists in other countries, it is not of the same degree of severity as in Germany. There is a problem of training labor as well as one of redistributing skilled manpower. In addition, production facilities and equipment must be provided if the unemployed are to make an effective contribution. Consideration must be given to the extent to which bottlenecks in various sectors of industry might hamper further expansion. The recent increases in coal output and the forecast of a sizeable further expansion during the present year are encouraging. The problem of power will require special attention. Adequate direction of the large volume of investment to enable the bottleneck problems to be solved will be necessary so that effective use can be made of industrial capacity. All these things will take time, but in the end, the existence of unemployed resources provides the reservoir out of which an expansion of total production can occur.

14. The extent to which Germany's defense effort can be increased is in some measure dependent upon the likely effect of this expansion upon the balance of payments. The increase in economic activity to which defense expenditures will lead will involve some increased demand for imports to meet consumer demand and to furnish additional raw materials. Imports may be further stimulated by the lifting of restrictions which have been applied to trade with the member countries of the European Payments Union. Nevertheless, there will be important compensating factors. Exports should continue to rise as a result of increased production and favorable prices in Germany as well as high demand from other countries. Increasing production of coal will contribute to an improvement in the balance of payments. The direct impact of the defense contribution on the export industries in the period under consideration will not be such as to affect markedly export prospects. As in the case of the overall balance, the problem of the dollar balance of pay-

ments is less severe than for most North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries. Dollar income can be expected to increase as a result of increased transfers by American troops stationed in Germany, and possibly by United States off-shore purchases. It is not to be expected, therefore, that either the overall or the dollar balance of payments will prevent the attainment of a higher level of German defense expenditure or that they are likely to set limitations of the kind experienced by certain other countries.

15. In summarizing the prospects for the German economy, therefore, it is apparent that a relatively high rate of expansion in total output can be expected. It is estimated in the memorandum of the Federal Government that the overall increase of the gross national product from 1950/51 to 1952/53 would be 11.4%. This estimate appears to be overly conservative. Although the exceptionally high rates of increase of the past few years cannot be anticipated, it must be recognized that Germany is still in the stage of recovery from a dislocated economy and low level of production. It is the experience of all countries in such circumstances that progress is very rapid under the stimulus of adequate demand. The carrying out of the defense program itself should contribute materially to the expansion of total output. The conclusion that a higher rate of expansion than that forecast is probable is strengthened by a comparison with the rise in national output occurring in countries where unused resources are not available to nearly the same extent and where bottlenecks are more severe than in Germany. The fact that industry plays such a predominant part in the Western German economy, constituting almost half of the national product, is an added reason for expecting a more rapid expansion. With regard to the expansion anticipated in non-industrial sectors, particularly services, a considerably larger increase than that projected by the Federal Government is probable. The progress made in the recovery of industry so far will allow a greater share of additional resources for expansion in the service sectors. The development of transportation and distribution cannot lag far behind industrial expansion. Consumers' services are now expanding rapidly with the rise in consumers' incomes. Furthermore, the rapid rate of residential construction also contributes to raising the level of services as the newly constructed homes become occupied. It appears, therefore, that inadequate weight has been given to the contribution that services will make to the development of the national product. In view of all these aspects of the problem, it is reasonable to expect an economic expansion in Germany that is well above the expectations of certain other major countries.

16. The rapid increase in the level of output will facilitate the solution of budgetary problems connected with the increase in the defense effort, particularly since the structure and rates of taxation are such as to increase public revenues by a large proportion of the rise in national product. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that there is a financial problem to be overcome in securing an adequate level of defense, especially in the initial stages of a defense buildup. All countries have faced the implications of the sharp increase in total government expenditures which go with such a buildup. Because of the present sound state of the government finances and the recently enacted tax increases, the Federal Republic is in a favorable position to face this problem. Present budgetary plans for 1952/53 for all levels of Government, as submitted, include provision for debt retirement, at a substantially higher rate than in previous years and the net deficit foreseen is of modest proportions. The steps now being taken to provide for an increase in the share of taxes collected by the Laender which are transferred to the Federal Government have been designed to make possible the financing of increased defense expenditures by the Federal Government. There is no question but that

the level of taxation in Germany is already high. It is noted, however, that out of the additional revenue, estimated by the Federal Government, three-quarters are expected to come from the expansion of the national product as forecast by the German authorities. It is recognized that the proposed budgets of the Bund, Laender and Communities contain a considerable amount of expenditure which cannot easily be reduced, partly on account of the special help given to refugees and to Berlin. However, bearing in mind that a large part of the forecast increase in tax receipts is at present budgeted to be spent on non-defense items, measures such as have been taken by other countries could produce some economies in non-defense expenditures. Should additional revenues be necessary, for defense purposes, tax measures bearing on luxury consumption and less essential investments would both reduce the potential deficit and would be appropriate, on economic and social grounds, to a period of defense buildup. There is full agreement that inflation must be avoided and that fiscal policies must be supplemented by adequate credit policies to this end. In the light of these considerations, the budgetary problem raised for the Federal Republic by a fair and equitable defense effort appears to be of manageable proportions.

17. We have given full recognition to the present level of production in Germany and the call made on it by the special burdens it has to bear. We have felt, on the other hand, that additional tasks can be more easily met when their fulfillment can bring in hitherto unused resources than when a diversion of such resources and restriction of other uses is required. Furthermore, other requirements are of a lower relative weight than in the past and the obstacles to further development appear less severe than in most countries. It is our best judgment that the global contribution by the Federal Republic to defense within its financial and economic capabilities, in the financial year 1952/53 beginning July 1, and which would be comparable with the contributions of the principal member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is DM 11.25 milliards measured at October 1951 prices. The foregoing is governed by the definitions of defense expenditures used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

18. We consider that this represents a fair share for Germany in the common effort. Moreover, the increased effort it represents over 1951/52 is comparable with the added burdens undertaken by other countries in the early stages of their defense buildup.

19. There is no precise way of measuring the absolute or relative contribution to the common defense effort being made by the various countries. The ways in which the efforts are being contributed differ as to the burden they represent on available and potential resources. There are also important human and social values to be considered as well as the more strictly economic and financial ones. However, despite recognized statistical limitations, the data on the total production of the various countries and the relation of defense expenditures of total production do give important indications of comparative burdens. The relevant data for the principal countries showing the percentage of total output that will be devoted to defense, the portion of the expansion of output going to increased defense, and the rates of increase in defense expenditures are given in the attached table.

20. Taking all factors into account, including comparison with the defense efforts of other countries, the recommended defense contribution for Germany is, in our judgment, within its politico-economic capabilities on the basis of the criteria used by the Temporary Council Committee. The requirements of an effective defense cannot be met without effort. The recommended defense contribution would place Germany among the larger nations which, in their relative contribution to the joint effort, are leading the way in providing for the common defense.

Protocol Supplementing Consular Convention With Ireland

[Released to the press March 4]

On March 3, 1952, there was signed at Dublin by the plenipotentiaries of the United States and Ireland a protocol supplementary to the consular convention between the two countries which was signed at Dublin on May 1, 1950.

The convention of 1950 is presently under consideration in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (S. Ex. P., 81st Cong., 2d sess.). The provisions of that convention followed, in general, the pattern of an earlier consular convention which had been concluded between the United States and the United Kingdom and which was pending in the Senate in 1950 at the time the convention with Ireland was submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. Thereafter, it appeared that questions would be raised with respect to certain provisions appearing in both of those conventions. The provisions in question related to the authority of consular officers in connection with the administration of estates. In order to obviate any possibility of controversy which might prejudice unduly the consideration of the conventions and delay needlessly the final action necessary to bring them into force, it was decided that the provisions with respect to which questions were likely to be raised should be deleted from the conventions. In the case of the convention with Ireland, the protocol signed on March 3, 1952, achieves that objective. The protocol will be submitted to the Senate for consideration in conjunction with the convention to which it relates and of which, in effect, it is to be an integral part.

British Policy on Malaya Welcomed

*Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson*¹

The U.S. Government has noted with interest the clear statement of policy and objectives contained in the directive issued on February 4 by the United Kingdom Government to the new High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya. We are heartened by the reiteration of Britain's determination to defeat Communist terrorism in Malaya, an alien movement which for nearly 4 years has conducted a deliberate and vicious campaign to disrupt the life of the country and retard its political and economic development. We welcome the statement that this objective is not to be achieved by military action alone, but also by

¹ Made on Mar. 5.

an imaginative and progressive policy of assisting the diverse peoples of Malaya toward the longer range objective—that of forging in due course a united and self-governing Malayan nation, which will have the choice of remaining within the Commonwealth.

The U.S. Government is fully cognizant of the importance of Malaya's present and future role in the free world, politically, economically, and strategically, and of the significance of the present struggle in Malaya as an integral part of the free world's common effort to halt Communist aggression. This is not a concern and responsibility only of the so-called "West," but a struggle which vitally affects the lives and progress of all free peoples, who must therefore strive in concert to achieve their mutual aim.

We consider that the efforts being made by the British and their associates among the peoples of Malaya represent a major contribution in that common struggle. We have confidence in the ultimate success of their efforts, both to halt the forces of communism and to build a new nation, and we wish to take this opportunity of expressing our solidarity of purpose with those engaged in these efforts.

"Germ Warfare" Charges Called Fabrication

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press March 4]

The Communists are seeking through every device known to Communist propaganda to persuade the Korean people and the people of the world that the U.N. Forces are using bacteriological warfare in Korea.

We have heard this nonsense about germ warfare in Korea before. We would not bother to deny it again were it not for the fact that the Communists are spreading these charges around the world at the same time they are stalling in the truce negotiations. I would therefore like to state categorically and unequivocally that these charges are entirely false; the U.N. Forces have not used, and are not using, any sort of bacteriological warfare.

When similar charges were fabricated in the past, we made it clear that we would welcome an impartial investigation by an international agency such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Communists, fully aware of the false nature of their charges, of course refused. We again challenge the Communists to submit their charges to the test of truth by allowing such an impartial investigation.

Unfortunately, these false charges reflect a very sad situation for the Korean people in Communist

hands. The inability of the Communists to care for the health of the people under their control seems to have resulted in a serious epidemic of plague. The Communists, not willing to admit and bear the responsibility that is theirs, are trying to pin the blame on some fantastic plot by the U.N. Forces.

Our deepest sympathy goes out to all those behind the enemy lines who are sick and suffering. We offer them the hope that our efforts toward a just armistice will succeed and make it possible for health, as well as peace and security, to be brought to all of Korea. These are the goals of the United Nations for all the people of Korea.

Agreement With Honduras For Civil Aviation Mission

Assistant Secretary Edward G. Miller, Jr., for the U.S. Government, and Ambassador Rafael Heliodoro Valle, for the Republic of Honduras, signed on March 7 an exchange of notes for the establishment of a Point Four civil-aviation mission in Honduras. The negotiations which led up to the agreement were conducted in this country by Capt. Roberto Galvez, Director of Civil Aviation in Honduras, with officials of the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. Captain Galvez, a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is the son of President Juan Manuel Galvez of Honduras. The Institute of Inter-American Affairs administers the Point Four Program in Latin America as the regional office of the Technical Cooperation Administration.

The agreement provides for the establishment of a mission of U.S. experts to advise and to consult with the office of the Director of Civil Aviation of Honduras and to aid in developing a program of civil aeronautics in Honduras.

Officials of the Civil Aviation Administration of the Department of Commerce said today that the use of aviation for passenger travel and freight carrying in Honduras is widespread. They stated that three local airlines service 30 locations within the country and that many of these towns and cities have no other means of communication with the rest of the country. In addition to the local services, Honduras is served by three international carriers.

A chief of aviation mission is to be sent to Honduras as soon as arrangements can be made. He will call on other experts from a pool of aviation technicians now being formed to service the Central American countries and eventually will establish a permanent mission composed of technicians in the special fields for which there is greatest need.

Nine Countries To Share In Secured Fund in Japan

[Released to the press March 7]

The U.S. Government, acting under the authority granted to it by the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission, has issued an interim directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan instructing him to distribute the Secured Fund. This Fund, which amounts to approximately 31½ million dollars, has accumulated from the sale of property in Japan which the Japanese forces looted from Allied territories during the war but which it has been impossible to identify as property looted from any particular country. In view of this situation the Far Eastern Commission by policy decisions authorized the nine countries whose territory was looted by Japan and from which originated the various items of unidentifiable property to agree on the distribution of the Fund.

Since the nine countries concerned have not reached an agreement on this problem and the office of the Supreme Commander, the custodian of the Fund, will terminate as soon as the Treaty of Peace comes into force, the United States considered it to be necessary to provide for the distribution of the Fund before the Occupation in Japan should end. Therefore, the United States, in accordance with the authority given to it to issue an interim directive in cases of urgency, has instructed the Supreme Commander to distribute the Secured Fund among the nine countries concerned in accordance with the following schedule of shares expressed in percentage terms: Australia 8%; Burma 12%; China 20%; France 8%; India 8%; Netherlands 12%; Pakistan 8%; Philippines 12%; United Kingdom 12%.

U. S.-Canadian Joint Boards On Pollution of Boundary Waters

[Released to the press March 31]

Pursuant to the approval given by the United States and Canadian Governments¹ to the proposals made by the International Joint Commission in regard to the correction and prevention of pollution in the waters of the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, the Detroit River, the St. Mary's River from Lake Superior to Lake Huron, and the Niagara River from Lake Erie to Lake Ontario, the International Joint Commission has established the following Advisory Boards to the International Joint Commission on Control of Pollution in Boundary Waters:

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 10, 1951, p. 947.

Chairman

L. F. Warrick, U.S. Public Health Service, Washington, D.C.

Member

Hayse Black, U.S. Public Health Service, Cincinnati, Ohio

Members for Questions Concerning St. Mary's River, St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair and Detroit River

John M. Hepler, Michigan Department of Health, Lansing, Mich.

L. F. Oeming, Michigan Stream Control Commission, Lansing, Mich.

Members for Questions Concerning the Niagara River

Earl Devendorf, New York State Department of Health, Albany, N. Y.

C. R. Cox, New York State Department of Health, Albany, N. Y.

FOR CANADA

Chairman

J. R. Menzies, Department of National Health and Welfare, Ottawa

Members

W. R. Edmonds, Department of National Health and Welfare, Ottawa

Dr. A. E. Berry, Ontario Department of Health, Toronto
A. V. De Laporte, Ontario Department of Health, Toronto

The Advisory Boards to the International Joint Commission on Control of Pollution of Boundary Waters will replace the Technical Advisory Boards on Pollution of Boundary Waters, which have now completed their task under the pollution references, to the complete satisfaction of the Commission.

EDITOR'S NOTE. These appointments were made in carrying out the provisions of article IV of the treaty of January 11, 1909, which provides that "the waters herein defined as boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other."

Letters of Credence*Pakistan*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali, presented his credentials to the President on February 27, 1952. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 148 of February 27.

In the BULLETIN of March 10, 1952, page 389, left-hand column, following the paragraph under Article XXIX, the following should be inserted:

In witness whereof the representatives of the two Governments, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed this Agreement.

Done at Tokyo, in duplicate, in the English and Japanese languages, both texts authentic, this twenty-eighth day of February, 1952.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

(SEAL)

DEAN RUSK

EARL D. JOHNSON

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN:

(SEAL)

K. OKAZAKI

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Mar. 3-8, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

No.	Date	Subject
143	2/25	ICAO meeting
148	2/27	Pakistan: Letters of credence (rewrite)
158	3/1	Ceremony on the <i>Courier</i>
159	3/3	Canada: Joint boards-water boundary
160	3/3	Finland: Tax convention signed
†161	3/3	Germany: U.S. bondholders' committee
†162	3/4	St. Lawrence interagency committee
163	3/4	Acheson: "Courier" ceremonies
164	3/4	U.S. del.: Mathematical union
165	3/4	Pt. 4 director for Jordan (rewrite)
†166	3/4	Allison: The U.S. and the Far East
*167	3/4	Acheson on Schoenfeld death
168	3/4	Ireland: Consular convention protocol
169	3/4	Acheson: Germ warfare in Korea
170	3/5	Acheson: British policy in Malaya
171	3/5	Acheson: Oliver Edmund Clubb
†172	3/6	Sargeant oath of office (rewrite)
*173	3/7	Vietnam: Anniversary message
174	3/7	Japan: Distribution of secured fund
†175	3/7	Compton: U.S. Information Program
176	3/7	Cohen appointment
177	3/7	Honduras: Civil aviation mission
†178	3/8	Hoey: Remarks on Indochina
179	3/8	U.S. educators to Ilceco
†180	3/7	Cuba: Military assistance agreement

Thirty-fourth Report of U. N. Command Operations in Korea

FOR THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 16-30, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2507
Transmitted January 28, 1952

I herewith submit report number 34 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-30 November, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 1084-1098, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Progress was made in negotiating a military armistice. At the plenary session of 27 November 1951 both delegations ratified an agreement on agenda item number two.

The agreement on agenda item number two is as follows: "The Delegation of the United Nations Command and of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers reach the following agreement on the second item of the agenda, fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as the basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

1. The principle is accepted that the actual line

of contact between both sides (as determined under either paragraph two or three, as appropriate) will be made the military demarcation line and that at the time specified in the signed armistice agreement both sides will withdraw two kilometres from this line so as to establish the demilitarized zone for the duration of the military armistice.

2. If the military armistice agreement is signed within thirty days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone determined by the sub-delegation on the basis of the above stated principle and in accordance with the present line of contact (as indicated in the attached map and explanatory note), the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone shall not be changed, regardless of whatever changes may occur in the actual lines of contact between both sides.

3. In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until the signing of the armistice agreement, if the military armistice agreement is not signed within thirty days after the two delegations approve in the plenary session this agreement and the specific location of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone as determined in paragraph two above, the sub-delegations shall revise, immediately prior to the signing of the military armistice agreement the above military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone in accordance with the changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between both sides, so that the revised military demarcation line will coincide exactly with the line of contact between both sides immediately prior to the signing of the military armistice agreement and will constitute the military demarcation line for the duration of the military armistice."

The agreed line of contact runs in general from the Sa-Chon River on the west, thence northeast to a point about six miles north of Chorwon, thence generally east to a point north of Kumhwa,

¹Transmitted to the Security Council by the deputy U.S. representative in the Security Council on Jan. 28. For texts of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th reports to the Security Council on U.N. Command operations in Korea, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43; and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. Reports nos. 1-11 are published separately as Department of State publications 3955, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108, respectively. The 12th, 13th, and 14th reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the 15th and 16th reports, *ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the 17th report, *ibid.*, Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the 18th, *ibid.*, May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, *ibid.*, May 21, 1951, p. 828; the 19th report, *ibid.*, June 4, 1951, p. 910; the 20th report, *ibid.*, June 11, 1951, p. 948; the 21st report, *ibid.*, July 2, 1951, p. 30; the 22d, *ibid.*, July 23, 1951, p. 155; the 23d and 24th reports, *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1951, p. 265; the 25th report, *ibid.*, Aug. 20, 1951, p. 303; the 26th report, *ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1951, p. 510; the 27th report, *ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1951, p. 709; the 28th and 29th reports, *ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1028; the 30th, 31st and 32d reports, *ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; and the 33d report, *ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395.

the Central front, aggressive patrol action by United Nations Command and hostile units, often resulting in bitter clashes dominated the battle scene.

The heaviest fighting on the Eastern front occurred in the Kosong and Tupo areas. In the former area, United Nations Command elements on a three-mile front executed a planned withdrawal of approximately two and one-half miles on 17 November. Hostile units rapidly followed up the United Nations Command withdrawal and subsequently made repeated attempts to breach the new positions. In all such instances attacking units failed to reach the main United Nations Command battle positions. In the area southeast of Tupo, the enemy made numerous night attacks. Although no forces of major size were involved in these enemy efforts, fighting was nevertheless prolonged and relatively intense. The enemy's determination to secure and retain positions in this area was vigorously demonstrated when it required two days of stubborn fighting for United Nations Command elements to restore a single position in the Tupo area.

Action continued to reflect the more aggressive enemy attitude noted during the preceding period. Relatively strong local attacks were launched against UNC positions with increasing frequency. The majority of these attacks occurred during the hours of darkness in the Western and Eastern sectors. Immediate United Nations Command counteractions on the Western front nullified local enemy gains in a matter of hours. The enemy attacks on the Eastern front failed to reach main United Nations Command battle positions. A limited attack by United Nations forces on the central front succeeded in advancing positions approximately two miles on a seven-mile front in the Talchon area. With the exception of this advance and a slight planned withdrawal in the Kaesong area, the front lines remained substantially unchanged.

There was no evidence during the period to suggest any diminution of the enemy's offensive potential. However, the enemy gave no indication that he would attempt to exercise this offensive capability in the near future.

United Nations Command Naval Forces on blockade patrols of North Korean coasts continued to prevent the Communists from utilizing sea communications. Day and night bombardments disrupted North Korean coastal highways and rail routes, and provided close artillery support and night illumination in support of front-line action near Kosong and the mouth of the Han River. United States destroyer *Hyman* was hit by return fire at Wonsan without casualties or serious damage resulting, but the city continued to take heavy damage as the siege of the port entered the fortieth week. Hungnam also received very severe punishment as thousands of rockets, shells, and bombs were poured into military target area.

Naval and Marine aviators accounted for many troop casualties, transportation stoppages, and industrial targets. Their claims included a large lumber mill near the south shore of the Choshin Reservoir, a mining plant at Kilchu, factories near Hungnam, scores of trucks, rail cars, bridges and supply and ammunition dumps. Again, downed pilots were rescued from icy seas, and picked up miles inland by helicopters that dared enemy fire and turbulent winds to accomplish their mission.

In spite of freezing weather, heavy seas, and poor visibility, United Nations Command vessels carried on with their difficult and dangerous tasks of minesweeping, rescue, resupply and patrol. The Republic of Korea Navy continued to take an able and substantial part in these operations which, although little publicized, are essential parts of the teamwork which permits major combatant vessels,

such as the newly reported battleship *Wisconsin*, to steam close in to the North Korean beaches to extend the inland range of their guns.

United Nations Command aircraft under the operational control of Far East Air Forces continued round the clock attacks on enemy installations throughout North Korea with greatest emphasis placed on rail and highway interdiction and airfield neutralization. Some increase in the night close support effort was required and our aircraft flew more than 1,290 sorties in close support of the United Nations Command ground forces. One enemy jet fighter base in North Korea was active for a few days during the period. Communist fighter reaction was spotty and heavily dependent on weather. The daily sighting of MIG-15 interceptors ranged from zero on five days to a maximum of 180, which were encountered on the eighteenth. Weather was favourable for visual daylight attacks on most days, but clouds restricted operations on the twenty-second and twenty-third and all but stopped combat flying on the twenty-fifth when freezing rain and snow blanketed most of Korea.

During the period the air interdiction programme was directed at paralyzing the enemy rail network south and east of the Chongchon River and the destruction of trucks and other vehicles along enemy highway supply routes. In daylight, United Nations Command fighter bombers made multiple cuts along open stretches of the rail lines and attacked locomotives, rolling stock and supply buildings. Medium and light bombers augmented this destruction by attacking key rail bridges and marshalling yards along the interdicted routes. These attacks accounted for approximately 1,685 rail cuts, destruction or damage to forty-seven bridges, 532 rail cars, sixty-five locomotives and damage to more than 1,700 supply buildings. Night intruder air craft continued to seek out and attack enemy truck convoys. These missions accounted for the greater portion of the 2,528 vehicles which were reported destroyed during the period.

Persistent Communist ground force night attacks on advanced outposts of the United Nations Command Army have been countered by increased close support with medium and light bombers.

The runways of jet airfields at Saamcham, Taechom, and Namsi have been kept in an unserviceable condition. Uiju airfield on the south bank of the Yalu River became operational for jet fighters early in the period. During a low level attack on this airdrome on the eighteenth, our aircraft destroyed four MIG-15 jet fighters and damaged four others. On the night of 23rd-24th November, the runway at Uiju was made unserviceable when heavy concentrations of 100-pound

general purpose and 500-pound air bursting bombs were dropped by Far East Air Force aircraft.

During the past two weeks United Nations Command pilots have shot down nine MIG-15 interceptors and damaged twenty three others in air-to-air battles. On 30 November United Nations Command jets shot down nine conventional enemy aircraft in a single engagement.

There was little change in the employment of reconnaissance, rescue, or combat cargo aircraft. No enemy air attacks were reported against United Nations Command forces and bases.

The large number of prisoners of war detained by the United Nations Command has necessitated the establishment of specific United Nations Command procedures for the disciplinary control of these prisoners. The United Nations Command, therefore, during October 1951 prepared and promulgated a penal code governing the conduct of prisoners of war, together with trial regulations governing the trial of prisoners of war for post capture offences by United Nations military commission. A United Nations Command procedure for the imposition of nonjudicial punishment and regulations governing the penal confinement of prisoners of war were also promulgated in October 1951. Copies of these documents are being forwarded. The provisions of these directives are in strict accordance with the terms of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war of 12 August 1949, which is being adhered to by the United Nations Command as governing the treatment of prisoners of war detained by the United Nations Command.

During the protracted delay in reaching agreement on agenda item two in the armistice negotiations, United Nations Command leaflets, loudspeaker, and radio broadcasts continued rapid dissemination of factual news accounts of the Panmunjom discussions. These media explained the determination of the United Nations Command delegation to press for an equitable, effective, and early solution, so that needless sacrifice of lives can be avoided. After Communist acceptance of the United Nations Command formula for solution of agenda item two, United Nations Command media lent vigorous support to efforts to expedite agreement on the remaining substantive items of the agenda, calling attention to the heavy loss of life sustained by the enemy during more than four months' delay on item two.

Supplies and equipment are being imported under a programme of relief and economic aid to Korea. These imports are to apply against the civilian needs, to encourage industrial rehabilitation, and to further the development of a self-sustaining and healthy economy.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

International Mathematical Union

On March 4 the Department of State announced that the first general assembly of the International Mathematical Union will convene at Rome, Italy, on March 6, 1952. The members of the United States delegation are as follows:

Delegates

Marshall H. Stone, Ph.D., *chairman*; chairman, Department of Mathematics, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

Einar Hille, Ph.D., professor, Department of Mathematics, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

John R. Kline, Ph.D., chairman, Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.

Saunders MacLane, Ph.D., professor, Department of Mathematics, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

Gordon T. Whyburn, Ph.D., chairman, Department of Mathematics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.

Alternate Delegates

Nathan Jacobson, Ph.D., professor, Department of Mathematics, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

W. R. Transue, Ph.D., professor, Department of Mathematics, Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio

The purpose of the forthcoming meeting is formally to organize the International Mathematical Union, which came into being on September 10, 1951. Consideration will be given to numerous administrative, organizational, and policy matters which must be settled in order to insure the effective operation of the newly created organization. Specific agenda items include election of officers of the Union, adoption of rules of procedure, determination of the unit contribution, establishment of an operating budget, application for membership in the International Council of Scientific Unions, and formulation of a scientific program.

European-Mediterranean Air Navigation Meeting

On February 25 the Department of State announced that the third European-Mediterranean Regional Air Navigation meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization (Icao) will convene on February 26, 1952, at Paris, France. The United States delegation is as follows:

Delegate

Clifford P. Burton, Chief, Airways Operations Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce, *Chairman*

Alternate Delegates

James F. Angier, Establishment Engineering Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Henry S. Chandler, Chief, International Standards Branch, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

James L. Kinney, Representative, Flight Operations, Icao, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Delbert M. Little, Assistant Chief of Operations, Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce

Edmond V. Shores, Aeronautical Communications Specialist, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Clement Vaughn, Commander, United States Coast Guard, Department of the Treasury

Advisers

Robert G. Armstrong, Capt., USN, Head, Civil Aviation Liaison Branch, Flight Services Division, Department of the Navy

William B. Becker, Operations Specialist, Domestic and International Standards, Operations Division, Air Transport Association of America, Inc.

James O. Beckwith, Col., USAF, Assistant Chief, Flight Operations Division, Directorate of Operations, Department of the Air Force

Robert L. Froman, Associate Director, Bureau of Safety Regulations, Civil Aeronautics Board

Thomas A. Kouchnerkavich, Electronics Engineer (International), Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Newton A. Lieurance, Commander, USN, Head, Weather Communications and Intelligence Unit, Flight Services Division, Department of the Navy

William J. McKnight, Special Representative, Aeronautical Radio, Inc.

Donald Mitchell, Assistant Chief, Aviation Division, Safety and Special Radio Services Bureau, Federal Communications Commission

LaVern C. Moore, Lt., USN, Head, Non-Tactical Communications Requirements Unit, Plans and Readiness Branch, Department of the Navy

Justus W. Smith, Maj., USAF, Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe, Wiesbaden, Germany

Seymour Stearns, Maj., USAF, Communications Liaison Branch, Directorate of Communications, Department of the Air Force

Roland E. Sturtevant, Chief Adviser, London International Field Office, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Vernon I. Weihe, Electronic Systems Engineer, Air Navigation and Traffic Control, Air Transport Association of America, Inc.

At the first (Paris, April 1946) and second (Paris, May 1948) European-Mediterranean Regional Air Navigation meetings, the then existing air navigation facilities and services in the region were surveyed, and such improvements as were considered necessary for the regularity and safety of air navigation were recommended. On the basis

of reports and recommendations formulated at the two meetings, plans for the development of air-navigation facilities and services in the region were subsequently adopted by the Council of ICAO.

The forthcoming meeting has been called by ICAO for the purpose of reviewing the extent to which the recommended plans have been implemented, reexamining the requirements for air-navigation facilities and services in the light of current aircraft operations in the region, and recommending to the Council of ICAO such amendments and revisions of the regional plans as may be deemed necessary. One of the outstanding accomplishments of the meeting is expected to be the drawing up of an air traffic control plan for Western Europe.

Communiqués Regarding Korea To the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2479, January 15; S/2512, February 4; S/2513, February 4; S/2517, February 11; S/2518, February 11; S/2519, February 11; S/2520, February 11; S/2525, February 13; S/2528, February 15; S/2531, February 20; S/2532, February 20; S/2533, February 20; S/2534, February 20; S/2536, February 20; S/2537, February 21; S/2538, February 26.

Benjamin V. Cohen Named to U.N. Disarmament Commission

The President on March 7 appointed Benjamin V. Cohen as deputy U.S. representative to the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. The U.S. representative to the Disarmament Commission is Ambassador Warren R. Austin, permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations.

The Disarmament Commission was established by a resolution adopted by the Sixth General Assembly on January 11, 1952, and was directed to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty or treaties for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; for the elimination of all weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and for effective international control of atomic energy to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The President described the nature of the U.S.-U.K.-French proposals which resulted in the establish-

ment of the Disarmament Commission in a Nationwide broadcast on November 7, 1951. The Commission takes the place of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments which have been abolished.

The first meeting of the Disarmament Commission was held in Paris on February 4, 1952, but dealt solely with procedural matters. The next meeting will be held in the near future in New York.

It is expected that Mr. Cohen will devote his full time to his new assignment for which he will have the personal rank of Ambassador.

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

General Assembly

- Report of the Economic and Social Council (Chapter IV). Report of the Third Committee. A/20029/Rev. 1, January 3, 1952. 11 pp. mimeo.
- Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1952. Supplementary Report of the Fifth Committee. A/2002/Add. 1, February 2, 1952. 30 pp. mimeo.
- The Problem of the Independence of Korea. Letter dated 25 December 1951 to the President of the General Assembly from the Chairman of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A/2038, January 5, 1952. 13 pp.
- Complaint of Aggressive Activity and Interference in the Domestic Affairs of Other Countries by the United States of America, as Instanced by the Appropriation of \$100 Million to Finance the Recruitment of Persons and the Organization of Armed Groups in and Outside the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Other Democratic Countries. Letter dated 26 December 1951 from the Chairman of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the President of the General Assembly. A/2051, January 10, 1952. 11 pp. mimeo.
- Abolition of Corporal Punishment in Trust Territories. Report of the Fourth Committee. A/2060, January 15, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.
- Administrative Unions Affecting Trust Territories. Report of the Fourth Committee. A/2062, January 16, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.
- Ways and Means for Making the Evidence of Customary International Law More Readily Available. Report of the Sixth Committee. A/2089, January 29, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

The United States in the United Nations

February 27–March 14, 1952

Trusteeship Council

When the Tenth Session of the Trusteeship Council opened under the Presidency of Sir Alan Burns (U. K.), on February 27, 1952, the new Conference Building at United Nations Headquarters was witnessing its first meeting. The major portion of this session of the Council will be concerned with the review of the annual reports on the administration of the four Trust Territories in the Pacific. These territories are New Guinea and Nauru, under Australian administration, Western Samoa, administered by New Zealand, and the United States-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. In examining the reports on these Territories the 12-member Council will take into consideration the report of its Visiting Mission sent to these territories in 1950, as well as petitions received from the inhabitants of the territories. The United States is represented on the Trusteeship Council by Ambassador Francis B. Sayre.

At its opening meeting the Council refused to consider the usual Soviet motion to unseat the representative of China, and adopted a United States-sponsored proposal bringing about an indefinite postponement of the question.

Examination of the report on Western Samoa began on March 4 and that on New Guinea March 11. During the general debate on the report on Western Samoa, the general view expressed by Council members was that the Administering Authority was discharging its obligations satisfactorily and that marked progress had been achieved in the field of political advancement. Discussion of the report on New Guinea is expected to be concluded by March 17.

Examination of the report by the United States on its administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is expected to begin on March 20. At that time Senator Elbert D. Thomas, High Commissioner of the Trust Territory, in his capacity as Special Representative of the United States for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, will make a statement outlining the progress that has been made in the Territory during the year under review (July 1, 1950 through June 30, 1951). Following that statement the High Commissioner will be available to answer questions by the various representatives on the Council relating to the administration of the Territory.

In addition to its examination of annual reports the Council has several other significant items on its agenda for the tenth session. A resolution passed by the Council on March 3 provided for the arrangements for the forthcoming Visiting Mission to West Africa. This Mission, which will arrive in Togoland not later than September

1, 1952, will make a study, pursuant to a resolution of the recent General Assembly, of the Ewe and Togoland unification problem. Pursuant to another General Assembly resolution the Council has adopted new procedures to facilitate the examination of petitions. A Standing Committee on Petitions, empowered to meet between sessions of the Council, has been established. In accordance with other General Assembly actions the Council has adopted resolutions (1) requesting its Standing Committee on Administrative Unions to prepare a draft of the report requested by the Assembly on administrative unions between trust territories and adjacent colonial areas; (2) authorizing its Committee on Rural Economic Development of Trust Territories to invite, where appropriate, specialized agencies to contribute or to participate in its study on the rural economic development of the trust territories; and (3) requesting the Secretary General to undertake further efforts to provide suitable information on the United Nations, and the International Trusteeship System in particular, for dissemination among the inhabitants and in the schools of the trust territories.

Under study by committees of the Council is the General Assembly resolution on the organization and functioning of Visiting Missions, together with an Ecosoc resolution recommending the consideration of the nomination of women as members of visiting missions, and the revision of the Provisional Questionnaire which guides administering authorities in preparing the annual reports on the trust territories under their administration.

Some consideration has also been given to the General Assembly resolution inviting the Trusteeship Council to examine the possibility of associating the inhabitants of the Trust Territories more closely in its work. There will be further discussion of this item at subsequent meetings of the Council.

Economic and Social Council

Subcommission on Freedom of Information and the Press—The fifth and final session of the Subcommission convened at United Nations Headquarters, March 3, for a 3-week period. Mr. Carroll Binder, Editorial Editor of the *Minneapolis Tribune*, is the American member of the Subcommission, which consists of 15 experts who serve in their individual capacities, and not as representatives of governments.

The purpose of the meeting was to consider the redrafting of an international code of ethics. Mr. Binder recalled his serious doubts that such a document would find general acceptance. He observed, however, that since the Subcommission was committed to the task, it should draft the

code simply and concisely and avoid ambiguous and vague terms.

After extended discussion, the draft of international code of ethics containing a preamble and four articles, was adopted March 14 by a vote of 7-0-3 (Mr. Binder, U.S.). It states, *inter alia*:

(1) Freedom of information and of the press is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of all the freedoms consecrated in the Charter of the United Nations and proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2) All engaged in gathering, transmitting, disseminating and commenting on news and in describing contemporary events by the written word, by word of mouth or by any other means of expression shall do their utmost to ensure that the information the public receives is factually accurate. (3) Fidelity to the public interest is vital to a high standard of professional conduct. (4) Deliberate calumny, slander, libel, unfounded accusations and plagiarism are serious professional offenses. (5) The reputation of individuals shall be respected, and news regarding their private lives likely to harm their reputation shall not be published unless it is in the public interest, as distinguished from public curiosity, to do so. (6) All engaged in the gathering of information about countries other than their own, or in commenting on them, shall make the utmost endeavor to acquire the necessary background knowledge conducive to accurate and objective reporting and comment concerning such countries. (7) No provision of this code may be interpreted as justifying governments to intervene in any manner whatsoever to ensure that the personnel of the press and of other media of information comply with the moral obligations set forth herein.

The proposal of the U.S.S.R. member, Mr. Zonov, for a new article 1 was rejected 1 (U.S.S.R.)-8-2. It required that "workers in the press and information services shall base their work on the principle that their fundamental obligation" is to combat war propaganda, fight for the exposure of fascism, develop friendly relations between nations, combat discrimination, etc. Mr. Binder criticized Mr. Zonov's proposal as an attempt to commit the United Nations to the Soviet concept of the role of the press.

The Subcommittee, March 13, adopted a recommendation to the Economic and Social Council that "an international professional conference be held not later than the end of 1953 to prepare and accept a final text of an international code of ethics for journalists." This recommendation, which was opposed by Mr. Binder and Mr. Zonov, was approved by a vote of 6-2-4.

The Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)—The Economic Commission for Europe began its seventh session in Geneva on March 3. The Commission had before it the task of evaluating the work of its technical committees and of reviewing the "Economic Survey of Europe," a survey put out by the ECE secretariat.

The discussions on the Survey brought out a Soviet charge that the secretariat was biased and incompetent. Soviet anger was due to the fact that this year the secretariat had found it necessary, because of a lack of adequate statistics and other information from Soviet sources, to analyze the Soviet economy in a chapter separate

from those chapters dealing with the economy of Europe as a whole. The separate chapter, while unemotional and completely objective, showed that a huge percentage of Soviet productive resources is being used for armament.

During the discussions on the technical committees, the Executive Secretary of ECE, Mr. Gunnar Myrdal, pointed out that the Iron Curtain countries had largely withdrawn their support from the technical work of ECE. The inference was clear that the Iron Curtain countries were primarily interested in ECE as a political instrument and as a propaganda forum.

Security Council

The Disarmament Commission—The first meeting of the Disarmament Commission, consisting of the 11 members of the Security Council and Canada, was held in Paris on February 4. At that time (1) the Rules of Procedure were adopted; (2) it was agreed that meetings of the Commission would, in principle, be open; and (3) that the chairmanship would be rotated on a monthly basis.

The second meeting was held on March 14 at U.N. Headquarters to consider the work of the Commission in conformity with General Assembly resolutions of January 11 and 19, 1952. Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen, U.S. deputy on the Commission, opened the general discussion and submitted this Government's draft proposal for a plan of consideration by the Commission. He noted that its language was deliberately designed to cover the essential elements of any balanced disarmament system without prejudging the details. "The United States," he said, "believed any proposals any government might wish to advance could be considered under the appropriate headings of the plan." He recalled that the sixth General Assembly had directed the Commission to consider plans for disclosure and verification "from the outset," and that point was therefore the first on the United States plan. Noting the Commission was directed to make its first report by June 1, he trusted that if "we concentrate on the items of disclosures and verification suggested we may be able to report some real progress which will enable us to grapple more intelligently with the other vital problems listed here."

The Representatives of France and the United Kingdom (M. Jules Moch and Sir Gladwyn Jebb) commented favorably on the proposed plan and accepted it in principle. The U.S.S.R. representative, in the course of questioning Mr. Cohen, repeated a number of familiar Soviet bloc charges, and maintained that disclosure and verification had been listed as Point 1 in order to prevent the Commission from coming to grips with the paramount business of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition and control of the atomic weapon.

The next meeting will be held on March 19.

Explanation of Procedure in Case of Oliver Edmund Clubb

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press March 5]

At his press conference on March 5, Secretary Acheson made the following extemporaneous statement regarding the case of Oliver Edmund Clubb:

Now, I should like to talk with you this morning about a matter which has been much agitated in the press recently, and that is the Clubb case. Various questions have been put to me about it. I have not answered any of those until this morning, and I shall now discuss the whole matter fully with all of you here.

First of all, I should like to remind you that the loyalty and security program of the Department was put into effect in 1947 under a Presidential order, which required such action, and it has been carried out in accordance with general rules laid down by the President and his Loyalty Review Board ever since.

The purpose of this whole program is to accomplish several things: First of all, it is to protect the Government against employing any persons whose loyalty may be doubtful, or whose security may be doubtful, so that the Government may be assured that its employees are loyal and devoted to its interests. A second great purpose of the program is to be completely fair and just to all employees of the Department, and, particularly, to an employee who may be under investigation. It is only in that way that the Government can be assured not only of the negative fact that it does not have disloyal employees, but of the positive fact that it has enthusiastic, trusted, and competent employees.

This program has resulted in the investigation of all people employed in the Department at the time the program went into effect, and with all those who have come into the Department since.

When these investigations, or information brought to the attention of the Department, require more formal proceedings, we go into a different stage of the program.

There is a Loyalty and Security Board in the Department of State. Information which comes to us, either through our own investigation or other investigations, is laid before that Board. If the Board believes that this requires a hear-

ing—response from the person involved—a notice is sent to him setting forth the information to which he is required to respond.

The Board then holds hearings. The Board then comes to conclusions. Those conclusions are reported to the Assistant Secretary in charge of these matters. If he approves of them, they are then transmitted by him to the individual concerned. If the individual concerned is dissatisfied with the finding, that individual has the right, under the regulations, to appeal to me. I can, if I choose, hear that appeal and read that record myself, or I can have that procedure followed under my direction by some officer who is deputized by me to represent me.

I should like to stress that all steps which are taken under this program are taken under my responsibility. The Secretary of State must remain responsible for the conduct of this whole procedure.

At this point I should like to bring in something somewhat more complicated. There are two general types of matters which come up in these investigations: One has to do with loyalty—if there is a reasonable doubt of the loyalty of the individual he may be separated from the service. The other question which comes up is whether the person involved is a security risk. Both of these matters are defined with certain criteria in the regulations which are available to you.

The reason I mention this is because if the finding is that a person is, or is not, disloyal, or there is reasonable doubt as to his loyalty, that matter may be reviewed by the President's Loyalty Review Board. However, in security questions, that is, if the man is found to be a security risk or not a security risk, that determination is final with me. It is not subject to review by the President's Board.

It has been our practice in the past not to discuss the procedural steps in any case, not to say what the result of each of these steps was. I am going to depart from that practice this morning because somewhat of a mystery has been made of this case. I regret that I have to do that, and I

think that, on the whole, it is not in the best interests of the program. The reason I think that is that the purpose of this whole program, and of all these investigations, is for me ultimately to determine whether or not an employee should be separated from the service for one or the other of these two reasons.

It is important that at the conclusion of this whole procedure an employee is either clearly separated or clearly reinstated; that is, cleared of the action of the charge made against him or that he is separated. There should not be twilight zones. There is a twilight zone if you report that in a particular case a certain group of my associates came to one conclusion under the procedure that was reviewed, and another person or group of my associates came to another conclusion, and that, finally, I, who have the ultimate responsibility, came to either one or the other of those conclusions, or, possibly, a third one. That does not leave the employee either completely cleared or clearly separated. In other words, we do not want to run box scores by innings on these investigations. However, in this case I think the interests of both the individual concerned, and the Government, and the public will be served by my going into the various steps in Mr. Clubb's case.

The hearing before the Loyalty and Security Board of the Department of State in Mr. Clubb's case involved two questions: One was—Was there reasonable doubt of his loyalty to the United States? The other was: Was he a security risk?

On the first question the Board found that there was not any doubt about his loyalty to the United States. That was reviewed and confirmed, so that that whole question of Mr. Clubb's loyalty was resolved in his favor throughout the procedure.

We now come to the question of security—security risk. On that matter the Board found that Mr. Clubb was, in their judgment, a security risk. That finding was sent to the Assistant Secretary who reviewed it, and approved it for forwarding to Mr. Clubb, and it was forwarded to him with the statement that under the procedure he had a period of time within which to appeal to the Secretary of State if he chose to do so. Mr. Clubb chose to appeal and within the appropriate time he appealed to me.

I have never, as I said before, been able to read these records and hear the arguments myself. I, therefore, designated one of our most experienced and trusted Foreign Service Officers to act for me, which he did. He very faithfully, very patiently, and very thoroughly reviewed the entire record. He listened to the arguments of Mr. Clubb's counsel, and he reached a conclusion, and wrote an opinion on it. That conclusion and opinion was that Mr. Clubb was not a security risk. That opinion was sent to me. I read it very carefully. I did not study the record because, as I have said, I do not have time to do that. It seemed to me that this trusted officer, who was my deputy, had

reached the right conclusion—I adopted his conclusion; I am responsible for the ultimate judgment which was that Mr. Clubb was not a security risk.

That decision was communicated to Mr. Clubb. Mr. Clubb applied for retirement. That application was considered in the Department and granted. There have been suggestions made, which I dislike very much to refer to but must, that there was some connection between my conclusion and his retirement. That is utterly and absolutely untrue. The final decision that he was not a security risk was reached on the basis of the record by my deputy, approved by me, and had nothing whatever to do with Mr. Clubb's retirement. His decision to retire was made when he had the decision of the Secretary of State before him.

That is the statement which I wish to make to you this morning, and I wish to end, as I began, by saying that I am doing this to remove any element of obscurity or mystery from this matter, in the interests of the Government, in the interest of Mr. Clubb, and in the interest of public information. But I shall not make this a practice, and in the future I hope I will not again be called upon to go into the various steps, and I hope you will understand that always the responsibility for these decisions must rest on me. It is mine under the law; it is mine under any proper administration; I must shoulder it. If there is any criticism for any result, that criticism must be directed at me and not at the various people who take part in the procedure, because each of them acts as my agent for me, as part of a procedure which is meant to give the greatest protection to the Government and the greatest protection to the individual.

Question: Mr. Secretary, would you name the Foreign Service Officer who acted as your deputy?

Answer: No, I don't think I will do that, Mr. Hightower, and the reason that I will not do it is that it makes it infinitely more difficult for me to get people to take on these highly disagreeable tasks of reviewing decisions made by people in the Department. If they are to be made the center of public controversy, they hesitate to do it. I think that if I am going to get the best advice and help that I can, in fairness to the people who work for me I must take the attitude that they are working under my direction, which is the case; that I am responsible, and that, therefore, I do not deflect any criticism which may arise from me to somebody who has been good enough and patriotic enough to come in and help me with a very disagreeable task.

Question: Mr. Secretary, could you define, in some way that we could understand, the difference between a loyalty and a security issue as you use the terms in this case?

Answer: I will try to have that done for you. Each one of these involves seven or eight para-

graphs in the regulations, and I am sure if I attempt to do it now I will get it wrong and further confuse the matter.

Question: Mr. Secretary, what did Mr. Clubb refer to—I can't use his exact words, but in his resignation, you know, he said something to the effect that he wouldn't be given assignments again which were in line with the career work he had done, and that, therefore, he was resigning?

Answer: I don't know. I am sorry, I just don't know.

Question: Well, would his assignment have been completely changed as a result of this? Would he have been denied the sort of work he had been doing?

Answer: I believe that he was informed of an assignment which was not the one which he was holding prior to the hearings.

Question: I see. Mr. Secretary, in mentioning that Mr. Clubb was found—that there was no reasonable doubt as to his loyalty—you added that that conclusion was reviewed. Did you imply by that that it was reviewed by the President's Loyalty Review Board?

Answer: No. No, it is reviewed in the Department by the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of these matters who acts for me at that stage of the proceedings.

Question: Well, Mr. Secretary, will you tell a Senate Committee, if they press you, who the Foreign Service Officer was that reviewed the case?

Answer: Oh, I don't want to speculate about that. This is a serious matter and I think that we ought to deal with it on the substance and not on that sort of basis.

Question: Mr. Secretary, could you say that the reason that it was possible to reverse the decision of the Security Board had to do with the fact that the reason that the Board had some doubt as to security did not actually deal with the basic charges that were lodged against Mr. Clubb to begin with?

Answer: I cannot. Under the President's Orders I cannot talk about the substance of any proceeding of this nature whatever. Those instructions are absolute on me.

Question: Mr. Secretary, have you received a request from Senator Ferguson for information on the number of persons receiving pensions after security investigations?

Answer: I have not received it. I am told that he is making such a request of me but I have not received it.

Question: Well, Mr. Secretary, are you prepared to say how many people there are in that category?

Answer: No, I am not informed on that subject.

Question: Mr. Secretary, would you care to say anything more specific about people who talk publicly about the step-by-step procedures in these loyalty and security investigations?

Answer: Am I prepared to do what? I am sorry I did not understand you.

Question: Comment on the action of people who talk publicly about the various steps involved in these loyalty and security investigations?

Answer: No, I don't wish to comment on anybody else. I have already said that I think it is detrimental to the proper working of this system to go into the various steps which reach the final conclusion. The final conclusion is the important thing: Is the ultimate result that the employee is cleared of the charges brought against him or is he not? That is the important thing and not who thought what at any particular stage.

Question: Mr. Secretary, is it the policy of the Department when a man has been investigated for loyalty, and then when perhaps there has been a disagreement among your staff as to whether he should or should not be found a security risk, then to remove him from a position where he has anything to do with secrets or policy making?

Answer: I know of no policy. As I say, we either clear a person or we do not clear a person.

THE DEPARTMENT

Educators Depart for HICOG Posts

The Department of State announced on March 8 that two American specialists have recently left the United States for Germany to participate in educational projects administered by the Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany. Allan R. Lichtenberger, Director of Research, State Department of Public Instruction, Lincoln, Nebr., and the Reverend Max E. Murphy, pastor of Saints Philip and James Catholic Church, Chagnanas, Trinidad, British West Indies, have been awarded grants for this purpose under the Department of State's exchange-of-persons program.

During his 6-month stay, Mr. Lichtenberger will work with the German Institute for Educational Research, assisting the staff in the organization of its professional program for school administrators and school finance experts. He will also advise and teach the students of the Institute.

Father Murphy will remain in Germany for 3 months in order to advise on the establishment of vocational guidance centers and homes for unemployed and refugee youth. He intends to survey the existing conditions and then to initiate on a broad scale education, recreation, and welfare services. He will work with young people of the age group of 14 to 25 in Bavaria and North-Rhine-Westphalia.

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An Organization for International Information

by Wilson Compton
Administrator, International Information Administration¹

We are here today to commemorate the birth-date of a great man. That man's greatness is known and appreciated well beyond the boundaries of his native land.

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk was a patriot and the founder of a nation. He was also a citizen of the world in its true sense. His name will live on in the firmament of the great statesmen of his time.

From his early years in politics, Masaryk steadfastly fought the battle of freedom. It was a good fight. Not once did he waver from that progressive spirit which has come to characterize the democratic way of life. Thomas Masaryk kept his feet on the ground and his eyes on the stars.

It was no accident that this man should have found refuge in America when in exile during the First World War. It was no accident that Czechoslovakia's first president made common cause with our own wartime President, Woodrow Wilson. It was no accident that a real bond of friendship developed between Masaryk and Wilson.

The principles which guided Masaryk and the principles which guided Wilson were never far apart.

Clearly, this man whom we honor today is more than a memory. He is a living symbol of the tradition of freedom and liberty which binds together all the democratic peoples.

This spiritual unity of freedom-loving men has been aptly described by one of our own American poets, Stephen Vincent Benet. Benet wrote—and this I quote:

"If our brothers are oppressed, then we are oppressed. If they hunger, we hunger. If their freedom is taken away, our freedom is not secure."

You who have seen the land of your fathers in recent years enveloped by the totalitarianism of international communism can derive great hope from the knowledge that you do not stand alone in your yearning for a free Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia for nearly 30 years was a democratic showcase of Europe; and we Americans

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the Czechoslovak National Council of America, New York, N. Y., on Mar. 7 and released to the press on the same date.

know that the democratic spirit is alive today in the hearts and minds of the Czechoslovak people.

The hope for a free society lives as long as that spirit lives. We must encourage and sustain that hope and that spirit.

I know that the President of the United States believes this even as I believe it and as you believe it.

Mr. Truman spoke emphatically on this point in a statement issued last month on the fourth anniversary of the demonstration of democratic Prague students against the Communist seizure of Czechoslovakia.² The President referred to Czechoslovakia and the other enslaved nations of Eastern Europe as being "only temporarily under the Communist yoke."

Mr. Truman made a clear-cut distinction between the Communist Government of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak people themselves.

Our American foreign policy is gauged accordingly. That policy is geared to the premise that there is a great gulf between the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Communist-controlled governments which have been imposed upon them by Moscow. It is fear—not sympathy—by which the Communists seek to bridge that gap.

America's Message to Captive Peoples

Our international information program, through the Voice of America, has been saying this to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain. And I am pleased to say that we are getting tangible results.

As you know, I have headed the United States International Information Administration for little more than a month. The ink on my appointment to this challenging task is hardly dry.

There is much—so much—to learn about the international information services as a means of carrying America's message to peoples everywhere. There is so much to learn about how best to deliver our message of hope, friendship, and understanding.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 394.

The international information program is itself a difficult undertaking. But it is an undertaking in which every American citizen has a stake; and that stake may in time be the difference between peace and war.

Propaganda—and let us face it, we are in the business of international propaganda—propaganda is a powerful political weapon. We are using that weapon in the interest of truth and truth only. That was the first mandate of the Congress of the United States in establishing in 1948 what is now known as the International Information and Educational Exchange Program.

The Soviet Union has been using propaganda as one of its most potent means of spreading totalitarian controls over other peoples as well as its own. But Soviet propaganda has demonstrated all too clearly that false statements, half-truths, and no truths at all are its stock in trade.

When I undertook the administration of this overseas information and educational exchange program, I well knew that the freedoms which we cherish here in America were in danger unless those freedoms were also made secure elsewhere in the world. I knew that other peoples, in their way, must have the right to seek a betterment of their lot by peaceful means and to find for themselves the kind of opportunity which you, my friends, have found for yourselves here in America.

I know that the information and educational exchange between America and other countries, if properly used, can do much to further a foreign policy designed to build security not only for this country but for the entire free world.

Recently, I had occasion to visit the Middle East. While there, I was asked by some of our Arab friends, "For whom are you working?" I replied: "Officially I am working for the U. S. Government; but in a more important sense I am working for your grandchildren and mine."

This battle for men's minds is of more than passing concern; and its stakes go well beyond the immediate "security" of this Nation or any nation.

We seek a secure America in a decent world. We also seek a secure and decent future.

I want my children, my children's children, and yours to have the benefits of freedom. I believe that the overwhelming majority of Americans want the same thing; and they want it for other people too.

We must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological struggle in which we are engaged is not one which is likely to end today, tomorrow, or next week. There are no fortresses which can be taken with a sudden tactical charge.

The psychological struggle is likely to be a long-term affair. If we are wise and are true to our trust, we will gauge our plans accordingly.

I have mentioned that our international information effort has been making an impact behind the Iron Curtain. America's Campaign of Truth

has been making sizeable dents in the barrier which in recent years has been dropped across central and Eastern Europe.

U.S. Objectives Behind the Iron Curtain

But before getting into some of the evidences of this, it would be well to explain what it is that we are trying to achieve behind the Iron Curtain.

We are doing a difficult job behind the Iron Curtain and so far as I have reason to believe, we are doing it effectively. We are not accomplishing miracles. Nor do we expect to accomplish miracles.

What, then, are our objectives behind the Iron Curtain? Our objectives are not the same in the Soviet Union as they are among the so-called satellite countries.

In the Soviet Union, we are seeking to tell the truth about the United States. We are seeking to expose the Soviet Government's fraudulent efforts to misrepresent to its own people America's policies, aims, and actions. We want the peoples of the Soviet Union to know the facts about the attitudes, interests, and purposes of the American people.

We are seeking to counteract the immoral mixture of falsehoods and half-truths which the Soviet propaganda machine continuously concocts about us.

We are seeking to reach the peoples of the Soviet Union with the truth as to where America stands on vital world issues as well as to reveal to them the course of action which their own Government has taken in regard to these same world issues.

In seeking to reach the peoples of the satellite areas, on the other hand, we constantly bear in mind that many of these peoples have had long experience in democracy—an experience which is not to be found within the Soviet Union itself.

We are encouraging the peoples of the satellite areas to keep alive the hope that the Soviet order imposed upon them by force will not stand the test of time. We seek to buoy up their faith in a future in which they will once again have an independent national existence and be able again to observe in their own way the customs and traditions to which they are devoted.

We are seeking to keep them informed of our actions, to explain our policies, and to demonstrate that the United States is concerned with their welfare. We want them to understand that they have not been forgotten; that they have friends.

We are seeking to maintain and strengthen our reputation for truth and reliability in the reporting of current world events. And we seek constantly to relate those events to the aims and aspirations of these peoples who are temporarily enslaved.

What evidence do we have that America's Voice is getting across to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain? Well, let us look at some of the facts.

For one thing, the Soviet and satellite governments are doing everything in their power—at great expense—to prevent the penetration of America's information campaign. They would hardly be doing that if they themselves believed the campaign to be ineffective.

The Soviet Government is spending almost as much on efforts to jam our Voice of America broadcasts as we are spending on our entire worldwide radio broadcasting program.

Yet, in the face of this tremendous jamming, between 20 and 25 percent of our broadcasts are getting through to Moscow and Leningrad. In other areas of the Soviet Union, the penetration ratio is as high as 75 percent.

Both the Soviet and satellite governments have been using a constant campaign of terror and coercion to discourage listening to our broadcasts and the reading of our information materials.

Some of you in this audience are undoubtedly familiar with what President Gottwald and his associates are pleased to call a "law for the protection of peace." The Czech "protection of peace" law, enacted in December 1950, is typical of the "gag" laws currently in operation in most of the satellite countries. In the land of your fathers, passing on of news heard on the Voice of America broadcasts appears to be classified as "war-mongering"; and any person caught "war-mongering . . . or otherwise supporting war propaganda" is subject to from one to 25 years in jail.

In practice, this law means that any person caught repeating what he has learned from free world sources may be summarily clapped into prison.

In several of the countries behind the Iron Curtain, the rural people have been asked to sign a declaration that they will neither listen to free world broadcasts nor permit the relay of news heard on such broadcasts.

From Bulgaria and elsewhere come reports that the Communist government officials have turned off the electricity in rural areas during the peak broadcast period of the Voice of America. In Albania—among other Communist-controlled countries—those who have radios are under constant surveillance.

And so it goes throughout the Communist world—a world in which moral slavery has become the order of the day.

Has the terrorism of the Communist governments proved successful in shutting out America's Campaign of Truth? No, it has not.

In at least two of the satellite countries, nearly 80 percent of the radio audience tunes in on Voice broadcasts with reasonable regularity. Elsewhere in the Soviet orbit, the percentage is almost as high.

From the Baltic states come reports to the effect that the wave lengths of free world broadcasts appear regularly scrawled across the sidewalks and on the backs of fences.

Defectors from the Soviet zone of Germany tell us that a great many of the Red army men stationed there are regular listeners to the Voice of America.

Up to about a year and a half ago, also, our international press, periodical, book, and allied programs behind the Iron Curtain were having a substantial impact. That impact continues to be considerable throughout the free world today although now greatly reduced behind the Iron Curtain. *Amerika*, a magazine published by our International Information Administration and circulated in the Soviet Union, is one of the few written vehicles which is still having a substantial effect within the Soviet orbit.

The satellite Communist governments became so uneasy over the interest which their people were showing in our written materials that they undertook a systematic crusade to close down our United States information centers. The Czechoslovak Government forced the termination of our information center activities as of mid-1950. It also insisted upon the recall of our press attaché in Prague.

Today, no American information centers or libraries are operating behind the Iron Curtain. But the fact that we were forced to close them testifies to the psychotic Communist fear of the truth and to the effectiveness of the written word in carrying the truth.

The value of the movie film as an information vehicle is well illustrated, I think, by a recent occurrence in Finland. Now Finland, though living in the shadow of the Kremlin, is not an Iron Curtain country either in spirit or in fact. The Finns have retained their democracy despite their awkward geographic position on the frontier of the Soviet Union.

This occurrence is the more significant because of that geographic position.

Recently, the Finnish Communists called an important Party meeting in a major city. It so happened that an American film was being shown there at the same time.

What did the Communist Party dignitaries do? They went to the American movie rather than to their Party meeting.

Are we getting through the Iron Curtain? Of course, we are!

Perhaps the best evidence of all is the admission of key Communist leaders that they are greatly disturbed by our information program.

This is what Comrade Gottwald had to tell his fellow Communists some months ago. I am quoting him verbatim:

The Voice of America . . . distorted facts, spread untruths, intentionally harmed the economic relations of my country with others and assisted deserters and common criminals.

President Gottwald was at least admitting that the Voice of America was playing havoc with the Communist line.

Bierut, president of Communist-controlled Poland, gave us an equally good recommendation when he stated—and this also I quote :

The radio propaganda of the imperialist, though noisy and mendacious to the point of idiocy, does reach the most backward cells of our organism. This criminal diversion must be stamped out.

I don't know exactly what Mr. Bierut meant by "idiocy." But it seems to have a listening audience in Poland.

Yes, my friends, we are getting behind the Iron Curtain. We are getting positive results.

But we must not expect the impossible. This is a campaign—not a skirmish. We would be naive were we to expect a field of poison ivy to be transformed overnight into a bed of roses.

Growth of the Information Campaign

This fact was firmly recognized by my distinguished predecessor as head of the International Information and Educational Exchange Program, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Edward W. Barrett. Mr. Barrett and his associates achieved much progress under very exacting conditions. In a way, they took the information program from its swaddling clothes and in 2 years gave America the means of speaking to the people of the world—the means which America needs and will continue to need for years to come.

That achievement merits real recognition.

The recent reorganization and unification of these international information services are based upon the experience gained during the past several years.

I want to say a word about this reorganization and about the new United States International Information Administration which has resulted from it.

When the Secretary of State, on January 18, 1952, announced the establishment of the International Information Administration as a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of State, he made it clear that a thorough-going reorganization—not a "reshuffle"—was involved. He made it equally clear that the new Administration was the product of long study.

Under the new organization, the Administrator is the sole authority in developing policies, planning and executing programs in the international information and educational exchange field. He is charged with operating all the foreign information activities for which the Secretary of State is responsible.

The Administrator, as the Secretary's order states, is given "undivided responsibility and a clear line of authority" over the international program from "start to finish."

An important element in the new organization is that, in addition to concentrating administrative authority in one place, it makes that authority directly responsible to the Secretary of State. Heretofore this responsibility has been divided among several bureaus within the Department of State.

Under the new organization, the Administrator works in partnership with the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. He depends upon the Assistant Secretary for general guidance with respect to U.S. foreign policy as it may affect the international information program.

The task of the new organization is difficult. But it is as important as it is difficult. There is a real relationship between the successful performance of that task and the security of America and the free world as a whole.

In this country we have come to understand that America cannot stand alone in a troubled world. We have learned that we must work with others.

Goals of the Program

By the same token, the International Information Administration cannot "go it alone." We need the help of others here at home. We are seeking their cooperation and we intend to deserve it.

We wish in every practicable way to encourage private cooperation in promoting an understanding of America amongst the peoples of the world. When I refer to "private" cooperation in this sense, I do not mean only our ordinary overseas trade and commerce which in normal times has been such an effective Voice of America. Nor do I mean only our book publishers, newspaper editors, radio broadcasters, and advertising firms. I am thinking also of our great educational institutions, research foundations, and other agencies dedicated to the general advancement of American culture and to American understanding of the culture of other peoples. The help of all of these is important.

I hope too that we may maintain the closest possible liaison with the Congress of the United States. The Congress represents the "stockholders" of this great American enterprise—this new International Information Administration. The Congress will determine the organization's scope and the public funds available for it. We shall make the best use we can of those funds.

The international information program will not succeed without the understanding of the American people and without the confidence of Congress. We shall seek to deserve both.

We shall expect and welcome constructive criticism and suggestion at any time from anyone. If we are to operate an effective Voice of America, we must have access to the best thought of Americans.

We are seeking to win for America the understanding, the interest, and the confidence of peoples throughout the world. That is the essence of the "battle for men's minds." To do this, we must recognize, accept, and learn to appreciate the customs, habits, and traditions of others. We must learn to understand their prejudices, their preferences, and their ways of life, which differ from our own in so many ways.

If we wish to teach, we must also be willing to learn.

Finally, we must seek to maintain reasonable flexibility in our international information and educational exchange operations.

We are aiming at diverse and scattered targets all over the world. Those targets are all different and they are all changing. As they change, we must be prepared to change with them.

We are, of course, relying upon a variety of information tools. We rely upon the spoken word by radio, the written word, the motion picture, the film strip, the exchange of persons. But all of these tools must lend themselves to shifts in emphasis as the changing situation may demand. We are expected to be able to cope with unexpected problems when they arise and we shall do so.

This may perhaps give you some idea of the course which the International Information Administration hopes to follow. That course is your business as well as ours. It is the business of every American.

Ladies and gentlemen, the future of freedom may appear to be dark in some parts of the world. But it need not be. And it will not be if all who have been free retain the courage of conviction.

Men who have known freedom do not lose the desire for it simply because they are temporarily chained to the altar of political slavery. Such men do not easily lose hope.

America—with its living message of hope, friendship, and human understanding—can be a shining beacon lighting the way to the strengthening and the expansion of freedom throughout the world. All of us here in America must do our utmost to keep lighted that beacon on the road to peace.

U.S. Views on Economic Conference at Moscow

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press March 14]

The Department of State has received many inquiries concerning the International Economic Conference scheduled to convene at Moscow on April 3.

I should like first to make clear the sponsorship

of the Conference. Publicity for this meeting takes great pains to dissociate it from the Soviet Government and its front organizations. We are told by Communist propaganda that this Conference is the independent undertaking of a rather small and obscure group of persons referred to collectively as the International Initiating Committee. I believe any person seeking the truth is entitled to wonder why there is this great effort to maintain the obvious fiction that the Conference is not a Soviet creation.

It is a matter of public record that the so-called World Peace Council—which is a major Communist organization—called for a general economic conference to be held in the U.S.S.R. The World Peace Council called for this meeting in a resolution adopted at Berlin more than a year ago. We should be naive, I think, if we did not regard misrepresentation of this sort as a stratagem to lure unsuspecting men of good reputation to participate in the Moscow proceedings in order to misuse their names and their public standing.

What are the real purposes of this Conference? The evidence leads inescapably to the conclusion that the true purposes of the organizers of this Conference are to confuse and weaken our unity of purpose. They wish to organize pressures in non-Communist countries against current restrictions on the export of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc. They wish also to discourage us from carrying forward our program of creating strength, strength which is indispensable to maintaining our independence, indispensable to maintaining peace itself.

The sponsors of this Conference clearly acknowledge the growing effectiveness both of our joint program to build defensive strength and of the program of security trade controls which we, in cooperation with other nations, have established to prevent increased growth of the Soviet war potential. We should all make sure that our hard-earned security gains are appropriately safeguarded.

And now a word about the publicity attending the Conference. A major theme of this publicity is that by restoring normal East-West trade relations the Conference at Moscow will relax current international tensions. We, together with all peoples united in the constructive task of laying the foundations of a peaceful, prosperous, and orderly world, sincerely desire and are actively working for the relaxation of international tensions.

The peoples of the world have an institution before which honest proposals furthering constructive steps for the relaxation of international tensions may be laid with confidence. The United Nations, with its specialized agencies, is the legitimate and natural forum for such proposals. For example, the Economic and Social Council was established precisely to foster constructive international economic cooperation. The degree to

which the Soviet Union and the countries under its domination sincerely desire to move forward toward a relaxation of international tensions must be measured by the attitude they take in forums specifically designed to bring about such ends. It is not and cannot be measured by the staging of spurious conferences sponsored by Moscow.

We cannot foster the myth that the causes of current international tension are essentially eco-

nomie in character. It does not require detailed knowledge of postwar international developments to understand that existing restraints on the shipment of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc are a consequence and not the cause of existing tensions. Reasonable men throughout the world agree that the true causes of current tension may be found in the aggressive political and military policies of the U.S.S.R.

U.S., U.K., and France Present New Austrian Treaty Draft to Soviet Union

[Released to the press March 13]

On March 13 the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, through their respective embassies at Moscow, presented a new Austrian treaty draft to the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union with identical explanatory notes.

The texts of the note and of the new Austrian treaty draft follow:

U.S. NOTE OF MARCH 13

On February 28 the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and France publicly expressed their serious concern that the discussions of the Austrian Treaty by the Deputies planned for January 21, for the purpose of concluding the Treaty, were frustrated owing to the failure of the Soviet Deputy to attend.¹ They recalled that Austria, the first country to be occupied by Hitler, was promised full independence in the Moscow Declaration of 1943² but that nearly 9 years afterwards this promise has not yet been fulfilled.

Responsibility for this state of affairs lies squarely on the Soviet Government. The Four Foreign Ministers reached agreement in Paris on June 20, 1949 on the basic issues involved in the Austrian settlement and instructed their Deputies to complete negotiations on the draft Treaty no later than September 1, 1949.³ Since that time, the Soviet Government has studiously evaded its obligation towards Austria undertaken in the Moscow Declaration. The Soviet Government has refused to engage in constructive negotiations on the

remaining unagreed issues in the draft Treaty, has introduced extraneous issues, and did not send its representative to attend the last scheduled meeting of the Deputies.

The Government of the United States considers that failure to reach an Austrian settlement has placed a heavy and unnecessary burden on the Austrian people and has contributed materially to the maintenance of the dangerous tensions which unhappily exist in international relations. It is the most earnest desire of the Government of the United States to do everything within its power to remove these tensions. The conclusion of an Austrian Treaty would constitute an important step toward the consolidation of peace.

This Government, in concert with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, has now examined the Austrian problem anew. The three Governments are in agreement that the paramount obligation of the powers occupying Austria is to restore Austria's freedom and full independence in accordance with the Moscow Declaration. The three Governments are also agreed that this fundamental obligation to the Austrian people is vastly more important than the minor and extraneous considerations which have since June 1949 prevented agreement on the Treaty. Accordingly, the Government of the United States desires to propose to the Soviet Government a simple instrument which will give Austria full independence. This new proposal should be examined in the light of the impasse in negotiations on the draft Treaty and the progress of Austria toward democratic self-government during the prolonged occupation. The Soviet Government will note that it conforms to the Moscow Declaration and contains the essentials which are required to reestablish Austrian independence.

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 379.

² *Ibid.*, Nov. 6, 1943, p. 310.

³ *Ibid.*, July 4, 1949, p. 858.

The Government of the United States earnestly recommends that the Soviet Government give this proposal most careful and serious consideration and inquiries if the Soviet Government is prepared to instruct its Deputy to renew negotiations.

Withdrawal of Allied Forces

1. The Agreement on the Machinery of Control in Austria of June 28, 1946, shall terminate on the coming into force of the present Treaty.

2. On the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Inter-Allied Governing Authority (*Komendatura*) established under paragraph 4 of the Agreement on Zones of Occupation in Austria and the Administration of the City of Vienna of July 9, 1945, shall cease to exercise any functions with respect to the administration of the City of Vienna. The Agreement on Zones of Occupation of Austria shall terminate upon completion of the withdrawal from Austria of the forces of the Allied and Associated Powers and in any case at the expiration of ninety days from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

3. The forces of the Allied and Associated Powers and members of the Allied Commission for Austria shall be withdrawn from Austria as soon as possible and in any case within ninety days from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

4. The Government of Austria shall accord to the forces of the Allied and Associated Powers and the members of the Allied Commission for Austria pending their withdrawal from Austria the same rights, immunities and facilities as they enjoyed immediately before the coming into force of the present Treaty.

5. The Allied and Associated Powers undertake to return to the Government of Austria within the specified period of 90 days:

(a) All currency which was made available free of cost to the Allied and Associated Powers for the purpose of the occupation and which remains unexpended at the time of completion of withdrawal of the Allied forces;

(b) All Austrian property requisitioned by Allied forces or the Allied Commission, and which is still in their possession.

ARTICLE 5

Reparation

No reparation shall be exacted from Austria arising out of the existence of a state of war in Europe after September 1, 1939.

ARTICLE 6

War Booty—German Assets

Each of the Allied and Associated Powers shall, within the ninety-day period specified in Article 4, relinquish to Austria all property, real and personal, of whatever description held or claimed by them as German Assets or as war booty in Austria.

ARTICLE 7

Accession Clause

1. Any member of the United Nations at war with Germany which had the status of a United Nation on May 8, 1945, and is not a signatory to the present Treaty, may accede to the Treaty and upon accession shall be deemed to be an Associated Power for the purposes of the Treaty.

2. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and shall take effect upon deposit.

ARTICLE 8

Ratification

The present Treaty, of which the Russian, English, and French texts are authentic, shall be ratified. It shall come into force immediately upon deposit of instruments of ratification by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

NEW AUSTRIAN TREATY DRAFT

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and France, hereinafter referred to as "the Allied and Associated Powers," of the one part, and Austria, of the other part:

WHEREAS on March 13, 1938, Hitlerite Germany annexed Austria by force and incorporated its territory in the German Reich;

WHEREAS in the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America declared that they regarded the annexation of Austria by Germany on March 13, 1938, as null and void and affirmed their wish to see Austria reestablished as a free and independent State and the French Committee of National Liberation made a similar declaration on November 16, 1943;

WHEREAS as a result of the Allied victory Austria was liberated from the domination of Hitlerite Germany;

WHEREAS the Allied and Associated Powers, and Austria, taking into account the importance of the efforts which the Austrian people themselves have made and will have to continue to make for the restoration and democratic reconstruction of their country, desire to conclude a treaty reestablishing Austria as a free, independent and democratic State, thus contributing to the restoration of peace in Europe; and

WHEREAS the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria are desirous for these purposes of concluding the present Treaty to serve as the basis of friendly relations between them, thereby enabling the Allied and Associated Powers to support Austria's candidature for admission to the United Nations Organization;

Have therefore appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries who, after presentation of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed to the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

Reestablishment of Austria as a Free and Independent State

The Allied and Associated Powers recognize that Austria is reestablished as a sovereign, independent and democratic State.

ARTICLE 2

Preservation of Austria's Independence

The Allied and Associated Powers declare that they will respect the independence and territorial integrity of Austria as established under the present Treaty.

The Allied and Associated Powers declare that political or economic union (*Anschluss*) between Austria and Germany is prohibited. Austria fully recognizes its responsibilities in this matter.

ARTICLE 3

Frontiers of Austria

The frontiers of Austria shall be those existing on January 1, 1938.

Ireland, by the United States of America, and by France of the one part and by Austria of the other part. The instruments of ratification shall, in the shortest time possible, be deposited with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

With respect to each Allied and Associated Power which accedes to the Treaty in accordance with Article 7, and whose instrument of ratification is thereafter deposited, the Treaty shall come into force upon the date of deposit. The present Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies to each of the signatory States.

In faith whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in the city of _____ in the Russian, English French and German languages this _____ day of _____, 195-.

Tax Treaty Negotiations With Austria

[Released to the press March 11]

United States and Austrian tax officials are expected to meet at Vienna in the early future for technical discussions looking to the conclusion of conventions between the two countries for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and to taxes on the estates of deceased persons.

If bases for agreement are found, drafts of the proposed terms will be prepared by the participants and submitted to their respective Governments for consideration with a view to signing.

In preparation for the discussions, interested persons are invited to submit information and suggestions to Eldon P. King, Special Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Washington 25, D.C.

Negotiations With Spain On Military Facilities

*Press Conference Statement by
Secretary Acheson*¹

Preparations have now been completed for negotiations with the Spanish Government regarding the use of military facilities in Spain.

Since my last statement on this subject in July,² a military team and an economic group were sent to Spain. After thorough study of the reports of these survey groups, the Department of State, with the Department of Defense, and the Mutual Security Agency, have made preparations for negotiations with the Spanish Government. These

negotiations will involve the use by the United States of military facilities in Spain and, in that connection, the use of the \$100,000,000 already voted by the Congress for aid to Spain.

Negotiations will be opened with the Spanish Government immediately after the arrival of Ambassador MacVeagh. Military advisers have been appointed to assist the Ambassador. They will be headed by Maj. Gen. August W. Kissner, U.S. Air Force, and will also include Maj. Gen. Crump Carvin, U.S. Army, Capt. H. B. Sanchez, U.S. Navy, and Col. Jack Roberts, U.S. Air Force.

Military Assistance Agreements

Cuba

The Departments of State and Defense announced on March 7 that a bilateral military assistance agreement had been signed that day with the Government of Cuba.¹

The agreement was signed in Habana by the American Ambassador to Cuba, Willard L. Beaulac, and Aureliano Sanchez Arango, Minister of State of Cuba.

This agreement is the third of its kind to be signed between the United States and another American Republic.²

Brazil

The Departments of State and Defense announced on March 15 that a bilateral military assistance agreement had been signed that day with the Government of Brazil.³

The agreement was signed by the American Ambassador to Brazil, Herschel V. Johnson, and João Neves da Fontoura, Foreign Minister of Brazil.

This military assistance agreement is the fourth of its kind to be signed between the United States and one of the other American Republics, consistent with and conforming to the various instruments of inter-American cooperation already in effect. Similar agreements are now being negotiated with certain other American Republics to assist in developing the capabilities of these countries to participate in the collective defense of the Western Hemisphere.

¹ For text of agreement, see Department of State press release 180 of Mar. 7.


² For text of similar agreement with Ecuador, see BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 336.

³ For text of agreement, see Department of State press release 198 of Mar. 15.

¹ Made on Mar. 12, 1952.

² BULLETIN of July 30, 1951, p. 170.





AREAS CLOSED TO FOREIGN TRAVEL as of 15 January 1952

Area closed to foreigners

- ▲ City closed to foreigners
- City open to foreigners

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

- | | | | |
|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|
| 1 R S F S R | 9 Georgian S S R | A Komi ASSR | J. Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR |
| 2 Karelo-Finnish S S R | 10 Armenian S S R | B Udmurtskaya ASSR | K Kabardinskaya ASSR |
| 3 Estonian S S R | 11 Azerbaijdzhan S S R | C Mariyskaya ASSR | L Abkhazskaya ASSR |
| 4 Latvian S S R | 12 Kazakh S S R | D Chuvashskaya ASSR | M Adzharskaya ASSR |
| 5 Lithuanian S S R | 13 Uzbek S S R | E Mordovskaya ASSR | N Nakhichevanskaya ASSR |
| 6 White Russian S S R | 14 Turkmen S S R | F Tatarskaya ASSR | O Kara Kalpakskaya ASSR |
| 7 Ukrainian S S R | 15 Tadzhik S S R | G Bashkirskaya ASSR | P Buryat-Mongol'skaya ASSR |
| 8 Moldavian S S R | 16 Kirgiz S S R | H Dagestanskaya ASSR | Q Yakutskaya ASSR |

Travel Restrictions for Soviet Officials In U.S.

[Released to the press March 10]

The U.S. Government has instituted travel regulations for Soviet officials stationed in the United States.

For some time the Soviet Government has sharply restricted the travel of foreign officials including U.S. representatives stationed in the U.S.S.R. A short time ago the Soviet Government further increased these travel restrictions. The U.S. Government has therefore instituted regulations governing the travel of Soviet officials in the United States. This step has been taken reluctantly, because the American people and their Government believe that such treatment of foreign representatives by a receiving state is not necessary, customary, or correct, nor is it conducive to the proper conduct of relations between nations. Unfortunately, the Soviet Government does not appear to share this view, but rather it has tended constantly toward the imposition of greater restrictions on the legitimate activities of foreign officials.

The present regulations are outlined in a note sent March 10 to the Soviet Embassy at Washington.

As is made clear in the note to the Soviet Embassy, the United States is prepared at any time to re-examine the question of travel regulations in the light of the treatment accorded U.S. official representatives in the Soviet Union.

U.S. NOTE OF MARCH 10

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to invite the Ambassador's attention to note No. 46/PR of January 15, 1952, note No. 1130/PR of September 30, 1948, and the *note verbale* dated May 16, 1941,¹ addressed to the United States Embassy at Moscow by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the effect of which has been to restrict the travel in the Soviet Union of American diplo-

¹ For texts of the 1941 and 1948 notes, see BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1948, p. 525. The Soviet Ambassador is Alexander S. Panyushkin.

matic and consular officers, as well as of the other members of the staff of the American Embassy at Moscow.

In view of the restrictions which have been placed upon the travel of American diplomatic and consular representatives and employees in the Soviet Union, the Government of the United States is constrained to regulate the travel of Soviet personnel assigned to the Embassy in Washington, Soviet representatives of the official Soviet news agency, Tass, and Soviet representatives of other publicity media who are assigned for duty in Washington and Soviet official personnel assigned to Amtorg in New York. Effective immediately Soviet official personnel of the Embassy in Washington, Tass representatives and others who are Soviet citizens assigned for newspaper work in Washington are required not to travel to any point more than 25 miles distant from the center of Washington without previous official notification at least 48 hours in advance. Soviet official personnel assigned to Amtorg shall not travel to any point more than 25 miles distant from the center of New York City without previous official notification at least 48 hours in advance.

In the case of Soviet civilian officials, the notification should be addressed to the Department of State; and in the case of Soviet military personnel to the appropriate Army, Navy or Air Force foreign liaison office. Notification should contain the name of each traveler, complete and detailed information concerning his projected travel, including itinerary, points of stopover, and duration of journey.

The United States Government observes that by reason of the action of the Soviet Government in restricting the travel of United States official personnel in the USSR, it is compelled similarly to regulate Soviet official personnel. At the same time the United States Government states it is prepared to reexamine the question of travel regulations in the light of the treatment accorded United States official representatives in the Soviet Union.

SOVIET TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST AMERICAN OFFICIALS

Travel restrictions were first placed upon American officials as well as other foreign representatives in the U.S.S.R. by a circular note from the Soviet Foreign Office to foreign missions in Moscow dated May 16, 1941. The Soviet note declared travel to certain points and localities prohibited and established a procedure under which travel on the territory of the U.S.S.R. by members of foreign embassies, legations, and consulates may take place "only on condition that such persons previously inform appropriate organs of the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Peoples Commissariat for Defense, and Peoples Commissariat for Navy with regard to trips planned, indicating itinerary, points of stopover, and length of travel so that such trips may be registered by above-mentioned organs."

On June 7, 1941, the United States imposed retaliatory restrictions which required Soviet officials in this country to secure permits for travel more than 100 miles outside of Washington (and 50 miles outside of New York and San Francisco). These retaliatory restrictions were withdrawn shortly after the German attack on the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet regulations were not officially withdrawn, although application of the provisions was relaxed for a short time at the end of the war. By 1947 it had become evident that the Soviet authorities were actively hindering the movements of official American personnel outside of Moscow. In the summer of 1948 the hindrances were extended to automobile travel only a short distance from Moscow.

On September 30, 1948, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the American Embassy and other foreign missions at Moscow that the 1941 restrictions were still in effect and added a new and greatly expanded list of localities closed to travel by members of the staffs of foreign missions. Under the 1948 procedure, however, foreign officials were required to give the Soviet Foreign Office (military personnel—the Foreign Liaison Section of the Ministry of Armed Forces) 48 hours' advance notice of their intention to travel more than 50 kilometers outside of Moscow. Beyond this 50-kilometer zone travel was permitted only by public carrier except to three points of historic interest near the city. Even within this 50-kilometer perimeter certain areas were forbidden for travel, with the result that automobile travel to the 50-kilometer limit was possible on only four highways.

In general, the border areas, the Central Asian Republics, the Caucasus region with the exception of Tiflis, the Baltic States, and the western areas of the Ukraine and Byelorussia, including the capital cities of Kiev and Minsk were placed within the zones prohibited to foreign officials. Although most of the Siberian area was left technically

"free," in practice it was greatly restricted owing to the fact that the important cities were forbidden areas and therefore no facilities were available for foreign visitors.

On January 15, 1952, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs prohibited 22 additional cities of the U.S.S.R. to foreigners and reduced the zone around Moscow from 50 to 40 kilometers from the center of the city. In addition, several more districts within the 40-kilometer limit were placed on the prohibited list, thus reducing to a great extent the number of places to which foreign officials may travel in the U.S.S.R. or in the Moscow area.

Red Cross To Investigate "Germ Warfare" Charges

On March 11 Secretary Acheson, through the American Consul at Geneva, Switzerland, sent a message to Paul Ruegger, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, categorically denying Communist charges that biological warfare by the United Nations Command has caused an epidemic in Communist-held areas of Korea and proposed that the International Committee of the Red Cross make arrangements to conduct an investigation.

On March 12 the International Committee of the Red Cross communicated with both sides in the Korean conflict. It stated that, subject to agreement by both sides, a committee would be set up for this purpose.

On March 13 Secretary Acheson expressed his appreciation to Mr. Ruegger for the prompt action of the International Committee of the Red Cross and stated that the proposals made by the International Committee on March 12 for carrying out the investigation are fully acceptable by the U.S. Government for the Unified Command.

Texts of Secretary Acheson's telegram of March 11, the communication of the International Committee of the Red Cross of March 12, and Mr. Acheson's reply of March 13 follow:

Secretary Acheson's Telegram of March 11¹

Despite categorical denials by the United States Government and the United Nations Command, Communists continue to charge that biological warfare by the United Nations Command has caused an epidemic in Communist-held areas of Korea.

I repeat that the United Nations Command has not engaged in any form of biological warfare.

In the interest of having the facts clearly estab-

¹ Released to the press on the same date.

lished by a disinterested international body, the United States Government as the Unified Command would like to suggest that the International Committee of the Red Cross make arrangements to conduct an investigation to determine (1) the nature and extent of this epidemic and (2) the real cause of the epidemic.

To establish the facts beyond all doubt, such an investigation would have to be conducted on both sides of the battle line in Korea. Investigation in the Communist-held areas would reveal the nature and extent of this epidemic plus evidence of the real cause of the epidemic. Investigation behind the United Nations lines would provide additional evidence with regard to the falsity of the biological warfare charge. For example, International Committee of the Red Cross investigators would be given free access to all sources of possible information behind United Nations lines bearing upon the investigation.

ICRC Statement of March 12

[Released to the press March 14]

The public has been told through numerous news items in the press of allegations that bacteriological weapons had recently been employed in Korea. The International Committee of the Red Cross has received protests on the subject from Red Cross societies of Hungary, Poland, Roumania and Bulgaria.

The Government of the United States which denies these allegations so far as it is concerned has also addressed itself to the International Committee of the Red Cross asking if the Committee would be prepared to have an inquiry made with the object of determining the real causes, nature and extent of the epidemics which are stated to have occurred in North Korea. The United States Government proposes that such inquiry should be made on both sides of the fighting lines in Korea and offers to give representatives of the International Committee full access behind the United Nations lines to all possible sources of information having relevance to the inquiry.

In conformity with the principles which govern its attitude in such cases and which are set out in its circulars to governments and national Red Cross Societies of December 1939 and November 1951, the Committee today is addressing the following communication to both parties to the Korean conflict:

1. Subject to the agreement of both parties, the International Committee of the Red Cross will set up a Committee which will be under its direction. The Committee will be composed of persons who will offer every guarantee of moral and scientific independence which could be offered by experts who have the highest qualifications, especially in epidemiology. It will address itself to known specialists whom it will itself select in Switzerland. It will also invite two or three scientific experts whom it shall ask National Red Cross Societies of Asiatic countries not taking part in the conflict to propose.

2. The above-mentioned Committee must be assured of the cooperation by the authorities on both sides of the front and of experts whom they will nominate.

The International Committee of the Red Cross requests both parties to be good enough to let it have their replies at the earliest possible moment so that as soon as their agreement is notified it can take emergency measures which will be called for.

Secretary Acheson's Reply of March 13

The prompt action of the International Committee of the Red Cross on my Government's request of March 10 for an impartial investigation by the International Committee of the Red Cross is greatly appreciated. The proposals contained in your message of March 12 for carrying out this investigation are fully accepted by the United States Government for the Unified Command.

Communist Aggression In Indochina

*by Robert E. Hoey
Officer in Charge of Vietnam-Laos-Cambodian
Affairs¹*

Indochina is an area of extreme importance to the United States and to the free world.

The success or failure of the measures which are being undertaken there, at this very moment, to prevent and discourage Communist aggression will have a most profound effect upon not only the history of Southeast Asia, but upon the future of democracy in many other parts of the world.

Why are we interested in Indochina and what are we doing there?

In the first place, we are actively interested in Indochina because it is the locale of one of the most significant developments of today. Three newly formed sovereign governments have emerged, in the last 2 years, to take their places alongside the other nations of the free world. Not long ago, the areas which now make up the States of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, were French colonies and protectorates. The achievement of independence and statehood by former colonial areas in Southeast Asia is part of a progressive and evolutionary movement which has included similar progress by the Philippines, Indonesia, and Burma. In Indochina, or more properly speaking, in the areas of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, this progression has been challenged and opposed by the forces of communism. The powerful and determined forces of an enemy who assumes convenient pro-

¹Remarks made on "Battle Report" over the NBC television network on Mar. 9 and released to the press on the same date.

tective coloring in various parts of the globe has attempted to identify communism in Indochina with the Nationalist desires of the people for self-government. In this effort our enemy has failed. Today Indochina stands as a bulwark against the expansion of Communist imperialism. In Indochina there is now a force of more than three hundred thousand anti-Communist soldiers, all of them volunteers. They are fighting against a Communist-directed army under Moscow-trained leaders, whose forces receive supplies from Communist China and whose officials slavishly proclaim their adherence to and admiration for the cause of Marxism as translated for them by Stalin and Mao-tse Tung. To allow the fall of this important area to such an army and to such a cause would result in the most far-reaching and at the same time most tragic consequences.

The newly formed governments of the three States do not stand alone in this battle to preserve their countries from communism. France, as a member of the French Union of which the three States are also members, is contributing financially and militarily. French soldiers and resources have borne the brunt of this brutal attack but the armies of the three States are rapidly emerging to a stage of combat effectiveness.

American economic and military aid is making a large contribution to their effort. The 37 battalions of the Vietnam National Army have been largely equipped through the American military aid program. America, the arsenal of democracy, has again undertaken to put weapons into the hands of free people in order that they may defend their liberties.

If the forces of communism are allowed to achieve the communization of Indochina the position of the free people of Southeast Asia will be in grave hazard. In each of those newly independent countries there already exist cells or even armed groups awaiting an opportunity to seize power at the propitious moment.

Our policy is to help those free and independent governments and people who are determined to remain free and independent. That is the reason for our support of the Governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in their struggle to preserve their way of life in the face of Communist aggression.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

- Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Executives A, B, C, and D. S. Exec. Rept. 2, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 30 pp.
- Agreements or Understandings Between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. H. Rept. 1381, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 4 pp.
- Acknowledging Receipt of House Resolution 514. Letter from the Secretary of State Transmitting the Information That He Has Been Directed by the President To Acknowledge Receipt of House Resolution 514, and To Call Attention to the President's Statement of February 20. H. Doc. 378, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 1 p.

Fourth Semiannual Report to Congress on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Fourth Semiannual Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program Covering the Period April 1 to October 9, 1951, Pursuant to Public Law 329, Eighty-first Congress (63 Stat. 714). H. Doc. 352, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 99 pp.

United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1947. Hearings Before a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eightieth Congress, First Session on H. R. 3342. Committee print. 241 pp.

Sixth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Containing the Report of Hon. Mike Mansfield and Hon. John M. Vorys. H. Rept. 1453, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 92 pp.

United States Contribution to the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund. Communication From the President of the United States Transmitting a Letter Relative to Urging the Congress To Complete Action on Legislation To Authorize a United States Contribution of \$12,000,000 to the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund for the Fiscal Year 1952. H. Doc. 373, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 2 pp.

The Inter-American Study Mission. Report of the Inter-American Study Mission of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. H. Rept. 1454, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 36 pp.

Report on Germany. Report of the Special Study Mission to Germany and Certain Other Countries. H. Rept. 1456, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 48 pp.

Report on Israel by Hon. Jacob K. Javits, New York, of the Special Study Mission to Germany and Certain Other Countries, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. H. Rept. 1455, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 9 pp.

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(Continued on p. 479)

The U.S. and the Far East: Opportunities for Closer Cooperation

by John M. Allison

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs¹

When we look at the Far East from the United States we too often, I am afraid, see only evidences of disaster. Certainly disaster is there to see. Continued fighting in Korea, continued stalling and befogging of issues by the Communist negotiators at Panmunjom, the continent of China in the ruthless grip of a Soviet-dominated Communist Government, constant pressure by Communist forces on the young states of Indochina, banditry in Malaya—all these, and more, are certainly enough to discourage anyone. One year ago the situation was even worse. The United Nations forces had almost been thrown out of Korea; the Japanese people were becoming more and more restive under a military occupation which, due to Soviet intransigence, there seemed no prospect of bringing to a close. The Philippines were almost bankrupt, Huk bandits were terrorizing the countryside. There were indications of an early attack by Communist China on either Formosa or Indochina or both. There was not even the beginning of any sort of collective security system in the whole Pacific area.

But let us for a moment or two lift our eyes from these depressing facts. Too often we seem to stress what is bad instead of what is good. Trouble seems to make a better headline. No one who deals every day with foreign policy can afford to ignore the bad, but unless he can also see evidences of hope and progress, the tendency will surely be to become a defeatist, to be ultra-cautious, and to do nothing in the hope that will prevent further troubles.

In spite of the dark days still ahead, the past year has seen real evidences of progress in the Far East, and the year ahead offers further opportunities.

Negotiation of Peace and Security Treaties

Perhaps the single most constructive accomplishment during the past year was the negotiation

¹ Address made before the Philadelphia *Bulletin* Forum at Philadelphia, Pa., on Mar. 4 and released to the press on the same date. (This address was delivered by U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.)

and signing of the peace treaty with Japan and the security and mutual defense treaties associated with it. By this Treaty of Peace a nation of 83 million vigorous, intelligent, industrially capable people will be brought back into the community of free nations as a peaceful, cooperative member. The negotiation of this treaty with Japan marks real progress in several fields. It was a milestone in bipartisan cooperation on foreign policy in the Far East. On September 8, 1950, the President requested John Foster Dulles to take charge of the negotiations looking toward a peace treaty with Japan. From this time until just 1 year later, on September 8, 1951, when the treaty was signed in San Francisco, as Mr. Dulles has testified, he had the complete support of the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. He also had the support of the leading members of his own party in the Congress. Of the 16 American signatures on the 4 treaties connected with the Japanese peace settlement, 9 were those of Republicans, 7 of Democrats. It is my hope that this bipartisan cooperation will continue in all phases of our Far Eastern policy.

Not only was the conclusion of these treaties a milestone in bipartisan cooperation, but it marked a significant advance in cooperation between the legislative and the executive sides of the Government. Mr. Dulles and members of his staff appeared on numerous occasions not only before the consultative subcommittee on the Far East of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but also before the full committee itself, in order to explain what was being done and to receive the suggestions of the Senators on various points. In its report of the hearings on the Japanese peace treaty and other treaties relating to security in the Pacific, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee states:

The Committee wishes to express its appreciation for the cooperative spirit in which the treaties were negotiated by the executive branch of the Government. Rarely, if ever, have committee members seen such legislative-executive teamwork as that which characterized negotiation of the treaties. The Committee particularly desires to commend Ambassador Dulles for his outstanding contribution to the cause of world peace and bipartisan consultation.

This close cooperation between the legislative and executive branches of the Government must continue if the United States is to have a foreign policy which will command the loyalty of the people and the respect of our allies.

Not only did we achieve domestic unity during the negotiation of the Japanese peace settlement, but we also witnessed a unique example of international unity. Fifty non-Communist allies were invited to San Francisco; 48 came and signed the treaty. These nations agreed with the distinguished Foreign Minister of Pakistan when he said of the treaty:

It opens to Japan the door passing through which it may take up among its fellow sovereign nations a position of dignity, honor, and equality. . . . It is evidence of a new departure in the relations of the East and the West as they have subsisted during the last few centuries.

This twofold unity, at home and with our allies, made it possible for us to wrest the initiative in an important segment of foreign policy from the Soviet Union. The Soviet delegates came to San Francisco as a wrecking crew—but the train which was wrecked was their own. Despite the Soviet charge that the United States was building for war in the Far East and not for peace, the delegates of the non-Communist countries were unanimous in agreeing that by giving Japan freedom the treaty made for peace, not for war.

We have concluded security treaties with the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. The President has referred to these treaties as "initial steps." It is our hope that there will be a growing consciousness among the nations of the Far East of their interdependence in the maintenance of peace in the Pacific and that this will be reflected in further cooperation toward mutual security. The United States stands ready to cooperate in the further organization of collective security in the Pacific area.

Our Action in Korea

Today the United Nations Forces in Korea hold strong defensive positions above the 38th parallel. The Communist aggressors have been forced back beyond the point from which they launched their aggression. There is too much defeatism in discussing Korea. The Communist aggressors have been repelled. They sought an armistice. They are trying all the usual tactics of Communist negotiators in an effort to wear us out but General Ridgway and his able staff of negotiators are patiently and firmly sticking to our principles. If the Communists really want an armistice, they must agree to honorable, military terms. We do not intend to reward aggression. We do not intend to compromise our principles.

It is our policy to confine the conflict to Korea. We do not propose to widen the scope of the war. That has been our policy from the start. That remains our policy. It is up to the Communists.

If they want to widen the conflict and engulf the world in a terrible world war, then they must be the ones to do so. We and the United Nations seek peace. We want a peaceful solution in Korea, but not at the cost of sacrificing our principles.

Our action in Korea crystallized the growing determination of the free world to organize its defense not for war but for peace. Our action in meeting the Korean aggression meant hope for all the free peoples of the world. The Communist aggression has failed. It has failed in its principal objective—to bring about defeatism and a peaceable disintegration of the free world.

We must use the organized force of the world community for the essential purposes of maintaining the peace without having it, at the same time, consume us all in a great conflagration. We must exercise our self-restraint by limiting the use of force to the essential task of the maintenance of peace.

If a workable armistice can be arranged, then the way will be open for the use of peaceful methods to seek a final settlement of the Korean problem. Since 1943 the internationally agreed solution for Korea has been on the basis of an independent and unified Korean nation. If an armistice is arranged and the course of negotiation is set in motion again, a final and satisfactory settlement will not be easy. But, the political issues will be back in political channels—and the essential purpose of the armed action by the United Nations will have been accomplished.

This coalition of nations under the United Nations and the united action in Korea represent a very definite step forward in collective security. The League of Nations was never able to accomplish this.

U.S. Assistance to Various Areas

The Philippines

Another bright spot in the Far East is the Philippines, where remarkable progress has been made in the past year. Implementing the Bell Mission Report, tax revenues were increased 60 percent, tax collections for the first 4 months of the fiscal year were up 113 percent over the previous year; the Government's deficit dropped from 154 million pesos to less than 1 million pesos; production of export crops boomed. The Communist-led Huks have been reduced to small, scattered bands, still able to commit acts of terrorism but now unable to mount the large-scale attacks of the past on provincial towns. This has been accomplished by the energetic efforts of the Philippine Armed Forces, aided by American military and budgetary assistance. The November elections were free and honest, thanks to the courageous action of Philippine President Quirino, who backed up Secretary of Defense Magsaysay in a major effort to prevent terrorism and threats to voters.

A year ago there were constant rumors that Formosa was about to be invaded. These rumors have died away. The island has not been attacked. Meanwhile there has been economic improvement despite the enormous burdens which fall upon the island's resources. Our military mission is training the Chinese National troops for the adequate defense of the island. Military supplies and equipment are going forward in ever-increasing amounts to insure the means of defense. The National Government continues to be recognized by a great majority of the governments of the world. And after more than 96 votes in more than 45 international organizations, the National Government continues to occupy the Chinese seat in all of them.

Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia

We hear a lot about the serious fighting in Northern Indochina but not enough attention is paid to the progress in other areas in the three Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. A gradual increase in economic recovery partially due to American aid has been made. Exports of rubber and rice were the highest since V-J Day. Real progress in the development of a national army has been made. The National Army of Vietnam has been built up to 34 battalions of infantry, mainly equipped through American aid. Approximately 1,000 new Vietnamese officers were graduated from training schools last year plus significant numbers of technicians and noncommissioned personnel. The take-over of internal functions formerly administered by the French proceeded. The three states participated in the Japanese peace treaty conference and signed the treaty as independent nations.

Malaya

In Malaya, the British are making a major effort to restore security and to provide the social reforms hand in hand that will lead to a self-governing nation by the diverse peoples of Malaya. Indonesia and Burma are new nations and have yet to complete the organization of their own institutions in such a way as to carry out their new responsibilities. In some instances, they are reluctant to accept assistance in order not to create anxieties, no matter how ill-founded, that such assistance might compromise in some way their newly won independence.

Communist China

Communist China poses the most difficult question of all for American foreign policy. Americans have had a traditional friendship for the peoples of China. Today the Chinese people are the pawns of a small group of ruthless Soviet-led Chinese Communists. Purge after purge is sweeping China and thousands are being killed and greater numbers imprisoned. Sons are informing against and denouncing their own fathers. A

ruthless ideology is being imposed upon the country. There is scattered resistance but it is unorganized and uncoordinated.

Frankly, we do not know what we can accomplish at this time. First we must prevent the spread of Chinese Communist imperialism and contain it within China.

Identity of Interests Urged

The year 1952 can be a year of opportunity.

We have the opportunity in Japan to demonstrate to the people of Asia that we can act as partners with Asians. If we can show in Japan by our actions that we can live as equal partners with an Asian nation with full respect for its sovereign rights, we can do as much as any one single thing to cut the ground from under Communist propaganda that portrays us as a nation of imperialists only interested in exploiting Asia for our own benefit. Some of our friends are skeptical. Witness India's refusal to attend the San Francisco peace conference. Yet we have just concluded the negotiations for the administrative agreement implementing the security treaty with Japan. These were true negotiations between sovereign equals. There was honest give and take, with full regard for the rights of each.

We have the opportunity in Southeast Asia to show our determination to assist these nations to grow in stability and to take their rightful places as full, free, equal, and independent members of the family of the United Nations. The threat of Communist imperialism to these nations cannot be ignored. As U.S. delegate, John Sherman Cooper said in the General Assembly:

... any such Communist aggression in Southeast Asia would, in the view of my Government, be a matter of direct and grave concern which would require the most urgent and earnest consideration by the United Nations.

As Senator Smith of New Jersey so ably pointed out the other day "basically the restlessness among the people of both the Middle and the Far East is due to the yearning for freedom and independence and the deep-seated resistance to any form of imperialism or colonialism." We must take every opportunity to prove to the peoples of the Far East that their aspirations are our own goal and the goal of all freedom-loving peoples. Once this identity of interests has been demonstrated we will have achieved our objectives in the Far East and we shall have lasting friends and allies, not enemies, across the Pacific.

CORRECTION

In the BULLETIN of March 3, 1952, page 350, left-hand column, thirty-fourth line, the name "Kohnstamon" should be "Kohnstamm." The corrected phrase should read:

"Minister Max Kohnstamm representing the Netherlands;"

Residual Problem of Refugees on Termination of IRO

REPORT ON RECENT SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

by George L. Warren

The General Council of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) held its ninth session at Geneva from February 11 through February 16, 1952. The Executive Committee met from February 7 through February 14, 1952.

Matters that the Executive Committee considered included the semiannual report of the Director General for the period July 1 to December 31, 1951; the financial statements for the period July 1, 1950 to September 30, 1951; the final plan of expenditure for the supplementary and closure periods beginning July 1, 1950; the report of the Director General on the liquidation of the organization; and the report of the Director General on plans for the writing of the history of IRO.

At its eighth session in October 1951¹ the General Council of IRO reported to the United Nations on the residual problems of refugees which would remain on the termination of IRO and authorized the Director General to continue resettlement activities as long as available resources permitted while reserving intact funds for liquidation which had been set aside by the Council. The General Council at its ninth session received from the Executive Committee comments on the semiannual report of the Director General for the period ending December 31, 1951; the financial statements for the 15-month period ending September 30, 1951; the final plan of expenditure; and on plans for the liquidation of the Organization and the writing of the history of IRO.

The Council learned from the Director General's semiannual report that 76,501 refugees had been resettled and 411 repatriated during the 6-month period under review. This figure brought the grand total of persons resettled by the Organization by December 31, 1951, to 1,038,750. The total number of persons repatriated was 72,834. An

additional 7,000 refugees were resettled in January 1952. On January 31, 1952, IRO turned over for movement to the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe 12,205 refugees who had received visas prior to that date.² The total cost of movement of these refugees was estimated at approximately \$2,300,000. Toward this amount IRO had paid the Provisional Committee \$950,000 and undertaken to pay the balance on the receipt of further income.

The problem of refugees requiring continuing institutional care had been virtually resolved by December 31, 1951, when only 362 families remained for whom no satisfactory arrangements had been concluded. Of these, 333 were in Shanghai and 29 in the Philippines. The final total of families for which continuing care had been required and for which arrangements had been made was 25,000, comprising a total of 47,000 persons, including dependents.

The financial statements for the 15 months ending September 30, 1951, showed that the total resources available during the period were \$106,344,900 and that a total of \$85,746,702 had been utilized and inventory values reduced by \$4,844,215. The net total of available resources on October 1, 1951 was \$15,753,983. Contributions due but not received amounted to \$60,565. If this latter amount were later received, the total of resources available for the remaining period would be \$15,814,548. The Director General reported that practically all liabilities outstanding for the years 1947-1948, 1948-1949, and 1949-1950 had been met and that the Organization had received approximately \$1,500,000 from the sale of surplus materials which had been applied to the final plan of

¹ For article by Mr. Warren on the eighth session, see BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 50.

² For an article by Mr. Warren on the Brussels conference on migration and on movement of migrants from Europe, see BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 169.

expenditure. Also applied to the plan of expenditure, in addition to the \$15,814,548 referred to above, were the amounts of \$297,203 received in final settlement from the Australian Government and \$1,323,219 from other miscellaneous income, excluding the sale of surpluses.

The Council learned that the food replacement account in Germany, from which additional income was expected, was still under negotiation but was not included in the final plan of expenditure because of uncertainty as to final settlement. The only other potential income not included in the final plan of expenditure was an estimated \$600,000 anticipated from the further sale of surplus supplies and equipment.

Proposed Final Plan of Expenditure

The Council received from the Executive Committee the proposed final plan of expenditure, which provided for a total outlay during the supplementary and closure period of \$102,827,440. All income received by the Organization to January 31, 1952, was included in the plan and allocated. The Council recognized that in view of the fact that the Organization had ceased operations on January 31, 1952, the final plan of expenditure was more in the nature of a report on the utilization of funds than of proposals for future expenditure. After full examination, the plan was adopted by the Council. Two hundred and seventeen thousand dollars were earmarked under the plan to provide care and maintenance for a further 6 months after January 31, 1952, for all refugees in China receiving such assistance on that date, and \$60,000 for the cost of operating the Shanghai office for the same period. These funds were to be administered by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. In addition, \$500,000 were established as a trust fund to be administered by the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe for the future movement of Iro eligibles remaining in Shanghai who may secure visas to immigration countries. Arrangements were made in February 1952 for the movement of 180 such refugees at the expense of the trust fund. The maintenance of the former Iro office in Hong Kong under the joint administration of the High Commissioner and the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for an additional 6-month period was provided for. The plan included provision of \$100,000 for the hospitalization of 100 tuberculous cases in Trieste, with respect to which negotiations were still in progress with the Italian Government. Funds were also set aside in the plan to insure permanent care for the 99 refugees remaining in the Philippines for whom a voluntary agency has assumed responsibility. The total number of persons moved during the period July 1, 1950, to January 31, 1952, was 257,335—20,000 more than originally expected.

Allocation for Liquidation

An allocation for liquidation expenditures totaling \$1,137,000 was included in the plan of expenditure. The liquidation budget contained \$400,000 for the payment of all sums owing to staff personnel. To carry out the liquidation of the Organization, the Council established a Board of Liquidation consisting of the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela, and appointed a liquidating staff consisting of Oliver E. Cound (U.S.) as liquidator, Francis H. Dallison (U.K.) as deputy liquidator, and H. E. Henri Ponsot (France) as counselor. The powers, duties, and responsibilities of the Board of Liquidation and of the liquidator were established in resolutions adopted by the Council. The liquidator will be responsible to the Board of Liquidation, which will in turn report to the member governments of the Organization.

In addition to the settlement of all liabilities of the Organization, the Board of Liquidation and the liquidator are directed by the terms of resolutions adopted by the Council to make payments according to an established list of priorities out of two remaining possible sources of income expected to be received by the Organization during the liquidation period. The final sale of surplus supplies and equipment may produce between \$500,000 and \$600,000 in income. The only other potential income may result from settlement of the Iro claim against the Federal Government of Germany on the German food credit. Negotiations concerning this claim were still in progress during the session of the Council. If the claim, by decision of the Bonn government, is included with other postwar claims for consideration by the German Post War Debt Settlement Conference, the likelihood of any payment to Iro will be extremely small. Under these circumstances, the liquidator will attempt to arrange a settlement of the claim entirely in deutschemarks.

The priorities for payment by the liquidator from the foregoing two sources of income if, as, and when received, were established by the Council in a resolution as follows:

1. The first charge shall be to meet unforeseen claims against the Organization and to defray any additional costs of liquidation which might be incurred during the period of liquidation beyond those provided for in the Final Plan of Expenditure;

2. The second charge shall be to reimburse the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe the costs of moving Iro eligible refugees who, by 1 February 1952 had been visaed, but not moved;

3. The third charge shall be to provide, after consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to the extent of assets realized from a satisfactory settlement of the Food Replacement Account in Germany and from any assets which may be realized in Deutsche Marks, grants for assistance to residual refugees, such as grants for refugees in Trieste, to the Displaced Persons Department of the Expellee Bank, to Voluntary Societies and to Refugee Service Committees.

4. The fourth charge shall be to establish a revolving fund in the form of a trust, to be managed by the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe, for the movement of refugees who receive visas after 1 February 1952. Priority will be given to refugees now registered with the IRO.

With respect to the second priority above, IRO owes to the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe a balance of \$1,350,000 for the movement of 12,205 refugees who had received visas prior to January 31, 1952. The movement of these refugees will be completed by March 31, 1952.

The Council recognized that the actions which the liquidator may take under priority three would be of close interest to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and that he should therefore, for purposes of coordination of joint efforts, be consulted concerning payments made under priority three. The Council hoped that funds would become available to make more adequate provision for the hospitalization of tuberculous refugees in Trieste than was possible out of income available prior to January 31, 1952. The Council also strongly supported a proposed allocation of approximately 1,000,000 deutschemarks to the Displaced Persons Department of the Expellee Bank in Germany. Iro had previously made a contribution of 1,500,000 deutsche marks in capital funds to this department of the Expellee Bank in consideration of other contributions by the Allied High Commission and the Federal Government of Germany. These latter funds have been completely exhausted by the granting of small loans to refugees remaining in Germany, and many applications for such loans remain unsatisfied because of the lack of capital. A number of voluntary agencies in Europe and refugee service committees in the Near East, Turkey, and Latin American countries continue to assist the adjustment of refugees in those areas. Grants to these voluntary agencies and committees were envisaged as a useful method of facilitating the assimilation of such refugees.

Status of Liquidation Process

The Director General reported to the Council that all offices and installations had been closed at the end of January 1952 with the exception of small liquidation staffs still required for varying periods to effect the closure of accounts and the transfer or disposal of records and property in the following areas: Austria, Canada, Germany (including International Movements, Bremen), Italy (including International Movements, Genoa), and the United States. The extension of operations during January 1952 resulted in a delay of approximately one month in the commencement of the final liquidation period. As of February 1, 1952, 290 international staff members and 360 local staff members remained under employment. It was planned to reduce the staff still further during

February to 127 international staff members and 70 local members. A warehouse and motor depot will be retained at Munich for an additional period after January 31, 1952, at which point most of the remaining surplus property will be transferred pending final disposal.

The Council learned at its last session that the total contributions actually received from governments during the period July 1, 1947, to January 31, 1952, were \$398,596,802. Contributions due and unpaid totaled \$8,270,493, of which contributions unpaid by China totaled \$8,210,469. The only other unpaid contribution was that of Guatemala, \$60,024, which was still in process of collection. Of the total \$398,596,802 actually received in contributions from governments, the United States paid \$237,116,355. The estimated total expenditures were \$429,775,450. The excess of expenditures of approximately \$30,000,000 above the total of contributions from governments resulted from reimbursements to the Organization by governments for the movement of refugees, the sale of surplus supplies, and other miscellaneous income arising out of operations.

Sixteen member governments of Iro were represented at this final session of the Council:

Australia	Luxembourg
Belgium	Netherlands
Canada	New Zealand
Denmark	Norway
Dominican Republic	Switzerland
France	United Kingdom
Guatemala	United States
Italy	Venezuela

The Governments of China and Iceland, members of the Organization, were not represented. The Governments of Austria, Brazil, Federal Government of Germany, Israel, Mexico, and Sweden, as well as the Holy See, the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Labor Office, and the World Health Organization were represented by observers. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees was also present as an observer. George L. Warren of the United States presided as Chairman of the Council for the final session. Victor Dore of Canada served as first Vice Chairman; Finn T. B. Friis of Denmark as second Vice Chairman; and P. J. de Kanter of the Netherlands as Rapporteur. The Council adjourned on February 16, 1952.

The opening date of this final session, February 11, 1952, was the fifth anniversary of the convening of the first session of the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization at Geneva on February 11, 1947. Appropriate commemorative statements were made at the final meeting of the Council.

• *Mr. Warren, author of the above article, is Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State. Mr. Warren was U.S. representative to the February session of IRO.*

Tasks Before Disarmament Commission

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson¹

On Friday at U.N. Headquarters in New York, the Disarmament Commission begins the task assigned it by the General Assembly in Paris. That task is to prepare proposals for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments—including the prohibition of atomic weapons under an effective system of international control.

The spokesman of the United States at these meetings will be Benjamin V. Cohen, who has been given the rank of Ambassador to serve as deputy to Ambassador Warren R. Austin.

The U.S. Government attaches the greatest importance to the work of the Disarmament Commission. We know that its tasks are complex. We are aware that there are immense difficulties to be overcome and that the work may be slow and arduous. But we are prepared to negotiate in good faith, in the hope that the energies now necessarily devoted to defense may be liberated for positive programs of reconstruction and development.

Agreement on a plan of work to be undertaken by the Disarmament Commission—the topics to be discussed and studied—will be one of its first tasks. The United States has prepared a draft plan of work and has circulated it among all members of the Commission. It is our hope that one of the first acts of the Commission will be to consider this U.S. draft. Details of the U.S. draft will be made public on Friday. I can only tell you at this time that hard, sincere effort has gone into its framing and we will welcome suggestions from other members of the Commission who, like the United States, are sincerely devoting their full energies to the fulfillment of the task set by the General Assembly at Paris.

It is not inconsistent to talk about reduction of armaments in this time of world tension and while we are still hard at work building our military strength. We are rearming because we have been forced to do so by the threat to world peace and security stemming from the existence of huge armies and armaments in the Soviet Union and its satellites. But we are ready, as we have always been, to take the other and—from our viewpoint—much preferred way toward international peace and security: To cut down our forces if agreement can be reached on an effective plan of balanced disarmament.

It is the business of the U.N. Disarmament Commission to try to find this way—to work out a detailed plan for disarmament, so that when the time is ripe, nations may achieve international order without the burden of tremendous defense budgets.

U.S. Committee for German Corporate Dollar Bonds

[Released to the press March 3]

The Department of State announced on March 3 that at its request Beardsley Ruml, Herbert F. Boynton, and Ganson Purcell have undertaken to organize and to serve as members of an independent and private committee to represent the interests of the U.S. holders of German corporate dollar bonds at the International Conference on German debts. The Conference convened at London on February 28, 1952, under the auspices of the Tripartite Commission on German Debts on which Ambassador Warren Lee Pierson is the U.S. representative.¹

Mr. Boynton left for London by air on March 2 to attend the Conference as spokesman for the committee. He will take part in the negotiations with representatives of the German Government and German debtors and with government and creditor representatives of some 30 other countries which are attending the Conference.

The corporate dollar bonds represent a substantial part of the German external indebtedness. There are about 66 different issues of bonds outstanding on which there is a principal amount due estimated at about 180 million dollars.

Mr. Ruml of New York City was formerly chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and of R. H. Macy & Co.

Mr. Boynton was formerly chairman of the National Association of Security Dealers and a partner in the investment firms of F. S. Moseley & Co. of Boston, and Laird, Bissell and Meeds of New York.

Mr. Purcell is a member of the Washington law firm of Purcell and Nelson and was formerly chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. He was also a member of the Economic Stabilization Board during World War II.

The committee has taken the name of "U.S. Committee for German Corporate Dollar Bonds." Wallace H. Fulton, executive director of the National Association of Security Dealers, is temporarily handling the administrative arrangements for the committee.

Representation at the London conference of other categories of U.S. creditors is:

James Grafton Rogers, president of the Foreign Bondholders' Protective Council, Inc., will represent holders of German governmental bonds (including state and municipal bonds) and corporate bonds which are governmentally guaranteed.

Andrew L. Gomory, chairman, American Committee for Standstill Creditors of Germany, will represent a number of American banks holding certain claims the payment of which was deferred

¹ Made on Mar. 12, 1952.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1952, p. 206.

sometime prior to the war under agreements entered into with the German Government.

Gordon H. Michler of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, and chairman of the German Committee of the National Foreign Trade Council will attend on behalf of commercial and miscellaneous creditors.

Parker McCollester of the New York law firm of Lord, Day and Lord will represent the Committee of Mixed Claims Commission Award Holders.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers issued in 1952: S/2521, February 11; S/2539, February 27; S/2540, February 27; S/2543, February 28; S/2545, February 29; S/2546, February 29; S/2547, March 3.

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Letter Dated 22 January 1952 Addressed by the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council. Methods Which Might be used to Maintain and Strengthen International Peace and Security in Accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. S/2496, January 26, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions as to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

General Assembly

Report of the Economic and Social Council (Chapter V). Report of the Third Committee. A/2111, February 3, 1952. 14 pp. mimeo.

The Problem of the Independence of Korea: Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Relief and Rehabilitation of Korea: Report of the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction. Report of the First Committee and the Joint Second and Third Committee, meeting jointly. A/2114, February 3, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.

Threats to the Political Independence and Territorial Integrity of China and to the Peace of the Far East, Resulting from Soviet Violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945 and from Soviet Violations of the Charter of the United Nations. Letter dated 7 January 1952 from the Chairman of the Chinese delegation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly. A/C.1/712, January 26, 1952. 6 pp. mimeo.

Economic and Social Council

Basic Programme of the Economic and Social Council for 1952. Note by the Secretary-General. E/2158, December 10, 1951. 11 pp. mimeo.

Inter-Agency Agreements. Agreement between the International Labour Organisation and the Council of Europe. Note by the Secretary-General. E/2159, December 11, 1951. 7 pp. mimeo.

Implementation of Recommendations on Economic and Social Matters. Economic and Social Council Resolution 283 (X). Texts of Replies from Governments of Member States. E/2165/Add. 12, January 15, 1952. 8 pp. mimeo. and E/2165/Add. 13, January 15, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.

Economic Commission for Europe. Reports from the Committees of the Commission on their Activities, and an Additional Note by the Executive Secretary. E/EC/E/142, January 28, 1952. 64 pp. mimeo.

Trusteeship Council

Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa on Ruanda-Urundi. Prepared in accordance with Trusteeship Council Resolution 344 (IX) of 5 July 1951 and with rule 99 of the rules of procedure for the Trusteeship Council. T/948, December 27, 1951. 97 pp. mimeo.

Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1951, on Somaliland Under Italian Administration. Prepared in accordance with Trusteeship Council resolution 344 (IX) of 5 July 1951 and with rule 99 of the rules of procedure for the Trusteeship Council. T/947, January 11, 1952. 122 pp. mimeo.

Population, Land Categories and Tenure in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. (Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat.) T/AC.36/L.36, February 18, 1952. 9 pp. mimeo.

Petitions Concerning Tanganyika. Observations of the Administering Authority. T/953/Add.4, February 20, 1952. 51 pp. mimeo.

**The U.S. in the U.N.,
a weekly feature, does not appear in this issue.**

Building Collective Strength Through The Mutual Security Program

Following are statements made March 13 on the Mutual Security Program for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1953, before a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee:

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON¹

The Mutual Security Program for 1953 is of cardinal importance to our national interest and security and I welcome this opportunity to appear before you in its behalf.

It seems fair to say that there is no substantial disagreement with the basic policy represented in this legislation.

The American people have clearly rejected both isolationism and preventive war as self-defeating courses of action. Instead, our national policy—which commands strong agreement and support among our people—is directed toward increasing the strength and unity of the free world as a safeguard of peace and freedom.

The program which properly bears the name of “mutual security” is one of the principal means by which this national policy is translated into action.

What the Mutual Security Program represents is our share of the total effort which is now going on, to reduce the weakness which stands as a temptation to aggression and to build instead a strong and confident structure of peace.

Mr. Harriman has just discussed in full and in some detail the projection of this program for 1953 which you now have before you.² It is not my purpose to repeat what he has just said. I want to assure you, however, that I adopt and endorse what he has said, and I profoundly believe in the program he has presented.

In my short presentation this morning, what I should like to put before you are some of the factors which seem to me to be essential to an understanding of the more far reaching and enduring side of this Mutual Security Program.

¹Released to the press Mar. 13. For the President's message to the Congress recommending continuance of MSP, transmitted Mar. 6, see BULLETIN of Mar. 17, p. 403.

²Text of Mr. Harriman's statement appears on p. 467.

Mr. Harriman has dealt with the urgent necessity for providing for defense, and for supporting the defense efforts of our friends and allies.

There are four other points to which I should like to draw your attention, in your consideration of this program.

The Time Element in Europe

First of all, I wish to point out the importance of those moments in history when things are fluid and when great advances can be made which will endure for centuries and greatly influence the lives of generations to come. This is one of those moments in Europe.

Each cataclysm which has swept Europe—from the wars of Napoleon to the wars of Hitler—has left Europe in a molten state with great possibilities for change—destructive or creative.

American foreign policy since the war has been based on an understanding of this fact. This period of our foreign policy has been one of the most constructive in the history of our Republic. We have been working with the vast new forces which are developing in Europe—forces of unity and cohesion. We have come to the point when it is possible to put aside destructive rivalries which have divided Europe for centuries. In their stead, there can be created a unified Europe which will give enduring and underlying strength, not only to the immediate task of creating a defense force, but to the European community itself. For an effective defense force cannot be merely a military organization. It must be founded upon and grow out of a living and vibrant community.

This is what we have been working for. This has been the consistent goal of the Congress, the Administration, and the American people since the war.

What I want to stress is that we are approaching the culmination of this effort. In the past 2 or 3 years tremendous steps have been taken. It is only necessary to mention the organization of NATO itself, the steps toward the Schuman Plan, toward the European Defense Community, and toward bringing Germany back into close relations with Western Europe.

The dramatic events of recent weeks cannot fail to excite any student of history. The fact that within a period of 10 days both the French Parliament and the German Bundestag approved the revolutionary step of merging their armed forces with those of Italy and the Benelux countries was a political event absolutely unique in the last several centuries. And equally striking is the fact that the proposal for the European Defense Community contains provisions for early action toward a constitutional federation of Europe.

Who would have thought, even 2 years ago, that we could by now have come even this close to seeing Germany and France going along the road together?

These things can be brought to fulfillment now. If we lose this momentum—if they are not accomplished now—they may not be accomplished for a long time to come.

In a large measure, it depends upon what we do. This legislation which we are considering here is of vital importance in bringing about the larger creation and all its interrelated parts.

The relation of the 1952 military plans to the arrangements with Germany, to the development of NATO, to the creation of a European Defense Community which looks forward to political integration—these are all intimately interwoven with one another.

If they succeed, you will have a force which will underpin strength in Europe for generations. If not, you will have an inherent weakness in Europe which will have to be kept propped up—if indeed we can keep it propped up.

This country—the American people—have done as much as, and perhaps more than, any other country to bring this about. Now is the time to put it through. If it is not put through now, then the things we have talked about for the past 5 years may become impossible of achievement.

Europe's Efforts and Commitments

The next point has to do with the efforts and commitments of our European friends. There has been a great deal of discussion—and more than a little misinformation—on this point in the past. Therefore, I would like to add a few words to what Mr. Harriman has told you about this effort.

First, it should be emphasized that the targets agreed on at Lisbon are not goals toward which we are just beginning to work. We have already made solid progress toward these goals since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed 3 years ago.

The defense expenditures of our European allies—and I am not here including the addition of Greece and Turkey—have doubled since 1949. Their rate of military production is nearly four times above the 1949 level and is still rising. They have all increased their periods of compulsory military service and have added more than 500,000 men to their armed forces. They have made sub-

stantial progress in training these forces, organizing them, and providing them with modern equipment. All told, the number of organized ground divisions available in Europe has more than doubled since General Eisenhower assumed the Supreme Command last spring.

But the question remains: Are our allies doing their full part?

It is my considered judgment that efforts already made by our friends plus increased programs for the current year now before their parliaments approach the limits of their capacities. To go beyond these limits would produce a strain in their political, economic, and social structures which would endanger both their security and ours—and might well wreck everything we are trying to accomplish.

The limitations on the European economies are real limitations. They cannot be removed by exhortation or by carping. The average citizen in Western Europe has an income about one-third that of the average U.S. citizen. He pays about the same percentage of that meager income in taxes. He still hasn't made up the housing, clothing, and furniture he lost in the war. He is suffering from a new inflationary trend which since the outbreak of Korean hostilities has pushed up prices twice as rapidly as they have risen in the United States. Finally, in certain countries such as Britain and France his Government has assumed heavy commitments in the defense of other parts of the free world.

Just one fact should serve to illustrate this last point. In Indochina, where the French have committed thousands of their best troops for 5 years in a bloody battle against Communist aggression, France has already spent more money than the entire amount of all Marshall Plan aid received from the United States.

These economic limitations do not mean that we cannot meet our security objectives. On the contrary, our allies have pledged themselves to continue to increase their defense efforts.

All of us, both we in the United States and our allies, would wish to increase our defensive strength more quickly than it is practicable to do. Both we and they have faced the problem of adjusting what is desirable to what is possible.

Mr. Harriman has discussed some of the problems with which our allies must deal in carrying out the plans laid at Lisbon. We have recently seen a dramatic illustration of these problems in the fall of the French Cabinet. But the significant point about these French developments is that the French Parliament, immediately after Lisbon, voted 512 to 104 to approve the military budget. This action made it clear that the entire Parliament, with the exception of the Communists, supported the NATO defense program and the continuation of operations in Indochina. The method of raising the necessary funds created a political crisis but all democratic peoples know

that tax problems are rarely simple. I am confident that the necessary funds will be found.

The program worked out at Lisbon is a cooperative and interdependent program. I am confident that it can be accomplished if each of the partners does its part.

Mr. Harriman has pointed out how important the proposed U.S. contribution is to the total NATO program. He has pointed out, and it is easy to see, that the tanks, guns, and planes which we furnish provide the arms for ground divisions and air formations. If these arms are not provided, it means fewer divisions and fewer formations. This point needs little argument.

What I wish to stress is the vital importance of the defense support provided in this request. These funds not only provide the materials which will enable the workers and factories in the allied countries to produce equipment for their forces, but provide other supplies essential to the economy which underpins the entire defense effort of these countries. To remove or reduce these funds would have the immediate and destructive effect of undermining the whole economy of the countries concerned at this critical period in their rearmament program. If this is done it would be of little profit for us to produce the tanks, planes, and guns which this program calls for.

May I stress further that if there is any deficiency in our part of the program no other of our NATO partners is in a position to make it up. Therefore, a cut in the program does not mean a shift of the burden; it means a cut in results obtainable. There is no escape from this conclusion.

I have said earlier that the plans which we and our allies have developed are a reconciliation of the desirable with the possible. I believe that our military advisers will tell you that to do less than what has been found to be possible would be to incur risks to our security which should not be undertaken. Therefore, reduction of the program would involve the assumption of risks which those responsible for its development cannot advise.

Technical and Economic Assistance Program

I turn now to a third point—technical and economic assistance to underdeveloped countries.

I will not take your time now to detail the encouraging and growing record of accomplishment of our Point Four Program in the underdeveloped areas which has been achieved for a relatively small investment. All this will be laid before you in later meetings.

There is one point, however, which I wish to stress because it has a direct bearing on our security and on the cost of this program. This is that if Point Four Programs of technical and economic assistance are to be effective in their objective of adding to our security and welfare they must be devised and timed to meet the conditions of the particular country we are aiding.

In many, probably in most cases, it is enough to plan our programs so that they will help the people of these underdeveloped areas to solve their economic and social problems gradually over a long term. We provide only a small part of the resources required, but that small part has the effect of a catalyst in making the whole effort of the country succeed. The greater number of the programs being carried out under existing legislation and proposed in the new legislation are of this kind. They will be of inestimable importance to our country in the long years of growth ahead.

In some countries, however, and particularly in Asia, there is a flowing tide of nationalism, a desperate discontent, a ferment of communism—or all together—creating an *urgent* need. This need will not permit the luxury of a long-term solution. In these countries our basic program can be the same, but it must be speeded up to bring about in a few years results for which in other countries we could safely work many years.

India is the most striking example of a need for urgent and effective action.

India is at a critical point in its history. The Indian people have just completed their first national elections. These elections have shown some very startling and revealing and important things. Although the Congress Party won by a substantial majority, the Communist Party showed unexpected strength, especially in certain localities. This showing is essentially attributable to the discontent of many of the people over the abject poverty and hopelessness of their lives. This discontent is being fanned by a constant flow of Communist propaganda and subversion. The advice of all our observers on the ground is that, unless the newly independent government under Prime Minister Nehru can show substantial progress in economic development over the next 5 years, the likelihood is that in the next elections the democratic forces will be endangered either by the extremists of the right or by the Communists.

The effort to avert this catastrophe centers chiefly on the food problem.

For the last 20 years India's food production has been stable at about 50 million tons of grain per year. During the same period her population has increased between 80 and 90 million. Today India has to import some 4 to 5 million tons of grain annually to feed her people. She cannot afford to do this. She must substantially increase her food production. Only last year a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions was forestalled by aid voted by the U.S. Congress. Unless heroic measures are taken India's food deficit will continue to increase and the danger of political upheaval may pass the point of control.

Fortunately, the Indian Government has the foresight and the courage to take these heroic measures. India has set for herself a goal of self-sufficiency in food at the end of 4 years. It is

already clear from work which has been done in India—some of it under the Point Four Program—that this goal is technically possible. It can be achieved by improved seeds, by more effective plows, by increased use of fertilizer, by reclaiming of waste lands, and in some areas by making more water available through tube wells and irrigation to supplement the uncertain monsoon rains.

But this is a great undertaking—an effort to accomplish in 4 years a revolution in agricultural practices, health and sanitation, education, and the like. India will be devoting vast sums to this work. She will be substantially aided by sister nations in the British Commonwealth and she will also have technical assistance and loans from various U.N. agencies and the benefit of private investment. But taking all these assets together she will not be able to achieve this goal without help from the United States on terms of county agents, public health experts, education specialists, and, in addition, the substantial amount of supplies and equipment necessary to make their work effective in the time available. In order for the farmers to learn and apply the new agricultural techniques which will enable them to raise their production in the amount required, they will need more fertilizer, more water, more and better tools—and these things require money.

I venture to say with considerable confidence that if India succeeds in this tremendous effort, it will have won its fight against communism. On the other hand, the failure of this effort will greatly increase the danger of communism not only to India but to all Asia. The issue here at stake is vast indeed. But this disaster does not need to happen in India. The Indian Government and the Indian people are determined that it shall not happen. With our help they can succeed. This is a point at which we have to take a decisive step.

The program now before you also continues technical assistance to our friendly neighbors in Latin America where it has been a proven and mounting success for 10 years. It continues assistance to the independent States of Africa where its potentialities have just begun to appear. It continues aid to Iran and Pakistan, nations which, like India, are on the periphery of the Soviet Union and which suffer from many of the same problems that India does. In these nations as in India the need is great and urgent and the programs are of substantial size to fill the need in time.

The problems which confront Israel and those which face the United Nations and the Arab States giving asylum to the Arab refugees have been ameliorated but are not yet solved. The solution of these problems with all of their connotations of human suffering and the establishment of stable conditions in the region are still important in the hearts and minds of the people of the United States. Therefore, we are proposing the extension

of the program inaugurated this year for the relief and resettlement of refugees into Israel and we are proposing a contribution to the U.N. fund for the relief and resettlement of the Arab refugees from Palestine and an appropriate program of aid to the Arab States concentrating on those sheltering the refugees in order to provide a setting in which reintegration can take place.

The Far Eastern Problem

And now I come to the fourth point, which has to do with the Far East.

The situations which confront us in this area are of the utmost gravity.

Both in Korea and in Indochina a prolonged and costly struggle has been made to restore peace and security. We hope and believe that this struggle will come to a successful conclusion. But we cannot close our eyes to the fact that tremendous potentialities for danger exist throughout the area.

The magnificent defense against Communist military aggression has given the world the warning and the time to prepare its defenses.

We have made good use of this time.

During the past year we have been making progress toward laying the basis for long-term security in Asia and the Pacific.

Within the past year the return of Japan to a place of dignity, equality, and responsibility among the family of nations was begun. Defense arrangements with the Philippines, New Zealand, and Australia were concluded. All these measures are now before the Senate for ratification. After they are ratified, we must go on to do the things necessary to make them effective.

During this past year also, the direct and indirect military aid programs have already begun to make a difference. American Military Assistance Advisory Groups are stationed in Indochina, Thailand, Formosa, and the Philippines. Military aid to Indochina has been given a high priority and has helped to turn the tide of the battle against Communist aggression there.

Military aid to the Chinese Nationalist Government forces on Formosa has strengthened the island against aggression and economic aid has enabled it to sustain this military effort.

In the Philippines and in Thailand, our military aid programs are providing essential support for the preservation of internal security.

These programs of military aid, of military support, and of economic and technical aid to our friends in the Far East, in Southeast Asia, and across the Middle East are directed both against the short-range military threat and toward meeting the long-range need for economic and political growth and stability. Both are a necessary part of our security program in this area.

Any reduction in this part of the Mutual Security Program must be weighed against the con-

sequences of weakening this vital area in the face of the grave dangers which threaten it.

In one sense, what I have said about the problems in Asia goes to the very heart of our world policy. In every land, to a greater or lesser degree, the struggle against Communist imperialism must be fought on two or more fronts at the same time. No nation and no people can be truly safe until the free world as a whole possesses enough military strength to protect itself against a treacherous attack. And it is equally true that no nation can be secure unless the political, economic, and moral foundations of its society are sound and solid.

It is not easy to conduct a long and strenuous struggle on two fronts. But whatever difficulties and hard choices we must endure in this struggle, we know that our own security is part and parcel of the safety, the freedom, and the economic well-being of our neighbors. We gain strength as we contribute strength; we gain security as we make others more secure. If we do our full part in this great common endeavor to provide the strength needed to assure peace, we will have met our responsibilities to the American people.

STATEMENT BY W. AVERELL HARRIMAN³

Last year the Congress authorized the appointment by the President of a director for mutual security. The director is responsible for supervising the Mutual Security Program so that it will be "effectively integrated both at home and abroad, and administered so as to assure that the defensive strength of the free nations of the world shall be built as quickly as possible on the basis of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." The director also has primary responsibility for preparing and presenting to the Congress such military, economic, and technical assistance programs as may be required in the interests of the security of the United States.

I am here this morning to begin the presentation of the Mutual Security Program for the coming fiscal year.

The program submitted to the Congress by the President, recommending the authorization of \$7,900,000,000, has been developed with the full participation and cooperation of all the departments and agencies involved. It has been a team job. Testimony will be presented by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by other officials directly concerned with each part of the program.

Everyone recognizes the grave dangers which confront our Nation. None of us disputes the existence of the Communist threat to our security, or the need to meet it. The questions which arise among us are over how to meet the threat, in what

directions, and to what extent our efforts should be applied.

It is my firm conviction that the Mutual Security Program is a hard-headed, statesman-like way to build the collective strength we need for our security. We will give you facts and figures to show that, for a fraction of the amount we are spending for our own military establishment, we are assisting in the development of military forces with more men under arms—in Europe alone—than are in our own services. We will demonstrate how relatively small sums invested in the underdeveloped areas will strengthen the security of the entire free world—indispensable to our own.

The Mutual Security Program is one part of our total security effort. The funds requested represent about 12½ percent of that portion of the budget devoted to our security. The President has recommended about 64 billion dollars for our major security programs, nearly 8 billion dollars of which are to help build the strength of our friends and allies around the world. That strength is essential to our own security; without it, it is difficult to see how the rest of our own defense efforts could be effective.

The program includes contributions of various kinds to help strengthen Europe, the Near East and Africa, the Far East, and Latin America. These contributions are of three types: finished military items and military training; raw materials and other commodities to support the defense programs of friendly nations; and economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. Each of these categories is designed to meet in the most effective manner the threat as it exists in each area.

Building the Defense of Europe

By far the greater part of the funds requested is to help the defense build-up in Europe. We have long recognized that the defense of Europe is vital to us. Western European resources in skilled manpower and industrial capacity could determine the balance of power in the present global struggle.

Our joint effort under the North Atlantic Treaty—ratified only 2½ years ago—has already gathered momentum. In the past year there has been a steady increase in the number and effectiveness of trained forces integrated under General Eisenhower's command.

Last autumn the Temporary Council Committee, of which I was chairman, analyzed the NATO defense program in relation to the political and economic capabilities of the member countries. Each country, freely and without reserve, laid before the Committee the details of its military program and its financial and economic situation. These programs were reviewed and concrete measures recommended for the rapid build-up of combat-ready forces. As a result of this joint work,

³Released to the press Mar. 13 by the office of Mr. Harriman, who is Director for Mutual Security.

the NATO governments agreed at Lisbon last month to provide, by the end of 1952, 50 divisions, over 4,000 combat aircraft, and substantial naval forces, and to lay the groundwork for further build-up next year and beyond.⁴ This program, in the words of General Eisenhower, will provide "a real deterrent to aggression."

The Lisbon plan also set up a system of priorities under which equipment will be made available only to forces which require it to become combat ready or to meet training needs. General Eisenhower's command has the key role in this system. This will make sure that the equipment we send to Europe will go where it will do the most good.

At Lisbon, the NATO Council endorsed the plans for the European Defense Community which, together with the Schuman Plan, constitute major steps toward closer European integration. These are momentous undertakings. We will continue to give active support to further progress in this direction. As the Congress has long recognized, the best assurance of a stable and secure Europe would come from the breaking down of national barriers and the pooling of national efforts and resources.

Over 5 billion dollars of the funds under the Mutual Security Program is to help implement the Lisbon plan of action. These funds are directly geared to the requirements of the plan.

The military assistance funds, together with those previously appropriated, will provide the U.S. contribution toward initial equipment for the European 1952 forces agreed at Lisbon. They will also cover partial combat reserves and some initial equipment for additional forces, including German contingents in the European Defense Community, to be brought into being during 1953. The President has directed that deliveries to our NATO partners be given very high priority.

To meet the Lisbon plan and requirements in other areas, 12 billion dollars of expenditures against past and requested authorizations have been projected for military assistance during fiscal years 1952 and 1953. The military assistance funds requested are needed to finance the flow of necessary equipment.

The major portion of the military assistance will be in form of end items produced in this country. We also expect to place about one billion dollars of contracts in Western Europe during fiscal year 1953 for the production of military equipment, including items such as ammunition, electronics, spare parts, and small naval craft. This is called offshore procurement. It serves several purposes. It produces needed equipment. It is a source of needed dollar earnings. It enables our partners to develop their capacity for arms production by utilizing available labor and facilities. It brings closer the time when they

will be able to carry the production load themselves.

Apart from end-item assistance, our European allies need defense support in the form of imported raw materials, fuel, certain other essential commodities, and technical help in order to make their full contribution to the joint military effort. A major military build-up can only be successful if undertaken, as we in the United States well know on the basis of expanded production. The Europeans have undertaken the necessary measures to expand production, measures we are supporting through an intensified productivity drive which brings American know-how to European management and labor. Under the Lisbon plan of action the expansion of each country's total production will make possible increased defense efforts.

Provision for Imported Commodities¹

The increasing European defense effort requires larger supplies of imported raw materials. These supplies cannot be fully paid for by present European earnings, when the European economy has not yet been adjusted to the diversion of substantial resources for military use. For these reasons the Mutual Security Program includes about 1.5 billion dollars to provide the critical margin of imported commodities as defense support for Europe as a whole. Of this amount, 1.4 billion dollars is for the countries in the Lisbon plan of action.

This is not the same thing we were doing under the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was designed to help Europe rebuild its civilian economy from the disastrous consequences of the war. Defense support is also a form of economic assistance but for an entirely different purpose. It is to make it possible for our friends in Europe to expand their defense efforts for our common security.

Defense support is not designed to provide our European partners with the means to live in comfort while we shoulder the burden of rearmament. They are embarked upon large-scale military efforts which mean real sacrifices to their people. They are providing the manpower for their force build-up. Every NATO country in Europe has universal military service. Our allies pay, clothe, and maintain their forces. They are providing most of the necessary military facilities and a considerable part of the equipment. This coming year their military budgets—including Germany's—will be about 14 billion dollars, more than double the pre-Korea level. This represents about 10 percent of their gross national product.

But this figure tells only part of the story. Their military costs are lower in many ways than ours. Their standards of pay and maintenance of troops are on a much more austere basis than ours. Therefore, comparing the percentages of gross national product devoted to military bud-

⁴ BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 368.

ts is not an accurate reflection of the relative forts of the United States and the European untries. Furthermore, with a per capita output ss than $\frac{1}{3}$ ours, this 10 percent creates a serious rain on their economy. Everybody knows it is arder for people with such small incomes to put p 10 percent than it is for people with larger ocomes to put up the 18 percent which we are pending for our security programs.

Other witnesses will explain to you in detail recisely how defense support will enlarge the ilitary effort of our European partners. I want o emphasize one thing. On a conservative calcu- tion of economic factors alone, defense support esults in military expenditure amounting to two r three times its cost. But in reality, failure to rovide defense support would have far wider onsequences than the direct loss in military ex- penditures. There would have to be a sharp re- duction in European-financed defense production nd in European forces.

A major cut in the defense programs of the prospective partners in the European Defense Community would place in jeopardy this most im- portant move toward European unity. The whole NATO plan for building up an effective force under General Eisenhower would be undermined. It is ifficult to foresee what could be salvaged in the form of an integrated defense program, geographi- cally and strategically sound and capable of being an effective deterrent to aggression.

Commitments of our European allies in other parts of the world, in which we as well as they have vital interests, would inevitably have to be reviewed and expenditures curtailed to a degree which neither we nor they would like to contem- plate. One has only to think of the effort which France is making in Indochina, or of the world- wide strategic responsibilities of the United King- dom, to appreciate what grave problems would be presented to the free world if a withholding of U.S. defense support were to throw all these efforts into question. In terms of world politics, this disruption of established plans would represent a major victory for the Soviet leaders in the Kremlin.

Thus both military assistance and defense sup- port are required to carry out the Lisbon plan of action. It is impossible to predict with precision the size of the U.S. contribution beyond the com- ing year or how long it should be continued. The North Atlantic Council recognized that, in a cold war, planning for the future must be kept flexi- ble—that requirements will be affected by changes in international tensions, the development of new weapons and military techniques, and by other factors. For this reason, firm force plans were made only for calendar year 1952, with provisional plans for 1953, and planning guides beyond. There will be a complete review in NATO next autumn when plans for 1953 are firmed up and the planning cycle moved forward a year.

Outlook for the Future

The outlook as we now see it is that next year will also be one of large-scale capital build-up. Thereafter, subject to the factors I have pre- viously mentioned, requirements for the further capital build-up should taper off. When the capital build-up is completed, an expanded Euro- pean economy, and especially an expanded Euro- pean munitions production should make it possible for the European countries themselves substan- tially to maintain their own defense forces at an adequate level.

In addition to support for the Lisbon plan of ac- tion, the Mutual Security Program includes funds for military assistance and defense support for the two new North Atlantic Treaty partners, Greece and Turkey. These two countries will add sizeable and effective military forces to those called for under the Lisbon plan of action and will strengthen the southern flank of European defense. Similar assistance is also provided for Yugoslavia whose defection in 1948 represented a major setback to Kremlin designs. Assistance is also provided for Austria where continued eco- nomic assistance is necessary to maintain stabili- ty in the face of occupation of part of the country by Soviet forces. A program for Spain is being developed and will be carried out with funds al- ready appropriated by the Congress.

We are engaged in a collective defense effort in Europe to deter aggression, but on the other side of the globe, in Korea and Indochina, the Kremlin has already induced its satellites to wage open ag- gression. Since the whole of Southeast Asia is in immediate danger, the Mutual Security Pro- gram for next year includes 611 million dollars for military assistance to this area. Substantial amounts are included in this sum for Indochina and for continued help to prepare the Chinese armies on Formosa to resist Communist aggres- sion. The balance will be used in the Philippines and other countries in the area where Communist minorities are a severe threat to internal security.

Direct military aid is also planned for Latin America. The comparatively small figure of 62 million dollars in military assistance for our neighbors to the South reflects the fact that there is no immediate threat of Communist aggression from abroad. Our military assistance there is to help them play a larger role in the collective de- fense of the Western Hemisphere.

The direct military assistance and related de- fense support aspects of the Mutual Security Pro- gram which I have been describing account for 90 percent of the funds required for the coming year.

I turn now to the technical and economic assist- ance activities of the Program in the Near East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. While these constitute less than 10 percent of the funds, their significance cannot be over-stated.

There is greater discontent among the peoples in the underdeveloped areas than there has ever

been in the past. We understand and sympathize with their demands for economic and social progress. Their desires for a change from the miserable conditions of the status quo are fanned by intense feelings of nationalism. Unless we provide technical and economic assistance, and do it promptly, to help these people begin to improve their conditions, there is serious danger that they will fall into the trap of the shrewd and ruthless Communist machine which is cynically promising quick cures for age-old ills. This would be just as grave a blow to our security as if they fell to communism through armed attack.

Without technical and economic assistance in places such as Indochina and Formosa, the effectiveness of our military assistance would be greatly impaired. Without technical and economic assistance to new nations recently emerged from colonialism, we cannot hope for political stability and economic progress. Stability in the underdeveloped areas is necessary to maintain a steady flow of materials so badly needed by the free world.

Tackling Fundamental Problems

The technical and economic assistance activities of the Mutual Security Program are based on the principle of "first things first." In areas where as high as 70 percent of the people suffer from hunger, disease, or illiteracy, these fundamental problems must be tackled before economic development can progress very far. Expanding trade and industrialization will follow of their own accord from these beginnings.

Our assistance goes, insofar as possible, to the people directly. Our representatives go out into the fields and the villages where they can work with the people themselves. Where we work with governments, it is primarily to help them build stable political and social institutions and the most essential public services which can bring immediate, tangible benefits. We are actively supporting land-reform movements and the establishment of free trade unions, farm-credit institutions, local public-health services, and schools.

The fact that this work is done in nonindustrialized societies does not mean that it can be carried out successfully on a shoestring basis. Our experts in the villages and on the farms must be backed up with adequate supplies and equipment. In some instances, direct shipments of commodities may be necessary to tide countries over critical periods until our assistance projects have begun to take hold.

In nations like India, Pakistan, and Iran our economic and technical assistance programs are of substantial size to meet the needs of an urgent situation. If there were no danger of internal subversion, we could probably carry out programs of technical cooperation in these countries at a slower pace, and would not have to speed them up

with considerable quantities of equipment and supplies from the United States to support the work of the experts. But we do not have the time. We cannot afford to risk doing it the slow way in these areas.

The technical and economic assistance activities of the Mutual Security Program are carried out with other countries on a cooperative basis. We are not carrying the load by ourselves. We are helping other nations to help themselves. As the effects of our assistance increase, as the countries benefit from them, they will take on more and more of the work and our share in the enterprise will decrease. We have found this to be the case in Latin America where technical assistance has been under way for 10 years.

It has been our steadfast policy that the bulk of the funds required for the ultimate development of underdeveloped areas must come from private investment, supplemented by loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Export-Import Bank. But until local economies are raised to the point where they can attract capital from these sources we must be prepared in some instances to make special grants for development.

The total amount of technical and economic assistance provided for programs in Southeast Asia under the Mutual Security Agency, including support for defense efforts, is 258 million dollars. For Point Four Programs in South Asia, the Near East, Africa, and Latin America under the Technical Cooperation Administration, 227 million dollars is requested. An additional 141 million dollars is requested for refugee relief and resettlement programs in Israel and the Arab States.

I regard technical and economic assistance as an investment absolutely essential to the attainment of a free, prosperous, and expanding world economy. Development in these areas will provide raw materials for the continued growth of our own economy and those of other free nations. It will give hope for a better life in a free society and should, in time, strengthen the nations of these areas so that they can in the future, without special help from us, be self-reliant members of the free world.

I am convinced that the Mutual Security Program in all its parts is sound, practical, and absolutely essential.

There are many people, both in Congress and among the general public, who are saying that this program can and should be cut drastically. I am aware that very early in these hearings I am going to be asked the direct question "Can this program be cut, and, if so, how much?"

Of course, this program *can* be cut—any program *can* be cut. I believe, however, that the important question is not "Can it be cut?"

The real question is: "What will be the result if it is cut?"

I am convinced that any decision to cut the Mutual Security Program is a decision to reduce the strength which is being built in the free world for our common defense against the threat of the Kremlin. A substantial cut would gravely impair our own security.

I share with you a profound concern that our expenditures should not be one dollar greater than is necessary. For that reason this request has been rigorously held to the minimum necessary. It is not padded. If it were, I could not defend it with conviction as I am doing today. The sums requested are large. They reflect the size of the peril and the dimensions of the need.

I have already stated my belief that this program is less costly than any other means by which we might seek to insure our security. There are additional benefits which cannot be measured in terms of dollars and cents. Security is not only in steel and guns. Security is in men. Men fly planes, men shoot guns, men fight in tanks. I do not believe that we should reserve to the young men of this country the exclusive privilege of fighting for freedom. They are entitled to well-equipped allies.

I want to state to you my deep conviction that this Mutual Security Program is an essential in-

vestment in the security and destiny of our country. Through it we seek to deter aggression and prevent another world war. Through it we provide our citizens with allies, ready and able to fight with us for our common freedoms. Through it we help assure the supplies of raw materials essential to our economic life. Through it we enhance the cause of freedom, help less fortunate peoples to free themselves from the slavery of hunger and disease, and lay the foundations for a world in which peace, freedom, and prosperity may endure.

There are moments in history when acts of omission are as fatal as acts of commission. In our own lifetime we have seen the terrible results of hesitation. This is a moment when we can move forward in giving inspiration and confidence to free men the world over, and carry through the constructive programs for which your committees have been so largely responsible. If we hesitate now, much of what we have done will be undone, and the barbaric tyranny of the Kremlin will spread. Although the outlook is not completely clear and there are grave tasks ahead, with courage and determination, we can move steadily toward our goal—a strong, united free world.

Helping To Strengthen the Free World

FIRST REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM¹

[Released to the press on March 7 by the Office of the Director for Mutual Security]

The President on March 7 described the Mutual Security Program (MSP) as a "program for peace" in presenting the first report to the Congress on the operations of the MSP. The report is a comprehensive account of military and economic and technical activities carried on or developed by the United States with other free nations. The report described the many different actions taken to help reach the objective of building in the free world sufficient military and other strength to assure peace by deterring, or, if necessary, by repelling any further Communist aggression.

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 unified the responsibility for directing, supervising, and coordinating all U. S. programs of military, economic, and technical assistance to other nations. Under the coordination of the Director for Mutual Security, W. Averell Harriman, these three programs, especially the military-assistance program, have been intensified during the past few months.

The President's report, dated December 1951,

reviews the background of the Mutual Security Program, including the assistance of the United States to the economic recovery of Western Europe (the Marshall Plan), military aid to Greece and Turkey (under the Truman Doctrine), the development of technical-assistance programs (Point Four), and military developments based upon the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO and SILEX). The report was prepared before the success of the recent conference in Lisbon could be known and lists as desirable goals many matters which have now been agreed to.

In addition, the report contains optimistic review of other developments in Western Europe: "Four years ago, most nations of Western Europe could not have faced the economic and political consequences of a defense build-up. . . . Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has armed forces in being on the continent of Europe with plans for continued build-up." The report says that "the nations of Western Europe have learned to work together in close cooperation." Mentioned, as examples of this cooperation, are the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the European Payments Union, the Council of Europe, the adoption of the Schuman Plan treaty and the work now being done to create a European Defense Community.

¹ H. doc. 371, transmitted March 7.

“... Progress has been steady,” the report states. “A crowning achievement of our Mutual Security Program has been the fact that not one nation has turned from the path. Neutralism—the ostrich-like disposition to ignore the reality of the Soviet threat—has steadily declined in the face of growing confidence in the free world’s ability to defend itself.”

Contents of the Report

The report consists of a general introductory chapter entitled “The Meaning of Mutual Security” and, following in the order of the titles in the Mutual Security Act itself, separate chapters on details of developments in Europe, the Near East and Africa, Asia and the Pacific, American Republics, and other parts of the program. The final chapter of the report is devoted to the organization and functions of the Office of the Director for Mutual Security.

“The situation in Europe during the past year presented marked progress, as well as serious problems of a political, economic, and military nature . . . The focus of our program in Europe is the defense build-up jointly undertaken by the signers of the North Atlantic Treaty . . . The United States is providing certain Army, Navy, and Air Force units, military equipment for our allies, training programs, and defense support in the form of raw materials and other commodities—all to implement a specific NATO plan for the build-up of this defensive force. Our contribution is directly related to the contributions of other North Atlantic Treaty countries. Their contribution takes the form of military manpower and equipment, military supplies, defense construction, and mutual agreements to place forces under unified command.”

“At the close of 1951, the goals set up within the Medium Term Defense Plan were reviewed in relation to the economic capabilities of the NATO countries, and were redirected toward a more rapid build-up of combat-ready forces. A specific plan of action for the calendar year 1952, geared to the immediate capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty countries, was worked out by the 12-nation Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, under the Chairmanship of W. Averell Harriman, United States Director for Mutual Security . . .”

“... The North Atlantic Treaty Organization became, during 1951, an active organization for coordinating the efforts of the Treaty countries. The command structure, which existed only on paper at the beginning of the year, was brought into being with the appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the appointment of Admiral McConkie as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.”

Noting that “The European countries themselves provide by far the largest portion of the

troops called for under the NATO defense plans” and also “a large part of their own military equipment and supplies.” the report recounts steady progress in the defense build-up. The defense expenditures of European NATO countries have doubled in the last 2 years. The production in Europe of “military hard goods” was estimated for this fiscal year at approximately \$2.5 billion, an increase of two-thirds over last year. However, the report also says that “Much still needs to be done,” especially in the creation of competent cadres and the development of a better logistical support system.

The President’s report says, in connection with our own contribution to NATO defense: “We supply those additional major items of military equipment” which the countries cannot supply themselves, but “which they must have if they are to build the combat-ready forces, within the time limit prescribed, that they have agreed to place under the NATO command. We supply commodities, in addition to military end-items, which are necessary to permit the country to make its contribution of manpower, construction and military supply to the NATO plan.”

These commodities, for the most part, will be consumed directly in defense production abroad or used directly by the military establishments of the European NATO countries. However, a substantial portion of commodities furnished are basic items such as cotton, foodstuffs, and coal, the provision of which will enable European nations to devote a larger part of their manpower and production to the defense build-up.

In Greece, Turkey, and Iran the Mutual Security Program represented, for the most part, a continuation of programs already in existence. In other countries of the Near East and Africa, programs of technical assistance (Point Four) have been effective in setting off “the chain reaction which will lead to economic betterment . . .”

Problems of Southeast Asia

The report calls attention to the fact that the countries of Southeast Asia (Burma, the three Associated States of Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, the Republic of China on Formosa, and the Philippines) “face serious military and economic difficulties . . .” Military assistance has been given to most of these countries to help them solve their problems of internal security—problems which had been increased by guerrilla warfare carried on by local dissidents, mostly Communist-led—and to help them strengthen themselves against aggression from outside.

A large portion of the military and economic aid provided to Southeast Asia by the United States has gone to the Republic of China on Formosa.

In the countries of south Asia (Afghanistan, Ceylon, India, Nepal, and Pakistan) the Mutual Security Program has consisted mostly of activi-

ties under the Point Four Program, with special emphasis on projects which will enable the countries to increase their production of food, to improve their standards of health, and generally to equip themselves to become increasingly active as partners in the free world.

Military assistance to Latin America under the Mutual Security Program is still in the stage of negotiations. In accordance with mandate of the Congress, such aid could not be extended except after a finding by the President that plans for the defense of this hemisphere required the participation of other American Republics in missions important to such defense. The President made this finding early in December 1951. Negotiations have been started with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru.

Before passage of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, but in accordance with the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, substantial quantities of military equipment had been offered, on a reimbursable basis, to the Latin American Republics.

The report says: "Taken together, the military equipment made available to other American Republics, both as reimbursable aid and as grant aid under the bilateral military assistance agreements now in process of negotiation, will put at the disposal of our sister Republics means to carry out more effectively their own commitments under the inter-American treaty system."

The remainder of the President's report dealt with other parts of the program: guaranties of private American investment abroad; surplus agricultural commodities; compliance with the 50-50 American flag provision in regard to transportation; aid to small business under the Msr; and the acquisition of strategic materials.

In his letter of transmittal to the Congress, the President said that the ultimate success of the Mutual Security Program "will come when the troops and weapons are no longer needed, and the monies now required for defense can be used to raise the living standards of our own and other nations who are truly devoted to peace."

U.S. Role in the Conference on Settlement of German Debts

Following is an exchange of correspondence between Senator Gillette of Iowa and Assistant Secretary McFall regarding U.S. participation in the Conference on Settlement of External Debts of the Federal Republic of Germany, which convened at London on February 28:

LETTER OF SENATOR GILLETTE¹

FEBRUARY 23, 1952.

MY DEAR SECRETARY: According to State Department press release No. 30, dated January 14, 1952,² there is to be held in London on February 28 an international conference on the settlement of the external debts of the Federal German Republic, at which the United States Government and private American creditors will be represented.

There are a number of issues involved in these negotiations on which I should like to have the views of the Department of State, within the shortest possible time.

A study of State Department releases concern-

ing steps toward settlement of the German prewar and postwar external debts (issued on March 6, May 24, June 19, and December 11, 1951, and on January 14, 1952),³ reveals a pattern or set of facts on which I would appreciate having the Department's further comment.

The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have obtained from the Government of the German Federal Republic an acknowledgment of its responsibility for the external debts of the former Reich, for the most part contracted prior to the coming to power of the Nazis, and for the debts derived from postwar economic assistance given by the Allied Governments to Germany. The German Government has also granted priority to reimbursing debts of the latter category.

The Allied Governments, however, have very clearly signified their intention to forego this priority when the time comes, to the extent necessary to insure the fair and methodical settlement of prewar claims.

This can only be interpreted as meaning that the Allied Governments will defer payments by Germany on postwar debts owed them by the German

¹ Printed from *Cong. Rec.* of Feb. 26, p. 1401.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1952, p. 206.

³ BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 443; *ibid.*, June 4, 1951, p. 901; *ibid.*, July 2, 1951, p. 35; *ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1021; and *ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1952, p. 206, respectively.

Government in order to guarantee settlement of prewar claims.

The total amount of the German governmental debt to the allies for postwar economic assistance amounts to \$3,500,000,000, of which \$3,200,000,000 is owed to the United States Government.

The total amount of the prewar German external debt is estimated as ranging from one to two billion dollars.

The prewar external debt subject to settlement includes liabilities arising from the Dawes and Young loans; and debts of States, municipalities, corporations, and individuals located in the German Republic, involving 100 issues of foreign currency bonds floated during the 1920's, as well as commercial and bank debts, including those involved in the Hoover moratorium.

These prewar obligations are held mainly in the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Holland, and Sweden, with lesser amounts held in some 15 other countries.

It is thus established that the German prewar external debt ranges in dollars from one to two billion, owed to private institutions, banks, and individuals, and that the German postwar external debt for economic assistance amounts to approximately \$3,500,000,000 owed to the allied governments, principally the United States.

The United States Government has announced (State Department release No. 1082, December 11, 1951)⁴ that it is prepared to accept, in settlement of its claim on the German Federal Republic's Government for postwar economic assistance, approximately \$1,200,000,000, or 37 cents on the dollar, a scaling down from three billion two hundred million to one billion two hundred million dollars, or about two-thirds.

State Department release No. 30 (January 14, 1952)⁵ calls this a considerable write-down. For the United States it amounts to a considerable write-down of \$2,000,000,000, for the United Kingdom £51,000,000 (roughly equal to \$142,000,000), and for France \$3,860,000 payable in francs.

It is thus evident that if Germany agrees to satisfy the claims of her prewar private creditors (banks, individuals, etc.), the allied governments will permit her not only to defer payments on postwar intergovernmental debts owed them but will also scale down by nearly 65 percent the total of these postwar debts, with the United States Government, of course, taking by far the greatest loss.

In return for Germany's agreeing to settle prewar debts to private institutions and citizens, the United States is willing to write off \$2,000,000,000 owed our Government.

This, in effect, is nothing but the transfer of a \$2,000,000,000 load to the banks of the American taxpayer, present and future, in order that a small

group of banks and other private creditors may be paid off.

There is no thought in my mind of preventing a fair and proper settlement of legitimate debts owed American creditors for loans on which they risked their money during the twenties to finance various German governmental, corporate, and private borrowers. They knowingly risked their money in purchasing these obligations, and they are entitled to seek repayment if they can and to the extent possible.

But I would vehemently protest an arrangement whereby the debt load and the tax burden of the American people is increased by the enormous sum of \$2,000,000,000 in order to make possible the repayment of from one to two billion dollars in private debts.

I note the comment of the *New York Times* on January 15, 1952, writing of the willingness of our Government to settle intergovernmental postwar claims for about 37 cents on the dollar:

This willingness to compromise official claims would furnish the framework within which West Germany's prewar private creditors would bargain direct with the officials and private creditors of the Bonn republic for the settlement of claims totaling about \$1,500,000,000, including interest.

The international conference in London on February 28 is designed to secure international sanction for the debt settlement as proposed by the Tripartite Commission on the German Debt.

By what authority can the United States representative on the Tripartite Commission proceed to seek international sanction for a debt settlement of this magnitude without the sanction of the United States Congress? The \$2,000,000,000 reduction in Germany's postwar debt to the United States Government would represent, in effect, an additional American grant to the Bonn government without the approval of Congress.

I am not persuaded that there exists any authority under which the Department of State or its representatives can commit this Government, by executive agreement, to such a vast scaling down of a legitimate intergovernmental debt, particularly in view of the fact that the obvious purpose of this settlement is to arrange for satisfying the claims of a small number of financial and other private creditors at public expense.

I am strongly of the opinion that this is a matter to be handled as a treaty and that, as such, it must be submitted to the Senate for ratification.

I do not believe that the Congress or the people, when they know the facts, will applaud such bountiful generosity on the part of appointed officials, unless approved after due consideration through the constitutional processes of treaty-making.

What is the purpose of this agreement if not to reduce the governmental debt owed by the German Federal Republic to the United States Government in an amount amply sufficient to permit

⁴ BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1021.

⁵ BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1952, p. 206.

Germany to pay off prewar debts owed to private creditors in the United States and elsewhere?

What conclusion can be drawn from these transactions other than that the United States Government is willing to charge to the Nation's taxpayers the sum of \$2,000,000,000 owed it by the German Government, in order that banks and other private creditors holding German prewar debts may receive payment?

Does the proposed settlement also have as one of its purposes to liquidate outstanding prewar claims of American private investors in Germany in order to facilitate new flotations of German bonds in the American market?

Is not the effect of the proposed settlement to permit private American and other creditors to receive payment on German prewar debts at the expense, not of the German Government, but of the American people?

By what authority can the Department of State, through its representative, Ambassador Pierson, increase the ultimate tax burden of American citizens by the enormous sum of \$2,000,000,000?

By what authority can the Department agree to a reduction of a debt owed the United States Government by a foreign government unless that agreement be in the form of a treaty ratified by the United States Senate?

I await reply to this letter and urge the speediest possible action, since the international conference at which these transactions are to be finally negotiated is to take place on February 28.

In closing, I note for the record that the head of the German delegation which has been negotiating these matters with the Tripartite Commission on the German Debt is the same person about whose mysterious visit to this country I wrote to the State Department on December 5, 1949: Herman J. Abs, head of the Deutsche Bank under the Hitler regime.

Sincerely,

GUY M. GILLETTE.

REPLY OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY McFALL *

FEBRUARY 27, 1952.

MY DEAR SENATOR GILLETTE: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of February 23, 1952, with regard to the International Conference on German Prewar External Debts which is to be held in London commencing February 28, 1952, and to the proposed settlement of the claim of the United States against the Federal Republic of Germany covering economic assistance extended to Germany by the United States up to June 30, 1951. You refer to the proposed settlement of the postwar aid claim and you inquire by what authority can the Department of State agree to a reduction of a debt owed to the United States Government by a foreign government unless the

agreement is in the form of a treaty ratified by the United States Senate.

I am glad that you have given me the opportunity of discussing with you now the problems which have arisen in the German debt settlement program and particularly the proposed settlement of the claim of the United States against the Federal Republic on account of postwar economic assistance.

The Department on a number of occasions attempted to arrange for consultations with the appropriate subcommittees of the Committees on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs concerning the subject of settlement of German debts. In letters dated January 16, 1952, the chairmen of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees were informed of our desire to discuss this and a number of other problems with members of those committees. On January 18, 1952, we again communicated with the chairmen of the Committees on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs informing them that Ambassador Warren Lee Pierson, the United States representative on the Tripartite Commission on German Debts, was in the United States for a brief period prior to the convening of the London conference and suggesting the desirability of consultations between Ambassador Pierson and appropriate consultative subcommittee members regarding the German debt settlement program. As a result of these communications a meeting was arranged for 3 p.m. January 28 in the Foreign Relations Committee room. Ambassador Pierson, accompanied by Mr. Henry A. Byroade, Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, and myself attended the meeting on behalf of the Department. Unfortunately, however, it was possible only for Senator Connally and Senator McMahon to attend the meeting and we were unable to discuss the problems with as many of the committee members as we would have liked.

The International Conference at London will consider the problem of the readjustment of the prewar external debts of Germany and it is hoped that this conference will achieve substantial agreement in the manner in which this will be accomplished. It is contemplated that the debt settlement plan developed at the conference will then be incorporated in an international agreement which will, of course, come before the United States Senate for consideration. It is to be noted that the proposed adjustment of the United States claim for postwar economic assistance is only to be finalized if and when the international agreement becomes effective by approval of the requisite number of governments. The two are part and parcel of the same over-all transaction. It is further contemplated that the international agreement will expressly refer to the terms of the proposed settlement of the claim of the United States against the Federal Republic on account of postwar economic assistance. The adjustment of the United States claim for postwar assistance is,

* Printed from *Cong. Rec.* of March 3, p. 1745.

therefore, a matter that will come before the United States Senate in connection with the international agreement.

In the light of the foregoing explanation, it is apparent that neither the Department of State nor Ambassador Pierson has assumed authority, without regard to constitutional procedures, to reduce the obligation of the Federal Republic to the United States Government on account of postwar economic assistance.

Determination of the terms of settlement of the United States claim against the Federal Republic on account of postwar economic assistance presents a problem which must be considered in the light of the over-all foreign policy of the United States as well as the economic situation of the Federal Republic and the special circumstances which exist in respect of the Federal Republic. Upon the surrender of Germany and its occupation following World War II, the German economy was found to be in a state of complete collapse. The people were on the point of starvation and it was necessary for the Allies, principally the United States, to make available large quantities of food and other civilian supplies to prevent disease and unrest and thereby protect the security of our troops. In later years aid to the Federal Republic was extended under the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, and such aid also consisted largely of civilian supplies. To a great extent all of the aid has been of a type which was immediately consumed by the civilian population. In general, it did not increase the capital of the country and it cannot therefore be looked upon as an investment from which repayment can ultimately be effected. On the other hand, the aid extended by the United States was largely responsible for the progress which has been made in the revival of the German economy and the Federal Republic would be in no position today to consider the readjustment of its external debts had such aid not been extended. It should be borne in mind, however, that the Federal Republic is not yet on a completely self-sustaining basis and, although further economic recovery is expected, its capacity to service external debts will be limited for many years to come, particularly in view of the many internal financial problems with which the Federal Republic is faced and the contribution it is expected to make as a member of the European Defense Community, including the support of Allied troops stationed in the Federal Republic.

Aside from the claims of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France for postwar economic assistance, which the Federal Republic acknowledges have a priority over all other external debts of Germany or German nationals, the Federal Republic is faced with large prewar obligations which have long been in default. If the Federal Republic is to normalize its trade and commercial relations and take its

proper place among the free nations of the world it is essential that these prewar debts be refunded and placed on a current basis within the Federal Republic's capacity to pay. It has not been possible to determine definitely the amount of these debts which are presently outstanding. A recent survey by the Central Bank of Germany places the debts at approximately \$1,600,000,000 with accrued interest of \$1,000,000,000. It is known however, that this survey does not include certain types of obligations in substantial amounts with which it will be necessary to deal in the settlement program. According to the survey approximately 40 percent of the debts are held in the United States or are expressed in dollars. Of the balance, 18 percent is held in the United Kingdom; 15 percent is held in Switzerland; 11 percent is held in France; the residue by creditors in some 20 other countries. In taking an active part in the prewar debts settlement program, it is our intention to insure that the United States creditor receive fair and equitable treatment in relation to creditors located in other countries.

In view of the magnitude of the external debts it is not believed that the Federal Republic has the capacity to liquidate all obligations, both prewar and postwar, in full within the foreseeable future. A substantial reduction in the amount of both prewar and postwar obligations must be anticipated, therefore, if we are to leave the Federal Republic with external debts which it can reasonably be expected to liquidate and avoid a repetition of the defaults which caused so many difficulties during the thirties.

Since a settlement of the claims of prewar creditors is necessary in order to restore normal commercial and trade relations between the Federal Republic and the free world, it was felt that the three Governments should be prepared to modify the priority of their postwar claims sufficiently to permit the Federal Republic to work out reasonable adjustments with prewar creditors and leave it with a total annual payments burden on both categories of debts within its reasonable capacity to pay. The problem was fully considered by the executive branch, and after consultation with the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems this Government joined with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France in tentatively offering to scale down the amounts of their claims as indicated in the press releases to which you referred. It is clearly understood, however, that the settlement of the postwar claims will be concluded only if the other German obligors are able to work out an equitable and reasonable settlement of their prewar obligations on payment terms which it can reasonably be expected will be met, taking into consideration the payments which will be required on the total postwar claims and other relevant factors.

It should be borne in mind also that due to the

social situation of a divided Germany and the absence of a peace treaty, the total amount of the aid extended to Germany has been handled as a claim subject to final settlement of the amount due, rather than being extended on a grant basis, as was done to a substantial extent in the case of the other European countries. Of the economic aid extended by the United States to the other European countries since the end of the war, only about 35 percent has been on a repayment basis—including substantial postwar loans to the United Kingdom and France—the remainder being on an outright grant basis. Aside from other considerations involved, the Federal Republic's participation in western defense makes it desirable to accord it somewhat comparable treatment to that accorded the other European countries in respect of postwar economic assistance.

I trust that after consideration of the foregoing you will agree that the proposed settlement of the United States claim against the Federal Republic is not as you suggested in your letter for the purpose of benefiting the private holders of prewar claims against German obligors but rather an essential and equitable part of an over-all program to refinance the external obligations of the Federal Republic so as to bring them within its capacity to pay.

In the concluding paragraph of your letter you question the desirability of Herman J. Abs as head of the German delegation to the Debt Conference. You will appreciate that the selection of the head of the German delegation is a matter for the Government of the Federal Republic to decide. Moreover, as indicated in the Department's letter to you of December 15, 1949, we are in possession of no information which would warrant objection by this Government to the selection made by the Government of the Federal Republic.

Sincerely yours,

JACK K. McFALL,
Assistant Secretary
(For the Secretary of State)

President Urges Action on Contributions to UNICEF

*The President on February 29 sent the following communication to Alben W. Barkley, the President of the Senate:*¹

MY DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: I am writing to urge that the Congress complete action on legislation to authorize a United States contribution of \$12,000,000 to the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund for fiscal year 1952. I ask also that the Congress take steps to authorize addi-

tional contributions of up to \$12,000,000 in fiscal year 1953.

As you will recall, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted more than a year ago to extend the operation of the children's fund through December 1953. For that reason, when the authorization for United States contributions to the fund expired last June 30, I requested authorization of a contribution for the current fiscal year.² Legislation for that purpose passed the Senate last session, but is still pending in the House. I earnestly hope that the House will join with the Senate in approving this authorization, so this Government may continue to support the children's fund. And since the pending legislation covers only the current fiscal year, ending next June 30, I hope the Congress will add authority for additional contributions in the coming fiscal year.

Only if the Congress takes these actions now will we be able to continue financial support for the children's fund. Only in this way can we honor the decision of the United Nations to keep this important program going until the end of 1953.

I know that the Congress recognizes the good work the children's fund has done in the past in helping to meet urgent needs of children in many countries around the world. The fund has directly reached at least 42,000,000 children in 64 countries and territories. Its work is closely coordinated with that of the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization and has provided a vital supplement to their programs. The fund is now placing emphasis on work in the less developed countries, primarily to help them establish permanent programs to aid their children. At the same time, the fund is continuing direct aid to children caught in sudden emergencies like the recent flood in the Po Valley of Italy, or the recent typhoons in the Philippines.

The United States has supported the children's fund since it was first set up by the United Nations. At its recent meeting in Paris, the General Assembly of the United Nations urgently requested all countries to continue their support for the remainder of the fund's existence. This gives us a real opportunity—an opportunity to help children, in many concrete, practical ways. I am confident the people of this country will want to take full advantage of that opportunity. I urge the Congress to act on these authorizations without delay.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

NOTE: An identical letter was sent on the same date to Sam Rayburn, the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

¹ Printed from *Cong. Rec.* of Mar. 4, p. 1812.

² BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 313.

Department Issues Booklet On U. S. Foreign Policy

The Department of State on March 23 released a pamphlet entitled *Our Foreign Policy 1952*, prepared at the request of the President. In the foreword, the President states:

"The purpose of American foreign policy is to defend the independence and the integrity of the Republic. To do this we must build peace in the world: not peace at any price, but a peace in which the peoples of all countries—big and little alike—can live free from the fear of aggression. Everything we do in our relations with other countries has that paramount aim."

Following are excerpts from the pamphlet:

The Roots of Our Foreign Policy. "The independence of nations that we stand for is bound up with the responsibilities of independence—to refrain from aggression, to act in ways that will not endanger world security, and to cooperate for the peace and welfare of the world. The foreign policies of the United States are designed to promote world conditions that will advance the freedom and security of all free nations."

How Can a Nation Be Secure? "Now and then some American loses patience and calls for a 'preventive war.' But the concept of preventive war is intolerable to Americans. It is a violation of our fundamental moral and legal principles. A preventive war would be like the preventive suicide of the man who jumps off a bridge because he is afraid of death."


Germany. "The Western community needs Germany as a full partner, sharing in the privileges and responsibilities of the free nations. Germany's neighbors do not want a German national army. Most Germans do not want it. But if German units can be incorporated into a European defense force under international command, German strength will contribute greatly to the North Atlantic community's bulwark against aggression."

Security in Asia and the Pacific. "The fall of China underlines the fact that the United States alone cannot guarantee the freedom of all Asia. In the long run, it is the peoples of Asia who will have to build the institutions of their own freedom, with the help and good will of the rest of the free world."

Disarmament. "We have made it quite clear that it does not make any sense to reduce armaments when we are combatting aggression in Korea. Moreover, there is a close relationship between the problems of disarmament and other major issues between the Soviets and the free world. So we have said that there must also be a settlement of the main political issues which have divided the world at the same time that we start reducing armaments."

Rights of Men and Nations. "The fact that we help a country to be free of foreign domination does not mean that we admire the particular government it happens to have at any particular time. It means that we do not want any people to be deprived of the chance to govern themselves, as they would be if they became Soviet satellites."

Other topics discussed in the pamphlet are: What Makes Foreign Policy? The Truman Doctrine, The North Atlantic Area, Inter-American Security, Korea, Security in the Near East, Economic Well-being, Point Four, Mutual Security Program, National Defense, The United Nations as a Peace Organization, and The Campaign of Truth.



A Brief Survey of American Aims and Policies

Copies are now on sale for 25¢ by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. A 25-percent discount is allowed on purchases of 100 or more copies bulk mailed to a single address.

THE DEPARTMENT

oint Four Technicians Complete Course

The Department of State announced on March 13 that 1 technicians and administrative personnel have completed a special 4-week course at the Foreign Service Institute as final preparation for various overseas assignments under the Point Four Program, which is administered by the Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State.

Nineteen are scheduled to serve in Latin American countries, ten in the Near East and South Asia, and two in Africa. This group of technicians represents eighteen specialties. Their specialties embrace agriculture, public health, industry, transportation, civil aviation, geology, fisheries, housing, water development, education, and fiscal affairs. Two of the number are women.

Twenty-seven in the group will be accompanied to their posts by members of their families.

The orientation course emphasize language, culture, religion, and local customs encountered at the various posts of duty. Wives of many of the men in the group also took the course.

oint Four Appointments

Wesley R. Nelson as American member on the Central Development Board of the Government of Iraq, effective March 14.

Hollis W. Peters as country director of technical cooperation in Lebanon, effective March 14.

onfirmation

The Senate on February 20 confirmed Howland H. Hargreant as Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

onfirmations

The Senate on March 12 confirmed the nomination of James Clement Dunn as Ambassador to France.

The Senate on March 12 confirmed the nomination of Cavendish W. Cannon as Ambassador to Portugal.

The Senate on March 12 confirmed the nomination of Ellsworth Bunker as Ambassador to Italy.

The Senate on March 13 confirmed the nomination of George F. Kennan as Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Legislation—Continued from p. 454

Revising the Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality. H. Rept. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 328 pp.

Public Law 258, 82d Cong., Chapter 18, 2d sess. H. R. 5448. An Act To Provide for the Temporary Free Importation of Zinc. 1 p.

Public Law 257, 82d Cong., Chapter 17, 2d sess. H. R. 4948. An Act To Suspend Certain Import Duties on Lead. 1 p.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 10-15, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

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(*) 183	3/11	End of locust plague and Point Four
184	3/11	Tax negotiations with Austria
(*) 185	3/11	Visitors to U.S.
(†) 186	3/11	Acheson to Senator Maybank
187	3/12	Use of military facilities in Spain
188	3/12	Acheson on Disarmament Commission
(†) 189	3/12	Thorp: Health and geography
190	3/13	Acheson: MSP testimony
191	3/13	Austrian treaty draft
192	3/13	Pt. Four technicians at FSI (rewrite)
193	3/13	Acheson: Economic conference (Moscow)
(†) 194	3/13	Miller: U.S.-Mexican relations
195	3/14	Nelson: Pt. Four adviser to Iraq (rewrite)
196	3/14	Investigation of Korean epidemic
197	3/14	Pt. Four director for Lebanon (rewrite)
198	3/15	Military assistance agreement with Brazil (rewrite)

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The Department of State

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Overt International Information and Educational Exchange Programs of the United States

by *Howland H. Sargeant*
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

Recently I heard a speaker say that "no one any longer questions the importance of this Government's International Information and Educational Exchange Program; no one any longer says that ideas are not as important as bullets." I am sorry to say that this is not an accurate statement. Plenty of people today, both in this country and other countries, confess to their belief that the only possible outcome of the cold war is a hot war in which the test for victory will be which nation or which group of nations will produce the fastest airplanes, the most efficient bazookas, the most maneuverable and hard-hitting tanks and that expenditures on such frippery as propaganda are largely wasted.

Although I do not agree with their conclusion I want to make it clear that I regard propaganda is only one of four major instruments to support the attainment of our national policy objectives whether we are in peace or war. Propaganda alone is no substitute either for policy or for action. It must be used in concert with the other major instruments of national policy—political, economic, and military power. Propaganda is 90 percent deeds and only 10 percent words. If we do the right things and make them known to others in an intelligent way, we succeed in our propaganda task. For example, we could shout for many weeks in every medium of mass communication that we use that we intend to stay in Berlin until the danger of aggression from the East is checked and until the German people have the opportunity freely to determine the kind of government and the kind of unification they may want. All this will mean little, however, as long as the words are unaccompanied by deeds. When we mount in the face of a Soviet blockade of Berlin an airlift which sets a plane down every 3 minutes on Tempelhof Airdrome, and we show the capacity to supply the people of the city of Berlin with the necessities of living to an extent even greater than when the city was supplied by rail and surface transport, then we have developed a mighty propaganda symbol to all the world. Similarly, appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Europe, was a propaganda symbol. He stood above all

for victory in Europe and inspired a feeling of renewed confidence and determination among the peoples of Western Europe that Soviet aggression might be prevented—or, if it occurred, could be successfully resisted.

There is another dangerous fallacy abroad which I shall mention. I find that many people regard Soviet propaganda as invincible, infallible, and all-conquering. Soviet propaganda is apparently effective in many circumstances. I believe, however, that Soviet propaganda has serious fundamental weaknesses which are capable of being exploited by the free world. I believe this in spite of the fact that in the fifteenth century Louis XI of France proclaimed the simple doctrine that "if they lie to you, you lie still more to them" and George Orwell in his frightening picture of the totalitarian state of 1984 shows a ministry of truth on whose vast white façade stretch these slogans: "War is Peace; Freedom is Slavery; Ignorance is Strength." Yet one of the most vulnerable points is the demonstrable contradiction between Soviet words and Soviet deeds. This contradiction, evident even to the peoples of the Soviet Union and its satellites, is accentuated by blunders that the so-called infallible Soviet propaganda machine makes from time to time—and, to take a phrase from the late Mayor LaGuardia, "When they really pull a boner, it is a beauty."

For example: Despite their most valiant efforts to convince the world that the United States and the Republic of Korea are the aggressors in Korea, the Soviet propaganda machine has failed in its task. Most of the peoples in the world don't believe them. When Mr. Vyshinsky at the General Assembly rejected the disarmament proposals of the Western Powers with the statement that he had lain awake all night laughing at these proposals, the Kremlin belatedly realized that a propaganda blunder of the first magnitude had been made. In Italy and other Western European countries, pictures appeared of Mr. Vyshinsky emphasizing his laughter over the disarmament proposals and asking the question: "Does Mr. Vyshinsky speak for you?" All the doves and peace rallies the Communists can muster will not completely erase that picture.

Against this background I should like to sketch the following broad topics (1) The development of an overseas information program; (2) the recent reorganization of that program; (3) the scope of the program; (4) the content of the program; (5) the results we are getting; and (6) some special problems of United States propaganda in the future.

Development of the Program

In briefest compass, the U.S. Government did not become interested in any kind of international information and educational exchange program before the years immediately prior to World War II. Beginnings of what we call educational exchange and cultural relations were made in 1938 and underwent a vast wartime expansion under both the Nelson Rockefeller operation (the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs) and the Office of War Information (OWI). Even before that period, we as a nation had used propaganda from time to time as one of the basic instruments of our national policy and strategy. More than 30 years ago, for example, during the First World War, Woodrow Wilson understood the power of persuasion. He correctly estimated the force of ideas and his Fourteen Points became a powerful weapon for the Allies and a major factor in the surrender of Germany. His "conditions of a just peace" reached the people behind the enemy lines and undermined their will to resist. They gained for America a position of world leadership. Of course, between the wars we promptly forgot most of these lessons we had learned, and in the Second World War we again had to discover the importance of ideas. We improvised a psychological warfare mechanism which achieved some success—both tactical and strategic. At the end of World War II, we did remember some of the lessons and salvaged some of the equipment of propaganda.

What happened was that in August 1945 the President by Executive order turned over to the State Department many of the functions, personnel, resources, and funds of OWI, Office of Inter-American Affairs, Office of Strategic Services, and Foreign Economic Administration. Those which related to the propaganda and educational exchange functions were consolidated under the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, William Benton, now junior Senator from Connecticut, who was invited by Secretary Byrnes to take over the hard task of cutting down a wartime information program to peacetime proportions. Incidentally, in that process Mr. Benton was to try to find out just what the job was for the U.S. Government in time of peace, using these instruments of persuasion which we had developed. In a period of about 3 months, Mr. Benton cut personnel of somewhat over 10,000 back to roughly 3,000. He lost almost every one of his top wartime administrators who had been drawn from the highest levels of the

private mass communications business. He manifested considerable ignorance and apathy as to any need for continuing such an instrument of international persuasion.

From the end of the war until January 1948 the issue was in doubt whether in fact the Congress would appropriate money to sustain any kind of peacetime information program. One of the great tributes that history should pay to Senator Benton is that he saw the issue clearly and he fought it through to a successful result, culminating in the passage in January 1948 of what is now known as the International Information and Educational Exchange Act sponsored by Senator H. Alexander Smith and Senator (then Congressman) Karl Mundt which authorized a permanent program of this kind. However, I want to point out that this legislation concentrated primarily on authorizing the creation of better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the peoples of other countries and on presenting "a full and fair picture of the United States" to other peoples of the world.

From January 1948 until April 1950, the program experienced heavy going and drastic fund reductions. During this period of time, however, a considerable amount of progress was made.

On April 20, 1950, the President called for the all-out expansion of these efforts which he styled the "Campaign of Truth." He said at that time "Our task is to present the truth to the millions of people who are uninformed, or misinformed, or unconvinced. Our task is to reach them in their daily lives, as they work and learn. We must be alert, ingenious, and diligent in reaching people of other countries, whatever their educational and cultural backgrounds may be. Our task is to show them that freedom is the way to economic and social advancement, the way to political independence, the way to strength, happiness, and peace. The task is not separate and distinct from other elements of our foreign policy. It is a necessary part of all we are doing to build a peaceful world. It is as important as armed strength or economic aid. The Marshall Plan, military aid, Point Four—these and other programs depend for their success on the understanding and support of our own citizens and those of other countries."

Organization and Function of the Program

Reduced to its essentials the reorganization announced late in January¹ is an attempt to give the Administrator of the world-wide Information and Educational Exchange Programs all the tools he needs to do his job and the administrative flexibility which will be required. It also lifts the status of the whole program since the new administrator, a distinguished economist, business man, and more recently, college president, Wilson Compton, reports directly to the Secretary and

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 28, 1952, p. 151.

Under Secretary of State. He is no longer responsible in his operations to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs who, under the earlier concepts, was not only responsible for determining information policy but was also ultimately responsible for the operations of the program itself.

Under the reorganization the Assistant Secretary can become far more a staff officer of the Secretary and other top officers of the Department. He is relieved of any necessity for participation in operating decisions of the new International Information Administration (IIA); he retains the responsibility for seeing that the information policy pursued by the IIA is in line with foreign policy objectives and current foreign policy decisions.

The Administrator of the IIA gains under the reorganization a consolidation of authority in his own hands which in the past was somewhat divided between the General Manager of the program, the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, the regional bureaus, and the central administrative offices of the Department. The Administrator now takes the responsibility for the supervision of the planning and conduct of all the overseas aspects of these programs—a job formerly performed by the Department's regional bureaus. He also acquires considerably greater flexibility in handling the mechanics of his administration.

The Scope of the International Program

We shall know how good our reorganization is only after we have actually got it working. I would like, though, to give an indication of what this program includes: In the fiscal year 1948 around 2,500 people participated in the program that operated on a budget of approximately 20 million dollars. This was the low point of the program in the postwar years. We were forced to close down a number of our overseas posts and hire a number of skilled and experienced people in the very year in which the Marshall Plan was getting under way in Europe and the Soviet propaganda campaign against us was really beginning to roll. Since 1948, however, we have been building up again. The supplemental appropriation of 79 million dollars we received in the fall of 1950 following the President's call for a greatly expanded Campaign of Truth resulted in an operation with four times as many people on board as in the lean year 1948—and with nearly six times as much money. Our current strength is slightly under 12,000 people, at home and abroad, and our appropriation for 1952 is \$85,000,000.

The program consists of three primary fast media—radio, press and publications, and motion pictures—and two of what are usually called “slow media” but what I prefer to call deep penetration media—information centers and exchange programs.

Most important of all are the people overseas on the firing line itself who constitute USIE—the United States Information Service.

Radio. The world-wide radio network of the Voice of America transmits programs in 46 languages around the clock and has a potential foreign listening audience of some 300,000,000 people. It operates 38 domestic shortwave transmitters with overseas relay bases at Honolulu, Manila, Munich, Tangier, and Salonika plus use of BBC relays at Wooferton, England. Soviet jamming of programs to the U.S.S.R. and the Iron Curtain areas began in the spring of 1949 and became increasingly severe. We have taken major steps to overcome jamming, including such spectacular developments as the recent commissioning of the first of our high-powered floating transmitters—which was formally inaugurated at Washington on March 4.

Radio, of course, is our primary means of hammering holes through the Iron Curtain to carry messages of truth to those peoples. Despite operation of at least 250 sky-wave jamming installations and at least 1,000 ground-wave jammers, our latest monitoring reports indicate a level of understandable reception of 25 percent inside Moscow and Leningrad, and between 75 and 80 percent in many outlying areas. We have relays over the local stations of various countries including such important ones as France, Italy, Korea, Greece, Austria, Germany, and a number of the Latin American countries.

PRESS AND PUBLICATIONS

We use the news to get facts across in a number of ways. A 9,000-word daily wireless bulletin supplies U.S. information officers in 67 U.S. diplomatic missions with official news and background material designed for local use abroad. By air-mail and pouch the press branch supplies 170 points all over the world with a weekly air bulletin covering a number of short topics designed for the local press abroad. We do a major job in a steadily expanding publications operation including publication of more than 60 million copies of magazines, cartoon books, photo pamphlets, leaflets, and educational materials in 30 languages. Best known is *Amerika*, the big handsome slick-

USIE Personnel and Appropriations, 1947 to 1952

	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952
Authorized Personnel			4, 118	6, 030	10, 807	11, 566
Appropriation Amount	\$24, 659, 778	\$20, 730, 000	\$31, 180, 900	\$47, 300, 000	\$121, 301, 789	\$85, 000, 000

paper illustrated monthly about this country printed in Russian of which around 20,000 copies continue to be distributed in the Soviet Union despite Soviet obstructionist tactics. We do a major job with visual materials, including news and feature photos, wall posters, and plastic plates for use in newspapers abroad. Regional production centers at London and Manila speed up the work.

MOTION PICTURES

Through documentary motion pictures shown in more than 90 countries we are reaching audiences of more than 1 million people everyday. They are produced with sound tracks in over 30 languages and are shown to a wide variety of rural as well as urban groups, including churches, labor organizations, youth groups, and primary and secondary schools. Newsreels are used for very current and immediate hard-hitting topical material. "Eisenhower" and "A Plan for Peace" are examples of fast use for maximum impact.

OVERSEAS INFORMATION CENTERS

One hundred and forty-six U.S. Information Centers and 31 binational centers in 78 countries throughout the world are distributing American books, newspapers, and magazines, reaching additional millions. I often think of these centers as the arsenals of ideas for the freedom-loving and prodemocratic individuals in many of these countries. Last year these centers recorded more than 24 million visits from foreign nationals. There are more than 1 million books, periodicals, Government publications, and printed materials in these centers. In addition to library services, the centers carry on cultural and educational activities, including English-language teaching in many places.

EXCHANGE OF PERSONS PROGRAMS

One of the ways to straighten people out about the facts is to let them see for themselves. Government grants enable teachers, research scholars, labor leaders, newspaper publishers, editors, and reporters to come here to see what we are like. Similar grants permit Americans to travel abroad. During fiscal 1951 more than 7,500 persons received grants-in-aid for exchanges between the United States and 71 foreign countries. Our emphasis in these exchange programs is more and more on leaders, molders, and communicators of opinion.

USIE ITSELF

Approximately 850 American officers operate at 175 foreign-service posts in 84 countries and territories, ably and devotedly assisted by 4,000 local

employees. This inventory to be complete should also include the information officers and their staffs at Paris and the Marshall Plan countries who operated under the Economic Cooperation Administration (now the Mutual Security Agency). It should also list the information activities conducted by the military services in Japan and Austria and the psychological warfare program in Korea today.

The Content of the Program

This has been simply a bare-bones inventory of the facilities and media that we are using. The content of our output is, of course, the real test of the job that we are doing. The content—what we have to say—in the long run cannot be superior to the actions and decisions taken by the free nations themselves. The policies and actions of the American Government and the behavior of the American people constitute the hard core of any content or any message that we may carry through our different media. I am often asked what it is we are trying to say in our output.

To put it very briefly, we are trying to make people believe

(1) That Soviet communism is not the progressive revolutionary movement it pretends to be but a reactionary conspiracy that would, if it succeeded, re-create the Dark Ages.

(2) That the "true revolution" in human affairs is the inevitable spread of freedom and the equitable distribution of the spiritual and material benefits of freedom.

(3) That while this "true revolution" will inevitably triumph, it will triumph in our lifetime only if all peoples resolutely and cooperatively resist the Communist conspiracy.

(4) That the United States, which since 1776 has given this "true revolution" its greatest impetus, is a strong, determined, and enlightened power which champions this concept of freedom not only for its own people but for all peoples.

(5) That it is in the self-interest of all peoples to cooperate with the United States in pursuit of this common goal.

(6) That this cooperation is gradually, often painfully, materializing, with a consequent increase in unity, confidence, and determination.

Are we making progress in the achievement of our objectives?

I can state categorically that we are. America's message is getting across, and it is getting results. At the same time, however, I want to stress the fact that there is no such thing as a clear-cut, black-versus-white test of progress. There are too many intangibles. It is exceedingly difficult to measure the opinions and reactions of our own countrymen. It is a good deal more difficult to do the same for peoples of other countries and other cultures.

We do have a number of concrete indications of

or effectiveness. And those indications are readily increasing.

AUDIENCE REACTION

Take the question of audience mail. The Voice of America alone—our radio operation—gets an average of a thousand letters a day. Mail has increased three-fold since 1949. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the letters we receive either give us a pat on the back and urge us to expand our efforts or urgently request a copy of our program schedule booklet. In 1951, we sent out almost six million schedule booklets (5,751,529).

A lot of these audience letters come by air mail from such faraway places as India, where airmail stamps are a pretty expensive proposition.

In crucial pressure areas—areas where the free world and the Soviet sphere are in immediate contact—considerable progress has been made in building up our audience at Soviet expense. For example, in West Berlin, once the exclusive preserve of Soviet radio, 98 percent of the radio listeners are regular Voice of America patrons. One out of every 25 Swedish radio listeners tunes in on the Voice regularly.

Our record behind the Iron Curtain is real cause for confidence. Nine out of every 10 radio listeners in the Soviet zone of Germany listen to our radio broadcasts.

At Naples, a woman recently sewed together a ticket for a showing of an American film—a ticket which her pro-Communist husband had ripped to shreds.

At Helsinki, Finland, one of our films was shown in competition with an important Communist party meeting. Several party functionaries preferred to see the movie rather than attend the meeting.

In Yugoslavia, a film in which President Truman defines American foreign policy has been borrowed twice by the central committee of the Communist Party.

In Burma (Kachin), the people have gone to great lengths to get our films to their villages. Often, our trucks are stopped by the dense undergrowth. The villagers have then volunteered to carry heavy movie projectors, generators, and other equipment on poles slung over their shoulders.

PRESS CAMPAIGN

Our record in the press-materials field indicates a good measure of progress as well.

A specific example of how a well-thought-out press campaign can get concrete results comes to us from Italy, where our people made excellent use of the twelfth anniversary of the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939. We distributed a series of feature articles on the pact well in advance. When the anniversary arrived, virtually

every non-Communist paper in the country carried something on the treaty.

What efforts are being made to prevent our messages from reaching the audience?

An important measure of the effectiveness of our over-all informational program lies in the lengths to which the Communists have been going to insulate the peoples under their control against our propaganda. Some of the things being done to keep the people behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains from seeing, hearing, or reading our informational materials are almost inconceivable.

The Soviet Union has been engaged in a tremendous jamming campaign ever since the Voice of America began broadcasting. The Soviets now have over 2,000 stations engaged in nothing but jamming—in trying to keep us from being heard. Between 5,000 and 10,000 technicians man these jamming stations.

We are told that the Soviets and their satellites spend almost as much on jamming as we do on our entire international radio program.

The so-called “defense of peace” law enacted in virtually all satellite countries is another means toward the same end—keeping America from putting its case before the enslaved peoples. Coercion is the underlying theme here. The Czech “defense of peace” law of December 1950 is typical of such gag laws. It subjects a person caught spreading “warmongering news or propaganda by word of mouth” to from 1 to 10 years in prison. Deciphering the Communist double talk, that law means that any person caught repeating what he hears over the Voice of America or the BBC, or what he reads in a non-Communist publication, can be summarily jailed.

The licensing and taxation of all persons in possession of radio equipment are common practices in the Soviet satellite areas. In Albania, among other places, every known possessor of a radio is under constant scrutiny.

Recently, the Communists have taken to turning off the electric current in towns and villages during the hours when American broadcasts are coming through. We have had such reports from Bulgaria and Lithuania among other places.

Perhaps one of the best evidences of our effectiveness lies in the frenzied tirades against our informational media which appear in the Communist press and in speeches by Communist leaders. Few weeks pass in which *Pravda* does not complain about the Voice of America or seek to impress its readers with the “fact” that lending an ear to our efforts is a most dangerous and unpatriotic practice.

DEFECTORS

One of our best sources of information as to how people behind the Iron Curtain are reacting is the defector. And there has been a flood of defectors from Soviet-controlled Europe during the past

several years. We recognize, of course, that the average defector is under great emotional strain and that many tend to overstate their case.

But we have checked the stories of defectors very closely. Further, we have discovered that a considerable area of agreement exists among the many accounts which we have received from such people.

We have learned, among other things, that a great percentage of the soldiers of the Red army in Soviet-controlled Germany listen to our broadcasts. We have learned that even the political commissars—the officers charged with seeing to it that the soldiers are properly oriented—listen to the Voice.

We have learned that it is becoming an increasingly common practice to scrawl the wave-lengths of American broadcasts across fences and on sidewalks in the Baltic and other Sovietized areas.

COMMERCIAL SURVEYS

In France we made surveys in 1948 and in 1950 by the Gallup poll affiliates. We found in those years that our audience has increased in France from 16 to 24 percent of the adult population of the country; that there are 7,000,000 people in France who listen to the Voice of America at least occasionally; and that every weekday we can expect an audience of 1,000,000 people which expands to between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 people every Sunday. Half of the adult population of France has heard of the Voice of America programs. Our problem, we know from that survey, is to get more and more of them coming to their receivers.

The analysis of the audience shows that, generally speaking, our listeners include a high proportion of the better educated and urban residents.

In Germany, public opinion surveys made under the supervision of the High Commissioner's office show that in the same couple of years we have increased our audience in the U.S. zone of Germany from 4,000,000 to 6,000,000 people.

The same sort of survey showed us that in Sweden we have an occasional audience for our English-language program of 15 percent of the total population, over 700,000 people, and that we have a regular audience for our English-language program of about 100,000, who are weighted on the side of public opinion leaders and of youths.

Special Problems of U.S. Propaganda in the Future

I have taken you on a rapid and cursory inspection of what we are doing in the Campaign of Truth. A more leisurely and thorough survey would include more details on such subjects as the building up of an integrated organization at the highest levels of Government (the Psychological Strategy Board) for the coordination of our psychological strategy and the complementary work

of the Psychological Operations Committee for the coordination of our overseas information operations; it would include some remarks on what we are doing in the research and planning fields.

Above all, no one of us is fooled into thinking that the job being done by the Government's International Information Administration—or by all agencies of Government combined—constitutes more than a fraction of the impact of the United States and the American people on peoples abroad. We know that there are many voices of America—the GI abroad in his attitude and daily conduct, the tourist, the businessman, the American newspapers, magazines, and motion pictures, the statements of the President and of congressional leaders—all of these and many more are the voices of America.

One of the most significant developments of the past 2 years has been the increasing cooperation of private enterprise in this country in every form and variety with the overseas information programs of the Government. We have a special staff exclusively devoted to working with private enterprise which has been forced, because of the great expansion of its activity, to open offices not only at Washington and New York but at San Francisco, New Orleans, Houston, Chicago, and other points in the United States. What kind of things do they help stimulate and develop? Publishers of various American magazines have agreed that their overseas newsstand returns be given without cost to USIA offices abroad for appropriate distribution; the "letters from America" campaign sponsored by the Common Council for American Unity; affiliations between towns and cities in the United States and their counterpart abroad; encouraging private production of a leaflet to be placed in the hands of all American traveling abroad with some Do's and Don'ts helping to see that positive and affirmative content is included in advertising campaigns conducted abroad by American firms; bringing newspaper editors and reporters to this country to work on American papers for short periods, etc.

Of course I should mention a very important project of private enterprise—Radio Free Europe. The Voice of America and Radio Free Europe (RFE) are two members of the great free-world team that is fighting Soviet imperialism on the side of personal and national freedom throughout the world. Radio Free Europe, financed by private citizens through individual contributions to the Crusade for Freedom, is an enterprise concentrating on the captive countries behind the Iron Curtain: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. It is a citizen station over which Poles are able to speak to Poles; Hungarians to Hungarians, etc. They speak a "The Voice of Free Poland," "The Voice of Free Hungary," and so on. They look at their peoples' problems through their own eyes.

In contrast the Voice of America is a worldwide network financed by U.S. Government funds and speaking for the U.S. Government and the American people. It sees world problems largely through American eyes. It is the only American voice heard in the Soviet Union and in many other parts of the globe. In the area behind the Iron Curtain, in which both VOA and RFE operate, their aims are essentially the same: to keep alive the hope of liberation; to let listeners know that they have not been forgotten; to stiffen their resistance against their Communist oppressors; to expose the lies of their oppressors and the unworkability of communism. Both expose the fraudulent basis of authority on which the Moscow-dominated regimes rest. Both combat communism and the persecution of religion and denial of human rights. Both report the superior industrial power and fighting potential of the free world over the Soviet enslaved world.

VOA, which has responsibility for full reporting of official American acts and documents, American news, and world developments, cannot devote the major part of its Iron Curtain broadcasts to events inside those countries. RFE, giving less time to events outside those countries, specializes in three types of broadcasts. (1) RFE reports back all truth that can be learned about what is going on in the listeners' own country; (2) RFE spreads fear in the ranks of the Communist officials of the regime by denouncing and threatening with retri-

bution all evil doers about whom it can obtain accurate information, including reports on dissolute private life and instances of personal cruelty and criminal acts; (3) RFE weans Communist youth workers and intellectuals from allegiance to the Moscow-dominated regime.

I was interested to see that Gordon Dean, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, is quoted as saying in a recent interview that he regards the job he and his colleagues are doing as "the second most important task in the world that we have here at the Commission. The first, I think, is somehow or other to pierce the Iron Curtain and let the ordinary Russian know our real, and peaceful intentions."

Mr. Dean's remarks fit rather interestingly with the statement made by General Eisenhower in July 1950 in his testimony on Senate Resolution 243 when he said that "Truth, in my opinion, could almost be classified as our T-bomb, if you want to call it that, in this warfare. . . . It is a terrific responsibility to decide how much to do, where it would be better to divert a dollar into a tank, and where it is better to put a dollar into this information effort. But I am quite certain of one thing: that you could find no soldier, no man of experience in the business of fighting, . . . who would decay for one second the importance of morale, and if you do not have morale you know you cannot win. There is just not enough to win without morale. I believe that can be done by truth."

'Courier' To Pay Good Will Visits to Latin America

The Voice of America's seagoing radio broadcasting station, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter, *Courier*, will pay good will visits to several Latin-American countries during its forthcoming shake-down cruise in the Caribbean.

The *Courier* is scheduled to sail from Norfolk, Va., on about March 20 and arrive at La Guaira, Venezuela, March 27; Cartagena, Colombia, on April 1; and Panama City, Panama, on April 5. At each of the ports of call, broadcasts will be arranged in cooperation with local radio stations to demonstrate the operation of the floating transmitter.

The 5,800-ton, 338-foot vessel, which was dedicated in Washington, March 4, by President Truman,¹ will remain in the Caribbean area for several weeks for thorough testing of the transmitting equipment.

The transmitting equipment on the *Courier* is the most powerful of its kind ever installed on a ship. It consists of one 150,000 watt medium-wave transmitter—three times the power of the

largest American broadcasting station—two 35,000 watt short-wave transmitters and supporting communications equipment. The floating transmitter is designed to enable the Voice of America to cover areas beyond the reach of present broadcasts and to assist in overcoming Soviet jamming.

RIAS Begins 24-Hour Service

The Department of State announced on March 21 that RIAS, the American radio station in Berlin, has inaugurated round-the-clock programming in order to offset the five stations of the Communist radio network in the Soviet zone of Germany which have developed an all-night schedule.

RIAS previously broadcast on a 22-hour a day schedule, going off the air from 3 to 5 a. m. for transmitter servicing. By activating the subsidiary transmitter at Hof, Bavaria, and by the use of RIAS' short-wave and wired transmitting facilities, full 24-hours a day service now is offered to listeners in Berlin and the Soviet zone.

During the 2 hours of added time, 5-minute newscasts are repeated several times in addition to portions of RIAS' normal programs.

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 421.

Japan: Asset of the Free World

by Ambassador William J. Sebald
*Political Adviser to Supreme Commander Allied Powers (Japan)*¹

Tonight I would like to talk a little about Japan—about the momentous changes that have taken place there and about the important influence a free and independent Japan will have on our foreign relations in the Far East. The fact that the Senate has just approved the Treaty of Peace with Japan, together with three related security agreements in the Pacific area, has turned the spotlight on Japan and on these constructive steps in the rebuilding of the fabric of peace in the Far East.

My present assignment in Japan is of twofold character. In one capacity I am serving as the representative of the Department of State as the Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and in my other capacity I am serving as Chief of the Diplomatic Section of the Supreme Commander's General Headquarters. In these two offices it has been my privilege to have been closely associated with the unique work of the Allied Occupation of Japan almost throughout its length.

It might be well if I reviewed briefly for you the circumstances which brought about this Occupation. When the aggressive, militarist Japan we formerly knew finally went down to defeat in August 1945, it was more than a military defeat alone. The entire political, economic, and social structure of the country had been brought to the verge of complete collapse under the impact of the great sea, air, and land offensive the United States had built up against the Japanese armed forces. When the day of unconditional surrender came aboard the battleship *Missouri* on September 2, 1945, Japan was not only militarily defeated but was in almost complete ruin, its cities leveled by air attacks, its economy exhausted by the strain of war and consequent privations, and the morale of its people shattered after the first defeat in Japan's modern history. It was a day when time-honored institutions and traditions were being swept away in the torrent of despair and disillusionment which came with unconditional surrender.

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the Knights of Columbus at Baltimore, Md., on Mar. 23 and released to the press on the same date.

At this point the Allied forces moved into : crushed and disillusioned Japan to begin the military occupation of the country. It may sometime be asked if it was really necessary to occupy Japan after the threat of Japanese aggression had been so completely smashed. Would it not have been simpler to have regarded Japan's defeat as a good job well done and to have left the Japanese to rebuild their country as best they could? I am sure such questions have been raised before, but the answer as I see it is a simple one. To her everlasting credit, the United States realized before Japan's final surrender that the mere military defeat of Japan alone was not sufficient, that at that point, the job was only half done, and that what remained to be done after Japan's military defeat was as important as the task of defeating the Japanese armed forces. It was essential that we should also win the peace.

It was thoroughly realized, therefore, that unless the United States assumed a real responsibility for Japan's reconstruction, all the blood and treasure expended for Japan's defeat would in a real sense have been wasted.

U. S. Assumption of Occupation Duties

With this realization the United States assumed the primary responsibility for the Occupation of Japan.

This Occupation has indeed been unique in our history. Unlike almost all other occupations, it was not motivated by a spirit of vengeance or by any desire to make the vanquished pay the price of defeat. Rather, the Occupation of Japan was inspired by the desire to remove from Japan the root causes of deceit and aggression which had led to such tragedies as Pearl Harbor. Accordingly, the Occupation of Japan had as its goal, not the punishment of the Japanese people, not the exacting of vengeance for injuries received, but rather, the rebuilding and reconstruction of the Japanese nation and people upon a new and sound basis where by Japan could eventually return to the family of nations as a respected member committed to strive for the peace and well-being of the entire world.

Under this unique concept of an occupation, a vast program of democratic reform was inaugu-

Senate Approval of Japanese Peace Treaty

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press March 21]

The approval by the U.S. Senate by an overwhelming vote of the Treaty of Peace with Japan and the related security treaties with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines is an event of great significance.

It is an important step in the making of a satisfactory peace settlement in the Pacific.

It is one of a series of great actions which free peoples are taking to create and consolidate a world-wide system of peace and freedom with security.

It is a demonstration to the world at large of the essential unity of the American people in pursuit of these goals.

I should like to pay tribute to the brilliant and devoted role which for a year and a half John Foster Dulles has played in the negotiation of the treaties and the San Francisco conference and in explaining the treaties before the Senate.

Throughout this year and a half and in the final consideration in the Senate, the Executive Branch has had the invaluable guidance and help of Senators of both parties. This has been an outstanding example of bipartisan foreign policy at its most effective. From the very outset the chairmen of both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee and members of both parties of the Far Eastern subcommittees have been in constant consultation with us.

ated, affecting the entire political, economic, and social life of the nation. The whole structure of the Japanese military machine was liquidated, the remaining Japanese forces disarmed and disbanded. Japanese who surrendered outside Japan were promptly repatriated and disbanded so that they could begin life anew as peaceful citizens. This great process of disarming and disbanding the once powerful Japanese military machine is an outstanding example of efficient and yet humanitarian achievement on the part of the United States and the Allied Powers. There was, however, one glaring exception. The Japanese armed forces and civilians who fell into the hands of the Soviet Union when Soviet forces occupied Manchuria, Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands were not promptly repatriated as the Potsdam Declaration provided. Instead most of these soldiers and civilians were carried off to Siberia and other areas under Soviet control and placed into forced labor camps. Only after repeated representations on the part of the Supreme Commander did the Soviet Union belatedly and grudgingly undertake to repatriate any of this slave labor force of whom some 370 thousand individuals are yet to be accounted for. In the light of the circumstances revealed by those Japanese who were fortunate enough to be repatriated, it can only be presumed that most of those still unaccounted for have perished while in Soviet custody from overwork, undernourishment, and the harsh treatment typical of the Soviet slave labor system.

But the unique Occupation of Japan was not concerned only with the disarming and disbanding of the Japanese military machine. That was merely an initial and necessary step to a much more far-reaching program of reform and reconstruction, which included a new, democratic Constitution, the reform of the land system, the equality of women, the reform of the courts and the judiciary, universal suffrage, the complete overhauling of the educational system, the dissolution of the vast, monopolistic corporate interests—the so-called “zaibatsu”—the removal from public office of all persons who had been associated with Japan’s previous totalitarian system, the establishment of a free press and free speech, and the development of a democratic labor movement.

These reforms have been practical as well as ideal. They have provided Japan with a workable democratic system which has clearly demonstrated over the past 6 years that the Japanese have a real capacity for democratic government and a peaceful way of life.

In this great process of the reform and reconstruction of Japan, tribute must be paid to the ability and broad vision of Gen. Douglas MacArthur who as a great soldier not only played a major part in bringing Japan to defeat but also directed the Occupation of Japan as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. It was his task to implement the policies of the United States and the Far Eastern Commission, which could only have remained pieces of paper had they not been materialized within the complicated framework of Japanese life. This task has been successfully continued by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway.

Under this unique Occupation Japan has made remarkable progress. Not only have the burned-out cities been rebuilt and the shattered factories put back into operation but the Japanese people have been offered new and more worthy aspirations. As a result, the enemy we fought so bitterly a few years ago has not only become our friend and ally today, but what is of even greater importance, an asset of the free world.

Once it became apparent that the Occupation with the willing cooperation of the Japanese had laid a sound foundation for Japan’s reconstruction as a democratic, peaceful nation, the United States found itself confronted with another great task, namely, to bring about a treaty of peace that would permit Japan to resume its well-earned place among the free nations of the world.²

Problems of a Peace Settlement

In view of the great success of the Occupation in achieving its original objectives, it would have seemed that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan would have been a simple step. As you all

² For text of the Japanese peace treaty, see BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1951, p. 349.

know, this was far from the case. There proved to be many obstacles to a Japanese peace treaty, the most difficult of which was the persistent demand of the Soviet Union that the terms be written by the four big powers, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. This meant in effect that not only the other nations that had been at war with Japan and who had suffered from Japanese aggression would have been excluded from the preparation of the treaty, but that the Soviet Union, by the use of its veto power in any Big Four Conference, could have effectively prevented the conclusion of any peace treaty which would not have left Japan a defenseless, easy prey for Communist aggression.

The task, therefore, fell to the United States to work out in agreement with all other countries concerned, including the Soviet Union, a basis for a peace settlement with Japan which would not only be a fair and just settlement for the Japanese people but would also take into account the interests and problems of all the nations which had been at war with Japan. By the great statesmanship and untiring effort of Ambassador John Foster Dulles, appointed by President Truman to this task, it was finally possible to harmonize and reconcile numerous differences and interests and achieve a peace settlement that was acceptable and generally satisfactory to all concerned. The peace conference at San Francisco last September saw the realization of this difficult labor, whereby 49 nations, including Japan, were able to find a common basis of understanding. The Soviet Union, had it so chosen, could have been a party to this settlement.

Unfortunately, the problems which grew out of Japan's defeat could not be settled by a peace treaty alone. The military collapse of Japan in 1945 had created a great power vacuum in eastern Asia which Communism, that imperialist arm of Soviet Russia, was quick to fill. The earlier threats posed by Japanese aggression in eastern Asia and the Pacific area were replaced by an even more serious menace to peace and freedom. In brief, the Communist attack in Korea, and the continued threat of Communist aggression and subversion in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, have created a new and formidable security problem in the Pacific area which had to be met if a peace treaty with Japan and the termination of the protective Occupation were not to turn over Japan to Communism and open the way to new Communist conquests in the Pacific.

To complete the pattern, of which the peace treaty is an important part, it has been necessary to work out an effective security system for the Pacific area. Ambassador Dulles also accomplished this great task as a parallel endeavor to his peace treaty negotiations by negotiating a Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, and by security treaties with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. These treaties

envisage a system of collective security arrangements for the Pacific area.

By virtue of the Security Treaty with Japan and its supplementary Administrative Agreement recently negotiated,³ it is visualized that the United States will retain military forces in and about Japan after the termination of the Occupation to safeguard Japan against aggression until the Japanese are in a position to provide adequately for their own security.

At this point, it might be asked why are we here in the United States so vitally concerned with Japan's future security? And some may also wonder why it is that this nation which was so recently our enemy has now become our ally?

I believe the answer can be summed up in the words I chose for the title of my address to you this evening: Japan today is an asset of the free world, a very vital and important asset. And, in the face of the threat to freedom, every asset which contributes to its defense must be preserved.

Protection and Security for Japan

When I say that Japan is an asset of the free world, I am thinking in terms of 84 million Japanese people who have clearly demonstrated their desire and capacity to work on the side of the free world. I am thinking in terms of a people who have demonstrated outstanding know-how and managerial ability, who have built up an industrial complex with a heavy industrial potential unequalled in any other part of Asia. I am thinking of a proud, self-respecting people who while deeply grateful for the aid we have given them, are anxious and determined to stand on their own feet, who dislike charity and hand-outs and who, given fair opportunity, have the ability and the ambition to support themselves by their own industry and hard work. I believe that people possessing these qualities are worthy of our respect and admiration, and that in the support and defense of the free world we ourselves can be proud to be associated with them. I believe that people with such qualities can and will assist us as a stabilizing factor in the Pacific area, and that it is therefore in our own best interests that we make it possible for Japan to maintain itself as free, independent, and democratic nation.

In the defense of the free world, the preservation of Japan's security is not an isolated problem but affects the well-being and security of all free nations. For under Communist domination Japan's now peaceful manpower would become a source of potential millions of trained soldiers with a vast industrial complex to supplement the economic deficiencies of Communist China, with scientific knowledge and technical skill for which

³ For text of Security Treaty, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1951, p. 464; for text of Administrative Agreement, see BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 382.

When the Soviets have demonstrated respect by their ruthless retention of Japanese technicians. Japan's present assets for peace would become assets for aggression if Japan were to fall under Communist domination.

In explaining why I believe Japan is such a vital asset to the free world, I do not want to give the impression that I am thinking only in terms of Japan's material assets and technical abilities. In any assessment of Japan's importance to the free world, we must think primarily of the Japanese people and their aspirations as individual men and women. You can be sure that in their own evaluation of Japan, the masters of the Kremlin place a high premium on Japan's industrial potential, the know-how of its technicians, and the great manpower reservoir of its 84 million people. We can be sure, too, that the masters of the Kremlin care nothing for the individual aspirations of these men and women.

It is, therefore, the aspirations of the Japanese people which, in final analysis, make Japan the vital asset of the free world. In their aspirations the Japanese are indisputably linked to the side of the free world. They realize as much as you and I do here tonight that their future freedom and well-being are bound with the future of the free nations. They realize as well as we do that there is no third choice, that if the free nations of the world do not survive, there can be no freedom for anyone. It is because of this unmistakable realization that the Japanese nation is aligned with us today. We must not think that the Peace and Security Treaties are the sole cause of Japan's alignment with the free world. These treaties merely represent the means by which this alignment has been made possible in response to Japan's genuine desire for freedom and peace and the opportunity to support herself by her own industriousness and hard work.

The Japanese people are already playing a vital role in the defense of the free world. Japan is wholeheartedly supporting the U.N. operation in Korea by providing extensive services. Japanese factories are producing on procurement order vast quantities of manufactured items essential to the U.N. effort, while Japanese ships and crews are ably helping to solve difficult transportation problems. Japanese from all walks of life, from members of the Imperial family to laborers are voluntarily contributing blood donations for the U.N. forces. Various Japanese civic organizations and other groups like the Japanese Red Cross are undertaking activities for the entertainment of wounded U.N. soldiers hospitalized in Japan.

But perhaps the greatest tribute to Japan's sincere support of the U.N. effort is the fact that in the early days of the Korean war, when we were compelled to pull out virtually all of the Occupation forces from Japan for use in Korea, there was not one single incident or gesture against what had then become the unarmed Occupation of Japan.

It is of real advantage to the free nations of the world to have such a friend and ally in the Far East. The necessity to defeat a misled Japan in the last war unfortunately gave Communism the chance to bid for the domination of Asia. Had not the United States moved into Japan, the Soviet Union would have occupied these vitally strategic islands. Even today the menacing power of Soviet Communism is dangerously close to Japan. At the eastern tip of Hokkaido, only 3 miles of water separate Japan from the Soviet-occupied Habomai Islands. At another point on eastern Hokkaido, it is only 12 miles to Kunashiri, the southernmost island of the Kuril chain, which is entirely under Soviet occupation. From the town of Wakkanai at the northern tip of Hokkaido, Soviet-occupied Sakhalin is plainly visible on a clear day. The rich, undeveloped island of Hokkaido, Japan's last frontier, is today virtually surrounded by the advanced outposts of Soviet power. In the rich fishing grounds off Hokkaido, Soviet patrol craft roam the seas to within 3 miles of the Japanese coastline and frequently seize Japanese fishing vessels which are taken with their crews to Sakhalin, the Kurils, or the Habomais. The crews are there interrogated by Soviet intelligence officers about conditions in Japan and the character of the Occupation forces. Occasionally, these Japanese fishing craft are confiscated and their crews fined for "violating" Soviet "territorial waters." The external threat of Soviet Communism to Japan's security is not, therefore, a hypothetical menace; it is a visible reality.

But Communism also poses an internal threat to Japan's security. The Communist Party in Japan is directed by Moscow-trained Japanese Communists, many of whom are now operating from an illegal, underground network. Overtly, as well as covertly, the Japanese Communists are working day and night to undermine and destroy Japan's democratic institutions and economic stability, using the typical Communist methods of infiltration into labor and other organizations, creating various front groups which delude and take advantage of sincere but often misguided liberals, exploiting through agitation and propaganda every real or fancied grievance among the people, resorting to intimidation and terrorism through acts of violence and the inciting of disorders.

Fortunately, the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people have the intelligence to see through the typical tricks of the Communists and are not deceived by their agitation and propaganda. Fortunately, too, the reconstruction of Japan under the Occupation has provided a sound, democratic, political, and economic structure which is successfully resisting the corrosive elements of Communism.

But any nation's security requires constant vigilance. Heretofore, Japan has been able to

depend for her security largely upon the protection of the United States.

The Security Treaty with Japan provides for this protection until Japan is in a position to build up her own defensive strength. As I stated earlier, the Japanese are a proud people who dislike to depend upon others for things which they feel they should properly provide for themselves. The Japanese dislike accepting alms whether in the form of economic relief or protection. I am convinced, therefore, that under the Security Treaty the Japanese will rise to meet their own responsibilities for their own defense and will not be content to permit the United States to shoulder almost the entire burden. The Japanese are firm believers in equality, not just equality of privilege, but equality of responsibility as well.

Our new partnership with Japan is one based upon a genuine community of interests. But it is also a unique partnership. It demonstrates that an oriental nation and people can work on a basis of equality, cooperation, and understanding with an occidental nation and people. It demonstrates that all free nations, whether of the East or the West, have the same fundamental qualities, share the same aspirations, and have the same determination to work toward a common goal. This American-Japanese partnership is, therefore, in accord with the underlying purposes and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations, and sets an example, not only to the other countries of Asia, but to all free nations of what can be achieved through understanding and cooperation.

The record is now clear. As the Treaty of Peace with Japan is about to come into force, the free world is to acquire a valuable asset in the form of a nation of 84 million people with a demonstrated capacity to contribute to the welfare and progress of all nations. Japan will thus constitute a vital, strong link in the defense of the free world against ruthless Communist enslavement. Japan, as an equal partner in the free community of equals, is of vital importance in contributing to this defense.

Financial Aid to Iran Considered

In connection with press reports from Iran on the question of U.S. financial aid, the Department released the following statement on March 20:

The United States has received several requests, both written and oral, from the Iranian Government for loans for direct financial assistance to ease the acute situation in which the Iranian Government finds itself as a result of the loss of its oil revenues. The U.S. position in response to these requests has been that while the United States desires to be in a position to render Iran any proper and necessary assistance, it could not justify aid of

the type requested at a time when Iran has the opportunity of receiving adequate revenues from its oil industry without prejudice to its national aspirations. It has been pointed out that the United States is bearing a heavy financial burden in its efforts to help bring about a stable and lasting peace and that it is most difficult to undertake additional commitments to a country which has the immediate means of helping itself.

The United States has not, as indicated in press reports originating in Iran, established as a condition for granting financial aid to Iran that the Iranian Government should accept any particular proposals. The United States has consistently maintained that a settlement is possible in which the legitimate interests of both Iran and the United Kingdom will be protected and which will make the resumption of the oil-industry operation feasible and practicable from the economic viewpoint. We believe that the offer of the International Bank to assist in this matter has provided a good opportunity to reach this objective, even though on an interim basis. We continue to hope that a formula will be found which will be acceptable to both parties.

Export-Import Bank Grants Credits to Indonesia

On March 15, the Export-Import Bank of Washington announced four credits to the Indonesian Government aggregating \$22,770,000. These credits are in addition to those announced in January 1951 when the first loan agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Bank was signed covering credits aggregating \$52,245,500. Thus, total credits authorized by the Bank amount to \$75,015,500 and represent allocations from the \$100,000,000 earmark for the Republic of Indonesia established by the Export-Import Bank in February 1950. The loan is being used to finance the importation from the United States of productive equipment and materials required for the reconstruction and development of vital sectors of the Indonesian economy.

The credit agreement of January 1951 consisted of allocation of \$20,000,000 for the purchase of automotive equipment; \$2,100,000 for road-building equipment; \$6,700,000 for dredges, warehouses, and other equipment and materials for the rehabilitation of port facilities; \$17,100,000 for the purchase of railway equipment, including principally diesel-electric locomotives, track-laying supplies and equipment, and machine tools for railroad shops; \$6,085,500 for the purchase of eight airplanes to be used by the Garuda Indonesian Airways; and \$260,000 for telecommunication equipment.

The allocations announced are as follows:

Eight million three hundred thousand dollars for the purchase of diesel-electric generating equipment, hydroelectric generating equipment, transmission line materials, and accessory control and protective equipment to assist the Indonesian Government and private utilities to restore damaged generating plants and to permit increased production of electric energy in certain critically short areas.

Ten million dollars for the purchase of additional automotive equipment, principally trucks, but also including busses, jeeps, and some passenger cars urgently required for the 1952 Indonesian program to restore motor vehicle transportation facilities.

Two million six hundred and fifty thousand dollars for the purchase of equipment for four sawmills; rails and diesel locomotives for forestry railroads in the Java teak area; forestry equipment for logging, skidding, loading, and unloading; and trucks and trailers for log transport.

One million eight hundred and twenty thousand dollars for the purchase of 40 marine engines to be installed in coastal cargo and passenger vessels, all of which have been ordered in Western Europe.

The credit extended to finance the purchase of electric equipment was authorized by the Board of Directors of the Bank early in 1951, and the three other credits have been authorized since November 1951. Funds advanced under the terms of the credits will bear interest at the rate of 1/2 percent per annum and will be repayable in 10 approximately equal semiannual installments beginning March 1, 1956.

Herbert E. Gaston, chairman of the Board of the Export-Import Bank, said in making the announcement:

These credits are the result of the continued cooperation between the Export-Import Bank and the Government of Indonesia looking toward effective rehabilitation and development of the Indonesian economy. That cooperative effort has taken the form of continuous study and negotiation in Washington as well as an Export-Import Bank mission to Indonesia in the summer and fall of 1951.

Negotiation of Saar Question

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press March 21]

As you are no doubt aware, Foreign Minister Schuman of France and Chancellor Adenauer of Germany have agreed to negotiate a settlement of the Saar. We are very pleased to learn this. This agreement which places interests of Europe first reflects statesmanship of a high order. The agreement reached at Paris augurs well for a final solution of this century old problem.

March 31, 1952

Visit of Queen of the Netherlands

On March 17 the Department of State announced that Queen Juliana of the Netherlands and the Prince of the Netherlands and their party will arrive at Washington on April 2. President and Mrs. Truman will meet the party at the Washington National Airport. On that evening, President and Mrs. Truman will give a dinner in honor of the Queen and the Prince.

On April 3 the party will visit Mount Vernon and Arlington National Cemetery. At 12:30 p. m. that day the Queen will address the Congress, and, on that evening, she and the Prince will be entertained by the Secretary of State and Mrs. Acheson.

On April 4 Queen Juliana will present to the President a temporary carillon as a symbol of the permanent carillon to be offered by the people of the Netherlands to the people of the United States. On that evening the Queen and the Prince will give a dinner in honor of President and Mrs. Truman at the Netherlands Embassy.

On April 5 the party will depart for Philadelphia, where Queen Juliana will be honored by a ceremony at the Philadelphia Museum of Art, and later, the party will depart for West Point Airport, New York.

On April 7 the party will go to New York City where the Mayor will receive the Queen and the Prince at City Hall. On April 8 Columbia University will bestow an honorary degree on Her Majesty.

During the period April 10-21, the party's itinerary will include visits to the following cities: Knoxville, Tenn., Detroit, Grand Rapids, Holland and Ann Arbor, Mich., San Francisco and Los Angeles, Calif. The party will leave Los Angeles for Canada on April 22.

WHO's Offer of Assistance To Korean Epidemic Victims

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press March 21]

The World Health Organization (WHO) offer of assistance to victims of reported epidemics in North Korea, as announced by U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie this morning, has our full support. We of the free world are always interested in helping the sick and suffering and we have profound sympathy for the Korean people. The U.S. Government, as the Unified Command, is fully prepared to cooperate with WHO. If the Communists do not accept WHO's generous offer it will simply confirm that they have no regard for the welfare of the people under their control.

U.S. Charges Rumanian Violation of Treaty Provisions on Human Rights

[Released to the press March 18]

The Secretary of State on March 18 instructed Ambassador Warren R. Austin, the U.S. representative to the United Nations, to submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations copies of a supplement to the volume submitted by Ambassador Austin to the Secretary-General on November 16, 1951, containing evidence of the violation by the Rumanian Government of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace concerning freedom of expression and freedom of press and publication in Rumania.¹

The supplemental volume contains facsimiles of the original Rumanian and Russian language texts of evidence heretofore submitted in English translation. These exhibits, deriving in greater part from the Rumanian Government, demonstrate that Government's guilt of the charges made against it by the United States on this subject.

Simultaneously the Department of State has delivered to the Rumanian Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at Washington, for transmission to his Government at Bucharest, copies of both books. Following is the text of the note delivered by the United States to the Rumanian Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in this connection:

U.S. NOTE OF MARCH 18

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of the Rumanian People's Republic and transmits herewith, for the information of the Rumanian Government, three copies of Department of State publication No. 4376 entitled "Evidence of Violations of Human Rights Provisions of the Treaties of Peace by Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, submitted by the United States Government to the Secretary General of the United Nations pursuant to the resolution of the General Assembly of November 3, 1950, Volume I, Violations by the Rumanian Government, Freedoms of Expression and of Press and Publication,"² together with three

copies of a supplement containing facsimile reproductions of original exhibits included in English translation in Volume I. Volume I was submitted by the United States Government to the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 16, 1951, and the supplement is being submitted presently.

The Secretary of State takes this occasion to note that the Rumanian Government has referred to the contents of Volume I, following its submission to the Secretary General of the United Nations, as "a collection of lies and falsifications." Such references were made by the Rumanian Government in a declaration in its controlled press on December 6, 1951.

This declaration the Rumanian Government repeated in a volume distributed by it during the meeting of the last General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris, entitled "The Aggressive Policy and Machinations of American Imperialism Against the Rumanian People's Republic."

The attention of the Rumanian Government is called to the fact that of the eighty-nine exhibits with sub-exhibits, constituting the evidence offered by the United States Government to support its charges that the Rumanian Government has violated the provisions of the Treaty of Peace by which the Rumanian Government undertook to secure the enjoyment of freedom of expression and freedom of press and publication in Rumania, sixty-five, including sub-exhibits, are reproduced in the supplement in facsimile of the original form. These sixty-five include articles or statements by Soviet Communist authorities (four exhibits), quotations from the Rumanian Constitution (three exhibits), quotations from the official Rumanian Government press or Rumanian newspapers appearing during the period when the press has been under the Rumanian Government's control (six exhibits), and official legislation and decrees of the Rumanian Government as published in the official gazette, "Monitorul Oficial" or "Buletinul Oficial," and similar government publications (forty-six exhibits). Since these sixty-five exhibits, including sub-exhibits, have been in documents believed to be official, the Rumanian

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 26, 1951, p. 867.

² For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., at 75¢ a copy (paper cover).

Government is invited to specify which, if any, of these exhibits it charges fall in the category of "lies and falsifications" and to specify further the respects in which the "lie" or "falsification" is comprised.

The remaining exhibits offered by the United States Government as evidence in Volume I consist, for the most part, of certain affidavits or declarations sworn to before persons authorized to administer oaths in various countries. These include forty documents, including sub-exhibits. If the remarks of the Rumanian Government were intended to apply to these latter exhibits, the Rumanian Government is invited to specify which of them it believes fall into the category of "lies and falsifications," giving again the respects in which the "lie" or "falsification" is comprised.

If, on the other hand, the Rumanian Government does not contend that the excerpts from its official publications, or from the writings of Communist leaders, or from the Rumanian Press, contained in the exhibits, have in fact been forged or otherwise falsified by the United States or by others, but means only that the Rumanian Government differs in the interpretation thereof, or if the Rumanian Government, while not charging that the signatures of affiants have been forged or falsified or that the affiants have wilfully lied, differs with respect to the facts to which the affiants have testified, the attention of the Rumanian Government is called to the introductory statement of the United States Government in Volume I as follows (page vi) :

The Rumanian Government is invited to offer in any appropriate way such evidence—in the legal sense—as it may have in rebuttal and to submit that evidence to further objective verification.

The United States Government has looked in vain in the publications of the Rumanian Government on this subject to which reference has been made above for the submission of any evidence in any legal sense; it has instead found unsupported conclusions, unresponsive and irrelevant assertions, always without factual proof, and statements which, insofar as they might be relevant, the United States would be prepared to demonstrate, in any appropriate forum governed by rules of legal procedure, to be false.

It is clear to the United States, as it must be to objective persons examining these documents, that the failure of the Rumanian Government to meet the issues of fact and of law in this matter, coupled with that Government's evasion of its established legal duty to submit these issues for trial by the Commission provided in the Treaty of Peace, or by any other judicial body, constitute an unquestionable admission by the Rumanian Government that the charges made by the United States against that Government were correct, that the evidence submitted by the United States amply sustains its charges against the Rumanian Gov-

ernment and that, therefore, the Rumanian Government stands convicted in accordance with the normal legal rules obtaining in civilized countries of violating the Treaty of Peace by wilfully and systematically denying to its citizens and other persons in its jurisdiction the enjoyment of elemental human rights and fundamental freedoms which the Rumanian Government pledged.

The Secretary of State takes this occasion to repeat what he said in submitting Volume I to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

From its past performance one may expect the Rumanian Government—and the other accused governments—to say, always in general terms, that the charges to which this first installment of evidence relates have not been proved and that its persecutions have been directed solely to the suppression of Nazism and Fascism and to make other self-serving statements of sweeping generality. This will not do. Verifiable facts are called for from the accused, not mere conclusions nor name calling. The truth is that, since the charges and the evidence in support thereof relate to facts localized in the territory of Rumania, their truth or falsity in the event of dispute may best be determined by inquiries on the spot in Rumania—and in Hungary and Bulgaria. Were the accused governments sincerely concerned with establishing the truth, they would welcome an arbitral commission of the kind stipulated by the Treaty of Peace. In this case, the commission would receive the testimony of officials of the Rumanian Government concerned with press, radio, books, theater, book publishing and similar matters; it would question other persons within Rumania having testimonial qualifications and otherwise make the dispassionate, careful inquiry which civilized nations expect of judicial tribunals, attended by effective assurances to witnesses against intimidations or reprisals. This the accused governments have thus far refused to permit. The refusal of the accused governments to respect their treaty obligations by joining in the establishment of commissions must be taken as born in substantial part out of the suspicion that such a tribunal would seek and find a way to obtain evidence which these governments prefer to conceal.

In submitting its material, the United States Government is guided by the legal meaning of the word "evidence" used in the General Assembly resolution; that is, as denoting testimony which is logically probative of issues of fact raised by charges made and the replies thereto, and which is acceptable for consideration under standards for the conduct of judicial proceedings generally prevailing in civilized countries.

Recent Releases

United States Educational Foundation in Denmark. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2324. Pub. 4424. 11 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Denmark—Signed at Copenhagen Aug. 23, 1951; entered into force Aug. 23, 1951.

Land Reform—A World Challenge. Economic Cooperation Series 29. Pub. 4445. 81 pp. 20¢.

A discussion with related papers, including statements by Secretary Acheson and Isador Lubin; addresses by Willard L. Thorp and Henry G. Bennett; resolution of the Economic and Social Council.

Poland Asked To Cease Issuance Of Abusive Publications in U. S.

[Released to the press March 21]

The United States on March 21 delivered a note to the Polish Embassy in Washington protesting the issuance by the Embassy on March 3 of a press release concerning the investigation by the Madden Committee of the House of Representatives into facts, evidence, and circumstances of the Katyn Forest massacre. As a consequence of the issuance of this press release by the Polish Embassy, Secretary Acheson, in the U.S. note, requests that Polish Government establishments in the United States cease immediately the issuance of all publications and of press releases of the nature of that issued on March 3.

U.S. Note of March 21

The Secretary of State wishes to refer His Excellency the Ambassador of Poland to a matter of serious concern to the United States Government

involving a press release which was issued by the press office of the Polish Embassy on March 3, 1952, under the heading, "Polish Statement on Madden Committee".

This propaganda utterance released by the Embassy was designed as a calculated and completely baseless attack on the United States and its Congress, as well as on the aspirations of the United States for peace and international security. In addition, the press release made wholly untrue allegations concerning the actions of the United Nations in Korea.

In both tone and contents this abusive press release exceeded the limits of propriety which international custom and usage have established for press offices of a mission of one state acting within the territory of another state.

The Secretary of State protests this outrageous and improper action of the Embassy and in consequence requests that Polish Government establishments in the United States cease immediately the issuance of all publications, and of press releases of this character.

Rewards of U.S.-Mexican Cooperation

*by Edward G. Miller, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs¹*

This seems a suitable occasion for calling to mind what I feel is an important anniversary in our good neighborly relations. Just 10 years ago, the Mexican-American Commission for Economic Cooperation was established. It was a historical milestone in our record of cooperation as neighbors and friends. It strengthened both of us for the part that we played in World War II in our resistance against Axis aggression.

Our contacts with Mexico are continuous. Some 30 thousand of our own citizens visit that country monthly, many of them by car, and the number is increasing steadily. What our citizens spend in Mexico in order to see its lovely sights and enjoy its warm hospitality now constitutes, in effect, Mexico's largest single export to the United States, since those tourists spend in Mexico nearly 200 million dollars per year. In addition, Mexico's commercial exports to the United States total 326 million dollars for 1951, with imports from the United States of 711 million dollars for the same year.

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the Mexican-United States Committee of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 13 and released to the press on the same date.

Past and Present Cooperative Endeavors

It is heartening to look at some of the many ways in which our two countries are cooperating for our mutual advantage, through both official and private agencies. Take agriculture, for example. One of the urgent needs of our time is to increase the productivity of the world's essential food crops. In Mexico corn is the basic food. While in the United States also we rightly regard corn as of major importance, since it is our most valuable as well as our largest crop, we find the figures for Mexico astonishing. There, 60 percent of the country's cropland is planted in corn. It is the staple food of the people; vital to their very existence. Consequently, such successful cooperation as has been carried on between the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican Government for the purpose of increasing corn productivity is of inestimable value. Agricultural scientists from the Foundation train young Mexican research assistants who will eventually take over the work altogether, and the Foundation assists also in building and equipping the necessary laboratories. When the project was inaugurated 9 years ago, in 1943, the average Mexican small farmer produced 10 bushels of corn per acre, and

the quality was generally poor. In 1948 for the first time in 35 years, Mexico did not have to import corn. By 1949 there was enough seed of good synthetic varieties, produced by the cooperative project, to plant one million acres, almost one-tenth of Mexico's cornland. In that same year a small farmer in Texeoco produced 125 bushels to the acre from the Rockefeller-Mexican—or Rocamex—hybrid seed. Incidentally, Mexico has borne more than half the cost of this project and the work has been carried on by 11 U.S. scientists, 5 Mexican technicians, and 56 Mexican laboratory assistants. The total cost has been little more than 2 million dollars. It has been rightly said that "seldom has so modest an investment yielded such astronomical returns in terms of food, progress, and human welfare."

A recent statement by President Alemán and an announcement by our Secretary of Agriculture just yesterday have highlighted another positive evidence of Mexican-American cooperation—the successful battle waged against the dread foot-and-mouth disease by the joint Mexican-United States Commission for the Eradication of Foot and Mouth Disease. The Secretary's announcement that Mexico will be declared free of the disease if no more outbreaks occur by September 1 is the goal toward which the two nations have jointly worked for almost 5 years, contributing labor, technical skill, and money to this all-important project. In the fields, in the offices, in the laboratories where vaccines were produced and tested, Mexicans and Americans have worked side by side, sharing equally the authority and responsibility.

On the governmental level one of the great achievements of the International Boundary and Water Commission is the joint construction of the big Falcón Dam, now well under way. Its benefits to agriculture will be immediate, continuous, and transforming. The Commission is cooperating effectively, not only on this, but in the working out of all of the complications involved in our joint boundary, including the important problem of the equitable distribution of water from both the Rio Grande and the Colorado.

Extension of U.S. Economic Support

Also just a decade ago, in 1942, Mexico obtained a loan in this country in order to build and expand its own steel-making capacity. Our economic cooperation with Mexico may be figured in terms of the loans which have been made by the Export-Import Bank for many purposes, such as Mexico's program of highway construction; the development and expansion of the steel, sugar, sulphur, and mining industries; the rehabilitation of its railways; financing its broad electrification program; and for financing the importation of Mexican handicraft for sale in the United States. In the last few years Mexican plans for economic development have also been given impetus through

the cooperation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development which has invested approximately 90 million dollars in Mexico. While most of this has gone into the development of Mexico's electric resources, one particularly interesting operation was the line of credit of 10 million dollars extended by the International Bank to a consortium of Mexican private banks for the financing of small industry. It is a great tribute to the credit standing of Mexico that approximately 400 million dollars has been placed in Mexico through these two lending institutions in Washington.

The great bulk of this financing has been handled in Mexico by *Nacional Financiera*, the financial agency of the Mexican Government which has so effectively devoted its resources to Mexico's economic development.

It might be noted parenthetically that it is a tribute to the versatility of Mexican culture that one family could produce two such distinguished leaders in widely differing fields as Licenciado Antonio Carrillo Flores, head of *Nacional Financiera*, on the one hand, and his distinguished father, Don Julián Carrillo, composer of the symphonic work "Horizontes."

I would like to make one more point about U.S. economic cooperation, which is that it can be measured not only in terms of credits but also in terms of deliveries of essential products. A year ago, when the foreign ministers of the American Republics were meeting here in Washington, there was considerable anxiety, on both sides of the Rio Grande, about the United States' ability to carry out a rearmament program and still continue to supply Latin America with the products essential for economic development. Today, the rate and composition of our exports should quell much of that anxiety. There was intense concern about the availability of tin plate. Today there is no problem in tin-plate supplies as far as Latin America is concerned. In many commodities, we have not only continued to export but have considerably increased our exports. For example, American exports to Latin America of iron and steel in the past year, 1951, were 29 percent greater than in 1950, increasing from 968,000 tons in 1950 to 1,246,000 tons in 1951. The record in many other commodities is equally good, and the general outlook is even better provided the world situation does not change for the worse.

One great accomplishment of these past 10 years is written in bold lines on the map, for Mexico has completed her own section of the Pan American Highway; 1,619 miles long and 99 percent paved; open to year-round traffic; and running from Nuevo Laredo to the Guatemalan border. She has interlaced the whole Republic with a splendid system of roads in order to make surface travel speedy and easy, including a highway from El Paso through the State of Chihuahua to Mexico City; and still another from Nogales

to Guadalajara. We have become so accustomed to speaking of such thoroughfares as arteries of commerce that the phrase is somewhat worn with use but it describes exactly what they are: branching routes that carry the hearts blood of the country's commerce from section to section. It is an evident fact that these highways are in great part responsible for Mexico's good financial condition. Take the one item of tourists alone.

There are, of course, many positive evidences, in many widely separate fields, of the cooperation between our Governments for the increased welfare of our peoples. In the sorely vexed question of the *braceros*, for example, the United States and Mexico are cooperating to arrange conditions satisfactory to both countries which will enable surplus Mexican workers to come to work in the United States in communities where the labor supply cannot meet the urgent need.

In still another field, we have reason for satisfaction in the cooperation between Mexican and U.S. distributors of winter fruits and vegetables. Together they are undertaking to regulate the timing and amount of these products brought into the United States, with monthly quotas for such things as tomatoes and cantaloupes.

The steadily increasing interest of U.S. business in Mexico is shown by the number of our firms that maintain representation or have established subsidiaries there. In this connection your group might well consider the disparity between Mexican legislation which tends to discourage foreign investments in national industrial enterprises and the actual climate for such investments, which is currently favorable. As we all know, Mexican business itself is perfectly well aware that competition quickens industrial development. Furthermore, a new industry may enrich the national economy in unexpected ways. We might mention here the success of Sears Roebuck in showing what can be done along that line. I understand that their branch store established in Mexico City a couple of years ago features products of Mexican origin rather than imported goods.

The rewards of cooperation are great and the benefits are mutual. We all know that they are worth far more than the effort that they take, even though we are all at the same time perfectly well aware how much effort is sometimes required. Good will is the keynote of our dealings with one another, in business, in diplomacy, in all the complex relationships of twentieth century life.

I would like to close by recalling a forthright statement endorsed by the 21 American Republics and attesting our common faith in our common future and in the path toward its attainment. That statement, approved at Chapultepec just 7 years and one week ago, at the plenary session of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held March 6, 1945, declares that "the Inter-American community is dedicated to the ideals of peaceful cooperation." This is a

faith held equally by every one of our American countries, and its power is precisely in the fact that it is shared by all.

Radio Agreement Enters Into Force

On April 13, 1952, the Inter-American Radio Agreement, signed at Washington on July 9, 1949, will enter into force between the Governments of Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the United States. Article 13 of the agreement provides that it shall come into force 30 days after the date of deposit of the fifth acceptance with the U. S. Government. The fifth acceptance was deposited on March 14, 1952, by Nicaragua. Other countries which have deposited acceptances are Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and the United States.

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Economic and Social Council

The Problem of Statelessness. Information Transmitted by States in Pursuance of Economic and Social Council Resolution 352 (XII) Relating to the Problem of Statelessness. E/2164/Add.10, February 6, 1952. 24 pp. mimeo.

Economic Commission for Europe: Inland Transport Committee. Text of International Convention to Facilitate the Crossing of Frontiers for Passengers and Baggage Carried by Rail, as adopted by the Inland Transport Committee at its eighth (special) session. E/ECE/137 and E/ECE/TRANS/318, January 17, 1952. 14 pp. mimeo.

Economic and Social Conditions and Problems of Economic Development in Non-Self-Government Territories. Note by the Secretary-General. E/2176, February 20, 1952. 10 pp. mimeo.

Social Commission, Social Services, Planning, Organization and Administration for Social Welfare. Methods of Administering Assistance to the Needy. Study by the Secretary-General of Programmes in Seven Countries. E/CN.5/273, January 16, 1952. 62 pp. mimeo.

(Continued on page 519)

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Document Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Advancement of World Peace Through Disarmament

*Statements by Ambassador Benjamin V. Cohen
Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations*

PROPOSALS FOR COMMISSION'S WORK¹

We are met here to consider how peace may be made more secure and the general welfare advanced by disarmament. We have been given a broad mandate by the General Assembly because the peoples of the world want a world free from the burden and fear of armaments. It is no accident that President Roosevelt translated the fourth freedom—freedom from fear—into world terms to mean “a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.”

We meet here to discuss disarmament as nations are building up their armed strength because of their fears of each other's armed strength. The fear of armaments has led not to disarmament but to increased armaments, increased suspicion and profound distrust. Armaments have not only been growing in volume: They have so grown in destructive power that another total war might conceivably destroy the whole civilized world.

Nations' fears have multiplied their arms, and nations' arms have multiplied their fears. The people of the world look to this Commission to find a way to reverse this process: To achieve balance by reduction, instead of by production, of armed forces and armaments. The people look to us for guidance away from this wasteful approach to security, and toward the constructive approach—a systematic plan for getting out from under the burden and fear.

Ours is therefore a terrifying responsibility. We must not fail.

There should be no question as to our goal.

Our goal is freedom from fear. The goal can

be reached by reducing armaments to such a point, in such a thorough fashion, and with such fool-proof safeguards that no nation is in a position to wage successful war. That means the elimination of mass armies and other instruments of mass destruction. That means an open world with no secret armies, no secret weapons, and no secret war plans.

With effective disarmament in a truly open world, no nation would have reason to fear or suspect that any other nation was covertly making preparations to fight a war. In such a world, any new aggressor's flouting of the rules of the open world would be known long before he could put himself in a position to fight a war.

We have already learned from our work in the Atomic Energy Commission and in the Commission for Conventional Armaments that it is difficult to make genuine progress unless we tackle the problem of armaments and the problems of balanced armed strength as a whole. We cannot make progress by eliminating one category of armaments only to build up armed strength in other ways. We may indeed find it relatively easier and more practicable to enforce a genuine and drastic disarmament system in an open world than to police an armed world with elaborate and involved ceilings on various and not readily comparable categories of armaments.

All members of the United Nations have agreed not to use force in their international relations except to keep the peace, as provided by the Charter. If we are serious in our undertakings to eliminate the use of force as an instrument of national policy, we should be willing to move toward the goal of universal disarmament as rapidly as effective safeguards can be devised and put into effect to protect law abiding states from the hazards of violations and evasions. In a disarmed world, nations will need only a small militia

¹Made before the U.N. Disarmament Commission at New York, N. Y., on Mar. 14 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

with small arms, to cope with internal disorders. A small militia with small arms would not be tempted to stray into its neighbor's territory.

Once the goal of a disarmed and truly open world is attained, the task of statesmanship to keep the peace would become much easier. In an open and a relatively disarmed world, measures to maintain security against a lawbreaker, if undertaken promptly, could be carried out with a minimum of force.

If such a world is accepted as our goal, how do we get there?

Distrust and suspicion and political differences interpose serious and perhaps insuperable obstacles in the way of the quick attainment of our goal. The Secretary of State said in Paris last fall:

When it comes to reducing armaments, there must obviously be some connection between the solution of great problems, the reduction of tensions, and the reduction of armaments. . . .

On the other hand, the very working out of such a system . . . will in itself help to reduce these tensions and help us to find solutions for problems which now seem very difficult to us. . . .

. . . the inauguration of such a system will in and of itself . . . furnish a turning point in history, a point from which the world can turn away from tension and the danger of war and turn toward cooperation for the establishment of peace.²

This is to say that, if we reach our goal of an unarmed, open world, many of the causes of existing suspicion and distrust, and many of the existing political differences, would no longer disturb us. Progress in one field goes with progress in the other. In any case, if we knew of a certainty that no nation was in a state of preparedness to undertake a major war, there would be a profound change in the climate of international relationships. Differences would remain—differences in ideas, differences in interest—but the people would know that they could not suddenly explode into war. The goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war, to make war inherently and constitutionally impossible as a means of adjusting disputes between nations.

These changes will not be made overnight. It is hard for men accustomed to living in the dark to trust themselves in the light. We are all deeply concerned about our national safety. No responsible statesman can be expected to risk the national security of his country for a hope which may prove to be illusory. We do know that within our lifetime aggressors have used disarmament agreements and nonaggression pacts to lull their victims into a false sense of security. We must not let that happen again. What we want is a balanced reduction in arms and in armies to the lowest possible levels, based, as President Truman has stated, "on safeguards that will insure the compliance of all nations."

Until we can agree on and put into effect a sys-

tem of balanced reduction with adequate and effective safeguards, free nations cannot leave their freedom and security at the mercy of the uncontrolled armed strength of other nations. Until all do reduce, the free must continue to produce, in order to keep the peace. But President Truman has stated:

We would prefer to see the nations cut down their armed forces on a balanced basis that would be fair to all. That is the way we hoped the world would follow 6 years ago when we helped to set up the United Nations. And it is what we are still working for—an international order without the burden of tremendous armaments.³

We here must face the difficulties of our task. If we wish to make progress we must try to understand one another's problems. We must avoid recrimination and abuse. We will not make progress by boasting of our own good intentions and casting the blame for failure on others. It is better that we should be able to report some tangible progress than that we excoriate each other for not reaching heaven in a single bound.

The General Assembly's Mandate

I hope this progress can be made, even if a little at a time, along a broad front. Our mandate from the General Assembly is not a limited one:

the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and co-ordinated plans, under international control for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

Obviously the General Assembly does not believe that we can reach the goal the world wants by abolishing one weapon, or adopting promises no one can enforce, or recommending reductions without regard to what the present levels are. Law abiding nations cannot be expected to agree to any formula of arms reduction which would perpetuate an existing imbalance of armed strength and aggravate, rather than relieve their fears of aggression.

The General Assembly also requires us to look at the total world picture, and to understand the relationship between the whole and its interdependent parts. An English poet has defined freedom as "leave to live by no man's leave, underneath the Law." Nations, like individuals, do not feel secure in their freedom unless they have leave to live by no other nations' leave, underneath the law. Many of the present difficulties both in Europe and in Asia spring from an imbalance of armed strength which causes some nations to feel that they live only by leave or grace of their more powerful and none too friendly neighbors. If a balanced reduction of arms is to reduce fear of

² BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1951, p. 888.

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1951, p. 799.

U.S. Proposal for Plan of Work

U.N. doc. DC/3, dated Mar. 14, 1952

A. Disclosure and verification:

- (a) plans for the progressive and continuing disclosures of all armed forces, including paramilitary, security and police forces, and all armaments including atomic,
- (b) methods of verification, in particular through international inspection, to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information thus disclosed.

B. Methods of calculating and fixing over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments, including:

- (a) effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.
- (b) elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

C. The development of agreed national programmes, by negotiation among States under the auspices of the Commission, and the allocation within the respective military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments.

D. Methods of implementing and enforcing the disarmament programme, including:

- (a) the establishment of an international control organ or organs with appropriate rights, powers and functions,
- (b) the elaboration of effective safeguards.

E. Procedure and timetable for giving effect to the disarmament programme.

aggression, it must take into account the balance of armed strength of the most powerful states not only in relation to one another, but also in relation to their neighbors. In other words, a truly balanced program of disarmament must deal not only with the relations of the powerful states with each other, but must redress the present imbalance of armed strength in Europe and Asia so as to dispel the fears of free nations in those areas.

It is with these thoughts in mind that the U.S. Government proposes for the consideration of the Disarmament Commission the draft plan of work now before you. This plan, on which we are anxious to have the views of other delegations, follows the language of the General Assembly resolution establishing this Commission. The language is deliberately designed to cover the essential elements of any balanced disarmament system without prejudging the details of those elements. We believe that any proposals any government may wish to advance can be considered under the appropriate headings of the plan.

In our deliberations here, there is room for all constructive ideas and we will need them. Every suggestion on practical ways and means of building a security system based on reduction instead of production of weapons needs to be thoroughly explored in an open-minded spirit—needs to be tested by hard facts of international life, by the

question as to whether the proposal will work in the mutual interest of all governments and all peoples.

Need for a Practical Plan

The people of the world are not interested in propaganda tricks or polemics. They expect from us a workable plan for a new house of peace and security. They are interested in the livability of this structure. They believe that a new approach to world disarmament can be made and must be made in practical terms.

As I said earlier, my Government hopes that the Commission will explore all these points. We might most usefully begin with a consideration of those items on which agreement is most likely to facilitate further progress. The General Assembly has directed the Commission "to consider from the out-set plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification" of all armed forces—including paramilitary, security and police forces—and all armaments including atomic, "the implementation of which is recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution." That point is therefore first on our plan of work.

No responsible government can agree to cut its own defenses without knowing where such cuts will leave it in relation to the armed forces of other countries. As Abraham Lincoln said, "If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it."

We are directed to make our first report by June 1. The time is extremely short. We trust that if we concentrate on the items of disclosure and verification suggested we may be able to report some real progress which will enable us to grapple more intelligently with the other vital problems listed in our work plan. That does not mean that we should not give thought to other items in which there may be a possibility of early progress.

Starting with disclosure and verification, our plan of work moves forward to four other points which seem to us to embrace the rest of the ramified problems which must be explored in the development of an honest and workable disarmament system.

Having considered under our first point ways of finding out the armed strength of all nations, we come to grips in our second point with the heart of the disarmament problem. This second point involves the exploration of methods of setting limits on permitted armaments which includes, of course, the effective elimination of atomic weapons and all instruments adaptable to mass destruction—categories to which the General Assembly's resolution directs our special attention.

Our third point involves consideration of the methods by which, having agreed on the principles

of limitation and abolition of the various elements of armed strength, states would negotiate agreements with each other as to the armed forces and armaments permitted to each state and as to the distribution of the permitted elements within each national military establishment.

Next we come in our proposed work plan to the crucial question of how to enforce the principles of disarmament once those principles have been agreed upon and put into practice by all states possessed of substantial military strength. Under this item, we would consider the establishment of an international control organ or organs and the appropriate rights, powers, and functions of such a control organ, together with the safeguards necessary to deter any state from violating the agreed disarmament program.

Lastly, under our proposed work plan the Commission would consider the complex questions of procedure and timing involved in agreeing upon a disarmament program and putting that program into operation.

For the sake of convenience, the five points of our work plan have been set down in what seems to us a logical sequence but, quite frankly, we see no compelling reason for the Commission to examine these problems according to this or any other rigidly predetermined order, except insofar as the Commission is instructed to consider the matter of disclosure and verification from the outset. The order in which these problems are taken up, and whether by the Commission itself or by subcommittees of the part or of the whole, seem to us questions which the Commission should resolve in terms of its own best efficiency of operation. On these questions, as on the text of the plan of work we have put before you, my Government would welcome the views of the other members of the Commission.

In closing, I should emphasize that we offer these suggestions only as a beginning. Our desire is to proceed as rapidly as possible to the goal of an open world where national armaments will be reduced drastically, and mass armies and all other instruments of mass destruction completely eliminated, so that no state need stand in fear of aggression from any other state. Let us resolve to work together, determined, with God's help, to carry out our mandate: To lift from the peoples of this world the burden and fear of armaments and thus to liberate new energies and resources for positive programs of reconstruction and development. Let us work together to make this a friendly and peaceful world in which all men may have a chance to live out their lives free from fear which men have created and free from want which men can avoid.

As the members of the Commission will recall, I contented myself with two observations with respect to Mr. Malik's first two questions.⁵ I stated *first* that the questions were out of order because they were addressed to substantive issues regarding arms reductions and prohibition and not to the proposed plan of work. I stated *second* that the questions clearly related to the substantive problems listed in the proposed work plan and could be discussed under it. But the Soviet representative, ignoring my reasoned reply, proclaimed that the U. S. representative had refused to give a direct answer to his questions. He wilfully tried to disrupt the spirit of conciliation which I and other speakers had tried to introduce into our first meeting and attempted to make it appear that it was the United States instead of the Soviet Union which was preventing the Commission from getting on with its work. Such tactics on the part of the Soviet representative, if I may say so, Mr. Chairman, are an affront not only to the United States, but to all States represented on this Commission. Such tactics, if continued, threaten to disrupt the work of the Commission and to obstruct efforts which all the rest of us are trying to exert, honestly and in good faith, to make progress in this difficult field of disarmament.

Let there be no misunderstanding. If the Soviet representative had any real, *bona fide* questions about our plan of work, he would have had no difficulty in getting enlightenment without a brawl.

I sent the proposed plan of work before last week's meeting to all members of the Disarmament Commission. I telephoned the Soviet delegation on Monday, March 10, 4 days before the meeting, and said that if there were any questions which the Soviet delegation had to raise, or any comments it had to offer on the proposed plan of work, I would be glad to talk to Mr. Malik or any other member of the Soviet delegation. I received no response to this invitation. It would seem that the Soviet representative is more eager to precipitate a propaganda fight over disarmament than to labor with us in good faith to work out concrete and practical plans of disarmament.

But as the Soviet representative chose to say that I refused to answer his questions, I propose to answer them, despite their irrelevance and impropriety at this stage of our proceedings.

Let me read you Mr. Malik's first question:

All States must, of course, when necessary, supply the United Nations Disarmament Commission with full information as to their available armaments. Once the decision to reduce armaments and prohibit weapons of

⁴ Made before the Disarmament Commission on Mar. 19 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

⁵ Yakov Malik is the Soviet representative on the Disarmament Commission.

mass destruction has been taken in principle, then, of course, not a single State will refuse to supply such information.

It is important, therefore, to elucidate the question whether the United States representatives intend to support the proposal for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, for such a decision would make it possible immediately to obtain full information on the armaments of all States.

It is, I confess, a little difficult to distinguish Mr. Malik's question from his loaded explanations. But, if I understand the question, it is not new. It is simply the old question which the Soviet delegation has raised in the United Nations every year since 1946. Of course, everyone agrees "in principle" that armaments should be reduced and all weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited. The General Assembly set up the Disarmament Commission because all the members of the United Nations have declared themselves in favor of this principle. What we are here to do is to devise ways and means of reducing armaments and prohibiting weapons of mass destruction. But the Soviet representative's question is a loaded question. He does not really want us to reiterate our devotion to disarmament. He really wants us to accept the old Soviet position that the way to reduce armaments and prohibit weapons of mass destruction is to make a pronouncement—to take, as he says, "a decision." What he wants us to do is to recommend to the General Assembly that it adopt the old Soviet proposal, raised in the United Nations time and again and always rejected, that the way to disarm is to pass a resolution. What he wants us to do is to agree to a proclamation reducing armaments and prohibiting weapons of mass destruction without establishing those safeguards which alone can guarantee that faith is kept and disarmament actually carried out. What he wants us to do is to obligate ourselves to disarm before there is any way of knowing that his Government is fulfilling its reciprocal obligation.

U. S. Position Clear

The position of the United States on this subject is clear and it has been stated time and time again in the various organs of the United Nations. The United States wants to reduce armaments and eliminate effectively and with foolproof safeguards all instruments of mass destruction, including mass armies, atomic warfare and germ warfare. But we are not going to delude our own people and the people of other countries by going through the motions of "taking a decision" on a general reduction of armaments and on the elimination of all instruments of mass destruction. We know that these things cannot be done in fact except by working out, agreeing upon, and putting into effect a system of safeguards which will ensure compliance by all States whose compliance is necessary to make the system work. In our own lifetime, aggressors have used disarmament

agreements and nonaggression pacts to lull their victims into a false sense of security. The people of the world want real disarmament and not disarmament only on paper. In matters involving the survival of the entire civilized world, no nation can in honesty to its own people disarm in reliance on the mere paper promise of another nation. That is the view taken not only by the United States. It is the view taken by the United Nations in rejecting the Soviet proposal each time it has come before it. But the Soviet Union pays little attention to the views of other nations. The Soviet Union is more concerned about talking disarmament than it is about finding means by which all nations can safely disarm.

We come now to Mr. Malik's second question. It reads as follows:

Since Mr. Acheson seeks to justify the armaments race, and in particular the colossal expansion of armaments in the United States, by reference to the alleged existence of large armies in the U.S.S.R. while the U.S.S.R. is proposing the immediate adoption of a decision on the reduction of the armed forces and the armaments of the five great Powers and on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, why not begin the work of the Disarmament Commission by adopting a decision on the substantial reduction of armaments, beginning with a reduction in the armaments of the five great Powers?

This question, like Mr. Malik's first question, is rhetorical and somewhat confused, but not new. While clothed in somewhat different words, it is the same proposal which the U. N. General Assembly has debated and rejected more than once. Apart from its reference to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction which is covered in the first question, it is the substantial equivalent of the Soviet proposal for an exchange of promises to reduce by one-third the armaments of the so-called Big Five—without verification and without knowing the actual levels from which there is to be this reduction. That is not a program for balanced-armed reduction. It is a program to perpetuate the superior armed strength of the Soviet Union in relation to the Western nations.

After World War II the Western nations reduced their arms drastically. Then came Korea. The Soviet Union then had 4,000,000 men in their regular armed forces; another 1,000,000 in security units and uniformed and secret Soviet police forces; 5,000,000 in all. In addition the Soviet Union controlled another 1,000,000 men in its eastern European satellites, a total of 6,000,000, not counting the Communist armies in Asia. At that time the United States had only 1,500,000 men and the United Kingdom and France together had somewhat less than that. To preserve peace, the Western nations are trying to remedy that dangerous imbalance. But until balance has been restored, the Western nations cannot accept any across-the-board percentage reduction which would perpetuate—or indeed accentuate—the present dangerous imbalance of forces. As I explained in my opening statement, we are for a balanced reduction of arms that will reduce and

not aggravate existing fears and tensions. We cannot accept the phony and illusory proposal of the Soviet which has been exposed and rejected by the General Assembly. Let me ask Mr. Malik a question. What would the Soviet Union have said to Hitler in 1938 if he had proposed a percentage reduction in all armed forces to them? Would the Soviets have disarmed in reliance on Hitler's promises?

Meaning of the Soviet Proposals

We must recognize the Soviet proposals embodied in these two questions for what they are—a Soviet attempt to hold, if not widen, the existing gap between the mass armies of the Soviet and the forces of the free world, and to strip the free world of the defensive protection of the atomic weapon without any assurance that that weapon will not be used by the Soviets.

The Soviet Union may talk of disarmament but it has yet to evince the slightest desire to cooperate with other nations in finding practical ways to achieve disarmament. Apparently the Soviet Union would rather excoriate the free world for refusing to accept illusory declarations than cooperate with the free world in working out any realistic program for peace.

Last Friday [March 14], I answered directly and unequivocally the Soviet representative's monstrously false charge that the Unified Command was using bacteriological warfare. If there are epidemics in North Korea and Communist China, the source lies not in any bacteriological warfare employed by the United Nations, but rather in the terrible carnage which has been left in the wake of an aggressive war, the starting and waging of which was aided and abetted by the Soviet Union.

Monstrous falsehoods are usually used to cover up monstrous wrongs. If sanitary measures and medical care are lacking north of the United Nations' lines, it is not the fault of the United Nations, it is the fault of those who are fighting the United Nations and neglecting the health of those in their keeping. The Soviet Union has sent arms for use in the fight against the United Nations. But does it send doctors and medical aid to succor the sick, the wounded, and the dying? The Kremlin does send out alarms to the faithful throughout the world to hold rigged demonstrations where the shedding of crocodile tears is organized in a useless and transparent effort to conceal the aggressors' failures to take care of their own people.

Let me repeat what Secretary Acheson said on March 4:⁶

Our deepest sympathy goes out to all those behind the enemy lines who are sick and suffering. We offer them

the hope that our efforts toward a just armistice will succeed and make it possible for health, as well as peace and security, to be brought to all of Korea. These are the goals of the United Nations for all the people of Korea.

Let there be no mistake about it. There is no bacteriological warfare being used by the United Nations in Korea. The U.N. Command has denied these charges categorically. Moreover, in order to leave no question of the falsity of these charges, the U.S. Government, acting on behalf of the Unified Command, on March 11 requested the International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate these charges and has offered its full aid to the investigation. The International Committee of the Red Cross on March 12 formally offered to investigate these charges, subject to the agreement of both the United Nations Command and the Chinese Communist-North Korean Command, and has requested the cooperation of both sides in conducting the investigation. On March 13, the U.S. Government, on behalf of the Unified Command, unconditionally accepted the offer of the International Committee of the Red Cross.⁷ The Chinese Communist-North Korean Command has not yet replied to the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The Soviet representative has put a number of questions to my Government. I will now put to him a question to which I think we are entitled to an answer from his Government. The Soviet Government is on friendly terms with the Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities. Those authorities have indicated on many occasions their confidence and trust in the Soviet Government, and would no doubt be influenced by the advice of the Soviet Government. I want to ask Mr. Malik whether his Government will exercise its good offices to prevail on the Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities to accept the proposal of the International Committee of the Red Cross for an impartial investigation of these charges. I think we are entitled not only to a direct and unequivocal answer but to the active help of the Soviet Government to make this investigation possible. Those who make such charges have a duty to assist and not obstruct impartial, international determination of the truth. I hope the Soviet representative will not reply that an investigation is already being carried out by an "impartial" committee of international free jurists, or any such body of stooges whose report is dictated in advance by the very instigators of the charges.

In closing, I wish to add one further word. I wish to make it clear, on behalf of my Government, that we wish to find means to live in peace and friendship with the Soviet Union as with all other

⁶ BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 427.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1952, p. 453.

ates. My Government joined with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France in urging the establishment of this Commission in the hope that, through working together with the Soviet Union in patient exploration of these complex and immeasurably important problems, we might come to genuinely constructive solutions of the grave issues outstanding between us. The General Assembly endorsed our purpose in establishing this Commission, and we have taken heart from the decision of the Soviet Union to join in the work of the Commission. Frankly, we were disappointed by the attitude expressed by the distinguished representative of the U.S.S.R. at our last meeting. We had expected better. But we will continue to expect better and perhaps, some day, we shall be rewarded. Some day, perhaps, the Soviet representative will make substantive proposals which will be genuinely constructive. We look toward that day.

My Government believes in this Commission and will not be lightly deflected from this Commission's high purposes, for, second only to their freedom, free men cherish peace.

EDITOR'S NOTE: On November 19, 1951, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France presented to Committee I of the General Assembly a draft resolution establishing a Disarmament Commission (BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1951, p. 889). A revised tripartite draft was introduced in Committee I on December 13 (BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1952, p. 23). The resolution as adopted by the General Assembly on January 11, 1952, which differs slightly from the revised tripartite draft, is printed below for convenient reference.

U.N. doc. A/L. 25, dated Jan. 12, 1952

The General Assembly,

MOVED by anxiety at the general lack of confidence plaguing the world and leading to the burden of increasing armaments and the fear of war,

DESIRING to lift from the peoples of the world this burden and this fear, and thus to liberate new energies and resources for positive programmes of reconstruction and development,

REAFFIRMING its desire that the United Nations develop an effective collective security system to maintain the peace and that the armed forces and armaments of the world be progressively reduced in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter,

BELIEVING that a necessary means to this end is the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and co-ordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only,

RECOGNIZING that a genuine system for disarmament must include all kinds of armed forces and armaments, must be accepted by all nations whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system, and must include safeguards that will ensure the compliance of all such nations,

NOTING the recommendation of the Committee of Twelve established by resolution 496 (V) that the General Assembly should establish a new commission to carry forward the tasks originally assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments,

1. *Establishes* under the Security Council a Disarmament Commission. This Commission shall have the same membership as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and shall function under the rules of procedure of the Atomic Energy Commission with such modifications as the Commission shall deem necessary;

2. *Dissolves* the Atomic Energy Commission and recommends to the Security Council that it dissolve the Commission for Conventional Armaments;

3. *Directs* the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The Commission shall be guided by the following principles:

(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces—including para-military security and police forces—and all armaments including atomic;

(b) Such verification must be based on effective international inspection to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed; this inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the international control organ (or organs) to be established;

(c) The Commission shall be ready to consider any proposals or plans for control that may be put forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy. Unless a better or no less effective system is devised, the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

(d) There must be an adequate system of safeguards to ensure observance of the disarmament programme, so as to provide for the prompt detection of violations while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country;

(e) The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open to all States for signature and ratification or adherence. The treaty (or treaties) shall provide what States must become parties thereto before the treaty (or treaties) shall enter into force;

4. *Directs* the Commission, when preparing the proposals referred to in the preceding paragraph, to formulate plans for the establishment, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international control organ (or organs) to ensure the implementation of the treaty (or treaties). The functions and powers of the control organ (or organs) shall be defined in the treaty which establishes it;

5. *Directs* the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the out-set plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution;

6. *Directs* the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments;

(a) To determine how over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed;

(b) To consider methods according to which States can agree by negotiation among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission, concerning the determination of the over-all limits and restrictions referred to in subparagraph (a) above and the allocation within their respective national military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments;

7. *Directs* the Commission to commence its work not

later than thirty days from the adoption of the present resolution and to report periodically, for information, to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, or to the Members of the United Nations when the General Assembly is not in session. The Commission shall submit its first report not later than 1 June 1952;

8. *Declares* that a conference of all States should be convened to consider the proposals for a draft treaty (or treaties) prepared by the Commission as soon as the work

of the Commission shall have progressed to a point where in the judgment of the Commission any part of its programme is ready for submission to governments;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to convene such a conference when so advised by the Commission;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish such experts, staff and facilities as the Commission may consider necessary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes of the present resolution.

A Plea for Adequacy of News Distribution and Free Flow of Information

Statement by Carroll Binder

*U.S. Representative in the Subcommittee on Freedom of Information*¹

We come at long last to that aspect of our task which the informational media and the people of my country have regarded from the first as the most important duty and the greatest opportunity of the subcommittee: A consideration of the adequacy of the news available to the peoples of the world and the obstacles to the free flow of information to them.

The informational media and the Government of the United States were instrumental in committing the United Nations to an attempt to lower barriers to the free flow of information between peoples. They saw in this new international organization an opportunity to examine the causes for obstructions to the gathering and transmission of news and a means of removing those obstructions through international compacts.

The U. S. Government was reflecting one of the deepest aspirations of the American people when it took the initiative in committing the United Nations to this high aspiration. For in my country the people are sovereign. Our basic decisions are not made by the executive or legislative branches of our Government but by the 50 or more million citizens who vote in our national elections. Now these citizens cannot make wise decisions unless they have accurate information as to what goes on at home and abroad. They need the fullest information as to the attitude of other peoples and the policies of other governments in order to make wise decisions about what the United States should do and not do. They need to have full information about their own government in order to wisely direct its policies. They are the masters and the government is their servant. When some official

or branch of the government tries to hide information which the people require for correct evaluation of performance or policies he is called to account by the press, speaking for the people.

This has been our law and custom from the beginning of our history. It is one of our greatest strengths. It occasionally is abused, but we consider the harm done by such abuses infinitely easier to sustain than the harm that would be done by limitations upon the right to know and publish. This permits those who oppose or distrust freedom to quote things published in our free press to embarrass us and to persuade the people of other countries that we are not what we should be. You have been treated to many examples of this self-criticism in the course of our discussions. It is hard for people not used to freedom to understand that publication of something damning in American newspapers does not necessarily convict us of the offense with which we are charged.

That, as I have said, is one of the liabilities of freedom to know and publish. We consider such a liability worth bearing because of the priceless assets which come with freedom to know and publish. This freedom is essential to the welfare of all our people—to scholars, artists, scientists, businessmen, trade-unionists, farmers, and people in all walks of life as well as to journalists.

U. S. Interest in Free Informational Media

We attach so much importance to it that we do not believe there can be lasting peace with freedom, justice, and security for all the peoples of the world until all peoples enjoy the right to know, to publish, and to discuss. It was in that spirit that the United States raised freedom of information issues in the United Nations. Perhaps naively, we believed that if other nations

¹ Made before U.N. Subcommittee on Freedom of Information on Mar. 13 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

looked into them they too would put their trust in free principles and practices.

We also were concerned at the diminution of the quality and quantity of the news available to the peoples of the world, including ourselves. We noted with alarm that while the destinies of the peoples of the world were increasingly interdependent the amount of information about each other was increasingly limited. While the peace and security of one nation was becoming increasingly dependent upon the policies and attitudes of other nations it was increasingly difficult to know exactly what the policies and attitudes of the other nations are.

This is because governments place obstacles in the way of independent newsgatherers and restrict what may be sent abroad. Correspondents are not permitted to obtain reliable information about what goes on in many countries. Censorship prevents them from sending what they believe to be the true character of given policies and the real attitudes of peoples when those estimates are at variance with what governments wish to be published abroad.

It was hoped that by realistic examination of such attitudes and practices in the United Nations ways could be found to increase the volume and quality of news available to the peoples of the world.

It was realized that some governments opposed in principle to freedom and other governments distrustful of freedom would oppose attempts to lower barriers to the free flow of information through international compacts. Thus the problem was approached along two lines. On the governmental level there was an attempt to draft conventions on newsgathering and freedom of information which would find sufficient acceptance to become a part of international law. But it was realized that if this vital problem were left wholly in governmental hands it might not be dealt with as fully and effectively as the situation requires.

So this Subcommittee on Freedom of Information was created for the consideration of freedom of information and of the press issues on a non-governmental level. The Subcommittee was supposed to be composed of experts—men with wide experience in the field of information—who would deal with problems in this field in a more uninhibited and constructive manner than could be expected of some governmental representatives. It was expressly provided that the members of the Subcommittee should not be answerable to their governments. While serving, their modest honorariums are paid not by their governments but by the United Nations. Once elected they cannot be recalled by their governments for they are chosen for stated terms by the United Nations.

It was assumed that such experts assured such independence would realistically examine and report upon the adequacy of the news available to

the peoples of the world. It was assumed they would call attention to obstacles to the free flow of information and thus create an international public opinion which governments could not disregard. It was on that assumption that I accepted election to the Subcommittee. I hoped that at the end of the 3 years I was chosen to serve I could feel that some useful contribution had been made to the profession I have been engaged in for 34 years and to the cause of freedom of information.

The Subcommittee's Record

I am sorry to say that unless we accomplish a very great deal during the few days of existence still allowed us by the United Nations we shall have embarrassingly little to our credit. We have spent so much time debating what to do and how, that we have given little attention either to the adequacy of the news available to the peoples of the world or to a consideration of ways of removing obstacles to the free flow of information.

We have called attention to the suppression of *La Prensa* and many other independent newspapers in Argentina. We have condemned the jamming of broadcasts by governments interested in preventing their people from learning what goes on abroad.

Aside from those highly creditable but embarrassingly few acts, what can we point to when our labors are concluded and we become a modest paragraph or two in the history of the United Nations? The record will show a regrettable tendency to expend time in discussions about what to do or not to do and to bury ourselves in diversionary activities such as the drafting of a code of ethics which shows little promise of increasing the adequacy of the news available to the peoples of the world or removing obstacles to the free flow of information.

I rejoice that at long last we have gotten around to consideration of that primary task. At least it will enable me to say to my colleagues and countrymen that we did take note of the fact that today there is far less news available to the peoples of the world than at any time since newsgatherers began making the world their beat and that this is an alarming state of affairs calling for far more realistic consideration than it thus far has obtained.

When I think of the countries I could visit and the freedom with which I could report when I first became a foreign correspondent and the freedom with which I could report 30 years ago I am appalled at the limitations and restrictions existing today.

When I first became a foreign correspondent, my colleagues and I could travel and report freely in most parts of the world. We encountered some censorship but usually they were open, that is we took our dispatches to an official who promptly examined it and told us what—if anything—could

not be sent. We felt we were badly put upon by such censorship, which happily were not numerous. But when I think of the restrictions existing today I realize that those were halcyon days, the like of which I shall not see again in my lifetime.

For those who govern large parts of the world no longer permit independent correspondents to visit their countries or so severely circumscribe their movements and contacts that they cannot possibly know what goes on in the country to which they are accredited. Then what they write is censored, often by officials who are inaccessible and who do not let the correspondent know what has been deleted or why. The end result all too often is merely a duplication of the versions put out by the governmental propaganda apparatus. The reader knows only what the government thinks he should know, which in many instances is far from adequate for a correct appraisal of governmental policies or their import for the peace and security of other nations.

Now each government is sovereign in such matters. I recognize the authority of governments to exclude independent correspondents and to censor what is transmitted from their countries. But governments exercising such limitations upon the right to know and to publish should at least be identified as such and their restrictive practices should be appraised from the standpoint of the peoples' right to know. That is what I have conceived to be a primary responsibility of this Subcommittee. I have objected to so much time being spent on other matters because I saw how we were being prevented from tackling this job. I realize that our activities spared restrictive-minded governments from embarrassments but I realize also that it disappointed the great numbers of people who looked to this body of independent experts for something more useful and courageous than that.

Unless one deals with news day in and day out, as I do and as several other members of the Subcommittee do, I doubt if one realizes how appallingly the volume and quality is diminishing. I have tried during my service on the Subcommittee to have this matter periodically examined by the United Nations. You will remember that at our fourth session we proposed that information about obstacles be made available to members of the Subcommittee. The Economic and Social Council adopted resolution 306 F at its eleventh session in response to our request. The history of this resolution is given in document 143 and 143 add. 1, add. 2, and add. 2 correction 1, which are before us. The resolution in question had as its purpose the obtaining of information from press services on "the current status of freedom of information in any part of the world."

Unfortunately, the response to the U.N.'s inquiry has not been good. As stated in Doc. 143/Add. 1, the only material received to date has

been from the Associated Press. This is a comprehensive report which simply tells what is being done in the way of censoring news country by country. It has the merit of being a continuous survey so that changes from year to year can be noted.

Now the U.N. resolution which brought forth this Associated Press report did not provide that the material received should be distributed but only that the United Nations should make an analysis. This I think was an oversight on the part of the Economic and Social Council. I believe this and all other reports should be circulated widely. If this is done it may encourage other news services to submit similar reports. I will recommend formally that such be done by the United Nations.

For our present purpose it is enough that the members of this Subcommittee have this material before them. It tells the deplorable story of newspapers shut down, correspondents restricted and even imprisoned, and censorship and other restrictions being practiced. When the world is surveyed it becomes apparent that independent newsgatherers are barred from all of Communist China and have only limited access to Russia and countries associated with Russia. This you will agree is a very large part of the world and a most important one. How much better would be the prospects for peace with security and justice for all if there could be a free flow of information between the people on the two sides of the iron and bamboo curtains!

Criteria of News Adequacy

At this point I shall attempt an analysis of what our terms of reference called the "adequacy" of news. What elements go into a judgment as to whether the public is getting an "adequate" supply of news?

The first criterion I would say is volume. As an editorial writer, I would be greatly handicapped if I were forced to form opinions and write editorials on the basis of fragmentary information. I think the same is true with the general public. This does not mean necessarily that every newspaper or every radio station must carry in every news report a total account of a particular event or trend of events; but in there should be available in some printed form full and "adequate" accounts.

The second element of adequacy is a multiplicity of news sources. I would find myself very much handicapped if I could not read the reports of the Associated Press, International News Service, the United Press, Agence France Presse, Reuters, and Tass as well as those of my newspaper's own correspondents, of the *New York Times*, the *Chicago Daily News*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*, each of which has many of its own correspondents overseas. In other words, I

to not form my opinions of the Batista coup in Cuba simply from reading one account of it. I read it many times, in newspapers, in magazines, and in editorials.

This multiplicity of news sources is equally essential, I feel, to the public and countless hundreds of thousands of individuals in my country who form their opinions from this multiple reading of news events.

The third and in some ways the most important quality of adequacy I would say is objectivity. No news is adequate, no matter how great its volume, if it uniformly tells one side of the story. If it is slanted, if it is prejudiced, if it leaves out essential facts and overemphasizes nonessentials for ulterior motives, that news is inadequate. The international press community could do no greater service to their people than to find ways, and employ them, of spreading the gospel of news objectivity.

Main Weaknesses of Present News Picture

Taking these three criteria of news adequacy as a guide, I have come to the conclusion that there are three main soft spots or weaknesses in the news picture in the world today.

First, there is the area of the globe where journalism is underdeveloped and these are mainly the underdeveloped countries of the world. Let me not be misunderstood. This is not intended as a disparagement of any people or any country. But I think that we must face the fact that in some areas of the globe where illiteracy is high and therefore newspaper readers are relatively few in number, where capital is relatively scarce for investment in costly newspaper plants, where foreign exchange is scarce for the purchase of newsprint, where newspaper and radio technicians are few in number—here not only the people but the government officials operate at an immense handicap in arriving at intelligent decisions.

The people walk in darkness or in shadows and frequently stumble into blind alleys of both domestic and foreign policy. Their opinions are formed directly by rumor and here the rumor monger frequently goes energetically to work and almost as often becomes the equivalent of a warmonger. These are conditions which breed instability of government and promote misunderstandings and frictions between governments.

There are numerous obstacles to the development of journalism, some of which exist in developed countries as well as underdeveloped. I have mentioned technical and economic difficulties. In addition, there are feudal political systems which dislike change and oppose development of government by an informed electorate.

In addition, there are those flagrant instances in which a powerful government, backed up by mob rule deliberately chokes the life from the liv-

ing freedom which exists. Such was the case of the great newspaper *La Prensa* in Argentina. Here freedom existed. It stood against tyranny. In the face of the condemnation of the free people of the globe, a dictatorial regime brought fear and death to that paper's editors and workmen. Such a barrier as this must be broken. I confess I do not know the full and complete answer. But freedom will not be safe so long as *La Prensa* remains a prisoner of a tyrant.

The second principal weakness in our news situation today is the growing tendency to impose restrictions on the international flow of news—restrictions on movement of correspondents, censorship of what they write, and other extreme measures. It raises the most important questions connected with the peace-keeping activities of the nations. How can we in America learn about Egypt, or India, or France, or any other country—and I use these names not to indicate any particular laws that your countries may have passed—if nations continue to build little iron curtains around themselves, how, moreover, can the people and the officials of Lebanon, of India, or of China hope to understand the people and the policy of the United States if little iron curtains continue to drape themselves around the borders of many countries. We want to build our foreign policy on an understanding of other peoples, and I am sure they want to do the same thing with relation to us. But restrictions breed misunderstanding. Restrictions mean isolation. The ultimate in restrictionism arose a little less than a year ago when an American reporter, William Oatis, of the Associated Press, was arrested, held incommunicado, tried without being permitted to consult with his Government or his friends, and thrown into prison, allegedly for spying. William Oatis, as the evidence produced at his trial clearly shows, was doing only the work of a newspaperman. His imprisonment constituted an aggression against the rights of mankind as surely as the attack on Ethiopia, Manchuria, and Korea were attacks on rights of states.

What a fearsome prospect for a journalist if this precedent of repression is allowed to stand. Prison awaits for any reporter who interviews his own embassy officials. A spy charge falls upon him because he is requested by his editors to find the truth about the activities of government officials.

This is intimidation at its worst. It affects not merely news from Czechoslovakia but as a precedent it affects news available in all other countries. It establishes the precedent that reporters must only report news that is dictated by a certain government. Just as Hitler dictated commercial policies and terms of trade in his prewar commerce with dependent countries, this is an effort to dictate the terms of our commerce in free ideas.

The third weak spot in the news picture which needs attention, is the development of traditions of objectivity in news reporting.

I am of the opinion that a tradition of objective fact-finding and fact-reporting is one of the highest attributes of democracy because it is the clearest evidence of the path of government in its own people.

My point is that no society—especially a society mature enough to govern itself—is so lacking in innate intelligence and wisdom that it has to be spoon-fed on a diet of information that somebody else thinks is good for it. The citizens of each of our countries are quite capable of separating for themselves the good facts from the bad. No people is so immature that it cannot stand the shock of the facts. It disparages the intelligence of the

human being to advocate a system of information in which some arbitrator, human censor, or purveyor of doctrine—subject to all the emotions of spite and slander, bribery and corruption, ambition and greed—becomes a filter to sift for the minds of the citizen or inflames him against others or tells falsehoods about his neighbors.

In objectivity, in the straight telling of the facts, lies the quickest solution to the problems which so frequently are laid at the doorstep of newspapermen—the promotion of peace, the promotion of racial and religious friendship, and tolerance and respect for human rights.

These are the primary spheres, the primary problems of information in the world which Ecosoc and the United Nations and the press of the world must struggle with and seek to amend.

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

THIRTY-FIFTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD DECEMBER 1-15, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2514
Transmitted February 5, 1952

I herewith submit report number 35 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 December, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 1099-1113 inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

During this period armistice negotiations on Agenda

Item three continued in Sub-Committee meetings. On 3 December the Communist side introduced two proposals: "(6) In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to introduce into Korea any military forces, weapons and ammunition under any pretext. (7) In order to supervise the strict implementation of the stipulation of Paragraph (6), both sides agree to invite representatives of nations neutral in the Korean War to form a supervisory organ to be responsible for conducting necessary inspection, beyond the Demilitarized Zone, of such ports of entry in the rear as mutually agreed upon by both sides, and to report to the Joint Armistice Commission the result of inspection."

Communist proposal (6) above would result in the evacuation of United Nations Command Forces from Korea by attrition. The United Nations Command holds that it has the right to maintain its forces in Korea during the period of the military armistice and pending a settlement at higher level.

Communist proposal (7) shows the clear intent to confine the activities of the Military Armistice Commission to the Demilitarized Zone only. Comparable United Nations Command proposals were as follows:

"4. A. Both sides shall designate an equal number of members to form a Military Armistice Commission which shall be responsible for supervising the execution of and adherence to the whole armistice agreement. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with, and assisted by, observer teams which shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Military Armistice Commission only. The observer teams shall be composed of representatives of nations neutral in the Korean War, such nations to be mutually agreed to by both sides.

"B. Observation outside the Demilitarized Zone will be performed only by neutral observer teams. Observation within the Demilitarized Zone may be performed by neu-

¹Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Feb. 5. For texts of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th reports to the Security Council on U.N. Command operations in Korea, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43; and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. Reports nos. 1-11 are published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108, respectively. The 12th, 13th, and 14th reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the 15th and 16th reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the 17th report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the 18th in the BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, in the BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 828; the 19th report in the BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 910; the 20th report in the BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 948; the 21st report in the BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 30; the 22d in the BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 155; the 23d and 24th reports in the BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1951, p. 265; the 25th report in the BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 303; the 26th report in the BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1951, p. 510; the 27th report in the BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1951, p. 709; the 28th and 29th reports in the BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1028; the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report in the BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; and the 34th report in the BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430.

ral teams, by joint teams selected by the Military Armistice Commission, or by the Military Armistice Commission itself.

"C. Neutral observer teams shall be located at such land, sea, and air ports of entry and communication centres as are mutually agreed to by both sides. These observer teams shall be permitted freedom of movement over principal lines of communication throughout all of Korea and each side shall afford these teams full assistance in the execution of the duties assigned them by the Armistice Commission. In addition, such periodic aerial reconnaissance and observation and photographic flights as are mutually agreed to by both sides will be performed by neutral teams.

"5. Neither side shall increase the level of military units, military personnel, war equipment, or war material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective. The rehabilitation, expansion, and improvement of existing airfields and aviation facilities and construction of new airfields and new aviation facilities shall not be permitted."

Toward the close of the period there were four basic points of disagreement concerning Agenda Item three:

A. No increase in present strength levels and equipment stocks versus no introduction of personnel and equipment under any pretext.

B. Rehabilitation of facilities, particularly airfields.

C. Status of offshore islands.

D. Relationship of neutral observer teams to Military Armistice Commission.

Item four consists of "arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war". From the 4th to the 10th of December the United Nations Command Delegation daily urged that a separate sub-Delegation be designated to discuss Item four. This proposal was made by the United Nations Command Delegation for the sole purpose of expediting the negotiations and in view of the humanitarian features of prisoner of war matters. Finally, on 11 December, after a week's time had been wasted, the Communists agreed to initiate discussions. At the outset of these discussions the United Nations Command made, and has made daily since then, two fundamental and logical proposals; namely, that information on prisoners of war be exchanged and that representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross be permitted to visit prisoner of war camps. Both of these reasonable and humanitarian proposals, designed to alleviate the suffering of prisoners and their families, were callously and summarily rejected by the Communists. The United Nations Command long ago agreed to observe the Geneva Convention relative to prisoners of war and has done so. Names of prisoners have been sent to the International Committee of the Red Cross. International Committee of the Red Cross representatives regularly visit United Nations Command prisoner of war camps. The enemy, in complete disregard of the custom and usage of civilized society, has refused up to period covered by this report to exchange information on prisoners.

There were few significant military developments and no major changes in troop dispositions along the line of contact during the period. Both sides continued routine reconnaissance patrolling. The enemy remained alert, and appeared determined to intercept all United Nations Command patrols. He also made numerous small scale probing attacks, all of which were promptly repulsed.

On the western front, extending northeastward about fifty miles from Hungwang to the vicinity of Chungdong, small, scattered patrol clashes occurred on the sector between Pungi and Kigong, to the west of Sangnyong, and to the south of Sagimak. Usually, upon establishing the presence of the enemy, the United Nations Command patrols returned to their bases after a short skirmish. During the period, the 39th Chinese Communist Forces Army relieved the 47th Chinese Communist Forces Army in the Sangnyong area, apparently in conformity to the

enemy's long established policy for the periodic relief of units on the line of contact.

Contacts were much more frequent and somewhat more intensive on the central and eastern fronts, and hostile small scale probing efforts were virtually continuous. The bulk of these skirmishes were concentrated in the vicinity of Kumsong on the central front, and in the vicinity of Mulguji, Sohui, and Cemyon on the eastern front. The enemy supported his forces with moderate volumes of artillery and mortar fire in all sectors.

There was evidence of continued improvement in the organization and development of hostile defences, but the enemy displayed little interest in offensive warfare. The volume of traffic sighted in the enemy rear areas, however, indicates a continued effort to maintain full combat capacity as regards logistic support; and the steady flow of hostile replacements to depleted units demonstrates the enemy intention to maintain a strong military potential in Korea.

Strong United Nations Command security elements scored significant successes against guerrillas during the current period. The bulk of the 7500 to 10,000 bandits and Communist dominated partisans operating in the Republic of Korea have long been concentrated in the more inaccessible mountain regions in the extreme southwest of the Korean peninsula. Although not a serious impediment to logistic or frontline military operations, these forces have constituted a serious problem to internal administration, and are extremely prejudicial to the maintenance of civil order. Because of a recent flare up in the activity of these bands, it was decided to launch a determined military effort to eliminate the guerrilla menace. Accordingly, strong Republic of Korea forces were deployed into southwestern Korea to seek out and destroy all dissident elements. To date, this effort has been very successful. From 1 to 12 December, 2500 were killed or captured. Increasing numbers of guerrillas are surrendering and the remainder have retreated farther into the mountains to avoid destruction.

Minor guerrilla groups were contacted occasionally in rear areas, in the vicinity of the front lines, near the east coast. The chief concern of these small bands has been to avoid United Nations Command security elements which were seeking them out. They have not constituted a menace to United Nations Command military operations.

The clear, cold weather of early December favored United Nations Command Naval forces in exerting increased pressure on the enemy. Up and down the length of the North Korean coasts the ships and planes of the fleet methodically and accurately chopped up enemy rail and highway routes with record quantities of high explosive missiles. Close support by Naval gunfire and air attack was also stepped up in highly effective blows at enemy personnel and weapons. The Communists resisted strongly with heavy return fire from their coast artillery and anti-aircraft batteries; and in a surprise night amphibious invasion they succeeded in driving off the Korean garrison to seize the island of Taewha-Do in the Bay of Korea. Several of their troop laden junks were sunk by the defending British destroyer *Cockade* which was itself slightly damaged by enemy gunfire. United Nations Command Marine Commandos retaliated with a series of harassing raids deep behind enemy lines near Songjin on the northeast Korean coast.

Naval aircraft reported several brushes with Communist jet fighters and thirteen MIG-15's were sighted over Wonsan. Blockading ships and aircraft sank or damaged numerous junks and sampans to deprive the enemy of sea-borne supplies. Heavy bombardments of North Korean coastal supply hubs were made at frequent intervals as United Nations Command Naval and Marine forces intensified their attacks throughout the period.

The tentative agreements on a cease fire line have had no effect on the United Nations Command air operation. Aircraft of Far East Air Forces and attached United Nations Command units continued to search out and destroy targets throughout North Korea. An aver-

age of 885 sorties per day were flown in the execution of this mission.

In close support, location and destruction of troublesome front line enemy artillery has been emphasized during daylight operations. More than 230 of these positions have been wiped out or heavily damaged in the past two weeks. At night B-29 medium bombers supported United Nations Command ground forces by attacking enemy positions and troop concentrations beyond the range of artillery.

The heavy impact of the rail interdiction programme is now more apparent. Along some sections of the open lines the cumulative damage caused by United Nations Command fighter bombers exceeds the recovery and repair capability of the enemy labour pool. In this respect the main line from Pyongyang south to Sariwon has been abandoned and the main West coast line from Sinanju to Sukchon is only occasionally serviceable. Some shuffle traffic is flowing south of Sinanju but numerous short hauls with multiple loading and unloading under cover of darkness are required in this operation. The important rail bridges at Sinanju, Songchon, and Sunehon were again knocked out by our night flying medium bombers.

Night intruder aircraft, aided by moonlight, have destroyed or damaged fifty locomotives in the past fifteen nights. Target of opportunity strikes by armed reconnaissance, interdiction, and night intruder aircraft are estimated to have accounted for 550 enemy troops killed, 1000 store houses destroyed and damaged, 560 rail cars destroyed and damaged, and 2550 vehicles destroyed as well as many other miscellaneous targets.

Enemy opposition to deep penetration by United Nations Command aircraft is increasing in intensity. In the area north and west of Pyongyang large numbers of MIG-15 fighters were seen by the United Nations Command pilots whenever the weather was favourable for flying. During the period, 2350 enemy jet aircraft were observed; United Nations Command fighters shot down twenty-nine and damaged at least twenty-eight more. The day of heaviest activity was 5 December when Far East Air Forces aircraft sighted 310 MIG-15's. Night flying aircraft were frequently intercepted and fired at by Communist night fighters, some of which were reported as jet types. Observed tactics indicated that ground controlled radar and searchlights were used in these interceptions. United Nations Command aircraft suffered no losses and very little damage from these attacks. Airdromes within North Korea have been slow to recover from the heavy bombing attacks delivered throughout November. These targets remained high on the priority list but required less effort to keep them in an unserviceable status. Throughout the period the only runway in North Korea which became temporarily serviceable for jet fighter operation was Uiju.

Aircraft of the Far East Air Forces Combat Cargo Command flew 3,060 sorties to transport 10,130 tons in support of the Korean operation. Included in this total were 42,700 passengers and 3,000 medical evacuees.

Enemy aircraft were detected over South Korea on four occasions. There were also two ineffective air attacks on friendly islands north of the bomb line.

United Nations Command leaflets, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasts devoted particular attention to rapid dissemination of news reports concerning discussion of Armistice Agenda Items three and four, and urged support for United Nations efforts to bring hostilities to an early conclusion. The significance of Communist delaying tactics, which consumed day after day in fruitless quibbling over irrelevant issues, was made clear to soldiers and civilians alike. Through United Nations Command media, the soldiers of the Communist Armies were forcefully reminded of the relentless increase in their casualty lists while the Communist Delegates prolong the war with persistent evasion of inquiries and refusal to clarify vague and ambiguous proposals.

Continued action is being taken by the United Nations Command to import supplies and equipment for relief purposes as well as for stimulation of Korean industry.

Power facilities and coal mines are being rehabilitated and placed in operation. Further, we are encouraging the Republic of Korea to take all steps possible toward self-rehabilitation and the establishment of a sound, viable economy.

General health conditions throughout South Korea are reported relatively good. No wide-spread outbreaks of respiratory diseases have been reported to date. The prospects of preventing impaired health due to lack of shelter appears good. The South Koreans have intensified construction of shelters from rough timber and mud. In many cases, tents have been provided and winterized. Warm floors are being constructed in tents and buildings from any material available and a great deal of ingenuity has been shown in improvising winter comforts. It is expected that these improvements together with houses being built with lumber supplied through the civil assistance programme will provide adequately for the majority of the needy population.

With the exception of a relatively large number of cases of dysentery reported from Kangwon-Do Province, the reported incidence of communicable diseases is quite low. Vaccines are being distributed according to schedule and the immunization programme is in full swing in all provinces under United Nations Command control with the exception of Cholla-Pukto.

For the period 25 June 1950 to 24 November 1951 the total estimated dollar value of supplies and equipment programmed under the United Nations Command programme for civilian relief and economic aid to Korea, exclusive of supplies delivered for common military and civilian use—bridges, rolling stock, road building equipment, and similar items—is \$187,673,578 of which supplies and equipment worth \$85,819,824 have been delivered. In this total is included \$168,140,631 programmed out of United States appropriated funds, of which \$69,428,425 worth of supplies and equipment has been delivered. Also included in the total are contributions from other United Nations members and voluntary relief agencies with an estimated dollar value of \$19,532,947, of which supplies worth an estimated \$16,319,399 have been delivered.

St. Lawrence Seaway Applications

[Released to the press March 4]

The Department of State announced on March 4 that a group of U.S. officials, headed by Jack Gorrie, Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, will go to Ottawa on March 6 for the purpose of making an exploratory examination of subjects relating to the references of applications to the International Joint Commission for approval of the St. Lawrence Project.

The U.S. officials are members of an inter-agency committee established to consider with the Canadian Interdepartmental Committee on the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project the steps to be taken in proceeding with the reference of applications to the Commission, in connection with the all-Canadian Seaway, should that be necessary. N. A. Robertson, Secretary to the Canadian Cabinet, is Chairman of the Canadian Committee.

The conferences were provided for in an exchange of notes on January 11, 1952, between Secretary Acheson and H. H. Wrong, Canadian Ambassador to the United States.¹

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1952, p. 234.

The United States in the United Nations

[March 15—March 27, 1952]

Security Council

The Disarmament Commission—At the March 19 meeting of the Disarmament Commission, the U.S. representative, Benjamin V. Cohen, spoke on the U.S. draft plan of work.

Mr. Malik (U.S.S.R.) accused the U.S. representative of slandering the U.S.S.R. as a means of concealing the U.S. Government's refusal to reduce armaments and prohibit the atomic weapon. He reiterated the proposals made by the Soviet Union during the sixth session of the General Assembly, and introduced a plan of work for the Commission embodying these proposals.

Mr. Malik concluded by once again accusing the United States of using bacteriological weapons and refusing to condemn this criminal method of warfare. He insisted that the Disarmament Commission must consider this question, condemn the users of such weapons, and call them to account.

At the March 20 meeting of the Disarmament Commission, the representatives of China, the Netherlands, Greece, and Turkey expressed their concern over, and disapproval of, the Soviet Union's tactics of diverting the Commission's attention from its work through introducing false charges that the United States had employed bacteriological warfare in Korea. Mr. Tsiang (China) pointed out that the Chinese Communists had killed many physicians and nurses and had forced many others to leave the country; that there was famine in China; consequently, that it was natural that there should be epidemics which affected not merely North Korea but other areas in China.

Mr. Kyrou (Greece) strongly supported the U.S. plan of work as objective, complete, and enabling any member of the Commission to raise any relevant point. He was sure that all the subjects in the U.S.S.R. plan fitted perfectly into the U.S. plan. He concluded by pointing out that the authority of the International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate charges of bacteriological warfare used by the Unified Command in Korea had been recognized by the Red Cross societies of Hungary, Rumania, Poland, and Bulgaria which had filed "indignant" protests with the International Committee.

Mr. Malik (U.S.S.R.) insisted that he had answered the U.S. representative's request that the Soviet Union exercise its good offices to bring about an impartial investigation of alleged bacteriological warfare use in Korea, through calling in the Disarmament Commission to study banning the use of bacteriological weapons and calling to account those who violated such ban.

Mr. Cohen (U.S.) and Mr. Moch (France) emphasized that Mr. Malik once again had refused to answer the question whether the U.S.S.R. would exercise its good offices to bring about Chinese Communist-North Korean acceptance of the International Committee of the Red Cross offer to investigate these charges. Mr. Moch regretted the Soviet representative's activities in making serious accusations without a shadow of proof.

On March 26 the representatives of Chile, the United Kingdom, Brazil, France, and Canada spoke to deplore the U.S.S.R.'s raising obvious false allegations of bacteriological warfare use in the Disarmament Commission, in accordance with the normal Communist technique of the "big lie" and to divert attention from epidemics which apparently existed in North Korea and North China.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.), after reminding the Commission that the failure of the potato crop in Czechoslovakia some time ago had led to an elaborate propaganda campaign that the United States had brought about such failure by dropping potato bugs from airplanes, hoped that Mr. Malik had completed reading out his instructions received from Moscow and would now come to the conclusion that he had done his duty and would allow the Commission to proceed with its proper work. As for the Soviet Union's plan of work, while it was agreed that Mr. Vyshinsky's proposals made in the Political Committee of the General Assembly's sixth session should be considered in the Commission, there was no reason for the Commission to commit itself in advance to accept these proposals by adopting the Soviet plan of work which in effect required such acceptance. If the Commission would take the Soviet plan of work as drafted, Mr. Malik would then say all members were committed in principle to accept the Soviet plan. If the Commission declined to walk into this trap, Mr. Malik would then say that the Com-

mission was refusing in advance even to consider the Soviet proposals and rejecting outright prohibiting atomic weapons or reducing armaments and armed forces. However, what the Commission might do would be to say whether some compromise might be arrived at between the Soviet Union plan of work and that submitted by the United States.

Mr. Teixeira Soares (Brazil) agreed with Sir Gladwyn Jebb's views regarding the Soviet work plan but supported the U.S. plan of work as enabling the Commission to consider all necessary questions without committing members to a predetermined course of action.

Mr. Moch (France) asked the representatives of the United States and the U.S.S.R. whether they would agree that the Commission should not vote on the two plans as a whole from the outset but take a first section only. He suggested that this first section should consist of fusing parts A and B of the U.S. plan of work, enabling simultaneous or alternate discussion of the question of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification and the question of methods of calculated and fixing overall limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments.

The Chairman, Mr. Johnson of Canada, accused the Soviet representative of introducing into the Disarmament Commission a false note which disappointed all who looked to the Commission for some positive and constructive results.

On March 26 the Disarmament Commission met both morning and afternoon. The Soviet representative accused the United States of attempting merely to collect information by stages, beginning with the least essential weapons, in order to prevent prohibition of atomic weapons and reduction of armaments as well as preventing disclosing information on atomic and other mass destruction weapons. He bitterly attacked the concept of disclosure by stages, and charged that the U.N. atomic energy control plan was designed to enable the "aggressive bloc" to interfere in the internal affairs and economic life of the U.S.S.R. and other states. Once more, Mr. Malik devoted the major portion of his speech to the Communist-propaganda charge of bacteriological warfare in Korea.

He stated that the International Committee of the Red Cross, was not an international organization but a Swiss national group which could not be expected to act objectively and impartially and that U.S. insistence that this Red Cross Committee investigate the bacteriological warfare charges was an attempt to prevent the Disarmament Commission, as a competent organ of the United Nations, from taking up the question.

Ambassador Cohen, speaking for the United States, said the Soviet representative had presented a wilderness of half-truths and total lies in which there was one central fact: The Soviet Union refused to assist the International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct an impartial investigation in the bacteriological warfare charges.

As for the work plan, the United States would have no objection to concurrent consideration of paragraphs A and B of the draft U.S. plan of work, as suggested the previous day by the French representative. However, Mr. Cohen hoped that the Commission could agree at the outset on a whole work plan so that it could see where the various proposals fitted in.

Mr. Moch (France) introduced a new draft plan, which he believed contained all the elements of the U.S.S.R. and U.S. plans in neutral form, hoping that the first two paragraphs could be discussed concurrently in the first stages of the Commission's work, either jointly, or alternately, by the Commission or simultaneously by its working committees. The French plan called for (1) disclosure and verification of all armaments and all armed forces; (2) regulation of all armaments and armed forces, including elimination of atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction and limitation and balanced reduction of all other armaments and armed forces, together with the controls necessary to insure these objectives; (3) the procedures and time-table for giving effect to the disarmament program.

The Soviet representative said he would study the French plan with care but believed that there did not seem to be much difference between this and the U.S. plan, and repeated that the Commission would only be able to carry out its obligations if it conducted its business on the basis of the Soviet plan.

Economic and Social Council

Subcommission on Freedom of Information and of the Press—The fifth and final session of the Subcommission ended on March 21. It recommended to the Economic and Social Council the continuance of a special U.N. body to deal with freedom of information questions. The terms of reference would be the same as the old subcommission but its membership would be altered to assure a truly professional membership of persons active in journalism, radio, or other information media.

Other actions by the Subcommission were the adoption of recommendations for agenda items dealing with freedom of information for future sessions of the Economic and Social Council; a condemnation of the infringement of the freedom of the press and information by the Argentine Government in closing of *La Prensa*; recommendations that Ecosoc open for signature the Convention on the International Transmission of News and the Right of Correction ("Newsgathering" Convention) and the Convention on Freedom of Information. It also requested UNESCO to continue its efforts to encourage the establishment of independent domestic information agencies and of an International Institute of the Press and Information on a universal basis and requested the General Assembly that it urge members to give the widest dissemination to U.N. resolutions.

Concern Expressed Over Trade Restrictions Of Defense Production Act

[Released to the press March 11]

Following is the text of a letter dated March 10, 1952, from Secretary Acheson to Senator Burnet R. Maybank, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee:

In view of the fact that your committee is now considering a bill to extend the Defense Production Act, it occurred to me that it might be useful to review the developments with regard to Section 104 of the Act which have taken place since the fall of 1951, when last the Department had an opportunity to testify on the subject. These developments have a particular bearing on your Committee's consideration of S. 2645 as proposed to be amended by Senator Ives, which would extend the terminal date of Section 104 from June 30, 1952 to June 30, 1954.

As you know, the Department of State was concerned from the very beginning over the effects which Section 104 was bound to have on the ability of friendly foreign countries to earn the dollars they need to put themselves on a self-supporting basis. It was foreseen that these restrictions would prevent them from earning considerable sums, running into the millions of dollars, and that they would be profoundly discouraged by this particular experience in any further efforts to build up their export industries. As we saw the problem then, we were simply putting these countries in a position in which they would need even more financial help to carry their share of the defense burden. We felt also that, in the end, the measures were bound to hurt our own exports of agricultural products as the affected countries acquired fewer dollars with which to buy our products.

We felt even greater concern at the broader implications of these restrictions. Section 104 requires the United States to take action contrary to the basic provisions of agreements under the Trade Agreements Act to which the United States is a party, and to take action contrary to the objectives of the Mutual Security Act. Apart from the immediate effects of the particular measure, inconsistencies of this sort tend to undermine the basis on which our position of leadership rests, by raising fundamental doubts in the minds of

the other countries of the free world as to our sense of responsibility and the nature of our goals.

The damage which these restrictions have done is aggravated by the fact that the provisions involved embody principles on which the United States has always put great store. These principles are aimed at developing the kind of trading system among the friendly countries of the world in which businessmen could buy and sell their goods with a minimum of governmental interference in their activities. This attitude towards quotas and other governmental restrictions on trade is essential if private enterprise is to maintain its place in the conduct of international trade.

It is against that general background that we have appraised the developments in the international field since last summer which have occurred as a result of Section 104. These developments have convinced me that the Department's original estimate of the effect of Section 104 on other countries, if it erred at all, erred in the direction of understatement. It is clear now that Canada and Western Europe have been profoundly disturbed by the implications of these restrictions. It is not so much the immediate dollar loss involved in these restrictions which concerns them, though that is serious enough for some of them. Much more important is the uncertainty which these measures have created, uncertainty as to the direction in which the United States proposes to move in the field of trade policy. Our friends in Europe and elsewhere, whether they produce cheese or not, have begun to wonder whether the imposition of these restrictions means that the United States proposes to revert to a policy of raising trade barriers, even though the policy may weaken the collective economic strength of the free world.

This deep concern on the part of Canada and Western Europe has been evident in a number of ways. Last October, at Geneva, nine Contracting Parties of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade formally protested against our restrictions under Section 104, charging this Government was acting inconsistently with its trade-agreement undertakings. The countries filing the complaint were The Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, New Zea-

Section 104 of Defense Production Act

"Sec. 104. Import controls of fats and oils (including oil-bearing materials, fatty acids, and soap and soap powder, but excluding petroleum and petroleum products and coconuts and coconut products), peanuts, butter, cheese and other dairy products, and rice and rice products are necessary for the protection of the essential security interests and economy of the United States in the existing emergency in international relations, and no imports of any such commodity or product shall be admitted to the United States until after June 30, 1952, which the Secretary of Agriculture determines would (a) impair or reduce the domestic production of any such commodity or product below present production levels, or below such higher levels as the Secretary of Agriculture may deem necessary in view of domestic and international conditions, or (b) interfere with the orderly domestic storing and marketing of any such commodity or product, or (c) result in any unnecessary burden or expenditures under any Government price support program. The President shall exercise the authority and powers conferred by this section."

land, Norway, Australia, France, Canada, and Finland. The filing of a complaint of this sort is not done lightly; it is a fairly important political step on the part of any government. In this case, the Contracting Parties concluded that our action was in fact inconsistent with the General Agreement. They went on to counsel the countries affected to withhold any offsetting actions on their part for the time being until it was clearer what steps the United States Government might take to rectify the situation.

There have been at least two developments since that meeting which are worth noting. The Dutch Government has announced that it is consulting with its partners in the Benelux Union, Belgium and Luxembourg, on increasing its duties against American goods, a step which it may eventually be compelled to take because of the reduction in the amount of dollars it has available to buy dollar goods. Meanwhile, the Italian Government has filed a long and carefully drafted memorandum with the Department decribng the cumulative effect of recent United States import measures upon the Italian economy.

I should like to quote two paragraphs from the Italian memorandum, since it sets out succinctly the nature of the concern which other countries have felt as a result of our cheese restrictions.

Finally, there are the political and psychological effects to be considered. These can hardly be overestimated. What is at stake is the vast store of good will and gratitude which exists in Italy and other friendly countries as a result of the generous post-war American aid, and of Marshall Plan aid in particular. For, most segments of Italian public opinion are altogether at a loss to understand how the vast amount of help poured into Italy during the past three years, with the express purpose of restoring the stability of both the domestic and the international economy of the nation, can be reconciled with the recent restrictions that have hit vital sectors of the Italian

economy. The very fact that these restrictions are but incidental and almost trivial within the over-all context of U. S. policies, is bound to intensify their adverse impact. This is because they appear to involve the mistaken idea that, while American policies are liberal and indeed generous at their over-all level, they acquire an altogether different connotation as soon as the protection of special interests is concerned.

This implication, no matter how unwarranted, plays directly into the hands of that vocal minority of opinion which is swayed by communist propaganda in Europe. As it is known, the communists noisily press their line that the Marshall Plan and other aid programs are not really meant to bring about the economic emancipation of Western Europe but to perpetuate their dependence on American bounty, and that American aid programs are calculated to find additional outlets for domestic production, while harring the door to foreign products. The result is that a state of confusion and doubt is generated in the minds of some people—which is sedulously exploited by the communist minority for its own ends—despite the constant emphasis of the Italian Government on the true facts.

Italy's sensitivity to the possibilities which these cheese restrictions have created for communist propaganda is due in part to the fact that Southern Italy has been particularly hard hit by the restrictions. As you know, the widespread poverty and unemployment in Southern Italy have created a fertile ground for communist agitators. Before Section 104 was enacted, one of the bright spots in the economy of Southern Italy was a growing export trade in cheese. Pecorino, romano, and other pungent cheeses of the area were coming to the United States in growing volume, giving employment to Southern Italy, and giving dollars to the Italian economy. Shortly after Section 104 put a halt to this development, we received reports out of Southern Italy that agents of the Soviet Government were ostentatiously making bids for various agricultural products of the same area, with obvious propaganda effect.

Of course, in any balanced appraisal of the desirability of Section 104, one has to take into account not only its effects upon our foreign policy objectives, but also upon our domestic agriculture. On this score, representatives of the Department of Agriculture have repeatedly stated their considered judgment that the measure hurts rather than helps American agriculture. They have also stated it as their conclusion that Section 104 is unnecessary for the protection of domestic agriculture, and, in the end, is bound to do it real injury. This Department is in agreement with these conclusions. Other provisions of the law, such as Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and the escape clauses of the Trade Agreements Act, provide the means whereby American agriculture can be protected in any individual cases of injury. Moreover, American agriculture relies heavily upon foreign markets for the sale of its products. In 1950, for example, American farmers sold 2.9 billion dollars of their products overseas, to foreign consumers they never saw and often never knew were their customers. On the other hand, American imports of agricultural

Allegations Regarding Infringements of Trade Union Rights Received Under Council Resolution 277 (X). Communication received from the World Federation of Trade Unions. E/2154, February 27, 1952. 7 pp. mimeo.

General Assembly

Question of South West Africa. Report of the Fourth Committee. A/2066, January 16, 1952. 16 pp. mimeo.
 Economic and Financial Provisions in Respect of Eritrea Arising Out of Paragraph 19 of Annex XIV of the Treaty of Peace With Italy. A/2077, January 24, 1952. 9 pp. mimeo.
 Report of the Economic and Social Council (Chapter II). Report of the Second Committee. A/2069, January 24, 1952. 13 pp. mimeo.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Mar. 17-22, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

No.	Date	Subject
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200	3/17	Program for Queen Juliana's visit (rewrite)
201	3/17	Inter-American radio agreement
202	3/18	Violation of press freedom in Rumania
†203	3/18	Commission on status of women
†204	3/18	Conference on fisheries
*205	3/19	Truman: "Our foreign policy, 1952"
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207	3/20	Question of financial aid to Iran
*208	3/20	L'Heureux: Naturalization
209	3/20	Public safety specialist to Germany (rewrite)
210	3/21	Round-the-clock broadcasting by RIAS
211	3/21	U.S. note to Poland on publications
211	3/21	Who assistance to N. Korea
213	3/21	Acheson: Japan peace treaty
214	3/21	Acheson: Saar question
215	3/22	Sebald: Japan, asset to free world
†216	3/21	Tewksbury: resignation (rewrite)
217	3/21	Drew: Director General of F.S. (rewrite)

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment of Officers

Gerald A. Drew as Director General of the Foreign Service, effective March 21.

Joseph B. Phillips as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, effective March 6.

Public Safety Specialist for Germany Named

The Department of State announced on March 20 that William J. Roach, Superintendent of Police, Waterbury, Conn., will participate in a public-safety project administered by the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany.

During this 3-month stay, Mr. Roach will work with German police forces, advising them on organization and administration. These German groups have requested assistance in the departments of criminal investigation and traffic control. To enable him to carry out this proposed assignment, he has been awarded a grant under the Department of State's exchange of persons program.

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